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| | {{#Wiki_filter:From: Mike Mulligan [steamshovel2002@gmail.com] |
| | Sent: Sunday, May 26, 2013 1:53 PM To: Guzman, Richard |
| | |
| | ==Subject:== |
| | Pilgrim: Evacuation Plan Broken During Blizzard Nemo And Unenforced By The NRC Power Reactor Event Number: 49062 Facility: COOPER Region: 4 State: NE |
| | |
| | Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] |
| | RX Type: [1] GE-4 NRC Notified By: NATHAN L. BEGER HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL Notification Date: 05/23/2013 Notification Time: 15:45 [ET] |
| | |
| | Event Date: 05/23/2013 |
| | |
| | Event Time: 10:19 [CDT] |
| | |
| | Last Update Date: 05/23/2013 Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY |
| | |
| | 10 CFR Section: |
| | 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE Person (Organization): |
| | NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO) |
| | Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode 1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation Event Text TEMPORARY LOSS OF METEOROLOGIC AL MONITORING SYSTEM DURING PLANNED MAINTENANCE |
| | |
| | "At 1019 CDT, AC power was removed from the site meteorological monitoring system (MET) equipment for planned maint enance in order to remove abandoned equipment left in place since installing the new meteorological system in October 2012. Removing AC power was not expected to have an effect since all MET information would continue to be available due to an 8-hour battery backup system |
| | |
| | installed at the meteorologic al tower. However, when power was removed, all onsite meteorological data was lost to the control room via t he Plant Management Information System (PMIS). PMIS is the onl y display of local direct meteorological conditions available. Subs equently, [Cooper Nuclear Station] CNS determined the interface between MET system and PMIS was not powered from the 8 hour MET battery backup system which accounted for t he lost MET indication. CNS corrected the condition and restored meteorological data to the control room via the PMIS system at 1219 CDT. |
| | |
| | "Site backup assessment capability relies on Meteorological model estimates from the National Weather Service out of Valley, Nebraska or on default values derived from historical local weather patterns. Since there was no direct information of site meteorological conditions dur ing the period of lost power , CNS considered this to be a major loss of assessment capability and reportable under 10CF R50.72(b)(3)(xiii)." |
| | The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. |
| | Mr Guzman, So here is an official concern to the NRC by me. I not crazy! |
| | With LER 2013-003-00 Entergy admits the t he plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data. Whatever that means? Was the spinning cups out in the weather frozen and iced over during blizzard Nemo or did the instruments fail because of the power failure? Was it ju st a data recording issue or did the site lose wind speed and direction indication in the control room or at the te ch support center? |
| | Cover-Up: Public Notification And Radi ation Evac Plan Broke During Accident http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2013 |
| | /05/loss-of-off-site-power-events-due-to.html I am calling it, they lost wind speed and direction indication in the control room and the evacuation plan was severely impaired. |
| | 2013-003-00: "During the storm on February 8, meteorological instruments at PNPS recorded sustained wind speeds between 42 and 49 mph through 2338 hours at which time the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data until 1840 hours the following day. The wind direction was predominantly from the ocean toward the switchyard during the storm So why didn't Pilgrim during the Nemo Blizzard make an event report like the Cooper station? Cooper: "At 1019 CDT, AC power was remov ed from the site meteorological monitoring system (MET) equipment for pl anned maintenance in order to remove abandoned equipment left in place since installing the new meteorological system in October 2012 Why was there no "major loss of a ssessment capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)" like the Cooper station? |
| | Cooper: Since there was no direct informati on of site meteorol ogical conditions during the period of lost power, CNS c onsidered this to be a major loss of assessment capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)." And it raises questions if this should have been reported in the emergency classification system such as a Unusual Event. |
| | |
| | It raises issue if the Met instrumentation has failed in other power failures, blizzards and weather conditions and not reported as required? |
