ML15005A085

McGuire, Units 1 and 2, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task F

ML15005A085
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	12/17/2014
From:	Capps S D Duke Energy Carolinas
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
MNS-14-097
Download: ML15005A085 (64)

Text

Steven D. Capps Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station'ENERGY, Duke Energy MG01VP 1 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078 o: 980.875.4805 f: 980.875.4809 Steven.Capps@duke-energy.com 10 CFR 50.54(f)December 17, 2014 Serial: MNS-14-097 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy)McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17

Subject:

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

References:

1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12053A340.

2. NEI Letter, Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations, dated April 9, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13101A379.

3. NRC Letter, Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report XXXXXX, Seismic Evaluation Guidance:

Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations, dated May 7, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13106A331.

4. Duke Letter, Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 20, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML14098A421.

Ac'o kj&L United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 17, 2014 Page 2 On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference 1 to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. Enclosure 1 of Reference 1 requested each addressee located in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) to submit a Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report within 1.5 years from the date of Reference 1.The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted Reference 2 requesting NRC agreement to delay submittal of the CEUS Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report so that an update to the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) ground motion attenuation model could be completed and used to develop that information.

NEI proposed that descriptions of subsurface materials and properties and base case velocity profiles be submitted to the NRC by September 12, 2013, with the remaining seismic hazard and screening information submitted by March 31, 2014. The industry guidance was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated February 15, 2013 (Reference 3).Reference 1 requested that licensees provide interim evaluations and actions taken or planned to address the higher seismic hazard relative to the design basis, as appropriate, prior to completion of the risk evaluation.

In accordance with the NRC endorsed guidance in Reference 3, the attached ESEP Report for MNS Units 1 and 2 provides the information described in Section 7 of Reference 3 in accordance with the schedule identified in Reference 2.There are no new regulatory commitments associated with this letter.Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact George Murphy at 980-875-5715.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on December 17, 2014.Sincerely, Steven D. Capps

Enclosure:

MNS Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 17, 2014 Page 3 xc: V.M. McCree, Region II Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Avenue NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257 John Boska, Project manager (NRR/JLD/JOMB)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mailstop 13 F15 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 G. E. Miller, Project Manager (CNS & MNS)U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop 8 G9A Rockville, MD 20852-2738 J. Zeiler NRC Senior Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station Justin Folkwein American Nuclear Insurers 95 Glastonbury Blvd., Suite 300 Glastonbury, CT 06033-4453 Enclosure MNS Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT December 03, 2014 Revision 0 Duke Energy McGuire Nuclear Station Page 1 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 PURPO SE AND O BJECTIVE ...............................................................................................

4 2.0 BRIEF

SUMMARY

OF THE FLEX SEISMIC IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES

......................

4 3.0 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PROCESS AND ESEL ..................................................................

6 3.1 Equipm ent Selection Process and ESEL ...................................................................

6 3.1.1 ESEL D evelopm ent ..............................................................................................

7 3.1.2 Pow er-O perated Valves ......................................................................................

8 3.1.3 Pull Boxes .....................................................................................................

....8 3.1.4 Term ination Cabinets ...........................................................................................

8 3.1.5 Critical Instrum entation Indicators

......................................................................

8 3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections

...........................................................

9 3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX Im plem entatio n .....................................................................................................

..9 4.0 GROUND MOTION RESPONSE SPECTRUM (GMRS) ........................................................

9 4.1 Plot of GM RS Subm itted by the Licensee .................................................................

9 4.2 Comparison to Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) ....................................................

11 5.0 REVIEW LEVEL GROUND MOTION (RLGM) ...................................................................

13 5.1 Description of RLGM Selected .................................................................................

13 5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS) ....................................

15 6.0 SEISMIC MARGIN EVALUATION APPROACH .................................................................

15 6.1 Sum m ary of M ethodologies Used ..........................................................................

16 6.2 HCLPF Screening Process ........................................................................................

17 6.3 HCLPF Capacity Determ ination ...............................................................................

18 6.4 Functional Capacity Screening Using EPRI NP-6041-SL

..........................................

18 6.5 Seism ic W alkdow n Approach ................................................................................

19 6.5.1 W alkdow n Approach .......................................................................................

19 6.5.2 W alkdow ns and W alk-Bys .................................................................................

20 6.5.3 Significant W alkdow n Findings ........................................................................

21 6.6 HCLPF Calculation Process ......................................................................................

21 6.7 Functional Evaluations of Relays ............................................................................

21 6.8 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes) ................................

24 7.0 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS, ADDITIONAL ITEMS ASSOCIATED WITH FLEX STRATEGY CHANGES AND NEW COMPONENT INSTALLATION

.....................................................

24 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns

.....................................

24 7.2 Identification of Additional ESEL Items Associated with FLEX Strategy Changes and New FLEX Component Installations

.................................................

24 7.3 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out ...........................................

24 8.0 ESEP CONCLUSIONS AND RESULTS ...............................................................................

25 Page 2 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 8.1 Supporting Inform ation ..........................................................................................

25 8.2 Identification of Planned M odifications

.................................................................

26 8.3 Schedule for Completion of Required Modifications and Remaining ESEL Com ponent W alkdow ns/Evaluations

......................................................................

26 8.4 Summary of Regulatory Commitments

.................................................................

27 9 .0 R E FE R EN C ES ......................................................................................................................

2 8 APPENDICES APPENDIX A MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results APPENDIX B MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results APPENDIX C MNS FLEX Flow Paths FIGURES Figure 4-1. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) -Tabular Format [4] ....................................................

10 Figure 4-2. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) -Graphical Format [4] ...............................................

11 Figure 4-3. MNS SSE (5% Damping) -Graphical Format ..........................................................

12 Figure 4-4. Comparison of MNS GMRS and SSE (5% Damping) ...............................................

12 Figure 5-1. M NS RLGM (5% Dam ping) ......................................................................................

15 Figure 6-1. Comparison of MNS RLGM vs. IPEEE RLE ..............................................................

17 TABLES Table 4-1. MNS SSE (5% Damping) -Tabular Format [4] ........................................................

11 Table 5-1. Ratio of the GMRS to the SSE (1 to 10 Hz Range, 5% Damping) .............................

13 Table 5-2. M NS RLGM (5% Dam ping) .......................................................................................

14 Table 6-1. Unit 1 Components that Require Modifications

....................................................

22 Table 6-2. Unit 2 Components that Require Modifications

....................................................

23 Table 8-1. Summary of Committed Follow-up Actions .............................................................

27 Page 3 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 1.0 Purpose and Objective Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena.

Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f)letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance.

Depending on the comparison between the reevaluated seismic hazard and the current design basis, further risk assessment may be required.

Assessment approaches acceptable to the staff include a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA), or a seismic margin assessment (SMA). Based upon the assessment results, the NRC staff will determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary.

This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken for McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS). The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1] to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic [2].The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the interim evaluations.

2.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies The MNS FLEX strategies for Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal, Reactor Inventory Control/Long-Term Subcriticality, and Containment Function are summarized below.This summary is derived from the MNS Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049

[3] (as supplemented by subsequent six-month updates [20], [21], and [22]), and Duke Energy MNS Calculation MCC-1612.00-00-0012, Augmented Approach for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic -Determine Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL) [18].Simplified flow diagrams which depict the FLEX strategy flow paths are included in Appendix C.Page 4 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Steam Generator (SG) heat removal is achieved during Phase 1 and 2 via the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (TDAFWP) with suction from buried Condenser Circulating Water (RC) system cross-over header (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-i). Later stages of Phase 2 and 3 strategy entails SG cooling water make-up via a portable diesel powered pump with suction from the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) and discharge aligned to new SG FLEX supply connections.

Refer to Appendix C, Figures C-2, C-4, C-5, and C-6 for FLEX connection locations.

The TDAFWP flow control valves and Main Steam (SM) Power-Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) are also required to provide SG heat-removal capability (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-3). The Phase 2 SG heat removal is achieved via the credited B.5.b connection (primary) or via the new FLEX mechanical connections located in the Auxiliary Building (AB) doghouses (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-6). The FLEX strategy with steam generators unavailable (i.e., refueling outage) relies on reactor coolant system feed and bleed for Phase land 2. The ESEL was populated with the components credited for Phase 1, 2 and 3 mitigation.

Reactor coolant system borated make-up during normal operation and outage conditions includes the following primary make-up connections: " High pressure primary make-up via the Safety Injection System (NI) mechanical connection near 1/2NI-152B (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-4)." Low pressure primary make-up via the Residual Heat Removal (ND) system mechanical connection upstream of 1/2ND-35 (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-5)." Borated water suction source FW system mechanical connection (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-2).Reactor coolant system inventory control relies upon FLEX pump make-up as accommodated by reactor coolant system shrink, passive reactor coolant pump seal leakage, and additional letdown capability via reactor vessel head-vents.

The reactor coolant pump seal return outboard containment isolation valve is manually isolated to conserve inventory and maintain leak-off flow within the Reactor Building.

To ensure SG continued heat removal capability, the cold-leg accumulator (CLA) block isolation valves are electrically closed during the cooldown to prevent Nitrogen injection into the reactor coolant system.There are no required Phase 1 FLEX actions to maintain containment integrity.

The primary Phase 2 FLEX strategy for containment integrity entails repowering one train of Hydrogen igniters.

Phase 2 and/or 3 entails repowering of select compartment fans inside of containment.

Later in the Extended Loss of all AC Power (ELAP) event, the Residual Heat Removal (ND)system must be aligned to maintain containment temperature.

This action is accomplished by powering a train of ND and Component Cooling (KC) pumps with a portable generator from the Regional Response Center (RRC). For ND and KC system heat removal, a portable diesel powered FLEX pump is interfaced with the Nuclear Service Water (RN) system to provide a heat sink from the Standby Nuclear Service Page 5 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Water Pond (SNSWP). The portable pump is connected via the bonnet of an RN pump discharge check valve. Cross-train KC and RN isolation valves are credited with manual closure, in order to minimize components exposed to the credited FLEX flow path pressure boundary.

Similarly, manual isolation of RN heat-exchangers not required for the FLEX strategy is credited where possible (e.g., Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water (KD) heat-exchangers, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) starting air compressor, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (MDAFWP) motor coolers, etc.).Necessary attendant electrical components are outlined in the MNS FLEX OIP submittal

[3], as supplemented by subsequent six-month regulatory updates [20], [21], and [22], and primarily entail 600 VAC essential motor control centers, vital batteries, equipment installed to support FLEX electrical connections, and monitoring instrumentation required for core cooling, reactor coolant inventory, and containment integrity.

During the latter stages of Phase 3, the 4.16 kV switchgear is energized to support residual heat removal (RHR) operation.

3.0 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The complete ESELs for Unit 1 and Unit 2 are presented in Appendices A and B, respectively.

The selection of equipment for the ESEL followed the guidelines of EPRI 3002000704

[2].3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installed plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase 1, 2 and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE), as outlined in the MNS OIP in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049

[3], as supplemented by subsequent six-month updates [20], [21], and [22]. The OIP and subsequent updates provides the MNS FLEX mitigation strategy and serves as the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP.The scope of "installed plant equipment" includes equipment relied upon for the FLEX strategies to sustain the critical functions of core cooling and containment integrity consistent with the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [20], [21], and [22]. FLEX recovery actions are excluded from the ESEP scope per EPRI 3002000704

[2]. The overall list of planned FLEX modifications and the scope for consideration herein is limited to those required to support core cooling, reactor coolant inventory and subcriticality, and containment integrity functions.

Portable and pre-staged FLEX equipment (not permanently installed) are excluded from the ESEL per EPRI 3002000704

[2].The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2 of EPRI 3002000704.

1. The scope of components is limited to that required to accomplish the core cooling and containment safety functions identified in Table 3-2 of EPRI 3002000704.

The instrumentation monitoring requirements for core Page 6 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 cooling/containment safety functions are limited to those outlined in the EPRI 3002000704 guidance, and are a subset of those outlined in the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [20], [21], and [22].2. The scope of components is limited to installed plant equipment and FLEX connections necessary to implement the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [20], [21], and [22] as described in Section 2.3. The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path (i.e., either "Primary" or "Back-up/Alternate").

4. The "Primary" FLEX success path is to be specified.

Selection of the"Back-up/Alternate" FLEX success path must be justified.

5. Phase 3 coping strategies are included in the ESEP scope, whereas recovery strategies are excluded.6. Structures, systems, and components (SSCs) excluded per the EPRI 3002000704

[2] guidance are: " Structures (e.g., containment, Rx Building, Control Building, AB, etc.)* Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports.* Manual valves and rupture disks." Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies." Nuclear steam supply system components (e.g., reactor pressure vessel and internals, reactor coolant pumps and seals, etc.)7. For cases in which neither train was specified as a primary or back-up strategy, then only one train component (generally

'A' train) is included in the ESEL.3.1.1 ESEL Development The ESEL was developed by reviewing the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates[20], [21], and [22] to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEX strategies.

Further reviews of plant drawings (e.g., Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and Electrical One Line Diagrams) were performed to identify the boundaries of the flow paths to be used in the FLEX strategies and to identify specific components in the flow paths needed to support implementation of the FLEX strategies.

Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanical isolation device (e.g., isolation amplifier, valve, etc.) in branch circuits / branch lines off the defined strategy electrical or fluid flow path. P&IDs were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components and instrumentation.

The flow paths used for FLEX strategies were selected and specific components were identified using detailed equipment and instrument drawings, piping isometrics, electrical schematics and one-line drawings, system descriptions, design basis documents, etc.Page 7 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 3.1.2 Power-Operated Valves Page 3-3 of EPRI 3002000704

[2] notes that power-operated valves not required to change state are excluded from the ESEL. Page 3-2 also notes that"... functional failure modes of electrical and mechanical portions of the installed Phase 1 equipment should be considered (e.g., RCIC/AFW trips)." To address this concern, the following guidance is applied in the MNS ESEL for functional failure modes associated with power-operated valves: " Powered-operated valves that remain energized during the ELAP events (such as DC-powered valves) were included on the ESEL, with the exception of various air-operated valves which fail to the required position as a result of the ELAP event." Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies were not included on the ESEL. The seismic event also causes the ELAP event; therefore, the valves are incapable of spurious operation as they would be de-energized.

• Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies during Phase 1, and re-energized and operated during subsequent Phase 2 and 3 strategies, were not evaluated for spurious valve operation as the seismic event that caused the ELAP has passed before the valves are re-powered.

3.1.3 Pull Boxes Pull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these components provide completely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks or connections in the cabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were considered part of conduit and cabling, which are excluded in accordance with EPRI 3002000704

[2].3.1.4 Termination Cabinets Termination cabinets, including cabinets necessary for FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections, provide consolidated locations for permanently connecting multiple cables. The termination cabinets and the internal connections provide a completely passive function; however, the cabinets are included in the ESEL to ensure industry knowledge on panel/anchorage failure vulnerabilities is addressed.

3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators Critical indicators and recorders are typically physically located on panels/cabinets and are included as separate components; however, seismic evaluation of the instrument indication may be included in the panel/cabinet seismic evaluation (rule-of-the-box).

