MNS-14-097, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review.

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review.

ML15005A085
Person / Time
Site:	Mcguire, McGuire
Issue date:	12/17/2014
From:	Capps S Duke Energy Carolinas
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
MNS-14-097
Download: ML15005A085 (64)

Text

Steven D. Capps Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station

'ENERGY, Duke Energy MG01VP 1 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078 o: 980.875.4805 f: 980.875.4809 Steven.Capps@duke-energy.com 10 CFR 50.54(f)

December 17, 2014 Serial: MNS-14-097 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy)

McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17

Subject:

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident

References:

1. NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012, ADAMS Accession No. ML12053A340.

2. NEI Letter, Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations, dated April 9, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13101A379.

3. NRC Letter, Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report XXXXXX, Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations, dated May 7, 2013, ADAMS Accession No. ML13106A331.

4. Duke Letter, Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident, dated March 20, 2014, ADAMS Accession No. ML14098A421.

Ac'o kj&L

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 17, 2014 Page 2 On March 12, 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Reference 1 to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status. Enclosure 1 of Reference 1 requested each addressee located in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) to submit a Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report within 1.5 years from the date of Reference 1.

The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted Reference 2 requesting NRC agreement to delay submittal of the CEUS Seismic Hazard Evaluation and Screening Report so that an update to the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) ground motion attenuation model could be completed and used to develop that information. NEI proposed that descriptions of subsurface materials and properties and base case velocity profiles be submitted to the NRC by September 12, 2013, with the remaining seismic hazard and screening information submitted by March 31, 2014. The industry guidance was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated February 15, 2013 (Reference 3).

Reference 1 requested that licensees provide interim evaluations and actions taken or planned to address the higher seismic hazard relative to the design basis, as appropriate, prior to completion of the risk evaluation. In accordance with the NRC endorsed guidance in Reference 3, the attached ESEP Report for MNS Units 1 and 2 provides the information described in Section 7 of Reference 3 in accordance with the schedule identified in Reference 2.

There are no new regulatory commitments associated with this letter.

Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact George Murphy at 980-875-5715.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on December 17, 2014.

Sincerely, Steven D. Capps

Enclosure:

MNS Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission December 17, 2014 Page 3 xc:

V.M. McCree, Region IIAdministrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Avenue NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1257 John Boska, Project manager (NRR/JLD/JOMB)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mailstop 13 F15 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 G. E. Miller, Project Manager (CNS & MNS)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop 8 G9A Rockville, MD 20852-2738 J. Zeiler NRC Senior Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station Justin Folkwein American Nuclear Insurers 95 Glastonbury Blvd., Suite 300 Glastonbury, CT 06033-4453

Enclosure MNS Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report

EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS (ESEP) REPORT December 03, 2014 Revision 0 Duke Energy McGuire Nuclear Station Page 1 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 EXPEDITED SEISMIC EVALUATION PROCESS REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 PURPO SE AND O BJECTIVE ............................................................................................... 4 2.0 BRIEF

SUMMARY

OF THE FLEX SEISMIC IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES ...................... 4 3.0 EQUIPMENT SELECTION PROCESS AND ESEL .................................................................. 6 3.1 Equipm ent Selection Process and ESEL ................................................................... 6 3.1.1 ESEL D evelopm ent .............................................................................................. 7 3.1.2 Pow er-O perated Valves ...................................................................................... 8 3.1.3 Pull Boxes ..................................................................................................... . . . . 8 3.1.4 Term ination Cabinets ........................................................................................... 8 3.1.5 Critical Instrum entation Indicators ...................................................................... 8 3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections ........................................................... 9 3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX Im plem entatio n ..................................................................................................... . . 9 4.0 GROUND MOTION RESPONSE SPECTRUM (GMRS) ........................................................ 9 4.1 Plot of GM RS Subm itted by the Licensee ................................................................. 9 4.2 Comparison to Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) .................................................... 11 5.0 REVIEW LEVEL GROUND MOTION (RLGM) ................................................................... 13 5.1 Description of RLGM Selected ................................................................................. 13 5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS) .................................... 15 6.0 SEISMIC MARGIN EVALUATION APPROACH ................................................................. 15 6.1 Sum m ary of M ethodologies Used .......................................................................... 16 6.2 HCLPF Screening Process ........................................................................................ 17 6.3 HCLPF Capacity Determ ination ............................................................................... 18 6.4 Functional Capacity Screening Using EPRI NP-6041-SL .......................................... 18 6.5 Seism ic W alkdow n Approach ................................................................................ 19 6.5.1 W alkdow n Approach ....................................................................................... 19 6.5.2 W alkdow ns and W alk-Bys ................................................................................. 20 6.5.3 Significant W alkdow n Findings ........................................................................ 21 6.6 HCLPF Calculation Process ...................................................................................... 21 6.7 Functional Evaluations of Relays ............................................................................ 21 6.8 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes) ................................ 24 7.0 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS, ADDITIONAL ITEMS ASSOCIATED WITH FLEX STRATEGY CHANGES AND NEW COMPONENT INSTALLATION ..................................................... 24 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns ..................................... 24 7.2 Identification of Additional ESEL Items Associated with FLEX Strategy Changes and New FLEX Component Installations ................................................. 24 7.3 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out ........................................... 24 8.0 ESEP CONCLUSIONS AND RESULTS ............................................................................... 25 Page 2 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 8.1 Supporting Inform ation .......................................................................................... 25 8.2 Identification of Planned M odifications ................................................................. 26 8.3 Schedule for Completion of Required Modifications and Remaining ESEL Com ponent W alkdow ns/Evaluations ...................................................................... 26 8.4 Summary of Regulatory Commitments ................................................................. 27 9 .0 REFE REN CES ...................................................................................................................... 28 APPENDICES APPENDIX A MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results APPENDIX B MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results APPENDIX C MNS FLEX Flow Paths FIGURES Figure 4-1. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) -Tabular Format [4] .................................................... 10 Figure 4-2. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) - Graphical Format [4] ............................................... 11 Figure 4-3. MNS SSE (5% Damping) - Graphical Format .......................................................... 12 Figure 4-4. Comparison of MNS GMRS and SSE (5% Damping) ............................................... 12 Figure 5-1. M NS RLGM (5% Dam ping) ...................................................................................... 15 Figure 6-1. Comparison of MNS RLGM vs. IPEEE RLE .............................................................. 17 TABLES Table 4-1. MNS SSE (5% Damping) - Tabular Format [4] ........................................................ 11 Table 5-1. Ratio of the GMRS to the SSE (1 to 10 Hz Range, 5% Damping) ............................. 13 Table 5-2. M NS RLGM (5% Dam ping) ....................................................................................... 14 Table 6-1. Unit 1 Components that Require Modifications .................................................... 22 Table 6-2. Unit 2 Components that Require Modifications .................................................... 23 Table 8-1. Summary of Committed Follow-up Actions ............................................................. 27 Page 3 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 1.0 Purpose and Objective Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review of NRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system. The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena. Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [1], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(f) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Depending on the comparison between the reevaluated seismic hazard and the current design basis, further risk assessment may be required. Assessment approaches acceptable to the staff include a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA), or a seismic margin assessment (SMA). Based upon the assessment results, the NRC staff will determine whether additional regulatory actions are necessary.

This report describes the Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) undertaken for McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS). The intent of the ESEP is to perform an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1] to demonstrate seismic margin through a review of a subset of the plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is implemented using the methodologies in the NRC endorsed guidance in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 3002000704, Seismic Evaluation Guidance:

Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic [2].

The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the ESEP evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the interim evaluations.

2.0 Brief Summary of the FLEX Seismic Implementation Strategies The MNS FLEX strategies for Reactor Core Cooling and Heat Removal, Reactor Inventory Control/Long-Term Subcriticality, and Containment Function are summarized below.

This summary is derived from the MNS Overall Integrated Plan (OIP) in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 [3] (as supplemented by subsequent six-month updates [20], [21], and [22]), and Duke Energy MNS Calculation MCC-1612.00-00-0012, Augmented Approach for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic - Determine Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL) [18].

Simplified flow diagrams which depict the FLEX strategy flow paths are included in Appendix C.

Page 4 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Steam Generator (SG) heat removal is achieved during Phase 1 and 2 via the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (TDAFWP) with suction from buried Condenser Circulating Water (RC) system cross-over header (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-i). Later stages of Phase 2 and 3 strategy entails SG cooling water make-up via a portable diesel powered pump with suction from the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) and discharge aligned to new SG FLEX supply connections. Refer to Appendix C, Figures C-2, C-4, C-5, and C-6 for FLEX connection locations. The TDAFWP flow control valves and Main Steam (SM) Power-Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) are also required to provide SG heat-removal capability (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-3). The Phase 2 SG heat removal is achieved via the credited B.5.b connection (primary) or via the new FLEX mechanical connections located in the Auxiliary Building (AB) doghouses (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-6). The FLEX strategy with steam generators unavailable (i.e., refueling outage) relies on reactor coolant system feed and bleed for Phase land 2. The ESEL was populated with the components credited for Phase 1, 2 and 3 mitigation.

Reactor coolant system borated make-up during normal operation and outage conditions includes the following primary make-up connections:

" High pressure primary make-up via the Safety Injection System (NI) mechanical connection near 1/2NI-152B (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-4).

" Low pressure primary make-up via the Residual Heat Removal (ND) system mechanical connection upstream of 1/2ND-35 (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-5).

" Borated water suction source FW system mechanical connection (refer to Appendix C, Figure C-2).

Reactor coolant system inventory control relies upon FLEX pump make-up as accommodated by reactor coolant system shrink, passive reactor coolant pump seal leakage, and additional letdown capability via reactor vessel head-vents. The reactor coolant pump seal return outboard containment isolation valve is manually isolated to conserve inventory and maintain leak-off flow within the Reactor Building. To ensure SG continued heat removal capability, the cold-leg accumulator (CLA) block isolation valves are electrically closed during the cooldown to prevent Nitrogen injection into the reactor coolant system.

There are no required Phase 1 FLEX actions to maintain containment integrity. The primary Phase 2 FLEX strategy for containment integrity entails repowering one train of Hydrogen igniters. Phase 2 and/or 3 entails repowering of select compartment fans inside of containment.

Later in the Extended Loss of all AC Power (ELAP) event, the Residual Heat Removal (ND) system must be aligned to maintain containment temperature. This action is accomplished by powering a train of ND and Component Cooling (KC) pumps with a portable generator from the Regional Response Center (RRC). For ND and KC system heat removal, a portable diesel powered FLEX pump is interfaced with the Nuclear Service Water (RN) system to provide a heat sink from the Standby Nuclear Service Page 5 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Water Pond (SNSWP). The portable pump is connected via the bonnet of an RN pump discharge check valve. Cross-train KC and RN isolation valves are credited with manual closure, in order to minimize components exposed to the credited FLEX flow path pressure boundary. Similarly, manual isolation of RN heat-exchangers not required for the FLEX strategy is credited where possible (e.g., Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water (KD) heat-exchangers, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) starting air compressor, Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (MDAFWP) motor coolers, etc.).

Necessary attendant electrical components are outlined in the MNS FLEX OIP submittal [3], as supplemented by subsequent six-month regulatory updates [20], [21],

and [22], and primarily entail 600 VAC essential motor control centers, vital batteries, equipment installed to support FLEX electrical connections, and monitoring instrumentation required for core cooling, reactor coolant inventory, and containment integrity. During the latter stages of Phase 3, the 4.16 kV switchgear is energized to support residual heat removal (RHR) operation.

3.0 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The complete ESELs for Unit 1 and Unit 2 are presented in Appendices A and B, respectively.

The selection of equipment for the ESEL followed the guidelines of EPRI 3002000704 [2].

3.1 Equipment Selection Process and ESEL The selection of equipment to be included on the ESEL was based on installed plant equipment credited in the FLEX strategies during Phase 1, 2 and 3 mitigation of a Beyond Design Basis External Event (BDBEE), as outlined in the MNS OIP in Response to the March 12, 2012, Commission Order EA-12-049 [3],

as supplemented by subsequent six-month updates [20], [21], and [22]. The OIP and subsequent updates provides the MNS FLEX mitigation strategy and serves as the basis for equipment selected for the ESEP.

The scope of "installed plant equipment" includes equipment relied upon for the FLEX strategies to sustain the critical functions of core cooling and containment integrity consistent with the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [20], [21],

and [22]. FLEX recovery actions are excluded from the ESEP scope per EPRI 3002000704 [2]. The overall list of planned FLEX modifications and the scope for consideration herein is limited to those required to support core cooling, reactor coolant inventory and subcriticality, and containment integrity functions. Portable and pre-staged FLEX equipment (not permanently installed) are excluded from the ESEL per EPRI 3002000704 [2].

The ESEL component selection followed the EPRI guidance outlined in Section 3.2 of EPRI 3002000704.

1. The scope of components is limited to that required to accomplish the core cooling and containment safety functions identified in Table 3-2 of EPRI 3002000704. The instrumentation monitoring requirements for core Page 6 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 cooling/containment safety functions are limited to those outlined in the EPRI 3002000704 guidance, and are a subset of those outlined in the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [20], [21], and [22].

2. The scope of components is limited to installed plant equipment and FLEX connections necessary to implement the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates [20], [21], and [22] as described in Section 2.

3. The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path (i.e., either "Primary" or "Back-up/Alternate").

4. The "Primary" FLEX success path is to be specified. Selection of the "Back-up/Alternate" FLEX success path must be justified.

5. Phase 3 coping strategies are included in the ESEP scope, whereas recovery strategies are excluded.

6. Structures, systems, and components (SSCs) excluded per the EPRI 3002000704 [2] guidance are:

" Structures (e.g., containment, Rx Building, Control Building, AB, etc.)

• Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports.

• Manual valves and rupture disks.

" Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies.

" Nuclear steam supply system components (e.g., reactor pressure vessel and internals, reactor coolant pumps and seals, etc.)

7. For cases in which neither train was specified as a primary or back-up strategy, then only one train component (generally 'A' train) is included in the ESEL.

3.1.1 ESEL Development The ESEL was developed by reviewing the MNS OIP [3] and subsequent updates

[20], [21], and [22] to determine the major equipment involved in the FLEX strategies. Further reviews of plant drawings (e.g., Process and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) and Electrical One Line Diagrams) were performed to identify the boundaries of the flow paths to be used in the FLEX strategies and to identify specific components in the flow paths needed to support implementation of the FLEX strategies. Boundaries were established at an electrical or mechanical isolation device (e.g., isolation amplifier, valve, etc.) in branch circuits / branch lines off the defined strategy electrical or fluid flow path. P&IDs were the primary reference documents used to identify mechanical components and instrumentation. The flow paths used for FLEX strategies were selected and specific components were identified using detailed equipment and instrument drawings, piping isometrics, electrical schematics and one-line drawings, system descriptions, design basis documents, etc.

Page 7 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 3.1.2 Power-Operated Valves Page 3-3 of EPRI 3002000704 [2] notes that power-operated valves not required to change state are excluded from the ESEL. Page 3-2 also notes that

"... functional failure modes of electrical and mechanical portions of the installed Phase 1 equipment should be considered (e.g., RCIC/AFW trips)." To address this concern, the following guidance is applied in the MNS ESEL for functional failure modes associated with power-operated valves:

" Powered-operated valves that remain energized during the ELAP events (such as DC-powered valves) were included on the ESEL, with the exception of various air-operated valves which fail to the required position as a result of the ELAP event.

" Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies were not included on the ESEL. The seismic event also causes the ELAP event; therefore, the valves are incapable of spurious operation as they would be de-energized.

• Power-operated valves not required to change state as part of the FLEX mitigation strategies during Phase 1, and re-energized and operated during subsequent Phase 2 and 3 strategies, were not evaluated for spurious valve operation as the seismic event that caused the ELAP has passed before the valves are re-powered.

3.1.3 Pull Boxes Pull boxes were deemed unnecessary to add to the ESELs as these components provide completely passive locations for pulling or installing cables. No breaks or connections in the cabling are included in pull boxes. Pull boxes were considered part of conduit and cabling, which are excluded in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2].

3.1.4 Termination Cabinets Termination cabinets, including cabinets necessary for FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections, provide consolidated locations for permanently connecting multiple cables. The termination cabinets and the internal connections provide a completely passive function; however, the cabinets are included in the ESEL to ensure industry knowledge on panel/anchorage failure vulnerabilities is addressed.

