IR 05000289/1989009: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML20247N716
| number = ML20235Y727
| issue date = 05/25/1989
| issue date = 02/28/1989
| title = Insp Rept 50-289/89-09 on 890417-21.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Measurement Control,Qc,Training & Analytical Procedure Evaluations
| title = Insp Rept 50-289/89-09 on 890213-16.Potential Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Diesel Generator Air Sys Failures
| author name = Jang J
| author name = Bennett W, Constable G, Pick G
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
| addressee affiliation =  
| addressee affiliation =  
| docket = 05000289
| docket = 05000298
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = 50-289-89-09, 50-289-89-9, NUDOCS 8906060009
| document report number = 50-298-89-09, 50-298-89-9, NUDOCS 8903140529
| package number = ML20247N713
| package number = ML20235Y718
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 8
| page count = 5
}}
}}


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t U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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,    REGION I Report N /89-09 Docket N License N DPR-50 Priority - Category 1 Licensee: GPU Nuclear Corporation P.O. Box 480 Middletown, PA 17057 Facility Name: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Middletown, Pennsylvania Ins:tection Conducted: April 17-21, 1989 ds Inspectors:  -
p e
    [ 6 f-24~-89 M C. Jang, Sdn%r Radiation Specialist date Approved by: .
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W R. J. Bore W ChieT, Effluents
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      @2987 date Radiation Protection Section Inspection Summary: Inspection on April 17-21, 1989 (Inspection Report No. 50-289/89-09)
      ' APPENDIX'
Areas Inspected: Reutine, announced inspection of the non-radiological chemistry progra Areas reviewed included measurement control, quality control, training and analytical procedure evaluation Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations were identifie gg6060oop890525 Q ADOCK 05000289 PDC
U.S.' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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==REGION IV==
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NRC Inspection Report: 50-298/89-09   Operating' License: DPR-46 Docket: 50-298 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)      .:
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    'P.O. Box 499        ;
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Columbus, Nebraska 68602-0499    i
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  ' Facility Name: Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS)
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Inspection At: CNS, Nemaha County, Nebraska      l
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Inspection-Conducted:  February 13-16, 1989    j Inspectors:   M  A JM9 G. A. Pick, Resident Inspector, Project Section C,  Date Division of Reactor Projects      !
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l DETAILS    j 1.0 Individuals Contact _ed e 1.1 Licensee Personnel    l
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   *T. G. Broughton, Operations and Maintenance Director, TMI-1 !
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R. Bybel, Group Chemistry Supervisor, TMI-1  !
W. R. Bennett, Senior Resident Inspector, Project  Date  !
  *E. Fuhrer, Chemistry Manager, TMI-1    l
Section C, Division of Reactor Projects    .j
  *H. D. Hukill, Director, TMI-1    !
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L. Lucas, Group Chemistry Supervisor, TMI-1  '
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  *S. M. Otto, Licensing Engineer, TMI-1
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  *J. G. Reed, Senior Chemist II, Plant Enginee !'
     - W. /M / -M',    ,
E. Gliot, Chemistry Instructor, Training Department 1.2 NRC Personnel     l
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  *T. A. Moslak, Resident Inspector   j i
Approved: ,
  * denotes those present at exit meeting on [[Exit meeting date::April 21, 1989]]. j i
GrL? Constable, Chief, Project Section C, Division 2Mffy Date of Reactor Projects C
2.0 Purpose       l l
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The purpose of this inspection was to review the licensee's chemistry l program in the following area l l
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The licensee's ability to measure non-radiological chemistry  l
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parameters during normal operation The licensee's ability to demonstrate the acceptability of the analytical results through implementation of quality control  ,
activities'in the chemistry laboratory
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3.0 Previously Identified Items     j (Closed) Inspection Follow-up Item (50-289/88-30-02): Demonstration of j analytical capability at minimum detectable concentrations. The !
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licensee's analytical capability at these concentrations was demonstrated i by analysis of NRC standards during this inspection. (See SerHon 5.)
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4.0 Review of Analytical Procedures    I l
1 -Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted February 13-16, 1989 (Report 50-298/89-09)
The inspector reviewed the following analytical procedures related to the l non radiological chemistry progra )
Areas Inspected: Special, unannounced inspection of diesel generator (DG) ai ~ system failure Results: On February 13, 1989, a fitting on the control air system to DG No. I failed'during the monthly DG operability surveillance. The failure
