IR 05000272/2010004

IR 05000272-10-004, 05000311-10-004, on 07-31-10 - 09-30-10, Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, Integrated Inspection Report

ML102980181
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	10/25/2010
From:	Burritt A L Reactor Projects Branch 3
To:	Joyce T P Public Service Enterprise Group
burritt al
References
IR-10-004
Download: ML102980181 (35)

Text

UNITED NUCLEAR REGULAtORY REGION 475 ALLENDALE KING OF PRUSSIA, PA October 25, 2010 Mr. Thomas P. Joyce President and Chief Nuclear Officer PSEG Nuclear LLC N09 P.O. Box Hancock'H Bridge, NJ SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000272/2010004

Dear Mr .*Joyce:

On September 30,2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results discussed on October 7, 2010, with Mr. Fricker and other members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel..

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

However, two violations that were determined to be of very low safety significance are listed in this report. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Secti()n 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy because of the very low safety significance of the violcltions and because they are entered into your corrective action program (CAP). If you contest NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, A TIN: Document Control Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Directclr, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Salem Nuclear Station. In accordance with 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," i3 copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronic8111y for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly T.Joyce 2 Available Hecords (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html(the PubliC Electronic Reading Room). Arthur L. Burritt, Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos: 50-272; 50-311 License Nos: DPR-70; DPR-75

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 0500027212010004 and 05000311/2010004

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information co w/encl: Distribution via ListServ T. Joyce 2 Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.govlreading-rm/adams.html(the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely.

IRAJ Arthur L. Burritt, Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos: 50-272; 50-311 License Nos: DPR-70; DPR-75

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000272/2010004 and 05000311/2010004

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information CC w/encl: Distribution via ListServ Distribution w/encl. W. Dean, RA (R10RAMAIL Resource)

A. Turilin, DRP M. Dapas, ORA (R10RAMAIL Resource)

C. Douglas. DRP D. Lew, DRP (R1DRPMAIL Resource)

D. Schroeder, DRP, SRI J. Clifford, DRP (R1 DRPMAIL Resource)

P. McKenna, DRP, RI D. Roberts, DRS (R1DRSMaii Resource)

K. McKenzie, DRP, OA P. Wilson, DRS (R1DRSMaii Resource)

L. Trocine, RI OEDO A. Burritt, ORP RidsNrrPIVISalem Resource L Cline, DHP ROPreportsResource@nrc.gov DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRP\BRANCH3\lnspection\Reports\lssued\SAL 1 004.docx SUNSI Review Complete:

ALB (Reviewer's Initials)

ML 102980181 After declaring this document "An Official Agency Record H it will be released to the Public. To receive a co OFFICE mmt RIIDRP RI/DRP NAME DSchroeder/ALB for LeHne/ALB for ABurritt!

ALB DATE 10/22/10 10/22/10 10/22/10 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Docket Nos: License Nos: Report No: Licensee:

Facility:

Location:

Dates: Inspectors:

Approved By: U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 50-272, 50-311 DPR-70, DPR-75 05000272/2010004 and 05000311/2010004 PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2 P.O. Box Hancocks Bridge, NJ July 1, 2010 through September 30, 2010 D. Schroeder, Senior Resident Inspector S. Ibarrola, Acting Resident Inspector J. Ayala, Acting Resident Inspector E. Torres, Acting Resident Inspector E. Burket, Reactor Inspector J. Furia, Senior Health Physicist Arthur L. Burritt, Projects Branch Division of Reactor Enclosure TABLE OF

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

.........................................................................................................

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

...............................................................................................................1 R01 Adverse Weather Protection

............................................................

............

......... 1 R04 Equipment Alignment

............................................................................................. 1 R05 Fire Protection

........................................................................................................ 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures .................................................................................... 1 R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program ............................................................

1R12 Maintenance

Effectiveness

..: .................................................................................

1R13 Maintenance

Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control ................................

1R15 Operability

Evaluations

...........................................................................................

1R18 Plant Modifications

.............................

...................................................................

1R19 Post-Maintenance

Testing .................................................................................... 1 R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

.................................................................. 1 R22 Surveillance Testing ............................................................................................. RADIATION SAFETy...........................................................................................................

2RS1 Radiological

Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls ....................................

2RS2 Occupational

As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls

2RS4 Occupational

Dose Assessment

........................................................................... OTHER ACTIVITI ES ............................................................................................................ 40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

................................................................. 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems ............................................................. 40A3 Event Follow-up

................................................................................................... 40A5 Other Activities

...................................................................................................... 40A6 Meetings, Including Exit ........................................................................................ 40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations

................................................................................ ATTACHMENT:

=SUPPLEMENTAL

INFORMATION=

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

...................................................................................................

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

.......................................................

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

REVIEWED .......................................................................................

LIST OF ACRONYMS

...........................................................................................................Enclosure

SUMMAR Y

OF [[]]

FINDINGS IR 050002 J2I20 1 0004, 05000311/2010004;

07/01/2010

-09/30/2010;

Salem Nuclear Generating

Station Unit Nos. 1 and 2; Routine Integrated

Inspection

Report. The report covered a three-month

period of inspection

by resident inspectors, and announced

inspections

by a regional radiation

specialist

and reactor engineers.

The NRC's program for overseeing

the safe operation

of commercial

nuclear power reactors is described

in 1649, "Reactor Oversight

Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006. No findings of significance

were identified.

Other Findings Two violations

of very low safety significance, which were identified

by PSEG, have been reviewed by the inspectors.

Corrective

actions taken or planned by

PSEG have been entered into

PSEG's CAP. These violations

and their corrective

action tracking numbers are listed in Section 40A7 of this report. Enclosure

REPORT [[]]

DETAILS Summary ()f Plant Status Salem Nuclear Generating

Station Unit No. 1 (Unit 1) began the period at full power. On July 7, Unit 1 automatically

tripped following

a fault on the B main power transformer (MPT). Unit 1 was synchronized

to the grid on July 24 and full power was reached on July 25. On September

17, after operators

isolated bleed steam valve, 12BS22, due to an internal steam leak, operators

reduced power to 98 percent to comply with engineering

established

main turbine operating

limits. Unit 1 remained at 98 percent power for the remainder

of the inspection

period. Salem Nuclear Generating

Station Unit No.2 (Unit 2) began the period at full power. Unit 2 remained at or near full power for the duration of the inspection

period. 1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones:

Initiating

Events, Mitigating

Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency

R01 Adverse Weather Protection

(71111.01 -2 samples) .1 Evaluate Readiness

for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a. Inspection

Scope The inspectors

completed

one adverse weather protection

sample to evaluate

for seasonal extreme weather conditions.

The inspectors

reviewed PSEG's

and protection

of risk significant

systems at Unit 1 and Unit 2 during hot conditions

between July 6 and July 7,2010. The inspectors

evaluated implementation

of summer readiness

procedures

and compensatory

measures extreme hot weather that included ultimate heat sink temperatures

above 84°F ambient air temperatures

above 100°F. The inspectors

walked down

strlJctures, systems, and components (SSCs) to ensure that weather related

did not adversely

impact sse operability.

In addition, the inspectors

assessed condition

of balance of plant equipment

with the potential

to initiate plant-level

The inspectors

performed

detailed walkdowns

of the service water (SW) emergency

diesel generators (EOGs), vital switchgear

rooms, the gas turbine (GTG), main and unit auxiliary

transformers, component

cooling water (CCW) exchangers, the main turbines and generators, and the station air

Th,e inspectors

observed portions of GTG performance

testing from the control room GTG local control panel. The inspectors

also reviewed PSEG corrective notifications

to ensure that PSEG appropriately

identified

and resolved weather problems.

The documents

reviewed are listed in the

b. Findings No findings were identified . . 2 Evaluate Readiness

to Cope with External Flooding a. Inspection

Scope Enclosure

I

.1 The inspectors

completed

one adverse weather protection

sample to evaluate readiness

for external flooding.