3.1.5 Critical Instrumentation Indicators Critical indicators and recorders are typically physically located on panels/cabinets and are included as separate components; however, seismic evaluation of the instrument indication may be included in the panel/cabinet seismic evaluation (rule-of-the-box).

Page 8 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 3.1.6 Phase 2 and Phase 3 Piping Connections Item 2 in Section 3.1 above notes that the scope of equipment in the ESEL includes "... FLEX connections necessary to implement the MNS alP [3] and subsequent updates [20], [21], and [22] as described in Section 2." Item 3 in Section 3.1 also notes that "The scope of components assumes the credited FLEX connection modifications are implemented, and are limited to those required to support a single FLEX success path (i.e., either 'Primary' or 'Back-up/Alternate')."

Item 6 in Section 3 above goes on to explain that "Piping, cabling, conduit, HVAC, and their supports ..." are excluded from the ESEL scope in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2].

Therefore, piping and pipe supports associated with FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connections are excluded from the scope of the ESEP evaluation. However, any active valves in FLEX Phase 2 and Phase 3 connection flow path are included in the ESEL.

3.2 Justification for Use of Equipment that is not the Primary Means for FLEX Implementation The ESEL only uses equipment that is the primary means of implementing FLEX strategy.

4.0 Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS) 4.1 Plot of GMRS Submitted by the Licensee The MNS GMRS used to select the ESEP Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) was included in the MNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. Digitized GMRS frequency and acceleration values from the MNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4] are shown in Figure 4-1, which is Table 2.4-1 from [4]. The MNS GMRS is plotted in Figure 4-2.

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Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Table 2.4-1 UHRS and GMRS at control point for McGuire (5% of critical damping respo nse spectra)

Freq (Hz) 1E-4 UHRS (g) 1E-5 UHRS (g) GMRS (g) 100 1.92E-01 6.48E-01 3.05E-01 90 1.95E-01 6.60E-01 3.1OE-01 80 2.01E-01 6,86E-01 3.22E-01 70 2.16E-01 7.50E-01 3.51E-01 60 2.56E-01 9.10E-01 4.24E-01 50 3.37E-01 1.22E+00 5.65E-01 40 4.03E-01 1.44E+00 6.70E-01 35 411E-01 1.45E+00 6.76E-01 30 4.06E-01 1.41E+00 6.60E-01 25 3.93E-01 1.34E+00 6.29E-01 20 3.84E-01 1.28E+00 6.03E-01 15 3.65E-01 1.18E+00 5.59E-01 12.5 3.49E-01 1.11E+00 5.28E-01 10 326E-01 1.02E+00 4.86E-01 9 3.09E-01 9.50E-01 4.55E-01 8 2.90E-01 8.75E-01 4.21E-01 7 2.68E-01 7.96E-01 3.84E-01 6 2.45E-01 7.11E-01 3.44E-01 5 2.17E-01 6.16E-01 3.OOE-01 4 1-80E-01 4.91E-01 2.41E-01 3.5 1-59E-01 4.24E-01 2.09E-01 3 1.37E-01 3.58E-01 1.77E-01 2.5 1.14E-01 2.88E-01 1.43E-01 2 1.05E-01 2.58E-01 1.29E-01 1.5 8.66E-02 2.06E-01 1.04E-01 1.25 7-49E-02 1.75E-01 8.86E-02 1 6.47E-02 1.47E-01 7.49E-02 0.9 6-25E-02 1.42E-01 7.24E-02 0.8 6.05E-02 1.38E-01 7.00E-02 0.7 5.77E-02 1.31E-01 6.69E-02 0.6 5.35E-02 1.22E-01 6.20E-02 0.5 4-70E-02 1.07E-01 5.44E-02 0.4 3.76E-02 8.55E-02 4.35E-02 0.35 3.29E-02 7.48E-02 3.81E-02 0.3 2.82E-02 6.41E-02 3.26E-02 0.25 2.35E-02 5.35E-02 2.72E-02 0.2 1.88E-02 4.28E-02 2.18E-02 0.15 1-41E-02 3.21E-02 1.63E-02 0.125 1.17E-02 2.67E-02 1.36E-02 0.1 9.39E-03 2.14E-02 1.09E-02 Figure 4-1. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) - Tabular Format [4].

Page 10 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS GMRS 0.8 ----- .....

0.6 -

0 .4 --- -------

II- GMRS

~0.3 .

0.2....J..

0 .0 . ------- . ..

0.1 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 4-2. MNS GMRS (5% Damping) - Graphical Format [4].

The MNS Control Point is located at Elevation 716'-6", which is at the base of the mat foundation of the Reactor Buildings.

4.2 Comparison to Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE)

A description of the MNS horizontal SSE and spectral shape is included in Section 3.1 of the MNS Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [4]. The SSE is tabulated as a function of frequency in Table 4-1 and plotted in Figure 4-3.

A comparison of the MNS GMRS plotted against the SSE is shown in Figure 4-4.

Table 4-1. MNS SSE (5% Damping) - Tabular Format [4].

Frequency (Hz) Spectral Acceleration (g) 0.33 0.06 2 0.36 6 0.36 35/PGA 0.15 Page 11 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS SSE 5% Damping 0.40 ----7---

0.35 . . ..

0.30  :.

0.2 0.200. . .

'w 0.15 SS 0.10 -- 4. - .A *. - , ---

0.05 0.1 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 4-3. MNS SSE (5% Damping) - Graphical Format.

MNS GMRS vs SSE 0.6 -----------

~0.4 SS w 0.3~~ ------- -

0. 7 -GMRS 0.1 0.0 - -~.- ------- --

0.1 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 4-4. Comparison of MNS GMRS and SSE (5% Damping).

Page 12 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 5.0 Review Level Ground Motion (RLGM) 5.1 Description of RLGM Selected The procedure for determining the RLGM for the ESEP is described in Section 4 of EPRI 3002000704 [2]. The RLGM is determined by multiplying the spectral acceleration values for the 5%-damped SSE horizontal ground response spectrum by a scale factor. The scale factor is the largest ratio of spectral accelerations between the 5%-damped GMRS and the 5%-damped SSE ground response spectrum at frequencies from 1 Hz to 10 Hz, but not to exceed 2.0.

The ratio of the GMRS to the SSE over the 1 to 10 Hz frequency range is shown in Table 5-1. The largest ratio of the GMRS to the SSE in the 1 to 10 Hz range is at 10 Hz. The ratio of the spectral accelerations is 1.74. The RLGM is determined by multiplying the SSE ground response spectrum by 1.74. Digitized RLGM frequency and acceleration values are shown in Table 5-2. The MNS RLGM is plotted in Figure 5-1.

Table 5-1. Ratio of the GMRS to the SSE (1 to 10 Hz Range, 5% Damping)

Frequency SSE GMRS Ratio (Hz) (g) (g) GMRS/SSE S _1 0.180 0.075 -

2 0.360 0.129 0.358

_3- 0.360 0.177 0.492 .

4 0.360 0.241 0.669 I 5 - 0.360 , 0.300 0.833 6 I 0.360 0.344 0.956 L ~ 0.3332L 0.384 1.151 I 8 0.312_* _0.421 1.349.

9_ _ 0-.294 0455

. 10 0.279 00.486 1.740 .

Page 13 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Table 5-2. MNS RLGM (5% Damping)

Freq*uency- IAcceleration

[_(Hz) 1 . _(g). .-

0.333 0.0104 1 I _0.313 S2 0.626 Fiii-2.1 -3il 6**

_j_.626 4 _0.626 5 0.626

.......... 2io8i2 I 10 _ _0._486 j .11 0.464 t

. 12_. 0.444.2 13 0.427

. 14 0.411 15 0.397 17.5 0.368 20 0.345 22.5 0.325 25 0.308

.. 27.5 0_2:94 I 30 I 0.282 35 . 0.261

-100 0.261i Page 14 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 0 MNS RLGM 0 .7 r 0.6F 0.5 j-0O.4 - ~ - -- .. ------

• 0. - - --- "------~-- RLGM 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 5-1. MVNS RLGM (5% Damping).

5.2 Method to Estimate In-Structure Response Spectra (ISRS)

ISRS for the ESEP were estimated by scaling the MNS design-basis SSE ISRS by the RLGM scale factor of 1.74.

6.0 Seismic Margin Evaluation Approach It is necessary to demonstrate that ESEL items have sufficient seismic capacity to meet or exceed the demand characterized by the RLGM. The seismic capacity is characterized as the peak ground acceleration (PGA) for which there is a high confidence of a low probability of failure (HCLPF). The PGA is associated with a specific spectral shape, in this case the 5%-damped RLGM spectral shape. The HCLPF capacity must be equal to or greater than the RLGM PGA. The criteria for seismic capacity determination are given in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [2].

There are two basic approaches for developing HCLPF capacities:

1. Deterministic approach using the conservative deterministic failure margin (CDFM) methodology of EPRI NP-6041-SL, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin (Revision 1) [7].

2. Probabilistic approach using the fragility analysis methodology of EPRI TR-103959, Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities [8].

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Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 6.1 Summary of Methodologies Used Seismic capacity screening was done using information from the MNS Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) submittal [9] and supporting documentation (MCC 1535.00-00-0004, Seismic PRA/IPEEE Backup Calculations [19]).

MNS used a seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA) to address the IPEEE.

The SPRA is described in the IPEEE submittal.

Prior to the IPEEE, Duke Energy had performed a SPRA for MNS. The SPRA utilized fragilities calculated in 1981-1983 using the separation of variables methodology, which is one of the methods in EPRI TR-103959 [8]. The calculated fragilities were based on the MNS SSE spectral shape. The IPEEE submittal states that these fragilities were updated where needed based on plant walkdowns and used in the IPEEE SPRA. The fragility calculations are documented in Volumes 4 and 5 of MCC 1535.00-00-0004. Table 3-1 of the IPEEE submittal gives the fragilities used in the IPEEE SPRA. Equipment items listed in the IPEEE Equipment List, contained in Attachment 24 of MCC 1535.00-00-0004, that were not included as fragilities in the SPRA had been screened out on the basis of the median capacity being greater than 2.0g.

The equipment fragilities were based on plant design information, including equipment qualification test and analysis reports. Failure modes considered were functional failures, including relay chatter, and anchorage failure. The original anchorage capacities were updated as needed based on the SMA walkdowns described below. Seismic interactions were addressed by the SMA walkdowns.

Duke Energy also performed a SMA in 1993. The SMA is documented in Volumes 1 and 2 of MCC 1535.00-00-0004 [19]. The SMA consisted of screening walkdowns and anchorage calculations. The screening walkdowns used the screening tables from Chapter 2 of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. The walkdowns were conducted by engineers trained in EPRI NP-6041-SL (the engineers attended the EPRI SMA Add-On course in addition to the Seismic Qualification Users Group Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Course), and were documented on Screening Evaluation Work Sheets from EPRI NP-6041-SL.

Anchorage capacity calculations utilized the CDFM criteria from EPRI NP-6041-SL.

Seismic demand was the IPEEE Review Level Earthquake (RLE) for SMA (mean NUREG/CR-0098 [11] ground response spectrum anchored to 0.3g PGA). A relay review, beyond searching for low-ruggedness relays, was not included in the SMA.

Figure 6-1 shows the mean NUREG/CR-0098 ground response spectrum used as the RILE for the SMA, compared to the RLGM response spectrum. It is seen that the RLE envelopes the RLGM at all frequencies greater than about 2.0 Hz. The RLE is slightly less than the RLIGM at frequencies below about 2.0 Hz. This may be disregarded as there are no MNS SSCs in this frequency range.

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Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS RLGM vs IPEEE RLE 0 .7 -.

0.6 50.4 0.3 RLGMV U - IPEEE RLE 0.2 0.0 L--

0.1 1 10 100 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 6-1. Comparison of MNS RLGM vs. IPEEE RLE.

6.2 HCLPF Screening Process The SMA was based on the RLE, which was anchored to 0.3g PGA. The RLE is equal to the RLGM at frequencies from about 2.0 Hz to about 6.0 Hz, and greater than the RLGM at frequencies above about 6.0 Hz. Therefore, any components whose SMA-based HCLPF exceeds the RLE can be screened out from HCLPF calculations. The screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL are based on ground peak spectral accelerations of 0.8g and 1.2g. These both exceed the RLGM peak spectral acceleration. The anchorage capacity calculations were based on SSE floor response spectra scaled to the RLE, except for equipment in the AB for which new floor response spectra were generated for the RLE [11]. Therefore ESEL components which were evaluated in the IPEEE SMA, met the screening caveats, and had anchorage capacity exceeding the RLE can be screened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination because the HCLPF capacity exceeds the RLGM.

Most of the non-valve components in the ESEL were screened out based on the SMA results. A few components that did not have CDFM anchorage calculations were screened out on the basis of the HCLPF calculated from the SPRA fragility.

In the SMA, valves were documented as a group rather than as individual components with individual documentation. The screening for valves proceeded differently.

Page 17 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 The Unit 1 and Unit 2 ESEL contain approximately 220 valves in total, both power-operated (MOV and AOV) as well as relief valves. Per Table 2-4 of EPRI NP-6041-SL, active valves may be assigned a functional capacity of 0.8g peak spectral acceleration without any review other than looking for valves with large extended operators on small diameter piping, and anchorage is not a failure mode. Therefore, valves on the ESEL which are listed in the IPEEE Mechanical Equipment List may be screened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination. Power-operated valves were addressed both in the IPEEE fragility calculations and in the SMA. In the fragility calculations, all of the valves on the IPEEE Mechanical Equipment List were screened out on the basis of median capacity exceeding 2.0g. In the SMA, the valves were found to meet EPRI NP-6041-SL, Figures F-25 and F-26 (thus meeting the 1.2g peak spectral acceleration screening criteria) or to exceed the RLE floor response spectra on the basis of vendor seismic qualification reports. The IPEEE SMA covered approximately 360 valves in Unit 1. The walkdowns focused on MOVs on small diameter piping and valves at high elevations in the plant. Comparison with Unit 2 showed that the conclusions of the Unit 1 review applied to the corresponding Unit 2 valves. Relief valves were not explicitly included in the IPEEE review except for PORVs, both steam (SV) and reactor coolant (NC), which met the criteria. Spring-operated relief valves are considered to meet the EPRI NP-6041-SL 0.8g peak spectral acceleration screening criteria without explicit review. On the basis of the above, most of the ESEL valves were screened out from ESEP seismic capacity determination.

The results of the IPEEE capacity screening are noted in Appendix A for the Unit 1 ESEL and in Appendix B for the Unit 2 ESEL. For the components that were not screened out, HCLPF capacities were determined using the deterministic EPRI NP-6041-SL CDFM methodology and RLGM spectral shape and/or anchorage evaluations.

6.3 HCLPF Capacity Determination HCLPF capacities were determined by evaluating the function, anchorage, and seismic interaction failure modes. HCLPF functional capacities were determined using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL. HCLPF anchorage capacities were determined using the CDFM methodology in EPRI NP-6041-SL. HCLPF seismic interaction capacities were determined by walkdown screening.

6.4 Functional Capacity Screening Using EPRI NP-6041-SL The components were screened against EPRI NP-6041-SL, Table 2 4. For components not located on the basemat of the Auxiliary or Reactor Buildings, the ISRS were used for the screening; therefore, the screening levels of EPRI NP-6041-SL were increased by a factor of 1.5 per EPRI 1019200, Seismic FragilityApplications Guide Update [17]. Thus, the accelerations for the screening levels were 1.2g and 1.8g instead of 0.8g and 1.2g.

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Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 The SSE ISRS were amplified by a factor of 1.74 throughout the frequency range and were then clipped (per EPRI 1019200), using the methodology in EPRI NP-6041-SL, Appendix Q, and the North-South and East-West clipped peaks were averaged.

6.5 Seismic Walkdown Approach 6.5.1 Walkdown Approach Walkdowns were performed in accordance with the criteria provided in Section 5 of EPRI 3002000704 [2], which refers to EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] for the SMA process. Pages 2-26 through 2-30 of EPRI NP-6041-SL [7] describe the seismic walkdown criteria, including the following key criteria.

"The SRT [Seismic Review Team] should "walk by" 100% of all components which are reasonablyaccessible and in non-radioactive or low radioactiveenvironments. Seismic capability assessment of components which are inaccessible,in high-radioactiveenvironments, or possibly within contaminatedcontainment, will have to rely more on alternatemeans such as photographicinspection, more reliance on seismic reanalysis, and possibly, smallerinspection teams and more hurried inspections. A 100% "walk by" does not mean complete inspection of each component, nor does it mean requiringan electricianor other technician to de-energize and open cabinets or panels for detailed inspection of all components. This walkdown is not intended to be a QA or QC review or a review of the adequacy of the component at the SSE level.

