ML15110A048

2015 Perry Nuclear Station Initial License Exam Administered Scenarios

ML15110A048
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	04/03/2015
From:	Walton R K NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB
To:	FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
References
Download: ML15110A048 (89)

Text

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Perry Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Op-Test No.: 2015-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) (ATC) (BOP) Initial Conditions

The Unit is operating at rated power. CRDH 'B' Pump tagged out for the work schedule, NCCW 'C' Pump tagged out for packing repair. Motor Feed Pump is OOS due to water in the lube oil. SLC 'A' pump was tagged out last shift for an oil leak. Control rod 46

-55 is inserted due to slow to settle.

Control Room Humidification boiler (M29) is tagged out for repairs

. HPCS ESW is running for the monthly PTI.

PSA risk is GREEN. Grid is NORMAL Turnover: Shift TBCC Pumps from

'A' to 'C' for an oil change on

'A' pump. An NLO has been briefed and is on station.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 N (BOP) Shifts TBCC pumps A C 2 pt01_1c11n 0012a I(SRO) 1C11N012A fails high

- SDV High Half Scram 1C11-N601A trip unit pegged high TS 3.3.1.1 Cue - ARI-H13-P680-5-A7 & A9 3 bs02_1b21-n0668b & bs02_1b21 n0668f R(ATC) C(BOP) C(SRO) Inadvertent SRV Opening lower Rx power to 96%

O NI-B21-1 & ONI-C51 T.S. 3.4.4, 3.6.1.6, & 3.3.6.4 Cue - ARI-H13-P601-19-A7 & B 7 4 pt01_1p41 n0033 C(ATC) MTLO TCV controller fails down causing oil temp to increase Cue - ARI-H13-P680-15-A3 5 MS11 C(BOP) SSE Pressure Control valve failure ONI-N62, ONI-C51 Cue - ARI-H13-P870-7-C1 6 mv05_

1g33f004 C(ATC) Inadvertent 2 SRV Openings

- Actions to close will be ineffective ATC to scram ONI-B21-1, EOP-2 Cue - ARI-H13-P601-19A-A7 & B7 7 M(ALL) Scram on rising Suppression Pool temperature EOP-1 8 cb03_ 1n514mcs I(ATC) RPS fails

- -1A SLC B pump suction valve loses power preventing SLC B from starting 9 cb01_1b33s105a & cb01_1b33s105 b C(BOP) RHR C fails to auto start on T&P NOP-OP-1002, NOBP

-OP-1002 10 M(ALL) Emergency Depressurize on HCL , EOP-4-2. (Contingency Event)

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor FENOC Facsimile

Narrative Summary

- Initial Scenario 1 100%

Event 1. . 2. A Scram discharge volume instrument fails high causing a half scram. The SRO will enter T.S.

3.3.1.1. The half scram can't be reset.

3. One Low-Low Set SRV opens, the ATC . The crew enters ONI

-B21-1 & ONI-C51. The SRV will close when the BOP takes the Div. 2 switch to off. The SRO enters T.S. 3.4.4, 3.6.1.6, & 3.3.6.4. If the suppression pool temperature exceeds 95°F the crew will enter EOP-02. The crew may start a loop of RHR in suppression pool cooling.

4. The MTLO temperature controller fails down causing oil temperature to go up. The ATC will either place the controller in manual or bypass the TCV to restore oil temperature.

5. The steam seal header pressure control valve fails closed. Using the ARI and SOI the BOP will bypass the PCV and restore pressure. The crew may enter ONI

-N62 and reduce Rx power to stabilize vacuum. If vacuum degrades to 6" HGA the crew will scram the Rx. Event 6 will be initiated prior to the crew scramming the Rx.

6. Two SRVs will open, immediate actions will not be effective in closing the SRVs.

7. The crew will scram the Rx prior to 110 degrees in the suppression pool, EOP

-02 will be entered. 8. On the Scram, RPS fails to insert control rods, ARI inserts some rods. SLC B suction valve fails with SLC A OOS, rendering SLC A & B unavailable. EOP-01 is entered and transitioned to EOP

-01A ATWS. The ATC will manually insert control rods.

9. RHR C will fail to start on T&P, the BOP will be required to start it.

10. Suppression Pool temperature may challenge HCL, If challenged, ED will be required

, EOP-04-2 will be entered. When Rx pressure is below MSCP the crew will inject to control Rx level.

If pressure is controlled to stay below HCL, ED will not be required and Critical Tasks 6, 7, & 8 will not be evaluated.

EOPs: EOP-2, EOP-1, EOP-01A, EOP-04-2 Critical tasks:

1. Initiate actions to close an inadvertent open SRV Deleted 2. Place the mode switch in shutdown prior to 110 degrees in the suppression pool

3. Initiate actions to insert control rods on an ATWS

4. During an ATWS inhibit ADS

5. During an ATWS T&P ECCS and Feedwater

6. During an ATWS when ED is required T&P ECCS and Feedwater (Contingency)

7. ED when suppression pool temperature cannot be maintained <HCL (Contingency)

8. When Rx pressure is <MSCP inject to control Rx level (Contingency)

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 1 of 25 Cue: Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Driver Driver Simulator Setup:

Reset Simulator to IC 29 Load Schedule File: NRC-2015-S1.sch Change Init.dat file to Exam Init.dat file Restart ICS Driver Driver Verify Initial Conditions:

Reactor Power 100%. BOL Pull Sheets Book OTLC

-3058 2014-06 Seq. A1, Rods @ Step 61, verify all previous steps are signed off as complete IOI-3 Step 4.6 is complete. Verify all completed steps are signed off.

N21-F220 manual control adjusted so that N21

-R710 (N21-F230) is reading 75

-85% open Verify TBCC C in standby Verify HPCS ESW running CRDH B is OOS

- put on a yellow switch cap NCC C is OOS

- put on a yellow switch cap Motor Feed Pump is OOS

- put on yellow switch cap s SLC A is OOS

- place sw in INOP, put on a yellow switch cap and update the status board Driver Driver Initial Conditions

The Unit is operating at rated power. CRDH 'B' Pump tagged out for the work schedule, NCCW 'C' Pump tagged out for packing repair.

Motor Feed Pump is OOS due to water in the lube oil. SLC

'A' pump was tagged out last shift for an oil leak. Control rod 46

-55 is inserted due to slow to settle.

Control Room Humidification boiler (M29) is tagged out for repairs

. HPCS ESW is running for the monthly PTI.

PSA risk is GREEN. Grid is NORMAL Turnover: Shift TBCC Pumps from

'A' to 'C' for an oil change on

'A' pump. An NLO has been briefed and is on station.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 2 of 25 Event

Description:

1 - Shift Turbine Building Closed Cooling (TBCC)

Pumps from A to C for an oil change on the A pump Cue: Direction from Turnover Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SOI-P44 Section 7.2 Driver Role play as NLO and RP as directed BOP Perform SOI

-P44 Section 7.2 to shift TBCC pumps 7.2.1 Start TBCC pump C 7.2.2 Stop TBCC pump A Driver If NLO dispatched to observe the pump shift, report oil level is good and the pump is ready to start.

BOP Report to SRO that pump shift is complete

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100% Page 3 of 25 Event

Description:

2 - 1C11N0012A fails high

- Cue: Alarm H13-P680-5-A7 & A9 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ARI-H13-P680-5-A7 & A9 Tech Specs Driver Just prior to initiating Event 2, post pictures of trip units 1C11

-N601A-D on back panels. Driver When directed initiate Event 2. Role play as needed ATC Announce 1/2 Scram due to SDV volume high level BOP Walkdown back panel to determine SDV levels on instruments 1C11

-N601A-D Evaluator NOTE: When BOP looks at instrument 1C11

-N601A on the back panels, the trip unit will be pegged high with the TRIP and GROSS FAIL lights on. Trip units 1C11-N601B, C, & D are indicating

'0' with no lights on.

SRO Direct subsequent actions for ARI

-H13-P680-5-A 7 4.2.14.2.4 Verify SDV vents and drains open ATC Verify SDV vents and drains open and report to SRO (H13-P680-6C) ATC or BOP Request assistance from I&C for the failed trip unit Driver When requested, role play as I&C technician to troubleshoot the failed trip unit SRO Refer to the PDB and Tech Specs T.S. 3.3.1.1 function 8.a Action A

- place channel in trip in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 4 of 25 Event

Description:

3 - Cue: Alarm H13-P601-19-A7 & B7 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ARI-H13-P601-19-A7 & B7 ONI-B21-1 ONI-C51 Tech Specs Driver Just prior to initiating Event 3, post pictures of trip units 1B21-N668B & F on back panels. Driver When directed initiate Event 3. Role play as Reactor Engineering to support ONI

-C51, and as an NLO when directed

ONI-B21-1 Immediate Actions 3.1 Prior to Suppression Pool temperature reaching 110 degrees or RPV pressure reaching 1065 psig Scram the Reactor (not expected to be performed) 3.3 Evacuate the Containment 3.4 Reduce Rx power using flow 3.5 When Rx power is then perform the following 3.5.1 Verify Reactor Pressure is less than 1033 psig.

3.5.2 Attempt to close the open SRV by taking both switches to off BOP Make announcement for SRV open and to Evacuate Containment ATC Reduce Rx power using flow ATC Initiate a manual scram and place the mode switch in shutdown prior to Suppression Pool temperature reaching 110 degrees (Critical Task #1) Evaluator Power reduction should be done immediately and without waiting for direction BOP When Rx power is attempt to close the open SRV by taking both switches to off Evaluator The SRV will close when the division 2 switch is taken to off.

ATC Inform SRO that the SRV that was open was 1B21

-F051D - low-low set valve SRO Enter ONI-B21-1 and ONI-C51 and make announcement. BOP Walkdown back panel to determine SRV trip unit status Evaluator NOTE: When BOP walks down the back panel for SRV trip unit status, 1B21

-

N668B and F trip lights will be 'on'.

SRO Direct ONI

-C51 steps C51-4 Monitor Nuclear instruments for oscillations C51-5 Perform ONI

-SPI-G-4 Power verification C51-15 Confirm Jet Pump operation within established limits

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 5 of 25 Event

Description:

3 - Cue: Alarm H13-P601-19-A7 & B7 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC Monitor nuclear instrumentation for oscillations and Scram the Rx if any occur SRO Direct Reactor Engineering or BOP to perform ONI

-SPI-G4 Power Verification SRO Direct Supplemental Actions of ONI

-B21-1 4.3 Confirm Main Generator output has returned to normal 4.4 Place RHR in Suppression Pool (SP) Cooling per hardcard 4.5 Evaluate entry into EOP

-02 Primary Containment Control 4.6 Monitor SP temp with SVI

-D23-T1213 4.7 Determine if an EAL has been exceeded (Directed to Shift Manager)

ATC When directed verify Mn Generator output has returned to normal after SRV closes SRO Refer to tech specs 3.4.4 SRVs

- PLCO for SRV 1B21

-F051D 3.6.1.6 LLS SRV

- Action A for 1 inop LLS SRV

- restore in 14 days 3.3.6.4 SRV instruments

- Action A for one trip system inop

- restore in 7 days SRO Enter EOP-02 when suppression pool temp is >95°F Evaluator EOP-02 may not be entered if the suppression pool temperature remains below 95°F SRO Direct EOP-02 actions Suppression Pool Temperature Control leg Control temp <95°F using RHR When SP can't be maintained <95°F Maximize SP Cooling Before SP temp reaches 110°F enter EOP

-01 Before HCL limits are exceeded Initiate SPMU When HCL cannot be restored and maintained below HCL by pressure control then ED BOP When directed start RHR in suppression pool cooling per the hardcard

1. IF ESW PUMP is available and is not running, THEN TAKE ESW PUMP control switch to START.

1P45 C001 2. IF ECC PUMP is available and is not running, THEN TAKE ECC PUMP control switch to START.

1P42 C001 3. TAKE LPCI INJECTION VALVE to CLOSED.

1E12 F042 Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 6 of 25 Event

Description:

3 - Cue: Alarm H13-P601-19-A7 & B7 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

4. If an RHR LOCA signal is present, THEN PERFORM the following:

a) VERIFY RHR PUMP is running.

1E12 C002 b) TAKE RHR TEST VALVE TO SUPR POOL control switch to OPEN.

Time Opened: A

- B - 1E12 F024 c) When RHR LOCA signal has been in for at least 10 min., Then VERIFY RHR HX'S BYPASS VALVE is CLOSED 1E12 F048 d) THROTTLE RHR HX'S OUTLET VALVE to obtain system flow 7100 7300 gpm. 1E12 F003 1E12 R603 5. If no RHR LOCA signal is present, THEN PERFORM the following:

a) VERIFY RHR PUMP is running.

1E12 C002 b) VERIFY RHR HX'S BYPASS VALVE is CLOSED.

