ML18354A760: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
(8 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown)
Line 17: Line 17:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:From: Sent: To: Cc:
{{#Wiki_filter:}}
 
==Subject:==
Attachm e nt s: Haagensen, Brian Wednesday, May 31, 2017 2:12 PM Rich, Sarah Siwy, Andrew FW: Assessment of IP3 Boric Acid Leakage -Recap MP-PROC-MP-MP 3792AA[r006.00].pdf Attached is the Millstone 3 procedure for RPV o-ring replacement.
From: McKown, Louis Sent: Wednesday, May 3 1 , 2017 2: 10 PM To: Haagensen, Brian <Bria n.Haagense n@nrc.gov>
Cc: Ambrosini, J oseph i ne <Josephine.Ambrosini@nrc.gov>;
Highley, Christopher
<C h ristopher.Highley@nrc.gov>
 
==Subject:==
RE: Assessment of I P3 Boric Acid Leakage -Recap Good Day, So with all of the containment entries do they have a hatch or a set of fancy revolving doors in series (that way we can credit redundancy for safety). By the way when you are searching for o-ring, use 'o--ring' with two dashes ... you know because it's Millstone. If you have any further questions, comments, or concerns please do not hesitate to contact me at the information provided below. Very Respectfully , Lou McKown , Resident Inspector, Millstone Power Station Division of Reactor Projects , Branch 2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I 860-447-3170/3179 (Desk) Lou i s.McKown@NRC
.gov From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: W ednesday, May 31, 2017 1:58 PM To: McKo wn , L o uis <L ouis.Mc K o wn@n rc.gov> Cc: Ambrosini, J oseph i ne <Joseph i ne.Ambros i n i@n r c.gov>; Highley, Christopher
<Chr i stopher.High l ey@nrc.gov> Subj e ct: FW: Assessment of IP3 Bor i c Acid Leakage -Recap Lou -I'll show you m i ne if you'll show me yours (i.e. send me a copy of the Millstone 3 RPV o-ring installation procedure).
From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2017 8:30 AM To: Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setze r@nrc.gov> C c: Tifft, Doug (Doug.Tifft@n r c.gov) <Doug.Ti fft@nrc.gov>; Greives, Jonathan <Jonathan.Gre i ves@nrc.gov
>; Guzman, Richar d <R i chard.Guzman@nrc
.gov>
 
==Subject:==
Assessment of IP3 Boric Acid Leakage -Recap Yesterday, Entergy entered the IP3 containment and identified a 6-8 foot boric acid deposit on the reactor pressure vessel flange area. The BA apparently leaked from the outer RPV flange o-ring. (b)(4) Presently , the RCS UIL is no longer increasing.
Review of past leak rate data indicates that the leak has stabilized at -0.12 gpm. This may be indicative of the outer o-ring sea ling to the flange when f ull pressure was applied. The BA leakage may have been a tran s ient phenomenon , where by the leakage occurred during the period of time when IP3 shifted from the inner o-ring seal to the outer o-ring seal. Current leakage may be going t hrough the outer seal or it may be l eak ing from another location.
2 
-. " ~--~---~---~-----------~---~----,~~~~~ av
* rl'CAICUl:111".'*'<~
..,, ----------1------+-----+-----...----+------i ,m,. UV &#xa3;------+----+,----~----+<---~-----+---
~---------------~--------,------
..... The challenge is that while the o-ring seating surface is stainless steel and therefore is not subject to BA corrosion, the RPV studs are carbon steel and may be subject to BA corrosion.
Alternate leakage indications in the co ntainment show that conta i nment sump leakage initially increased at the same approximate time that the inner o-ring seal failed. However , sump chemistry results are not indicativ e of an RCS (sump pH not decreasing, [BA] not increasing) and the containment particulate radiat i on monitor is no longer increasing (increased from 1.0 E-9 on 5/25 to 1.6 E-9 uCi/ml on 5/26 and stabilized).
IP3 i s still analyzing the conditions and trying to make sense out of conflicting data. At this point, we should let them take the time to get this right without trying to get ahead of the issue. No public statements are planned in the immediate future regarding this leak. However , we should be ready to answer questions at the AAM regarding this condition. Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident In specto r Indian Point Energy Center 914 739-9360 (Office) (b)(6) (Cell) 3 From: Sent: To:
 
==Subject:==
Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914-739-9360 (Office) !(b)(6) !(cell) In plant x5347 From: Safouri, Christopher Haagensen, Brian <bhaag90@entergy.com
> Monday, December 11, 2017 10:03 AM Haagensen, Brian [Ext e rn a l_S e nder] FW: RCS k ea kage trend s on Unit 2 Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2017 1:35 PM To: Ha agensen, Brian
 
==Subject:==
RE: RCS keakage trends on Unit 2 Understood, I'll check it out. Thanks, Chris From: H aagensen, Brian Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2017 9:02 AM To: Safouri, Christopher Cc: andrew.s i wy@nrc.gov
 
==Subject:==
RCS keakage trends on Unit 2 Chris, Take a l ook at the Un it 2 total leakage trend below. Since 11/16, gross RCS l eakage has slowly increased from 0.08 gpm to 0.13 gpm. This appears to be caused by an increase in non-RCS p r e s sure boundary l eakage (i.e. eves leakage) from 0.01 gpm to 0.05 gpm. These are s till very small numbers so no action is needed but t h ey apparently are s eeing l e ak a ge through the charging pump packing again. Brian (b)(4) 2 Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914-739-9360 (Office) j(b)(6) I (cell) In plant x5347 3 From: Haagensen Br i an To: Schroeder Dan i e l; Setzer Thomas: Hen rioo Mark* Ross i Matthew Cc:
 
==Subject:==
Date: R~~l~~ka C g h e i:~:~~:-0 n Unit 2 -l(b )( 5) Attachments
: Monday. December 11 , 201711:16: 20AM '----------'
Extema l Sende r FW RCS keakage ueods on Voit 2 msg un i deorified l eakage srats treads rnsg Ex t erna l Sende r msg Dan , l(b)(5) Two weeks ago (on 11 /28), we identified a small but steady increase in the gross (tota l) RCS leak rate (see 1s t attached email -from 0.08 to 0.13 gpm).
IP2 attributed this trend to an i ncrease in eves leakage which did not make a lot of sense to me (CVCs leakag e tends to trend in steps , not slow i ncreases , when shifting charging pumps). However, the absolute value was tor the leak rate was still very small, On 12/8 , we noted that IP2 would be in AL 1 (see 2nd attached email) on Monday (today) but the small absolute value (0.05 apm UIL) seemed to be inconsequential CR-IP2-2017-05071 (see 3rd attached email) showed that there may have been indications of increased RCS leakage into containment following the MBFP outage last September based on Xe-133 / Ar-41 ratio trending , but nobody jdentjfjed it at the time --..,..--,---------" The most battling piece is that there was never any 1n 1cat1on o a ea on e e -a e rain line from the external o-ring. In fact , the leakoff li ne temperature actually dropped slowly from 94 F to 73 F over the since September. Th i s may have been caused by the line being plugged with boric ac i d from the previous inner a-r i ng leak. The overall gross RCS leakage trend from September to December is as follows (see graph below): (Note -the gross leakage sp i ke on 9/18 was caused by the MBFP outage)
(b)(4) IPEC has written a CR to determine how thei r ODMI for the inner o-ring l eak failed to catch the outer o-r i ng leak. Br i an C. Haagensen Senior Resident Insp e ctor Indian Point Energy Center 914 739-9360 (Office) (b )(6) (Cell) f rom: HJ~t.~J'l'!e", llria>n T o: .............-
Sil~Kt: Oite: An,11,h m tr1t$: (ht1tNl_,Send 111 rn': 11.(S lukl1,1 111nll1 an un~ l 1,W!o.l'f,Dettfflbetl t, 20 1 710: 0l.26AM !!!!!L~ Sr/,11n C. HJilgtnstn Senio r Re51dent lnspec t Of I ndian Pom t Energy Center 914 /39 9360 (OU1<c) i lh}/6) j (celll t n p l J nt M!&deg;>.3117 F ro m: Sa f o url , C h ,lstop h er Se nt: Tuesday , N ove m bt r 28, 2017 1 :35 PM To: Ha age n se n , B r ian Sub j ect: R E: RCS t:e.-ikage tren d s on Un i t 2 Unders t ood, I'll check i t ou t F ro m: Haagensen.
B rian Sent: Tue$di:ly , N o vembe( 28, 2017 9: 02 AM To: Safoun , Christopher Cc: andWY s~vtnrc sov Sub j ect: R CS keallag e uen ds o n U nit 2 C h r1s, Tak e a l ook .it the Un it 2 tota l l eakage trend be l ow. S i nce 11/16 , gross RCS l eakage has s l owtv i ncreased fr om 0.08 gpm to O 13 epm T his appears to be c au s ed by an in a ease i n non-R C S pr es sure boundary l ea kag e (1.e CV CS le 11 k11g e t fr om O 01 gpm to 0.0 5 gpm. T he s,e 11 r e s till very s m 11 II n um btrs s o n o ;, c tl o n I s n eede d lxit th e v a pp.erently ar e see mg l e;,kag e ch r o ugh t h e c h 11 rging pt.Jmp p 11c kln g ag;,in. Brian Srl;, n C. H n ge nse n Th i s i s the same graph that appeared i n the p r ior ema il , wh i c h was b een r edacted on the bas i s of FO I A exemption
: 4. 11 From: Sent: To: Cc: Alyse L. Peterson <Alyse.Peterson@nyserda.ny.gov>
Thursday, September 03, 2015 3:39 PM Tifft. Doug
 
==Subject:==
bridget.frymire@dps.ny.gov; McNamara, Nancy [External_Sender]
Re: IP3 seal leakage update Thank you very much Doug. Please continue to keep us updated. On Sep 3, 2015, at 3:07 PM, Tifft, Doug <Doug.Tifft@nrc.gov>
wrote: SENSITIVE INFORMATION
-This email contains proprietary information related to a plant shutdown -NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE As we discussed earlier this week, Indian Point Unit 3 is currently working *through an issue where both their inner and outer reactor vessel head seals a,re leaking. And as discussed, NRC inspectors have been closely monitoring the licensee's actions in response to this issue. At the end of the call you requested to be informed should the situation change, so I would like to update you on some recent developments.
* At the time of.the call, the inner reactor vessel head seal was in service. We discussed how the leakage from the inner seal was directed to the reactor coolant drain tank (RCDT). We noted that at the current leak rate, the operators were pumping down the tank about twice per 12 hour shift. Subsequent to our call, the licensee chose to place the outer seal in service. The thought being that the outer seal was less degraded than the inner seal and would result in less leakage and lessen the burden on operators of pumping the RCDT down. When the licensee placed the outer seal into service, they began to see containment parameters that indicated that the leakage was not flowing-through the drain lines to the RCDT, but rather directly to containment across the outer o-ring. The licensee again plac~d the inner seal back in service. With this new information the licensee is re-evaluating their decision to remain operating.
They are still working through their engineering decision making process, but the licensee has indicat e d that th e y may s hut the plant down in about 1 w ee k or so to r~pair the s ea l s. (Th e d a t e we have heard is Friday, September 11, but my understanding is thi s a soft targe, and is weather dependent.)
The NRC continues to monitor the licensee's actions and decisions as they work thr o ugh this is s ue. Please let me know if you have any questions. -Doug ~<<?~ Regional State Liaison Officer ~: p;)(~] 0-337-691 1 1 From: Sent: To: Cc:
 
==Subject:==
Jon, Te\son, Ross Monday, June 26, 201712:28 PM Greives, Jonathan Anderson, Shaun; San,ders, Serita; King, Mark; Rosebrook, Andrew RE: Indian Point RPV Head 0-Ring Leak Thanks for the additional information.
Actually, I was engaged in an email discussion with another staff member in IOEB and 1 asked him a number of questions (not realizing t.hat they would make their way to you). Apologies if we distracted you from other priorities.
I just tried to teach you by phone but without success .. I had seen email from the region indicating (a) a pattern of repetitive (RPV Head-to-Vessel) 0-ring failures at JP-3 and unsuccessful licensee correctiv~
actions (to prevent repetition?), and (b) regional intent to inspect associated licensee cause determinations and corrective actions to prevent repetition.
This caused me to question (c) whether the licensee (or NRC) had considered the failures to constitute one or more SCAQs and ( d) how proposed changes in NEI 16-07 (CAP-02) might impact the process and expectations.
I think I understand now that no one is considering the issue to constitute an SCAQ. As you may know, I'm on a team reviewing NEl 16-07 which proposes a number of relaxations to licensee Pl&R programs including (a) adjustments to SCAQ thresholds and (b) Crit. XVI SCAQ requirement interpretations specific to cause determination and corrective actions to prevent repetition.
Your NEI 16-07 representative is Andrew Rosebrook.
It was not my intent to task re ion al resources nor to insert myself into regional inspection.
However, I can be reached at M: (b)(6) if you have any insights you wish to share or questions for me. I would be happy to share perspectives.
(*We recently moved offices and my desk phone is not working correctly yet.) 1 ~U.S.NRC "'""""'~~
... ll.t,;! ... n i'kl'j'~1.1~,r~"''"':ft,i
* lnlmirr,:
iffplr.trrri;;;;;;;,.1Tr,-;;;;;;;;
Ross Tefson (301} 115 22S. Temporarily oos) M!(b)(6) Reactor Inspection Branch (IR'm} .__ ___ ____. NRR Div. of Inspection
& Regional Support Office -O 13E20 PS: If you're curious, you can find Draft NEI 16-07 [Rev. A] at ML 17152A233.
See 2.1 Definitions (Pg. 4) for definition of Corrective Action to Preclude Repetition (CAPR). See 3.2 Significant Condition Adverse to Quality (SCAQ) (Pg. 6) for direction on cause determ i nation & CAPR See Appendix A -Condition Report Significance Examples (Pg. A-1) for definition
& examples of SCAQ. From: King, Mark Sent: Monday, June 26, 2017 10:45 AM
* To: Telson, Ross <Ross.Telson@nrc.gov>
 
==Subject:==
FW: Indian Point RPV Head 0-Ring Leak Your welcome Ross ... ta/k about your timely support from R-1.
From: Greives, Jonathan Sent: Monday, June 26, 201710:31 AM To: Te Ison, Ross <Ross.Telson@nrc.gov>
Cc: King, Mark <Mark.King@nrq~ov>;-setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>;
Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haagensen@nrc.gov>;
Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>;
Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwv@nrc.gov>;
Henrion, Mark <Mark.Henrion@nrc.gov>
 
==Subject:==
Indian Point RPV Head 0-Ring Leak Ross, We were told this morning that you had a questions regarding the CAP classification of the double a-ring leak for IP3's RPV head. Entergy did not classify the most recent leak as a significant conditions adverse to quality. In all cases, _they classified the leaks to a level B, condition adverse to quality, requiring an apparent cause evaluation.
This is consistent with how they have classified previous occurrences.
The residents are in the middle of a PIR sample on repeated leaks from RPV head o-rings and we expect it to be documented in the 2017 integrated inspection report. Let me know if you have any additional questions.
Regards, Jon Jonathan Greives Branch Chief (Acting) Branch 2-Division of Reactor Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-Region 1 610-337-5120 (W) !(b )(6) !(C) jonathan.greives@nrc.gov 2
From: Guzma n , Ri c har d Sent: To; Cc: Monday , J u n e 2 6 , 201 7 2: 0 7 PM Grei v es, J onathan Setzer , Thomas
 
==Subject:==
Fwd: 2.20 6 Petition fro m T. G urdzie l dated June 11 ,.20 1 7 re; Indian Point Unit 3 Jon -see message below. Thanks for the ass i s t. Rich Guzman Sr. Project Manager NRR/DORL US NRC 301-415-1030 Begin Forwarded Message: From: "Guzman, Richard" <Richa r d.Guzman@nr c.g o v>
 
==Subject:==
2.206 Petition from T. Gu r dz i el dated.June 11 , 2017 re: Indian Po i nt U n it 3 Date; 22 June 2017 16:25
* To: "'tgurdziel@twcny.rr.com
"' <tgurdziel@twcny.
r r.c o m> Mr. Gurdziel, Good Afternoon.
As we discusse d, I have been ass i gned as a Petition Manager for the 10 CFR 2.206 petition you submitted to the U.S. N u c l ear Regu l atory Commissi o n (NRC) on June 11 , 2017 , regarding your concerns with the reactor vessel head a-rings at I ndia n Point Nudear Ge n era ti ng Un i t No. 3. Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regu l a ti ons describes the petition process -the primary mechanism for the public to request enforcement actio n by t he NRC in a pub l ic process. This process pennits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement-type ac ti on rela t ed t o NRC l icensees or licensed activities.
Depending on the results of its evaluation , NRC could mod i fy , suspend or revoke an NRG-issued license or take any other app 1 ropria t e enforcement ac ti on to reso l ve a p r ob l em. The NRC staffs guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition reques t s is in M anagement Direc t ive 8.11, wh i ch is publicly available.
The 2.206 process provides a mechan i sm for any mem b er of t he p ub lic to request enforcement action against NRC licensees.
The 2.206 process is separa t e from t he a ll egations process wh i ch aff'.ords individuals who raise safety concerns a degree of protection of their i dentity. In t he 2.206 process, all of the information in your letter will be made public, including your identity. You specifically requested in you r e-mai l for the NRC t o keep Ind i an Po i nt, Unit 3 (IP3) in cold shutdown until the condition of the reactor vesse l head upper and lower surfaces are "proved to be i dentical to the purchased condition".
The NRC cons i ders your request as a s h ort-term, immed i ate action given that IP3 is in the process of restarting from its maintenance outa g e. On June 22 , 2017 , your r , equest for immediate action was reviewed by members o f the Petit i on Review Board (PRB), which includes s t aff from the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and Region 1.* After it s r eview and discussion, the PRB determined that there were no immediate safety concerns wh i ch w o ul d ad v erse l y i mpact the pub l ic's health and safety; therefore, the PRB denied yo 1 ur request for immediate ac ti on in th e restart of I P3. Specifically, the PRB noted -that plant technical specificat i ons require t h e li c ensee to mo n i t or for unidentified leakage into containment and specifies actions if leakage were increase in excess of t h ese li mi t s, up to and i ncluding a plant shut down. Unidentified leakage at I P3 i s currently within the limit s s p ecifie d by th i s requirement.
1 In accordance with NRG Management Directive 8.11, you have the opportunity to address the PRB, either in person at the NRC Headquarters in Rockville, MD, or by telephone conference.
The purpose of this interaction is so that the petitioner can discuss the petition and verbaHy supplement the petition with any new information.
During the meeting, the PRB is in listening mode and will not make any decisions regarding your petition.
I understand from our conversation today that you would like to decline the opportunity to address the PRB at this time. If you have other questions on the 2.206 process, or regarding the role as petition rnanager, please contact me at 301-415-1030.
Thank you, Rich Guzman Sr. PM, Division Operator Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office: 0-9C7 I Phone: (301) 415-1030 Richard.Guzman@nrc.gov 2
From: Sent: To: Cc:
 
==Subject:==
All, A l ley, David Wednesday, August 12, 2015 9: 44 AM Tsao, John; Burritt, Arthur; Floyd, Ni k las; Gray, Mel Holmberg, M e l; Sh a ikh , Atif; Drak e , Jam es; Elliott, Rob e rt RE: Indian Poi n t U n it 3: Questions Regarding the U n it 3 inner a nd o u ter Rx Head 0-rings Lea k age I am work at home today and leave beginning tomorrow.
Despite the info notice, these leakoff lines appear to still be a source of confusion.
When we wrote the info notice, I believe it was our intent that plants use the info notice as a basis for the need to conduct pressure tests. I t is certain l y our opinion that this piping should be code class piping and that it should be pressure tested. Indian Point is not currently alone in this issue. I have recently received calls on the subject from Jim Drake (ANO I think, inner O ring is l eaking, plant doesn't want to stop the leak by closing leakoff line valve because l ine has not been pressure tested), Atif Shaikh and Mel Holmberg (Perry I think no leaks but discrepancy discovered during inspection)
Part of a ll this appears to be related to the age of the plant. If the plant predates Reg Guide 1.26 (again I think that is the right one), there is a bigger chance that the leakoff line could be other than code class pipe. If the leakoff line is appropriate l y classed as other than code class pipe, we may have a harder time with enforcing the pressure test. If the leakoff line is classed by the plant (or should be classed) as code class piping, i.e., the plant is committed to the reg guide , it would seem that we have a valid basis for challenging the lack of a pressure test. As John mentioned in his email , we get a lot of relief requests for reducing the pressure for testing these lines. The universal approach is to test the l ine with the refueling cavity full. This puts the line under about 10 to 15 psi. Not much but something. When we first started authorizing these alternatives we agonized over them for a long time. Some of the lines (generally BWRs if I remember) have a thermally operated valve. When leakage occurs, temperature goes up the va l ve opens and the control r oom is not i fied. We had less concern with these because the pressure stayed low. We did not consider the concept that the valve would be closed and the plant would continue to run for a long time. The rest of the plants had a pressure sensor in the l eakoff l ine. When l eakage occurred, pressure bu il t up and as some point the valve opened and the contro l room was notified.
The pressure at which the valve opened was significantly higher than the test pressure, ergo the greater concern about the test pressure.
Aside from all the above, the question at hand , at least to some extent , involves the question of where the pressure boundary is located. We may be in a situatio n where t h e ASME code pressure boundary and the reactor coo l ant pressure boundary (tech specs) are in different places. We are very good sometimes in using similar words to have different meanings and then spending hours discussing what we did or did not mean. Bottom li ne on this subject is that it is on my list of things to discuss with Rob Elliot of t h e tech spec branch. I t is not, however , on the "must be hand l ed immediately list". (I f it needs to be elevated in priority , p l ease let me know.) I don't know that this has helped any , but at least you can all take comfort in that you are not alone in dealing with th i s and that we at headquarters are paying attention to the problem. I am open to suggestions as to how to proceed and how fast that needs to happen. I promise that any responses to this that I get today will get more attention than those that come in while I am on leave. I probably will check ema il some whi le on leave b~Jt vom pr j mar y contact t ill I get back w ill be John Tsao. Shou l d you really need to get hold of me, please ca 1 q (b)(6) I .__ ___ __, 1 Dave From: Tsao, J ohn Sent: Wedne sda y , August 12 , 20 1 5 9:10 AM T o: Burritt, Arthur; Floyd , Nikla s; Gray , Mel Cc: Alley , Dav i d
 
==Subject:==
Indian Point Un i t 3: Questions Regarding the U n it 3 inner and outer Rx Head 0-rings Leakage I have a concern regarding the licensee's response to Question # 1 which asked whether the vessel 0-ring drain lines have been pressure tested at Indian Point Unit 3 (please see email below). The licensee's interpretation of the ASME Code, Section XI, IWC-5221 is that a pressure test is not needed because there is no pressure in the drain lines during normal operation.
IWC-5221 states that " The system l eakage test shall be conducted at the s ystem p r essure obtained while th e system , or portion of the system, is in service performing its no rma l operating function or at t he system press ure developed during a test cond u cted to verify system operabi l i ty (e.g., to demonstrate system safety function or satisfy technica l speci fi cat i on survei ll ance requirements)." My interpretation (as discussed in Information Notice 2014-02) is that the system pressure of the drain lines should be the pressure of the RCS even though there is no pressure inside the drain lines during normal operation. The drain lines are designed to support the RCS pressure in case there is a leak from the reactor vessel via a degraded inner 0-ring. The purpose of the system leakage test as required by IWA-5000 and IWC-5000 is to ensure that the pipe does not leak when it is needed. The drain lines are needed when leakage occurs. When leakage occurs , the drain l ines will be pressurized. Therefore , my position is that the drain lines need to be pressure tested using RCS pressure during normal operation.
However, we have recognized that pressure testing of the drain lines using the RCS system pressure is a hardship. Therefore, a licensee may request relief from using the RCS system pressure.
As an alternative, licensees may use the hydrostatic head of the cavity water as the test pressure for the system leakage test and perform VT-2 exam prior to startup during the refueling outage. We have reviewed and approved such relief requests from licensees.
I think that Indian Point should submit a relief request and should include the pressure test of vesse l 0-ring drain lines in its 10-year inservice inspection program. Because Indian Point has never performed a pressure test on the 0-ring drain lines I do not know whether the Region Office s hould cite the licensee for non-compliance to the ASME Code, Section XI (i.e., 10 CFR 50.55a). Please note that the above are my personal thoughts and they have not been reviewed by my supervisor, Dave Alley. I have included my supervisor Dave Alley in this email. Any final NRR decision should come from Dave Alley. Dave is on annual leave from August 12 , 2015 to August 19 , 2015. John From: Burritt, Arthur Sent: Tuesday, August 11, 2015 5:56 PM To: Tsao, John <John.T sao@nrc.gov>; Floyd, Nikla s <N i kl as.Floyd@n r c.gov>; Gray, M e l <Me l.Gray@nrc.gov
>
 
==Subject:==
FW: Questions R egar ding the Unit 3 i nner and outer Rx H ea d 0-rings Leaka ge 2 For your review and thoughts on next steps From: Stewart, Scott Se nt: Tuesday, August 11, 2015 2:50 PM To: Floyd, Niklas <Niklas.F l oyd@nrc.gov
> Cc: Burritt, Arthur <Arthur.Burr i tt@nrc.gov>; Pinson, Brandon <Brandon.Pinson@nrc.gov
>; Rich, Sarah <Sarah.R i ch@nrc.gov
>; Newman, Garrett <Garrett.Newman@nrc
.gov>; Pick ett, Douglas <Douglas.Pickett@n r c.gov> Subj ec t: Quest i ons Regard i ng the Unit 3 inner and outer Rx Head 0-rings Leakage The licensee has prepared this response to questions we had raised r egarding the f l ange leak on Unit 3. FY I , Scott 1. H as th e head v e n t l ea k-o ff lin e b ee n pr ess ur e t es t e d acc ording to ASME C o d e, S ec tion XI , IWA-5000? If not , why? We be l ieve this is referring to the Vessel 0-ring leak-off l ines under NRC Informat i on Notice 2014-02 instead of the head vent. In br i ef, IPEC d oes not pressure tes t t h ese lines. Response to the referenced IN i s documented under WT-WTIPC-20 1 4-00055 CA-06. See excerpts of the response below: Even though IPEC is suscep t ib le to the issue discussed above , the intent of the requ i rements of 10 CFR 50.55a (g) (4) are being met. The lines have been c l assified as Quality Group B {Class 2) for both IP2 and I P3. An 0-r ing is an acceptable barrier between safety classes per ANS I/ANS 51.1, thus prov i ding the boundary from C l ass 1 (reactor vessel) to Class 2 (leak-off lines). Per I WC-5221, Class 2 components are tested at the system pressure obtained while the system is in service performing its normal ope r ating function or at the system pressure developed during a test conducted to verify system operability. The lines a r e isolated (no press u re) during normal operation.
Applying pressure to the line for testing is not required.
During each refueling outage prior to startup, a visual inspection (VT-2) is performed on these lines at normal operating pressure and tempera t ure; 2-P T-R075 , "RCS I ntegrity I nspection" for I P2 , and 3-PT-R131, " RCS Integr i ty Leak Test" for I P3. During norma l plant operation when the VT-2 inspection is performed, the f l ange leak-off line is not pressurized provided the 0-rings are holding pressure.
However , i f the inner 0-r i ng is leaking , there will be some pressure in the line and the VT-2 inspection will be effective in detecting leakage if a through wal l defect is present. The requirement of monitor i ng and inspecting for leakage past the reactor head flange 0-rings i s satisfied by having a leak collection system and verifying that the co llection system is operat i ve. This sat i sfies a VT-2 v i sual examination of the 0-ring per ASME Sectio n X I , I WA-5243. The reactor vessel leak detection instruments are maintained by calibration; IP2 calibration procedure 2-IP-I-T-401 , IP3 calibration procedure IC-P C-I-T-401. 2. H ow m uc h o f th e rea ct or vesse l a nd c lo su r e h ea d fl anges a re c l a d? A re th ere any d e t ailed dr awi n gs, which show the e xt e nt o f c ladding o n thes e co mponents? The exposed mating surfaces o f the reactor vessel and closure head f l ange are cladded. Drawing 23 4-042 for the reactor vessel show a nominal clad thickness of 7/32". However , due to the proprietary na ture of the closure head forming and welding under drawing 233-046-4 and 234-046-1, exact detail of the cladding cannot be determined. The best estimate that is available is from drawing 234-047. 3. Wh at i s th e se n s itivity l e v e l for d e t e cting the pr ese n c e of Boron in th e w ee kly VC atmo s ph e re sa mpl es? Wh at i s th e se n s itivity l e v e l for d e t ec ting RCS l ea k a g e v ia th e R-11 a nd R-12 r ad i a ti on m o nitor s? The existi n g gross comparative
* methodo log y for checking Boron concentration in VC atmospheric samples is by using the filter media from the rad monitor samples, by "d igesting a portion of the filter paper and analyzing it using t h e I on Coup l ed Plasma instrume n t" for Boro n. H owever this methodology is intended to detect/ t r ack gross changes in atmospheric boron co ncentration over long periods. We have vi s ually inspected the filters, but do not 3 currently have the instrument required; i.e., "the acid digester" for performing th e Boron ana ly sis. We have saved the filters. As for sensit iv ity o f R-11 and R-12, based on cur rent RCS activity level and a r ev iew of ca l culat i ons IP 3-CA LCRAD-03514 and IP 3-CA L C-RAD 034 14 , it is anticipa t ed t h a t R-11 would be able to detect a 1 GPM l eak i nt o containment within 4 hours while R-12 would be able to detect a 3-10 GPM i nto containmen t w i thin 4 hours. 4. During the most recent VC visual inspections , how much area around the reactor head flange was available for inspection (i.e. full circumference or partial)?
And, are there any interferences that could mask potential flange leaks? Is it possible to visually examine the reactor vessel for boric acid accumulation while at power? The entire periphery of the vessel is able to be observed from the east and west po i nts over the cavity, looking down. T he actua l fl ange to vesse l inte rf ace and th e closure st u ds/bo lts a r e not visible with the u n it at power and the mirror insulation app li ed. However , the insulation extends down from the flange to the cav i ty f l oor and there is a gap between the insu l ation and the floor. Additiona ll y , there is a vertical gap between the vesse l to the cavity floor s uch that liquid could drop , down the side of the vessel to the Reactor Cavity Su m p. There h ave been no l evel a l arms or pump-outs of the cavity sump since the RFO. L eakage past the flange to head interface wou l d start as steam and then conde n se. To this point , as noted o n the weekly i n spections , there has been n o evidence of external leakage past the flange int erface as noted in the form of s t eam, poo li ng condensed steam , o r dried boron extending along the cav it y floor. 5. In response to ODMI limits, it was noted that both Robinson and Salem operated with both 0-rings leaking. Was there any evidence of flange leakage observed following these two events? And, was there any adverse impact as a result of operating in this configuration?
There was reportedly no damage to t h e Robinson 2 0-ring sea t ing surfaces, but extensive clean-up was requ ir ed for the effects o f the Salem 1 0-ring l eak. There no report as to the extent of any indications on the Salem 1 0-r i ng seat i ng s urf aces tha t required repair. H oweve r , there i s mention of boric acid and oxide deposits t h at had to be cleaned during the recovery from the Salem 1 0-ring leak. 6. What is the potential impact to the structural integrity of the reactor vessel and head i f leakage beyond both 0-rings were to occur for a prolonged period of time? Are there any additional components that could be subject to damage from boric acid from a flange leak in addition to the vessel , head, and studs? The conce rn as re l ated t o structural in t egrity of the r eactor vesse l wou l d be the condition of th e vesse l st ud s. The other concern would be potential wash out of the seat i ng surfaces on the reactor vessel and t he c l osure head which may require substantial remediat i on. 7. The inner 0-ring has been placed back in-service. Are there any contingencies or other plans to return the outer 0-ring to service if unexpected leakage past the inner 0-ring is observed?
The ODM I was revised to have a trigger action# 4 where leakage exceeds either 1 GPM or a rate of 0.25 GPM / head. When this trigger is reached, consideration may be give n to p la ce th e oute r 0-ring in service. 4 From: Lorson, Raymond Sent: Wednesday, September 09, 2015 3:12 PM To: Cc: Floyd, Niklas; Gray , Mel; B u rritt, Arthur; Scott, Michael Set z er, Thoma s; Sub e r , Gr e gory
 
==Subject:==
RE: I P 3 Reactor Stud Corros i on Cale Nik -tlhanks for the follow-up.
I don't have any further questions at this time; should the licensee elect to defer the shutdown currently planned for the 14th we will re-visit.
In the meantime it would be interesting to follow-up after the shutdown to understand the as-found condition of the studs. May provide some interesting data to apply to future leaks of this nature. Ray F r om: F l oyd, N iklas S e nt: Wednesday, September 09, 2015 2:15 PM To: Gray, Mel; Burritt, Arthur; Lorson, Raymond; Scott, Michael Cc: Setzer, Thomas Subj ec t: FW: I P3 Reactor Stud Corrosion Ca l e All, I reached out to one of our materials experts in NRR in order to get a second, independent assessment of Indian Point's boric acid corrosion calculation of the vessel studs. We performed our own calculations with an even more conservative approach (assuming a 2 in/yr corrosion rate around the entire stud) and concluded that the licensee will still be within their ASME code limits, given a plant shutdown on September 14, 2015. I included below the email exchange between myself and John Tsao for your reference.
Please feel free to ask any questions regarding the details of the calculation.
Nik From: Tsao, J ohn Sent: Wednesday , September 09, 2015 1:33 PM To: Floyd, N iklas <N i klas.F l oyd@nrc.gov> S ubj e ct: RE: I P3 Reactor Stud Corrosion Cale Nik, I used 2 weeks (from September 1 to September
: 14) as the time duration and a corrosion rate of 2 in/yr for both the inside and outside surface of the stud. I came up with a ratio of 0.955 which exceeds the allowable ratio of 0.922. I would not say that I agree or disagree with the licensee's calculations.
The licensee has its own justification for the assumptions and analytical approaches.
I think that our assumption of using a corrosion rate of 2 in/y r for both the inside and outside surface is more conservative than the licensee's.
The steam and coolant exiting the outer RPV head 0-ring will cover the inside surface and outside surface of the studs. The studs will be corroded by boric acid regardless the location of its surface. Therefore, the corrosion rate for the outer surface should be similar to the inside surface. 1 Based on the information provided in the licensee's corrosion calculation and the staffs (in your case inspector's) independent calculations, the staff concludes that the studs will still be within the allowable stresses in accordance with the ASME Code, Section Ill, given the plant will shut down on September 14, 2015. The licensee has demonstrated the reasonable assurance that the structural integrity of the studs will be maintained until September 14, 2015. John From: F l oyd, N iklas S e nt: Wedne s day, September 09 , 2015 12:47 PM To: T sao, John <John.T s ao@nrc.gov
>
 
==Subject:==
RE: I P3 R eacto r S t u d Corros i o n Cale John, I also feel that the licensee should have used 2.37 in/yr instead of 2; however, 2 in/yr is still a pretty conservative value in the realm of boric acid corrosion. The flange leakage started on September 1 51 based on indication of unidentified leakage and visual indications of boron on the vessel. The 2.5 months is just a bounding calculation to show that the plant is ok to operate for that long beyond September
: 1. As a comparison, they plan to shut down on September 14th (2 weeks is much shorter than 2.5 months= plenty of margin). I am not sure where they obtained the 0.2 in/yr corrosion rate for the outside surface. The data that I found for low-alloy steel immersed in high temperature solution ranged from 0.01 to 10 in/yr, where 10 is very extreme and the conditions were stated as likely not possible in a plant setting. When applying a corrosion rate of 2 in/yr to both the inside and the outside surface of the studs, I get approximately 1 month (26 days). As a comparison with this estimation , 2 weeks is still much shorter than 1 month. Nik From: Tsao, J o h n Sent: Wednesday, Sep t ember 09, 2015 11: 44 A M To: Floyd, N iklas <N i kla s.F l oyd@nrc.gov> Subj e ct: R E: I P3 R eactor Stud Corro s i on Cale Nik, My initial comments.
The licensee used a corrosion rate of 2 in/yr for the inside surface of the studs even though the max corrosion rate I read was 2.37 in/yr. I think that the licensee should have used 2.37 in/yr. However, the difference between 2 and 2.37 is small so the end results should not change too much. The licensee used a duration of 2.55 months. Is this the time between when the leakage was discovered and September 14, 2015 when the plant will be shutdown?
When the leakage occurs did the coolant impinge on the studs right away? Or the studs was in contact with the coolant only after the outer 0-ring was installed recently?
In other words is 2.55 month duration correct or too conservative?
2
: 3. I did not see where the licensee obtained a corrosion rate of 0.2 in/yr for the outside surface of the studs. I did a quick calculation assuming that the corrosion rate for the outside surface of the studs is 2.0 in/yr {the same as the inside surface) using the licensee's method on page 2 of 4. My calculation showed that the studs would exceed the allowable stress l i mits. Of course I was way conservative. I will keep review i ng further. John From: Floyd, N iklas Sent: Wednesday, September 09, 2015 10:23 AM To: T sao, John <John.Tsao@n r c.gov> Cc: Alley, David <Dav i d.Alley@nrc.gov
>
 
==Subject:==
IP3 Reactor Stud Corrosion Cale John , I f you have some time today, would you mind taking a quick look at the attached calculation?
The l icensee used a similar approach as one example in the EPR I Boric Acid Corrosion Guidebook.
P l ease let me know what you think about their assumptions regarding th e corrosion mechanism and corrosion rates. Th ey assumed two different mechanisms (one for the bo l t area facing the reactor and anothe r one for the bo l t area facing towards the containment).
I've made my conclusions, but I would like a second opinion. T hank you much! Nikl as Floyd Reactor In spector Division of Reactor Safety USN RC Region I (610) 337-5282 3 ott, c,a l U se O n l y-S ensi ti ve I n t erna l and S ecuri t y-R e l a t ed l n fo rmat,on -P re-D ec1s1ona l Indian Point 2&3 ROP-16 End-of-Cycle Plant P erformance Summary Ja nuary 1, 20 1 5 -December 31 , 2015 Performance Overview and Previous Assessment Results Unit 2 Current Action Matrix Column Licensee Response Basis A ll Green Findings and Pis Previous Action Matrix Column Licen see Response Previous Basis All Green Findings and Pi s I Un i t 3 I Current Action Matrix Column R equlatorv R esponse Basis White Pl i n Unpl anned Sc r a m s per 7000 Cr it ical H ours Prev i ous Action Matrix Column Licensee Respo n se Previous Basis A ll G reen F indings and Pi s I Cross-Cutting Summary I Cross-Cutting Th emes N/A Cross-Cutting Issues N/A Prev. Cross-Cutting Themes N/A Prev. Cross-Cutting I ssue s N/A I De v i a ti o n s None Assessment Letter Inform a tion Assessment Letter Si nature Div is i o n D i rector Unit 2 Power History and Event Declarations December 5 , 2015 Cont r ol Room operators i n iti ated a Manual R eacto r Trip due to indi cat ions of multiple dropped Control Rods. The ini ti a ting event was a smo ld ering Motor Control Center (MCC) cubicle in the Turbine Building that supp lies power to the Rod Co n tro l System. Th e smo l dering MCC cubicle had power removed from it when 24 MC C breaker tripped on overcurrent.
Repairs we r e comp l e t ed , r eacto r went c r it i ca l on December 8 and fu ll power ope r atio n resumed December 10. Pl Im act -Un lanned Scrams er 7000 Critical Hours Unit 3 Power History and Event Declarations January 8 , 2015 Mar c h 1 , Operators commenced a s hutdown in accordance with Techn ical Specification (TS) 3.5.4 due to both r efue l i n g water s torage tank (RWST) l evel alar m s be in g inoperab le. Unit 3 reached 4 5 percent power when one level channe l was restored and the s hutdown stopped. Operators r es tor ed both level channels , com m enced power ascension , and returned U n it 3 to 100 per cent power la t er the same day. (Pl Impact -Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours The l a nt was s hut down for a la nned refue lin and ma in te n ance ou ta e Official Use On ly s e nsit i v e Int e rn a l a nd s e cu rit y-R e lated Inf o rm a ti o n -Pr e-D e cisi on al 2 ! I ndian Point 2&3 2015 Ma y 7, 20 1 5 May 9, 2015 Jun e 1 5 , 2015 July 8 , 2015 September 15 , 20 1 5 D ecembe r 14 , 2015 (3R18). Following refueling and maintenance act i vit i es, t h e r eactor was cr i tica l on March 24 , and returned to power operation on March 25 , 2015. Full power operat i on resumed on Ap r il 1 , 20 1 5 afte r troubleshoo t ing and maintenance on 31 main bo iler fe edwate r um . On May 7 , 2015 , U nit 3 in i tiated an u np l anned shutdown to a p l anned trip to repa ir a weld crac k on valve BFD-64-10.
Valve BFD-64-10 is a l ow side i so l ation va lve for feedwater f l ow transmitter FT-438B. The lea k was repai re d and the reactor was r estarted on May 8 , 2015 and returned to 1 00% power on M ay 9 , 2015. Pl Im act -Un fanned Power Chan es er 7000 Critical Hours The un i t experienced a reactor trip and fire associated with f ai lure o f the 31 main transformer. The unit remained shut down to replace th e transformer. Unit 3 r eactor we nt c r i tical on M ay 25 , 20 15, a nd ret urn ed to full power on May 26, 2015. Pl Im act -Un lanned Scrams er 7000 Critical Hours The unit tripped from full power on June 15, 2015 due to a sw i tchyard distu r bance. U n i t 3 r eactor wen t c ri tica l on June 1 6 and re t urned to fu ll power later that da . Pl Im act -Un lanned Scrams er 7000 Critical Hours The un i t was manually tripped from full power on July 8 , 2015 , as re s u lt o f a feedwater transient.
Th e uni t was restarted on July 9 , 2015 , and o p era t ed at reduced power wh il e repairs were made to secondary components. Unit 3 returned t o full powe r operation s o n July 1 1 , 20 1 5. (Pl Impact -Unplanned Scrams er 7000 Critical Hours The unit was shut down for a planned maintenan ce o u tage to r ep l ace the reactor vesse l 0-ring s. Following maintenance act i vit i e s, the reac t or was crit i ca l on September 25, 2015 , and returned to power opera t ion on Septem be r 26, 2015. After r ece i p t of a Main Generator Lockout tri p signal , the reactor automati c a ll y tripped. Site personnel r eporte d seeing arcing on a 3 4 5kV output t r ansmiss i on line t ower. Tow e r i nsu l ators w e r e r ep l ac e d and/o r c l eaned. Th e r eacto r was crit i ca l on D ecember 17 , 20 1 5 and return e d to fu ll power operation late r that da . Pl Im act -Un fanned Scrams er 7000 Critical Hours Safety-Significant Inspection and Performance Indicator Results I s sue Green-Whit e Thr e s hold exceeded for Pl -Unplanned S c r a m s per 7000 Cr i t i cal Hour s Safety Wh i te Signifi c an ce Date 4 t h Quarter 20 1 5 Supplemental Th e li censee ha s not yet declared readine s s; the 95001 i s not sc hedu l ed yet. I n s p e ct i on S t a tu s Traditional Enforcement Summary
* E A-14-180 -S LII I P rob l em (2 vio l at i on s in a s i ng l e NOV) -impa c t i ng the r e gu l atory pr o ce ss. i ss u ed March 1 6 , 2015. The first v i olat i on i nvo l ved En t e r gy's failure to notify the NRC within 30 days after learning , on October 25, 2012 , of a change in a U n it 3 reactor operator's (RO's) medica l c ond i tion th at i nvo l v e d a permanent d i sabi lit y/illn ess (s l e e p apnea). En t ergy a l so did n ot r eq u est an a m ended li cense with a condi ti on t o account for the med i cal i ssue, r esu lti ng in th e R O performing li censed operator d uti es withou t a proper l y restricted l icense. The s ec ond v i ol a tion i nvo l v e d En t e r g y's s ubmitt a l of inform a tion to the NRC in a De ce mber 3 , 20 1 2 , applica ti on for r enewal of the RO's l i cense th at was not comp l ete and accura t e in Offa;ial Yse GAly SeAsiti&#xa5;e IAterAal aAa See1:1rity Related IF1fe m,, 11tie 1 1 P r e Deeisioilal Off i cial Us e 0, ,Iv -Se, ,sitive Ii ,te, , ,al a11d !le cur l ty-1\ela ted 1 11 for rn atlon -Pre-Detlslonal Indian Point 2&3 3 all material respects. Specifically , the application did not specify that the RO had a medical condition that required a restriction (for use of a Continuous Positive Airway Pressure (CPAP) machine).
Based , in part, on this inaccurate information, the NRC issued a li cense renewal that did not contain the necessary restrict i on.
* I R 2015005-SL-IV NCV , impacting the regulatory process , issued August 7 , 2015. On Apr i l 27, 2015, I PEC issued an LER in accordance with 50.73 which reported three MSSV test failures (MS-46-2 , 45-4 , and 47-4) that occurred on February 27, 2015. However, the L ER did not discuss the failure of MS-46-3, which also failed its TS as-found lift setting test and was declared inoperable on March 22, 2015. MS-46-3 was inoperable for greater than its TS allowed outage time , which is a condition prohibited by TSs , and therefore is required to be reported to the NRC. In spection Followup:
IP 92723 was successfully completed at Indian Point during the week of December 7, 2015 , and is documented in IR 2015004. This inspection reviewed actions planned and taken in re s ponse to the above SL I V and SLIII vio l ation , an additional SLIV violation from 2014 (i nvo lving a failure to r eport the loss of a moveable in-core detector within one hour, as requ i red); these violations spanned the timeframe from July 1, 2014 , to July 1 , 2015. * (b )(5) Potential Safety-Significant Inspection Findings
* None Performance Indicators Close to Threshold
* None Open Unresolved Items I s sue Date Opened Licensee Actions Entergy fai l ed to identify all c ritical digita l a sset s (CDAs) in ac c ordance with the NRC app r oved cybe r security p l an Im p l ementation Schedule for M i l estone 2. Specifically, Entergy eva lu ated that dig i tal devices used for access authorization s uch a s the s ite's Secu r ity Acce ss Manage m ent Sy s tem (SAMS) wer e not classified as CDAs. 4Q2015 Based on an NRC inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, Entergy in i tiated CR-HQN-2015-00 3 49 on April 10, 2015, to tra ck a c tions necessary to a ddre ss Off i cial Use 01119 Se 11 sit i ve l 11 te 11 ,al a11d Secu, i ty-Rela led Ii ,Fo11 11 atio 11 P, e De c isioilal Offtcial Use Only 3e, ,sitive Ii ,te, 1 , el t1Ra See1,rity Related IPfocroarioo
-Pce-pecisi onal 4 ! Indian Point 2&3 NRC Next Steps NRC clarifications in these letters and ins ector concerns.
NSIR will prov i de additional guidance to the Region and the industry as t o whether the dig i tal devices for the Access Authorization Program should be classified as CDAs. Open 01 Investigations
* None Third Party Reviews
* Resident staff reviewed the results from the most recent WANO/IN PO plant performance assessment conducted du ring December 2015 (report not yet i ssued). There were no con flicts between the NRC assessment and the WANO draft assessment resul t s. The inspectors reviewed the final INPO p l ant assessment of Indian Point , Unit s 2 and 3 , conducted in December 2013. The inspectors evaluated these reports to ensure that NRC perspectives of Entergy performance were consistent with any issues identified du r ing the assessments.
The inspecto r s also review ed these r eports to determine whether INP O identified any significant safety is s ues that required further NRC fo ll ow-up. The results of this review were documented in the 2n d quarter resident inspection report 2014003. Off ic ial U5e Onl9 SeRsiti&#xa5;e IRterRal aREI ~ee1,rity Rela:teg IPt,m.iatigp Pce-DecisioPal Offltlal Use 01119 -Se, ,sitive l11te 11 1al a11d Seca, ity-Rela led Ii ifo 111 1atio 11 P, e Decisio 11 al Ind ia n Po int 2&3 5 Analysis of Cross-Cutting Areas (for finding specifics, refer to the PIM) Area Aspect 1015 2015 3015 4015 Total H.1 R eso ur ces 1 1 H.2 F ie l d Pr esence H.3 Chanqe M anaqe m e nt (l) H.4 Te a m wo rk 1 1 (.) H.5 Wo r k M a n age m e n t C: (1J H.6 D es ign M a r a i ns 2 2 E .... H.7 Do c ume n t at i o n 1 1 2 .g H.8 P roc edur e Ad h e r e n ce 1 1 2 (l) a.. H.9 T ra ininq C: (1J H.10 Base s for D ec ision s E H.11 C h a ll en q e the Unkn own 2 2 :::, I H.1 2 A void Co mpl ac en cy 1 1 H.13 C on s i s tent Pr oc es s H.14 Conserva ti ve Bi as 1 1 _ T o t a l @ac k s~ 4 4 3 1 12 ------P.1 I dentification P.2 Eva l uation 1 1 2 0::: P.3 Reso l ution 1 1 1 3 P.4 Trendinq a: P.5 Ooeratina Experience 2 2 P.6 Se l f-A s sessmen t T o t a l (B ackstop) 1 2 3 1 J 7 r S.1 SCWE P ol i cy S.2 A lt e rn a te P r ocess for Ra i s in g Conce rn s w S.3 Free Fl ow o f Inf o rm a ti o n Th e l ice n see h as rece i ved a c hill i n g effect (.) Cl) l e tt e r Th e li ce n see h as r ece i ved an e sca l a t e d I (S LIII or h ig h e r) e n fo r ce m e nt ac ti o n or or d e r in vo l v ing d i sc ri m i na ti o n. Human Performance and Pl&R A theme or CC I does not exist per IMC 0305. On J a nuary 27 , 2016 , the most recent P l&R biennia l inspection was comp l eted. Ba se d on the samples selected for review, t h e inspection team conc l uded that Entergy was generally effective in identifying , eva l uating , a nd re so lv ing problems. Ent e rgy per sonnel identif ied problems and entered them into the corrective action program. Entergy generally prioritized and evaluated is s ue s commensurate with the safet y significance of t he prob l ems and corrective actions were generally implemented in a tim e ly manner. In addi ti on t o imp l eme ntati on of the co rr ec t ive ac tion program, the in s pector s also review e d Entergy's u se of operating experience , conduct o f assessments, and sa fety conscious work environment at the station. Ba se d on the samples selected for review , the inspectors d id not ident i fy any i s sues with Entergy's u se of ind ust ry operating experience.
The i nspec tors c oncluded that the se l f-assessments reviewed were Of&#xa3;ic ial J !s e Oo l v-Seosi1 i ve Jo t ecoal aod Se rn c ity-Belated lofacmatiao
-Pre-Decjsj o nal Offltlal Use Only Sensi t ive l 11t e1 n al a n d !le cur l t y-Rela ted Ii lfu, 111atiu11
-fl, e Decisio 11 al 6 ! Indian Point 2&3 effective in identifying issues and improvement opportunities.
Finally, the inspectors found no evidence of significant challenges to Indian Point's safety conscious work environment Based on the inspectors
' observations, Indian Point staff are willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means avai labl e. However, two security-re l ated green NCVs were identified during the inspection. One cross-cutting aspect was assigned in the area of Human Performance , T eamwork , because Entergy work groups failed to communicate and coordinate their activities w i thin and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear security is maintained
[H.4]. Additionally , one cross-cutting a s pect was assigned in the area of Problem I dentification and Resolution, Resolution, because Entergy failed to take effective corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with safety significance
[P.3]. Safety Conscious Work Environment Concerns
* None Planned Refueling Outages, Temporary Instructions, and Other Significant Activities Tl 2800/041 , 10 CFR Part 37 Physical Protection of Category 1 and Category 2 Quantities of Radioactive Material at Facilities with a 1 O CFR 73 Physical Protection Program Unit 2 Refueling Outage (2R22) Unit 3 Refueling Outage (3R 19) Tl-191 FLEX Order Impl ementation (dependent on SE issuance)
Units 2&3 Triennial Fire Prot ec tion Biennial Pl&R 01/11/2016 -01/15/2016 03/07/2016-04/06/2016 03/06/2017 -03/31/2017 04/17/2017-04/21/2017 05/01/2017 -05/05/2017 05/15/2017 -05/19/2017 11/27/2017 -12/01/2017 12/11/2017 -12/15/2017 Proposed Appendix C Inspections through December 31 , 2017 IP 60845, Operation of I nter-Unit Fuel Transfer Canister and Cask S stem Planned 2016 Pl&R Samples Corrective actions for the 31 main transformer fire on Unit 3: Unit 3 tripped when the 31 m a in transformer faulted and caught on fire on May 9 , 2015 (CR-IP 3-2015-02913) DRS (Patel) is s c hedu l ed to review the root cause and co r rective a c tions when the RCE i s approved by CARB in F e bruary 2016. Also verify that previous tra n sformer failu r es were included i n the CAP products. Unit 2 Main Boiler Feed P um p loss of trip-ability due to control oil problems:
the Unit 2 main feedwater pump failed to trip automat i cally and manually from the c ontrol room dur i ng the Unit 2 rea c tor trip on De c embe r 5, 20 1 5 (CR-IP 2-2015-05459). The feedwater pump had to be tripped locally. Tech Spec 3.7.3 (Main F e edwater I solation) requir es the main f e edwater p ump to be operab l e. T he resident office (B. Haagensen) will review the aooarent conflict between the Tech Spec requirement and the 07/25/2016-07/29/2016 09/04/2017 -09/08/2017 DRS-J. Patel 102016 DRP 102016 Offltlal Use Only Sensitive Ii 1te 11 1al and ~ecu, ity-fl.ela ted l 11 fu1111atio 11 fl, e-Decisio11al Offici a l Use 0 1119 Se113itioe 11,tw'lel BRB See1:1rity RelatQa IRfan:;:i at ion l?ce-Decisiooal Indian Po i nt 2&3 7 degraded cond i tion in t h e 1 s t quarter of 20 1 6 (in progress).
Maintenance Rule process for balanc i ng reliab i lity with a vail a bility: The residents have noted in the past that the p r ocess fo r balancing r e li ab ili ty and availabi l ity i s not conducted in a systema t ic way. Th i s problem was noted recently dur i ng the DRP 202016 P l&R inspection by S. Rich. There is no CR for this issue of co n cern. T he resident office (S. Rich) w ill rev i ew the ba l anc i ng process du r ing the i n 2nd q u arter of 2016. Comm e rc ia l dedicat i on of non-qu a lified QA p a rts i n safety systems: T he r e have been severa l recent a ll egations r egard in g the insta ll ation of non-qualified parts in safety-related systems with commercial dedication occurring after the part has been p l aced in service. T h e i ndiv i dua l allegat i ons h ave been properly DRP 3020 1 6 dispositioned.
The resident office (G. N ewman) will review the effectiveness of the changes made i n response to these a ll egat i ons to the commercia l dedicat i on process dur i ng t h e 3 rd quarter 2016. Effectiveness of the corre c tive actions for the degraded conditions that c a us e d the U n it 2 r e actor trip on December 5: DRS w i ll review the resolution of the var i ous degraded cond i tions noted during the Unit 2 reactor tr i p. T his included a DRS 202016 fa il ed 480 vo l t MCC 24 (CR-I P2-2015-05464
), a degraded a l ternate power supply for the rod c ontrol that overheated and caused contro l rods to drop as we ll as valves that failed to proper ly s t roke (CR-IP 2-2015-05460 , 05461, 05466 , 05467). R e view of the c a u ses a nd ac tions b e ing t a k e n to a dd r ess the January 2016 tritium groundwater le a k. Rev i ew actions being taken to investigate the rad waste drain system and DRS 102016 causes of contam i nated water exit i ng the building enve l opes and entering the groundwater.
(1 st ind i cation that the leak occu rr ed was on 1 /16; see CR-I P2-2016-00264
/ CR-I P2-2016-0 0226.) S e rvic e wat e r s yst e m piping l ea k s: There hav e b ee n n umerous leaks i n ASME c l ass I ll service water p i pes over the past yea r. Th is has inc l uded the 21 fan coole r un i t motor (CR-I P2-20 1 5-05755), 21 CCW h eat exchanger s upp l y l in e (CR-I P2-20 1 5-05358), 24 fan coo l er unit , and t h e 32 CCW hea t DRS 2 or .3Q20 1 6 exchanger supp ly l i ne. I nspection should inc l ude verifica t ion this i s captured in Maintenance Rule appropriate l y. Staffed by DRS i n 2 nd or 3 rd q u arter of 2016 after N RR has comp l eted the li cense renewal audit of the service water system. MT&E Pr o gram e quipment ca libr a ti o n a nd ope ra bility i ss u es: There have been a number of i ssues identified with MT&E that was not properly calibrated.
A review wi ll be DRP 302016 conducted to assu r e that issues identified in m ul tip l e condition re ports a r e beina adeauate l v i dentified and resolved.
Ext e nt o f conditi o n a nd root ca u s e an a ly s i s for th e Unit 3 r eac tor h ea d fl a ng e g as k et l ea k: T he Un it 3 reactor vesse l h ead f l ange gasket l eaked following the r efueling outage in DRP 302016 Mar c h. T hi s le ak r es u l ted in a p l ant s hutdown to repai r the leak i n September. Unit 3 has had several prob l ems with leakina Off ic ial Use 0111 v Se11siti oe li1le11 ,al a11d Seculit9-Re l a led Ii ,fu1111atio11 fl, e-E>ecisio11al Gffaiial lJ se Gr:t ly l!ier:tsiti v e lr:t t e rn a l a r:te ~e1;1,1rit
~* Rel a t e e lr:tfe r r:t:1atie r:t
* P re i;>e1;isier:tal 8 ! I ndian Point 2&3 reactor vessel head flanges over the past 1 0 years. Unit 2 had not has any problems of this nature. T his samp l e will review the differences between Unit 2 and Unit 3 as well as the r oot causes of the head gasket leak and determine if they have been adequately corrected.
Cyber Security.
Follow up on co rre ct iv e actions from T l-2201/104 as requested by NSIR Other Items of Interest DRS TB D (CY2016 or CY2017)
* Li cense Renewal: Eleve*n content ion s have been heard: one was settled, one was re so lv ed in favor of New York, and nine were resolved in favor of the Entergy and the Staff. Appea l s from the B oa r d's resolution of t wo contentions are pending before t h e Commission.
Hearings on the th ree remaining safety contentions were held in Tarrytown, NY , on Novem ber 16-1 9, 20 15; th e Bo ard is not likely to issue a decision before the latter h a lf of 2016. Th e NR C Staff issued its. second supp l ement to the S.afety Evaluation Report (S ER) for li cense renewal o f IP2 and IP 3 in N ovembe r 2014, which it published in July 20 1 5. Th e NRC staff ha s sc hedule d an onsite audit of Entergy's serv i ce water integ r i ty and fi r e water system aging management programs during the week of February 22 , 20 1 6. T he audit wi ll foc u s on how Ente r gy manages r ecu rrin g internal co rro sion in th e serv i ce water int egr i ty and fire water syste m , as well as aging effects managed by th e Fire Water System Progr am. T he staff's review of these issues was prompted by the issuance of interim staff g u idance document LR-ISG-2 012-02 , "Agi ng Mana ge ment of Internal Surfaces, F ire Water Systems, Atmospheric Storage Tanks, an d Corrosion Under I nsu l at i on." On D ecembe r 22, 2015, t he Staff issued a draft for pub li c com ment of the second supplement to the Final Supp l ementa l Envi ronmental Impact Statemen t (F S EI S Vo l. 5) for li cense renewal o f IP 2/IP 3. Th is supp l ement addresses new information received by the staff s in ce p re pa r at ion and pub li cation of the previous FSEIS Supplement (FS EIS Vol. 4) in June 2013. Th e public comment per i od closes on March 4 , 2016. T he staff expects to issue the fi na l FSEIS Supplement in September 2016. It is poss i ble th a t the d r aft and/or fi n a l FSEIS supp l emen t s. may trigger the filing of n ew environmental con t en t ions.
* Leak Rate T est Int erval Extension: In December 20 1 4, En tergy fil ed a li cense amendment r equest for Indian Po i nt Unit 2 that would permanently extend th e fre qu ency of th e containment integrated leak rate t est (ILRT) from once every 10 years to once every 1 5 years. Th e l ast ILRT was performed i n 2006 and will need to be performed dur in g the upcoming March 20 1 6 r efueling outage unless the staff approves the a m end m ent r equest. In M ay 20 1 5, the State of NY Attorney General's Office ob j ected to the amendment request a nd filed a petition to intervene an d reque st f or hearing. The ASLB denied the request in their d ecision dated Sep t ember 25 , 20 1 5. The State of NY AG Office fil ed an appea l on October 20, 2015 , and the final d ec i sion is n ow before the Commission.
The NRR technical staff recommends a pprov a l of t he request an d NRR/DO RL i s preparing a No tifica t ion of Signi fi can t Licensing Action (N S LA) inform i ng the Commission t h at the staff intends to take the l icensing action on or about February 12, 2016. I f th e Commission does not object within 5 working days fo ll owing receipt o f the N S LA , the s t aff can take the proposed action. In ea rly 20 15 , the staff granted Entergy's s i milar reques t to ex t end the ILRT in t erva l to 15 yea r s for I ndian Poi nt Unit 3. O ffie isl U5e ORiy S e Asiti&#xa5;e l r:t tern;.I aAd S ecwi!y-B el a!ed lofocroatiao Pre-Peci s j on a l Offltlal Use 01119 -Se, ,sitive l11te 11 1al a11d Seca, ity-Rela led Ii ifo 111 1atio 11 P, e Decisio 11 al Indian Point 2&3 9
* Spectra Energy's Proposed Natural Gas Pipeline (A IM Project):
Spectra Energy approached Entergy during the summer of 2013 about plans to expand their natural gas pipeline capacity across the Hudson River with a new 42-inch d i ameter pipeline.
On February 28 , 2014 , Spectra filed an app li cation with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for a certificate to build a new 42-inch natural gas pipeline along a southern route on Indi an Poin t property. Entergy performed a site hazards analysis to determine the impact of the new natural gas pipeline on the site. On August 21, 2014 , Entergy submitted a 50.59 evaluation and blast analysis for NRC review. A Region I DRS security inspector and Headquarters expert on blast analysis performed an ROP baseline inspection (71111.18
-Plant Modifications) of the 50.59 and blast ana ly sis. The results of the inspection were documented in the 3 r d quarter 2014 resident inspe c tion report. In summary , the inspectors determined Entergy had appropriately concluded that the proposed pipeline does not introduce significant additional r i sk to safety-re l ated SSCs and SSCs important-to-safety at Indian Point Units 2 and 3; and, therefore, the change in t he design bases external hazards analysis associated with the proposed pipeline does not r equire pr i or NRC review and approval.
FERC approved Spectra Energy's application on March 3 , 2015 , and construction has begun in areas near the I ndian Point owner controlled property.
The pipeline continues to receive considerable stakeholder interest and opposition. FERC has received multiple Congressional and local requests to reopen hearings.
On January 28 , 2016 , FERC issued an order denying a rehearing and dism i ss i ng the stay request regarding the proposed Algonquin In cremental Market (AIM) pipel i ne project at Indian Point.
* Indian Point 2 Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis:
The existing Un i t 2 technical s pecification s for SFP crit i cality are non-con s ervative and c ompensatory measures have been imp l emented. The licensee initiated a SFP management improvement program that was originally scheduled for completion in 2016. A SFP criticality analysis , prepared by NETCO (a bu s ine s s segment of Sc i entech Curtiss-Wright), was s ubm i tted for NRC r e view and approval in November 2014. On November 23 , 2015 , the staff prov i ded conditional approval of the NETCO report for reference at Indian Point 2. The critical i ty analysis takes cred i t for new boron inse*rt s currently being de s igned by Ho l tec. Boron impregnated insert s w i ll be installed in two phases pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. Phase 1 , o rig inally scheduled for late 2015 , will include regions of the SFP that have experien c ed the most degradation of the boroflex inserts. Phase 2 , orig i nally scheduled for late 2016 , will complete the process. The schedules for both Phase 1 and 2 have been delayed. Entergy plans to s ubmit a license amendment request that r eferences the NETCO crit i cality analysis and seeks NRC approval of the new neutron absorb i ng inserts and revised technical specifications.
* Weapons Preemption:
The Ind ian Point security force current l y uses weapons and c apa c ity magazine s that are banned by s tate and lo c al law s. On J a nuary 5 , 2016, NRR issued the confirmatory order , conforming amendments, and supporting safety evaluation that will permit security p , ersonne l at Indian Point to transfer, rece i ve , possess, transport , import , and u se c ertain firearm s and l arge capac i ty ammunition f e eding device s not previously permitted to be owned or possessed under Commission authority , notwithstanding certain local , state, or federal firearms laws, including regulations that prohib i t such actions. Offa;i3l 'I H 1 Only Seositive lo!eroal aod Sernr ity-Bela ted Informa t ion Pre-Decisional OHieial Use 0 1 1 ly Sem iti oe II 1 te.i , al a 11 d Se cu 1 it y Rel a led Ii , Fu, 11 ,aliu 1 , -fl, e-Elecisiu11al 10 ! Indian Point 2&3
* NY Department of Public Service Investigation
: On December 16, 2015, Governor Cuomo directed the NYS Department of Public Service (DPS) to launch an investigation into the operations and safety protocols of I ndian Point. The direction was i n response to the Unit 3 trip caused by the failure of an insulator on a high voltage transmission line. The trip was uncomplicated , but did result in the performance indictor for unplanned scrams crossing over the white threshold , and follows a trip of Ind ian Point Unit 2 which occurred the pr io r week. The NRG continues to monitor the Sta te's investigation.
OGG has been invo l ved s ince the inve s tigation is potentially pre-empted by NRG authority.
The NRG s taff co ntinues to maintain an open dialogue with the State and respond to their questions.
* State 401 Wate r Qua li ty Certificate
: On April 2 , 20 1 0 , New York State denied Entergy's request for a Clean Water Act (CWA) section 401 Water Quality Certificate (WQC) for the period of extended operation unles s cooling towers were constructed. Entergy has appealed the ru lin g to the State. The h earings were split by topic and began i n October 2011. Hearings will take place in 2016 on the two remaining top ics. The DEC's current best estimate for a final decision on Entergy's appeal is early 2017 , although that could be extended further. Entergy is continuing to operate under its existing WQC and SPDES permit, which is in effect under the timely renewal doctrine and will continue in effect until Entergy's pending application for a SPDES permit under the CWA is resolved in the ongoing New York State adjudication.
The NRC ha s not determined whether it wi ll issue a renewed license for operation of IP2/IP 3 prior to the completion of New York's administrative proceedings.
* Coastal Zone Management Act and Consistency Rev iew: On December 17 , 2012, pursuant to the Coastal Zone Management Act, Entergy provided a consistency certification to the NRG and furnished a copy to NYSDOS. However , by l etter to the NRC dated November 5 , 2014 , Entergy withdrew this consistency certification pending issuance of the NRC Staffs 2016 supplement to i ts Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement
("FSE I S Supplement")
concerning IPE C license r enewa l. NYDOS stated that Entergy did not have the right to withdraw its application. On November 6, 20 1 5 , NYSDOS denied Entergy's certification.
On November 10, 2015, Entergy appealed to the Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), asking that NOAA fi nd the NYSDOS decision i nvalid and based on Entergy's withdrawa l. On November 25 , 2015, NOAA deferred its decision pending the outcome of the ru lin g by the New York Court of Appea l s (discussed below). On December 11, 2014, the NY State Supreme Court Appe ll ate Division declared Indian P o int Units 2 and 3 exempt from a coastal zone management cons i s t ency review under the New York Coasta l Management Program. A five j udge panel unanimously agreed to rev e r se an earlier ruling by a lower court that had upheld a N ew York State De pa rtm ent of State (NYSDOS) decision denying the two Indian Point units from being grandfathered unde r , and therefo r e exempt from, the state Coastal Management Program. T his appellate court ruling affirmed Entergy's position that In dian Point does not need t o seek a new cons i stency certification from NYSDOS in order fo r the p l ants to have their operating li censes renewed by the NRC. Th e court ruled that because Indi an P oint began operating in the mid-1970s and an environmental impact statement for eac h unit was prepa r ed prior to the effective date of New Yo rk State's coastal zone management regulation s , the consistency cert ifi cation for Units 2 and 3 is automatically grandfathered for Offa;i3l l lgg GA l y SeAsiti&#xa5;e IAterAal aAEI ~eel:lrity Relateel IAfeFFl'latieA Pre DeeisieAal Gffaiial lJ se Gr:t ly l!ier:tsiti v e lr:t t e rn a l a r:te ~e1;1,1rit
~* Rel a t e e lr:tfe r r:t:1atie r:t
* P re i;>e1;isier:tal Indian Po int 2&3 11 the plants' entire lifetime under state law. New York has appea led the decision to the New York Court of Appeals; briefing of that appeal is scheduled to be completed in early 2016. On January 14, 2016, Entergy Nucl ear filed sui t against Cesar Perales, in his official capacity as the Secretary of the New York State Department of State ("NYDOS").
The suit is related to the licensee renewal application for India n Point currently under review by the NRG-specifically Coastal Zone Management Act ("CZ MA") comp li ance. Absent an exemption, the CZMA allows a state agency to object to the granting of a federal license on the ground that the facility is inconsistent with the state's coastal management program ("CMP"). Such an objection, unless overturned, prevents the federal agency from issuing the license. On November 6 , 2015, NYSDOS issued an objection concerning Indian Poin t's license renewal application.
According to Entergy, the objection repeatedly relies on nuclear safe ty concerns a nd , further , the objection's p urport edly nonnuclear safety rat iona l e (i.e., that Indian Point harms aquatic species in the Hudson R ive r) is but merely a pretext for NYSDOS's nuclear safety concerns.
Thus , Entergy argues that the objection thu s i ntrudes on the field o f the NRC's exclusive regulatory authority over nuclear safety concerns , and is as such preempted under well-settled case law. Entergy seeks a declaratory judgment that the objection is invalid and an injunction ordering the objection to be withdrawn.
While the su it mentions the New York Department of Public Service ("NYDPS") investigation (initiated at the direction of Governor Cuomo in a letter dated Nov. 16, 2015) as further evidence of a broad " effort by [NY] to undertake preempted r eg ul a t ion of Ind ian Point on nuclear safety grounds ," Entergy does not request as part of the su it any declaratory judgment or injunctive relief with respect to said NYDPS investigation.
* Groundwater Tritium: Due to previously identified tritium groundwater contamination events during Unit 2 refueling outages 2R19 (2010) and 2R20 (2012), prior to the start of 2R21 (February 2014), IPEC increased the frequency of sampling in mon itoring wells around the Unit from quarterly to monthly. In March 2014, monthly well samples from monitoring wells (MW) 31 and 32 showed sign ificant in creased tritium activity (up to 660,000 pCi/1). IPEC initiated a Condition Report (CR) and began conducting an investigation as to the source of the tritium contamination using the Kepner-Treg oe (KT) Analytic process. IPEC invest igation activities also included performance of an underwater remote video examination to VT-1 inspection standards of the cask loading area of the Unit 2 spent fuel pool. IPEC ultimately attributed the tr it ium to a mid-February 2014 drain down activity of the containment spray header , when reactor coolant spilled on the floor of the 51' elevation of the pipe penetration building , rather than flowing down a floor drain at that l oca t ion. A Problem Identificat ion and Resolution team inspect ion (Pl&R) was conducted on May 4-6, 2015. Results of the in spec tion includ ed one l icensee-identified Green inspect ion finding for a violation of Plant Technica l Specification 5.4.1.a, in that Entergy did not evaluate work practices invol ving changing the mode of opera tion to drain the containment spray system to a floor drain in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building to ass u re that t h e drainage operation d i d not reach groundwater. Subseq u ent to th e Pl&R in spection, in July 2015, the NRC re cognized that groundwater tritium levels at MW-30 had sp iked to 938,500 pCi/1 in February 2015 , and remained above 400,000 pCi/1 , some e leven months after the event identified by IPEC as the root cause had been terminated. This value was the highest tri t ium levels ever measured at IPEC since t h e start of the groundwater monitoring program in the mid-2000s. A telephone conference with IPEC was held on July 7, 2015 , and based on that meet ing , together with further review by the NRC staff, it was concluded that the February 2015 tritium spike was not part of the O ffic ial U se 0 1119 Se 11 sit iv e li1 t e 11 1al a 11 d ~e carlty-Rela t ed Info rm a ti on P re-Dec1s1ona l
OHieial Us e O Riy S e R siti&#xa5;e IA t eF A a l aAel See 1:1 Fi ty Relateel IAie F FAati aA P Fe i;>eGi&ier:tal 12 ! Indian Point 2&3 2014 event, and represented a new leak, which had not been reviewed by the licensee.
The NRC ide nt ifi ed a Green Finding for a violation of 10CFR20.1406(c), in that Entergy did not conduct operations to minimize the introduction of residual rad ioact ivity into the subsurface due to its fai l ure to identi fy a leak of tritium seen in February 2015 as unrelated to the previous l y ident ified leak of tritium in Mar ch 2014. This was documented in the 3 rd quarter integrated inspection rep,ort. In mid-September 2015, IPEC called the NRC (D. Mayer to J. Noggle) to inform the NRC of IP EC's plans to complete installation and operation of a recovery well previously insta ll ed (RW-1 ), to collect the subject tr i tiated groundwater and return i t to Unit 2 fo r normal liquid radioactive effluent processing.
IPEC had previously identified this as a potential corrective act i on for the March 2014 spill. While the cause of the current l y elevated groundwater tritium concentrations is unclear , the installation of the Unit 2 groundwater recovery well and its planned operation beginning in the summer of 2016, is expected to address the current groundwater con tamination issue. As of December 7, 2015, the current tritium va l ue was 457,400 pCi/1 at MW-30-69.
* 2.206 Petition: By letter dated October 15 , 20 14, Paul Blanch subm itted a 2.206 petition critical of Entergy's 50.59 site hazards ana l ysis report associated with the proposed Spectra Energy 42-inch diameter natural gas pipeline.
Mr. Blanch asserted that Entergy's 50.59 analysis was in accu r a t e and in complete r esul ting in vio l ations of 10 CFR 50.9, "Co mpleteness and Accuracy of I nformation
," and possibly 1 0 CFR 50.5 , " Del ibe r a te Misconduct." The petition gathered significant local stakeholder and po l itica l interest.
The petitioner made presentat i ons before the PRB on January 28 and July 15 , 2015. On September 9, 2015, the PRB rejected the petition on the basis that all iss ues ident i fied in the petition and its s upple men ts had been previously reviewed and r eso lved by th e NRC sta ff. Despite the r ejection , the petitioner continues to pursue the issue with the staff.
* 31 Ma in Tran sformer Fir e: On May 9, 2015, at 5:50 p.m., IP 3 experienced a main turbingenerator lockout , main turbine trip , and automatic reactor trip as a result of an explosion and fire on the 31 Main Transformer.
The site fire brigade was act ivated at 5: 52 p.m., and ca ll ed for offsite resources at 5: 53 p.m. A Not ice of Unusua l Event was dec l ared at 6: 01 p.m. due to an explosion in the Protected A r ea. The fire was initially extinguished at 6:15 p.m.; however, i t reflashed at 6:37 p.m., at which time additional offsite resourc es were brought into the Prote cted Area. Th e fire brigade contin u ed to fight the fire with foam and declared the fire extinguished at 8:05 p.m. During the event, there were reports of water in accumu l ation in the 480V swi t chgear room , totaling approximately 1 to 2 inches in depth. T he source of the water was determined to be deluge system water that had come from a deluge valve room that s it s ad j acent to the 480V switchgea r room. The water was unab l e to completely drain through a floor drain due to its lim ited capaci ty, r esu lting in i t making its way into the 480V sw i tchgear room. An IM C 0309 revi ew was co mpl eted, and a Special In spect i on T eam (SI T) was sent to IPE C on May 19 in order to review Entergy's response to the event, equipment performance and design, and the licensee causa l analyses.
The S I T inspect ion report (I R 2015010) was i ss u ed on July 23 rd with one Green NCV associated with Entergy's failure to correct a degraded condition o ffir e protection system so l enoid valve SOV-230-1 after previous fai lur es of the va l ve during testing in 2011 , 2014 and 2015. Offi c ial f l se Only Sensitive In ternal and Sec11city-Re latgd IAfgn:: A e1 tign ~rg O Q bi S iQAeil Official Use 01119 Semitioe IRteFAal aREl ~gc**rity-Belated lofacroatioo
-Pre-Decisional Indian Po int 2&3 13 A Maintenance Rule sample regarding the main transformer failure was documented in 2015003 with no findings.
As a part of that sample, a system review, and a review of the 31 main transformer failure was performed to ensure the effectiveness of maintenance activities. Past planned and corrective maintenance were also reviewed to verify t hey had been performed in accordance with work instructions. An interna l flood i ng samp l e was documented in 2015003 , and identified a Green finding becau se Entergy allowed the Unit 3 480V switchgear room floor drains to become blocked suc h that they could not mit i gate an internal flood if both SW relief valves in the switchgear room lifted. A Pl&R sample will be performed once Entergy's RCE is comp l e t e. Key Messages * (b )(5) *
* Off i cial Use 01119 SeAsiti&#xa5;e IRterRal aAd S ecwity Belated lofocroatiao Pre-De cisional Oftt c1a i U se O n l y S e nsitive Inter n al and Seca1 ity Related ii ,fent1atiaA Pre i;>eGi,ional 14 I I n d i a n Point 2 & 3 (b )(5) Attachments
: 1. P l ant S p ecific Action-Ma t rix H istor y Chart 2. Draft End-of-Cyc l e Assessment Letter 3. P l ant Issues Matrix (Prev i ous Four Quarters , all cornerstones)
: 4. RPS Report 22 and RPS Report 24 (1!pcoming 24 Mont h s) 5. Performance I ndicator for U nplanned Scrams pe r 7000 Critical Hours Offieial Use ORiy SeAsiti&#xa5;e IAterAai and Sei;;*,rity
~Ql3:tQg lnto crmt;on Pre-Deci s ional Official Use 011ly 5e11sitive l11te111al a11d 5eculity-f!;elated l 11for11 1atio11 Pre-Oetlslonal I nd i an Point 2&3 I 15 Indian Point Unit 2 Action Matri x History Chart CY 2012 CY 2013 CY 2014 CY 2015 Q1 Q2 Q 3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 ROP-13 ROP-13 ROP-14 ROP-14 ROP-15 ROP-15 ROP-1 6 ROP-16 MC EOC MC EOC MC EOC MC EOC IE MS B l EP PUB RAD occ RAD SEC Action Matrix LR LR LR LR LR LR LR LR LR LR L R LR LR LR LR LR Column SCC I ,//, ,'///////h WhW#ff#A ,'//.,',, ,'////////, *n 'fU 'Hij'/,1 Theme * -------(no SCCI) '/A r, ., W#####hl V/h/H/.r,n,01 W#####A W#ff#ff#A W###ff#A O&#xa3;&#xa3;icial Ilse Or:tly S 1m~itiirs lr:1tsrr:13I 3r:1g Ss,Yrit>,r Relates lr:1farFl'latier:1 Pre QeeisieAal O#ieial Use ORiy SeAsiti&#xa5;e IAterA a l aAa See1:1rit.,*
R.elatea IAfarFAatieA Pre QeeisieAal 16 I In d i an Po in t 2 & 3 Indian Point Unit 3 Action Matr ix H i story Chart CY 2012 CY 2013 CY 2014 CY 2015 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q 3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 RO P-13 R OP-1 3 ROP-14 RO P-14 RO P-15 R O P-15 ROP-1 6 RO P-16 MC EOC MC EOC M C E OC M C EOC IE I E-1 MS Bl EP PUB RAD occ RAD SEC Action Matrix LR LR LR LR LR LR LR LR LR LR LR LR LR LR LR RR Column SCCI ",I', "f , -,'/. ,,,. ,,,. ara r//. Theme 0 ,'/. ,'/. ,'//.~ :,'/,,~ V//////, ,'h ,'////////, *n"IN"n,,'/A
---(no --SCCI) IE-1 Scrams per 7 00 0 Cri ti cal Hours Official Use Ofll 9 Sensiti&#xa5;e I RterAa l a As See1,1rit;y ggl;;itgd lo&#xa3;ocrnatioa Pce-Decisiaaal Indian Point Unit 2 forced outage from December 9 through December 23'd. Re s pon s e to que s tion s fro m Paul Blan c h: Indian Point Unit 2 was shut down on December gth to replace a reactor coolant pump shaft seal that was approaching the allowed leakage limit. Shortly after th e reactor was shut down, a containment entry was made by licensee personnel.
During the entry into containment, boron w as di s cov e re d in the vi c inity of the rea c t o r pre ss ure ve sse l fl a n g e. Th e le ak w as s m a ll en o u g h that it was not detected by either the reactor pressure vessel outer seal drain line or the containment air particulate detector.
Total unidentified leak rate for Unit 2 at the time of the shut down w as l es s than t en p e rc e n t o f the a ll o wed limit of on e g a l lo n p er minut e. Thi s limit i s specified in the operating license technical specifications.
There was no corrosion of the reactor pressure vessel or head due to the leakage from the vessel o-rings. An in-service inspection specialist from Region I was dispatched to the site to perform in s pection o f components e x pos e d to th e boro n leak a g e. S e v e ral of th e 64 rea c tor pressure vessel closure studs were exposed to boron and were cleaned, inspected, and evaluated by the licensee.
One of the studs did not meet acceptance criteria for re-use and was replaced with a spare s tud. Both o-r ing sea l s w ere replaced during the rea c tor ve ss el assembly.
The design of the seals was modified slightly based on engineering recommend a tions , in an attempt to elimin a te the s eal l e akage. There has been no evidence of leakage of the Inner or outer seals since the unit came back on line on December 23rd. These o-ring seals will be replaced again during the Unit 2 spring refueling outage. Licensees perform Root Cause Analyses to determine the root and contributing causes, specify corrective actions, determine the scope of extent of condition and extent of cause review, and determine if a poor s af e ty cul t ure played a role in the c au s al factors. Root cau s e analy s es performed by the licensee are typically completed 30 to 45 days after initiation.
The NRC revi e ws the se root c ause evaluation s as part of the reactor oversight process. Viol a tion s of NRC regulations are sometimes discovered during the review of these root cause analyses.
Any violation that is determined to be more than minor is documented in the quarterly integrated in s pe cti on report. There were no event s or no t ifi c ation th r esho l ds m e t by I n di a n Point during the December 2017 forced outage that required a report to the NRC.
Indian Point Unit 3 Reactor Pressure Vessel 0-Ring Seal Leak Key Messages
* The licensee identified a small amount of Unit 3 reactor coolant system leakage, within the primary containment, coming from a reactor pressure vessel 0-ring flange seating surface.
* The 0-ring leakage and resulting increase in containment airborne particulate activity levels are within the plant's Technical Specifications and license requirements and does not currently pose a threat to public health or safety.
* The licensee has scheduled a near-term shutdown of Unit 3 to perform repairs and is monitoring the issue to ensure the plant can be operated safely despite the small amount of leakage through the 0-rings. Additionally, the licensee Is conducting engineering evaluations and failure modes analyses to implement repairs and prevent recurrence.
* NRC Resident Inspector staff continue to closely monitor the situation and have no immediate safety concerns.
Facts
* The rea c tor pre ss ure vessel head is attached to the pressure vessel by 56 2-lnch closure studs and sealed using two concentric 0-rings: an inner and outer. Either 0-ring is designed to provide the sealing function.
* Following startup from the last Unit 3 refueling outage (Spring 2017), the inner 0-ring was in service and exhibited leakage , which was followed by a steady increase in containment unidentified leakage. The Hcen see then placed the outer 0-ring in service, which also began to leak.
* The 0-ring leakage and resulting increase in containment airborne particulate activity levels are within the plant's Technical Specifications and license requirements and currently pose no threat to public health and safety.
* The licensee plans to conduct a shutdown of Indian Point Unit 3 on June 11 to repair the 0-ring leakage. Th e Resid e nt inspector staff will closely monitor and inspect the issue.
* There is a history of 0-ring leaks at Indian Point Units 2 and 3, dating back to the 1990s. Indian Point is currently conducting a failure modes and affects analysis that includes reviewing operating experience and benchmarking other utilitie s. The cause of the leak is currently unknown; however, foreign material may have migrated to the vicinity of the 0-ring seating surfaces, during recent outage-related activities.
* The Resident Inspector staff are conducting a Problem Identification and Resolution inspection of the current and previous reactor vessel head 0-ring leaks.
From: Sent: To:
 