If the SRT has a reasonablebasis for assuming that the group of components are similarand are similarly anchored, then it is only necessary to inspect one component out of this group. The "similarity-basis"should be developed before the walkdown during the seismic capabilitypreparatorywork (Step 3) by reference to drawings, calculations or specifications. The one component for each type which is selected should be thoroughly inspected which probably does mean de-energizing and opening cabinets or panelsfor this very limited sample. Generally, a spare representativecomponent can be found so as to enable the inspection to be performed while the plant is in operation. At leastfor the one component of each type which is selected, anchorageshould be thoroughly inspected.

The walkdown procedure should be performed in an ad hoc manner.

For each class of components the SRT should look closely at the first items and compare the field configurationswith the construction drawings and/orspecifications. If a one-to-one correspondenceis found, then subsequent items do not have to be inspected in as great a detail. Ultimately the walkdown becomes a "walk by" of the Page 19 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 component class as the SRT becomes confident that the construction pattern is typical. This procedurefor inspection should be repeated for each component class; although, during the actual walkdown the SRT may be inspecting several classes of components in parallel. If serious exceptions to the drawings or questionableconstruction practices are found then the system or component class must be inspected in closer detail until the systematic deficiency is defined.

The 100% "walk by" is to look for outliers, lock of similarity, anchorage which is different from that shown on drawings or prescribedin criteriafor that component, potentialSI [Seismic Interaction1 ]

problems, situations that are at odds with the team members' past experience, and any other areas of serious seismic concern. If any such concerns surface, then the limited sample size of one component of each typefor thorough inspection will have to be increased. The increase in sample size which should be inspected will depend upon the number of outliers and different anchorages, etc., which are observed. It is up to the SRT to ultimately select the sample size since they are the ones who are responsiblefor the seismic adequacy of all elements which they screen from the margin review. Appendix D gives guidancefor sampling selection."

6.5.2 Walkdowns and Walk-Bys Many of the components were walked down previously during IPEEE evaluations and have documented Screening Evaluation Work Sheets (SEWS) recording the results. Credit is given to these walkdowns since they were performed by qualified Seismic Review Teams. A walk-by of these components was performed and documented. The primary objective of a walk-by is to verify that the component and/or anchorage has not degraded since the original walkdown and to verify that the component is free of interaction issues that may have developed since the original walkdown.

Walkdowns were performed on all ESEL components which were not previously walked down during the IPEEE and for some ESEL items which did not have a specific SEWS in the IPEEE documentation.

Masonry walls in the AB were evaluated as part of IPEEE and shown to meet the RLE demand; therefore, they also meet the RLGM demand. Proximity of masonry walls to ESEL components were noted on the SEWS forms. Masonry walls in proximity to ESEL equipment were verified to have been included in the IPEEE evaluation and determined to not be a credible failure mode for the ESEP.

'EPRI 3002000704 [2] page 5-4 limits the ESEP seismic interaction reviews to "nearby block walls" and "piping attached to tanks" which are reviewed "to address the possibility of failures due to differential displacements."

Other potential seismic interaction evaluations are "deferred to the full seismic risk evaluations performed in accordance with EPRI 1025287 [15]."

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Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 6.5.3 Significant Walkdown Findings All of the ESEL components were determined to have an existing capacity greater than the RLGM, with the exception of the components listed in Tables 6-1 and 6-2. These components require modification in order to have a capacity greater than the RLGM.

6.6 HCLPF Calculation Process ESEL items not included in the previous MNS IPEEE evaluations were evaluated using the criteria in EPRI NP-6041-SL [7]. The evaluations included the following steps:

" Performing seismic capability walkdowns for equipment not included in previous seismic walkdowns to evaluate the equipment installed plant conditions;

" Performing screening evaluations using the screening tables in EPRI NP-6041-SL as described in Section 6.2; and

" Performing HCLPF calculations considering various failure modes that include both structural failure modes (e.g., anchorage, load path, etc.) and functional failure modes.

All HCLPF calculations were performed using the CDFM methodology and are documented in MCM-1612.00-0059.001 [10]. HCLPF results and key failure modes for ESEL items not included in the previous MNS IPEEE evaluations are included in the ESEL tables in Appendices A and B.

6.7 Functional Evaluations of Relays There are no relays on the ESEL that provide seal-in/lock-out capability for Phase 1 equipment; therefore, no functional evaluation of relays was required.

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Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Table 6-1. Unit 1 Components that Require Modifications.

Problem Description Unit ESEL ID Equipment # Bldg Modification/Recommendation 1 23 EHM-HR-TB27 RB Flex Conduit running between Required Modification: Add metal ties to EHM-HR-TB29 igniter boxes not supported for band cable to overhead cable tray.

approximately 15 ft.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

1 23 EHM-HR-TB29 RB Flex conduit from TB29 not tied Required Modification: Add metal ties to into cable tray. band cable to horizontal and vertical potions of this wall-mounted tray near 900 bends.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

1 24 EHM-TB-0589 AB Secure load path: Required modification:

Cabinet mounting tabs do not span Install Unistrut washers under mounting Unistrut. tabs.

Modification has been COMPLETED.

1 48 1SV-VA-O0019AB AB Interaction issue: Required modification:

A test or vent off port at top of Modify to achieve adequate clearance.

subject valve has been rubbing on side of support structure.

1 63 1EOA-PN-MC11 AB Secure load path: Pressure Required modification:

indicator PI-937 on MC11 is missing Install hold down clip on instrument.

hold down clip.

1 67 EQB-PN-DGLSA AB Potential interaction: Required modification:

Unistrut between DGLSA and ATC7 Remove Unistrut.

results in negligible clearance.

AB = Auxiliary Building DH = DogHouse RB = Reactor Building Page 22 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Table 6-2. Unit 2 Components that Require Modifications.

Unit ESEL ID EDB ID Bldg Problem Description Modification/Recommendation 2 18 NI-VA-0065B RB Potential interaction: Conduit and Required modification:

connecter to motor are in contact with Modify to achieve adequate adjacent structural support. clearance.

2 51 SV-CV-0001AB DH Soft target: Required Modification:

Position indicator cable is tight and Trim grating away from cable.

rubbing against floor grating.

2 78 NC-RD-5870 RB Cable support: Required modification:

Loop of signal cable supported by Move coil back and support from resistance temperature detector (RTD). structural member or cable tray to Subject RTD tubing is bent due to weight remove load on RTD.

of cable.

AB = Auxiliary Building DH = DogHouse RB = Reactor Building Page 23 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 6.8 Tabulated ESEL HCLPF Values (Including Key Failure Modes)

Tabulated ESEL HCLPF values are provided in Appendix A for Unit 1 and Appendix B for Unit 2. The following notes apply to the information in the tables:

" For items screened out using the IPEEE evaluations, the HCLPF value is provided as >RLGM and the failure mode Is listed as "Screened per IPEEE."

" For items screened out using EPRI NP-6041-SL [7) screening tables, the HCLPF value is provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is listed as "Screened per EPRI NP-6041."

" For items where interaction with masonry walls controls, the HCLPF value is provided as >RLGM and the failure mode is noted as "Interaction - Block Walls."

" For items where component function controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Functional."

" For items where anchorage controls the HCLPF value, the HCLPF value is listed in the table and the failure mode is noted as "Anchorage."

7.0 Inaccessible Items, Additional Items Associated with FLEX Strategy Changes and New Component Installation 7.1 Identification of ESEL Items Inaccessible for Walkdowns All ESEL items were accessible for walkdowns except the Units 1 and 2 diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks. These tanks are not accessible for visual inspection since they are buried below grade. Walk-bys of the yard areas above the tanks were performed to check for visible outliers or potential seismic interaction hazards.

7.2 Identification of Additional ESEL Items Associated with FLEX Strategy Changes and New FLEX Component Installations Seismic capability walkdowns and screening evaluations remain outstanding for components which were added to the ESEL as a result of subsequent changes to the FLEX mitigation strategy, and associated with new FLEX component installations. These outstanding walkdowns and evaluations are denoted as "to be done" (TBD) in Appendices A and B.

7.3 Planned Walkdown / Evaluation Schedule / Close Out The remaining ESEL component walkdowns and screening evaluations will be completed within the schedule outlined in Section 8.3.

The outstanding modifications listed in Tables 6-1 and 6-2 will be completed and closed-out in accordance with the schedule outlined in Section 8.3.

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Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 8.0 ESEP Conclusions and Results 8.1 Supporting Information MNS has performed the ESEP as an interim action in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1]. It was performed using the methodologies in the NRC-endorsed guidance in EPRI 3002000704 [2].

The ESEP provides an important demonstration of seismic margin and expedites plant safety enhancements through evaluations and potential near-term modifications of plant equipment that can be relied upon to protect the reactor core following beyond design basis seismic events.

The ESEP is part of the overall MNS response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [1]. On March 12, 2014, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) submitted to the NRC results of a study [12] of seismic core damage risk estimates based on updated seismic hazard information as it applies to operating nuclear reactors in the Central and Eastern United States (CEUS). The study concluded that "... site-specific seismic hazards show that there [...] has not been an overall increase in seismic risk for the fleet of U.S. plants..." based on the re-evaluated seismic hazards. As such, the "... current seismic design of operating reactors continues to provide a safety margin to withstand potential earthquakes exceeding the seismic design basis."

The NRC's May 9, 2014, NTTF 2.1 Screening and Prioritization letter [14]

concluded that the "fleetwide seismic risk estimates are consistent with the approach and results used in the GI-199 safety/risk assessment." The letter also stated that "As a result, the staff has confirmed that the conclusions reached in GI-199 safety/risk assessment remain valid and that the plants can continue to operate while additional evaluations are conducted."

An assessment of the change in seismic risk for MNS was included in the fleet risk evaluation submitted in the March 12, 2014, NEI letter [12]; therefore, the conclusions in the NRC's May 9 letter [14] also apply to MNS.

In addition, the March 12, 2014, NEI letter [12] provided an attached "Perspectives on the Seismic Capacity of Operating Plants," which (1) assessed a number of qualitative reasons why the design of SSCs inherently contain margin beyond their design level; (2) discussed industrial seismic experience databases of performance of industry facility components similar to nuclear SSCs; and (3) discussed earthquake experience at operating plants.

The fleet of currently operating nuclear power plants was designed using conservative practices, such that the plants have significant margin to withstand large ground motions safely. This has been borne out for those plants that have actually experienced significant earthquakes. The seismic design process has inherent (and intentional) conservatisms which result in significant seismic margins within SSCs. These conservatisms are reflected in several key aspects of the seismic design process, including:

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Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0

• Safety factors applied in design calculations;

" Damping values used in dynamic analysis of SSCs;

• Bounding synthetic time histories for ISRS calculations;

" Broadening criteria for ISRS;

" Response spectra enveloping criteria typically used in SSC analysis and testing applications;

• Response spectra based frequency domain analysis rather than explicit time history based time domain analysis;

• Bounding requirements in codes and standards;

• Use of minimum strength requirements of structural components (concrete and steel);

• Bounding testing requirements; and

" Ductile behavior of the primary materials (that is, not crediting the additional capacity of materials such as steel and reinforced concrete beyond the essentially elastic range, etc.).

These design practices combine to result in margins such that the SSCs will continue to fulfill their functions at ground motions well above the SSE.

8.2 Identification of Planned Modifications Tables 6-1 and 6-2 identify the remaining modifications to be made in accordance with EPRI 3002000704 [2] to enhance the seismic capacity of the plant.

8.3 Schedule for Completion of Required Modifications and Remaining ESEL Component Walkdowns/Evaluations Plant modifications will be completed in accordance with the schedule identified in NEI letter dated April 9, 2013 [13], which states that plant modifications not requiring a planned refueling outage will be completed by December 31, 2016 and modifications requiring a refueling outage will be completed within two planned refueling outages after December 31, 2014.

Completion of the remaining ESEL component walkdowns and evaluations will be completed within the same timeframe outlined for modification completion.

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Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 8.4 Summary of Planned Actions The actions Listed in Table 8-1 will be performed as a result of the ESEP.

Table 8-1. Summary of Planned Follow-up Actions.

Action # Action Description Completion Date 1 Complete remaining modifications Follow-up actions will be completed as (Table 6-1), and ESEL follows:

walkdowns/evaluations (Appendix A) 0 December 31, 2016 (if action for Unit 1 components. completion does not require a refueling outage) 2 Complete remaining modifications

( The end of the second planned (aledown6-2),ndx an Erefueling t outage after December 31, walkdowns/evaluations (Appendix B) 2014 (if action completion requires for Unit 2 components. outage) 3 Submit a letter to NRC confirming Within 60 days following completion of implementation of modifications ESEP activities for items 1 and 2.

associated with items 1 and 2.

Page 27 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 9.0 References

1) Letter from E. Leeds and M. Johnson, NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, et al.,

"Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," March 12, 2012.

2) Seismic Evaluation Guidance:Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1 -Seismic, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA: May 2013, EPRI 3002000704.

3) Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; Response to March 12, 2012, Commission Order to Modify Licenses With Regard To Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond Design Basis External Events (Order EA-12-049)," dated February 28, 2013, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.

4) Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,"

dated March 20, 2014, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.

5) Proceduraland Submittal Guidancefor the Individual Plant Examinationof External Events (IPEEE)for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities,June 1991, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1407.

6) USNRC Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4, "Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities- 10 CFR 50.54(f),"

June 28, 1991, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.

7) A Methodologyfor Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin, Rev. 1, August 1991, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, EPRI NP-6041-SL.

8) Methodology for Developing Seismic Fragilities,Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, July 1, 1994, EPRI TR-103959.

9) Letter from T. C. McMeekin to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Docket Nos.: 50-369 and 50-370; Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Submittal," dated June 1, 1994, Duke Power, Huntersville, NC.

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Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0

10) Expedited Seismic Evaluation Processfor Implementation of Seismic Risk Evaluations at McGuire Nuclear Station, Appendix D, "HCLPF Calculations," dated October 2014, Rev. 1, ARES Corporation Report No. 030319.13.02.11-001, Duke Energy Document No. MCM-1612.00-0059.001.

11) Development of Criteriafor Seismic Review of Selected Nuclear Power Plants, published May 1978, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR-0098.

12) Letter from A. Pietrangelo, NEI to D. Skeen, USNRC, "Seismic Core Damage Risk Estimates Using the Updated Seismic Hazards for the Operating Nuclear Plants in the Central and Eastern United States," March 12, 2014.

13) Letter from A. Pietrangelo, NEI to D. Skeen, USNRC, "Proposed Path Forward for NTTF Recommendation 2.1: Seismic Reevaluations," April 9, 2013.

14) Letter from E. Leeds, NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, et al., "Screening and Prioritization Results Regarding Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(F) Regarding Seismic Hazard Re-Evaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights From the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident," May 9, 2014.

15) Seismic Evaluation Guidance:Screening, Prioritizationand Implementation Details (SPID)for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, February 2013, EPRI 1025287.

16) Letter from E. Leeds, NRC to J. Pollock, NEI, "Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report xxxxx, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Augmented Approach for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic," as an Acceptable Alternative to the March 12, 2012, Information Request for Seismic Reevaluations," May 7, 2013.

17) Seismic FragilityApplications Guide Update, December 2009, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, CA, EPRI 1019200.

18) Augmented Approach for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic - Determine Expedited Seismic Equipment List (ESEL), Revision 2, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC, Calculation MCC-1612.00 0012.

19) Seismic PRA/IPEEE Backup Calculations,1994, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC, 1994, Calculation No. MCC-1535.00-00-0004.

20) Letter from Steven Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; First Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated August 28, 2013, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.

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Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0

21) Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; Second Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated February 27, 2014, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.

22) Letter from Steven D. Capps to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy); McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS), Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. 50-369, 50-370, Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17; Third Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)," dated August 27, 2014, Duke Energy, Huntersville, NC.

