IR 05000413/1998002

Partially Withheld Insp Repts 50-413/98-02 & 50-414/98-02 on 980112-13 (Ref 10CFR2.790).No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Support,Including Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Plant

ML20203C469
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	02/17/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20203C461	List: IR 05000413/1998002 ML20203C458
References
50-413-98-02, 50-413-98-2, 50-414-98-02, 50-414-98-2, NUDOCS 9802250196
Download: ML20203C469 (2)

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U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos:

NPF-35 and NPF-52 Report No 98-02 Licensee Duke Energy Corpor'ation Facility:

Catawba Nuclear Station Location:

422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Dates:

January 12-13, 1998 Inspector:

D. Thompson, Safeguards Inspector Accompanying George A.

Belisle, Chief Personnel Special Inspection Branch Division of Reactor Safety Barry Manili, Licensing Reviewer Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Approved by:

George A. Belisle, Chief Special Inspections Branch Division of Reactor Safety Documernevnemanetwowe estains senolove unciam the:I l O f #. C " "cu C E au -

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Catawba Nuclear Power Station

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NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-413/98-02 and 50-414/98-02 This routine announced inspection was conducted in the area of plant support by a regional safeguards specialist.

The specific area evaluated was the Malevolent Use of Vehicles at Nuclear Power Plants.

The inspector concluded that the vehicle barrier system,

using a combination of gates, jersey barriers, bollards, buildings, and terrain, was an acceptable barrier capable of stopping a design basis vehicle traveling at the established speed prior to the vehicle penetrating the protected area

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perimeter and causing damage to vital equipment.

The inspector concluded that the engineering staff had perforr.ed a good analysis of the vehicle threat and had installed an appropriate vehicle barrier to counter the threat. (S2.5.1)

The inspector determined that the licensee had installed the vehicle barrier at a distance that would preclude an explosion from a bomb-laden vehicle from causing damage to vital targots required for the safe shutdown of the reactor.

(S2.5.2)

Based on thr* inspector's review of the vehicle barrier system procedures and in discussion with the licensee, the inspector concluded that the plans and procedures were acceptable for implementing the vehicle barrier system.

(S2.5.3)

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