Information Notice 1988-58, Potential Problems with Asea Brown Boveri ITE-51L Time-Overcurrent Relays: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:j UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:j


COMMISSION
===UNITED STATES===
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 8, 1988 NRC INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.


NOTICE NO. 88-58: POTENTIAL
20555


PROBLEMS WITH ASEA BROWN BOVERI ITE-51L TIME-OVERCURRENT
===August 8, 1988===
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-58:


RELAYS
===POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH ASEA BROWN BOVERI===
ITE-51L TIME-OVERCURRENT RELAYS


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:
:
All holders of operating
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power


licenses or construction
reactors.


permits for nuclear power reactors.
==Purpose==
:
This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential
 
problems involving ASEA Brown Boveri ITE-51L time-overcurrent relays.
 
It
 
is expected that recipients will review this information for applicability
 
to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar
 
problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not
 
constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response


==Purpose==
is required.
: This information


notice is being provided to alert addressees
==Description of Circumstances==
:
Several spurious actuations of ASEA Brown Boveri (ABB)
ITE-51L relays have


to potential problems involving
occurred at the Beaver Valley nuclear power plant. These actuations resulted


ASEA Brown Boveri ITE-51L time-overcurrent
in unnecessary interruptions of the electrical power supply to safety-related


relays. It is expected that recipients
equipment.


will review this information
The ITE-51L relays monitor circuit current. When the magnitude


for applicability
of the current exceeds a reference value for a specific duration, the relay


to their facilities
actuates to energize the circuit breaker's trip coil.


and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
===The licensee has===
determined that the spurious relay actuations were caused by faulty silicon- controlled rectifiers (SCRs) that were manufactured by the Motorola Company.


However, suggestions
SCRs are solid-state devices that are used as electronic switches in electrical


contained
circuits. When a voltage is applied across the terminals of the SCR, the device


in this information
is designed to allow current to flow only when 'gated" or switched on by the


notice do not constitute
proper electrical signal.


NRC requirements;
The SCRs that failed at Beaver Valley allowed cur- rent to flow in the absence of the proper gating signal.
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description


of Circumstances:
These "leakage"
Several spurious actuations
currents were of sufficient magnitude to energize the trip coil of the as- sociated circuit breaker.


of ASEA Brown Boveri (ABB) ITE-51L relays have occurred at the Beaver Valley nuclear power plant. These actuations
The licensee was informed by Motorola that SCRs manufactured between the late


resulted in unnecessary
1970s and early 1980s are susceptible to this mode of failure and that these


interruptions
SCRs are likely to fail within the first 2 years of service.


of the electrical
===Since 1982, all===
SCRs manufactured by Motorola have been subjected to a "burn-in" test. In this


power supply to safety-related
test, the SCRs are placed in a high-temperature environment both with and with-'
out voltage applied. SCRs that pass this test are expected to perform normally


equipment.
for an extended period.


The ITE-51L relays monitor circuit current. When the magnitude of the current exceeds a reference
88080200


value for a specific duration, the relay actuates to energize the circuit breaker's
IN 88-58 August 8, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately 105 ITE-S5L relays installed in safety- related applications, and Unit i has 10.


trip coil. The licensee has determined
===The licensee is testing all the relays===
in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are faulty.


that the spurious relay actuations
No specific action or written response is required by this information


were caused by faulty silicon-controlled
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the


rectifiers (SCRs) that were manufactured
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate


by the Motorola Company.SCRs are solid-state
office.


devices that are used as electronic
notice.


switches in electrical
technical


circuits.
regional


When a voltage is applied across the terminals
===Charles E. Rossi, Director===
Division of Operational Events Assessment


of the SCR, the device is designed to allow current to flow only when 'gated" or switched on by the proper electrical
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
K. R. Naidu, NRR


signal. The SCRs that failed at Beaver Valley allowed cur-rent to flow in the absence of the proper gating signal. These "leakage" currents were of sufficient
(301) 492-0980
Technical Contacts:


magnitude
===N. E. Fields, NRR===
(301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


to energize the trip coil of the as-sociated circuit breaker.The licensee was informed by Motorola that SCRs manufactured
S


between the late 1970s and early 1980s are susceptible
Attachment


to this mode of failure and that these SCRs are likely to fail within the first 2 years of service. Since 1982, all SCRs manufactured
IN 88-58


by Motorola have been subjected
===August 8, 1988 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED===
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES


to a "burn-in" test. In this test, the SCRs are placed in a high-temperature
Information


environment
Date of


both with and with-'out voltage applied. SCRs that pass this test are expected to perform normally for an extended period.88080200
Notice No.
IN 88-58 August 8, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately


105 ITE-S5L relays installed
Subject


in safety-related applications, and Unit i has 10. The licensee is testing all the relays in Units 1 and 2 to determine
Issuance


whether the SCRs are faulty.No specific action or written response is required by this information
Issued to


If you have any questions
88-57
88-56
88-55
88-54


about this matter, please contact one of the contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator
===Potential Loss of Safe===
Shutdown Equipment Due to


of the appropriate
===Premature Silicon Controlled===
Rectifier Failure


office.notice.technical regional Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
===Potential Problems with===
Silicone Foam Fire Barrier


===Events Assessment===
===Penetration Seals===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Potential Problems Caused


K. R. Naidu, NRR (301) 492-0980 Technical
by Single Failure of an


Contacts: N. E. Fields, NRR (301) 492-1173 Attachment:
===Engineered Safety Feature===
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Swing Bus


Notices S
===Failure of Circuit Breaker===
Following Installation of


===Amptector Direct Trip===
Attachment
Attachment


IN 88-58 August 8, 1988 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
===Licensee Violations of NRC===
Regulations, Which Led to
 
===Medical Diagnostic===
Misadministrations
 
===Failure of Intrauterine===
Tandem of Fletcher
 
===Applicator Brachytherapy===
Devices During Patient
 
Treatment
 
8/8/88
8/4/88
8/3/88
7/28/88
7/28/88
7/27/88
 
===All holders of OLs===
or CPs for nuclear
 
power reactors.
 
===All holders of OLs===
or CPs for nuclear


NOTICES Information
power reactors.


Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 88-57 88-56 88-55 88-54 Potential
===All holders of OLs===
or CPs for nuclear


Loss of Safe Shutdown Equipment
power reactors.


Due to Premature
===All holders of OLs===
or CPs for nuclear


===Silicon Controlled===
power reactors.
Rectifier


Failure Potential
===All manufacturers and===
distributors of radio- pharmaceuticals for


Problems with Silicone Foam Fire Barrier Penetration
human use, nuclear


Seals Potential
pharmacies, and


Problems Caused by Single Failure of an Engineered
medical licensees.


Safety Feature Swing Bus Failure of Circuit Breaker Following
Medical licensees.


Installation
88-53
88-52
88-46,


of Amptector
===Supplement 1===
Licensee Report of


===Direct Trip Attachment===
===Defective Refurbished===
Licensee Violations
Circuit Breakers


of NRC Regulations, Which Led to Medical Diagnostic
7/26/88


===Misadministrations===
===All holders of OLs===
Failure of Intrauterine
or CPs for nuclear


Tandem of Fletcher Applicator
power reactors.


===Brachytherapy===
88-51
Devices During Patient Treatment 8/8/88 8/4/88 8/3/88 7/28/88 7/28/88 7/27/88 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All manufacturers


and distributors
===Failures of Main Steam===
Isolation Valves


of radio-pharmaceuticals
7/21/88


for human use, nuclear pharmacies, and medical licensees.
===All holders of OLs===
or CPs for nuclear


Medical licensees.
power reactors.


88-53 88-52 88-46, Supplement
OL = Operating License


1 Licensee Report of Defective
CP = Construction Permit


Refurbished
IN 88-58 August 8, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately 105 ITE-51L relays installed in safety- related applications, and Unit 1 has 10.


Circuit Breakers 7/26/88 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.88-51 Failures of Main Steam Isolation
===The licensee is testing all the relays===
in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are faulty.


Valves 7/21/88 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.OL = Operating
No specific action or written response is required by this information


License CP = Construction
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the


Permit
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate


IN 88-58 August 8, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately
office.