==Subject:==
Haagensen, Brian Friday, June 09, 2017 8:17 AM Ambrosini, J osep hin e; H aage n s en, Brian; Highl ey , C hri s t op her; M cKo wn, L o uis; Rich, Sarah; Setzer, Thomas; Siwy, Andrew; Henrion, Mark RPV Head Seal Leakage assessment IP3 RPV Flange seal leakage may have increased over the past 24 hours. Total leak rate has increased from 0.23 to 0.27 gpm today. Theo-ring leakage is a combination of unidentified leakage coming out the flange seating surface and identified leakage flowing through the o-ring seal leakoff lin e Into the RCDT. The current leak rate trend is shown below. It is hard to measure RPV o-ring seal leakage alone because it is a co mbin a tion of UIL and IL. Fl a nge le akage parti a lly co ntribut es to id ent i fied l ea kag e if t h e flange l ea koff line is flowing boric acid from the o-ring leak into the RCDT. We are seeing an increase in the area around the flange seating surface where the boric acid is leaking out. There is no other information to indicate why m eas ur e d identifi ed l ea kage would incre as e when the UIL de c reased except for the o-ring l eakage go in g i nto the RCDT. The planned outage will s t art o n June 11 at midni ght. The power r e duction will b egin around 2200 this evening. (b)(4) Brian C. H aage n sen Senior Resident Inspector Indian Point Energy Center 914 7 39-9360 (Office) (b)(6) (Cell~ I P3 RCS Leak8ge Indian Point Reactor Vessel (RPV) 0-ring Seal Leaks Assessment:
June 8, 2017
* Safety perspective of the issue: There* is little immediate safety significance to small amounts of RCS coolant leakage through the RPVowring flange seating surfaces.
Increasing RCS leakage may increase containment airborne particulate activity levels and challenge Tech Spec limits for RCS leakage resulting in a plant shutdown.
Hot boric acid may intrude onto the RPV head studs (made of carbon steel) which may experience boric acid degradation.
Ultimately, the reactor vessel integrity could theoretically be challenged if sufficient stud wastage occurs but this is highly unlikely considering the large number of studs (32) and the limited corrosion rates that would be experienced over a refueling cycle.
* How it was identified:
Following startup from the last refueling outage, the inner owring failed followed by a steady increase in RCS unidentified leakage (0.01 gpm to 0.12 gpm) over a five day period. Containment airborne particulate activity levels showed a slight increase as expected.
Operators entered containment at power and visually observed boric acid leakage seeping out around the RPV head flange area.
* Previous history: In 2015 following the last previous refueling outage, IP3 was shutdown to repair o-ring leakage. IP2 also experienced a recent failure of an inner o-ring seal in March 2017. RPV head o-ring seal failure history: o 1986 -1989 there were a cluster of 4 o-ring leaks split between both units in the late o 1995 -the o-ring design was then changed to a different type of o-ring o 1996 -2014 fewer leaks occurred w only 3 inner o-ring leaks in 10 years o 2015-2017
-frequency of a-ring leaks increased -3 leaks in 2 years:
* 3R18 in May 2015 -Unit 3 had a double owring leak and plant shutdown
* 2R22 -Unit 2 had a single o-ring leak in March 2017 (current condition)
* 3R19-May 2017 Unit 3 had a double a-ring leak (the current leak).
* Licensee's immediate actions: Monitored RCS leakage trends and entered containment to visually observe RPV flange leakage patterns.
Established ODMI for trigger levels and actions. IPEC is currently conducting a failure modes and affects (FMA) analysis that includes reviewing OpE and benchmarking other utilities.
They appear to be an industry outlier for o-ring leakage problems.
* Licensee's plan to address the issue during the forced outage: The IPEC FMA analysis has identified six potential causes for o-ring leaks. They narrowed this down to two likely causes: o FME intrusion into the flange seating surfaces during decontamination operations or RPV head stud can removal -(Note: IPEC is one of only two sites that still use stud cans) o Plant operations after head set but prior to head torque that introduced water into the flange area and disrupted the Qwring seal seating For the upcoming planned outage to repair the o-ring seal (starts June 11 -planned for 11 days), IPEC will:
* not use stud cans when installing the RPV head studs
* revise their decontamination procedures to minimize FME intrusion, and
* prohibit all activities that can change water level inside the RPV between the time that the RPV head is set and the time when the RPV studs are torqued.
From: Sent: To: Cc:
 
==Subject:==
Haagensen, Brian Wednesday, June 21, 2017 1041 AM H aag e n se n, Br i a n; H e nri on, Mad<: R i ch, S, irt1h; Se t zer, Th omas; S iwy, A ndrnw Pe lt on, David; Guzman, Richurd 0-ring leak assessment 6/21 at 1030 IP3 experienced a leak through the inner o-ring on the RPV flange seal this morning at 0102. They had r eac h ed NOP/NOT at 2 115 l as t ni g ht. The IPRO had reviewed the corrective actions associated with the o-ring leakage. We had the following observat i ons:
* There was no obvious cause for the o-ring leakage wl1en the RPV head was removed. The boric acid depo s it s obscured any obv i ous indications of o-ring failure o r FME in trus i on dur in g th e initi a l as-found inspection.
They did see sma ll black deposits that could have been related to FME in the boric acid deposits.
* After clean in g off the boric ac id deposits, IP EC determined that the probabl e cause of the leak age was that they had a ll owed RCS waler l eve l to wet the o-ring surfaces during the time between l anding the head and tensioning the studs. IPEC thought that the water could have either dislodged the o-ring sea ting su rf aces or caused F ME to be tran spo rted into th e flange seati ng surfaces. Removal of the boric ac id d epos its would have a l so removed any F M E.
* We reviewed the as-found o-ring inspection videos. We noted that some of the o-ring retaining clips w e re s kew e d (turn e d so th a t they w e r e not in th e correct position to hold th e o-r in g) and that it appeared that the a-r in g may have been rolled (partially ex truded from th e f l ange seating surfaces).
In addition, the RPV flange seating surfaces appeared to have surface pitting and other surface d e f ec ts. IPEC had ana l yzed thi s degradation from pr i or outages a nd d e termin e d (by visual insp ec tion) that the degradation had not become worse.
* IPEC did not take measurements of the pitting on the flange seating sutiaces or conduct any depth mic measurement s during this planned outage. They conc lu ded that the pits were not of suff i cient dep th to require further repairs. They had previously taken measurem e nts of these defects during the o-ring outage in 2015 and determined that they had not degraded further and did not require repairs. ring shou ld have compressed 10 fill th ese defects an d sea l the joint.
* I PEC comp l eted an FMEA that identifi e d numerous (-10) possible causes for the o-ring l eak. They identified two likely causes; 1) the o-ring became dislodged during the time when RCS water impacted the flange seati n g surfaces prior to tensioning due to changes in RHR flow, and 2) FME had been introduc e d in th e flange seating s urfaces. They e lect ed to start up with the new o-r i ng b eca u se, although they did not determine the cause of the leakage, they thought their corrective actions wou l d be effective because they had been effective in 2015.
* I PEC has two new 0-r in gs of the same design avai l ab l e on-site for replacement.
However, the supp ly chain is investigating lead times for a different design a-ring that would have thicker silver deposits to fac ilit ate filling deeper fl ange surface defects. Thi s repair op tion will r equ ire at l east an 8 week l ead time to manufacture this new a-ring.
* IPEC is preparing a critical decision paper for review during a fleet call later today (1230) that wi ll dete rmine a path forward. Th ey a r e li kely to most li kely continue the s tartup on the outer o-ring. Fo ll owing approva l of this decision, I PEC will have another fleet ca ll to approve the re s tart.
* They are leaving the ODMls in place for the a-ring leakage.
* Next update to be provided a fter th e 1 230 F l ee t ca ll. Brian C. Haagensen Sen i or Resident In spec tor Indian Point Energy Center 914 739-9360 (Office) (b)(6) (Cell) 2 L SUSTAINABLE Event Free Operations Leadership Effectiveness Learning Organization Tailgate June 8, 2017 e~------i , i--------------w E Pow ER Lt F E'M w E pow ER LIFE"'
L Agenda *Unit 3 0 Ring Update *NIOS Escalation
*NRC End of Cycle Meeting *Speed Bumps *Calendar of Events fl!Entergy_ (5) I WE POWER LIFE"' 2 L Unit 3 0-ring leakage
* Unit 3 has had 3 inner 0-ring failures and 2 outer 0 -ring failures since 2009 (2009 RFO, 2015 RFO and 2017 RFO)
* Unit 2 currently has an inner 0-ring failure (2016 RFO)
* IPEC formed a team to attempt to determine the possible causes and what mitigating actions that need to be put in place to ensure the highest probability of success for the upcoming planned outage to replace the Rx Head 0-rings. fl!Entergy_ (5) I WE POWER LIFE"' 3 L Unit 3 0-ring leakage
* Categorized the potential causes into several areas
* Potential causes that are considered unlikely
* Design *Weare one of several PWR's ~(b)(4) I l<b)(4) I) that use this design in the industry with success including last cycle after we performed the mid-cycle replacement.
* Installation Practices
* We reviewed our procedures against others in the industry and our procedure has the most robust instructions and controls and we have incorporated all the recommendations from Technetics and Westinghouse.
We also have video evidence during the installation of the RX vessel head there were no issues. fl!Entergy_ (5) I WE POWER LIFE"' 4 LJ') ! t!) w u.. -_J a: w 0 CL w _J 
! t!) w u.. -_J a: w 0 CL w _J 
! t!) w u.. -_J a: w 0 CL w _J L Unit 3 0-ring leakage fl!Entergy_ ., (b)(4) (5) I WE POWER LIFE"' 8 t!) _J Vl C 0 *-Vl :J l:::!, --------0 :0 u "-' * ! w u.. -_J a: w 0 CL w t!) _J "E 0 (.) <I> 0::: <I> > 'iii C: 0 a. 1/) <I> 0::: C: 0 z ! w d: a: w 0 CL w t!) _J -e 0 (.) (I) 0::: *u; C 0 0. rn (I) 0::: C 0 z * ! w a: w 0 CL w t!) _J 0 (.) 0) 0:: 'in C: 0 a. (/) 0) 0:: C: 0 z ! w a: w 0 CL w *
* L End of Cycle Meeting
* Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has scheduled the 2016 End of Cycle meeting to discuss safety performance of the Indian Point nuclear power plant for June 14, in Tarrytown, N.Y.
* The meeting will begin at 7 p.m., at the Double Tree by Hilton, 455 South Broadway.
* N RC staff responsible for inspections and oversight of the plant, including the resident inspectors based at the site full -time, will be on hand to discuss plant performance.
Doors to the meeting room will open at 6 p.m.
* Meeting attendees will be given time to ask questions of the NRC. Names of those who sign up to speak will be selected randomly.
fl!Entergy_ (5) I WE POWER LIFE"' 13 L Speed Bumps Security to Use Temporary Speed Bumps Security will be using temporary speed bumps, similar to the one pictured below, to help reduce vehicle speed on site. These strips will be placed in the vicinity of the front gate and inspection area. fl!Entergy_ (5) I WE POWER LIFE"' 14 
+' C C 0 QJ *-E +' -u QJ QJ QJ QJ "'C C Q. '-0 0 V) bO *-C C +' <t u -0 QJ +' *-C QJ C +' Q. u 0 u V) QJ QJ *-C C E Q. +' QJ C -V) -Q. "'C QJ -E C QJ *-'-+' ::::, ta -QJ u ta V) cc:: )( '-CT 0 C w bO w co 0 +' s.. 0 "'C C *-*-C nJ '-C +' Q. 0 ta :::> C QJ ta *-u -V) +' t.: bO 0 u V) V) ta C *-::::, QJ V) +' *-+' z QJ *-"'C *-u C u "'C 0 bO C QJ C "'C u QJ C *-*-nJ Q. 0 QJ QJ <t '-+' bO V) "'C '-u QJ C tlO ta ... u +' '-ta bO C QJ ta -C '-Q. C ta ta -.c '-*---bO QJ QJ -*---I 0 +' *--Q. '-C cc:: *-QJ '-*-Q. '-C +' '-:::> Q. *-QJ C 0 V) QJ C C ta V) +' -QJ > '-C C u z bO N > QJ 'ta-QJ u I-0 QJ ta C . u u QJ u en C > *-C '-'-V) *-'-QJ +' ta 'ta-0 0 QJ C 0 bO +' ta '994 > *-*-'-E 0 u. 'ta-ta u. 0 '-'-QJ QJ +' 0 '-QJ ::::, '-"'C C *--I-C V) u Q. QJ C 0 C C Q. 0 E QJ 0 *-C :::> E C QJ Q. w QJ -'-QJ -w V) "'C ::::, ta Q. 0 u u u ta u w -u 0 u u cc:: cc:: '-QJ ..., cc:: -Q. '-cc:: cc:: Q. 0 QJ -I 0 QJ z z z u. C cc:: z <C w u. Q. z z -! w u.. -t!) _J a: w 0 CL w en "" '994 N en I '994 N I I I a.n m "" in '994 \D ...... co en 0 " 0 N '994 '994 N N N N N N '994 '994 N QJ I QJ QJ QJ QJ QJ QJ QJ > > > > C en C C C C C C C ----::::, ::::, ::::, ::::, ::::, :J ::::, ::::, ::::, ::::, ::::, ::::, -, '994 -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, -, _J From: S iwy, Andr e w Sent: To: Friday, June 02, 2017 743 AM H e mi o n, M a rk
 
==Subject:==
Attachments:
F W: Hi s tory of o-ring l e ak s ;it I P3 -FIR S T L OO K IN FO RM A TI O N !External .Sender] The 3-page attachmen t has bee n w ithh e l d i n i ts C/ *. ,.d,,e, w 5',;,., 1 , ['S. R,,sidL,nt
!n.,plxlor I ludi,111 Point ll q;ion JI ~:~){4.7 3'J.r);,61l From: Haagensen, Brian Sent: Thur s d a y , Jun e 01 , 2 017 8: 3 2 AM entire t y und er F OIA e x em pti o n 4. To: Setzer, Thomas <Thomas.Setzer@nrc.gov>;
Pelton, David <David.Pclton@nrc.gov
> Cc: Patel, Jigar <Jigar.Patell@nrc.gov>;
Siwy, Andrew <Andrew.Siwy(tilnrc.gov>;
Rich, Sarah <Sarah.Rich@nrc.gov>
Subj e ct: R E: Hi s t o ry o f o-rin g l e a k s a t IP 3 -FIR S T LOOK IN FO RM A TION Dave, T'lrn, As r(:qt11:d:od, here is our analysis of HK: <.Hinq le: , ik hislc1ry al I P F:: C. _(Seethe attached photo of Samh': 3 orin9 leak time lino). This f.1;forn.ationJuretimi11c11y and subit~d ton~vision and valirlaricm
.. T h e i nifa: 11 lr e n d s ,'ir e: " 198 6 --19H9 the1*e were ct clusler of 4 o-ring leaks split b<::tween both unit:, in th0 lalo 19H(h; o ver a 4 year period. () :3 l ea k s o n U nit 2 i n c lu d in~J on e do ut>l e o-rin g l ea k r:) *1 kiak on Unil '.1 ., ~**199(:i double (Hinq leak on U11it 3. <JI t h e o, .. rin g d e s ig n w a s th e, n c h a n g e d to a d if fo r e nt tyr~i e o f o-d: l 91 .. '199G .... 20 *15 There worn fewer leak:, (only :; --f,in9k) o-rinq le-: tk:; '.,plit belweon the units over *-10 yecmc:) o 2 00 3 Uni t 2 ~;in[~l tJ o-,*in g l ea k u 2004 Unit 3 ~,ingl e o-ring leak o 20'!0 Unit 3 single o-rinr,i leak
* 2 0 1 5*-2 0 1 7 **** fr e q u e n c y o f o-r*in&#xa3;l l ea k s i ncre as(~d ... :-3 l e;;i k s in ;2 y e a r: 3 o 3 H"l8 in May 2 015
* Unit 3 had another doubl G o-ri119 l(J ak ,rnd ll~d to ~:hu!down in SEJplmnber for re;xiirn. o :.:'.F~22
*-Unit 2 h ad a s in g l n o-rin g l ea k in l'v b r c h 20*1 7 ... s hifl Ei d t o t h e o ul~: r o-r in g se a l and continued op81*ation * -curront condilion o 31~HJ -May 2017 Unit 3 had a doub!e cHi11g le;::.I~ (the currnnt leal,;). R<0)pai r plan being f o rm u l a t e d b y I PEC. We will liavo further analy::;is as w8 continue our i11spection efforts. We have started thl=J Pl&n sample 011 Fie C ,;;H.ISe~; an d c o rr o d.iv e sic t i o n s f or O**r i n 9 l ea l<s th a t w a~1 s r;ec i f i e d s t th e C OC r o r thi s q u ar t e r. Brian C. Hfwgonser1 Se ni or n es i c1 0 11t 11*1 s p ec t o r In dian Po in t Energy C e nt e r 914 739--9 360 (Office) (b)(6) (Celi) . From: Setzer, Thomas Sent: Thursday, June 01, 2017 7:31 AM To: H aage ns e n, Brian <.5.ria n.H a&sect;f,&!l.Sen(a) nrc.:&QY>
 
==Subject:==
FW: orings at IP3 -inspections C an u pi s h e l p get thi s? From: P e lt o n, David Sent: Thursday, June 01, 2017 7:31 AM To: Setzer, Thomas <Thornas.Setzer@n_~_,gQY>
 
==Subject:==
RE: or in gs a t IP 3 -insp ect i ons Tom, Enforcement aside, can we get a history/summary of RV head seal leakage (by unit)? Front Office request Th anks. dave p. 2 CR-AN0-1-2015
-03240 11 of 169 CRG Ag en d a M ee ting Dat e : 9/8/2015 Origina t or: Crosby.Patrick Phon e: 4903 Sit e -Group: ANO -Eng Code Programs Staff ANO Dis c ov e r e d: 8/31/2015 15:50:48 Supe: r vlsor: Greeson,William C Initi a ted: 8/31/201516:01:55 Condition Desc: CR-AN0-1-2015-02179 CA-15 re q u ires the Boric Ac i d Corros i on Con t ro l Program (BACCP) to perform a Bor i c Acid Evaluation for the U1 RVCH inner 0-ri ng l eak documented in CR-AN0-1-2015-02967.
The evaluation is requ i red to be documen t ed in an EC (EVAL), sub-type (SOR) I AW EN-DC-115 t o evaluate acceptability of the leak unt i l t h e next refueling out age (1 R26 -Fal l 2016). During the evaluation process it w as dete r mined that unpredictab l e steam cutting and impingement at the 0-r in g and reactor vessel flange area wou l d neither a l low for an acceptable evaluation nor provide j ustification for extended operation without mit i gating actions. Per EN-DC-319 (BACCP), periodic monitoring of the l eak is requ i red to mitiga t e and determine the condition of the s ta i nless stee l c l ad d i ng of the r eacto r ve sse l and closure head. The carbon steel reactor vessel and closure head are cladded internally with stainless steel. Stainless Steel i s res ista nt t o bor i c acid corrosion but i s not i mmune to steam cutting or i mpingement.
Per industry tests documented in EPR I Report No. 1000975, steam cutting and imp i ngemen t could degrade the cladd i ng and expose carbon steel. Based on the last visual inspect i on performed on 8/4/2 015 and the lac k of d isco loration of boric acid crystals, the steel cladding is intact and performing i t s intended function.
The ODM I and Critica l Decision document for CR-AN0-1-2 015-021 7 9 reference SER 3-09 , which is ind u stry OE regarding 0-ring leakage at Browns Ferry Unit 1 i n 2008. Th i s OE documents that Browns Ferry Unit 1 exper i enced 0-r i ng lea kage for 18 months ac ro ss both the inner and outer 0-ring s, which resulted in an inc re ase in unidentified Drywe ll leakage from O to 1.2 gp m over t he course of the 18 mo n th operat i ng cyc l e. Following removal of the RV head , damage to both the RV an d RVCH sea ting surfaces from steam cutting was observed.
Reg ar ding SER 3-09 applicability to AN0-1 , it is noted tha t B r owns Ferry Unit 1 is a BWR , which ut i l ized non-borated water in the RCS and operates at a nominal RCS pressure of 1000 psig. As such , the observed damage at Browns Ferry Unit 1 resulted from a 1000 ps i g de l ta-P across two 0-rings , whereas AN0-1 is current l y experiencing a 2155 psig de l ta-P across one 0-ring. As such , degradation of the AN0-1 RV and RVC H flange 0-r i ng seat i ng surfaces could accelerate at a much faster rate than the Browns Ferry Un it 1 scenario.
Immed iate A c ti o n: None Sugg es t e d Action Perform a containment entry every 30 days to ver i fy the stainless steel cladding is intact by observing the drain piping for discoloration , such as , red or brown boric ac i d crysta l s indicative of carbon steel corrosion.
The last visual observatio n was performed on 8/4/2015. P er form next inspect i on during the same power ent ry when adding oil to RCPs schedu l ed 9/15/15. Consider updating curre nt O D MI to take action upon discovery of discolo r atio n in boric acid crysta l s. Consider updating the current operab il ity to OP-DNC or OP-Comp Meas. with monito r ing as the compe n sa tory measure. Flagg e d fo r SM: Y Flagg e d fo r R e portability R e v ie w: Y As s ignments Catego r y: C CR Own e r:ANO -Eng Design & P ro gram s Mgmt ANO -Butl er.Paul W ayne Classification:
ADV CORRECT Comm e nts: Butler: (RM Action Due Date 09/24/15) Bring Ba c k Depar t m e n t/Date: Repor t Da t e: 09/03/2 01 5 From: To:
 
==Subject:==
Date: Attachments
: WHITLEY, STEPHEN lohnson lason; SCH ULTZ E ROBIN PAU L: MCKINNEY MIC H A EL R; SMITH I E A N NIE M: SCHLU T ERMAN DEBRA J; Loy. Dustyn: MILLS VICKI L; BLACK ANTHONY L; Young Amanda; entergy@ggtb
.com; Ho l man Garen; Cope. Ryan: PHILLIPS.
RANDY D; NICHOLSON.
ERIC: T i ndell. Br i an: B l ankenship.
Anthony: Se it er. Mary: .!::@!1.. Aye r s. Brandon: Marvin. Lisa E; SO!KA. DANIEL I: B E AIRD. ROB E RT K; Bryan, l amey: B.o.ll.N..E...
illY..E.t::I.
: Zerr Nancy* Cook L awrence; DORSEY W I LLIE L; Warne r Rex; B E AIRD ROB E RT K; M.ABII.N...
M ICHAE L RAY* WEAVER PATRICK W; F r ench. Albert; GRAY BILLY I: REHM PHILIP E: OWINGS. ROGER L; FAULKNER.
HOWARD B: MARTIN. DONNIE; Shurter. Tony: Nietert. E l izabeth Mo r gan; Harkreader.
Ma r y: WILLIAMS.
KEVI N: RASMUSSON.
DAVID C: san dbothel s@i npo.o r g; G r esh. Amber M; COOPER. MARCUS A: D ARBY K EL LY: POP E NICHO L AS T: R U DER M IC HAEL V ST E PH E NSON GREGORY C: TOPLEY DAVID; GIJ.E.S. GERALD R; Ves t Derrick: FOX. ANDREW; KI N NEY IOHN W; Maston Michael; CORLISS EDWARD A* BREGAR CURT A: chapman. danie l; TITUS. RUSSE L L; BARTES. KEV I N: Ba rk e r. David W; Ca r penter. Stephen; LABEAF. RQ.LAN.D; SIWI E C. GARY WAYNE: Smart. Shannon: Pr i dg i n. David; M OSHER. NATALIE B; Ba i ley lll. Asa: .6ill!ley. Farina Thomas: Correll Brian* Choate 1 ackson* CARTER RODNEY A: WOODSON TIMOTHY R: .P.e.Lkin.s..
Ke ith; Ha r vey l ohn D; OLSO N DONALD G; STEWART. IOSEPH; PARDI C H ARLES A; FLOYD. VICTORIA B; Couch. Cheryl: SEITER. IEF F ERY A L AN; Tobin. Ma r ga r et; TESSIER. ROBE R T: HENDERSON. DOUG L AS: THINGER * .fil'..RQN
; R h odes Kristie: SHORT BRADLEY W: SIG LE !OD Y L: STALNAKER DALE EDWARD: McGee Franc i s; E pp er son P a ul a: HI LL I ESS!C A; B ar r e tt A n d y; H EFLI N IAC K!E L; REMER CH A RLES A" AN O Tr aining Instructers
; HELMS. STEVE: Sotomayor.
Amy: '--'F R=I';X=:. G:: U:: Y=E;~M=u=n=o=z*:::: S':: a:: r a:_ _________________ [External_SenderJ 09110115 ANO CRG Report Note: Of two pages of the attached 401-page report are Wednesday, September 09, 2015 3:14:55 PM responsive records. At.JO_CR G_Re pru:t. pdf' Report -Attached Stephen Whitley Performance Improvement I CAA Adm i n Arkansas Nuclear One External: 479-858-4082 CRG CR Summary CRG Agenda Meeting Date: 9/10/2015 CR Number CR-AN0-1-2015-03210 Owner Current Sign i ficance Site Owner Group B-ADV E-ACE CARB ANO Projects Construction
-Supp Mgmt Oper Flag Assignment Description N Pace to Pa lmer: (E-ACE Action Due Date 10 10 1 1 15) C R G C o mm e nt s: TAKE BACK: CR-AN0-1-2015-3210: PCS requests CRG rev i ew/a pprove CRG Briefing Sheet (Attached at the end of this report) Non Responsive Record 9/9/2015 14: 54 Page 1 of 12 CR-AN0-1-2015-03210 1 of 327 CRG Agenda Meeting Date: 9/10/2015 Originator:
Beaird.Robert K Phone: 3167 Sit e
* Group: ANO -QA Audits Staff ANO Tak e Back Discovered
: 8/27/2015 16:10:59 Supe: r vlsor: Blocker 111 , Lenard Initiated: 8/27/2015 16:23:25 Condition Desc: Problem Statement:
CR-AN0-1-2015-2967 documenting the confirmat i on of the Un it 1 Reactor flange inner o-ring leakage was c l assified by t h e CRG as a ca t egory "C" ADV correct CR. Potential Consequences:
Potential outage delays or re-wo r k Details: During t h e review o f site activ i t i es surroundi ng the potential Unit Reactor F l ange leak ( CR-AN0-1-2015-2179) NIO S iden tif ied that CR-1-20 1 5-2967(wh i ch conf i rms the leak) had been downgraded from Cat B E-CARB to Cat C Correct/Address by the 8/1 8/15 CRG. The Cat CCR classificatio n will not ensure causal analysis is performed prior to any required shutdown to ensure issues such as poor i ns t a ll ation practices or de f ective parts are ident if ied and correc t ed pr i or to the instal l ation of a new o-r i ng. This le a ves the site vulnerable to outage delays or repeated leaks. No other CR was found tha t addresses the cause of the o-ri ng leakage. Immediate Action: Discussed issue with CAP/OE Manager Suggested Action Flagged for SM: N Flagged for Reportability Review: N Assignments Category:
B CR Owner: ANO -Projects Construction
-Supp Mgmt ANO -Clas s ification:
ADV E-ACE CARB Comment s: Pace to Palmer: (E-ACE Action Due Date 10/01 /15) Bring Back D e partmen t/Date: TAKE BACK: CR-AN0-1-20 1 5-32 1 0: PCS requests CRG review/approve CRG Br iefi ng Sheet (Attached a t the end of this report) Other Trends Type REPORT WE I G HT W GMR W GMR WGMR Code RW02 CRG PP10 EX 1 0 Reference Items Type Description QA-ASSESSMENT CR QA-FA-LE ADER SH I P Code Des c ription Overs i g ht-i dentified Condition Rev i ew Group Correc tiv e Action P r og r a m. Adm in i strat i ve Requirement not Met Report Date: 09/09/2015 From: To: S ubject: Date: F o l k s SftORT, BRADLEY W To b in M argaret: Barrett Andy: T i nde ll Br i an [Externa l_Se nder) FW: AN0-1 RV o-ring l eakage* 10/23/2015 Powe r Entry Friday. Octobe r 30. 201 S 2:46:02 PM Please l ook at t he re sponse to CR-AN0-1-2015-2 1 79 CA 23. Let me k now i f t h i s addresses your q ue st io ns or if there i s something else you need. Thanks From: BARBOREK, W DO UGLAS Sent: Tuesday, October 27, 2015 2:41 PM To: margaret, tob i n Cc: Bria n.T inde ll@nrc.gov; Andy.Barre tt@nr c.gov; SHOR T , BRADLEY W; WOODSON , T IMOTHY R; Conyers, Daniel
 
==Subject:==
R E: AN0-1 RV o-r i ng leakage* 10/23/2015 Power Entry Maggie, We have d isc ussed t h i s i nternally and br i efly w i t h AREVA and have no def i nitive explanation fo r the leakage to plateau as it ha s since la t e Ju l y. Our issue has certai n l y exh i bited different behav i or than the I nd ia n Po i nt-3 l eak and other prev i ous o-rin g l eaks i n the i n dust ry. It seems very l ikely t h at o ur o-r i ng leakage h as a different cause than the IP3 i ssue. T h eo-r i ng l eakage temperature a l arm i s st i l l loc k ed in on t h e Control Room a nnu ncia tor, an d t h e l eakage i s still emanating from the header nea r t h e sump, so we st ill believe the l eakage is from the RV o-r i ng. Th e on l y confi r m ing p i ece of info r mation we don't have is thermography o f the lea k-off d rai n p i ping whi ch we cannot obta i n at power due to the locat i on of the piping. That wil l be a piece of i nformation we p l an to ob t a in i f we have a p l anned or unplanned RX tr i p which allows genera l access to the RB basement.
D uri n g our next power entry i n December, I have info rmed RP t h at my i nt e nt i s to take another wa l k around e l evatio n 354' to look at the baseme nt floor (e l eva t io n 335') t h ro ug h the grat i ng and check for signs of any ot h er l eakage, as wel l as check i ng the temperature of the RCP int ergasket lea k-off l i nes aga i n to en s ure t h ey are at amb i ent te m peratu re a nd not lea k ing by. Th e l ast e nt ry in wh i ch we performed t h is effort was t h e Ju l y entry. Please l et me know if t his d i d not answer your quest i o ns or if yo u have a ny add i tional que s t io ns. Thank s, Doug B a rborek Ent er gy Opera t ion s, Inc./ Ark ansas Nucle ar O ne Sys t e m E n g m eer-AN 0-1 & A N02 Reac t or Coo l a n t Sys t e m s a nd AN O l Spen t Fue l C oo lin g & P u nfi c a t oo n S y s t e m Sys t em E n gi n eering Bu il di ng/ N*SYE*4 wba r bol@eote r sv rom 4 79-858-4 337 (office) !(b )(6) !(pag e r) Fro m: Tob in , Margaret [mailto*Margaret Tob j n@nrc gov] Sent: Tuesday, October 27, 2015 12:48 PM To: BARBOREK, W DOUGLAS Cc: 6c i ao Iiode ll@occ gov; Andy Barrett@nrc gov
 
==Subject:==
RE: AN0-1 RVo-r in g lea k age* 10/23/2015 Powe r Entry Doug, I have a follow-on question.
I'm cur i ous i f you h ave a t h eo ry on why t h e l eak rate seems to have more or l ess sett l ed out? Everything I heard about t hi s i ss ue from t h e start wa s that Op-E from other sites sugges ted t hi s l eak s ho u l d slowly get worse u nt il you hit a tr i gger point and n eeded to sh u t down. I'm co n cerned that so mehow we may be mi ss i ng some i mportant pie ce of i nform at i on some wh ere b ecause it i sn't following t h e expec t e d phy s i ca l pheno m e no n. T h an k s, Maggie From: BAR BOREK, w DOUG L AS [maj l toWBARBOl@enteri;y com] Sent: T u esday, October 27, 20 1 5 10:33 AM To: Barrett, Andy <A n dy Barrett@nrc gov> Cc: Tobin, M a rgar et <Margaret Tob j n@nrc gov>; T i ndell, Br i an <Brian Iiodell@orc gov>; SHORT, BRADLEY w 
<bshort@entergy com>; WOODSON, T IMOTHY R <TWOODSO@entergy com>; C onyers, D an i el <dconyer@entergy com>; EDGELL, DOUGLAS w <DEDGELL@entergy com> Subj ec t: (Externa l_Sender] AN0-1 RV o-r i ng l eakage -10/23/2015 Power Entry Andy, Rega r d in g your que st i ons on t he Un it 1 power entry la s t F riday. T h e boric ac i d at the ta i l pipe i s st i l l pristine wh ite, i nd i cat i ng n o wastage of carbon stee l. The l eak r ate w as v i sua l ly t yp i ca l of p r e v ious e n tries. T he r ate o f inc r ease of the lea k s low ed down in l ate July , an d is now on a very s l ow i n creas i ng t re nd. Be l ow is a snapshot fro m t h e Sh i ft Eng i nee r's s pr eads h eet for RCS l eakage wh ic h shows the C y c l e 26 data. Also attac h ed are some s til l shots from the video I took. You are mo re t h an we l come to stop by my cube a nd w a t ch t he enti r e v i deo. P lease l et me kn ow if you h ave any addit i on q uestio n s concern i ng this issue. Thank s , Dou g B a rbor e k En ter gy Opera t i o n s. Inc./ Ark ansas N u c l e ar O ne S y s t e m E n gi n eer-A N 0-1 & A N 0-2 Reac t or Coo l a n t Syste m s an d AN0-1 S p e n t Fu e l Coo lin g & P u r i fi ca t i o n System Sys t e m E n gi n eer i ng Bu i l di ng/ N-SYE-4 wba r bol@eote r gy co m ~office) ~pa g er) 0 200 --or F11 Rate fg p m) Un<<1enb~ed Ltak R att (!lPn,) RCS Leakrate Cycle 26 0 180 --Total RCS losws{gpn;) 1---------------------------i 0 1 60 0 140 0 020 0 000 "' "' s .... 5 l;j U tal\*2 Sigma U tan*2 Sigma -u,an*3Slgma -uean*l Sigma -**** Mean "' "' "' "' .., &sect; ! &sect; Q ;;:; 5 "' "' "' "' "' "' s 0 &sect; I 0 "' $ C;! Si * "' 0 Ill "' Ill "' "' "' "' "' "' "' "' '!! "' Q a i 0 &sect; 0 &sect; s 8 ":! IQ .. ,i .. ;a Si .... a; i 2 2 2 From: To:
 
==Subject:==
Date: Attachments:
See attached BRAD SHORT SHORT, BRADLEY W Job i n Mar gar e t [Externa l_Sender] RE: ODMI fo r RCS l eakage Un it 1 Wed n esday, August 19, 2015 7:3 6:17 AM Re a cto r Vesse l F l ange I n n er 0-r i ng Leakage.p tm<, UCENS1NG.
RE.6ULATORY S PPORT PHO &#xa3;. 479-858-3271 Ct:LL j(b)(6) I From: Tobin, Margaret [mailto:Ma rgaret.Tobin@nrc.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, August 19, 2015 7:24 AM To: SHORT, BRADLEY W
 
==Subject:==
ODMI for RCS leakage Un i t 1 Good Morning Brad , Can I get a copy of the most updated ODMI for RCS leakage in Unit 1? I t was updated severa l weeks ago , according to the control room. Thanks, Magg i e Reactor Vessel Flange Inner 0-ring Leakage Trigger Point 1: More than three consecutive daily Total RCS leakrate determination exceeds 0.180 gpm while on Green Train, or 0.200 gpm while on Red Train. Actions: 1. Notify Operations Management (notification is not required each night after the initial notification).
: 2. Revisit Critical Decision document.
: 3. Consider additional RB Power Entry at reduced power or with reactor line. 4. Commence OP-1103.013 Attachment A "RCS Leakage Investigation" to determine if there are other sources of leakage.
Reactor Vessel Flange Inner 0-ring Leakage (Cont.) Trigger Point 2: The 5 Day Average Unidentified leakrate exceeds 0.090 gpm. Actions: 1. Notify Operations Management (notification is not required each night after the initial notification).
: 2. Revisit Critical Decision document.
: 3. Consider additional RB Power Entry at reduced power or with reactor line. 4. Commence OP-1103.013 Attachment A "RCS Leakage Investigation" to determine if there are other sources of leakage.
Reactor Vessel Flange Inner 0-ring Leakage (Cont.) Trigger Point 3: The 5 Day Average RB Sump leakrate exceeds 0.060 gpm. Actions: 1. Notify Operations Management (notification is not required each night after the initial notification).
: 2. Revisit Critical Decision document.
: 3. Consider additional RB Power Entry at reduced power or with reactor line. 4. Commence OP-1103.013 Attachment A "RCS Leakage Investigation" to determine if there are other sources of leakage.
Reactor Vessel Flange Inner 0-ring Leakage (Cont.) Trigger Point 4: Difference between current 5 Day Average Unidentified Leakrate and the value from 30 days prior exceeds 0.036 gpm. Actions: 1. Notify Operations Management (notification is not required each night after the initial notification).
: 2. Revisit Critical Decision document.
: 3. Consider additional RB Power Entry at reduced power or with reactor line. 4. Commence OP-1103.013 Attachment A "RCS Leakage Investigation" to determine if there are other sources of leakage.
Reactor Vessel Flange Inner 0-ring Leakage (Cont.) Trigger Point 5: RCS Total Leakage > 0.25 gpm Actions: 1. Notify Operations Management.
: 2. Convene Bridge Call to determine the best time to take the Unit off-line.
: 3. At the agreed upon time to take the Unit offline, commence Plant Shutdown utilizing OP-1102.016 "Power Reduction and Plant Shutdown".
: 4. Following reactor shutdown, perform immediate RB Entry to validate source(s) of RCS leakage and to perform thermography of RV flange off piping at "A" Cold Leg opening in the primary shield wall to verify TE-1052 readings of 210 F. This will fully confirm the presence of RV flange inner 0-ring leakage.
Branc h 2 I BR I DGE: 9-1-866-75 1-2529 , passcode l(b )(6) I# I 01/1 6/20 1 8 Dally Status I New Info In bo l d DRP Statu s Board Items [D lac:uued at Morn ing M Nllng I Pro i ect Man aaers I IP/MS: R. Guzman I I Branch Items Non Responsive Record I NDIAN PO I NT UNIT 2 I R x Pow er: 100% I Ri s k: Green I Unidentifi e d Leakage: 0.05 gpm I AL: 1 Weekend Cover.age: Brian I RFO: 3/18 -5 18118 I AL1: AL2: A L3: U nplanned/Significant TSAs . 1 2/3 Swap essent i a l a n d no n-essen t i al SW heade r: 8-h r LCO . 12/3 M onthly t est o f 23 EOG I Major A c tiviti es On s ite . N one Other Items: (Security , EP , Stakeholder I nt erest) . Un i on co ntr act exp i rat i on date is 1/18/18 . . 21 RCP seal ma i ntenance ou t age being p l anned for 1/4/18. Expected to last 8-14 days . . Soe n t f U1el camoaian i n oroa r ess. M ov i na o n e drv cas k to I SFSI 1 1/9-1 1/22 . I NDIAN PO I NT UNIT 3 I R x Pow er: 100% I Risk: Y e llow I Unidentified Leakage: 0.01 gpm I AL: N/A Weekend Cove r age: Brian I 3R 2 0: 31 1 1 -5 1111 9 I AL1: AL2: AL3: Non Responsive Record MI L LSTONE U N IT 2 I Rx Power: 100% I Risk: Green I Unidentified Leakage: 0.121 gpm I AL: 0 Non Responsive Record MILLSTO N E UN I T 3 I Rx Power: 100% I Risk: Green I Unidentified Leakage: 0.124 gpm I AL: N/A Non Responsive Record
* From: Sent: To:
 
==Subject:==
Attachments
: Tobin, Margaret Friday, January 05, 2018 9:20 AM Fredette, Thomas FW: AN0-1 Reactor Ve ssel Flange Inner 0-ring L eakage -Video from 7/22/2016 Power Entry Comparison 6 entries.pdf From: BARBOREK, W DOUGLAS [mailto:WBARB0l@entergy.com] Sent: Friday, J uly 22, 2016 11:16 AM To: Tindell, Brian <Brian.Tindell@nrc.gov>
Cc: Tobin, Margaret <Margaret.Tobin@nrc.gov>;
Barrett, Andy <Andy.Barrett@nrc.gov>;
PYLE, S TEPH IE N IE L <SPYLE@entergy.com>;
WOODSON, TIMOTHY R <TWOODSO@e nt erg y.com>; SKARTVEDT, MARK EDM UND <M SKARTV@entergy.com>
 
==Subject:==
[External_Sender)
AN0-1 Reactor Vessel Flange Inner 0-ring Leakage -Video from 7/22/2016 Power Entry Brian, For youir information. The (RV inner o-ring) leakage at the HSD-15-2" header was observed to be approximately 48 drops/minute during this morning's power entry. Boric acid deposits remain white with no discoloration.
Initiated CR-AN0-1-2016-02183 to document observations.
A still shot from the videos from the past 6 power entries is attached.
Cycle 26 RCS/Sump leak rate info (as of today) i s provided below. Please l l et me know if you have any questions regarding today's entry observations.
If you would like to see the video from today's entry, please feel free to stop by my cube. Thanks , Doug B.a rborek Ente rgy Operat i ons, Inc./ Arkansas Nu clear One S y stem Engi n ee r-AN0-1 Reactor Coo l ant S y ste m and AN0-1 Spent Fuel Cooling & Pu rif i ca t i o n System System Engi n ee r ing Building/
N-S Y E-4 wbarbol@entergy.com 47 9-858-4 337 ~ce) l (b )(6) I (pager)
C) C) C) C) C) p C) p p p C) C) C) C) C) C) _. _. _. _. _. is., C) I'\) en co C) I'\) en co C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) C) 015 015 015 015 015 015 015 015 015 015 015 015 015 015 :i/20 .. 015 015 015 015 N 015 015 i :::0 015 I n I 015 I V, 015 I r 015 I Cl I Da 015 ... 015 Da -015 (D 015 n 015 '< (") 015 ci" 015 N 0 1 5 O'I 015 015 016 016 016 016 016 I I I I I I 016 I I 016 I I 016 s:: s:: s: s:: s: -t C 0 (I) (I) (I) (I) (I) 2. ::> -t 016 D.> D.> D.> D.> D.> D.> 0: "Tl ::> ::> ::> ::> ::> -(I) 016 I + ,:., + ;o ::> w w I\.) e. 016 ',[) (l'l ',[) (l'l C C C C C C C C 0 ... ... ;.., i--> w 8 8 8 8 1/17/2015 2/25120 1 5 311 CY2015 311~2015 3/2fr20 1 5 4/612015 4/1512015 4/2412015 5/312015 5/1212015 5/21/20 1 5 5/3CY20 1 5 616/20 1 5 6117/20 1 5 61262 5/2 01 5 7/5/2015 7/14120 1 5 7/2:Y20 1 5 8/1/20 1 5 8/1 CY20 1 5 8/1~20 1 5 w I 8/2fr2015 9/6/20 1 5 u, :;o 9/15120 1 5 0 a, 9/24120 1 5 (/) C: 1 CYl'20 1 5 3 "O 1 CY12/20 1 5 c;, 1 CY21/20 1 5 ;o CII 1 CY30/20 1 5 m io 1 1/lr20 1 5 U') "O 11/17/2015 C: 3 ;:: ...... 11/26/2015
.,, 12/5120 1 5 ,-12/1412015 12/26/2015 -I 1/4 120 1 6 1/1 )'20 1 6 1/22/20 1 6 1/31/2016 2/9/2016 2/1 fr20 1 6 2/27/20 1 6 317/2016 3/1 &20 1 6 3/25120 1 6 4!~...<?!!1 -=r...:
August 4th, 2015 September 15th , 2015 October 23rd, 2015 December 2nd, 2015 January 18th, 2016 July 22nd, 2016 OFFICIAL USE ONL'f SENSITIVE PRE-DECISIONAL INFORMATION VISIT BRIEFING PACKAGE Stephen G. Burns NRC Chairman United $ra r es N ucl ear R eg ul arory Co mmi ss i on Protecting P eo p le and the Environment INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NOS.1 , 2 , & 3 ENTERGY NUCLEAR NORTHEAST ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC. December 8, 2015 ADAM S A ccess ion N o. ML 1 533 4 A 44 2 OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE PRE DECISIONAL INFORMATION 1
TAB OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Index for Tabs I TOPIC OF INTEREST I PAGE NUMBER Non Responsive Record TAB6 I Cu rrent I ssues I 1 5-21 Non Responsive Record 8FFICIAL USE 8NLY SENSITIVE PRE-DECISIONAL INFORMATION 2
OFFICIAL USE ONLY* SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION II CONTENTS II Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC) Non Responsive Record Current Issues .....................................
.........................
Tab 6 Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ONL Y SENSITIVE PRE DECISIONAL INFORMATION 3
OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ONLY* SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION December 8 1 2015 8:00 a.m. Chairman arrives at IPEC main gate 8:00 a.m. -8:10 a.m. Present NRG badges to security at main gate and proceed to parking lot in front of Generation Support Building (GSB) 8:10 a.m. -8:20 a.m. Meet Entergy personnel at MAC 4 entrance for access 8:20 a.m. -9:00 a.m. Meet w i th resident i nspectors in GSB conference room 132 9:00 a.m. -9:10 a.m. Int roductions with congressional staffers 9:10 a.m. -9:20 a.m. Travel to Site VP conference room (Coffee, Danishes and Water provided) 9:20 a.m. -10: 20 a.m. Entergy Pre sen tation Site History/Performance Fukushima Transformers Performance 10: 20 a.m. -12: 20 p.m. Plant tour Tower 12 BRE U2 Con t rol Room U2 Turbine Central Alarm Station (GAS) U3 Turbine 480V vital switchgear room U3 Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) U3 Transfo r mer yard 12:20 p.m. -12: 50 p.m. Lunch 12: 50 p.m. -1 : 20 p.m. Meeting with Tim Mit c hell 1 :20 p.m. -2:00 p.m. Tour of FLEX building 2:00 p.m. Depart site Contact Information:
David L ew , D e p utv Regiona l Admini strato r , Region I Cell: l (b)(6) ] Brian Ha agensen , S enior Re s ident In specto r Cell: l (b)(6) ] Office: 914-739-9360 OFFICIAL USE ONLY -SENSITIVE PRE-DECISIONAL INFORMATION 5
OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Respons i ve Record 6 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE PRE DECISIONAL INFORMATION 7
OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE PRE DECISIONAL INFORMATION 8
OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Respons i ve Record OFFICIAL USE ONL Y SENSITIVE PRE DECISIONAL INFORMATION 9
OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ONLY -SENSITIVE PRE-DECISIONAL INFORMATION 1 0 OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ONLY -SENSITIVE PRE DECISIONAL INFORMATION 11 OFFICIAL USE ONLY* SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ONLY -SENSITIVE PRE DECISIONAL INFORMATIObl 1 2 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE PRE-DECISIONAL INFORMATION 1 3 OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSI \/ Non Responsive Record *Tl~ E INTERNAL INFORMATION
_ OFFICIAL USE ONLY SE NSITIVE PRE DECISIONAL INFORMATION 14 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE PRE*DEGISIONAL INFORMATION 1 5 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION TAB6 Current Issues Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3 A. EXPECTED DISCUSSION TOPICS Recent Licensee Performance Overall , I ndian Point Units 2 and 3 operated in a manner that preserved public health and safety and met all cornerstone objectives.
Performance at I ndian Point Units 2 and 3 during the most recent quarter was within the Licensee Response Column of the NRC's ROP Action Matrix because all inspection findings had very low (i.e., Green) safety significance and all Pis indicated that performance was within the nominal , expected range (i.e., Green). On May 9 2015, the IP3 31 main transformer experienced a failure , resulting in a fire and flooding from the transformer de l uge system in the 480V safety-re l ated switchgear room. As a result of the flooding , a Special Inspection T eam (SIT) was launched on May 19 , 2015 in order to review the circumstances surrounding the water intrusion into the switchgear room. The S I T report (2015010) documented one NRG-identified, Green NCV , for " fai l ure to promptly ident i fy, report , and correct a condition adverse to fire protection." The S IT did not review th e cause of 31 main transformer failure , which is scheduled to be reviewed when Entergy concludes their Root Cause Evaluation (current l y scheduled for 1 Q2016). History of Transformer Issu es On May 9 , 2015 IP3 experienced a main turb i ne-generator lockout , main turbine t rip , and automatic reactor trip as a result of an explosion and fire on the 31 Main Transforme
: r. The site fire brigade was activated and called for offs i te resources. A Notice Of Unusual Event was declared due to an explosion in the Protected Area. The fire was initia ll y extinguished at 6: 15 p.m.; however, it reflashed at 6: 37 p.m., at which time additiona l offsite resources were brought into the Protected Area. T he fire brigade continued to fight the fire with foam and dec l ared the fire extinguished at 8: 05 p.m. During the event , there were reports of water i n accumulation in the 480V s witchgear room , totaling approximately 1 to 2 inches in depth. It was later determined that , based on the leak rate, the amount of water in t h e switchgear room could not have exceeded 0.4 inches. The source of the water was determined to be deluge sys t em water that had com e from a d e luge valve room that sits adjacent to the 480V switchgear room. The water was unable to complete l y drain through a floor drain due to its limited capacity, resulting in it mak i ng its way into the 480V switchgear room. I n addition to the 31 main transformer failure on May 9 1 h, there have been multiple previous transformer issues at I P2 and IP3. Since 2007 , I ndian Po i nt has had the following transformer issues: Indian Point Unit 3 -#31 Main Transformer explosion on April 6 , 2007 , due to an e l ectrical fau lt in the 'B' phase high voltage bush in g Indian Point Unit 2 -#21 Main Transformer explosion on November 7 , 2010 OEEICIAI I ISE ONL Y -SENSITIVE PRE DECISIONAL INFORMA T ION 16 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Indian Point Unit 3 -Unit Auxiliary Transformer , removed from service on February 29 , 2012, due to high gassing The NRC's ROP inspection p rogram includes inspec tion s that review the impac t t hat non-safety related systems, such as main transformers, have on the p l ant. This includes inspections of Problem Id ent i ficat ion and Resolution (P l&R), Mai ntenance Rule, and Performance Indi ca t ors. The Resident I nspectors comp l eted an Event-Follow-up inspection of the 31 main transformer following th e fa ilure , and the results were documented in the publica lly available quarterly report (2015002). Additionally, the NRC comp l e te d a Maintenance Rule inspection of the 31 main transformer, the results of which were documented in the pub li cally avai l ab l e 3rct qua rter report (2015003). A Pl&R inspection sample of the transformer is sues s in ce 2007 is sc he du led to be completed once Entergy completes their Root Cause Eva lu ation , and i s expected to be completed i n the 1 st quarter of 2016. The resu l ts will be pub li shed in pub lica ll y avai l ab l e inspe ct i on reports. These inspections wi ll provide in s igh ts into Entergy's tran sfo rm e r maintenance and monitoring programs , and will review the causes of the various transformer issues. Status of Post-Fukushima Actions The post-F ukushima enhancements associated with EA-12-049, Mitig at ing Strateg ie s for Beyond-Des ig n-Basis External Events (FLEX), and EA-12-051 , Spent Fuel Poo l I nstrumentation, are ongoing at I PEC. The onsite audit for EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 was completed on October 27 , 2014, and I P3 achieved co mpl i ance with the orders in the Spring of 2015. T he ons i te audi t for IP 2 regard i ng EA-12-049 i s current l y schedu l ed for the week of November 30. License Renewal By l etter dated April 23, 2007 (Agencywide Documents an d Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number ML071210512), En tergy app l ied for renewa l of the Indian Point Units 2 an d 3 operating l icenses for an additiona l 20 years beyond the cu r ren t expira ti o n dates. The current expirat i on date of the operating li cense for Unit N o. 2 was midnight on Septembe r 28 , 2013, and the current expira t ion date of the operating license for Unit No. 3 is midnight on December 12 , 2015. The NRC staff conducted a safety review of the license renewal application and documented it s findings in NUREG-1930, "Safety Eva l uation Report Related to the Li cense Ren ewa l of Indian Po i nt Nu clear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3," (ADAMS Access i on N os. ML09 31 70451 and ML093170671) issued in November 2009. On August 30, 2011 , the staff issued Supplement 1 to NUREG-19 30 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 11242A215) and on July 7, 2015, the staff issued Supplement 2 to NUREG-1930 (ADAMS Accession N o. ML 15188A383).
Th e NRC staff also co ndu cted an env iron menta l review of th e li ce n se renewal app l ication and documented it s findings i n NUREG-1437 , Supplement 38, "Gene ric Env ironme ntal I mpact Statement for Li cense Renewal of Nu clea r Plants Regarding I ndian Point Nucle a r Generating Unit N os. 2 and 3" (A DAMS Accession No s. ML 103350438 , M L 103360209, and ML 10 3360212) issued in December 2010. On June 20 , 20 13, the staff issued NUREG 1437 , Supp l ement 38, Vo lu me 4 Final Report (ADAMS Accession No. ML 13162A616.
The staff expects to issue a draft FSEIS Supplement in Jla nuary 2016 and th e fina l FSEIS Supplement in Sep tember 2016. OFFICIAL USE ON LY SENSITIVE PRE-DECISIONAL INFORMA T ION 17 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSI I IVE IN I ERNAL INFORMATION It is possible that the draft and/or fina l FSEIS supp lemen ts may trigger the filing of new environmental contentions.
There are three unresolved safety contentions at present; additional contentions may be filed. Eleven contentions have been resolved:
one was settled, one was resolved in favor of New York , and nine were resolved in favor of the Entergy and the Staff. Appeals from the Board's resolution of two contentions a re pending before the Commission.
Hearings on the three remaining safety contentions were held in Tarrytown, NY , on November 16-20, 2015. Entergy is pursuing re so lu tion of issues related to the plant's Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) certification , C l ean Water Act section 401 certification, and renewal of the plant's State Pollution Discharge E limi nation System permit through the re l evant New York State adjudicatory processes.
The NR G staff is not directly involved in these processes.
If , Entergy does not obtain the requisite certifications prior to completion of the agency's review of the license renewa l application, the NRC may need to cons id e r whether renewed licenses may be issued prior to comp l etion of the State's adj u dicatory processes. State/Local Government Interest I ndian Point generates significant interest amongst the State and Local government representatives.
State and County age n cies a r e highly engaged on all activities related to I ndian Point. The li censee has an extensive outreach program with these offsite representatives and have developed a positive relationship with the four surrounding counties emergency organ i zations. Notwithstanding the above , both the Governor of New York and the Attorney General's office are on record regarding their desire that the Indian Point plants cease opera ti on. Follo wing the Fukush ima event , the Governor's office cited additiona l concerns in support of their position.
The three main topics were (1) the capability of evacuating New York City shou ld a similar event occur, (2) the adequacy of a 10 mile EPZ (versus 50) and (3) the p l ant being located near a seismic fault. Most recently , the Governor's Office sent a letter to the NR G Commission dated November 16 , 2015 opposing the re li censing of In d i an Point. The l etter can be found at: https://www
.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor
.ny.g ov/files/atoms/files/Entergy Le tte r.pdf The most controversia l issue at Ind ian Point for the past 2 years has been the Algonquin I ncremental Market (A IM) pipeline project. This project involves the insta ll ation of a 42-inch diameter natural gas pipeline in close proximity to I ndian Point. There are existing natura l gas pipelines t h at run even c lo ser to the site that pre-dates the const ru ctio n of Indi an Point. Both the new pipeline and the existing pipelines have received rigorous review by NRG staff. Entergy's site ha za rds analysis regarding the new pipeline was reviewed in 2014 with no safety issues ident ified. Quest io ns regarding the existing pipeline are still being answered via an open allegation.
Paul B l anch has reviewed the pipeline for the Town of Cortlandt and been in communication with elec t ed officia l s voicing his concerns over the pipeline. We have heard from Assemblywoman Galef's Office t h at Paul Blanch's concerns are the ir concerns. OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE PRE DECISIONAL INFORMATION 18 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION B. OTHER TOPICS OF INTEREST Emergency Preparedness Since the terrorist attacks of September 11 , 2001, significant stakeholder attention has been focused on security and emergency preparedness (EP) at I ndian Point. I n January 2003, James L ee Witt Associates, LLC, under contract from the State , issued a report critical of EP at Indian Point. Based on Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) offsite and NRC's on-site EP assessments, the NRC's overa ll dete rmi nation continues to be that EP at Indian Point is satisfactory and provides reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety. The last biennial full participation EP exercise at I ndian Point was conducted on October 7, 2014. The next biennial EP exercise is schedu l ed for June 2016. Additionally, since the events at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station and the decision to recommend the evacuation of US citizens out to 50 miles from the facility, there has been renewed and significant stakeholder interest in emergency preparedness and emergency planning zones at Indian Point. Open Allegations There are current l y two open allegations at Indian Point:
* Rl-2015-A-0074 involves a concern that Entergy did not adequately evaluate the effects of heat flux on SSCs around IPEC in the event of a ru ture of an existin as i eline
* Op e n Investigations None Weapons Preemption b 7 C there are parts in the 31 main trans armer that were not Th e I ndian Point security force currently uses weapons and l arge-capacity magazines that are banned by state and loca l laws. I n October 2015, the NRR staff pub l ished a draft Environmental Assessment i n the Federal Register that included a 30-day public comment period. NRR staff plans to issue a confirmatory order, conform i ng amendment , and supporting safety evaluation that will permit security personnel at I ndian Point to transfer, rece i ve, possess, transport , import, and use certain firearms and large capacity ammunition feeding devices not previous l y permitted to be owned or possessed under Commiss i on authority , notwithstanding certain l ocal , state, or federal firearms l aws , including regulations that prohibit such actions. These actions are anticipated to be complete by the end of this calendar year 2.206 Petitions Paul Blanch 2.206 Petition By l etter dated October 15 , 2014 , Pau l Blanch submitted a 2.206 petition critical of Entergy's OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVEi PREi DECISIONAL INFORMATION 19 OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION 50.59 site hazards analysis report associated wit h the proposed Spectra Energy 42-inch diameter natural gas pipeline. Mr. Blanch asserted th at Entergy's 50.59 analysis was inaccurate and incomplete resulting in violations of 1 O CFR 50.59, " Changes , tests , and expe rim ents , 1 O CFR 50.9 , "Comp l eteness a nd Accuracy of I nformation," 1 O CFR 50, Appendix B, " Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power P l ants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants ," and possibly 1 0 CFR 50.5, " Deliberate M i sconduct." The petition , which gathered significant local stakeholde r and po li tical interest, was rejected by an NRC Petition Review Board by letter dated September 9 , 2015 (ADAMS ML 15251A023). By l etter dated November 6, 2015, N RR i ssued a response to 39 questions that Paul Blanch had presented during his July 15 , 2015, presentat i on before the PRB rega r ding both the proposed and existing gas pipelines at IP EC.]] IP3 Reactor Vessel Head Seal Leakage/Repair Following the IPE C Unit 3 Spr i ng 2015 3R18 refue li ng outage, l eakage was identified past the inner o-ring reactor vessel head closure flange. I n order to isolate the i nner seal leakage, the leak off line was secured and the outer o-ring was p l aced in service a ll owi n g start-up to continue.
On, July 14t h , a high temperature leak off line alarmed and c l eared intermittent l y. The high l eak off li ne temperature a l arm annunciated and d i d n ot clear on July 19 th, indicating an outer o-rin g sea l fai l ure. Regional staff in DRS/DRP , Resident I nspectors, Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff comprised of a Senior Materials Engineer a n d the Sen i or Project Manager developed questions regarding the degraded condition and corrective action taken by the Licensee. On July 22, the li censee implemented an Operationa l Decision Making Issue (O DMI) indicating different set points and associated triggers regarding the monitoring of containment temperature and humidity; telltale temp; and reactor coo l ant drain tank level (RCDT). In order to reduce the pressure between the inner and outer seal , bot h seals were placed in service. On September 15, 2015 , Unit 3 was shut down for a planned maintenance outage to replace the reactor vesse l 0-rings. Following maintenance act i vit i es , the reac t or became cr iti cal on September 25, 2015, and re tu rned t o full power opera ti on on September 26 , 2015. [[Gas Pipelines (Existing and Proposed)
Presently , there are 2 natural gas pipelines (26" and 30") that run through the Owner Controlled Area of IP EC , and h ave been the subject of great interest with various stakeholders ove r the past few years. Spectra Energy approac h ed Entergy during the summer of 2013 about pl ans to expand their natural gas pipeline capacity across the Hudson River w i th a new 42-i nch diameter pipeline.
On February 28 , 20 1 4 , Spectra filed an application with the Federal Energy Regu l atory Commission for a certificate to build a new 42-inch natural gas pipe lin e along a southern route on Indian Point prop e rty. I n accordance with NRC requirements , Entergy performed a site hazards analysis to determ i ne the impact of the new natural gas pipeline on the site. On August 21 , 2014 , Entergy voluntari l y submitted a 50.59 evaluation and b l ast ana l ysis for NR C review. A Region I DRS secu ri ty inspector and Headquarters expert on blast ana l ys is p e rformed an ROP baseline insp e ct i on (71111.18 -Plant Modifications) of the 50.59 and b l ast ana l ysis. The results o f the inspection OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE PRE-DECISIONAi INFORMATION 20 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFI C IAL USE ON L Y SENSITIVE PRE-DECISIONAL INFORMAJIQN 2 1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE PRE*DE G ISIONAb INFORMATION 22 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ON L Y SENSITIVE PRE DECISIONAL INFORMA T ION 23 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFI C IA L USE ON LY w SENSI T IVE PRE-DE C ISIONA L INFORMA T ION 24 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE PRE-DEC ISIONAL INFORMATION 25 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFI C IA L USE ON LY w SENSI T IVE PRE-DE C ISIONAL INFORMA T ION 26 OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL US E ON LY S E NSI T IVE PRE DE C ISI O N AL INF O RMA T ION 27 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ONLY -SENSITIVE PRE-DECISIONAL INFORMATION 28 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE PRE-D ECISIONAL INFORMATION 29 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Respons i ve Record OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE PRE-DECISIONAL INFORMATION 30 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFI C IA L USE ON L Y SENSI T IVE PRE DE C ISI O NA L INFORMA T ION 3 1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY* SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record 8 FFI C IA L US E ON L Y SENSI T IVE PRE-DECISIONAL INFORMATION 32 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ONLY SeNSITIVEi PRE DECISIONAL INFORMATION 33 OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATIObl Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE PRE DECISIONAL INFORMATION 34 OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATIQbl Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ON L Y SENSITIVE PRE-DECISIONAL INFORMATION 35 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE PRE DECISIONAL INFORMATION 36 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record E-DECISIONAL INFORMATION 37 OFFICIAL USE ONLY* SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ONLY S6NSITIVE PRE-DECISIONAi INFORMATION 38 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE PRE DECISION.f\L INFORMATION 39 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL IJSE ONLY SENSITIVE PRE DECISIONAL INFORMATION 40 OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL I ISE ONLY SENSITIVE PRE-DECISIONAL INFORMATION 41 OFFICIAL USE ONLY* SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ONLY -SENSITIVE PRE-DECISIONAi INEQRMAJIQN 4 2 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL I ISE ONLY -SENSITIVE PRE-DECISIONAL INFORMATION 43 OFFICIAL USE ONLY* SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ONLY SENSITIVE PRE-DECISIONAL INFORMAJIQN 44 OFFICIAL USE ONLY-SENSITIVE INTERNAL INFORMATION Non Responsive Record OFFICIAL USE ON LY SENSI T IVE PRE DE C ISIONA L INF O RMA T ION 4 5 From: To: Cc: Sub ject: Date: Attachments:
All , Tobin, Margaret far j na Thomas: OKeefe Ne i l Tindell. Br i an CR on react or vesse l flange l eako ff li n e T h u rs d a y, Au g us t 0 6 , 2 0 1 5 4: 1 5: 0 0 PM Attached is a CR and corresponding documentat i on on t h is reactor vesse l flange leakoff l ine. In short , there is a pressure test l ine between the inner and ou t er gasket that is vulnerable to corrosion induced pipe cracking due to water being left in the piping follow i ng refue l i ng outages. The same issue may exis t at the RCP i nner gasket leakoff lines. These l ines are normally isolated , which creates the same potentia l for c r acking , and there may have been an NRC violation issued on these valves beinq closed years aqo. (b )(5) 1 nanKs , Maggie Entergy CO N DITION REPORT I C R-AN 0-1-2 008-025;*1 O ri g i na t or: Barborek , W Dou g l as O r i g in at o r Gro up: E ng Systems NSSS Staff ANO S up erv i sor Na m e: E dg e ll , Dou g la s W Discove r ed D ate: 1 2/08/2 008 0 6:19 Co ndi t i on D esc rip t i o n: O ri g in a t o r Ph o n e: 433 7 O p erab ili ty Re quir e d: Y R eportab ili t y Requ ir e d: Y Initi ated D ate: 1 2/08/20 08 06:22 1R2 l W0-0010 2463 Ta sk O I was not able to be successfu ll y performed as planned. C R-AN0-1-2005-0 114 0 was wr itt en to document OE from seve ral plant s which id enti fi e d corros ion (ch l or id e) in d u ced pipe cracking in r eac t or vessel (RV) flan ge l eak-off/pressure t es t con n ect i o n pipin g res ultin g from water left in th e pipin g fo ll owing refueling outages. ANO-I was determined to be vu ln erab l e si nce water h as be e n t r apped in th is pipi ng during pr ev i o u s operat in g cycles. The scope of W0-00 I 02463 was for System Engineering to attempt to ex t e rnally in spec t th e RV flange l eak-off/p ressure te s t connection piping for ev id ence of cracking.
Th e ins p ection approach wa s to utili ze a horo sco pe to externa ll y in s pect the piping v ia access t hrou g h th e r eac t or cav it y sea l pl a te ope nin gs and betwe e n the RV a!"ld th e RV insulation. Ho wever, du e to th e tight clearances between the insulation an d the RV , the inspection was not successfu l and the l eak-off/press ur e connectio n piping co uld not be visua ll y in s pected as planned. S in ce C R-AN0-1-2005
-0 11 40 was closed to W0-00 I 02463 , this C R is b e in g init iated to provide a m ea n s of tracking an alte rnat e resolution for ad dr ess in g th e noted OE. As documented in the 2005 CR , ANO proc e dure s have be e n rev i se d to e n s ure the sub je ct pipi n g i s drained dur i n g refue lin g o uta ges prior to in stall in g th e RV h ea d , tlhus mitigating th e damage m ec hani s m. The ope r ab ilit y state m e nt in C R-AN0-1-2005-01 1 40 r e m ai n s app li cab l e. Im me di ate A ction D esc ri pt i o n: Initia t ed thi s CR. S u gges t e d Ac ti o n Desc rip t i o n: Deve l op new strategy fo r inspecting the RV flange leak-off/pressure test connection piping relative to the O E documented in CR-AN0-1-2005-0 I 1 40. EQUIPMENT:
Tag Name NONE R EFERENCE IT EMS: l)p e Code CON DITIO N REPORT C ONDITION R EPORT W ORK ORDER Tag S u ffix Na m e Com p one: n t Code Process System C od e Desc rip tio n 1-2015-1950 l-2005-1140 10246 3 TR ENDING (Fo r Refere n ce P u rposes On l y): Tre n d Type RE P ORT WEI G HT SEVE RI T Y WEIGHT HEP FACTO R KEYWORDS KEYWORDS AJ T r e n d Code l 1 p KW-OPERA TrNG EXPE RIEN CE KW-REACTOR V ESSEL H EAD M APO Entergy Tre nd Typ e A I AA l NPO B l NNlNG LT-RFO/F O/SO CONDITION REPORT T r e nd C od e ESSE E SS E Pl2 CA-20 1R24 I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Ent e r g y ADMIN I C R-A N 0-1-2008-02 56 0 Initi a t e d Da t e: 12/8/2008 6:22 C ur re n t C ont act: O wn e r G roup : E ng Sy s tems & Comps Mgmt ANO C urr e n t S i g n ifica n ce: C C l osed b y: S ummar y Descr i pt i o n: I R 2 I W0-00 I 02463 Task O I was not able to b e successfu lly performed as planned. C R-A N0-1-2 005-01140 was writt e n to d oc ument O E from s everal pl a nt s which id e ntifi ed corros i o n ( c hl o rid e) indu ced pip e cracking in reactor vesse l (RV) flange l eak-off/pressure test conn ection piping resulting from water left in the piping followi n g r e fu e l ing outages. ANO-I was determined t o be vulnerab le s in ce water ha s bee n tr apped in th i s pip i n g durin g pre vious operating cycles. The scope of W0-00102463 was for Sys tem Engi ne er in g to attempt to externa ll y i ns pect t h e RV flange l ea k-off/p r ess u re test co nne c ti o n pip in g for ev id e nc e of crack ing. T h e in spect ion ap pr oac h was t o utili ze a boroscope to externally in s pect th e piping v i a acce ss throu g h the r eacto r cav i ty sea l plate o p e nin gs an d b etwee n th e RV a n d t h e RV in s ulati on. H owever, du e t o th e tight c l earances betwee n the in s u l ati o n and t h e RV , th e in s pection was n ot s uc cess ful and the l ea k-off/pressure con n ec ti o n pipin g co u ld n ot be v i sua ll y in s p ecte d as p l a nn e d. Since C R-AN 0-1-2005-01140 was c l osed to W0-0 0 102463, this CR i s b e ing initiat ed to p rov ide a m eans of tracking a n alt e rn ate r esol ution fo r add r ess in g the not e d O E. As d oc ument e d in th e 2 005 C R , ANO procedures h ave bee n rev i sed to e n s ur e th e subject p i p in g i s dr a in e d durin g r e fu e lin g outages prior to installing the RV head , thu s mitigating th e dam age mechanism.
Th e operability s t a t eme n t in C R-AN 0-1-2005-0 1140 remain s app li ca ble. R e m a r ks D escri p t ion: OE C l os ur e rev i ew r eq uir e d -l am 7/8/1 1 Pl Co mpleted a R a nd om Qua lity C lo sure R eview of CA-22, in acco rd ance with EN-LI-102 -Sa t (RG T-PID) 4/2 1/20 1 5 C lo s ur e D esc rip t ion:
Entergy Op e r a bili ty V ers ion: Op e r a bility C od e: ADM lN -NA Imm ed i ate R e po rt C od e: NOT REP ORTABL E P e rfo r m e d By: Ak in s, Danny W App r oved By: Kinney, J ohn W Ope r a b i li ty D esc rip t i o n: OPERABILITY 12/08/2008 07:34 12/08/2 008 09:04 I C R-AN0-1-2008-02560 Thi s co nditi on r epo r t id e n t ifi es the in ab ilit y to s ucces sfu ll y perform I R2 I W0-00102463 Ta s k O I planned. As state d in the Con diti on Description , th e sco p e of W0-00102463 was for System Eng ineering to attempt to externa ll y in s pect the RV flan ge leak-off/pressure t es t co nn ect ion piping for ev i dence of cracking.
Th e i nspect i on a pp roach was to utili ze a b orosco p e to ex t e rn a ll y in s p ect t h e pipin g via access throu gh th e reactor c avity sea l plate openings an d be tw een the RV a nd the RV in su l ation. However, due to the tight clearan ces between the insulation an d the RV, th e inspection was not s uccessful a n d the l eak-off/pressure co nn ect i on piping cou ld not be v i sually inspected as planned. S in ce CR-A N0-1-2005-0 114 0 was c l osed to W0-0010 2463, this CR i s b e in g initiat ed to provide a mean s of tracking an alternate r eso luti on for addressing t h e not e d OE. As documen te d in the 2005 C R , ANO procedures ha ve been revised to ensure the s ubj ect pipin g is drained d m in g r efue lin g outages prior to in sta llin g the RV head , thu s mitigating th e damage mecha ni sm. Add iti ona lly , the operabil i ty s tat e m e nt i n C R-AN0-1-2 005-0 1 140 remain s app li cab l e. The fo ll ow in g excerpt was taken from the operabi li ty det e rmin ation performed fo r CR-AN0-1-2 005-1140. "This condit i on r e port do es n o t i dentify the pr esence ofTGSCC in the RV 0-ring Leak D etec tion Lines of ANO U nit I , but only th e pot e nti a l t o develop a conducive environment.
H ot sh utd own walkdowns are p erformed at NOP/NOT cond iti ons fo ll owi n g eac h r efue lin g. Gross l eakage or ex t erna l boron accumulation wou ld be v i s i b l e. Jfa l eak o n a detec ti o n lin e we r e to d eve l op co incid e nt with an Inner 0-rin g l eak, it would be dete c t e d as "unidentified l eakage" durin g no r ma l R CS L cakrate survei llan ce t estu ng. A n y leakage via th i s m ec h a n is m would be bo un ded by T ec hni ca l S p ec ifi cat i on 3.4.1 3 (RCS L eakage) and app r opriate co rr ect i ve actions taken. Th i s co ndi tion r e p o rt d oes not s p ec i fica ll y id e ntif y a d eg rad e d or pote n t i a ll y d egra d ed plant system, s tructur e, or compo n e nt. The cond i t i on i s cons id ere d to b e admi ni strat i ve in nature. Lic ens ing an d Sys t em E n g in ee rin g were co nt ac t ed for co n c urr e n ce with thi s Operability D e t e rm ina ti on." Imm ediate NRC Rcportability i s not required fo r the s t ate d cond i tion. A ppro va l C omm e n ts:
Entergy ASSIGNMENTS V e rsion: Significance C od e: C C la ss ification Code: A D V CO RRE C T Owner Group: Eng Syste m s & Comps Mgmt ANO Performed B y: zzANO CRG **lH EA use only** Assi g nment
 