Page 8 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections Item 2 in Section 3.1 above notes that the scope of equipment in the ESEL includes "... FLEX connections necessary to implement the MNS alP [3] and subsequent updates [20], [21], and [22] as described in Section 2." Item 3 in Section 3.1 also notes that "The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path (i.e., either 'Primary' or 'Back-up/Alternate')." Item 6 in Section 3 above goes on to explain that "Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports ..." are excluded from the ESEL scope in accordance with EPRI 3002000704

[2].Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation.

However, any active valves in FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connection flow path are included in the ESEL.3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX Implementation The ESEL only uses equipment that is the primary means of implementing FLEX strategy.4.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS)4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee The MNS GMRS used to select the ESEP Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM)was included in the MNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. Digitized GMRS frequency and acceleration values from the MNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4] are shown in Figure 4-1, which is Table 2.4-1 from [4]. The MNS GMRS is plotted in Figure 4-2.Page 9 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Table 2.4-1 UHRS and GMRS at control point for McGuire (5% of critical damping respo nse spectra)Freq (Hz) 1E-4 UHRS (g) 1E-5 UHRS (g) GMRS (g)100 1.92E-01 6.48E-01 3.05E-01 90 1.95E-01 6.60E-01 3.1OE-01 80 2.01E-01 6,86E-01 3.22E-01 70 2.16E-01 7.50E-01 3.51E-01 60 2.56E-01 9.10E-01 4.24E-01 50 3.37E-01 1.22E+00 5.65E-01 40 4.03E-01 1.44E+00 6.70E-01 35 411E-01 1.45E+00 6.76E-01 30 4.06E-01 1.41E+00 6.60E-01 25 3.93E-01 1.34E+00 6.29E-01 20 3.84E-01 1.28E+00 6.03E-01 15 3.65E-01 1.18E+00 5.59E-01 12.5 3.49E-01 1.11E+00 5.28E-01 10 326E-01 1.02E+00 4.86E-01 9 3.09E-01 9.50E-01 4.55E-01 8 2.90E-01 8.75E-01 4.21E-01 7 2.68E-01 7.96E-01 3.84E-01 6 2.45E-01 7.11E-01 3.44E-01 5 2.17E-01 6.16E-01 3.OOE-01 4 1-80E-01 4.91E-01 2.41E-01 3.5 1-59E-01 4.24E-01 2.09E-01 3 1.37E-01 3.58E-01 1.77E-01 2.5 1.14E-01 2.88E-01 1.43E-01 2 1.05E-01 2.58E-01 1.29E-01 1.5 8.66E-02 2.06E-01 1.04E-01 1.25 7-49E-02 1.75E-01 8.86E-02 1 6.47E-02 1.47E-01 7.49E-02 0.9 6-25E-02 1.42E-01 7.24E-02 0.8 6.05E-02 1.38E-01 7.00E-02 0.7 5.77E-02 1.31E-01 6.69E-02 0.6 5.35E-02 1.22E-01 6.20E-02 0.5 4-70E-02 1.07E-01 5.44E-02 0.4 3.76E-02 8.55E-02 4.35E-02 0.35 3.29E-02 7.48E-02 3.81E-02 0.3 2.82E-02 6.41E-02 3.26E-02 0.25 2.35E-02 5.35E-02 2.72E-02 0.2 1.88E-02 4.28E-02 2.18E-02 0.15 1-41E-02 3.21E-02 1.63E-02 0.125 1.17E-02 2.67E-02 1.36E-02 0.1 9.39E-03 2.14E-02 1.09E-02 Figure 4-1. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) -Tabular Format [4].Page 10 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS GMRS 0.8 ----- .....0.6 -0 .4 --- -------II- GMRS~0.3 .0.2....J..

0 .0 .------- ...0.1 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)Figure 4-2. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) -Graphical Format [4].The MNS Control Point is located at Elevation 716'-6", which is at the base of the mat foundation of the Reactor Buildings.

4.2 Comparison to Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)A description of the MNS horizontal SSE and spectral shape is included in Section 3.1 of the MNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. The SSE is tabulated as a function of frequency in Table 4-1 and plotted in Figure 4-3.A comparison of the MNS GMRS plotted against the SSE is shown in Figure 4-4.Table 4-1. MNS SSE (5% Damping) -Tabular Format [4].Frequency (Hz) Spectral Acceleration (g)0.33 0.06 2 0.36 6 0.36 35/PGA 0.15 Page 11 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS SSE 5% Damping 0.40 --- --0.35 ....0.30 :.0.2 0.20 0. ..'w 0. 15 SS 0.10 --4 .-., ----A 0.05 0.1 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)Figure 4-3. MNS SSE (5% Damping) -Graphical Format.MNS GMRS vs SSE 0.6 -----------

~0.4 SS w 0.3~~ --------7 0. -GMRS 0.1 0.0 --~.- ------- --0.1 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)Figure 4-4. Comparison of MNS GMRS and SSE (5% Damping).Page 12 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 5.0 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM)5.1 Description of RLGM Selected The procedure for determining the RLGM for the ESEP is described in Section 4 of EPRI 3002000704

[2]. The RLGM is determined by multiplying the spectral acceleration values for the 5%-damped SSE horizontal ground response spectrum by a scale factor. The scale factor is the largest ratio of spectral accelerations between the 5%-damped GMRS and the 5%-damped SSE ground response spectrum at frequencies from 1 Hz to 10 Hz, but not to exceed 2.0.The ratio of the GMRS to the SSE over the 1 to 10 Hz frequency range is shown in Table 5-1. The largest ratio of the GMRS to the SSE in the 1 to 10 Hz range is at 10 Hz. The ratio of the spectral accelerations is 1.74. The RLGM is determined by multiplying the SSE ground response spectrum by 1.74. Digitized RLGM frequency and acceleration values are shown in Table 5-2. The MNS RLGM is plotted in Figure 5-1.Table 5-1. Ratio of the GMRS to the SSE (1 to 10 Hz Range, 5% Damping)Frequency SSE GMRS Ratio (Hz) (g) (g) GMRS/SSE S _1 0.180 0.075 -2 0.360 0.129 0.358_3- 0.360 0.177 0.492 .4 0.360 0.241 0.669 I 5 -0.360 , 0.300 0.833 6 I 0.360 0.344 0.956 L ~ 0.3332L 0.384 1.151 I 8 _0.421 1.349.9 _ _ 0-.294 0455.10 0.279 0 0.486 1.740 .Page 13 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Table 5-2. MNS RLGM (5% Damping)

IAcceleration

[ _(Hz) 1 ._(g). .-0.333 0.0104 1 I _0.313 S 2 0.626-3 _j _.626 Fiii-2.1 il 4 _0.626 5 0.626....................

2i o8i 2 I 10 _ _0._486 j .11 0.464 t.12_. 0.444.2 13 0.427.14 0.411 15 0.397 17.5 0.368 20 0.345 22.5 0.325 25 0.308.. 27.5 0_2:94 I 30 I 0.282 35 .0.261-100 0.261i Page 14 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 0 MNS RLGM 0.7 r 0.6F 0.5 j-0O.4 ------ -~ --- ..* 0. ----"------~--

-RLGM 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)Figure 5-1. MVNS RLGM (5% Damping).5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS)ISRS for the ESEP were estimated by scaling the MNS design-basis SSE ISRS by the RLGM scale factor of 1.74.6.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach It is necessary to demonstrate that ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meet or exceed the demand characterized by the RLGM. The seismic capacity is characterized as the peak ground acceleration (PGA) for which there is a high confidence of a low probability of failure (HCLPF). The PGA is associated with a specific spectral shape, in this case the 5%-damped RLGM spectral shape. The HCLPF capacity must be equal to or greater than the RLGM PGA. The criteria for seismic capacity determination are given in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704

[2].There are two basic approaches for developing HCLPF capacities:

1. Deterministic approach using the conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM)methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin (Revision

1) [7].2. Probabilistic approach using the fragility analysis methodology of EPRI TR-103959, Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities

[8].Page 15 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used Seismic capacity screening was done using information from the MNS Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) submittal

[9] and supporting documentation (MCC 1535.00-00-0004, Seismic PRA/IPEEE Backup Calculations

[19]).MNS used a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA) to address the IPEEE.The SPRA is described in the IPEEE submittal.

Prior to the IPEEE, Duke Energy had performed a SPRA for MNS. The SPRA utilized fragilities calculated in 1981-1983 using the separation of variables methodology, which is one of the methods in EPRI TR-103959

[8]. The calculated fragilities were based on the MNS SSE spectral shape. The IPEEE submittal states that these fragilities were updated where needed based on plant walkdowns and used in the IPEEE SPRA. The fragility calculations are documented in Volumes 4 and 5 of MCC 1535.00-00-0004.

Table 3-1 of the IPEEE submittal gives the fragilities used in the IPEEE SPRA. Equipment items listed in the IPEEE Equipment List, contained in Attachment 24 of MCC 1535.00-00-0004, that were not included as fragilities in the SPRA had been screened out on the basis of the median capacity being greater than 2.0g.The equipment fragilities were based on plant design information, including equipment qualification test and analysis reports. Failure modes considered were functional failures, including relay chatter, and anchorage failure. The original anchorage capacities were updated as needed based on the SMA walkdowns described below. Seismic interactions were addressed by the SMA walkdowns.

Duke Energy also performed a SMA in 1993. The SMA is documented in Volumes 1 and 2 of MCC 1535.00-00-0004

[19]. The SMA consisted of screening walkdowns and anchorage calculations.

The screening walkdowns used the screening tables from Chapter 2 of EPRI NP-6041-SL

[7]. The walkdowns were conducted by engineers trained in EPRI NP-6041-SL (the engineers attended the EPRI SMA Add-On course in addition to the Seismic Qualification Users Group Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course), and were documented on Screening Evaluation Work Sheets from EPRI NP-6041-SL.

Anchorage capacity calculations utilized the CDFM criteria from EPRI NP-6041-SL.

Seismic demand was the IPEEE Review Level Earthquake (RLE) for SMA (mean NUREG/CR-0098

[11] ground response spectrum anchored to 0.3g PGA). A relay review, beyond searching for low-ruggedness relays, was not included in the SMA.Figure 6-1 shows the mean NUREG/CR-0098 ground response spectrum used as the RILE for the SMA, compared to the RLGM response spectrum.

It is seen that the RLE envelopes the RLGM at all frequencies greater than about 2.0 Hz. The RLE is slightly less than the RLIGM at frequencies below about 2.0 Hz. This may be disregarded as there are no MNS SSCs in this frequency range.Page 16 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS RLGM vs IPEEE RLE 0 .7 -. --- ----- -0.6 50.4 0.3 RLGMV U -IPEEE RLE 0.2 0.0 L--0.1 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)Figure 6-1. Comparison of MNS RLGM vs. IPEEE RLE.6.2 HCLPF Screening Process The SMA was based on the RLE, which was anchored to 0.3g PGA. The RLE is equal to the RLGM at frequencies from about 2.0 Hz to about 6.0 Hz, and greater than the RLGM at frequencies above about 6.0 Hz. Therefore, any components whose SMA-based HCLPF exceeds the RLE can be screened out from HCLPF calculations.

The screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL are based on ground peak spectral accelerations of 0.8g and 1.2g. These both exceed the RLGM peak spectral acceleration.

The anchorage capacity calculations were based on SSE floor response spectra scaled to the RLE, except for equipment in the AB for which new floor response spectra were generated for the RLE [11]. Therefore ESEL components which were evaluated in the IPEEE SMA, met the screening caveats, and had anchorage capacity exceeding the RLE can be screened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination because the HCLPF capacity exceeds the RLGM.Most of the non-valve components in the ESEL were screened out based on the SMA results. A few components that did not have CDFM anchorage calculations were screened out on the basis of the HCLPF calculated from the SPRA fragility.

In the SMA, valves were documented as a group rather than as individual components with individual documentation.

The screening for valves proceeded differently.

Page 17 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 The Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESEL contain approximately 220 valves in total, both power-operated (MOV and AOV) as well as relief valves. Per Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL, active valves may be assigned a functional capacity of 0.8g peak spectral acceleration without any review other than looking for valves with large extended operators on small diameter piping, and anchorage is not a failure mode. Therefore, valves on the ESEL which are listed in the IPEEE Mechanical Equipment List may be screened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination.

Power-operated valves were addressed both in the IPEEE fragility calculations and in the SMA. In the fragility calculations, all of the valves on the IPEEE Mechanical Equipment List were screened out on the basis of median capacity exceeding 2.0g. In the SMA, the valves were found to meet EPRI NP-6041-SL, Figures F-25 and F-26 (thus meeting the 1.2g peak spectral acceleration screening criteria) or to exceed the RLE floor response spectra on the basis of vendor seismic qualification reports. The IPEEE SMA covered approximately 360 valves in Unit 1. The walkdowns focused on MOVs on small diameter piping and valves at high elevations in the plant. Comparison with Unit 2 showed that the conclusions of the Unit 1 review applied to the corresponding Unit 2 valves. Relief valves were not explicitly included in the IPEEE review except for PORVs, both steam (SV) and reactor coolant (NC), which met the criteria.

Spring-operated relief valves are considered to meet the EPRI NP-6041-SL 0.8g peak spectral acceleration screening criteria without explicit review. On the basis of the above, most of the ESEL valves were screened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination.

The results of the IPEEE capacity screening are noted in Appendix A for the Unit 1 ESEL and in Appendix B for the Unit 2 ESEL. For the components that were not screened out, HCLPF capacities were determined using the deterministic EPRI NP-6041-SL CDFM methodology and RLGM spectral shape and/or anchorage evaluations.

6.3 HCLPF Capacity Determination HCLPF capacities were determined by evaluating the function, anchorage, and seismic interaction failure modes. HCLPF functional capacities were determined using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL.

HCLPF anchorage capacities were determined using the CDFM methodology in EPRI NP-6041-SL.

HCLPF seismic interaction capacities were determined by walkdown screening.

6.4 Functional Capacity Screening Using EPRI NP-6041-SL The components were screened against EPRI NP-6041-SL, Table 2 4. For components not located on the basemat of the Auxiliary or Reactor Buildings, the ISRS were used for the screening; therefore, the screening levels of EPRI NP-6041-SL were increased by a factor of 1.5 per EPRI 1019200, Seismic Fragility Applications Guide Update [17]. Thus, the accelerations for the screening levels were 1.2g and 1.8g instead of 0.8g and 1.2g.Page 18 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 The SSE ISRS were amplified by a factor of 1.74 throughout the frequency range and were then clipped (per EPRI 1019200), using the methodology in EPRI NP-6041-SL, Appendix Q, and the North-South and East-West clipped peaks were averaged.6.5 Seismic Walkdown Approach 6.5.1 Walkdown Approach Walkdowns were performed in accordance with the criteria provided in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704

[2], which refers to EPRI NP-6041-SL

[7] for the SMA process. Pages 2-26 through 2-30 of EPRI NP-6041-SL

[7] describe the seismic walkdown criteria, including the following key criteria."The SRT [Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of all components which are reasonably accessible and in non-radioactive or low radioactive environments.

Seismic capability assessment of components which are inaccessible, in high-radioactive environments, or possibly within contaminated containment, will have to rely more on alternate means such as photographic inspection, more reliance on seismic reanalysis, and possibly, smaller inspection teams and more hurried inspections.

A 100% "walk by" does not mean complete inspection of each component, nor does it mean requiring an electrician or other technician to de-energize and open cabinets or panels for detailed inspection of all components.