| | It is beyond utter incompetence and neglig ence with public reporting on plant events with Entergy and the NRC on this atrocious incomplete statement: "the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data". Entergy should have been forced to add a few sentences in the LER like , we still had wind speed and direction indication in the control room or th is is how the site would have carried out the evacuation if we had become blind to knowing wind speed and direction. |
| | Why didn't Entergy carry fully out their licens ing reporting responsibilities during Blizzard Nemo and why is the NRC negligent with enforcing their rules? |
| | I see the meteorological instrum entation issue wasn't carried at all in your most recent inspection report. And the diesel smoke in the reactor building wasn't covered in the LER. This is so shoddy document ation reporting by both of you. |
| | Would you add this to the docket? |
| | Sincerely, Mike Mulligan Hinsdale, NH}} |
Revision as of 03:49, 17 July 2018
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Category:E-Mail
MONTHYEARML24157A0122024-06-0404 June 2024 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper - Acceptance Review - License Amendment Request (LAR) to Revise TS Table 3.3.2.1-1 Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) ML24094A2462024-04-0303 April 2024 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper Nuclear Station - RAI Emergency LAR Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switch TS 3.3.1.1 ML24081A0372024-03-21021 March 2024 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper Nuclear Station - Acceptance Review of LAR to Modify Allowable Value for HPCI Low Flow ML24032A2382024-02-0101 February 2024 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper Nuclear Station - LAR Dfo Tank Inspection RAI Issuance ML24010A1172024-01-10010 January 2024 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper Nuclear Station - LAR Dfo Tank Inspection RAI Issuance ML23352A2472023-12-18018 December 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper Nuclear Station - Relief Request RC3-02 Drywell Head Inspection RAI Issuance ML23339A0892023-12-0505 December 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper Nuclear Station - Acceptance Review of CLIIP LAR to Adopt TSTF-374 ML23318A5252023-11-0909 November 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper Nuclear Station - Relief Request RC3-02 Audit Agenda and Questions ML23257A2192023-09-14014 September 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper - Final RAI LAR to Adopt TSTF-551, Revision 3 ML23207A1742023-07-26026 July 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper Nuclear Station - Acceptance Review of Relief Request RC3-02 Drywell Head Bolting ISI ML23153A1062023-06-0202 June 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper Nuclear Station - Acceptance Review of License Amendment Request to Adopt Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-551 ML23150A2492023-05-26026 May 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper Nuclear Station - Acceptance Review of License Amendment Request to Adopt Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-580 ML22335A2802022-11-0404 November 2022 11-4-2022 Email Transmitting Draft Questions Pertaining to Pilgrim ISFSI Exemption Request ML22270A0422022-09-26026 September 2022 Acknowledgement Email for Holtec'S Request for Reporting Exemption with Regards to the Pilgrim ISFSI Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report (Docket No. 05000293) ML22192A0502022-07-0808 July 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper Nuclear Station - Acceptance Review of License Amendment Request to Adopt Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-554 ML22154A1622022-05-26026 May 2022 Letter and Email from Save Our Bay/Diane Turco Regarding Irradiated Water Release from Pilgrim ML22228A2572022-05-12012 May 2022 11 CNS-2022-06 Public Documents ML22055B1512022-02-22022 February 2022 CNS EP Exercise Inspection May 2022 RFI ML22010A2632022-01-10010 January 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper - Final RAI Relief Request RR5-01 Revision 1 ML22007A2602021-12-0606 December 2021 E-mail from P. O'Brien, Holtec, to A. Snyder, NRC, on Pilgrim Effluent Discharge ML21321A3742021-11-10010 November 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper - Final RAI Alternative Request RI5-02 Revision 3 ML21287A6192021-10-14014 October 2021 E-mail from S. Phillips, MEMA, to A. Snyder, NRC, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Commonwealth of Massachusetts Consultation Response to Amendment Review for Emergency Preparedness ML21266A2772021-09-23023 September 2021 HDI Clarification of Exemption Requested from 10 CFR 20, Appendix G, Section Iii.E ML21267A0012021-09-23023 September 2021 E-mail from A. Snyder, NRC, to