Page 30 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Appendix A MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results Page 31 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESELand HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown ESELID EDO Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State or Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes NCLPF** Key Failure Mode-1 1FW-VA-0032B RefuelingIsolation Suction Water Recirc Pump AUX 750 Rm 815 JJ,/1 Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p 772 Included in IPEEE,p 772 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 2 1PW-VA-0033A Refueling Water Recirc Pump Rm 811 Suction Isolation AUX 750 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 772 Included in IPEEE,p 772 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE KK/S3 3 1FW-VA-0001A Refueling Water Recirc Pump Rm 815 Suction Isolation AUX 750 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 772 Included in IPEEE,p 772 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE iJ/S 1 Rm 730 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 4 1ND-VA-0056 ND Relief- 'A' Coldlegs AUX 733 Closed Closed Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 GG/52 Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM 5 1ND-VA-0061 ND Relief- Hotlegs AUX 733 EE/52 Closed Closed Walkdown Screened per EPRINP-6041 Appendix C Table 2-4 Rm 730 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM 6 1ND-VA-0064 ND Relief -'B'Coldlegs AUX 733 Closed Closed Walkdown Screened per EPRINP-6041 HH/52 Appendix C Table 2-4 Rm 602 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM 7 1NI-VA-0119 NI Relief- 'A' Train Hotleg AUX 733 Closed Closed Walkdown Screened per EPRINP-6041 GG/52 AppendixC Table 2-4 Rm 817 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM 8 1NI-VA-O151 NI Relief- 'B' Train Hotleg AUX 750 Closed Closed Walkdown Screened per EPRINP-6041 HH/52 Appendix C Table 2-4 Rm 730 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM 9 1NI-VA-0161 NI Relief- Coldleg AUX 733 Closed Closed Walkdown Screened per EPRINP-6041 il/S1 Appendix C Table 2-4 Rm 601 >RLGM 10 ORN-VA-0007A SNSWP Supply to Units 1 & 2 AUX 716 Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE,p 776 Screened per IPEEE AA/63 11 1NV-VA-0095B NC Pumps Seal Water Return Cont AUX 733 E EE/S2 Open Closed Walk-By p 775 Included in IPEEE,p 775 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Reactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 12 1NC-VA-0272AC RX 774 B-CSide Closed Open and Closed Walkdown en>RLM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Isolation Valee 275S17R Appendia C Table 2-4 Reactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid Rx Cavity Window Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 13 1NC-VA-0273AC Isolation Valve RX 774 B-CSide 27"1RAppendix Closed Open and Closed Walkdown C Table 2-4 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 273' 17R NC System Pressurizer PORV Pressurizer Cavit 14 1NC-VA-0034A Sosem Preuric Cor o RX 808 P 02z 35R Closed Open and Closed Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE,p 773 >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Solenoids and Pneumatic Controls 102' 35R 1NC-34A Assured Nitrogen Supply lA CIA Rm 25 1NI-VA-0430A 1Nom34A A (M oV e RX 758 1A 48R Closed Open and Closed Walk-By p 775 Included in IPEEE,p 775 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE from 1A CIA (MOV) 46' 48R 16 IFW-TX-0001 Refueling Water Storage Tank Yard >760 N/A n/a n/a Walkdown Reference 10, Included in IPEEE (p 772). Evaluated by Meets RIOM Screened per PEEt Appendix C Structural Mechanics Associates (p 1461).

17 l CI1I-V-005A Blok Vlve(MOV RX 733 Pipe Chase 17 1NI-VA-42'4A 1ACLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 42p47R Open M-14 Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Pipe Chase 18 INI-VA-0065B 1B CLABlock Valve (MOV) RX 733 136"C0s Open M-14 Closed Walk-By p 774 Included n IPEEE,p 774 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 18 i CIABlok 21-V-007A Vave MOV) ~ 2f 733 Pipe Chase 19 1CCLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 2NI-VA-0076A Pipe 48R Open M-14 Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE,p 774 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 20 1 CI iI-V-008B Blok Vlve MOV RxPipe Chase 20 1NI-VA-3088B 1DCLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 Pipe 48R Open M-14 Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE,p 774 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE New equipment - updated IPEEE SEWS 21 1EHM-TF-HMTA H2 Igniter Transformer AUX 750 CC/46 Off Functional Walk-By p74 evaluation. "Reference 10, AppendixsB1, pg. B1- >RLGM Screened per IPEEE iEHMPN-Reference 10" 10, 22 EHM-PN- H2 Igniter Power Panel AUX 7S0 CC/46 Standby Functional Walkdown ' Bounded by evaluation of 1EHM-TB-589. >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 HMPPA Appendix C 1EHM-HR-TB03 A'Train H2 Igniters 23 thru TB71 (Odd (35 Ignit H er Train) RX Various Various De-energized Functional Walkdown Referencedix10,Nt in experience data base. Tested to SURTS RLGM Undetermined Numbers only) 23 a 1EHM-SX-HMBPA Voltage Reg Bypass Switch AUX 750 TBD De-energized Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screensout basedon EPRINP-6041-S2,Rev.1, >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Appendix C Table 2-4 Page 32 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATINGSTATE Walkdown or ESELID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF'* Key Failure Mode**

Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 23 b 1EHM-VR-HRMA Voltage Regulator AUX 750 TBD De-energized Functional Walkdown Appence C Appendin C Table eeain 2-4, HCLPFbased on Unit 2 value on save 0.29 Functional elevation.

24 1EHM-TB-589 Local Terminal Box AUX 750 CC/46 n/a Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.90 Functional Appendix C Table 2-4 25 Deleted 26 1CA-HX-0003 TDCAPBearing OilCooler AUX 716 BB/51 Idle Functional Walk-By p 542 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 27 1CA-PU-003 TDCAP(Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine AUX 716 BB/51 Idle Functional Walk-By p 242 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Driven Pump) 27 a ISA-TR-0003 TOCAP Turbine AUX 716 BE/Si Idle Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-boox with 1CA-PU-00w3, which has an oRLGM Screened per PEE IPEER SEWS 27 b 1SA-VA-0004 TDCAPSteamControl Valve AUX 716 BB/51 Idle Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-boo with 1CA-PU-0553, which hasun >RLGM Screened per IPEEE IPEEE SEWS 27 c ISA-GV-0003 TDCAPGovernor Valve AUX 716 BB/51 Idle Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-bus wish Rule-of-the-boo with 1CA-PU-0003, 1,-PU-SS3, which which has hasusa an >RLGM LM Screened per SrendprPn IPEEE IPEEE SEWS 27 d 1SA-GX-0003 Gear Reducer AUX 716 BB/51 Idle Functional Walk-By Ser IPEEESEWS >RLGM Screened IPEEE 28 1CA-PN-AFTP TDCAPControl Panel AUX 716 BB/52 n/a Available Walk-By p 187 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 29 1SA-VA-004EABCTDCAPSteam Supply Isolation Inner Doghouse 767 FF/S3 Closed Open Walk-By p777 Included in IPEEE,p 777 vRLGM Screened per IPEEE (AOV) (DH2)

Inner Doghouse Reference 10, Screens out bused on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, oRG ScendprERNP64 29 a 1SA-SV-0480 Air Supply Solenoid Dump Valve Dh (DH2) 767 FF/53 Energized De-energized Walkdown en>RLGM Appendix C Table 2-4 Screened per EPRINP-041 29 b 1SA-SV-0481 Air Supply Solenoid Dump Valve Inner Doghouse 767 FF/53 Energized De-energized Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 (DH2) Appendix C Table 2-4 Rm 600 30 1SA-VA-0003 TDCAPTrip-Throttle Valve AUX 716 Rm Open Open Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE,p 771 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE AA/32 31 Deleted 32 Deleted 33 Deleted 34 1VI-VA-0032 1A VIEssential Hdr Supply from VG AUX 733 Rm 719 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Interaction - Block Wall Inlet Relief (115 psig) FF/53 Appendix C Table 2-4 35 1VI-VA-B034 AUX 733 GG/54 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Inlet Relief (115 psig) Appendix C Table 2-4 36 1VI-VA-0112 1A VIAux Bldg Instrument AirTank AUX 733 Rm 719 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Relief (115psig) FF/53 Appendix C Table 2-4 37 IVI-VA-0134 1A VIAux BldgInstrument AirTank AUX 733 Rm 719 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Relief (115 psig) FF/53 Appendix C Table 2-4 38 1VI-VA-0155 1BVIAux Bldg Instrument AirTank AUX 733 GG/75 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL,Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Relief (115 psig) Appendix C Table 2-4 39 1VI-VA-0156 1BVi Aux BldgInstrument AirTank AUX 733 GG/55 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Relief (115psig) Appendix C Table 2-4 39M-ABVIIA-VAuatorRelef AUXe 73DoghCoeoefrneSOucensotbsdenER N-01SL e.1 >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6045 40 1VI-VA-2009 VI Accumulator Relief Outer Doghouse 7SM-1AB DD/44 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-604 (120 psig) (DHI) Appendix C Table 2-4 Page 33 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESELand HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or ESELID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode**

41 1VI-VA-2019 15M-7ABVI Accumulator Relief Outer Doghouse 790 DD/43 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, sRLOM Screenedper EPRINP-6041 (120 psig) (DHI) Appendix C Table 2-4 42 1VI-VA-2029 1SM-3ABC VIAccumulator Relief Inner Doghouse 790 DD/52 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 (120 psig) (DH2) Appendix C Table 2-4 43 1VI-VA-2039 1SM-5AB VIAccumulator Relief Inner Doghouse D/SI Closed Closed Wikd Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >51GM Screened per EPRINP-6041 (120 psig) (DH2) Appendix C Table 2-4 7 71 44 1CA-VA-0064AB TACAFlow control to 1A SOandOpen Open/Throttled/ Walk-By p 771 Included in IPEEE,p >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls BB/SO Closed 44 a 1CA-ML-0640 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1MC10 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Sm 605 44 b 1CA-SS-0640 Selector Switch AUX 716 88/00 BB/SO Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-64AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Rm 600 >RLGM 44 c 1CA-MT-0640 Misc Transmitter AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-64AB Screened per PEEE BB/50 Rm 600 44 d 1CA-VP-0640 Valve Positioner AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-64AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/50 Rm 600 44 e 1CA-SV-0640 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Energized Energized Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-64AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/50 Rm 600 44 f 1CA-SV-0641 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Energized Energized Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-64AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/50 45 SCA-VA-OO52AB TDCA Flow Control to 1B SG and AUX Rm 600 Open/Throttled/ Walk-By 716 Open p 771 Included in IPEEE, p 771 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls BB/51 Closed 45 a 1CA-ML-0520 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1MC10 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Rm 600 45 b 1CA-SS-0520 Selector Switch AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-52AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/51 Rm 600 45 c 1CA-MT-0520 Misc Transmitter AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-S2AB >RLGM Screened perIPEEE BB/51 Rm 600 45 d 1CA-VP-0520 Valve Positioner AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-52AB >RLGM Screened per PEEE BB/51 Rm 600 45 e 1CA-SV-0520 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Energized Energized Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-52AB >RLGM Screened perIPEEE BB/51 Rm 600 >RLGM 45 f 1CA-SV-0521 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Energized Energized Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-S2AB Screened perlPEEE BB/51 46 SCA-VA-0045AB TDCA Flow Control to 1C SG and AUX Rm 600 Open/Throttled/ Walk-By

>RLGM 716 Open p 771 Included in IPEEE,p 771 Screened perlPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls BB/51 Closed 46 a 1CA-ML-0480 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1MC10 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE Rm 600 >RLGM 46 b 1CA-SS-0480 Selector Switch AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-48AB Screened perFPEEE sa/51 Rm 600 >RLGM 46 c 1CA-MT-0480 Misc Transmitter AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-48AB Screened perlPEEE BB/51 Rm 600 >RLGM 46d 1CA-VP-0480 Valve Positioner AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-48AB Screened per PEEE BB/51 Rm 600 >RLGM 46e 1CA-SV-0480 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Energized Energized Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-48AB Screened perIPEEE BB/51 Rm 600 >RLGM 46 f 1CA-SV-0481 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Energized Energized Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-48AB Screened perlPEEE BB/51 TDCA Flow Control to 1D SG and Rm 600 Open/Throttled/ Walk-By >RLGM 47 1CA-VA-0036AB AUX 716 Open p 771 Included in IPEEE, p 771 Screened perlPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls AA/43 Closed Page 34 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESELand HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or ESELID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode-47 a 1CA-ML-0360 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1MC10 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 47 b 1CA-SS-0360 Selector Switch AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-36AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE AA/43 47 c Misc Transmitter AUX 716 SCA-MT-0360 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-36AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE AA/43 47 d Valve Positioner AUX 716 SCA-VP-0360 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1CA-36AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE AA/43 Reference 10,nLM ScendprERNF64 47 e 1CA-SV-0360 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 600 Energized Energized Walkdown en>RLGM Appendix C Screened per EPRINP-6041 47 f 1CA-SV-0361 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 600 Energized Energized Walkdown Reference 10, >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Appendix C 48 1SV-VA-0019AB 1ASGMain Steam PORVand Outer Doghouse 809 GG/44 Closed Open/Throttled/ Walk-By p 294 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH1) Closed SB SG Main Steam PORV and Inner DohueOpen/Throttled/ akB 9 49 1SV-VA-0013AB Doghouse 809 FF/53 Closed e Walk-By p 294 RLGM Screened per IPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH2) Closed 50 1VV-OA C SGMi509mPR ad Inr ohueOpen/Throttled!/ akB 9 Steam POV C S Main Pneumatic and Inner(DH2)

Doghouse 809 FF/52 Closed Walk-By p 294 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Associated Controls Closed PR ai ta nd OtrDohueOpen/Throttled/ 909 WakB p29 511D Main Pneumatic Associated Steam PORV and Controls Outer(DH1)

Doghouse GG/44 Closed Closed Walk-By p 294 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Vital Battery 125 VDC Distribution 52 1EPL-PN-EVDA AUX 733 DD/54 Functional Functional Walk-By p 212 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Panel 212 52 a 1EPL-PN-EVDDVital Battery 125 VDCDistribution AUX 733 BB/57 Functional Functional Walk-By p >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Panel 55 Sm 707 Rfrne1,>RL0M

• Interaction - Block Wall 53 0EPL-BA-EVCAVital Battery AUX 733 CC/54 Functional Functional Walkdown Reference Appendix 10, C

54 0EPL-BC-EVCS Vital Battery Charger and Charger AUX 733 Rm 701 Functional Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.45 Functional Connection Box ECBS BB/54 Appendix C Table 2-4 55 1EPE-MX-EMXA2600 VACEssential Power AUX 750 BB/46 Functional Functional Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 32 56 1EPE-MX-EMXA4600 VACEssential Power AUX 750 BB/47 Functional Functional Walk-By p >RLGM Screened per PEEE 57 1EPE-MX-EMXH600 VACEssential Power AUX 750 FF/56 Functional Functional Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 600 VACEssential Power S1EPE-MX-EMXB4 AUX 733 705 Functional Functional Walk-By p32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/416 59 1ETP-CA-0008 (1ATC 8) Pzr PORVRelay/Indication AUX 750 CC/53 Standby Functional Walk-By p 216 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Main Control Board Cabinet for 60 1EOA-PN-MCS Head-Vent Operation, Hotleg AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Temperature Indication 61 1EOA-PN-MC7 H2 Igniter Control Switch AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 86 62 1EOA-PN-MC10 Main Control Board Cabinet for CA/ AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p >RLGM Screened per IPEEE NC Systems Main Control Board Cabinet for NI 63 1EOA-PN-MC11 System, Containment Pressure AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Indication Page 35 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit I ESELand HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or ESELID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF- Key Failure Mode-*

Main Control Board Cabinet for SM 64 1EOA-PN-MC2 System (PORVControl, CF/SM AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Indication)

Main Control Board Cabinet for 6 ICCMa 1EOA-PN-MC1 AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p8 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE ICCMRemote Display ICMbtI-.-21 Train A Remote Display Processor AU 6 oto m95 Sady Fntoa akon Reference 10, Screens nut based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Sen. 1, >RG ScendprEIN-61 behind 2MC2 Appendiu C ruble 2-4 Train B Remote Display Processor Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, ICCMc IEIA-CA-9221 AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 behind 2MC2 Appendix C Table 2-4 ICCMd SRIA-P-9210 Train A Remote Display AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with SMC1,which hasan PEER Screened SEWS ICCMe 1EIA-P-9220 Train B Remote Display AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By Rule-of-tbe-bon with SMCS,which has an FREE Screened SEWS Reference 0, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Sen. 1, ICCMf 1EIA-CA-9210 Train A ICCM-86 Cabinet AUX 750 CC/55 Standby Functional Walkdown 10, S o 0.29 Functional Appendix C Table 2-4 ICCMg 1EIA-CA-9220 Train B ICCM-86 Cabinet AUX 750 CC/S5 Standby Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.29 Functional Appendix C Table 2-4 65 IFPE-CA-9010 SSPS Cabinet 'A' (CLABlock Valves AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 11 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Closure Permissive) CC/54 66 11PE-CA-9020 SSPSCabinet'B' (CLABlock Valves AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 11 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Closure Permissive) CC/54 Sm 603 Sady Fntoa Waknn Reference 10, Screens oat based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rex. 1, 67 1EQB-PN-DGLSAVarious Functions (i.e. H2 Igniters) AUX 750 BB/51 Standby Functional Walkdown Appendixc C e 2-4 Table 0.29 Functional 12OVAC Inst and Control Sm 701 Nominal 120 VAC 203 68 1EPG-PN-EKVA AUX 733 Functional Walk-By p >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Panelboard DD/54 Output Sm 701 Nominal 120 VAC 69 1EPG-BI-EVIA Vital Inverter AUX 733 Functional Walk-By p 65 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE CC/55 Output 70 1CF-LT-6000 Steam Generator NRLevel RX 739 Accum 1A Rm Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per IFEEE Indication Loop 1 39 45R Appendix C Table 2-4 71 1CF-LT-5540 Steam Generator NRLevel RX 742 Accum 1B Rm Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, 0 Screens cen out u based ae oon EPRI NP-6041-SL,Rev.

