ML20207J717

Insp Rept 50-412/86-29 on 860929-1003.Violation Noted: Improper Reporting

ML20207J717
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	12/15/1986
From:	Anderson C, Paulitz F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207J683	List: IR 05000412/1986029 ML20207J678 ML20207J717
References
50-412-86-29, NUDOCS 8701080565
Download: ML20207J717 (8)

See also: IR 05000412/1986029

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -

REGION I

Report No. 50-412/86-29

Docket No. 50-412

License No CPPR-105 Category B

Licensee: Duquesne Light Company

P.O. Box 4

Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077

Facility Name: Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2

Inspection At: Shippingport, Pennsylvania

Inspection Conducted: September 29, 1986 - October 3, 1986

Inspector: , NAh // f g

F . P' F/aulitz,' React 6r Engineer ~date'

Approved by: / f ff

C. 4. Anderson, Chief, Plant date

System Section, DRS

Inspection Summary: Inspection on September 29, 1986 - October 3,1986

(Inspection Report No. 50-412/86-29)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by one region based

inspector of activities pertaining to instrumentation, control and

electrical systems and components, including licensee response to

previous identified inspection findings.

Results: One violation was identified concerning improper reporting.

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DETAILS

1.0 Persons Contacted

1.1 Duquesne Light Company (DLC)

• T. Noonan, Superintendent Operation & Maintenance

• R. Coupland, Director, Quality Control (QC)

• C. Majumdar, Assistant Director, QC

• S. Fenner, Director, Operation QC

• E. Horvath, Lead Electrical Engineer

• G. Wargo, Supervisor, SQC Structural

• C. Kirschner, Supervisor, Quality Assurance (QA)

• M. Ziemba, Supervisor, Electrical SUG

• C. Trasada, Supervisor, I&C SVG

• S. Moore, Startup I&C

R. Martin, Manager, Regulatory Affairs

• R. Wallauer, Lead Compliance Engineer

• L. Rabenau, Compliance Engineer

• C. Schultz, Chairman, PRC

• J. Godleski, Senior Test Engineer SVG

R. Swiderski, Manager, Startup

1.2 Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation

• A. Dasenbrook, Senior Manager, Contruction

• P. Bienich, Assistant Superintendent of Engineering

• D. Lamson, Assistant Resident Engineer

• R. Wittschen, Licensing Engineer

D. Wilson , Instrumentation & Control Engineer

1.3 Westinghouse Electric Corporation

P. Federico, Nuclear Control Engineer

J. Zielinski, Nuclear Control Engineer

1.4 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• J. Beall, Senior Resident Inspector

• A. Asars, Resident Inspector

• Denotes those personnel present at exit meeting.

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2.0 Licensee's Action on Previous Inspection Findings

2.1 (Closed) Construction Deficiency Report (CDR) 82-00-04

Undetectable Failure of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) ,

Periodic testing of the SSPS requires actuation of the system master

relays and continuity tests of the output relays. During testing, the

voltage applied to the output relays is reduced from 120 volts ac to

15 volts dc. A pushbatton test switch actuates the master relays and

opens a switch contact shunting a proving lamp which verifies con-

tinuity of the output relay coils. Upon completion of the test, 15

volts dc is removed and 120 volts is reapplied to the circuit. If the

test pushbutton shunt contact fails to reclose, the proving lamp will

be in series with the output relay. This lamp could burn open when

120 volts is applied during an accident, thus causing the failure of

the output relay to perform its safety function.

Westinghouse notified the NRC of this potential problem in a letter

dated August 6, 1982 from E. Rahe to R. DeYoung. On August 30,

1982, DLC notified R. Keimig of Region I office by telephone. In-

terim reports dated September 29, 1982 and May 19, 1983, provided

additional information. A final report, 2NRC-4-113, was submitted by

Duquesne Light Company, DLC, to Region I on August 1, 1984.

The licensee's corrective action was to incorporate the design chan-

ges described in the Westinghouse Technical Bulletin NSD-TB-84-01

dated March 20, 1984. A Field Change Notice (FCN) DMWM-10688 dated

April 23, 1985 was issued by Westinghouse to detail the wiring and

hardware changes required to correct this deficiency. The modifi-

cation SDR 82-04 was completed February 28, 1986.

The modification was made by Westinghouse personnel with QC coverage

by other Westinghouse personnel. The inspector observed the train A&B

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test panels, which are located in the SSPS panels, for the wiring

changes to correct the deficiency. Discussions were held with Westing-

house personnel who were responsible for the above modification.

No deficiencies were noted. This CDR 82-00-04 is closed.

2.2 (Closed) CDR 83-00-06 Defective Circuit Cards in the

Westinghouse 7300 Process Protection System

There were two deficiencies associated with the 7300 Process Protect-

ion System as follows:

1. Heat sink adhesive failures have been identified to have occur-

red in the loop power supply (NLP) cards. This adhesive failure

could cause the heat sink to separate from the thermal links and

fall off the printed circuit board. The plate is conductive

metal and could cause shorting of low level signals if it became

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wedged between cards in the card frame. This signal shorting

could either cause damage to the Westinghouse 7300 Process Pro-

tection System or specific loop loss of safety function.