== Description:==
 
(RM Action Due Date 12/23/08) Edgell Conve rt ed from: Eng Sys M gmt ANO 1 2/10/2 008 10:59 CR-ANO-l-2008-02560 Entergy REPORTABILITY Rep o rtabili ty V e r s ion: R e port N umb e r: R e po r t Co d e: NOT R EPO RTABLE Bo il e rpl a te C od e: NO REPORT -ADMH P e rformed B y : Van Bu s kirk , Fr e d P R e port a bili ty D esc ription: This condition involves administrative issues t h at are not reportable.
I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 12/09/20 08 16: 10 Ent e rgy I CORRECTIV E ACTION CA N umb e r: G roup Ass i g n e d By: Eng Sys Mgmt ANO Asstg n e d To: E n g Sys Mgmt ANO S ub ass i g n ed T o: E n g Sys NSSS Staff ANO Or i g i nate d By: zz ANO CRG **lHEA use only** P erfor m e d By: Edge ll ,Douglas W S ub pe r fo rm e d By: Barborek,W D oug la s A ppr ove d By: C lo sed By: Edge ll , Douglas W C ur re n t Du e D ate: 1 2/23/2008 CA T y p e: DTSP -CA Pl a nt C on s tr a int: NONE CA D es cript io n: Miller Jr,John N Edge ll , D o u g l as W Barborek , W Douglas 1 2/10/2 008 l0:59:5S 1 2/18/2008 16:23:53 12/15/2 008 11: I 0:08 12/18/2008 1 7: 1 0:lE I n i t i a l Du e Date: 12/23/2 008 CA P ri o ri ty: I C R-AN0-1-2008-025 6 0 Na m e You h ave been assigned as the Responsible Manager for this Category "C" , Non-Significant Cond iti on Report by the CRG to ensure co rr ective actions are app ropriat ely comp l eted within the prescribed time frame. Dev e lop an action plan and issue follow up action as needed. Res p o n se: T concur with the fol lowin g sub-r espo n s e and c l osure of thi s corrective action. S ubr es p o n se : The following two CA's have been issued to further evaluate a course of action required to address the OE documented in C R-ANO-l-2005-0 l I 40. The i ss uance of these actions constitutes an acceptable corrective act i on plan for this CR. Addit.iona l CA's will be is sue d as deemed appropriate.
CA-02 -CR-AN0-1-2005-0 1140 (CA-04) eva l uat.ed the feas ibility of perfonning a hydro s tatic te s t of the RV flange leak-o ff/pressure test connection piping a: ad concluded that such a test was not feasible.
Based on the inabi l ity to visually inspect the piping during IR21 (v i a boroscope), revi s it the feasibility of performing a hydrostatic te s t on these lin es to verify piping integrity.
CA-03 -D ete rmin e the scope requ ir ed to perform a direct vis ual in spect i on of the RV flange l eak-off/p r essure test connect i on piping (i.e. remova l of reactor cavity sea l plate, conc rete sh ie l d blocks, and RV insulation) in the event that no other option is id ent ifi ed to verify th e integrity of th e piping. WDB 12/15/2 008 C l os ur e Co mm e nt s: J concur with closure of thi s corrective action.
Ent e rgy I CORRECTIV E ACTION CA N umb e r: 2 G roup Ass i g n e d By: Eng Sys Mgmt ANO Asstg n e d To: E n g Sys NSSS Staff ANO S ub ass i g n ed T o : Or i g i nate d By: Edge ll , Douglas W P erfor m e d By: Barborek, W D oug l as S ub pe r fo rm e d By: A ppr ove d By: C lo sed By: Edge ll , Douglas W C ur re n t Du e D ate: 08/2 7/2009 CA T y p e: ACTION Pl a nt C on s tr a int: NONE CA D es cript io n: Edge ll , Dougla s W Barborek, W Douglas 1 2/17/2 008 1 5:00: 1~ 8/27/2009 10: 37:49 8/2 7/200915:38:16 I n i t i a l Du e Date: 08/27/2 009 CA P ri o ri ty: I C R-AN0-1-2008-025 6 0 Na m e CR-ANO-L-2005-01 140 (CA-04) eva lu ated the feas ibility of performing a hydrostatic test of the RY flan ge l eaik-oWpressu r e test connection piping and concluded that suc h a test was not feasib l e. Ba sed on the inability to visua ll y in spect the piping during 1R21 (via horoscope), revisit the feasibility of performing a hydrostatic test on these lines to verify piping integri ty. Res p o n se: The inspection
/te s tin g of the Reactor Ve sse l Flange Leak-off & Pr essure Test Connect i on piping requires additiona l resource s and engineering which transcends the role and responsibility of System Engineering.
CA-07 has been created for SY E to initiat e a n ew SI PDB Record and present to the U RT/MPRC to recommend thi s sco pe of work be executed by the Projects organization.
WDB 8/27/2009 S ubr es pon se : C l os ur e Co mm e nt s: T concur with closure of this act ion. The scope of this in spectio n will required a project team g iv en the comp l ex iti es of the task, the expense involve, the potential dose invol ved and the required contingencies that must be in place at the time the in s p ec tion i s performed.
Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 C orrecti ve Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00002 Version: R e qu este d Du e dat e: 06/04/2009 Requ ested B y: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: Edge ll , Douglas W R e que st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Du e dat e: 02/18/2009 02/17/2009 02/17/2009 This CA could not be completed by the assigned due date due to co mp et in g work l oad priorities , and recent manpower demands from forced o ut ages 1F09-0 R, 1F09-02, and 2 F0 9-02. Therefore, the due date is being extended to J une 4, 2009. Th e n ew date i s <6 month s b eyon d C R ini tiation and i s therefore acceptable.
WDB 2/16/2009 A pprov e d
 
== Description:==
 
Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 C orrecti ve Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00002 Version: 2 R e qu este d Du e dat e: 08/27/2009 Requ ested B y: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: Edge ll , Douglas W R e que st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Du e dat e: 06/0 4/2009 06/03/2 009 06/03/2 009 This CA could not be completed by the assigned due date due to co mp et in g work l oad prioritie s and the comp l exity of the CA request. Therefore, the due date is being extended to August 27, 2009, prior to the start of 2R20. The new proposed due da t e i s >6 month s b eyo nd C R initiati o n and this i s the seco nd du e date ex t e n s ion r e qu est; however , th e l atest int er im r ev i ew (CA-05) approved by the En gineering Director ( on 5/2 1/2009) did note that the CA wou l d need to be extended past the current 6/3/2009 due dat e and i s th e refor e acceptab l e. WDB 6/3/2 009 Approved
 
== Description:==
 
I co n c ur with this DO E as act in g System En gi neering Man age r. Thi s ODE will not drive the age of the C R beyond that of existing actions and the l atest approved int e rim revi ew which was r ev i ewed by the Engi n eer in g D irector.
Ent e rgy I CORRECTIV E ACTION CA N umb e r: 3 G roup Ass i g n e d By: Eng Sys Mgmt ANO Asstg n e d To: E n g Sys NSSS Staff ANO S ub ass i g n ed T o : Or i g i nate d By: Edge ll , Douglas W P erfor m e d By: Barborek, W D oug l as S ub pe r fo rm e d By: A ppr ove d By: C lo sed By: Edge ll , Douglas W C ur re n t Du e D ate: 08/2 7/2009 CA T y p e: ACTION Pl a nt C on s tr a int: NONE CA D es cript io n: Edge ll , Dougla s W Barborek, W Douglas 1 2/J 7/2 008 J 5:01 :Of 8/27/2009 10: 37:24 8/2 7/200916:03:18 I n i t i a l Du e Date: 08/27/2 009 CA P ri o ri ty: I C R-AN0-1-2008-025 6 0 Na m e Determine the scope r eq ui red to perform a direct visual inspection of the RV flange leak-off/press ur e test connec tion piping (i.e. removal of reactor cavity sea l p l ate , concrete shield blocks , and RV in su l at ion) in the event that no other opt ion i s identified to verify the integrity of the piping. Res p o n se: The inspection
/te s tin g ofthc Reactor Ve sse l Flange Leak-off & Pr essure Test Connect i on piping requires additiona l resource s and engineering which transcends the role and responsibility of System Engineering.
CA-07 has been created for SY E to initiat e a n ew SI PDB Record and present to the U RT/MPRC to recommend thi s sco pe of work be executed by the Projects organization.
WDB 8/27/2009 S ubr es pon se : C l os ur e Co mm e nt s: T concur with closure of this corrective action.
Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 C orrecti ve Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00003 Version: R e qu este d Du e dat e: 06/04/2009 Requ ested B y: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: Edge ll , Douglas W R e que st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Du e dat e: 02/18/2009 02/17/2009 02/17/2009 This CA could not be completed by the assigned due date due to co mp et in g work l oad priorities , and recent manpower demands from forced o ut ages 1F09-0 R, 1F09-02, and 2 F0 9-02. Therefore, the due date is being extended to J une 4, 2009. Th e n ew date i s <6 month s b eyon d C R ini tiation and i s therefore acceptable.
WDB 2/16/2009 A pprov e d
 
== Description:==
 
Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 C orrecti ve Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00003 Version: 2 R e qu este d Du e dat e: 08/27/2009 Requ ested B y: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: Edge ll , Douglas W R e que st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Du e dat e: 06/0 4/2009 06/03/2 009 06/03/2 009 This CA could not be completed by the assigned due date due to co mp et in g work l oad prioritie s and the comp l exity of the CA request. Therefore, the due date is being extended to August 27, 2009, prior to the start of 2R20. The new proposed due da t e i s >6 month s b eyo nd C R initiati o n and this i s the seco nd du e date ex t e n s ion r e qu est; however , th e l atest int er im r ev i ew (CA-05) approved by the En gineering Director ( on 5/2 1/2009) did note that the CA wou l d need to be extended past the current 6/3/2009 due dat e and i s th e refor e acceptab l e. WDB 6/3/2 009 Approved
 
== Description:==
 
I co n c ur with this DO E as act in g System En gi neering Man age r. Thi s ODE will not drive the age of the C R beyond that of existing actions and the l atest approved int e rim revi ew which was r ev i ewed by the Engi n eer in g D irector.
Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION CA N umb e r: 4 Ass i g n e d By: E ng Sys Mgmt ANO Asstgned To: Eng Sys Mgmt ANO S uba ss i g n ed T o : G roup Originated By: zz ANO CRG **lHEA use only** P erfor m e d By: Bond , Vin cent S S ubp e rform e d By: Approved By: C lo sed By: Bond , Vincent S C ur re nt Du e Date: 06/03/2009 CA T y p e: CR CLOSU R E REVIEW Plant C on s traint: NONE CA D es cription:
C l osure R e view or int er im R ev i ew R e quir e d Bo n d, Vincent S Bo n d , Yincent S 4/29/2009 14:02:29 5/5/2009 03:27:46 5/5/2 009 03:28:04 Initi a l Du e Date: 06/03/2009 CA Priority:
I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Na m e (NO TE -an Interim R eview require s both "Re s pon s ible Manager" AND Director or Above" approval).
Conduct and document an interim review of this Condition Report using the "CR Interim and P eriodic Review Checklist", Attachment 9.8 of EN-LI-I 0 2 which i s available via the R efe r e n ce Libr ary EC H Site in th e Nuclear M a nag e m e nt Manual Commo n Forms section. OR If all Corrective Action s in thi s Condition Report are closed , conduct a c l osu re review. Thi s action i s b e in g i ssued by CA&A , per LI-102, for you to review this Condition Report for closure per t h e guide lin es provided in LI-102 a nd CA -CR C l osure C h eck li s t. Re s pon se: C lo sed to CA-5. S ubr es pons e : C l os ur e Co mm e nt s:
Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION CA Number: 5 Group Assigned By: Eng Sys Mgmt ANO Asstgned To: Eng Sys Mgmt ANO S uba ss i g ned To: E ng Sys NSSS Staff ANO Originated By: Bond , Vincent S P e rformed By: E dg e ll , Dougla s W S ubp e rformed By: Barborck , W D oug l as Approved By: Closed By: Edge ll , Dou g la s W Current Due Date: 06/03/2009 CA Typ e: C R CL O SU R E REVIEW Plant Constraint:
NONE CA
 
== Description:==
 
C l osure Review o r int er i m Revi ew R e quir e d Bond, V in cent S Edge ll , D o u g l as W Barborck , W Doug l as 5/5/2009 03:27:23 6/2/2009 1 5:27:23 5/26/2009 08:06:29 6/2/2 009 15: 28: 21 Initial Du e Date: 06/03/2009 CA Priority:
I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Name (N OTE -an Interim R eview require s both "Re s pon s ibl e M anager" A ND Director or Above" approval).
Cond uc t and document an interim review of this Co nditi on Report using th e "CR Int erim and P eriodic Review C h eck l is t" , Attachment 9.8 of EN-LI-I 0 2 wh i ch is avai l ab l e v i a the R efere n ce Lib rary EC H Site in th e Nuc l ear M anagemen t Manual Co m mo n Forms section. OR If a ll Corrective Act i ons in thi s Condit i on Report are c l osed , con du ct a c l osu re review. Thi s act i on i s b e in g i ssued per LI-I 02 fo r yo u to r ev i ew this Co nditi o n Report fo r c l os ur e per the g uid e lin es provided i n LI-102 a nd CA -C R C lo s ure C h ecklist. Re spo n se: l co n c ur w ith t h e follow i ng su b-r es pon se and closure of thi s co rr ec ti ve action as ac tin g System E n g in ee r in g M anager. T h e n ext int e rim revi ew action ha s b ee n assigned.
Subrcsponse
: int e rim Rev i ew i s attached.
E-m a il documenting Di rector approva l i s a l so attac h ed. WDB 5/2 6/2009 C lo s ur e Co mm e nt s: T co n c ur w ith closu r e of th i s corrective action wh i ch ha s been app r oved b y the En g in eer in g Dir ector. Attachm e nt s: Subres p onse Description In terim Review Subresponsc Desc r iption e-ma il fo r Dir ec tor A ppro va l Document Name: un t it l ed Document Location ~ub r es p onse D escri p t i on Attach Title: !inte r im Rev i ew Attachment Header ATT AC H M ENT 9.8 CR INTERIM A ND PERIODI C RE V IE W F OR M SHEET 1 OF 1 CR Interim and Periodic Review C R Nu m b e r: CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Ca t egory L eve l D AD B IZI C C R Ow n e r G roup: ENG SYS MGMT ANO CR D esc ripti o n: 1 R2 1 W0-00102463 T ask 0 1 was not ab l e to be success f u ll y perfo r med as pla n ned. CR-AN0-1-2005-011 4 0 was w ri tten to documen t OE from seve r a l pla n ts which identified corrosion (c h loride) in d u ced pipe cracking in reactor vessel (RV) flange leak-off/pressure t est co nn ection p i ping result i ng from wa t er left i n the p i ping f o ll owing r efue lin g outages. AN0-1 was dete rm i ned to be vu ln erab le s i nce water has bee n tr apped in this pip i ng du r ing previous ope r at in g cycles. The scope of W0-00102463 was for Sys t e m Enginee r i n g to attempt to exte rn a ll y i nspect the RV flange l eakoff/p r essure tes t co n nec t ion pip in g for evidence o f cracking. T he i nspection approach was to u t i l ize a boroscope to exte rn ally i nspect the p i p i ng via access t hrough t he reactor cav it y sea l plate open in gs and be t ween t he RV and t he RV i n sulat i on. Howeve r , due t o th e t i ght clearances between the i nsu l ation and the RV, the i n spection was not successfu l and t he l ea k-off/p r essure connection p i ping could n o t be visua ll y in spec t ed as pl a n ned. Si n ce CR-AN0-1-2005-0 11 40 was closed to W0-00102463, this CR is b ei ng i nit i a t ed t o prov i de a m e ans of t r ack ing an a lt erna t e r e so lut io n for address i ng the n oted OE. As doc u mented i n the 2005 CR , ANO procedures have been r ev i sed t o ensure the subject p i ping i s drained during r e f uel in g outages prior t o in s t a ll in g t he RV head , thus m iti ga t ing t h e da m age mechan i sm. T h e operabi l ity statemen t in CR-AN0-1-2005-0 11 4 0 remains applicab l e. CR Review: (A ll No r espo n ses r equ ir e ex pl a n a ti o n be in cluded.) T he fo ll ow in g t wo CA's h ave been i ssue d to further eva lu ate a course of action r eq ui r ed to add r ess t h e OE d ocumented in CR-AN0-1-2005-01 1 4 0. Th e i ssuance o f these actions const it utes an acce p table corrective a c ti on p l an for this CR. Add iti onal CA's will be iss u ed as deemed appropriate. CA-02 -CR-AN0-1-2005-01140 (CA-04) eva lu a t ed t he feasib i lity of perfo rm ing a hydrostatic tes t of t h e RV f l ange leak-off/pressure test connec tion pi ping and conc l ude d t h at such a tes t was n ot feasib l e. Based o n the i nability to visua ll y i nspect t he piping d urin g 1 R21 (v ia boroscope), r evisit the feasib i lity of performing a h yd r ostat i c test on t hese l ines to verify pip i ng i n t egrity. T hi s CA is c urr ently due on 6/3/2009 , bu t m ay need to b e exte n ded d u e to cu rr en t work l oad. CA-03 -Determ i ne the scope required to p erfo rm a d i rect visual in spec t io n of the RV flange l eakoff/pressure tes t co n nec t ion pipi ng (i.e. removal of r eac t or cavity seal plate , concre te s hi e l d blocks , and RV insulation) i n th e event that no o t her op t io n i s i dent i fied to verify t he integrity o f the pipi n g. T h i s CA i s current l y due on 6/3/2009 , but m a y need to be extended du e to c urr en t work l oad. 1. Wi ll th e ex i s tin g co rr ec ti ve ac ti ons d oc um e nt ed in th e co n d iti on r e p o rt, w h e n co m p l e t ed, co rr ec t th e c on d i ti on r e p o rt i ss u e? Yes IZI I No D T he cor r ective act i o n s , w h e n completed , along wit h t h e Work O r ders t o be i mp l emented for 1 R22 (W0-00 1 95437 fo r CA-02 and/or W0-00195 4 38 for CA-03), will ensure th e appropriate i nspection is performed. Assumi n g no degradat i on i s found , the ove r all i ssue identified by t h e i n dus t ry OE wi ll be f u lly re so l v e d. Any d e g r ada ti o n found du rin g 1 R22 would be addr e ss e d unde r a n e w Condit i on Report. 2. W h at is t h e ex p ec t e d C R C l os ur e da t e base d on r ema i n in g n ee d ed act i o n s? DATE: 2/11/2010 EN-Ll-10 2 REV 1 3 I t i s ant ici pa t e d t h at t his CR w i ll be c l osed pri or to 1 R22 Mi l es t one P0-4 7 " A ll Work Orders " Ready t o W ork'', which i s due o n Feb r ua r y 11 , 2010. 3. Is the previously documented operability/functionality position still valid for the current condition and expected to remain valid until CR closure? Yes [gl / No D /N/A D If the answer is NO , then initiate a new CR to document the concern; CR# N/A 4. Are all Ll-102 requirements for corrective action administration and control being met , i.e. justifications for Due Date Extensions valid, Long Term Corrective Actions identified, CARB approved CAPRs identified, and appropriate approvals obtained for all? Yes [gi/ No D 5. What risk to plant operation is imposed by the condition identified and how is risk reduced to an acceptable level for the duration of the action plan? T h i s CR does not spec ifi ca ll y identify a k now n degraded p l ant system, st ru cture , or component at AN0-1 , bu t does i de nt i fy a po t e n tial degradat i on mechanis m. Bo th t h e RV flange gas k et l eak detection line and p r essure tes t co nn ection lines were fl us h ed/d r ai n ed duri n g 1R19 , 1 R 2 0 , a n d 1 R2 1 , t hu s m ini m i z i ng the p o t entia l fo r f ai lu re result i ng from I D in it i ated , c h loride i nduced , t r a n sg r anula r st r ess-corros ion crack i ng (TGSCC). No RV f l a n ge gaske t l eakage was identified d u r ing p l a nt h eat-up f r o m 1 R19 , 1 R20 , or 1 R21 prior to i so l a tin g va l ves RBS-1 and R B S-2 , and RCS l eakage r ates follow in g 1 R 1 9 , 1 R20 , and 1 R21 h ave not ind i ca t ed t he prese n ce o f any concurre nt l eakage of t he R V f l ange gas k ets and leak detectio n/p r ess ur e test connect i on p i ping/components. Th e RV f l ange gas k ets are r ep l ace d during eac h ref u eling ou t age and va l ves RBS-1 a n d RBS-2 are not isolated unt i l j u st prior to c rit ical it y afte r it h as b ee n verified that t h e inn er gaske t is not l ea kin g. T he r efore , the li k el i h ood o f in ne r gaske t l eakage, w hi le possible, i s co n s i dered l ow. I n conclus i on , t h e risk to pl ant ope r at i o n is m ini ma l and reduced to accepta b le l eve l s until t he ac t ion p l an for t h i s CR can be i mplemented d ur i n g 1 R22. Review/ Approval Required:
Director/GM Title: Date: --------------
-----(Print name & Position title) NOTE: The expectation is to capture the discussion points of this form in a CA. The form itself need not be used, but all points applicable must be addressed.
EN-Ll-10 2 REV 1 3 Attachment Header Doc u ment Name: un t it l ed Document Location ~ub r es p onse Descri p t i on Attach Ti t le: ~-mai l f or D i rector App r ova l BARBOREK, W DOUGLAS From: LAY , LI NDA S Sent: T hursday , May 21 , 2009 5:44 PM To: BARBOREK, W DOUGLAS Cc: EDGELL , DOUGLAS W Subj e ct: RE: REQUEST FOR REV I EW -I nterim Rev i ew for CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 "Resolve I ndustry OE on Ch l or i de Induced Stress Corrosion Cracking on RV F l ange Pip i ng" Interim app r oved per Cleve. Li nda Fro m: Se nt: T o: Cc:
 
==Subject:==
C l eve , BARBOREK , W DOUG.AS Thursday , May 21 , 20 09 4:20 PM REASONER, a.EVELAND EDGELL, DCUGL.AS W; LAY, LI N DA S RE: REQUEST FOR REVIEW -Inte rim Review fo r CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 "Reso lv e I ndustry OE on Ch lo r id e Induced Stress Corrosion Cracking o n RV Range Pip i ng" 1 R22 W0-00195437 has been init i ated for the pressure (h ydro , pneumatic , or vacuum) test of the p i p ing (if we determ i ne we can do t hat), and 1 R22 W0-00195438 has been i n i t i ated for t he intrus i ve inspect i ons , i f i t comes to that. Keep i n mind t hat the in trusive i nspect i ons , if t h a t's the route we have to go, would be very cost l y , dose i ntens iv e , and have a ma j or impact o n cr iti ca l path since it involves dest r uctive l y r emoving the reactor cavity sea l plate, the concre t e shie ld b l ocks , a n d the RV insulation.
It is my des ir e to find a way to perform a pressure test. I am t ry i ng t o find out how Davis Besse , Oconee , and Calvert C lif fs did t heir t esting. Since this p i ping is i naccess i ble , this OE has proven difficult to resolve. I can bring some drawings to you if you wis h to i llustrate what we're up aga in s t on t h i s. Thanks , Do u g Barbo r e k En t ergy Opera t i o n s. I n c./ Arkansas Nuc l ea r One System E n ginee r -U n i t I Reactor Co olant System System E n g ine e ri n g Buildin g/ N-SYS-4 wba r bo l@e nt c r gy.co m 479-858-4337 !(b )(6) I pa ge r F r o m: Sent: To: Cc: Subjec t: LAY, LINDA S Thu rsda y , M ay 2 1 , 2 009 4: 1 2 PM BA.RBOREK, W DOUG.AS EDGE LL , DOUGLAS W RE: REQUEST FOR REVIEW -Inte rim Review fo r CR-AN0-1-2 008-02560 "Reso lv e I ndustry OE on Chlo r ide Indu ced Stress Corrosion Cracki n g on RV Range Piping" C l eve's Ques t ion -I s i nspec ti on scoped in the outage? From: Sent: To: Cc:
 
==Subject:==
Cleve & Vince, BARBOREK , W DOUGLAS Thu rsday , May 21 , 2009 9:40 AM REASONER, QEVElAND; BOND , VINCENT S EDGELL , DOOGLAS W; EICHENBERGER, JOHN R REQUES T FOR REVIEW -Int er i m Review for CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 "Resolve Industry OE on Ch l oride Induced Stress Co rro sio n Oack i ng on RV Range Ap i ng" The interim review for the subject CR is attached for your rev i ew and concurrence. The draft in te rim review has been attached to CA-05. The CA is ultimately due on Wednesday , June 3 , 2009 (initially due by me on Monday , June 1). Please let me know if you have any questions. Thanks , Doug Barborek E nt e r gy O p e rati o n s. In c. I Ark a n.sas u c l ea r One S ys t e m E n gi n ee r -Un i t I R eac t o r Coo l a nt S y s t e m Sys t e m E n gi n ee rin g Bui l d i n g/ -S Y S-4 wb ar bo I @c nt crgy.co m 4 7 9-85 8-4337 !(b)(6) !pa ger << File: CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-05 Interim Review.doc>>
Ent e rgy I CORRECTIV E ACTION CA N umb e r: 6 G roup Ass i g n e d By: E ng Sys Mgmt ANO Asstg n e d To: E n g Sys Mgmt ANO S ub ass i g n ed T o: E n g Sys NSSS Staff ANO Or i g i nate d By: E dgell , Dougla s W P erfor m e d By: Willi ams , Patrick J S ub pe r fo rm e d By: Barborck , W D oug l as A ppr ove d By: C lo sed By: William s, Patrick J C ur re n t Du e D ate: 02/11/2 010 CA T y p e: C R CL OS U R E REVIEW Pl a nt C on s tr a int: NONE CA D es cript io n: C l osure Review o r int er im R ev i ew R e quir e d Wi l l iams , P at ri c k J Edge ll , D o u g l as W Barborck , W Doug l as 6/2/2009 1 5:26: 1 6 2/9/20 10 1 7:10:37 2/8/20 10 10: 11:1 5 2/9/2010 17:11:04 I n i t i a l Du e Date: 0 2/11/20 I 0 CA P ri o ri ty: I C R-AN0-1-2008-025 6 0 Na m e (N OTE -an Interim R eview require s both "Re s pon s ibl e M anager" A ND Director or Above" a ppr oval). Con duct and document an int er i m review of this Co nditi on Report using th e "CR Int erim and P eriodic Review C h eck li s t" , Attachment 9.8 of EN-LI-I 0 2 wh i ch is avai l ab l e v i a the R efere n ce Lib rary EC H Site in th e Nuc l ear M anagemen t Manual Co mmon Forms sec tion. OR If a ll Corrective Action s in thi s Condit i on R eport are c l osed , con du ct a c l osu re review. Thi s act i on i s b e in g i ssued per LI-I 02 fo r yo u to r ev i ew this Condition Report fo r c l os ure per the g uid e lin es provided i n LI-1 02 a nd CA -C R C lo s ure C h ecklist. R espo n se: Concur w i th c l osure. S u bre s p o n se : Interim Review attached.
E-mail documenting Di recto r approval i s also atta ched. W DB 2/8/2010 C lo s ure C omm e nt s: A tt ac hm e n ts: Subresponse D esc ription Int erim R eview S ubr espo n se De s cription Dir ecto r Approva l e-ma il Document Name: un t it l ed Document Location ~ub r es p onse D escri p t i on Attach Title: !inte r im Rev i ew Attachment Header ATT ACHMEN T 9.8 CR INTERI M AND PERIODI C RE VIEW F OR M SHEET 1 OF 1 CR Interim and Periodic Review CR Nu mber: CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Category L eve l DAD B IZI C CR Owner Group: ENG SYS MGMT ANO CR
 
== Description:==
 
1 R21 W0-00102463 Task 01 was not ab l e to be successfully performed as p l anned. CR-AN0-1-2005-01140 was wr i tten to document OE from several p l ants which identified corrosion (chloride) i nduced pipe cracking in reactor vessel (RV) flange leak-off/pressure t est connection p i ping result i ng from water left i n the p i ping following refue l ing outages. AN0-1 was dete r mined to be vu l nerab le s i nce water has been t rapped in this piping during previous operat i ng cycles. The scope of W0-00102463 was for System Engineering to attempt to externally inspect the RV f l ange l eakoff/pressure test connection piping for evidence of cracking. The i nspect i on approach was to uti l ize a boroscope to externally i nspect the pip i ng via access through the reactor cav i ty sea l plate openings and between the RV and the RV i nsulat i on. However, due to the t i ght clearances between the i nsu l ation and the RV, the inspection was not successfu l and the l eak-off/pressure connection p i ping could not be visually i nspected as pla n ned. Since CR-AN0-1-2005-01140 was closed to W0-00102463, t hi s CR i s be i ng i nit i ated to provide a means of track i ng an a l terna t e reso l utio n for address i ng the noted OE. As documented i n the 2005 CR , ANO procedures have been revised to ensure the subject piping i s dra i ned during refueling outages pr i or to i nstall i ng t he RV head , thus m i tigating the damage mechan i sm. The operabi l ity statemen t in CR-AN0-1-2005-0 11 40 remai n s applicable. CR Review: (All No responses require exp l anation be included.) T he follow i ng CA's have been i ssued to further eva l uate a course of act i on requ i red to address the OE documented in CR-AN0-1-2005-01140. T he iss u ance of t h ese actions const i tutes an acceptab l e corrective action p l an for this CR. Add i tional CA's wi ll be issued as deemed appropriate. CA-02 -CR-AN0-1-2005-01140 (CA-04) evaluated the feasib i lity of performing a hydrostatic test of the RV f l ange leak-off/pressure test connec t io n p i p i ng and conc l uded that such a test was n ot feas i b l e. Based on the i nabi l ity to visually i nspect the p i ping d u r ing 1 R21 (via boroscope), revisit the feas i b i l i ty of perform i ng a hydrostat i c test on these l ines to verify pip i ng i ntegrity.
Th i s CA was closed on 8/27/2009 to CA-07 w hi c h was i ni tiated for SYE to i nit i ate a new S I PDB Reco r d and present to the U RT/M P RC to recommend this scope of work be executed by the Projects Organ i zation. CA-03 -Determ i ne the scope requi r ed to perform a d i rect visual inspection of t he RV f l ange loff/p r ess u re test connection p i ping (i.e. removal of reactor cavity seal plate, concrete s hi eld blocks, and RV insu l atio n) in the even t that no other option is i dent i fied to verify the integrity of the piping. Thi s CA was closed on 8/27/2009 t o CA-07 wh i ch was i nit i ated for SYE to in i tiate a new S I PDB Record and p r esent to the URT/MPRC to recommend this scope of work be executed by t h e Projects Organ iza tion. CA-07 -The i nspect i on of the RV F lange Leak-off & Pressure Test Con n ection pip i ng requires add i tional r esources and eng i neeri n g which t ransce n ds the ro l e and r espons i bi l i ty of System Engineer i ng. I nit i ate a new S I PDB Record and present to the URT/MPRC to recommend th i s scope of work be executed by the Projects Organization. S I PDB Record 4955 was i nit i ated to transfer this scope of wo r k to the Projec t s Organization and this CA was c l osed on 11/19/2009. New CA-08 was i ssued to t r ack the presentation of S I PDB Record 4955 to the URT. EN-Ll-102 REV 13 CA-08 -Present SIPDB Re co rd (In spec ti o n of the RV F l ange Leak-off & Pre ss ure Test Connect ion Pi p ing) to the URT/MPRC for this scope of work to be execu t ed by the Projects Organization.
SYE made the presentation at the 12/7/2009 URT meeting. The U RT conc urred that if the l eak-off & pres sure test connect i on piping u l timately require physica l inspect i on or replacement such that disassembly/reassemb l y of th e reactor cav ity sea l p l ate, conc r ete sh i e l d blocks, and r eactor vesse l i nsu l ation is required , then that significant scope of work wou l d be transferred t o the Proje ct Organi za tion. However, at this time , the URT de c ided that System Engineering shou ld re-eva l uate th e pres sure test option and come up with a plan to perform a pressure test on the l ea k-off and pressure test co nne c t i on piping to veri f y th e i ntegrity o f th e p i pi n g. If the pressure test fails on one or both of the l ines , the ensuing scope of work to access the p ip ing for ultimate reso l ution o f the issue would then be pursued by th e Proje c t s Organization. New CA-09 has been i ss u ed to SYE to determ i ne a s uit ab l e pr essure test method and to in i tiate the proper imp l e m en t a t i on documentation.
1 R22 w ill be util i zed to p e rform scop ing wa lkdo w n s since this pip ing i s not access i b l e dur i ng power operat i ons. Th i s CA was closed on 1/21/20 10. CA-09 -Coordinate with EP&C perso nn el a nd determine a su it a bl e pressure test method for th e RV f l ange l eak-off/pressure test connect i on piping, and init i ate the proper imp l ementat i on documentation.
Ut i lize 1 R22 to perform scop ing walkdowns as required. Ini tiate other co rre ct ive ac tion s as r eq uired. Assigned t o SYE with a due date of 5/6/20 10. 1. Will the existing corrective actions documented in the condition report, when completed, correct the co nd i tion report i ssue? Yes~/ No D Once CA-09 is co mp l eted , and any other actions which may be initiated as a r es ult of CA-09 , the CR shou ld b e able to b e closed to th e Work Order process for 1 R23 implem en tat i on of a pre ssure te s t. Any actual pip i ng degradation discovered (via fa i lur e of the pr essu r e test) during 1 R23 wou l d be add res sed und er a new Condition Report and th e mitigat i on (i.e. pipe repl acement) would l ikely be ass i gned to th e Projects Organ i zat ion due to the exte n s iv e sco p e required for mit i gation. Th e goal i s to have all CAs completed and Work Orders i nitiat ed prior to 1 R23 Milestone P0-7 " Eng Systems Scope Identified
', which i s due on July 2 , 2010. 2. What is the expected CR Closure date based on remaining needed actions? DATE: 712/2010 I t i s antici p ated th at th i s CR w i ll be c l osed p ri o r to 1 R23 M i l es t one P0-7 " Eng Systems Scope I dentified', which is due on July 2 , 2010. 3. I s the previously do c um ented operability/functionality position st ill valid for the current co ndition and expected to remain valid until CR closure? Yes~ I No D /N/A D If the answer is NO , then initiate a new CR to document th e concern; CR# N/A 4. Are all Ll-102 requirements for co rrective action administration and control being met , i.e. justifications for Due Date Extensions valid , Long Term Corrective Actions identified, CARB approved CAPRs identified, a nd appropriate approvals obtained for all? Yes~/ No D 5. What risk to plant operation is imposed by the condition identified and how is risk reduced to an acceptable level for the duration of the act i on plan? This C R does not spec i fically i dentify a known d eg rad ed p l ant system, s tru ct ure , or compo n e n t at AN0-1 , but does iden t ify a potential degradation me c hani sm. Both the RV fl ange gasket l ea k d etec tion lin e and pressure t est connection lin es were flu s h ed/d r a in ed during 1R19 , 1 R20 , and 1 R21 , thus m i nim i z in g the pote nti a l for fa i l ure resulting from ID initi a ted , ch l o rid e induced , transg r an ul ar stress-corrosio n c ra c king (TGSCC). No RV flange gasket l eakage was id en tifi e d dur i ng plant heat-up EN-Ll-102 REV 13 from 1R19 , 1 R20 , or 1 R21 prior to i so l a tin g valves RBS-1 and RBS-2 , and RCS leakage rates following 1 R19 , 1 R20 , and 1 R21 h ave not ind i ca t ed t he prese n ce of any concurren t leakage of t he RV flange gaskets and leak detec t i o n/press ur e test c onnect i on p i ping/components. T he RV flange gas k ets are r ep l aced during each refue l ing outage and va l ves RBS-1 a n d RBS-2 are not isolated unt i l just prior to c rit icali t y afte r it has been verified that the inn e r gaske t i s not l eak in g. T her e fore , t he li k el i hood of i nner gasket leakage, w h i le possible , i s cons i dered low. I t is noted t h at recen t CR-AN0-1-20 1 0-00056 and CR-AN0-1-20 10-0009 1 have docu m ented two i n stances where t h e Contro l Room r ece i ved annunciato r K09-F1 " Vessel Head Gasket Leak" fo r 5 m inu tes o n 1/10/20 1 0 and for 2.5 ho u rs on 1/13/2 010 , respectively , ind i cating a potent i al i nner o-ring leak. However , no i n c r ease i n RCS l eakage or s u mp fill r ate has been obse rv ed , wh i ch indicates that if t he inner o-ri ng i s actually leaking, the l eak-off pip i ng is no t degraded. In conclusion , t h e risk to p l an t opera ti o n is m in ima l and reduced to acceptable l eve l s until the ac t io n plan for t h i s CR can be i mpl e mented du rin g 1 R23. Review/ Approval Required:
Director/GM Title: Date: --------------
-----(Print name & Position title) NOTE: The expectation is to capt ure the discussion points of this form in a CA. The form itself need not be used , but all points applicable must be addressed.
EN-Ll-1 02 REV 13 Attachment Header Doc u ment Name: un t it l ed Document Location ~ub r es p onse Descri p t i on Attach Ti t le: !Di r ecto r Ap pr oval e-mai l BARBOREK, W DOUGLAS From: S e nt: T o: C c: MCCOY, JAIME H Saturday , February 06 , 2010 1 : 33 PM BARBOREK , W DOUGLAS; W I LLIAMS , PATRICK J EDGEL L , DOUGLAS W
 
==Subject:==
RE: REQUEST FOR REVIEW -Interim Review for CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 "Resolve I ndustry OE on Chloride I n duced Stress Corrosion Cracking on RV Flange Piping" I approve the i nterim r ev i ew as acting Engineering Directo r. Jaime -----Original Message-----F r om : BAPBOREK, W DOUGLAS S e nt: Thursday , February 04 , 201 O 4: 32 Av1 To: MCXX>Y, JAIME H; WI L LIAMS, PATR I CKJ Cc: EDGELL, DOUGLAS W; El CHENBERGER, JOHN R Subj ec t: REQUEST FOR REVIEW -I nterim Rev i ew for CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 "Reso l ve I ndus t ry OE on O,loride I nduced Stress Corros i on Oacking on RV Range Piping" Jaime & Patrick , T he interim review for the subject CR is attached for your review and concurrence.
The dra f t interim rev i ew has been attached to CA-06 of the subject CR. The CA is u ltimate l y due on Thursday, February 1 1, 2010 (i ni t ial l y due by me on Tuesday, February 9). Please let me know if you have any questions.
Thanks, D o u g Bar b ore k Ente r gy Opera li ons. ln c. / Arkansa s Nuclea r O n e Sys t e m Engi n eer -U ni t I R eac t o r Coola nt S ys t em System Engi n eeri n g B u i l di n g/ N-SYS-4 w b arbo I@cntcrgy.co m 479-858-4 33 7 !(b )(6) I page r << File: CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-06 Interim Rev i e w.doc>>
Ent e rgy I CORRECTIV E ACTION CA N umb e r: 7 G roup Ass i g n e d By: E ng Sys Mgmt ANO Asstg n e d To: E n g Sys NSSS Staff AN O S ub ass i g n ed T o : Or i g i nate d By: E dgell , Dougla s W P erfor m e d By: Barborek , W D oug l as S ub pe r fo rm e d By: A ppr ove d By: C lo sed By: Edge ll , Dou g la s W C ur re n t Du e D ate: 11/1 9/2009 CA T y p e: AC TION Pl a nt C on s tr a int: NONE CA D es cript io n: E dgell , D o u g l as W Barborek, W Dougla s 8/27/2009 1 6:01:06 11/18/2 009 1 3:39:20 11/18/2 009 14:34:45 I n i t i a l Du e Date: 11/19/2 009 CA P ri o ri ty: I C R-AN0-1-2008-025 6 0 Na m e The in s pection of th e R eactor V esse l Flange Leak-off & Pressure T est Co nrn ec tion p i ping r e quir es add iti onal r esou r ces and engi n eer in g wh i ch tran sce nd s the ro l e and re s pon s ibili ty of Sy ste m En g in ee r ing. Ini tiate a n ew S IPDB R eco rd and present to th e U RT/MPRC to r ecom mend thi s sco p e of work b e executed by the Pr ojects orgaruization.
Res pon se: SI PD B Record 4955 ha s been in itia t e d to tran sfe r the s ubj ect in spec ti on from Sys t em E ngin ee r i n g (SYE) to th e P rojects organization as a new project for lR 23. P er th e attached e-ma il , Sys t em Engi n eer in g has requ ested th a t the S I P I) R ecord be pre se nt e d by SYE t o the Unit R e l i abi l it y Team (U R T) in D ece mb e r 2009. It i s n ot n ecessa ry tha t thi s C A tr ac k the U R T pre se ntati o n it se lf s ince U R T approval and MPR C as s i g nm e nt of fu nd s could take severa l evo lu tions a nd i s di ctate d by esta bli shed s it e and cor por ate procedu r es. Th e crea tion of Record 495 5 s uffi cie ntly m eets th e intent of thi s CA. WDB 11/1 8/2009 S ubr es p o n se : C l os ur e Co mm e n ts: I co n c ur with clos u re of t hi s corrective action. CA # 8 ha s b ee n assigned to track th e URT Pre sen tation a nd deci sion. A tt ac h me nt s: R es pon se Descr ip t i o n e-ma il to U R T coordinator Attachment Header Document Name: un t it l ed Document Location !Response Descr ipt i on Attach Title: ~-ma i l to UR T coordinator Page 1 of 3 BARBOREK, W DOUGLAS From: BARBOREK , W DOUGLAS Sent: Wednesday, November 18 , 200911 :14 AM To: HARTMAN , ANGELA M Cc: EDGELL , DOUGLAS W; WOODSON, TIMOTHY R
 
==Subject:==
SIPD 4955 -Hydr o/Inspect AN0-1 RV Flange Leak-off/ Pressure Test Connection Piping due to Davis-Besse OE Angie , Can you put me on the agenda for a December URT to discuss handing this i ssue over to Projects?
This i ssue pertains to Davis-Besse OE from 2003 where they found their RV flange leak-off /pressure test connection piping degraded from PWSCC. I c a n do more w i th this as a SYE. We need to hydro the RV flange leak-off I pressu r e test connection p i ping , which is buried under the reactor cavity seal plate, reactor shield blocks , and RV insulation.
I tried t o come up with a hydro method bu t couldn't, and I tried to inspect these lines externally with a boroscope during 1 R21, but was unsuccessful due to the inaccessibil i ty of the p i ping. Due to the magnitude of what it will take to resolve this issue, I need to turn it over to Projects for resolution.
Thanks, Doug Barborek Entergy Opera t ions. l nc. / Arkansas Nuclear O n e S ys t e m E n g in eer -Un it I R eac t or Coo l a nt Sys t e m System Eng in ee ri ng Bu i ldi n g/ N-S Y E-4 wbarbu l@e m ergy.co m 479-858-4337 !(b)(6) !p age r 11/18/2009 P age 2 o f 3 l'J Microsoft Access -[SYSTEM PLAN~ING PROJECT] E ile ~d i t '.l!_i ew I n ser t f 0'm at ~eco r ds Iools ~i ndow t!elp ProjectJD 1 1 49 55 1 System:I J R CS *I ERGrade: 1 1 l.~u~u Multi Site Initiative:
I L I Project #: U 1 1 Project Tltle:! I A H 0-1 -R e so l ve O E on R V F l ang e L ea k-off/Pr e s s T es t Co nn e cti o n Pipe C r , Preparer: I J B a rb o r e k , W Do u g l a s _:J Date ll 11 11 a 12 009 j Project Manager: 1 1
* I Date ll r Project D es criptio n I Attribut es I C ost C as h F l ow I Ref e r e n ces I Study P h as e I D es ign P h ase I Imp l ementation Ph ase I J Project Description I O p erat ing E x p er i e n ce r epo rt O E-15417 " Crack in g I de n t ifi e d in C l ass 1 Reacto r Fl a n ge 0 on J a nu ary 27 , 2003 to d o c u me nt t h ro u g h wa ll c r acks on r eactor vesse l fl ange 0-r in g (g D av i s-Besse o n Octo b e r 29 , 2002. C R-AN0-1-2005-01140 d oc u me n ts a tt em p ts to r eso l v En gi n ee rin g. H oweve r , as docume n te d i n tha t CR and CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 , System E Recommended Solution I !Proj ect M a n age m e nt d e v e l op p l an t o r eso l v e p o t e nti a l i ss u e id e ntif e d in OE-1 5 417. P e rf o r m p ress ur e t es _t e st c onn ect i o n pi e!!!g_ a nd/o r p e rf o r m vi s u a l in spec t i o n of p i P.!!!g_. _ Key Benefits to be Validated I 1 1 fa1 s ur e i nt e grity o f piping to pr e v e nt p o t e nti a l b o ri c aci d co rr os i o n of R C S co mp o n e n ts. On-going Costs I I n o n e Alternatives Considered
~1 I n o n e Schedule Considerations I I must b e perf o rm e d during r e fu e l ing out age with r e fu e l i n g ca 1 n a l dr a in e d. Consequences of tlon Approval I !Th e s ubj ect piping h a s bee n fo und to b e d eg r a d ed at D a vi s-B esse a n dl o th e r pl a nt s. Until th e Atl 0-1 pipi ng i s in s p ected, t h ea d inn e r g a s k et w e re to l ea k re m a in s. B oric ac id co rr o s i on o f th e r eactor v esse l co u l d occ ur if thi s p i pin g l ea k s. Fo r m View I.'-' St a rt! J ,I!) r~ I!!) [!) >> J ls:_j Inbox -Mier ... , S 4 In t erne t ... *~ .. Paperless( ... I !IJ P 2E: Passpo ... j
* A dobe R I 11/1 8/2 009 Page 3 of 3 11/18/2009 Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Corrective Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00007 Version: Reque ste d Duedate: 11/19/2009 Requested By: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: Edge ll , Douglas W Reque st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Duedat e: 10/29/2009 10/28/2009 10/28/2009 This CA wa s not completed by the assigned due date due to competing workload priorities.
Addit i onal time i s r equ ired to initiate the SIPDB record and present it to the URT/MPRC.
The due date is being extended to 1 1/19/2009. The extension of th e du e dat e do es not negative l y imp act any in s tall e d plant SSCs a nd i s ther efo r e acceptab l e. WDB l 0/2 8/2009 A pprov e d
 
== Description:==
 
I concur with the following DDE which i s the first extension on a CR tha t is greater that 6 month old. This DDE does not increa se the age of the C R beyond the du e dat e of other ex i st ing actions therefore additional approvals are not r eq uir ed.
Ent e rgy I CORRECTIV E ACTION CA N umb e r: 8 G roup Ass i g n e d By: E ng Sy s M g mt ANO Asstg n e d To: E n g Sy s NSSS S t aff ANO S ub ass i g n ed T o : Or i g i nate d By: E dgell , Dougla s W P erfor m e d By: Barbor e k , W D o u g l as S ub pe r fo rm e d By: A ppr ove d By: C lo sed By: Edge ll , Douglas W C ur re n t Du e D ate: O l /2 1 /20 I 0 CA T y p e: ACTION Pl a nt C on s tr a int: NONE CA D es cript io n: E dg e ll , Dougla s W Barbor ek, W Dou g l as 11/1 8/2 009 14:3 3:0 8 1/2 1/2 010 1 6:4 3:5 7 1/2 1/2010 16:50:06 I n i t i a l Du e Date: 0 1/21/2 0 1 0 CA P ri o ri ty: I C R-AN0-1-2008-025 6 0 Na m e Pr ese nt S 1PD 4 955 (In s p ec ti o n oftb e R e a c tor V esse l Fl a n ge Le ak-o ff & Pr ess ur e T es t Co nn ec ti o n piping) t o t he U RT/MPR C for thi s this s c o p e of work be exe cut ed b y th e Pr o j ec t s Or ga ni z ation. Respo n se: SY E proposed at the 12/7/2 009 URT meeting (see attached present a tion) to transfer the scope of work outlined i n SlPD R ec ord 4 95 5 (In s pe c ti o n o f th e R ea ct o r Ve ss el Flan ge Leak-o ff & Pr ess ur e Test C o nn ec tion pipin g) to the Pr o ject s Organization.
The URT concurred that if the leak-off & pressure test connection piping ultimatel y require phys i cal in s p e cti o n or r e plac e m e nt s u c h that di s a sse mbly/r easse mbly o f th e r e a c tor c avit y se al plat e, co n c r e te s hi e ld bl oc k s, a nd r ea ct o r ve ss el in s ulation i s r e quired , then that s ignifi c ant sc ope of work would b e tran s ferred to th e P roje c t Or ga ni z ation. How e v e r , a t thi s tim e , th e URT d ec id e d th a t Sys t e m E n g ine e ring s h o uld r e-eva lu a t e th e pr ess ur e t es t o pti o n a nd co m e up with a plan to perform a pressure te s t on the l eak-off and pre s sure t e st connection p i p i ng to verify th e int e grity of th e pipin g. If th e pr ess ur e t es t fa il s on one o r both of th e lin es , the e n s uin g sco pe o f w o rk to access th e pip i n g fo r ult i m a te r eso lution of th e i ss ue w o uld then be pur s ued by the Project s Or ga ni z ati o n. As s u c h , n e w C A-9 ha s b ee n i ss u e d to S Y E t o det e rmine a s ui tab l e pr ess ure t est m e th o d a nd t o ini t iat e th e pr o p e r implementation documentation.
IR22 wi[I be utili z ed to perform scopin g walkdowns si nce this piping is not access i ble durin g pow e r o p e ration s. WDB 1/21/2 010 S u brespo n sc : C l os ur e Co mm e n ts: I c on c ur with closur e of thi s corrective a c tion. A tt ac hm e nt s: Re s ponse Description URT Pr ese nt a tion Outlin e Attachment Header Document Name: untitled Document Location !Response Description Attach Title: l uRT Presentat ion Outline SIPD 4955 "Resolve OE on RV F l ange Leak-o ff/Pressure Test Connection Pipe Cracking"
* Operating Experience report OE-1541 7 "Cracking Identified in C la ss 1 Reactor Flange 0-Ring Monitor Piping" was iss u ed on January 27, 2003 to docum en t through wall cracks on reactor v essel flange 0-r ing (gasket) monitor piping found at Davi s-Besse on October 29 , 2002.
* P roblems also identified at Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2 and other p l ant s.
* Cause was Transgranular Stress Corrosion Crack i ng due to water l eft in lines during power operation.
* AN0-1 was determined to be susceptib l e since water was not drained in thes e lines for many years since l eak-off iso l at io n va l ves were closed since mid-1990's. Unt i l 2005.
* Procedur e changes made to drain lines since 1Rl 9; however, dama ge may have occurred before damage mechanism was mitigated.
Must i ns p ect to be s ure.
* If cracked , and we de ve lop an inner gasket leak on head , we could cause B AC damage to exterio r of RV.
* Nee d to either perform hydrosta t ic test , or inspect & NDE externally.
* System Engineering has been un able to d eve l op successful plan for hydrostatic test. .... and co n tingenc i es if hydro fails is expensive (i.e. remove reactor cavity se al plate, shie l d blocks , an d RV insulation).
* Vis ual in spec t ion attemp t ed by horoscope in 1 R2 l via reactor cav i ty sh ield plate open i ngs, but not enough access for in s pection.
* Scope exceeds capab ili ty of SYE , need to tum over to P rojects for resolu t ion due to magnitude of sco p e and contingency.
* 1 R 22 Work Orders W0-00195437 for pressure test. W0-00195 4 38 for vis u a l inspec ti on. Most lik e ly need to be deferred to 1R23. Ri sk of deferra l is fairly low s i nce RV head gasket leakage is rare, and l ines are drained of wa ter pri or t o operation.
B a r borek 12/7/2009 Ent e rgy I CORRECTIV E ACTION CA N umb e r: 9 G roup Ass i g n e d By: E ng Sys Mgmt ANO Asstg n e d To: E n g Sys Mgmt ANO S ub ass i g n ed T o: E n g Sys NSSS Staff ANO Or i g i nate d By: E dgell , Dougla s W P erfor m e d By: Barborek , W D oug l as S ub pe r fo rm e d By: Barborck , W D oug l as A ppr ove d By: C lo sed By: Edge ll , Dou g la s W C ur re n t Du e D ate: I 0/2 8/20 I 0 CA T y p e: AC TION Pl a nt C on s tr a int: NONE CA D es cript io n: E dgell , D o u g l as W Barborek, W Dougla s Barborck , W Doug l as 1/2 1/2010 1 6: 51: 08 I 0/2 5/20 IO 1 7:2 1 :O~ 10/25/20 10 1 6:48:29 10/2 6/2 010 1 6:45:30 I n i t i a l Du e Date: I 0/28/2 0 I 0 CA P ri o ri ty: I C R-AN0-1-2008-025 6 0 Na m e Coo rdinate with EP&C p erso nn e l a nd determ in e a s uitabl e pre ss ur e test method for the RV flan ge leak-off/p r ess ur e t es t co nn ect i o n piping , and initiate the proper im p l eme n tat i on documentation.
Ut ili ze IR 22 to perform sco ping wa lkd owns a s r e qu ire d. lnitiate other corrective actions as re qu i r ed. Res p o n se: S ub-r espo n se i s comp l ete and sat i s factory. WDB I 0/25/2 0 I 0 S ubr es p o n se : The attac hed RV Flan ge Piping pressure t est pl a n has be en d eve lo pe d with s upport and concurrence from EP&C (Rick Holman & Mi ke Pat era k), Piping D es i g n (Maqboo l Bhatti), an d RP (Dan S t o lt z). C A-10 ha s b ee n initiat ed to assign followup corrective actions as required to impl ement the pressure t est plan in I R 23 via W0-0019543
: 7. WDB I 0/25/20 I 0 C lo s u re C omm e n ts: I co n c ur with closure of this corrective action. A tta c hm e n ts: S ubre s p onse D esc ription I R23 Pr ess ur e T est Pl an for RV Flang e Pipin g Attachment Header Document Name: untit l ed Document Location ~ubresponse Description Attach Title: 1 1 R23 Pressure Test Plan for RV Flange Piping AN0-1 Reactor Vessel Leak-off/Pressure Te s t Connection Piping Pressure Test Plan OBJECTIVE:
Page l of 6 D eve l op a pl a n to h ydros.tat i ca ll y test th e R eactor V esse l l eak-off a nd p ressure test co nn ect ion pip i ng from t h e R eac t or V esse l to the downstream i so l at i o n va l ves (RBS-1 a nd RC-5) to reso l ve i ndu s try operating experie n ce docum e nt OE-15417 "C racking I de nti fied in Class 1 R eactor F l a n ge 0-rin g M o ni tor Pipin g" r e l ative to AN0-1. REFERENCES
: l. CR-A N0-1-20 05-0 1]4 0 " OE-1 54 1 7 Appea r s to b e Applicabl e to ANO-I" 2. CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 "Ex t e rn a l In s p ec tion of RV Flange Leak-off Pipin g Not Successfu l durin g 1R21" 3. PEAR-93-0 246 " R eacto r Ve sse l C l osu r e H ea d Leak-off Lin e I so l a ti o n" 4. OE-1 5 41 7 "Crackin g Id ent i fied in C la ss l R eac tor Fl ange 0-rin g Monitor Pi p in g" 5. P&ID M-230 " R eac t o r Coo l a n t Syste m" 6. ANO dr aw in g M-114-AC-l " 1/4 to 2 In c h Bolt ed Bon n et Gate Valv e Fo r ge d" 7. ANO d rawing MlB-223 "R eac t or V esse l Upp e r She ll Assemb l y" 8. ANO i so m etric R C-20 1 " R eac t or V esse l R-1 Flan ge Gasket Leak-off Drain" 9. ANO i so metric RC-202 " R eac tor Vesse l R-1 F l a n ge Ga ske t Leak-off Drain" 10. CALC-9 3-E-5035-07 "Code Qualifi ca ti o n of Lin es CCC-6-1" & HSD-3-1" Pipin g & P ipe Suppor t on I some tr ics R C-201 & R C-202" 11. 1R23 W0-00195437 " R-1 P e r form Pr ess ur e Te s t of RV Inter gaske t Leak-off Lin es" 12. ANO Pro ce dur e OP-5 120.247 " Pr ess ure Test" 13. ASME B&PV Code S ect i on X I Article IW A-50 00 " Sy s t e m Press ur e Te s t s (Ge n era l req u ireme nt s)" 1 4. ASME B&PV Code Sect i on XI Articl e IWD-5000 "Sys t e m Pr ess ur e T es t s (C l ass 3 requir e ment s)" 15. Enter gy P roce dur e ClEP-PT-001
" ASME Section XI , Di v i s i on l Sy s tem Pre ss ur e T es tin g" 16. W e b site fo r C u rt i ss Wri g ht GripTig h t High Pr ess ur e T es t Plu gs -http://e s tgroup.cwfc.co m/prod u ctsSe r v i ces/spo k es/O 1 a HTplu gs 04-S02 HiPr ess u re.htm 1 7. http://www.co b-indu s trie s.co m/highpr ess ur es t o pper.as px BACKGROUND I N FORMATION:
OE-15417 was i ss u e d o n Jan u a r y 27, 2003 to do c um en t th ro u g h wa ll crac k s on reactor vesse l flan ge 0-r in g (gaske t) monitor p i pin g fo und at Davi s B esse on O c t ober 29, 2002. The cracks were a r es ul t of c hlo r id e i nduce d transgranu l a r s tr ess corros i o n crack in g du e to wa t er l e ft in t h e piping durin g pl a n t operation.
Th e first severa l feet of pipin g w hi c h ex it th e RV fl a n ge i s adjacent t o th e reactor vesse l b efo r e ex itin g th e RV in s ulation a nd ex p e ri ences temp era tur es nea r r eactor vesse l operating t e mp e ratures (550-600&deg;F). AN0-1 h as two l eak-off port s. On e p ort i s assoc iat e d with th e RV fl a n ge (int ergas k et) pr ess ur e t es t co nnection (a feat u re whi ch i s not u se d), and th e othe r port i s assoc i a t e d w ith th e RV flan ge (i nt ergaske t) l ea k-off a n d l e ak d e t ec ti o n con n ec ti o n Barborck l 0/2 5/2 0 I 0 AN0-1 Reactor Vesse l Leak-off/Pressure Te s t Connection Piping Pressure Test P l an Page 2 of 6 AN 0-1 h as operate d with b o th of t h ese lin es i so l ate d d u ri n g power o p era ti ons si n ce t h e ea rl y 1 99 0's, a nd th e p ip i n g was not ro u t in e ly d r ai n e d fo ll ow in g r e fu e lin g o ut ages un t il lR 19 (F a ll 2 00 5). A s s uch , th e AN 0-1 pipin g was s ubj ec t to th e d egra d a tion m ec h a ni s m d esc rib e d in O E-1 5 41 7 fro m th e ea rl y 1 990's t o l a t e 20 0 5. Vi s u a l in s p ec ti o n o f th e pipin g (ex t e rn a l) v i a b o ro sco p e was a tt e m pte d durin g 1R 2 l , but w as un s u ccessfu l du e to th e in access ibi l i t y of the p i pin g. As s u c h , a pr ess ur e t est i s r eq uir ed t o r eso l ve thi s i ss u e fo r AN 0-1 a nd ve r ify th e int eg ri ty of the s ubj ec t p ipin g. Alth o u g h t h e pr ess ur e t est i s n o t a Code r e qui re m e nt a nd is th e r efo r e s ubj ect t o O wne rs p ec ifi e d rul es, Cod e rul es w i ll b e ut ili ze d t o ve rif y in teg ri ty. PLAN:
* Cut l in c h pipin g appro x im ate l y 1 fo ot ab ove (i.e. up st r ea m) v a l ves RBS-1 a nd RC-5 (see ph o t os 1 thru 4 b e l ow). o Pi p in g i s l in c h Sc h 1 6 0 , A-3 1 2 TP-3 1 6 p e r iso m e tri c R C-20 1 a nd R C-2 0 2. RBS-1 a nd RC-5 ar e V e l a n m o d e l W05-3 0 5 4B-l3MS (l i n c h , s o c k et w e ld e d , 1 5 00# cl ass, sta i n l ess s t ee l F3 16 CF8 M ga t e va l ves) s h ow n on d raw in g M-11 4-AC-l.
* ln se rt hi g h pr ess ur e t es t plu gs in th e RV fl a n ge 0.5 i n c h po rt s (see Fi g ur e 1 & 2 b e lo w). o FME co nt ro l s m ust b e in p l ace to e n s ur e p l u gs d o n o t e n ter t h e RV in eve n t of fa ilur e. o P l u gs s hou ld h ave ve n t in g ca p a bility (for pip e fill).
* In se rt hi g h pr ess ur e te s t plu gs in CC C-6 p i pin g. o Plu gs t o b e u se d as h y d ro co nn ec ti o n.
* F ill p i p in g (ex p ec t ed v o lum e to b e l ess th a n o n e ga ll o n per co nn ec ti o n).
* P e r fo rm h y dro s t a ti c t est a t 101 t o 110% of C C C-6 D es i g n pr ess ur e (25 00 p s i g), for 4 h o ur s ( 4 hr s i s Co d e re quir e m e nt for in s ul a t ed p ipi n g vs. 10 minut es for nin s ul ate d).
* Acce pt a n ce c rit e ri a i s ze ro p ress u re d ecay.
* R e mo ve t es t e quipm e nt.
* R ewe ld pipin g u s in g 1 in c h co upl i n gs, p e r fo rm N D E as re quir e d fo r C l ass 3 p i p in g. OPEN ISSUES/ QUES T IONS / NOT E S: 1. Will th e test b e p erformed b efore RV CH r e m ova l o r after RV C H in s t a ll a ti o n? 2. l s t h e re a p oss ibil i ty t h at T E-10 52 co uld l ea k? App ea r s t o be a ll we l d e d co n s tru c ti o n. 3. P e r di sc u ss i o n s w i th P i pin g D es i g n (M aq b o ol Bh a tti), in s t a ll a ti o n of l in c h co uplin gs wo uld b e acce p ta bl e for th e C l ass 3 CCC-6 pi pin g. EC Ma rk-up w ill b e re quir ed t o rev i se d ra win gs R C-2 01 a nd R C-202 , a n d CALC-93-D-5 0 35-0 7. 4. Per AL ARA (Dan S t o l z), u se o f a 1 i n c h co u p lin g in th e ve rti c al p i pi n g a bove RB S-1 & R C-5 w ould b e acce pt a bl e r e l at i ve t o c r eat i on of c rud tr a p s. C urr e n t d ose ra t es a r e abo u t 1 5 mr em for b o th of th ese in access ibl e va l ves. Barborck l 0/2 5/2 0 I 0 (b)(4) AN0-1 Reactor Vesse l Leak-off/Pressure Test Connection Piping Pressure Test P l an P age 3 of 6 Figure 1 -Excerpt from drawin g MlB-223 showing 1/2 inch l eak-off port Barborck l 0/25/20 I 0 (b)(4) AN0-1 Reactor Vesse l Leak-off/Pressure Test Connection Piping Pressure Test P l an P age 4 of 6 Figure 2 -Excerpt from drawing MlB-223 showing 1 h inch l eak-off port Barborck l 0/25/20 I 0 AN0-1 Reactor Vessel Leak-off/Pressure Test Connection Piping Pressure Test Plan P age 5 of 6 Photo 1-RV Leak-off piping (RBS-1 & 2), P-32A Cold Leg Opening Photo 2 -RV Leak-off piping (RBS-1 & 2), P-32A Cold Leg Opening Barborck l 0/25/20 I 0 AN0-1 Reactor Vessel Leak-off/Pressure Test Connection Piping Pressure Test Plan Photo 3 -RV Leak-off piping (RC-5), P-32D Co ld Leg Opening Photo 4-RV Leak-off' piping (RC-5), P-32D Cold Leg Opening P age 6 of 6 Barborck l 0/25/20 I 0 Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 C orrecti ve Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00009 Version: R e qu este d Du e dat e: 08/ 1 2/20 I 0 Requ ested B y: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: Edge ll , Douglas W R e que st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Du e dat e: 05/06/20 I 0 05/04/2010 05/05/2010 Scop in g walkdowns were performed durin g I R22; however , due to current work l oad , this CA cannot be completed at thi s time. CA is extended to 8/12/20 1 0 to allow additional time for comp l et ion. This CA invo l ves development of act i vities to be p erfo rm e d in I R23 and the exte n s i o n of th e du e dat e h as no impact o n in s talled plant SSCs. WDB 5/4/20 l 0 A pprov e d
 
