Failures of Small-Diameter Tubing in Control Air, Fuel Oil & Lube Oil Systems Render Emergency Diesel Generators InoperableML031180501 |
Person / Time |
---|
Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
---|
Issue date: |
01/25/1989 |
---|
From: |
Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
---|
To: |
|
---|
References |
---|
IN-89-007, NUDOCS 8901180357 |
Download: ML031180501 (7) |
|
Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
---|
Category:NRC Information Notice
MONTHYEARInformation Notice 2020-02, Flex Diesel Generator Operational Challenges2020-09-15015 September 2020 Flex Diesel Generator Operational Challenges ML20225A0322020-09-0303 September 2020 NRC Choice Letter to NAC International with Attached Safety Inspection Report, IR 0721015/2020201, February 24-27, 2020 and July 22, 2020, Inspection of NAC International in Norcross, Georgia Information Notice 2012-09, PWROG-16043-NP-A, Revision 2, PWROG Program to Address NRC Information Notice 2012-09: Irradiation Effects on Fuel Assembly Spacer Grid Crush Strength for Westinghouse and CE PWR Fuel Designs.2019-11-30030 November 2019 PWROG-16043-NP-A, Revision 2, PWROG Program to Address NRC Information Notice 2012-09: Irradiation Effects on Fuel Assembly Spacer Grid Crush Strength for Westinghouse and CE PWR Fuel Designs. Information Notice 2011-20, NRC060 - NRC Information Notice 2011-20: Concrete Degradation by Alkali-Silica Reaction (Nov. 18, 2011)2019-07-24024 July 2019 NRC060 - NRC Information Notice 2011-20: Concrete Degradation by Alkali-Silica Reaction (Nov. 18, 2011) ML19196A2452019-07-15015 July 2019 Public Notice - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 - Exigent Amendment to Facility Operating License Information Notice 2019-01, Inadequate Evaluation of Temporary Alterations2019-03-12012 March 2019 Inadequate Evaluation of Temporary Alterations ML16028A3082016-04-27027 April 2016 NRC Information Notice; IN 2016-05: Operating Experience Regarding Complications From a Loss of Instrumentation Air Information Notice 2015-05, Inoperability of Auxiliary and Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits on Loss of Main Feedwater Pumps2015-05-12012 May 2015 Inoperability of Auxiliary and Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits on Loss of Main Feedwater Pumps Information Notice 2015-05, Inoperability Of Auxiliary And Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits On Loss Of Main Feedwater Pumps2015-05-12012 May 2015 Inoperability Of Auxiliary And Emergency Feedwater Auto Start Circuits On Loss Of Main Feedwater Pumps Information Notice 2013-20, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143)2013-10-0303 October 2013 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143) Information Notice 2013-20, Official Exhibit - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143)2013-10-0303 October 2013 Official Exhibit - NYS000538-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-20: Steam Generator Channel Head and Tubesheet Degradation (October 3, 2013) (ML13204A143) Information Notice 2013-11, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013)2013-07-0303 July 2013 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013) Information Notice 2013-11, Official Exhibit - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013)2013-07-0303 July 2013 Official Exhibit - NYS000551-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2013-11: Crack-Like Indication at Dents/Dings and in the Freespan Region of Thermally Treated Alloy 600 Steam Generator Tubes (July 3, 2013) Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Contain2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Con2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend And/Or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notic2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend And/Or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-11, Age Related Capacitor Degradation2012-07-23023 July 2012 Age Related Capacitor Degradation ML12031A0132012-02-0606 February 2012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Investigation Report No. 2-2010-058, Cpn International, Inc Information Notice 2011-19, Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components2011-09-26026 September 2011 Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components Information Notice 2011-15, Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues2011-08-0101 August 2011 Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues Information Notice 2011-17, Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping2011-07-26026 July 2011 Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-04, IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-262010-12-21021 December 2010 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 ML13066A1872009-12-16016 December 2009 Draft NRC Information Notice 2009-xx - Underestimate of Dam Failure Frequency Used in Probabilistic Risk Assessments ML1007804482009-11-23023 November 2009 Email from Peter Bamford, NRR to Pamela Cowan, Exelon on TMI Contamination Control Event Information Notice 2009-11, NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-112009-07-0707 July 2009 NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-11 Information Notice 2009-10, Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10)2009-07-0707 July 2009 Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10) Information Notice 2009-09, Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify2009-06-19019 June 2009 Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify Information Notice 2008-12, Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation2008-07-0707 