A. Sterdis, Holtec, - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 20, Appendix G, Section Iii.E Acceptance Review ML21266A2512021-09-23023 September 2021 Consultation with Commonwealth of Massachusetts Regarding Proposed Amendment Application for Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Levels ML21258A2632021-09-15015 September 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper - Final RAI Alternative Request RS-01 ML21257A3832021-09-15015 September 2021 E-mail from A. Snyder, NRC, to A. Sterdis, Holtec, - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Follow-on Request Re Request for Additional Information 2 Pilgrim - License Amendment Request Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Only Emergency Pl ML21253A0312021-09-0909 September 2021 Email 9-9-2021 - Request for Information - In-Office Inspection of Recent Cooper E-Plan Changes ML21232A2102021-08-20020 August 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper Nuclear Station - Acceptance Review of License Amendment Request Exception to Primary Containment Leakage Rate Program Requirement ML21211A5912021-07-22022 July 2021 Consultation Response from Commonwealth of Massachusetts Regarding Proposed Pilgrim ISFSI Only Technical Specifications ML21211A5162021-07-22022 July 2021 Consultation Response from Commonwealth of Massachusetts Regarding Proposed Pilgrim ISFSI Only Physical Security Plan ML21203A3072021-07-21021 July 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper Nuclear Station - Acceptance Review of Relief Request RI5-02 Revision 3 ML21202A1372021-07-20020 July 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper Nuclear Station - Acceptance Review of Relief Request RR5-01 Revision 1 ML21200A2352021-07-13013 July 2021 Consultation Request to Commonwealth of Massachusetts Regarding Proposed Pilgrim ISFSI Only Technical Specifications ML21200A1522021-07-13013 July 2021 Consultation Request to Commonwealth of Massachusetts Regarding Proposed Pilgrim Isfi Only Physical Security Plan ML21176A1842021-06-25025 June 2021 Email from HDI Regarding Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Training ML21180A0582021-06-17017 June 2021 Email from Region I Regarding Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Inspection - EA-13-132 ML21165A0062021-06-11011 June 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper Nuclear Station - Acceptance Review of License Amendment Request to Adopt Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-582 ML21109A2222021-04-15015 April 2021 Email with RFI Document for CNS PIR 2021012 ML21097A0402021-04-0606 April 2021 E-Mail Consult with Commonwealth of Mass Re - Amendment Application - Physical Security Plan for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML21089A1682021-03-30030 March 2021 Email 3-30-2021-RFI for CNS EP Exercise Inspection (Week of 5-24-2021) L-20-096, Supplemental Information to Support Physical Security Plan Revision and License Amendment Request to Incorporate Alternate Measures - Holtec Email Dated December 10, 20102020-12-10010 December 2020 Supplemental Information to Support Physical Security Plan Revision and License Amendment Request to Incorporate Alternate Measures - Holtec Email Dated December 10, 2010 L-20-092, Email Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station-Exemption from Annual Force-On-Force Exercise Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B,2020-12-10010 December 2020 Email Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station-Exemption from Annual Force-On-Force Exercise Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B, ML20328A2982020-11-16016 November 2020 Response from Commonwealth of Massachusetts on No Significant Hazard for Pilgrim ISFSI Amendment to Address ISFSI II Dated November 16, 2020 ML20315A3922020-11-10010 November 2020 Email 11-10-2020 - Cooper EP Prog Insp RFI ML20297A2372020-10-22022 October 2020 Request for Additional Information - HDI Fleet Decommissioning Quality Assurance Program ML20266G4032020-09-22022 September 2020 Acceptance Review Email - Request for Approval of HDI Fleet Decommissioning Quality Assurance Program, Revision 0 ML20260H4812020-09-0909 September 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper Nuclear Station - Acceptance Review of Request to Use a Provision of a Later Edition of the ASME B&PV Code Section XI, Relief Request RR5-04 (L-2020-LLR-0123) ML20203M3692020-07-21021 July 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Cooper - Final RAI License Amendment Request for Approval of EAL Scheme Change (EPID L-LLA-2020-0028) ML20175A5692020-06-22022 June 2020 (6-22-20 FEMA Hq Email) Cooper EP Biennial Exercise Exemption Request 2024-06-04
[Table view] Category:Licensee Event Report (LER)