== Description:==
 
Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Corrective Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00009 Version: 2 Reque ste d Duedate: I 0/28/20 I 0 Requested By: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: Williams,Patrick J Reque st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Duedat e: 08/1 2/20 10 08/11/20 I 0 08/11/20 10 Scop in g walkdowns were performed durin g JR22; however , due to current work l oad (in c l uding e m ergent wo rk), this CA cannot be completed at thi s time. CA is extended to 10/28/2010 to allow additional time for completion.
This CA i nvolves d e ve l opment of act i v i ties to be p erformed in I R23 and the ext e n s ion of tb e du e dat e h a s no im pact on in s ta ll ed plant SSC s. WDB 8/11/2010 Approved
 
== Description:==
 
Approved.
Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION CA Number: 10 Group Assigned By: E ng Sy s M g mt ANO Asstgned To: E n g S ys M g mt ANO S uba ss i g ned To: E n g S ys NS SS S t a ff ANO Originated By: E dg e ll , D o ugla s W P erfor m e d By: E dg e ll , Dou g l as W S ubp e rform e d By: B a rb o r e k , W D o u g l as Approved By: Closed By: Edge ll , Douglas W Current Due Date: 11 / 1 8/2 0 I 0 CA Typ e: ACTION Plant Constraint:
NONE CA
 
== Description:==
 
Barbor ek , W Dou g l as E d ge ll , D o u g l as W B a rb o r e k ,W D o u g l as 10/26/2 010 16: 41:1~ 11/17/2 010 1 8: 26:22 1 1/1 7/2010 1 5: 0 7: 11 1 1/1 7/2010 18:26:48 Initial Du e Date: 11/1 8/2 010 CA Priority:
I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Name B ase d o n th e pr ess u re t es t pl an d e v e l o p e d by S Y E and E P&C as d oc um e n te d in C A-0 9 , initi a te a nd ass i g n th e r eq ui s ite C A s r e quir ed t o impl e ment th e te s t pl a n durin g I R2 3 ( e.g. d ev e l op EC fo r in s tallin g co uplin gs o n C CC-6 pipin g , a ss i st Plannin g in W0-0019543 7 development , initiate procurem e nt o f hydro plug s, e tc.). Response:
T co n c u r with th e fo ll o wing s ub-r es p o n se and c l o s ur e of this c orr ec tiv e a c tio n. S ubr es pon se : The following two CA's have been initiated to s upport implementation of the pressure test plan documented in CA-09. Additi o nal C A's will b e i ss u e d in th e futur e , i f wa rrant e d. N e w C A-11-D e v e l op E C to s upport W0-001 9 54 37. lfr e qui_r e d , provid e ju s t ific ati o n fo r in s tallati o n of co uplin gs o n the aff ec t e d CCC-6 pipin g. Al s o , if r e quir e d , pr ov ide e n g in ee rin g r e quir e m e nt s fo r FME co ntr o l s assoc iat e d with t he p ress ur e test e q uipment and component s to be used in close prox i mity to the RV flan g e. See pressure test plan in CA-09 for additional d eta il s. New C A-1 2 -Det e nnine the a ppropriat e typ e & s i z e of hydro plug s to b e utili ze d for th e pr ess u re t es t (W0-0019 5437) o u t lin e d in C A-0 9. Initi a t e ac ti o n s t o pr oc ur e th e hydr o p l u gs , as r e quir e d. WDB I J/17/2 010 C lo s ure Co mment s: I co n c ur with clo s ur e.
Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION CA N umb e r: 11 G roup Ass i g n e d By: E ng Sys Mgmt ANO Asstgned To: E n g Sy s M g mt ANO S uba ss i g n ed T o: E n g Sys NS SS Staff ANO Originated By: E dgell , Dougla s W P erfor m e d By: Barbor ek, W Dougl as S ubp e rform e d By: Barb o r c k ,W D o u g l as Approved By: C lo sed By: Edge ll , Dou g la s W C ur re nt Du e Date: 07/2 1/2011 CA T y p e: ACTION Plant C on s traint: NONE CA D es cription:
E dg e ll , Dougla s W Barbor ek, W Dou g l as Barborck , W Douglas 11/1 7/2 010 1 8: 27:5 1 7/2 0/2 011 16:48:33 7/2 0/2 011 1 6:46:54 7/2 1/2 011 14:53:24 Initi a l Du e Date: 07/21/2 011 CA Priority:
I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Na m e D eve lop E C to s upport W0-001 95 4 37. lfr e quir e d , pr ov id e ju st ifi ca tion fo r ins t a llati o n of co upling s on th e affecte d CCC-6 pipin g. Al so, if required , provide engineering requirement s fo r FME controls assoc iated with the pr ess ure test e quipment and component s to be u se d in close proximity to the RV flange. See pressure te s t plan in C A-09 for additiona l details. Res pon se: S ub-r espo n se i s acceptab l e. EC i s no l o n ger r equ ired s inc e te s tin g meth o dol ogy which existed a t th e tim e of CA d eve l o pm e nt has changed. WDB 7/20/2011 S ubr es pons e : CA De scr iption: Develop EC to s upport W0-001954 3 7. If r eq ui red , provide ju stifica tion for in s ta ll ation of co upling s o n t h e affec t e d CCC-6 pipin g. Al so, if requir e d , provide e n g in ee rin g requir e m e nt s for FM E controls assoc iat e d with th e pr ess ur e t est eq uipm e nt a nd components to be u sed in close proximity to the RV flange. See pressure te s t plan in CA-09 for additional deta i ls. CA Response:
At the tim e this C A was written , th e plan was to seve r the one inch piping a bov e th e i so lation va l ves (RBS-I and R C-5) a nd to install ported hydro plugs at this location and solid hydro plugs at the RV flange leak-off port locations above. Subsequent t o the initi a ti on of this C A , the pl a n ha s b ee n revised following di sc u ss ion s with Out age M a n age m e nt (see attached pl an) to use the isolation va lv es as the test boundary and to pre ss uri ze at ported h ydro p l ugs installed in the RV flan ge ports. As such , th e plan no lon ger r e li es on seve rin g the pipin g, thu s removin g the installation of co uplin gs to restore the CCC-6 piping. Whil e the seve rin g and coupling of th e pipin g would ultimat ely remain a cont in ge ncy in the event th e boundary valves l ea k , the severi n g of th e piping and rep ea t of the pr ess ur e t est would occur at the end of th e outa ge before head set, thu s allowing tim e to d eve l op a n EC to in s tall th e co up l in gs. Additionally , it i s anticipated th at thi s test a nd all cont in gency planni n g will be transferred from System E n gineer in g to Proj ec t Mana ge m e nt for 1 R 24 implementatio n (thi s wo r k ha s b ee n defen-e d from I R 23 du e l ack o f cont in gency plans). Project Management may choose to develop contingency
&#xa3;Cs; however , thes e would not b e anticip ate d to be developed by System E n g in eer in g as p a rt of co r e bu s in ess. Th e same philo s oph y applie s to FME co ntrol s, which would li ke ly n o t require an EC. For th e r easo n s discu sse d above , th e not ed EC i s no l onger requ ir e d at thi s tim e to be developed by Syste m Eng in ee rin g as a prerequi s ite for perfonning the initial pre ss ure te s t. Accordingly , thi s CA i s b e ing clo s ed with no action taken. I f a future n ee d a ri ses to d e velop EC's to s upport th e pr ess ur e t es t , n ew Co rr ec ti ve Action s w ill b e ini tiated as ap propriat e. WDB 7/20/20 11 Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 C lo s ure Co mm e nt s: l conc ur with clos ur e of this co rr ective action. A tta c hm e n ts: S ubr es p o n se D esc ription Hydro plan 20-201 1 version Attachment Header Doc u ment Name: un t it l ed Document Location ~ub r es p onse Descri p t i on Attach Ti t le: !Hy d ro p l an 20-2011 vers i on AN0-1 Reactor Vessel Leak-off/Pressure Test Connection Piping ***DRAFT*** W0-00195437 Pressure Test Plan ***DRAFT***
OBJECTIVE:
P age l of 8 Develop a plan to h ydros.tat i ca ll y te s t the Reactor Ves se l l eak-off a nd pre ss ure te s t connection pip i ng from t he Reactor Vessel to the downstream i so lation va l ves (RBS-I a nd RC-5) to resolve industry operating experience document OE-15417 " Cracking Id e ntifi e d in Cla ss 1 Rea c tor Flan ge 0-ring M o nit or Piping" r e l ative to AN0-1.
 
==REFERENCES:==
: l. CR-AN0-1-2 005-01]40 "OE-15417 Appear s to b e Applicable to ANO-I" 2. CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 "Externa l In s pection of RV Flange Leak-off Pipin g Not Succe ss ful durin g 1R21" 3. PEAR-93-0246 "Reactor Ve sse l Clo s ure H ea d Leak-off Lin e I s o l ation" 4. OE-15417 "Cracking Id ent i fied in Class l R eactor Fl ange 0-ring Monitor Pipin g" 5. P&ID M-230 " Reactor Coolant System" 6. ANO drawing M-114-AC-l "1/4 to 2 Inch Bolted Bonnet Gate Valv e Fo r ged" 7. ANO drawin g MlB-223 "Reactor Vesse l Upper Shell Assemb l y" 8. ANO i so m etric RC-201 " R eac tor V esse l R-1 Flang e Gasket Leak-off Drain" 9. ANO i so metric RC-202 " Reactor Ve sse l R-1 F lan ge Gasket Leak-off Drain" 10. CALC-93-E-5035-07 "Code Qualification of Lin es CCC-6-1" & HSD-3-1" Piping & Pip e Support on I some tric s RC-201 & RC-202" 11. 1R23 W0-00195437 "R-1 P e rform Pr ess ure Te s t of RV Inter gask e t Leak-off Lines" 12. ANO Procedur e OP-5120.247 " Pre ss ure Te s t" 13. Entergy Procedure CIEP-PT-001 "ASME Section XI , Divi s ion 1 Sy s tem Pre ss ure Testing" 14. Web s it e fo r C urti ss Wri g ht GripTight High Pr ess ure Te s t Plug s -http://e s tgroup.cwfc.co m/pro du ctsSe rv i ces/spo k es/O l a HTpl u gs 04-S02 HiPr essure.ht m BACKGROUND INFORMATION:
OE-1 5417 was issued on January 27, 2003 to doc um ent throu g h wall cracks on r eac tor ve sse l flang e 0-ring (gasket) monitor piping fo und at Davi s Be sse o n Octob e r 29 , 2002 (ref e r ence a l s o D av i s Bes se OE-15061 and OE-2 0437). Th e cracks were a re s ult of c hlorid e indu ce d transgranular s tre ss corros ion cracking due to water l eft in the piping during plant operation.
Similar failures h ave occ urr ed at O co nee Unit 3 (B&W), Beaver Vall ey (Wes tin g h ouse) and Calv e rt C li ff s Unit s 1 & 2 (CE)[OE-6543].
Thi s failure m ec hani s m is not uniqu e to B& W pl a nt s. Th e fir s t seve ral fe e t of piping which ex it the RV flang e i s adjace nt to th e reactor vesse l before exiti n g the RV in su l ation and ex p er i ences t e mp erat ur es n ear r eac tor vesse l o p erat in g temp e ratures (550-600&deg;F). AN0-1 h as tw o leak-off port s. On e port i s ass ociated with th e RV flange (interga s k e t) pres s ure test connection (a feat ur e whi c h i s n ot u se d), a nd th e ot h er port i s a ss oc i ated with the RV flan ge (int ergasket) l eak-off and l eak d e t ection connect ion. Barborck 4/20/20 I I AN0-1 Reactor Vessel Leak-off/Pressure Te s t Connection Piping ***DRAFT*** W0-00195437 Pressure Test Plan ***DRAFT*** Page 2 of 8 AN 0-1 h as operate d with b o th of t h ese lin es i so l ate d d u ri n g power o p era ti ons si n ce t h e ea rl y/mid 1 9 90's to l ate 2 00 5 for th e l eak-o ff p ipin g, a nd fr o m 1 974 to th e l ate 2 0 05 fo r t h e pr ess ur e tes t co nn ec t io n pipin g. Th e pip i ng w a s n o t routin e l y drain e d fo llo w in g r e fu e ling o ut ages until 1Rl 9 (Fa ll 20 0 5). As s u c h , th e AN O-I pipin g w as s ubj ect t o th e d egra d a ti on m ec h a n is m desc rib ed in O E-1 54 1 7 fo r m a n y years. AN 0-2 h as always o p e rat e d w i t h t h e i so l a ti o n v al ves o p e n , a nd i s th e r e for e n o t s u sce ptibl e to t hi s fa ilu re m ec hani s m. Vi s u a l in s p ec ti o n o f the p i p in g (ex t e rn a l) v i a b o ro sco p e w as a tt e mp te d durin g 1 R 2 1 , b ut was un s u ccess ful du e to th e in access ibil i t y of the pip i n g. As s u c h , a pr ess ur e t es t i s req uir ed t o r eso l ve t hi s i ss u e for AN 0-1 a n d ve ri fy th e int eg rit y of th e s ubj ect pipin g. Th e p ress u re test i s n o t a Co d e r e quir e m e nt a nd is t h e r efore s u b j ect t o O w n e r-spec i fie d rul es. SYE pr ese n ted a r e qu es t to th e U R T in D ece mb er 2 00 9 t o tmn thi s i ssue over to P ro j ect M a n age m e nt du e t o the e ff o rt s a ssoc i a t e d w ith th e co nt i n ge n c i es. URT dir ec t e d SYE t o d e v e lop and p er form p ress ur e t es t, a nd that co ntin ge n c i es w o uld b e h a ndl ed b y Pro jec t s. TEST PLAN:
* Will u se 4 g pm h y dro pump ut i li ze d i n 2 R 2 1 fo r 2 B C A-1 4-3" (W0-00 238 46 7-01).
* Op era ti o n s ve ri fy t h a t va l ves RB S-1 & RBS-2 are closed o n t h e l eak-off pipin g, a nd t h a t va l ve R C-5 i s close d w ith th e b.lind fl a n ge in s t a ll e d o n the p r ess u re t es t c onn ec ti o n pipin g (see phot os l thru 4 b e l ow). o C C C-6 Pipin g i s l in c h Sc h 16 0 , A-3 1 2 TP-3 1 6 p e r i so m et ri c R C-2 01 a nd R C-2 0 2. o RBS-1 a nd R C-5 ar e V e.I a n m o d e l W05-3 0 54 B-13MS (1 in c h , soc k e t we ld e d , 1500# cl ass, sta i n l ess s t ee l F3 1 6 CF8 M ga t e va l ves) s h ow n on d ra win g M-114-AC-l.
* Fill p ip.in g a t RV fl ange 1/2" p orts (e x pec t e d vo lum e t o b e l ess th a n o n e ga ll o n pe r co nn ec tion).
* In se rt p o r te d hi g h p ress ur e t est plu gs in t h e R V fl a n ge 0.5 in ch p orts (see F i g ur e l & 2 be l ow). P o rt w ill be co nn ect i on t o h y d ro p um p. o FME co nt ro l s m ust b e in p l ace to e n s ur e plu gs d o n o t e nt e r t h e RV in eve nt o f h y d ro plug fa ilu re/ejec ti o n.
* Pe r fo rm ve n t in g of h y d ro p um p test r ig.
* Perfo rm h ydros t a ti c t es t at 1 00% (+I%, -0%) of CCC-6 Des i g n p r ess ur e (2500 psig), for 2 0 minut es (r a i se t o t es t pr ess u re, i s ol ate pump from pipin g, sec u re pump).
* Acce pt a n ce c rit eria is zero (i.e. n eg li gi bl e) pr ess ur e d ecay.
* If tes t res ul ts are acce p ta bl e, re m ove tes t eq uipm e nt a n d r es t ore sys t e m. Barborck 4/2 0/2 0 I I AN0-1 Reactor Vessel Leak-off/Pressure Te s t Connection Piping ***DRAFT*** W0-00195437 Pressure Test Plan ***DRAFT*** CONTINGENCY SCENARIOS:
* Test is s u ccessfu l , n o pressu r e decay in e ith e r lin e. D o n e, O E r eso l ve d. Page 3 of 8
* M i n o r pressu r e decay in e ith er or b ot h l j n es. indi cat ing e i t h er bounda r y va l ve l eakage or ac tu a l h a irlin e crac k (mu s t eli minat e fal se n eg at ive). o Cycle b o un da r y va l ves a n d pe r fo rm t es t aga in. o If minor pr ess ur e de c a y p e r s i s t s, c u t pipe a b ove va l ves, in se r t h y dro plu g in pip e, a nd p e rform t est again, m os t lik e ly a ft er r e fu eling i s co mpl e t e (will need EC to sever pipe and reweld with 1" couplin g). o If min o r pr ess ur e d ecay p e r s i s t s indi cat in g a h a irline c ra ck, t h e n:
* op e n RBS-1 and RBS-2 for C y cl e 24 o p e rati o n to e n s ur e lin es r e m a in d e p ress uri zed (will require procedure change s to change valve c onfiguration
),
* P e rform Op e rabili ty ev alu at ion for 1 a dditi o nal cy cle o f o p era ti o n ,
* r e pl ace/ca p p i pi ng during 1 R 24 (requires removal/reinstallation of reactor c avity s hield pl a te , concrete s hield block s, RV in s ulation)
* Si g nifi ca nt p r ess ur e d ecay in o n e line ind ic ating t o tal l oss of int eg rit y, b u t o th e r lin e i s fu lly i n tac t o in s t a ll ro ll e d tub e plug i n affected p o rt (will require AREVA analysis, equipment and E C, not yet confirmed as viab l e solution) o ope n va l ves (r e m ove blind fl a n ge i s ap pli cab l e) o n op p os in g lin e for p re ss ur e r e li e f (will requir e procedure chang e s to change configuration) o p e r fo rm Op era bilit y eva lu at ion fo r 1 a dd i ti o n a l cyc l e of op e rati o n o r ep l ace/cap p i p ing dur i n g lR 2 4 (requir e s r e moval/reinstallation of reactor cavity shield plate , concrete shi e ld blocks , RV in s ulation)
* S i g ni fica nt p r ess ur e d ecay in b o th li nes, indi cat in g t ota l l oss of int egr it y of b ot h lin es. o Durin g l R 23, r ep l ace l ea k-o ff pip in g, c ut/ca p p r ess ur e t est co n nect i o n. (requires removal/reinstallation of reactor cavity shi e ld plate , concr e t e shield blocks, RV insulation) Barborck 4/20/20 I I (b)(4) AN0-1 Reactor Vessel Leak-off/Pressure Te s t Connection Piping ***DRAFT*** W0-00195437 Pressure Test Plan ***DRAFT*** P age 4 o f 8 Figur e 1 -Exc e rpt from drawin g MlB-223 s howin g 112 inch l e ak-off port Barborck 4/20/20 I I (b)(4) AN0-1 Reactor Vessel Leak-off/Pressure Test Connection Piping
***DRAFT*** W0-00195437 Pressure Test Plan ***DRAFT*** P age 5 of 8 Figure 2 -Excerpt from drawing MlB-223 s howing 1 h inch leak-off port Barborck 4/20/20 I I AN0-1 Reactor Vesse l Leak-off/Pressure Te s t Connection Piping ***DRAFT*** W0-00 195437 Pressure Test Plan ***DRAFT*** P age 6 o f 8 Photo 1-RV Leak-off piping (RBS-1 & 2), P-32A Cold Le g Opening Photo 2 -RV Le a k-off piping (RBS-1 & 2), P-32A Cold Leg Opening Barborck 4/20/20 I I AN0-1 Reactor Vessel Leak-off/Pressure Te s t Connection Piping ***DRAFT*** W0-00195437 Pressure Test Plan ***DRAFT*** Photo 3 -RV Leak-off piping (RC-5), P-32D Cold Leg Opening Photo 4-RV Leak-off' piping (RC-5), P-32D C old Leg Opening P age 7 o f 8 Barborck 4/20/20 I I AN0-1 Reactor Vessel Leak-off/Pressure Test Connection Piping ***DRAFT***
W0-00195437 Pressure Test Plan ***DRAFT***
OPEN ISSUES/ QUESTIONS
/ NOTES: Page 8 of 8 1. Will the test be performed before RVCH removal or after RVCH installation?
: 2. I s there a po ss ibility t h at TE-1052 could le ak? Appears to be all welded construction.
: 3. Per discussions with Piping De sig n (Maqbool Bhatti), installation of 1 inch couplings would b e acceptable for the Class 3 CCC-6 piping. EC Mark-up will b e required to revise drawings RC-201 and RC-202, and CALC-93-D-5035-07.
: 4. Per ALARA (D an Sto lz), u se of a 1 inch coupling in the vertical piping above RBS-1 & RC-5 would be acceptable relative to creation of crud trap s. Current dose rates are about 15 mrem for both of th ese inaccessible valves. B ar b orek 4/2 0/2 0 I I Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Corrective Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00011 Version: Reque ste d Duedate: 07/21/2 011 Requested By: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: Edge ll , Dou g la s W Reque st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Duedate: 02/20/2 011 02/14/2011 02/15/2 01 1 This CA could not be completed by the or i g inal due date due to competing work priorities.
Th e cu rr ent plan is to presurize against clo sed valves (RBS-I and R C-5) in lieu of sever ing the pipin g above the va l ves and installin g h y dro pl ug s. A s such, t h e u se of coup lin gs i s a cont in gency to be u se d o nl y i f pressur i z in g aga i nst th e va l ves i s un s ucc ess ful. Th e d u e dat e is b e in g changed to 7/21/2011 and is acceptable s ince it co rresponds with Mil esto n e 48 "All Conti n ge n cy Plan s Approved".
WDB 2/14/2011 Approved
 
== Description:==
 
Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION CA N umb e r: 12 G roup Ass i g n e d By: E ng Sys M g mt ANO Asstgned To: E n g Sy s M g mt ANO S uba ss i g n ed T o: E n g Sys NS SS Staff ANO Originated By: E dgell , Dougla s W P erfor m e d By: Barbor ek, W Dougl as S ubp e rform e d By: Barb o r c k ,W D o u g l as Approved By: C lo sed By: Edge ll , Dou g la s W C ur re nt Du e Date: 06/09/2011 CA T y p e: ACTION Plant C on s traint: NONE CA D es cription:
E dg e ll , Dougla s W Barbor ek, W Dou g l as Barborck , W Douglas 11/1 7/2 010 1 8: 28:58 6/7/20 1 1 14:44:00 617/2 011 14:41 :04 6/9/2 0111 3:58:1 2 Initi a l Du e Date: 06/09/2 011 CA Priority:
I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Na m e D eter min e the a ppr op riat e typ e & s i ze of hydr o plu gs to be utili ze d fo r th e pr ess ur e t es t (W0-0019 5437) out l in ed in CA-09. I nitiat e actions to procure the h ydro plu gs, a s r e quir e d. Response:
Sub-response is appropriate.
CA-18 assigned to Barborek.
WDB 6/7/2011 S ub rcs pon se : The 1/2 inch (ref. dw g. MIB-223) ports on the r eac tor vesse l flan ge will be u sed as the hydro pump connections.
Th e respective boundary valves (RBS-1/2 & RC-5/blind flange) will be used for isolation on the downstream en d of the test b o undari es. The recommended typ e of hydro plug is the S Q 2 High Pr ess ur e Test Plug man u fact ured by C urti ss-Wri g ht F low Con trol Co mp a ny. Th ese t est plu gs a r e d es ign ed for m ax imum ope r a tin g pre ss ur es up to 6500 p s i g which b o und s th e ex p ec t ed test pressure of2500 psig. The test plugs have l/8 inch threaded port s fo r connection to the hydro pump sk id. Jt i s recommended that both mode l SQ 2-0047 and SQ2-0050 test plu gs be procu r ed for this test. The pipe (i.e. port) ID s i ze ran ge for th e mod e l SQ2-0047 te st plu g i s 0.4 7 to 0.5 in c h, and the pip e (i.e. port) ID s i ze ran g e for th e model SQ2-0050 t es t plu g i s 0.5 to 0.53 in ch. S in ce drawing MI B-223 s h ows that th e l eak-off ports are 1/2 inch di a m e t e r w ith n o toleran ce s pe c ified , pro c ur eme nt of both s i zes i s prud e nt to ensure proper fit. Per the company website , the lead t ime for the plu gs i s typically on the or d er of seve r a l da ys. I n fo rmation from the C urti s-Wright w ebs it e is a tta c h ed t o thi s CA for information.
CA-1 8 has b ee n issued for SYE to d evel op CATIDs for the aforementioned t es t plugs. Additional actions will b e issu ed as appropriate durin g comp l e tion of CA-1 8. WDB 6/7/2 011 C lo s ur e Co mm e n ts: I co n c ur with c lo s ur e of thi s co rr ec ti ve action. Attac h me nt s: S ubr es pon se Description SQ 2-0050 T est Plug D esig n Dat a S ubr es p o n se Description SQ 2-004 7 T est Plu g D esig n Data S ubr es pon se D esc ript i on S Q 2 Hi gh Pr ess ur e T est Plug S p ecs Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Attachm e nt s: Subresponse D esc ription SQ2 High Pre ss ure T est Pl ug I nfo Attachment Header Doc u ment Name: un t it l ed Document Location ~ub r es p onse Descri p t i on Attach Ti t le: ~Q2-0050 Test Plug D esign Da t a EST Group, a bu s ine ss unit of Curti ss-Wright F l ow Control Company 2701 T ownship Line Road , Hatfield , PA 19440 Telephone:
(215) 721-1100 800-355-7044 Fax: (215) 721-1 10 1 E-Mail: est-info@curtisswright
.com Website: estgroup.cwfc.com Item # SQ2-0050 , SQ 2 High Pr e ssure Tes t Plug QUOTE SQ2 H i gh P r e s sure Tes t Plug T o fi t pipe and tube inside diame t ers from 0.48" (1 2.1 mm) t o 0.92" (23.4 mm). Working Pressures to 6,500 ps i (4 66 Bar). SQ2-0050 to S02-0060 SPEC IFI CAT I O N S Pipe I.D. Size Range Qn) Pipe I.D. Size Range (mm) Plug O.D. (in) Plug O.D. (mm) Undercut from Minimum I.D. (i n) Undercut fr om Minimum I.D. (mm) Std Seal Mate rial Shaft O.D. (in) Shaft O.D. (mm) Shaft I.D. (in) Shaft 1.0. (mm) Shaft Seal Material Outlet Installation De pth (in) Installation Depth (mm) Notes: 1) Work i ng Pressure determ i ned for test i ng in ASTM A105 Grade B p i pe. Actual working pressure may vary by pipe materia l. 2)For pipe or tube sizes larger that 0.92" (23.4mm) please see the Gr i pT i ght&#x17d; Test P l ugs Specifications subject to change w i thout notice. 0.5 to 0.53 1 2.7 to 13.5 0.47 11.9 0.03 0.8 Urethane 1/2
* 1/4 12.7
* 6.4 0.11 2.8 Urethane 1/8 M 23 1 8 60.3 6/71 2011 I P age 1 of 2 0/A Length (in) 51/16 0/A Length (mm) 1 2 8.6 Max Operating 6500 Pressu r e (psi) Max Opera ti ng 446 Pressure (Bar) Shaft Hex Wrench S i ze 3/8 Hex Nut Wrench Size 3 1 4 A~prox i mate 0.4 S 1pp i ng Weight {l bs) Approx i mate 0.18 Shipp i ng Weight (kgs) 6/7/2011 I Page 2 of 2 Attachment Header Doc u ment Name: un t it l ed Document Location ~ub r es p onse Descri p t i on Attach Ti t le: ~Q2-0047 Test Plug D esign Da t a EST Group, a bu s ine ss unit of Curti ss-Wright F l ow Control Company 2701 T ownship Line Road , Hatfield , PA 19440 Telephone:
(215) 721-1100 800-355-7044 Fax: (215) 721-1 10 1 E-Mail: est-info@curtisswright
.com Website: estgroup.cwfc.com Item# SQ2-0047 , SQ 2 High Pr e ssure Tes t Plug QUOTE SQ2 H i gh P r essure Tes t Plug T o fi t pipe and tube inside diame t ers from 0.48" (1 2.1 mm) t o 0.92" (23.4 mm). Working Pressures to 6,500 ps i (4 66 Bar). SQ2-0050 to S02-0060 SPEC IFI CAT I O N S Pipe I.D. Size Range Qn) Pipe I.D. Size Range (mm) Plug O.D. (in) Plug O.D. (mm) Undercut from Minimum I.D. (i n) Undercut fr om Minimum I.D. (mm) Std Seal Mate rial Shaft O.D. (in) Shaft O.D. (mm) Shaft I.D. (in) Shaft 1.0. (mm) Shaft Seal Material Outlet Installation De pth (in) Installation Depth (mm) Notes: 1) Work i ng Pressure determ i ned for test i ng in ASTM A105 Grade B p i pe. Actual working pressure may vary by pipe materia l. 2)For pipe or tube sizes larger that 0.92" (23.4mm) please see the Gr i pT i ght&#x17d; Test P l ugs Specifications subject to change w i thout notice. 0.47 to 0.5 11.91012.7 0.44 11.2 0.03 0.8 Urethane 1/2
* 1/4 12.7
* 6.4 0.11 2.8 Urethane 1/8 M 23 1 8 60.3 6/71 2011 I P age 1 of 2 0/A Length (in) 51/16 0/A Length (mm) 1 2 8.6 Max Operating 6500 Pressu r e (psi) Max Opera ti ng 446 Pressure (Bar) Shaft Hex Wrench S i ze 3/8 Hex Nut Wrench Size 3 1 4 A~prox i mate 0.4 S 1pp i ng Weight {l bs) Approx i mate 0.18 Shipp i ng Weight (kgs) 6/7/2011 I Page 2 of 2 Attachment Header Doc u ment Name: un t it l ed Document Location ~ub r es p onse Descri p t i on Attach Ti t le: ~Q2 High Pressure Test Pl ug S p ecs E X PANSIO N SEAL T ECH N OLOGIES SQ 2 H i gh P r ess ur e Test P l ugs -Tec h n i ca l Spec ifi catio n s D C8 0 50 05/98 RE V 112/99 1/8 1/8 N PT I NSTA_LA TION DEPT H J INSTALLAT I ON DEPT, ---------0/A LrnGTH----~ ---------0/A LENGTH------SQ2-0050 to SQ2-0060 SQ2-0062 to SQ2-0090 Part Nuni>er I.D. S ize Ra nae P lug Undercut Fr om Std Seal Shaft Shaft I nstallation 0/A L engt h Max. Op. S haft He x H ex N ut M i n. M ax. M in. Max. O.D. M i ni mu m I.D. Mafl O.D.(2) I.D. Do ofh L e* nth Press u re W re nc h Size W rench S ize (in) (in) (mm) (mm) (in) (mm) (i n) (mm) (1) (i n) (mm) (i n) (mm) (in) (mm) (in) (mm) (ps i) (Bar) (in) (in) S Q2-0047 0 4 7 0.50 119 12 7 0.44 11 2 0.03 08 u 1/2-114 12 7-6.4 011 28 23/8 603 5 1116 1286 6500 446 3/8 3/4 SQ2-005 0 0.50 0.53 127 13.5 0.4 7 11.9 003 0.8 u 1/2-1/4 127-6.4 0.11 2.8 23/8 60.3 5 1/1 6 128.6 6500 446 3/8 3/4 S 02-005 3 0.53 0.56 135 1 4 2 0.50 127 0.03 08 u 1/2
* 1/4 12.7-64 011 28 2 318 603 5 1/1 6 1286 6500 446 3/8 3/4 S Q2-0056 0.56 0.60 142 152 0.53 135 0.03 08 u 112-1/4 1 2.7 -6.4 011 28 2 318 60.3 5 11 1 6 1286 6500 446 3/8 3/4 SQ2-0060 0.60 0.62 15.2 15.8 0.57 14.5 0.03 0.8 u 1/2-1/4 12.7 -6.4 0.11 2.8 2318 60.3 5 1/1 6 128.6 6!D'.J 446 3/8 3/4 $02-0062 0.62 0.65 1 5.7 16.5 0.59 15.0 003 0.8 u 1/2 -1/4 12.7 -6.4 0.11 2.8 2 318 60.3 5 1/1 6 128.6 6500 446 3/8 3/4 S 02-0065 0.65 0.68 165 17 3 0.62 157 0.03 08 u 1/2 -1/4 12.7-64 011 28 2 318 603 5 11 1 6 1286 6500 4 46 3/8 3/4 S Q2-0068 068 0.72 17 3 183 0.65 165 0.03 08 u 1/2-1/4 12 7-64 011 28 2 318 603 5 1/1 6 1286 6500 4 46 3/8 3/4 $02-00 72 0.72 0.75 18.3 19.1 0.69 1 7.5 0.03 0.8 u 1/2 -318 12.7-9.5 0.13 3.3 2318 60.3 5 1/1 6 128.6 6500 446 3/8 3/4 SQ 2-0075 0.7 5 0.78 19.1 19.8 0.72 18.3 0.03 0.8 u 1/2 -318 12.7 -9.5 0.13 3.3 2 5/16 58.7 5 1/1 6 128.6 6500 446 3/8 3/4 S 02-0078 0.7 8 0.81 198 20 6 0.75 19 1 0.03 08 u 1/2-318 1 2.7 -9.5 013 33 2 5/16 58.7 5 1/1 6 1286 6500 446 3/8 3/4 S Q2-0081 0.8 1 0.83 206 21 1 0.78 198 0.03 08 u 1/2-3/8 1 27-9.5 013 33 2 5116 58 7 5 1/1 6 1286 6500 446 3/8 3/4 SQ2-0083 0.83 0.8 7 2 1.1 22.1 0.80 20.3 0.03 0.8 u 1/2 -318 12.7 -9.5 0.13 3.3 2 5116 58.7 5 1/1 6 128.6 6500 446 3/8 3/4 S02-0087 0.8 7 0.90 2 2.1 22.9 0.84 21.3 0.03 0.8 u 1/2 -318 12.r -9.5 0.13 3.3 2 5/16 58.7 5 1/1 6 128.6 6500 446 3/8 3/4 S02-0090 0.90 0.93 229 236 0.8 7 22 1 0.03 08 u 1/2-318 1 2.7
* 9.5 0 1 3 33 2 5/16 58 7 5 1/1 6 1286 6500 446 3/8 3/4 Note s: ( 1) Stan d ard Seal Materal* U = ur e thane (2) S02 shans are a stepped design T he compressKJO nut is on the larger diameter , a n other <XllTlponents are on the smaller d i ameter. (3) Spec~icabons sub j ect to chanc e Wllhout nOl>ce. W orld H e adqu arters: Expan s ion Seal Technologi es 2 7 0 1 T ownshi p U na R oad H atfield , PA 19440-1770 U SA T e l: 1*215-7 21-11 0 0 F ax: 1&deg;2 15-721-11 0 1 T oll-Free: 1*80D-35 5-7044 Ex pa n s ion Se a l T echno l og i es EMEA Hoom 3 12a
* 2404 HL Alp h en aan den Ri j n Th e N e th e rlan ds T el: +3 1-17 2 41884 1 Fax: +3 1-172 -41 8 84 9 Ex pans ion Seal T ec hnologi n As ia Pte L td. 35 Ta n n e ry Rd , #11-10 Tann e ry B lock Ruby Industri a l Comp l ex S i ngapore 34774 0 Te l: +6 5-6 745-85 60 Fax: +65-6 7 4 2-8 700 SPECIALISTS IN TUB E TESTING. SL E EVING AND PWGGING TECHNOLOGY AN ISC,..9001 REGISTERED COMPANY App r o Xl mate S hipping W eight (l bs) (kgs) 0.40 0.18 0.40 0.18 0.40 0.18 0.40 0.18 0.40 0.18 0.40 0.18 0.40 0.18 0.50 0.23 0.50 0.2 3 0.50 0.2 3 0.50 0.23 0.50 0.23 0.50 0.2 3 0.60 0.2 7 0.60 0.27 i nf o@expans i onseal.co m I www.expans i onsea l.c om Attachment Header Document Name: untit l ed Document Location ~ubresponse Description Attach Title: ~Q2 High Pressure Test Plug Info EST G r o up, a bu s in ess uni t of Curti ss-Wright F l o w Co ntrol Co mp a ny 2701 T ownship L i ne Road, Hatfield , PA 19440 Telephone:
(215) 721-1100 800-355-7044 Fax: (215) 721-1 10 1 E-Mail: est-info@curtisswright
.com Website: estgroup.cwfc.com I I: I: ** l *i. l -i', 1 :** * * *.a ' -* . --= R esu l ts 1 -15 of 15 I t e m# SQ2-0047 SQ2-0050 SQ2-0053 SQ2-0056 SQ2-0060 SQ2-0062 S02-0065 SQ2-0068 SQ2-0072 SQ2-0075 S02-0078 SQ2-0081 SQ2-0083 SQ2-0087 SQ2-0090 R esu l ts 1 -15 of 15 ,I r I ,;a.,, ..... Pipe l.D. SQ2 H i gh P r essu r e Test Pl u g To f i t pipe an d tube inside d i ameters from 0.48" (12.1mm) to 0.92" (23.4mm). Work i ng Pressures to 6 , 500 ps i (466 Bar). N o t es: 1) Wo r king Pressure de t ermined for testing in ASTM A105 G r a de B pipe. Ac t ual wo rk i ng press u re may vary by p i pe mater i al. 2)For p i pe or tube sizes l arger that 0.92" (23.4mm) p l ease see the Grip Tight"* Test Plugs Specifications subject to change w i thout notice. Pipe l.D. P l u g O.D. Plug 0.0. Ma x O pe rating Ma x Operating List Price Si ze R a n ge (in) S i ze R a ng e (mm) (in) (mm) Pr ess u re (p s i) Press ure (B ar) 0.47 to 0.5 1 1.9to 12.7 0.4 4 11.2 6500 446 QUOTE 0.5to 0.53 12.71013.5 0.47 11.9 6500 446 QUOTE 0.531 0 0.56 13.5 to 14.2 0.5 1 2.7 6500 446 QUOTE 0.56 to 0.6 14.210 15.2 0.53 13.5 6500 446 QUOTE 0.601 0 0.62 15.2 10 15.8 0.57 1 4.5 6500 446 QUOTE 0.62to 0.65 15.7to 16.5 0.59 15 6500 446 QUOTE 0.65to 0.68 1 6.5to 17.3 0.62 15.7 6500 446 QUOTE 0.68to 0.72 17.3to 1 8.3 0.65 16.5 6500 446 QUOTE 0.72to 0.75 18.3to 19.1 0.69 17.5 6500 446 QUOTE 0.7510 0.78 19.1 to 19.8 0.7 2 18.3 6500 446 QUOTE 0.78 to 0.81 19.8to 20.6 0.75 19.1 6500 446 QUOTE 0.81 t o 0.83 20.6to 21.1 0.7 8 19.8 6500 446 QU O T E 0.83to 0.87 21.1 to 22.1 0.8 20.3 6500 446 QUOTE 0.8 7 to 0.90 22.1 to 22.9 0.84 21.3 6500 446 QU O TE 0.90to 0.93 22.9to 23.6 0.87 22.1 6500 446 QUOTE 6/7/2011 I Page 1 of 1 Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 C orrecti ve Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00012 Version: R e qu este d Du e dat e: 06/09/201 1 Requ ested B y: Barborek , W D oug l as Approved B y: Edge ll , Dou g l as W R e que st D es cription: Approved:
r ,/ Pr ev iou s Du e dat e: 02/20/20 1 1 02/14/201 1 02/18/201 1 Th i s CA cou l d not be completed by the original due date due to competing work load prior i ties. The due date is be i ng extended to 6/9/201 1 whic h is acceptable since it corresponds with Mi l es t one 30 "All Outa ge Material on Order". W DB 2/l4/20J J A pprov e d D esc ripti on:
Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION CA N umb e r: 13 G roup Ass i g n e d By: E ng Sys Mgmt ANO Asstgned To: E n g Sys M g mt ANO S uba ss i g n ed T o: E n g Sys NS SS Staff ANO Originated By: ZzAN O C RG **lH EA u se only** P erfor m e d By: E dg e ll , Dougla s W S ubp e rform e d By: Barb o r c k ,W D o u g l as Approved By: C lo sed By: Williams , Patrick J C ur re nt Du e Date: 02/17/2011 CA T y p e: P ERIODIC REVIEW Plant C on s traint: NONE CA D es cription:
Int e rim a nd P e ri o di c R e vi ew R e quir e d Wi ll iams , Patrick J E d ge ll , D o u g l as W Barborck , W Douglas 11/1 7/2 010 16:4 2:18 2/16/2 011 16: 56:41 2/16/2 011 08:20: 1 3 2/16/2011 19:42:51 Initi a l Du e Date: 02/17/2 011 CA Priority:
I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Na m e (NO TE -an Int e rim R ev iew require s both "R es pon s ible Mana ge r" AND a Director or Above" approval).
C onduct and document an interim review o f this Condition Report u s in g the "CR Interim a nd P eriodic Review C hecklist" , Attachment 9.8 of EN-LI-I 0 2 which i s ava il ab l e via t h e R efere n ce Libr ary EC H S it e in th e Nuclear M anagemen t Manual Commo n Forms section. C onsider any open CAs for Long Term classification per Attachment 9.9 of EN-Ll-102.
Respon se: l co n c u r with the attached int e rim r ev iew and c l os ur e of thi s co rr ec tiv e action. S ubr es pon se : I nterim Re v iew is attached.
E-mail docu me nting D irector/Manager appro v al i s a l s o attached. WDB 2/16/20 11 C lo s ur e Co mment s: Attachments:
Subresponse D esc ription Dir ec t or & Mana ge r Approval o fTR Subresponse Description interim r ev i e w Attachment Header Doc u ment Name: un t it l ed Document Location ~ub r es p onse Descri p t i on Attach Ti t le: !Di r ecto r & Manager Approval of IR BARBOREK, W DOUGLAS From: S e nt: T o: C c: WILLIAMS , PA T RICK J Tuesday, February 15 , 2011 10:08 PM BARBOREK , W DOUGLAS MCCOY , JAIME H; EDGELL , DOUGLAS W
 
==Subject:==
RE: REQUEST FOR REVIEW -Inter i m Revi ew for CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 "Resolve I ndustry OE on Chloride I n duced Stress Corrosion Cracking on RV Flange Piping" I concur as Acting Eng i neer i ng D i rector. Patrick From: BAPBOREK, W DOUGLAS Sen t: T uesday , Febr uar y 15 , 2011 3: 55 PM To: W I L LIAMS, PATR I CK J Cc: MOCOY , JA i ME H; EDGELL , DOUGLA S W Subj e ct: RE: REQUEST FOR REVIEW -I nterim Rev i ew for CR-AN0-1-2008-0 2560 "Reso l ve I n dustry OE on Chloride I nduced Stress Corros i on Cracking on RV Range Piping" P a t r i c k , T h anks fo r the c h a ll e n ge on t h e L TCA de s i g n atio n. Y es, I believe LTCNLTCR s tatu s i s a pp ropriate for t hj s 2008 CR. T h e r e will b e m o r e CA's i ssue d t h i s yem* to impl e m e nt t h i s l R 23 sc op e, and I think it b es t to wrap it all up a ft e r the outage with a defini tive s t ateme nt that the OE ha s finally been a ddre ssed for AN0-1. I ss ued two m ore CA's as follow s. CA-15 is to assess co n ti n ge ncy p.lan s in case t he p r essu r e t est r es u l ts a r e not as ex p ected. CA-16 wi ll b e the L TCA. I will pur s u e LTCA ap p roval t hi s week. CA-1 5 -P er EN-OU-100 , i den t ify any r eq u i red co ntin ge n cy p l ans fo r I R 23 wh i c h are required to s upport th e pressure t est of t he CCC-6 piping. I ss u e follow-u p CA's as required.
CA assigned to SYE. Original due date i s 4/28/20 1 1 , w h i c h i s t h e finish da t e for M i l es ton e 24 " I d e n tify Contin ge n cy P l ans". CA-16 -Following imp l ementat i o n of W0-00195437 during IR23 , document t h at t h e applicab l e OE ha s bee n a dequat e l y a ddre sse d fo r ANO-I. L TCA Classification is bein g pur s ued for thi s CA s ince RFO 1R23 is required to resolve this condition and since various additional CA's will likely b e required to support 1R23 resolution of this issue. CA a ssig n ed t o SYE. Orig i nal d u e da te i s 1 2/1 5/201 1 whj c h shou ld b e afte r the co m p l e t ion of 1 R 23. Th e updat e d IR i s attac h e d t o this e-mai l and t o CA-13 of the C R. P l ease l et m e know i f you h ave any additiona l qu es tion s. Thank s, Doug Barborek Ente r gy Operations, Inc./ Arkansas Nuclea r One System Eng i neer -Unit 1 Reactor Coo l ant System System Eng i neer i ng Bu i ld i ng/ N-SYE-4 wb arb o I@e nt crgy.c o m 479-858-4337
!(b )(6) I pa ge r << F i l e: C R-AN0-1-2 00 8-02560 CA-1 3 l n1cr im R ev iew.d oc>> From: W I LLI AMS, PATR I CK J Se nt: Mond a y , February 14, 2011 2:52 PM To:BARBOREK, WDOUGLAS Cc: MOCDY, JAi ME H; EDGB._L , DOUGLAS W
 
==Subject:==
RE: REQUEST FOR REVIEW-Int e rim R e view for CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 "Reso l v e I n dustry OE on Olloride I nduced Stress Corros i on Cracking on RV Range Piping" Approved as Acting Engineering D i rector , I s this a candidate for L TCA? Patrick From: BARBOREK , W DOUGLAS Sent: Monday , February 14 , 2011 1 :56 PM To: MCCOY, JAIMEH; WILLIAMS, PATRICKJ Cc: EDGELL , DOUGLAS W; El Q-lENBERGER, JOHN R
 
==Subject:==
REQUEST FOR REVIEW -Interim Rev i ew fo r CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 "Reso l ve Industry OE on O,loride I nduced Stress Omosion Cracking on RV Rang e Piping" Jaime & Patrick , The interim review for the subject CR is attached for your review and concurrence. The draft interim review has been attached to CA-13 of t h e subject CR. The CA is ultimately due on Thursday, February 17 , 2011 (i nitia ll y due by me on Tuesday, February 15). Please let m e know i f you h a ve any qu e stion s. Th a nks, Doug Barborek E n t ergy Opera ti ons. I n c./ A r kan s a s Nuclea r O n e System Engi n eer -Uni t I R eac t or Coo l ant Sys t e m Syste m Engi n ee ri n g Bui l di n g/ N-SYS-4 w b a r b o l@cme rgy.co m 479-858-4337
!(b )(6) I pager << File: CR-AN0-1-2008-0 2 560 CA-13 Int e rim R e vi e w.do c>> 2 Document Name: un t it l ed Document Location ~ub r es p onse D escri p t i on Attach Title: !i nte r im review Attachment Header ATTACHMENT 9.8 CR INTERIM AND PERIODIC REVIEW FORM SHEET 1 OF 1 CR Interim and Periodic Review CR Numb er: CR-AN0-1-2008
-02560 Category Level D AD B IZI C CR Owner Group: ENG SYS MGMT ANO CR
 
== Description:==
 
1 R2 1 W0-0 01 02463 Task 01 was n o t ab l e to b e successfully perfo r med as p l an n ed. CR-AN0-1-2005-0 1 140 was written to d ocume n t OE from severa l p l ants wh i c h i de n tified co r ros i on (ch l o ri de) induced p i pe crack i ng i n r eac t or vessel (RV) f l ange l eak-off/pressure test connect i on p i ping resu l t i ng from wa t er l eft i n the p i p i n g follow i ng ref u e l i n g outages. AN0-1 was d e t erm i ned to be v u l nerable s i nce wa t er has been trapped i n th i s piping duri n g p rev i o u s operat i ng cyc l es. T he scope of W0-00 1 02463 was fo r System E n g i neering to a t tempt t o ex t e rn ally i n spec t the RV flange l eak-off/p r essu r e tes t co n nect i o n p i p i ng fo r ev i dence of cracki n g. T h e ins p ection approach was to ut i l i ze a bo r oscope to ex t ernally i nspect the p i p i ng v i a access thro u g h th e r eac t o r cavity seal p l ate openi n gs and betwee n t h e R V and the RV in s u l ation. Howeve r , d ue to the tight c l earances between the i ns u l ation and the RV , th e i nspectio n was not successfu l and the loff/pressure co n nectio n p i p i ng cou l d n o t be vis u ally i n spec t ed as p la n n ed. Since CR-AN0-1-2 0 05-0 1 14 0 was cl osed to W0-001 0 2463 , th i s CR was i n i t iated to p rov i de a means of tr acki n g an al t ernate reso l ut i on fo r ad d ress i ng the noted OE. As doc u me n te d in th e 2005 CR, ANO p r oce d u r es h ave b ee n revised to e n s u re th e s u bject p i pi ng is d ra i n ed dur i ng re fu el i ng o u t ages p ri or to i n stalli n g the RV head , th us m i tiga ti ng th e dama g e mec h an i sm. The operabil i ty statemen t i n CR-AN0-1-2005-0 1 140 r emains app l i cab l e. CR Review: (All No responses require explanation be included.) Th e follow i ng CA's h ave b ee n i ssued to fu rther eva l u a te a course of act i on req u ired t o address the OE d ocume nt e d i n CR-AN0-1-2005-01 1 40. Th e issua n ce of th ese actio n s cons ti t u tes a n accep t ab l e co rr ec ti ve action p l an for th i s CR. A d d i tional CA's will b e i ss u ed as dee m ed approp ri a t e. CA-02 [c l osed] -CR-AN0-1-2005-0 1 14 0 (CA-04) eva l uated the feasibil it y of perform i ng a h y d r ostat i c test o f the RV f l ange l eak-off/pressure tes t connect i on pip i ng a n d co n cluded that such a tes t was not feasib l e. Based on the i nab i l i ty to v i sually inspect th e pip i ng d u ring 1 R21 (v i a b oroscope), revisit the f easib i l i t y of perfo r m i ng a hydrostatic t est o n t h ese l i nes to v er i fy p i p i ng i n tegri t y. Th i s CA was c l osed on 8/27/2009 to CA-07 wh i ch was init i a t ed f or SYE t o i n it i ate a new S IP DB Reco r d and p r esent to th e URT/MPRC to recommend t h is scope of work be executed by t h e P rojects Organ i zat i on. CA-03 [c l osed] -Dete r mine th e scope required to perform a direct visual i nspect i on of the RV flange lea koff/pressure test co n nect i on pipi ng (i.e. removal of r eacto r cav i t y sea l p l a t e, co n c r e te s hi e ld b l oc k s , and RV ins u l at i on) in t h e even t that no o th er option is i d e n ti fi ed to veri f y the i n t eg ri ty o f the p i pi n g. This CA was closed on 8/27/2 0 09 to CA-07 w h ich was i nit i ated for SYE to i n i tiate a new S IP DB Recor d a n d present to the UR T/M P RC to r ecommend th i s scope of wo rk be executed b y the P r o j ec t s Organ i zation. CA-07 [c l osed] -Th e inspect i on of t h e RV F l ange Leak-off & Pressure Tes t Connect ion p i ping r equ i res ad d i t io n a l reso u rces and engi n ee ri ng wh i c h t r anscends the role a n d r esponsibi l ity o f System E n g i neer i ng. In i tiate a new S I PD B Recor d a n d present to the UR T/MPRC t o reco m mend th i s scope of w o rk be exec u te d by the P rojects O r gan i zation. S IPDB Reco r d 4955 was in i t i a t ed to tr ansfe r t h i s scope of wo r k t o the P rojects Organiza ti on and th i s CA was close d o n 11/19/2009.
New CA-08 was i ss u ed t o track the p r esentat i on of S IPD B Record 4955 to the URT. CA-08 [c l osed] -P r es e nt S I PDB Recor d (I nspection of t h e RV F l ange Leak-off & P re ss ur e Test Con n ect i on P i p i ng) to t h e UR T/MPRC for th i s scope of work to be executed by th e Projects O r g a n izat i on. SYE made the prese n tat i on at the 1 2/7/2009 URT meet i ng. Th e URT concu rr e d t h at if t h e l eak-off & p r essure test connectio n pipi n g u l timately requi r e p h ysica l i nspection o r rep l acement such tha t disassemb l y/r eassemb l y of th e reacto r cav i ty sea l plate , concrete s h i e ld b l ocks , an d reactor vesse l i nsu l ation i s required , then that sig n ifi cant s cope o f wo r k woul d be tr a n sfe r red to t h e P r o j ec t O r gan i zat i on. Howeve r , at t his time , the UR T decided that System EN-Ll-102 REV 13 E n g i ne e ring shoul d re-eva lu ate the press u re test o p tion and com e u p w i th a p l a n to pe rf orm a p r essu r e test o n the leak-o f f and p r essu r e test co n nect i o n p i p i ng to ve ri fy t h e i ntegrity of th e p ip i ng. If the p r essure test fa i ls o n one or b o th o f the l i nes , the ensuing scope o f work to access the p i pi n g for u l timate r esolution of the issue would then b e p ursued by t h e P rojects Orga n izat i o n. New CA-09 has been issu ed to SYE to d eterm i ne a s u itab l e press u re t est method and to i n i tiate the pro p er imp l ementat i o n doc u men t ation. 1 R22 w ill b e uti l ized to pe rf orm sco p ing walkdowns si n ce th is p i pi ng is n o t access i ble duri n g p ower opera ti ons. Th i s CA was closed on 1/2 1/2 010. CA-0 9 [c l osed] -Coord i nate w ith EP&C person n e l an d dete r mi ne a suitab l e press u re test met hod fo r the RV flange l ea k-off/p r essu r e test co n nec ti o n p i p i ng, a nd i nitiate the proper imp l ementat i on documentatio
: n. Uti l ize 1 R22 to perform scopi n g wal k downs as req u i r e d. Initiate other corrective actions as r e q u i red. Completed by SYE on 10/25/2 010. CA-10 w as i n i ti ated fo r SYE to assign followup co rr ective actions as r equ i red to imp l ement the p r essu r e test p lan i n 1 R23 v i a W0-00 19 5437. CA-10 was complete d on 1 1/1 7/20 1 0 b y SYE and CA-1 1 an d CA-1 2 we r e i n i ti ated as a r esult. CA-1 1 -Develop EC to support W0-00195437.
I f required, prov i de justi fi cat i on for i nsta l lation of co u pl i ngs on the affected CCC-6 p i p i ng. Also, if r equire d , p ro v i de e n gineerin g requireme n ts f or F ME controls assoc i ate d with th e p ress u re te st eq u i pme n t and com p onents to b e u sed in c l ose p rox i m it y t o th e RV fl a ng e. CA assi g n e d to SYE, o r ig i n a l d u e date was 2/20/201 1. However , th e cu rrent p la n i s to press u ri ze agains t c l osed valves (RBS-1 and RC-5) i n l i eu o f sever i ng the p i p i ng above t h e va l ves an d i nstall i ng hyd ro p l ugs. As suc h , the use of coup l i n gs is a co n ti ng e n cy t o be use d o n ly i f pr essur i zing aga i ns t the va l ves is u nsuccessfu
: l. The due date is bei n g changed to 7/21/201 1 , correspo nd i n g wi th M i lestone 48 "All Contingency Plans Approved'. CA-12 -De t e rm i n e the ap p rop ri a t e type & s iz e of hy d ro pl u gs to be u ti l i zed fo r th e p ress u re t est (W0-00195 4 37) outl i ne d i n CA-09. In i ti ate ac ti o n s to p r ocure t he h y d ro p lugs, as r e q u i red. CA assigned t o SY E , origi n a l due date was 2/20/201 1. D ue date extended to 6/9/2011 to co r respo n d wi th M i lesto n e 30 " All Outage Material on Order'. CA-14 -Provide i n put t o Ou t a g e P&S to ensu r e 1 R23 W0-00195437 is p roper ly p l anned for pe rf or m a n ce of the CCC-6 p i p i n g p r essu r e test. CA assig n ed to SYE. Original d ue date i s 4/1 4/20 11 , w h i c h is th e fi n i sh date fo r Milestone 20 "All W ork Order T asks Planning Complete". CA-15 -Per EN-OU-100 , id e nti fy any r equ i red cont i ngency p l a n s fo r 1 R23 wh i c h a r e req u i red to sup p ort t h e pressure test of the CCC-6 piping. Issue follow-up CA's as r e q u ired. CA ass i g n ed to SYE. Original d ue date is 4/28/201 1 , w h ich is the finish d a t e fo r M i l es to ne 24 " Id e ntify Conting e ncy Plans". CA-16 -Follow i n g i mplementation of W0-00195437 during 1 R23 , document th a t the appl i cab l e OE h as been adequate l y addressed for AN0-1. L TCA Classification is being pursued for this CA since RFO 1 R23 is required to resolve this condition and since various additional CA's will likely be required to support 1 R23 r e solution of this iss ue. CA ass i gned to SYE. Orig i nal due date i s 12/15/201 1 w h ich s h ou l d be after the com p let io n o f 1 R23. 1. Will the existing corrective actions documented i n the condi ti on report , when co mpleted , co rrect the co nd i tion report issue? Y es~/ No D Imp le men t ation of 1 R23 W0-0 01 9543 7 w i ll resolve this issue , assuming no degradation is d i scovered. Since addi t i o nal CA's are expec ted b e twe e n n ow and 1 R23 , th e CR will re main op e n thro u gh 1 R23 a n d will be cl osed follow i ng completion of CA-1 6. 2. What i s the expected CR C l os ure date ba se d on remaining needed actions? DATE: 12/15/2011 I t i s anticipated t h at th i s CR w i ll b e closed followi n g 1 R23 imp l eme n ta ti o n o f the pressu r e test and comp l etion of CA-16. Target date i s 1 2/1 5/201 1. If deg r a d atio n is fou n d , a new CR will be i n i ti ated du ri ng 1R23. 3. Is the previously documented operability/functionality pos ition st ill va lid for th e curre n t co ndition and expected to remain va lid until CR clo s ure? Yes / No D /N/A D If the answer i s N O, then initiate a new CR to doc um ent the concern; CR# N/A EN-Ll-10 2 REV 13
: 4. Are all Ll-102 requirement s for co rrective action administration and control being met , i.e. ju s tifications for Due Date Ext e n s ion s valid, Long Term Corrective Actions identifi ed, CARB approved CAPRs ide ntifi ed, a nd appropr i ate approva l s obtained for a ll? Yes [gj/ No D 5. What r is k to plant operation is imposed by the condition i de ntified and how is ri sk redu ced to an acceptab l e level for the duration of the ac t ion plan? This CR does not specifically identify a known degraded plan t system, structure , or com p onent at AN0-1 , but does i de n tify a potential degradation mecha n i sm. Both the RV flange gasket leak detec ti on line and pressure t est connection l i n es were flushed/drained du ri ng 1R 19 , 1 R20 , 1 R21 a n d 1 R22, thus m i n i m i zing th e potential fo r fa i l u re resulting from ID i n i tiate d , ch l oride i nd uced , transgranu l a r stress-corrosion cracki ng (TG SCC). N o RV f l ange gasket leakage was identified dur i ng plant heat-up from 1R 19 , 1 R20 , 1 R21 o r 1 R22 prior to iso l ating valves R BS-1 and RBS-2 , and RCS l eakage rates following 1R 1 9, 1 R20 , 1R21 and 1R22 have not i ndicated the prese nc e of any concurrent leakage of the RV f l ange gaskets and leak detectio n/p re ssu re test co n nectio n piping/components. The RV f la nge gaskets are rep lac ed during each refueling ou tage and valves RBS-1 and RB S-2 are not iso l ated unti l just prior to crit i ca l i ty after i t has been ver i fied that the i n ner gas ke t is not leaki ng. Therefore , the likelihood of i n ner gas ke t leakage , wh il e possible , is cons i dered low. In conc l usion , the risk to plant operat i on i s m i n i mal and redu c ed to acceptab l e levels unti l the act i on plan for th i s CR can be implemen t ed d uring 1 R23. R eview/ Approval Required: Director/GM Titl e: Date: -----(P rint n a me & Position ti tl e) NOTE: The expec tati on i s to capt ur e the discussion points of this form in a CA. The form it self n eed n ot be used , but a ll points app li cab l e must be add re ssed. EN-Ll-102 REV 13 Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Corrective Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00013 Version: Reque ste d Duedate: 02/17/201 1 Requested By: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: Edge ll , Dou g la s W Reque st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Duedate: 02/02/20 1 1 02/01/2011 02/01/201 1 Due to competin g work l oad ass i g nment s, n o work ha s been performed o n r esolvi n g th e i ssue in thi s CR s in ce ea rl y December 2010, and the CA plan needs revision in conj unction with perfonnin g an accurate interim review. The du e date i s being ex t e nd e d two week s to 2/17/2 01 I. Thi s CA is a dmini s tr a tiv e in natur e a nd exte n s i on of th e du e dat e by two week s do es not impact the operability or functionality o f an y in sta ll ed plant SSCs; an d is therefore acceptab l e. WDB 2/1/201 1 Approved
 
== Description:==
 
Ent e rgy I CORRECTIV E ACTION CA N umb e r: 14 G roup Ass i g n e d By: Eng Sys Mgmt ANO Asstg n e d To: E n g Sys NSSS Staff ANO S ub ass i g n ed T o : Or i g i nate d By: Edge ll , Douglas W P erfor m e d By: Barborek, W D oug l as S ub pe r fo rm e d By: A ppr ove d By: C lo sed By: Edge ll , Douglas W C ur re n t Du e D ate: 05/05/2011 CA T y p e: ACTION Pl a nt C on s tr a int: NONE CA D es cript io n: Edge ll , Dougla s W Barborek, W Douglas 2/15/201 1 17:54:12 5/5/20 1 115:22:19 5/5/2011 15:52:08 I n i t i a l Du e Date: 05/05/2 011 CA P ri o ri ty: I C R-AN0-1-2008-025 6 0 Na m e Provide input to Outage P&S to ensu r e 1R2 3 W0-00195437 i s properly planned for performance of the CCC-6 piping pressure test. Respo n se: Based on a meeting with Outage Management on Monday, May 2nd, 201 1 , W0-00195437 to perform the RV flange piping pres s ur e testing i s go in g to be deferred from I R23 to I R24 due to the fact that inadequ ate time and re sources exist to develop the necessary contingency and repair actions required in the event piping degradation is discovered by the testing. As such, th i s CA i s no lon ge r required to support 1 R23 and is being closed. Note that S IPD R ecord 5678 ha s been ini t i ated to reque s t that the URT aga i n co n s id er reassignment of this i ss u e from System Engineering to Project Managem e nt for I R24 implementation.
C A-1 7 has be e n issu e d to SYE to present thi s SIPD Rec o rd to the URI. WDB 5/5/2 011 S u bres pon se : C l os u re Co mm e n ts: 1 concur with closure oftbis corrective action.
Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 C orrecti ve Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00014 Version: R e qu este d Du e dat e: 05/05/2011 Requ ested B y: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: Edge ll , Douglas W R e que st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Du e dat e: 04/14/20 1 1 04/13/201 1 04/13/201 1 Cannot complete by assigned date. Ex tend to 5/5/201 1 wh i ch is Mile s tone date for P0-20 "All Outage Work Order Ta s k Planning Comp l ete". Since the due date is before the milestone, the DDE is acceptable.
WDB 4/13/20 11 Approved Description
:
Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION CA N umb er: 15 G roup Ass i gned By: Eng Sys Mgmt ANO As stg n e d To: Eng Sys NSSS Staff ANO S uba ss i g n ed To : Originated By: Edge ll , Douglas W P e rform ed B y: Barborek, W D oug l as S ubp e rform e d By: Approved By: Closed B y: Edge ll , D oug l as W C urrent Due Date: 05/19/2011 CA Typ e: ACTION Plant Constra int: NONE CA
 
== Description:==
 
Edge ll , D o u g l as W Barborek, W Douglas 2/15/201 1 17:54:56 5/18/20 11 15:25:30 5/19/2011 17 :0 3 :03 Initial Du e D a t e: 05/19/201 1 CA Priorit y: I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Na m e Per EN-OU-100 , identify a ny r equ ir ed contingency plans for 1R23 which are required to s upp ort the pressure test of the CCC-6 piping. I ssue fo ll ow-up CA ?s as required.
R es pon s e: Based on a meeting with Outage Management on Monday, May 2nd, 201 1 , W0-00195437 to perform the RV flange piping pres s ure testing i s go in g to be deferred from I R23 to I R24 due to the fact that inadequ ate time and r esources ex i st to develop the necessary contingency and repair actions required in the event piping degradation is discovered b y the te sting. As such , th i s CA i s no lon ge r required to support 1 R23 and is being c l osed. Note that S IPD R ecord 5678 has been initiated to reque s t that the URT aga i n co n s id er reassignment of this i s su e from System E n gi n ee rin g to Project Managem e n t for I R24 implementatio
: n. CA-1 7 has been issu ed to SYE to prese n t thi s SIPD R eco r d to the URI. WDB 5/1 8/201 1 S ubr es ponse : C l os ure Co mm e n ts: 1 concur with closure oftbis corrective action.
Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 C orrecti ve Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-0001 5 Version: R e qu este d Du e dat e: 05/19/2011 Requ ested B y: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: William s, Patrick J R e que st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Du e dat e: 04/28/2 011 04/28/201 1 04/28/2 01 1 Due to in comp l ete and ongo in g di sc u ss ion s wit h Out age Man age m e nt , th is CA mu st be extended. A meetin g i s sc h ed u l e d for Monda y, May 2nd to di sc uss contingency actions associated with the 1R 23 RV flange piping pre ss ure test. This CA is being exte nd ed 3 week s to May 19 t h , 201 J. P e r Section 5.8[1] ofEN-OU-100 , JR 23 Mil e s tone P 0-24 "Id e ntif y Co n t ing e n cy Plan s" {du e today) applies to Bu siness Case Plan s on l y. Since the pressure test i s not a ss ociated with a Business Case Pl an, extension of the due dat e to 5/19/2011 i s acceptable.
WDB 4/28/201 1 Approved
 
== Description:==
 
Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA N umb er: 16 G roup Ass i gned By: E ng Sy s t e m s & Comp s Mgmt ANO Asst g ned To: E n g Sy s t e m s N S SS S t a ff ANO S uba ss i g n ed To : Originated By: E dgell , Dougla s W P e rform ed B y: S ubperformed By: Approved By: Closed By: Current Due Date: 11/17/2 016 CA Type: GENERAL AC TI ON Plant Constra int: NONE CA
 
== Description:==
 
Na m e Wood s on P.E., Timothy R Barbor ek , W Dou g l as 2/1 5/2011 17:53:14 Initial Du e Date: 11/18/2 01 6 CA Priorit y: 4 F o l lowin g impl e m e nt a tion of W0-00 L9 5 4 3 7 durin g IR 2 3, d oc um e nt th a t the a pp li ca bl e O E h as b ee n ad e qu a t e l y addr esse d for ANO-I. R es ponse: r Subrcspo n se : C lo s ur e Co mm e nt s:
Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Corrective Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00016 Version: Reque ste d Duedate: 05/30/2013 Requested By: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: Barborek , W Dou g l as Reque st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Duedate: 1 2/15/20 1 1 12/12/2011 12/1 2/201 1 The pressure test to be performed under W0-00 1 95437 was deferred from I R23 to I R 24 via SCR-1 1049 (attac h e d to DDE). As s uch, this CA must be extended to beyond 1R24. As such, the CA is being extended to May 30, 2013. This CA is adm ini strat iv e in nature , so extended the date i s both necessary and acceptab l e. WDB J 2/1 2/20 l l A pprov e d
 