1E12 F048 c) VERIFY RHR HX'S OUTLET VALVE is Fully OPEN.

1E12 F0 03 d) THROTTLE RHR HX'S OUTLET VALVE, 1E12 F003, by holding its control switch in CLOSE for 18 to 20 seconds.

1E12 F003 e) TAKE RHR TEST VALVE TO SUPR POOL control switch to OPEN. Time Opened: A

- B - 1E12 F024 f) THROTTLE RHR HX'S OUTLET VALVE to obtain system flow 7100 7300 gpm. 1E12 F003 1E12 R603 Evaluator Suppression pool cooling may not be started if the suppression pool temperature remains below 95°F

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100% Page 7 of 25 Event

Description:

4 - Main Turbine Lube Oil (MTLO) TCV controller fails down, causing oil temperature to increase Cue: Alarms H13-P680-15-A3 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ARI-H13-P680-15-A3 Driver When directed initiate Event 4. Role Play as an NLO when needed.

ATC Announce Main Turbine Oil Temp High alarm ATC Troubleshoot the MTLO controller 1N34

-R032 and determine it has failed closed.

Evaluator MTLO temp indication on the controller will be going down as the controller fails down. Actual oil temperature will be going up. The ATC may take manual control of the temperature controller.

ATC Notify the SRO of the actions to control temperature, either manual control of the controller or throttling open the TCV bypass.

Evaluator Manual control of the MTLO temp controller will restore lube oil temperature if manual control not yet taken.

Driver If directed to look at the MTLO cooler TCV, inform the control room that it is closed , if manual control not yet taken.

SRO Assign limits and an owner to control lube oil temperature SRO Direct subsequent actions of ARI

-H13-P680-15-A3 4.1 Verify proper operation of Service Water 4.3 Verify proper operation of the MTLO temp controller 1P41

-R032 4.4 Adjust MTLO temp to 110

-120°F 4.5 Verify closed TBCC HX SW TCV BYP 1P41F390 (H13-P870-2C) 4.6 If required throttle open MTLO TCV bypass 1P41F350 to maintain 110

-

120°F on 1N34

-R135 BOP When directed observe the Service Water system for proper operation.

Evaluator BOP should observe SW header pressure in the range of 55

-60 psig. BOP When directed Verify closed TBCC HX SW TCV BYP 1P41

-F390 ATC If directed throttle open MTLO TCV bypass 1P41F350 to maintain 110

-120°F on 1N34-R135 Report MTLO temperature returned to the normal band

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 8 of 25 Event

Description:

5 - Steam Seal Pressure Control Valve Failure Cue: Alarms H13-P870-7-C1 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ARI-H13-P870-7-C1 SOI-N33 ONI-N62 ONI-C51 Driver When directed initiate Event 5 Role play as an NLO when needed Driver Be ready to initiate Event 6 if directed BOP Announce the alarm SRO Direct supplemental actions of ARI

-H13-P870-7-C1 4.2.1 Verify steam supply valve lineup 1N33

-F010, F020, and F040 Open 4.2.2 If Steam Seal header control valve has failed then manually control steam seal header pressure per SOI

-N33 4.2.3 If necessary manually control Steam Seal Evaporator Main Steam Supply per SOI-N33 4.2.4 Refer to SOI

-N33 Adjustment of System Parameters Evaluator The crew may enter ONI-N62 and ONI

-C51 if vacuum degrades and reduce Rx power to stabilize vacuum.

Driver If asked to start Aux Boiler, tell them it will take 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> BOP Take manual control of Steam Seal header pressure per SOI

-N33 Section 7.6, announce control to SRO 7.6.1 Throttle closed the St Seal Evap to Hdr Supply Vlv 1N33

-F065 to obtain 2

-4 psig on Steam Seal Evaporator Hdr Press 1N33

-R083 7.6.2 Throttle open the St Seal Evap to Hdr Supply Bypass 1N33

-F075 to obtain 4

-6 psig on Steam Seal Evaporator Hdr Press 1N33

-R083 7.6.3 Repeat steps 7.6.1 and 7.6.2 until the St Seal Evap to Hdr Supply Vlv 1N33

-F065 is closed 7.6.4 Throttle the St Seal Evap to Hdr Supply Bypass 1N33F075 to maintain steam seal header pressure at 3

-5 psig Evaluator The 1N33-F075 valve must be held in OPEN for about a minute before steam seal header pressure responds.

Evaluator The crew will scram the reactor if vacuum degrades to 6" HGA per the Margins and

Limits hardcard Evaluator If the crew decides to scram the reactor due to vacuum concerns Initiate Event 6 Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 9 of 25 Event

Description:

6 - Inadvertent SRV Openings (BOP actions will be ineffective ATC to scram)

Cue: Alarms H13

-P601-19-A7 & B 7 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ARI-H13-P601-19-A7 & B7 ONI

-B21-1 ONI-C51 EOP-2 Tech Specs Driver When directed initiate Event 6. Role play as Reactor Engineering to support ONI

-C51, and as an NLO when directed ONI-B21-1 Immediate Actions 3.1 Prior to Suppression Pool temperature reaching 110 degrees or RPV pressure reaching 1065 psig Scram the Reactor 3.3 Evacuate the Containment 3.4 Reduce Rx power using flow 3.5 When Rx power is then perform the following 3.5.1 Verify Reactor Pressure is less than 1033 psig.

3.5.2 Attempt to close the open SRV by taking both switches to off BOP Make announcement for ONI entry and to Evacuate Containment ATC Verifies Rx power . Evaluator Power reduction was complete in Event 3 BOP When Rx power is attempt to close the open SRV by taking both switches to off SRO Direct EOP

-02 actions Suppression Pool Temperature Control leg Control temp <95°F using RHR When SP can't be maintained <95°F Maximize SP Cooling Before SP temp reaches 110°F enter EOP

-01 Before HCL limits are exceeded Initiate SPMU When HCL cannot be restored and maintained below HCL by pressure control then ED SRO When SRVs remain open, order ATC to Scram the Rx when SP temp is 95°F (Margins and Limits hardcard)

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 10 of 25 Event

Description:

6 - Inadvertent SRV Openings (BOP actions will be ineffective ATC to scram)

Cue: Alarms H13

-P601-19-A7 & B 7 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP When directed

, start RHR in suppression pool cooling per the hardcard ATC Initiate a manual scram and place the mode switch in shutdown prior to Suppression Pool temperature reaching 110 degrees (Critical Task #1) Evaluator The ATC may SCRAM the Rx without direction based on Suppression Pool Temp rate of rise.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 11 of 25 Event

Description:

7 - Scram on rising Suppression Pool temperature

- EOP-1 Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EOP-0 1 RPV Control Evaluator EOP-01 must be entered and the Reactor Shutdown prior to Suppression Pool temperature reaching 110 degrees EOP

-02 step STC

-04 and ONI-B21-1 step 3.1 ATC Initiate a manual scram and place the mode switch in shutdown prior to Suppression Pool temperature reaching 110 degrees (Critical Task #1) SRO Enter EOP-01 Evaluator All control rods do not go in after the scram, ARI inserts some rods, SLC 'B' suction valve fails to open ATC Perform Scram Hard Card Actions (OAI

-1703 att. 10)

1. Initiate ARI

2. Transfer RR pumps to slow speed

3. If Rx power is >4% Start SLC A and B and Inhibit ADS (Will be performed by BOP) 4. Make crew announcement

5. When generator load is <90 MWe trip the main turbine Verify Main Stop valves, Control Valves, and CIVs shut Gen breakers S610 and S611 open Gen field breaker open 6. Insert SRMs and IRMs

7. Verify HST level control N21

-S19 in off

8. Stabilize Rx water level using Feedwater hard card

9. Stabilize Rx pressure using Pressure Control hard card ATC EOP-01 step RC

-1 Verify mode switch locked in Shutdown ATC Report all rods not inserted, failure of Rx to scram, Rx Power >4%

SRO Transition from EOP

-01 to EOP-01A upon report that all rods did not insert on the Rx Scram Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 12 of 25 Event

Description:

8 - RPS fails

- ARI inserts some rods

- EOP-1A SLC B pump suction valve loses power. Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EOP-01A Level Power Control SRO Transition from EOP

-01 to EOP-01A upon report that all rods did not insert on the Rx Scram SRO Direct EOP

-01A actions Reactor Power Control leg Trip the Recirc pumps is APRMs are not downscale Insert Control Rods SPI 1.1

-1.7 Initiate SLC and inhibit ADS Initiate Alternate Boron Injection SPI 1.8 Reactor Level Control leg Stabilize Rx water level Verify Isolations and Actuations Inhibit ADS Maintain MSIVs open and bypass ECCS interlocks SPI 2.3 Terminate and Prevent (T&P) ECCS Injection Terminate and Prevent Feedwater Injection When APRMs are downscale give a level band

-25 to no more than 100" Start Hydrogen Igniters and Analyzers When ED is required Terminate and Prevent Feedwater and ECCS When RPV pressure is <MSCP (140 psig) inject to restore Rx level to

-25 to no more than 100" Reactor Pressure Control Leg Stabilize Reactor Pressure Evaluator SLC A is OOS and SLC B suction valve fails to open

- SLC B will not start BOP Start SLC B and announce the failure to start Inhibit ADS (Critical Task #3) Verify RWCU has isolated.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 13 of 25 Event

Description:

8 - RPS fails

- ARI inserts some rods

- EOP-1A SLC B pump suction valve loses power. Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Verify Isolations and Actuations hardcards BOP Maintain MSIVs open and bypass ECCS interlocks EOP-SPI-2.3 ATC Insert control rods using EOP-SPI-1.3 (Critical Task #2) EOP-SPI 1.3 1.0 Instrument Air is isolated to Containment THEN OPEN INST AIR CNTMT ISOL. P52-F200 2.0 VERIFY CRD HYDRAULICS FLOW CONTROL is in MANUAL. C11

-R600 3.0 ADJUST CRD HYDRAULICS FLOW CONTROL output to 100. C11

-R600 4.0 CLOSE CRD DRIVE PRESS CONTROL VALVE. C11

-F003 5.0 WHEN any CRD Pump is running, THEN PERFORM the following to Insert all control rods to position 00 concurrently with the remainder of this procedure follows:

5.1 DEPRESS AND HOLD the IN TIMER SKIP pushbutton.

5.2 SELECT Control Rods not fully inserted.

BOP When directed

, Terminate and Prevent ECCS injection

- hardcard (Critical Task #

4) Evaluator RHR C pump will fail to start on T & P, operator action will be required to start the pump BOP Upon discovery that RHR C pump failed to start, start the RHR pump and inform the SRO Evaluator NOP-OP-1002 4.10.3 step 5 states "If automatic actions fail to occur when required, it is the responsibility of the operator to take manual actions to perform the system or component function. Pump or component auto start failures are examples where operators are expected to take manual action." ATC Terminate Feedwater Injection hardcard (Critical Task #

4) BOP Start Hydrogen Igniters and Analyzers hardcard ATC Report to SRO when APRMs are downscale and report Rx level ATC Maintain directed Rx Level Band SRO Recognize when Suppression Pool Temperature can't be restored and maintained below HCL and go to EOP 2 Emergency Depressurization

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 14 of 25 Event

Description:

8 - RPS fails

- ARI inserts some rods

- EOP-1A SLC B pump suction valve loses power. Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Evaluator ED will not be required if RPV pressure is controlled to maintain suppression pool temperature less than HCL Critical Tasks #5, 6, & 7 will not be evaluated)

SRO Direct T&P of ECCS and Feedwater for ED (Critical Task #

5 [Contingency]

) ATC T&P Feedwater hardcard (Critical Task #

5 [Contingency]

) BOP T&P ECCS hardcard (Critical Task #

5 [Contingency]

) BOP Once T&P of ECCS and Feedwater has been completed

- Open all ADS valves or 8 SRVs (Critical Task#

6[Contingency]

) SRO When RPV pressure is <MSCP (140 psig) inject to restore Rx level to

-25 to no more than 100" (Critical Task #7 [Contingency]

) ATC/BOP When directed commence injection to restore Rx level to

-25 to no more than 100" (Critical Task #

7 [Contingency]

)

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 15 of 25 Event

Description:

9 - RHR C fails to auto start Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOP-OP-1002 NOBP

-OP-1002 Driver Role play as an NLO when needed Evaluator RHR C will fail to start on a Rx Level

-1 signal BOP Recognize that RHR C failed to start on a Rx Level

-1 signal and inform the SRO BOP Start RHR C Evaluator NOP-OP-1002 4.10.3 step 5 states "If automatic actions fail to occur when required, it is the responsibility of the operator to take manual actions to perform the system or component function. Pump or component auto start failures are examples where operators are expected to take manual action."