MONTHYEARNLS2024044, Secondary Containment Differential Pressure Perturbation Exceeds Technical Specifications2024-06-0606 June 2024 Secondary Containment Differential Pressure Perturbation Exceeds Technical Specifications NLS2024038, High Pressure Coolant Injection Pressure Switch Installation Causes Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function and a Condition Prohibited B Technical.2024-05-13013 May 2024 High Pressure Coolant Injection Pressure Switch Installation Causes Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function and a Condition Prohibited B Technical. NLS2024035, Main Turbine Stop Valve Position Switches Do Not Meet Channel Independence Criteria Results in Two Channels Being Declared Inoperable and a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications2024-05-0909 May 2024 Main Turbine Stop Valve Position Switches Do Not Meet Channel Independence Criteria Results in Two Channels Being Declared Inoperable and a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications NLS2024029, High Pressure Coolant Injection Steam Leak Causes Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function and a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications2024-04-22022 April 2024 High Pressure Coolant Injection Steam Leak Causes Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function and a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications NLS2024013, Inoperable Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switch Causes Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications2024-03-0404 March 2024 Inoperable Turbine Stop Valve Limit Switch Causes Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications NLS2024014, Technical Specifications Prohibited Condition for Inoperable Service Water Booster Pump2024-03-0404 March 2024 Technical Specifications Prohibited Condition for Inoperable Service Water Booster Pump ML18179A1632018-06-21021 June 2018 Retraction of Licensee Event Report 2018-002-00, Diesel Generator a Inoperability, a Condition Prohibited by the Plant Technical Specifications 05000293/LER-2017-0132018-01-25025 January 2018 1 OF 4, LER 17-013-00 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Regarding Reportable Conditions Involving Standby Gas Treatment System and Secondary Containment lnoperability Not Reported During the Previous Three Years 05000293/LER-2017-0122017-11-13013 November 2017 Start-Up Transformer Degraded Voltage Relay Found Outside Technical Specification Limit, LER 17-012-00 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Regarding Start-Up Transformer Degraded Voltage Relay Found Outside Technical Specification Limit 05000298/LER-2016-0012017-09-27027 September 2017 De-Energized High Pressure Coolant Injection Auxiliary Lube Oil Pump Caused by Relay Failure Results in Loss of Safety Function and a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications, LER 16-001-01 for Cooper Nuclear Station Regarding De-Energized High Pressure Coolant Injection Auxiliary Lube Oil Pump Caused by Relay Failure Results in Loss of Safety Function, a Condition Prohibited by Tech Specs, and a 10 CFR Part 21 Report 05000298/LER-2017-0042017-08-17017 August 2017 Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker Failure to Indicate Full Closed Causes Loss of Safety Function, LER 17-004-00 for Cooper Nuclear Station Regarding Torus to Drywall Vacuum Breaker Failure to Indicate Full Closed Causes Loss of Safety Function 05000298/LER-2017-0052017-08-17017 August 2017 Traversing In-core Probe In-shield Limit Switch Mounting Failure Results in Common Cause Inoperability of Independent Trains or Channels and Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications, LER 17-005-00 for Cooper Nuclear Station Regarding Traversing In-core Probe In-shield Limit Switch Mounting Failure Results in Common Cause lnoperability of Independent Trains or Channels and Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications 05000293/LER-2017-0112017-08-15015 August 2017 Simultaneously Opened Reactor Building Airlock Doors Caused Loss of Secondary Containment, LER 17-011-00 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Regarding Simultaneously Opened Reactor Building Airlock Doors Caused Loss of Secondary Containment 05000293/LER-2017-0102017-08-0707 August 2017 Air Accumulation Creates Small Void in Core Spray Discharge Piping, LER 17-010-00 for Pilgrim re Air Accumulation Creates Small Void in Core Spray Discharge Piping 05000298/LER-2017-0032017-07-24024 July 2017 Mispositioned Control Room Emergency Filter System Supply Fan Damper Causes Loss of Safety Function, LER 17-003-00 for Cooper Nuclear Station re Mispositioned Control Room Emergency Filter System Supply Fan Damper Causes Loss of Safety Function 05000293/LER-2017-0012017-07-17017 July 2017 Reactor Building Isolation Dampers Failed to Isolate, LER 17-001-01 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Regarding