The inspectors

reviewed PSEG's preparations

and compensatory

measures for severe weather conditions

that posed a risk of flooding during the week of August 23, 2010. The inspectors

interviewed

operations

and engineering

personnel

regarding

the actions taken to prepare for the impending

severe weather and walked down risk significant

systems to independently

assess the adequacy of PSEG's preparations.

Specifically, the inspectors

reviewed the condition

of the service water intake structure (SWIS) external flood protection.

The inspectors

verified that degraded conditions

with the potential

to impact safety"related

components

and systems were reported in the CAP. Corrective

action notifications

written for degraded conditions

were reviewed to ensure that operability

of components

in the SWIS was not impacted.

For those areas where operator actions were

credited for maintaining

safety-related

system operability

during a flooding event, the inspectors

also verified that the procedures

used to direct those actions could be fully implemented

during the event. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

R04 Eguipment

Alignment

(71111.04 -4 samples;

71111.04S -1 sample) Partial Walkdown a. Inspection

Scope The inspectors

completed

four partial system walkdown inspection samples. The

inspectors

walked down the systems listed below to verify the operability

of redundant

or diverse trains and components

when safety equipment

was inoperable.

The inspectors

focused their review on potential

discrepancies

that could impact the function of the system and increase plant risk. The inspectors

reviewed applicable

operating

procedures, walked down control systems components, and verified that selected breakers, valves, and support equipment

were in the correct position to support system operation.

The inspectors

also verified that

PSEG properly utilized its

CAP to identify and resolve equipment

alignment

problems that could cause initiating

events or impact the capability

of mitigating

systems or barriers.

Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 1,

SW system with 13

SW pump out of service (OOS) on August 4 * Unit 2, 21 and

22 CCW pumps with 23

CCW pump

OOS on August 11 and August .. Unit 2,28 and 2C

EDG with 2A

EDG [[]]

ODS on 'July * Unit 2, 21 and 23 chillers with 22 chiller DOS on September

b. Findings No findings were identified.

.2 Complete Walkdown a. Inspection

Scope The inspectors

conducted

one complete walkdown inspection

sample of the Unit 1 auxiliary

feedwater (AFW) system. The inspectors

independently

verified the alignment

and status of AFW motor-driven pumps

and valves electrical

power, labeling, hangers and supports, and associated

support systems. The walkdown also

included verification

of valve pesitiens, evaluation

of system piping and equipment

te verify pipe hangers were in satisfactery

condition, oil reservoir

levels were nermal, pump rIO ems and pipe chases were adequately

ventilated, system parameters

were within established

ranges, and equipment

deficiencies

were appropriately

identified.

The inspectors

interviewed

engineering

personnel

and reviewed cerrective

action evaluations

associated

with the system to determine

whether equipment

alignment

preblems were identified

and apprepriately

resolved.

Decuments

reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings NIt) findings were identified.

R05 Fire Protection

(71111.050 -6 samples) .1 Fire Pretectien

-Tours a. Inspection

Scope The inspectors

cempleted

six quarterly

fire protection

inspectien

samples. The in specters walked dewn the systems listed below to assess the material condition

and operational

status of fire protectien

features.

The inspectors

verified that combustibles

and ignition sources were contrelled

in accordance

with PSEG's administrative

procedures;

fire detection

and suppression

equipment

was available

for use; that passive fire barriers were maintained

in good material condition;

and that compensatory

measures for out of service, degraded, or inoperable

fire protection

equipment

were implemented

in accordance

with PSEG's fire plan. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 2, 4160V switchgear

rooms, 64' elevation;

• Unit 1 and Unit 2, AFW pumps area, 84' elevation;

• Unit 1 and Unit 2, SW intake structure, 92' & 112' elevations;

and * Unit 2, chemical and volume control system (CVCS) hold-up tank area, 64' elevation.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

'I R06 Flood Protectien

Measures (71111.06 -2 samples) .1 Internal Flooding Enclosure

.1 a. Inspection

Scope The inspectors

completed

one internal flooding area inspection

sample. The inspectors

eVi:lluated

flood protection

measures for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW pump bays. The inspectors

interviewed

engineering

personnel

and walked down the areas to assess operational

readiness

of various features in place to protect redundant

safety-related

components.

These features included plant drains, watertight

doors, sump pumps, and wall penetration

seals. The inspectors

also reviewed the flooding penetration

seal inspections.

operator logs, abnormal procedures, and corrective

action notifications

associated

with flood protection

measures.

Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings No findings were identified . . 2 Underground

Bunkers/Manholes

Subiect to Flooding a. Inspection

Scope The inspectors

completed

one underground

cable inspection

sample. The inspectors

evaluated

the condition

of safety-related

cables located in underground

bunkers and manholes.

The inspectors

interviewed

engineering

personnel

and examined photographic

evidence of conditions

in manhole vault MH-SWI-1.

The inspectors

verified that safety-related

cables were not SUbmerged

in water, the integrity

of the cables, the condition

of cable support structures, and the ability to dewater these structures.

The inspectors

noted that PSEG had recently instituted

a cable aging management

program at the site. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

R11 Licensed Operator Regualification

Program (71111.11 Q -1 sample)

Activities

Review by Resident Staff a. Inspection

Scope The inspectors

completed

one quarterly

licensed operator requalification

program inspection

sample. Specifically, the inspectors

observed a scenario administered

to a single crew during a training drill on September

14, 2010. The scenario included a partial loss of offsite power, a loss of turbine generator

stator cooling water that resulted in a reactor trip, and a loss of coolant accident.

The inspectors

reviewed operator actions to implement

the abnormal and emergency

operating

procedures.

The inspectors

examined the operators'

ability to perform actions associated

with high risk activities, the Emergency

Plan, previous lessons learned items, and the correct use and implementation

of procedures.

The inspectors

also observed and verified that the deficiencies

were adequately

identified, discussed, and entered into the CAP, as appropriate.

Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance

Effectiveness

(71111.12Q -3 samples) a. Inspection

Scope

inspectors

completed

three quarterly

maintenance

effectiveness

inspection

samples. The inspectors

reviewed pelformance

monitoring

and maintenance

effectiveness

issues 'for three components/systems

listed below. The inspectors

reviewed PSEG's process for monitoring

equipment

pelformance

and assessing

preventive

maintenance

effectiveness.

The inspectors

verified that systems and components

were monitored

in accordance

with the Maintenance

Rule Program requirements.

The inspectors

compared documented functional

failure determinations

and unavailability

hours to those being tracked by PSEG to evaluate the effectiveness

of PSEG's condition

monitoring

activities

and to determine

whether performance

goals were being met. The inspectors

reviewed applicable

work orders (Was), corrective

action notifications, and preventive

maintenance

tasks. The documents

reviewed are IiStl3d in the Attachment.

• 13 and 23 positive displacement

charging pumps * Unit

1 AFW pumps * Unit 3

GTG b. Findings No findings were identified.

R13 Maintenance

Risk Assessments

and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 -6 samples) a. Inspection

Scope The inspectors

completed

six maintenance

risk assessment

and emergent work control inspection

samples. The inspectors

reviewed the maintenance

activities

listed below to verify that the appropriate

risk assessments

were pelformed

as specified

by 10 CFR 50.65(a}(4) prior to removing equipment

for work. The inspectors

reviewed the applicable

risk evaluations, work schedules, and control room logs for these configurations.

PSEG's risk management

actions were reviewed during shift turnover meetings, control room

tours, and plant walkdowns.

The inspectors

also used PSEG's on..line risk monitor (Equipment

OOS workstation)

to gain insights into the risk associated

with these plant configurations.

The inspectors

reviewed notifications

documenting

problems associated

with risk assessments

and emergent work evaluations.

Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 1, 13 AFW pump unavailability

from July 7 to July 9 during Unit 2 forced outage * Unit 1 and Unit 2, control area ventilation (CAV) in maintenance

mode on July 28 * Unit 2, 2A

EDG [[]]

OOS on July 29 * Unit 2, 2A EDG 008 on August 23 Enclosure

.1 Unit 1, 13 AFW emergent repairs due to trip throttle valve overspeed

tripped after a remote trip of MS-52 from the control room on September

Unit 2, 23 control area supply fan OOS for planned maintenance

on September

b. Findings No findings were identified. 1 R 15 Operability

Evaluations

(71111.15 -5 samples) a. Inspection

Scope The inspectors

completed

five operability

evaluation

inspection

samples. The inspectors

revi:ewed

the operability

determinations

for degraded or non-conforming

conditions

associated

with: Unit 1, 1 CV284 reactor coolant pump seal return isolation

valve with inactive boron leak on weld; Unit 2, 22 residual heat removal (RHR) pump room cooler with

22 SW inlet valve (22

SW153)

failed in open position; Unit 2, 2A

EDG failure to shutdown at the end of a routine surveillance; Unit 2, 22

BF22 feedwater

containment

isolation

valve internal noise; and * Unit 1 and Unit 2, CAV isolation

damper degraded seals. The inspectors

reviewed the technical

adequacy of the operability

determinations

to ensure the conclusions

were justified.

The inspectors

also walked down accessible

equipment

to corroborate

the adequacy of PSEG's operability

determinations.

Additionally, the inspectors

reviewed other PSEG identified

safety-related

equipment

deficiencies

during this report period and assessed the adequacy of their operability

screenings.

Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

No findings were identified.

R18 Plant Modifications

(71111.18 -2 samples) Temporary

Modifications

a. Inspection

Scope The inspectors

completed

two plant modification

inspection

samples by reviewing

the key characteristics

associated

with the two temporary

plant modifications

listed below. Th<<9 inspectors

verified that the design bases, licensing

bases, and performance

capability

of the affected'systems

were not degraded by the temporary

modifications.

The license amendment

associated

with the Technical

Specification (TS) change for the 2C battery was also reviewed.

Other documents

reviewed for these samples are listed in the Attachment.

Unit 1, 11 & 12 AFW pumps lifted leads . Unit 2, 2C battery temporary

installation

b. Findings A violation

of very low safety significance (Green) was identified

by PSEG and is documented

in Section 40A 7. 1 R 19 Post-Maintenance

Testing (71111 .19 -7 samples) a. InslDection

Scope The inspectors

completed

seven post-maintenance

testing (PMT) inspection

samples. ThE: inspectors

observed portions of and/or reviewed the PMT results for the maintenance

activities

listed below. The inspectors

verified that the effect of testing on the plant was adequately

addressed

by control room and engineering

personnel;

testing was adequate for the maintenance

performed;

acceptance

criteria were clear, demonstrated

operational

readiness

and were consistent

with design and licensing

basis documentation;

test instrumentation

had current calibrations

and the appropriate

range and accuracy for the application;

tests were performed, as written, with applicable

prerequisites

satisfied;

and equipment

was returned to an operational

status and ready to perform its safety function.

Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

WO 60091111 and 60091124, 13 turbine-driven

AFW pump trip solenoid and overspeed

trip mechanism

head lever following

emergent corrective

maintenance

WO 60090467.

CCW pump inboard and outboard pump seals replacement WO 60091466.

2A

EDG PanAlarm power supply replacement

WO 60081294.

2SJ2. charging pump suction valve, thermal overload replacement WO 60092089, 22 control area chiller compressor

replacement WO 60087957, 2C 125 Vdc temporary

battery

WO 30197598,13

AFW pump following

head lever maintenance

b. Findings No findings were identified.

R20 Refueling

and Other Outage Activities

(71111.20 -1 sample) a. Inspection

Scope Plant Trip Following

Main Generator

Trip_ On July 7, 2010, Unit 1 tripped following

a main generator

trip related to a failure of the B phase of the

MPT. [[]]

PSEG conducted

a forced outage from July 7,2010, through July 24.2010, to repair the MPT, replace the 1 CV284, and perform additional

maintenance

activities.

During the outage, the inspectors

monitored

or observed the activities

listed below to verify PSEG controls over the outage activities.

The documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Portions of the shutdown and cool down processes Outage risk management Decay heat removal operations

Configuration

management, including

maintenance

of defense in depth Status and configuration

of electrical

systems and switchyard

activities

to ensure that TSswere met Walkdown of selected containment

areas to check for unidentified

leakage or other (liscrepant

conditions Personnel

fatigue management

controls b. Findings No findings were identified.

R22 Surveillance

Testing (71111.22 -5 samples) a. Inspection

Scope The inspectors

completed

five surveillance

testing inspection

samples. The inspectors

observed portions of and/or reviewed results for the surveillance

tests listed below to verify, as appropriate, whether the applicable

system requirements

for operability

were adequately

incorporated

into the procedures

and that test acceptance

criteria were consistent

with procedure

requirements, the

TS requirements, the updated final safety analysis report (

UFSAR), and American Society of Mechanical

Engineers (ASME)Section XI for pump and valve testing. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment. S2.0P-ST.DG-0001, 2A Diesel Generator

Surveillance

Test S2.0P-ST.SJ-0001, Inservice

Testing -21 Safety Injection

Pump S1.IC-FT.RCP-0023, 1PT-474 Pressurizer

Pressure Protection

Channel IV Functional

Test S2.0P-ST.RHR-0002, Inservice

Testing -22

RHR Pump S2.0P-

ST.RHR-0002, RHR Discharge

Check Valve 22RH8 Forward and Reverse Flow Test b. Findings No findings were identified.

2. RADIATION

SAFETY Cornerstone:

Radiation

Safety -Public and Occupational

2RS1 Radiological

Hazard Assessment

and Exposure Controls (71124.01)

a. Inspection

Scope Inspection

Planning The inspectors

reviewed PSEG performance

indicators

for the Occupational

Exposure Cornerstone

for follow-up.

The inspectors

reviewed the results of radiation

protection

program audits (e.g., PSEG's quality assurance

audits or other independent

audits). Enclosure

The inspectors

reviewed reports of operational

occurrences

related to occupational

radiation

safety since the last inspection.

The inspectors

reviewed Prompt Investigation

Report -Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm* Received During Radiography (notification

20467421)

regarding

an event on June 16, 2010, during radiography

operations

in the Unit 2 mechanical

penetration

service water room. During this activity, a locked high radiation

event took place (dose rates in excess of 1000 millirem per hour measured at 30 centimeters

from the source of radiation).

PSEG has reported this event under the occupational

exposure cornerstone

and the associated

performance

indicator.

The inspectors

observed radiography

operations

conducted

in the Unit 1 containment

on July 19-20,2010, and verified that PSEG had implemented

corrective

actions from the June 16, 2010, event and that these corrective

actions were effective.

Ris,k-Significant

High Radiation

Area (HRA) and Very High Radiation

Area (VHRA) Controls The inspectors

discussed

with the Radiation

Protection

Manager (RPM) the controls and procedures

for high-risk

HRA and

VHRAs. The inspectors

verified that any changes to PSEG procedures

did not substantially

reduce the effectiveness

and level of worker protection.

The inspectors

discussed

with first-line

health physics supervisors

the controls in place for special areas that have the potential

to become VHRAs during certain plant opl9rations.

The inspectors

verified that

PSEG controls for all

VHRAs, and areas with the potential

to become a VHRA, ensured that unauthorized

individuals

were not able to gain access to the VHRA. Radiation

Worker Performance

During job performance

observations.

the inspectors

observed radiation

worker performance

with respect to stated radiation

protection

work requirements.

The inspectors

determined

that workers were aware of the significant

radiological

conditions

in their workplace, radiation

work permit controls/limits

were in place, and that their performance

reflected

the level of radiological

hazards present. The inspectors

reviewed radiological

problem reports since the last inspection

that found

cause ofthe event to be human performance

errors. The inspectors determined

that there was no observable

pattern traceable

to a similar cause. The inspectors

determined

that this perspective

matched the corrective

action approach taken by PSEG to resolve the reported problems.

The inspectors

discussed

with the RPM any problems with the corrective

actions planned or taken. b. Findings No findings were identified. Occupational

As Low as Reasonably

Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls (71124.02) Enclosure

a. Inspection

Scope Verification

of Dose Estimates

and Exposure Tracking Systems The inspectors

selected ALARA work packages and reviewed the assumptions

and basis for the current annual collective

exposure estimate for reasonable

accuracy.