105 ITE-51L relays installed
notice.


in safety-related applications, and Unit 1 has 10. The licensee is testing all the relays in Units 1 and 2 to determine
technical


whether the SCRs are faulty.No specific action or written response is required by this information
regional


If you have any questions
===Charles E. Rossi, Director===
Division of Operational Events Assessment


about this matter, please contact one of the contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical Contacts:


of the appropriate
===K. R. Naidu, NRR===
(301) 492-0980
N. E.


office.notice.technical regional Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
(301)
Fields, NRR


===Events Assessment===
492-1173 Attachment:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===
*see previous concurrence


Contacts: K. R. Naidu, NRR (301) 492-0980 N. E.(301)Fields, NRR 492-1173 Attachment:
EAB:NRR
List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices*see previous concurrence
El


EAB:NRR El KNaidu* N1 7/18/88 7/*C:GCB:NRR
KNaidu*  
N1
7/18/88  
7/
*C:GCB:NRR


CHBerlinger
CHBerlinger


8/1/88 kB:NRR Fields*/14/88 EAB:NRR DFischer*BCj
8/1/88 kB:NRR
 
Fields*
/14/88 EAB:NRR
 
DFischer*BCj re*
7/19/88 NRR:RVIB
 
EBaker*
7/19/88 VIB:NRR
 
WBrach*
7/20/88 AD:DRIS
 
BGrimes*
7/22/88 C:EAB:NRR
 
WLanning*
8/2/88
*D:DEST
 
LShao
 
7/29/88
'V/3/88
 
IN 88- July
 
, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately 105 ITE-51L relays installed in safety- related applications, and Unit 1 has 10.
 
===The licensee is testing all the relays===
in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are faulty.
 
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
 
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical
 
contacts listed below or the regional administrator of the appropriate regional
 
office.
 
===Charles E. Rossi, Director===
Division of Operational Events Assessment
 
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
 
===Technical Contact:===
K. R. Naidu
 
(301) 492-0980
 
===N. E. Fields, NRR===
(301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
 
*see previous concurrence
 
EAB:NRR
 
EAB:NRR
 
EAB:NRR
 
H:
KNaidu *
NFields* DFischer*BC &re*
/ /88
/ /88
/
/88 C:G S d--R
 
D:
D:DOEA:NRR
 
CHBerlinger LShao
 
CERossi
 
(/* /88
1 / /88
/ /88 NRR:RVIB
 
EBaker
 
/ /88 VIB:NRR
 
WBrach*
/ /88 AD:DRIS
 
BGrimes*
/
/88
'ink
 
C:EAB:NRR
 
WLanning
 
r/ 2 /88
 
IN 88- July
 
, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately one hundred and five ITE-51L type


re*7/19/88 NRR:RVIB EBaker*7/19/88 VIB:NRR WBrach*7/20/88 AD:DRIS BGrimes*7/22/88 C:EAB:NRR WLanning*8/2/88*D:DEST LShao 7/29/88'V/3/88 IN 88-July , 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately
relays installed in safety-related applications.


105 ITE-51L relays installed
===Unit 1 has ten of the faulty===
relays in safety related applications. The licensee is in the process of


in safety-related applications, and Unit 1 has 10. The licensee is testing all the relays in Units 1 and 2 to determine
testing all the relays in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are


whether the SCRs are faulty.No specific action or written response is required by this information
faulty.


notice.If you have any questions
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.


about this matter, please contact the technical contacts listed below or the regional administrator
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical


of the appropriate
contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional


regional office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
office.


===Events Assessment===
===Charles E. Rossi. Director===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Division of Operational Events Assessment


Technical
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===


Contact: K. R. Naidu (301) 492-0980 N. E. Fields, NRR (301) 492-1173 Attachment:
===Technical Contact:===
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
K. R.