== Description:==
 
Note that CA-20 has already been classified as an L TCA. Per discussion with Bob Eichenberger, only o n e CA has to be classified as an L TCA to properly c la ss ify the C R as a LTCR. ODE #l is necessary and acceptable.
D o u g Barborek (for Doug Edge ll). WDB l 2/l 2/20 I l Attachments:
Request Description IR 23 SCR l 104 9 Attachment Header Doc u ment Name: un t it l ed Document Location !Re q ues t Description Attach Ti t le: 1 1 R23 SCR 11049 Scope Change Request Form Originator Section Scope Change#: 11049 Chan.ge Type: Deferral Work Order: ------Date Initiated:
6/9/2011 Work Request: 0 1 9 54 3 7 Component#:
R-1 Compon e nt Noun Nam e: R e a c t o r V esse l -----------------------
Reque s t or: BAR BOREK , WILLIAM DOUGLAS Phon e#: 4 33 7 Di s cipline: MECH -----ER#: Req'd Mhrs: 0 Dose Est: 0 Est Cost: $0.00 ----------Ta 1out Re 'd.: n R efe r e n ce o p e n CR-ANO-I -2 008-0 2 5 6 0. Th e pr ess ur e tes t o f th e r ea ctor v esse l l e ak-o ff and pr ess ur e test co nn ec tion pi pin g r e quir es s i g nifi c ant c ontin ge n cy planning whi c h ca nnot be acco mpli s hed by S ys t e m En gi n ee rin g pri or t o I R2 3. P o t e ntial co ntin ge n cy pl a n s in cl ud e t e mp o r a rily p lu gg in g (fo r o n e cy cl e) th e l eak-off po rt (s) assoc i a t ed w i t h a ny p ipin g fo und d egra d ed, a n i nvolv es a lon g term (i.e. next RFO) fix of r e movin g the r eactor c avity s hield plate , c on c r e t e shi e ld bl oc k s, an d RV in s ulati o n t o re p a i r/r e pl ace or cap th e pipin g if fo u nd degrade d by th e press ur e t es t. R eq u est d efer r al t o 1R2 4. S I P D R ecor d 5678 h as bee n d e v e lop e d to r e qu es t t ran s f e rin g th e sco pe o f thi s pr ess ur e t es t a nd th e d e v e l o pm e nt of the s i g nifi c ant co ntin gency p l anni n g ac ti o n. fr om S s t e m E n in ee rin t o Pro'e c t M a na e m e nt for 1R2 4 im l e m e nt a ti o n. Re a son for Scope Change submittal:
Futur e Out age-l a t er d e t e rm in at i on m a d e th at w o rk s h Justification for Scone Change: Althou g h the pre ss ur e t es t mu s t ultima t e ly be c ondu c t ed to c on fi rm that th e r e i s no clor ide-in d u ced s t r ess corro s ion c ra c kin g in t ht RV l ea k-o f fYp r ess ur e t es t co n nec t io n pipi ng (as see n at o th er p l a nt s), it i s n o t e d th at t h ere i s n o kno wn d eg r a d a ti o n in th e s ubj ec t ANO-L piping a t thi s tim e. Th e l ea k-o ff & pr ess ur e t es t c onn ec tion p i pin g i s c urr e ntl y (s in ce IR 19) d ra in e d a t the e nd of eac h r e fu e lin g out age, thu s mi t i g atin g th e d a ma ge m ec h a ni s m a nd e l i min a ting a ny p ress u r i za ti o n du e to th e h e atin g o f wat e r t ra pp e d i 1 th e pi p in g durin g po w e r o p e r a ti o n s, ass umin g n o inn e r o-rin g l ea k age. L eakage o f th e RV n a n ge inn e r o-rin g i s a n infr eq u e nt occuran ce. CA-1 9 of CR-ANO-l-2008-0 2 560 h as b ee n i ss u ed t o SYE to ju s tif y and e n act a pr oc edur e r e vi s ion to c han ge th e co n fig u ra ti o n of l ea k-off i so l a ti o n valves RB S-I a n d R BS-2 to " n o rm a lly o p e n" for Cyc l e 24 w hi c h wi ll e lim i n a t e th e p oss ib l il i t y of pr ess urin g th e CC C-6-1" pipin g in the e v e nt o f a n inn e r o-r in g l ea k until s u c h tim e th e pr ess u r e t es t ca n r eso lv e th e indu st r y OI Th e or i g inal d es i gn b as is c onfi g uration for RBS-L a nd RB S-2 was " norma ll y o p e n" durin g pow e r op e r a tion s u ntil b e ing c han ge d ir th e mid-I 99 0's. With RB S-1 a nd RB S-2 o p e n durin g Cy cl e 24, th e CCC-6-l" p iping w ill n o t be pr ess uri ze d i n th e eve nt o f a n inner o-ring leak whi c h will r e mo v e an y pre ss ure-induced chall e n ges to th e piping. Criteria for approval of outage scope additions
[after Scope Free1,e (T-11) and during outage execution]
: Check if this SCF has ANY Scaff old/Insulation work impact? D Ori g i n ator is re s po n s ible for co m pleti n g a n y form s req u ired for pr ogra 1 mn a tic c ha n ges a n d s u bmiuin g th ose per th e in s tr uc t i o ns o n th e s p ec ifi c fo r m s (Fo rm s ava il ab l e o n ID EAS): Is a PMDR required (EN-DC-324, Att 9.3)? 0 Is a ST Change (1000.009A)
Required?
0 Change Review Section Radiation Protection Does RP approve this change request? Name: STO L TZ , DANIEL C LIF F Yes~ No [J Date: 6/20/2 011 Comments:
No i ss u e w i t h deferra l. W o rk Ord e r s t i ll i n PLAN s t at u s , dose es ti ma t e a n d wor k scope n o t de fin e d a t thi s tim e. P r e lim i n a r d o se es timat e is 2 50 mr e m. For S co p e D e f e r ra l s from o ut age t o o n-li n e m a i n t e n a n ce; i t i s r e qu i r ed t h a t t h e OPS O WL h as d eve l o p e d/r e vi e w ed th e impa c t s t a t e m e n t fo r th e work t o b e p e r fo rmed a nd ob tai n e d co n c u r r e n ce from t he O PS Ma n a ger, o r hi s d es i g n ee, t h a t o n-l in e m a i nt e n a n ce r i s k i s acce pt a b l e. O erations:
Does OPS approve this change request? Yes No D Name: STUMBA U GH , STEVEN ARNOLD Date: 6/17/2 011 Conunents:
D efe rral o f t h e r erss ur e t est i s n o t an i ss u e with O s. F o r Scope D e f e r ra l s tha l req u i re a PMDR , ve ri fy th e PMDR h a s bee n a ppr ove d pri o r t o a ulh o ri z i n g t h e sco pe c han ge. Eva lu a t e th e res u l t s fo r , d e ferra l , if a Co n diti o n R e p o rt b ee n c l o s ed to th i s it e m? En ineerin : Do e s Engineerin g approve this change request? Ye s No D Name: E DG E LL , DOUGLA S WARR E N Date: 6/9/2 011 Comments:
SYE r eco mm e nd s d efe rral of thi s WO. Alth o u g h th e pr ess ur e t es t mu st ultim a t e l y b e co ndu c t ed to c on fi rm th a t th ere is n o cl o rid e-in d u ce d s tr ess corrosio n crac kin g i n th e RV l eak-oftY p ress ure tes t co nn ec t io n pi ping (a s se en a t o th e r p l a nt s), it i s n o t ed th a t th ere i s n o kn own d egrada ti on i n th e s u bjec t A NO-I pi p in g a t t h is t im e. Th e l eak-o ff p r ess ur e t es t co nn ec ti o n pi p in g is c urr e ntl y (s in ce lRl 9) d ra in e d a t the e nd of each r e fu e lin g out age, thu s mi t i gat in, th e d a m age m ec h a ni sm a nd e limjn a tin g a n y p ress ur i za t io n du e to t h e h ea tin g of w a ter t ra pp ed i n th e pi pin g du r in g po w e r o p e r a ti o n s, ass umin g no inn er o-rin g l ea k age. L ea k age o f th e RV fl a n ge inn e r o-rin g is a n infr e qu e nt occ uran ce. C A-1 9 of C R-AN0-1-2008-0 2560 h as be en i ss u ed t o SYE t o ju s tify a n d en ac t a pr oced ur e re vi s i on t o Monday , December 12 , 2011 Page 1 of 2 Scope Change Request Form change the configura tion of leak-off i so lati on valves RBS-I and RBS-2 to " normall y open" fo r Cycle 24 which will e liminat e the po ss iblility of pr ess uring the CCC-6-1" piping i n the eve n t of an inn er o-ring l ea k until s u c h tim e the pres s ure te s t can r esolve the industry O E. The original de s ign basis co nfi g uration for RBS-l and RBS-2 wa s "normally open" during power operationsu ntil being changed in the mid-1 990's. With RBS-1 and RBS-2 open during Cy c l e 24, th e CCC-6-1" piping will not be pr ess uri zed in th e eve nt of an in ner o-r in g l eak which will remov an ressure-induced ch alien es to the i in"* Mai n te n a n ce: Doe s Maintenan ce approve thi s change r e qu est? Y es~ No D Nam e: STUMBAUG H , STEVEN DALE D ate: 6/20/20 11 Comments:
J Agree with deferral ba sed on Eng. comme nt s. lf this SCF is dealing with a o n-li n e l eak repair the n verify t h e requirement s of 1025.015 "On-Line Leak Repair" are satisfied pr ior to d eterri n g work or disapproving add i t i on. Final Approval Section Note: Outage Manager may bypass rev i ew learn rccommcndalion s an d approve/reject for Minor Changes. Du ri n g ou t age execut i on, the Shi f t Outage Manager m ay perfo r m this function. The GMPO must approve any Major C h ange (An Activi t y> $100,000, or which would result in Outage Extention).
D oes Outage Mgt approve thi s c hang e request? Name: WALTERS , JOE RANDALL Yes PT No 0 Date: 6/20/2011 C omments: !Move to 1R24 when en gin eering has developed suitab l e contingency actions. Moved WO rask to 1R24. DC Offical Dat e Approved:
6/20/201 1 Has Schedule been Updated?~ PMDR approved and complete D Has MPC/OSG/RP been notified of addition/deferral O ST approved and complete?
O M o nday , D ece mber 12 , 2011 Page 2 of 2 Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 C orrecti ve Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00016 Version: 2 R e qu este d Du e dat e: 1 2/04/2014 Requ ested B y: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: Woodson P.E., Timothy R R e que st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Du e dat e: 05/30/20 1 3 05/21/2013 05/22/2013 Th e pr ess ure te st of the RV l ea k-off li n es was deferred to l.R25 by mana ge ment due to l ack of co ntin ge ncy plannin g (requ ir es AREY A support, and funding for that support) and l ack of resources to p l an and execute the work. This CA is being exte nd ed t o J 2/4/20 14 to co rr es pond to a d a t e ex p ec t e d to be b eyo nd 1 R 25 to a ll ow time fo r WO impl e m e n tat i o n. This DOE is nec essary since the work has been deferred by management.
WDB 5/2 I/2 013 Approved De sc ription: ODE approved by Eng in ee ring Dir ec t o r p e r attached e mail. Attachmen t s: Approved D esc ription Director approval ofDDE Attachment Header Doc u ment Name: un t it l ed Document Location f pp ro ved Descr i ption Attach Ti t le: !Di r ecto r app r oval of D OE BARBORB<, W DOUGLAS Fr o m: Sent: To: Cc: M CCDY , JA.IM EH Tuesday , May 21 , 2013 9: 34 PM BARBOREK, W DOUGLAS B)GaL, DOUGLASW; WOODSJN , llMOTHYR; LAY , LINDA S SUbj e ct: RE: PEQUEST FOR APPFOVAL-DDE#2 & DDE#1 for CA-16 & CA-20 of AN0-1-2008-02560 (Pressure Test of RV Leak-off p i ping to resolve 2002 Davis Besse OE) I approv e both. I would l ik e t o ha ve a m eet in g wit h outa ge man age m e n t, syste m s, and proj ec t s t o make s ure funding i s arran ge d. Linda -pl e a se schedule a me e ting n e xt w eek or w ee k after. Thank s, Jaim e S e n t wi th G oo d (www.good.com) -----Oti g ina l Me ssage-----
F r o m: BARBOREK , W DOUGLAS Se nt: Tu es day , May 2 1, 2 0 1 3 09:2 8 P M Central St a ndard Tim e To: MCCOY , JAIME H Cc: E DG E LL , DOUGLAS W; WOODSO N, TIMOTHY R S ubj ec t: REQUEST FOR APPROVAL-DOE #2 & DOE #1 for CA-16 & CA-20 o f CR-AN0-1-2 00 8-0256 0 (Pressure T es t of RV Leak-off piping to re so l ve 2002 D av i s B esse O E) Jlime , CA.-16 and CA.-20 of CRAN0 1-2008-02560 ar e due on 5/29/20 1 3 and assumed we wou l d pe r form t h e pressure test of t h e RV l eak-off lines i n 1 R24. This work was once again deferred to 1 R25due to the l ack of rontingency planning , which requires funding for AFB/ A support and requ i res det erm i nation of who w i 1 1 p l an and perform the test i ng and rontingendesdu r i ng 1R25 (A'oject Managemen t hasded i ned to take t his work). I am submitting DDE#2 for CA.-1 6 and DDE:#1 for CA.-20for 1 2/4/20 1 4 (beyond end o f 1 R25 .. per amen t cyde schedu l e). CA.-20 i san LTCA.and requ i res your approval. CA.-16-Following imp l ementat i on of W0-00 1 95437 during 1 R23 , dorument that t h e app l icab l e OE h asbeen adequate l y add r essed for AN0-1. CA-20-[Note: All LTCA. DDEs requ i re G'v1F0'Dredor or Above approval.
l am 1 2/03/1 2] 8lsure W0-00 1 95437 is implemented in 1 R24. This WO h as bee n deferred to 1 R24 asdorumented in the attached 1 R23 g:R 1 1049. I ssue additional rorrective actions as required to support 1 R24 rero l ution of this issue. Th is CA is being dassif ied as a L T CA..
DDE~uest for both CA's-lhe pressure t est of the FN l eak-off lines was defe r red to 1FQ5 by manageme n t due to lack of contingency planning (requires AFB/A rupport, and funding for that rupport) and lack of reoo u rces to plan and executethework.
This CA is being extended to 1 2/4/2014 t o correspond to a date expected to be beyond 1 FQ5 to allow time for WO imp l ementation.
This DOE is necessary since the work has been deferred by management.
WDBS/21/2013 R ease let me k n ow if you have any q uestions regarding this req u est. T h a nk s, Doug Barbor ek Entergy Q:,erations.
Inc./ Arka n sas N udear One S,,stem Eng in eer -U nit 1 A:lac t or ())olant S,,stem S,,stem Eng i n eer i ng Bui l di ng/ N-~ wbarbo1@en t ergy.com 47 9-8 5 8-4 33 7 !(b )(6) I page r From: woooroN , T l MOTHY R S e n t: T uesday , May 21, 2013 5:49 Pfv1 To:BAA30REK WDOUG...AS Cc: <?ASTON, KERRY Subj e ct: RE: CA's for RV l eak-off l i ne testing ~nd an email to J3mie requesting the DDE, procedure requires DDEapproval from a Dr e ctor/ClvlA)f or an LTCA. Cbpy l:x:>ug Edgel I. Thank s, Tim From: BARBORB<, W DOUGLAS S e nt: Satu r day , May 18 , 2013 11 :42 PM To: woooroN, Tl MOTHY R Cc: GA.SfON, KERRY
 
==Subject:==
CA's for RV leak-off l i ne test i ng Tim, CA-16 and CA-20 of CRAN0-1-2008-02560 are due on 5/29/2013 and assumed we wou l d p erform t h e pressure test of the FN l eak-off lines in 1FQ4. Cbviously , this has been deferred again to 1FQ5. Are we still 'dS9Jming 1 FQ5w i ll ocx::ur i n Fall 20 1 4 (after the cyde delay due to the stator drop) regarding due date extensions?
Not knowingtheoutagetimeframefor 1 FQ5 , I wasgoingto extend them to 12/1/2014 if you concur. I f we are going to change the cyde schedule , shou l d I move them out even f urther? CA-1 6 currently has one DDEand CA-20 has none. Thanks , Doug Barborek 2 Entergy ~rat i ons, Inc./ Arkan= N u dear Oie S,,stem Engineer -Unit 1 A3actor Coo l ant S,,stem S,,stem Engineering Bu i lding/ N-SYE--4 wbarbo1@entergy
.com 3 Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Corrective Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00016 Version: 3 Reque ste d Duedate: 11/18/2016 Requested By: Barborek , W Douglas Approved By: Edge ll ,Do u g la s W Reque st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Duedat e: 12/04/20 14 12/03/2014 12/04/2014 The pressure test of the RV l eak-off li n es was deferred to l.R26 by p l ant mana gement due to a l ack of contingency planning (rnquires AREY A support, and funding for that support) and a lack of resources to plan and execute the work. See attached I R25 SCR-1 5969 which approves the deferral from lR25 to I R26. T his CA i s being extended to l J /J 8/20 1 6 to co rr espond to a date expected to be beyond I R26 to a ll ow time for WO implementation.
This DDE is necessary s ince the work has been deferred by management.
WDB 12/3/2014 Approved
 
== Description:==
 
I concur with thi s DOE. The requested date support impl ementat i on during t h e next refueling outage. Attachments:
Request Description l R25 SCR-15969 deferral Attachment Header Document Name: untitled Document Location !Request Description Attach Title: 1 1 R25 SCR-15969 d eferral Scope Change Request Form Originator Section Scope Change #: .1 5.969 _ Change Type: Date Initiated:
7/8/2 014 Work Request: 0 Work Order: __J)eferr.aL 195437 Component#
: R-1 Compo n e nt Noun Name: R-1 RX vessel l eak off l in es Requestor: SKA RTVEDT , M AR K ER#: Req'd. l\1hrs: _Q_ Phone #: ___+/-6+/-2...._ Dose Est: _Q_ Di s cipline: ____MN T_L ___ Est Cost: __$Q, OO Tagout Re 'd.: D This is to defer th e r eacto r vessel h ead 0-r i n l eak off line h dro that i s sc heduled for .1 R25 until I R 26. Reason for Scope Change submittal:
Future Outage-later dete rminati on made t h at work s h Justification for Seo Chan e: Criteria for approval of outage s cope additions
[after Scope Freeze (T-11) and during outage execution]:
C he ck if this SCF h as ANY Scaff old/Insulation work impact? D Ori g in a t or i s r es p o n s ibl e f o r co mpl e ting a ny form~ r e quir e d fo r pr og r a mm a tic c h a n ges a nd s u b mittin g th ose p e r t h e in s tr uc ti o ns o n th e s pecific forms (Forms availab l e on IDEAS): Is a PMDR required (EN-D C-324 , Att. 9.3)? 0 I s a ST Change (1000.009A)
Required?
0 Change Review Section Radiation Protection Does RP approv e this change request? Name: R ey n olds , R ya n Conunents:
!RP approves this deferral.
Yes~ No [l Date: 7/9/2014 Fo r Sco p e D efer ral s fr o m o uta ge to o n-l in e maint e nan ce; it i s requ i red that th e OP S O\.VL ha s d e v e l o p e d/r e vi e w e d th e imp act s t a t e ment for th e work t o b e perform e d and obtain e d c on c urr e n ce from th e OP S Mana ge r , o r hi s d es i g n ee, that o n-li n e m a in t e n a n ce ri sk i s acce pt a ble. Operations:
Does OPS approve this c hange request? Yes No 0 Name: HILL. SJEYEN.n.
Date: 7/10/2014 Co nunents: !n ot r e qui red, can be deferred Fo r Sco p e D e ferra l s th at r e quire a PMDR , v e rif y th e PMDR h as bee n appr ove d pri or to a uth o ri z i ng t h e sco pe c h a n ge. Eva l u ate th e r es ult s for: deferral , if a Cond i tion Report bee n cl o sed to t hi s i tem? Engineering:
Does Engi n eer in g approve this change requ est? Yes~ No D Name: WOODSON. TIMOTHY ROY Date: 7/8/2014 Conunents:
CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 i s track i n g OE ge n erated i ss u e where other B&W NSSS p l ants ha ve had fa il ures of these lines. ANO Unit l h as a reasonable p robabi l ity of one of th ese two l i n es failing. AJso referen ce SlPD 5678 for funding request s and requ ests t o obta in a Pr oject M anager to pr epare t h e test a nd contenge n cy plan to addres s failure. The plan wou ld inc l ude plugging bo th li nes at the r eactor vessel for one cycle wi th rolled p l ugs a nd then correct the co nditi on in the n ext refueling o u tage wh i ch would require constructio n wo rk to obta.in access to t he lin es. R esou r ces do not ex i st to perform this work in IR25 and th e risk still ex i s t s, but the work cannot b e carr.ied ou t in 1 R25. Maintenance
: I Doe s Maint e nance approve this c h ange r e que s t? Yes No [1 Name: SKAR.TVEDT.
~MARK Date: 7/1012014 Conunents:
I fthi s SCF i s d ea lin g with a o n-l in e l e ak r e p a ir th e n v e rif y th e requir e m e nts o f 10 2 5.0 1 5 "On-Lin e L ea k Rep a ir" are s ati s f ie d pri o r to d e ferr i n g w o rk o r d i sa pproving a dditi o n. Final Approval Section Note: Outage M a n ager may bypass review t eam recommendations an d approve/reject fo r Minor C h anges. D urin g outage exec ut ion , the Shift Outage Mana ger may perform thi s function. Th e GMPO mu st approve any Ma jor Change (An Ac ti vi t y> $10 0,000, o r wh i ch would r esu lt i n Outage Extention). Does Outage Mgt approve this change request? Y~No Name: SKARTVEDT.
MARK Dat e: ll0.120 I 4 Comments:
ca nn ot meet mi l es t one, E n gei nn e r i n g r esources wi ll not s upport comp l e ting this project for 1R 25. **Moved to 1R26 OWL** Wedne s d a y , Decemb e r 03, 2014 Pag e 1 of 2 Scope Change Request F onn Oflical Date Approved:
8/13/2014 Has Schedule been Updated?~ Has MPC/OSG/RP been notified of addition/deferral D Wednesday , December 03 , 2014 PMDR approved and complete D ST approved and complete?
D Page2 of 2 Ent e rgy I CORRECTIV E ACTION CA N umb e r: 17 G roup Ass i g n e d By: E ng Sy s Mgmt ANO Asstg n e d To: E n g Sy s NSSS S t aff ANO S ub ass i g n ed T o : Or i g i nate d By: Barbor e k , W Dougla s P erfor m e d By: E dg e ll , Dougla s W S ub pe r fo rm e d By: A ppr ove d By: C lo sed By: Edge ll , Douglas W C ur re n t Du e D ate: 1 2/0 8/2011 CA T y p e: ACTION Pl a nt C on s tr a int: NONE CA D es cript io n: E dg e ll , Dougla s W Barbor ek, W Dou g l as 5/5/2 01 1 15:55: 2 1 1 2/7/2 011 11 :4 9:05 12/7/2011 11 :49:05 I n i t i a l Du e Date: 12/0 8/2 011 CA P ri o ri ty: I C R-AN0-1-2008-025 6 0 Na m e Pr ese nt S 1PD R ec ord 56 7 8 to the U RT t o r e qu est r eass i g nm e nt o f th e RV Fl a n ge l ea k-o ff/pr ess ur e t es t c onn ec t ion pipin g pr ess ure te s t (W0-00 1 95437) from Sy s tem En g in ee rin g to Proje c t Mana g em e nt for I R 2 4 implementation.
I ss ue follow-up C A's as required.
Res p o n se: This c o rrec tiv e ac ti o n i s n o lon ge r n e ed e d. Thi s i ss ue hav e b e en pre se nt e d t o th e URT previou s ly a s d o cum e nt e d in C A # 8. The scope of work is approved outa g e scope for 1R24. Vent port inspec t ion were completed dur i n g lR23 to support co ntin ge n c y plan s fo r a I R24 exe cuti o n. R e-a ss i g nm e nt of thi s pr o j ec t e x ec uti o n and th e a ss oci a t ed c o ntin ge n cy p l an s will b e m a d e by the s it e lead team. This corr e ctive a ction i s read y for clo s ur e. S ubr es pon se : C l os ur e Co mm e nt s:
Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 C orrecti ve Action: CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00017 Version: R e qu este d Du e dat e: 07/21/2011 Requ ested B y: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: Edge ll , Douglas W R e que st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Du e dat e: 06/09/20 1 1 06/08/201 1 06/08/201 1 Additional t im e i s required to s chedule the URT pre se ntation with the ORT coordinator.
The due date i s being extended to 7/21/2011. Since this work is being deferred from IR23 to IR24 , extension of the due date is acceptable.
WDB 6/8/201 1 Approved Description
:
Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 C orrecti ve Action: CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00017 Version: 2 R e qu este d Du e dat e: 1 2/08/2011 Requ ested B y: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: Williams , Patrick J R e que st Description
: Approved:
r ,/ Previous Du e dat e: 07 /21/20 1 1 07/19/201 1 07/19/201 1 Due to hi g her U RT prioritie s and URT coordinator turnover , thi s SIPD Record ha s not be e n sc hedu l ed for di sc u ss ion. Additional time is required to schedule the URT presentation with the URT coordinator.
The due date is being extended to 1 2/8/201 J. Since this work i s being deferred from l R 23 to J R24 , e xten s i o n of the du e date is acce ptabl e and s h o uld provide adequate time to schedule and present. WDB 7/9/2 011 Approved D esc ription: Approved.
Ent e rgy I CORRECTIV E ACTION CA N umb e r: 1 8 G roup Ass i g n e d By: Eng Sys Mgmt ANO Asst g n e d To: E n g Sys NSSS Staff AN O S ub a ss i g n ed T o : Or i g i nate d By: Ba r bo r ek, W Doug l as P e rfor m e d B y: Barborek, W D oug l as S ub p e r fo rm e d By: A ppr ove d B y: C lo sed By: B a rb o r ek,W D oug l as C ur re n t Du e D ate: 02/23/2012 C A T y p e: AC TI ON Pl a nt C on s tr a int: NONE CA D es cript io n: Edge ll , D o u g l as W Barborek, W Doug l as 6/7/2011 1 4: 42: 4 5 2/22/20 1 2 1 5:26: 1 5 2/2 3/2012 1 6:0 1 :33 I n i t i a l Du e Date: 02/23/2 012 CA P ri o ri t y: I C R-AN0-1-2008-025 6 0 Na m e Develop CA Tl Ds for t h e test p l ugs specified i n CA-12. l ss ue add i t i ona l cor r ect i ve act i ons as requ ir ed to ensu r e mate ri a l i s p l e d ged to W0-00 1 95437. R e spo n se: CA REQ U EST: D eve l o p CA T1D s for t h e t es t pl ugs s p ecifie d in C A-I 2. lssue ad di tiona l corrective actio n s as re qu i r ed to ensure mater i al i s p l edged to W0-00 1 95437. CA RES P ONSE: T h e hydro t es t p lu gs a r e co n s id e r ed test eq uipm e nt a n d do n ot re quir e deve l op m e n t of a CA TID in o rd er t o be p r ocu r ed to support the IR24 pressure test. No action i s required and this CA may be closed. WDB 2/22/2012 S u br es po n se : C lo s u re Co mm e nt s: CA is r eady for clos u re. Do u g Barborek 2/23/20 1 2 Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 C orrecti ve Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00018 Version: R e qu este d Du e dat e: 02/2 3/2012 Requ ested B y: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: Edge ll , Douglas W R e que st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Du e dat e: 08/04/20 1 1 08/03/201 1 08/03/201 1 Thi s CA could not be completed by the assigned due date and mu s t be extended.
ft i s l ikely that this CA will not be required since the hydro test plugs may not require development of a CAT ID in order to be procured to sup p ort the I R24 pressure test. How e ver, the CA i s b e ing extended to 2/23/20 l2 in the eve nt a CA T IO i s r e quir e d. E xten s i o n of thi s CA t o th e n e w d a t e does not affect the ability to perform t h e RV flange l eak-off piping pressure test in I R24 and is therefore acceptable.
WDB 8/3/2 011 Approved
 
== Description:==
 
Ent e rgy I CORRECTIV E ACTION CA N umb e r: 19 G roup Ass i g n e d By: Eng Sys Mgmt ANO Asstg n e d To: E n g Sy s NSSS Staff ANO S ub ass i g n ed T o : Or i g i nate d By: Barborek, W Douglas P erfor m e d By: Barborek, W D oug l as S ub pe r fo rm e d By: A ppr ove d By: C lo sed By: Barborek,W Douglas C ur re n t Du e D ate: I 0/20/2011 CA T y p e: ACTION Pl a nt C on s tr a int: NONE CA D es cript io n: E dgell,Douglas W Barborek, W Douglas 6/22/2011 08:35:19 I 0/20/201 1 21 :54:48 10/20/2011 21 :54:48 I n i t i a l Du e Date: I 0/20/2 011 CA P ri o ri ty: I C R-AN0-1-2008-025 6 0 Na m e Submit Plf to Operations to revise the app li cab l e plant operating procedures to change the normal operating configuration of RV Flan ge Leak-off I so lation Valv es RBS-I and RBS-2 from "n o rmall y close d" to "nonnally open" prior to Cyc l e 24. "Normally open" is the original design basis coafi!,'llration (ref. PEAR-93-0246).
Issue corrective action(s) to Operations as required to enact procedure change prior t o lR 23. R eference lR 23 SCR 11049 and SIPD R ecord 5678. Res p o n se: CA REQUEST: Submit PIF to Operations to revise the applicable plant operating procedures to change the normal operating configura tion of RV Flange Leak-off I s olation Valve s RBS-I and RB S-2 from "n ormally clo se d" to "normally open" prior to Cycle 24. "Normally open" is the original design ba s i s configuration (ref. PEAR-93-0246
). I ssue corrective act ion(s) to Opera t ion s as r eq uired to enact procedure c hang e prior to I R23. R efe r e n ce I. R23 SCR 1 1049 and SIPD R eco rd 5678. CA R ESPONSE: PIF 1-11-062 1 to OP-1203.012H, PTF 1-11-0622 to OP-1015.036 , PTF 1-1 1-062 3 to OP-1102.015 , and PIF 1-11-0624 to OP-1103.002 to change the configuration of valve s RBS-I and RBS-2 from normally closed to normally open for Cyc le 24 opera tion h ave been tr a n s mitted to Operations by CA-21 , which will tra ck incorporation of th e PTF s i nto the applicable procedures.
The P I Fs were generated by and approved under EC-32271.
A copy of each PIF is attached to CA-21. Thi s act i on i s complete.
WDB 10/2 0/20 11 S ub rcs p onse : C l os ure C omm e n ts:
Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Corrective Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00019 Version: Reque ste d Duedate: I 0/06/2 011 Requested By: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: Edge ll , Douglas W Reque st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Duedate: 09/15/20 1 1 09/15/2011 09/15/201 1 In orde r to support changing RBS-I & RBS-2 from normally closed to normall y open , an EC will be required s inc e P&ID M-230 sh. I will need to be revi se d. Additiona l time (and resources) is required to develop an EC. Since the procedure change i s not requir e d until sta rtup from JR23 , ex t e n s i on of th e due dat e t o 10/6/2 011 i s acceptab l e. WDB 9/15/2 01 J A pprov e d
 
== Description:==
 
Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Corrective Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00019 Version: 2 Reque ste d Duedate: I 0/20/201 1 Requested By: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: Williams , Patrick J Reque st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Duedate: 10/06/20 1 1 10/05/2011 10/05/201 1 In order to support c h ang in g RBS-I & RBS-2 from normally clo se d to n orma ll y ope n , an EC will be required s in ce P&ID M-230 sh. I will need to be re vise d. Additiona l time (an d resource s) i s required to develop an EC. Since the procedure change i s not requir e d until sta r t up from J R 23 , ex t e n s i on of th e du e date t o 10/2 0/20 11 i s acceptab l e. WDB 1 0/5/201 I Approved
 
== Description:==
 
Approved.
Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA Number: 20 Group Name Assigned By: Eng Systems & Co m ps Mgmt ANO Asst g n e d To: Eng Systems NSSS Staff ANO S uba ss i g ned To : Woodson P.E.,T i mothy R Barborek, W Doug l as Originated By: Ba r bo r ek, W Doug l as P e rform e d B y: S ubp e rformed By: Approved By: Closed By: Current Due Date: 11/1 7/20 1 6 C A Typ e: CA T C-CO RRE CT Plant Constraint:
NONE CA
 
== Description:==
 
7/27/201 1 16:24:23 Initial Du e Date: 1 1/18/2016 CA Priorit y: 3 [Not e: A ll L T CA DDEs requi r e GMPO/Director or Above approval.
l am 12/03/12] E n su r e W0-00 1 95437 i s im p l emented i n I R 24. Th is WO h as been deferred to I R 24 as docu m ente d in t h e attached I R 23 SCR 11049. I ss u e ad dit iona l corrective actio n s as req u ire d to s u pport 1R24 reso lu tion of t his issue. Th i s CA is be i ng clas s ified a s a L TCA. R e spon se: r Subresponse
: C losure C omm e nt s: Atta c hm e nt s: CA Descri p t i on 1 R23 SC R 11 049 to defer press u re test to 1 R24 CA Descript i on LTCA For m Attachment Header Doc u ment Name: un t it l ed Document Location F A Description Attach Ti t le: 1 1 R23 SCR 11049 to defer pressure t est t o 1 R24 Scope Change Request Form Originator Section Scope Change#: 11049 Chan.ge Type: Deferral Work Order: ------Date Initiated:
6/9/2011 Work Request: 0 1 9 54 3 7 Component#:
R-1 Compon e nt Noun Nam e: R e a c t o r V esse l -----------------------
Reque s t or: BAR BOREK , WILLIAM DOUGLAS Phon e#: 4 33 7 Di s cipline: MECH -----ER#: Req'd Mhrs: 0 Dose Est: 0 Est Cost: $0.00 ----------Ta 1out Re 'd.: n R efe r e n ce o p e n CR-ANO-I -2 008-0 2 5 6 0. Th e pr ess ur e tes t o f th e r ea ctor v esse l l e ak-o ff and pr ess ur e test co nn ec tion pi pin g r e quir es s i g nifi c ant c ontin ge n cy planning whi c h ca nnot be acco mpli s hed by S ys t e m En gi n ee rin g pri or t o I R2 3. P o t e ntial co ntin ge n cy pl a n s in cl ud e t e mp o r a rily p lu gg in g (fo r o n e cy cl e) th e l eak-off po rt (s) assoc i a t ed w i t h a ny p ipin g fo und d egra d ed, a n i nvolv es a lon g term (i.e. next RFO) fix of r e movin g the r eactor c avity s hield plate , c on c r e t e shi e ld bl oc k s, an d RV in s ulati o n t o re p a i r/r e pl ace or cap th e pipin g if fo u nd degrade d by th e press ur e t es t. R eq u est d efer r al t o 1R2 4. S I P D R ecor d 5678 h as bee n d e v e lop e d to r e qu es t t ran s f e rin g th e sco pe o f thi s pr ess ur e t es t a nd th e d e v e l o pm e nt of the s i g nifi c ant co ntin gency p l anni n g ac ti o n. fr om S s t e m E n in ee rin t o Pro'e c t M a na e m e nt for 1R2 4 im l e m e nt a ti o n. Re a son for Scope Change submittal:
Futur e Out age-l a t er d e t e rm in at i on m a d e th at w o rk s h Justification for Scone Change: Althou g h the pre ss ur e t es t mu s t ultima t e ly be c ondu c t ed to c on fi rm that th e r e i s no clor ide-in d u ced s t r ess corro s ion c ra c kin g in t ht RV l ea k-o f fYp r ess ur e t es t co n nec t io n pipi ng (as see n at o th er p l a nt s), it i s n o t e d th at t h ere i s n o kno wn d eg r a d a ti o n in th e s ubj ec t ANO-L piping a t thi s tim e. Th e l ea k-o ff & pr ess ur e t es t c onn ec tion p i pin g i s c urr e ntl y (s in ce IR 19) d ra in e d a t the e nd of eac h r e fu e lin g out age, thu s mi t i g atin g th e d a ma ge m ec h a ni s m a nd e l i min a ting a ny p ress u r i za ti o n du e to th e h e atin g o f wat e r t ra pp e d i 1 th e pi p in g durin g po w e r o p e r a ti o n s, ass umin g n o inn e r o-rin g l ea k age. L eakage o f th e RV n a n ge inn e r o-rin g i s a n infr eq u e nt occuran ce. CA-1 9 of CR-ANO-l-2008-0 2 560 h as b ee n i ss u ed t o SYE to ju s tif y and e n act a pr oc edur e r e vi s ion to c han ge th e co n fig u ra ti o n of l ea k-off i so l a ti o n valves RB S-I a n d R BS-2 to " n o rm a lly o p e n" for Cyc l e 24 w hi c h wi ll e lim i n a t e th e p oss ib l il i t y of pr ess urin g th e CC C-6-1" pipin g in the e v e nt o f a n inn e r o-r in g l ea k until s u c h tim e th e pr ess u r e t es t ca n r eso lv e th e indu st r y OI Th e or i g inal d es i gn b as is c onfi g uration for RBS-L a nd RB S-2 was " norma ll y o p e n" durin g pow e r op e r a tion s u ntil b e ing c han ge d ir th e mid-I 99 0's. With RB S-1 a nd RB S-2 o p e n durin g Cy cl e 24, th e CCC-6-l" p iping w ill n o t be pr ess uri ze d i n th e eve nt o f a n inner o-ring leak whi c h will r e mo v e an y pre ss ure-induced chall e n ges to th e piping. Criteria for approval of outage scope additions
[after Scope Free1,e (T-11) and during outage execution]
: Check if this SCF has ANY Scaff old/Insulation work impact? D Ori g i n ator is re s po n s ible for co m pleti n g a n y form s req u ired for pr ogra 1 mn a tic c ha n ges a n d s u bmiuin g th ose per th e in s tr uc t i o ns o n th e s p ec ifi c fo r m s (Fo rm s ava il ab l e o n ID EAS): Is a PMDR required (EN-DC-324, Att 9.3)? 0 Is a ST Change (1000.009A)
Required?
0 Change Review Section Radiation Protection Does RP approve this change request? Name: STO L TZ , DANIEL C LIF F Yes~ No [J Date: 6/20/2 011 Comments:
No i ss u e w i t h deferra l. W o rk Ord e r s t i ll i n PLAN s t at u s , dose es ti ma t e a n d wor k scope n o t de fin e d a t thi s tim e. P r e lim i n a r d o se es timat e is 2 50 mr e m. For S co p e D e f e r ra l s from o ut age t o o n-li n e m a i n t e n a n ce; i t i s r e qu i r ed t h a t t h e OPS O WL h as d eve l o p e d/r e vi e w ed th e impa c t s t a t e m e n t fo r th e work t o b e p e r fo rmed a nd ob tai n e d co n c u r r e n ce from t he O PS Ma n a ger, o r hi s d es i g n ee, t h a t o n-l in e m a i nt e n a n ce r i s k i s acce pt a b l e. O erations:
Does OPS approve this change request? Yes No D Name: STUMBA U GH , STEVEN ARNOLD Date: 6/17/2 011 Conunents:
D efe rral o f t h e r erss ur e t est i s n o t an i ss u e with O s. F o r Scope D e f e r ra l s tha l req u i re a PMDR , ve ri fy th e PMDR h a s bee n a ppr ove d pri o r t o a ulh o ri z i n g t h e sco pe c han ge. Eva lu a t e th e res u l t s fo r , d e ferra l , if a Co n diti o n R e p o rt b ee n c l o s ed to th i s it e m? En ineerin : Do e s Engineerin g approve this change request? Ye s No D Name: E DG E LL , DOUGLA S WARR E N Date: 6/9/2 011 Comments:
SYE r eco mm e nd s d efe rral of thi s WO. Alth o u g h th e pr ess ur e t es t mu st ultim a t e l y b e co ndu c t ed to c on fi rm th a t th ere is n o cl o rid e-in d u ce d s tr ess corrosio n crac kin g i n th e RV l eak-oftY p ress ure tes t co nn ec t io n pi ping (a s se en a t o th e r p l a nt s), it i s n o t ed th a t th ere i s n o kn own d egrada ti on i n th e s u bjec t A NO-I pi p in g a t t h is t im e. Th e l eak-o ff p r ess ur e t es t co nn ec ti o n pi p in g is c urr e ntl y (s in ce lRl 9) d ra in e d a t the e nd of each r e fu e lin g out age, thu s mi t i gat in, th e d a m age m ec h a ni sm a nd e limjn a tin g a n y p ress ur i za t io n du e to t h e h ea tin g of w a ter t ra pp ed i n th e pi pin g du r in g po w e r o p e r a ti o n s, ass umin g no inn er o-rin g l ea k age. L ea k age o f th e RV fl a n ge inn e r o-rin g is a n infr e qu e nt occ uran ce. C A-1 9 of C R-AN0-1-2008-0 2560 h as be en i ss u ed t o SYE t o ju s tify a n d en ac t a pr oced ur e re vi s i on t o Wednesday, Ju l y 2 7, 2011 Page 1 of 2 Scope Change Request Form change the configura tion of leak-off i so lati on valves RBS-I and RBS-2 to " normall y open" fo r Cycle 24 which will e liminat e the po ss iblility of pr ess uring the CCC-6-1" piping i n the eve n t of an inn er o-ring l ea k until s u c h tim e the pres s ure te s t can r esolve the industry O E. The original de s ign basis co nfi g uration for RBS-l and RBS-2 wa s "normally open" during power operationsu ntil being changed in the mid-1 990's. With RBS-1 and RBS-2 open during Cy c l e 24, th e CCC-6-1" piping will not be pr ess uri zed in th e eve nt of an in ner o-r in g l eak which will remov an ressure-induced ch alien es to the i in"* Mai n te n a n ce: Doe s Maintenan ce approve thi s change r e qu est? Y es~ No D Nam e: STUMBAUG H , STEVEN DALE D ate: 6/20/20 11 Comments:
J Agree with deferral ba sed on Eng. comme nt s. lf this SCF is dealing with a o n-li n e l eak repair the n verify t h e requirement s of 1025.015 "On-Line Leak Repair" are satisfied pr ior to d eterri n g work or disapproving add i t i on. Final Approval Section Note: Outage Manager may bypass rev i ew learn rccommcndalion s an d approve/reject for Minor Changes. Du ri n g ou t age execut i on, the Shi f t Outage Manager m ay perfo r m this function. The GMPO must approve any Major C h ange (An Activi t y> $100,000, or which would result in Outage Extention).
D oes Outage Mgt approve thi s c hang e request? Name: WALTERS , JOE RANDALL Yes PT No 0 Date: 6/20/2011 C omments: !Move to 1R24 when en gin eering has developed suitab l e contingency actions. Moved WO rask to 1R24. DC Offical Dat e Approved:
6/20/201 1 Has Schedule been Updated?~ PMDR approved and complete D Has MPC/OSG/RP been notified of addition/deferral O ST approved and complete?
O Wednesday, July 27, 201 1 Page 2 of 2 Attachment Header Doc u ment Name: un t it l ed Document Location F A Description Attach Ti t le: LTCA Fo r m ATTACHMENT 9.9 L TCA CLASSIFICATION FORM SHEET 1 OF 1 L TCA Classification Form Long Term CA Classification:
CR Number: CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CR Owner Group: Eng Sys Mgmt ANO CA Number: 20 L TCA C l assif i cation (check ONLY one): RFO/FO Req'd 1 R24 D NRC Resp. Req'd L TCA Assigned to Group: SYE-NSSS D Mod/Design Change Req'd D Multi-cycle Training Req'd Provide specific details for L TCA classification selected above. W0-00195437 to perfo r m a pressure test of the RV f l ange leak-off and press ure test connect i on pip i ng to resolve OE-15 4 17 " Cracki ng I dentified in C l ass 1 React or Vessel Fla nge 0-ring M onitor P i p i ng [Dav is Besse)" has been defer re d to 1 R24 to a ll ow additiona l t i me and resources to deve l op appro p riate conti ngen cy measures i n the event the pressure test fa i l s o n one or both leak-of f lines. S i nce the co n d itio n described i n th is C R w i l l no t be resolved until 1 R 2 4 (Spring 2013), this CR should be des i g n ated a L TC R v i a CA-20. What risk to plant operation is imposed by the condition identified and how is risk reduced to an acceptable l eve l for the duration of the action plan? T his CR do es not spec i fically ident i fy a known degraded plant sys t em , structure, or component a t AN0-1, but does i dent i fy a potent i al d egradat i on mechanism.
Both t he RV flange gasket l eak detec tion l i ne and p ressu re tes t connection l ines were flushed/drained d ur i n g 1 R 19, 1 R 20 , 1 R 21 a nd 1 R22, thus m i n i m i zing t h e potential for fa i l ure result i ng from I D i n i tiated , ch l oride induced , transgranular stress-corrosion crack i ng (TGSCC). No R V flange gasket leakage was identif i ed during plant hea t-up fr om 1R19 , 1 R20 , 1 R 21 or 1 R 22 prior to iso l ating valves RBS-1 an d RBS-2 , and RCS leakage rates followi ng 1 R19 , 1 R20 , 1 R21 an d 1 R22 have not indicated the presence of any concu r rent l eakage of the RV flange gaskets and l eak detection/pressure test con necti on p i p i n g/compone nts. The RV flange gas k ets are rep l aced during each refuel i ng outage and valves RB S-1 a nd RBS-2 are not iso l ated until just p r i or to c ri t i cality af t er i t has been ver i fied that t he i nner gasket i s not l eaking. Therefore , t he like l i hood of inner gasket leakage, wh il e possi b l e , is considered l ow. I n co n clus i on, t he r i sk to p l ant operat i o n i s m i n i m al and red uce d to accepta b l e l eve l s u n til the ac ti on plan for th is C R can be implemented dur i ng 1 R24. Explain impact to condition report timeliness. This C R was ant i cipated to be closed follow i ng 1 R23. How ever , s i nce the p ressure te st has been deferred to 1 R24 , the de f erral will result in an 1 8 month (i.e. one operating cycle) delay in closure of t his CR. EN-Ll-10 2 REV 16 Review/ Approval Required:
Director/GM Title: Jaime McCoy Director Engineering Date: 07/28/11 (Print name & Position title} NOTE: The expectation is to capture the discussion points of this form in a CA, DOE request or initial CA assignment as appropriate.
The form itse l f need not be used , but all points applicable must be addressed. EN-Ll-102 REV 16 Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 C orrecti ve Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00020 Version: R e qu este d Du e dat e: 1 2/04/2014 Requ ested B y: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: Woodson P.E.,T imothy R R e que st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Du e dat e: 05/30/20 1 3 05/21/2013 05/22/2013 The pressure test of the RV leak-off li n es was deferred to l.R25 by management due to l ack of co n tingency plannin g (requ ir es AREY A support, and funding for that support) and l ack of resources to p l an and execute the work. This CA is being exte nd ed to 12/4/20 14 to correspond to a dat e ex pect ed to be b eyo nd 1R25 to a ll ow time for WO impl e m entat ion. This DOE is nec essary since the work has been deferred by management.
WDB 5/2 1/2 013 Approved De sc ription: ODE for this LT C A de s ignated action approved by th e Engineering Director per the attached ema il. Attachmen t s: Approved De sc ription Director approval ofDDE Attachment Header Doc u ment Name: un t it l ed Document Location f pp ro ved Descr i ption Attach Ti t le: !Di r ecto r app r oval of D OE BARBOREK, W DOUGLAS From: LEA , PHILLIP B Sent: Thursday , October 20, 2011 10: 01 AM To: WOODSON , TIMOTHY R; BARBOREK , W DOUGLAS C c: GUILTY , RICHARD C
 
==Subject:==
RE: PIFs pertinent to EC-032271 Pl F nos. 1203.012H 1015.036 1102.015 1 1 03.002 Ph i l l ip Lea 1-11-0621 1-1 1-0622 1-11-0623 1-11-0624 UNIT 1 OPERA T IO NS SPEC I ALIST 4 79-858-5 498 From: WOODSON , Tl MOTHY R Se111t: Thursday, October 20, 2011 9:22 AM To: LEA , PHILLIP B
 
==Subject:==
FW: PIFs pertinent to EC-032271 limothy R Wood9Jn , P.E Arkansas Nudear Ole Phone: (479) 858-5544 Pax: (479 858-5529 Pager: (b )(6) Alpha e From: Kane , O,ris Se111t: Thu r sday, Octobe r 20 , 20 1 1 1:52 AM T o: GUILTY , RICHARD C Cc: BARBOREK, W DOUGLAS; WOODSON , T IM OTHY R
 
==Subject:==
Pl Fs pertinent to EC-0 32271 Mr. Guilty , Pa ge 1 of 1 Attached are the P IFs associated with the 1 R23 convers i on of Valves RBS-1 & RBS-2 from Normally Closed to Normally Open. R eference EC-032271 Please prov i de P I F numbers for Doug. He w i ll deve l op a CA. Thank you , Chris Kane 1 0/20/2011 Attachment Header Doc u ment Name: un t it l ed Document Location F A Description Attach Ti t le: I P I F for 1103.0 02 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE Paae 1 E-DOC TITLE: I E-DOC NO. 1000.006-P I CHANGE NO. 053 0 R I G I N A T 0 R PROCEDURE IMPROVEMENT FORM This Document Contains 2 Page(s) Page 1 of 2 TO: Kar l Jones UNIT:_~1 ___ _ DATE: 10/11/11 Responsible Supervisor
/Superintendent FROM: Chris Kane PHONE:_3_97_5 __ _ PROCEDURENUMBER
: __ 11_0_3_.0_02~----CHANGE N0:_0-3-6
__ PROCEDURE TITLE: FILLING AND VEN TING THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Descr i ption of Improveme nt: Identify step n umber , page numbers , etc., where applicable or attach copy of affected pages with suggested changes marked. Include any research t hat ha s been performed, such as drawing numbers, personnel contacted , etc. Attachment C p.7 of 10 Not e 1 correspond i ng to Valves RBS-1 and RBS-2. These valves w i ll NOT be closed by Containment Bui l ding C l oseout (1015.036), Attachment L "Pre-Critical Inspe ction". These va l ves will remain OP EN.
 
==Reference:==
 
EC-032271 Supervisor review should include the following: 1. Is an immed i ate Revision needed instead of a PIF? 2. Is PIF needed? 3. Does change require a software or da tabase change? 4. Should a cond i tion report be initiated?
0'9=S ~ES DYES DYES ~o ONO ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE E-DOC TITLE: R E s p 0 N s I B L E s u p V PROCEDURE IMPROVEMENT FORM Assignee:
______________ _ D Evaluate & rev ise immed i ately D Eva l uate & in clude in next change D Revise immediately D Revise by _______ _ D Include in Ne xt P roced ur e Change Procedure No: Remarks D E-DOC NO. 1000.006-P Evalua te and discuss C U TRACKING SYST EMENTRY P IF# ___
* _____
* ____ _ L O COPY DEPT. HEAD K A s s I G N E E s u p V C L K RESPONSE:
In corpo rat e d in Change No. ___ _ R esponse By: REVIEWED BY: D COPY ORIGINATOR D TRACKING SYSTEM CLOSEO U T Paae 2 CHANGE NO. 053 Page 2 of 2 Date: ____ _ Date: Date: Dat e:
PROC.JWORK PLAN N
 
==O. PROCEDURE==
/WORK PLAN TITLE: PAGE: 65 of 72 1103.002 FILLING AND VENTING THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM CHANGE: 036 ATTACHMENT C Page 7 of 10 VALVE TAG NUMBER ( ,/) OPEN CLOSED DESCR I PTI O N RB BASEMENT -B STEAM GENERATOR AREA Capped RBD-lOA X PP-1047 Isolation RBD-9A X P32A & B cold leg drain RBD-8A X P32A cold leg drain RBD-8B X P32B cold leg drain Capped RBD-9B X P32A -& B cold leg drain flush connection N 1 RBS-1 X RV -gasket leak detection 1 I RBS-2 X RV gasket le ak detection SOUTH CAVITY -RCP SEAL ELEVATION Hot Leg Level LT-1193 Lower Tap RC-1073 X Isolation LT-1195 Upper Tap Isolation Hot Leg Level LT-1193 Lo wer Tap RC-1074 X Isolation LT-1195 Upper Tap Isolation SOUTH CAVITY -RCP MOTOR ELEVATION Hot Leg Level LT-1191 Lo w er Tap RC-1075 X Isolation LT-1193 Upper Tap Isolation Hot Leg Level LT-1191 Lower Tap RC-1076 X Isola tion LT-1193 Upper Tap Isolation Root Valve to PDT-1034, 1035, RC-1035A X 1036, 1037 and PDX-1 035 Root Valve to PDT-1034 , 1035 , 1036, 1037 and RC-1035B X PDX-1035 Root Valve to PDT-1034, 1035, RC-1036A X 1036, 1037 and PDX-1035 Root valve to PDT-1034, 1035, RC-1036B X 1036, 1037 and PDX-1035 (_ Note 1: RBS-1 and RBS-2 will be closed by Containment Building Closeout (1015.036), Attachment L " Pre-Critical I.nsp e ction". (Z.~N, f,/Of'fi I Attachment Header Doc u ment Name: un t it l ed Document Location F A Description Attach Ti t le: I P I F for 1102.0 15 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE Paae 1 E-DOC TITLE: I E-DOC NO. 1000.006-P I CHANGE NO. 053 0 R I G I N A T 0 R PROCEDURE IMPROVEMENT FORM This Document Contains 2 Page(s} Page 1 of 2 TO: Karl Jones UNIT: _ __.:.1 ___ _ DATE: 10/11/1 1 Responsible Supervisor/
Superintendent FROM: Chris Kane PHONE:__,3 ...... 9 __ 75.__ __ _ PRO CEDURE NUMBER_~11~0=2=
~~15~----CHANGE NO: 032 PROCEDURE TITLE: F ILLIN G AND DRA ININ G THE FUEL TRANSFER CANA L Descr iption of Improvement:
Identi fy step number , page n umber s, etc., where applicable or attach copy of affected pages with suggested changes marked. Include any research that has been performed , s u ch as drawing numbers , personnel contacted, etc. Attachment H p.1 Section 3.4 When line is drained , Leave valves RBS-1 and RBS-2 OPEN.
 
==Reference:==
EC-032271 Supervisor review shou l d include the following: 1. Is an immediate Rev i s i on needed instead of a PIF? 2. Is P I F needed? 3. Does change requ ire a software or database change? 4. Shou l d a condition report be init ia ted? DYES DYES DYES DYE S ONO ONO ONO ONO AR KAN SAS NU C L E AR ONE Pace 2 E-DOC TITLE: E-DOC NO. CHANGE N
 
==O. PROCEDURE==
 
IMPROVEMENT FORM 1000.006-P 053 Page2 of2 R E Assignee: s p 8 Eva lu ate & revise immediate l y D E v al u ate and d i scuss 0 N Ev a l uate & include in next change s D Revise immediate l y I D Revise by B D Include in Ne xt P roced u re Change L E Procedure N o: Remarks s u p V C LJ T RACKING SYSTEM ENTRY PIF# --D ate: L D COPY D EPT. H EAD K RESPONSE: Incorporated in Change No. A s s I G N E E Response By: Date: s u p V REVIEWED BY: Date: C D COPY ORIGINATOR L K D TRACKI N G SYSTEM C L OSEOUT Date:
PROC./WORK PLAN N
 
==O. PROCEDURE==
/WORK PLAN TIT L E: PAGE: 170 of 176 1102.015 FILLING AND DRAJNING THE FUEL TRANSFER CANAL CHANGE: 032 ATTACHMENT H Page 1 of 2 DRAINING REACTOR VESSEL GASKET LEAKOFF LINES This attachment is performed after the refueling canal has been drained below the vessel flange elevation in preparation for replacing the vessel head. This attachment must be completed prior to the head being set. Containment Building Closeout (1015.036) will ensure that RV Gasket Leak Detection (RBS-1 and RBS-2) and RV Gasket Pressure Test Connection (RC-5) are closed prior to power operation.
Reference CR-AN0-1-2005-1140.
 
===1.0 Verify===
RCS level ~376.3' elevation.
 
===2.0 Maintenance===
 
has been contacted for removing flange at RV Gasket Pressure Test Connection (RC-5) per MWO 00094316.
NOTE If desired , sub-section 4.0 may be p'e"rio'rmed prior to sub-section 3.0. 3.0 Drain RV gasket leak detection line as follows: CAUTION RV Gasket Leak Detection (RBS-1 and RBS-2) drain to the RB Sump. Avoid spread of contamination.
 
===3.1 Verify===
one of the follo w ing conditions exists (~): () No personnel and no tools are in the RB Sump, AND sump is available to receive RCS drainage.
() Verify appropriate catch basin provided at drain line. 3.2 Open RV gasket leak detection (RBS-1). Location:
RB basement, south end, on primary shield wall, under A RCP discharge, 12 ft up. 3.3 Slowly throttle open RV gasket leak detectio n (RBS-2) and drain line. Location:
RB basement, south end, on primary shield wall, under C RCP discharge, 11 ft up. 3.4 WHEN line is drained, THEN close the following valves: 0
* RV gasket leak detection (RBS-1)
* RV gasket leak detection (RBS-2) -
PROCJWORK PLAN N
 
==O. PROCEDURE==
/WORK PLAN TITLE: PAGE: 171 of 176 1102.015 FILLING AND DRAINING THE FUEL TRANSFER CANAL CHANGE: 032 ATTACHMENT H Page 2 of 2 4.0 Drain RV gasket press u re test connection line as follows: 4.1 Verify M aintenance has removed flange at RV gasket pressure test co n necti o n (RC-5). Location: RB basement , above incore tun n el, by primary shield wall. CAUTION RV Gasket Pressure Test Connection (RC-5) drainage must be captured or controlled to prevent spread of contamination.
 
===4.2 Coordinate===
 
with RP as needed AND verify appropriate catch basin or hose rigged below RV gasket pressure test connection (RC-5). 4.3 Slowly throttle open RV gasket pressure test connection (RC-5). 4.4 WHEN line is drained, THEN close RV gasket pressure test connection (RC-5). 5.0 WHEN attachment complete, THEN make a station log entry s tat ing such. Date Date Attachment Header Doc u ment Name: un t it l ed Document Location F A Description Attach Ti t le: I P I F for 1015.036 ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE Page 1 E-DOC TITLE: I E-DOC NO. 1000.006-P I CHANGE NO. 053 0 R I G I N A T 0 R PROCEDURE IMPROVEMENT FORM This Document Contains 2 Page(s) Page 1 of 2 TO: Karl Jones UNIT:. _ __,1 ___ _ DATE: 10/11/11 Responsible Supervisor/Superintendent FROM: Chris Kane PROCEDURE NUMBER:_....:.;10"""'1:...:5.:..:
.0 PROCEDURE TITLE: CONTAINMENT BUILDING CLOSEOUT PHONE:~3~9~75::.......
__ _ CHANGE NO: 034 Desc r iption of Improvement:
Identify step number, page numbers, etc., where applicable or attach copy of affected page s with s ugges te d changes marked. In cl ude any resea rch tha t ha s be e n performed, such as drawi n g numbe r s , personnel contacted, etc. Attachment L " Pre-Cr i tical Inspection" p.3 of 7 Step 2.11.1 Valves RBS-1 and RBS-2, RV Gasket Leak Detection, will be OPEN. Step 2.1 1 "NOTE" section, first b u lle ted sentence Remove "RBS-1, RBS-2," from this sentence.
 
==Reference:==
 
EC-032271 Supervisor review s hould includ e the following: 1. Is an immediate Revision need ed i ns tead of a PIF? 2. I s PIF n ee d ed? 3. Does c hange req uire a software or database change? 4. Should a condition r e p o rt be initi ated? DYES DYES DYES DYES ONO ONO ONO ONO ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE Page 2 E-DOC TITLE: E-DOC NO. CHANGE N
 
==O. PROCEDURE==
 
IMPROVEMENT FORM 1000.006-P 053 Page 2 of 2 R E Assignee:
s p D Evaluate & revise i mmediate ly D Evaluate and discuss 0 D Eva l uate & include in nex t cha ng e N s D Re v ise immediately I D Revise by B D In c lude in Ne xt Procedure Change L E Procedure No: Remarks s u p V C D TRACKING SYSTEM ENTRY PIF# --D ate: L D COPY DEPT. HEAD K RESPONSE:
Incorporated in Change No. A s s I G N E E Response By: Date: s u p V REVIEWED BY: Date: C D COPY ORIGINATOR L K D TRACKING SYS T EM C LO SEOUT Date:
PROC.IWORK PLAN N
 
==O. PROCEDURE==
/WORK PLAN TITLE: PAGE: 65 of 70 1015.036 CONTAINMENT BUILDING CLOSEOUT CHANGE: 034 A TT A C HME NT L Page 3 of 7 2.11 IF Unit 1, THEN perform the following:
NOTE
* If time permits, the closing of RBS-1, RB S-2, RBS-11B, RBS-12B, RBS-llC, RBS-12C, RBS-11D and RBS-12D should be performed~
4 hrs after reaching R CS normal operating temperature (NOT). This will allow sufficient time for thermal equilibrium to be reached across the RCP and reactor vessel head flange gaskets.
* Once RCS NOT is reached, System Engineering may request early closure of particular RCP intergasket leakage isolation valves in order to check the integrity of other RCP's inner gasket.
* RBS-llA and RBS-12A are normally closed.
* Steps in this section may be performed in any order. 2 .11.1 2.11.2 2.11.3 2.11.4 2.11.5 Ve ri fy th e follo w ing val ves closed:
* RBS-1 , RV Gas k et Lea k Detection
* R B S-2 , RV Gasket Leak Detec t io n
* RBS-llA, RCP P32A Intergasket Leak !sol
* RBS-12A, RCP P32A Intergasket Leak !sol
* RBS-11B, RCP P32B Intergasket Leak !sol
* RBS-12B, RCP P32B Intergasket Leak !so l
* RBS-llC, RCP P32C Intergasket Leak !sol
* RBS-12C, RCP P32C Intergasket Leak Isol
* RBS-11D , RCP P32D Intergasket Leak !sol
* RBS-12D, RCP P32D Intergasket Lea k !so l Verify the line downstream of RV Pressure Test Connection (RC-5) has blind flange installed. Secure Containment Building lighting per Attachment 2 of 1107.005.
Open breaker 5642A to RB Elevator (M-6). Open breaker B713, Power to RB Crane.
Attachment Header Document Name: un t it l ed Document Location F A Description Attach Title: I PIF for 1203.012H ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE Paae 1 E-DOC TITLE: I E-OOC NO. 1000.006-P I CHANGE NO. 053 0 R I G I N A T 0 R PROCEDURE IMPROVEMENT FORM This Document Contains 2 P age(s) Page 1 of 2 TO: Karl Jones UNIT: __ 1 __ _ DATE: 10/11/11 Responsible Supervisor
/Superintendent FROM: Chr is Kane PHONE:.__,3=9-'-75=-----
PRO C EDURE NUMBER: 1 203.012H CHANGE NO: 040 PROCEDURE TITLE: ANNUNC IATOR K09 CORRECT I VE ACTION Descr i ption of Improvement:
Iden tify step numb er, page numbers , etc., where appl i cab l e or attach copy of affected pages w ith suggested c hange s mari<ed. I n c lude a ny re search t hat has been performed , such as drawing numbers , personnel contacted, etc. p. 9 of 64 Vessel Head Gasket Leak Note Section First Bullet RV Gasket Leak Det (RBS-1 and RBS-2) will No t be C l osed during performance of Containment Building Closeout ( 1015.036). These valves w i ll rema i n OPEN.
 
==Reference:==
EC-032271 Supervisor review should i nc lud e the following: 1. Is an immediate Revision needed instead of a PIF? 2. I s PIF needed? 3. Does change req ui re a software or database change? 4. Should a conditio n re port be i nitiated?
~ES (ZfYES DYES DYES ARKANSAS N UCLEAR ONE E-DOC TITLE: E-DOC NO. 1000.006-P R E s p 0 N s I B L E s u p V C L K A s s I G N E E s u p V C L K PROCEDURE IMPROVEMENT FORM Assignee: ______________
_ D Evaluate & revise immediately D E v aluate and discuss D Evaluate & i nclude i n next change D Rev i se immediately D Rev i se by _______ _ D In clude in Ne xt Procedure Change Procedure N o: Remarks 0 TRA CKING SYSTEM ENTRY P IF # ___ -----------0 COPY DEPT. H EAD RESPONSE:
Incorporated in Change No. ___ _ R esponse By: REVIEWED BY: D COPY OR I GINATOR D TRACKING SYSTEM C L OSEO UT Page 2 CHANGE NO. 053 Page 2 of 2 Dat e: ____ _ Date: Date: Date:
PROC./WORK PLAN N
 
==O. PROCEDURE==
/WORK PLAN TITLE: 1203.012H ANNUNCIATOR K09 CORRECTIVE ACTION Location:
C14 Device and Setpoint:
Reactor Gasket Drain Temp (TS-1052) >150&deg;F PAGE: CHANGE: VESSEL HEAD GASKET LEAK 9of64 040 Alarm: K09-Fl
* NOTE G a s k et L ea Det (RBS-1 and RBS-2) ar e closed during perform a nce of Conta~nment Building Closeout (1015.036). RCS Leakage Safety E v aluation instructions are contained in RCS Leak Detection (1 1 03.0 1 3). 1.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 1. Calculate R CS leakage using RCS Leak Detection (1103.013).
: 2. IF leakage is <10 gpm, THEN contact System Engineering.
: 3. IF l eakage is >10 gpm, THEN perform the following:
* Refer to Excess RCS Leakage (12 03.039).
* Refer to TS 3.4.13 and enter Condition B, if mode is applicable. 2.0 PROB A B L E CAUSES
* Reac t or head gasket leak-off li ne tempe rature hig h 3.0 RE FERENCES Window Arrangement Annunciator K09 (E-4 59, sheets 1-4)
Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 C orrecti ve Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00021 Version: R e qu este d Du e dat e: 11/11/2011 Requ ested B y: Cui lty , Ri chard C Approved By: Cui l ty, Ri c hard C R e que st Description
: Approved:
r ,/ Previous Du e dat e: 11/04/20 l 1 11/03/20 11 11/03/20 11 Operat i ons Management and Engineering to determ i ne directio n. Questions have been ra i sed wh i ch may require RBS-I and RBS-2 to remain closed dur ing the cycle. It is acceptable an d necessary to extend this action because a final d ecision has not bee n made. Approved De sc ription: Ap pr oved.
Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 C orrecti ve Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00021 Version: 2 R e qu este d Du e dat e: 11/18/20 11 Requ ested B y: Cui lty , Ri chard C Approved By: H o rton ,Jeffrey S R e que st Description
: Approved:
r ,/ Previous Du e dat e: 11/1 1/2011 11/1 1/201 1 11/1 1/201 1 Mana ge ment ha s determin e d procedure changes are required.
This actiorn w ill be performed. Cu rr ently , U n i t I i s in co ld shutdown, therefore it is accepta bl e to extend this action. It necessary to extend this action due to limited resources and late decision to perform action. Approved De sc ription: app r ove DO E Ent e rgy I CORRECTIV E ACTION CA N umb e r: 22 G roup Ass i g n e d By: Eng Sys Mgmt ANO Asstg n e d To: E n g Sy s Mgmt ANO S ub ass i g n ed T o: E n g Sys NSSS Staff ANO Or i g i nate d By: ZzAN O CRG **lH EA use only** P erfor m e d By: Edge ll ,Douglas W S ub pe r fo rm e d By: Barborck,W D oug la s A ppr ove d By: C lo sed By: Williams , Patrick J C ur re n t Du e D ate: 02/2 9/2012 CA T y p e: PERIODIC REVIEW Pl a nt C on s tr a int: NONE CA D es cript io n: Wi l liam s, Patrick J Edge ll , D o u g l as W Barborck , W Douglas 1 2/21/201 1 13:07:38 2/15/20 1 2 1 7:00: 11 2/15/2 012 13:4 3:36 2/15/2012 17:50:15 I n i t i a l Du e Date: 02/29/2 012 CA P ri o ri ty: Int erim and P er i od i c Review Required -Comp l ete one of th e fo llowin g: I C R-AN0-1-2008-025 6 0 Na m e l) lf t his CR and all CRs closed to thi s CR are NOT associated with Safety Related Equ ipment tben, clearly document in this ac ti ol!l that thi s CR i s not associated with Safety Related Equipment.
In c lude a brief discussion of the ba s i s for that determination.
OR 2) (NOTE -an Interim and Periodic Rev ie w requires both "R espons ibl e Manager" AND a "Dir ec tor or Above" approval).
If this CR or any C R closed to this C R are associated with safety relat e d equipment t h en conduct and document an interim r ev i ew of thi s Cond ition Report u s ing the "CR Int e rim and Period i c Review Check li s t" , Attachment 9.8 of EN-Ll-102 which i s availab l e via the Refer ence Library ECH Site in the Nuclear Mana gemen t Manual Common F orms section. Consider any open CAs for Long Term classification per Attachment 9.9 of EN-Ll-102. Res pon se: T co n c u r with the fol l ow in g s ub-respon se and c lo s ure of thi s correct iv e action. S ubr es pon se : Approved I nterim Review attached.
E-mail with Director approval also attached.
WDB 2/1 5/2012 C l os ure C omm e nt s: At t ac h me n ts: Subresponse De s cription In teri m Review S ubrespon se Description e-ma il with Director approval Document Name: un t it l ed Document Location ~ub r es p onse D escri p t i on Attach Title: !inte r im Rev i ew Attachment Header ATTACHMENT 9.8 CR INTERIM AND PERIODIC REVIEW FORM SHEET 1 OF 1 CR Interim and Periodic Review CR Numb er: CR-AN0-1-2008
-02560 Category Level D AD B IZI C CR Owner Group: ENG SYS MGMT ANO CR
 
