ML13226A266

E-mail from J. Boska, NRR to S. Hicks, Ois FW: Change in Public Availability of Slide Package

ML13226A266
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	05/03/2013
From:	Boska J P Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
To:	Pascarelli R J Division of Operating Reactor Licensing
References
FOIA/PA-2013-0264
Download: ML13226A266 (34)

Text

Boska, JohnFrom: Boska, JohnSent: Friday, May 03, 2013 11:26 AMTo: Hicks, SusanCc: Pascarelli, Robert

Subject:

FW: change in public availability of slide packageAttachments:

2013-03-25 Revised Duke slides (non-public).pdf Importance:

HighSusie, the email string below discusses a set of slides used by the licensee at a public meeting, and thelicensee later informed us that one of the slides had sensitive information.

Those slides are in ADAMS atML1 3084A022.

You had changed this document profile to non-public.

The licensee has now provided us thesame set of slides, but with the "Withhold from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390" added to the bottom ofall the slides. Please replace ML1 3084A022 with the attached pdf file. The licensee has also provided a set ofpublic slides, which I added to ADAMS as ML13123A204.

Thanks.John BoskaOconee Project Manager, NRR/DORLU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 301-415-2901 email: john.boska@nrc.gov From: ADAMS IMSent: Tuesday, April 23, 2013 10:14 AMTo: Boska, John; Pascarelli, RobertCc: Monninger, John; CSIRT; McCarthy, James

Subject:

RE: change In public availability of slide packageJohn,Thank you for the information

-document ML1 3084A022 has now been set for "Sensitive-Security

-Related-Periodic review required/MD Code A.3.ThanksSusie HicksOn Behalf of ADAMS IM[(b)(6) ] l can be reached at (b)(6)From: Boska, JohnSent: Tuesday, April 23, 2013 9:50 AMTo: ADAMS IM; Pascarelli, RobertCc: Monninger, John; CS_IRT; McCarthy, James

Subject:

RE: change in public availability of slide packageImportance:

HighSusie, I have talked to Bob Pascarelli about the document sensitivity.

Please label the sensitivity as Sensitive, and MD 3.4 Non-Public A.3 (sensitive-security-related-periodic review required).

Thanks.C__

John BoskaOconee Project Manager, NRR/DORLU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 301-415-2901 email: iohn.boskanrc..qov From: ADAMS IMSent: Tuesday, April 23, 2013 8:51 AMTo: Pascarelll, RobertCc: Boska, John; Monninger, John; CSIRT; McCarthy, James

Subject:

RE: change in public availability of slide packageImportance:

HighRobert/James, ADAMS IM has changed the availability for ML13084A022 to Non-Public, which will automatically remove thisfile from Public Access once the synch occurs.For now this file is Non-Public/Non-Sensitive with "Non-Public Pending Review" added to the keyword file.Per our previous email request -please provide the proper document sensitivity selected from the attachedMD Code Chart.ThanksSusie HicksOn Behalf of ADAMS IM(b)(6)(b)(6)

( I can be reached atFrom: McCarthy, JamesSent: Monday, April 22, 2013 2:06 PMTo: ADAMS IM; Pascarelli, RobertCc: Boska, John; Monninger, John; CSIRT

Subject:

RE: change in public availability of slide packageADAMS IM,Thank you for the notification.

CSIRT will perform all necessary information spill reporting.

Jim McCarthyLIS Nuclear Regulatory Commission Computer Security OfficeOffice: .01-415587 Mobile:i(b)(6),

From: ADAMS IMSent: Monday, April 22, 2013 2:03 PMTo: Pascarelli, Robert2 Cc: Boska, John; Monninger, John; CSIRT

Subject:

RE: change In public availability of slide packageHello Robert,Below are guidelines to change Released Public files to Non-Public.

Also, pleaseprovide us with the proper document sensitivity which you can select from theattached ND Code Chart, so we can render this file ML13084A022 Non-Public?

Before we can process your request to withdraw a document(s) from the ADAMS Public Library (WBA), we need writtenauthorization and justification (an e-mail message is fine) from a Division Director or above in the originating orresponsible organization.

This requirement is documented in an August 28, 2002, memo from Stuart Reiter, ChiefInformation

Officer, to all NRC Office Directors and Regional Administrators.

See ML022340277.

