Contamination and Degradation of Safety-Related Battery CellsML031180527 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Issue date: |
02/22/1989 |
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From: |
Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
|
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References |
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IN-89-017, NUDOCS 8902150140 |
Download: ML031180527 (6) |
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Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Category:NRC Information Notice
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 February 22, 1989 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 89-17: CONTAMINATION AND DEGRADATION OF
SAFETY-RELATED BATTERY CELLS
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to reports of
contamination and degradation of safety-related battery cells. It is expected
that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facili- ties and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC require- ments; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
Several licensees for nuclear power plants have identified contamination and
degradation of safety-related battery cells that resulted In decreased station
battery voltages. This information notice details such discoveries at the Peach
Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 2; St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2; and the
Duane Arnold Energy Center.
Copper Contamination
On July 29, 1988, the Philadelphia Electric Company (PECo) reported to the NRC
pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21 that it had discovered copper contamination on the
negative plates of the station batteries at its Peach Bottom Atomic Power
Station, Unit 2. The station batteries at the Peach Bottom station are 125-volt
direct current (dc) Exide Corporation GN-23 batteries. Similarly in 1987, Florida Power & Light Co. (FP&L) personnel noted that approximately 97 out of
240 safety-related battery cells at the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, showed
signs of discoloration and copper contamination. The batteries at the St. Lucie
Plant are 125-volt C&D Power Systems, Inc., type LC-33.
The copper contamination at the Peach Bottom and St. Lucie plants was caused by
the battery electrolyte attacking the copper inserts in the cells' positive
terminal posts. The copper inserts improve the current-carrying capability of
the posts and are normally isolated from attack by the electrolyte by a lead
coating. According to Exide and C&D, the copper does not remain isolated from
7902150140
y-
-~ _
IN 89-17 February 22, 1989 electrolyte attack throughout the design life of the cell if improper alignment
or casting occurred at the time of manufacture. For example, gases caught in
the lead coating during the casting and freezing involved in the manufacturing
process may later develop into perforations that become a path between the
battery electrolyte and the copper inserts.
The battery electrolyte attacks all copper and cupric alloys, causing copper to
deposit on the negative plates of the affected cell. The first typical indica- tion of copper contamination is the discoloration, a pinkish-red color, of the
negative plates and straps, and as the contamination progresses, the discolora- tion works its way down the negative plates. This condition can quickly lead to
loss of battery capacity and serious deterioration.
At Peach Bottom, Unit 2, a total of 19 cells in four station batteries exhibited
copper contamination. PECo revised the Peach Bottom station battery surveil- lance tests to include checks for signs of discoloration on the negative plates
during testing of cell voltages and specific gravity.
FP&L, based on C&D recommendations, augmented its Technical Specification
surveillances for safety-related battery cells until replacement of all cells
showing signs of contamination was completed. The additional surveillances
included (1) weekly visual inspections of each cell to monitor the extent of
copper buildup on the negative plates; (2) weekly voltage monitoring and trending
of all cells exhibiting signs of copper contamination, including recording the
temperature, specific gravity, and electrolyte level of each of these monitored
cells; and (3) weekly monitoring and trending of battery terminal voltages.
Degradation
In late 1986, personnel at the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) observed
crumbling or eating away of the positive plates on 12 out of 120 cells in
the station battery. The degradation is believed to have been caused by a
galvanic reaction from impurities in the plate weld materials. The battery
cells are 250-volt dc GNB Batteries, Inc. (formerly Gould, Inc.), Model FPS-17.
The degradation consisted of crumbling or eating away of positive plates approx- imately 1 to 2 inches below the welded connection of the positive plate to the
cell's internal positive bus bar. According to DAEC personnel, the crumbling
appears to have originated at the edge of the plate and to have worked inward, thus reducing the plate-to-bus bar junction area. The GNB representative noted
that the severely degraded areas took on a brown appearance as opposed to the
normal flat black color. Sparkling was also noted when a light was shone on the
degraded areas, indicating sulfation. After the initial inspection, GNB deter- mined that 14 cells were significantly degraded.
The degradation at DAEC progressed rapidly after its discovery. In one in- stance, a cell noted to be 50 percent to 75 percent degraded was reexamined
less than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> later and was found disconnected from the bus bar. Although
the exact root cause of the degradation was not determined, it is believed that
impurities introduced into the plates during the welding process, combined with
aging, resulted in the galvanic reaction. GNB noted that high temperatures may
I &
IN 89-17 February 22, 1989 accelerate the degradation. DAEC indicated that the degraded cells
in the upper tier of the two tier-rack, approximately 2 feet higher were located
cells in the lower rack. In addition, the ventilation in the batterythan the
may not have been sufficient and may have contributed to the degradation cell room
rate.