N1915 Rev. 10 " Determination of Ammonia" N1916.3 Rev. O " Ammonium and Morpholine by I.C. (4000i)"  ,
  . was due to personnel error and inadequate corrective actions following previous similar failures, which allowed installation of an incorrect fittin One potential violation (failure to maintain diesel generator operable) was identified. An enforcement conference to discuss this potential violation will be held in the Region IV offic _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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b-3-DETAILS
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' Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees
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  *G. R. Horn, Division Manager of Nuclear Operations
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  *V. L. Wolstenholm, Division Manager of Quality Assurance
  *J. M. Meacham, Senior Manager, Technical Support
  *E. M. Mace, Engineering Manager
   *R. Brungardt, Operations Manager
  *D. M. Norvell, Maintenance Manager
  *K. C. Walden, Licensing Manager
  *L. E. Bray, Regulatory Compliance Specialist J. R. Flaherty, Engineering Supervisor
  *G. A. Schmielau, Instrument and Control Foreman
  *G. E. Smith, Quality Assurance Manager D. Dageforde, Systems Engineer
  * Denotes those present during the exit interview conducted on February 16, 198 The NRC inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees during the inspection perio . Followup of Plant Events (93702)
13, 1989, the monthly operability test of Diesel On February (DG) No. I was being performed. Approximately 1 hour into the Generator surveillance, licensee personnel manually shut down DG No. I after observing control air system pressure decreasing, as indicated on a local pressure gauge. After shutdown, the DG was declared inoperabl The licensee determined that air pressure was decreasing due to a cracked fitting connecting a control air pressure gauge to the overspeed trip mechanism. This fitting had previously failed on January 17, 1989. If
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N1912.3 Rev. I " Air-Acetylene Flame on the Perkin-Elmer 2380 i          Atomic Absorption Spectrophotometer" N1914 Rev. 1 " Determination of Hydrazine in Water (Low Concentration)"
the DG had not been manually shut down, the cracked fitting would have eventually allowed 30 psi control air to bleed off from the overspeed trip valve. The loss of control air to the overspeeo trip mechanism would then secure 80 psi air to the fuel racks. The fuel racks would have closed, shutting off fuel flow to the cylinders, thereby stopping the engin After the DG failure on January 17, part of the licensee's corrective u
N1913 Rev. 7 " Determination of Molgdate Reactive , Silica" N190 Rev. 8 " Determination of Free Fluoride Ion" N1912.2 Rev. 2 " Graphite Furnace Analysis using the Perkin-Elmer 3030 Atomic Absorption Spectrophotometer"
action was to replace the cracked fitting. During the repair activity, I
.      Based on the review of the above procedures, the inspector determined that the licensee's procedures were technically adequate. The procedures are required by Regulatory Guide 1.33, which is referenced in Section 6.8.8 of the licensee's Technical Specifications. No violations were identifie .0 Evaluation of the Analytical Capability During the inspection, standard chemical solutions were given to the licensee for analysis. The standard solutions were prepared by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) for the NRC Region 1[ and were analyzed by the licensee using normal methods and equipment. The analysis of standards is used to verify the licensee's capability to monitor chemical parameters in various plant systems with respect to Technical Specifica-tion and other regulatory requirement In addition, the analysis of standards is used to evaluate the licensee's analytical procedures with respect to accuracy and precisio ' After the. licensee provided their lower limits of quantification (LLQs)
the licensee determined that no exact replacement nipple for the fitting was available on site. The cognizant engineer determined that a thin-walled nipple was satisfactory as a replacement for the failed nipple. This determination was made without performing the required Equipment Specification Change for form, fit, and function. The thin-walled nipple did not meet vibration resistance requirements and subsequently l
for the non radiological chemical parameters to the inspector, the appropriate NRC standards were provided to the licensee with instructions for dilution to achieve solutions at concentrations near the licensee's LLQ The licensee's LLQs were:
Ammonia (Ion Specific Electrode and Ion Chromatography): 500 ppb Fluoride (Ion Specific Electrode): 40 ppb Hydrazine (Spectrophotometry): 10 ppb Silica (Spectrophotometry): 10 ppb Lithium ( AA-Flame): 200 ppb Sodium (AA-Flame): 30 ppb Iron (AA-Graphite): 30 ppb The results of the comparisons are listed in Table The analytical results of the standard measurements comparison indicated that one (1)
out of twenty-four (24) comparisons was in statistical disagreement under the criteria used for comparing results (see Attachment I). This statistical disagreement is insignificant because of the high precision    ,
associated with the result.,       1 i