The inspectors

reviewed the applicable

procedures

to determine

the methodology

for estimating

exposures

from specific work activities

and the intended dose outcome. The inspectors

verified that for the selected work activities

that PSEG had established

measures to track, trend, and, if necessary, to reduce, occupational

doses for ongoing work activities.

The inspectors

verified that trigger points or criteria were established

to prompt additional

reviews and/or additional

ALARA planning and controls.

The inspectors

reviewed PSEG's collective

exposure performance

during the Spring 2010 refueling

outage at Unit 1 ('I RF20). Total collective

exposure for this outage was the lowest ever at either Salem unit. The inspectors

evaluated

PSEG's method of adjusting

exposure estimates, or planning work, when unexpected

changes in scope or emergent work were encountered.

The inspectors

determined

that adjustments

to exposure estimates

were based on sound radiation

protection

and ALARA principles

or that they were just adjusted to account for failures to control the work. The inspectors

evaluated

the frequency

of these adjustments

determine the

adequacy of the original ALARA planning process. No findings were identified.

2RS4 Occupational

Dose Assessment

(71124.04)

a. Inspection

Scope §Qecial Bioassay The inspectors

selected internal dose assessments

obtained using in-vitro monitoring.

The inspectors

reviewed and assessed the adequacy of PSEG's program for in-vitro monitoring

of radionuclides, including

collection

and storage of samples. The inspectors

determined

that PSEG had not specifically

qualified

their vendor laboratory

to perform in-vitro sample counting, having neither audited the lab in the area of in-vitro analysis, nor verifying

the lab's participation

in an analYSis cross-check

pmgram. The inspectors

reviewed the adequacy of PSEG's program for dose assessments

based on airborne/DAC

monitoring.

The inspectors

verified that flow rates and/or collection

times for fixed head air samplers or lapel breathing

zone air samplers were adequate to ensure that appropriate

lower limits of detection

are obtained.

The inspectors

reviewed the adequacy of procedural

guidance used to assess dose when PSEG personnel

apply protection

factors. The inspectors

reviewed dose assessments

performed

using airborne/DAC

monitoring.

The inspectors

verified that PSEG's DAC calculations

were Enclosure

representative

of the actual airborne radionuclide

mixture, including

hard-to-detect

nuclides.

The inspectors

reviewed the adequacy of PSEG's internal dose assessments

for any actual internal exposure greater than 10 millirem committed

effective

dose equivalent.

The inspectors

determined

that the affected personnel

were properly monitored

with calibrated

equipment

and the data was analyzed and internal exposures

properly assessed in accordance

with PSEG procedures.

Dosimeter

Placement

and Assessment

of Effective

Dose Equivalent

for External

The inspectors

reviewed PSEG's methodology

for monitoring

external dose in situations

in which non-uniform

fields are expected or large dose gradients

exist. The inspectors

verified that PSEG had established

criteria for determining

when alternate

monitoring techniques were

to be implemented.

The inspectors

reviewed dose assessments

performed

using multibadging

during the current assessment

period. The inspectors

verified that the assessment

was performed

in accordance

with PSEG procedures

and dosimetric

standards.

Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE) The inspectors

review SDE dose assessments

for adequacy.

The inspectors

evaluated

PSEG's method for calculating

SDE from distributed

skin contamination

or discrete radioactive

particles.

Neutron Dose Assessment

The inspectors

evaluated

PSEG's neutron dosimetry

program, including

dosimeter

types and/or survey instrumentation.

The inspectors

selected neutron exposure situations

and verified that (a) dosimetry

and/or instrumentation

was appropriate

for the expected neutron spectra, (b) there was sufficient

sensitivity

for low dose and/or dose rate measurement, and (c) neutron dosimetry

was properly calibrated.

The inspectors

verified that interference

by gamma radiation

was accounted

for in the calibration.

The inspectors

verified that time and motion evaluations

were representative

of actual neutron exposure events, as applicable.

For the special dosimetric

situations

reviewed in this section, the inspectors

determined

how

PSEG a

SSigned the dose of record for total effective

dose equivalent, SDE. and lens dose equivalent.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

Enclosure*

4. OTHER

40A1 Performance

Indicator (PI) Verification

(71151 6 InsRection

Scope The inspectors

reviewed PSEG submittals

for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 mitigating

systems cornerstone

PI listed below. To verify the accuracy of the

PI data reported during this period the data was compared to the PI definition

and guidance contained

in NEI 99-02, "Regulatory

Assessment

Performance

Indicator

Guideline," Revision 5. Cornerstone:

Mitigating

Systems * Unit 1 and Unit

2 AFW systems; * Unit 1 and Unit 2

RHR systems; and * Unit 1 and Unit 2 SW systems. The inspectors

verified the accuracy of the data' by comparing

it to CAP records, control room operators'

logs, the site operating

history database, and key PI summary records. b. Findings No findings were identified.

40A2 Identification

and Resolution

of Problems (71152 -1 work-around

sample) Review of Items Entered into the Corrective

Action Program As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification

and Resolution

of Problems," and in order to help identify repetitive

equipment

failures or specific human performance

issues for follow-up, the inspectors

performed

a daily screening

of all items entered into PSEG's CAP. This was accomplished

by reviewing

the description

of each new notification

and attending

daily management

review committee

meetings.

Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Review of Operator Workaround

Program Inspection

Scope The inspectors

conducted

a cumulative

review of operator workarounds

for Unit 1 and Unit 2 and assessed the effectiveness

of PSEG's operator workaround

program. The inspectors

reviewed PSEG's control room distraction

report, operator burden list, and operator burden self-assessment.

The inspectors

focused on the potential

impact on mitigating

systems and the potential

to affect operator ability to implement

abnormal and emergency

operating

procedures.

The review included interviews

with licensed

and walkdowns

of main control room panels. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Findings and

No findings were

.1 16 PSEG identified

twelve operator challenges

at Unit 1 and Unit 2, but none of the challenges

were classified

as operator workarounds.

The inspectors

did not identify additional

operator challenges

or workarounds.

The inspectors

reviewed

103, "OperatorWorkaround

Program", and OP-AA-1 02-1 03 w 1 001 , UOperator

Burdens Program>>, for PSEG program requirements

and found that PSEG adequately

implemented

these procedures.

The most recent operator burden assessment

was reviewed for each unit. The inspectors

determined

that the cumulative

impact of the identified

operator challenges

was within manageable

limits. Event Followwup

(71153 -3 samples) iQ!.osed)

Licensee Event Report 05000272/2010-001-00, Automatic

Start of the 1C EDG On April 16, 2010, at 1641 hours0.019 days <br />0.456 hours <br />0.00271 weeks <br />6.244005e-4 months <br />, the 1C 4160 volt vital bus lost power. Surveillance

testing was being performed

to demonstrate

the transfer of the 1 C 4160 volt vital bus from one offsite power source to the second offsite power source. The 1 C EDG automatically

started but the EDG output breaker did not close per design. Abnormal operating

procedure

S1.0P-ABAKV-0003

was entered for loss of power to the 1C 4160 vollt vital bus. Fuel movement was in progress at the time of the event and was suspended.

Thl9 unexpected

start of the 1 C

EDG was the result of the failure of the 13

CSD breaker auxiliary

position switch (52STA switch). The failure of the 52STA switch was the result of binding caused by mis-adjustment

of the gap between the breaker and the 52STA switch assembly.

The mis-adjustment

was the result of unclear procedural

guidance for measuring

the breaker plunger gap. Corrective

actions consist of replacement

of the

13CSD 52

STA switch, proper adjustment

of the breaker plunger gap. inspection

of other 41130 volt in-feed breaker plunger gaps, and procedure

revisions

to improve the guidance for measuring

breaker plunger gaps. The inspectors'

review of this issue noted a licensee identified

violation

of regulatory

requirements, specifically

that PSEG maintenance

procedure

guidance for measuring

the breaker plunger gap was inadequate.

The enforcement

aspects ofthis violation

are discussed

in Section 40A7. This

LER is closed . . (Closed) l

ER 05000272-2010-002-00.

Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer

Bushing Failure On July 7. 2010, at approximately

1118, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a turbine trip above 50% reactor power. The turbine trip was caused by the actuation

of the regular and back-up phase B ...C differential

relays in the main generator

protection

scheme, which was caused by arc flash across the B phase main power transformer

bushing after an inadvertent actuation

of the transformer

fire protection

deluge system. The deluge system was actuated by one of the 18 air-pilot

sprinkler

heads that had mEllted due to the unusually

high ambient temperatures

combined with the transformer's

heat, direct sunlight.

and restricted

ventilation

caused by concrete walls that surround three sides of the main power transformer

B phase. Mist from the deluge system actuation, driven by the transformer

cooling fans, the heat rising from the transformer

and the close proximity

of the concrete wall enclosure, rose above the main power transformer

B phase bushing and caused an arc flash and bushing failure. PSEG corrective

actions included replacing

the main power transformer

deluge system air-pilot

sprinkler

heads with sprinkler

heads that have a higher temperature

setpoint.

The Enclosure

.1 inspectors

completed

a review of this LER and did not identify a violation

of regulatory

requirements.

This lER is closed . . 3 (Closed) LER 05000272/2010-003-00, Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 3.0.4 On July 25, 2010, at 0940, a PSEG technician

identified

that the circuitry

was disabled for the motor driven AFW pump automatic

start on a trip of both steam generator

feedwater

pumps (SGFPs). At the time of discovery, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 and the AFW automatic

start circuitry

is required by

TS 3.3.2.1 function 8f to be operable in Modes 1 and 2.

PSEG re-established

the automatic

start of the

AFW pumps on a trip of both

SGFPs at 1557 on July 25, 2010. The cause of the failure to re-establish

the automatic

start circUitry

for the start of the motor driven

AFW pumps on a trip of the

SGFPs was due to operators

performing

the incorrect

section of the procedure

to re-establish

the start circuitry

during mode ascension.

Corrective

actions consisted

of training, procedure

revisions, and personnel

accountability.

The inspectors

review of this issue noted a licensee identified

violation

of regulatory

requirements, specifically

that entry into Mode 2 with the circuitry

required by TS 3.3.2.1 function 8f disabled was a condition

prohibited

by TS 3.0.4. The enforcement

aspects of this violation

are discussed

in Section 40A7. This

LER is closed. 40A5 Other Activities

NRC Temporary

Instruction (TO 2515/177 -Managing Gas Accumulation

in Emergency

Core Cooling. Decay Heat Removal. and Containment

Sgray Systems a. Inspection

Scope

NRC staff developed

TI 2515/177 to support the NRC's confirmatory

review of licensee responses

to

NRC Generic letter (

GL) 2008-01, "Managing

Gas Accumulation

in Emergency

Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment

Spray Systems." Based on the review of

PSEG 's

GL 2008-01 response letters, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (

NRR) staff provided guidance on TI inspection

scope to the regional inslPectors.

The inspectors

used this inspection

guidance along with the

TI to verify that

PSEG implemented

or was in the process of acceptably

implementing

the commitments, modifications, and programmatically

controlled

actions described

in their GL 2008-01 response.

The inspectors

verified that the plant-specific

information (including

licensing

basis documents

and design information)

was consistent

with the information

that PSEG submitted

to the

NRC in response to

GL 2008-01. The inspectors

reviewed a sample of isometric

drawings and piping and instrument . diagrams and conducted

selected system piping walkdowns

to verify that PSEG's drawings reflected

the subject system configurations

and UFSAR descriptions.

Specifically, the inspectors

verified the following

related to a sample of isometric

drawings for the CVCS, RHR, safety injection (SI), and containment

spray (CS) systems: High pOint vents were identified; High points that did not have vents were recognized

and evaluated

with respect to their potential

for gas accumulation;

Other areas where gas could accumulate

and potentially

impact subject operability, such as orifices in horizontal

pipes, isolated branch lines, exchangers, improperly

sloped piping, and under closed valves, were

evaluated

in engineering

reviews or had ultrasonic

testing (UT) points which reasonably

detect void formation; For piping segments reviewed, branch lines and fittings were clearly shown. The inspectors

conducted

walkdowns

of portions of the above systems to reasonably

assure the acceptability

of PSEG's drawing utilized during their review of GL 2008-01. The inspectors

verified that PSEG conducted

walkdowns

of the applicable

systems to confirm that the combination

of system orientation, vents, instructions

and procedures, tests, and training would ensure that each system was suffiCiently

full of water to assure operability.

The inspectors

reviewed PSEG's methodology

used to determine

system piping high pOints, identification

of negative sloped piping, and

calculations

of void sizes based on UT equipment

readings to ensure the methods were reasonable.

The inspectors

verified that PSEG included all emergency

core COOling systems, along with supporting

systems, within scope of the GL. In addition, the inspectors

verified that P5EG acceptably

addressed

flashing of

RHR suction lines when initiating

RHR while the lines are at elevated temperatures

to ensure system operability.

The inspectors

also reviewed engineering

analyses associated

with the development

of acceptance

criteria for <:is-found

voids, which included engineering

assumptions

for void transport

and acceptability

of void fractions

at the suction and discharge

piping of the applicable

system pumps. The inspectors

coordinated

this review with NRR, who was concurrently

pursuing questions

associated

with void acceptance

criteria at the time of the inspection.

The inspectors

reviewed a sample of P5EG's procedures

used for filling and venting the associated

GL

systems to verify that the procedures

were effective

in venting or redl:..Icing

voiding to acceptable

levels. The inspectors

verified the installation

of a hardware vent, located in the Unit 1 RHR cross connect discharge

piping, as committed

to in P5EG's GL response.

A similar vent installation

is planned for the upcoming Unit 2 outage in the spring of 2011. The inspectors

also confirmed

the planned implementation

of an additional

hardware high point vent modification

on each unit that was associated

with the common RHR cold Jeg branch point between the associated

to RHR check valves and was designed to allow any possible gas intrusion

and accumUlation

to be vented off (two vents per unit). The Unit 2 modification

is planned for the Spring 2011 outage (design change request 80099810)

and the Unit 1 modification

is expected to be implemented

in the Fall 2011 outage (design change request 80101453).

The inspectors

verified that PSEG's surveillance

frequencies

were consistent

with the UFSAR, T5s, and associated

bases. The inspectors

reviewed a sample of system venting surveillance

results to ensure proper implementation

of the surveillance

program anc! that the existence

of unacceptable

gas accumulation

was evaluated

within the CAP, as necessary.

In addition, on August 4, 2010, the inspectors

observed portions of the performance

of the Unit 2 monthly venting surveillance

to assess the adequacy of procedures

and implementation.

The inspectors

reviewed CAP documents

to verify that selected actions described

in P5EG's nine-month

and supplemental

submittals

were acceptably

documented, including

completed

actions and the implementation

schedule for incomplete

actions. The inspectors

also verified that NRC commitments

in PSEG's submittals

were included in the CAP. Additionally, the inspectors

reviewed evaluations

and corrective

actions for various issues PSEG identified

during their GL 2008-01 Enclosure

review. The inspectors

performed

this review to ensure PSEG appropriately

evaluated

and adequately

addressed

any gas voiding concerns, including

the evaluation

of

for gas voids discovered

in the field. Finally, the inspectors

reviewed PSEG's training associated

with gas accumulation

to assess if appropriate

training was provided to the operations

and engineering

support staff to ensure appropriate

awareness

of the effects of gas voiding. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings No findings were identified.

NRR is still evaluating

some technical

aspects associated

with void acceptance

criteria and will likely request additional

information

from

PSEG. Because of this, the

TI may require additional

inspections

prior to final closure. Final closure of GL 2008-01 for Units 1 and 2 will be documented

via separate correspondence

from NRR. 40A6 Meetings, Including

Exit The inspectors

presented

the inspection

results to Mr.

C. Fricker and other members of

PSEG management

at the conclusion

of the inspection

on October 7, 2010. The inspectors

asked PSEG whether any materials

examined during the inspection

were proprietary.