FIN-05S. e.11, >eeec RLGM Screened per IFEEE Indication Loop 2 146 49R Appendix C Table 2-4 72 1CF-LT-5S70 Steam Generator NRLevel RX 741Iniain Accum 1CRm Indication Indication Idcto Wakdown Wadon>GM Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >61GM Screened Sredpr per PEFEEt Indication Loop 3 214 5SR Appendix C Table 2-4 73 1CF-LT-6030 Steam Generator NRLevel RX 744 Accum 1D Rm Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per IFEEE Indication Loop 4 326 56R Appendix C Table 2-4 74 1SM-PT-50850 DD/44 Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Pressure Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 Sm 600 74 a ICA-PN-AFPA 1ACAPump Control Panel AUX 716 Standby Functional Walk-By p 180 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/51 75 1SM-PT-51O Steam Generator #2 Wide Range AUX 733 Rm 702 Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Pressure Indication Loop DD/53 Appendix C Table 2-4 76 FSM-PT-5140 Steam Generator #3 Wide Range AUX 733 Rm 702 Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Pressure Indication Loop DD/53 Appendix C Table 2-4 Sm 600 76 a SCA-PN-AFPB 1BCAPump Control Panel AUX 716 C/

cc/s1 Standby Functional Walk-By p 180 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 77 1SM-T-570 Steam Generator #4 Wide Range AUX 750 Sm802 Indication Idio Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Pressure Indication Loop DD/45 Appendix C Table 2-4 76 1NC-RD-5850 Steam Generator #1 NCWR T-Hot RX 740 24° 306 Indication Indicution Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI-NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EFRI NP-6041 Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 78 a iNC-CA-S0lO Reactor Vessel Level Indication Aux 767 86/49 Standby Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, AppendixunTablen2- 0.37 Functional System (RVLIS) Cabinet Train A ppendix C Table 2-4 Steam Generator 62 NCWR T-Hot Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 79 INC-RD-5870 Indication Loop RX 740 164° 30 Indication Indication WalCdown Appendix C Table 2-4 >RLGM Screened per EFRINP-6041 Page 36 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or ESELID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode-Steam Generator #3 NC WR T-HotReeee ,SrenoubaeonEINP64-,Rv.,

80 1NC-RD-5900 RX 740 203* 30R Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10 Screens out basedon EFRINP-B041-SL, Rev.1, sRLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 Steam Generator #4 NC WR T-Hot Reference 10, Screens out based on EFRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 81 1NC-RD-5920 RX 740 308° 30R Indication Indication Walkdown 1>RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 Containment NR Pressure Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 82 1NS-PT-5070 AUX 750 DD/S1 Indication Indication Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 83 1NC-FT-5120 NCWR Pressurizer NCW rsuie Pressure rsueAUX 7m3702Indication Rm 702 Indication Walkdown>LM Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, sRLOM Screened per EPRINP-6041 ScendprERN-04 Indication Loop CC/46 Appendix C Table 2-4 84 1EIA-CA-9010 ProcessControl Cabinet 1 AUX 767 Control Rm925 Indication Indication Walk-By p 16 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE (7300 Cabinet) AA/54 85A DieselGenerator FuelOil yard <760 N/A Intact/Available Intact/Available Walk-By p 556 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Storage Tank 18 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil 86 1FD-TK-0057 yard <760 N/A Intact/Available Intact/Available Walk-By p 556 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Storage Tank 600 VAC Essential for H2 Skimmer Rm 803 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 87 1EPE-MX-EMXA3Fan 1A Suction Isolation Valve AUX 750 88/45 Closed Closed Walkdomn Appendi>RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 IVXIA (04A) 600 VAC Essential for H2 Skimmer Rm 705 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 88 1EPE-MX-EMXBSFan 1BSuction Isolation Valve AUX 733 B8/47 Closed Closed Walkdown AppendiRLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 1VX2B(01C) 600 VAC Essential VENVX(04C, 060 Rm 803 89 1EPE-MX-EMXC AUX 750 Closed Closed Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE

& 0SD) BB/52 90 1EPE-MX-EMXD600 VACEssential for VE/VX(06E & AUX 733 Rm 705 Closed Closed Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 05D) BB/52 HZ Skimmer Fan IA Suction Reference 10, 91 1VX-VA-000A isola tion RX 831 265' 43R Closed Open Walkdown 0.60 Functional Isolation Valve Appendix C Reference 10, 03 92 1VX-AH-0003 Hydrogen Skimmer Fan No 1A RX 818 272' 47R Off On Walkdown Appendie 1 0.39 Anchorage 93H Skimmer Fan1 Suction RX 831 2798 49R Closed Open Walkdown Reference0.44 Functional Isolation Valve Appendix C Reference 10, 94 1VX-AH-0004 Hydrogen Skimmer Fan No 1B RX 818 268" 47R Off On Walkdown Appence C 0.40 Anchorage Appendix C 85 1VX-DA-9120 Containment Air Return Fan 1A RI 775 270° 0R Closed Open Walk-By Rule of the box with 1VX-AH-0001 which has IPEEE sRLGM Screened per IPEEE (1RAF-D-2) Damper SEWS 96 1VX-AH-0001 Containment Air Return Fan 1A RX 775 270° SOR Off On Walk-By p 434 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 03 nhrg 97 1VE-XF-0004 Annulus Ventilation Fan 1A AUX 767 JJ/51 Off On Walkdown Apendx0.35 Appendix C Table 2-4 Anchorage 98 1VE-XF-0005 Annulus Ventilation Fan 1B AUX 767 HH/52 Off On Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out basedox EFRINP-6041-SL, Rev.1, 0.45 Anchorage Appendix C Table 2-4 99 1KC-PU-0003 B1 Closed Cooling Water System AUX 733 HH/57 On On Walk-By p 255 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Pump 100 1KC-PU-0004 B2 Closed Cooling Water System AUX 733 HH/57 On On Walk-By p 2553er >RLGM Screened IPEEE Pump 101 1KC-TK-0009 Component Cooling Water System AUX 767 JJ/57 Intact/ Intact/ Walk-By p528 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Surge Tank In-Service In-Service 102 1KC-VA-0050A KCAuxiliary BldgSupply Non- AUX 750 J /55 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE,p 773 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Essential Isolation 103 1KC-VA-0230A KCReactor BldgSupply Non- AUX 750 JJ/55 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE,p 773 oRLGM Screened per IPEEE Essential Isolation 104 1KC-VA-0200A KCAuxiliary BldgReturn Non- AUX 733 HH/55 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE,p 773 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Essential Isolation 105 1KC-VA-0003A KCReactor BldgReturn Non- AUX 733 HH/55 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 308 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Essential Isolation Page 37 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit I ESELand HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or ESELID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode-106 1KC-HX-0005 Train A Component Cooling Water AUX 750 JlJ/56 Intact/ Intact/ Walkdown Reference 10, HCLPFbased on IPEEE evaluation (p 1728) by >RLGM Screened per IPEEE HX In-Service In-Service Appendix C Structural Mechanics Associates 773 107 1NC-VA-0032B NC System Pressurizer PORV RX8 Pressurizer Cavity Closed Closed Walk-By p Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGM Screened per PEEE 110' 32R Pressurizer Cavity 108 1NC-VA-0o36B NC System Pressurizer PORV RX 806 Closed Closed Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE 105. 32R Pressurizer Cavity 773 773 109 1NC-VA-0001 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve RX 815 Closed Closed Walk-By p Included in IPEEE,p >RLGM Screened perlPEEE 105' 35R Pressurizer Cavity 773 773 110 1NC-VA-0002 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve RX 801 Closed Closed Walk-By p Included in IPEEE, p >RLGM Screened perIPEEE 101" 35R RX Pressurizer Cavity 111 1NC-VA-0003 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve 801 Closed Closed Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE,p 773 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 101* 35R Rm 500 Intact Pressure 112 1ND-PU-0001 Train A ND Pump AUX 695 Off Walk-By p 273 >RLGM Screened perIPEEE FF/54 Boundary Rm 501 Intact Pressure 273 113 1ND-PU-0002 Train B ND Pump AUX 695 Off Walk-By p >RLGM Screened per IPEEE GG/54 Boundary AUX Rm 733 Intact/ Intact/

114 1ND-HX-O003 Train A ND HX 750 Walk-By p 458 >RLGM Screened perIPEEE LL/52 In-Service In-Service AUX Rm 732 Intact/ Intact/

Screened per PEEE 115 1ND-HX-0004 Train B ND HX 750 Walk-By p 458 >RLGM LL/52 In-Service In-Service Rm 500 116 1ND-HX-O005 Train A ND Pump Seal Cooling HX AUX 695 Intact Intact Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 1ND-PU-0002, which has an >RLGM Screened per IPEEE FF/54 IPEEE SEWS 773 117 1ND-VA-0002AC RHR Pump Hotleg Suction Isolation RX 745 182" 50R Closed/Open Open Walk-By p Included in IPEEE,p 773 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 118 1ND-VA-0O01B RHR Pump Hotleg Suction Isolation RX 745 180' 22R Closed/Open Open Walk-By p 773 Included in IPEEE, p 773 >RLGM Screened per PEEE 1N1-VA-O173A Train A RHR Isolation to the Rm 602 4 119 AUX 733 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 77 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Coldlegs GG/52 120 1NI-VA-O178B Train B RHR Isolation to the AUX Rm 730 774 733 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE Coldlegs HH/52 AUX Rm 603 774 121 1NI-VA-Ol18A Train A NI Isolation to the Coldlegs 716 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened perIPEEE JJ/52 AUX Screened perlPEEE 122 1NI-VA-0121A Train A NI Isolation to the Hotlegs 742 FF/52 Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p 774 Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM AUX Rm 603 774 123 INI-VA-O150B Train B NI Isolation to the Coldlegs 716 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE HH/52 774 124 1NI-VA-0152B Train B NI Isolation to the Hotlegs AUX 750 ,,' Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE HH/52 774 125 1NI-VA-0162A NI Isolation to the Coldlegs AUX 733 730 Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p Included in IPEEE, p 774 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Ji/51 126 1NI-PU-0009 Train A NI Pump AUX 716 R.

HH/54 Off Bnda Boundary re Walk-By p 245 >RLGM Screened per tPEEE Sm 626 Intact Pressure 127 INI-PU-O010 Train B NI Pump AUX 716 Off Walk-By p 245 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Sm GG/535026 Intact Pressure Boundary 128 INS-PU-0001 Train A NS Pump AUX 695 Off Intact Pressure Walk-By p 277 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE GG/S5 Boundary 129 1NS-PU-0002 Train B NS Pump AUX 695 GG/5503Off Boundary Walk-By 277 >RLGM Screened er IPEEE Sm 733 130 1NS-HX-O003 Train A NS Heat Exchanger AUX 750 Intact Intact Walk-By p 451 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE MM/S1 Sm 732 131 1NS-HX-0004 Train B NS Heat Exchanger AUX 750 M MM/51 Intact Intact Walk-By p 451 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 0

132 1SM-VA-007AB Train A MSIV Outer Doghouse 792 DD/43 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 30 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE (DH1)

Page 38 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESELand HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or ESELID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode***

Inner Doghouse 792 DD/53 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 300 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 133 1SM-VA-0OO5ABTrain BMSIV (DH2)

Inner Doghouse 134 1SM-VA-OO03ABC Train C MSIV 792 DD/52 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p300 >RLGM Screened per PEEE (DH2)

Outer Doghouse 135 1SM-VA-O001AB Train D MSIV 792 DD/44 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 300 >RLGM Screened per PEEE (DH1)

Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 136 1SV-VA-0020 Valve 791 EE/43 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE (DH1)

Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 137 1SV-VA-0021 Valve 791 EE/43 Closed Closed Walk-By p297 >RLGM Screened perIPEEE (DH1) 1SV-VA-0022 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 138 791 EE/43 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE Valve (DH1)

Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 139 1SV-VA-0023 Valve 791 EE/43 Closed Closed Walk-By p297 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE (DH1)

Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 140 1SV-VA-0024 Valve 791 EE/43 Closed Closed Walk-By p297 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE (DH1)

Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 141 1SV-VA-0014 Valve 791 EE/53 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE (DH2)

Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 142 1SV-VA-0015 Valve 791 EE/53 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per PEEE (DH2)

Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 143 1SV-VA-O016 Valve 791 EE/53 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per PEEE (DH2)

Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 144 1SV-VA-0017 Valve 791 EE/S3 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE (DH2)

Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 14S 1SV-VA-O018 Valve 791 EE/S3 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per PEEE (DM2)

Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 146 1SV-VA-O0O8 Valve 791 EE/52 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per PEEE (DH1) 1VV009Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 147 791 EE/52 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened perIPEEE Valve (DH1)

Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 148 1SV-VA-001 Valve 791 EE/52 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened perIPEEE (DHI) 1VV001Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 149 791 EE/52 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE Valve (DH1)

Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 150 1SV-VA-0012 Valve 791 EE/52 Closed Closed Walk-By p297 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE (DH1) 151 1SV-VA-COO3 1SV-VA-0002 Vlv D Main Steam Safety Relief Train Valve Inner Doghouse 791 EE/43 Closed Closed Walk-By p297 >RLGM Screened perIPEEE Valve (DH2)

Train D Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 297

>RLGM 152 791 EE/43 Closed Closed Walk-By p Screened perlPEEE (DH2)

Train D Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse >RLGM 153 1SV-VA-0004 Valve 791 EE/43 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 Screened per PEEE (DH2)

Train D Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse >RLGM 154 1SV-VA-COOS Valve 791 EE/43 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 Screened per PEEE (DH2)

Train D Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 155 1SV-VA-0006 Valve 791 EE/43 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per PEEE (DH2)

Rule-of-the-box with 1RN-PU-0O04, which has an 156 IRN-HX-0006 18 RN PumpMotor Cooler AUX 716 EE/57 In-Service In-Service Walk-By p 249 >RLGM Screened per PEEE IPEEESEWS (p 249) 157 1R-A04ARNPumpDischarge CrossTrain AUX 716 FF/56 Normally Open Closed Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Screened per PEEE Supply Isolation MSV 1R-AO8BKC HX Cooling Water Outplet 1RN-VA-01 H Cooling Water Supply BKC 776 158 1RN-VA-01slB Isolation AUX 750 LL/55 Throttled Open Walk-By p Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Screened per PEEE 1S9 1RN-VA-0190B KCHX Cooling Water Outlet AUX 750 HH/54 Throttled Open Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Isolation Page 39 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 1 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or ESELID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF'* Key Failure Mode-160 1RN-VA-8213B B1 KCPump Motor Cooler Cooling AUX 733 HH/56 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE,p 776 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Water Outlet Isolation 7 76 161 1RN-VA-0218B B2 KCPump Motor Cooler Cooling AUX 733 GG/57 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE,p >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Water Outlet Isolation 776 162 EDGKDHXSupply MOV Isolation AUX 776 SRN-VA-0171B BB/4 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p Included in IPEEE,p 776 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Sm 704 163 1RN-VA-0174B EDGKDHXOutlet MOV Isolation AUX 736 88/4 BB/45 Open Closed Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE,p 776 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 164 1RN-VA-S235B Train B NSHX Supply Isolation MOV AUX 733 Rm 732 Closed Closed Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE,p 776 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE KK/S1 164 1RN-VA-02058 Train B NSHIPuppl IsColatonMO AUX 733 KE/0SadySntciakB 5 Rl-ftebxwih1VP-06 hihhsa RG Sree e PE Rm 630 Standby/ Intact Walk-By p252 Rule-of-the-box with 1NV-PU-0016, which hasan vSLOM Screenedper IPEEE 165 iRN-HX-O0iB Train B NVPump Mtr Cooler AUX 716 HH/5S In-Service IPEEE SEWS(p 252)