Notices*see previous concurrence
(301)
Naidu


EAB:NRR EAB:NRR EAB:NRR H: KNaidu
492-0980


* NFields* DFischer*BC
===N. E. Fields, NRR===
(301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


&re*/ /88 / /88 / /88 C:G S d--R D: D:DOEA:NRR
EAB: 1RR


CHBerlinger
KNa i du


LShao CERossi (/* /88 1 / /8 8/ /88 NRR:RVIB EBaker/ /88 VIB:NRR WBrach*/ /88 AD:DRIS BGrimes*/ /88'ink C:EAB:NRR WLanning r/ 2 /88 IN 88-July , 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately
7 /A/88 EAB:N1 NFieli


one hundred and five ITE-51L type relays installed
7//1 l


in safety-related
RR


applications.
&XAB R T2 ds


Unit 1 has ten of the faulty relays in safety related applications.
DFischer


The licensee is in the process of testing all the relays in Units 1 and 2 to determine
aS


whether the SCRs are faulty.No specific action or written response is required by this information
7//1/88
8
4G


notice.If you have any questions
3/p/
W


about this matter, please contact the technical contact listed below or the Regional Administrator
TRR:RVIB


of the appropriate
EBaker


regional office.Charles E. Rossi. Director Division of Operational
7 /A/88 r -1
1) Y- - /4 -j


===Events Assessment===
'Vz'X,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
C:EAB:NRR


Technical
WLanning


Contact: K. R.(301)Naidu 492-0980 N. E. Fields, NRR (301) 492-1173 Attachment:
/ /88 C:GCB:NRR
List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices EAB: 1RR KNa i du 7 /A/88 EAB:N1 NFieli 7//1 l RR &XAB R T2 ds DFischer aS 7//1/88 8 4G 3/p/ W TRR:RVIB EBaker 7 /A/88 r -1 1) Y- -/4 -j'Vz'X, C:EAB:NRR WLanning/ /88 C:GCB:NRR CHBerlinger
CHBerlinger


/ /88 u:IMUEA:NRR
/ /88 u:IMUEA:NRR


WRossi/ /88 Ra}}
WRossi
 
/ /88 Ra}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 10:29, 16 January 2025

Potential Problems with Asea Brown Boveri ITE-51L Time-Overcurrent Relays
ML031150022
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Crane
Issue date: 08/08/1988
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-88-058, NUDOCS 8808020102
Download: ML031150022 (6)
v • d • e


j

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555

August 8, 1988

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-58:

POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH ASEA BROWN BOVERI

ITE-51L TIME-OVERCURRENT RELAYS

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

This information notice is being provided to alert addressees to potential

problems involving ASEA Brown Boveri ITE-51L time-overcurrent relays.

It

is expected that recipients will review this information for applicability

to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar

problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not

constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response

is required.

Description of Circumstances

Several spurious actuations of ASEA Brown Boveri (ABB)

ITE-51L relays have

occurred at the Beaver Valley nuclear power plant. These actuations resulted

in unnecessary interruptions of the electrical power supply to safety-related

equipment.

The ITE-51L relays monitor circuit current. When the magnitude

of the current exceeds a reference value for a specific duration, the relay

actuates to energize the circuit breaker's trip coil.

The licensee has

determined that the spurious relay actuations were caused by faulty silicon- controlled rectifiers (SCRs) that were manufactured by the Motorola Company.

SCRs are solid-state devices that are used as electronic switches in electrical

circuits. When a voltage is applied across the terminals of the SCR, the device

is designed to allow current to flow only when 'gated" or switched on by the

proper electrical signal.

The SCRs that failed at Beaver Valley allowed cur- rent to flow in the absence of the proper gating signal.

These "leakage"

currents were of sufficient magnitude to energize the trip coil of the as- sociated circuit breaker.

The licensee was informed by Motorola that SCRs manufactured between the late

1970s and early 1980s are susceptible to this mode of failure and that these

SCRs are likely to fail within the first 2 years of service.

Since 1982, all

SCRs manufactured by Motorola have been subjected to a "burn-in" test. In this

test, the SCRs are placed in a high-temperature environment both with and with-'

out voltage applied. SCRs that pass this test are expected to perform normally

for an extended period.

88080200

IN 88-58 August 8, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately 105 ITE-S5L relays installed in safety- related applications, and Unit i has 10.

The licensee is testing all the relays

in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are faulty.