July 2008 Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation Information Notice 2008-11, Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 12008-06-18018 June 2008 Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 1 Information Notice 2008-04, Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants2008-04-0707 April 2008 Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants Information Notice 1991-09, Counterfeiting of Crane Valves2007-09-25025 September 2007 Counterfeiting of Crane Valves Information Notice 2007-28, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls2007-09-19019 September 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls Information Notice 2007-29, Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment2007-09-17017 September 2007 Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment Information Notice 2007-14, Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station2007-03-30030 March 2007 Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station Information Notice 2007-06, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems2007-02-0909 February 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Information Notice 2007-05, Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures2007-02-0909 February 2007 Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures Information Notice 2006-31, Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers2006-12-26026 December 2006 Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-13, E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination2006-07-13013 July 2006 E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 January 25, 1989 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 89-07: FAILURES OF SMALL-DIAMETER TUBING IN
CONTROL AIR, FUEL OIL, AND LUBE OIL
SYSTEMS WHICH RENDER EMERGENCY DIESEL
GENERATORS INOPERABLE
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to events in- volving breaks or cracking of small-diameter tubing which can render emergency
diesel generators (EDGs) inoperable. Failures apparently caused by vibration
have occurred in the tubing of the instrumentation and control air system as
well as in the fuel oil and lube oil systems of EDGs. These events have sig- nificant safety implications because of the loss of, or the potential loss of, ability of safety-related equipment to perform its intended safety function.
It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability
to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar
problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not
constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response
is required.
Description of Circumstances
Cooper Nuclear Station
During an operability surveillance test of an emergency diesel generator on
October 21, 1988, at Cooper Station (Nebraska Public Power District), a loss
of control air pressure occurred and the 'Turbo Bearing Wear' annunciator
alarmed. The control air system is a subsystem of the starting air system.
The starting air goes through two pressure-reducing valves, set at 80 psi and
30 psi, respectively, to supply 30 psi control air. The control air subsystem
maintains the engine at a set speed regardless of engine load and protects the
engine from abnormal conditions through protective trip functions. During
engine operation the control air supplies 80 psi air to hold the fuel racks in
position. If control air is shut off or-if any of the diesel generator trips
occur, the 80 psi air flow to the fuel shutoff cylinder is stopped, dumping the
fuel racks and tripping the EDG.
8901180357 ZAr
- -IN 89-07 January 25, 1989 After the overspeed shutdown relay and the valve associated with maintaining
a constant air pressure for the various EDG protective trip mechanisms
rebuilt, the control air pressure still could not be sustained. were
Subsequently, the licensee identified a circumferential crack in a i-inch stainless
instrument line during a walkdown inspection of the control air system.steel
cracked line allowed the 30 psi control air to bleed off, reducing pressure The
the safety trip valve solenoid which shut down the EDG. Approximately on
of the line was removed and replaced with a compression fitting. The 1 inch
restarted, and the test was successfully completed. EDG was
Nebraska Public Power District forwarded the cracked piece of stainless
tubing to a testing laboratory for analysis to determine the cause of steel
failure. At this time, engine vibration is assumed to be the cause the
failure. The licensee has introduced design changes to relocate all of the
engine- mounted instruments subject to high vibration from the engine onto instrument
racks. The modifications are scheduled for the next refueling outage.
Similar events in the instrumentation and control air system previously
curred at Cooper Station in both 1975 and 1981. These problems were oc- thought
to have been resolved by replacement of the original copper tubing
less steel tubing. The EDGs at Cooper Station were manufactured by with stain- Energy Systems of Cooper Industries (so-called Cooper-Bessemer EDGs).Cooper
Wolf Creek Generating Station
A break in the fuel oil line of an EDG at Wolf Creek Generating Station
resulted in a fire on November 27, 1988. A fuel oil leak emanated from
a compression fitting on a 1-inch surge tank line. The leak quickly
creased from a drip to a spray over approximately 45 minutes. Since in- leak appeared to be between the nut and the ferrule and was believed the
to
be correctable with the unit in service, and because the EDG was undergoing
a 24-hour endurance test, operations personnel did not shut down the
EDG.