No proprietary

information

was identified.

40A7 UcensesMldentified

Violations

The following

violations

of NRC requirements

were identified

by PSEG. They were determined

to have very low safety significance (Green) and meet the criteria of Section 2.3 of the NRC Enforcement

Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned

as NCVs: TS 6.8.1 "Procedures

and Programs" states, in part, that written procedures

shall be established, implemented

and maintained

for activities

specified

in Regulatory

Guide 1.33, Revision

2, February 1978, Regulatory

Guide 1.33,Section IX. includes written procedures

for performing

maintenance, which can affect the performance

of safety related equipment.

Contrary to the above, PSEG did not adequately

implement

and maintain the 4KV Breaker Plunger Gap Verification

maintenance

procedure.

Specifically, the inappropriate

guidance to perform plunger gap adjustments

for 4KV magne-blast

breakers resulted in a miswadjustment

of the gap between the breaker closing plunger and 521ST A auxiliary

switch operating

mechanism.

This resulted in loss of power to the 1 C vital bus for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> on April 16, 2010. This violation

was determined

to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not increase the likelihood

of a loss of reactor coolant system (RCS) inventory, it did not affect PSEG's ability to terminate

a leak path or add

RCS inventory, and it did not degrade

PSEG's ability to recover decay heat removal in the event it was lost. PSEG entered this violation

in their CAP as notification

20459055.

TS 3.2.1.1 function 8f requires that both motor-driven

AFVV pumps start when both steam generator

feed pumps trip when the reactor is in Modes 1 and 2. Contrary to this requirement.

from 2132 hours0.0247 days <br />0.592 hours <br />0.00353 weeks <br />8.11226e-4 months <br /> on July 22.2010, to 1557 hours0.018 days <br />0.433 hours <br />0.00257 weeks <br />5.924385e-4 months <br /> on July 25,2010, Enclosure

lhis auto start function was disabled.

Leads that were lifted to disable the auto start function during the forced outage were not properly re-Ianded

prior to ascension

to Mode 2. This finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent

the loss of a system safety function, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater that the TS allowed outage time, or screen as potentially

risk significant

due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating

event.

PSEG entered this

TS violation

in their CAP as notification

20471722.

A

IT [[]]

ACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL

INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL

INFORM ATION

KEY [[]]

POINTS [[]]

OF [[]]

CONTACT Licensee personnel:

C. Fricker, Site Vice President

E. Eilola, Plant Manager L. Rajkowski, Engineering

Director R. DeSanctis, Maintenance

Director J. Garecht, Operations

Director J. Higgins, System Engineer F. Hummel, System Engineer R. Gary, Radiation

Protection

Manager S. Bowers, System Engineer E. Villar, Licensing

Engineer

M. Wolk, Senior Reactor Operator

LIST [[]]

OF [[]]

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED,

AND [[]]

DISCUSSED

Closed 05000272/2010-001-00

LER Automatic

Start of the 1 C

EDG (Section 40A3.1) 05000272/2010-002-00

LER Automatic Reactor Trip Due to Main Power Transformer

Bushing Failure (Section 40A3.2) 0500027212010-003-00

LER Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 3.0.4 (Section 40A3.3)

LIST [[]]

OF DOCUMENTS

REVIEWED In addition to the documents

identified

in the body of this report, the inspectors

reviewed the following

documents

and records: Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures

SC.OP-AB.ZZ-0001, Adverse Environmental

Conditions, Revision 13 OP-AA-1 08-111-1 001, Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines, Revision 5 Orders 70111536 70049239 Attachment

Section 1 R04: Equipment

Alignment

S1.0P-ST-SW-0013, Service Water Valve Verification

Modes 1-4, Revision S 1. OP-SO ,AF-0001, Auxiliary

Feedwater

System Operation, Revision S1.0P-ST.AF-0008, Auxiliary

Feedwater

Valve Verification

Modes 1-3, Revision Se.MD-PM.ZZ-0005, Molded Case Circuit Breaker Maintenance, Revision Drawings 205331 222508 205236 Notifications

20472361 20460084 20465265 20465263 20476129 20477356 20476554 20477357 20477358 20467120 20471722 Orders 60090467 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091834 70111793 Other Documents

VTD 174547, Terry Turbine Inspection

Manual, Revision 21 Section

Fire Protection

Procedures

FRS-II-421, Salem Unit 1 (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan, 4160V Switchgear

Rooms & Battery Rooms Elevation:

64', Revision 6 FRS-II-433, Salem Unit 1, (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan, Auxiliary

Feed Water Pumps Area Elevation:

84', Revision 6 FRS-II-9111, Salem Unit 1, (Unit 2) Pre-Fire Plan, Service Water Intake Structure

Elevation:

2' & 112', Revision 2 FRS-II-424, Salem Unit 1 Pre-Fire Plan, cves Hold-Up Tank Area Elevation:

64', Revision 2 Drawings FA-01, Detection

Design Layout 4160V Switchgear

Room Unit No.2 Elev. 64', Revision 0 FP-01, Sprinkler

Design Layout 4160V Switchgear

Room Unit No.2 Elev. 64', Revision A FP-12B. No.1 Unit Auxiliary

Building Fire Protection

Piping Aux. Feedwater

Pump Area Elev. 84', Revision 2 Notifications

20429890 20472945 Orders 70044438 Other Documents

Design Change Plan 80089591, S2 C02 Replacement

64', 78' and 84' Elevations

NC.DE-PS.zZ-0001 (Q)-A2-FHA, Salem Fire Protection

Report Fire Hazards Analysis, Revision 6 . I S-2-FP-FEE-1987, Fire Suppression

System Performance

Capability

Evaluation

-2FA-AB-64A, Revision 0 I Attachment

Section 1 R06: Flood Protection

Measures Procedure§

S2.0P-AB.SW*0001, Loss of Service Water Header Pressure, Revision 16 S2.0P-AB.SW-0003, Service Water Bay Leak, Revision 7 S2.0P-AB.ZZ-0002, Flooding, Revision 3 S2.0P-SO.SW-0005, Service Water System Operation, Revision 40 SC.FP-SV.FBR-0026.

Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration

Seal Inspection, Revision 3 Drawings 205342 212805 Notifications

(*NRC identified)

20385854 20410172 20410627 20440749 20474545*

20474629*

20149343 20092519 20433918 20408227 20188995 20316562 20;318626

20095182 20256504 20153983 20194450 Orders 70090400 60081894 80043396 30177759 70067380 700068098

Other Documents

SC.DE-TS.ZZ-2034.

Technical

Requirements

for Construction

of Electrical

Installation, Salem Generating

Station. Revision 5 SC.FP-SV.FBR-0026, Flood and Fire Barrier Penetration

Seal Inspection, dated April 23, 2010 SC.OP-DLZZ-0008, Circulating/Service

Water Logs, dated July 26,2010, and August 2. 2010 ER-AA-3003, Cable Condition

Monitoring

and Aging Management

Program, Revision 0 NRC Generic Letter 2007-01, Inaccessible

or Underground

Power Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation

Systems or Cause Plant Transients, dated 2/7/2007

PSEG Response to

NRC Generic Letter 2007-01. dated 1211212007

Specification

No A-O-ZZ-EDS-0225-0, Class 1 E Medium Voltage Shielded Power Cable for Use at Salem & Hope Creek Generating

Stations General Specification

85651-0-1, 5KVto 15KV Insulated

Cable Program Element 5, Actions for Cables Having Wet Environments

NRC Information Notice 2002-12. Submerged

Safety-Related

Electrical

Cables NRC Component

DeSign Bases Inspection

Report 05000416/2009006

Engineering

Evaluation

Number: S-C-4KV-EEE-1751, Safety Related Medium Voltage Cable Issues routed below grade in duct bank or potentially

submerged

condition

for Salem Unit 1 and 2 Seabrook Issue Summary, Condition

Report No. 211208,357, Topic Submerged

Service Water Electrical

Cables, dated 11/19/2009

Section 1 R11: Licensed Operator Regualification

Program Procedures

TO-AA-301, Simulator

Configuration

Management, Revision 13 2-EOP-TRIP-1, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 27 2-EOP-TRIP-2, Reactor Trip Response, Revision 27 Attachment