== Description:==
 
1 R2 1 W0-0 01 02463 Task 01 was n o t ab l e to b e successfully perfo r med as p l an n ed. CR-AN0-1-2005-0 1 140 was written to d ocume n t OE from severa l p l ants wh i c h i de n tified co r ros i on (ch l o ri de) induced p i pe crack i ng i n r eac t or vessel (RV) f l ange l eak-off/pressure test connect i on p i ping resu l t i ng from wa t er l eft i n the p i p i n g follow i ng ref u e l i n g outages. AN0-1 was d e t erm i ned to be v u l nerable s i nce wa t er has been trapped i n th i s piping duri n g p rev i o u s operat i ng cyc l es. T he scope of W0-00 1 02463 was fo r System E n g i neering to a t tempt t o ex t e rn ally i n spec t the RV fl ange l eak-off/p r essu r e te s t co n ne ct i o n p i p i ng fo r ev i dence of cracki n g. T h e ins p ection approach was to ut i l i ze a bo r oscope to ex t ernally i nspect the p i p i ng v i a access thro u g h th e r eac t o r cavity seal p l ate openi n gs and betwee n t h e R V and the RV in s u l ation. Howeve r , d ue to the tight c l earances between the i ns u l ation and the RV , th e i nspectio n was not successfu l and the loff/pressure co n nectio n p i p i ng cou l d n o t be vis u ally i n spec t ed as pl a n n ed. Since CR-AN0-1-2 0 05-0 1 14 0 was cl osed to W0-001 0 2463 , th i s CR was i n i t ia ted to p rov i de a means of tr acki n g an al t e rnate reso l ut i on fo r ad d ress i ng the noted OE. As doc u me n te d i n th e 2005 CR, ANO p r oce d u r es h ave b ee n revised to e n s u re th e s u bject p i pi ng is d ra i n ed dur i ng re fu el i ng o u t ages p ri or to i n stalli n g the RV head , th us m i tiga ti ng th e dama g e mec h an i sm. The operabil i ty statement i n CR-AN0-1-2005-0 1 140 r emains app l i cab l e. CR Review: (All No responses require explanation be included.) Th e follow i ng CA's h ave b ee n i ssued to fu rther eva l u a t e a course of act i on req u ired t o a ddres s t h e OE d ocum en te d i n CR-AN0-1-2005-01 1 40. Th e issua n ce of th ese actio n s cons ti t u tes a n accep t ab l e co rr ec ti ve action p l an for t h i s CR. A d d i tional CA's will b e i ss u ed as dee m ed approp ri a t e. Based on past discussions with plant management , the pressure test scope needs to be transferred from the responsibility of System Engineering to Project Management to ensure successful 1 R24 implementation.
Otherwise , resolution of this OE in 1 R24 is in jeopardy. CA-0 2 [c l osed] -CR-AN0-1-2005-0 1 1 40 (CA-04) eva l uated the feasib i l i ty of perform i ng a h y d r ostat i c tes t of the RV f l ange l eak-off/pressure tes t connect ion pip i ng a n d co n cl uded that such a tes t was not f easib l e. Base d on the i nab i l it y to v i sually inspect th e pip i ng d u r i ng 1 R2 1 (v i a b oroscope), r evis i t the f easib i l it y of perfo r m i ng a hydrosta ti c t es t on these l i nes t o ver i fy p i p i ng i n tegrity. T his CA was closed on 8/27/2009 to CA-07 w h i ch was init i a t ed for SYE to i n i t i ate a new S IPDB Re co r d and p r esent to th e URT/MPRC to recommend th is scope of wo r k b e executed by th e Projects O r gan i zat i on. CA-03 [c l osed] -D ete r mine th e scope required to perform a direct visual inspec ti on o f the RV f l ange lea koff/pressure test connect i on pip i ng (i.e. r emova l of r eacto r cav i ty sea l p l a t e , co n cre t e sh i e l d bloc k s, and RV ins u l at i on) in t h e even t that no o th er option is i d ent i fied to verify the i nteg ri t y of the piping. Thi s CA was closed on 8/27/2009 to CA-07 w h i ch was i nit i ated fo r SYE to i n i tiate a new S I PDB Record and present to the URT/MPRC t o r ecommend th is s c ope of work be executed b y the P r o j ec ts O r gan i za ti o n. CA-0 7 [c l osed] -The inspection of t h e RV F l ange Leak-off & P ressure T es t Connect i on pipi n g r eq u i re s ad d i tio n a l r esources and eng i n eer i ng wh i ch transcends th e r ole a n d responsibi l ity o f System E n g i neeri n g. In i tiate a new S I PDB Recor d a n d present to the URT/MPRC t o recommend th i s scope of work be exec u te d by the Projects O r gan i zation. S IP DB Reco r d 4955 was init i a t ed to tr ansfe r t h is scope of wo r k t o the Projects Orga n iza ti o n and th is CA w as close d o n 11/19/2009. New CA-08 was i ss u ed to t r ac k the p r ese n tat ion o f S IP D B Record 4955 to the U R T. CA-08 [c l osed] -P r esent S I PDB Recor d (Inspect i on of t h e RV F l ange Leak-off & Press u re Test Con n ect i o n P i p i ng) to t h e UR T/MPRC for th i s scope of work to be exec u ted by th e Projects Orga n i zat i on. SYE made the prese n tat i o n at the 1 2/7/2009 U R T meet i ng. T h e URT concu rr e d t h at i f th e l eak-off & p r essu r e test con ne ctio n EN-Ll-102 REV 13 pi p i n g u l ti m a te ly req u ir e p hys i ca l i n s p e ct i on or r e pl a ce m e n t such t hat d isasse m b l y/r ea s se m b l y of th e rea c t o r cav it y seal p late, conc r e te s h i e l d b l oc k s, a nd r eac t o r vesse l i n su la tion i s req u i r ed , th e n that sig n ifi cant scope o f wo r k woul d be tr a n s fe rred to the P r o j ec t Organ i zat i on. H oweve r , a t th i s t ime , the UR T decided that System E n g i nee ri ng s h oul d re-eva l uate the pressure tes t o p tion and come u p w i th a p l a n to pe rf o rm a p r essu r e te st on th e l eak-o f f and p r essu r e t est co n nect i o n p i p i ng t o ve ri fy the i n t e g ri ty of th e p iping. If the p r essure t es t fa i ls o n on e or b o th o f th e l i nes , the ens u in g scope o f wo r k t o access th e p i pi n g for u lti mate r esolut i on of th e iss u e wou l d th e n b e p ursue d by th e Project s Or g a n i z a ti o n. New CA-09 h a s b e en issued to SYE to d e te r mine a s u i ta b l e p r ess u r e t est me th o d and to i n i ti a te the pro p er im pl e m e n ta ti o n doc um en ta tion. 1 R 22 w ill b e u ti li zed to perform sco p ing wal k downs s i n ce th i s p i pi ng is n o t access i ble du ri n g p ower opera ti ons. Th i s CA was cl osed on 1/2 1/2 010. CA-0 9 [c l ose d] -Coord i nate with E P&C p erson n e l an d d e te rm i ne a s u itab l e p re ss u re te st m e thod fo r th e RV flange l ea k-off/p r essu r e te st co n n ecti o n p i p i ng, a nd in it i ate the pro p er i mple menta ti on doc u me nt atio n. Uti l i z e 1 R22 to pe rf o r m scopi n g wa l k downs as req u i r e d. In i ti ate ot h e r co rre c tiv e ac tion s as r equ i red. Com pl eted by SYE on 1 0/25/2010. CA-10 was i n i ti ated fo r SYE to assign fo ll owu p co rre c tive act i ons as r equ i r ed to imp l ement the p r essu r e te st p l an i n 1 R23 v i a W0-0 01 95437. CA-1 0 was complete d o n 1 1/1 7/20 1 0 b y SYE an d CA-1 1 an d CA-1 2 we r e i n i ti a t ed as a r es u l t. CA-11 [c l ose d] -D eve l op E C to su p po rt W0-0 01 9 54 3 7. I f r equ i red, provi d e j us ti fi c ation f o r i n stallat i o n of co up l i n gs o n th e affec t ed CCC-6 pip i n g. A l so, i f r equ i red, prov i de eng i ne e ri n g r equ i remen ts for F ME co n t ro l s associated with the p r essure t est eq u i p ment and com p onents to be use d in c l ose prox i m i ty to the RV fl an g e. CA close d o n 7/2 1/20 1 1 w it h no actio n tak en s i n ce pressure tes t p l a n no l onger r eq u i r es cut ti n g/ca p p i ng pipi n g (i so l a ti on va l ves RBS-1 & RC-5 w i ll be use d as th e press u r e b ou n dary). CA-12 [cl ose d] -D e t e r mine th e app r op riat e type & s i ze of h y d ro p lugs t o b e u tilize d fo r t h e pr ess u r e t es t (W0-00195437) outl i ned i n CA-09. I n i ti a t e ac ti o n s to procu r e the h ydro plugs. as req u i red. CA co m p l e t ed b y SYE on 6/9/201 1. CA-1 8 i ss ued to SYE t o deve l op CAT ID's (i f r e q u i red). CA-14 [cl ose d]-P r ov id e inpu t to O u tage P&S to e n s u re 1R23 W0-00 1 95 4 37 is pr ope rly p l a n n ed for pe rf o rm ance of th e CCC-6 p i p i ng pr essu r e tes t. CA clos ed b y SYE on 5/5/20 1 1 s i nce th e WO was d e fe r red to 1 R24. CA-15 [c l osed] -Per EN-OU-100, id e nt i fy any required co n tingenc y plans for 1 R23 wh i ch a r e requ i r ed to s u pport th e p ressure te st of th e CCC-6 p i pi n g. I ss u e f ollow-u p CA's as required. CA clos e d b y SY E on 5/1 8/20 1 2 sin ce t h e WO was de fe rred to 1 R24. CA-16 -Following implementation of W0-001954 3 7 during 1 R23, document that the applicable OE has be e n adequately addressed for AN0-1. CA assigned to SYE. Curr e nt due dat e is 5/30/2013 which follows completion of 1 R24. CA-17 [cl ose d] -Pr esent S IP D Re c o r d 5678 to th e URT to req u es t r e a ss i g n me nt o f th e RV Flang e loff/pressure t es t co n nec ti on pipi n g pressure t est (W0-0 0195437) fr om System E n g i neeri n g to P r oject M a n a gemen t for 1 R2 4 imp l e m e n ta ti o n. CA-18 -Develop CATIDs for the tes.t plugs specified in CA-12. Issue additional corrective actions as required to ensure material is pledged to W0-00195437. Current due date is 2/23/2012. Anticipate this action being closed to no action taken since the hydro plugs are a tool and not a stock item. CA-20 -Ensure W0-00195437 is implemented in 1 R24. This WO ha s been deferred to 1 R24 as documented in th e attached 1R23 SCR 11049. Issue additional corrective actions as r e quir e d to support 1 R24 resolution of this issue. This CA is being classified as a L TCA. Current due date is 5/29/2013, based on anticipated completion of 1R24. CA-21 [c l osed] -I nco rp o r ate P I F 1-1 1-0621 t o OP-1 203.0 1 2H, P I F 1-11-0622 t o OP-1 015.036, P IF 1-11-0623 t o OP-1 10 2.0 1 5, a nd P IF 1-1 1-0624 t o OP-1 1 03.00 2 to c h a nge th e co nfig u r at i on of va l ves RB S-1 and RB S-2 from no rm a lly closed t o norma lly o p en for Cycle 24 o p era ti on. T h is c h a ng e h as been a p prove d by EC-32271. EN-Ll-102 REV 13 CA clo s e d by O p era t i o n s on 11/16/20 1 1. RBS-1 and RBS-2 are c u r r ent l y open for Cyc l e 24 operation which el i minates the potent i a l for pressu r iz i ng the l eak-off piping i n the event of i nner o-r i ng leakage. 1. Will the existing corrective actions documented in the condition report, when completed, correct the cond i tion report issue? Yes 1Z! / No D Impl ementat i on of 1 R24 W0-00 1 95437 w i ll r esolve th i s issue, assum ing no degradation i s d i scovered. S i n ce add i tiona l CA's are expected between now and 1 R24 , the CR will r emain open through 1 R24 and w i ll be c l osed follow i ng completion of CA-1 6 & CA-20. 2. What is the expected CR Closure date based on remaining needed actions? DATE: 5/30/2013 I t i s anticipated t hat th i s CR w i ll be closed followi n g 1 R24 implementa ti on o f the pressure test and comp l etion of CA-1 6 & CA-20. T arget date i s 5/30/2013. If degradation i s fou n d , a new CR w i ll be init iate d dur i ng 1 R24. 3. Is the previously documented operability/functionality position still valid for the current condition and expected to remain valid until CR closure? Yes IZ] / No D /N/A D If the answer is NO , then initiate a new CR to document the concern; CR# N/A 4. Are all Ll-102 requirements for corrective action administration and control being met , i.e. justifications for Due Date Extensions valid , Long Term Corrective Actions identified, CARB approved CAPRs identified, and appropriate approvals obtained for all? Yes IZ]! No D 5. What risk to plant operation is imposed by the condition identified and how is risk reduced to an acceptable level for the duration of the action plan? Th i s CR does n o t speci fi cally identify a known degraded p l ant sys t em, structu r e , or compone n t at AN0-1 , but does i de n tify a potential deg r adatio n mecha n ism. Bot h t h e RV fl a n ge gaske t leak detection l i n e and pressure te st connect i on l i nes were flushed/dra i ned during 1R 1 9, 1 R20, 1 R2 1 , 1 R22 and 1 R23 , t hus min i mizing the potential fo r fa i l u r e result i ng from ID i n i t i ated , chlo r i de induced , t r a n sgranula r st r ess-co r rosion c r ack i ng (TGSCC). No RV f l ange gasket l eakage was i dentified during pla n t heat-up from 1 R19 , 1 R2 0 , 1 R2 1 , or 1 R22 prior to iso l a ti ng va l ves RBS-1 & RBS-2 fo r plant operat i on. RBS-1 & RBS-2 we r e l ef t open for Cyc l e 24 to preve n t pressu ri zat i on of the pi p i n g i n the even t of an i n n er o-r i ng leak. RCS l eakage rates follow i ng 1R 1 9, 1 R20 , 1 R21 , 1 R2 2 and 1 R23 have not i nd i cated the p r esence of a n y concu r ren t l ea k age of t he RV fla n ge gaskets and le ak detect i on/press ur e test connect i on piping/co mponents. The RV f l ange gas k ets are replaced du ri ng eac h r efue l i ng o u tage a n d va l ves RBS-1 a n d RBS-2 were l e f t open fo r Cycle 2 4 operation. The likelihood of i nner gas k et l eakage , w h i l e possible, is cons id ered l ow. In conclus i on, the risk to plant o p era ti on is m i n i m al a n d r e d uced to accep t able leve ls u nt i l the act i on plan for th i s CR can be i mplemented dur i ng 1 R24. Review/ Approval Required:
Director/GM Title: Date: -----(Pr i nt name & Position t i tle) NOTE: The expectation is to capture the discussion points of this form in a CA. The form itself need not be used , but all points applicable must be addressed.
EN-Ll-10 2 REV 1 3 Attachment Header Doc u ment Name: un t it l ed Document Location ~ub r es p onse Descri p t i on Attach Ti t le: ~-ma i l w i th D i rector approva l BARBOREK, W DOUGLAS From: Sent: T o: Cc:
 
==Subject:==
MCCOY, JAIME H Wednesday, February 15 , 2012 1 :04 PM BARBOREK , W DOUGLAS; WILLIAMS , PATRICK J EDGELL, DOUGLAS W RE: REQUEST FOR REVIEW -Interim Review for CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 "Resolve Indu stry OE on Chloride Induced Stress Corrosion Cracking on RV Flange Piping" I approve the i nterim rev i ew. Linda -can you set up a meet i ng w i th Bauman, Edgell , W i lliams , Barborek , and myse l f? Jaime From: BAffiOREK, W DOUGLAS Sent: Monday, February 13, 2012 5:20 PM To: MCCOY, JAIMEH; WILLIAMS, PATRICKJ Cc: EDGELL , DOUGLAS W
 
==Subject:==
REQUEST FOR REVIEW -Interim Review for CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 "Reso l ve Industry OE on Oiloride Induced Stress Corrosion Cracking on RV Range Aping" Jaime & Patrick , The interim review for the subject CR is attached for your rev i ew and concurrence.
Th e draft interim rev i ew has been attached to CA-22 o f the subject CR. T h e CA is ultimately due on Wednesday, February 15 , 2012 (initi ally due by me today). As we discussed last cycle, the pressure testing of the RV leak-off/pressure test connection piping needs to be turned over to the Project Management group. System Engineering does not have the ability or luxury to focus on a critical path activity like this to ensure it is coordinated and executed flawlessly during a refueling outage. An example which highlights this is the 1 R23 activity which I drove to obtain diametrical data and boroscope inspections of the leak-off ports to support development of contingency efforts. We all know that did not go well after it fell to the opposite shift , who were not fully engaged in the activity and ultimately only obtained half of the information I wanted to obtain. Part of that was my fault due to the fact that I could not even think about this inspection during the first 6 nights of the outage due to my other required inspections.
I would like to meet with you , and perhaps Project Management (David Bauman}, to discuss this issue and the ultimate transfer of responsibility for the pressure test to the PM organization. Otherwise , I feel another outage will pass and we will still not have tested these lines to resolve the now 10 year old OE. Please let me know i f you have any questions.
Thanks, Doug Barborek E nt ergy O pe ra ti ons, In c./ A r kansa s N u clea r O n e Sys t e m E n gi n ee r -U nit I R eacto r Coo l a nt Sys t e m Sys t e m E n gi n eeri n g B ui l di n g/ N-S Y S-4 w b arbo l@entergy.co m 479-858-4337 479-858-0879 p age r << File: CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-22 lnt e rim Revi e w.do c>>
Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 C orrecti ve Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00022 Version: R e qu este d Du e dat e: 02/29/2012 Requ ested B y: Barborek,W Dou g l as Approved By: Barborek , W Doug l as R e que st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Du e dat e: 02/15/20 1 2 02/15/2012 02/15/2012 Due to an emergent p l ant issue and potential for a forced outage , this CA needs to be extended. TR i s comp l ete but await in g director/manager approval.
Extending two weeks to 2/29/2012. This CA is administrative in nature and extending it to 2/29/20 J 2 i s therefor e acc e ptable. WDB 2/ l 5/20 J 2 A pprov e d
 
== Description:==
 
Discussed this 1st DOE wi th Doug Edgell , who concurs with the DOE. D oug Barborek (fo r Doug Edgell)
Ent e rgy I CORRECTIV E ACTION CA N umb e r: 23 G roup Ass i g n e d By: E ng Sy s M g mt ANO Asstg n e d To: E n g Sy s M g mt ANO S ub ass i g n ed T o: E n g S ys NS S S S t a ff ANO Or i g i nate d By: Zz ANO C RG **lH E A u se only** P erfor m e d By: Bond , Yin ce nt S S ub pe r fo rm e d By: Barb o r c k , W D o u g la s A ppr ove d By: C lo sed By: Oliver , Jason R C ur re n t Du e D ate: 0 2/13/2013 CA T y p e: PERIODIC REVIEW Pl a nt C on s tr a int: NONE CA D es cript io n: E dg e ll , Dougla s W E d ge ll , D o u g l as W Barbor c k , W Dou g la s 1 2/2 0/2 01 2 l6: 04: 3 S 2/12/2 01 3 11 : 57: 5 6 2/11/2 01 3 1 5:43: 3 1 2/12/2013 17:23:49 I n i t i a l Du e Date: 02/1 3/2 01 3 CA P ri o ri ty: 4 Int e rim a nd P e ri o di c R e vi ew R e quir e d -C omp l e t e on e o f th e fo llowin g: I C R-AN0-1-2008-025 6 0 Na m e l) l f t his CR and all CR s closed to this C R ar e NOT a ss ociated with Safety Related E quipment tben , clearly do c ument in this ac ti o l!l th a t this C R i s not assoc iat e d with Sa f e t y R e lat e d Equipm e nt. In c lude a bri e f di sc u ss i o n o f th e b as i s fo r th at determination. OR 2) (NOT E -an Int e rim a nd P e ri o dic R e v ie w r e quir es both "R es p o n s ibl e Mana ge r" AND a "Dir ec t o r o r Ab o v e" approv a l). If thi s CR or any C R closed to this C R are associated with safety relat e d equipment t h en conduct and document an interim r e vi e w of thi s Co ndition R e port u s ing th e " C R Int e rim and P e ri o d i c R e vi e w C h ec kli s t" , Att ac hm e nt 9.8 of EN-Ll-102 whi c h i s availab l e via the Refer e nce Library ECH Site in the Nu c lear Mana ge men t Manual Common F orms s ection. Consider an y op e n C As for Long Te rrn cl ass ific a tion per Attachment 9.9 of E N-Ll-10 2. Res pon se: S ub-r es pon se i s a cce ptbl c. S ubr es pon se : I nterim Re v iew and e-mail documenting Engineering Director approval are attached. WDB 2/11/2013 C l os ure C omm e nt s: Int e rim r ev i ew h as b ee n co mpl e t e d and approv e d by the e n g in ee rin g dir ec t or. T hi s ac ti o n i s co mpl e te a nd m ay be c lo se d. Jason Oliv e r a cting for Dou g Ed ge ll. 2-1 2-1 3 Attac h me n ts: S ubr es ponse D e scription Dir ec t o r a ppr o v a l e-m a il (M cC o y) S ubr es p o n se D esc ription I nte r im Review Attachment Header Doc u ment Name: un t it l ed Document Location ~ub r es p onse Descri p t i on Attach Ti t le: !Di r ecto r app r oval e-ma il (Mc C oy)
BARBOREK, W DOUGLAS From: S e nt: T o: C c:
 
==Subject:==
MCCOY, JAIME H Monday, February 11, 2013 1 :09 PM BARBOREK , W DOUGLAS; EDGELL , DOUGLAS W WOODSON, TIMOTHY R RE: REQUEST FOR REV I EW -Interim Review for CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 "Resolve I ndustry OE on Chloride I n duced Stress Corrosion Cracking on RV Flange Piping" I approve the inte r im review. I t hin k we had put t his on the P 02 m ajo r maintenance l ist for 1 R25. Please send an email to John Jacobs/Dustin Shoptaw/Randall Walt e rs with the O&M estimate for developing the c o ntingency plan including Areva cost -they need to get that in the 2014 budget (unless we need to do some of it this year). I thought that Randal was going t o ask for money to cov e r this. in his outag e budget , but he continues to ge t squeez e d so the site may ha ve to ea t it in O&M proj ec t s. If it e v e r turn s into an a c tu a l in s tall a tion , it might go capit a l at th a t time. Jaime From: BAffiOREK, W DOUGLAS Sent: Monday, February 11, 201312:57 PM To: MCCOY, JA I ME H; EDGELL, DOUGLAS W Cc: WOODOON , Tl MOTHY R
 
==Subject:==
REQUEST FOR REVIEW -I nterim Rev i ew for CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 "Reso l ve Industry OE on Ollo r ide Induced Stress Omos i on Cracking on RV Range Piping" Jaime & Doug , The interim review for the subject CR is attached for your rev i ew and concurrence.
T he draft inter i m rev i ew has been attached to CA-23 of the subject CR. The CA is ultimately due on Wednesday , February 13 , 2013. See e-mail string below from last year's IR. Since Corporate Project Management refused in 2012 (see attached e-mail) to accept the scope of this pressure test and contingency development , the pressure test will not occur in 1 R24. We will need to regroup and form a new plan if we are to pull this off for 1 R25. Thanks, Doug Barborek Entergy Operations, Inc. / Arkansas Nuclear One System Eng i nee r* Unit 1 Reactor Coo l ant System System Eng i neer i ng Build i ng/ N-SYE-4 w bar bo I @c nt crgy.co m 4 79-85 8-4337 j (b )(6) I p age r << M essnge: f'W: /\NOi RV Sea l Lea k Off Co ntin ge n cy>> << Fi l e: C R-AN0-1-2 00 8.0256 0 C A-23 Int e rim R ev i e w.d oc>> Fr o m: MCCOY, JA i ME H Sent: Wednesday , February 15 , 20121: 04 PM To: BARBOREK, W DOUGLAS; WILLI AMS , PATR I a< J Cc: EDGELL , DOUGLAS W
 
==Subject:==
RE: REQUEST FOR REVIEW -I nterim Rev i ew for CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 "Resolve I ndustry OE on Olloride I nduced Stress Corros i on Cracking on RV Range Piping" I approve the interim review. Linda -can you set up a meet i ng with Bauman, Edgell, Williams , Barborek , and myse l f?
J aime F r om: BAPBOREK , W DOUGLAS S e nt: Monday , February 13 , 2012 5:2 0 PM To: MCCOY, JAIMEH; WILLIAMS, PATR I O<J Cc: EDGELL , DOUGLAS W
 
==Subject:==
REQUEST FOR REVIEW -I nterim Rev i ew for CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 "Reso l ve Industry OE on Ollo r ide I nduced Stress Omos i on Oacking on RV Rang e Aping" Jaime & Patrick , The interim review for the subject CR is attached for your review and concurrence. T he draft interim rev i ew has been attached to CA-22 of the subject CR. The CA is ultimately due on Wednesday , February 15, 2012 (i n it ially due by me today). As we discussed last cycle , the pressure testing of the RV leak-off/pressure test connection piping needs to be turned over to the Project Management group. System Engineering does not have the ability or luxury to focus on a critical path activity like this to ensure it is coordinated and executed flawlessly during a refueling outage. An example which highlights this is the 1 R23 activity which I drove to obtain diametrical data and horoscope inspections of the leak-off ports to support development of contingency efforts. We all know that did not go well after it fell to the opposite shift , who were not fully engaged in the activity and ultimately only obtained half of the information I wanted to obtain. Part of that was my fault due to the fact that I could not even think about this inspection during the first 6 nights of the outage due to my other required inspections.
I would like to meet with you, and perhaps Project Management (David Bauman}, to discuss this issue and the ultimate transfer of responsibility for the pressure test to the PM organization.
Otherwise , I feel another outage will pass and we will still not have tested these lines to resolve the now 10 year old OE. Please let me know i f you h a ve any questions.
Thanks, Do u g B ar bor e k Ent e r gy Operati o ns. In c./ Arkan s a s Nuclear On e S y s t e m E n gi n ee r -U n i t l R e a c t o r Coo l ant Sys t e m Sy s tem En g ineerin g Buildin g/ N-SYS-4 w b a r bo I @e nt e r gy.co m 479-8 5 8-4 3 37 !(b )(6) << File: C R-AN 0-1-2 00 8-0 256 0 CA-22 lnt er i m R e v i e w.d oc>> 2 Document Name: un t it l ed Document Location ~ub r es p onse D escri p t i on Attach Title: !inte r im Rev i ew Attachment Header ATTACHMENT 9.8 CR INTERIM AND PERIODIC REVIEW FORM SHEET 1 OF 1 CR Interim and Periodic Review CR Numb er: CR-AN0-1-2008
-02560 Category Level D AD B IZI C CR Owner Group: ENG SYS MGMT ANO CR
 
== Description:==
 
1 R2 1 W0-0 01 02463 Task 01 was n o t ab l e to b e successfully perfo r med as p l an n ed. CR-AN0-1-2005-0 1 140 was written to d ocume n t OE from severa l p l ants wh i c h i de n tified co rr os i on (ch l o ri de) induced p i pe crack i ng i n r eac t or vessel (RV) f l ange l eak-off/pressure test connect i on p i ping resu l t i ng from wa t er l eft i n the p i p i n g follow i ng ref u e l i n g outages. AN0-1 was d e t erm i ned to be v u l nerable s i nce wa t er has been trapped i n th i s piping duri n g p rev i o u s operat i ng cyc l es. T he scope of W0-00 1 02463 was fo r System E n g i neering to a t tempt t o ex t e rn ally i n spec t the RV fl a nge l eak-off/p r essu r e test c o n ne c t i o n p i p i ng fo r ev i dence of cracki n g. T h e ins p ection approach was to ut i l i ze a bo r oscope to ex t ernally i nspect the p i p i ng v i a access thro u g h th e r eac t o r cav i ty seal p l ate openi n gs and betwee n t h e R V and the RV in s u l ation. Howeve r , d ue to the tight c l earances between the i ns u l ation and the RV , th e i nspectio n was not successfu l and the l eakoff/pressure co n nectio n p i p i ng cou l d n o t be vis u ally i n spec t ed as p l a n n ed. Since CR-AN0-1-2 0 05-0 1 14 0 was cl osed to W0-001 0 2463 , th i s CR was i n i ti ated to p r o v i de a means of tr a c ki n g an al te rnate reso l ut i on fo r ad d ress i ng the noted OE. As do cu me n te d i n th e 2005 CR, ANO p r o c e d u r es h ave b ee n revised to e n s u re th e s u bject p i pi ng is d ra i n ed dur i ng re fu el i ng o u t ages p ri or to i n stalli n g the RV head , th us m i tiga ti ng th e dama g e mec h an i sm. The operabil i ty statemen t i n CR-AN0-1-2005-0 1 140 r ema i ns app l i cab l e. CR Review: (All No responses require explanation be included.) Th e follow i ng CA's h ave b ee n i ssu e d to fu rther e va l u a te a c ourse of act i on req u ired t o address the OE d ocum ent e d i n CR-AN0-1-2005-01 1 40. Th e issua n ce of th ese ac t io n s cons ti t u tes a n accep t ab l e co rr ec ti ve action p l an for t h i s CR. A d d i tional CA's will b e i ss u ed as dee m ed approp ri a t e. Per past discussions with plant management , the pressure test scope was requested in 2012 to be transferred from the responsibility of System Engineering to Project Management to ensure successful 1R24 implementation. This was due to the coordination required to develop and implement the pressure test and due to the extensive contingency planning required , which includes AREVA support. This request was rejected by Corporate Project Management.
As such, resolution of this OE in 1 R24 will not occur due to lack of adequate resources. Resolution by 1 R25 is dependant solely on allocation of site resources , which at this time is unresolved. CA-02 [c l osed] -CR-AN0-1-2005-0 1 1 40 (CA-04) eva l uated the feasib i l i ty of perform i ng a h ydrostat i c test of the RV f l ange l eak-off/p r essu r e tes t connect i on p ip i ng a n d co n c l uded that such a t es t was not f eas i b l e. Base d on the i n ab i l it y to v i sually inspect th e pip i ng d u r ing 1 R2 1 (v i a b oroscope), revisit the f easib i l i t y of perfo r m i ng a hydrostatic test o n these l i nes to ver if y p i p i ng i n tegrity. Th i s CA was closed on 8/27/2009 to CA-07 wh i ch was in i t i a t ed f o r SYE t o i n i t i ate a new S IPOS Reco r d and p r esent to th e URT/MPRC to reco m me nd t h i s scope of work be , executed by t h e Projects Organ i zat i on. CA-0 3 [cl osed] -Dete r mine th e scope requi r ed to perform a di r ect v i s ual i n spect i on o f the RV flange lea koff/pressure test co n nec ti on pipi ng (i.e. removal of r eacto r cav i ty sea l p l a t e , co n c r ete sh i e l d bloc k s , and RV insu l at i on) i n the even t that no o th er option is i d ent i fi ed to ve r i f y the i n t eg ri ty o f the pipi n g. Thi s CA was closed on 8/27/2 0 09 to CA-07 w h i ch was i nit i a t ed for SYE to i n i tiate a new S IP DB Recor d and p r ese n t to the URT/MPRC to recommend th i s scope of wo rk be executed b y the Pro j ec t s Organ i zat i on. CA-07 [c l osed] -The inspection of th e RV F l a ng e Lea k-off & Press u r e Tes t Connect i on pipi n g r equ i res addit i o n a l r eso u rces and engineer i ng wh i ch transcends the role a n d r esponsibility of System E n g i neeri n g. In i tiate a new S IP DB Recor d a nd p r esent to the UR T/MPRC t o recommend th i s scope of wo r k be exec u te d by th e Projects O r gan i zatio n. SIPDB Reco r d 4955 was in i t i a t ed to tr ansfe r t h i s scope of wo rk t o the Projects Organiza ti on and t h i s CA was c l osed o n 11/19/2009.
New CA-08 wa s i ss ued to t r ac k the pr ese ntat i on o f S IPDB Record 4955 t o the URT. EN-Ll-102 REV 13 CA-08 [c l osed] -P r esent S I PDB R ecord (I nspection of the RV F l an g e Leak-off & Pressu r e T est Connect i o n P i p i ng) to the UR T/M PR C for th i s scope of w ork to be execu t ed by t he Projects O rg an i zat i on. SY E made the presentation at the 1 2/7/2009 URT mee t i ng. The URT concu rr ed that i f th e l eak-off & press ure te st connection pip i ng u l timately require physical i nspection o r rep l acement such tha t disassemb l y/r eassem b ly of the reac to r cav i ty seal plate , conc r ete sh i e ld b l oc k s, and r eacto r vesse l i nsu l atio n i s required , t he n that sig n ifi cant scope o f work would be tr ansferred to the P r o j ec t O r gan i zat i on. However , at t his time , the URT decided that System Eng i nee ri ng s h ould re-eva l uate the press u re test option and come up w i th a p l an to perfo rm a p r essu r e test on th e l eak-o f f and pressure te st connection p i p i ng t o ve ri fy th e i n teg ri ty o f th e pip i n g. If the p r essure te st fails o n o ne o r bo t h of th e l i nes , th e ensuing scope of work to access the p i pi n g for u l t i mate resolut i on of the iss u e would then be pursued by t he Projects O r gan i zat i on. New CA-09 has been i ssued to SYE t o de t e r m i ne a s u i tab l e p r essu r e t est m e th od and to i n i ti ate the pro p e r imp l emen t at i o n d ocu m en t a tion. 1 R2 2 w i ll be u ti li zed to perform scoping walkdowns s i n ce t h i s piping i s no t access i ble dur i n g power ope r a ti ons. Th i s CA was c l osed on 1/21/20 1 0. CA-09 [c l osed] -Coor d i n ate with EP&C perso n nel and d ete r m i ne a s u i tab le p r essu r e t est m et h od fo r the RV flange l eak-off/pressure t est connect i on p i p i ng, and i nit i a t e the proper im p l ementat i on documentation.
Uti l i ze 1 R22 to pe rf orm scopi n g wa l kdowns as requi r ed. In i ti ate othe r co rr ec ti ve ac ti ons as r equ i r ed. Comp l eted by SYE on 1 0/25/20 10. CA-1 0 was i n i t i ated fo r SYE to ass i gn fo ll ow u p co rr ective act i ons as r equ i r ed to imp l eme nt the p r essu r e test p l an i n 1 R 23 v i a W0-00 1 95437. CA-1 O was comple t ed o n 1 1/1 7 /201 O by SYE a n d CA-1 1 and CA-1 2 we r e i ni ti ated as a r es u l t. CA-1 1 [c l osed] -D eve l op EC to support W0-00 1 95 4 37. If requ i red, p ro v i de j ust i fication fo r installation of coupli n gs on the affec t ed CCC-6 p i p i n g. A l so, i f requ i red, provide eng i neeri n g r eq u i r ements for FME co n tro l s associated w ith the p r essure t est eq u i pment and components to be used in c l ose prox i m i ty to the RV f l ange. CA closed on 7/21/20 1 1 w it h no actio n taken s i n ce pressure test plan no l onger r equ i r es cu tti ng/capp i ng p i ping (iso l at i on va l ves RBS-1 & RC-5 w i ll be u sed as the p re ssu re boundary). CA-12 [c l osed] -Dete r mine t he app r opr iat e type & s i ze of h ydro plugs t o be uti l ized fo r the p r ess u r e t est (W0-00 1 95437) outl i ned in CA-09. I n i ti ate ac ti ons to procure the hydro plugs, as r equ i r ed. CA co m p l eted by SYE on 6/9/201 1. CA-18 i ssued to SYE t o deve l op CA TID's (i f requ i red). CA-14 [c l osed]-Prov i de input to Ou t age P&S to ensu r e 1 R23 W0-00 1 9543 7 is prope rl y planned for perfo r mance o f the CCC-6 p i ping pressure test. CA closed by SYE on 5/5/201 1 s i nce the WO was deferred to 1R24. CA-1 5 [ c l osed] -Per EN-OU-100, i dent i fy any required contingency p l ans f or 1 R23 w h i ch are requ i r ed to suppo rt t he pressure test of the CCC-6 p i ping. I ssue follow-up CA's as requ i r ed. CA closed by SY E o n 5/18/2012 since t h e WO was deferred to 1 R 24. CA-16 -Following implementation of W0-00195437 during 1 R23, document that the applicable OE has been adequately addressed for AN0-1. CA assigned to SYE. Current due date is 5/30/2013 which follows completion of 1 R24. Will have to be extended again since this work is not going to be performed in 1R24 due to lack of resources and contingency planning.
CA-17 [c l osed] -Pr esent S IPD R eco r d 5678 to t h e URT t o r equest r eass i gnme n t of the RV F l ange l eakoff/press u re t es t connec ti on piping p r ess u re t est (W0-00 1 95437) fr om System Eng i nee r ing t o Project Management for 1 R24 imp l emen t at i on. CA-1 8 [c l osed] -Develop CAT ID s for t h e t est p l ugs spec i fied i n CA-1 2. I ssue a d d it ional cor re c ti ve act i o n s as req u ired t o ensure mater i al i s pledged to W0-00 1 95437. CA c l osed on 2/22/20 1 2 since th e hy , d r o plugs a re a t ool and n ot a stock i tem. CA-20 -Ensure W0-00195437 is implemented in 1 R24. This WO has been deferred to 1 R24 as documented in the attached 1R23 SCR 11049. Issue additional corrective actions as required to support 1 R24 resolution of this issue. This CA is being classified as a L TCA. Current due date is EN-Ll-102 REV 13 5/29/2013, based on anticipated completion of 1R24. This CA will have to be extended again to 1R25 since this work will not be performed in 1R24 due to lack of resources and contingency planning.
CA-21 [c l osed] -I ncorpo r ate P I F 1-1 1-0621 to OP-1 203.0 1 2 H , P IF 1-11-0622 to OP-1 015.036, P IF 1-11-0623 to OP-1 102.0 1 5, a n d P l F 1-1 1-0624 to OP-1 103.0 02 to c h ange t h e co n figu r ation of valves RBS-1 and RBS-2 from no rm a ll y closed to n orma ll y open for Cycle 24 operat i on. T his cha n ge has been app r ove d by EC-32271. CA c l osed by O p era t io n s on 11/16/201 1. RBS-1 and RBS-2 are c ur r ent l y open for Cyc l e 24 operation whic h el i minates the potentia l for pressurizing the leak-off piping i n the event o f inne r o-r ing leakage. 1. Will the existing corrective actions documented in the condition report, when completed, correct the cond i tion report issue? Yes~/ No D I mp l ementation of W0-00195437 will reso l ve this issue , assu m i n g n o deg r a d a t io n is d iscove r e d. S in ce additio n a l CA's are expected between n ow a nd 1 R25 , the CR will r emain open through 1 R25 a nd w ill b e cl osed f ollowing comp l etion o f CA-1 6 & CA-20. 2. What is the expected CR Closure date based on remaining needed actions? DATE: 11/30/2014 I t i s ant i c i pated t h at th i s CR w i ll b e closed fo ll ow i n g 1 R25 imp l eme n ta ti o n o f the pressu r e test and comp l etion of CA-16 & CA-20. Ta r get date is 11/30/20 1 4. If degradation is fo u nd, a n ew CR will be i n i tiate d d u r ing 1R25. 3. Is the previously documented operability/functionality position still valid for the current condition and expected to remain valid until CR closure? Yes / No D /N/A D If the answer is NO , then initiate a new CR to document the concern; CR# N I A 4. Are all Ll-102 requirements for corrective action administration and control being met , i.e. justifications for Due Date Extensions valid, Long Term Corrective Actions identified, CARB approved CAPRs identified, and appropriate approvals obtained for all? Yes~/ No D 5. What risk to plant operation is imposed by the condition identified and how is risk reduced to an acceptable level for the duration of the action plan? Th i s CR does n ot s p eci fi ca ll y identify a known d egrade d p l a n t system, str u cture, or component at A N 0-1 , but does i denti fy a potential deg r adatio n mecha n ism. Bo th the R V f la n ge gaske t leak detection l i n e and pressure test connectio n lines we r e fl u shed/d r ained duri n g 1R 1 9, 1 R20, 1 R2 1 , 1 R22 a nd 1 R23 , th us min i mizi n g the potentia l for fa i l u re resu l t i ng from I D i n i t i ate d , chlo ri de in d uced , tr a n sgra n ular stress-co r rosion c r acki n g (TGSCC). No RV fl ange gasket l eakage was i de n tified d uri n g p la n t h eat-u p fr om 1R1 9 , 1 R20 , 1 R21 , o r 1 R22 pri o r to iso l a ti ng va l ves RBS-1 & RBS-2 fo r p l ant o p erat i on. RBS-1 & RBS-2 we r e lef t o pe n for Cy cl e 24 to prevent pressur i zation of the pipi n g i n the eve nt o f an i n n er a-r i ng leak. I t is a n tic i pated th a t t h ese va l ves will be open fo r Cycle 25 operation as we l l. RCS l eakage ra t es following 1R 1 9 , 1 R20, 1 R2 1 , 1 R22 and 1 R23 have not i n d i cated the p r esence of a n y concu rr e n t l ea k age of th e RV flange gaskets and l eak detect io n/p ressure test co nn ec tion p i p ing/compo n ents. The RV flange gaskets a r e rep l aced dur i ng eac h refuel i ng o u tage a n d va l ves RBS-1 a n d RBS-2 were l e ft o p en fo r Cyc l e 24 operatio n. The like l i hood of i nner gas k et l eakage , w h i l e poss i b le, is cons i dered l ow. I n conc l u s i on , the ri sk to plant o p era ti on i s m i n im al a n d r educed to accep t ab le leve l s unti l the act i on plan for th i s CR can be i mp l e m e n ted d uri ng 1 R25. Review/ Approval Required: Director/GM Title: Date: -----(Print name & Position title) EN-Ll-102 REV 13 NOTE: The expectation is to capture the discussion poin t s of this form in a CA. The form itself need not be used , but all points app l icable must be addressed. EN-Ll-1 02 REV 1 3 Ent e rgy I CORRECTIV E ACTION I C R-AN0-1-2008-025 6 0 CA N umb e r: 24 G roup Ass i g n e d By: E ng Sy s t e m s & Comp s Mgmt ANO Asstg n e d To: E n g Sy s t e m s & Comp s M g mt ANO S ub ass i g n ed T o : E n g S ys tem s NSS S Staff ANO Or i g i nate d By: Zz ANO C RG **lH E A u se only** P erfor m e d By: Wood s on P.E., Timothy R S ub pe r fo rm e d By: Barb o r c k , W D o u g la s A ppr ove d By: C lo sed By: Edge ll , Douglas W C ur re n t Du e D ate: 0 2/1 2/2014 CA T y p e: PERIODIC REVIEW Pl a nt C on s tr a int: NONE CA D es cript io n: Na m e E dg e ll , Dougla s W Wood so n P.E., Timothy R Barbor c k , W Dou g la s l/2 7/2014 09:55: 2 1 2/1 0/2 014 2 1 :0 I : 2 4 2/10/2 014 15:02:01 2/12/2014 07:10:59 I n i t i a l Du e Date: 02/1 2/2 014 CA P ri o ri ty: 4 Int e rim a nd P e ri o di c R e vi ew R e quir e d -C omp l e t e on e o f th e fo llowin g: I) I f t his CR and all CR s closed to this C R ar e NOT a ss ociated with Safety Related E quipment tben , clearly do c ument in this ac ti o l!l th a t this C R i s not assoc iat e d with Sa f e ty R e lat e d Equipm e nt. In c lude a bri e f di sc u ss i o n o f th e b as i s for th at determination. OR 2) (NOT E -an Int e rim a nd P e ri o dic R e v ie w r e quir es both "R es p o n s ibl e Mana ge r" AND a "Dir ec t o r o r Ab o v e" approv a l). If this CR or any C R closed to thi s CR are associated with safety relat e d equipment t h en conduct and document an interim r e vi e w of thi s Co ndition R e port u s ing th e " C R Int e rim and P e ri o d i c R e vi e w C h ec kli s t" , Att ac hm e nt 9.8 of EN-Ll-102 whi c h i s availab l e via the Refer e nce Library ECH Site in the Nu c lear Mana ge men t Manual Common F orms s ection. Consider any op e n C As for Long Te rrn cl a s s ific a tion per Attachment 9.9 of E N-Ll-10 2. Res pon se: Concur with s ub-r es pon s e S ubr es pon se : I nterim Re v iew is attached. E-mail docu m enting D irector approval is a l so a t tached. WDB 2/10/2014 C l os ur e C omm e nt s: I co n c ur with clo s ur e o f this c orr ec tiv e a c tion. At t ac h me n ts: S ubr es p o n se D es cription In t erim Review S ubrespon se D e scr i ption e-m a il d oc umentin g Dir ec t o r ap pr ov a l Document Name: un t it l ed Document Location ~ub r es p onse D escri p t i on Attach Title: !inte r im Rev i ew Attachment Header BARBORB<, W DOUGLAS Fr o m: Sent: To: Cc: SUbj e ct: I appro v e t he i n t er i m re v ie w. M CCDY, JA.IM EH S.mday , February 09, 2014 10:16 PM BAROOREK, W DOUGLAS; EDGaL, DOUGLAS W WOODSJN , TIMOTHY R RE: REQUEST FOR REVIEW -I nte r im Review for CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 "Resolve I ndustry OE on O,lo r ide I nduced $ress C.orrosion Qacking on RV Range Piping" Is this in a.ment 1 R25 outage g;ope? If it is not, then we need to have aO&M project added to 2015 b ud ge t to oont r act Areva to develop t heoon ti ngency plan/ro ll ed plug, oo we can do in 1 R26. I f it is, then i t appears we are behind t he funding 8ball because there i s not an O&M project t h a t I k now of i n 20 14 b udget f o r this i te m ... ..aime From: BARBOREK , W DOUGLAS Sent: T hursday , February 06, 2014 4:39 Pfv1 To: MCCOY, JAJ ME H; EDGELL, DOUG.AS W Cc: WOODSJN, T l MOTHY R
 
==Subject:==
REQUEST FOR REVIEW -I nterim Review for CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 "Resolve Industry OE on Ch l oride I nduced Stress Corrosion Qacking on RV Flange Piping" Jaime & Doug , The inter i m review for the subject CR is attached for your review and concurrence.
The draft interim review has been atta c hed to CA-24 of the subject CR. The CA i s ultimately due on Wednesday , February 12 , 20 1 4. See e-mail string below from 2012's IR. Since Corporate Project Management refused in 2012 (see attached mail) to accept the scope of this pressure test and contingency development , the pressure test did not occur in 1 R24. We will need to regroup and form a new plan if we are to pull this off for 1 R25. Thi s effort is once again in jeopardy for 1 R25 due to lack of avail a ble resources. Th a nk s , Doug Barborek E n t e rg y O p e r a t i o n s, I n c. I Ark a n sas N uc l ea r On e Sys t em E ng i nee r -Un i t 1 Reacto r Coo l a nt System S y s t e m E n gi n ee r i ng Bui l d i ng/ N-S Y E-4 wba r b o I @e n t e r gy.co m 479-858-4337 !(b )(6) l p ag e r << M essage: F W: AN O! R V S e a l L ea k Off C ont i n g e n c y>> << F i l e: C R-ANO-l-2 00 8-0 25 60 CA-24 lnt e r i m Review.do c>> From: MCCOY , JA i ME H S e nt: Wednesd a y , Fe br u ary 1 5 , 2012 1:04 PM To: BARBOREK, W DOUG.AS; WILLIAMS , P ATRIO<J Cc: EDGELL , DOUGLAS W 
 
==Subject:==
RE: REQUEST FOR REV I EW -I nterim Review for CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 "Resolve I ndustry OE on Olloride I nduced Stress Corrosion Oacking on R V Range Piping" I approve the interim review. Linda -can you se t up a meeting w i th Bauman , Edge ll , W il l iams , Barborek , and myself? Jaime From: BARBOREK , W DOUGLAS Sent: M onday , February 1 3 , 20 12 5: 20 Pfv1 To: MCCOY , JAi ME H; W I LL I AMS , PATR I O< J Cc: EDGEL L , DOUGLAS W
 
==Subject:==
REQ U EST FOR REVIEW -I nterim Review for CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 "Resolve Industry OE on Ol l oride I nduced Stress Corrosion Oacking on RV Range Piping" J aime & P atrick , The inter i m review for the subject CR is attached for your review and concurrence. The draft interim review has been attached t o CA-22 of the subject CR. The CA is ultimately due on Wedn es d a y , F e bruary 1 5 , 2012 (initia l l y due by me t oday). As we discussed last cycle , the pressure testing of the RV leak-off/pressure test connection piping needs to be turned over to the Project Management group. System Engineering does not have the ability or luxury to focus on a critical path activity like this to ensure it is coordinated and executed flawlessly during a refueling outage. An example which highlights this is the 1 R23 activity which I drove to obtain diametrical data and horoscope inspections of the leak-off ports to support development of contingency efforts. We all know that did not go well after it fell to the opposite shift , who were not fully engaged in the activity and ultimately only obtained half of the information I wanted to obtain. Part of that was my fault due to the fact that I could not even think about this inspection during the first 6 nights of the outage due to my other required inspections.
I would like to meet with you , and pe r haps Project Management (David Bauman}, to discuss this issue and the ultimate transfer of responsibility for the pressure test to the PM organization.
Otherwise , I feel another outage will pass and we will still not have tested these lines to resolve the now 10 year old OE. P l ease l et me know if you have any q u est i ons. Than k s, D o u g B arb o re k Entergy Operation s, In c./ Arkansas N u clea r One Sy s t e m Eng in ee r -U n it I Reactor Coolan t System Sy s tem E ng i neering Build in g/ N-SYS-4 wba rb o I@c nt c r gy.co m 479-858-4337 !(b )(6) I pa ge r << F il e: CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-22 In t e rim R e v i ew.d oc>> 2 Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA N umb e r: 25 G roup Ass i g n e d By: Eng Systems & Comps Mgmt ANO Asst g n e d To: E n g Systems NSSS Staff ANO S uba ss i g n ed T o : Originated By: Woodson P.E., Timothy R P e rform e d B y: S ubp e rform e d By: Approved By: C lo sed By: C ur re nt Du e Date: 09/03/2015 CA T y p e: CAT C-CORRECT Plant C on s traint: NONE CA D es cription:
Na m e Woodson P.E.,T imothy R Barborek, W Douglas l/2 1/2 015 1 6: 23:34 Initi a l Du e Date: 09/04/2 015 CA Priorit y: 3 Based on the l/1 5/2015 EC RG meeting , S IPD-5 678 "ANO! -R eso l ve OE on RV F l ange Leak-off/Press Test Connect i on Pi pe Cracking" was not approved for I R 26 but was deferred to I R27 by the EC R G due to a l ack of ava ilab l e Engineeri n g resources.
To s upport the 1R 27 efforts to resolve this 2 003 O E, obtain a cost estimate from AREY A to design and qualify a rolled tube plug which can be installed into th e l eak-off port(s) as a one cyc l e co ntin ge n cy if the pre ss ur e test reveal s degradat i on in the leak-off piping. Also , obta i n AREVA estimate to perform the pr essure test and in stall the rolled tube plug(s) (if required) as a turnkey effort in 1R 27. Once information i s obtained, present the S l PD to the ECRG fo r fundi n g of the AREVA contract(s) and assignment/funding of the required engineering re so ur ces for EC deve l opment to support IR 27 implementation.
R espo n se: S ubr es pon se : C losure C omm e nt s:
Ent e rgy I CORRECTIV E ACTION I C R-AN0-1-2008-025 6 0 CA N umb e r: 26 G roup Ass i g n e d By: E ng Systems & Co mp s M gmt ANO Asstg n e d To: E n g Systems NSSS Staff ANO S ub ass i g n ed T o : Or i g i nate d By: Barborek, W Douglas P erfor m e d By: Barborek , W D oug l as S ub pe r fo rm e d By: A ppr ove d By: C lo sed By: Wood son P.E., Timoth y R C ur re n t Du e D ate: 07/24/2015 CA T y p e: CA T C-CO RRECT Pl a nt C on s tr a int: NONE CA D es cript io n: Na m e Woodson P.E.,T im othy R Barborek, W Dougla s 5/13/2015 1 6: 39:3 1 7/16/20 1 5 1 0:58: 1 0 7/16/2 015 15:56:40 I n i t i a l Du e Date: 07/2 4/2 015 CA P ri o ri ty: 3 Contact AREY A and det e rmin e i f s uffic i e nt AREY A r eso ur ces are avai l able to s upp o ri qualific at i on of the r olled tube plug co ntin ge n cy in time to s upp o rt I R26 PO Mil estone P0-1 6 (2/4/20 1 6). lfnot , determine i f AREVA ca n s upport a date after the P0-16 Milestone but p rior t o the start of 1 R26. Res p o n se: CA R EQUEST: Con t act A R E Y A and d e t e rmin e if s u ffic i e nt A R EY A re so urce s are ava il ab l e to s upport qualification of the roll e d tub e plug co ntin gency in time to support LR 26 PO Mil estone P0-16(2/4/20 1 6). I f not , d ete rmin e if AREY A can support a date after th e P0-1 6 Mil es t o n e but p ri o r to th e sta rt of l R 26. CA R ES PO NSE: Per the attached e-mai l from AREVA , A R EY A b e li eves th e rolled tube plu g opt i on i s v i ab l e for I R 26. T h e I R 26 PO Milestones may not be a b le to be met: how eve r , due to the curren t RV flange inner o-r in g lea kag e and the inability to iso l a t e i t due to the unre so l ved Davi s Be sse OE , Syste m E n g in eering i s go in g t o pur s ue see kin g approva l fo r a I R 26 p r ess ur e t es t and a ppro va l to deve l op th e rolled tube plug co ntin gency with AREY A. CA-27 w i ll dr i ve Sy s tem Engineering to re-present SI PD R ecord 5678 t o th e EC R G o n ce aga in for I R 26 cons i derat i o n. B ased on th e r es ult s of th e ECRG me e tin g, ad diti o nal Corrective Actions w ill be initi ated as required to p e r fo m1 the pressure test and co ntin gency measures in I R 26 (o r IR2 7), as determin e d by th e EC RG. T?ve r ev i ewe d the CA r es pon se u si n g the CA Qu a lity W I LL S h eet and EN-Ll-1 02 a nd conclude that it is a ppropriat e for closure. WDB 7/1 6/2015 S ub res pon se : C l os ur e Co mm e n ts: Con cur with su b-res p onse, actio n may b e closed. Attac hm e n ts: R esponse De sc ripti o n e-ma il AR E VA to B arbo rek d ate d 7-9-20 1 5 Attachment Header Document Name: un t it l ed Document Location !Response Descr ipt i on Attach Title: ~-ma i l AREVA to Barborek d a te d 7-9-2015 BARBORB<, W DOUGLAS From: Sent: S<UUNA Dave (AREVA) <Dav i d.S<u l ina@areva.com> Thu r sday , JJly 09 , 20 1 5 8:49 AM To: BARBOREK, W DOUGLAS Subj e ct: RE: ANO Leak off line -question I have not yet. Due to drrumstances, the critical personne l are not immediately availab l e. I will get yo u a status of the proposal effort A'2:AP. I apologize for the delay. However , I am confident that we can support the effort during your next roiedu l ed outage. Fegards, Dave David Skulina Project Manag e r , Busin ess D e ve l opm e nt AREVA, Inc. 3315 Old For e st Road (OF53) Lynchburg , VA 24501 Office: 434-832-2621 Mob i le: !(b)(6) I Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail o ert and is intended so l e l y for the addressees.
Re roduction and From: BARBOREK , W DOUGLAS [mailto:WBARB01@entergy
.com] Sent: T hursday, J uly 09 , 2015 9:24 AM To: SKU Li N A Dave (RSI IB)
 
==Subject:==
RE: ANO Leak off line -question Dave, Have you heard anything from AFEVA 81gineering
& OJtage Sarvices regarding the feasibility of deve l oping/qualifying the rolled tube plug design fo r our Sapt 2016 FFO? I would assJme tha t we need to get started on this effort pre tt y soon. I n l ight of our current si t uation, I thin k I could serure the f unds to make it happen. Qment R:Sunidentified l eakage has been holding fairly steady over the l ast week around 0.070 gpm. We are about 0.030 to 0.035 gpm higher than a month ago .... so about doubled. Thanks , Doug Barborek 8'1 t ergy Q:ierations, Inc./ Ar ka n sas N udear Ole S,,stem Eiig in eer-A N0-1 & AN0-2 ~acto r ():)o l ant S,,stems an d AN0-1 !:pent Fi.J e l ():)o lin g & Pur i fication S,,stem S,,stem 8'1g in eer i ng Bui l di ng/ N-SY&4 wbarbo1@en t ergy.com 479-858-4337 (office) !(b )(6) !(p ager)
Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I C R-A N 0-1-2008-02560 C orr ec ti ve A ction : C R-AN 0-1-2 008-02 56 0 CA-000 2 6 Ve r si on: R e qu e s te d Du e da te: 06/2 5/2015 R e qu ested B y: B a rb o r e k , W Do ug l as A ppr ove d By: Woo d s on P.E., Ti m o th y R R e qu e st D e sc rip t i o n: A ppr o v e d: r ,/ Prev i o u s Du e d a t e: 06/1 2/20 1 5 06/1 1/20 1 5 06/1 1/2 01 5 AREVA (Dav i d Sku li na) ha s bee n co nt acted co n ce rnin g t h e fe as i bi lity of d eve l op i n g t h e r ol l e d tu be p lu g cont in g ency in t i me for I R2 6 exec u tio n. A res po nse fr om AREY A E n g i neeri n g an d AREY A Outa ge Serv i ces is s t ill pen d i n g. As s u c h, t hi s CA i s b e ing e xt e nd e d two w ee k s to obta i n a r es p o n se from AREVA. T hi s C A is a d mi n i s trat i v e i n na t ure a nd th e e xt e n s i on o f th e d ue d a t e b y two wee k s to 6/25/2 01 5 h as no i mp act on in sta ll e d pl a n t S SCs. As s u c h , the DO E i s necessary a nd acce p tab l e. WDB 6/11/20 1 5 A pp roved De s c ripti o n: I s t ODE a p p r o ve d fo r thi s c o rr ec t i v e ac t i on , work i s n e a ri ng c omp l e t i on.
Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Corrective Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00026 Version: 2 Reque ste d Duedate: 07/24/2015 Requested By: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: Woodson P.E., Timothy R Reque st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Duedat e: 06/25/20 15 06/19/2015 06/2 1/2015 AREVA (Dav id Skulina) was co nt acted aga in on 6/19/20 1 5 concern in g the feasibility of developing the r olled tube plug contingency in time for I R26 execution.
A response from AREY A Engineering an d AREY A Outa ge Services i s sti ll p en d i n g at t hi s t im e, and the CA a s s i gnee wi ll b e off s it e during th e w e e k thi s CA i s actua ll y du e (du e o n 6/25/20 1 5). As s uch , thi s CA is being exten ded to 7/2 4/2015 to allow a dd it ion a l time to obtain a response from AREY A a nd to account for the ava ilabili ty of the CA assignee , who will be out of the office for two of the next three weeks. Th i s CA i s administrative i n nat u re and the extens i o n of the due date to 7/24/2015 has no impa ct on installed pla n t SSC s. As s uch , the DDE is n ece s sa t y and acceptab l e. WDB 6/19/2015 Approved
 
== Description:==
 
DDE approved.
Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA N umb er: 27 G roup Ass i gned By: E ng Systems & Co mp s M gmt ANO Asst g ned To: E n g Systems NSSS Staff ANO S uba ss i g n ed To : Originated By: Barborek, W Douglas P e rform ed B y: S ubp e rform ed By: Approved By: Closed By: Current Due Date: 08/27/2015 CA Type: CA T C-CO RRECT Plant Constra int: NONE CA
 
== Description:==
 
Na m e Woodson P.E.,T im othy R Barborek, W Dougla s 5/13/2015 1 6: 39: 42 Initial Du e Date: 08/28/2015 CA Priorit y: 3 Ba sed o n the results ofCA-26 , rev i se and pre se nt S lPD R eco rd 5678 to the EC RG o n ce agai n for lR26 cons id e r at i on. Based o n the re s ult s of the EC RG meeting , ini tiate add i tiona l Corrective Act i o n s as r equ i re d to perform th e pre ss ur e test and conti n gency measures in lR26 (o r 1R27), as d etermined by the EC RG. Response:
S ubr es pon se : C lo s ur e Co mm e nt s:
Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I C R-A N 0-1-2008-02560 C orr ec ti ve A ction : C R-AN 0-1-2 008-02 56 0 CA-000 2 7 Ve r si on: R e qu este d Du e da te: 08/28/2015 R e qu ested B y: Barborek , W Dou g l as A ppr ove d By: Woodson P.E.,Ti mothy R R e qu est Desc rip t i o n: A ppr o v e d: r ,/ Prev i o u s Du e d a t e: 06/26/20 15 06/1 9/2015 06/2 1/2015 Thi s CA i s d ependa nt on the re s pon s e to CA-26. CA-26 ha s been ex t e nded to 7/24/20 1 5. Therefore , thi s CA require s extension and is bein g extended to 8/28/2015 to allow time to updat e S I PD record 5678 and to make the pr esentation to the EC RG. Th e ex t e n s i on of th e due dat e t o 8/28/20 1 5 does not h ave a ny d ele t e ri ou s im pact on any in s t a ll e d plant SSC s and i s therefore acceptable.
WDB 6/19/2015 A ppr oved D esc ription: ODE approved.
Ent e rgy I CORRECTIV E ACTION I C R-AN0-1-2008-025 6 0 CA N umb e r: 28 G roup Ass i g n e d By: Eng Systems & Comps Mgmt ANO Asstg n e d To: E n g Systems NSSS Staff ANO S ub ass i g n ed T o : Or i g i nate d By: Woodson P.E., Timothy R P erfor m e d By: Barborek, W D oug l as S ub pe r fo rm e d By: A ppr ove d By: C lo sed By: Woodson P.E., Timothy R C ur re n t Du e D ate: 06/05/2015 CA T y p e: GENERAL ACTION Pl a nt C on s tr a int: NONE CA D es cript io n: Na m e Woodson P.E.,T imothy R Barborek, W Douglas 5/2 1/2 015 1 6:47:10 6/4/20 1 5 1 2: I 0:34 6/4/2015 14:28:22 I n i t i a l Du e Date: 06/05/2 015 CA P ri o ri ty: 5 CR-ANO-L-20 1 5-01950 was Administratively C l osed to this CR. As R espons ibl e Manager for this CR, ensure tb at the condition docum e nt ed in that CR i s appropriately addressed within the scope of this CR's Correct i ve Action Plan. CR-AN0-1-20 1 5-0 19 50 Condit i on D esc: CR-ANO-l-20 15-0 1 936 was written to doc ument a K09-Fl (Reactor Ve ssel H ead Gasket Leak) alarm received at 0713 on 4/25/2015. If determined to be a valid a farm , this wou l d indicate that leaka ge is occurring past the inner o-ring (gasket) on the Reactor Vessel Closure Head (R VCH). This CR is being initiated to make the site aware that in the event that actual RVCH o-ring leakage i s co nfirm ed to be occur rin g, th e RV Gasket Leak Detection I so l a ti on Valve s RBS-I and RBS-2 can n ot be closed to isolate the leak since the 2003 Davis Besse OE concerning potential chloride induced stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of the RVCH Leak-off lines ha s not been resolved for ANO-I (ref. open CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 a nd closed CR-AN0-1-2005-0 1 140). Since this OE h as not been re so l ve d , the two RV C H leak-off lines s hould not be allowed to pre ssurize by clo sing RBS-I and RBS-2 until the integrity of the piping is confirmed v i a a refueling outage pressure te s t of the p ipin g (CCC-6 line c l ass) at it s Design Pressure (2500 psig). Jfthe structura l integrity of the piping i s in fact degraded by SCC, failure of the piping due to pressuri zat ion could ultimately result in boric acid corrosion of the external surface of t he R eac t or Vessel. For this reason , inner o-ring leaka ge cannot be miti gated by c lo s in g RBS-I and RB S-2 a nd thus sh iftin g the boundary to the outer o-ring a nd leak-off piping. The inabi l ity to isolate an inn e r o-ring leak could re s ult in the le ak becoming incr easi ngly worse and result in a p l ant sh utdown due to exceeding Tech Spec leakage limi t s and could potent i ally r esu l t in erosion of the o-ring/gasket seating surface. System Engineering initiated W0-00195437 (WR-OOI64196) in May 2009 to perform a pre ss ure test of the two RVCH L eak-off lin es during I R22. Th e pressure test ha s been co ntinually deferred and is c urr en tly not sched ul ed to occur until IR 27 due to lack of allocation of funds and resource s to develop the contingency measures required in the event d egra dation i s discovered during the pre ss ure te st. The contin ge ncy measures in clude a (one operating cycle) qualification ofa rolled tube plu g which would isolate one or both of the le ak-off lines at the (ASME C lass I) RV leak-off port(s) until repa i r s could be enac t e d during the s ub seq uent refueling outage. It is noted that the s ubj ect piping is inaccessible and would require destrnctive removal of portions of the permanent reactor cavity sea l plate , removal of the concrete s hield blocks around the RV , and removal of RV in s ul at i on in order to access the s ubject piping for repa ir/re p l acement. System En gi n ee rin g ha s previou s ly in i tiated S I PD R eco rd 4955 ( I 1/18/2009) and S l PD R ec ord 5678(5/5/20 1 1) t o r eq u es t funding/resourc es for th e development of th e pressure test a nd r equ ir e d con tin gency measures.
During the 1/1 5/20 l 5 ECRG me et in g, the pre ss ure te s t was once again deferred t o I R27 due to the lack of avai l able Engineering r eso urc es t o oversee development of the required contingency measures.
Note that since th e initiation of th e 2003 Davis Besse OE , RVCH leak-off piping d egra dation h as been discovered at other B&W, CE a nd Westinghou se PWR s. Thi s CR , lik e previous C R-AN0-1-2 005-0 1140 and CR-ANO-l-2008-02560, does not id cnt i fy known d egradation of a pla nt SSC , but rather the potentia l for degradation of a plant SSC based on indu stry OE.
Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 Response:
CA REQUEST: C R-AN0-1-20 1 5-01950 was Administratively C lo se d to thi s CR. As R espons ibl e Manag er for this C R , e nsur e that th e condition documented in that CR i s appropriately addressed with in the scope of this C R's Corrective Act i on P lan. CA RESPONSE:
C R-AN0-1-20 15-01950 identifies the same cond ition originally documented i n this CR (CR-AN0-1-2008-02560).
As documented in CA-25 , t h e pressure test o f the l eak-off lin es i s current l y n ot scheduled until 1 R27. In s ummary , the c urr e nt CA P l an outlined in CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 is: CA-25 -Obtain a cost estimate from AREY A to design/qualify the rolled tu be p lu g contingency to be used foll o wing pressure testing of the l eak-off piping and obta i n fu ndin g to move forward with con tin gency deve l opment; CA-26 -Determine i f AREY A could support perform i ng the rolled tube plu g design/qualification in a timeframe suitable to s upport I R26; CA-27 -If AREVA can sup port 1 R26 , re-pre se nt S JPD R ecord 5678 to EC RG for I R26 cons id erat i on i nstead of I R27. Based on the condition documented in C R-AN0-1-20 15-02 179 (RV inn er o-ring appears to be l eaking) and the current CA Plan for CR-AN0-1-2008-02560, the fo ll ow in g addit i o n a l co rr ec tiv e act i on h as b ee n ini tiated to dr i ve the replace m e nt of the leak-off detection li ne and to permanently remove and cap the pres s ure test connection l ine to u l tima t ely resolve the Davis Besse (and ot her p l ants) O E, re ga rdle ss of w h ether or not t h e piping passes a future one-t im e pressure t est. This action i s ult i mate l y required since the likelihood of having induced chloride-induced intergranu l ar stress corrosion cracking (lGSC C) i s considered high based on past ANO-I operating practices.
T h e performance of a one-time pressure t est will n ot ens ur e that future wetting & pressurization of th i s piping does not result in further propa ga tion and fa ilur e ofan ex i st in g l GSCC flaw. CA-29 -Initiate S IP D Re co rd to repla ce the leak-off detection line and to permanent l y remove and cap th e p r es s ure test co nn ectio n lin e to u lt im ate l y r eso l ve the Davis B esse (and othe r plants) OE, rega r d l ess of w h e ther or n ot the pipin g passes a future one-time pressure test. This action is ul timate ly re q uired si n ce the lik e lih ood of having i n duced ch l oride-induced int ergra nu la r stress corros i o n cracki n g (I GSCC) i s cons id ered hi g h ba se d o n pa s t AN O-I operat in g practic es (i.e. water l eft in pressure test connection piping for 30+ years). The perfonnanc e of a one-time pre ss ure test will not ens ure that future wetting & pressurizat i on of this pip in g does not re su l t in further pr opagation and fai l ure of an existing I GSCC flaw. Initiat e addit i onal corrective act i ons as required to o bt ain approval the S IP D r ecord scope. The issuance of CA-29 , a lo ng w i th the balance ofope n corrective actions for C R-AN0-1-2008-02560 , constitu t es an acceptab l e CA p lan fo r the condition documented in C R-AN0-1-2 015-0 1 950. Add iti ona l co rrective act i ons wi ll be iss u ed as required as the existing corrective act ion s are comp l eted. WDB 6/4/2015 Subres pon se : C lo s ur e Co mment s: Concu r with response , action i s complete.
Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA N umb er: 29 G roup Ass i gned By: Eng Systems & Comps Mgmt ANO Asst g ned To: E n g Systems & Comps M gmt ANO S uba ss i g n ed To : E n g Systems NSSS Staff ANO Originated By: Woodson P.E., Timothy R P e rform ed B y: S ubperformed By: Approved By: Closed By: Current Due Date: 08/06/2015 CA Type: GENERAL ACTION Plant Constra int: NONE CA
 
== Description:==
 
Na m e Woodson P.E.,T imothy R Wood son P.E., Timothy R Barborck , W Douglas 6/4/2 015 14: 27: 13 Initial Du e Date: 08/07/2 015 CA Priorit y: 5 I nitiate S JP D R eco rd to replace the l eak-off detection l ine and to permanent l y remove and cap the pressure test co nn ec ti on l ine to ultimately re so lve the Da v i s Be sse (a nd other plants) OE , r egar dl ess of whether or n ot the p i ping passes a future one-time pressure test. Th is action is ultimately required since t he likelihood of having induced chloride-induced intergranu l a r s tress corros ion crack in g (IGSCC) is considered hi g h ba se d on pa s t ANO-I operating practice s (i.e. water left in pressure test connection pipin g for 30+ years). The performance of a one-time pressure test w ill not ensure that future wetti n g & pressurization of this piping do es not result in further propagation and fai lur e of an existing lGSCC fl aw. Initiate additional corrective actions as required to obtain approva l the SI PD record scope. Response:
S ubr espo n se : C l os ur e Co mment s:
Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION I CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 C orrecti ve Action : CR-AN0-1-2008-02560 CA-00029 Version: R e qu este d Du e dat e: 08/07/2015 Requ ested B y: Barborek , W Dou g l as Approved By: Woodson P.E., Timothy R R e que st
 
== Description:==
 
Approved:
r ,/ Previous Du e dat e: 07/03/20 15 07/02/2015 07/02/2015 Due to current ba se work l oad and emergent plant i ss ue s, th i s CA could not be completed by the assigned due date and mu st be extended. Extension of the due date to 8/8/20 15 will not deleteriously impact any installed plant SSCs and is therefore acce ptabl e. WDB 7/2/2 0.15 A pprov e d
 
== Description:==
 
DDE approved.
From: To: Sub je ct: Date: Barrett, Andy Tindell Br i an; Tobin Margare t; Choate 1 ackson; BenneJJ Ma,:y CRs 1 1-13 Monday, Novem b e r 1 4, 2016 7:39:19 AM Several CRs (not included below) from the effectiveness reviews offloading penetrations corrective action s Unit 1 Rx Vessel leakage not from 0-ring, or the expected degraded point. Unit 1 A EOG Inoperable due to problem unloading
-3 CRs Missing concrete block in fire wall in fuel building Drain valve misaligned allowing BWSTwater to get into Decay Heat Vault Trend CR on mlspositionlng events CR-AN0-1-2016-04627 11/12/20 16 5:57:09 AM 11/12/2016 6:38:56 AM Barborek, W Doug l as I Eng Systems NSSS Staff ANO The 3.5 i nch segment of Reactor Vessel inner o-ring wh i ch was sent to LP I (Contract 10494381) for forensic analys i s was determ in ed by LPI to not have a t hr ough w all l eak. A ddit i onally, stereom icro sco pi c images of the o-r ing segment revealed no appreciab l e loss of t he si l ver pl ating l ayer at the o-r ing seating surfaces, thu s in dicating t hat th e l ocat i on o f the Cyc l e 26 i nner o-ring leak w as not assoc i ated w i th th is segment of or ing. T hi s segment of inn e r o-r i ng was taken from the l eak-off port l ocat i on between studs 52 and 53. LP I report i s attached.
Cause d eterm i nat i on fo r t h e Cycle 26 inner o-r i ng l eakage i s being performed under C R-AN0-1-2015-0296
: 7. Discovered:
Originated
: Y Originator:
Operability
: Immediate Action: Operability Version: S t at u s: Approved By OP Code Performed By Date Performed Operability D esc ription: 1 A P P ROVED M art i n.Michael R ADM I N -NA Walls,Donald E 11/12/2016 3: 16: 10 PM Th i s condit i on r epo rt documents the condit i on of the Reactor Vessel inn e r o-ring t hat was sent off si t e for test in g and is no l onger an i nsta ll ed SSC. Th i s condit i on i s ADMIN-NA IAW EN-OP-104. REAP has been r eviewe d for imme d iate NRC reportab ili ty w i th respect t o thi s condit i on I AW EN-Ll-10 8 and OP-1015.047, and no i mmediate reportab ili ty c r i t e r ia have b een met. Suggested Action: I nspect in n e r (and outer) o-ring grooves of the RV an d RVCH for flaws under W0-00 420217 Task 0 5 wh i c h could resul t i n o-r i ng l eakage. Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record From: To:
 
==Subject:==
Date: Bar r ett, A n dy Tindell Br i an; Tobin Margaret C R s Tuesday , September 01, 2015 3:36:41 PM CR-AN0-1-2015-03240 Originator:
Crosby,Patrick Group: Eng Code Programs Staff A Phone: 4903 Di sc ov e red: 8/31/2015 3:50:48 PM Supv: Greeson.William C In iti a t ed: 8/31/2015 4:01 :55 PM CR-AN0-1-2015-02179 CA-15 requires the Bor i c Acid Corrosion Control Program (BACCP) to perform a Boric Acid Evaluation for the U1 RVCH inner 0-ring leak documented i n CR-AN0-1-2015-02967. The eva l uation is required to be documented in an EC (EVAL), sub-type (BOR) IAW EN-DC-1 1 5 to evaluate acceptability of the leak until the next refueling outage (1 R26 -Fall 20 1 6). During the evaluation process it was determined that unpred i ctab l e steam cutting and impingement at the Oring and reactor vessel flange area would neither allow for an acceptable evaluation nor provide just i 1 fication for extended operation without m i tigat i ng actions. Per EN-DC-319 (BACCP), periodic mon i toring of the leak is required to mit i gate and determine the cond i tion of the stainless steel cladding of the reactor vessel and closure head. The carbon stee l reactor vesse l and closure head are cladded internally w i th sta i n l ess steel. Stainless Stee l i s resistant to boric acid corrosion but is not immune to steam cutting or impingement.
Per industry tests documented in EPR I Report N o. 1000975, steam cutting and imp i ngement cou l d degrade the cladding and expose carbon steel. Based on the last visual inspection performed on 8/4/2015 and the l ack of discoloration of boric acid crystals, the steel cladding is i ntact and perform i ng its intended funct i on. The ODMI and Critical Decision document for CR-AN0-1-2015-02 1 79 reference SER 3-09, wh i ch is indus t ry OE regard i ng 0-ring leakage at Browns Ferry Unit 1 i n 2008. This OE documents t h at Browns Ferry U ni t 1 exper i enced 0-ring leakage fo r 18 months across both the inne,r and outer 0-rings , which resu lt ed in an increase in unidentified Drywell leakage from Oto 1.2 gpm over the course of the 18 month operating cycle. Fo ll o w ing removal of the RV head, damage to both the RV and RVC H seat i ng surfaces from steam cutting was observed. Regarding SER 3-09 appl i cability to AN0-1, it is noted that Browns Ferry U n it 1 is a BWR, wh i ch utilized non-borated water i n the RCS and operates at a nom i nal RCS pressure of 1000 psig. As such, the observed damage at Browns Ferry Un it 1 resulted from a 1000 psig delta-P across two 0-rings, whereas AN0-1 is currently experiencing a 2155 psig delta-P across one 0-ring. As such, degradation of the AN0-1 RV and RVCH flange 0-r i ng seating surfaces could accelerate at a much faster rate than the Browns Ferry Un it 1 scenario.
None Perform a containment entry every 30 days to ver i fy the sta i nless s t eel cladding is intac t by observing the drain piping for discoloration, such as , red or brown boric acid crystals indicat i ve of carbon steel corrosion.
The last visual observation was performed on 8/4/2015. Perform next inspection during the same power entry when adding oil to RCPs scheduled 9/15/15.
Consider updating current ODMI to take action upon discovery of disco l oration in bor i c acid crystals.
Consider updating the current operability to OP-DNC or OP-Comp Meas. with monitor i ng as the compensatory measure. S ugg es t ed A c tion D esc ription: Imm e diate Action D es cription:
C o ndit i on Description
: Op er ability R e qu i r e d: Y R e port a b i li ty R e qu i r e d: Y OPERABILIT Y VERSION: 1 PERFORMED B Y: Ward , Danie l E PERFORMED DATETIME: 8/31/2015 4: 20:48 PM INITITIAL REPORTABILITY:
NOT REPORTABL E OPERABILITY CODE: ADMIN -NA OPERABILITY DE S CRIPTION This cond i tion report identifies a Boric Ac i d Evaluation cou l d no1 be completed for CR-AN0-1-2015-CR-AN0-1-2015-03243 Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record From: To: Cc: Sub ject: Date: Attachment s: Haagensen, Brian Gray Harold: Schroeder Daniel FW: FW: Oversized 0-R i ng Mod Wed n esday, December 1 3 , 2017 11 :45:00 AM ove rs i zed o-ring Mod EC 72951,doc Note: Th i s 1 4-page attachmen t is wi t hhe l d in i ts ent ir et y under FOIA e xe mpt ion 4. Attached is the EC justification for installing the oversized 0-rings at Unit 2. I can provide any of the references upon request. From: Haagensen, Br i an [ma i 1to:bhaag90@entergy.com
] Sent: W ednesday, December 13, 2017 11:31 AM To: Haagensen, Brian <Brian.Haag ensen@nrc.gov>
 