Reactor Building Isolation Dampers Failed to Isolate 05000293/LER-2017-0092017-07-17017 July 2017 Supplement to Potential Primary Containment System Inoperability Due to Relay Concerns, LER 17-009-00 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Regarding Potential Primary Containment System lnoperability Due to Relay Concerns 05000293/LER-2017-0082017-06-30030 June 2017 Supplement to 480V Bus B6 Auto Transfer Function Degraded Due to Time Delay Relay Failure, LER 17-008-00 for Pilgrim re 480V Bus B6 Auto Transfer Function Degraded Due to Time Delay Relay Failure 05000293/LER-2017-0072017-06-22022 June 2017 Supplement to Potential Inoperability of Safety Relief Valve 3A, LER 17-007-00 for Pilgrim Regarding Potential Inoperability of Safety Relief Valve 3A 05000293/LER-2016-0102017-06-14014 June 2017 MSIV Inoperability Led to a Condition Prohibited by the Plant s Technical Specifications, LER 16-010-01 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station re MSIV Inoperability 05000293/LER-2017-0062017-06-13013 June 2017 Source Range Monitor Inoperable During Fuel Movement, LER 17-006-00 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Regarding Source Range Monitor Inoperable During Fuel Movement 05000293/LER-2017-0052017-06-0707 June 2017 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, Leak Rate Criteria Exceeded, LER 17-005-00 for Pilgrim Regarding 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, Leak Rate Criteria Exceeded 05000293/LER-2017-0042017-06-0202 June 2017 Secondary Containment Testing Led to Loss of Safety Function to Both Trains of Standby Gas Treatment System, LER 17-004-00 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Regarding Secondary Containment Testing Led to Loss of Safety Function to Both Trains of Standby Gas Treatment System 05000293/LER-2017-0032017-05-25025 May 2017 Supplement to Suppression Pool Declared Inoperable Due to High Water Level, LER 17-003-00 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Regarding Pressure Suppression Pool Declared Inoperable Due to High Water Level 05000293/LER-2017-0022017-05-25025 May 2017 Isolation of HPCI, LER 17-002-00 for Pilgrim Regarding Isolation of HPCI 05000298/LER-2017-0022017-04-27027 April 2017 Valve Test Failures Result in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and a Loss of Safety Function, LER 17-002-00 for Cooper Nuclear Station Regarding Valve Test Failures Result in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and a Loss of Safety Function 05000298/LER-2017-0012017-04-0505 April 2017 Residual Heat Removal Minimum Flow Valves OUt of Position Results in Loss of Safety Function and Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications, LER 17-001-00 for Cooper Regarding Residual Heat Removal Minimum Flow Valves Out of Position Results in Loss of Safety Function and Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications 05000298/LER-2016-0082017-01-0505 January 2017 Purchase and Installation of Incorrect Actuator Results in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications, LER 16-008-00 for Cooper Nuclear Station Regarding Purchase and Installation of Incorrect Actuator Results in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications 05000298/LER-2016-0062016-12-19019 December 2016 High Vibration on Control Room Emergency Filter System Fan Results in Inoperability and Loss of Safety Function, LER-16-006-00 for Cooper Nuclear Station Regarding High Vibration on Control Room Emergency Filter System Fan Results in Inoperability and Loss of Safety Function 05000298/LER-2016-0072016-12-19019 December 2016 Isolation of Shutdown Cooling due to Relay Maintenance Results in a Loss of Safety Function, LER 16-007-00 for Cooper Nuclear Station Regarding Isolation of Shutdown Cooling due to Relay Maintenance Results in a Loss of Safety Function 05000293/LER-2016-0082016-12-0909 December 2016 Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' Past Inoperability, LER 16-008-00 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Regarding Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' Past Inoperability 05000298/LER-2016-0042016-11-22022 November 2016 Closure of Multiple Main Steam Isolation Valves due to High Flow Signal, LER 16-004-00 for Cooper Nuclear Station Regarding Closure of Multiple Main Steam Isolation Valves due to High Flow Signal 05000298/LER-2016-0032016-11-0909 November 2016 Scaffold Construction Places Plant in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications, LER 16-003-00 for Cooper Nuclear Station RE: Scaffold Construction Places Plant in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications 05000293/LER-2016-0072016-11-0404 November 2016 Manual Reactor Scram Due To Feedwater Regulating Valve Malfunction, LER 16-007-00 