Section 1 R12: Maintenance

Effectiveness

Notifications

20388211 20395605 20395804 20398649 20406227 20413015 20413425 20413466 20433555 20437493 20455197 20462179 20463908 20468478 20477633 Other Documents

Salem 1 Jet Narrative

Log, from 9/28/2008

-9/28/2010

evc (a)(1) Action Plan Development

and Action Plan (Monitoring)

Goal Setting Template Maintenance

Rule Scoping Document (for CVC) Section 1 Ri3: Maintenance

Risk Assessments

and Emergent Work .control Procedures

Risk Management, Revision 6 OP-AA-1 01-112-1 002, On-Line Risk Management, Revision 5 WC-AA-101, On-Line Work Management

Process, Revision 18 OP-AA-1 08-116, Protected

Equipment

Program, Revision 2 Notifications

20476129 Orders 30105373 30188989

60091834 Other Documents

SGS Unit 2

PRA Risk Assessment

for Work Week 037 Section iRiS: Operability

Evaluations

Procedures

S2.0P-PTSW-0005, Service Water Fouling Monitoring

Room Coolers, Revision 8 S2.0P-SO.SW-0008, Inservice

Room Cooler Flushes, Revision 0 S2.0P-STDG-0001, 2A Diesel Generator

Surveillance

Test, Revision 46 Drawings 205228 205342 205337 Notifications

20469463 20469609 20469615 20469616 20469713 20469719 20469720 20470114 20470182 20470193 20470211 20470260 20408942 20409466 20472868 20473031 20474841 Orders 60091028 60091030 60091035 60091094 70096444 60091466 Other Documents

SER [[]]

OTDM. Issue Resolution

Documentation

Form for 1 CV284, Revision 6 Attachment

Section 1 R18: Plant Modifications

Procedure§, S1.0P-IO.ZZ-0002, Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby, Revision 56 S 1.OP-IO.ZZ-01

03, Hot Standby to Minimum Load Administrative

Requirements, Revision 6 S1.0P-SO.RPS-0009, Install/Removal

of

AFW Start Function from

SGFP Trips, Revision 5 S1.0P-SO.PC-0001, SWitchgear

and Penetration

Areas Ventilation

Operation, Revision 20 Design Changes

TCCP No 2SnO-006, 2C 125

VDC Battery Online Replacement

Notifications

20471722 20477280 Orders 70104212 Other Documents

Letter from the

NRC to

PSEG, Subj: Salem Nuclear Generating

Station, Unit No.2, Issuance of Amendment

Re: One-time On-line Battery Replacement.

daled 9/112010 Control Room Logs Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance

Testing Procedures

S1.0P-SO.AF-0001(Q), Auxiliary

Feedwater

System Operation, Revision 27 S2.0P-ST.CC-0003(Q), Inservice

Testing, 23 Component

Cooling Pump, Revision 25 SC.MD-PM.AF-0007(Q), 13 and 23 Auxiliary

Feedwater

Terry Turbine Linkage Inspection

and Lubrication, Revision 0 S2.0P-ST.CH-0004, Chilled Water System -Chillers, Revision 17 S2.0P-ST.125-0001, Electrical

Power Systems

125VDC Distribution, Revision 11 S2.0P-

ST.SJ-0003, Inservice

Testing. Safety Injection

Valves, Modes 1 -6, Revision 12 S2.RA-ST.SJ-0003, Inservice

Testing, Safety Injection

Valves, Modes 1 -6, Acceptance

Criteria, Revision 14' . S1.0P*PT.AF-0003, 13 Auxiliary

Feedwater

Pump Periodic Run, Revision 0 S2.0P-ST.DG-0001, 2A Diesel Generator

Surveillance

Test, Revision 46 Notifications

20460084 20465265 20469586 20469623 20469903 20469904 20474843 20474841 20416141 Orders 60089923 60090670 60091111 60091124 70037915 60090467 60087957 60081294 60091466 Other Documents

Salem 2 Narrative

Log, dated 9124/2010

Salem Prompt Investigation

Report, No. 13 TDAFW Trip Latch Issue 9/2/2010 Root Cause Investigation

Report, 13123 Auxiliary

Feedwater

Turbine Driven Pumps Spurious Trips, dated 9/20/2010

(page 1 of 3), Revision 10 Attachment

Section 1 R20: Refueling

and Other Outage Activities

Procedures

OP-AA-10B-108, Unit Restart Review, Revision 9 Notifications

20469470 20469513 20469536 20469582 20469742 20469465 20469536 20469542 20469623 20469643 20469650 20469651 Orders 60091125 Other

S1.0P-SO.AF-0001, Attachment

2, Turbine-Driven

AFW Pump Restoration (Page 3 of Revision 27

OP-SA-1 08-114-1 001, Attachment

1, Trip Report, Revision 1 OP-SA-1 08-114-1001, Attachment

2, Post Reactor Trip/ECCS

Actuation

Review, Revision 1 Prompt Investigation

Report. "B" Phase Main Power Transformer/High

Voltage Bushing Failure, dated 7fll2010 PSEG-NBU-SaJem

Unit 1 Trip Forced Outage-LT-CR

Critical Path Schedule U1 Forced Outage Transformer

& Start-up Work Schedule Salem Emergency

Classificati.on

Guide, Attachment

14, Four Hour Report -NRC Operations

Salem Emergency

Classification

Guide, Attachment

29, Twenty-four

Hour Report North American Electric Reliability

Corporation (NERC) Disturbance

Reporting

SequencE'

of Events Review Report Section 1R22: Surveillance

Testing Procedures

S1.IC-FT.RCP-0023, 1PT-474 Pressurizer

Pressure Protection

Channel IV, Revision 16 S2.0P-ST.DG-001, 2A Diesel Generator

Surveillance

Test, Revision 46 S2.0P-ST.SJ-0001, Inservice

Testing -21 Safety Injection

Pump, Revision 19 S2.0P-ST.RHR-0002, Inservice

Testing -22 Residual Heat Removal Pump, Revision 28 S2.RA-ST.RHR-0002, Inservice

Testing 22 Residual Heat Removal Pump Acceptance

Criteria, Revision 8 S2.0P-PT.RHR-0002, 22 RHR Pump Flow Data, Revision 4 Drawings 223678 Notifications

(*NRC identified)

20153697'

20456318 20465919 20449238 20472159*

20474660 20474496 20472575 Orders 50132645 60091451 70050041 70106347 Section 2RS1: Radiological

Hazard Assessment

and Exposure Controls Notifications

20467421 Attachment

Other

Prompt Investiga1ion

Report, Low Dose and Dose Rate Alarm Received During Radiography

Section 2RS2: Occupational

ALARA Planning and Controls

20460949 20457836 20458565 20459222 20457304

Other Documents

Salem Unit 1 20 th Refueling

Outage Radiological

Performance

Report Past-ALAR A Review 2010-59 Section 2RS4: Occupational

Dose Assessment

Procedures

RP-AA-220, Bioassay Program, Revision 6 I RP-AA-21, Dosimetry

Issue, Usage, and Control, Revision 10 i ! Section 4OA1: Performance

Indicator

Verification

I Notifications

20436451 20444609 20448722 20458929 20459838 20462412 20469716 . 20472916 20477296 Other Documents

Salem 1 SW Narrative

Lag, from 7/1/2009 -7/1/2010 Salem 1 RHR Narrative

Log, from 7/1/2009 -7/1/2010 Salem 1 AF Narrative

Lag, from 711/2009 -7/1/2010 Salem 2 SW Narrative

Log, from 6/30/2009

-6/30/2010

Salem 2 RHR Narrative

Log, from 6/30/2009

-6/3012010

Salem 2 AF Narrative

Lag, from 6/30/2009

-6/30/2010

Section 40A2: Identification

and Resolution

of Problems Notifications

20330173 20333113 20333114 20392282 20428779 20439278 20440694 20444513 20447503 20448233 20453788 20456599 20460121 20462546 20463203 20462952 Orders 70092096 Other Documents

OP-AA-102-103-1001.