Please have theappropriate Division Director or above send the authorization and justification to the e-mail address ADAMS IM. If youhave been given the authority required by ML022340277, have those manager(s) provide us with the delegation.

If the document(s) to be removed from WBA contains classified, safeguards, or privacy information, please let us knowand we will take actions to immediately remove the document(s) prior to receiving the written authorization.

However, westill require the appropriate written authorization.

Please note that if this document is part of a publicly available ADAMSPackage, we will change the Package's Public availability to A Non-Publicly Available status if appropriate.

Also note that in accordance with Management Directive 3.4, A Release of Information to the Public, the Office Directors and Regional Administrators are required to take corrective action in the event that any information for which they areresponsible is released contrary to NRC policy and must inform the EDO and the Office of the Inspector General in writingof the occurrence.

The authorizing official or office requestor should e-mail WEBWork to remove the document or any links if they exist onany external Web pages. If your office maintains an external Web site separate from the official NRC Web page, you areresponsible for.the removal of the document from the site.ThanksSusan HicksOn Behalf of ADAMS IMX work at an alternate 1, cati n n (b)(6)anI can be reached at (b)(6) iFrom: Pascarelli, RobertSent: Monday, April 22, 2013 12:33 PMTo: ADAMS IMCc: Boska, John; Monninger, John

Subject:

change In public availability of slide packageOn 03/25/2013, Duke Energy provided the staff with a slide presentation (ML13084A022) that we placed in ADAMS aspublically available.

Duke Energy subsequently informed the NRC that one of the slides contained SUNSI information (slide 18). Please change the profile of this document to non-publically available.

Thank you.Bob Pascarelli, ChiefPlant Licensing Branch I1-1Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 3

ADukeIkerg Agenda*:, Current Dam Failure Analysis

-January 28, 2011, Breach Analysis Summary, Model Development

,:, Updated Dam Failure Evaluation

-submitted March 12, 2013, Models Considered

ý Selection of Xu & Zhang, Update Breach Parameters

, Sensitivity Analysis, Independent ReviewComparative Analysis

-Large Modern Dam Failures*:, Modifications ScopeFor Informaton Only PDukelrgy 2011 Breach Analysis Summary,:, Breach parameters developed using regression methodology andtechnical papers:ý Froehlich 2008ý Walder & O'Connorý MacDonald

& Langridge-Monopolis

• • Breach analysis focused on maximizing flooding levels to provide avery conservative and bounding analysis:

ý Breach dimensions maximized to assume loss of most of the damembankment,

ý Froehlich breach time of 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> was reduced to 2.8ý Maximum peak outflow was selected from all methodsý Breach times of Keowee dams/dikes adjusted to maximize waterdirected at the site> Tailwater effect below Jocassee dam was not considered For Informaton Only lukernergy2011 Breach Analysis SummaryJocassee Dam (postulated dam failure)*:, Initial breach derived primarily from Froehlich equations.

regression Breach dimensions were adjusted based on physicalconstraints of natural valleyJocassee breach parameters:Top Width -1156 (64% of overall crest), Bottom Width -431 feetBottom Elevation

-800 mslBreach Formation Time -2,8 hrs,Peak outflow 5,400,000 cfsFor Information Only-Withho d ' lI Disciosure unoer-0 CFR 2M.

9DukeUEnergy2011 SE Jocassee Dam BreachProgression and Stage-Discharge Hydrographs Jocassee Dam Breach Progression and Hydrographs Case 2(100W)0.810,6liIoI'6,0004AD0Q0003,000,000 2,00Q0000M0 20 4:00 6., 8010 I O12:00 140 16:00 1100 20:00 22:00 0M0 200 40 60 8 IND00 12:00llme-Headwlter

-Tailwa'ter

-Breach Proression

-Breach Olscharge For lnformabon OnlyWithheldfrom PublcDcIMr fd6 ~~j F31115(4i nerg 2011 Breach Analysis SummaryKeowee Dam/Dikes (postulated cascading dam failures)

,:o Overtopping failure trigger of two feet over the cresto:. Cascading dam/dike failure on Keowee, Keowee main dam- 2.8 hrs, West Saddle Dam -0.5 hrs, Intake Canal Dike- 0.9 hrs, Little River Dam -1.9 hrss:o Conservative assumptions were made to maximize the waterdirected toward the power blockFor Information OnlyWih ;I rum Disciosure unaer 10 CR -".;30 awfnergyModel Development HEC.RAS JD ModelI,, :&ou~w*Mcwhmimm Owkwuhilonuahu NO T *mor informa