2. During a seismic event the Temperature Channel Test (NTC) card

which utilizes a mercury relay could experience a relay contact

bounce. This contact bounce could result in signal saturation of

the downstream RTD Amplifier (NRA) card in the T hot and T cold

circuits of the Westinghouse 7300 Process Protection System.

This saturation of the NRA card could delay initiation of the

Overtemperature - Delta T and Overpower - Delta T reactor trips.

The licensee identified twenty one (21) NLP cards in Inspection Re-

port, SPE-74, which had defective heat sinks that required replace-

ment. These defective NLP cards were identified by the licensee on

July 25, 1984. The cards were defective in that they were subject to

the adhesive failure mechanism that resulted in heat sink adhesive

failures previously reported by Westinghouse. The defective cards

consisted of twelve (12) NLP cards in secondary safety-related pro-

cess rack (RK*2SEC-PROC-A) and nine (9) NLP cards in (RK*2SEC-PROC-

B). Of the twenty one (21) defective cards, five of these were found

by the licensee to have loose heat sinks. The balance of the cards

did not have loose heat sinks. A Nonconformance & Disposition Report

(N&D) number 4650 was issued July 26, 1984 for the above deficiency.

The twenty one (21) above identified NLP card heat sinks were re-

placed by Westinghouse IED Field Engineers. The correction of this

deficiency was completed on May 20, 1985. The N&D was closed June 18,

1985. These deficiencies were reported to the NRC Region I in supple-

mental letter dated March 13, 1986.

The licensee issued N&D number 4563B dated July 21, 1984 for the

deficiency of the NTC cards. The modification to the NTC cards in

the process protection system was per Westinghouse Field Change Not-

ice (FCN) DMWM-10638A dated October 16, 1985. The modification was

the addition of a daughter board with a reed relay. The reed relay

contacts were connected in parallel with the mercury relay contacts.

This arrangement would provide circuit continuity during a seismic

event thus preventing delayed Overtemperature-Delta T and Overpower-

Delta T reactor trips. The modification was made by Westinghouse

, personnel and completed March 4, 1986. The N&D was closed April 18,

1986. The inspector verified that assembly drawings were revised to

preclude future replacement of these modified NTC with those NTC

cards which did not have this modification.

During the course of the inspection, the inspector noted several

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deficiencies with regard to the licensee's reporting of the defective

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circuit cards to the NRC. Background related to the reporting of the

defective 7300 cards is described below.

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Westinghouse notified the NRC of this potential problem in a letter

dated June 1, 1983, from E. P. Rahe to R. C. DeYoung. The NRC issued

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an Information Notice IN 83-38 on June 13, 1983 to inform licensees

and holders of cps of potential problems with the Westinghouse NLP

and NTC cards. The licensee provided an interim report dated July

19, 1983 followed by a final deficiency report, dated August 26, 1983

2 NRC-3-068 to Region I. In the final report the licensee stated

that the NLP cards were not present in BVPS-2.

This was based on a review by Stone and Webster (S&W) that determined

the NLP cards were not shipped to BVPS-2; and an S&W inspection

that determined the cards were not present and information from

Westinghouse that indicated they had not supplied NLP cards

directly to BVPS-2.

On July 25, 1984 (as a result of an inspection by site Quality Cont-

rol Personnel) the licensee determined that they did have the defect-

ive NLP cards. The licensee replaced the defective NLP cards in May

1985. However, it was twenty (20) months from the time the licensee

identified the presence of the NLP cards before they notified the NRC

Region I on March 13, 1986 of the presence of the cards at BVPS-2.

With regard to the NTC cards, in their July 19, 1983 report the li-

censee indicated that defective NTC cards in safety related Balance-

of-Plant applications would be replaced. However, the corrective

actions for defective NTC cards in the Process Protection System were

not discussed. Furthermore, the licensee ultimately determined that

the NTC cards used in safety related Balance-of-Plant applications

need not be replaced. They did not notify NRC of this change in

plans.

The late reporting of the presence of the NLP cards and the failure

to provide adequate corrective action plans as a part of the deficiency

report for the NTC cards is a violation of 10 CFR 50.55(e).

2.3 (Closed) Unresolved Item 84-18-04 Cracked and Broken Piston Rods

In Brown Boveri Electric Type SHK Breakers

Information Notice No. 83-84 dated December 30,1983 described a po-

tentially significant problem pertaining to Brown Boveri Electric

(BBE) type 5HK 250/350, 1200/2000 ampere circuit breakers. The

breaker puffer piston connecting rods developed cracks and failed.

Beaver Valley Unit 2 was identified as having the above type

breakers.