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 16 of 25 Event

Description:

10 - Emergency Depressurize on HCL, EOP-4-2 Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EOP-0 4-2 Emergency Depressurization Evaluator ED will not be required if RPV pressure is controlled to maintain suppression pool temperature less than HCL Critical Tasks #5, 6, & 7 will not be evaluated)

SRO Recognize when Suppression Pool Temperature can't be restored and maintained below HCL and go to EOP 2 SRO Direct T&P of ECCS and Feedwater and Emergency Depressurization (Critical Task #5 [Contingency]

) ATC T&P Feedwater hardcard (Critical Task #

5 [Contingency]

) BOP T&P ECCS hardcard (Critical Task

1. 5 [Contingency]

) BOP Once T&P of ECCS and Feedwater has been completed

- Open all ADS valves or 8 SRVs (Critical Task#

6 [Contingency]

)

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.: 1 - 100% Page 17 of 25 Event

Description:

Termination Criteria Cue: Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

1. Reactor depressurized to less than or equal to 140 psig

2. Injects to maintain level between

-25" and +100"

3. Control Rods are being inserted

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 18 of 25 Event

Description:

Critical Task #

1 - - Prior to exceeding 110

° F in the Suppression Pool, crew places MODE SWITCH in SHUTDOWN Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Prior to exceeding 110

° in the Suppression Pool, crew places REACTOR MODE SWITCH in SHUTDOWN.

1. Safety Significance:

Prevent a violation of the facility license condition (T.S. 3.6.2.1).

2. Cues: Procedural compliance.

Suppression Pool temperature trend.

3. Measured by:

With rising Suppression Pool Temperatures, the REACTOR MODE SWITCH is placed in SHUTDOWN prior to exceeding 110

°F in the Suppression Pool.

4. Feedback: Reactor Power trend.

Control Rod indication.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 19 of 25 Event

Description:

Critical Task #2 - With reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, initiate action to reduce power by inserting control rods.

Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior With reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, initiate action to reduce power by inserting control rods.

1. Safety Significance:

Shutting down reactor can preclude failure of Containment or equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant.

2. Cues: Procedural compliance.

3. Measured by:

Control rod insertion commenced in accordance with Section 1.0 of EOP-SPI's. 4. Feedback: Reactor Power trend.

Control Rod indication.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 20 of 25 Event

Description:

Critical Task #

3 - With reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, to prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization and subsequent power excursion, inhibit ADS.

Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior With reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, to prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization and subsequent power excursion, inhibit ADS.

1. Safety Significance:

Precludes core damage due to an uncontrolled reactivity addition.

2. Cues: Procedural compliance.

3. Measured by:

ADS logic inhibited prior to an automatic initiation unless all required injection systems are Terminated and Prevented.

4. Feedback: RPV pressure trend.

RPV level trend.

ADS "ADS OUT OF SERVICE" annunciator status.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 21 of 25 Event

Description:

Critical Task #

4 - During an ATWS, when conditions are met to deliberately lower RPV level; Terminate and Prevent injection into the RPV from ECCS and Feedwater until conditions are met to reestablish injection.

Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior During an ATWS, when conditions are met to deliberately lower RPV level; Terminate and Prevent injection into the RPV from ECCS and Feedwater until conditions are met to reestablish injection.

1. Safety Significance:

Precludes loss of primary containment integrity and uncontrolled release of radioactivity into the environment. 2. Cues: Procedural compliance

. 3. Measured by:

Observation

- With Emergency Depressurization not required and the deliberate lowering level override met (>4% power, and > 110

°F Suppression Pool temperature, and >16.5" RPV level, and > 1.68# Drywell pressure or SRV open) injection systems are terminated and prevented until <4% power, or 16.5" RPV level, or SRV's closed with

<1.68# Drywell pressure.

4. Feedback: Injection system flow rates into RPV.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 22 of 25 Event

Description:

Critical Task #

5 - During an ATWS, when conditions with Emergency Depressurization required, Terminate and Prevent RPV injection from ECCS and Feedwater until reactor pressure is below the MSCP as directed by US.

Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior During an ATWS, when conditions with Emergency Depressurization required, Terminate and Prevent RPV injection from ECCS and Feedwater until reactor pressure is below the MSCP as directed by US.

1. Safety Significance:

Prevention of fuel damage due to uncontrolled feeding.

2. Cues: Procedural compliance. 3. Measured by:

Observation

- No ECCS injection prior to being less than the MSCP.

AND Observation

- Feedwater terminated and prevented until less than the MSCP. 4. Feedback: Reactor power trend, power spikes, reactor short period alarms.

Injection system flow rates into RPV.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 23 of 25 Event

Description:

Critical Task #

6 - When RPV pressure and Suppression Pool temperature cannot be maintained below HCL the US determines that Emergency Depressurization is required, RO initiates Emergency Depressurization as directed by US Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior When RPV pressure and Suppression Pool temperature cannot be maintained below HCL the US determines that Emergency Depressurization is required, RO initiates Emergency Depressurization as directed by US

1. Safety Significance:

Precludes failure of containment.

2. Cues: Procedural compliance.

3. Measured by:

Observation

- US determines (indicated by announcement or observable transition to EOP 2) that Emergency Depressurization is required before exceeding the HCL. AND Observation

- RO opens at least 5 SRV's during performance of Emergency Depressurization actions.

4. Feedback: RPV pressure trend.

Suppression Pool temperature trend.

SRV open status indications.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 24 of 25 Event

Description:

Critical Task #

7 - With RPV pressure <MSCP, slowly increase and control injection into RPV to restore and maintain RPV level above MSCRWL (-25") as directed by US.

Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior With RPV pressure <MSCP, slowly increase and control injection into RPV to restore and maintain RPV level above MSCRWL (-25") as directed by US.

1. Safety Significance:

Maintaining adequate core cooling and preclude possibility of large power excursions.

2. Cues: Procedural compliance.

RPV pressure indication.

3. Measured by:

Observation

- Injection not commenced until less than MSCP, and injection controlled such that power spikes are minimized, level restored and maintained greater than or equal to

-25". 4. Feedback: RPV level trend.

RPV pressure trend.

Injection system flow rate into RPV.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

1 - 100% Page 25 of 25 Procedures to erase/clean Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ARI-H13-P680-5-A7 ARI-H13-P680-15-A3 ARI-H13-P6 0 1-1 9-A7 & B7 ARIH13-P870-7-C1 ONI-B21-1 ONI-C51 ONI-SPI-G4 ONI-N62 SOI-P44 7.2 SOI-N33 7.6 EOP-SPI-1.1 - 1.7 EOP-SPI-2.3 PDB-I-1 to 5 C11 SV I-D23-T1213 TS 3.3.1.1 TS 3.4.4 TS 3.6.1.6 TS 3.3.6.4 Hardcards SRO oversight checklist E Plan charts

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Perry Scenario No.:

2 - 90% Op-Test No.: 2015-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) (ATC) (BOP) Initial Conditions

Reactor power is at 90%.Control rods are at Step 61. Control rod 46

-55 is inserted due to slow to settle. Control Room humidification boiler (M29) is tagged out for repairs. PSA risk is GREEN. Grid is NORMAL Turnover: Shift FHB Supply Fans from A to B for RSE troubleshooting flow indication, Dave Mackovjac and a n NLO are standing by on station. Lower Rx Power to 85%, per the Reactivity Plan, for steam leak investigation in the NW MSR room. IOI

-3 Att. 3 Step 1.4 is in progress.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 N (BOP) Shift FHB Supply fans A B 2 R (ATC) Lower power with Control Rods & Flow 3 NM04D C(AT C) C(SRO) APRM "D" fails Down

- Bypass APRM T.S. 3.3.1.1, T.S. 3.3.1.3, ORM 6.2.1, & ORM 6.2.5 Cue - ARI-H13-P680-6-D4 4 PC1 8 & mv01_m17f0025 C (BOP) C (SRO) M17-F0 2 0 Containment Vacuum Breaker Opens - requires closing M17-F0 2 5 and declaring the vacuum breaker INOP TS 3.6.1.11 Cue - ARI-H13-P800-2-A3 5 cb01_1b33s105a & cb01_1b33s105 b C(ATC) Manual scram on no RR pumps running Cue - H13-P680-3-A9 6 RD15 M(ALL) C(BOP) ATWS - EOP-1 EOP-1A G33-F001 and F004 fail to auto close on SLC initiation 7 RD16 C(BOP) Scram discharge volume leak requires containment spray 8 mv06_1e12 f0537a C(BOP) Containment Spray valve 1E12

-F537A fails closed, go to Containment Spray B * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor FENOC Facsimile

Narrative Summary

- Initial Scenario 2 9 0% Event 1. . 2. The ATC will lower Rx Power to 85% using Control Rods and Rx Recirc Flow

. 3. APRM D fails downscale. The ATC will bypass APRM D and reset the 1/2 Scram. The SRO will initiate PLCOs for T.S. 3.3.1.1 & ORM 6.2.1. The SRO evaluates T.S. 3.3.1.3 & ORM 6.2.5

. 4. M17-F020 Containment Vacuum Breaker opens.

DP indications are normal. The BOP will close 1M17-F025 per the ARI. The SRO enter T.S. 3.6.1.11 action A.1 close the MOV within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

5. Both Rx Recirc Pumps Trip. The ATC will scram the Rx per ONI

-C51 immediate actions. All control rods do not go in. The SRO will enter EOP

--01A ATWS. 6. The SRO will transition to EOP

-01A ATWS. The BOP will start SLC pumps. G33

-F001 and G33

-F004 fail to close on the SLC pump start. The BOP will close them. The BOP will inhibit ADS. The ATC will insert control rods. ECCS & Feedwater will be terminated until APRMs are downscale. Rx level will then be controlled using Feedwater, RCIC will be injecting at Rx level 2, it can be tripped.

7. A Scram Discharge volume leak will cause containment pressure to increase requiring EOP

-02 entry. The crew will initiate Containment Spray prior to PSP. The crew will terminate containment spray prior to containment pressure reaching 0 psig.

8. Containment Spray valve 1E12

-F537A fails to open rendering containment spray A INOP. The BOP will initiate containment spray B. (Pushbutton must be depressed for 35 seconds)

EOPs: EOP-1, EOP-01A, EOP-2 Critical tasks:

1. During an ATWS inhibit ADS

2. Initiate actions to insert control rods on an ATWS

3. During an ATWS T&P ECCS and Feedwater

4. When containment pressure is >CSIL spray containment

5. Before containment pressure drops to 0 psig terminate containment spray

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

2 - 90% Page 1 of 20 Event

Description:

N/A

- Driver Instructions Cue: Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Driver Driver Simulator Setup:

Reset Simulator to IC 2 7 Load Schedule File: NRC-2015-S2.sch Change Init.dat file to Exam Init.dat file Restart ICS Driver Driver Verify Initial Conditions:

Reactor Power 90%. BOL Pull Sheets Book OTLC-3058 2014-06 Seq A 1, Rods @ Step 61, verify all previous steps are signed off as complete IOI-3 Step 4.6 is complete. Att. 3 Step 1.4 in progress. Verify all completed steps are signed off.

Provide a copy of IOI

-3 Att 3 with steps signed off to the crew N21-F220 manual control set at 0%

APRM/OPRM D & H alarms reset Driver Driver Initial Conditions:

Reactor power is at 90%.Control rods are at Step 61. Control rod 46

-55 is inserted due to slow to settle. Control Room humidification boiler (M29) is tagged out for repairs. PSA risk is GREEN. Grid is NORMAL Turnover: Shift FHB Supply Fans from A to B for RSE troubleshooting flow indication, Dave Mackovjac and a n NLO are standing by on station. Lower Rx Power to 85%, per the Reactivity Plan, for steam leak investigation in the NW MSR room. IOI

-3 Att. 3 Step 1.4 is in progress.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

2 - 90% Page 2 of 20 Event

Description:

1 - Shift FHB supply fans for troubleshooting flow indication Cue: Direction from Turnover Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SOI-M40 Section 7.2 Driver Role play as an RP technician to monitor the FHB while swapping fans. Role play as Dave Mackovjac to troubleshoot fan flow indication.

BOP SOI M40 Section 7

.2 7.2.1 Direct RP to monitor the area prior to shifting fans 7.2.2 Take the offgoing FHB HVAC supply fan to Stop 7.2.3 Take the oncoming FHB HVAC supply fan to On Driver When directed as RP to monitor the FHB in preparation for a FHB supply fan swap, tell the operator you are ready for the fan swap, proceed when ready.

Driver After the FHB supply fans are swapped, report as Dave Mackovjac that the FHB

supply fan flow indication is in its normal band and he can leave the fan running.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

2 - 9 0% Page 3 of 20 Event

Description:

2 - Lower Reactor Power to 85% using IOI-3 Cue: Direction from Turnover Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior IOI-3 Att. 3 Reactivity Plan Driver Role play as RP, Chemistry, and Unit Dispatch / ACC for the power change SRO Direct the ATC to lower Rx Power to 85% in accordance with the Reactivity Plan with Control Rods and Flow. Provide Oversight. ATC Notify RP, Chemistry, and Unit Dispatch / ACC of the intended power change.