DAEC augmented its battery cell inspections after the initial degradation
identified to include daily visual inspections of degraded cells was
and biweekly
inspections of non-degraded cells. Periodic cleaning of all the
nals also was incorporated into the preventive maintenance program. battery termi- Discussion:
Station batteries provide a reliable source of dc current for many
related functions. Degradation and contamination, as described safety- above, can
render the station batteries incapable of delivering sufficient capacity
perform these functions. In most instances, normal battery surveillance to
grams including total battery voltage, individual cell voltage, electrolyte pro- specific gravity, level and temperature, and visual inspections, indicators of the overall physical condition of a battery and are are the best
identifying cell degradation or contamination. In cases in which capable of
degradation or
contamination occur, the battery vendor plays an important role
appropriate recommendations and in determining the root cause of in providing the
a problem.
Once degradation or contamination is identified, an augmented
program may be necessary to monitor the battery condition and surveillance
replacement of cells may be needed. to estimate when
Adaitional guidance on battery surveillance requirements is provided
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standards in the
1980, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing and 540-1975 and
Replacement of
Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations."
No specific actions or written response is required by this information
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the notice.
technical
contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate
office. regional
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Jaime Guillen, NRR
(301) 492-1170
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
IN 89-17 February 22, 1989 accelerate the degradation. DAEC indicated that the degraded cells were located
in the upper tier of the two tier-rack, approximately 2 feet higher than the
cells in the lower rack. In addition, the ventilation in the battery cell room
may not have been sufficient and may have contributed to the degradation rate.
DAEC augmented its battery cell inspections after the initial degradation was
identified to Include daily visual inspections of degraded cells and biweekly
inspections of non-degraded cells. Periodic cleaning of all the battery termi- nals also was incorporated into the preventive maintenance program.
Discussion:
Station batteries provide a reliable source of dc current for many safety- related functions. Degradation and contamination, as described above, can
render the station batteries incapable of delivering sufficient capacity to
perform these functions. In most instances, normal battery surveillance pro- grams including total battery voltage, individual cell voltage, electrolyte
specific gravity, level and temperature, and visual Inspections, are the best
indicators of the overall physical condition of a battery and are capable of
identifying cell degradation or contamination. In cases in which degradation or
contamination occur, the battery vendor plays an important role in providing the
appropriate recommendations and in determining the root cause of a problem.
Once degradation or contamination is identified, an augmented surveillance
program may be necessary to monitor the battery condition and to estimate when
replacement of cells may be needed.
Additional guidance on battery surveillance requirements is provided in the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standards 540-1975 and
1980, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing and Replacement of
Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations."
No specific actions or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional
office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Jaime Guillen, NRR
(301) 492-1170
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Draft information notice on this subject was transmitted by Jacque Durr, Region I to C. H. Berlinger by mejorandum dated September 20, 1989.
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES 27~TJQ B ~f] *C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR *PPI'1B:ARM
LCE!ois17' CHBerlinger TeclhEd
02//5_9 / 02/09/89 Ol/:26/89
- OGCB: DOEA: NRR *SELB: DEST: NRtR *C/SELB:DE T:NRR *AD/DEST:NRR *D/I DEST:NRR
JGuillen JKnight FRosa AThadani LCSI hao
01/31/89 02/06/89 02/06/89 02/06/89 02/: 12/89
IN 89-XX
February xx, 1989 accelerate the degradation. DAEC indicated that the degraded cells were located
in the upper tier of the two tier-rack, approximately 2 feet higher than the
cells In the lower rack. In addition, the ventilation in the battery cell room
may not have been sufficient and may have contributed to the degradation rate.
DAEC augmented its battery cell inspections after the initial degradation was
identified to include daily visual inspections of degraded cells and biweekly
inspections of non-degraded cells. Periodic cleaning of all the battery termi- nals also was incorporated into the preventive maintenance program.