N&D No. 12294 was issued June 27,1985 to inspect the puffer pistons

in 5HK Brown Boveri breakers. Sixty five(65) pistons with surface

cracking were identified. The Information Notice 83-84 indicated

that complete failure could reduce the number of operations before

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maintenance would be necessary. BBE indicated that no breakers had

failed but that low current interruption may be impaired. BBE indi-

cated that minor surface cracks should not be the cause for reject-

ion. However, .all pistons which evidenced cracking including tooling

marks and minor surface cracks as identified by N&D No. 12294 were

replaced by the licensee. The inspection of pistons fabricated from

the susceptible material at each maintenance cycle will preclude

failure of the piston.

SWEC letter, 20LS-227764, dated April 15, 1986 recommended to DLC the

. replacement of all puffer pistons to ensure proper performance of

the associated safety functions of these circuit breakers on demand.

However, DLC-in letter, 2DLC-8893, dated June 18, 1986 to SWEC stated

that the maintenance inspection was adequate based upon :

The reported broken (Fractured) puffer pistons were found after

long periods of operation during routine maintenance inspection.

.There were no reported problems of catastrophic failures or

failures that prevented the breakers to operate on demand.

No deficiencies were identified by the inspector. This unresolved

item 84-18-04 is closed.

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2.4 (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (IFI) 85-16-07 Station Battery

Cell Spacing-To Battery Rack End Support

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The concern was that there was no space between the battery cell and

the rack end rails. Previous identified potential cracking problems

in battery jars due to expansion of the cells against battery rack

end. rails were noted in NRC Unresolved item (85-17-02) for Unit 1.

The unit 2 batteries are either Exide 2GN-13 or Exide 2GN-21 type

cells mounted 15 cells on each of four racks per battery room. There

are two battery cells contained within each battery jar. There are a

total of twelve (12) compression spacers distributed between the 30

jars. With at least two spacers per rack, there is adequate room for

battery expansion should it occur. Further , Activity Summary Report

for BVPS-1, EM 72594, dated June 6, 1986 reported a discussion bet-

ween DLC and Exide in which Exide recommended that the batteries be

i installed with the end rails lightly snug. ,

Based upon the above considerations this unresolved item 85-16-07 is

closed.

2.5 (0 pen) CDR 86-00-06 Potential Deficiency 480V ITE Circuit Breakers

A failure of an ITE/Telemecanique molded case circuit breaker to

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reset after a breaker trip was reported by the DLC Maintenance De-

partment. The breaker reset mechanism which is held by a slotted

clip (latch cam) had moved laterally and come free. This allowed the

breaker operating arm to move freely and not reset the breaker. The

original design, prior to October 6, 1982, was a rectangular piece of

metal with a hole in the center. This was to eliminate movement and

maintain tension.

The licensee stated that this concern would not adversely affect the

safety of plant operations because there are no safety functions that

require the breakers to be manually opened. The safety function of

the breakers is to provide power to their respective loads and pro-

tect the equipment and busses from overload conditions.

The licensee notified Region I( S. Hall to L. Tripp) by telephone on

May 5, 1986 of the above problem. A Potentially Significant Defici-

ency Report 86-06, 2NRC-6-084, was submitted on August 12, 1986. The

licensee corrective action stated in N&D No. 12325 dated March 20,

1986 was to replace the defective latch cam using the vendors ins-

tructions. This replacement was to be completed prior to fuel load-

ing.

The inspector discussed this modification with the licensee. The

inspector determined that sixty percent of the MCCs, have had the

defective latch cam replaced. Based upon the above considerations

this CDR 86-00-06 remains open pending completion of replacement of

the latch cams.

2.6 (Closed) IFI 86-01-04 Missing Jumpers from Westinghouse Reactor

Protection System Card for Over-Power Delta T Trip Function

Information Notice 85-98 dated December 26, 1985 identified that

jumpers were removed during a preoperational test and were not rein-

stalled on two of the cards following the test. The licensee ident-

ified in the IN 85-98 attributed this error to deficient vendor draw-

ings and documents, which did not contain explicit guidance regarding

the need for the missing jumpers. Other licensees have had similar

problems. The preoperational testing and subsequent surveillance

testing at two plants failed to detect the missing jumpers because

none of the tests include test signals that simulate conditions of

decreasing T-ave.

The licensee review concluded the following :

There was no print straping shown on the lead-lag card of con-

trolled drawing 7414D02 & 03.

The Westinghouse instruction manual,SWEC File No. 2501-410-001-

004C was checked for card style 2837A18G01 & G02. This identi-

fied the JA jumper on item #106 black jumper on the lead-lag

card spike suppression.

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Field inspection of Cabinet 1,2,&3 Part frames slot 35 indicated

that the jumpers were installed on the three cards.

The monthly surveillance procedure (MSP) 2MSP-6.38,39,&40-I were

revised to perform a check of the JA jumper installation.

The loops have not been calibrated therefore the proof test has not

been completed. The inspector reviewed the 2MPS-6.39-I procedure and

verified the requirement for the proof test. Based upon the above

this IFI 86-01-04 is closed.

3.0 Exit Meeting

The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)

at the conclusion of the inspection on October 3, 1986 at the site. The

inspector summarized the scope and the inspection findings discussed herein.

No written material was provided to the licensee.

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