When the attending personnel discovered that the leak had increased signifi- cantly, they notified the shift supervisor, and, consequently, the EDG
secured by a control room operator. As the load was reduced, the attending was
personnel noted flames, reported the fire to control room and security
nel, and actuated the fire alarm. Within about 3 minutes from the time person- attending personnel first noticed the fire, the fire was out. the
Severe fretting on a horizontal section of the damaged i-inch fuel line
was
observed when the section was removed for repair. The fretting apparently
was caused by vibration-induced rubbing against the larger line to which
fuel line was attached. The broken line also appeared to have been the
broken and repaired in the same place. At that time, the fuel line previously
had been
shortened, which could have introduced additional stresses at the location
the new break. A post-event walkdown inspection of the EDG revealed of
further
evidence of inadequate support and fretting of other small fluid lines.
Previously, on December 4, 1986, a similar event occurred at Wolf Creek
involved the same fuel line on one of the other EDGs, also during a 24-hour that
IN 89-07
__ January 25, 1989 endurance test. In this instance, the leak through the wall of the i-inch
fuel line was caused by fretting similar to that observed on the fuel line
that failed in the event previously described. In addition, a number of other
problems have occurred involving small-diameter fluid lines on the EDGs as a
result of vibration. In January 1985, two fuel oil leaks resulted from holes
rubbed in a section of J-inch steel tubing. In February 1985, sections of both
the control air system and the fuel oil lines failed to meet minimum wall thick- ness requirements because of wear from vibration. In December 1987, a cracked
lube oil line fitting caused the EDG to shut down after 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> of a 24-hour
endurance test. The Wolf Creek EDGs were manufactured by Colt-Pielstick/Colt
Industries.
Discussion:
These events indicate that small-diameter tubing installed on EDGs is suscepti- ble to vibration-induced failures which could render the EDGs inoperable. The
vibration-induced failures may appear as cracking or breaks as well as holes
and wall thinning caused by rubbing of components that contact. These failures
are not limited Just to specific manufacturers, systems, or materials. The
common underlying cause of the failures is the inadequate design or installa- tion of the supports for the small-diameter tubing in a vibration environment.
As the potential unavailability of an EDG has such a significant impact on
reactor safety, addressees may wish to review the small-diameter tubing of
the Instrumentation and control air system as well as the tubing of the fuel
oil and lube oil systems of their EDGs. It is important to determine whether
vibration can introduce cracks or breaks and whether these failures could lead
to inoperability of the EDGs.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the techni- cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate
regional office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: G. L. Constable, RIV
(817) 860-8151 J. P. Jankovich, NRR
(301) 492-1167 W. C. Seidle, RIV
(817) 860-8148 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
IN 89-07 January 25, 1989 endurance test. In this instance, the leak through the wall of the i-inch
fuel line was caused by fretting similar to that observed on the fuel line
that failed in the event previously described. In addition, a number of other
problems have occurred involving small-diameter fluid lines on the EDGs as a
result of vibration. In January 1985, two fuel oil leaks resulted from holes
rubbed in a section of i-inch steel tubing. In February 1985, sections of both
the control air system and the fuel oil lines failed to meet minimum wall thick- ness requirements because of wear from vibration. In December 1987, a cracked
lube oil line fitting caused the EDG to shut down after 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> of a 24-hour
endurance test. The Wolf Creek EDGs were manufactured by Colt-Pielstick/Colt
Industries.
Discussion:
These events indicate that small-diameter tubing installed on EDGs is suscepti- ble to vibration-induced failures which could render the EDGs inoperable. The
vibration-induced failures may appear as cracking or breaks as well as holes
and wall thinning caused by rubbing of components that contact. These failures
are not limited just to specific manufacturers, systems, or materials. The
common underlying cause of the failures is the inadequate design or installa- tion of the supports for the small-diameter tubing in a vibration environment.