This walkdown is not intended to be a QA or QC review or a review of the adequacy of the component at the SSE level.If the SRT has a reasonable basis for assuming that the group of components are similar and are similarly anchored, then it is only necessary to inspect one component out of this group. The"similarity-basis" should be developed before the walkdown during the seismic capability preparatory work (Step 3) by reference to drawings, calculations or specifications.

The one component for each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probably does mean de-energizing and opening cabinets or panels for this very limited sample. Generally, a spare representative component can be found so as to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant is in operation.

At least for the one component of each type which is selected, anchorage should be thoroughly inspected.

The walkdown procedure should be performed in an ad hoc manner.For each class of components the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the field configurations with the construction drawings and/or specifications.

If a one-to-one correspondence is found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as great a detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the Page 19 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 component class as the SRT becomes confident that the construction pattern is typical. This procedure for inspection should be repeated for each component class; although, during the actual walkdown the SRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel.

If serious exceptions to the drawings or questionable construction practices are found then the system or component class must be inspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers, lock of similarity, anchorage which is different from that shown on drawings or prescribed in criteria for that component, potential SI [Seismic Interaction 1]problems, situations that are at odds with the team members' past experience, and any other areas of serious seismic concern. If any such concerns surface, then the limited sample size of one component of each typefor thorough inspection will have to be increased.

The increase in sample size which should be inspected will depend upon the number of outliers and different anchorages, etc., which are observed.

It is up to the SRT to ultimately select the sample size since they are the ones who are responsible for the seismic adequacy of all elements which they screen from the margin review. Appendix D gives guidance for sampling selection." 6.5.2 Walkdowns and Walk-Bys Many of the components were walked down previously during IPEEE evaluations and have documented Screening Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS) recording the results. Credit is given to these walkdowns since they were performed by qualified Seismic Review Teams. A walk-by of these components was performed and documented.

The primary objective of a walk-by is to verify that the component and/or anchorage has not degraded since the original walkdown and to verify that the component is free of interaction issues that may have developed since the original walkdown.Walkdowns were performed on all ESEL components which were not previously walked down during the IPEEE and for some ESEL items which did not have a specific SEWS in the IPEEE documentation.

Masonry walls in the AB were evaluated as part of IPEEE and shown to meet the RLE demand; therefore, they also meet the RLGM demand. Proximity of masonry walls to ESEL components were noted on the SEWS forms. Masonry walls in proximity to ESEL equipment were verified to have been included in the IPEEE evaluation and determined to not be a credible failure mode for the ESEP.'EPRI 3002000704

[2] page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements." Other potential seismic interaction evaluations are "deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed in accordance with EPRI 1025287 [15]." Page 20 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 6.5.3 Significant Walkdown Findings All of the ESEL components were determined to have an existing capacity greater than the RLGM, with the exception of the components listed in Tables 6-1 and 6-2. These components require modification in order to have a capacity greater than the RLGM.6.6 HCLPF Calculation Process ESEL items not included in the previous MNS IPEEE evaluations were evaluated using the criteria in EPRI NP-6041-SL

[7]. The evaluations included the following steps: " Performing seismic capability walkdowns for equipment not included in previous seismic walkdowns to evaluate the equipment installed plant conditions;" Performing screening evaluations using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL as described in Section 6.2; and" Performing HCLPF calculations considering various failure modes that include both structural failure modes (e.g., anchorage, load path, etc.) and functional failure modes.All HCLPF calculations were performed using the CDFM methodology and are documented in MCM-1612.00-0059.001

[10]. HCLPF results and key failure modes for ESEL items not included in the previous MNS IPEEE evaluations are included in the ESEL tables in Appendices A and B.6.7 Functional Evaluations of Relays There are no relays on the ESEL that provide seal-in/lock-out capability for Phase 1 equipment; therefore, no functional evaluation of relays was required.Page 21 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Table 6-1. Unit 1 Components that Require Modifications.

Problem Description Unit ESEL ID Equipment

1. Bldg Modification/Recommendation 1 23 EHM-HR-TB27 RB Flex Conduit running between Required Modification:

Add metal ties to EHM-HR-TB29 igniter boxes not supported for band cable to overhead cable tray.approximately 15 ft.Modification has been COMPLETED.

1 23 EHM-HR-TB29 RB Flex conduit from TB29 not tied Required Modification:

Add metal ties to into cable tray. band cable to horizontal and vertical potions of this wall-mounted tray near 900 bends.Modification has been COMPLETED.

1 24 EHM-TB-0589 AB Secure load path: Required modification:

Cabinet mounting tabs do not span Install Unistrut washers under mounting Unistrut.

tabs.Modification has been COMPLETED.

1 48 1SV-VA-O0019AB AB Interaction issue: Required modification:

A test or vent off port at top of Modify to achieve adequate clearance.

subject valve has been rubbing on side of support structure.

1 63 1EOA-PN-MC11 AB Secure load path: Pressure Required modification:

indicator PI-937 on MC11 is missing Install hold down clip on instrument.

hold down clip.1 67 EQB-PN-DGLSA AB Potential interaction:

Required modification:

Unistrut between DGLSA and ATC7 Remove Unistrut.results in negligible clearance.

AB = Auxiliary Building DH = DogHouse RB = Reactor Building Page 22 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Table 6-2. Unit 2 Components that Require Modifications.

Unit ESEL ID EDB ID Bldg Problem Description Modification/Recommendation 2 18 NI-VA-0065B RB Potential interaction:

Conduit and Required modification:

connecter to motor are in contact with Modify to achieve adequate adjacent structural support. clearance.

2 51 SV-CV-0001AB DH Soft target: Required Modification:

Position indicator cable is tight and Trim grating away from cable.rubbing against floor grating.2 78 NC-RD-5870 RB Cable support: Required modification:

Loop of signal cable supported by Move coil back and support from resistance temperature detector (RTD). structural member or cable tray to Subject RTD tubing is bent due to weight remove load on RTD.of cable.AB = Auxiliary Building DH = DogHouse RB = Reactor Building Page 23 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 6.8 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes)Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values are provided in Appendix A for Unit 1 and Appendix B for Unit 2. The following notes apply to the information in the tables: " For items screened out using the IPEEE evaluations, the HCLPF value is provided as >RLGM and the failure mode Is listed as "Screened per IPEEE."" For items screened out using EPRI NP-6041-SL

[7) screening tables, the HCLPF value is provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is listed as "Screened per EPRI NP-6041."" For items where interaction with masonry walls controls, the HCLPF value is provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is noted as "Interaction

-Block Walls."" For items where component function controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Functional."" For items where anchorage controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Anchorage." 7.0 Inaccessible Items, Additional Items Associated with FLEX Strategy Changes and New Component Installation 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns All ESEL items were accessible for walkdowns except the Units 1 and 2 diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks. These tanks are not accessible for visual inspection since they are buried below grade. Walk-bys of the yard areas above the tanks were performed to check for visible outliers or potential seismic interaction hazards.7.2 Identification of Additional ESEL Items Associated with FLEX Strategy Changes and New FLEX Component Installations Seismic capability walkdowns and screening evaluations remain outstanding for components which were added to the ESEL as a result of subsequent changes to the FLEX mitigation strategy, and associated with new FLEX component installations.

These outstanding walkdowns and evaluations are denoted as "to be done" (TBD) in Appendices A and B.7.3 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out The remaining ESEL component walkdowns and screening evaluations will be completed within the schedule outlined in Section 8.3.The outstanding modifications listed in Tables 6-1 and 6-2 will be completed and closed-out in accordance with the schedule outlined in Section 8.3.Page 24 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 8.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results 8.1 Supporting Information MNS has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1]. It was performed using the methodologies in the NRC-endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704

[2].The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedites plant safety enhancements through evaluations and potential near-term modifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.The ESEP is part of the overall MNS response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1]. On March 12, 2014, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted to the NRC results of a study [12] of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that "... site-specific seismic hazards show that there [...] has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for the fleet of U.S. plants..." based on the re-evaluated seismic hazards. As such, the "... current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis." The NRC's May 9, 2014, NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter [14]concluded that the "fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with the approach and results used in the GI-199 safety/risk assessment." The letter also stated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached in GI-199 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plants can continue to operate while additional evaluations are conducted." An assessment of the change in seismic risk for MNS was included in the fleet risk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014, NEI letter [12]; therefore, the conclusions in the NRC's May 9 letter [14] also apply to MNS.In addition, the March 12, 2014, NEI letter [12] provided an attached"Perspectives on the Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (1) assessed a number of qualitative reasons why the design of SSCs inherently contain margin beyond their design level; (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs; and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely. This has been borne out for those plants that have actually experienced significant earthquakes.

The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismic margins within SSCs. These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects of the seismic design process, including:

Page 25 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0* Safety factors applied in design calculations;" Damping values used in dynamic analysis of SSCs;* Bounding synthetic time histories for ISRS calculations;" Broadening criteria for ISRS;" Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testing applications;

• Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time history based time domain analysis;* Bounding requirements in codes and standards;

• Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel);* Bounding testing requirements; and" Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity of materials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range, etc.).These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the SSE.8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications Tables 6-1 and 6-2 identify the remaining modifications to be made in accordance with EPRI 3002000704

[2] to enhance the seismic capacity of the plant.8.3 Schedule for Completion of Required Modifications and Remaining ESEL Component Walkdowns/Evaluations Plant modifications will be completed in accordance with the schedule identified in NEI letter dated April 9, 2013 [13], which states that plant modifications not requiring a planned refueling outage will be completed by December 31, 2016 and modifications requiring a refueling outage will be completed within two planned refueling outages after December 31, 2014.Completion of the remaining ESEL component walkdowns and evaluations will be completed within the same timeframe outlined for modification completion.

Page 26 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 8.4 Summary of Planned Actions The actions Listed in Table 8-1 will be performed as a result of the ESEP.Table 8-1. Summary of Planned Follow-up Actions.Action # Action Description Completion Date 1 Complete remaining modifications Follow-up actions will be completed as (Table 6-1), and ESEL follows: walkdowns/evaluations (Appendix A) 0 December 31, 2016 (if action for Unit 1 components.

completion does not require a 2 Complete remaining modifications refueling outage)( The end of the second planned (aledown t 6-2),ndx an Erefueling outage after December 31, walkdowns/evaluations (Appendix B) 2014 (if action completion requires for Unit 2 components.

outage)3 Submit a letter to NRC confirming Within 60 days following completion of implementation of modifications ESEP activities for items 1 and 2.associated with items 1 and 2.Page 27 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 9.0 References

1) Letter from E. Leeds and M. Johnson, NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, et al.,"Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," March 12, 2012.2) Seismic Evaluation Guidance:

Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 -Seismic, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA: May 2013, EPRI 3002000704.

3) Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17;Response to March 12, 2012, Commission Order to Modify Licenses With Regard To Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design Basis External Events (Order EA-12-049)," dated February 28, 2013, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.4) Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17;Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," dated March 20, 2014, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.5) Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities, June 1991, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1407.

6) USNRC Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, "Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities-10 CFR 50.54(f)," June 28, 1991, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.7) A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Rev. 1, August 1991, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, EPRI NP-6041-SL.

8) Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, July 1, 1994, EPRI TR-103959.

9) Letter from T. C. McMeekin to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370; Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Submittal," dated June 1, 1994, Duke Power, Huntersville, NC.Page 28 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 10) Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process for Implementation of Seismic Risk Evaluations at McGuire Nuclear Station, Appendix D, "HCLPF Calculations," dated October 2014, Rev. 1, ARES Corporation Report No. 030319.13.02.11-001, Duke Energy Document No. MCM-1612.00-0059.001.

11) Development of Criteria for Seismic Review of Selected Nuclear Power Plants, published May 1978, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-0098.

12) Letter from A. Pietrangelo, NEI to D. Skeen, USNRC, "Seismic Core Damage Risk Estimates Using the Updated Seismic Hazards for the Operating Nuclear Plants in the Central and Eastern United States," March 12, 2014.13) Letter from A. Pietrangelo, NEI to D. Skeen, USNRC, "Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations," April 9, 2013.14) Letter from E. Leeds, NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, et al., "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(F) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," May 9, 2014.15) Seismic Evaluation Guidance:

Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, February 2013, EPRI 1025287.16) Letter from E. Leeds, NRC to J. Pollock, NEI, "Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report xxxxx, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance:

Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations," May 7, 2013.17) Seismic Fragility Applications Guide Update, December 2009, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, EPRI 1019200.18) Augmented Approach for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic -Determine Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL), Revision 2, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC, Calculation MCC-1612.00 0012.19) Seismic PRA/IPEEE Backup Calculations, 1994, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC, 1994, Calculation No. MCC-1535.00-00-0004.

20) Letter from Steven Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; First Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated August 28, 2013, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.Page 29 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 21) Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17;Second Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated February 27, 2014, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.22) Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369, 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; Third Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated August 27, 2014, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.Page 30 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Appendix A MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results Page 31 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown ESEL ID EDO Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State or Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes NCLPF** Key Failure Mode-1 1FW-VA-0032B Refueling Water Recirc Pump AUX 750 Rm 815 Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p 772 Included in IPEEE, p 772 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Suction Isolation JJ,/1 2 1PW-VA-0033A Refueling Water Recirc Pump Suction Isolation 3 1FW-VA-0001A Refueling Water Recirc Pump Suction Isolation 4 1ND-VA-0056 ND Relief- 'A' Coldlegs 5 1ND-VA-0061 ND Relief- Hotlegs 6 1ND-VA-0064 ND Relief -'B'Coldlegs 7 1NI-VA-0119 NI Relief- 'A' Train Hotleg 8 1NI-VA-O151 NI Relief- 'B' Train Hotleg 9 1NI-VA-0161 NI Relief- Coldleg 10 ORN-VA-0007A SNSWP Supply to Units 1 & 2 AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX 750 750 733 733 733 733 750 733 716 Rm 811 KK/S3 Rm 815 iJ/S 1 Rm 730 GG/52 EE/52 Rm 730 HH/52 Rm 602 GG/52 Rm 817 HH/52 Rm 730 il/S1 Rm 601 AA/63 Open/Closed Open/Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Open/Closed Walk-By Walk-By Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walk-By p 772 Included in IPEEE, p 772 p 772 Included in IPEEE, p 772 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, AppendixC Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per IPEEE 11 1NV-VA-0095B NC Pumps Seal Water Return Cont AUX 733 E Open Closed Walk-By p 775 Included in IPEEE, p 775 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE EE/S2 Reactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 12 1NC-VA-0272AC RX 774 B-C Side Closed Open and Closed Walkdown en>RLM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Isolation Valee 275S 17R Appendia C Table 2-4 Reactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid Rx Cavity Window Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 13 1NC-VA-0273AC RX 774 B-C Side Closed Open and Closed Walkdown >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Isolation Valve 27"1RAppendix C Table 2-4 273' 17R NC System Pressurizer PORV Pressurizer Cavit 14 1NC-VA-0034A Sosem Preuric Cor o RX 808 P 02z 35R Closed Open and Closed Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Solenoids and Pneumatic Controls 102' 35R 1NC-34A Assured Nitrogen Supply lA CIA Rm 25 1NI-VA-0430A 1Nom34A A (M oV e RX 758 1A 48R Closed Open and Closed Walk-By p 775 Included in IPEEE, p 775 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE from 1A CIA (MOV) 46' 48R 16 IFW-TX-0001 Refueling Water Storage Tank Yard >760 N/A n/a n/a Walkdown Reference 10, Included in IPEEE (p 772). Evaluated by Meets RIOM Screened per PEEt Appendix C Structural Mechanics Associates (p 1461).17 1I-V-005A l CI Blok Vlve(MOV RX 733 Pipe Chase 17 1NI-VA-42'4A 1ACLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 42p 47R Open M-14 Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Pipe Chase 18 INI-VA-0065B 1B CLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 136" C0s Open M-14 Closed Walk-By p 774 Included n IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 18 21-V-007A i CIABlok Vave MOV) ~ 2f 733 Pipe Chase 19 2NI-VA-0076A 1CCLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 Pipe 48R Open M-14 Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 20 iI-V-008B 1 CI Blok Vlve MOV RxPipe Chase 20 1NI-VA-3088B 1DCLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 Pipe 48R Open M-14 Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE New equipment

-updated IPEEE SEWS 21 1EHM-TF-HMTA H2 Igniter Transformer AUX 750 CC/46 Off Functional Walk-By p74 evaluation. "Reference 10, AppendixsB1, pg. B1- >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 10" iEHMPN-Reference 10, 22 EHM-PN- H2 Igniter Power Panel AUX 7S0 CC/46 Standby Functional Walkdown ' Bounded by evaluation of 1EHM-TB-589.