ATC Lower Rx power in accordance with the Reactivity Plan to 85% using Control Rods and then Reactor Recirc flow. Keep A and B loop flows matched.

ATC Keep the Main Turbine load set 120 MWe above turbine load to a max of 1450 MWe ATC Maintain Reactor Feedwater Pump Turbine deviations nulled.

ATC Maintain N21

-F230 between 75%

-85% open by adjustment of N21

-F220 manual control ATC Monitor Main turbine control valve positions for proper response to the power change ATC Monitor Average Power Range Monitors for proper response to the power change ATC Notify the SRO when the power change is complete. Notify RP, Chemistry, and Unit Dispatch / ACC

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

2 - 90% Page 4 of 20 Event

Description:

3 APRM D fails downscale Cue: Alarm H13-P680-6-D4 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ARI H13-P680-6-D4 SOI-C51 (APRM) Tech Specs Driver When directed initiate Event 3 Role play as I&C to troubleshoot APRM D ATC Makes announcement that APRM D has failed downscale BOP Observe APRM D on the back panel for indication of the cause of the failure I&C Tech If called to Control Room , inform the BOP operator that APRM D is as he sees it

. SRO ARI-H13-P680-0006-D4 4.1 If an APRM has failed then bypass it SRO Direct ATC to Bypass APRM D per SOI

-C51 (APRM) ATC Bypass APRM D per SOI

-C5 1 (APRM) 7.4 7.4.3 Bypass APRM D with the joystick 7.4.5 Confirm that the bypass half of the downscale/bypass status light is on 7.4.6 Confirm that the APRM bypass status light is on at the APRM on the back panel SRO Declare APRM D inop, and refer to tech specs T.S. 3.3.1.1 RPS instruments

- PLCO for D APRM inop T.S. 3.3.1.3 OPRM - D should not be declared inop ORM 6.2.1 Rod block instruments

- PLCO for D APRM inop ORM 6.2.5 Recirc flow rod block

- APRM D downscale will not inop recirc flow

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

2 - 90% Page 5 of 20 Event Description

4 - M17-F020 containment vacuum breaker opens Cue: Alarm H13-P800-2-A3 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ARI H13-P800-2-A3 Tech Specs Driver Prior to initiating Event 4, post M17 trip unit pictures near US' s desk. Driver When directed initiate Event 4 Role play as I&C and an NLO as needed BOP Make announcement that M17

-F020 containment vacuum breaker is open BOP Check Containment DP to determine if the vacuum breaker is open on a valid signal of approximately 0.1 psid

. Indicators are 1M17

-N037, N0 47, N018 and N0 27 on 1H13-P868 and P 869 (these indicators are not simulated)

Evaluator NOTE: The trip units are indicating a slightly positive pressure with no trip lights illuminated Evaluator /Driver If candidate asks for TS Rounds, reply "No change in trend".

SRO Direct the BOP operator to close 1M17

-F025 per ARI

-H13-P800-0002-A3 BOP Close 1M17-F025 Driver If an NLO is directed to look at the vacuum breaker in containment, tell him it looks like it is open slightly SRO Refer to Tech Specs 3.6.1.11 Action A.1 One or Two vacuum breakers not closed

- Close the MOV within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Then initiate a PLCO for the inop vacuum breaker.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

2 - 9 0% Page 6 of 20 Event

Description:

5 Both Reactor Recirc pumps trip Cue: Alarms H13-P680-3-A9 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ONI-C51 EOP-1 Tech Specs NOP-OP-1002 Driver When directed initiate Event 5 Role play as Reactor Engineering to support ONI

-C51, and as an NLO when directed ONI-C51 Immediate Acti ons If any of the following conditions exist In Mode 1 or 2 and no Recirculation Pumps in operation Then Scram the Reactor ATC Recognize that no Rx Recirc pumps are running and Scram the Reactor, Place the mode switch in shutdown Evaluator The action to scram the reactor should be immediate, ATC should not wait for direction Evaluator All control rods do not go in after the scram, G33-F001 & F004 fail to close on SLC initiation ATC Report all rods not inserted, failure of Rx to scram, Rx power >4%

SRO Enter EOP-01 ATC Per EOP-1 verify mode switch locked in shutdown ATC Perform Scram Hard Card Actions (OAI

-1703 att. 10)

1. Initiate ARI

2. Transfer RR pumps to slow speed (They will be off)

3. If Rx power is >4% Start SLC A and B and Inhibit ADS (Will be performed by BOP) 4. Make crew announcement

5. When generator load is <90 MWe trip the main turbine Verify Main Stop valves, Control Valves, and CIVs shut Gen breakers S610 and S611 open Gen field breaker open

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

2 - 9 0% Page 7 of 20 Event

Description:

5 Both Reactor Recirc pumps trip Cue: Alarms H13-P680-3-A9 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

6. Insert SRMs and IRMs

7. Verify HST level control N21

-S19 in off

8. Stabilize Rx water level using Feedwater hard card

9. Stabilize Rx pressure using Pressure Control hard card BOP Start SLC A & B Inhibit ADS (Critical Task #1)

Verify RWCU has isolated.

BOP Recognize that 1G33

-F001 and F004 did not close on SLC initiation, notify the SRO and close 1G33

-F001 and F004.

Evaluator NOP-OP-1002 4.10.3 step 5 states "If automatic actions fail to occur when required, it is the responsibility of the operator to take manual actions to perform the system or component function. Pump or component auto start failures are examples where operators are expected to take manual action."

SRO Transition from EOP

-01 to EOP-01A upon report that all rods did not insert on the Rx Scram Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

2 - 9 0% Page 8 of 20 Event

Description:

6 - ATWS EOP- EOP-01A Cue: Containment pressure increase Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EOP-01A Level Power Control SRO Transition from EOP

-01 to EOP-01A upon report that all rods did not insert on the Rx Scram SRO Direct EOP

-01A actions Reactor Power Control leg Trip the Recirc pumps i f APRMs are not downscale (They will be off

) Insert Control Rods EOP-SPI 1.1-1.7 Initiate SLC and inhibit ADS Initiate Alternate Boron Injection EOP-SPI 1.8 Reactor Level Control leg Stabilize Rx water level Verify Isolations and Actuations Inhibit ADS Maintain MSIVs open and override ECCS interlocks E OP-SPI 2.3 Terminate and Prevent (T&P) ECCS Injection Terminate and Prevent Feedwater Injection When APRMs are downscale give a level band

-25 to no more than 100" Start Hydrogen Igniters and Analyzers When ED is required Terminate and Prevent Feedwater and ECCS When RPV pressure is <MSCP (140 psig) inject to restore Rx level to

-25 to no more than 100" Reactor Pressure Control Leg Stabilize Reactor Pressure BOP Verify Isolations and Actuations hardcards BOP Maintain MSIVs open and override ECCS interlocks EOP-SPI 2.3 Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

2 - 9 0% Page 9 of 20 Event

Description:

6 - ATWS EOP- EOP-01A Cue: Containment pressure increase Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC Insert control rods using EOP-SPI 1.1-1.7 (Critical Task #2)

EOP-SPI 1.3 1.0 Instrument Air is isolated to Containment THEN OPEN INST AIR CNTMT ISOL. P52-F200 2.0 VERIFY CRD HYDRAULICS FLOW CONTROL is in MANUAL. C11

-R600 3.0 ADJUST CRD HYDRAULICS FLOW CONTROL output to 100. C11

-R600 4.0 CLOSE CRD DRIVE PRESS CONTROL VALVE. C11

-F003 5.0 WHEN any CRD Pump is running, THEN PERFORM the following to Insert all control rods to position 00 concurrently with the remainder of this procedure follows:

5.1 DEPRESS AND HOLD the IN TIMER SKIP pushbutton.

5.2 SELECT Control Rods not fully inserted.

BOP When directed Terminate and Prevent ECCS Injection

- hardcard (Critical Task

1. 3) ECCS TERMINATE AND PREVENT HARDCARD 1 PERFORM the following actions for ECCS systems that are in Standby or Operating conditions.

2. TERMINATE AND PREVENT HPCS as follows:

(@ P601-16) A. HOLD the HPCS INJECTION VALVE in CLOSED. 1E22

-F004 B. IF HPCS initiation signal is NOT present, THEN ARM AND DEPRESS HPCS MANUAL INITIATION pushbutton to obtain white HPCS SEAL IN RESET light.

C. PERFORM one of the following, 1) VERIFY HPCS INJECTION VALVE is CLOSED. 1E22

-F004 2) TAKE the HPCS PUMP to STOP. 1E22

-C001 4. PERFORM Step 5 and Step 6 in any logical order.

5. TERMINATE AND PREVENT Division 1 as follows:

(@ P601-15 & 17) A. HOLD the following switches in CLOSE:

LPCS INJECTION VLV. 1E21

-F005 LPCI A INJECTION VALVE. 1E12

-F042A Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

2 - 9 0% Page 10 of 20 Event

Description:

6 - ATWS EOP- EOP-01A Cue: Containment pressure increase Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior B. IF LPCS and LPCI A initiation signal is NOT present, THEN ARM AND DEPRESS LPCS & LPCI A MANUAL INITIATION pushbutton to obtain the white LPCS & LPCI A SEAL IN RESET light.

C. PERFORM one of the following, 1) VERIFY LPCS INJECTION VALVE is CLOSED. 1E21

-F005 2) TAKE LPCS PUMP to STOP. 1E21

-C001 D. PERFORM one of the following, 1) VERIFY the following valves are CLOSED:

LPCI A INJECTION VALVE. 1E12

-F042A SHUTDOWN COOLING A TO FDW SHUTOFF valve. 1E12

-F053A RHR A HEAD SPRAY ISOL valve. 1E12

-F023 2) TAKE RHR A PUMP to STOP. 1E12

-C002A 6. TERMINATE AND PREVENT Division 2 as follows:

(@ P601-14) A. HOLD the following switches in CLOSE:

LPCI B INJECTION VALVE. 1E12

-F042B LPCI C INJECTION VALVE. 1E12

-F042C B. IF LPCI B and LPCI C initiation signal is NOT present, THEN ARM AND DEPRESS LPCI B & C MANUAL INITIATION pushbutton to obtain the white LPCI B & C SEAL IN RESET light.

C. PERFORM one of the following, 1) VERIFY RHR C INJECTION VALVE is CLOSED. 1E12

-F042C 2) TAKE RHR C PUMP to STOP. 1E12

-C002C D. PERFORM one of the following, 1) VERIFY the following valves are CLOSED:

LPCI B INJECTION VALVE. 1E12

-F04 2B SHUTDOWN COOLING B TO FDW SHUTOFF valve. 1E12

-F053B 2) TAKE the RHR B PUMP to STOP. 1E12

-C002B Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

2 - 9 0% Page 11 of 20 Event

Description:

6 - ATWS EOP- EOP-01A Cue: Containment pressure increase Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC Terminate Feedwater Injection hardcard (Critical Task #3)

FEEDWATER TERMINATE AND PREVENT HARDCARD

(@ P680-3 & DFWLC Screens

) VERIFY the following (preferred for Level Control):

RFPT A is Tripped. 1N27

-S24 RFPT B is Tripped. 1N27

-S28 MFP FCV MANUAL/AUTO station in MANUAL with the output set to 0%. C34-R601C MFP FULL FLOW CONTROL VALVE is CLOSED. 1N27

-F010 MFP LOW FLOW CONTROL VALVE is CLOSED. 1N27

-F110 RFP A DISCH VALVE is CLOSED. 1N27

-F100A RFP B DISCH VALVE is CLOSED. 1N27

-F100B FDW PUMPS BYPASS VALVE is CLOSED. 1N27

-F200 BOP Start Hydrogen Igniters and Analyzers hardcard ATC Report to SRO when APRMs are downscale and report Rx level ATC Maintain directed Rx Level Band BOP Per Pressure control hard card Trip RCIC if not needed for RPV level control

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

2 - 90% Page 12 of 20 Event

Description:

7 - Scram discharge volume leak requiring Containment Spray Cue: Containment and Drywell (DW) pressure increase Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EOP-02 Driver Event 7 is automatically initiated from the Mode Switch ATC/BOP Report a rise in containment and DW pressure (value and trend)

SRO Enter EOP-02 Containment Control SRO Direct EOP

-02 actions Containment Pressure control leg Monitor and control containment pressure below 0.5 psig using normal means (Containment Ventilation and B/U purge

) Before containment pressure reaches PSP Spray Containment SRO Direct BOP operator to spray containment using EOP-SPI-3.1 (Critical Task #4)

Evaluator Containment Spray valve 1E12

-F0537A fails to open rendering Containment Spray A unavailable BOP Initiate Containment Spray per EOP-SPI-3.1 (Critical Task #4) 2.1 Bypass the hi DW pressure 1.68 psig signal if required 2.2 Confirm Containment pressure is above CSIL 2.3 Arm and depress Containment Spray A manual initiation pushbutton 2.4 Verify RHR A running 2.5 Verify ESW A running 2.6 Verify ECC A running 2.7 Ver ify the following valves open Cntmt spray A first shutoff E12

-F028A Cntmt spray A second shutoff E12

-F537A 2.8 Verify the following valves are closed LPCI A injection E12-F042A RHR A test valve to supr pool E12

-F024A SDC A to FDW shutoff E12

-F053A RHR Hx BPV E12

-F048A Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.: 2 - 90% Page 13 of 20 Event

Description:

8 - Containment Spray valve 1E12F0537A fails closed, must use Containment Spray B Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Recognize that E12

-F0537A did not open, and attempt to open the valve.