Discussion:
Station batteries provide a reliable source of dc current for many safety- related functions. Degradation and contamination, as described above, can
render the station batteries incapable of delivering sufficient capacity to
perform these functions. In most instances, normal battery surveillance pro- grams including total battery voltage, individual cell voltage, electrolyte
specific gravity, level and temperature, and visual inspections, are the best
indicators of the overall physical condition of a battery and are capable of
identifying cell degradation or contamination. In cases in which degradation or
contamination occur, the battery vendor plays an important role in providing the
appropriate recommendations and in determining the root cause of a problem.
Once degradation or contamination is identified, an augmented surveillance
program may be necessary to monitor the battery condition and to estimate when
replacement of cells may be needed.
Additional guidance on battery surveillance requirements is provided in the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standards 540-1975 and
1980, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing and Replacement of
Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations."
No specific actions or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional
office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Jaime Guillen, NRR
(301) 492-1170
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Draft information notice on this subject was transmitted by Jacque Durr, Region I to C. H. Berlinger by.memorandum dated September 20, 1989.
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES D/DOEA:NRR *C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR *PPIMB: ARM
CERossi CHBerlinger Tec hEd
02/ /89 02/09/89 01/
- OGCB: DOEA: NRR *SELB: DEST: NI
IR*C/SELB:DEST:NRR *AD/DEST:NRR D/D
JGuillen JKnight FRosa AThadani LCSI ao
01/31/89 02/06/89 02/06/89 02/06/89 02/ (p89
IN 89-XX
February xx, 1989 accelerate the degradation. DAEC indicated that the degraded cells were located
in the upper tier of the two tier-rack, approximately 2 feet higher than the
cells in the lower rack. In addition, the ventilation in the battery cell room
may not have been sufficient and may have contributed to the degradation rate.
DAEC augmented its battery cell inspections after the initial degradation was
identified to include daily visual inspections of degraded cells and biweekly
inspections of non-degraded cells. Periodic cleaning of all the battery termi- nals also was incorporated into the preventive maintenance program.
Discussion:
Station batteries provide a reliable source of dc current for many safety- related functions. Degradation and contamination, as described above, can
render the station batteries incapable of delivering sufficient capacity to
perform these functions. In most instances, normal battery surveillance pro- grams including total battery voltage, individual cell voltage, electrolyte
specific gravity, level and temperature, and visual inspections, are the best
indicators of the overall physical condition of a battery and are capable of
identifying cell degradation or contamination. However, once degradation or
contamination is identified, an augmented surveillance program is necessary to
monitor the battery's condition and to estimate the time before replacement of
cells Is required. In such cases, the battery vendor plays an important role in
providing the appropriate recommendations and the possible root cause of a
problem.
Additional guidance on battery surveillance requirements is provided in the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standards 540-1975 and
1980, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing and Replacement of
Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations."
No specific actions or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional
office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Jaime Guillen, NRR
(301) 492-1170
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Draft information notice on this subject was transmitted by Jacque Durr, Region I to C. H. Berlinger by memorandum dated September 20, 1989.,
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES D/DOEA:NRR C/OG20189 14-NRR
CERossi CHBerlinger 0
02/ /89 / 02/ lC
OGC SELB:DEST:NRFZ C/SELB:9g3 NRR AD/DEST:1 *PPB:ARM Sn
JGu 1I i JKnight 4it FRosa ATh dani ' Techfd
021b /89 01/7.I/89
01/ w ffi 02/b/89 02/6 /89
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list | - Information Notice 1989-01, Valve Body Erosion (4 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-02, Criminal Prosecution of Licensee'S Former President for Intentional Safety Violations (9 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-03, Potential Electrical Equipment Problems (11 January 1989, Topic: Overexposure)
- Information Notice 1989-04, Potential Problems from the Use of Space Heaters (17 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-05, Use of Deadly Force by Guards Protecting Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage (19 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-06, Bent Anchor Bolts in Boiling Water Reactor Torus Supports (24 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-07, Failures of Small-Diameter Tubing in Control Air, Fuel Oil & Lube Oil Systems Render Emergency Diesel Generators Inoperable (25 January 1989, Topic: Overspeed)
- Information Notice 1989-08, Pump Damage Caused by Low-Flow Operation (26 January 1989, Topic: Integrated leak rate test)
- Information Notice 1989-09, Credit for Control Rods Without Scram Capability in the Calculation of Shutdown Margin (26 January 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin)
- Information Notice 1989-10, Undetected Installation Errors in Main Steam Line Pipe Tunnel Differential Temperature-Sensing Elements at Boiling Water Reactors (27 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-11, Failure of DC Motor-Operated Valves to Develop Rated Torque Because of Improper Cable Sizing (2 February 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin)