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The results of two chemical parameters (silica and hydrazine analyzed using the spectrophotometry method) did not meet the agreement criteria until they were re-analyzed a third tim The first and second analytical results of silica and hydrazine were biased from the known values but showed high degrees of the precision. These results indicated a potential problem with the calibration standard solution The inspector had discussions with the licensee regarding the preparation of their calibration standards. The licensee stated that their calibration standards may have degenerated. In order to determine 11 calibration standards were the problem, silica and hydrazine standards were prepared and certified by GPUN Laboratory Services during this inspection. The licensee used these certified standard solutions for the instrument calibration. The results of silica and hydrazine measurements were then in agreement. In general, the laboratory environmental conditions (temperature and-humidity) were acceptable. The inspector also noted that the licensee maintained the spectrophotometer regularl .0 Chemistry Laboratory Quality Control Program The inspector reviewed Section 3.1 (Preparation and Analysis of Spiked Samples) of Procedure N1826, " Control of Analytical Performance". The inspector also reviewed licensee's " percent recovery of spike samples" data and associated control charts for anions, cations, boron, hydrazine, and silica. These control charts consist of nean values and acceptance levels. The inspector noted that the licensee has performed these items as required by Section 3.1 of Procedure N182 Reviewing the above control charts, the inspector noted that the licensee should use those control charts for trending analyses of each chemical parameter to better control accuracy of the analytical results-. For example, the average spike sample recovery of hydrazine was about 106%
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   (which was within the licensee's hydrazine acceptance criteria) in April, 1989. The first analytical results of the NRC hydrazine standard solutions were about 7% higher than the BNL known value. This would have been compensated, had the hydrazine recovery data been utilized to correct for system calibration shifting. This was identified by the inspector through use of the results of the licensee's spike sample progra Similar results were shown in silica analyses.
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l The inspector calculated means and standard errors for analytes using the licensee's " percent recovery of spike samples" data and the results are i
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listed in the following table.
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I failed after the diesel had been operated for less than 7 hours. The replacement part did not allow DG No. I to perform its intended function, therefore, DG No. I was inoperable from the time of its initial failure (January 17,1989). Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.F.1 allows reactor operation for only seven days with one DG inoperable. Operating from January 17 to February 13, 1989, with one DG inoperable was identified by the NRC inspectors as a potential violatio In response to the February 13, 1989, failure, the licensee reduced reactor power and replaced the failed fitting with a required thick-walled fittin In addition, Maintenance Work Requests (MWR) 89-0853 and 89-0868 were approved which replaced a large portion of control air, fuel oil, and lube oil tubing. The MWRs also installed stainless steel flexible tubing on the overspeed safety shutdown valve to reduce vibration between the j
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diesel engine and off-engine components. The NRC inspectors observed that the modifications were properly reviewed and approved by the Station Operations Review Committee on February 13 and February 15, 1989. The modifications were performed in accordance with the MWRs and approved maintenance procedures. Postmaintenance testing was specified in the MWR and properly performed and documente During the maintenance activities on the DGs, TS required surveillance were properly performed and Limiting Conditions for Operations were correctly followed. Maintenance was completed on DG No. I and it was declared operable on February 16, 1989. Maintenance was then performed on DG No. 2, and it was declared operable on February 1 Additionally, an NPPD investigation team consisting of the QA Division Manager, the CNS QA Manager, the Nuclear Overview Manager, and the Nuclear Licensing and Safety Manager assembled to evaluate the history and root cause of the DG No.1 failure. The team discovered that a thin-walled Nonconformance fitting Report (failure NCR) No.had occurred 16 was issued previousl on November 27, 1973, documenting a failed nipple in the control air system of DG No. 2. Corrective action for the NCR was to replace all fittings with thick-walled nipples in both DG This NCR was not discovered during root cause analysis for the January 17, 1989, fitting failure or for a previous air system failure which occurred on DG No. 2 on October 21, 1988. The licensee's program requires that NCRs be reviewed for only the last 5 years during root cause determinatio In addition, no changes had been made to the applicable drawings or specifications to require that thick-walled fittings be installed. The team also identified several other instances of vibration induced failures on both DGs. The team noted several other documents which indicated a continuing problem with vibration associated failures on diesel generators which, if they had been properly evaluated, could have prevented the failure in January 1989 or ensured that the subsequent repair would have been identical to the previous installation. The licensee has committed to implementing design modifications to move vibration sensitive instruments from the DG to instrument racks, and to upgrade tubing during the 1989 refueling outag . . -