>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 HMPPA Appendix C 1EHM-HR-TB03 A'Train H2 Igniters 23 thru TB71 (Odd (35 Ignit H er Train) RX Various Various De-energized Functional Walkdown Referencedix10, Nt in experience data base. Tested to SURTS RLGM Undetermined Numbers only)23 a 1EHM-SX-HMBPA Voltage Reg Bypass Switch AUX 750 TBD De-energized Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-S2, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Appendix C Table 2-4 Page 32 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF'* Key Failure Mode**Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 23 b 1EHM-VR-HRMA Voltage Regulator AUX 750 TBD De-energized Functional Walkdown Appence C Table 2-4, HCLPF based on Unit 2 value on save 0.29 Functional Appendin C eeain elevation.

24 1EHM-TB-589 Local Terminal Box AUX 750 CC/46 n/a Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.90 Functional Appendix C Table 2-4 25 Deleted 26 1CA-HX-0003 TDCAP Bearing Oil Cooler AUX 716 BB/51 Idle Functional Walk-By p 542 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 27 1CA-PU-003 TDCAP (Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine AUX 716 BB/51 Idle Functional Walk-By p 242 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Driven Pump)27 a ISA-TR-0003 TOCAP Turbine AUX 716 BE/Si Idle Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-boox with 1CA-PU-00w3, which has an oRLGM Screened per PEE IPEER SEWS 27 b 1SA-VA-0004 TDCAP Steam Control Valve AUX 716 BB/51 Idle Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-boo with 1CA-PU-0553, which has un >RLGM Screened per IPEEE IPEEE SEWS 27 c ISA-GV-0003 TDCAP Governor Valve AUX 716 BB/51 Idle Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-bus with 1,-PU-SS3, which has an >RLGM Screened per IPEEE IPEEE SEWS Rule-of-the-boo wish 1CA-PU-0003, which has usa LM SrendprPn 27 d 1SA-GX-0003 Gear Reducer AUX 716 BB/51 Idle Functional Walk-By >RLGM Screened Ser IPEEE IPEEE SEWS 28 1CA-PN-AFTP TDCAP Control Panel AUX 716 BB/52 n/a Available Walk-By p 187 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 29 1SA-VA-004EABC TDCAP Steam Supply Isolation Inner Doghouse 767 FF/S3 Closed Open Walk-By p777 Included in IPEEE, p 777 vRLGM Screened per IPEEE (AOV) (DH2)Inner Doghouse Reference 10, Screens out bused on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, oRG ScendprERNP64 29 a 1SA-SV-0480 Air Supply Solenoid Dump Valve Dh 767 FF/53 Energized De-energized Walkdown en>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-041 (DH2) Appendix C Table 2-4 29 b 1SA-SV-0481 Air Supply Solenoid Dump Valve Inner Doghouse 767 FF/53 Energized De-energized Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 (DH2) Appendix C Table 2-4 Rm 600 30 1SA-VA-0003 TDCAP Trip-Throttle Valve AUX 716 Rm Open Open Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 771 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE AA/32 31 Deleted 32 Deleted 33 Deleted 34 1VI-VA-0032 1A VI Essential Hdr Supply from VG AUX 733 Rm 719 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Interaction

-Block Wall Inlet Relief (115 psig) FF/53 Appendix C Table 2-4 35 1VI-VA-B034 AUX 733 GG/54 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Inlet Relief (115 psig) Appendix C Table 2-4 36 1VI-VA-0112 1A VI Aux Bldg Instrument Air Tank AUX 733 Rm 719 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Relief (115 psig) FF/53 Appendix C Table 2-4 37 IVI-VA-0134 1A VI Aux Bldg Instrument AirTank AUX 733 Rm 719 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Relief (115 psig) FF/53 Appendix C Table 2-4 38 1VI-VA-0155 1B VI Aux Bldg Instrument Air Tank AUX 733 GG/75 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Relief (115 psig) Appendix C Table 2-4 39 1VI-VA-0156 1B Vi Aux Bldg Instrument Air Tank AUX 733 GG/55 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Relief (115 psig) Appendix C Table 2-4 39M-ABVIIA-VAuatorRelef AUXe 73DoghCoeoefrneSOucensotbsdenER N-01SL e.1 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6045 40 1VI-VA-2009 7SM-1AB VI Accumulator Relief Outer Doghouse DD/44 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-604 (120 psig) (DHI) Appendix C Table 2-4 Page 33 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode**41 1VI-VA-2019 15M-7AB VI Accumulator Relief Outer Doghouse 790 DD/43 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, sRLOM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 (120 psig) (DHI) Appendix C Table 2-4 42 1VI-VA-2029 1SM-3ABC VI Accumulator Relief Inner Doghouse 790 DD/52 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 (120 psig) (DH2) Appendix C Table 2-4 43 1VI-VA-2039 1SM-5AB VI Accumulator Relief Inner Doghouse D/SI Closed Closed Wikd Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >51GM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 (120 psig) (DH2) Appendix C Table 2-4 44 1CA-VA-0064AB TACA Flow control to 1A SO andOpen Open/Throttled/

Walk-By p 771 Included in IPEEE, p 7 7 1 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls BB/SO Closed 44 a 1CA-ML-0640 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1MC10 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Sm 605 44 b 1CA-SS-0640 Selector Switch AUX 716 88/00 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-64AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/SO 44 c 1CA-MT-0640 Misc Transmitter AUX 44 d 1CA-VP-0640 Valve Positioner AUX 44 e 1CA-SV-0640 Solenoid Valve AUX 44 f 1CA-SV-0641 Solenoid Valve AUX TDCA Flow Control to 1B SG and 45 SCA-VA-OO52AB AUX Associated Pneumatic Controls 45 a 1CA-ML-0520 Manual Loader AUX 45 b 1CA-SS-0520 Selector Switch AUX 45 c 1CA-MT-0520 Misc Transmitter AUX 45 d 1CA-VP-0520 Valve Positioner AUX 45 e 1CA-SV-0520 Solenoid Valve AUX 45 f 1CA-SV-0521 Solenoid Valve AUX TDCA Flow Control to 1C SG and 46 SCA-VA-0045AB AUX Associated Pneumatic Controls 46 a 1CA-ML-0480 Manual Loader AUX 46 b 1CA-SS-0480 Selector Switch AUX 46 c 1CA-MT-0480 Misc Transmitter AUX 46d 1CA-VP-0480 Valve Positioner AUX 46e 1CA-SV-0480 Solenoid Valve AUX 46 f 1CA-SV-0481 Solenoid Valve AUX TDCA Flow Control to 1D SG and 47 1CA-VA-0036AB AUX Associated Pneumatic Controls 716 716 716 716 716 767 716 716 716 716 716 716 767 716 716 716 716 716 716 Rm 600 BB/50 Rm 600 BB/50 Rm 600 BB/50 Rm 600 BB/50 Rm 600 BB/51 Control Rm 925 Rm 600 BB/51 Rm 600 BB/51 Rm 600 BB/51 Rm 600 BB/51 Rm 600 BB/51 Rm 600 BB/51 Control Rm 925 Rm 600 sa/51 Rm 600 BB/51 Rm 600 BB/51 Rm 600 BB/51 Rm 600 BB/51 Rm 600 AA/43 Functional Functional Energized Energized Open Functional Functional Functional Functional Energized Energized Open Functional Functional Functional Functional Energized Energized Open Functional Walk-By Functional Walk-By Energized Walk-By Energized Walk-By Open/Throttled/

Walk-By Closed Functional Walk-By Functional Walk-By Functional Walk-By Functional Walk-By Energized Walk-By Energized Walk-By Open/Throttled/

Walk-By Closed Functional Walk-By Functional Walk-By Functional Walk-By Functional Walk-By Energized Walk-By Energized Walk-By Open/Throttled/

Walk-By Closed Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-64AB Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-64AB Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-64AB Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-64AB p 771 Included in IPEEE, p 771 Rule-of-the-box with 1MC10 Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-52AB Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-S2AB Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-52AB Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-52AB Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-S2AB p 771 Included in IPEEE, p 771 Rule-of-the-box with 1MC10 Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-48AB Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-48AB Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-48AB Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-48AB Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-48AB p 771 Included in IPEEE, p 771>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM Screened per PEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened perIPEEE Screened per PEEE Screened perIPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perFPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened per PEEE Screened perIPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Page 34 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode-47 a 1CA-ML-0360 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1MC10 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 47 b 1CA-SS-0360 Selector Switch AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-36AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE AA/43 47 c SCA-MT-0360 Misc Transmitter AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-36AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE AA/43 47 d SCA-VP-0360 Valve Positioner AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-36AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE AA/43 Reference 10,nLM ScendprERNF64 47 e 1CA-SV-0360 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 600 Energized Energized Walkdown en>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Appendix C 47 f 1CA-SV-0361 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 600 Energized Energized Walkdown Reference 10, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Appendix C 48 1SV-VA-0019AB 1A SG Main Steam PORV and Outer Doghouse 809 GG/44 Closed Open/Throttled/

Walk-By p 294 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH1) Closed SB SG Main Steam PORV and Inner DohueOpen/Throttled/

akB 9 49 1SV-VA-0013AB Doghouse 809 FF/53 Closed e Walk-By p 294 RLGM Screened per IPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH2) Closed 50 1VV-OA C SGMi509mPR ad Inr ohueOpen/Throttled!/

akB 9 C S Main Steam POV and Inner Doghouse 809 FF/52 Closed Walk-By p 294 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH2) Closed 909 ai ta PR nd OtrDohueOpen/Throttled/

WakB p29 511D Main Steam PORV and Outer Doghouse GG/44 Closed Walk-By p 294 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH1) Closed Vital Battery 125 VDC Distribution 52 1EPL-PN-EVDA AUX 733 DD/54 Functional Functional Walk-By p 212 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Panel 52 a 1EPL-PN-EVDD Vital Battery 125 VDC Distribution AUX 733 BB/57 Functional Functional Walk-By p 2 1 2 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Panel Sm 707 Rfrne1,>RL0M 5*5 Interaction

-Block Wall 53 0EPL-BA-EVCA Vital Battery AUX 733 Functional Functional Walkdown Reference 10, CC/54 Appendix C 54 0EPL-BC-EVCS Vital Battery Charger and Charger AUX 733 Rm 701 Functional Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.45 Functional Connection Box ECBS BB/54 Appendix C Table 2-4 55 1EPE-MX-EMXA2 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 750 BB/46 Functional Functional Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 56 1EPE-MX-EMXA4 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 750 BB/47 Functional Functional Walk-By p 3 2 >RLGM Screened per PEEE 57 1EPE-MX-EMXH 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 750 FF/56 Functional Functional Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE S1EPE-MX-EMXB4 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 733 705 Functional Functional Walk-By p32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/416 59 1ETP-CA-0008 Pzr PORV Relay/Indication AUX 750 CC/53 Standby Functional Walk-By p 216 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE (1ATC 8)Main Control Board Cabinet for 60 1EOA-PN-MCS Head-Vent Operation, Hotleg AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Temperature Indication 61 1EOA-PN-MC7 H2 Igniter Control Switch AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 62 1EOA-PN-MC10 Main Control Board Cabinet for CA / AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 8 6 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE NC Systems Main Control Board Cabinet for NI 63 1EOA-PN-MC11 System, Containment Pressure AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Indication Page 35 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit I ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF- Key Failure Mode-*Main Control Board Cabinet for SM 64 1EOA-PN-MC2 System (PORV Control, CF/SM AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Indication)

Main Control Board Cabinet for ICCM a 1EOA-PN-MC1 AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 8 6 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE ICCM Remote Display ICMb tI-.-21 Train A Remote Display Processor AU 6 oto m95 Sady Fntoa akon Reference 10, Screens nut based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Sen. 1, >RG ScendprEIN-61 behind 2MC2 Appendiu C ruble 2-4 Train B Remote Display Processor Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, ICCM c IEIA-CA-9221 AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 behind 2MC2 Appendix C Table 2-4 ICCM d SRIA-P-9210 Train A Remote Display AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with SMC1, which has an PEER Screened SEWS ICCM e 1EIA-P-9220 Train B Remote Display AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By Rule-of-tbe-bon with SMCS, which has an FREE Screened SEWS Reference 0, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Sen. 1, ICCM f 1EIA-CA-9210 Train A ICCM-86 Cabinet AUX 750 CC/55 Standby Functional Walkdown 10, S o 0.29 Functional Appendix C Table 2-4 ICCM g 1EIA-CA-9220 Train B ICCM-86 Cabinet AUX 750 CC/S5 Standby Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.29 Functional Appendix C Table 2-4 65 IFPE-CA-9010 SSPS Cabinet 'A' (CLA Block Valves AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 11 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Closure Permissive)

CC/54 66 11PE-CA-9020 SSPSCabinet'B' (CLA Block Valves AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 11 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Closure Permissive)

CC/54 Sm 603 Sady Fntoa Waknn Reference 10, Screens oat based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1, 67 1EQB-PN-DGLSA Various Functions (i.e. H2 Igniters)

AUX 750 Standby Functional Walkdown c e 0.29 Functional BB/51 Appendix C Table 2-4 12OVAC Inst and Control Sm 701 Nominal 120 VAC 68 1EPG-PN-EKVA AUX 733 Functional Walk-By p 2 0 3 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Panelboard DD/54 Output Sm 701 Nominal 120 VAC 69 1EPG-BI-EVIA Vital Inverter AUX 733 Functional Walk-By p 65 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE CC/55 Output Steam Generator NR Level Accum 1A Rm Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 70 1CF-LT-6000 RX 739 Indication Indication Walkdown >RLGM Screened per IFEEE Indication Loop 1 39 45R Appendix C Table 2-4 Steam Generator NR Level Accum 1B Rm Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 71 1CF-LT-5540 RX 742 Indication Indication Walkdown >eeec 0 cen u ae o FIN-05S. e.1 RLGM Screened per IFEEE Indication Loop 2 146 49R Appendix C Table 2-4 Steam Generator NR Level Accum 1C Rm Indication Indication Wakdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >61GM Screened per FEEt 72 1CF-LT-5S70 RX 741Iniain Idcto Wadon>GM Sredpr PE Indication Loop 3 214 5SR Appendix C Table 2-4 Steam Generator NR Level Accum 1D Rm Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 73 1CF-LT-6030 RX 744 Indication Indication Walkdown >RLGM Screened per IFEEE Indication Loop 4 326 56R Appendix C Table 2-4 74 1SM-PT-50850 DD/44 Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Pressure Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 Sm 600 74 a ICA-PN-AFPA 1A CA Pump Control Panel AUX 716 Standby Functional Walk-By p 180 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/51 75 1SM-PT-51O Steam Generator