As the potential unavailability of an EDG has such a significant impact on
reactor safety, addressees may wish to review the small-diameter tubing of
the instrumentation and control air system as well as the tubing of the fuel -
oil and lube oil systems of their EDGs. It is important to determine whether
vibration can introduce cracks or breaks and whether these failures could lead, to inoperability of the EDGs.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter,.,please contact one of the..techni- cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate
regional office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: G. L. Constable, RIV
(817) 860-8151 J. P. Jankovich, NRR
(301) 492-1167 W. C. Seidle, RIV
(817) 860-8148 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES D
01// ^89
- OGCB:DOEA:NRR *RIV *RIV *RPB:ARM *C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
JJJankovich GLConstable WSeidle TechEd CHBerlinger
12/29/88 12/29/88 01/09/89 01/12/89 01/05/89
IN 89-XX
January xx, 1989 endurance test. In that instance, the leak through the wall of the 1i-nch fuel
line was caused by fretting similar to that observed on the fuel line which
failed in the event described above. In addition, a number of other problems
have occurred involving small diameter fluid lines on the EDGs as a result of
vibration. In January 1985 two fuel oil leaks resulted from holes rubbed in a
section of i-inch steel tubing. In February 1985, sections of both the control
air system and the fuel oil lines failed to meet minimum wall thickness require- ments because of wear due to vibration. In December 1987 a cracked lube oil
line fitting caused the EDG to shut down after 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> into a 24-hour endurance
test. The Wolf Creek EDGs were manufactured by Colt-Pielstick/Colt Industries.
Discussion:
These events indicate that small diameter tubing installed on EDGs is suscepti- ble to vibration induced failures which could render the EDGs inoperable. The
vibration induced failures may appear as cracking or breaks as well as holes
and wall thinning due to rubbing of components which contact each other. These
failures are not limited just to specific manufacturers, systems, or materials.
The common underlying cause of the failures is the inadequate design or instal- lation of the supports for the small diameter tubing in a vibration environment.
Since the potential for unavailability of an EDG has such a significant impact
on reactor safety, all licensees are encouraged to review th small diameter
tubing of the instrumentation and control air system as well as the tubing of
the fuel oil and lube oil systems of their EDGs. The licensees are encouraged
to determine whether vibration can introduce cracks or breaks and whether these
failures could lead to inoperability of the EDGs, and to consider actions, as
appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the techni- cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate
regional office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: G. L. Constable, RIV
(817) 860-8151 J. P. Jankovich, NRR
(301) 492-1167 W. C. Seidle, RIV
(817) 860-8148 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
D/DOEA:NRR
CERossi
01/ /89
- OGCB:DOEA:NRR RIV RIV4g r P&M C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
JJJankovich GLConstable WSeifte TechEd CHBerlinger
12/29/88 12/ /88 12/, /88 12-/--te&- 01/ /89 be¢~qjb z /Y7
IN 89-XX
January xx, 1989 endurance test. In that instance, the leak through the wall of the i-inch fuel
line was caused by fretting similar to that observed on the fuel line which
failed in the event described above. In addition, a number of other problems
have occurred involving small diameter fluid lines on the EDGs as a result of
vibration. In January 1985 two fuel oil leaks resulted from holes rubbed in a
i-inch steel tubing. In February 1985 both the control air system and the fuel
oil lines failed to meet minimum wall thickness requirements because of wear
due to vibration. In December 1987 a cracked lube oil line fitting caused the
EDG to shut down after 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> into a 24-hour endurance test. The Wolf Creek
EDGs were manufactured by Colt-Pielstick/Colt Industries.
Discussion:
These events indicate that small diameter tubing installed on EDGs is suscepti- ble to vibration induced failures which could render the EDGs inoperable. The
vibration induced failures may appear as cracking or breaks as well as holes
and wall thinning due to rubbing of components which contact each other. These
failures are widespread and are not limited just to certain manufacturers, to
specific systems, or to certain materials. The common underlying cause of the
failures is the inadequate design or installation of the supports for the small
diameter tubing in a vibration environment.