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.f Percent Recovery of Spike Samples TMI-1 Chemistry Laboratory April 19, 1989 Number of Percent Analyte Mean Determinations Recovery Range Hydrazine  106 3  6 100.3 - 10 Silica  97 3 10 89.0 - 10 Ammonia  97 6  .10 89.9 - 10 Boron  9 .6 (Manual) 4 98.6 - 9 .8 0.6 (Auto 15 98.9 - 10 Titration)
Lithium  97 4  14 95.0 - 10 Copper  108 10  4 99.0 - 12 Iron  102 9  2 95.0 - 10 Chloride  103 7  18 89.2 - 11 Fluoride  94 3  15 90.0 - 10 Sulfate  100 6  18 85.7 - 10 Sodium  97 5  4 90.0 - 10 (boron 5 90.0 - 10 Matrix)
The highest percent recoveries of silica, fluoride, and sodium were about 100%. These suggested that analytica l results of silica, fluoride, and sodium might be underestimated during April, 1989. The mean and standard error of copper was 108 10% in Aprilji989. This suggested that analytical results of copper might be overestimated about 8% during April, 1989. Although all analytical results of spike samples were within the licensee's acceptance criteria, the bias (using mean values) and the precision (using standard errors) of each analyte measurement could be estimate Based on the above review, the inspector determined that the licensee had a good quclity control program but its results were not being fully utilize The inspector recommended that the licensee use the
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      -5-An inoperable DG,in excess of 7 days was identified as a potential'
i spike sample recovery program to evaluate the accuracy of his  1 measurement J 7.0 Training and Analytical Performance
violation. The cause for the inoperability was~an inadequate replacement part installed after a previous DG failur The root cause was determined to be personnel error and inadequate corrective actions in response to previous failure . Exit Interview (30703)'
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An exit interview was conducted February 16, 1989, with licensee     I representatives (identified in paragraph 1). During this interview, the NRC inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspector <
The inspector observed on the job training (0JT) in the Unit-1 Chemistry Laboratory. This OJT was conducted by an instructor from the Training Department. The instructcr observed a technician's analytical /calibra-tion performance and then discussed any improvements in techniques and theory with the technician. The inspector discussed with the instructor the purposes and objectives of the OJT. In addition, the analytical performance of technicians was evaluated by the supervisor through the
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  " percent recovery of spike samples" program (Procedure N1826, " Control of .
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Analytical Performance").
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Based on the above observation, discussion, and review of the analytical performance data, no violations were identified in this are .0 Exit Interview The inspector met the licensee representatives (denoted in Section 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on April 21, 1989. The inspector summarized the purpose, scope, and findings of the inspectio _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _  .- _ _ . _ - - .
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i TABLE 1
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TMI Unit 1 Capability Test Results Unit = ppb NRC Licensee Ratio Analyte Value Value (Lic./NRC) Comparison
    'Ammenia 620 30 581 10 0.93 0.05 Agreement (Ion Chromato- 60216 583 10 0.97 0.02 Agreement graphy) 980 50 1040 30 1.06 0.06 Agreement Ammonia 620 30 627 12 1.01 0.05 Agreement (Specific Ion 60216 590 10 0.98 0.02 Agreement Electrode) 980 50 890 40 0.91 0.06 Agreement Fluoride 45 4 44.3 .98 0.09 Agreement (Specific' Ion 84.6 .71 .99 0.02 Agreement Electrode) 166 3 163.2 .98 0.02 Agreement Lithium 197 4 204 5 1.04 0.03 Agreement ( AA-Flame) 300 7 308 5 1.03 0.03 Agreement 413 10 423 3 1.02 0.03 Agreement Sodium 61 7 63.7 .04 0.12 Agreement ( AA-Flame) 106 6 119.71 .13 0.07 Agreement 158 9 174 2 1.10 0.06 Agreement Iron 37.2 .3 .98 0.03 Agreement (AA-Graphite) 79.2 .3f .98 0.02 Agreement 117 3 120 3 1.03 0.04 Agreement Silica 10.6 .1 0.1(2) 0.95 0.06 Agreement (Spectrophoto- 20.8 .8 0(2) 0.95 0.04 Agreement metry) 31.4 .2 0.1(2) 0.962 0.013 Statistical Disagreement (2)'
Hydrazine 19.9 .9 0.1(2) 1.000 0.015 Agreement (Spectrophoto- 49.9 .5 0.2(2) 0.992 0.011 Agreement metry) 100.0 .0 0.3(2) 0.990 0.010 Agreement (2) Third analytical results (2) Insignificant
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ATTACHMENT I CRITERIA FOR COMPARING ANALYTICAL MEASUREMENTS This attachment provides criteria for comparing results of. capability tests.