ýkeModel Development ni ergySRH 2D Model(57 thousand elements)

REUSE COWUA11OINAL AISKFor Informaton Oný"Whiheldft~

P.I~ u2~fds~wcuo

• 44a1CR 2.30 m1 Duke 2011 Breach Analysis SummaryVEnergy 2D ModelWATER SURFACE ELEVATIONS AT KEOWEE DAMJocassee-Keowee Dam Breach StudyPool Elevations at Keowee Dam8608408208wn~o'"780760740-Case NO0W0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12Model Time (hrs)For Information OnlyWIN0 2 ukew.nergyUpdated DamFailure Evaluation For Information Only~i~no~u~.u.1 PI" ~cc~our un.51, i * ..

S DUke Updated Dam Failure Evaluation iEnergy Fukushima 2.1Attributes of updated and refined dam failure analysis.: Updated methodology and present day regulatory guidance.: Performed to meet NUREG CR/7046, 2011 & ANS 2.8,1992*:, Realistic but still conservative assumptions

,:, Physical characteristics of the dams/dikes recognized including materials and method/quality of construction

.Overtopping and Seismic are confirmed from the 2011 SE, asnot being credible failure modesFor Information Ony-VWMo6l7 rom Dfl iumure unaer CFR 2.I;M -

EDUke Updated Dam Failure Evaluation iEnergy Fukushima 2.1Overtopping of the Jocassee dam was confirmed not to be a credible failure modei:s The Jocassee dam and dikes include 15 feet of freeboard

• . The Jocassee watershed is small relative to storage capacity

-148 square miles.:. The top of the spillways are located at 1110 (full normal level)ý Four diverse methods of assuring spillway gate operation

, Rigorous spillway gate maintenance and surveillance testing as required andmonitored by FERC*:, Lake management procedures require consideration of lower level to anticipate additional storage needs for significant stormsý Weekly rain forecast are prepared by Duke Energy to project rainfall for the basiný Precipitation monitoring has assured that no overtopping of the spillway gates hasoccurred in 40 + years of operation

.:, PMF using current HRR.51,52 results in 3 feet of freeboard margin*:. 2011 SE also concluded that overtopping was not credibleFor Information Only40'00mA 'm u ISC osure ,

• Duke Updated Dam Failure Evaluation iEnergy Fukushima 2.1Seismic Failure of the Dam was confirmed not to be a credible failure mode*:, Seismic evaluation based on current FERC criteria using the 1989 EPRI Hazard Curves> The Jocassee dam is designed to a 0.12 g horizontal ground acceleration (Oconee site is designed to a0.1g horizontal ground acceleration).

,:. 2007 Updated Fragility Analysis> High Confidence of a Low Probability of Failure (HCLPF) of the dam by sliding 0.305 g> Evaluation was performed by Applied Research

& Engineering Sciences (ARES) Corp., formerly EQE, arespected consulting firm in the area of seismic fragility

> The ARES report concluded the median centered fragility value for failure of the dam is 1.64 g.> Maximum Probabilistic Peak Ground Acceleration for a 2% probability of being exceeded within a 50 yearperiod is 0.197 g (using the United States Geologic Service hazard maps applicable to Jocassee),

,:. Jocassee dam is included in the seismic model of the Oconee Probable Risk Assessment.

> The combination of the updated seismic fragility with the seismic hazard curve results in a negligible riskcontribution from seismic events.> In a letter dated 11/20/07 and in the 1/28/11 SE repor, the NRC concluded that there is a negligible riskFor Information OnlyWithhnld from Public, Dcb ,: under,10 CFR," 2.3N DukeEnergyModels Considered Regression Analysis> Froehlich 2008> Walder & O'Connorý MacDonald

& Langridge-Monopolis 1984ý Xu & Zhang 2009For Information OnlyMULLId Diclo3ure under iT CVr

• DUke Selection of Xu & Zhang 2009EEnergy Basis*:. Most current regression method developed and validated withthe largest data base of dam failures:

ý 182 earth and rockfill dam failures compiledý 75 failures w/ sufficient info to develop breach regression modelso:, Empirical formulas that account for physical characteristics ofdam/reservoir:

dam type, failure mode, height, dam erodibility, reservoir shape/storage)

• , 33 of the 75 failures were on large dams ( >.. 15 meters),:. Applies to multi-zoned damst:. Method yields realistic but conservative breach parameters

,:, Recognized by industry expertsFor Informaton OnyW-oeitk~~

CP, ,[w re U

• DUke Breach Parameters Energy Fukushima Update,:. Jocassee Dam -Xu & Zhang> Starting reservoir elevation 1110 (normal full pond)> Rockfill dam with low erodibility classification

> Piping failure initiating at 1020 feet msl (Sunny Day Failure)> Breach parameters:

V"Top Width- 701' (39% of overall crest)V Bottom Width -431'V Bottom Elevation

-870'V Breach Formation Time:, Xu & Zhang -29.2 hrs.(13.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> piping +16.0 open weir), Froehlich

-16.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> (open weir)v/Peak outflow:

1,760,000 cfsFor Information Only-Wihhod iemfrCP6e~wunS" M

DukeEnergyJocassee DamLow Erodibility Classification (b)(7)(F)

For Information Only-WIu lo f IioUI I u V 10 IF h DukeEnergyFukushima Model-'2 1Breach Formation TimeXu & Zhang definition:

29.2 (13.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> piping + 16.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> open weir)Froehlich definition:

16.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> open weirFor Information Only-WIith!~

alrom-hbi i~~~rurdrI e1 .S uKeFukushima Model Jocassee Dam BreachProgression and Stage-Discharge Hydrographs L,IryJocassee Dam Breach Progression and Hydrographs BEP ILE1.20!I3,o000,0irn2,500,000

'o.00.80aIo0.40IU.-2,000.1D1,5040001,000,0Ulu IS0,000OO 20 4 6182 OD 0 12.9 14:01610 1S.0 20:00 21-0 OWO 200 4:0flow6:0 8:00 .001-Headwater

• - -- Breach MUMllif-T~Ivwter

-Bfeadi Prgression

---

Sreach Formiation Comp~lel-DischafrM Breach Formalon Time Xu & Zhang dofiniUon:.

29.2 (13.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> piping + 16.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> open weir) Froehlich definlion:

.16.0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> open weirFor Information OnlyWithhoid from Public DI5d uure und-er10CR Duke Breach Parameters lEnergy Fukushima Update*:, Keowee Damý Starting reservoir elevation 800 (normal full pond), Homogeneous earth fill dam, Overtopping failure trigger of two feet over the crest at 817 msl byrapid rise of Keowee reservoir over the crestMultiple simultaneous breach initiation formation points across theKeowee dam and West Saddle damo:o Cascading dam/dike failure on Keoweeý Keowee main dam- 0.75 hrsý West Saddle Dam -0.5 hrs (shorter than main dam, ratio of height)For Information OnlyWihhldfa Pbl ibQsure under 10 CFR 2.39 aFukushima Model Keowee DamBreach Progression HEC-RAS,1n ergyNffiOMjV'&'1 60.90.80.70540.0302I.00 0.] 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9Relative Time Progression For Information Only-deIsIIuIIUIIrgld e~t~Uv j4Ou-nfV Duke.nergyFukushima ID ModelingKeowee Dam -Headwater and Tailwater Stage Hydrographs Final BEP LE 1-D Model Performance 830820810S007907807707601750S740S730S7207107006906806706600 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36Model Time. hours-BEPLEHW

-BEPLETWFor Information Only*

J f ""j ....... undr FR-.,,

VlUKl:,nergyFukushima 2.1 2D ModelingKeowee Dam Breach Progression R.ijv: 10.90.8Co 0.7I.~06IL.Cu0.50.400.30.20.1016.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6Time (hr)16.7 16.8 16.917For Information Only, -, , -.. , -..,., ,