- Information Notice 1989-12, Dose Calibrator Quality Control (9 February 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-13, Alternative Waste Management Procedures in Case of Denial of Access to Low-Level Waste Disposal Sites (8 February 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin, Authorized possession limits)
- Information Notice 1989-15, Second Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Failure at Crystal River (16 February 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin)
- Information Notice 1989-16, Excessive Voltage Drop in DC Systems (16 February 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin, Battery sizing)
- Information Notice 1989-17, Contamination and Degradation of Safety-Related Battery Cells (22 February 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-18, Criminal Prosecution of Wrongdoing Committed by Suppliers of Nuclear Products or Services (24 August 1990, Topic: Stress corrosion cracking)
- Information Notice 1989-20, Weld Failures in a Pump of Byron-Jackson Design (24 February 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-21, Changes in Performance Characteristics of Molded-Case Circuit Breakers (27 February 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-23, Environmental Qualification of Litton-Veam Cir Series Electrical Connectors (3 March 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-24, Nuclear Criticality Safety (6 March 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-25, Unauthorized Transfer of Ownership or Control of Licensed Activities (7 March 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-26, Instrument Air Supply to Safety-Related Equipment (7 March 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-27, Limitations on the Use of Waste Forms and High Integrity Containers for the Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste (8 March 1989, Topic: Process Control Program)
- Information Notice 1989-28, Weight and Center of Gravity Discrepancies for Copes-Vulcan Air-Operated Valves (14 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-29, Potential Failure of Asea Brown Boveri Circuit Breakers During Seismic Event (15 March 1989, Topic: Commercial Grade)
- Information Notice 1989-30, High Temperature Environments at Nuclear Power Plants (1 November 1990, Topic: Stress corrosion cracking)
- Information Notice 1989-31, Swelling and Cracking of Hafnium Control Rods (22 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-32, Surveillance Testing of Low-Temperature Overpressure-Protection Systems (23 March 1989, Topic: Stroke time)
- Information Notice 1989-33, Potential Failure of Westinghouse Steam Generator Tube Mechanical Plugs (23 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-34, Disposal of Americium Well-Logging Sources (30 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-35, Loss & Theft of Unsecured Licensed Material, Attachment 1 to NRC Information Notice 1990-014: Accidental Disposal of Radioactive Materials. (Also includes Attachments 2 & 3) (30 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-35, Loss & Theft of Unsecured Licensed Material, Attachment 1 to NRC Information Notice 1990-014: Accidental Disposal of Radioactive Materials. (Also Includes Attachments 2 & 3) (30 March 1989, Topic: Moisture-Density Gauge, Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1989-36, Excessive Temperatures in Emergency Core Cooling System Piping Located Outside Containment (4 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-37, Proposed Amendments to 40 CFR Part 61, Air Emission Standards for Radionuclides (4 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-38, Atmospheric Dump Valve Failures at Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3 (5 April 1989, Topic: Emergency Lighting)
- Information Notice 1989-39, List of Parties Excluded from Federal Procurement or Non-Procurement Programs (5 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-40, Unsatisfactory Operator Test Results and Their Effect on the Requalification Program (14 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-41, Operator Response to Pressurization of Low-Pressure Interfacing Systems (20 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-42, Failure of Rosemount Models 1153 and 1154 Transmitters (21 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-43, Permanent Deformation of Torque Switch Helical Springs in Limitorque SMA-Type Motor Operators (1 May 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-44, Hydrogen Storage on the Roof of the Control Room (27 April 1989, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-45, Metalclad, Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breakers Refurbished with Substandard Parts (8 May 1989, Topic: Commercial Grade Dedication, Coatings, Commercial Grade)
- Information Notice 1989-46, Confidentiality of Exercise Scenarios (11 May 1989, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-47, Potential Problems with Worn or Distorted Hose Clamps on Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (18 May 1989, Topic: Coatings, Fatality)
- Information Notice 1989-48, Design Deficiency in the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Cooling Water Systems (22 May 1989, Topic: Coatings, Temporary Modification)
- Information Notice 1989-49, Failure to Close Service Water Cross-Connect Isolation Valves (22 May 1989, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-50, Inadequate Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Supply (30 May 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-51, Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin During Refueling Operations (31 May 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin, Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-52, Potential Fire Damper Operational Problems (8 June 1989, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Shutdown Margin, Fire Barrier, Fire Protection Program)
... further results |
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