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Regarding Manual Reactor Scram Due To Feedwater Regulating Valve Malfunction 05000293/LER-2016-0032016-07-11011 July 2016 Spent Fuel Storage Design Feature Exceeded, LER 16-003-00 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Regarding Spent Fuel Storage Design Feature Exceeded 05000293/LER-2016-0042016-07-11011 July 2016 Salt Service Water Pump B Past Operability - Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications, LER 16-004-00 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Regarding Salt Service Water Pump B Past Operability - Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications 05000298/LER-2016-0022016-06-27027 June 2016 De-Energized High Pressure Coolant Injection Auxiliary Lube Oil Pump Caused By Light Bulb Failure Results in Loss of Safety Function, LER 16-002-00 for Cooper Regarding De-Energized High Pressure Coolant Injection Auxiliary Lube Oil Pump Caused By Light Bulb Failure Results in Loss of Safety Function 05000293/LER-2016-0022016-06-20020 June 2016 Online Maintenance Test Configuration Prohibited By Technical Specifications, LER 16-002-00 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Regarding Online Maintenance Test Configuration Prohibited By Technical Specifications 05000293/LER-2016-0012016-06-0909 June 2016 Both Emergency Diesel Generators Inoperable, LER 16-001-00 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Regarding Both Emergency Diesel Generators Inoperable NLS2015063, Retraction of Licensee Event Report 2014-005-00, Lube Oil Leak Results in a Potential Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and a Potential Loss of Safety Function.2015-06-0909 June 2015 Retraction of Licensee Event Report 2014-005-00, Lube Oil Leak Results in a Potential Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and a Potential Loss of Safety Function. ML13149A1722013-05-26026 May 2013 E-mail from Micheal Mulligan to R.Guzman, Pilgrim Evacuation Plan Broken During Blizzard Nemo and Unenforced by the Nrc. NLS2013015, Special Report, Offgas Treatment System Charcoal Adsorbers Out of Service2013-01-29029 January 2013 Special Report, Offgas Treatment System Charcoal Adsorbers Out of Service NLS2008058, LER 08-S01-00 for Cooper Regarding Temporary Suspension of Security Measures Due to Tornado Warning2008-08-0505 August 2008 LER 08-S01-00 for Cooper Regarding Temporary Suspension of Security Measures Due to Tornado Warning ML0613706222006-05-11011 May 2006 LER 06-01-000, Pilgrim Re Manual Scram Due to High Offgas Recombiner Temperature Resulting from Inadequate Preventive Recombiner Preheater Pressure Control Valve Controller ML0416706152004-06-0808 June 2004 LER 99-008-01 for Pilgrim Regarding Automatic Scram at 100 Percent Power Due to Turbine Trip ML0207700612002-02-27027 February 2002 LER 99-003-01 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Re Local Leak Rate Test Results Exceeding Allowable Technical Specification Leakage Rates 2024-06-06
[Table view] |
Text
From: Mike Mulligan [steamshovel2002@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, May 26, 2013 1:53 PM To: Guzman, Richard
Subject:
Pilgrim: Evacuation Plan Broken During Blizzard Nemo And Unenforced By The NRC Power Reactor Event Number: 49062 Facility: COOPER Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4 NRC Notified By: NATHAN L. BEGER HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL Notification Date: 05/23/2013 Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 05/23/2013
Event Time: 10:19 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/23/2013 Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode 1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation Event Text TEMPORARY LOSS OF METEOROLOGIC AL MONITORING SYSTEM DURING PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"At 1019 CDT, AC power was removed from the site meteorological monitoring system (MET) equipment for planned maint enance in order to remove abandoned equipment left in place since installing the new meteorological system in October 2012. Removing AC power was not expected to have an effect since all MET information would continue to be available due to an 8-hour battery backup system
installed at the meteorologic al tower. However, when power was removed, all onsite meteorological data was lost to the control room via t he Plant Management Information System (PMIS). PMIS is the onl y display of local direct meteorological conditions available. Subs equently, [Cooper Nuclear Station] CNS determined the interface between MET system and PMIS was not powered from the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> MET battery backup system which accounted for t he lost MET indication. CNS corrected the condition and restored meteorological data to the control room via the PMIS system at 1219 CDT.