UKGL,nergyFukushima 2DModeling Velocityand Flow Patternat l7 hrs.:- 17.U0 2 4 6 8 101214 16 182022242628303234363840 For Informabon Only DukeLfnergyFukushima 2DModeling Velocityand Flow Patternat 20 hrs.0.02 4 6 8 10121416182022242628303234363840 For Informaton Only-t o R li lwu* t l er i A, A ^ 1 A o4 lukenergyFukushima JD-2DModeling ResultsBreachine Keowee Dam Intake DikeHEC-RAS 2-D HEC-RAS 2-DElevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time817 16.28 817 16.24 n/a n/a n/a n/aNW 4Maximum Water SurfacesKeowee Dam Intake DikeHEC-RAS 2-D HEC-RAS 2-DElevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time818.4 16,53 820.1 16.58 810 17,17 807.2 17.67____ ___ __ ___ ___ A= A ,Maximum Water SurfacesSwale Tallwater HEC-RAS 2-D HEC-RAS 2-DElevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal Time Elevation Decimal 1ime817.5 16.55 815.5 16.53 787.4 17.52 790.4 18.41-4X10 N11 1 , -I A W -li,For Informaton Only Sensitivity AnalysisModel Peak Oufflow (cfs)McDonald

& Langridge-Monopolis 1984 1,566,381 Costa, 1985 1,634,480 Xu & Zhang, 2009 1,760,000 Evans, 1986 1,803,331 SoS, 1981 2,647,711 Bureau of Reclamation, 1982 3,046,462 McDonald

& Langridge-Monopolis 1984 5,093,603 (upper envelope)

Froehlich (with additional conservatism),

2008 5,440,000 Data in this table based on Wahl 2004, January 28, 2011 SE and updated Xu & Zhang data100+ HEC-RAS studies performed with varied breach parameters and control variables Erodiblity was the most significant factor influencing the breach parameters for Xu & Zhang 2009Bias of conservatism with realismFor Informaton Only,.,.,.,:.

l;,-, .....

vkeIndependent ReviewBreach Parameters wnergy, Independent Peer ReviewJoe Ehasz, P.E.David Bowles, Ph. D P.E. P.H., FERC Board of Consultant ReviewGonzalo Castro, Ph.D., P.E.James Michael Duncan, Ph.D., P.E.James F Ruff, Ph.D., P.E.Gabriel Fernandez, Ph.D., P.E.For Information OnlyLiJtllI JA Ami AAA'.'vimn~ia trom ~UWi~ ui~cIo~ur~

unacr lv ~

S Duke Comparative Analysisnergy Large Modern Dam Failures*:. Taum Sauk, Overtopping failure initiated by human error (previous overtopping events had occurred)

, Random rockfill embankment supporting the inner concrete liner loosely placed by end dumping the materialwithout compaction except for the top 16' of 84' height, The embankment was constructed on a very steep downstream slope of 1.3H to lV with a 10 high concreteparapet wall along the crest of the damEmbankment was highly erodible and contained over 45% sand sized material (also evident in unusuallevel of surface erosion from rain events)*:..Teton

, earthen dam with majority of dam constructed of highly erodible windblown silt (infant mortality event), No transition zones (sand and/or fine filters) were included between the silt core and the sand & gravel, Thin layer of small rock fill on both up and downstream faces with a majority of protection relied upon mix ofsand, gravel and cobble, Piping failure at 130' below the crest due to inadequate protection of impervious core trench material, Breach top width 781' (-25% of overall crest)*:, Hell Hole> True rockfill dam,with upstream sloping impervious core with massive rock fill sections up and down streamto support and protect the core., Failure caused by overtopping durng construction due to an intense rain event that could not be passedthrough the construction diversion tunnel, After overtopping of the core started, the dam took 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> to complete the breach and empty the upstreamreservoir For Information Onylll ll~llIUad Duke Modification Scopel onergy Updated,:, Modifications for protection from dam failure (under review):1. Relocation of external backup power transmission line2. Intake Dike embankment protection

3. East embankment protection

4. Discharge Diversion wall*:. Modifications for Local Intense Precipitation (under review):ý Transformer relocation

ý Diversion walls and drainage canalsý Aux building and Turbine building protection For Information Only--W ,,hokIf I Pubic Man u vw r 10"FR 103k DukewwM ergEModification OptionsI ý 77,77 =11'-<Jocassee Dam(~ 2C.uaIwIm/N..~

a~1///*J ,For Information Only Disclosure une.elu'.I"r"

.3C

.ukeinergy..... .......i -i;;Questions and FeedbackFor Information Only