1. 2 Wide Range AUX 733 Rm 702 Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Pressure Indication Loop DD/53 Appendix C Table 2-4 76 FSM-PT-5140 Steam Generator

1. 3 Wide Range AUX 733 Rm 702 Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Pressure Indication Loop DD/53 Appendix C Table 2-4 Sm 600 76 a SCA-PN-AFPB 1B CA Pump Control Panel AUX 716 C/ Standby Functional Walk-By p 180 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE cc/s1 77 1SM-T-570 Steam Generator

1. 4 Wide Range AUX 750 Sm802 Indication Idio Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Pressure Indication Loop DD/45 Appendix C Table 2-4 Steam Generator

1. 1 NC WR T-Hot Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI-NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 76 1NC-RD-5850 RX 740 24° 306 Indication Indicution Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EFRI NP-6041 Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 Reactor Vessel Level Indication Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.37 Functional 78 a iNC-CA-S0lO Aux 767 86/49 Standby Functional Walkdown AppendixunTablen2-System (RVLIS) Cabinet Train A ppendix C Table 2-4 Steam Generator 62 NC WR T-Hot Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 79 INC-RD-5870 RX 740 164° 30 Indication Indication WalCdown >RLGM Screened per EFRI NP-6041 Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 Page 36 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode-Steam Generator

1. 3 NC WR T-HotReeee ,SrenoubaeonEINP64-,Rv., 80 1NC-RD-5900 RX 740 203* 30R Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10 Screens out based on EFRI NP-B041-SL, Rev. 1, sRLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 Steam Generator

1. 4 NC WR T-Hot Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 81 1NC-RD-5920 RX 740 308° 30R Indication Indication Walkdown 1>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 Containment NR Pressure Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 82 1NS-PT-5070 AUX 750 DD/S1 Indication Indication Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 NC WR Pressurizer Pressure Rm 702 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, sRLOM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 83 1NC-FT-5120 NCW rsuie rsueAUX 7m3702Indication Indication Walkdown>LM ScendprERN-04 Indication Loop CC/46 Appendix C Table 2-4 84 1EIA-CA-9010 Process Control Cabinet 1 AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Indication Indication Walk-By p 16 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE (7300 Cabinet) AA/54 85A Diesel Generator Fuel Oil yard <760 N/A Intact/Available Intact/Available Walk-By p 556 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Storage Tank 18 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil 86 1FD-TK-0057 yard <760 N/A Intact/Available Intact/Available Walk-By p 556 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Storage Tank 600 VAC Essential for H2 Skimmer Rm 803 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 87 1EPE-MX-EMXA3 Fan 1A Suction Isolation Valve AUX 750 88/45 Closed Closed Walkdomn Appendi>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 IVXIA (04A)600 VAC Essential for H2 Skimmer Rm 705 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 88 1EPE-MX-EMXBS Fan 1B Suction Isolation Valve AUX 733 B8/47 Closed Closed Walkdown AppendiRLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 1VX2B (01C)600 VAC Essential VENVX (04C, 060 Rm 803 89 1EPE-MX-EMXC AUX 750 Closed Closed Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE& 0SD) BB/52 90 1EPE-MX-EMXD 600 VAC Essential for VE/VX (06E & AUX 733 Rm 705 Closed Closed Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 05D) BB/52 HZ Skimmer Fan IA Suction Reference 10, 91 1VX-VA-000A isola tion RX 831 265' 43R Closed Open Walkdown 0.60 Functional Isolation Valve Appendix C Reference 10, 03 92 1VX-AH-0003 Hydrogen Skimmer Fan No 1A RX 818 272' 47R Off On Walkdown Appendie 1 0.39 Anchorage 93H Skimmer Fan 1 Suction RX 831 2798 49R Closed Open Walkdown Reference0.44 Functional Isolation Valve Appendix C Reference 10, 94 1VX-AH-0004 Hydrogen Skimmer Fan No 1B RX 818 268" 47R Off On Walkdown Appence C 0.40 Anchorage Appendix C 1VX-DA-9120 Containment Air Return Fan 1A Rule of the box with 1VX-AH-0001 which has IPEEE 85 RI 775 270° 0R Closed Open Walk-By sRLGM Screened per IPEEE (1RAF-D-2)

Damper SEWS 96 1VX-AH-0001 Containment Air Return Fan 1A RX 775 270° SOR Off On Walk-By p 434 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 03 nhrg 97 1VE-XF-0004 Annulus Ventilation Fan 1A AUX 767 JJ/51 Off On Walkdown Apendx0.35 Anchorage Appendix C Table 2-4 98 1VE-XF-0005 Annulus Ventilation Fan 1B AUX 767 HH/52 Off On Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based ox EFRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.45 Anchorage Appendix C Table 2-4 99 1KC-PU-0003 B1 Closed Cooling Water System AUX 733 HH/57 On On Walk-By p 255 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Pump 100 1KC-PU-0004 B2 Closed Cooling Water System AUX 733 HH/57 On On Walk-By p 255 >RLGM Screened 3er IPEEE Pump 101 1KC-TK-0009 Component Cooling Water System AUX 767 JJ/57 Intact/ Intact/ Walk-By p528 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Surge Tank In-Service In-Service 102 1KC-VA-0050A KC Auxiliary Bldg Supply Non- AUX 750 J /55 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Essential Isolation 103 1KC-VA-0230A KC Reactor Bldg Supply Non- AUX 750 JJ/55 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 oRLGM Screened per IPEEE Essential Isolation 104 1KC-VA-0200A KC Auxiliary Bldg Return Non- AUX 733 HH/55 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Essential Isolation 105 1KC-VA-0003A KC Reactor Bldg Return Non- AUX 733 HH/55 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 308 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Essential Isolation Page 37 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit I ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode-106 1KC-HX-0005 Train A Component Cooling Water AUX 750 JlJ/56 Intact/ Intact/ Walkdown Reference 10, HCLPF based on IPEEE evaluation (p 1728) by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE HX In-Service In-Service Appendix C Structural Mechanics Associates 107 1NC-VA-0032B NC System Pressurizer PORV RX8 Pressurizer Cavity Closed Closed 110' 32R 108 1NC-VA-0o36B NC System Pressurizer PORV 109 1NC-VA-0001 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve 110 1NC-VA-0002 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve 111 1NC-VA-0003 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve 112 1ND-PU-0001 Train A ND Pump 113 1ND-PU-0002 Train B ND Pump 114 1ND-HX-O003 Train A ND HX 115 1ND-HX-0004 Train B ND HX 116 1ND-HX-O005 Train A ND Pump Seal Cooling HX 117 1ND-VA-0002AC RHR Pump Hotleg Suction Isolation 118 1ND-VA-0O01B RHR Pump Hotleg Suction Isolation Train A RHR Isolation to the 119 1N1-VA-O173A Coldlegs Train B RHR Isolation to the 120 1NI-VA-O178B Coldlegs 121 1NI-VA-Ol18A Train A NI Isolation to the Coldlegs 122 1NI-VA-0121A Train A NI Isolation to the Hotlegs RX RX RX RX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX RX RX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX 806 815 801 801 695 695 750 750 695 745 745 733 733 716 742 716 Pressurizer Cavity 105. 32R Pressurizer Cavity 105' 35R Pressurizer Cavity 101" 35R Pressurizer Cavity 101* 35R Rm 500 FF/54 Rm 501 GG/54 Rm 733 LL/52 Rm 732 LL/52 Rm 500 FF/54 182" 50R 180' 22R Rm 602 GG/52 Rm 730 HH/52 Rm 603 JJ/52 FF/52 Rm 603 HH/52 Closed Closed Closed Closed Off Off Intact/In-Service Intact/In-Service Intact Closed/Open Closed/Open Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Intact Pressure Boundary Intact Pressure Boundary Intact/In-Service Intact/In-Service Intact Open Open Open Open Open Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 7 7 3 Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGM Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGM Walk-By p 7 7 3 Included in IPEEE, p 7 7 3 >RLGM Walk-By p 7 7 3 Included in IPEEE, p 7 7 3 >RLGM Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGM Walk-By p 273 >RLGM Walk-By p 2 7 3 >RLGM Walk-By p 458 >RLGM Walk-By p 458 >RLGM Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1ND-PU-0002, which has an >RLGM IPEEE SEWS Walk-By p 7 7 3 Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGM Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGM Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 77 4 >RLGM Walk-By p 7 7 4 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Walk-By p 7 7 4 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Walk-By p 7 7 4 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened per PEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perIPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened perIPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened perIPEEE Screened per PEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per PEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perIPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE 123 INI-VA-O150B Train B NI Isolation to the Coldlegs 124 1NI-VA-0152B Train B NI Isolation to the Hotlegs AUX 750 ,,' Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p 7 7 4 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE HH/52 125 1NI-VA-0162A NI Isolation to the Coldlegs AUX 733 730 Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p 7 7 4 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Ji/51 Sm 626 Intact Pressure 126 1NI-PU-0009 Train A NI Pump AUX 716 R. Off Bnda re Walk-By p 245 >RLGM Screened per tPEEE HH/54 Boundary Sm 5026 Intact Pressure 127 INI-PU-O010 Train B NI Pump AUX 716 Off Walk-By p 245 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE GG/53 Boundary 128 INS-PU-0001 Train A NS Pump AUX 695 Off Intact Pressure Walk-By p 277 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE GG/S5 Boundary 129 1NS-PU-0002 Train B NS Pump AUX 695 03Off Walk-By 277 >RLGM Screened er IPEEE GG/55 Boundary Sm 733 130 1NS-HX-O003 Train A NS Heat Exchanger AUX 750 Intact Intact Walk-By p 451 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE MM/S1 Sm 732 131 1NS-HX-0004 Train B NS Heat Exchanger AUX 750 M Intact Intact Walk-By p 451 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE MM/51 132 1SM-VA-007AB Train A MSIV Outer Doghouse 792 DD/43 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 30 0 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE (DH1)Page 38 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESELID 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 14S 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 EQUIPMENT EDB Description 1SM-VA-0OO5AB Train B MSIV 1SM-VA-OO03ABC Train C MSIV 1SM-VA-O001AB Train D MSIV Train A Main Steam Safety Relief 1SV-VA-0020 Valve Train A Main Steam Safety Relief 1SV-VA-0021 Valve Train A Main Steam Safety Relief 1SV-VA-0022 Valve Train A Main Steam Safety Relief 1SV-VA-0023 Valve Train A Main Steam Safety Relief 1SV-VA-0024 Valve Train B Main Steam Safety Relief 1SV-VA-0014 Valve Train B Main Steam Safety Relief 1SV-VA-0015 Valve Train B Main Steam Safety Relief 1SV-VA-O016 Valve Train B Main Steam Safety Relief 1SV-VA-0017 Valve Train B Main Steam Safety Relief 1SV-VA-O018 Valve Train C Main Steam Safety Relief 1SV-VA-O0O8 Valve 1VV009 Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Valve Train C Main Steam Safety Relief 1SV-VA-001 Valve 1VV001 Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Valve Train C Main Steam Safety Relief 1SV-VA-0012 Valve Train D Main Steam Safety Relief 1SV-VA-0002 Valve Train D Main Steam Safety Relief 1SV-VA-COO3 Vlv Valve Train D Main Steam Safety Relief 1SV-VA-0004 Valve Train D Main Steam Safety Relief 1SV-VA-COOS Valve Train D Main Steam Safety Relief 1SV-VA-0006 Valve IRN-HX-0006 18 RN Pump Motor Cooler 1R-A04A RN Pump Discharge Cross Train Supply Isolation MSV 1RN-VA-01 BKC H Cooling Water Supply 1RN-VA-01slB 1R-AO8BKC HX Cooling Water Outplet Isolation OPERATING STATE Walkdown or Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode***Inner Doghouse 792 DD/53 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 300 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE (DH2)Inner Doghouse (DH2)Outer Doghouse (DH1)Outer Doghouse (DH1)Outer Doghouse (DH1)Outer Doghouse (DH1)Outer Doghouse (DH1)Outer Doghouse (DH1)Inner Doghouse (DH2)Inner Doghouse (DH2)Inner Doghouse (DH2)Inner Doghouse (DH2)Inner Doghouse (DM2)Outer Doghouse (DH1)Outer Doghouse (DH1)Outer Doghouse (DHI)Outer Doghouse (DH1)Outer Doghouse (DH1)Inner Doghouse (DH2)Inner Doghouse (DH2)Inner Doghouse (DH2)Inner Doghouse (DH2)Inner Doghouse (DH2)AUX AUX AUX 792 792 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 791 716 716 750 DD/52 DD/44 EE/43 EE/43 EE/43 EE/43 EE/43 EE/53 EE/53 EE/53 EE/S3 EE/S3 EE/52 EE/52 EE/52 EE/52 EE/52 EE/43 EE/43 EE/43 EE/43 EE/43 EE/57 FF/56 LL/55 Open/Closed Open/Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed In-Service Normally Open Throttled Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed In-Service Closed Open Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By p 300 p 300 p 297 p297 p 297 p297 p297 p 297 p 297 p 297 p 297 p 297 p 297 p 297 p 297 p 297 p297 p297 p 2 9 7 p 297 p 297 p 297 p 249 p 776 p 7 7 6>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM Screened per PEEE Screened per PEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perIPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened per PEEE Screened per PEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per PEEE Screened per PEEE Screened perIPEEE Screened perIPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perIPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened per PEEE Screened per PEEE Screened per PEEE Screened per PEEE Screened per PEEE Screened per PEEE Rule-of-the-box with 1RN-PU-0O04, which has an IPEEE SEWS (p 249)Included in IPEEE, p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 1S9 1RN-VA-0190B KC HX Cooling Water Outlet AUX 750 HH/54 Throttled Open Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Isolation Page 39 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF'* Key Failure Mode-160 1RN-VA-8213B B1 KC Pump Motor Cooler Cooling AUX 733 HH/56 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Water Outlet Isolation 161 1RN-VA-0218B B2 KC Pump Motor Cooler Cooling AUX 733 GG/57 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 7 7 6 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Water Outlet Isolation 162 SRN-VA-0171B EDG KD HX Supply MOV Isolation AUX 776 BB/4 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 7 7 6 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Sm 704 163 1RN-VA-0174B EDG KD HX Outlet MOV Isolation AUX 736 88/4 Open Closed Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/45 164 1RN-VA-S235B Train B NS HX Supply Isolation MOV AUX 733 Rm 732 Closed Closed Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE KK/S1 164 1RN-VA-02058 Train B NS HIPuppl Is ColatonMO AUX 733 KE/0SadySntciakB 5 Rl-ftebxwih1VP-06 hihhsa RG Sree e PE Rm 630 Standby/ Intact Walk-By p252 Rule-of-the-box with 1NV-PU-0016, which has an vSLOM Screened per IPEEE 165 iRN-HX-O0iB Train B NV Pump Mtr Cooler AUX 716 HH/5S In-Service IPEEE SEWS (p 252)Sm 630 Standby Sole-of-the-hoe with 1NV-PU-0016, which has an 166 1RN-HX-0020 Train B NV Pump Bearing Oil Cooler AUX 716 H/ Indby/ Intact Walk-By p 252 IPEEE with (p w52) >RLGM Screened per IPEEE HH/SS In-Service IPEEE SEWS (p 252)Sm 630 Standby/ Inat Wl-BR 5 ule-of-the-bon with 1NV-PU-OO16, which has an 167 1RN-HX-0022 Train B NV Pump Gearbox Oil Cooler AUX 716 HH/55 In-Service Inat Wl-y p22 IPEEE SEWS (p 252) >RLGM Screened per IPEtEE Sm 503 Seference 10, 168 1VA-AH-0023 Train B NS Pump AHU AUX 695 Standby Intact Walkdown R Same make/model as U2 ESEL 168 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE GG/SS Appendix C Sm 500 169 1VA-AH-0027 Train B NO Pump AHU AUX 695 FF/54 Standby Intact Walk-By p 413 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE FF/54 170 1RN-HX-0024 Train B NI Pomp Mtr Cooler AUX 716 Rm 626 Standby Intact Walk-By p245 Role-of-the-boo with SNI-PU-0010, which has an vSLOM Screened per P555 GG/53 IPEEE SEWS (p 245)171 1RN-HX-0026 Train B NI Pump Brg Oil Cooler 1B SN Essential Return Header to 172 1RN-VA-O2978 SNSWP 173 0RN-VA-O283AC 1B/2B RN Disch To RC X-Over Isol 174 ORN-VA-01528 1B/2B SN Essential Return Header to SNSWP SNSWP Return Headers Cross Train 175 ORN-VA-O151B Islto Isolation 176 2RN-VA-0297B 2B RN Ess Hdr SNSWP Return Iso 177 1CA-VA-162B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Isolation from circulating water 177 a 1CA-SV-1620 Solenoid Valve 177 b 1CA-RV-1622 Relief Valve 177 c 1CA-GC-1620 Control Air Gas Cylinder 177 d 1CA-GC-1621 Control Air Gas Cylinder AUX 716 Standby GG/54 AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX Aux Aux Aux Aux Aux Rm 602 EE/52 Rm 602 EE/52 Rm 647W EE/60 EE/54 Rm 647W EE/60 Closed Open Closed Closed Open Closed Energized Closed Intact Intact Intact Open Closed Open Closed Closed Open Energized Closed Intact Intact Rule-of-the-box with 1NI-PU-0010, which has an vRLGM Walk-By p 245>RG IPEEE SEWS (p 245)Walk-By p776 Included in IPEEE, p 7 7 6 >RLGM Walk-By p776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Walk-By p7 7 6 Included in IPEEE, p 7 7 6 >RLGM Walk-By p776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Walk-By p 7 8 6 Included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGM TBD TBD TBD T7D TBD TBD TBD T7D TBD TBD TBD TED TBD TBD TBD TBD T8D TBD TBD TBD Screened per PEEE Screened per PEEE Screened per PEEE Screened per PEEE Screened per PEEE Screened per PEEE TBD TB7 TBD TBD TBD 177 e 1CA-PS-5380 Pressure Switch Aux 716 Functional Functional TBD TBD TBD T7D TBD 177 f 1CA-PS-5391 Pressure Switch Aux 716 Functional Functional T7D TBD TBD TBD TBD 177 g 1CA-TB-901 Junction Box houses Relays 'AA' and Aux 733 Functional Functional TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD'BB'178 1NV-VA-0055A Letdown Inboard Containment RX 752 Open Closed TBD TBD TBD TED TBD Isolation 178 a 1NV-SV-0350 Solenoid Valve RIX 752 Energized De-energized TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD Page 40 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit I ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT ESEL ID EDB Description 178 b 1NV-SV-0351 Solenoid Valve 179 1NV-VA-0121 Auxiliary Letdown Isolation 179 a 1NV-ML-1210 Manual Loader Letdown Inboard Containment 180 1NV-VA-O457A Islto Isolation 180 a 1NV-SV-4570 Solenoid Valve 180 b 1NV-SV-4571 Solenoid Valve Letdown Inboard Containment 181 1NV-VA-O458A Isolation 181 a 1NV-SV-4580 Solenoid Valve 181 b 1NV-SV-4581 Solenoid Valve Bldg RX AUX AUX RX RX RX RX RX RX RX RX EL 752 733 767 752 752 752 752 752 752 725 725 OPERATING STATE Location Normal State Desired State Energized De-energized RHR HtX Room Closed Closed Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Closed Closed De-energized De-energized Closed De-energized De-energized Closed De-energized De-energized De-energized Closed De-energized De-energized Closed Walkdown or Walk-By TBD TBD TBD TED TBD TED TBD TOD TED TBD TED SEWS*TBD TBD TBD TED TBD TED TBD TED TED TBD TED Screening Notes TED TED TBD TED TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD HCLPF**TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TED Key Failure Mode-5 TBD TBD TBD TBD TED TBD TBD TBD TBD TED TBD 182 182 a INV-VA-0025B IdNV-SV-0250 Excess Letdown Isolation Solenoid Valve Instrument Air Blackout De-energized 183 1VI-TK-0010 A AUX 750 Intact Intact TBD TED TBD TBD TBD 184 1VI-1328 Blackout Accumulator Relief AUX 750 Closed Closed TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD 185 1VI-1330 Blackout Header Relief AUX 750 Closed Closed TED TBD TBD TBD TBD Page number refers to IPEEE scanned document page.** HCLPF values of >RLGM indicate that the HCLPF exceeds the Review Level Ground Motion (0.26g), but that a specific HCLPF value was not calculated since the component was screened out from further evaluation.