No specific action or written response is required by this information

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the

contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate

office.

notice.

technical

regional

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

K. R. Naidu, NRR

(301) 492-0980

Technical Contacts:

N. E. Fields, NRR

(301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

S

Attachment

IN 88-58

August 8, 1988 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information

Date of

Notice No.

Subject

Issuance

Issued to

88-57

88-56

88-55

88-54

Potential Loss of Safe

Shutdown Equipment Due to

Premature Silicon Controlled

Rectifier Failure

Potential Problems with

Silicone Foam Fire Barrier

Penetration Seals

Potential Problems Caused

by Single Failure of an

Engineered Safety Feature

Swing Bus

Failure of Circuit Breaker

Following Installation of

Amptector Direct Trip

Attachment

Licensee Violations of NRC

Regulations, Which Led to

Medical Diagnostic

Misadministrations

Failure of Intrauterine

Tandem of Fletcher

Applicator Brachytherapy

Devices During Patient

Treatment

8/8/88

8/4/88

8/3/88

7/28/88

7/28/88

7/27/88

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

All manufacturers and

distributors of radio- pharmaceuticals for

human use, nuclear

pharmacies, and

medical licensees.

Medical licensees.

88-53

88-52

88-46,

Supplement 1

Licensee Report of

Defective Refurbished

Circuit Breakers

7/26/88

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

88-51

Failures of Main Steam

Isolation Valves

7/21/88

All holders of OLs

or CPs for nuclear

power reactors.

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 88-58 August 8, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately 105 ITE-51L relays installed in safety- related applications, and Unit 1 has 10.

The licensee is testing all the relays

in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are faulty.

No specific action or written response is required by this information

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the

contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate

office.

notice.

technical

regional

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts:

K. R. Naidu, NRR

(301) 492-0980

N. E.

(301)

Fields, NRR

492-1173 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • see previous concurrence

EAB:NRR

El

KNaidu*

N1

7/18/88

7/

  • C:GCB:NRR

CHBerlinger

8/1/88 kB:NRR

Fields*

/14/88 EAB:NRR

DFischer*BCj re*

7/19/88 NRR:RVIB

EBaker*

7/19/88 VIB:NRR

WBrach*

7/20/88 AD:DRIS

BGrimes*

7/22/88 C:EAB:NRR

WLanning*

8/2/88

  • D:DEST

LShao

7/29/88

'V/3/88

IN 88- July

, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately 105 ITE-51L relays installed in safety- related applications, and Unit 1 has 10.

The licensee is testing all the relays

in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are faulty.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contacts listed below or the regional administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

K. R. Naidu

(301) 492-0980

N. E. Fields, NRR

(301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • see previous concurrence

EAB:NRR

EAB:NRR

EAB:NRR

H:

KNaidu *

NFields* DFischer*BC &re*

/ /88

/ /88

/

/88 C:G S d--R

D:

D:DOEA:NRR

CHBerlinger LShao

CERossi

(/* /88

1 / /88

/ /88 NRR:RVIB

EBaker

/ /88 VIB:NRR

WBrach*

/ /88 AD:DRIS

BGrimes*

/

/88

'ink

C:EAB:NRR

WLanning

r/ 2 /88

IN 88- July

, 1988 Beaver Valley Unit 2 has approximately one hundred and five ITE-51L type

relays installed in safety-related applications.

Unit 1 has ten of the faulty

relays in safety related applications. The licensee is in the process of

testing all the relays in Units 1 and 2 to determine whether the SCRs are

faulty.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi. Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

K. R.

(301)

Naidu

492-0980

N. E. Fields, NRR

(301) 492-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

EAB: 1RR

KNa i du

7 /A/88 EAB:N1 NFieli

7//1 l

RR

&XAB R T2 ds

DFischer

aS

7//1/88

8

4G

3/p/

W

TRR:RVIB

EBaker

7 /A/88 r -1

1) Y- - /4 -j

'Vz'X,

C:EAB:NRR

WLanning

/ /88 C:GCB:NRR

CHBerlinger

/ /88 u:IMUEA:NRR

WRossi

/ /88 Ra


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