Sm 630 Standby Sole-of-the-hoe with 1NV-PU-0016, which has an 166 1RN-HX-0020 Train B NVPump Bearing Oil Cooler AUX 716 H/ Indby/ Intact Walk-By p 252 IPEEE (p with w52) >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Sm 630 Standby/ Inat Wl-BR 5 ule-of-the-bon with 1NV-PU-OO16, which has an 167 1RN-HX-0022 Train B NV Pump Gearbox Oil Cooler AUX 716 HH/SS HH/55 In-Service In-Service Inat Wl-y p22 IPEEE SEWS IPEEE SEWS (p(p 252) 252) >RLGM Screened per IPEtEE Sm 503 Seference 10, 168 1VA-AH-0023 Train B NSPump AHU AUX 695 Standby Intact Walkdown R Same make/model as U2 ESEL168 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE GG/SS Appendix C Sm 500 169 1VA-AH-0027 Train B NOPump AHU AUX 695 FF/54 FF/54 Standby Intact Walk-By p 413 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 170 1RN-HX-0024 Train B NIPomp Mtr Cooler AUX 716 Rm 626 Standby Intact Walk-By p245 Role-of-the-boo with SNI-PU-0010, which has an vSLOM Screenedper P555 GG/53 IPEEESEWS(p 245)

AUX 716 Standby Walk-By p 245>RG Rule-of-the-box with 1NI-PU-0010, which has an vRLGM 171 1RN-HX-0026 Train B NI Pump Brg Oil Cooler GG/54 Intact Screened per PEEE IPEEESEWS (p 245) 172 1RN-VA-O2978 1B SN Essential Return Header to Rm 602 7 76 AUX Closed Open Walk-By p776 Included in IPEEE,p >RLGM Screened per PEEE SNSWP EE/52 Rm 602 173 0RN-VA-O283AC 1B/2B RN Disch To RC X-Over Isol AUX Open Closed Walk-By p776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Screened per PEEE EE/52 Rm 647W 7 7 76 174 ORN-VA-01528 1B/2B SN Essential Return Header AUX Closed Open Walk-By p7 6 Included in IPEEE, p >RLGM Screened per PEEE to SNSWP EE/60 175 ORN-VA-O151B SNSWP Islto Return Headers Cross Train AUX EE/54 Closed Closed Walk-By p776 Included in IPEEE,p 776 >RLGM Screened per PEEE Isolation Rm 647W 7 6 176 2RN-VA-0297B 2B RN Ess Hdr SNSWP Return Iso AUX Open Closed Walk-By p 8 Included in IPEEE,p 786 >RLGM Screened per PEEE EE/60 177 1CA-VA-162B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Aux Closed Open TBD TBD TBD T7D TBD Isolation from circulating water 177 a 1CA-SV-1620 Solenoid Valve Aux Energized Energized TBD TBD TBD T7D TB7 177 b 1CA-RV-1622 Relief Valve Aux Closed Closed TBD TBD TBD TED TBD 177 c 1CA-GC-1620 Control Air Gas Cylinder Aux Intact Intact TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD 177 d 1CA-GC-1621 Control Air Gas Cylinder Aux Intact Intact T8D TBD TBD TBD TBD 177 e 1CA-PS-5380 Pressure Switch Aux 716 Functional Functional TBD TBD TBD T7D TBD 177 f 1CA-PS-5391 Pressure Switch Aux 716 Functional Functional T7D TBD TBD TBD TBD 177 g 1CA-TB-901 Junction Box houses Relays 'AA' and Aux 733 Functional Functional TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD

'BB' 178 1NV-VA-0055A Letdown Inboard Containment RX 752 Open Closed TBD TBD TBD TED TBD Isolation 178 a 1NV-SV-0350 Solenoid Valve RIX 752 Energized De-energized TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD Page 40 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit I ESELand HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or 5

ESELID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode-178 b 1NV-SV-0351 Solenoid Valve RX 752 Energized De-energized TBD TBD TED TBD TBD 179 1NV-VA-0121 Auxiliary Letdown Isolation AUX 733 RHR HtX Room Closed Closed TBD TBD TED TBD TBD 179 a 1NV-ML-1210 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD 180 1NV-VA-O457A Letdown Islto Inboard Containment Isolation RX 752 Closed Closed TED TED TED TBD TBD 180 a 1NV-SV-4570 Solenoid Valve RX 752 De-energized De-energized TBD TBD TBD TBD TED 180 b 1NV-SV-4571 Solenoid Valve RX 752 De-energized De-energized TED TED TBD TBD TBD 181 1NV-VA-O458A Letdown Inboard Containment RX 752 Closed Closed TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD Isolation 181 a 1NV-SV-4580 Solenoid Valve RX 752 De-energized De-energized TOD TED TBD TBD TBD 181 b 1NV-SV-4581 Solenoid Valve RX 752 De-energized De-energized TED TED TBD TBD TBD 182 INV-VA-0025B Excess Letdown Isolation RX 725 Closed Closed TBD TBD TBD TBD TED 182 a IdNV-SV-0250 Solenoid Valve RX 725 De-energized De-energized TED TED TBD TED TBD Instrument AirBlackout 183 1VI-TK-0010 A AUX 750 Intact Intact TBD TED TBD TBD TBD 184 1VI-1328 Blackout Accumulator Relief AUX 750 Closed Closed TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD 185 1VI-1330 Blackout Header Relief AUX 750 Closed Closed TED TBD TBD TBD TBD Page number refers to IPEEEscanned document page.

• • HCLPF values of >RLGM indicate that the HCLPF exceeds the Review Level Ground Motion (0.26g), but that a specific HCLPF value was not calculated since the component was screened out from further evaluation.

Key Failure Modes are defined as follows:

Screened per IPEE - Indicates that the component was evaluated in the IPEEEand therefore meets the RLGM demand.

Screened per EPRI NP-6041 - Indicates that the component meets the screening criteria of EPRI NP-6041, Table 2-4 and that neither anchorage, relay chatter, nor nor interactions limit the reported HCLPF.

Interaction - Block Wall - Indicates that the component is located near a block wall. The block wall was evaluated in the IPEEEand therefore the block wall meets the RLGM demand. The functional and anchorage HCLPFs exceed the reported HCLPF value.

Anchorage - Indicates that the anchorage is the governing failure mode for the component.

Functional - Indicates that functional failure is the governing failure mode for the component.

• Component adjacent to block wall. Aux building block walls were evaluated in the IPEEEas robust without a specific value. HCLPF of component provided in Table 7-1.

However block wall may have lower HCLPF than component, therefore HCLPF reported here as >RLGM.

Page 41 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Appendix B MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results Page 42 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESELand HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESELID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walkdown SEWS Screening Notes HCLPFo* Key Failure Mode-0 Walk-By SWYSreigNtsHPF eyFiueMd 1 2FW-VA-0032B Refueling Water Recirc Pump AUX 750 Rm 828 Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p 782 Included in IPEEE,p 782 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Suction Isolation JJ/61 2 2FW-VA-0033A Refueling Water Recirc Pump AUX 750 Rm 824 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 782 Included in IPEEE,p 782 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Suction Isolation J.1/61 2FW-VA-0001A Refueling Water Recirc Pump Rm 828 3 AUX 750 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 782 Included in IPEEE,p 782 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Suction Isolation JJ/6i Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 4 2ND-VA-O056 ND Relief- 'A' Coldlegs AUX 733 HH/60 Closed Closed Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 5 2ND-VA-O061 NO Relief - Hotlegs AUX 716 FF/6o Closed Closed Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 6 2ND-VA-0064 ND Relief - 'B' Coldlegs AUX 733 JJ/61 Closed Closed Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 7 2NI-VA-0119 NI Relief- 'A' Train Hotleg AUX 716 GG/60 Closed Closed Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Appendix C Table 2-4 Rm 830 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 8 2NI-VA-0151 NI Relief- 'B' Train Hotleg AUX 750 Closed Closed Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 GG/60 AppendixC Table 2-4 Rm 788 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 9 2NI-VA-0161 NI Relief- Coldleg AUX 733 Closed Closed Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 HH/60 Appendix C Table 2-4 Rm 601 10 ORN-VA-0007A SNSWP Supply to Units land 2 AUX 716 Closed Open Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE,p 776 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE AA/63 Rm 602A 11 2NV-VA-0095B NC Pumps Seal Water Return Cont AUX 733 Open Closed Walk-By p 785 Included in IPEEE,p 785 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE EE/60 Reactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid RXCavity Window Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 12 2NC-VA-272AC Isolation Valve RX 772 B-C Side Closed Open and Closed Walkdown Reeence 1 Screens>RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 117' 20R Appendix C Table 2-4 13 2NC-VA273AC Reactor Vessel Head-Vent Solenoid RXCavity Window Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 772 B-C Side Closed Open and Closed Walkdown Reeence 1 Screen outRLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Isolation Valve RX 117' 20R Appendix C Table 2-4 NC System Pressurizer PORV Pressurizer Cavity Solenoids and Pneumatic Controls RX 806 y Closed Open and Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 14 2NC-VA-0303A A1052 NRrGM 358 Screne pe PAtER 5 2NI-VA-o430A 2NC-34A from Assured 2A CIA (MDV)Nitrogen Supply 762 2A CA 45' 51RRm Closed Open and Closed Walk-By p 785 Included in IPEEE,p 785 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Reference 10, Included in IPEEE(p 772). Evaluated by Structural 16 2FW-TX-OO01 Refueling Water Storage Tank Yard >760 N/A n/a n/a Walkdown Appendix C Mechanics Associates (p 1461). >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 17 2NI-VA-0054A 2A CLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 Pipe Chase Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 43' 46R 18 Pipe Chase is 2NI-VA-OO6SB 2B CLABlock Valve (MOV) RX 733 Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE,p 784 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 138' 47R 18 2 CI 21-V-007A Blok Vlve(MDV RX 733 Pipe Chase 19 2NI-VA-O76A 2C2CLABlock Valve (MOV) RX 733 221"47R Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 20 2NI-VA-0088B 2D CLA Block Valve (MOV) RX 733 Pipe Chase Open M1-4 Closed Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 317" 49R New equipment - updated IPEtE SEWS evaluation.

21 2EHM-TF-HMTA H2 Igniter Transformer AUX 750 CC/61 Off Functional Walk-By p 74 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE "Reference 10, Appendix B1, pg. R1-10" Reference it*

NP-6041 22 2EHM-PN-HMPPA H2 Igniter Power Panel AUX 750 CC/61 Standby Functional Walkdown enc Bounded by evaluation of 2EHM-TB-158.

Buddb vlaino EMT-59

>GM RG cendprER per EPRI P64 Screened Appendix C 2EHM-HR-TB03 A'Train H2 Igniters Reference 10, Not in experience database. Tested to SQURTS 23 thru TB71 (Odd RX Various Various De-energized Functional Walkdown eRLGM Undetermined Appendix C TRS.

numbers only) (35 Igniters per Train) 23 a 2EHM-SX-HMBPA Voltage Reg Bypass Switch AUX 750 CC/61 De-energized Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on SPRI NP-5041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Appendix C Table 2-4 Page 43 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESELand HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESELID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walkdow or S SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode***

Walk-By 23 b 2EHM-VR-HMRA Voltage Regulator AUX 750 CC/61 De-energized Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screensout basedon EFRiNP-6t41-SL,Rev.1, 0.29 Functional AppendixC Table 2-4 24 2EHM-TB-1549 LocaITerminal Box AUX 750 CC/61 n/a Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screensout basedon EFRiNP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.90 Functional Appendix C Table 2-4 25 Deleted 26 2CA-HX-OO03 TDCAPBearing Oil Cooler AUX 716 AA/60 Idle Functional Walk-By p 542 vRLGM Screened per IPEEE 27 2CA-PU-0003 TDCAP(Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine AUX 716 AA/60 Idle Functional Walk-By p 242 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Driven Pump)

Rsie-of-the-box with 2CA-PU-0003, which has an 27 a 2SA-TR-O003 TDCAPTurbine AUX 716 AA/6O Idle Functional Walk-By fE SEWS IPEEE tSEWS w>RLGM Screened per IPEEE Rsle-of-the-hoo with 2CA-PU-053, which has an 27 b 2SA-VA-0004 TDCAPSteam Control Valve AUX 716 AA/60 Idle Functional Walk-By R IPEEESEWS wiWh >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Rule-of-the-box wish 2CA-PU-0003, which has an 27 c 2SA-GV-0003 TDCAPGovernor Valve AUX 716 AA/60 Idle Functional Walk-By FEtSEWS IPEEE SEWS ' w>RLGM Screened per IPEEE Rule-of-the-boo with 2CA-PU-0003, which has an 27 d 2SA-GX-0003 Gear Reducer AUX 716 AA/6O Idle Functional Walk-By >RLGM Screened per IPEEE IPEEE SEWS 28 2CA-PN-AFTp TDCAPControl Panel AUX 716 AA/61 n/a Available Walk-By p 187 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 29 2SA-VA-O048ABC TDCAPSteam Supply Isolation Inner Doghouse 767 FF/59 Idle Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEE,p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE (AOV) (OH3) inner Doghouse Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 29 a 2SA-SV-0480 Air Supply Solenoid Dump Valve 767 FF/59 Energized De-energized Walkdown 1>RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 (DH3) AppendixC Table 2-4 29 b 2SA-SV-0481 AirSupply Solenoid Dump Valve 767Reference 10, Screensout basedon EPRINP-641-SL, Rev.1, RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 (DH3) Appendix C Table 2-4 Rm 601 30 2SA-VA-0003 TDCAPTrip-Throttle Valve AUX 716 60 Open Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEE,p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE FF/69 31 Deleted 32 Deleted 33 Deleted 34 2V1-VA-003ý 2A VIEssential Hdr Supply from VG AUX 733 Rm 726 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Interaction - Block Wall Inlet Relief (115 psig) FF/59 Appendix C Table 2-4 35 2VI-VA-0034 2B VlEssential Hdr Supply from VG AUX 733 FF/R8 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Interaction - Block Wall Inlet Relief (115 psig) Appendix C Table 2-4 36 2VI-VA-011Z 2A VIAux Bldg Instrument AirTank AUX 733 Rm 726 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6B41 Relief (115 psig) FF/S9 Appendix C Table 2-4 37 2VI-VA-013 2A VIAux BldgInstrument AirTank AUX 733 Rm 726 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL,Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Relief (115 psig) FF/59 AppendixC Table 2-4 38 2VI-VA-015 2B VIAux Bldg Instrument AirTank AUX 733 FF/58 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Relief (115 psig) Appendix C Table 2-4 39 2VI-VA-015 2B ViAux Bldg Instrument AirTank AUX 733 FF/58 Closed Closed Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Relief (115 psig) Appendix C Table 2-4 40 2VI-VA-2009 2SM-1AB VIAccumulator Relief Outer Doghouse 70/67 Closed Closed Wlkd Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, RLGM Screened per EFRI P-6041 (120 psig) (DH4) Appendix C Table 2-4 Page 44 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESELand HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESELID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Waikdown or SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode***

Walk-By 41 2VI-VA-2019 2SM-7ABVIAccumulator Relief Outer Doghouse Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 42 2VI-VA-2019 790 DD/69 Closed Closed Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 42 2VI-VA-2029 2SM-3ABC VIAccumulator Relief Inner Doghouse Closed Closed Wlkd Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLOM Screenedper EFRINP-6041 (120 psig) (0143) Appendix C Table 2-4 2SM-5AB VI Accumulator Relief Inner Doghouse 70/59 Closed Closed Wlkd Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screenedper EFRINP-6041 (120 psig) (DH3) Appendix C Table 2-4 44TCA FlowControl to 2A S and AUX 716 Open Open/Throttled Walk-By p 781 Included in IPEEE,p 781 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls BB/62 Closed 44 a 2CA-ML-0640 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2MC10 >RLGIM Screened per IPEEE 44 b 2CA-SS-640 Selector Switch AUX 716 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-64AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/62 44 c 2CA-MT-0640 Misc Transmitter AUX 716 Rm601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-64AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/62 44 d 2CA-VP-0640 Valve Positioner AUX 716 Rm601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-64AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/62 Reference 10, LM ScendprERN-64 44 e 2CA-SV-0640 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown en>RLGM Appendix C Screened per EPRINP-6041 Reference 10,vLM ScendprERNF64 44 f 2CA-SV-0641 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Appendix C 1