BOP Inform the SRO that Containment Spray A is not available BOP Initiate Containment Spray using B per EOP-SPI-3.1 (Critical Task #4) 3.1 Bypass B High DW pressure 1.68 psig signal if required 3.2 Confirm Containment pressure is above CSIL 3.3 Arm and depress Containment Spray B manual initiation pushbutton for at least 35 seconds 3.4 Verify RHR B running 3.5 Verify ESW B running 3.6 Verify ECC B running 3.7 Verify the following valves open Cntmt spray B first shutoff E12

-F028B Cntmt spray B second shutoff E12

-F537B 3.7.1 Verify the following valves are closed

LPCI B injection E12-F042B RHR B test valve to supr pool E12

-F024B SDC B to FDW shutoff E12

-F053B RHR Hx BPV E12

-F048B BOP Terminate Containment Spray prior to containment pressure reaching 0 psig per EOP-SPI-3.1 Critical Task #5 1.2.1 TAKE LPCI B INJECTION VALVE control switch to CLOSE.

E12-F042B 1.2.2 VERIFY CNTMT SPRAY B MANUAL INITIATION pushbutton collar in DISARM. E12A-S63B 1.2.3 DEPRESS CNTMT SPRAY B SEAL IN RESET pushbutton to reset the Containment Spray initiation logic. E12A-S64B 1.2.4 CLOSE CNTMT SPRAY B SECOND SHUTOFF. E12-F537B 1.2.5 IF Combustible Gas Mixing System B is NOT running, THEN CLOSE CNTMT SPRAY B FIRST SHUTOFF. E12-F028B Appendix D, Rev.

9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

2 - 90% Page 14 of 20 Event

Description:

Scenario Termination Criteria Cue: Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

1. Control Rods are being inserted.

2. Containment pressure maintained between 0 psig and CSIL

3. Injection controlled to maintain level between

-25" and +100".

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

2 - 9 0% Page 15 of 20 Event

Description:

Critical Task #

1 - With reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, to prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization and subsequent power excursion, inhibit ADS.

Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior With reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, to prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization and subsequent power excursion, inhibit ADS.

1. Safety Significance:

Precludes core damage due to an uncontrolled reactivity addition.

2. Cues: Procedural compliance.

3. Measured by:

ADS logic inhibited prior to an automatic initiation unless all required injection systems are Terminated and Prevented.

4. Feedback: RPV pressure trend.

RPV level trend.

ADS "ADS OUT OF SERVICE" annunciator status.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

2 - 9 0% Page 16 of 20 Event

Description:

Critical Task #

2 - With reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, initiate action to reduce power by inserting control rods.

Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior With reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, initiate action to reduce power by inserting control rods and injecting boron

. 1. Safety Significance:

Shutting down reactor can preclude failure of Containment or equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant.

2. Cues: Procedural compliance.

3. Measured by:

Control rod insertion commenced in accordance with Section 1.0 of EOP-SPI's. Boron injection commenced in accordance with EOP

-1A. 4. Feedback: Reactor Power trend.

Control Rod indication.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

2 - 9 0% Page 17 of 20 Event

Description:

Critical Task #

3 - During an ATWS, when conditions are met to deliberately lower RPV level; Terminate and Prevent injection into the RPV from ECCS and Feedwater until conditions are met to reestablish injection.

Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior During an ATWS, when conditions are met to deliberately lower RPV level; Terminate and Prevent injection into the RPV from ECCS and Feedwater until conditions are met to reestablish injection.

1. Safety Significance:

Precludes loss of primary containment integrity and uncontrolled release of radioactivity into the environment.

2. Cues: Procedural compliance

. 3. Measured by:

Observation

- With Emergency Depressurization not required and the deliberate lowering level override met (>4% power, and >100" RPV level) injection systems are terminated and prevented until <4% power, or 50" RPV level

. 4. Feedback: Injection system flow rates into RPV.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

2 - 9 0% Page 18 of 20 Event

Description:

Critical Task #

4 - With Containment pressure exceeding the Containment Spray Initiation Limit (CSIL), and prior to reaching the Pressure Suppression Pressure, initiate Containment Spray. Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior With Containment pressure exceeding the Containment Spray Initiation Limit (CSIL), and prior to reaching the Pressure Suppression Pressure, initiate Containment Spray.

1. Safety Significance:

Precludes degradation of a fission product barrier.

2. Cues: Procedural compliance.

Containment pressure increase

. 3. Measured by:

Observation

- When above the CSIL, Containment Spray is manually initiated prior to reaching the Pressure Suppression Pressure.

4. Feedback: Containment pressure.

"CONTAINMENT SPRAY START SIGNAL RECEIVED" annunciator status.

Containment Spray flowrate.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

2 - 90% Page 19 of 20 Event

Description:

Critical Task #

5 - With Containment pressure decreasing due to Containment Spray operation, before containment pressure drops to 0 psig, terminate Containment Spray.

Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior With Containment pressure decreasing due to Containment Spray operation, before containment pressure drops to 0 psig, terminate Containment Spray.

1. Safety Significance:

Precludes degradation of a fission product barrier

2. Cues: Procedural compliance.

Containment pressure decreasing due to Containment Spray operation.

3. Measured by:

Observation

- Containment Spray terminated before containment pressure drops to - 0.1 psig on validated SPDS (less than 0 psig if SPDS not available).

4. Feedback: Containment pressure.

Containment Spray flowrate.

Containment Spray valve status.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

2 - 90% Page 20 of 20 Procedures to erase/clean Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ARI-H13-P680-6-D4 ARI-H13-P800-2-A3 SOI-M40 7.2 SOI-C51 APRM 7.4 EOP-SPI-1.1 - 1.7 EOP-SPI-2.3 EOP-SPI-2.3 EOP 3.1 IOI-3 Att. 3 TS 3.3.1.1 ORM 6.2.1 TS 3.6.1.11 Hardcards SRO oversight checklist E Plan charts Appendix D, Rev. 9 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Perry Scenario No.:

3 - 68% Op-Test No.: 2015-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) (ATC) (BOP) Initial Conditions

Reactor power is at 68%. Raising power following repair of 6B FW heater. IOI-3 Att. 3 step 2.

4 is in progress. Control Rods are at Step 61. RCIC is OOS due to an oil leak, waiting on the clearance. RFBP 'A' is OOS for motor replacement. Control rod 46

-55 is inserted due to slow to settle. Control Room humidification boiler (M29) is tagged out for repairs. PSA risk is GREEN.

Grid is NORMAL

. Turnover: Shift Condensate Booster Pumps from

'A' to 'C' due to elevated vibrations on the

'A' pump then continue raising Rx Power to 75% per the Reactivity Plan.

Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 N (BOP) Shifts CBP A C 2 R (ATC) Raise power with flow 3 1h13p8003 ad6 C(BOP) Drywell Cooling fan hi vibs fans. Cue - ARI H13-P800-3-D6 4 pt01_1b21n067c & pt01_1b21 n067g C(SRO) Inadvertent HPCS in BOP override HPCS off ONI-E12-1 & ON I-C51 TS 3.5.1 Cue - ARI-H13-P601-16-A5 5 PC02 & PC02 C(SRO) Both Upper Containment airlock doors open at same time TS 3.6.1.2 Cue - ARI-H13-P680-7-C5 6 cb01_1b33s105a & cb01_1b33s105 b M(ALL) C(ATC) NR level spike causes Turbine trip, a loss of all FW RPS and ARI fail in auto, ARI works manually Cue - ARI-H13-P680-3-A8 7 cb01_1n27 c0004 C(ATC) Motor Feed Pump fails use LP ECCS systems to fill vessel 8 multiple C(BOP) Div 1 and 2 ECCS Initiation Signal Fails on Rx Level 1 9 M(ALL) Emergency Depressurize on Rx Low level , EOP-4-2. 10 rv04 x4 C(BOP) Four ADS SRV's fail to open

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor FENOC Facsimile

Narrative Summary

- Initial Scenario 3 68

% Event 1. The BOP shifts Condensate Booster Pumps A. 2. The crew will raise Rx power using Rx recirc flow to 75%.

3. DW Cooling Fan 1M13

-C002A high vibration. The BOP will shift cooling fans 2A 2B. 4. Inadvertent HPCS initiation. ONI

-E12-1 & ONI-C51 will be entered and the HPCS pump overridden off. The SRO will enter T.S. 3.5.1 action B and D. (RCIC is already INOP)

5. Both Containment Upper Airlock doors are opened. The SRO will enter T.S. 3.6.1.2 action B

. 6. Narrow range level spike trips the main turbine & RFPTs. The Rx scrams, RPS and ARI fail in auto. The ATC will manually initiate ARI which will insert all control rods.

7. The Motor Feed Pump trips, HPCS trips (RCIC is already INOP). No High Pressure Injection/Fee d available. RFPT quick restart per ONI

-C34 will not be successful

. EOP-01 will be entered. The BOP will inhibit ADS and lineup ECCS systems for injection. SLC demin water and CRD alternate injection will be started.

8. Division 1 & 2 ECCS initiation signals fail on the Rx level 1 signal.

The BOP will manually initiate Div. 1 & 2 ECCS. 9. ED will be required at Rx low water level of 0".

EOP-04-2 will be entered.

10. Four ADS valves fail to open on ED. The BOP will open additional valves to get eight open. Rx level will be restored >TAF when LPCS injects at <450 psig Rx pressure.

EOPs: EOP-1, EOP-04-2 Critical tasks:

1. Initiate ARI to insert control rods

2. ED at 0" Rx level 3. Restore Rx level >TAF using ECCS

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

3 - 68% Page 1 of 18 Event

Description:

N/A

- Driver Instructions Cue: Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Driver Driver Simulator Setup:

Reset Simulator to IC 2 8 Load Schedule File: NRC-2015-S3.sch Verify schedule file NRC

-2015-S3_1 loads Change Init.dat file to Exam Init.dat file Restart ICS Driver Driver Verify Initial Conditions:

Reactor Power 68%. BOL Pull Sheets Book OTLC-3058 2014-06 Seq A1, Rods @ Step 61, verify all previous steps are signed off as complete

. Remove the reactivity plan and insert the 6B Feedwater Heater specific reactivity plan.

IOI-3 Step 4.6 is complete. Att. 3 step 2.4 in progre ss. Verify all completed steps are signed off.

N21-F220 manual control set at 0%

Verify CBP C in standby RFBP A is OOS

- put on a yellow switch cap RCIC turbine in secured status

. Verify RCIC Inop switch es in INOP. ECCS status board updated Driver Driver Initial Conditions

Reactor power is at 68%. Raising power following repair of 6B FW heater. IOI

-3 Att. 3 step 2.4 is in progress. Control Rods are at Step 61. RCIC is OOS due to an oil leak, waiting on the clearance. RFBP 'A' is OOS for motor replacement. Control rod 46-55 is inserted due to slow to settle. Control Room humidification boiler (M29) is tagged out for repairs. PSA risk is GREEN. Grid is NORMAL

. Turnover:

Shift Condensate Booster Pumps from 'A' to 'C' due to elevated vibrations on the

'A' pump then continue raising Rx Power to 75% per the Reactivity Plan.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

3 - 68% Page 2 of 18 Event

Description:

1 - Shift Condensate Booster Pumps (CBP) from A to C due to elevated vibrations on the A pump Cue: Direction from Turnover Tim e Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SOI-N21 Section 7.3, 4.4, 6.1 Driver Role play as an NLO to support the Condensate Booster Pump shift SRO Directs ATC or BOP to shift Condensate Booster Pumps from A to C BOP or ATC SOI-N21 Section 7.3 7.3.1 Verifies one Condensate Filter is in Manual (This is the normal lineup) 7.3.2 Starts Condensate Booster Pump C per section 4.4 7.3.3 Stops Condensate Booster Pump A per section 6.1 7.3.4 Verify only one RFP Seal Injection Pump is running Driver 7.3.1 If asked

, inform ATC or BOP that the 'A' condensate filter is in manual Evaluator ATC may not ask Turbine Tour rounds to verify one condensate filter in manual since this is the normal lineup for condensate BOP Starts CBP C per SOI

-N21 section 4.4 4.4.3 Verify the oncoming CPB oil pump is running 4.4.4 Verify the oncoming CBP suction and discharge are open 4.4.5 Take the oncoming CBP to start 4.4.6 Confirm discharge pressure increases to ~ 340 psig 4.4.7 Verify the hot surge tank level control remains in band BOP Stop CBP A per SOI

-N21 Section 6.1 6.1.2 Stop the offgoing CBP Evaluator ATC may direct BOP operator to verify only one RFP seal injection pump is running BOP or ATC Inform SRO that Condensate Booster Pumps have been shifted from A to C

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

3 - 68% Page 3 of 18 Event

Description:

2 - Raise Reactor Power to 75% using IOI

-3 Cue: Direction from Turnover Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior IOI-3 Att. 3 Driver Role play as RP, Chemistry, and Unit Dispatch / ACC for the power change SRO Direct the ATC to raise Rx Power to 75% with flow. Provide Oversight.