Key Failure Modes are defined as follows: Screened per IPEE -Indicates that the component was evaluated in the IPEEE and therefore meets the RLGM demand.Screened per EPRI NP-6041 -Indicates that the component meets the screening criteria of EPRI NP-6041, Table 2-4 and that neither anchorage, relay chatter, nor nor interactions limit the reported HCLPF.Interaction

-Block Wall -Indicates that the component is located near a block wall. The block wall was evaluated in the IPEEE and therefore the block wall meets the RLGM demand. The functional and anchorage HCLPFs exceed the reported HCLPF value.Anchorage

-Indicates that the anchorage is the governing failure mode for the component.

Functional

-Indicates that functional failure is the governing failure mode for the component.

• Component adjacent to block wall. Aux building block walls were evaluated in the IPEEE as robust without a specific value. HCLPF of component provided in Table 7-1.However block wall may have lower HCLPF than component, therefore HCLPF reported here as >RLGM.Page 41 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Appendix B MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results Page 42 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walkdown SEWS Screening Notes HCLPFo* Key Failure Mode-Walk-By SWYSreigNtsHPF eyFiueMd 0 1 2FW-VA-0032B Refueling Water Recirc Pump AUX 750 Rm 828 Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p 782 Included in IPEEE, p 782 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Suction Isolation JJ/61 2 2FW-VA-0033A Refueling Water Recirc Pump AUX 750 Rm 824 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 782 Included in IPEEE, p 782 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Suction Isolation J.1/61 3 2FW-VA-0001A Refueling Water Recirc Pump Suction Isolation 4 2ND-VA-O056 ND Relief- 'A' Coldlegs 5 2ND-VA-O061 NO Relief -Hotlegs 6 2ND-VA-0064 ND Relief -'B' Coldlegs 7 2NI-VA-0119 NI Relief- 'A' Train Hotleg 8 2NI-VA-0151 NI Relief- 'B' Train Hotleg 9 2NI-VA-0161 NI Relief- Coldleg 10 ORN-VA-0007A SNSWP Supply to Units land 2 11 2NV-VA-0095B NC Pumps Seal Water Return Cont AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX 750 733 716 733 716 750 733 716 733 Rm 828 JJ/6i HH/60 FF/6o JJ/61 GG/60 Rm 830 GG/60 Rm 788 HH/60 Rm 601 AA/63 Rm 602A EE/60 Open/Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Open Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Open Closed Walk-By Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walk-By Walk-By p 782 Included in IPEEE, p 782 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, AppendixC Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 p 785 Included in IPEEE, p 785>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM Screened per IPEEE Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Reactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid RX Cavity Window Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 12 2NC-VA-272AC Isolation Valve RX 772 B-C Side Closed Open and Closed Walkdown Reeence 1 Screens>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 117' 20R Appendix C Table 2-4 13 2NC-VA273AC Reactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid RX Cavity Window Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Isolation Valve RX 772 B-C Side Closed Open and Closed Walkdown Reeence 1 Screen outRLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 117' 20R Appendix C Table 2-4 NC System Pressurizer PORV Pressurizer Cavity Solenoids and Pneumatic Controls RX 806 y Closed Open and Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 14 2NC-VA-0303A A1052 358 NRrGM Screne pe PAtER 5 2NI-VA-o430A 2NC-34A Assured Nitrogen Supply 762 2A CA Rm Closed Open and Closed Walk-By p 785 Included in IPEEE, p 785 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE from 2A CIA (MDV) 45' 51R Reference 10, Included in IPEEE (p 772). Evaluated by Structural 16 2FW-TX-OO01 Refueling Water Storage Tank Yard >760 N/A n/a n/a Walkdown Appendix C Mechanics Associates (p 1461). >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 17 2NI-VA-0054A 2A CLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 Pipe Chase Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 43' 46R 18 Pipe Chase is 2NI-VA-OO6SB 2B CLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 138' 47R 18 21-V-007A 2 CI Blok Vlve(MDV RX 733 Pipe Chase 19 2NI-VA-O76A 2C2CLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 221"47R 20 2NI-VA-0088B 2D CLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 Pipe Chase Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 317" 49R New equipment

-updated IPEtE SEWS evaluation.

21 2EHM-TF-HMTA H2 Igniter Transformer AUX 750 CC/61 Off Functional Walk-By p 74 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE"Reference 10, Appendix B1, pg. R1-10" Reference 22 2EHM-PN-HMPPA H2 Igniter Power Panel AUX 750 CC/61 Standby Functional Walkdown enc Bounded by evaluation of 2EHM-TB-158.

>GM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Appendix C Buddb vlaino EMT-59 RG cendprER P64 2EHM-HR-TB03 A'Train H2 Igniters Reference 10, Not in experience database.

Tested to SQURTS 23 thru TB71 (Odd RX Various Various De-energized Functional Walkdown eRLGM Undetermined numbers only) (35 Igniters per Train) Appendix C TRS.23 a 2EHM-SX-HMBPA Voltage Reg Bypass Switch AUX 750 CC/61 De-energized Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on SPRI NP-5041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Appendix C Table 2-4 Page 43 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results Rev. 0 EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walkdow S or SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode***Walk-By 23 b 2EHM-VR-HMRA Voltage Regulator AUX 750 CC/61 De-energized Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRi NP-6t41-SL, Rev. 1, 0.29 Functional AppendixC Table 2-4 24 2EHM-TB-1549 LocaI Terminal Box AUX 750 CC/61 n/a Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRi NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.90 Functional Appendix C Table 2-4 25 Deleted 26 2CA-HX-OO03 TDCAP Bearing Oil Cooler AUX 716 AA/60 Idle Functional Walk-By p 542 vRLGM Screened per IPEEE 27 2CA-PU-0003 TDCAP (Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine AUX 716 AA/60 Idle Functional Walk-By p 242 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Driven Pump)Rsie-of-the-box with 2CA-PU-0003, which has an 27 a 2SA-TR-O003 TDCAP Turbine AUX 716 AA/6O Idle Functional Walk-By fE t SEWS w>RLGM Screened per IPEEE IPEEE SEWS Rsle-of-the-hoo with 2CA-PU-053, which has an 27 b 2SA-VA-0004 TDCAP Steam Control Valve AUX 716 AA/60 Idle Functional Walk-By R wiW h >RLGM Screened per IPEEE IPEEE SEWS Rule-of-the-box wish 2CA-PU-0003, which has an 27 c 2SA-GV-0003 TDCAP Governor Valve AUX 716 AA/60 Idle Functional Walk-By FE t SEWS ' w>RLGM Screened per IPEEE IPEEE SEWS Rule-of-the-boo with 2CA-PU-0003, which has an 27 d 2SA-GX-0003 Gear Reducer AUX 716 AA/6O Idle Functional Walk-By >RLGM Screened per IPEEE IPEEE SEWS 28 2CA-PN-AFTp TDCAP Control Panel AUX 716 AA/61 n/a Available Walk-By p 187 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 29 2SA-VA-O048ABC TDCAP Steam Supply Isolation Inner Doghouse 767 FF/59 Idle Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE (AOV) (OH3)inner Doghouse Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 29 a 2SA-SV-0480 Air Supply Solenoid Dump Valve 767 FF/59 Energized De-energized Walkdown 1>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 (DH3) AppendixC Table 2-4 29 b 2SA-SV-0481 Air Supply Solenoid Dump Valve 767Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-641-SL, Rev. 1, RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 (DH3) Appendix C Table 2-4 Rm 601 30 2SA-VA-0003 TDCAP Trip-Throttle Valve AUX 716 60 Open Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE FF/69 31 Deleted 32 Deleted 33 Deleted 34 2V1-VA-003ý 2A VI Essential Hdr Supply from VG AUX 733 Rm 726 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Interaction

-Block Wall Inlet Relief (115 psig) FF/59 Appendix C Table 2-4 35 2VI-VA-0034 2B Vl Essential Hdr Supply from VG AUX 733 FF/R8 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Interaction

-Block Wall Inlet Relief (115 psig) Appendix C Table 2-4 36 2VI-VA-011Z 2A VI Aux Bldg Instrument AirTank AUX 733 Rm 726 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6B41 Relief (115 psig) FF/S9 Appendix C Table 2-4 37 2VI-VA-013 2A VI Aux Bldg Instrument AirTank AUX 733 Rm 726 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Relief (115 psig) FF/59 AppendixC Table 2-4 38 2VI-VA-015 2B VI Aux Bldg Instrument AirTank AUX 733 FF/58 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Relief (115 psig) Appendix C Table 2-4 39 2VI-VA-015 2B Vi Aux Bldg Instrument AirTank AUX 733 FF/58 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Relief (115 psig) Appendix C Table 2-4 40 2VI-VA-2009 2SM-1AB VI Accumulator Relief Outer Doghouse 70/67 Closed Closed Wlkd Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RLGM Screened per EFRI P-6041 (120 psig) (DH4) Appendix C Table 2-4 Page 44 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Waikdown or SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode***Walk-By 41 2VI-VA-2019 2SM-7AB VI Accumulator Relief Outer Doghouse Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 42 2VI-VA-2019 790 DD/69 Closed Closed Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 42 2VI-VA-2029 2SM-3ABC VI Accumulator Relief Inner Doghouse Closed Closed Wlkd Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLOM Screened per EFRI NP-6041 (120 psig) (0143) Appendix C Table 2-4 2SM-5AB VI Accumulator Relief Inner Doghouse 70/59 Closed Closed Wlkd Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EFRI NP-6041 (120 psig) (DH3) Appendix C Table 2-4 44TCA Flow Control to 2A S and AUX 716 Open Open/Throttled Walk-By p 781 Included in IPEEE, p 781 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls BB/62 Closed 44 a 2CA-ML-0640 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2MC10 >RLGIM Screened per IPEEE 44 b 2CA-SS-640 Selector Switch AUX 716 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-64AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/62 44 c 2CA-MT-0640 Misc Transmitter AUX 716 Rm 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-64AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/62 44 d 2CA-VP-0640 Valve Positioner AUX 716 Rm 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-64AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/62 Reference 10, LM ScendprERN-64 44 e 2CA-SV-0640 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown en>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Appendix C Reference 10,vLM ScendprERNF64 44 f 2CA-SV-0641 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Appendix C 45 2CA-VA-0052AB TDCA Flow Control to 2B SC and AUX 716 Em 601 Open Open/Throttled/