Since the potential for unavailability of an EDG has such a significant impact
on reactor safety, all licensees are encouraged to review the small diameter
tubing of the instrumentation and control air system as well as the tubing of
the fuel oil and lube oil systems of their EDGs. The licensees are encouraged
to determine whether vibration can introduce cracks or breaks and whether these
failures could lead to inoperability of the EDGs, and to consider actions, as
appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the techni- cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate
regional office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: G. L. Constable, RIV
(817) 860-8151 J. P. Jankovich, NRR
(301) 492-1167 W. C. Seidle, RIV
(817) 860-8148 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- Transmitted by dated D________
D/DOEA:NRR
CERossiAi g
pg 0/ /g~
- OGCB:DOEA:NRR RIV r RIV6 RPB: ARM C/OGCB: RD
JJJankovich GLContle WSe e TechE Lv CHBerlinger
12/29/88 Adfi - /;z rv Hi/// i 01/ -/89 Lvt
IN 88-XX
December xx, 1988 endurance test. In that instance, the leak through the wall of the 1-inch fuel
line, was also caused by fretting similar to that observed on the fuel line
which failed in the event described above. In addition a number of other
problems have occurred involving small diameter fluid lines on the EDGs as a
result of vibration. In January 1985 two fuel oil leaks resulted from holes
rubbed in a i-inch steel tubing. In February 1985 both the control air system
and the fuel oil lines failed to meet minimum wall thickness requirements
because of wear due to vibration. In December 1987 a cracked lube oil line
fitting caused the EDG to shut down after 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> into a 24-hour endurance
test. The Wolf Creek EDGs were manufactured by Colt-Pielstick/Colt Industries.
Discussion:
These events indicate that small diameter tubing installed on EDGs is suscepti- ble to vibration induced failures which could render the EDGs inoperable. The
vibration induced failures may appear as cracking or breaks as well as holes
and wall thinning due to rubbing of components which contact each other. These
failures are widespread and are not limited Just to certain manufacturers, to
specific systems, or to certain materials. The common underlying cause of the
failures is the inadequate design or installation-of the supports for the small
diameter tubing in a vibration environment.
Since the potential of unavailability of an EDG has such a significant impact
on reactor safety, all licensees are encouraged to review the small diameter
tubing of the instrumentation and control air system as well as. the tubing.of
the fuel oil and lube oil systems of their EDGs. The licensees are encouraged
to determine whether vibration can introduce cracks or breaks and whether these
failures could lead to inoperability of the EDGs, and to consider actions, as
appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the techni- cal contacts listed below or the Regional, Administrator of the appropriate
regional office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: G. L. Constable, RIV
(817) 860-8151 J. P. Jankovich, NRR
(301) 492-1167 W. C. Seidle, RIV
(817) 860-8148 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
D/DOEA:NRR
CERossi
12/ /88 OGCB:DOEA:NRR RIV RIV RPB:ARM C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
JJJankoviathl GLConstable WSeidle TechEd CHBerlinger
12/60/88Td 12/ /88 12/ /88 12/ /88 12/ /88
|
---|
|
list | - Information Notice 1989-01, Valve Body Erosion (4 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-02, Criminal Prosecution of Licensee'S Former President for Intentional Safety Violations (9 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-03, Potential Electrical Equipment Problems (11 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-04, Potential Problems from the Use of Space Heaters (17 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-05, Use of Deadly Force by Guards Protecting Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage (19 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-06, Bent Anchor Bolts in Boiling Water Reactor Torus Supports (24 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-07, Failures of Small-Diameter Tubing in Control Air, Fuel Oil & Lube Oil Systems Render Emergency Diesel Generators Inoperable (25 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-08, Pump Damage Caused by Low-Flow Operation (26 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-09, Credit for Control Rods Without Scram Capability in the Calculation of Shutdown Margin (26 January 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin)
- Information Notice 1989-10, Undetected Installation Errors in Main Steam Line Pipe Tunnel Differential Temperature-Sensing Elements at Boiling Water Reactors (27 January 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-11, Failure of DC Motor-Operated Valves to Develop Rated Torque Because of Improper Cable Sizing (2 February 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin)
- Information Notice 1989-12, Dose Calibrator Quality Control (9 February 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-13, Alternative Waste Management Procedures in Case of Denial of Access to Low-Level Waste Disposal Sites (8 February 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin, Authorized possession limits)