==Subject:==
[Ex terna l_Se n de r) FW: Oversized 0-Ring M od Brian C. Haagensen Senior Resident I nspector I ndian Point Energy Center 914-739-9360 (Office) !(b)(6) !(cell) In p l ant x5347 From: L oPiccolo , Angela Marie. Sent: W e dn esday, December 1 3, 20 17 11:15 AM To: H aagensen, Br i an Cc: W ittich, Walter
 
==Subject:==
Oversized 0-Ring Mod H i Brian, I have attached the Top i c Notes from the Oversized 0-ri n g mod EC 72951 R ev 0. There is a P2E folder associa t ed with t hi s mod which co nta i ns more documents. Do you h ave access t o P2E? If not, let me know i f there are any addi t i onal docume n ts you requ i re and I'll se nd th em over! Angela LoP i ccolo E n g i neeri n g N SSS X5657 From: Sent: To: Cc:
 
==Subject:==
Attachm e nt s: Art , Taylor , Nick Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:30 AM Burritt, Arthur O'K e efe, N e il; Tindell, Brian; Corr e ll, Brian; Egli, Richard; Tobin, Margar et; Dixon, John FW: U n it 1 RCS Leakage ODMJ RV F l ange 0-ring Lea k age.pdf Note: Th i s 8-page attachment , E N-OP-111 Rev .11 , i s w i thheld i n i ts entirety under FO IA exemption
: 4. You were l ooking for OE l ast week on operat i ons with both inn e r a n d outer O r i ngs fa i led. I hadn't discovered any previous occurrences.
But we got ANO's ODM I today and the licensee lists a numb e r of previou s occur r e n ces both at ANO , Browns Ferry 1 and Wolf C r eek. Hope this he lp s, Nick Tay lor Senior Pr oject Engineer D i vis i on of Re acto r Projects USNRC Region I V 0: 817 200-1 520 C: (b)(6) E: n i ck.tay l or@n r c.gov From: Correll, Brian Sent: Tuesda y , July 21, 2015 9:11 AM To: OK ee f e, N e il; Tay l or, Nick; Farin a , Thoma s; Tind e ll, Brian; Tobin, Marg a r et Cc: Egli, Richard
 
==Subject:==
Un i t 1 RCS Leakage ODM I Unit 1 RCS L eakage O D MI i s attached. Pages 5 a nd 6 a r e the T h r es h olds a n d Act i ons to be t aken if the thresho l ds are exceede d. Bria n F,om: To: rlwWLI!lio Cc: S ubj ect: ~~Tobin Margacer Choa1e 1 ac k soo: George Andre a. FW: ANO~ I R C S Leak R a t e P ,oje ctl on Da t e: T hu rsday , Aug u st 20, 20 15 2: 1 0: 55 PM Attachments:
illw!<006.on,;
l m ag.007 , ong F YI -see graph be l ow. From: BARBOREK, W DO UGL AS (ma i l to WBARBO l@en t ergy.com]
Sent: T hu rs d a y , Au g u s t 2 0, 2 01 5 10: 4 2 AM To: T in de ll, Br i a n Cc: WOOD S O N , TI M OT H Y R
 
==Subject:==
[Ex t e rn a l_Sende r) F W: AN0-1 RCS Lea k Rat e Pro j ec ti on Br i a n, FY I. See l ates t project i o n be l ow regarding RV F l ange o-ring leakage. Thanks, Doug Barborek Enterav O~m l o n i, t nc I At k 1 n wi Nu cle,r Ooe Syste m Engineer -AN0-1 & A N 0-2 R ea cto r Cool a nt Syste m s a nd AN 0-1 S~n t F u e l Coo 1n g & P u r if w;a tl o n Sys t e m Sv,.t em Eng i nee ri ng B u ld1n g/ N*S Y(.4 wtar ho l@enlerrv rorn A79 8~8 4337 (o ffi ce) ~(p.ag e-11 ~RBOREK, W DOUG LA S Sent: Thursday, Aug u s t 20, 2015 1 0:41 A M T o: WOODSON, TI M OTHY R; EDGE L L, DOUGLAS W; SKAR T VEDT, MARK EDMUND; P ER K INS, D ARR E LL L; GO R DON, ROBERT A; FORD , JEFFREY; Ev ans, Te r r y Al a n; ANO OPS 1 S M's; P alme r , Charles; BUTLER , PAUL WAYN E; WO ER NER, GEORGE W; HOLLO W OA , TROY 8; Dav i s , B arry; PUTNAM, R E X G; GARBE, C HAR LES R Cc: MEYERS, J OHN M; HOW E LL,JERRY W; H ILL, S T EVEN D; Park e r, Bo b by J oe; CRANE, NELSONS; Pa ce , R obert D. (IN PO) (paceRD@I NPO oq:) Sub j ec t: RE: AN 0-1 RCS Leak Rate Proje ction All, The l atest 2nd orde r po l ynomia l projection for reach i ng 0.250 gpm Tota l RCS Losse s is 94 days from now, or November 22nd, 20 1 5. This proJection i s about two weeks beyond the l ast three weeks of project i ons due to a s l ight l eve l ing o ff of the Total RCS leak rate over the last week. Thanks, Doug Barborek lntetQ'f O~r.H I O n~, i nc / A r k a n s.as Nu t l e,1, One Svste m E ng1 n,e er -AN 0-1 & A N 0-2 Reacto r C oolant Syste ms a n d A N 0* 1 Spem r u t l Coolin& & P u r 1 fica t1 o n Sys l f'm Svste m Eng 1 n.e en ng B u ld1ng/ N-S'f E-11 wbachol@enrer@v oom 479-SSS-433' (of l k:*) !(b)(6) !1"'""'1 RC s Leakrate C y c le 26 0 200 0 1 50 0 1 00 O 050 0 000 "' "' 0 &sect; <:I s 5 --OTFlil~t t(Oon,) Unld4nDlto ltak Fla l t (IJIN'l1) --Tol al R CS L C,..!(O P m) --wean*2 S4oma --l,l tan-2 Sigma -1.1 ,111*)$Ao,n1
--1,1 ,a,,.JSlgma
----*lil tM --Poly (T<>lalRCS L os,..(o,,lll))
"' "' "' "' "' ... "' ... &sect; I 0 i &sect; 0 i ij <:I <:I 5 Si Iii s; la 5i From: BARBOREK, W DOUG LA S Sen t: Thu r s day , Aug u s t 13, 2015 3:1 5 PM ... ... "' "' "' ... &sect; 0 &sect; 0 &sect; <:I $ s :s ii As of 8 20/2015 , the 2nd order potynoml1I projection to reach 0.250 Total RCS Leakce Is 94 days from now , or 11/22/2015 T o: WOOD SO N, TIMOTHY R; EDGE L L, DOUGLA S W; S KARTVEDT, MARK ED M UND; PERKINS, DARRELL L; GO RD O N , ROB E R T A; F O RD, J E FFR EY; E va ns , Te r ry A l an; ANO OPS 1 SM's; P almer, Charles; BUTLER, P AU L WAYNE; WOERNER, GEORGE W; HOLLO WOA , TROY 8; Dav i s , Barry; P UTNAM, REX G; GARBE, C HARLE S R Cc: MEYERS.J O HN M; H O W E LL,JER RY w; HlLL, STE V E N D; Park e r, Bo b by J oe; CRANE , NEL SONS; Pace , R obert D. (INPO) (PaceRD@INPO QC&) 
 
==Subject:==
RE: AN0-1 RCS Leak R ate Pr oject i on All, The l atest 2nd orde r po l y nom i a l project ion for reac h ing 0.250 gpm T ota l RCS L osses is 85 d ays from now , or November 6th, 20 1 5. T h i s i s cons i stent with the last two weeks of pro1ect1ons.
Thanks, Dou g B ar b ore k Ente rgv Oper.itions, Inc./ Alkansas Nuclear One S~tem Enclneer AN0-1 Re.ictor Coo l ilnl System and ANO 1 Spent F-ue l Coo 111a & Purlf1ut1011 Sy~tcm SV1lC rn Eog in('~rin g Bu Id ins/ N SYE 4 wtmchol Pcnsecav mm 479-858-.4337 (office) ~(p.]ffit>rl 0 300 0200 --OTFI I Ralt (OPIIII Unlltnllnt4 LtakRalt (ll)m) --Toc.i FlCS Lo*H IOPIIII --uean*2S.om.1
--uun-2Sio .. -uean*l s,grna -uun,3Stgma
... --*~Mean "' C .. From: BARBOREK, W DOUGLAS Sen t: Thu r s day, Augu s t 06, 2 01 5 11 :4 8 AM RC s Leakrate Cycle 25 To: WOODSON, TIMOTHY R; EDGE L L, DOUGLAS W; S KARTVEDT, MARK EDMUND; PERKINS , DARRE LL L; GORDON , ROBERT A; FORD.JEFFREY; Evans , Terry Alan; ANO OPS1 SM's; Pa l m e r , Char l es; BUTLER, PAUL WAYNE; WOERNER, GEORGE W; HOLLOWOA, TROY 8; Dav i s, Barry; PUTNAM, REX G Cc: ME YERS,JOHN M; HOW E LL,J ERRY W; HlL L , STEVEN D
 
==Subject:==
RE: AN0-1 RCS Leak Rate Projec tion Al l , T h e l atest 2 n d o r d er po l ynom i a l proj ection for rea c h in g 0.250 gpm Tota l R CS Losses is 91 d ay s from n o w , or Novemb e r 5th, 20 1 5 (r ef. attached ODMI, Rev. 01). This I s base d on leak r a t e data from 4/1/2015 to present, which cor r esponds to th e approximate date that t h e total RCS l ea kr ate began i ncr easing. See projection graph below. N ote that the nom i nal in n er o-r i ng l ea k rate i s determined by adding the increase in t he RB Sump fil l rate s i nce -4/1/2015 t o the i ncrease in the T-111/T-4 2 fi l l r a te s in ce -6/22/2015.
T h e in crease i n the Uni d en t i fied leak r ate is NOT i nd icat i ve of th e tota l o-ring leakage r ate s i nce some of the r l ng l ea k age 1s apparen t l y bei n g condensed i n the RCP Seal Collection sys t em l oo p seal a nd is bemg ret u rne d to the Quenc h Ta n k as I d ent ifi ed leakage. Thanks, Dou g Barbor e k Ent*ra v O~ratlons, I nc: / Atkanus NuclH f O na Syste m Engineer -AN0-1 & AN0-2 Reactor Cool a nt Systems and AN0-1 S~nt F utol Coo 1n 1 & Pur il 1Ca tion Sy11trm SV1 1 t!m Er,glni!:t!rin.g B u ld1ng / N-SYE-4 wtzachqJ@rntrrev mm 479 8S3-4337 (office) !(b )(6) I ,,.g.,J
____J R C S L ea kr ate Cyc l e 25 0.300 ,----------------------------------------..
--O T F il Ra t e (gpm) --U n lden t l fled L ea~ R ate (QPm) --T ota l RCS L o sses(gpm)
--M e an+2 S i gma --M ean-2 S i gma -Mean+3S l g ma 0 200 -M ea n-3 S i gma -----M ea n --Pol y. (Tot a l R CS Losses (g p m)) As of 8/6/2015, the 2nd orde r 0 1 5 0 +-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-tr-c:,...,,::...-..IL..~~~~~~-..:.
p_o_l y , n_o~m-==ia~l~p-r_o~j*~c~t i~o~n r.t~o==-~~ rue 0.250 gpm Tota RCS 0.0 00 "' "' "' "' "' 0 0 c::::! c::::! 0 "' OJ C:! "' Fro m: BARBOREK , W DOUG L A S Sent: Fr i d ay.Ju ly 3 1 , 2 0 1 5 10: 2 4 A M "' <D "' "' "' "' "' 0 "' 0 C:! ;a C:! C? "' <D <D "' "' "' 0 '!! ,.._ ,.._ C:! ..... "' 0 Leakag* I s 91 days from now , or 11/5/2015 T o: W OODSON, TIMOTHY R; EDGE L L, DOUGLAS W; S KA R TV E D T , MAR K ED M UN D; PERK IN S , DARRELL L; GO R DON, ROB E RT A; F O R D.JE FFR EY; E vans , Te r ry A l a n; ANO OPS 1 S M's; P a l m e r, C h a rl e s; BUTLER, PAUL W A Y NE; W OERNER, GEORGE W; HOLLO W OA , TR OY B Cc: M EY E RS , JOHN M; H OWE LL, J E RRY W; H ILL, S T EVEN D S ub j ec t: AN0-1 R CS L e ak R a te P ro j ec tion All , O bv i o u sly, t his i s n ot an e x act sc i ence, but the la t es t 2 n d or d er po l yno m i al pr o j ect i on for reach i ng 0.250 gpm T o t al R CS L osses i s 99 days from no w, or N o v e mb er 7 , 2015 (r e f. atta ched O O M I, R e v. 0 1). T h i s is ba sed on l eak r ate d a t a from 4/1/2 0 15 to p re s ent , w hi c h co r res p onds to t h e a p pr oxi m ate date that t h e to t al RCS l ea k rate b egan I ncreas i n g. See pr o j ect i o n graph b e l ow. FY I, t he s a me p r o j e c t i o n two we e k s ag o ca l c u l at ed a d at e of 1 2/19/20 1 5 t o r e ac h 0.2 50 gp m. It i s ant i c i pat ed t ha t t h i s va l u e will con t i nu e t o m o v e t o w a rd s t h e p r e s e n t. I w i ll be pa r tic i pati n g i n a 2n d P o w er E n try o n 8/4/2 0 15 t o quant if y the l ea k age at t he d r a i n hea d er nea r the w est e nd o f th e R B Su m p. I w i ll a t tem p t to u pd at e th i s pr o j ect i on on a w eekl y basis from thi s po i n t fo rw a rd. T h a n ks. Dou g B ar b ore k En t er g'( O pe r;i t i o n s, I nc / Atk a n ws Nu c l ear One Sys t em En&l neer-AN 0-1 & A N0*2 R.octor Coo l a nt Sys t ems ,;ind AN0-1 $pe n t F u e l Cool mg & P u r if ic ati o n S y s tem SV$1 1m Ena i nee ri n.a: B u 1l d 1 n 1/ N ,$Y E*4 wtachoJ@rnsecev mm 4 79-8 58-4337 (o.ffic e) 1 (b )(6) r ,.i .. l RCS Leakrate Cycle 25 0.300 ~--------------------------------------~
--Q T Fi l Ra t e (gpm) --U n iden t ified Lea k Rate (gpm) --Tota l RCS L osses (gpm) --Mea n+2 S i gma --M e a n-2 Sigma -Mea n+3S i gma 0-200 -M e a n-3 Sigma ----* Mea n --Poly. (Tot al RCS Losses (g p m)) /u of 7/30/2015, the 2nd order polynomia l 0_ 1 50 -------------------
-~"""'--------
....r::.':..: o:..*e=: c;-: t.:..:: i o:..:, n;.-: t;.: o:,,: r c: e:.: a.:.ch:,:..:.0.:..::.2:.: S.:.o _ __, gpm Tota l RCS Leakage is 0.000 "' "' "' "' "' "' "' "' 0 0 0 :,:: lo? "' "' a, 112 (") 0 .... .... C!. C!. "' in C!. ... ... "' "' "' "' "' "' 0 ,.._ 1::1 0 ..... ... C!. (D (0 (0 C!. "' (D "' "' "' 0 0 ;:: lo? "' ..... ;:::: "' "' N a, C!. C!. ..... ..... 99 days from now , or 11/7/2015.
From: To: Cc: Su bj ect: Date: Attachments:
IiilllfJWaJl llixwl..Jl!ll!l umll..J!iwJ; E*a o* Jb omas* Iobio Mac*ace r George Aoacea , Note: The same 8-page attachment as p r io r str i ng FW: AN0-1 RC S L ea k R a t e P ro je c t i o n ( EN OP 111 R 11) d th 6 tt h t W ednesd ay, Au g ust OS , 2 01 S 11: 04: 3 1 AM --eV an anO er -page a aC men OOMLl!<v.OJ.
RV_Flil!ll<tO c11 Qtlea_lL-aomll>vOoill2Ll>d( (EN-FAP-OM-021 Rev 1 )-have been withhe l d in the i r l mageoo , .png -----------------------1 entirety under FO IA exemption
: 4. Ne i l, I just got d one ta l king with the Un i t 1 RCS system eng i nee r. He showed me the below graph, which is a great illustration f or the ANO Un it 1 i nne r vessel 0-ring leakage t rend. He guesses, which see ms r i ght assu m ing nothi n g cha n ges, t h at A NO w i ll h it t h ei r arb it rary .25 gpm to t al l ea k age thres h old during t h e Un it 2 o ut age. Because they won't wan t t o have both un it s offl i ne at t h e same t i me , t hey w i ll like l y keep Unit 1 on l ine at least unt i l after t he Un i t 2 outage. Mo r e to come, Br i an From: B AR B O RE K, W D O U G L A S [m a i 1 to:WBA R B0 l@e n terg y.com] Sent: W e d n e s d a y , Augu s t 05, 20 1 5 11:00 AM To: T i nd ell , B r ian
 
==Subject:==
[E xte rn a l_Sender] F W: AN0-1 R CS L e a k Rate P ro j ect i on Br ia n , I w ill i n cl u de yo u o n f u tu r e u pd a t es , w h i ch I ho pe to p ut tog e t h er w e e kl y from t h is p o i n t forwar d. P l ease le t me kn o w 1 fy ou ha v e any q uestio n s rega rdin g th is i n formatio n. Th ank s , Doug Barborek Entergy Opera t'&deg;ns, I nc./ A r kansas Nudear One Sys1em En1 i neer AN0-1 & A N O* 2 Reactor Coo l an t Systems and ANO l Sptnt Fuel Coo h r'II & Pur1f1catton Sy!ot*m S ys t em Eng i neering Bui l d i ng/ N-SYE-4 wtmbe1@COICCRY ,e m 479-85S-4337 (office) ~(page r! ~RBOREK , W DOUGLAS Sent: F r i day.J u ly 3 1, 2015 1 0:24 A M To: WOODSON, TIMOTHY R; EDGELL, DOUGLAS W; SKARTVEDT, MARK EOMUND; PERKINS, DARRELL L; GORDON, ROBERT A; FORD.JEFFREY; Evan s , Te rry A l an; ANO OPS1 SM's; Pa l mer , Char l es; BUTLER, P AU L WA YNE; WOERNER, GEORGE W; HO LL OWOA, TROY B Cc; ME Y ERS, J OHN M; HOWELL, JERRY W; HILL, STEVEN D
 
==Subject:==
AN0-1 RCS L eak Rate Projection A l l, Obv i ou s l y , t h i s i s not a n e x a c t sc i e n ce, b u t the l at es t 2 nd ord er po l yn om ial pr oj e c t i o n fo r r ea ching 0.250 g p m T o ta l RCS L osses i s 9 9 d a y s fro m now, o r N ov e mb er 7 , 20 1 5 (r e f. atta c h e d ODM I , Re v. 0 1). T hi s i s based o n le ak rate d at a fr o m 4/1/2 01 5 t o p rese n t, w hic h co r res po nds t o the ap pr ox i m at e d ate tha t th e t otal R CS l eakrat e be g an i n cr ea s i n g. S ee pro j ec ti on g r a p h b el ow. FY I , t h e sa m e p ro j ec t ion t wo w ee k s ago ca l c u la t ed a da te o f 1 2/19/20 1 5 to reac h 0.250 gp m. It is a nt i ci p a t e d th at t his v alue will co nt i n ue t o mo v e t owa r d s t he p re sen t. I w i ll be pa rti c ip a ti ng in a 2 n d Po w e r E n tr y o n 8/4/2015 to q u a n tif y th e leakage a t th e dra i n hea d er near t he w es t end of the R B Sump. I w ill att em pt t o upda t e th i s pro j ec ti on o n a w e ek l y ba s i s from t h i s po i nt fo r wa r d. Than k s , Doug Barborek [r'\lC f8V 0J)er'tll0r'IS , I nt./ A , k ansas N utlta( O n t Sys t em En gi neer -A N0-1 & A N 0*2 Reac t o r Coo l an t Sys te ms a nd A N O*l Spe n t Fu el Coo li n g & P u nfl ca t t0n S v~t e m Sys t em Eng l t1ee,1ne Bu l l d l n.f; I N-S Y E-A wt,;irho)@Pnl P rg y.m m RCS Lea k rate Cycle 25 0-300 ~-----------------------------------------~
--OT Fil Rate (gpm) --Unk!enbfied Leak Rate (gp m) --To t al RCS L osses (gp m) --Mean*2S i gma --Mean-2 S i gma -Mean+3S i gma 0200 -Mean-3 S i gma ----* Mean --Pol y. (Tota l RCS Losses (gpm)) A., of 7/30/2015 , the 2nd order po l ynom i a l o_ 150 +----------------------tr-=-'------------
--'p'--r_o.,_j e-=c=-t_io_n:-t::-0::-:-re ,...a_c-=h_0_._2..., so _ ___, gpm Total RCS Leakage i s 0.000 .,, "' "' "' "' .,, .,, .,, .,, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 C:! C:! C:! C:! C:! C:! -I!,! \{) "' a, "' 0 "-.... .... C:! C:! iil C:! C:! .... .... Ill Ill .,, .,, .,, .,, .,, 0 0 0 0 0 C:! C:! C:! 0 ..... .... -w w C:! ..... "' .,, .,, .,, 0 0 0 C:! C:! I!,! \{) N "-;;:: C:! "-.,, 0 C:! a, C:! "-99 days from now , or 11/7/2015.
F,om: To: Cc: S ubj ect: Da te: Attachments:
N e i l, FYI be l ow. Th a n k s , Br i an Iillll.ilL..adi
'1:.lllilLlllll 01mn....J2hn: Choate 1 acksoo* ~; Tottln Ma , gar e t FW: A NO-I R CS L ea k R a i e P tojec tl on T hu rs day , S*p te m ber 03 , 20 1 5 1:23: 0 2 PM ima&#xa3;e005.one. l m agt006.png From: B AR BO R E K, W DO U GLAS (m ailto:WBA R B Ol@e n tergy.co m) Sent: T hu r sd a y , S e p t em ber 03, 20 1 5 1:0 8 P M T o: Tin de ll , B r ia n
 
==Subject:==
[E x t e rn a l_Se n de r) F W: AN0-1 R CS L ea k Rate P r o j e c ti on Br i a n, T h e l atest u pda t e. T h a n ks, Dou g Ba r bo re k fn t e1sv Optm 1 o n ,, t nc / Ar k 1 n\a\ Nu c l Nr On&#xa3;> Sys t em Eng i ne er A N Q.1 & AN 0-2 R e~t or Coo l a n t Sys t ems a nd AN0-1 Spen t F u e l C oo li n g & P u r if ic ati on S ys t e m Sys 1 1m E~1 nci1r 1 n1 B u l d 1 n 1 / N SYE-4 wharh21@rowex rnm '}'L"\!fU, (o ffi ce) !(hl(g.} ~(p.gc, J From: BARBOREK, w DOUGLAS Sent: Thursday, Septembe r 03, 2015 1 :0 4 P M To: WOODSON , TI M OTHY R; EDGE L L , DOUGLAS W; SKARTVEDT, MARK EDMUND; P E RKINS, DARRE LL L; GORDON, ROB E RT A; FORD.JEFFREY; Evans, Terry Alan; ANO OPS 1 SM's; P a l m e r , Cha rl e s; BUTLER, PAUL WAYNE; WOERNER, GEORGE W; HOLLO W O A, TR OY B; Dav i s , B a rry; PUTNAM, REX G; GARBE, CHARLES R Cc: ME YER S, J OHN M; HOW EL L.JERR Y W; H ILL, S T EVEN D; Par k e r, Bobby J oe; CRANE, NELSONS; PA C E , ROBER T D; OLIVE R.JA SON R; MEATHEAN Y , DANIEL J; S CH LUTER MAN , PAMELA S; C r osby, Patr ic k; Be l d i n, J o s hu a; GREE S ON , WILLIAM C Sub j ect: RE: AN0-1 RCS Le ak Ra te Pr o j ect i on All, T h e l ates t 2 nd o r d e r po l y nom i al p ro j ection for r eac h i ng 0.250 gp m Tota l RC S L osses i s 11 4 da y s fr om n ow, or D ecember 26 , 2015. T h a n ks, Dou g Ba r b ore k fn t t"f8V OJ)f'n1 11 o n 1, I nc / Ar k&n$.l1 Nu t l t>ar Ont' Sys t em Eng i ne e r A N Q...1 & AN 0-2 R e~t or Coo l a n t Sys t em~ an d AN 0-1 Spe n t F u e l C oo li n g & P u r if ic ati o n Sys t e m Sy, 1 1m Ert 1 Mlrlnl B u Id 1 n 1 / N -SYE -4 whach21@rnrecrx row 479 85S 4337 (office) ~IP.B*fi 0 300 0 2 0 0 --O TF I I Rall (9 p m) U nlde nll fltd Lea k Raie (,gpm) --T ol a/RCS L0$Sf S(OP IIIJ M u n*2Sigma --M u n-2S.gma -tJun*J~oma --Mean-3 Sigma -----M oan --PolJ' (T~RCSL .. sa (!IJ)m)) R CS Leakrate Cyc le 26 order polynomia l 0 1 50 +--------------.,,..,.
~.dC=---------
..c.:.r::.o i:: e:.::: ct.:.: l~on:.:...:;to::..:.: re:.:*:.: t::.: h..: 0::.:.2:.: S:.:: O:__-I cpm Total RCS Leakage Is From: BARBOREK, W DOUG L A S Sent: Thu r s day , Aug u s t 27, 2015 5:46 PM 114 days from now , or 12/26/201S T o: WOODSON, TIMOTHY R; EDGE L L, D OUGLA S W; S KAR T VEDT, MARK EDMUND; PE R KIN S , D ARRELL L; G O R DON, ROBERT A; FORD.J EF F R EY; E van s ,
Te r ry Al a n; ANO OPS1 S M's; P a l m er, C har l es; BUTL E R, PAU L WAYNE; WOERNER, GEOR G E W; HOLLOWO A , TR OY B; Dav i s, Barry; PUTNAM, R EX G; GA R BE, CHARLES R Cc: MEYE R S, J OHN M; H OWE LL , JE R RY W; HILL, S T EVEN D; P arke r , Bobby J oe; CRANE, NELSON S; PACE, ROBER T D; O LI VER.J ASON R Su bj ec t: RE: A N 0-1 RCS leak R ate P ro j ect i on All, Th e l atest 2nd o rd er po l ynom i a l proj ection for reac h ing 0.250 gpm T ota l RCS l osses is 104 days from n o w, or D ecember 9, 2015. This project i on i s beyond the l ast four weeks of p roiections due to a s l ight leve l ing o ff of the Tota l RCS l ea k ra t e over the last week to 10 days. Tha n ks. Doug Barborek Ente,gy Operations, I nc: / Alkansas Nuclea, One S~t em lnglrlter
-ANO J & ANO 2 Atactot Cool1nt SY')\ems Jnd ANO* l Spent fue l coo11ng & Purificatio n System Svstem (nijll')t'erlng Bu Id 1ne / N*SYf *4 wbocbotd!eosec,v oom ~79-858-4337 (office) !(b )(6) l'PJ .. rf R CS Lea k r a te Cycle 25 0200 OTF-Ratt ~pm) Unidenbfte~
Leal< Ra t e (Q?tl1) --Total RCS lo .... (g p m) --Mtan*2 Sigma Mtan ,2 Sigma -Mean*3Ssgma
--Mtan-3S.gma
----*tJean As of 8/27/2015 , the 2nd --Poly (TOU I RCS LOI-~pm)) 0 150 t-----------------r,_-.:z,;.-=-'-------
---:'o"-rd.::.e.:..r:..;P 0;0.:..l-:: y':'n'::: om 7" 1*:.: l-<p cc r 2 o1..:*e c: ct 7 1::o'=n=---l to reach 0.2501pm Total RCS Leak11e is 104 devs from now , or 12/9/2014. 0100 ooso 0000 "' "' "' I "' "' I 8 &sect; 8 ;i ;i s 5i F r om: BARBOREK, w DOU G L A S Sent: Thu r s day, Aug u s t 2 0, 2015 1 0:41 AM T o: WOODSON, TIMOTHY R; EDGE L L, DOUGLAS W; S KARTVEDT, MARK EDMUND; PERKINS, DARRELL L; G ORDON, ROBER T A; FORD.JEFFREY; Evans, Terry A l an; ANO OPS1 SM's; P a l mer, Char l es; BUTLER, PAUL WAYNE; WOERNER, GEORGE W; HOLLOWO A , TROY B; Dav i s , Barry; PUTN A M, REX G; GARBE, CHARLES R C c: ME YE RS, J OH N M; H OWE LL, J E RR Y W; H IL L, S T EVEN D; Par k e r , Bobby J oe; C RAN E , NELSON S; Pace, Robert D. (INPO) (paceRD@J NPO o r~) Su bj ec t: RE: AN0-1 RC S L e ak Rate Pro j e c t io n A l l , The l atest 2 nd o rd er po l ynomia l projection for reac h ing 0.250 gpm Tota l RCS L osses is 94 days from n o w , or N ovember 22nd, 20 1 5. T h i s project i on is about two weeks beyond the l a s t three w ee k s of projec t i ons d u e to a s lig h t l eve ling o ff of the To t a l RCS l ea k ra t e over th e last w eek. Thanks, Doug Barborek Ente<sv Optra11ons, 1 1"1(: / A<kansas Nuclea< one SV)te m l~l~tr-ANO.
l & AN0*2 R.t~tot Coolant !>~t ems and ANO* l Spe n t Fue l Cool ins & P u rification System Svs1em (n11lneeriF'g 8u lcl 1ne / N *SY&#xa3; *4 wb a rbot@e n ters v.oom 479-858-4.UJ (offl~) !{b )(6) 1 1,,a.,,
0 200 --OTF-Ralt(Op,11) un~n11t1olukRa 1 1 t-J --TotalRCSlouu(gpm)
--wean*2'Sio,na lolt.,..2$io,na
-Ytan*l~gma -1o11.,..3$i0,na
------I.lean RCS Leakrate Cycle 25 --Pol y (TOlalRCSlOl,.
(Qll"1)) 0150 -l------------------;.-::
,....=--'-----'-'
A"'c s c" o'-f 8=2 cc 0 cc/.;c 20.c.1;;., S cc'-'t-'-he.c..;c 2;.;.nd.c.;.;.o cc rd;.;e;.;.r---! po l ynomlal projection to reach 0.250 Total RCS Leakce Is 94 days from now , or ll/22/201S From: BARBOREK, w DOUG L AS Sent: Thur s day, Aug u st 1 3, 2015 3: 15 PM To: WOOD S ON, TIMOTHY R; EDGE L L, D OU G LAS W; SKAR T VE D T, MA R K E DMUN D; PE R KINS, D ARRELL L; GO R DON, ROBERT A; F O R D.J EFFRE Y; Evans , Te r ry Ala n; ANO OPS1 SM's; Palmer, Charle s; BUTLER, PAUL WAYNE; WOERNER, GEORGE W; HOLLOWOA, TROY B; Dav i s, Barry; PUTNAM, REX G; GARBE, CHARLES R Cc: ME Y E R S.J OHN M; H OWE LL.JERR Y W; H ILL, STEVEN D; Par k e r , Bobby J oe; CRANE, NELSONS; Pace, Robert D. (JNPO) (PareRD@)NPO org) Sub j ect: RE: ANO-1 RCS Leak Rate Project i on A l l , Th e l a t es t 2 nd o rd er po l y n om i a l p ro j ec t i o n for reac h i n g 0.25 0 gpm T ota l R CS L osses is 85 da y s fr o m n o w , or N ove m be r 6t h, 2 0 1 5. T h i s i s c o ns i s t ent w i th t h e l as t tw o w eeks o f p r o j e c tions. Th a nk s, Doug Barborek [r\l CtQ'f 0J)t r j llOr'15, l n,c / Af k 6r'l1.;l5 Nut l t,H 01\C S~t em &#xa3;nglf'}Ccr
-A N O 1 R e.actor C<lo l ant 5y5tc m a n d A'II 0-1 S1>tnt F u e l Cooltn8 & P 1.mhcatlo n 5vste m Svsttm (nglnttdng 8 u ld1 n 9 / N*S Y(-4 wti~rbol@enrergy com 0 JOO --OTFII Rate (gpn,) Undtn*neo Ltak Race (Ql>"11 --Toto t FICS losstS(Ol)n,)
0200 OOSCl 000() ... ... 0 &sect; <:t s s 1o1un*2Sooma --u e an-2 Stoma -uun*J s.oma -uun-3Stoma
----*Utan "' "' "' &sect; &sect; I 0 ct 5i s lii From: BARBOREK , W DOUG L AS "' "' i ; 0 s $ R CS L eakre t e Cycle 26 "' I "' &sect; "' "' i&sect; 0 8 0 ct ct Q! .... i "' ;:
S ent: T hu r s d ay, Aug u s t 06, 201 5 11 : 48 AM T o: WOODSON, TIMOTHY R; EDGELL, DOUGLAS W; SKARTVEDT, MARK EDMUND; PERKINS, DARRE L L L; GORDON, ROBERT A; FORD , JE F FREY; E van s , Terry Alan; ANO OPS1 SM's; P a l me r , Char l es; BUTLER, PAUL WAYNE; WOERNER, GEORGE W; HOLLOWOA, TR OY B; Dav i s, Barry; PUTNAM, REX G Cc: MEY ER S.J OHN M; H OWELL.JE R RY W; H ILL. S T EVEN D Sub j ect: RE: AN0-1 RC S Leak Rate Pro j ecti on A ll , T h e l atest 2nd o rd er po l y nom i a l pro j ection for reac h ing 0.250 gpm Total R CS L osses is 91 days from n o w , or N ovembe r 5t h , 20 1 5 (ref. attached ODM I, Rev. 01). T h i s i s ba s e d on lea k rate d a ta from 4/1/2015 to p rese n t, w h i ch corr espo nd s t o t h e appro x im at e da te that th e t o t a l RCS l ea k r ate began increasing. See pro j ectio n graph below. N ot e that the nom i na l inner o-r i ng l ea k ra t e i s d e t er min e d by ad d ing th e in cr ease i n t he R B Su m p f i l l rat e s i nce -4/1/2015 t o the i ncrea se i n the T-111/T*42 fi ll ra te s i nce ~6/22/2015. T h e I ncrease i n the Uni d en ti fied leak rate is NOT i nd i ca t i ve of t he tota l o ring leakage r ate s i nce some o f the o r i ng l ea k age is apparen t l y bei n g condense d i n the R CP S eal CollectiOn sys t em l oo p seal a nd i s bei n g ret u rne d to the Que n c h T a n k as I d e n t i f i ed leakage. Tha n ks , D ou g B a rb or ek Ente<gy Optr.ttion s, l ne / A/kansas Nuclea, Ooe S~t~m Eoglnte,r-ANO l & ANO 2 RektOt Coola o l SV'\t C'mS and ANO 1 Spent F uel (001mg & Pu<1f1C,1tlon System S~1e m Et'IBl~ering e u Id 1nA / N-SYf-4 Yd:iatboJ@emer,v com 479-858-433? (office) ~(pagH\ _J RCS Leakrate Cycle 25 0.3 0 0 ~--------------------------------------~
0.200 --O T F il Ra t e (g p m) U n lden t i fled L eak Ra t e ( gpm) --To t a l R CS L o ss e s(gpm) --M ea n*2 S i gma --M ean-2 S i gma -Mean*3S l g ma -M ean-3 S i gma -----Mean --Pol y. (Total R CS Losses (g p m)) A s of 8/6/2015, t he 2nd o r der po l ynomial projection to 0 1 5 0 +-------------------t,-::;f'~---"---------':
r"'.:".e*::-: c ,:-;;0-;;.2~50" 1':-: p:-: m':-.:-To:-: t::-a r.R" CS;;:----, 0 0 0 0 "' "' "' "' "' 0 0 Si -C! .., .., Fro m: BARBOR E K. W DOUGLAS Sent: F ri day, Ju l y 31, 20 1 5 10:24 AM "' "' C! "' Leakage is 91 days from now , or 11/5/2015 "' "' "' "' "' "' "' "' 0 &sect; 0 8 0 ll! r,... C! I!? C! <D <D .... .... .... T o: WOODSON, TIMOTHY R; EDGE L L, D OUGLAS W; SKARTVEDT, MARK EDMUN D; PERK I NS , DARRELL L; GORDON , ROBERT A; FORD.JEFFREY; Evans, T e r r y A l a n; ANO OPS1 SM's; Pa l m er , Cha rles; BUTLER, PAUL WAYNE; WO E RN E R, GEORG E W; HOLLOWOA, TROY B C c: ME Y ERS.J OHN M; HOWE LL.JERRY W; HIL L , STEVEN D Sub j ect: AN0-1 RCS Leak Rate Projection All, O bv io u sly, th is is no t an e x act sc i ence. b ut t h e la t es t 2n d o rd er po l yno m ial pr o j ectio n for reac h ing 0.250 gpm T o t al R CS L osses is 99 days fro m no w, or N o v e mb er 7 , 2 0 15 (r e f. a tt a ched O O M I, R ev. 01). T hi s i s ba s e d on l ea k rat e da ta fr o m 4/1/2 0 15 to p re s ent, w hi ch co r res po nd s to t he a p pr oxi m at e date that the to t al RCS l ea k rate b ega n i ncreasi n g. See pr o j ectio n graph b e l o w. FY I , the s a me p r o j ect i o n tw o w ee k s a go ca l cu l at ed a d a te o f 1 2/19/20 1 5 t o r each 0.2 5 0 gp m. I t is a n t i c ipat ed tha t t h i s va lu e wi ll con t i n u e t o mo v e t o w a rd s the pre s e n t. I w i ll be p a r ti c i p at i ng i n a 2 n d Power E n try on 8/4/2015 to q ua nt ify the l ea ka ge at the d r a i n hea d er nea r the west end of the RB S u m p. I w i ll a t tem p t to u pda t e th i s pr o j ection on a w eekl y basis from thi s po i n t fo r wa rd. Tha n ks. Dou g B a rb ore k E n tergy 0~1 ati o n s, l oc / Alk a ns.a s Nucl!a r Ont Svs 1 em Eng l l'\ter-AN O, t 8, A N0*2 R eac t or Coo l a n t Svs 1 ems and AN0-1 Spent F u e l Coo li ng & P u rific ation S~tem S~te m Eng i neering B u ildi ng/ N-SY E-4 wNrho J@tnrrrev mm 479*853~337 (offia!) I (bV6' 1 1"'8" 1 RCS Leakrate Cyc l e 25 0.300 ~--------------------------------------~
--O T Fi l Ra t e (gpm) --U n id e n t ified L eak Rat e (g pm) --Tota l RCS L osses (gpm) --Mea n+2 S i gma --Mea n-2 S igma -Mea n+3S i gma 0.200 -Mea n-3 Sigma -----l~ea n --Po l)'. (Tota l R CS Losses (gpm)) As of 7/30/2015 , the 2nd order po l ynomia l 0_ 1 50 +----------------------tr->-./<"=-----------..!p'--'r-=-o'-'je:.: c.:: t i:.: o c.c n:...t:.: o:...r:...: e:.: a:.: c cc h_: 0:..::.2::.5:..: 0=--__, gpm Tota l RCS leakage Is 0.000 "' "' "' "' "' "' "' "' "' a a a a a a a t::! t::! t::! t::! t::! t::! t::! -"' N 0) 112 "' a ...... " " t::! t::! "' in t::! t::! " " "' I!) "' "' "' "' "' a a a a a t::! t::! t::! t::! t::! I!? a ...... V -<D w t::! ...... <D "' "' "' a t::! "' N ...... ;;: t::! ..... "' a t::! 0) t::! .... 99 days from now, or 11/7/2015.
F,om: To: Cc: S ubj ect: Date: Attachments: llJlwU,tll Tobin Margare t*~ OJx.c.n...J..Q.
FW: ANO~ 1 R C S Leak R a t e P toje ct l on Th u rsday , AuguSI 1 3, 20 1 5 3: 27:22 PM irM<e002.olUI; l m ag.003.png F Y I -U nit 1 RCS l eak rate update. F rom: BARBOREK, W DO UGL AS (ma i l to:W BARB0 1@en tergy.com]
Sent: T hu rs d a y , Augu st 1 3 , 2 01 5 3:26 PM To: Tinde ll, Br i an
 
==Subject:==
[E x t e rn a l_Sen d e r) FW: ANO*l RC S Lea k Rat e P r o jec tio n Bri a n, FYI. I believe I to l d you I would forward these updates to you. T hank s, Doug Barborek Ente rgy Oper.ations, I nc./ Alkansas Nuclear O ne Svstem En&lnter-ANO l & ANO 2 Rt.ctor Cool1nt SV$1Cm~ and ANO 1 Sp('nt Fue-1 Cooling & Purlf1c.1t!on Systrm wtwholf'bemersv rom 419-858-A337 (offlce) ITiiiZill]
lpogerl From: BARBOREK, W DOUGLAS Sent: Thursday , August 1 3, 2015 3: 15 PM To: WOODSON, TIMOTHY R; EDGELL, DOUGLAS W; SKART V EDT , MARK EDMUND; PERKINS , DARRELL L; GORDON , ROBERT A; FORD.JEFFREY; Evans , Te r ry Alan; ANO OPS1 SM's; Pa l me r, Charles; BUTLER , PAUL WAYNE; WOERNER, GEORGE W; HOLLO WOA, TROY B; Dav i s , Barry; PUTNAM, REX G; GARBE , CHARLES R Cc: ME Y E R S, J OHN M; H OWE LL, JER RY W; H ILL, STEVEN D; Parker, Bobby J oe; CRANE , NELSON S; Pace, Robert D. (INPO) (PaceRD@INPO or~)
 
==Subject:==
RE: AN0-1 RCS Le ak Ra te Project io n Al l , The l atest 2nd o rd er po l ynom i a l proje c tion for reac h i ng 0.250 gpm Tota l RCS Losses is 8 5 days from now , or N ovember 6th, 20 1 5. Th i s i s consistent with the last two week s of p roiections.
T ha n ks, Doug Barborek Entergy Ope r.1tion s, I nc./ Arka nsa s Nucle,1r One Sys 1 1m Enc1nHr AN0.1 R*.;ictor Coo l 1nl Systf'm a nd AN0-1 Spent F u e l Cooli n g & P u r 1t 11:.1t ion System Sntem Ef'll i n-eer i n.s Bu Id 1ng / N -SYE -4 '41WheJ@cmecev mm 479-8S84H7 (off i ce) ~IP.Serl 0 300 0200 --OTFI I Ra1t(OP"II unad1n11 n ,o LnkR~* (gpff1l --r oc a1 LONU(OPml Unn*2S.gnw --M tan*2StOMl
--u ean*l s.oma --M nn-3 Slgna *****U tan From: BARBOREK, W DOUG LA S Sent: Thursday, Aug u st 06, 2015 11 :48 AM R C s Leak rate Cyc l e 26 T o: WOODSON, TIMOTHY R; EDGE L L, DOUGLAS W; SKAR TVED T, MARK EDMUND; P ER K IN S, DARRELL L; GORDON, ROBERT A; FORD,J E FFREY; Evans, Te r ry A l a n; ANO OPS1 S M's; Pa l me r, Charle s; BUTLER, PAU L WAYNE; WOERNER, GEORGE W; HOLLOWOA, TROY B; Dav i s , Barry; PUTNAM, RE X G Cc: MEYE R S.J OHN M; HOWELL.JERRY W; H.ILL, STEVEN D Su bj ect: RE: AN0-1 RCS Leak Rate P r o j ection Al l , The l atest 2nd order po l ynom i a l projection for reac h ing 0.250 gpm Tota l RCS L osses is 91 days from now , or N ovember 5th, 2015 (ref. attached ODMI, Rev. 01). T h i s i s base d on leak rate data fro m 4/1/2015 to present, w h ich corresponds to the approxima te da te that t h e total RCS l ea k r ate began increasing.
See projection graph below. N ote that the nom i nal i n n er o-r i ng l ea k rate i s determ i n ed by add i ng the i ncrease i n th e RB Sump f i l l rate s i nce -4/1/20 15 t o th e i ncrease i n the T-111/T-42 fil l rate s in ce -6/22/2015.
T h e in crease i n the Uniden ti fied lea k rate is NOT i nd i cat i ve of t he tota l o-ring leakage rate s i nce some of the r i ng l ea k age is appa r en t l y bei n g condense d i n the RCP Seal Collection sys t em l oo p seal a nd is being returne d to the Que nch Tank as I d e n t i f i ed le akage. Thanks , Dou g B ar b ore k E n te r gy Operations, I nc / Arkansas Nuclea r One Systtm E"I II\Hr AN().l & AN0-2 Rttctot Coolin~ System, and AN0-1 Spent Fuel Cooling & P u r iftcation System System e,,.in-eerin1 Bu ld1ng / N SYE-4 whacho l@eo 1 ecev com 479 853 4337 (offitt) !(b )(6) 1 1"'8"' __J 0.300 0 200 --OT F il Ra t e (gpm) Unklen t i fted L ea~ Rate ( gpm) --Tota l RCS Losses(gpm)
--M ean*2 S i gma --M ean-2 S i gma -Mean*3S l gma -M ean-3 S i gma -----Mean --Poly. (Tota l RCS Losses (g pm)) 0 1 50 0 1 00 0 050 0 000 or, or, or, or, or, 0 0 c:::! C:! S5 From: BARBO R EK, W DOUG L A S S e nt: Fr i da y.Ju l y 3 1, 20 1 5 10:24 AM or, or, or, or, 0 C:! in w or, RCS Leakrate Cycle 25 or, or, or, or, or, or, 0 0 C:! C:! Q! ,.._ ,.._ ;::: CD CD ,.._ As of 8/6/2015 , the 2nd o r der po l ynomia l p r o j ect i on to roac 0.250 1pm Tota RCS Leakage is 91 days from now , or 11/5/2015 To: WOODSON, TI M OTHY R; EDGEL L , DOUGLAS W; S KARTVEDT , MARK EDM U ND; P ERKINS, DARRE LL L; G O R DON, RO B ER T A; FO R D , JEFFREY; Ev ans , Te r ry A la n; AN O OPS 1 $M's; Pal m er, Charles; BUTLER , PAUL W AY N E; W OERNE R , GEORGE W; HOLLO W OA , TR OY B Cc: ME Y E R S.J OHN M; H O W E LL.J E R R Y W; H ILL. STEVE N D Subj e ct: A N 0-1 R CS Leak R a t e P rojection All, Obviously, thi s is not an exact sc ien ce , but t he la t es t 2 n d order po l ynom ial p r o j ection for reach i ng 0.250 gpm Tota l RC S Lo sses is 99 days from now, or N ovember 7, 2015 (r e f. attac h ed ODM I , Rev. 01). T hi s i s based on l e a k rate da t a from 4/1/2015 to p r esent, wh ic h co r responds to t h e app r oximate date that the to t al RCS l ea k rate b ega n inc reasi ng. See p r o j ectio n graph b e l ow. FY I, th e same p r ojectio n t wo wee k s a g o ca l c u l a t ed a da t e o f 12/19/2015 t o reach 0.25 0 gpm. I t i s an t i ci p a t ed t hat th i s va l u e will con ti nue to move toward s the present. I will be pa r tic i pati n g i n a 2nd Power E n try o n 8/4/2015 to quantify the l ea k age at the d r a i n hea d e r nea r the west e n d of th e RB Sump. I will attempt to up da te this project i on on a week ly basis from t hi s po i nt forward. T h an ks, Doug Barborek E n t etg'( O pe rc1tion s, I nc./ ArkanS.Js Nucle ar O ne Sv, t em Ent l necir -AN0.1 & AN0*2 R tKtor Coo l i n! Sv, t cmi a nd AN0-1 Spe n t F u@I Cool, ng & P u r i fl u tion Sys t t m Sys te m Eng i neer i ng B u 1 ld1ne / r*ViYE*4 wborhQ I l!!cmrcev com 4 7 9 858--4337 (office) !(b)(6) 1 1,.s er l RCS Leakrate Cycle 25 0.300 ~--------------------------------------~
--Q T Fi l Ra t e (gpm) --U n iden t ified Lea k Rate (gpm) --Tota l RCS L osses (gpm) --Mea n+2 S i gma --M e a n-2 Sigma -Mea n+3S i gma 0-200 -M e a n-3 Sigma ----* Mea n --Poly. (Tot al RCS Losses (g p m)) /u of 7/30/2015, the 2nd order polynomia l 0_ 1 50 -------------------
-~"""'--------
....r::.':..: o:..*e=: c;-: t.:..:: i o:..:, n;.-: t;.: o:,,: r c: e:.: a.:.ch:,:..:.0.:..::.2:.: S.:.o _ __, gpm Tota l RCS Leakage is 0.000 "' "' "' "' "' "' "' "' 0 0 0 :,:: lo? "' "' a, 112 (") 0 .... .... C!. C!. "' in C!. ... ... "' "' "' "' "' "' 0 ,.._ 1::1 0 ..... ... C!. (D (0 (0 C!. "' (D "' "' "' 0 0 ;:: lo? "' ..... ;:::: "' "' N a, C!. C!. ..... ..... 99 days from now , or 11/7/2015.
From: T o: Su b jec t: Da t e: Attachm en t s: FY I Tob i n Margartt Choate 1 ackso0*~~~ FW: A N0-1 Re ac t or Vessel F l ange I n ne r 0-r l ng L eakage -Vi deo rrom 7 1 22/20 1 6 P ower E n try Fri da y.J u l y 22. 2 0 1 6 11: 1 8:00 A M j ma.ee00 1.on.e. ~o fllo ar iso rl 6 entries.odf From: BA R BOR E K, W DOU GL A S [m a i l t o: WBAR B 01@en t e r g y.co m) Sent: F r i d a y , J u l y 22 , 20 1 6 11: 16 A M To: T i n d e l l, B r i a n Cc: T o b i n , M a r garet; B a r r e tt , A n d y; PY L E, S TE P HE N IE L; WOODSO N , T IM O THY R; SKAR T VED T, MAR K ED M U N D
 
==Subject:==
[E xt e rn a l_Se n d er] A N 0-1 Rea c t o r Ve ssel F l a n ge I n n er 0-r i ng L e akag e -V id e o from 7/22/20 1 6 P o w er E n try Br i a n , Fo r yo u r infor m at i o n. T he (RV i n n er o-r i n g) lea k age a t t h e H S D-lS-2" h eader w as obse rv e d to be a p p r o x i m atel y 48 d r o p s/m i n u te du r in g th i s morni n g's po w er en tr y. Bo r ic a cid d epo s i ts r em ain w h ite w i th no d i s c o l orat i o n. In i ti a t ed CR-ANO*l-20 1 6-0 2 1 83 to doc u m en t o b se rv at i o n s. A s t i ll shot from t h e videos fr o m the pas t 6 po w e r e n t r ies is a t tache d. C y cle 26 RCS/S u mp l ea k ra t e in fo (as o f toda y) is p r o v ided b e l o w. P l ease l e t m e k n ow i f you h ave any quest i ons r e g a r d i n g tod ay's en try observat i o ns. If yo u wou l d l i k e to s ee the v i d e o fro m today's entry, p l e a se fee l free t o stop b y my cube. Than k s , Dou g Barbor e k E n t e rgy O p e r ati on s. 1 n c. / Ark a n sa s N u c l ea , On e S'(S t ll!m E ngine e r-A N O*! R e act Of' Cool a n 1 Sv~t e m and A N O 1 Sp e n t Fu e l Coo lln a & Purlfl ca h on S v~t e m S ys tem E n gi ne e ri n g Build mg / N-SY E-4 whachoJ 6Pc01c11v com 47 9-8S8*4337 (off tet! !(b)(6) !10''" 1 0.200 0.1 80 0 1 6 0 0.1 40 0.1 20 0.1 00 0 0 8 0 0.060 0.040 0.0 2 0 0.000 RCS Leakrate Cyc l e 25 --OT F i l Rate (gp m) U n id e n tifie d L e ak Rate (gpm) --To t a l R CS Losses (g pm} --Mean*2 S i gma --IAean-2 Sig ma -l.!ean+3 S i g ma -l.!ean-3 S ig ma ooooooooooo o oo~ooooooooooonnnonnon n oo o ooo o oooooooooooooooo C> C> C> C> C> C> --"' C> C> "' w 8 !!I 8 !!I 8 !!I 8 1/17/2015 2/2&2015 3/1 (Y2015 3/1 !W2015 3/2&2015 4/612015 4/1&2015 4/2412015 5/3/2015 5/12/2015 5121/2015 5/3lY2015 6/8/2015 6/17/2015 6/2625/2015 7/512015 7/14/2015 112:r2015 8/112015 8/1 (Y2015 8/1!W2015 I I 8/2&2015 9/6/2015 "' ;a 9/1&2015 c;, a, 9/24/2015 (I> C 1 <Y:r2015 l 3 .., 1tv1212015 c:, 1 (Y21/2015
;a !!! 1tv~015 m :;;-11/&2015 "' ! 11/17/2015 C: 11/26/2015
;;: -0 12/&2015 ,-12/14/2015 12/26/2015
_, 1/4/2016 1/1 :Y2016 1/2212016 1/31/2016 2/9/2016 2/1&2016 2/27/2016 3/7/2016 3/1&2016 3/2&2016 4/3/2016 4/1212016 4/21/2016 4/3(Y2016 519/2016 5/1&2016 5127/2016 615/2016 6/14/2016 612:r2016 7/2/2016 7/11/2016 7/2tv2016 From: To: S ubject: Date: F YI Tobin Macucet Barrett Andy: T i ndell Brian FW: AN0-1 RV o-r i ng l ea ka ge
* 1 012 3 120 1 S Power E n try Wednesday.
October 28. 20 1 S 7: 36:0 0 AM From: BARBOREK, W DOUG L AS [m a i l to: WBARB0l@ent e rgy.com] Sent: T u esda y , October 27, 20 1 5 5:17 PM To: Tobi n , Ma r garet Cc: S H O R T, BRADLEY W; WOODSO N, T I MOTHY R; Conyers, Dan iel
 
==Subject:==
[Externa l_Sender] RE: ANO*l RV o-ri n g l eakage -10/23/2015 Power E n try Magg ie, We have not written a CR to doc u ment the fact that the l ea k rate esse nt ia l ly p l atea u ed. We are, h owever, monitor in g the leak rate on a da i l y bas i s. My i ntent w as to i nit i ate a new CR if the l eak rate takes a step change i n the i n creas i ng direction. Thanks, Doug Barborek Entergy Operat i ons, Inc./ Arkan sas Nuc l ear One System E ngmeer ANO*l & AN0-2 Reactor Coolant Systems and AN0-1 Spent Fue l Coo ling & Puriflcatoon System Sys tem E ng , nc erong Bui ld ing/ N SYE 4 wba r bol@eoternv com 479-858-4337 (o ff,ce) !(b )(6) I (pager) From: T obin, M arga ret [ma il WMari:;aret Tobjn@nrc i:;ov J Sent: Tuesday, October 27 , 2015 3: 58 P M To: BARBOREK, W DOUGLAS Sub j ect: RE: AN0-1 RV a-ring l ea k age -10/23/2015 Power Entr y Tha nk s for t he e xp l an a t i on Do ug. Was th ere a CR writt en t o do c ument the u n e xp e ct ed b eh avior? From: BAR BOR EK, w DOUG LA S [maj!toWBARBOl@entergy com] Sent: T u esday, O ctober 27, 20 1 5 2:41 PM To: Tobi n , M a r garet <M a rgaret.Tob i o@orc.gov> Cc: T i ndel l , Bria n <Brian Iindell@orc gov>; Bar rett , Andy <Andy Barrett@nrc gov>; SHORT, BRADLEY w <bshort@entergy co m>; WOO DSO N, T I MO THY R <TWOODSO@entergy com>; Conyers, Dan i el <dcoover@eo t ergy com> Subj ec t: [E xterna l_Sender] RE: AN0-1 RV o-ri n g l ea k age -10/23/2015 Power E nt r y Maggi e, We have discu ssed th i s internally and br i e fly w i th AREVA and h ave no definitive explanat i on fo r t h e leakage to plateau as it h as since la te Ju l y. Ou r issue has certai nly exh i bited different behav i or than the I nd ia n Po i nt-3 l eak and other previous o-r in g l eaks in the industry.
It seems very l i kely that our o-r i ng leakage h as a different cause than the IP3 i ss ue. T h eo-r i ng l eakage temperature a l arm i s st i ll locked in on t h e Control Room annunc i ator, and t h e l eakage i s still emanating from the header near t h e sump, so we st i ll be l ieve the l eakage is from the RV a-r i ng. The only confi rmin g p i ece of info rm ation we don't have is thermography of t h e leak-off drain p i ping w hi ch we cannot obta in a t power due to the locat i on of the p i pi n g. That w i l l be a piece of i nforma t io n we p l an t o ob t a in if we have a p l anned or unplanned RX trip wh i ch allows gene r a l access to the RB basement.
Dur i n g our next power entry in December, I have i nformed RP t h at m y i n tent i s to take anot h er wa l k around e l evatio n 354' to l ook at the basement floor (e l evatio n 335') t hrou gh the g r at i ng and check for signs of a n y ot h er l eakage, as wel l as checking t he temperature of the RCP i n t ergasket lea k-off l i nes aga i n to ensure they are at ambient temperature a nd not leaking by. The last e nt ry in wh i ch we performed this effort wa s the Ju l y entry. P lease l et me know if t his d i d not a n swer your q u est i ons or if you have any add i tio n al questions.
Th anks. Doug Barborek Entergy Operations, Inc./ Arkansas Nuclea r O ne System E ngin eer-ANO I & ANO 2 Reactor Coo l ant Systems and AN0-1 S p e n t F ue l Co o lin g & P u r i fi c a t i on Sy s tem Sys t e m E n g, n eerong Bu l l d, ng / N-SYE 4 wba r bol @eote r gy com 479-858-4 337 (off,ce) !(b )(6) !(p ag e r) From: Tob in, M argaret [ma i l to: Margare t.Tobin@n rc.gov] Sent: Tuesday, October 27 , 2015 12:48 PM To: BARBOREK, W DOUGLAS Cc: 6c iao,l i odell@orc eov; Andy Barrett@orc.eov
 
==Subject:==
RE: AN0-1 RV o-ring l ea k age -1 0/23/2015 Power Entry Doug , I have a follow-on question.
I'm curious if you have a theory on why the l eak rate seems to have more or l ess settled out? Everything I heard about this issue from the start was that Op-E from other sites suggested this leak should slowly get worse unti l you hit a trigger point and needed to shut down. I'm concerned that somehow we may be missing some important p i ece of information somewhere because it isn't following the expected physical phenomenon. Thanks, Maggie From: BAR BOR EK , w DOUGLAS [ma j!toWBARBOl@entergv com) Sent: T u esday, October 27, 20 1 5 10:33 AM To: Barrett, Andy <Andy Barrett@nrc
.gov> Cc: Tob i n, Margar et <Margaret Tob i o@orc gov>; T i ndel l , Br i an <Brian I i od e ll@or c, goy>; SHORT, B R ADLEY w <bshort@entergy.com
>; WOOD SO N , T I MOT H Y R <TWOODSO@entergy,com
>; Conyer s, D an i el <dconver@e ntergy com>; EDGELL, DOU GLAS w <PEPGELL@entergy com>
 
==Subject:==
[Externa l_Sender) AN0-1 RV o-r i ng l eakage -10/23/2015 Power Entry Andy, Regard ing your qu est i ons on t h e Un it 1 powe r ent r y l as t F riday. T h e boric ac i d at th e ta i l pipe i s st i l l pri st i ne white, i nd i cat i ng n o wa s tag e of carbon s t ee l. The l ea k rat e wa s v i s ua l ly typ i ca l of pr evious e n tr i e s. T he r ate of inc r ease of th e lea k s lowed down in l ate Jul y, a nd is now on a v e ry s l ow i n creas i ng t re nd. Be l ow is a sna pshot fro m t h e Sh i ft Eng i nee r's spreads hee t for R CS l ea kage wh ic h shows the Cyc l e 26 data. A l so attac h ed are some sti ll shots from the video I took. You are more t h an we l come to stop by my cube a n d w a t c h t he e ntire v i d eo. P lease l e t me know i f you h ave any add i tion q ues t io n s conce rni ng this issue. Thanks , Doug Barborek E n t er gy Opera t i on s , I nc./ Ar k an s a s N u c l ea r O ne S y s t e m E n g i n eer-ANO-I & AN 0-2 Reac t or C oo l a nt S y s t e m s and AN0-1 Spe n t Fue l Coolin g & P u r i f i ca t i on Sys tem S y s t e m E ng i n ee r i ng B ui l din g/ N-S Y E-4 wba r bol@e ote r gy com 4 79-8 5 8-4 337 (offic e) !(b)(6) l (page r) iC------------~=-----------~
... , 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 g ,.. 0 l/17'2015 2/25'2015 l/10'2015 3/1912015 3/28fl015 4,\312015 4/15.l2.015 4/24'2015 51312015 5/12/.2015 5121'2015 5/30/2015 6,1312015 6/17/2015 6/2625120 71512015 71141.2015 7123/.2015 8/1/2015 BJ10'2015 B/19/2015 6/28/2015 9A312015 9/151.2015 9/24/2015 10/3l2015 10/12/2015 10/21/2015 0 0 ... 8 0 ... ... 0 0 1 1 II 0 ;;;; 0 :=~!~~~c9 t "' !!l !l !!: i ::! WWNN!!!w!aci,EJ,.
f o.s;oc,-A*
a~ila;i= .. :: 'O .. ~.a 'O "' ij a 0 N 8 ::u n Cl) .. II> iii Ii n '< !?. ..
From: Tobin Marwei To: S ubject: Date: OKeefe Ne il* Correll Brian; Dixon l obo; Choate 1 ackson FW: AN0-1 RV o-r i ng l eakage
* 1 0123120 1 5 Power E n t r y Monday, Novembe r 02. 2015 1 1 :02: 00 AM Atta ch ment s: s t i l l s hot 1.pd( FYI, an up date for RCS l eakage From: BAR BOREK, W DOUGLAS [mai 1 to:WBARB0l@ente r gy.com) Sent: Tuesday, October 2 7 , 2015 10:33 A M To: Barrett, Andy Cc: Tobin, Margaret; Tindel l , Bri a n ; S H ORT, BRAD L E Y W; WOODSON, TIMOTHY R; Co n ye r s , Dan i el ; EDGELL, DOUG LAS W
 
==Subject:==
[Externa l_Sender) AN0-1 RV o-ring l eakage* 10/23/2015 Power Entry Andy, R egar d ing your quest i ons on t h e Unit 1 power ent ry l ast Friday. T h e boric aci d at the ta i l pipe i s st i l l prist i ne white, i nd i cat i ng n o wastage of carbon steel. The l ea k rate was v i s ua l ly typ i ca l of p r eviou s e n trie s. The r ate of increa s e of the lea k slowed down i n l ate Ju l y, a nd i s now on a v e ry s l ow i n creas i ng tre n d. Be l ow is a sna p s h ot from t h e Sh i ft Eng i nee r's sp r ea d s h eet fo r RC S l eakage which shows the Cyc l e 26 data. A l so at t ached are some st i l l sho t s from the video I t oo k. You are mo re t h an we l come to stop by my cube a nd watch the entire v i deo. Please l et me know i f you h ave any add i tion questions conce rni ng this issue. Thanks , Doug Barbor ek En t e rg y Opera t i o n s, Inc./ Ark ansas N u cle ar O ne Syste m E n gi n eer-A N O*! & AN0-2 Reactor Coo l a n t System s an d AN O*l Spen t Fue l C ooling & Pur i fi c a t i o n S y s t e m Sys t em E n g i n eer in g Bu ildi ng/ N*SYE*4 wba r bo l@ente r gy com 479-858-4337 (off i ce) !(b)(6) l (p ag er) 0 200 --CT FIi Rale (OP ml Unleltnb~ed Uak!U t e (gpm) RCSLeakrate Cycle 26 0 180 --Tot,1IRCS lOSMl (OP IT1) 1--------------------------
-< 0 160 0 140 0 120 0100 0 080 0 060 0 040 0 020 0 000 "' 5 --uean*2S1Qma LI ean , 2 sioma -u tan+:l &oma -u,an-3Sigma ***** Mean 10/23/2015 Power Entry -U 1 RV Inner 0-r ing L eakage at HSD-15-2" Drain Header just West of RB Sump. 
 