45 2CA-VA-0052AB TDCAFlow Control to 2BSCand AUX 716 Em 601 Open Open/Throttled/ Walk-By p 781 Included in IPEEE,p 78 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls BB/61 Closed 45 a 2CA-ML-0520 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2MC10 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 45 b 2CA-SS-0520 Selector Switch AUX 716 Em 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-S2AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/61 45c 2CA-MT-520 Mis Transmitter AUX 716 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-S2AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/61 45 d 2CA-VP-Em20 Valve Po~itioner AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-52AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 813/61 Reference 10,vLC ScendprERN-61 45 e 2CA-SV-0520 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Appendco C >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 45f 2CA-SV-0521 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Reference 10, RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Appendix C TDCA Flow Control to 2C SC andRr 0OpnT oted 46 2CA-VA-0048AB AUX 716 Em 601 Open Openflhrottled/ Walk-By p 781 Included in FPEEE,p 781 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls CC/60 Closed 46 a 2CA-ML-0480 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2MC10 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 46 b 2CA-SS-0480 Selector Switch AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-48AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE CC/60 46c 2CA-MT-0480 Mis Transmitter AUX 716 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-48AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE CC/6O 46 d 2CA-VP-0480 Valve Poxitioner AUX 716 Em 601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-48AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE CC/60 Reference 10,>LM ScendprERN-61 46 e 2CA-SV-0480 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Appence 1 >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Appendix C Reference 10,vLM ScendprPRN-61 46f 2CA-SV-0481 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Appendix C >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 47 2CA-VA-0036ABTDCAFlow Control to 2D SGand AUX 716 Rm 601 Open Open/Throttled/ Walk-By p 781 Included in IPEEE,p 781 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls BB/63 Closed Page 45 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESELID BDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walkdown or SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode-Walk-By 47 a 2CA-ML-0360 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2MC10 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 47 b 2CA-SS-0360 Selector Switch AUX 716 Sm601 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-36AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/63 Sm 601 47 c 2CA-MT-0360 MistcTransmitter AUX 716 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-36AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/63 Sm 601 47 d 2CA-VP-0360 Valve Positioner AUX 716 BB/60 BB/63 Functional Functional Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2CA-36AB >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 47e 2CA-SV-0360 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Reference Appendix 10, C >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 47 f 2CA-SV-0361 Solenoid Valve AUX 716 Rm 601 Energized Energized Walkdown Reference 10, >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Appendix C 48 -CV-001niB 2ASG Main Steam PORVand Outer Doghouse tog FF/66 Closed Open/Throttled/ Walk-By p 264 49 2SV-C'V-OOS3AR 2BSGMain Steam PORVand Outer Doghouse 0 FF/66 F6 Closed lsdWl-y Open/Throttled/ Walk-By p 294 p24>LMSree e PE Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH4) Closed 50 25V-CV-0007ABC 2C SGMain Steam PORV and Inner Doghouse 809 80nF5 FF159 Closed lsd Open/Throttled/ Walk-By akB p 294 9 RLGM Screened per IFEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH3) Closed 512D Main SteamPORVand Inner Doghouse 809 FF/59 Closed Open/Throttled/ Walk-By p 294 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Associated Pneumatic Controls (DH3) Closed 52 2EPL-PN-EVDAVital Battery 125 VDCDistribution AUX 733 DD/54 Functional Functional Walk-By p 212 RLGM Screened per IPEEE Panel 52 a 2EPL-PN-EVDDVital Battery 125 VDCDistribution AUX 733 CC/57 Functional Functional Walk-By p 212 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Panel Sm 707 - Refeence50, edunantrompnentlistng, eferkoWlESE 53 OEPL-BA-EVCAVital Battery AUX 733 C/ Functional Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Redundant component listing, refer to U- BlockWall CC/54 Appendix C item 953 54 OEPL-BC-EVCSVitSl Battery Charger and Charger AUX 733 Rm 701 Functional Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.45 Functional Connection BoxECBS BB/S4 Appendix C Table 2-4 55 2EPE-MX-EMXA4 600 VACEssential Power AUX 750 BB/65 Functional Functional Walk-By p32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 56 2EPE-MX-EMXA2 600 VACEssential Power AUX 750 BB/65 Functional Functional Walk-By p32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 57 2EPE-MX-EMXB4 600 VACEssential Power AUX 733 716 Functional Functional Walk-By p32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE B1/65 2ETP-CA-0010 58 (2ATC 10) Pzr PORVRelay/Indication AUX 767 HH/58 Standby Functional Walk-By p 216 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Main Control Board Cabinet for 59 2EOA-PN-MC5 Head-Vent Operation, Hotleg AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Temperature Indication 602OA-F-MC7 Main Control Board Cabinet with H2 60 Switch 2EOA-PN-MC7 Igniter Control Switch AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 61 2EOA-PN-MCSO Main Control Board Cabinet for CA/ AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 RLGM Screened per IPEEE NC Systems Main Control Board Cabinet for NI 62 2EOA-PN-MC11 System, Containment Pressure AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Indication Main Control Board Cabinet for SM 8

63 2EOA-PN-MC2 System (PORVControl, CF/SM AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 6 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Indication)

Page 46 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESELand HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESELID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walkdown or SEWS Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode-C Walk-By Cob ICCMa 2EOA-PN-MC1 AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 86 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE ICCMRemote Display ICCMb 2EIA-CA-9211 Train A Remote Display Processor AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL,Rev, 1, RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 behind 2MC2 Appendix C Table 2-4 ICCMc 2EIA-CA-9221 Train B Remote Display Processor AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRINP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 behind 2MC2 AppendixC Table 2-4 Role-of-the-box with 2MCI, which has an RPEEE RG cendprPt ICCMd 2EIA-P-9210 Train A Remote Display AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By E>RLGM SEWS Screened per IPEEE Rule-of-the-boo with 2MC1, which has an IPEtEE LM SrendprPt ICCMe 2EIA-P-9220 Train BRemote Display AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Standby Functional Walk-By SEWS >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Reference SO, Screens nout based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.9Fntoa ICCMf 2EIA-CA-9210 Train A ICCM-86 Cabinet AUX 750 CC/S5 Standby Functional Walkdown 0.29 Functional Appendix C Table 2-4 ICCM 2EIA-CA-9220 Train BICCM-86 Cabinet AUX 750 CC/SB Standby Functional Walkdown Reference Appendix 10, C Screens Table 2-4out based on EPRINP-6041-SL,Rev. 1, 0.29 Functional 64 21PE-CA-9010 SSPS.Cabinet'A (CABlock.Valves AUX 767 Control Rn 925 Standby Functional Walk-By p 11 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Closure Permissive) CC/58 SSPSCabinet 'B' (CLABlock Valves Control Rm 925 Standby 65 21PE-CA-9020 AUX 767 Functional Walk-By p 1 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Closure Permissive) CC/58 Rm 805 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 66 2EQB-PN-DGLSA Various Functions (i.e. H2 Igniters) AUX 750 Standby Functional Walkdown 0.29 Functional BB/61 Appendix C Table 2-4 120VACInst and Control Rm 701 Nominal 120 VAC 67 2EPG-PN-EKVA AUX 733 Functional Walk-By p 203 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Panelboard DD/54 Output Rm 701 Nominal 120 VAC 68 2EPG-BI-EVIA Vital Inverter AUX No Functional Walk-By p 65 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE CC/S5 Output Steam Generator NRLevel Accum 2A RmR Indication Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 69 2CF-LT-6000 RX 739 Indication Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Indication Loop 1 36' 46R Appendix C Table 2-4 Steam Generator NRLevel Accum 2BF1w Indication Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 70 2CF-LT-5540 RX 742 Indication Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Indication Loop 2 145999R Appendix C Table 2-4 Steam Generator NRLevel Accum 2CFm Indication Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 71 2CF-LT-5570 RX 740 Indication Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Indication Loop 3 215956R Appendix C Table 2-4 Steam Generator NRLevel Accum 2D FmR Indication Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 72 2CF-LT-6030 RX 744 Indication Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Indication Loop 4 326' 57R Appendix C Table 2-4 Steam Generator #1 Wide Range Rm 804 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 73 2$M-PT-S080 AUX 750 Indication Indication Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Pressure Indication Loop DD/67 Appendix C Table 2-4 Rm 601 73 a 2rA-PN-AFPA 2ACA Pump Control Panel AUX 716 Standby Functional Walk-By p 180 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE BB/61 Steam Generator #2 Wide Range Rm 713 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 74 25M-PT-5110 AUX 733 Indication Indication Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Pressure Indication Loop DD/59 Appendix C Table 2-4 Steam Generator #3 Wide Range Rm 713 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 75 2SM-PT-5140 AUX 733 Indication Indication Walkdown oRLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Pressure Indication Loop DD/59 Appendix C Table 2-4 Rm 601 75 a 2CA-PN-AFPB 2BCA Pump Control Panel AUX 716 Stand Functional Walk-By p 180 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE CC/62 Steam Generator #4 Wide Range Rm 804 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 76 2SM-PT-5170 AUX 750 Indication Indication Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Pressure Indication Loop DD/67 Appendix C Table 2-4 Steam Generator #1 NC WRT-Hot Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 77 2NC-RD-5850 RX 740 24' 30R Indication Indication Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 77 a e" or. . n caon AUX 767 BB/63 Standby Functional Walkdown 0.37 Functional Ino EDB#) System (RVLIS) Cabinet Appendix C Table 2-4 79 2 Steam Generator #2 NC WR T-Hot 65 740 164' 309 Indication Indication Waibdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 79 2NC-D5900 Steam Generator #3 NC WR T-Hot RX 740 203' 309 Indication Indication Waibdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, vRLGM Screened per FF91 NP-6041 Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 Page 47 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESELand HCLPFResults EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESEL ID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Waldown SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode-f*

Walk-By Steam Generator #4 NC WRT-Hot 80 2NC-RD-5920 RX 740 308630R Indication Indication Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Indication Loop Appendix C Table 2-4 Containment WR Pressure Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 81 2NS-PT-5070 Indication Loop AUX 750 DD/60 Indication Indication Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Appendix C Table 2-4 2 NC-PT-5 120 NC WRPressurizer Pressure Rm 713 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 82 AUX 733 Indication Indication Walkdown >RLGM Screened per EPRINP-6041 Indication Loop DD/67 Appendix C Table 2-4 Process Control Cabinet 1 Control Rm 925 83 2EIA-CA-9010 (7300 cabinet) AUX 767 Indication Indication Walk-By p 16 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE AA/54 2F0-TK-0056 2A Diesel Generator Fuel Oil 84 Yard <760 N/A Intact/Available Intact/Available Walk-By p 556 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Storage Tank 2BDiesel Generator Fuel Oil 85 2FD-TS-00S7 Storage Tank Yard <760 N/A Intact/Available Intact/Available Walk-By p 556 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 600 VAC Essential for IH2 Skimmer Rm 805 Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 86 2EPE-MX-EMXA3 Fan 2A Suction Isolation Valve AUX 750 89/66 Closed Closed Walkdown Reeence 1 Scree out >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 2VXIA (04A) Appendix C Table 2-4 600 VAC Essential for H2 Skimmer Rm 716 Reference 10 Screens out based on EPRI NP-6141-SL, Rev. 1, 87 2EPE-MX-EMXBS Fan 2B Suction Isolation Valve AUX 2VX2 (0C) 733 BB/65 B/65Appendix Closed Closed Walkdown Reeence SC Scree 2-4out Table >RLGM Screened per EPRI NP-6041 2VX2B(01C) 600 VAC Essential VE/VX (04C, 06D Rm 805 88 2EPE-MX-EMXC AUX 750 Closed Closed Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE

& 051) BA5/59 89 2EPE-MX-EMXD 600 VAC Essential for VE/VX (06E &

6051) AUX 733 Rm 716 BB/60 Closed Closed Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE H2 Skimmer Fan 2A Suction Reference 10, 90 2VX-VA-OOO1A Isolation Valve RX 826 264" 451 Closed Open WaAkdown AppendinC C 0.60 Functional 91 2VX-AH-0003 Hydrogen Skimmer Fan No 2A RX 816 272* 38R Off On Waikdown Reference 10, 0.39 Anchorage Appendix C H2 Skimmer Fan 28 Suction Reference 10, 92 2VX-VA-0002B RX 827 283° 46R Closed Open Walkdown 0.41 Functional Isolation Valve Appendix C 93 2VX-AH-0004 Hydrogen Skimmer Fan No 2B RX 816 268° 38R Off On Walkdown Reference 10, 0.39 Anchorage Appendix C 2VX-DA-9120 Containment Air Return Fan 2A RX 775 27 606 Closed Open Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2VX-AH-0001, which has an vRLGM Screened per PEE (2RAF-D-2) Damper IPEEE SEWS 4

95 2VX-AH-0001 Containment Air Return Fan 2A RX 270° 50R Off On Walk-By p 34 >RLGM Screened per PEEE 96 2VE-XF-0004 Annulus Ventilation Fan 2A AUX JJ/59 Off On Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.35 Anchorage Appendix C Table 2-4 97 2VE-XF-000S Annulus Ventilation Fan 2B AUX JJ/60 Off On Walkdown Reference 10, Screens out based on EPRI NP-6041-SL, Rev. 1, 0.35 Anchorage Appendix C Table 2-4 2KC-PU-0001 Al Closed Cooling Water System 98 AUX GG/SS On On Walk-By p 255 >RLGM Screened per PEEE Pump 2KCC-PU-0002 A2 Closed Cooling Water System 99 AUX FF/55 On On Walk-By p 255 >RLGM Screened per PEEE Pump 2KC-TK-O009 Component Cooling Water System 100 Surge Tank AUX JJ/57 Intact/In-Service Intact/In-Service Walk-By p 528 >RLGM Screened per PEEE 2KC-VA-OOSOA KC Auxiliary Bldg Supply Non- 783 101 AUX LL/59 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p >RLGM Screened perlPEEE Essential Isolation 2KC-VA-0230A KC Reactor Bldg Supply Non-102 AUX LLIS8 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE Essential Isolation

- C Auxiliary Bldg Return Non-K 78 3 103 Essential Isolation AUX GG/56 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p Included in IPEEE, p 783 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE 2KC-VA-0003A KC Reactor Bldg Return Non-104 AUX GG/56 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 308 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE Essential Isolation Page 48 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESELand HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESELID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walkdows or SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode"*

Walk-By 105 2KC-HX-O005 Train A Component Cooling Water AUX 750 JJ/57 Intact/In-Service Intact/In-Service Walkdown Reference 10, HCIPF based on IPEEE evaluation (p 1728) by >RLGM Screened per PEEE HX Appendix C Structural Mechanics Associates 106 2NC-VA-0032B NCSystem Pressurizer PORV RX 806 Pressurizer Cavity Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE,p 783 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 110" 32R 107 2NC-VA-00368 NCSystem Pressurizer PORV RX 806 Pressurizer Cavity Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEER,p 783 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 105° 32R 108 2NC-VA-0001 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve RX 794 Pressurizer Cavity Closed Closed Walk-By p783 Included in IPEEE,p 783 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 109" 34R 3

109 2NC-VA-0002 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve RX 802 Pressurizer Cavity Closed Closed Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE,p 78 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 109" 34R 3