- Information Notice 1989-15, Second Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Failure at Crystal River (16 February 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin)
- Information Notice 1989-16, Excessive Voltage Drop in DC Systems (16 February 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin, Battery sizing)
- Information Notice 1989-17, Contamination and Degradation of Safety-Related Battery Cells (22 February 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-18, Criminal Prosecution of Wrongdoing Committed by Suppliers of Nuclear Products or Services (24 August 1990)
- Information Notice 1989-20, Weld Failures in a Pump of Byron-Jackson Design (24 February 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-21, Changes in Performance Characteristics of Molded-Case Circuit Breakers (27 February 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-23, Environmental Qualification of Litton-Veam Cir Series Electrical Connectors (3 March 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-24, Nuclear Criticality Safety (6 March 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-25, Unauthorized Transfer of Ownership or Control of Licensed Activities (7 March 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-26, Instrument Air Supply to Safety-Related Equipment (7 March 1989, Topic: Health Physics Network)
- Information Notice 1989-27, Limitations on the Use of Waste Forms and High Integrity Containers for the Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste (8 March 1989, Topic: Process Control Program)
- Information Notice 1989-28, Weight and Center of Gravity Discrepancies for Copes-Vulcan Air-Operated Valves (14 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-29, Potential Failure of Asea Brown Boveri Circuit Breakers During Seismic Event (15 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-30, High Temperature Environments at Nuclear Power Plants (1 November 1990)
- Information Notice 1989-31, Swelling and Cracking of Hafnium Control Rods (22 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-32, Surveillance Testing of Low-Temperature Overpressure-Protection Systems (23 March 1989, Topic: Stroke time)
- Information Notice 1989-33, Potential Failure of Westinghouse Steam Generator Tube Mechanical Plugs (23 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-34, Disposal of Americium Well-Logging Sources (30 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-35, Loss & Theft of Unsecured Licensed Material, Attachment 1 to NRC Information Notice 1990-014: Accidental Disposal of Radioactive Materials. (Also includes Attachments 2 & 3) (30 March 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-35, Loss & Theft of Unsecured Licensed Material, Attachment 1 to NRC Information Notice 1990-014: Accidental Disposal of Radioactive Materials. (Also Includes Attachments 2 & 3) (30 March 1989, Topic: Moisture-Density Gauge)
- Information Notice 1989-36, Excessive Temperatures in Emergency Core Cooling System Piping Located Outside Containment (4 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-37, Proposed Amendments to 40 CFR Part 61, Air Emission Standards for Radionuclides (4 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-38, Atmospheric Dump Valve Failures at Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3 (5 April 1989, Topic: Emergency Lighting)
- Information Notice 1989-39, List of Parties Excluded from Federal Procurement or Non-Procurement Programs (5 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-40, Unsatisfactory Operator Test Results and Their Effect on the Requalification Program (14 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-41, Operator Response to Pressurization of Low-Pressure Interfacing Systems (20 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-42, Failure of Rosemount Models 1153 and 1154 Transmitters (21 April 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-43, Permanent Deformation of Torque Switch Helical Springs in Limitorque SMA-Type Motor Operators (1 May 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-44, Hydrogen Storage on the Roof of the Control Room (27 April 1989, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-45, Metalclad, Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breakers Refurbished with Substandard Parts (8 May 1989, Topic: Commercial Grade Dedication, Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-46, Confidentiality of Exercise Scenarios (11 May 1989, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-47, Potential Problems with Worn or Distorted Hose Clamps on Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (18 May 1989, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-48, Design Deficiency in the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Cooling Water Systems (22 May 1989, Topic: Coatings, Temporary Modification)
- Information Notice 1989-49, Failure to Close Service Water Cross-Connect Isolation Valves (22 May 1989, Topic: Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-50, Inadequate Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Supply (30 May 1989)
- Information Notice 1989-51, Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin During Refueling Operations (31 May 1989, Topic: Shutdown Margin, Coatings)
- Information Notice 1989-52, Potential Fire Damper Operational Problems (8 June 1989, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Shutdown Margin, Fire Barrier, Fire Protection Program)
... further results |
---|