ATC Notify RP, Chemistry, and Unit Dispatch / ACC of the intended power change.

ATC Raise Rx power to 75% using reactor recirc flow. Keep A and B loop flows matched. ATC Keep the Main Turbine load set 120 MWe above turbine load to a max of 1450 MWe ATC Maintain feed pump turbine deviations nulled

. ATC Maintain N21

-R475 between 75%

-85% by adjustment of N21

-F220 manual control ATC Monitor Main turbine control valve positions for proper response to the power change ATC Monitor Average Power Range Monitors for proper response to the power change ATC Notify the SRO when the power change is complete. Notify RP, Chemistry, and

A CC Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

3 - 68% Page 4 of 18 Event

Description:

3 Drywell Cooling Fan High Vibration 1M13C002A Cue: Alarm H13

-P800-3-D6 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ARI H13-P 80 0-3-D6 SOI-M13 Section 7.2 Driver When directed initiate Event 3. Role play as an NLO to support the fan shift BOP Makes announcement that there is a high vibration on Middle DW Cooling Fan 2A SRO Direct swapping DW cooling fans from 2A to 2B (ARI action)

BOP SOI-M13 Section 7.

2 7.2.1 Start the oncoming fan 7.2.2 Place the offgoing fan in standby 7.2.3 Confirm green status light is on for the standby fan BOP Per ARI H13

-P800-3-D6 Direct an NLO to depress the reset pushbutton on the vibration relay 1M13-N110A Driver When the NLO is directed to reset the vibration alarm wait 5 minutes then modify malfunction 1H13P8003AD6 to ALARM OFF. Notify the BOP operator that the vibration light was on and is now reset.

BOP Report to the SRO that the DW cooling fans have been shifted

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

3 - 68% Page 5 of 18 Event

Description:

4 - Standby Cue: Alarm H13

-P601-16-A5 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ARI H13-P601-16-A5 ONI-E12-1 ONI-C51 Tech Specs Driver Prior to initiating Event 4, place red dots on gross fail lights on B21

-N0667C & G trip units.

Driver When directed initiate Event 4. Role play as an NLO, Rx Engineering and Chemistry to support troubleshooting HPCS start Evaluator The instruments that tripped are 1B21

-N0 667C and N0667G BOP Make announcement that HPCS has started and is injecting BOP Walkdown the HPCS panel and observe and report that the D/G has started and HPCS ESW has started. SRO Announce and enter ONI

-C51 and ONI-E 12-1 ATC Monitor Rx Power increase, FW flow decrease, and Turbine Load increase BOP ONI-E12-1 Immediate Actions Unit Supervisor concurrence is required to override safety system operat ion. An ECCS system shall not be manually overridden unless one of the following is confirmed Initiation is proven incorrect (beyond a reasonable doubt by two independent indications)

Continued operation is no longer necessary Misoperation in automatic is confirmed 3.1 If HPCS initiation is incorrect or misoperation in automatic is confirmed, then take the HPCS pump to stop.

Evaluator The BOP operator must receive concurrence from the SRO prior to stopping the HPCS pump SRO Concur with the override of the HPCS pump to stop Driver Contact the control room as an NLO and report keying your radio in containment in a no radio zone by the HPCS instrument rack SRO Direct Supplemental actions for ONI

-E12-1 4.1 Close the HPCS injection valve 4.6 Refer to IOI

-18 and perform RHR LOCA Isolation (Level 1 / 1.68#) Isolation Restoration (Performance of this step has no effect on the outcome of the scenario)

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

3 - 68% Page 6 of 18 Event

Description:

4 - Standby Cue: Alarm H13

-P601-16-A5 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 4.7 If an injection occurred then perform the following:

Notify the reactor engineer Direct Chemistry to evaluate reactor water and Off

-Gas Pre-treatment samples to ensure parameters have not been exceeded (pH, conductivity, chlorides)

If ICS is available then direct the shift engineer to archive data to aid in evaluating the event 4.8 Refer to tech specs 4.9 Restore the Condensate Storage Tank to normal level 4.10 Restore the Suppression Pool to normal level Driver When chemistry is called tell them you will obtain a Reactor Water Sample and an Off-gas Pretreatment Sample BOP When directed, Close the HPCS injection valve 1E22

-F004 BOP When directed perform RHR LOCA Isolation (Level 1 / 1.68#) Isolation Restoration per IOI-18 Evaluator NOTE: When the BOP walks down the HPCS trip units on the back panel

, they will all be indicating normal with gross fail lights illuminated on 1B21N0667C and N0667 G SRO Direct ONI

-C51 step s C51-4 Monitor Nuclear instruments for oscillations C51-5 Perform ONI

-SPI-G-4 Power verification C51-15 Confirm Jet Pump operation within established limits SRO Refer to Tech Specs.

3.5.1 ECCS-Operating Evaluator The SRO should evaluate HPCS operability declare HPCS Inop while it is overridden off T.S. 3.5.1 Action B

- verify RCIC operable W/I 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and D- Since RCIC is not operable Be in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Mode 4 in 36 h ours T.S. 3.0.3

- Enter after 3.5.1 Action B is complete.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

3 - 68% Page 7 of 18 Event

Description:

5 Both Upper Containment Airlock doors open Cue: Alarms H13

-P680-7-C5 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ARI-H13-P680-7-C5 Tech Specs Driver When directed initiate Event 5 Role play as an NLO when directed ATC or BOP Observe the matrix lights on H13

-P601 to determine which airlock has both doors open SRO Direct subsequent operator actions of A RI-H13-P680-7-C5 4.1.1 Immediately Investigate 4.1.2 If necessary then direct maintenance to repair Driver After both doors are closed call the control room, as an NLO, and notify them:

"Contractors moving scaffold into containment opened both doors

. The y are now clos ed with the seals inflated. The Contractors have been coached and their supervisor will report to the control room

". SRO Evaluate Tech Specs 3.6.1.2 Primary Containment Air Locks Action B Inop interlock mechanism:

B.1 Verify operable door closed W/I 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> B.2 Lock operable door closed W/I 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> B.3 Verify operable door locked closed once per 31 days

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

3 - 68% Page 8 of 18 Event

Description:

6 - Narrow Range Level Spike Main Turbine Trip, and a loss of all FW. RPS fails in auto; ARI fails in Auto but will work when manually initiated.

Cue: ARI-H13-P680-3-A8 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ONI-C71-1 ONI-C34 EOP-01 Driver When directed initiate Event 6. Role play as an NLO as needed.

Driver 10 minutes after the Scram verify #1 BPV fails to 60% open (Event 20) ATC or BOP Make announcement for the Scram and evacuate containment ATC Place the mode switch in Shutdown Evaluator RPS and ARI fail in Auto, Manual ARI inserts all control rods. The Motor Feed Pump trips. HPCS trips.

ATC Perform Scram Hard Card Actions (OAI

-1703 att. 10)

1. Initiate ARI (Rods go in on manual ARI)

(Critical Task #1

) 2. Transfer RR pumps to slow speed

3. If Rx power is >4% Start SLC A and B and Inhibit ADS (Will not be required

) 4. Make crew announcement

5. When generator load is <90 MWe trip the main turbine Verify Main Stop valves, Control Valves, and CIVs shut Gen breakers S610 and S611 open Gen field breaker open

6. Insert SRMs and IRMs

7. Verify HST level control N21-S19 in off

8. Stabilize Rx water level using Feedwater hard card

9. Stabilize Rx pressure using Pressure Control hard card SRO Direct ATC to stabilize Rx water level using the Feedwater hard card and stabilize Rx pressure using Pressure Control hard card ATC Perform Feedwater hard card (OAI

-1703 att. 11) and Pressure Control hard card (OAI-1703 att. 14)

BOP Verify Isolations and Actuations (hardcard)

ATC Recognize that the Motor Feed Pump is not available and inform the SRO

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

3 - 68% Page 9 of 18 Event

Description:

6 - Narrow Range Level Spike Main Turbine Trip, and a loss of all FW. RPS fails in auto; ARI fails in Auto but will work when manually initiated.

Cue: ARI-H13-P680-3-A8 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC Using ONI-C34 Perform a Reactor Feed Pump Quick Restart section 4.4 Notify the SRO when the RFPT can't be restarted BOP Recognize that the HPCS pump has tripped and is not available and inform the SRO Evaluator At this time no high pressure injection or Feedwater is available SRO Direct Low Pressure ECCS to be lined up for injection EOP

-01 step RLC

-4 Evaluator Div 1 and 2 Level

-1 Initiation Signals BOP Recognize that there was a failure of Div 1 and 2 ECCS Initiation Signal and initiate Div 1 and 2 ECCS.

(Critical Task #3)

SRO Direct Alternate Injection subsystem startup EOP-01 step RLC

-6: SLC demin water EOP-SPI 4.5 CRD alternate injection EOP-SPI 4.1 SRO Direct Inhibit of ADS BOP Inhibit ADS SRO Direct Startup of Hydrogen Igniters and Analyzers EOP

-01 step ALC

-3 BOP Start Hydrogen Igniters and Analyzers hardcard SRO Direct Emergency Depressurization when Rx water level reaches 0" but before

-25" EOP-01 step ALC

-8 (Critical Task

1. 2) BOP Perform Emergency Depressurization EOP 2 Open all ADS valves Recognize that all ADS SRVs did not open and notify the SRO (Critical Task #2)

Evaluator Four ADS valves fail to open SRO Direct opening of additional SRV to obtain 8 valves open and to Bypass the Instrument Air isolation SPI 2.8 EOP 2 Step ED-4 (Critical Task #2)

BOP Open additional SRVs to obtain 8 valves open and bypass the Instrument Air isolation SPI 2.8 (Critical Task #2)

SRO Direct restoration of RPV level above

-25 " BOP When RPV pressure is <450# (or <280#)

Verify LPCS (or RHR) is injecting into the RPV. Notify the SRO

. SRO When RPV water level is >

-25" Direct RPV level band >16.5" (Band should be 150-219")

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 O p-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

3 - 68% Page 10 of 18 Event

Description:

7 - Motor Feed Pump Fails Cue: Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Driver Role play as an NLO if directed ATC Recognize that the Motor Feed Pump is not available and inform the SRO ATC Dispatch an NLO to determine the problem with the Motor Feed Pump Driver When dispatched notify the control room that there is a large oil leak on the Motor Feed Pump ATC Notify the SRO that the MFP will not be available

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

3 - 68% Page 11 of 18 Event

Description:

8 - Div 1 and 2 ECCS Initiation Signal Failure on Rx Low Level one signal Cue: Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOP-OP-1002 4.10.3 Driver Role play as NLO as directed BOP Recognize that the Div 1 and 2 ECCS initiation signals failed on a Rx level 1 signal and Inform the SRO BOP Arm and Depress Div 1 and 2 ECCS Initiation push buttons Evaluator NOP-OP-1002 4.10.3 step 5 states "If automatic actions fail to occur when required, it is the responsibility of the operator to take manual actions to perform the system or component function. Pump or component auto start failures are examples where operators are expected to take manual action."