110 2NC-VA-0003 Pressurizer Safety Relief Valve RX 802 Pressurizer Cavity Closed Closed Walk-By p 78 Included in IPEEE, p 783 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 109' 34R 111 2ND-PU-O001 Train A ND Pump AUX 695 Rm 506 GG/59 Off Intact Walk-By p 273 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 112 2ND-PU-0002 Train B NDPump AUX 695 Sm 507 Off Intact Walk-By p 273 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE FF/58 Sm 785 113 2ND-HX-0003 Train A ND HX AUX 733 LL/60 Intact Intact Walk-By p 458 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Rm 786 114 2ND-HX-0004 Train B ND HX AUX 733 Intact Intact Walk-By p 458 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE LL/60 Rm 506 115 2ND-HX-O0S Train A ND Pump Seal Cooling HX AUX Intact Intact Walk-By Rule-of-the-box with 2ND-PU-0001, which has an >61GM Screened per IPEEE GG/59 rPEEESEWS 116 2ND-VA-OOO2AC RHR Pump Hotleg Suction Isolation RX 184* 481 Closed Open Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p 783 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 783 117 2ND-VA-0OOiB RHR Pump Hotleg Suction Isolation RX 184' 27R Closed Open Walk-By p 783 Included in IPEEE, p >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Train A RHR Isolation to the 118 2NI-VA-0173A Coldlegs AUX GG/60 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Train B RHR Isolation to the Rm 788 119 2NI-VA-0178B Coldlegs AUX Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE HH/60 Rm 646 4 120 2NI-VA-0118A Train A NI Isolation to the Coldlegs AUX Open/Closed Open Walk-By p784 Included in IPEEE, p 78 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE JJ/60 Rm 646 784 121 2NI-VA-0121A Train A NI Isolation to the Hotlegs AUX Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p784 Included in IPEEE, p >RLGM Screened per IPEEE GG/60 Rm 646 4 122 2NI-VA-0150B Train B NI Isolation to the Coldlegs AUX Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 784 Included in IPEEE, p 78 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE GG/60 Rm 830 123 2NI-VA-0152B Train B NI Isolation to the Hotlegs AUX Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p 734 Included in IPEEE, p 784 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE HH/60 Rm 788 4 124 2NI-VA-0162A NI Isolation to the Coldlegs AUX Open/Closed Open/Closed Walk-By p734 Included in IPEEE, p 78 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE JJ/61 Rm 635 125 2NI-PU-0009 Train A NI Pump AUX Off Intact Walk-By p 245 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE HH/58 Rm 633 126 2NI-PU-0010 Train B NI Pump AUX Off Intact Walk-By p 245 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE GG/59 Rm 505 127 2NS-PU-0001 Train A NS Pump AUX Off Intact Walk-By p 277 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE GG/57 Rm 504 128 2NS-PU-0002 Train B Ns Pump AUX Off Intact Walk-By p 277 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE GG/57 Rm 786 451 129 2NS-HX-0003 Train A NS Heat Exchanger AUX Intact Intact Walk-By p >RLGM Screened per IPEEE LL/60 Rm 786 130 2NS-HX-0004 Train B NS Heat Exchanger AUX Intact Intact Walk-By p 451 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE LL/60 Page 49 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESELand HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Location Normal State Desired State or SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode-na ESELID EDB Description Bldg EL Walk-By 131 2SM-VA-0007AB TrainAMSIV Outer Doghouse 792 DD/69 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 300 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE (DH4) 132 2SM-VA-0OOSABTrain BMSIV Inner Doghouse 792 DD/S9 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 300 >RLGM Screened per PEEE (DH3) 133 2SM-VA-0003ABC TrainCMSIV Inner Doghouse 792 DD/6O Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 300 >RLGM Screened per PEEE (DH3) 134 2SM-VA-0001AB Train D MSIV Outer Doghouse 792 DD/67 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 300 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE (DH4) 135 2SV-VA-0020 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 EE/68 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per PEEE Valve (DH4) 136 2SV-VA-0021 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 Valve (DH4) EE/68 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened periPEEE 137 2SV-VA-0022 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 Valve (DH4) EE/68 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE 138 2SV-VA-0023 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 Valve (OH4) EE/68 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE 139 2SV-VA-0024 Train A Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 EE/658 Valve (DH4) Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE 140 2SV-VA-0014 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788 Valve (0H3) EE/58 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened perIPEEE 141 2SV-VA-0015 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788 Valve (DH3) EE/58 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE 142 2SV-VA-0016 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788 Valve (DH3) EE/58 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE 143 2SV-VA-0017 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788 Valve (DH3) EE/58 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE 144 2SV-VA-0018 Train B Main Steam Safety Relief inner Doghouse 788 EE/S8 Valve )DH3) Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE 145 2SV-VA-0008 Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788 Valve (DH3) EE/60 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened perIPEEE 146 2SV-VA-0009 Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788 Valve (DH3) EE/60 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened perIPEEE 147 2SV-VA-0010 Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788 Valve (DH3) EE/60 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE 148 2SV-VA-0011 Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788 EE/60 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE Valve (DH3) 149 2SV-VA-0012 Train C Main Steam Safety Relief Inner Doghouse 788 EE/60 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened perlPEEE Valve (DH3)

Page 50 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESEL and HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE ESELID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Normal State Desired State Walkdown or SEWS' Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode***

Walk-By 150 2SV-VA-0002 Train D Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 EE/68 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Valve (DH4) 151 25V-VA-0003 Train D Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 EE/68 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Valve (DH4) 152 2SV-VA-004 Train D Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 EE/BB Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Valve (DH4) 153 2SV-VA-005 Train D Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 EE/68 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Valve (DH4) 154 2SV-VA-0006 Train D Main Steam Safety Relief Outer Doghouse 788 EE/68 Closed Closed Walk-By p 297 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Valve (DH4)

Rule-of-the-boo with 2RN-PU-OO03, which has an 155 2RN-HX-0005 2A RNPump Motor Cooler AUX 716 FF/56 In-Service In-Service Walk-By p 249 IPEEE with 24w h >RLGM Screened per IPEEE RNPump DischargeCross TrainPEER SEWS(p 249)oLM ScendprPE is6 2RN-VA-0040A RN Pump Discharge Crss Train AUX 716 GG/56 Normally Open Closed Walk-By p 786 included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Supply Isolation MOV 157 2RN-VA-0086A KCHI Cooling Water Supply AUX 760 HH/56 Throttled Open Walk-By p786 Included in IPEEE,p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Isolation KC HX Cooling Water Outlet 158 2RN-VA-0089A Isolin Isolation AUX 750 HH/58 Throttled Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEE,p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 159 2RN-VA-C112A Al KCPump Motor Cooler Cooling AUX 750 GG/55 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEE,p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Water Outlet Isolation 160 2RN-VA-0117A A2 KCPump Motor Cooler Cooling AUX 750 GG/55 Open/Closed Open Walk-By p786 Included in lPEEE,p 786 >RLGM Screened per PEEE Water Outlet Isolation 161 2RN-VA-0070A EDGKDHXSupply MOVIsolation AUX 736 Rm714 Open/Closed Closed Walk-By p 786 Included in lPEEE,p786 >RLGM Screened per PEEE DD/68 162 2RN-VA-O073A EDOKD HIXOutlet MOV Isolation AUX 738 714 Rm ,1= Open Closed Walk-Sy p756 Included in lPEER, p 78e >RLGM Screened perlPEER uu/68 Rm 785 163 2RN-VA-0134A Train A NS HXSupply Isolation MOV AUX MM/el Closed Closed Walk-By p786 Included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGM Screenedper IPEER Rm 634 Standby/

164 2RN-HX-0017 Train A NV Pump Mtr Cooler AUX Intact Walk-By p 252 Rule-of-the-box with 2NV-PU-O015, which has an >RLGM Screenedper PEER HH/57 In-Service IPEEESEWS (p 252)

Rm 634 Standby/

165 2RN-HX-0019 Train A NV Pump Bearing Oil Cooler AUX Intact Walk-By p252 Rule-of-the-box with 2NV-PU-0015, which has an Screenedper PEER HH/57 In-Service IPEEESEWS (p 252)

Train A NV Pump Gearbox Oil Rm 634 Standby/ intact Walk-By p 252 Rule-of-the-box PERSW with 2NV-PU-OO15, which has an p5)>RLGM 166 2RN-HX-0021 AUX IPEEESEWS (p 252) Screenedper IPEEE Cooler HH/57 In-Service Rm 505 167 2VA-AH-0024 Train A NS Pump AHU AUX Standby Intact Walkdown Reference 10, Same make/model as ESEL168 >RLGM Screenedper PEtE GG/57 Appendix C Rm 506 168 2VA-AH-0028 Train A ND Pump AHU AUX Standby Intact Walk-By p 413 >RLGM ScreenedperIPEER GG/58 Rm 635 169 2RN-HX-0023 Train A NI Pump Mtr Cooler AUX Standby Intact Walk-By p 245 Rule-of-the-box 4with 2NI-PU-OO09, which has an >RLGM ScreenedperIPERE HH/SS IPEEESEWS (p 2 5)

Rm 635 170 2RN-HX-0025 Train A NI Pump Brg Oil Cooler AUX Standby Intact Walk-By p 245 Rule-of-the-box with 2NI-PU-O009, which has an >RLGM ScreenedperiPEtE HH/59 IPEEESEWS (p 245) 171 2RN-VA-0279B Unit 2 Aux Bldg Ventilation Return Rm 830 Isolation AUX Closed Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEE, p 786 >RLGM Screenedper PEtE HH/60 Rm 602 172 ORN-VA-0147AC 1A/2A RN Disch to RC X-Over Isol AUX Open Closed Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM ScreenedperIPEER FF/53 173 ORN-VA-0149A 1A/2A RN Essential Return Header AUX FF/59 Closed Open Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE, p 776 >RLGM Screenedper PEtE to SNSWP Page 51 ofGO0

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESELand HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown or Key Failure Mode-ESELID EDB Description Bldg EL Location Nor mal State Desired State SEWS' Screening Notes HCLPF**

Walk-By O

Rev.

274 2RN-VA-0295A 2A RN Ess Hdr SNSWP Return AUl Rm Fr/t647 Open Open Walk-By p 786 Included in IPEEE,p 786 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE Isolation FF/6O 175 1RN-VA-0296A 1A RNEss Hdr SNSWP Return Open Closed Walk-By p 776 Included in IPEEE,p 776 >RLGIM Screened per IPEEE Isolation 1RN-VA-0064A Unit 1 Non-ESS Return Isolation to AUX Rm 602E Walk-By >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 176 Open Closed p 776 Included in IPEEE,p 776 SNSWP FF/55 Rmn724 177 2EPE-MX-EMXB600 VACEssential Power AUX 733 GG/56 Functional Functional Walk-By p 32 >RLGM Screened per IPEEE 178 2CA-VA-162B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Aux 716 TBD

losed Open TBD TBD TBD TBD Isolation from circulating water 179 a 2CA-SV-1620 Solenoid Valve Aux 716 Energized De-energized TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD 179 b 2CA-RV-1622 Relief Valve Aux 733 C:losed Closed TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD 179 c 2CA-GC-1620 Control AirGas Cylinder Aux 733 ntact Intact TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD 179 d 2CA-GC-1621 Control AirGas Cylinder Aux 733 ntact Intact TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD 179 e 2CA-PS-5380 Pressure Switch Aux 716 Fu nctional Functional TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD 179 f 2CA-PS-5391 Pressure Switch Aux 716 Fu nctional Functional TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD Junction Boo houses Relays 'AA' and 179 g 2CA-TB-1901 Aux 733 Electr Pen Room Fu nctional Functional TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD

'BB' 10 2NV-VA-003ALetdown Inboard Containment 160 2N-AO3ARX 752 Open Closed TBD TBo TBD TBD TBD Isolation 180 a 2NV-SV-0350 Solenoid Valve RX 752 Energized De-energized TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD Page 52 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MNS Unit 2 ESELand HCLPF Results EQUIPMENT OPERATING STATE Walkdown c Location Normal State Desired State Walk-By SEWS* Screening Notes HCLPF** Key Failure Mode***

ESELID EDB Description Bldg EL Walk-By 180 b 2NV-SV-03S1 Solenoid Valve RX 752 Energized De-energized TBD TBD TBD TED TBD 181 2NV-VA-0121 Auxiliary Letdown Isolation AUX 733 RHRHtXRoom Closed Closed TBD TED TED TBD TBD 181 a 2NV-ML-1210 Manual Loader AUX 767 Control Rm 925 Functional Functional TED TBD TBD TBD TBD Letdown Inboard Containment 182 2NV-VA-0457A Lation EnRX 752 Closed Closed TBD TBD TBD TED TBD Isolation 182 a 2NV-SV-4570 Solenoid Valve RX 752 De-energized De-energized TBD TBD TBD TED TBD 182 b 2NV-SV-4571 Solenoid Valve RX 752 De-energized De-energized TED TBD TED TBD TBD Letdown Inboard Containment 183 2NV-VA-04S8A RX 752 Closed Closed TED TED TED TBD TBD Isolation 183 a 2NV-SV-4580 Solenoid Valve RX 752 De-energized De-energized TED TBD TBD TBD TBD 183 b 2NV-SV-4581 Solenoid Valve RX 752 De-energized De-energized TED TBD TBD TBD TBD 184 2NV-VA-OO2SBExcess Letdown Isolation RX 725 Closed Closed TED TBD TED TBD TBD 184 a 2NV-SV-0250 Solenoid Valve RX 725 De-energized De-energized TBD TBD TED TED TBD Instrument Air Blackout 185 2VI-TK-0010 AUX 750 Intact Intact TED TBD TBD TED TBD Accumulator 186 2V1-1328 Blackout Accumulator Relief AUX 750 Closed Closed TED TBD TBD TED TBD 187 2V1-1330 Blackout Header Relief AUX 750 Closed Closed TBD TBD TBD TBD TBD Page number refers to IPEEE scanned document page.

26 HCLPFvalues of >RLGMindicate that the HCLPFexceeds the Review Level Ground Motion (0. g), but that a specific HCLPFvalue was not calculated since the component was screened out from further evaluation.

Key Failure Modes are defined as follows:

Screened per IPEEE - Indicates that the component was evaluated in the IPEEE and therefore meets the RLGMdemand.

Screened per EPRINP-6041 - Indicates that the component meets the screening criteria of EPRINP-6041, Table 2-4 and that neither anchorage, relay chatter, nor nor interactions limit the reported HCLPF.

Interaction - Block Wall - Indicates that the component is located near a block wall. The block wall was evaluated in the IPEEE and therefore the block wall meets the RLGMdemand. The functional and anchorage HCLPFsexceed the reported HCLPFvalue.

Anchorage - Indicates that the anchorage is the governing failure mode for the component.

Functional - Indicates that functional failure isthe governing failure mode for the component.

-*

• Component adjacent to block wall. Aux building block walls were evaluated in the IPEEEas robust without a specific value. HCLPFof component provided in Table 7-2.

However block wall may have lower HCLPFthan component, therefore HCLPFreported here as >RLGM.

Page 53 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Appendix C MNS FLEX Flow Paths List of Figures Figure C-1. Auxiliary Feedw ater System ................................................................................... 55 Figure C-2. Borated Water Supply Refueling Water System ................................................... 56 Figure C-3. Main Steam Header ............................................................................................... 57 Figure C-4. Reactor Coolant Make-Up Safety Injection System .............................................. 58 Figure C-5. Reactor Coolant Make-Up (Low Pressure) Residual Heat Removal System ...... 59 Figure C-6. SG Secondary FLEX Make-Up Pump Connections Feedwater System Te m pering Head er ............................................................................................................ 60 Page 54 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM NON-SAFETY AUXILIARY FEEOWATER CA-G4AB STORAGETANK(CASTI CA-52A-9 BURIED CONTEVSER CI.RCULATING

,AEPIR STEAMGENERATOR 221 TU.BINEJ.RIVEN Pump CA-49AB STEAM GENERATOR CA-3GA9 STEAMGENERATOR Figure C-1. Auxiliary Feedwater System Page 55 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 0 SORATEDWATER SUPPLY REFUELING W~AER SYSTEM TORXO*LN Figure C-2. Borated Water Supply Refueling Water System Page 56 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 MAIN STEAM HEADER CSAE'S STEAM DUMP TO CONDENSER (9:

RE-HEATERS (2ND STAGE)

FDWPT Figure C-3. Main Steam Header Page 57 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 REACTOR COOLANT MAKE-UP SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM PCs B&C HOTLECS PCs MV~LMSs Refit RCS mO I437 LECS Figure C-4. Reactor Coolant Make-Up Safety Injection System Page 58 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rv Rev. 0 REACTOR COOLANT MAKE-UP (LOW PRESSURE)

RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM Figure C-5. Reactor Coolant Make-Up (Low Pressure) Residual Heat Removal System Page 59 of 60

Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process Report, McGuire Nuclear Station Rev. 0 Rv S/0 SFECNDARY FLE MAKE-UP PUMP CFNNECTIONS ILDWATERY 'TEM TEMPER £NC H AD ES COIN A IENT Figure C-6. SG Secondary FLEX Make-Up Pump Connections Feedwater System Tempering Header.

Page 60 of 60