F ro m: To:
 
==Subject:==
Da te: Attachments
: To b i n Ma rg ar et e am rn And y FW: FW: AN0-1 RCS l@i:tk R,Ue P ro j ect i on T u esday, Octobe , 27, 20 1 S 8:27:00AM j m ue007 .. D1li. From: Ti nde ll, B r ian Sent: Mo nd ay, September 21, 2015 8:40 AM To: OKeefe , N e i l Note: The attac h ed i mages appea r on subsequent pages with i n t h e body of the ema il str in g. Cc: D ixon, J o hn; Correl l , Brian; Choate, Jackson; Barrett, Andy; Tob i n , Ma r gare t
 
==Subject:==
FW: FW: AN0-1 RCS L eak Rate Projection FYI. From: BARBOREK , w DOUGLAS [maijtpWBAR B Oj@entergy cam] Sent: T hu rs d ay , Sep t ember 17, 2015 5:26 PM To: Tindell, B r ian <B r i an.T j n del l@nr c gov>
 
==Subject:==
[Ex t erna l_Sende r) FW: AN0-1 RCS Leak Ra t e Projec t ion Br ian, FY I. I was out las t week ... thi s is the first u pda te in two weeks. T hanks , Doug Ba r borek fnte<gv Oper.;Hlons, inc / Atkan~s Nuc.lea, One System Engineer -AN0-1 & AN0-2 R.eiM:to, Coolant Systems and AN0* 1 Spent Fuel Coo mg & :Purification S~tem System Engineering Bu ld1ng/ N-SYE-4 itfbarbo]@entergy com 479-858-4337 (office) 1/h\ffi\1 (p.ge,I ~RBOREK, W DOUG L AS Sent: Thu r s day , September 1 7 , 20 1 5 5: 1 4 P M To: WOODSON, TIMOTHY R; E DGE L L, DOUGLAS W; SKARTVEDT , MA R K EDMUN D; P ER K I NS, DAR RELL L; GORDON, ROBER T A; FORD.JEFF R E Y; Evans, T e r ry Alan; ANO O P S1 SM's; P a l me r, C h a r l es; BUTLER , PAU L WAYNE; WOERNER, GEORGE W; HOL LO WOA, TROY B; Davi s, B arry; PU T NAM , RE X G; GARBE, C H ARLES R Cc: MEY ER S, J OHN M; H OWE LL , JERRY W; HILL , S T EVEN D; P arker, Bobby J oe; CR AN E , NE L SONS; PACE, ROBER T D; OLIVER , JASON R; M EATH EA NY , DANIELJ; SCH L U TER MAN, P AME L A S; C rosby, Patrick; Be l d i n.J osh u a; G REESON, WI LLI A M C
 
==Subject:==
RE: AN0-1 RCS Lea k R ate Pr o j ection Resend with corrected date. All, The l atest 2nd order po ly nomia l projection for reac h i ng 0.250 gpm Total RCS Losses is 230 days from now , or May 4th, 201 6. The recent stabilization of the leakage ra t e is movi ng the projec ted ODM I tr i gger pomt further into Cycle 26. T hanks , Doug B a rborek Ente f gy Oper.-itions., Inc./ Arkanws. Nuclea r One System Engineer -AN0-1 & AN0-2 Reactor Coolant Systems and A.N0-1 Spent Fuel Coo ling & Purification S~tem svstem El'l8iritNing Bu ld ins/ N SYE 4 wharh2J..tll"'Oferey m m 479 85S--4H7 {office) !(b )(6) l (p.ge,J 0 300 0 250 0 200 RCS Leakrate Cycle 25 ------------~
--OTFII Rate(9prn)
Unldtn l fttd lea~ Ra 1 1 (111>m) --TolalRCSLos,os (9p!TI) t.tun*2 Sl oma --t.tur>2S19ma
-t.ttan*3 Sloma -M ean-Js.oma
*****Mun As of 9/17/2015, the 2nd order polynomlal 0 150 -+-----------i=f...ll~--:...._---------:.
P __ ro;.: J.;,e=-tt
__ io.._, n:-:::-:to=:-:re,..a
__ ,.,..h __ 0 __ .2::.s;..o~---1 1pm Total RCS leekace Is 230 days from now , or 5/4/2014. From: BARBOREK, W DOUG L AS Sent: Thu r s d ay, September 03 , 2015 1 :04 P M T o: WOODSON, TIMOTHY R; EDGELL, DOUGLAS W; SKARTVEDT, MARK EDMUND; PERKINS, DARRELL L; GORDON, ROBERT A; FORD.JEFFREY; E vans, Terry Alan; ANO OPS1 SM's; P alme r , Char l es; BUTLER, PAU L WAYNE; WOERNER, GEORGE W; HO L LOWOA, T ROY B; Dav i s, Barry; PUTNAM, R EX G; GARBE, CHARLES R Cc: MEYERS, J OHN M; HOWEL L , JERRY W; HILL, STEVEN D; Parker, Bobby J oe; CRANE, NEL S ON S; PACE, ROBERT D; OLIVER.J ASON R; MEATHEANY , D ANI E L); SCH L U TE RMAN, P AMELA S; C rosby, Pat ri ck; Be l d i n , Joshua; G REESON, WILLIAM C Sub j ec t: RE: AN0* 1 RCS Leak Rate Proje c t i on All, T h e l atest 2 nd o rd er po l y nom i a l p ro j ec t ion for reac h i n g 0.250 gp m T ota l R CS L osses is 114 da y s fr om n o w , or D ece m ber 26, 2015. Tha n ks, Doug Barborek E.nterg\f Oper a tions, I nc I At k ansas Nucle.a, Ooe Svs 1 em fn,g1neer-ANO-l
& AN0-2 Ae3Ctot Coolant Systems and ANO*l Sptnt Fue l Coo 1na & Pur1fic.1t1on Systtm S.Y$1 em Engineer i ng Su l d 1 n g/ N-S.YE-4 wbMbot@cosecsv oom 479-SSS-.4317 (Gl!it@) 1 (b)(6) r ,. ... J 0 300 0 200 --OTFI I Ratt (9p m) Unldtnllfltd Lut Ralt (Q)m) --TOl a lRCSLosses(gpmJ
--Llun*2Sl9ma --Mtan*2 Slgmt -uun--3SJoma
--Mean , J&grru ----*MUii --POIY (Total R C S LOI-(gp m)) R CS Leak r a te Cyc le 2 5 0150 ,--------------1<-:-r;l,,..dl:::._
_______ .L.:,:::,,:c=,:.:=.-==:.=::-=.::=:._
---1 cpm Total RCS leaka&e Is 114 days from now , or 12/26/2015 From: BARBOREK, W DOUGLAS Sent: Thursday, Aug u s t 27, 2015 5:46 PM T o: WOODSON, TIMOTHY R; EDGE L L, DO UGLAS W; SKARTVE D T, MARK EDMUND; P ERKINS, DA RRELL L; GO R DON, ROBERT A; FOR D.JE FFRE Y; Evans, Te r ry A l a n; ANO OPS 1 SM's; P al m er, Char l es; BUTLER , PAUL WAYNE; WOERNER, GEORGE W; HOLLOWOA, TROY B; Dav i s , Barry; PUTNAM, R EX G; GARBE, CHARLES R Cc: ME YERS, JO HN M; HOWE LL , JERRY W; H ILL, S T EVEN D; P ar k e r , Bobby J oe; CR AN E, NELSON S; P ACE, ROB E R T D; OLIVER.J ASON R Sub j ec t: RE: AN0-1 RCS Leak Rate Proje ct i on A l l , T h e l atest 2 nd o rd er po l y nom i a l p ro j ec t ion for reac h i ng 0.250 gpm T ota l R CS L osse s is 104 da y s fr om n o w , or D ecembe r 9 , 20 1 5. Thi s pro j ect i on i s b e yo nd t he l ast four w e e ks of p r o j ect i o ns d ue to a s l i g h t l eve l i ng o ff o f t h e T ot a l RC S l e a k r at e ov er the l ast w eek to 10 d a y s. Th a n k s , Doug Barborek En t t'iV OJ)t 1 o1 t1 o n~. l r'IC / AJ k a, n~> Nu t l t.lt Ont SV'!,\c m Eng i n ee r -AN O 1 & ANO 2 R c.Ktot Coo l a nt Sl/l, tc m~ a nd AN0-1 Spe n t r u e l Cooli n g & P 1.ir1h ca tl o n S y s tem S~t cm(ro~l r.t~dng B u ld 1 n 9/N SYl-4 wbMbol@rnrew oom 479-858'-4 H7 (o ffl ct) !(b )(6) l (p,g e, J RCS Leakr a te Cycle 25 -rnr~-------------~
--OTFI Ralo(llpm)
Unld e nbnod Lea k Ralt ( gi, m) --T otal RCS Losses (gpm) --M oan*2S l gma --Mun-2!Mgma 0200 --M oan*3Slgma
-M ean-3SIOJ"l"la
*****U tan --Pot y (TOia! RC S L*-(llpffl)) 0 150 ;---------------
"""11=,1-='-------_:
o c:.rd.::.e.::.r;..;p";o:..l-: y'=n-=om~l1:..l-<p"'.r::'01<.:*e c.: ct 7 i':'o-:: n::--i t o rea c h 0.2501pm Tota l RCS Leaka1e i s 104 days from now , or 12/9/2014. 0 000 .,... .................................................................
_ .............
._ ........................................................
_ ....................................
.... From: BARBOREK, W DOUG L AS Sent: Thursday, Augu s t 20, 2015 10: 41 AM To: WOODSON, TIMOTHY R; EDGE L L, DO UGLAS W; SKARTVEDT, MARK EDMUND; P ERKINS, D ARRELL L; GORDON, ROBERT A; FORD,JEFFREY; Eva ns, Te r ry A l a n; ANO OPS1 S M's; P a l mer, Charle s; BUTLER, PAUL WAYN E; WOERNER, GEORGE W; HOLLOWOA , TROY B; Dav i s , Barry; PUTNAM, REX G; GARBE , CHARLES R C c: ME YER S, J OHN M; HOWELL.JERRY W; H ILL, S T EVEN D; P arke r , Bobby J oe; CRANE, NE LS ONS; Pace, R obe r t D. (INPO) (paceRP@INPO or~) Sub j ect: RE: AN0-1 RCS Leak Rate P r o j ection Al l , T h e l atest 2 nd o rd e r po l ynom i a l p ro j e c t ion for reac h i ng 0.250 gpm Tota l R CS L o ss e s is 94 day s from n o w , or N ovembe r 22 nd , 20 1 5. T h is p r o j e c t i on i s a b out tw o w ee k s b e y o n d the l a s t t h r ee w ee ks o f pro j ec ti ons d u e t o a s l ight l e v e l i ng o ff of the Tota l R CS l eak ra te o v er t h e last w eek. Th a nk s , Doug Barborek En t c,sv Opt r 4 t1 0 n), i nc I Ar k 111 n w~ Nu t l f , H o~ Sys te m En,g 1 ne e r -A N 0-1 & AN0-2 R eac.t or Coo l a nt Sys te ms a n d AN 0-1 Spe n t r u e l Coo , n g & P u , 1 f 1Ca tl o n S y s tem Sys t em f.ng l n-eer i ng B u Id 1 n g / N -SYE. -4 wharbol@P OIPCID'-OOID 479*853 4H? (ofllc*) !(b)(6) l (p.ge<)
0 200 --OTF-Ralt(Op,11) un~n11t1olukRa 1 1 t-J --TotalRCSlouu(gpm)
--wean*2'Sio,na lolt.,..2$io,na
-Ytan*l~gma -1o11.,..3$i0,na
------I.lean RCS Leakrate Cycle 25 --Pol y (TOlalRCSlOl,.
(Qll"1)) 0150 -l------------------;.-::
,....=--'-----'-'
A"'c s c" o'-f 8=2 cc 0 cc/.;c 20.c.1;;., S cc'-'t-'-he.c..;c 2;.;.nd.c.;.;.o cc rd;.;e;.;.r---! po l ynomlal projection to reach 0.250 Total RCS Leakce Is 94 days from now , or ll/22/201S From: BARBOREK, w DOUG L AS Sent: Thur s day, Aug u st 1 3, 2015 3: 15 PM To: WOOD S ON, TIMOTHY R; EDGE L L, D OU G LAS W; SKAR T VE D T, MA R K E DMUN D; PE R KINS, D ARRELL L; GO R DON, ROBERT A; F O R D.J EFFRE Y; Evans , Te r ry Ala n; ANO OPS1 SM's; Palmer, Charle s; BUTLER, PAUL WAYNE; WOERNER, GEORGE W; HOLLOWOA, TROY B; Dav i s, Barry; PUTNAM, REX G; GARBE, CHARLES R Cc: ME Y E R S.J OHN M; H OWE LL.JERR Y W; H ILL, STEVEN D; Par k e r , Bobby J oe; CRANE, NELSONS; Pace, Robert D. (JNPO) (PareRD@)NPO org) Sub j ect: RE: ANO-1 RCS Leak Rate Project i on A l l , Th e l a t es t 2 nd o rd er po l y n om i a l p ro j ec t i o n for reac h i n g 0.25 0 gpm T ota l R CS L osses is 85 da y s fr o m n o w , or N ove m be r 6t h, 2 0 1 5. T h i s i s c o ns i s t ent w i th t h e l as t tw o w eeks o f p r o j e c tions. Th a nk s, Doug Barborek [r\l CtQ'f 0J)t r j llOr'15, l n,c / Af k 6r'l1.;l5 Nut l t,H 01\C S~t em &#xa3;nglf'}Ccr
-A N O 1 R e.actor C<lo l ant 5y5tc m a n d A'II 0-1 S1>tnt F u e l Cooltn8 & P 1.mhcatlo n 5vste m Svsttm (nglnttdng 8 u ld1 n 9 / N*S Y(-4 wti~rbol@enrergy com 479*8S8 4U7 (offl<<") l<b )(6) r** .. 1 0 JOO --OTFII Rate (gpn,) Undtn*neo Ltak Race (Ql>"11 --Toto t FICS losstS(Ol)n,)
0200 OOSCl 000() ... ... 0 &sect; Cl s s 1o1un*2Sogma --u e an-2 Stoma -uun*J s.oma -uun-3Stoma
----*Utan "' "' "' &sect; &sect; I 0 Cl 5i s lii From: BARBOREK , W DOUG L AS "' "' i ; 0 s $ R CS L eakre t e Cycle 26 "' I "' &sect; "' "' i&sect; 0 8 0 c; c; Q! .... i "' ;:
S ent: T hu r s d ay, Aug u s t 06, 201 5 11 : 48 AM T o: WOODSON, TIMOTHY R; EDGELL, DOUGLAS W; SKARTVEDT, MARK EDMUND; PERKINS, DARRE L L L; GORDON, ROBERT A; FORD , JE F FREY; E van s , Terry Alan; ANO OPS1 SM's; P a l me r , Char l es; BUTLER, PAUL WAYNE; WOERNER, GEORGE W; HOLLOWOA, TR OY B; Dav i s, Barry; PUTNAM, REX G Cc: MEY ER S.J OHN M; H OWELL.JE R RY W; H ILL. S T EVEN D Sub j ect: RE: AN0-1 RC S Leak Rate Pro j ecti on A ll , T h e l atest 2nd o rd er po l y nom i a l pro j ection for reac h ing 0.250 gpm Total R CS L osses is 91 days from n o w , or N ovembe r 5t h , 20 1 5 (ref. attached ODM I, Rev. 01). T h i s i s ba s e d on lea k rate d a ta from 4/1/2015 to p rese n t, w h i ch corr espo nd s t o t h e appro x im at e da te that th e t o t a l RCS l ea k r ate began increasing. See pro j ectio n graph below. N ot e that the nom i na l inner o-r i ng l ea k ra t e i s d e t er min e d by ad d ing th e in cr ease i n t he R B Su m p f i l l rat e s i nce -4/1/2015 t o the i ncrea se i n the T-111/T*42 fi ll ra te s i nce ~6/22/2015. T h e I ncrease i n the Uni d en ti fied leak rate is NOT i nd i ca t i ve of t he tota l o ring leakage r ate s i nce some o f the o r i ng l ea k age is apparen t l y bei n g condense d i n the R CP S eal CollectiOn sys t em l oo p seal a nd i s bei n g ret u rne d to the Que n c h T a n k as I d e n t i f i ed leakage. Tha n ks , D ou g B a rb or ek Ente<gy Optr.ttion s, l ne / A/kansas Nuclea, Ooe S~t~m Eoglnte,r-ANO l & ANO 2 RektOt Coola o l SV'\t C'mS and ANO 1 Spent F uel (001mg & Pu<1f1C,1tlon System S~1e m Et'IBl~ering e u Id 1nA / N-SYf-4 Yd:iatboJ@emer,v com 479-858-433? (office) lifilfil](p.1gH\ _J RCS Leakrate Cycle 25 0.3 0 0 ~--------------------------------------~
0.200 --O T F il Ra t e (g p m) U n lden t i fled L eak Ra t e ( gpm) --To t a l R CS L o ss e s(gpm) --M ea n*2 S i gma --M ean-2 S i gma -Mean*3S l g ma -M ean-3 S i gma -----Mean --Pol y. (Total R CS Losses (g p m)) A s of 8/6/2015, t he 2nd o r der po l ynomial projection to 0 1 5 0 +-------------------t,-::;f'~---"---------':
r"'.:".e*::-: c ,:-;;0-;;.2~50" 1':-: p:-: m':-.:-To:-: t::-a r.R" CS;;:----, 0 0 0 0 "' "' "' "' "' 0 0 Si -C! .., .., Fro m: BARBOR E K. W DOUGLAS Sent: F ri day, Ju l y 31, 20 1 5 10:24 AM "' "' C! "' Leakage is 91 days from now , or 11/5/2015 "' "' "' "' "' "' "' "' 0 &sect; 0 8 0 ll! r,... C! I!? C! <D <D .... .... .... T o: WOODSON, TIMOTHY R; EDGE L L, D OUGLAS W; SKARTVEDT, MARK EDMUN D; PERK I NS , DARRELL L; GORDON , ROBERT A; FORD.JEFFREY; Evans, T e r r y A l a n; ANO OPS1 SM's; Pa l m er , Cha rles; BUTLER, PAUL WAYNE; WO E RN E R, GEORG E W; HOLLOWOA, TROY B C c: ME Y ERS.J OHN M; HOWE LL.JERRY W; HIL L , STEVEN D Sub j ect: AN0-1 RCS Leak Rate Projection All, O bv io u sly, th is is no t an e x act sc i ence. b ut t h e la t es t 2n d o rd er po l yno m ial pr o j ectio n for reac h ing 0.250 gpm T o t al R CS L osses is 99 days fro m no w, or N o v e mb er 7 , 2 0 15 (r e f. a tt a ched O O M I, R ev. 01). T hi s i s ba s e d on l ea k rat e da ta fr o m 4/1/2 0 15 to p re s ent, w hi ch co r res po nd s to t he a p pr oxi m at e date that the to t al RCS l ea k rate b ega n i ncreasi n g. See pr o j ectio n graph b e l o w. FY I , the s a me p r o j ect i o n tw o w ee k s a go ca l cu l at ed a d a te o f 1 2/19/20 1 5 t o r each 0.2 5 0 gp m. I t is a n t i c ipat ed tha t t h i s va lu e wi ll con t i n u e t o mo v e t o w a rd s the pre s e n t. I w i ll be p a r ti c i p at i ng i n a 2 n d Power E n try on 8/4/2015 to q ua nt ify the l ea ka ge at the d r a i n hea d er nea r the west end of the RB S u m p. I w i ll a t tem p t to u pda t e th i s pr o j ection on a w eekl y basis from thi s po i n t fo r wa rd. Tha n ks. Dou g B a rb ore k E n tergy 0~1 ati o n s, l oc / Alk a ns.a s Nucl!a r Ont Svs 1 em Eng l l'\ter-AN O, t 8, A N0*2 R eac t or Coo l a n t Svs 1 ems and AN0-1 Spent F u e l Coo li ng & P u rific ation S~tem S~te m Eng i neering B u ildi ng/ N-SY E-4 wNrho J@tnrrrev mm 479*853~337 (offia!) l<b )(6) I (oog<<) RCS Leakrate Cyc l e 25 0.300 ~--------------------------------------~
--O T Fi l Ra t e (gpm) --U n id e n t ified L eak Rat e (g pm) --Tota l RCS L osses (gpm) --Mea n+2 S i gma --Mea n-2 S igma -Mea n+3S i gma 0.200 -Mea n-3 Sigma -----l~ea n --Po l)'. (Tota l R CS Losses (gpm)) As of 7/30/2015 , the 2nd order po l ynomia l 0_ 1 50 +----------------------tr->-./<"=-----------..!p'--'r-=-o'-'je:.: c.:: t i:.: o c.c n:...t:.: o:...r:...: e:.: a:.: c cc h_: 0:..::.2::.5:..: 0=--__, gpm Tota l RCS leakage Is 0.000 "' "' "' "' "' "' "' "' "' a a a a a a a t::! t::! t::! t::! t::! t::! t::! -"' N 0) 112 "' a ...... " " t::! t::! "' in t::! t::! " " "' I!) "' "' "' "' "' a a a a a t::! t::! t::! t::! t::! I!? a ...... V -<D w t::! ...... <D "' "' "' a t::! "' N ...... ;;: t::! ..... "' a t::! 0) t::! .... 99 days from now, or 11/7/2015.
From: To: Su bj ect: Date: Attachments:
Tobin Margaret T i n d ell Br i an FW: fW: O OM I Up date
* Rea ctor Ve s se l Head Inne r Gas k et Leak Th urs d a y, July 1 6 , 2 0 15 9:38:00 A M RY Flan ge 0-rio g l eakave od f im ageOOJ nag From: SHOR T , BRADLEY W [mai l to:b s hort@entergy
.com] Sent: Thu r s d ay, J u l y 16, 2015 8:55 A M To: Tob in, Marga r e t Note: The same two procedures , the firs t with a cover sheet , IEN-OP-111 Rev.11 and EN-FAP-OM-021 Rev.1 , are withhe l d in th e i r ent ir ety under FOIA exempt i on 4.
 
==Subject:==
[Externa l_Send e r] RE: F W: O DM I Upd a te -R ea c t o r V essel H e a d I nner Ga s k e t L e a k I t has been s i gned off. See a tt a che d BRAD S H O RT LI CENSING REGUL AT ORYSU PP ORT PHO N E 479-$5$*32r CE LL l (b )(6) _ From: Tobin, Ma r ga r et [majlro-Mariare t Jobjn@nrc KPY J Sent: Thursday.Jul y 16 , 20 15 7: 49 AM To: S H ORT, BRADLEY W S ubj ect: RE: FW: OD MI Upda t e -Reactor Vessel Head Inner Gas k et Leak Brad, Did this ODM I eve r ge t s i gned off? T hanks , Maggie From: PYL E, S TE PHEN I E L [ma jlto*SPYLE@entergy com] Sent: Wednes d ay, J u l y 08 , 201510:04 AM To: Tobin, Marga r et Cc: SHORT, BRADL EY W
 
==Subject:==
[Externa l_Sende r] RE: FW: 0 DM I Update -Reac t o r Vesse l H ead I nner Gaske t L eak T h e OD M I sh ou l d be sig n ed o ff b y COB T hu rs day a nd w e can get y o u a cop y th en. T h a n k s , S t ep h e ni e Fr om: Tobin, Ma r ga r et r mailto*Mamret Jobjn@nrc KPY l Sent: Tuesday, Ju ly 07, 20 1 5 3:56 P M To: PYLE, STEPHENIE L S ubject: RE: FW: OD MI Up d a t e -Reactor Vessel Head Inner Gas k et L eak H i Stephanie, Thanks for the update on this. Do you know i f the full ODM I i s available?
Thanks , M aggie From: PYL E , S TE PHEN I E L [ma j lto*SPYLE@enter gy com] Sent: Tu esday, Ju l y 07, 2015 3:48 P M To: OKeefe, N e i l; T i ndel l, Br i an; Tay l or, N i ck; Tob i n , Marga r et
 
==Subject:==
[E xt e rna l_S e nd e r] FW: ODM I Upda te -R eac tor V essel H e ad I nn er Ga s k e t L ea k F Y I From: ANO MAIL Sent: T uesday , Ju ly 07, 20 15 3: 38 P M To: Server ANO-EXS0 1; Server ANO-EXS02
 
==Subject:==
ODMI Upda t e -Reactor Vessel Head I nner Gasket Leak From: To: Cc:
 
==Subject:==
Date: Tay l or N i ck Burr i tt Arthur O" Keefe Nei l: T i ndell Brian: Corre ll Br i an: Eg l i Richard: Tob in Ma r garet* D i xon J ohn FW: Unit 1 RCS L ea kage ODMI Tue sday, Ju l y 21, 20 1 5 1 1:30:11 AM Attachments:
RV Fl ange 0-ring L ea kage.p d f Note: The same two procedures ( EN-OP-111 Rev.11 and EN-FAP-OM-021 Rev.1) ------------------.
a r e w i thhe l d in the ir ent ir erty unde r FO I A ex imageoo1 png Art , You were look i ng for OE last week on operations with both inner and outer O rings failed. I hadn't discovered any previous occurrences.
But we got ANO's ODMI today and the licensee lists a number of prev i ous occurrences both at ANO, Browns Ferry 1 and Wolf Creek. Hope this helps , Nick Taylor Senior Project Engineer Division of Reactor Projects USNRC Region IV 0: 817 200-1520 C: (b)(6) E: o i ck.t aylor@nrc.gov From: Correll , Brian Sent: Tuesday , J uly 21 , 2 0 15 9: 11 AM To: OKeefe , Neil; Tay l or, Nick; Far i na , Thomas; Tinde ll , B r i an; T obin, Marga r e t Cc: Egli , Richard
 
==Subject:==
Unit 1 RCS L eakage ODMI Unit 1 RCS Leakage ODMI is attached.
Pages 5 and 6 are the Thresholds and Actions to be taken if the thresholds are exceeded.
Brian From: Sent: To: Cc:
 
==Subject:==
Egli , Richard Tuesday, July 21, 2015 12:42 PM Taylor, N ick; Burritt , Arthur O'Keefe, Neil; Tindell, Brian; Correll, Brian; Tobin, Margaret; Dixon , John RE: Unit 1 RCS Leakage ODMI Sizewell B Operation with both 0-rings leaking: htt p://nr r 10 .n r e.gov /rorp/a i r s/00003428. htm l From: Tay l or, Nick Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 11:30 AM To: Burritt, Arthur Cc: OKeefe, Neil; Tindell, Brian; Correll, Brian; Egli, Richard; Tobin, Margaret; Dixon, John
 
==Subject:==
FW: Unit 1 RCS Leakage ODMI Art, You were l ooking for OE l ast week on ope r ations with bo th inner and outer O rings f ailed. I hadn't discovered any p r evious occurrences.
But we got ANO's ODM I today and the l i censee lists a numb er of previous occurrences both at ANO , Browns Ferry 1 and Wo l f Creek. Hope this he lp s, N i ck Tay lor Senior Project Eng i n eer D i vision of Reactor Projects USNRC R egion IV 0: 817 200-1 520 C: (b)(6) E: n i ck.tay l or@nrc.gov From: Correll, Brian Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 9:11 AM To: OKeefe, N e il; Tay l or, Nick; Farina, Thomas; Tinde ll , Brian; Tobin, Margaret Cc: Egli, Richard
 
==Subject:==
Un i t 1 RCS Leakage ODMI Unit 1 RCS Leakage ODM I is attached. Pages 5 and 6 are the Thresholds and Actions to be taken if the thresholds are exceeded.
Brian N R C: Int e rn ationa l In c id e nt R e portin g Syste m FOR NRC INTER..l\IAL USE ONLY N ot Ror Pub I ic Di~lribuiion
*int e rnat io nal. Incid e nt Reporting Sys t e m (IR S) -IRS N u mber--Rep0rt Type--IAEA NUmbar--NE A Number--Date of Receipt-0 0 076 4 3 M ai n 20040916 P age 1 of 3 *Title* --Coun try-CONTINUED REACTOR OPERATION WITH BOTH REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL HEAD '0' RING SEALS LEAKING DUE TO LEAK-DETECTION SYSTEM DESIGN DEFICIENCI Un i t e d Ki n g d om -Date of Incident--Planl_N8ma-
-Po w er-*Plant -D e s i g n e r--Reactor Type--SLart_ of_ operation--Abstrac t-20010511 S l ZE W ELL*B 1196 GB-24 GB-24 P PC PWR 19950922 Whils t start i n g up afte r the refuell in g outage the then 11 oco uple in t he Reactor Pr ess u re Vesse l (RPV) head sea l l eak detect i on system in dicated l eakage from th e inner head o-ring seal. T h e inner seal lenknge detection pat h was isolated as per operating instruc t ions. L ater i n the fuel cycle airborne activi t y leve l s, humidity and s u mp levels provided evidence of leakage from t h e R eac t or Coola n t Sys t em (R CS), but thi s always rema in ed well wi thi n t he Tech ni cal Specifica t ion lim it for unidentified l eakage. Several co n tain m en t en t ries were made at powel', followed by an en t ry d u ring a fo r ced o u ta ge. to sea r ch for the sou r ce of t he leak but th e leak s it e was not detec t ed. Based u pon t he lack of evidence from th e leak s ea r ches in th e other a r eas, and the fact that the t h ermocouple on t h e outer seal l ea k detec t ion sys tem showed n o sig n of l ea k age, an eva l ua t io n of possib l e leak s it es determined the most like l y t o be a 'conosea l' thermoco u ple connection. The r eac t or was ret u rned to power afler t h e forced ou t age w i t h two areas u ni n spected; the reactor head package and the inst rum ent tu n ne l ben ea t h the rea ctor. Preparations we r e m a de for a planned s h u tdo wn t o fu t1 h er progre ss ident i fication a n d reso l u t io n of the proble m) bu t in dication ofan i n creasin g instrument t unne l sump l evel i n th e reac t or b u il ding gave cau s e f or concern and p l an s fo r t h e s hutdown were broug h t forward. The reactor wa s sh utd own on 1 1 May 200 I to enable perso n ne l to conduct a deta i led leak search i n th e reactor bui l ding. The leak source was ide nt ified a s a leak fro m the RJ'V Head ou t e r o-r in g sea l. The subsequen t i n vest i gatio n r evea l ed t hat t he ou t e r o-ring leakage detect i on system wo u l d n o t r e lia bly detect ou t er o-r i ng l ea ka ge w h en the reacto r is at operat i ng con d it ions. -G u ide Words-C ODED WATC H LI ST O F GU ID E WORD S A_I REPORTING C ATEGORIES A_1_3 Deficiencie s in de s ign , cons tru ct i o n , opernt i on (i nc lu ding main t ena n ce and s urvei ll ance), qua l it y o s sumncc or sofcty eval uati o n A_2 PLANT STA T US PRIOR TO Tl-IE EVENT A_2_1 On powe*r A_3 FAILED/AffECTED SYSTEMS i\_3_/\C Reactor vessel (w i t h core internu l s. PHWR or LWGR pressure tu bes , ... ) A 4 FAILED/AFFECTED COMPONENTS A_ 4_2_0 Other A_5 CAUSE OF THE EVENT i\_5_1_1_6 L ea k A 5 I I 8 B l oc k age, restrict i o n , obs tru ct i o n , bi n di n g , f ore i gn materia l A 6 EFFECTS ON OPERATION A_ 6 _ 2 Co ntr o ll e d sh utd own A_7 CHARACTE RISTI CS OF THE IN CIDENT A_ 7 _ 2 Degraded reactor coo l an t bo u ndary A 8 NATURE Of FA I LURE OR ERROR A_8_2 Mult i p l e fa i lure or mult i ple erro r A_9 NATURE OF R ECOVE RY ACTIONS A_9 _ I R ecovery b y h um a n action -Full_Rcport-2. NARRATIV E DES C RIPT I ON Intr oduc t ion h ttp://nrrlO.nrc.
gov/r orp/a ir s/0000342 8.h t m l 01/10/20 1 8 N R C: Int e rn at i o n a l In c id e nt R e portin g S y ste m P age 2 of 3 The RPV fla n ge is fitted with two leak off lines 10 detect in n er and ou t e r o-r ing seal fail u re (A tt achment I). T h e tw o lines from t he vesse l flang e common t ogether before pas s in g through a remote cont r o ll ed i s olut io n valve and n on-re tu rn va l ve t o the Reu c tor Coo l ant Dru in Ta n k (RCDT) (Attuc h men t 2). Th e arrangemcn l i s such t hat if t he in n er seal fa i l s, th e in t er-space betwee n the i n n er a nd o u ter seal pressurises and h o t water/steam is forced down the inner l eak detec t io n line causing t he t e m peroture 10 r ise at a temperature probe. This ini tiates an a l arm in the Ma i n Con t ro l Room. With the i n ter-s pace betwee n the o-r in g s eals pre ss urised. the full reac t o r pre ss ure is tak e n by t h e ou t e r sea l. The expectat i o n was that should the o u ter sea l fa i l t h e outer seal l eak detection line wou ld p i ck u p t h e l eakage of hot wate r flowing p as t th e t e m perature probe a n d re-in it ia t e t he a l arm. The I l e l iconex o-r i n g sea l s consis t of a n inne r ln conel sp r*in g surrou n ded by a C-shapcd l nco n el i n ner jacket 10 spread th e s pring load. Thi s i n t um i s covered w i t h a s i mi l ar C-s h aped o u ter jacke t made of si l ve r to pro v i de t h e co n fon nit y with the sea l face ro u ghness. The seals arc i ns t alle d with t h e opening of the C-s h aped j acket fac i ng away from t he pressurised water. Even t Descri p t i on D u ring preparations on 23 October 2000 fo r reactor ret u rn to power at th e en d of a r efuelling outage, ev i dence for fa i l u re o f t he Reactor Pr ess u re Vessel (RPV) in n er o-r in g sea l was observed.
The in n e r o-rin g seal, t oget h er w it h the outer o-ring seal, const i t ute t he barriers to reactor coola n t escape t o t he containmen t b u il di ng fro m the in t erface betwee n t he R J>V itself and the RPV head. B o th sea l arrangements i11 eludc l ea k age dete c t ion equ ipm e nt n n d arc subject to s t a t ion procedure s f o r the actio n t o be taken o n re ce ipt o f n sea l l eakage dete c tion a l arm. A s statio n Tech ni cal Speci fi catio n s J>C nnit opera t io n wi th t h e in ner se al in a fa i led condit i on, t he decision was taken 10 i so la t e the i n ner o-r in g se.11 lcak detectio n syste m as pe r t h e re l evant proc ed u re and con t inue with r eac t o r start-u p. The ou t er o-rin g se a l l eakage de1ec t ion sys tem rema i ned in se r v i ce. In mid-December 2000, ev id e n ce fo r water l eakage i n t o the reactor buildi n g was observed, b u t the source of the l eakage wa s u n k n own. Tec h nica l Spec i fi ca tio n s permit operat i on with bo t h iden t ified and un i d e n t i fied leakage, but the allowab l e lea k age rates are s m aller for u niden t ifie d leakage. A lt h ough the p l an t rema i n e d withi n the Tec h nica l Spec i ficat i o n l im its for u ni dent i f i ed lei,kage.
severn l co nta in m e n t en t rie s were made (both at powe r :md duri n g an u npla n n ed s h u t dow n) dur ing Dece m ber 2000 and ea rl y Jan u ary 200 I in an unsucce ss ful effo rt t o i de n t i fy t h e so urce of t he leak. T h e d i agnost ic a n alys i s of wa t e r sa m ple s, increased co n tain m ent b ui l d ing h u mi dit y levels, airborne activ~ty levels and th e prese n ce of bor i c ac id powder on some sur fa ces al l i nd i cate d that 1 he leakage was reac t or coolant. bu t t h e sou r ce o f th e leakage rema i ned u nknown. The area beneath t h e RPV and the area aro u nd the RP\/ h ead were n o t inspected for radio l og i cal d ose reasons, as t he outer o-ring seal leakage detec1ion sys t em co ntinu ed 10 g i ve no i ndicatio n of a leak in t h i s area. Follow in g u further , uns u ccess ful l ea k search at power. arrange m cnl s were made 10 s h u t d ow n the reactor on 18 Jun e 200 I t o i de n t i fy t he so urce of the leak. However , over the weeke n d o f 5 Mny 2001. ind i cat i o n s of a n increas in g su m p level i n the ins tru me n t tu n ne l a t t he bottom of t h e reactor building gave further ca u se fo r concern. The reac t or coo l an t leakage rate was being d ete nnin ed t hrough the l evel i nd i catio n in t h e sump; once the s u mp had fille d , level indication wo u l d h ave bee n lost and i t would have become im possible to quan t ify the l ea k age ra t e. I n respo n se , the decisio n was t ake n to carry o ut a co n trolled reactor s h ut d own on I I May 200 I. The re s ulting dcrn il cd l ea k search revealed th at the rcnctor coolarit l cak source wu s fr o m t he RJ'V ou t er o-ring sea l (s h own later to be on the o pp os i te side of the RPV head to th e inner o-ring sc:i l leak s it e). Bot h the in n e r and ou t er o-ring seal failures occ u rred at t h e in terface be tween the seals and t he u pward facing fla n ge, w ith the most l i kely initia ti ng eve11t be in g debris p resent in the sea l a n d RPV/hcad flange jo i n t a r ea from t he r ece n t re fu ell i n g outage. The leak si t e on the vesse l nan ge is i llustrated i n Atta ch m ent 3. The upper in t e rn als are v isibl e in t he top left of the p i ctu re , w hi lst o n the r i g h t ca n b e seen part o fa h ea d stud. The leak si t e on the closu r e head i s i llu s t ra t ed in Attac h ment 4. The h ead has b een partially raised for i nit i a l inspection w i th t he RPV t o the l ower left. T h e inner aod ou t er o-r i n g seals can seen in t hi s view. T heo-r i n g sea l s we r e vis u ally i nspec t ed on remova l and t he secl i o n of the in ner a n d o u ter seals that conta in e d the l ea k sites we r e reta in ed. A n a d di t io n al sectio n of seal that exh i bited an u n usual d efor m a t io n wa s al so reta in ed (sec Attachments 5 & 6). 3. SAFETY ASSESSMENT Stat i o n Tec h nical Spec i ficatio n s permi t operat i on with t h e i n ner sea l in a failed condit i on a n d a l so pe m1it o p era t io n w it h both iden tifi e d and un i dent i fied l ea k age, a lt ho u g h the allowab l e leakag e ra t es are s m a ll er for u n identified l ea k age. The operat in g procedure for action on rece i pt of the i nner sea l leak de t ect i on alarm in structs t he operator t o confir m th e l ea k age by mon i toring the R CDT or by u sing a c-0ntac 1 thcrm ornc t er a nd t hen i sola t e the i rrner seal leak off hoc aod esta b l is h monitor i11 g 011 the o u ter seal. 4. CAUSE ANALYSIS Des i g n I n t ent A lt hough the des i gn i ntent wa s tha t s hould the o u ter seal fail, t h e outer sea l l ea k detec t ion line would pick u p t h e leakage of hot wa t er , investigat i o n s subseq ue n t to t he eve nt ind i ca t e d t hat this wou l d not happen in pract i ce when t h e reac t or wa s at operat in g tempera t ur e. The RJ>V flange i s de sig ned wi t h a I m m gap 0 11 the o u t s i de of t h e ou t er se a l , w hi ch rnean s there is a direct pat h from t he oute r seal t o the con t a in me nt e n vi r onmen t. T h ere is a single leak de t ect i on ho l e in the flange , which i n this case was o n the opposi t e s id e of th e vessel 10 t h e l eak s i te. When wa t er (at 1 55 bar a n d 323oC) leaks 10 th e con t ai n me n t a t mosphere, approx i m a t e l y 40% wi ll turn 10 s t eam straig h t away form in g a two-phase stea m/water j ct. Any water th at col l ects in t he I mm w id e gap will rapidly boil due to the h ea t from th e h o t (323oC) me t a l vessel. T h e bo i ling will c au se bo r ic acid to co m e out of so l u t i o n fo rmi ng crystals in the gap blocking t he path aro u n d the circumfere n ce of th e vesse l. Thus th e leak w i.11 form a water/stea m jct that takes t he path of leas t r es i s t ance s tra i gh t o u t of th e gap in t h e vessel nange to t h e co nt ain m ent b ui ld i ng. It is t he refore very u nlike l y t h at a s i g nifi can t quantity of liq ui d would t ravel arou n d the flange via t he inner/outer sea l int er-space t o the le akage d etec t ion h ole un l ess th e l eak site is i mmed i ately ad j a ce n t. Thi s conc lu sion is s upp orted by a physicul check undertaken on t h e sea l leakugc detec t io n system curried ou t whc 11 t h e rcucto r wa s first s hut down a n d befor e it was d e prc ss uriscd. By opening u m anual drain va l ve it was co n finned tha t o n ly 5 drips per mi nu t e were co llec t ing in the o u ter seal leak d etect i on l i n e. T h is co u l d ha ve bee n due to conde n sa ti on of the s t eamy atmosphere that mu s t h ave bee n prescm in the n arrow gap i n th e ou t e r fl ange. G i ven th e lengt h of the sma ll bore p i pework fro m the flange to the temperature probe. suc h a s mall a m o u n1 ofliq ui d wou l d no t cause a n y signific ant t e 111 pe1111ure r i se. The N u clear S t eam S u pp l y System al S i zewe ll B i s of a We s tin gho u se de s ign b u t the RPV and h ead were manufactured in France. A comparison of ot h er ves sel s t o the Sizewell B ves se l s h ows some differences in the fla n ge deta i l. Vessel heads e i t her have a to t ally fl at fla n ge face wi t h m e t al-t o-m e t al co n tac t on the o u ts i de of t h e ou t er sea l (wh i ch forces t he wate r/steam arou n d t he ou t er sea l grove t o the l ea k detectio n h ole), or have a taper acro ss the ou t e r par t of th e na n ge with t h e gap be i ng desig n e d to c l ose lo c ally just outside the o uter 0-rin g groove during boltin g of the head t o t he vesse l. This gap t hen c l oses completely d u ring the heat up t ra n sie nt d u e to rotation of the c l os u re fla n ges, and r e-op ens as t h e t e m perature stab ii ises an d steady s tat e i s a t tained. H owever the gap on t h e ou t s id e oflhe S i z cwe ll B o u ter seal is gre a t e r a n d , therefore.
do cs not fu ll y close at opera t ing co n dit i o n s. T he conc l usion is t h a t th e RPV h ead seal leak de t ect i on sys t em in stalle d a t Sizewell B wil l pro v i de an effec t ive warni n g for an inner sea l failure, but t he prese n c e of t h e gap r esults in a r ed u ced re l iabi l it y in detect i ng the fai l ure of t h e outer sea l. Therefore , i fo: pern t ing on t h e ou t er sea l , a lt c 111 atc in dicat i o n s s u ch as contai n me n t act i v i ty , h um i dity an d drainage mu s t also be u se d to d e t ect a po ss i ble outer sea l fai l ure. Leak Searc h es Th r ee co 111 11in 111 cn 1 en tri es were made at power to t ry a n d i dentify the source of the l ea k but were u ns u ccessf u l. A ,*cactor t rip th e n occ u rred a n d t h e opport u ni t y wa s taken t o carry o ut an i n spection conce n trat i ng o n the i n n er annulus (not acce ss i ble at power) b u t the so u rce of th e l eak was not fo u nd. H owever, there was evidence of bor i c ac i d crys t a l s a n d s urfaces coa ted w i t h boron powder with in t he reactor bu il d i ng. The reaclQI' wa s rc s ta 1 1 cd th e following day. h ttp://nrrlO.nr c.gov/r o rp/air s/0000342 8.h t m l 01/10/20 1 8 N R C: Int e rn at i o n a l In c id e nt R e portin g S y ste m P age 3 of 3 In re tr ospect, n o in s p ectio n of the RPV hea d package took place a n d no e n try was m a d e into 1 he inst ru ment tu n ne l to inspec t the u n d e r s ide o f the vesse l (these areas o nl y b eing acce ss i ble w i t h the reac t or sh utdow n). Even t h o u g h the leak was s m all and m ay not have been readi l y see n , fi n ding th e source of the leak would huvc allowed more effective management of th e issue , particulurly t hose associa t ed w ith the corrosion o f carbon steel due to t h e bor i c ac i d. Sizewell B did n o t have a boric acid leakage detec t ion progra m me (as req ui red i n t he US as a resu lt o f NR C Ge n eric Letter 88-05) whic h s h o ul d h ave prompted a n inspection of t h e h ead pa c ka ge and evaluat i on o f t h e co n se qu ences o f the l eak before restart i ng the reactor and the conscqu.ences o f th e l eak. The fo r ced s hut dow n was a missed oppo 1 1 u nity to iden t i f y t h e so u rce of th e leak. S i zewc ll B was built a fter 1 988 and th erefore, the s i te Opera t ing Exper i ence gro u p did n o t review the NRC Generic Lener. There has been n o requirement t o rev i ew h istorica l OE information, t herefore th e opport u nity to learn from in ternat i ona l operating experie n ce was l os t. Fore i gn Material In clus i on (F M E) The most pr obab l e cuusc of seal fai l ure was debris on t h e vessel n(lnge. I nvestigation has revea l ed that (l ebris could have been deposited on to t h e nangc from t wo causes, bo t h of wh i ch urc c l early iden t ifie d in West i nghouse Tec h nica l B ulle t in (NSD-TB-87-02). T hi s doc u me nt s p e c ifica ll y exp lain s th e impo rt ance of protec t ing t he opening between the r eac t or vesse l head an d reacto r vessel na n gc during hydrolasi n g and o th er r efue ll ing cav it y c l eaning opera tion s. The co n trol of water level in the RPV d u r i ng se ttin g a n d bo lt i ng th e h ea d 1 0 prevent washing s m all partic l es of debris 0 111 0 t he vesse l n angc i s also covered in the document.
When t h e clos u re h ead is in it i a ll y p l aced on t o the vessel after refuelling the sea l faces do not make contac t and there is a gap betwee n the vesse l nange and o-r in gs in t he c l osure head. To protect the clean vessel hea d a nd p r event d ebr i s en t er in g the flange area , a cove r i s placed ove r th e h ead package ex t e n d in g to th e cavity fl oor. T h i s i s impo rtan t as t h e process of mecha n ically scrub bi ng a n d jc t was hi n g t h e walls and fl oors of the cavity can ca u se a lot m obile debr i s a n d panic u late m a tter. It has been iden tifi ed t h at dur in g t h e previo u s r efuelling outage t h e pro t ect i ve cover was 11 01 correct l y fitted an d h ad been l eft sa t on the top of t h e c l os u re head bo lt ing ring. It therefore d id not prov id e any protection aga i nst debr i s be i ng washe d in t o the flange gap. Wr itten work inst n, c t io n s for th e insta llat i on of t h e h ead cover d i d n o t pro v id e comprehensive instruc t ions for fitting of th e cove r , nor did t hey require a fina l i ndependent in spec t ion to confirm i t was fitted correctly. Th e i ns truc tions a l so di d n ot r eq ui re t he use o f a secondary FME ba rr ier (o r debris d a m providi n g ad d it i ona l protec t ion t o the fl ange jo int), such as a soft d eformable s trip tha t can be pushed in to th e na n gc gap before t h e plas t ic sheath is dropped o n t o t h e fl oo r. W est in g h o u se Technica l Bullet i n (NSD-TB-87-02) recommen d s 1ha1 plan ts w ith 'in verted t op ha t' su pp ort p l ate upper in t ernals shou l d ma i ntain the water l eve l approximate l y 361040 in c he s below t he RPV na n ge during selling t h e h ea d an d until th e h ead is tensioned.
The reason for t h e low er l eve l i s that experie n ce has s h own t hat w i t h h ig h er water l evels there is a risk of inadv e 1 1e11t l y flood in g o f th e vesse l flan ge, particula r ly w h en the heud i s place d on t o the vessel. T h e problem i s that when th e h.ead is not tens i oned it does not s i t down on t h e fla nge jo in t, but r ests 'p ro u d' on t h e reac t or int e rnal s. T h is m ea n s t he o-r in g sea l are not in con tact wi t h the flange foce and th ere i s risk t h at debr i s or bor i c acid crysta l s may be lef\ o n the faces of t he f'la n ge, w hi ch co u ld da m age t he o~r in g sea l s dur i ng tens i on in g. S i zewe ll B had followed the water lev el ad v ice s inc e the first refuelling outage, maintaining t he level a t 965m m be l ow t h e nang e. However due to operat i ona l concerns d u ring the l ast r efuelling ou t age th e s t at i on opera t ing procedures we r e tem p orarily amended t o allow t h e wate r l eve l to be m aintai n ed betwee n 200 m m and 965 m m below the fl unge. Dulin g t h e r efuelli n g ou t age t h e h ead was ini t ially placed o n the vessel w i t h t he wa t er level nomi n ally 965 m m be l ow flan ge. To maxim i se inve n tory the l eve l was the n ra i se d and m ain t a in ed betwee n 2 4 5-360 mm below flange dur i ng t he 40-ho ur per i od we r e the cavity was bein g d e-con t a m i nated and t he RP V s tu d ho l es cleaned. The l eve l was t h e n lowere d back to 965 m m for the fina l head ten s i oning. The head was l ifted a n d r eplaced for th e final n a n ge in spec t ion before t ighte ni ng whils t t h e water was still a t th e hi g h er level. A n o th er poss i ble so u rce of d ebr i s o n t he flan ge was i de n tified du r in g t h e cu ll'cnt forced outage to replace the o-ri n gs. II was fou n d th at wa t er was in t e 1111i1t en tl y being splas h e d on to the fla nge the w h e n RCS leve l was operati n g at a n o mi nal 150m m be l ow t h e flan ge. Due to t he tu rb ul e nt flow b elow the upper i n t ernals wate r was bein g forced u p th e u pper h ead r ecirc ul at i on fl ow h o l es w h ere it nowed ac r oss t h e flan ge face. T h is was mana ged by red u cing t he level t o 350 m m below the fl ange. Attac h me n t 7 shows the water com i ng from the cen t re o f th e t hree ho l es, on t o the upper in t enra l s a n d the n on t o the fl ange face. 5. LESSONS LEARNED AN"D COR R ECT I V E ACTIONS Re view o f NR C Ge n e r ic Letter 88-05, Boric Ac i d Corrosion of Carbon S t ee l R eactor Pres su r e Vessel Boundary Compo n en t s i n PWR P l ants and rob u st imp l eme nt atio n of its re co mme n dations. Confidence in the prov i sion by reactor press u re vessel head seal d e tec t io n sys tems of ear l y wa rn ing of sea l failure. Operation w ith a fa il ed i 11ocr RPV o-r i11 g. The fo llowin g ac t ion statemen t h as been in clu d e d in t h e relevant Sizewcll B operating procedures:-
lf t h e RPV is o perat i n g on t h e ou t er 0-ring seal t he con l u i1 m1cnt condit i ons m u st be monitored ca r efully. I f a n y R CS l eakage is identified ur gent act i on mu s t be taken t o iden t i f y the so u rce of t h e leak. I f the l ea k can n o t be id e nt ifie d b y physica l containme n t i n spect i ons wit h in 15 days t h e r eactor s h o ul d be sh u t down to a l l ow a proper inspection of RPV flange , Conosea ls a n d other inaccessib l e reg i ons. The reactor sho u l d then on l y be operated once a forma ll y agreed operat i ng reg i me h as been estab l ished. Th e 15 day action period i s based o n the rules that EdF apply to th eir la r ge r 4 l oop P WRs. Genera l U nid e n tified RCS Leaka ge: If there is physic a l evi d ence ofan RCS leak in c onta i nmenl u rgent act i on must be taken at S i zewe ll 8 to determine the locat i on and s i ze of the le a k. A com prehen s i ve assessmen t should be made t o evaluate t he impac t and ris k of o pe rating w ith the l eak a n d clea r g ui dance m u st be prov i ded as to what addit i ona l monito rin g m us t mk e place a nd DI w h a t levels spec i fic act i ons sha ll take place. If the leak source cannot be identified t he react or s h o u ld be sh u t down in a t i me l y manner t o a ll ow proper i nspec t ion of the RPV head and other inaccessib l e a r ea in the in ner a n n u lus. Implem en t a fon n al Boric Ac i d leak Detec t ion Procedur e: Sizewell Bare developing a fo m, al inspect i on procedu r e for i nvestigati n g an d eval u ating the effects of IRCS l ea k age in line w i t h US NRC Generic Letter 88-05. Impr ove t h e rou t i n e procedures for rea c t or r e-asse m bly: A n umber o f improve m ent s were imp l eme n ted o n the work order cards and procedures fo r r e-assemb li ng the h e ad du r in g t h e forced outage. These arc now be i ng embedded i n the ro u t i ne refuell in g procedures.
lm 1>rove RPV head seu l l eak detec t io n system: Sizcwell B ,,re r eview i n g in ternat i onal proced u res and methods in t his flrea. Contro ll ing RCS water level w h e n refitt i ng the reactor vesse l head: Sizewe ll B opera t ing pro cedures have been amen d ed to e n s ure th e water level is mainta i ned at t h e 965111111 be l ow t h e flan ge at all s t ages fro m when the head is re-seated o n t o the vessel u ntil it i s fina ll y te n sio n e d. Tech ni cal Speci fic a t ion for Reactor Coolant Leakage: The bases of th e Sizcwe ll 13 Techn i cal Specifica t ion for Reactor Coo l ant Leakage have been im proved to exp l a in h ow th e assessmen t of p ress u re boundaiy leakage is made. FME Pr eca u t i ons: The proc~dure for fin ing th e FME protec t ive s l 1 e ath has b ee n improved to give clear i ns t r u ct i o , , as to h ow i t sho u l d be fined and an inspection hold po in t inserted before c<rv i ty cleani n g co m me n ces. It i s recommended tha t an addit i ona l FME b arrie r be ins t a ll ed in the RPV head to fla n ge gap d u r i n g stud hole clea n ing a n d to pro v i de seco ndary protection dur in g cav i ty clean. h ttp://nrrlO.nrc.gov
/r o rp/air s/0000342 8.h t m l 01/10/20 1 8 From: Sent: To: Cc:
 
==Subject:==
Arth u r , Taylor , Nick Thursday, J ul y 16, 2015 12:29 PM Burr i tt, Ar t hur O'Keefe, Neil; Tindell, Brian FW: Ind i a n Point Head L eak OpE F Y I , A NO uni t 1 is r un ni ng rig h t now wit h a leaking in n e r sea l , and t he lea k off l ine betwee n the seals can n o t be isol at e d. Th e ir l eak is mani fes tin g i tse l f as a s lo w wa t e r lea k int o the s ump (a b o ut 0.07 g pm an d ri s in g ve r y s l owly for n ow), a n d fo r some his t or i ca l reasons th e y ca nn o t c l ose the isolat i on va l ve in t h e an nu l u s dr a i n li ne. Li censee is s tr ugg li ng w i th estab li shing w i t h O DMI crite r ia. N ot s ur e i f this h elps in fo rm your s i tuation a t Ind i an P oi n t or n ot. .. We h a v e h ad some RI V P WRs ru n th e cycle w i t h a fa il ed in ne r sea l , but n eve r w i th both sea l s fa il ed to my kn o w led ge. H ope th is he l ps, Ni ck T aylor S e ni or P ro j ect En gi n ee r Di vis ion of R eac to r P rojects U S N RC Region I V 0: (817) ?QQ-1520 C: !(b)(6) I E: n i ck.tay l or@nrc.gov From: Pa n n i er, Stephen S e nt: Thursday, July 16, 2015 10:41 AM To: T a y lo r , Nick
 
==Subject:==
FW: I ndian Point Head L eak OpE FYI From: Burritt, Arthur S e nt: Thursday, J uly 16, 2015 11:32 AM To: Pannier, Stephen
 
==Subject:==
RE: I ndia n Po i nt H ead Leak OpE Thanks From: Panni e r , St e phen Sent: Thursday, J uly 16, 2015 11:28 AM To: Burritt, Arthur Cc: Pickett, Doug l as
 
==Subject:==
RE: Indi a n Point H ead Leak OpE There was also a question about a RIV unit currently operating with a failed inner seal. That is ANO Unit 1. But the outer seal is holding , so this is different than what is occurring at IP. Nevertheless , the POC in the Region for ANO for any questions is Nick Taylor. Thanks Steve From: Pannier, Stephen Sent: Thur s day , J uly 16, 2015 10:17 AM To: Burr i tt, Arthur Cc: Pickett, Doug la s
 
==Subject:==
RE: Ind ian Point H ead Leak OpE Oh ... so r ry about that hype rl ink issue. This link shou l d work https:/ / adamsxt. n rc.gov/WorkplaceXT
/getContent?objectStoreName=Main. . Library& vs Id=% 78 728 BC F23-D94C-402 D-AD D5-6AOOOE 788 3E7% 7D&id=% 7B8FD9 F7BB-B F 62-493C-B569-2869B 181 C026% 7D&objectType=document Thanks , Steve From: Burritt, Arthur Sent: T hur s day, July 16, 2015 10:03 AM To: Pannier , St e phen
 
==Subject:==
RE: Ind ian Point H ead Leak OpE Thanks , but the first SER involves a BWR so not really applicable and the second link went to a part 21 issue at Vogt l e From: Panni e r , Steph e n Sent: Thur s day , J uly 16, 2015 9:53 AM To: Burr i tt, Arthur; P ickett, Douglas
 
==Subject:==
Indian Point Head Leak OpE Hi Folks, I foun d a f ew events related to ope r ation af t er failure of both reactor vessel h ead sea l s. As you can see there isn't much available from th e NRC , as these events are not typically re portable un de r 50. 72 and / or 50.73. What I found i s i ncluded in INP O documents
... t hrough I CES and INP O reports. Here you go ..... 2 SER 3-09, "Unrecognized Reacto r Pressure Vesse l Head Fla n ge Leak." This is Browns Ferry U nit 1 reactor vessel head leak. Also discussed in this report is a reactor vessel head leak which occurred at Dresden. I n December 2001, Dresden Station Unit 3 was removed from power operation to a ll ow personnel to identify and repair a l eak in the drywell. A reactor vessel pressure test identified a reactor head/flange leak. I nspections of the vessel and head flange sealing surfaces identified multiple areas that had experienced steam cutting. The reactor head 0-rings had not been adequately compressed at these locations.
The depth of the seating grooves was deeper than the dimensions specified by the vendor as-bui l t drawing. The INP O report related to the Dresden report is attached to th i s message. I NPO SER 5-03, "Opera ti onal Dec is i on-Making.' (Event summa r y starts on page 23 -The unit is Sizewell B NPP in t h e UK. Sizewe l l B is a 1, 188-MWe , Westinghouse pressurized water reac t or with two turbine generator sets that began commercia l operation in 1995). Thanks , Steve Pannier IOEB 3 Note: The two I NPO documents , cons i st i ng of 27 pages , have been with h e l d in the ir enti r ety under FOIA exemption
: 4.
Official U se Only Sensitive Internal Information Internal NRG Qnly Sup ort Issues RA N STR Plant Status BRANCH A Non Responsive Record S TP Un it 2 Non Responsive Record BRANCH B Non Responsive Record BRANCH C Non Responsive Record BRANCH D INon Responsive Record RIV NEWS Thursday , 06/14/2012 10 0% Experienced th ree temperature spikes over th e last 24 hrs between the two o-rings in the vessel head (temp currently n orma l). H as occurred before -l ice n see not Offic i a l Use Only Sens i tive I nternal I nformation l ntenial r~RC On l y From: Sent: To: Cc:
 
==Subject:==
Attachment s: Common Unit
* N one Palo Verde Unit 1 Reinert, Dustin Friday, November 17, 20 1 7 9: 4 1 AM You, David; Peabody, Charles; Miller, Geoffrey; Dixon, J o h n; Lingam, Siva; Choate , Jackson Re in ert, Dusti n FYI: Palo Verde Plant Status 11/17/2017 Rx Vessel flange lea k age diagram.pdf Mode/Power Level/Planned Power Changes: M ode: 1 / F u ll Power TS Action Statement s:
* Non Responsive Record Events/Conditions of Interest:
* Non Responsive Record
* Pressure has been observed to be increas i ng i n the area between t h e inner and ou t er o-r in gs. This indicates leakby pas.t the i nner vessel head o-ring. P r essure current l y i s about 600#. This h as occurred at least t w i ce i n other u n i ts over t he past few years. Historica l l y, t h e licensee has a ll owed pressu r e in this space to inc r ease to full R CS pressure (-2250) and them imple m e n ted a T-mod w hic h changes the alarm setpoint t o 2150 psig and lowe ri ng. T h is wou l d give an i ndication o f the outer o-ring hav i ng failed. Containment entry anticipa t ed fo r Monday t o isolate the r eactor vessel head l eakoff line u pstream manua l isolation va l ve V-211 (see attached figure) ... the soleno i d va l ves downstream that can be used for vent i ng this space are known to !leak by. Below I've pasted the status from the m ost r ecent time t hi s inner o-ri ng leakage occ u rred in Unit 3. From Unit 3 in 2014-2015
* 2/27/15: ODMI alarm setpoint of 1950 psig was reached y esterday for the reactor vessel head a-ring annulus decreasing pressure.
Pressure is decreasing about 2# per hour. Licensee has not observed any changes in the reactor drain tank conditions, containment radiation monitors, or the unidentified leakage surveillance.
Action directed by the ODMI is to reconvene the ODMI team. Licensee is planning for a containment entry and will hold an ODMI challenge meeting today.
* 5/19/14: Friday afternoon, low pressure alarm received.
Pressure lowered to 1395 psig. Containment entry Friday night to close leakoff line upstream manual isolation valve V-211. Pressure immediately increased.
Currently at 2250 psig. Licensee believes seat leakage across solenoid valve V-403 was the cause of the lowering pressure.
* 5/12/14: Reactor vessel a-ring annulus pressure increased and stabilized at 2250 psig on Friday 5/9. Temporary modification installed which changes the alarm setpoint to 2150 psig and lowering.
Operators are monitoring count rates from containment rad monitor RU-1 for early indication of any leakage from outer a-ring.
* 4/12/2014:
Operators observed PT-118 increasing Non Responsive Record 2 Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record INon Responsive Record Dustin Reinert Resident Inspector Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Office: 623-393-3737 Cell: !(b)(6) I Ema il: dustin.reinert@nrc.gov 3
RE A CTOR V ESSEL i---c;r I -----V 21 7 fPT\ _ l ___ (PsH\ CR [X}-~ REACTOR V ESS E L _. (Hs\B04 -~ T O REAC T OR 1-------.DRAIN TAN K H V 403 MAIN 0-RING POSITION PA CK UP 0-R I NG POSITIO N R E A CTOR --V E S S EL F LA NGE T O PRESSURE S W ITC H (LEA K.A.G E DETECT I O N) RC00 9-98 Fig u re 2 -6 R eactor Vesse l 0-Rin g Leak D etect i o n R eactor Vess e l Hea d S e a l D r a in Va l ve C on tr ol (HS-40 3) A two posit i o n (O P EN/CL O SE) cont r o l sw it ch i s p r ov id ed on B 04 in t h e main co n t r ol r oo m fo r c ontrol of t he r eac t o r vessel h ea d seal d ra in va l ve. It i s u se d w h e n the p r ess ur e of t he r eac t o r vesse l 0-r in gs in d i cate hi g h e n o u gh t o h ave some l eakage. I n the OP EN p os i tio n , coo l an t is dra in ed to t h e reactor dra i n ta nk. I n the C L OSE p ositi on , the r e actor vessel h ead sea l dr a in va lve c l oses, i so l a tin g th e d ra in l in e. C l os ur e H ea d A tt ac hm e nt s Th e top por ti on o f t he closme head c ont a i ns n in ety e i g h t pe n etra tion s in w hi c h are attac h ed h ou s in gs fo r 89 ope r ab l e co n tro l e l ement d ri ve m ec h anis m s (CE DM s) a n d one 3/4 in c h ven t lin e w i t h a b u tt we l d c o n n ectio n. Of t h e r e m a i ning 8 p e n e t ra ti o n s , u ni t I co n ta i ns CE DM h o usi n gs and u ni ts 2 & 3 co n tain p r ess ur e h o u s in gs. T w o of t h e 8 s p a r e h o u s in gs a r e u t ili zed for t he r eac t o r vessel l eve l m o n i t o rin g syste m (R VL M S). Th ese 2 hous in gs a r c l ocate d sy m et ri ca ll y op p osi t e fro m eac h o th e r an d a p prox i mate l y 90&deg; 0 3/0 5/9 9 24 RC S TM / V o lu me 39 / R ev. 5 From: Sent: To: Cc:
 
==Subject:==
Attachment s: Common Unit
* N one Palo Verde Unit 1 Reinert, Dustin Friday, November 17, 20 1 7 9: 4 1 AM You, David; Peabody, Charles; Miller, Geoffrey; Dixon, J o h n; Lingam, Siva; Choate , Jackson Re in ert, Dusti n FYI: Palo Verde Plant Status 11/17/2017 Rx Vessel flange lea k age diagram.pdf Mode/Power Level/Planned Power Changes: M ode: 1 / F u ll Power TS Action Statement s:
* Non Responsive Record Events/Conditions of Interest:
* Non Responsive Record
* Pressure has been observed to be increas i ng i n the area between t h e inner and ou t er o-r in gs. This indicates leakby pas.t the i nner vessel head o-ring. P r essure current l y i s about 600#. This h as occurred at least t w i ce i n other u n i ts over t he past few years. Historica l l y, t h e licensee has a ll owed pressu r e in this space to inc r ease to full R CS pressure (-2250) and them imple m e n ted a T-mod w hic h changes the alarm setpoint t o 2150 psig and lowe ri ng. T h is wou l d give an i ndication o f the outer o-ring hav i ng failed. Containment entry anticipa t ed fo r Monday t o isolate the r eactor vessel head l eakoff line u pstream manua l isolation va l ve V-211 (see attached figure) ... the soleno i d va l ves downstream that can be used for vent i ng this space are known to !leak by. Below I've pasted the status from the m ost r ecent time t hi s inner o-ri ng leakage occ u rred in Unit 3. From Unit 3 in 2014-2015
* 2/27/15: ODMI alarm setpoint of 1950 psig was reached y esterday for the reactor vessel head a-ring annulus decreasing pressure.
Pressure is decreasing about 2# per hour. Licensee has not observed any changes in the reactor drain tank conditions, containment radiation monitors, or the unidentified leakage surveillance.
Action directed by the ODMI is to reconvene the ODMI team. Licensee is planning for a containment entry and will hold an ODMI challenge meeting today.
* 5/19/14: Friday afternoon, low pressure alarm received.
Pressure lowered to 1395 psig. Containment entry Friday night to close leakoff line upstream manual isolation valve V-211. Pressure immediately increased.
Currently at 2250 psig. Licensee believes seat leakage across solenoid valve V-403 was the cause of the lowering pressure.
* 5/12/14: Reactor vessel a-ring annulus pressure increased and stabilized at 2250 psig on Friday 5/9. Temporary modification installed which changes the alarm setpoint to 2150 psig and lowering.
Operators are monitoring count rates from containment rad monitor RU-1 for early indication of any leakage from outer a-ring.
* 4/12/2014:
Operators observed PT-118 increasing Non Responsive Record 2 Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record Dustin Reinert Resident Inspector Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Offic'1'*~~=~u....E.L..., Cell: (b)(6) Ema i: 3 From: Sent: To: Cc: Reinert, Dustin Monday, December 18, 2017 9:25 AM You, David; Peabody, Charles; Miller, Geoffrey; Dixon, John; Lingam, S i va; Choate , Ja c kson; O'Banion (Watford), Marga r et Re in ert, Dustin
 
==Subject:==
FYI: Palo Verde Plant Status 12/18/2017 Common Unit
* M et tower data restored late Fr id ay afternoon.
Palo Verde Unit 1 Mode/Power Level/Planned Power Changes: Mode: 1 / F u ll Power TS Action Statements:
o None Events/Conditions of Interest:
* Non Responsive Record *
* 11/30: Pressure in th e area between the inne r and outer o-rings currently at 700#. o 11/21: Valve V-211 was shut yesterday. Cu r re n t ly pressure is at 608# and slowly rising. o 11/17: Pressure has been observed to be increasing in the area between the inner and o ut er o-ri ngs. This in dicate s leakby pa s t the inn er ve ss el head o-ring. Pre s sure cu rr e nt l y i s about 600#. Thi s has occurred at l east twice in other units o v er the past few years. Historically, the li censee has allowe d p r essure in this s p ace to increase to full RCS pr essu re (-22so) and them implemented a T-mod wh i ch changes the ala rm set point to 2 1 50 p sig a nd lowering.
Th is would g ive an indic ation of the outer o-ring h aving fa il ed. Conta in ment entry ant i cipated for Mo nday to isolate the reactor vessel head l eakoff line upstream manual i s o l at i on valve V-211 (see attached figure) ... the solenoid valves downstream that can be used for venting this s pace are known to lea k by. B elow I've pasted the s tatus from the most recent time this i nner o-ring leakage occurred in Uni t 3. Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record Dustin Reinert Resident Inspector Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Office: 623-393-3737 Cell: (b)(6) Email: nrc.gov 2 From: Sent: To: Cc: Reinert, Dustin Thursday, December 21, 2017 9:03 AM You, David; Peabody, Charles; Miller, Geoffrey; Dixon, John; Lingam, Siva; Choate , Jackson; O'Banion (Watford), Margaret Re in ert, Dustin
 
==Subject:==
FYI: Palo Verde Plant Status 12/21//2017 Common Unit
* None Palo Verde Unit 1 Mode/Power Level/Planned Power Changes: Mode: 1 / Full Power TS Action Statements:
0 !Non Responsive Record Events/Conditions of Interest: o 12/19: Pressure in the area between the inner and outer a-rin gs cu rr ently at "'600#. No change in the past f ew weeks. 0-ring may h ave reseated.
o 11/21: Valve V-211 was shut yesterday.
Currently pressure is at 608# and slowly rising. o 11/17: Pressure has been observed to be increasing in the area between the inner and outer o-rings. This indicates leakby past the inner vessel head o-ring. Pressure current l y is about 600#. Thi s has occurred at least twice in other units over the past few years. Historical l y, the licensee has allowed pressure in this space to increa se to full RCS pressure ("'2250) and them implemented a T-mod which changes the alarm setpoint to 2150 psig and lowering.
This would give an indication of the outer o-ring having failed. Containment entry an t icipated for Monday to iso l ate the reactor vessel head l eakoff line upstre a m manual isolation valve V-211 (see attached figure) ... the solenoid va l ves downstream that can be used for venting this space are known to leak by. Below I'v e pasted the status from the most recent time this inner o-ri ng leakage occurred in Unit 3. Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record I Non Responsive Record Dustin Reinert Resident Inspector Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Office: 623-393-3737 Cell: (b)(6) Emai : us 1n.reinert nrc.gov 2 From: Sent: To:
 
==Subject:==
Thank you, Dustin! From: Reinert, Dustin H agar, Bob Tuesday, April 21, 2015 11: 24 AM Reinert, Dustin RE: Foll o w-up to r eactor ve sse l fl a nge iss u e Sent: Tuesday, Apri l 21, 2015 11:09 AM To: Hagar, Bob Cc: Peabody, Charles; You, David; Brandt, Lindsay
 
==Subject:==
Follow-up to reactor ves se l flange issue Bob, Near the start of each outage, the li censee does an as-found ins p ection of the inner and outer reactor vessel flange o-rings. The inner o-ring (the one which had been leaking for severa l months) had what I wou l d call a small dimple near stud hole #22 (see attached p icture) which was indicative of a leakage pa thway. Thi s past weekend whi l e reflooding the refueling cavity prior to core reload , the licensee performed a visual inspection of the vessel fl ange and identified a small pit on the flange at this same location. Th e second page of each of the attached newsletters describes the repair strategy and the second news l etter shows a picture of the as-left repa i red area. Note that n ew o-rings are in s talled before each operating cyc l e. Dust i n Reinert Resident I nspector Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station g: 1% )?l?-393-373 1 Email: d u sti n.rei n e rt@nrc.gov From: Sent: To:
 
==Subject:==
Thank you, Dustin! From: Reinert, Dustin H agar, Bob Tuesday, April 21, 2015 11: 24 AM Reinert, Dustin RE: Foll o w-up to r eactor ve sse l fl a nge iss u e Sent: Tuesday, Apri l 21, 2015 11:09 AM To: Hagar, Bob Cc: Peabody, Charles; You, David; Brandt, Lindsay
 
==Subject:==
Follow-up to reactor ves se l flange issue Bob, Near the start of each outage, the li censee does an as-found ins p ection of the inner and outer reactor vessel flange o-rings. The inner o-ring (the one which had been leaking for severa l months) had what I wou l d call a small dimple near stud hole #22 (see attached p icture) which was indicative of a leakage pa thway. Thi s past weekend whi l e reflooding the refueling cavity prior to core reload , the licensee performed a visual inspection of the vessel fl ange and identified a small pit on the flange at this same location. Th e second page of each of the attached newsletters describes the repair strategy and the second news l etter shows a picture of the as-left repa i red area. Note that n ew o-rings are in s talled before each operating cyc l e. Dust i n Reinert Resident I nspector Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Offic
* 7 Ce ll: (b)(6) @nrc.gov From: Sent: To:
 
==Subject:==
Attachments
: Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record Palo Ve rde Unit 3 TS Action Statements:
Reinert, Dustin Friday, February 27, 2015 9:17 AM You, David; Peabody, Charles; Parks , Brian; Hagar, Bob; Tice, Jan; O'Banion (Watford), Margaret; Hay, Michael; Brandt, Lindsay FYI: PVNGS Status 2/27/2015 Rx Vessel flange leakage diagram.pdf Day 5 of Diesel Generator A "super-outage" in progress. Expected to comp l ete final retest overnight.
* 3.8.1 Condition B (10 days) EOG "A" inoperable for planned maintenance Event s/condition s of intere s t: Reactor Vessel Head Flange Leak Detection Update. See attached figure also.
* 2/2 7 /15: ODMI alarm setpoint of 1950 psig was reached yesterday for the reactor vessel head o-ring annulus decreasing pressure.
Pressure is decreasing about 2# per hour. Licensee has not observed any changes in the reactor drain tank conditions, co nt ainment r adiation monitors, or the unidentified leakage surveillance.
A , ction directed by the ODMI i s to reconvene the ODMI team. Licensee is planning for a containment entry and will hold an ODMI chaillenge meeting today.
* 5/19/14: Friday afternoon, l ow pressure alarm re ceived. Pressure lowered to 1395 psig. Containment entry Friday night to close leakoff line upstream manual isolation va l ve V-211. Pressure immediately increased.
Currently at 2250 psig. L icensee believes seat leakage ac r oss solenoid valv e V-403 w as the cause of the lowe ri ng pressure.
* 5/12/14: Re actor vessel o-ring annulus pressure increased and stabi li zed at 2250 psig on Friday 5/9. Temporary modification installed which changes the alarm setpoint to 2150 psig and lowering.
Operators are monitoring count rates from containment rad monitor RU-1 for early indication of any leakage from outer o-ring.
* 4/12/2014:
Operators observed PT-118 increasing Oth er
* 1 11 rain predicted for Sunday
* DNMS e xited yesterday afternoon with no issues. Re si dent Coverage:
Char l ey Peabody Dustin Reinert Resident I nspector Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Offic)<.*......w.1.w...w.>t.1-..i..w.1.., Ce ll: (b)(6) nrc.gov 2 From: Sent: To:
 
==Subject:==
Non Responsive Record Non Responsive Record Palo Verde Unit 3 TS Action Statements
:
* None Events/conditions of interest:
Reinert, Dustin Friday, May 16 , 2014 9:02 AM Baquera, Mica; Brown, Tony; Hagar, Bob; Parks, Brian; Rank i n , Jenniv i ne; Taylor, Nick; Tice, Jan; Reinert, Du st in PVNGS Status May 16 2014
* 5/12: Reactor vessel o-ring annulus pressure increased and stab ili zed at 2250 p s ig o n Friday 5/9. T e mpor a ry modifica t ion installed which changes the alarm setpo in t to 2150 psig and lower i ng. Operators are monitoring count rates from containment rad monitor RU-1 for early indication of any leakage from outer o-ring.
* Dustin has weekend coverage. 1-888-455-9242 , p assco d e!(b)(6) j! Re si d e nt Cover ag e: Dustin Reinert Dustin Reinert Resident Inspector Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Office: 623-393-3737 Cell: (b)(6) 2 From: Egli, Richard To: Taylor N i ck; Burr i tt Arthur Cc: Q" Keefe Neil: Tindell Brian: Correll Brian; Jobin Margaret; Pixon l obo Su bject: Date: Attachment s: RE: Un it 1 RCS Leakage ODMI Tue s day, Ju l y 2 1 , 201511:44:1 1 AM T u rkey Point o-Ring o&MR ons.odf imageoo1 oog No te: T h e firs t attachmen t , cons i st i ng of t wo p ages , i s wi th he l d i n i ts ent i re t y unde r FO I A exempt i on 4. The 2nd attach m ent i s the NRC l ogo. Attached occur r ed at T urkey po i nt circa mid-80's From: Taylo r, N i ck Sent: T u esday, J u ly 21, 2015 11:30 AM To: Burritt, Art hu r Cc: OKeefe, Ne il; T i ndell, Brian; Co rr ell, Bria n; Eg li, R i c h ard; Tob i n , Ma r garet; D i xon, John
 
==Subject:==
FW: Unit 1 RCS Leakage ODMI Art , You were loo k ing for OE last week on operations with b o th in ner a nd outer O rings f aile d. I hadn't discovered any previous occurrences.
But we got ANO's ODMI today and the licensee l is ts a number of previous occurrences bo th at ANO, Browns Ferry 1 and Wo l f Creek. Hop e thi s helps , Nick Taylor Senior Proje c t Engi neer Divi sio n of R eactor Pro jec t s USNRC Region I V n:::::t v r / R From: Cor r ell, Brian Sent: Tue s day, July 21, 201 5 9:11 AM To: OKeefe, Ne i l; Taylo r , N i c k; Farina, Thomas; T indell, Brian; Tob i n , M argaret Cc: Eg li , R i c h a r d
 
==Subject:==
Unit 1 RCS L eakage ODM I Unit 1 RCS Leakage ODMI is attached.
Pages 5 and 6 are the Thresholds and Actions to be taken if the thresho l ds a r e exceeded. Brian From: To: S u b j ect: Dat e: Attac h ments: Tob i n, Ma r garet Newman Garrett RE: Un i t 1 RCS Leakage ODMI M on day, J u l y 27, 2015 10:00:00 AM i mage00 1.png Thanks Garrett! From: Newman, Garrett Sent: T u esday, J u ly 21, 2015 1:04 PM To: Tob i n, M argaret
 
==Subject:==
FW: Unit 1 RCS Leakage OD M I Note: T he attached image is the NRC l ogo. D i dn't know you l eft HQ to become a resident too. Welcome! From: Burr i tt, Arthur Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 1:42 PM To: Pinson, Brandon; Newman, Garrett; Ric h , Sara h; Setzer, Thomas; Stewart, Scott
 
==Subject:==
FW: Unit 1 RCS Lea ka ge ODMI FY I From: Egli, Richard Sent: Tuesday, July 2 1, 2015 12: 44 PM To: Taylor, N ick; Burritt, Arthur Cc: OKeefe, N e i l; T i ndell, Bria n; Co rr ell , Bria n; Tobin, Margaret; Dixo n , J ohn Subj ec t: R E: U nit 1 RCS L eakage ODMI Attac h ed occurred at Turkey po i nt circa mid-80's From: Taylor, N i ck Sent: T uesday, July 21, 2015 11:30 AM To: B urr i t t, Art h ur Cc: O K eefe, Nei l; T i ndell, Brian; Correll, Bria n; Eg li , R i c h ard; Tobi n, Margaret; D i xon, John
 
==Subject:==
FW: Unit 1 RCS Leakage OD M I Art , You were look ing for OE last week on opera t ions with both i nner a nd outer O rings fai le d. I hadn't discovered any previous occurrences.
But we got ANO's ODM I today and t he li censee l is ts a numb er of previous occurrences both at ANO, Brown s F e rry 1 and W ol f C r eek. Hope thi s he l ps , Ni ck T ay lor Senior Proj ec t Engineer Division of Reactor Pro jec ts U S NRC Reg ion I V 0: (8 17) 200-1 520 C: !(b)(6) ! E: n ick.t a yl o r@nrc.g ov From: Correll, Brian Sent: Tuesday, July 2 1 , 2015 9:11 AM To: OKeefe , Nei l; Taylor, Nick; Farina, Thomas; Tindell, B r i an; Tobin, Marga r et Cc: Eg l i, Richard
 
==Subject:==
Unit 1 RCS Leakage ODMI Unit 1 RCS Leakage ODMI is attached.
Pages 5 and 6 are the Thresholds and Actions to be taken if the thresholds are exceeded.
Brian}}

Latest revision as of 07:27, 5 January 2025

NRC-2018-000251 - Resp 1 - Final, Agency Records Subject to the Request Are Enclosed. (Part 2 of 2)
ML18354A760
Person / Time
Issue date: 11/27/2018
From:
NRC/OCIO
To:
Shared Package
ML18354A758 List:
References
FOIA, NRC-2018-000251
Download: ML18354A760 (375)
v • d • e


Text

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML18354A760&oldid=4945063"