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

3 - 68% Page 12 of 18 Event

Description:

9 - Emergency Depressurize on Rx Low Level Cue: Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Direct Emergency Depressurization when Rx water level reaches 0" but before

-25" EOP-01 step ALC

-8 (Critical Task #2)

BOP Perform Emergency Depressurization EOP 2 Open all ADS valves Recognize that all ADS SRVs did not open and notify the SRO(Critical Task #2)

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

3 - 68% Page 13 of 18 Event

Description:

10 - Four ADS SRVs fail to open Cue: Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Perform Emergency Depressurization EOP 2 Open all ADS valves Recognize that all ADS SRVs did not open and notify the SRO(Critical Task #2)

SRO Direct opening of additional SRV to obtain 8 valves open and to Bypass the Instrument Air isolation SPI 2.8 EOP 2 Step ED-4 (Critical Task #2)

BOP Open additional SRVs to obtain 8 valves open and bypass the Instrument Air isolation SPI 2.8 (Critical Task #2)

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.: 3 - 68% Page 14 of 18 Event

Description:

Termination Criteria Cue: Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

1. Rx is depressurized to allow Low Pressure ECCS to inject

2. Rx Level maintained >0"

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actio ns Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

3 - 68% Page 15 of 18 Event

Description:

Critical Task #

1 - With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, take action to reduce power by initiating ARI to cause control rod insertion.

Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, take action to reduce power by initiating ARI to cause control rod insertion.

1. Safety Significance:

Shutting down reactor can preclude failure of containment or equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant.

Correct reactivity control.

2. Cues: Procedural compliance.

Reactor power indication

.

3. Measured by:

Observation

- ARI pushbuttons armed and depressed to cause control rod insertion

. 4. Feedback: Reactor power trend.

Rod status indication.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

3 - 68% Page 16 of 18 Event

Description:

Critical Tas k #2 - - After RPV water level drops to 0 inches, when RPV level cannot be restored and maintained above MSCRWL (-25"), RO initiates Emergency Depressurization as directed by US. Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior After RPV water level drops to 0 inches, when RPV level cannot be restored and maintained above MSCRWL (-25"), RO initiates Emergency Depressurization as directed by US.

1. Safety Significance:

Maintaining adequate core cooling.

2. Cues: Procedural compliance.

RPV level indication.

3. Measured by:

At least 5 SRV's are opened when RPV level cannot be restored and maintained above

-25". 4. Feedback: RPV pressure trend.

Suppression Pool temperature trend.

SRV open status indication.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

3 - 68% Page 17 of 18 Event

Description:

Critical Task #

3 - With RPV pressure below the Shutoff Head of the available Low Pressure system(s), operate available Low Pressure system(s) to restore RPV water level above T.A.F. (0 inches). Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior With RPV pressure below the Shutoff Head of the available Low Pressure system(s), operate available Low Pressure system(s) to restore RPV water level above T.A.F. (0 inches).

1. Safety Significance:

Maintaining adequate core cooling.

2. Cues: Procedural compliance.

Pressure below low pressure ECCS system(s) shutoff head.

3. Measured by: Operator manually starts or initiates at least one low pressure ECCS system and injects into the RPV to restore water level above 0 inches.

4. Feedback: Reactor water level trend.

Reactor pressure trend.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

3 - 68% Page 18 of 18 Procedures to erase/clean Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ARI-H13-P800-3-D6 ARI-H13-P680-7-C5 ONI-E12-1 ONI-C51 ONI-SPI-G4 ONI-C34 SOI-N21 7.3, 4.4, 6.1 SOI-M13 7.2 EOP-SPI-2.8 EOP-SPI 4.1 EOP-SPI 4.5 EOP-SPI 6.1-6.5 IOI-3 Att. 3 TS 3.6.1.2 TS 3.5.1 Hardcards SRO oversight checklist E Plan charts

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Perry Scenario No.:

4 - 0% Op-Test No.: 2015-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO) (ATC) (BOP) Initial Conditions

The Reactor is in Mode 2 after a soft shutdown

. A startup is in progress using IOI-2 with the Rx subcritical. Reactor pressure is ~6 20 psig. Pressure band is 5 00-7 00 psig using the Main Steam Line drains per IOI-5 attachment 1.

RPV level band is 192

-215 inches using the Motor Feed Pump.

Maintaining Main Condenser vacuum 3

-4" HgA per SOI

-N64/62 Attachment 6.

Rods are at Step 35, Gang 41 @ 12. The Motor Fire Pump is tagged out for bearing replacement. IRM 'H' is bypassed due to a card failure. Control Room humidification boiler (M29) is tagged out for repairs. PSA risk is GREEN. Grid is NORMAL Turnover: Continue with the Reactor Startup using IOI

-2 step 4.3.14 Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 cp03_0g41c0003a C (BOP) FPCC Pump A low discharge pressure Shift pumps Cue - ARI-H13-P970-1-C5 2 1H13P800 2AF5 C (SRO) Combustible Gas Mix Compressor B loses power TS 3.6.3.3 Cue: ARI-H13-P800-2-F5 3 H13P6809 1C1 C(ATC) Isophase Bus Trouble Cue - ARI-H13P680-9-D1 4 RD01R102 7 C-ATC Continue with startup, discovers stuck control rod use alt methods.

5 R(ATC) Pull rods for criticality 6 cb01_1n62c0001a C (BOP) Vacuum Pump Trip Cue - ARI-H13-P870-7-G3 7 NM02B I(SRO) IRM B fails TS 3.3.1.1 Cue - ARI-H13-P680-6-D2 8 RC07 M-ALL RCIC unisolable steam leak Cue - ARI-H13-P601-21-E2 9 M(ALL) Scram prior to exceeding max safe area temperature 10 RD01 x 8 C(ATC) ATWS manually insert control rods

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor FENOC Facsimile

Narrative Summary

- Initial Scenario 4 0% Event 1. FPCC pump A will have a low discharge pressure, the BOP will shift to B per the ARI and SOI.

2. Combustible Gas Mix Compressor B loses power.

The SRO will enter T.S. 3.6.3.3 action A.

3. Isophase Cooling F an A trips, the B fails to auto start. The ATC will start the B fan.

4. Continue with plant startup

, control rod 10-27 will require elevated drive pressure per the SOI.

5. The crew will pull control rods for criticality. When IRMs are on range 7 we will proceed to the next event. 6. Mechanical Vacuum Pump A trips. The BOP will start the B vacuum pump per the ARI

. 7. IRM B fails downscale, causing a rod block. With IRM H already bypassed, IRM B can't be bypassed, therefore the startup can't be continued with a rod block locked in. The SRO will enter T.S. 3.3.1.1 action A. The crew may scram the Rx due to a rod block with power decreasing. If the crew elects to scram

, Event 9 will be initiated.

8. Unisolable steam leak on RCIC. The crew will enter EOP-03 and EOP

-01 and scram the reactor prior to exceeding Max Safe room temperature in RCIC. Only one area Max Safe temperature will be challenged, ED will not be required.

9. Scram the reactor prior to exceeding Max Safe room temperature in RCIC , per EOP-03 and EOP-01. All control rods do not insert. The ATC will drive rods. The SRO will transition from EOP

-01 to EOP-01A. The BOP will inhibit ADS and terminate and prevent ECCS injection. The ATC will control Rx level on the Motor Feed Pump. The crew will commence a controlled cooldown <100 degrees per hour

. 10. RPS and ARI do not insert all control rods, the ATC will insert control rods.

EOPs: EOP-3, EOP-1, EOP-01A Critical tasks:

1. Scram the Rx prior to exceeding max safe temperature in the RCIC room

2. Initiate actions to insert control rods on an ATWS

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

4 - 0% Page 1 of 18 Event

Description:

N/A

- Driver Instructions Cue: Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Driver Driver Simulator Setup:

Reset Simulator to IC 3 1 Load Schedule File: NRC-2015-S 4.sch Verify schedule file s NRC-2015-S4-2, S4-3 & C11_Del load Change Init.dat file to Exam Init.dat file Restart ICS Place SOI-N64/62 Att 6 marked up through Step 4.2.b.2 in front of MVP's Driver Driver Verify Initial Conditions:

Reactor power 0%. BOL Pull Sheets Book OTLC-3058 2014-06 Seq A1, Rods @ Step 35, gang 41 @12, verify all previous steps are signed off as complete IOI- 2 Step 4.3.14. Verify all completed steps are signed off.

IRM 'H' bypassed Motor Fire Pump OOS

- put a switch cap on it Place the highest reading SRM recorder in fast speed Driver Driver CAUTION: "Event Description

" numbers and "Simulator trigger Event

" numbers do not agree.

Driver Driver Initial Conditions

The Reactor is in Mode 2 after a soft shutdown.

A startup is in progress using IOI

-2 with the Rx subcritical. Reactor pressure is ~620 psig. Pressure band is 5 00-7 00 psig using the Main Steam Line drains per IOI

-5 attachment 1. RPV level band is 192-215 using the Motor Feed Pump.

Maintaining Main Condenser vacuum 3

-4" HgA per SOI

-N64/62 Attachment 6.

Rods at Step 35, Gang 41 @ 12. The Motor Fire Pump is tagged out for bearing replacement.

IRM 'H' is bypassed due to a card failure. Control Room humidification boiler (M29) is tagged out for repairs. PSA risk is GREEN. Grid is NORMAL Turnover: Continue with the Reactor Startup using IOI

-2 step 4.3.14

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.: 4 - 0% Page 2 of 18 Event

Description:

1 - to B Cue: Alarm H13

-P970-1-C5 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ARI-H13-P970-1-C5 SOI-G41 Section 7.4 Driver When directed initiate Event 2. Role play as NLO and RP as directed BOP Recognize a problem with the FPCC A pump and notify the SRO SRO Direct BOP operator to perform ARI

-H13-P970-1-C5 Subsequent Actions BOP Perform ARI

-H13-P970-1-C5 Subsequent Actions 4.1 Investigate the system for leaks 4.2 If proper discharge pressure is not restored, then refer to SOI

-G41 (FPCC) and start the FPCC pump B.

4.3 If no FPCC pumps are running then go to ONI

-E12-2 and take the actions BOP Shift FPCC pumps from A to B per SOI

-G41 Secti o n 7.4 7.4.1 Notify RP of any changes to FPCC system configuration 7.4.2 Start the B pump 7.4.3 Stop the A pump Driver If asked to check out the A pump

- Inform the BOP that it looks normal on the camera with good oil level in the bubbler. If asked to go in to the room, notify the BOP it will be a High Rad Entry and will take an hour to get there.

BOP Notify the SRO when the shift is complete Evaluator The SRO may evaluate entry into ONI

-E12-2 Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

4 - 0% Page 3 of 18 Event

Description:

2 Combustible Gas Mix Compressor (CGMC) B loses power Cue: Alarm H13

-P 80 0-2-F5 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ARI-H13-P 80 0-2-F5 Tech Specs Driver When directed initiate Event 3. Role play as NLO as directed BOP Recognize that Combustible Gas Mix Compressor B has no power and inform the SRO BOP Dispatch an NLO to the disconnect (EF1D08

-T) for CGMC B to investigate the loss of power Driver When requested to investigate the disconnect (EF1D08

-T) for CGMC B

- inform the BOP that the control power fuse is blown

- no obvious reason SRO Enter T.S. 3.6.3.3 Action A

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.: 4 - 0% Page 4 of 18 Event

Description:

3 Isophase Bus Trouble Cue: Alarm H13

-P680-9-D1 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ARI-H13-P680-9-D1 SOI-R13 NOP-OP-1002 Driver When directed initiate Event 4. Role play as NLO as directed Observe the ATC Operator on a camera (cameras 1, 2, and/or 4) in order to initiate Event 13 in a timely manner.

ATC Recognize that Isophase bus duct fan A has tripped and the B fan has failed to start in 45 seconds. Notify the SRO ATC Start the B Isophase bus duct fan. Notify the SRO Driver When the ATC takes the B fan to Start, initiate Event 13 to delete the B fan 'Override to OFF' Driver If dispatched to Isophase fan A breaker F1C06

-XH, Inform the ATC that the C

Ø main line fuse is blown Evaluator NOP-OP-1002 4.10.3 step 5 states "If automatic actions fail to occur when required, it is the responsibility of the operator to take manual actions to perform the system or component function. Pump or component auto start failures are examples where operators are expected to take manual action."