Operator Burdens Program, Revision 0 OP-AA-102-103, Operator Work-Around

Program, Revision 2 Quarterly

Operator Burden Assessment, Salem Unit 1 -Second Quarter Quarterly

Operator Burden Assessment, Salem Unit 2 -Second Quarter Attachment

Section 4()A3: Event Follow-up

Procedures

SC.OP -SOAKV-0001,

4KV Breaker Operation, Revision 23

SC.MD-PRAKV-0002, 4KV Breaker Plunger Interlock

Gap Verification, Revision 9 Notifications

20471722 20459055 20270692 20459354 20459059 20459352 Orders 70109763 70053722 30151345 Other Documents

Prompt Investigation

Report, Aux Feed Pump Auto Start from 11/12 SGFP Trips disabled when required by Technical

SpeCifications

4.160KV Function Level Maintenance

Rule Scoping Document Salem Unit 1 Operations

Narrative

Log (Day and Night Shift), dated 4/16/2010

Salem Unit 1 Operations

Narrative

Log (Night Shift), dated 4/1712010

Section 40A5: Other Activities .

S1.0P-AB.LOCA-0001, Shutdown LOCA, Revision S1.0P-SO.CVC-0007, Fill and Vent of the cves, Revision S1.0P-SO.RHR-0001, Initiating

RHR, Revision S1.0P-SO.RHR-0002, Terminating

RHR , Revision S1.0P-SO.RHR-0003, Filling and Venting the

RHR System, Revision S1.0P-

SO.SJ-0001, Preparation

of the Safety Injection

System for Operation, Revision S1.0P-ST.SJ-0009, ECCS Subsystems

-Tavg 2! 350°F, Revision S2.0P-SO.eS-0001, Preparation

of the

CS System for Normal Operation, Revision S2.0P-

ST.SJ-0009, ECCS Subsystems

-Tavg 2! 350"F, Revision 205228 205232

205234 205235 CVC-1-2B

RH-1-1A RH-1-1B Notifications

(*NRC

20187615 20367369 20368686 20372382 20384080

20385350 20385364 20390204 20399042 20399108

20408241 20409145 20409991 20444790 20460621 60082989 70079735 70095588

70096422 70101308

Calculations

and

11050-740-02, Waterhammer

Technical

Evaluation

for Salem 1 & 2 eve System, Revision 11050-740-03, Waterhammer

Technical

Evaluation

for Salem 1 & 2 RHR System, Revision 11050-740-04, Waterhammer

Technical

Evaluation

for 5alem 1 & 251 System, Revision Attachment

80097737, Adding Vent Valves on S'IRHR-11RH19

Cross Connect Header between

RHR Pumps (50.59 Review), Revision 0 80099810, Install Vent Line to Common Legs between 21/23

SJ43

and 22/24SJ43

Valves (Design Change Request), Revision 0 Sargent & Lundy LLC Project

Salem Unit

1 GL 2001-01

CS System Evaluation, dat,ed 1212012008

Sargent & Lundy

LLC Project 11050-705, Salem Unit 1

GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation, dated 12/20/2008

Sargent & Lundy

LLC Project 11050-705, Salem Unit 1

GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation, dated 12/20/2008

Sargent & Lundy

LLC Project 11050-705, Salem Unit 1

GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation, dated 1212012008

Sargent & Lundy

LLC Project 11050-705, Salem Unit 2

GL 2001-01 CS System Evaluation.

dated 10/2712008

Sargent & Lundy

LLC Project 11050-705, Salem Unit 2

GL 2001-01 CVC System Evaluation, dated 10/27/2008

Sargent & Lundy

LLC Project 11050-705, Salem Unit 2

GL 2001-01 RHR System Evaluation, dated 1 0/27/2008

Sargent & Lundy

LLC Project 11050-705, Salem Unit 2

GL 2001-01 SI System Evaluation, dated 10/27/2008

S-C-MPOO-VDC-0058-0, Hydraulic

Transient

Analysis of the Spray System, Revision 0 S-C-SJ-MDC-1893, Allowable

Volume of Non-Condensable

Gases in RHR Recirculation Connect Piping, Revision 0 Technical

Basis for the Simplified

Equation, NEI System Gas Accumulation

Management

Workshop, dated 1/21/2010

VTD 431261, Industry Guidance -Evaluation

of Unexpected

Voids or Gas Identified

in Plant

ECCS and Other Systems, Revision 1

WCAP-16631-NP, Testing/Evaluation

of Gas Transport

to Suction of ECCS Pumps, Revision 0 Completed

Tests S1.0P-ST.SJ-0009, ECCS Subsystems

-Tavg <i! 350"F, performed

4/17/2009, 8/13/2009, 12/11/2009,1/16/2010,211212010,3/11/2010,4/25/20410, and 5/14/2010

S2.0P-ST.SJ-0009, ECCS Subsystems

-Tavg 350 D F, performed

7/9/2009, 8/7i2009, 1/8/2010,2/6/2010,3/6/2010,4/9/2010,5/5/2010, and 6/15/2010

Other Documents

NRC [[]]

GL 2008-01, Managing Gas Accumulation

in Emergency

Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment

Spray Systems, dated 1/11/2008

LR N08-0234,

PSEG to NRC, Salem Units 1 and 2 Nine-Month

Response to

NRC [[]]

GL 2008-01, dated 10/13/2008

LR N09-0028,

PSEG to NRC, Salem Unit 1 Supplementa.1 (Post-Outage)

Response

10 NRC [[]]

GL 2008-01, dated 2110/2009

LR N10-0014,

PSEG to NRC, Salem Unit 2 Supplemental (Post-Outage)

Response to

NRC [[]]

GL 2008-01, dated 2/8/2010

LR N10-0075,

PSEG to NRC, Salem Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional

Information

Regarding

GL 2008-01, dated 3111f2010

S-C-RHR-MEE-1055, Shutdown LOCA Design Basis, Salem Units 1 and 2, Revision 0 Engineering

Support Training.

Gas Intrusion, Revision 3 Long

Training Plan 0910, licensed Operator Requalification

Training, Revision 1 System Health Reports, Unit 1 and

2 CVC , SI, RHR, and

CS Systems, 3 rd Otr 2009 through 2 nd Qtr 2010 Attachment

ADAMS [[]]

AFW [[]]

ALARA [[]]

CAP [[]]

CCW [[]]

CFR [[]]

CS [[]]

CVCS [[]]

DAC [[]]

EDG [[]]

GL [[]]

GTG [[]]

HRA [[]]

HX [[]]

LER [[]]

MPT [[]]

NCV [[]]

NEI [[]]

NRC [[]]

NRR [[]]

OOS [[]]

PARS [[]]

PI [[]]

PMT [[]]

PSEG [[]]

RCS [[]]

RHR [[]]

RPM [[]]

SDE [[]]

SGFP [[]]

SI [[]]

SSC [[]]

SW [[]]

SWIS [[]]

TI [[]]

TS [[]]

TSAS [[]]

UT [[]]

VHRA [[]]

WO [[]]

LIST OF

Agency-wide

Documents

Access and Management

System Auxiliary

Feedwater

As Low As Reasonably

Achievable

Corrective

Action Program Component

Cooling Water Code of Federal Regulation

Containment

Spray Chemical and Volume Control System Derived Air Concentration

Emergency

Diesel Generator

Generic Letter Gas Turbine Generator

High Radiation

Area Heat Exchanger

Licensee Event Report Main Power Transformer

Non-cited

Violation

Nuclear Energy Institute

Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Out-of -Service Publicly Available

Records Performance

Indicator

Post-Maintenance

Testing Public Service Enterprise

Group Nuclear LLC Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Radiation

Protection

Manager Shallow Dose Equivalent

Steam Generator

Feedwater

Pump Safety Injection

Structures, Systems, and Components

Service Water Service Water Intake Structure

Temporary

Instruction

Technical*Specifications

Technical

Specification

Action Statement

Ultrasonic

Test Very High Radiation

Area Work Order Attachment