Walk-By p 781 Included in IPEEE, p 78 1 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls BB/61 Closed 45 a 2CA-ML-0520 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2MC10 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 45 b 2CA-SS-0520 Selector Switch AUX 716 Em 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-S2AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/61 45c 2CA-MT-520 Mis Transmitter AUX 716 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-S2AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/61 45 d 2CA-VP-Em20 Valve Po~itioner AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-52AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 813/61 Reference 10,vLC ScendprERN-61 45 e 2CA-SV-0520 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Appendco C >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 45f 2CA-SV-0521 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Reference 10, RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Appendix C TDCA Flow Control to 2C SC andRr 0OpnT oted 46 2CA-VA-0048AB AUX 716 Em 601 Open Openflhrottled/

Walk-By p 781 Included in FPEEE, p 781 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls CC/60 Closed 46 a 2CA-ML-0480 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2MC10 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 46 b 2CA-SS-0480 Selector Switch AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-48AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE CC/60 46c 2CA-MT-0480 Mis Transmitter AUX 716 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-48AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE CC/6O 46 d 2CA-VP-0480 Valve Poxitioner AUX 716 Em 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-48AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE CC/60 Reference 10,>LM ScendprERN-61 46 e 2CA-SV-0480 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Appence 1 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Appendix C Reference 10,vLM ScendprPRN-61 46f 2CA-SV-0481 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Appendix C >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 47 2CA-VA-0036AB TDCA Flow Control to 2D SG and AUX 716 Rm 601 Open Open/Throttled/

Walk-By p 781 Included in IPEEE, p 781 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls BB/63 Closed Page 45 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESEL ID BDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walkdown or SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode-Walk-By 47 a 2CA-ML-0360 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2MC10 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 47 b 2CA-SS-0360 Selector Switch AUX 716 Sm 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-36AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/63 Sm 601 47 c 2CA-MT-0360 Mistc Transmitter AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-36AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/63 Sm 601 47 d 2CA-VP-0360 Valve Positioner AUX 716 BB/60 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-36AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/63 47e 2CA-SV-0360 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Reference 10, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Appendix C 47 f 2CA-SV-0361 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Reference 10, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Appendix C 48 -CV-001niB 2A SG Main Steam PORV and Outer Doghouse tog FF/66 Closed Open/Throttled/

Walk-By p 264 2B SG Main Steam PORV and Outer Doghouse FF/66 Closed Open/Throttled/

Walk-By p 294 49 2SV-C'V-OOS3AR 0 F6 lsdWl-y p24>LMSree e PE Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH4) Closed 2C SG Main Steam PORV and Inner Doghouse 809 FF159 Closed Open/Throttled/

Walk-By p 294 50 25V-CV-0007ABC 80nF5 lsd akB 9 RLGM Screened per IFEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH3) Closed 512D Main Steam PORV and Inner Doghouse 809 FF/59 Closed Open/Throttled/

Walk-By p 294 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH3) Closed 52 2EPL-PN-EVDA Vital Battery 125 VDC Distribution AUX 733 DD/54 Functional Functional Walk-By p 212 RLGM Screened per IPEEE Panel 52 a 2EPL-PN-EVDD Vital Battery 125 VDC Distribution AUX 733 CC/57 Functional Functional Walk-By p 212 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Panel Sm 707 -Refeence50, edunantrompnentlistng, eferkoWlESE 53 OEPL-BA-EVCA Vital Battery AUX 733 C/ Functional Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Redundant component listing, refer to U- Block Wall CC/54 Appendix C item 953 54 OEPL-BC-EVCS VitSl Battery Charger and Charger AUX 733 Rm 701 Functional Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.45 Functional Connection Box ECBS BB/S4 Appendix C Table 2-4 55 2EPE-MX-EMXA4 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 750 BB/65 Functional Functional Walk-By p32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 56 2EPE-MX-EMXA2 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 750 BB/65 Functional Functional Walk-By p32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 57 2EPE-MX-EMXB4 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 733 716 Functional Functional Walk-By p32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE B1/65 2ETP-CA-0010 58 Pzr PORV Relay/Indication AUX 767 HH/58 Standby Functional Walk-By p 216 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE (2ATC 10)Main Control Board Cabinet for 59 2EOA-PN-MC5 Head-Vent Operation, Hotleg AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Temperature Indication 60 2OA-F-MC7 Main Control Board Cabinet with H2 60 2EOA-PN-MC7 Switch AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Igniter Control Switch 61 2EOA-PN-MCSO Main Control Board Cabinet for CA / AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 RLGM Screened per IPEEE NC Systems Main Control Board Cabinet for NI 62 2EOA-PN-MC11 System, Containment Pressure AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Indication Main Control Board Cabinet for SM 63 2EOA-PN-MC2 System (PORV Control, CF/SM AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 8 6 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Indication)

Page 46 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walkdown or SEWS Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode-C Walk-By C o b ICCM a 2EOA-PN-MC1 AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE ICCM Remote Display ICCM b 2EIA-CA-9211 Train A Remote Display Processor AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev, 1, RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 behind 2MC2 Appendix C Table 2-4 ICCM c 2EIA-CA-9221 Train B Remote Display Processor AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 behind 2MC2 AppendixC Table 2-4 Role-of-the-box with 2MCI, which has an RPEEE RG cendprPt ICCM d 2EIA-P-9210 Train A Remote Display AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By E>RLGM Screened per IPEEE SEWS Rule-of-the-boo with 2MC1, which has an IPEtEE LM SrendprPt ICCM e 2EIA-P-9220 Train B Remote Display AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By SEWS >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Reference SO, Screens nout based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.9Fntoa ICCM f 2EIA-CA-9210 Train A ICCM-86 Cabinet AUX 750 CC/S5 Standby Functional Walkdown 0.29 Functional Appendix C Table 2-4 ICCM 2EIA-CA-9220 Train B ICCM-86 Cabinet AUX 750 CC/SB Standby Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.29 Functional Appendix C Table 2-4 64 21PE-CA-9010 SSPS.Cabinet'A (CABlock.Valves AUX 767 Control Rn 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 11 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 73 a 74 75 75 a 76 77 21PE-CA-9020 2EQB-PN-DGLSA 2EPG-PN-EKVA 2EPG-BI-EVIA 2CF-LT-6000 2CF-LT-5540 2CF-LT-5570 2CF-LT-6030 2$M-PT-S080 2rA-PN-AFPA 25M-PT-5110 2SM-PT-5140 2CA-PN-AFPB 2SM-PT-5170 2NC-RD-5850 Closure Permissive)

SSPS Cabinet 'B' (CLA Block Valves Closure Permissive)

Various Functions (i.e. H2 Igniters)120VAC Inst and Control Panelboard Vital Inverter Steam Generator NR Level Indication Loop 1 Steam Generator NR Level Indication Loop 2 Steam Generator NR Level Indication Loop 3 Steam Generator NR Level Indication Loop 4 Steam Generator

1. 1 Wide Range Pressure Indication Loop 2A CA Pump Control Panel Steam Generator

1. 2 Wide Range Pressure Indication Loop Steam Generator

1. 3 Wide Range Pressure Indication Loop 2B CA Pump Control Panel Steam Generator

1. 4 Wide Range Pressure Indication Loop Steam Generator

1. 1 NC WR T-Hot Indication Loop AUX AUX AUX AUX RX RX RX RX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX RX 767 750 733 No 739 742 740 744 750 716 733 733 716 750 740 CC/58 Control Rm CC/58 Rm 805 BB/61 Rm 701 DD/54 Rm 701 CC/S5 Accum 2A R 36' 46R Accum 2B F 1459 99R Accum 2C F 2159 56R Accum 2D R 326' 57R Rm 804 DD/67 Rm 601 BB/61 Rm 713 DD/59 Rm 713 DD/59 Rm 601 CC/62 Rm 804 DD/67 24' 30R 925 Standby Standby Nominal 120 VAC Output Nominal 120 VAC Output Rm Indication 1w Indication m Indication Fm Indication Indication Standby Indication Indication Stand Indication Indication Functional Functional Functional Functional Indication Indication Indication Indication Indication Functional Indication Indication Functional Indication Indication Walk-By Walkdown Walk-By Walk-By Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walkdown Walk-By Walkdown Walkdown Walk-By Walkdown Walkdown p 1 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 p 203 p 65 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 p 180 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 p 180 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4>RLGM 0.29>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM oRLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM Screened per IPEEE Functional Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per IPEEE Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per IPEEE Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 77 a e" or ..n caon AUX 767 BB/63 Standby Functional Walkdown Ino EDB #) System (RVLIS) Cabinet 0.37 Functional 79 2 Steam Generator

1. 2 NC WR T-Hot 65 740 164' 309 Indication Indication Waibdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 79 2NC-D5900 Steam Generator

1. 3 NC WR T-Hot RX 740 203' 309 Indication Indication Waibdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, vRLGM Screened per FF91 NP-6041 Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 Page 47 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results ESEL ID 80 81 82 83 84 85 EQUIPMENT EDB Description Steam Generator

1. 4 NC WR T-Hot 2NC-RD-5920 Indication Loop Containment WR Pressure 2NS-PT-5070 Indication Loop NC WR Pressurizer Pressure 2 NC-PT-5 120 Indication Loop Process Control Cabinet 1 2EIA-CA-9010 (7300 cabinet)2A Diesel Generator Fuel Oil 2F0-TK-0056 Storage Tank 2B Diesel Generator Fuel Oil 2FD-TS-00S7 Storage Tank Bldg RX AUX AUX AUX Yard Yard EL 740 750 733 767<760<760 Location 3086 30R DD/60 Rm 713 DD/67 Control Rm 925 AA/54 N/A N/A OPERATING STATE Normal State Desired State Waldown SEWS* Screening Notes Walk-By Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Indication Indication Walk-By p 16 Intact/Available Intact/Available Walk-By p 556 Intact/Available Intact/Available Walk-By p 556 HCLPF**>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM Key Failure Mode-f*Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE 600 VAC Essential for IH2 Skimmer Rm 805 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 86 2EPE-MX-EMXA3 Fan 2A Suction Isolation Valve AUX 750 89/66 Closed Closed Walkdown Reeence 1 Scree out >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 2VXIA (04A) Appendix C Table 2-4 600 VAC Essential for H2 Skimmer Rm 716 Reference 10 Screens out based on EPRI NP-6141-SL, Rev. 1, 87 2EPE-MX-EMXBS Fan 2B Suction Isolation Valve AUX 733 BB/65 Closed Closed Walkdown Reeence S Scree out >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 2VX2 (0C) B/65Appendix C Table 2-4 2VX2B (01C)600 VAC Essential VE/VX (04C, 06D Rm 805 88 2EPE-MX-EMXC AUX 750 Closed Closed Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE& 051) BA5/59 89 2EPE-MX-EMXD 600 VAC Essential for VE/VX (06E & AUX 733 Rm 716 Closed Closed Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 6051) BB/60 H2 Skimmer Fan 2A Suction Reference 10, 90 2VX-VA-OOO1A RX 826 264" 451 Closed Open WaAkdown C 0.60 Functional Isolation Valve Appendin C 91 2VX-AH-0003 Hydrogen Skimmer Fan No 2A RX 816 272* 38R Off On Waikdown Reference 10, 0.39 Anchorage Appendix C H2 Skimmer Fan 28 Suction Reference 10, 92 2VX-VA-0002B RX 827 283° 46R Closed Open Walkdown 0.41 Functional Isolation Valve Appendix C 93 2VX-AH-0004 Hydrogen Skimmer Fan No 2B RX 816 268° 38R Off On Walkdown Reference 10, 0.39 Anchorage Appendix C 2VX-DA-9120 Containment Air Return Fan 2A RX 775 27 606 Closed Open Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2VX-AH-0001, which has an vRLGM Screened per PEE (2RAF-D-2)