Evaluator The ATC may use SOI

-R13 section 7.1 to shift fans 7.1.1 Verify oncoming ISO Phase Bus Clg Fan in Stby 7.1.2 Place off going ISO Phase Bus Clg Fan in Off 7.1.3 Place oncoming ISO Phase Bus Clg Fan in On 7.1.4 When the oncoming ISO Phase Bus Clg Fan starts, then place the second ISO Phase Bus Clg Fan in Stby.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.: 4 - 0% Page 5 of 18 Event

Description:

4 - 10-27 Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior IOI-2 IOI-5 SOI-C11 (RCIS)

Section 7.25 Driver Role play as NLO as directed SRO Direct the crew to continue the plant startup ATC Recognize that control rod 10-27 is not moving at normal drive pressure and inform the SRO SRO Direct the use of Alternate control methods per SOI

-C11 (RCIS)

ATC Perform alternate control methods per SOI

-C11 (RCIS) Section 7.25 7.25.2 Raise drive pressure in 50 psid increments until the rod moves or max of 500 psid 7.25.3 If the rod is immovable at 500 psid then refer to ONI

-C11-1 Inability to move rods 7.25.5 Return drive pressure to normal when one of the following is met:

The rod is at the withdrawal limit Rod movement is suspended Elevated pressure is no longer needed Another control rod is to be selected 7.25.6 IV normal operating pressures 7.25.7 Annotate on the control rod movement sheet with the DP required to move the rod ATC Notify the SRO when alternate controls are no longer needed Evaluator The ATC should lower drive pressure to normal 250-275 psid prior to moving the next control rod

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Acti ons Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.: 4 - 0% Page 6 of 18 Event

Description:

5 Pull Rods for Criticality Cue: Direction from Turnover Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior IOI-2 IOI-5 Drive r Role play as NLO, Chemistry, and RP as directed ATC Continue plant startup, pulling rods to criticality per IOI

-2 Step 4.3.15 to obtain a 60-150 second period ATC Adjust control rod positions to maintain 60

-150 second period until mid

-scale IRM rang e 7 SRO Provide oversight for the startup ATC and Bop Obtain post criticality data:

4.3.16 Time of Criticality 4.3.17 Record data on the ECP 4.3.20 Demand a control rod position log ATC and Bop Perform IRM/SRM overlap

. IRMs should start to show a flux increase when the SRM count rate is 10 4 to 10 5 cps Proper overlap is determined by the IRM indicating > 10/125 prior to the related SRM count rate exceeding 10 5 cps If the related SRM is inoperable, IRM operability may be determined by IRM overlap with an adjacent SRM Evaluator All IRM s will have proper overlap ATC Adjust the IRM range as power increases to maintain between 25/125 and 75/125 SRO Verify IRMs are operable for T.S. 3.3.1.1 ATC Withdraw the SRMs to maintain 10 2 -105 cps Evaluator SRMs should not be withdrawn prior to verifying SRM/IRM overlap ATC When SRM/IRM overlap is complete and with all IRM on range 3 or above then withdrawal the SRMs from the core.

Evaluator When IRMs are on range 3 or higher proceed to the next event

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

4 - 0% Page 7 of 18 Event

Description:

6 - Mechanical Vacuum Pump (MVP) A Trip Cue: ARI-H13-P870-7-G3 ARI-H13-P870-1-B6 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ARI-H13-P870-7-G3 Driver When directed initiate Event 7. Role play as NLO as directed BOP Recognize that the A MVP has tripped and notify the SRO BOP Dispatch an NLO to investigate Driver After 5 minutes inform the BOP that the overcurrent relay is tripped on F1B09 BOP Notify the SRO that the OC relay is tripped on the A MVP SRO Direct the BOP to perform ARI

-H13-P870-7-G3 subsequent actions to start the B MVP BOP Per ARI-H13-P870-G3 Step 4.1 start the B MVP and notify the SRO Driver If asked to walkdown the B MVP after the start, report that the pump is running normal with the seal water pump running and the cooling water valve is open

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

4 - 0% Page 8 of 18 Event

Description:

7 - IRM B fails downscale Cue: ARI-H13-P680-6-D2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ARI-H13-P680-6-D2 Tech Specs Driver When directed initiate Event 8. Role play as I&C as directed ATC or BOP Recognize there is a problem with IRM B and inform the SRO BOP Walkdown the back panel for indications on IRM B Evaluator Inform the BOP that IRM B is downscale. If he asks

, there is no obvious reason it is downscale BOP Report to the SRO that IRM B is indicating downscale, reason unknown SRO Enter T.S. 3.3.1.1 Action A place channel in trip condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (two inop IRMs in trip system B)

SRO Evaluate Scramming the Rx due to the Rod Block and power decreasing Evaluator The crew may elect to Scram the Reactor since power will be decreasing and a rod block will prevent moving rods. IRM B can't be bypassed since IRM H is Inop and bypassed. Driver If the crew elects to scram the reactor, immediately initiate Event 9 and proceed to next page.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

4 - 0% Page 9 of 18 Event

Description:

8 - RCIC unisolable Steam Leak Cue: ARI-H13-P601-21-E2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ARI-H13-P601-21-E2 ARI-H13-P601-21-D2 EOP-03 NOP-OP-1002 EOP-01 EOP-01A Driver When directed initiate Event 9. Role play as NLO as directed BOP or ATC Recognize there is a steam leak in the RCIC room due to elevated room temperature Evaluator The RCIC room communicates to the RWCU room. RWCU room temperatures will also be increasing.

BOP Evaluate RCIC and RWCU temperatures on the NUMAC and notify the SRO that max safe temperatures are being approached SRO Upon receipt of the RCIC and/or RWCU room temperature alarms enter EOP

-03 SRO Direct isolation of RCIC EOP

-03 SCC-12 BOP Isolate RCIC and notify the SRO that RCIC won't isolate SRO Enter EOP-01 and direct a Rx Scram prior to exceeding Maximum Safe Condition

. EOP-03 SCC-16 (Critical Task #1)

ATC Scram the Rx. EOP

-01 step RC

-1 Verify mode switch locked in Shutdown (Critical Task #1) ATC Notify the SRO that all control rods did not go in on the Scram and ARI Evaluator NOTE: Depending on timing of manual control rod insertion and ability of SRO to work through multiple flow charts, transition to EOP

-1A may not be required SRO Transition from EOP

-01 to EOP-01A upon report that all rods did not insert on the Rx Scram and ARI ATC Perform Scram Hard Card Actions (OAI

-1703 att. 10)

1. Initiate ARI

2. Transfer RR pumps to slow speed (Won't be required)

3. If Rx power is >4% Start SLC A and B and Inhibit ADS (Won't be required)

4. Make crew announcement

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

4 - 0% Page 1 0 of 18 Event

Description:

8 - RCIC unisolable Steam Leak Cue: ARI-H13-P601-21-E2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

5. When generator load is <90 MWe trip the main turbine (Won't be required)

Verify Main Stop valves, Control Valves, and CIVs shut Gen breakers S610 and S611 open Gen field breaker open

6. Insert SRMs and IRMs

7. Verify HST level control N21

-S19 in off (Won't be required)

8. Stabilize Rx water level using Feedwater hard card

9. Stabilize Rx pressure using Pressure Control hard card SRO Direct EOP

-01A actions Reactor Power Control leg Insert Control Rods SPI 1.1

-1.7 Reactor Level Control leg Stabilize Rx water level Verify Isolations and Actuations Inhibit ADS Maintain MSIVs open and bypass ECCS interlocks SPI 2.3 Terminate and Prevent (T&P) ECCS Injection Give a level band

-25 to 219" Start Hydrogen Igniters and Analyzers Reactor Pressure Control Leg Stabilize Reactor Pressure Depressurize the RPV, maintain cooldown < 100°F per hour SRO Direct the ATC to Insert control rods per EOP-SPI 1.1-1.7 (Critical Task

1. 2)

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

4 - 0% Page 11 of 18 Event

Description:

8 - RCIC unisolable Steam Leak Cue: ARI-H13-P601-21-E2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC Insert Control rods using EOP-SPI 1.1-1.7 (Critical Task

1. 2) EOP-SPI 1.3 1.0 Instrument Air is isolated to Containment THEN OPEN INST AIR CNTMT ISOL. P52-F200 2.0 VERIFY CRD HYDRAULICS FLOW CONTROL is in MANUAL. C11

-R600 3.0 ADJUST CRD HYDRAULICS FLOW CONTROL output to 100. C11

-R600 4.0 CLOSE CRD DRIVE PRESS CONTROL VALVE. C11

-F003 5.0 WHEN any CRD Pump is running, THEN PERFORM the following to Insert all control rods to position 00 concurrently with the remainder of this procedure follows:

5.1 DEPRESS AND HOLD the IN TIMER SKIP pushbutton.

5.2 SELECT Control Rods not fully inserted.

BOP Verify Isolations and Actuations hardcards BOP Inhibit ADS BOP Maintain MSIVs open and bypass ECCS interlocks SPI 2.3 BOP When directed Terminate and Prevent ECCS injection

- hardcard BOP Start Hydrogen Igniters and Analyzers hardcard ATC Maintain directed Rx Level Band

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

4 - 0% Page 12 of 18 Event

Description:

8 - RCIC unisolable Steam Leak Cue: ARI-H13-P601-21-E2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Determine reactor is subcritical, then direct a controlled cooldown EOP

-01A LPC/P7 ATC Commence a controlled cooldown, maintain cooldown < 100°F per hour Evaluator All control rods can be inserted but one. If all control rods are inserted but one, the SRO will transition to EOP

-01 and perform a controlled cooldown per EOP

-01 RPC-5 SRO When all but one control rod is inserted

, transition to EOP

-1 and direct Reactor Level Control Leg Give a RPV level band of 1 5 0-219" Reactor Pressure Control Leg Depressurize the RPV, maintain cooldown < 100°F per hour ATC Maintain directed Rx Level Band SRO Direct a controlled cooldown EOP

-01 RPC-5 ATC Commence a controlled cooldown, maintain cooldown < 100°F per hour

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

4 - 0% Page 13 of 18 Event

Description:

9 - Scram prior to exceeding max safe area temperature Cue: Alarm H13-P601-21-D2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EOP-03 Driver Role play as NLO as directed SRO Upon receipt of the RCIC and/or RWCU room temperature alarms enter EOP

-03 SRO Direct isolation of RCIC EOP

-03 SCC-12 BOP Isolate RCIC and notify the SRO that RCIC won't isolate SRO Enter EOP-01 and direct a Rx Scram prior to exceeding Maximum Safe Condition. EOP-03 SCC-16 (Critical Task #1)

ATC Scram the Rx. EOP

-01 step RC

-1 Verify mode switch locked in Shutdown (Critical Task #1)

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

4 - 0% Page 14 of 18 Event

Description:

1 0 - ATWS Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior EOP-01 EOP-01A ONI-C71-1 Driver Role play as NLO as directed ATC Scram the Rx. EOP

-01 step RC

-1 Verify mode switch locked in Shutdown ATC Notify the SRO that all control rods did not go in on the Scram and ARI SRO Transition from EOP

-01 to EOP-01A upon report that all rods did not insert on the Rx Scram and ARI SRO Direct the ATC to Insert control rods per EOP-SPI 1.1-1.7 (Critical Task #2)

ATC Insert Control rods using EOP-SPI 1.1-1.7 (Critical Task #2)

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.: 4 - 0% Page 15 of 18 Event

Description:

Termination Criteria Cue: Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

1. Rx Level maintained in band 2. Control Rods Inserted Transition to EOP

-01 3. Commence a controlled depressurization

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

4 - 0% Page 16 of 18 Event

Description:

Critical Task #

1 - With reactor at power and with a primary system discharging into the secondary containment, manually scram the reactor before any area exceeds the maximum safe operating level. Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior With reactor at power and with a primary system discharging into the secondary containment, manually scram the reactor before any area exceeds the maximum safe operating level.

1. Safety Significance:

Scram reduces to decay heat levels the energy that the RPV may be discharging into the secondary containment.

2. Cues: Procedural compliance.

Secondary containment area temperature, level, and radiation indication.

Field reports.

3. Measured by:

Observation

- With a primary system discharging into secondary containment, a reactor scram is initiated before a maximum safe condition is reached.

OR Observation

- With a primary system discharging into secondary containment, US transitions to EOP-01 and RO initiates scam upon field report that a maximum safe condition has been reached.

4. Feedback: Control rod positions.

Reactor power decrease.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

4 - 0% Page 17 of 18 Event

Description:

Critical Task #

2 - With a reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, take action to reduce power by initiating ARI to cause control rod insertion.

Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior With reactor scram required and the reactor not shutdown, initiate action to reduce power by inserting control rods.

1. Safety Significance:

Shutting down reactor can preclude failure of Containment or equipment necessary for the safe shutdown of the plant.

2. Cues: Procedural compliance.

3. Measured by:

Control rod insertion commenced in accordance with Section 1.0 of EOP-SPI's. 4. Feedback: Reactor Power trend.

Control Rod indication.

Appendix D, Rev. 9 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-01 Scenario No.:

4 - 0% Page 18 of 18 Procedures to erase/clean Cue: None Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ARI-H13-P970-1-C5 ARI-H13-P800-2-F5 ARI-H13-P680-06-D2 ARI-H13-P680-09-D1 ARI-H13-87 0-7-G3 ARI-H13-P601-21-D2 & E2 SOI-G33 6.3 SOI-G41 7.4 SOI-R13 7.1 SOI-C11 RCIS 7.25 EOP-SPI-1.1 - 1.7 EOP-SPI-2.3 IOI-2 4.3 TS 3.6.3.3 TS 3.3.1.1 Hardcards SRO oversight checklist E Plan charts