"Site backup assessment capability relies on Meteorological model estimates from the National Weather Service out of Valley, Nebraska or on default values derived from historical local weather patterns. Since there was no direct information of site meteorological conditions dur ing the period of lost power , CNS considered this to be a major loss of assessment capability and reportable under 10CF R50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
Mr Guzman, So here is an official concern to the NRC by me. I not crazy!
With LER 2013-003-00 Entergy admits the t he plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data. Whatever that means? Was the spinning cups out in the weather frozen and iced over during blizzard Nemo or did the instruments fail because of the power failure? Was it ju st a data recording issue or did the site lose wind speed and direction indication in the control room or at the te ch support center?
Cover-Up: Public Notification And Radi ation Evac Plan Broke During Accident http://steamshovel2002.blogspot.com/2013
/05/loss-of-off-site-power-events-due-to.html I am calling it, they lost wind speed and direction indication in the control room and the evacuation plan was severely impaired.
2013-003-00: "During the storm on February 8, meteorological instruments at PNPS recorded sustained wind speeds between 42 and 49 mph through 2338 hours0.0271 days <br />0.649 hours <br />0.00387 weeks <br />8.89609e-4 months <br /> at which time the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data until 1840 hours0.0213 days <br />0.511 hours <br />0.00304 weeks <br />7.0012e-4 months <br /> the following day. The wind direction was predominantly from the ocean toward the switchyard during the storm So why didn't Pilgrim during the Nemo Blizzard make an event report like the Cooper station? Cooper: "At 1019 CDT, AC power was remov ed from the site meteorological monitoring system (MET) equipment for pl anned maintenance in order to remove abandoned equipment left in place since installing the new meteorological system in October 2012 Why was there no "major loss of a ssessment capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)" like the Cooper station?
Cooper: Since there was no direct informati on of site meteorol ogical conditions during the period of lost power, CNS c onsidered this to be a major loss of assessment capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)." And it raises questions if this should have been reported in the emergency classification system such as a Unusual Event.
It raises issue if the Met instrumentation has failed in other power failures, blizzards and weather conditions and not reported as required?
It is beyond utter incompetence and neglig ence with public reporting on plant events with Entergy and the NRC on this atrocious incomplete statement: "the plant information (PI) system stopped recording weather data". Entergy should have been forced to add a few sentences in the LER like , we still had wind speed and direction indication in the control room or th is is how the site would have carried out the evacuation if we had become blind to knowing wind speed and direction.
Why didn't Entergy carry fully out their licens ing reporting responsibilities during Blizzard Nemo and why is the NRC negligent with enforcing their rules?
I see the meteorological instrum entation issue wasn't carried at all in your most recent inspection report. And the diesel smoke in the reactor building wasn't covered in the LER. This is so shoddy document ation reporting by both of you.
Would you add this to the docket?
Sincerely, Mike Mulligan Hinsdale, NH