Damper IPEEE SEWS 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 2VX-AH-0001 Containment Air Return Fan 2A 2VE-XF-0004 Annulus Ventilation Fan 2A 2VE-XF-000S Annulus Ventilation Fan 2B 2KC-PU-0001 Al Closed Cooling Water System Pump A2 Closed Cooling Water System 2KCC-PU -0002 Pump 2KC-TK-O009 Component Cooling Water System Surge Tank 2KC-VA-OOSOA KC Auxiliary Bldg Supply Non-Essential Isolation 2KC-VA-0230A KC Reactor Bldg Supply Non-Essential Isolation-KC Auxiliary Bldg Return Non-Essential Isolation 2KC-VA-0003A KC Reactor Bldg Return Non-Essential Isolation RX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX 270° 50R JJ/59 JJ/60 GG/SS FF/55 JJ/57 LL/59 LLIS8 GG/56 GG/56 Off On Off On Off On On On On On Intact/In-Service Intact/In-Service Open/Closed Closed Open/Closed Closed Open/Closed Closed Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 4 34 Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Appendix C Table 2-4 Walk-By p 255 Walk-By p 255 Walk-By p 528 Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 7 8 3 Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783 Walk-By p 7 8 3 Included in IPEEE, p 783 Walk-By p 308>RLGM 0.35 0.35>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM Screened per PEEE Anchorage Anchorage Screened per PEEE Screened per PEEE Screened per PEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Page 48 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walkdows or SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode"*Walk-By 105 2KC-HX-O005 Train A Component Cooling Water AUX 750 JJ/57 Intact/In-Service Intact/In-Service Walkdown Reference 10, HCIPF based on IPEEE evaluation (p 1728) by >RLGM Screened per PEEE HX Appendix C Structural Mechanics Associates 106 2NC-VA-0032B NC System Pressurizer PORV RX 806 Pressurizer Cavity Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 110" 32R 107 2NC-VA-00368 NC System Pressurizer PORV RX 806 Pressurizer Cavity Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEER, p 783 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 105° 32R 108 2NC-VA-0001 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve RX 794 Pressurizer Cavity Closed Closed Walk-By p783 Included in IPEEE, p 783 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 109" 34R 109 2NC-VA-0002 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve RX 802 Pressurizer Cavity Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 78 3 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 109" 34R 110 2NC-VA-0003 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve RX 802 Pressurizer Cavity Closed Closed Walk-By p 78 3 Included in IPEEE, p 783 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 109' 34R 111 2ND-PU-O001 Train A ND Pump AUX 695 Rm 506 Off Intact Walk-By p 273 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE GG/59 112 2ND-PU-0002 Train B ND Pump AUX 695 Sm 507 Off Intact Walk-By p 273 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE FF/58 Sm 785 113 2ND-HX-0003 Train A ND HX AUX 733 Intact Intact Walk-By p 458 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE LL/60 114 2ND-HX-0004 Train B ND HX 115 2ND-HX-O0S Train A ND Pump Seal Cooling HX 116 2ND-VA-OOO2AC RHR Pump Hotleg Suction Isolation 117 2ND-VA-0OOiB RHR Pump Hotleg Suction Isolation Train A RHR Isolation to the 118 2NI-VA-0173A Coldlegs Train B RHR Isolation to the 119 2NI-VA-0178B Coldlegs 120 2NI-VA-0118A Train A NI Isolation to the Coldlegs 121 2NI-VA-0121A Train A NI Isolation to the Hotlegs 122 2NI-VA-0150B Train B NI Isolation to the Coldlegs 123 2NI-VA-0152B Train B NI Isolation to the Hotlegs 124 2NI-VA-0162A NI Isolation to the Coldlegs 125 2NI-PU-0009 Train A NI Pump 126 2NI-PU-0010 Train B NI Pump 127 2NS-PU-0001 Train A NS Pump 128 2NS-PU-0002 Train B Ns Pump 129 2NS-HX-0003 Train A NS Heat Exchanger 130 2NS-HX-0004 Train B NS Heat Exchanger AUX AUX RX RX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX 733 Rm 786 LL/60 Rm 506 GG/59 184* 481 184' 27R GG/60 Rm 788 HH/60 Rm 646 JJ/60 Rm 646 GG/60 Rm 646 GG/60 Rm 830 HH/60 Rm 788 JJ/61 Rm 635 HH/58 Rm 633 GG/59 Rm 505 GG/57 Rm 504 GG/57 Rm 786 LL/60 Rm 786 LL/60 Intact Intact Closed Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Off Off Off Off Intact Intact Intact Intact Open Open Open Open Open Open/Closed Open Open/Closed Open/Closed Intact Intact Intact Intact Intact Intact Walk-By p 458 >RLGM Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2ND-PU-0001, which has an >61GM rPEEE SEWS Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783 >RLGM Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 7 8 3 >RLGM Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGM Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGM Walk-By p784 Included in IPEEE, p 78 4 >RLGM Walk-By p784 Included in IPEEE, p 7 8 4 >RLGM Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 78 4 >RLGM Walk-By p 734 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGM Walk-By p734 Included in IPEEE, p 78 4 >RLGM Walk-By p 245 >RLGM Walk-By p 245 >RLGM Walk-By p 277 >RLGM Walk-By p 277 >RLGM Walk-By p 4 5 1 >RLGM Walk-By p 451 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Page 49 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL 131 2SM-VA-0007AB TrainAMSIV Outer Doghouse 792 (DH4)132 2SM-VA-0OOSAB Train B MSIV Inner Doghouse 792 (DH3)133 2SM-VA-0003ABC TrainCMSIV Inner Doghouse 792 (DH3)134 2SM-VA-0001AB Train D MSIV Outer Doghouse 792 (DH4)135 2SV-VA-0020 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 Valve (DH4)136 2SV-VA-0021 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 Valve (DH4)137 2SV-VA-0022 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 Valve (DH4)138 2SV-VA-0023 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 Valve (OH4)139 2SV-VA-0024 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 Valve (DH4)140 2SV-VA-0014 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788 Valve (0H3)141 2SV-VA-0015 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788 Valve (DH3)142 2SV-VA-0016 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788 Valve (DH3)143 2SV-VA-0017 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788 Valve (DH3)144 2SV-VA-0018 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief inner Doghouse 788 Valve )DH3)145 2SV-VA-0008 Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788 Valve (DH3)146 2SV-VA-0009 Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788 Valve (DH3)147 2SV-VA-0010 Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788 Valve (DH3)148 2SV-VA-0011 Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788 Valve (DH3)149 2SV-VA-0012 Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788 Valve (DH3)DD/S9 DD/6O DD/67 EE/68 EE/68 EE/68 EE/68 EE/658 EE/58 EE/58 EE/58 EE/58 EE/S8 EE/60 EE/60 EE/60 EE/60 EE/60 Open/Closed Open/Closed Open/Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed OPERATING STATE Location Normal State Desired State or SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode-na Walk-By DD/69 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 300 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Closed Walk-By p 300 Closed Walk-By p 300 Closed Walk-By p 300 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297 Closed Walk-By p 297>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM>RLGM Screened per PEEE Screened per PEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per PEEE Screened periPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perIPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perIPEEE Screened perIPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Screened perlPEEE Page 50 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walkdown or SEWS' Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode***Walk-By 150 2SV-VA-0002 Train D Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 EE/68 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Valve (DH4)151 25V-VA-0003 Train D Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 EE/68 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Valve (DH4)152 2SV-VA-004 Train D Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 EE/BB Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Valve (DH4)153 2SV-VA-005 Train D Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 EE/68 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Valve (DH4)154 2SV-VA-0006 Train D Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 EE/68 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Valve (DH4)Rule-of-the-boo with 2RN-PU-OO03, which has an 155 2RN-HX-0005 2A RN Pump Motor Cooler AUX 716 FF/56 In-Service In-Service Walk-By p 249 IPEEE with 24w h >RLGM Screened per IPEEE RN Pump Discharge Cross TrainPEER SEWS (p 249)oLM ScendprPE is6 2RN-VA-0040A RN Pump Discharge Crss Train AUX 716 GG/56 Normally Open Closed Walk-By p 786 included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Supply Isolation MOV 157 2RN-VA-0086A KC HI Cooling Water Supply AUX 760 HH/56 Throttled Open Walk-By p786 Included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Isolation KC HX Cooling Water Outlet 158 2RN-VA-0089A Isolin AUX 750 HH/58 Throttled Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Isolation 159 2RN-VA-C112A Al KC Pump Motor Cooler Cooling AUX 750 GG/55 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Water Outlet Isolation 160 2RN-VA-0117A A2 KC Pump Motor Cooler Cooling AUX 750 GG/55 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 786 Included in lPEEE, p 786 >RLGM Screened per PEEE Water Outlet Isolation 161 2RN-VA-0070A EDG KD HX Supply MOV Isolation AUX 736 Rm 714 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 786 Included in lPEEE, p786 >RLGM Screened per PEEE DD/68 Rm 714 162 2RN-VA-O073A EDOKD HIXOutlet MOV Isolation AUX 738 ,1= Open Closed Walk-Sy p756 Included in lPEER, p 78e >RLGM Screened perlPEER 163 2RN-VA-0134A Train A NS HX Supply Isolation MOV 164 2RN-HX-0017 Train A NV Pump Mtr Cooler 165 2RN-HX-0019 Train A NV Pump Bearing Oil Cooler 166 2RN-HX-0021 Train A NV Pump Gearbox Oil Cooler 167 2VA-AH-0024 Train A NS Pump AHU 168 2VA-AH-0028 Train A ND Pump AHU 169 2RN-HX-0023 Train A NI Pump Mtr Cooler 170 2RN-HX-0025 Train A NI Pump Brg Oil Cooler 171 2RN-VA-0279B Unit 2 Aux Bldg Ventilation Return Isolation 172 ORN-VA-0147AC 1A/2A RN Disch to RC X-Over Isol 173 ORN-VA-0149A 1A/2A RN Essential Return Header to SNSWP AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX AUX uu/68 Rm 785 MM/el Rm 634 HH/57 Rm 634 HH/57 Rm 634 HH/57 Rm 505 GG/57 Rm 506 GG/58 Rm 635 HH/SS Rm 635 HH/59 Rm 830 HH/60 Rm 602 FF/53 FF/59 Closed Standby/In-Service Standby/In-Service Standby/In-Service Standby Standby Standby Standby Closed Open Closed Closed Walk-By p786 Included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGM Intact Walk-By p 252 Rule-of-the-box with 2NV-PU-O015, which has an >RLGM IPEEE SEWS (p 252)Intact Walk-By p 252 Rule-of-the-box with 2NV-PU-0015, which has an IPEEE SEWS (p 252)Rule-of-the-box with 2NV-PU-OO15, which has an intact Walk-By p 252 PERSW p5)>RLGM IPEEE SEWS (p 252)Intact Walkdown Reference 10, Same make/model as ESEL 168 >RLGM Appendix C Intact Walk-By p 413 >RLGM Intact Walk-By p 245 Rule-of-the-box with 2NI-PU-OO09, which has an >RLGM IPEEE SEWS (p 2 4 5)Intact Walk-By p 245 Rule-of-the-box with 2NI-PU-O009, which has an >RLGM IPEEE SEWS (p 245)Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGM Closed Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Open Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Screened per IPEER Screened per PEER Screened per PEER Screened per IPEEE Screened per PEtE Screened perIPEER Screened perIPERE Screened periPEtE Screened per PEtE Screened perIPEER Screened per PEtE Page 51 ofGO0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Nor 2A RN Ess Hdr SNSWP Return Rm 647 274 2RN-VA-0295A AUl Fr/t Isolation FF/6O 175 1RN-VA-0296A 1A RN Ess Hdr SNSWP Return Isolation 176 1RN-VA-0064A Unit 1 Non-ESS Return Isolation to AUX Rm 602E SNSWP FF/55 Rmn 724 177 2EPE-MX-EMXB 600 VAC Essential Power AUX 733 Fu GG/56 178 2CA-VA-162B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Aux 716 Isolation from circulating water 179 a 2CA-SV-1620 Solenoid Valve Aux 716 En 179 b 2CA-RV-1622 Relief Valve Aux 733 C 179 c 2CA-GC-1620 Control Air Gas Cylinder Aux 733 179 d 2CA-GC-1621 Control Air Gas Cylinder Aux 733 179 e 2CA-PS-5380 Pressure Switch Aux 716 Fu 179 f 2CA-PS-5391 Pressure Switch Aux 716 Fu Junction Boo houses Relays 'AA' and 179 g 2CA-TB-1901 Aux 733 Electr Pen Room Fu'BB'10 2NV-VA-003A Letdown Inboard Containment 160 2N-AO3ARX 752 Isolation 180 a 2NV-SV-0350 Solenoid Valve RX 752 En Rev. 0 OPERATING STATE mal State Desired State Open Open Open Closed Open Closed nctional Functional

losed Open ergized De-energized

losed Closed ntact Intact ntact Intact nctional Functional nctional Functional nctional Functional Open Closed ergized De-energized Walkdown or Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By Walk-By SEWS' Screening Notes p 786 Included in IPEEE, p 786 p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 p 32 HCLPF**>RLGM>RLGIM>RLGM>RLGM TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD Key Failure Mode-Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE Screened per IPEEE TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBo TBD Rev. O Page 52 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown c ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By Walk-By 180 b 2NV-SV-03S1 Solenoid Valve RX 752 Energized De-energized TBD 181 2NV-VA-0121 Auxiliary Letdown Isolation AUX 733 RHR HtX Room Closed Closed TBD 181 a 2NV-ML-1210 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional TED Letdown Inboard Containment 182 2NV-VA-0457A Lation EnRX 752 Closed Closed TBD Isolation 182 a 2NV-SV-4570 Solenoid Valve RX 752 De-energized De-energized TBD 182 b 2NV-SV-4571 Solenoid Valve RX 752 De-energized De-energized TED Letdown Inboard Containment 183 2NV-VA-04S8A RX 752 Closed Closed TED Isolation 183 a 2NV-SV-4580 Solenoid Valve RX 752 De-energized De-energized TED 183 b 2NV-SV-4581 Solenoid Valve RX 752 De-energized De-energized TED 184 2NV-VA-OO2SB Excess Letdown Isolation RX 725 Closed Closed TED 184 a 2NV-SV-0250 Solenoid Valve RX 725 De-energized De-energized TBD Instrument Air Blackout 185 2VI-TK-0010 AUX 750 Intact Intact TED Accumulator 186 2V1-1328 Blackout Accumulator Relief AUX 750 Closed Closed TED 187 2V1-1330 Blackout Header Relief AUX 750 Closed Closed TBD Page number refers to IPEEE scanned document page.HCLPF values of >RLGM indicate that the HCLPF exceeds the Review Level Ground Motion (0.2 6 g), but that a specific HCLPF value was not calculated since the component was screened out from further evaluation.

Key Failure Modes are defined as follows: Screened per IPEEE -Indicates that the component was evaluated in the IPEEE and therefore meets the RLGM demand.Screened per EPRI NP-6041 -Indicates that the component meets the screening criteria of EPRI NP-6041, Table 2-4 and that neither anchorage, relay chatter, nor nor interactions limit the reported HCLPF.Interaction

-Block Wall -Indicates that the component is located near a block wall. The block wall was evaluated in the IPEEE and therefore the block wall meets the RLGM demand. The functional and anchorage HCLPFs exceed the reported HCLPF value.Anchorage

-Indicates that the anchorage is the governing failure mode for the component.

Functional

-Indicates that functional failure is the governing failure mode for the component.

-*

• Component adjacent to block wall. Aux building block walls were evaluated in the IPEEE as robust without a specific value. HCLPF of component provided in Table 7-2.However block wall may have lower HCLPF than component, therefore HCLPF reported here as >RLGM.Rev. 0 SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode***TBD TBD TED TBD TED TED TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TED TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TED TED TBD TBD TED TED TBD TBD TBD TED TED TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TED TED TED TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD Page 53 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Appendix C MNS FLEX Flow Paths List of Figures Figure C-1. Auxiliary Feedw ater System ...................................................................................

55 Figure C-2. Borated Water Supply Refueling Water System ...................................................

56 Figure C-3. M ain Steam Header ...............................................................................................

57 Figure C-4. Reactor Coolant Make-Up Safety Injection System ..............................................

58 Figure C-5. Reactor Coolant Make-Up (Low Pressure)

Residual Heat Removal System ...... 59 Figure C-6. SG Secondary FLEX Make-Up Pump Connections Feedwater System Te m pering H ead er ............................................................................................................

60 Page 54 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM NON-SAFETY AUXILIARY FEEOWATER STORAGE TANK (CAST I CA-G4AB CA-52A-9 BURIED CONTEVSER CI.RCULATING ,AEPIR STEAM GENERATOR 221 TU.BINEJ.RIVEN Pump CA-49AB STEAM GENERATOR CA-3GA9 STEAM GENERATOR Figure C-1. Auxiliary Feedwater System Page 55 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 0 SORATEDWATER SUPPLY REFUELING W~AER SYSTEM TO RX O*LN Figure C-2. Borated Water Supply Refueling Water System Page 56 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MAIN STEAM HEADER CSAE'S STEAM DUMP TO CONDENSER (9: RE-HEATERS (2ND STAGE)FDWPT Figure C-3. Main Steam Header Page 57 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 REACTOR COOLANT MAKE-UP SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Refit PCs B&C HOT LE CS PCs MV~ LMSs RCS mO I437 LECS Figure C-4. Reactor Coolant Make-Up Safety Injection System Page 58 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 0 REACTOR COOLANT MAKE-UP (LOW PRESSURE)RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM Figure C-5. Reactor Coolant Make-Up (Low Pressure)

Residual Heat Removal System Page 59 of 60 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 0 S/0 SFECNDARY FLE MAKE-UP PUMP C FNNECTIONS ILDWATERY ES 'TEM TEMPER £NC H AD COIN A IEN T Figure C-6. SG Secondary FLEX Make-Up Pump Connections Feedwater System Tempering Header.Page 60 of 60