l In these criteria the judgement limits are based on the uncertainty of the ratio of the licensee's value to.the NRC value. The following steps are performed:
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  (1) the ratio of the licensee's value to the NRC value is computed ratio =. Licensee Value NRC Value (2) the uncertainty of the ratio is propagate If the absolute value of one minus the ratio is less than or equal to twice the ratio uncertainty, the results are in agreemen (ll-ratiol s 2 uncertainty)
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2Z= 5' then 3* S*+bY y Z2 x2 y2 2(From: Bevington, P. R., Data Reduction and Error Analysis for the Physical Sciences, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1969)
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Revision as of 19:59, 25 January 2022

Insp Rept 50-289/89-09 on 890213-16.Potential Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Diesel Generator Air Sys Failures
ML20235Y727
Person / Time
Site: Three Mile Island Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 02/28/1989
From: Bennett W, Constable G, Greg Pick
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235Y718 List:
References
50-298-89-09, 50-298-89-9, NUDOCS 8903140529
Download: ML20235Y727 (5)
v • d • e


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' APPENDIX'

U.S.' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

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NRC Inspection Report: 50-298/89-09 Operating' License: DPR-46 Docket: 50-298 Licensee: Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) .:

'P.O. Box 499  ;

Columbus, Nebraska 68602-0499 i

' Facility Name: Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS)

Inspection At: CNS, Nemaha County, Nebraska l

Inspection-Conducted: February 13-16, 1989 j Inspectors: M A JM9 G. A. Pick, Resident Inspector, Project Section C, Date Division of Reactor Projects  !

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WAlbf  ;

W. R. Bennett, Senior Resident Inspector, Project Date  !

Section C, Division of Reactor Projects .j

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Approved: ,

GrL? Constable, Chief, Project Section C, Division 2Mffy Date of Reactor Projects C

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1 -Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted February 13-16, 1989 (Report 50-298/89-09)

Areas Inspected: Special, unannounced inspection of diesel generator (DG) ai ~ system failure Results: On February 13, 1989, a fitting on the control air system to DG No. I failed'during the monthly DG operability surveillance. The failure

. was due to personnel error and inadequate corrective actions following previous similar failures, which allowed installation of an incorrect fittin One potential violation (failure to maintain diesel generator operable) was identified. An enforcement conference to discuss this potential violation will be held in the Region IV offic _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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b-3-DETAILS

' Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees

  • G. R. Horn, Division Manager of Nuclear Operations
  • V. L. Wolstenholm, Division Manager of Quality Assurance
  • J. M. Meacham, Senior Manager, Technical Support
  • E. M. Mace, Engineering Manager
  • R. Brungardt, Operations Manager
  • D. M. Norvell, Maintenance Manager
  • K. C. Walden, Licensing Manager
  • L. E. Bray, Regulatory Compliance Specialist J. R. Flaherty, Engineering Supervisor
  • G. A. Schmielau, Instrument and Control Foreman
  • G. E. Smith, Quality Assurance Manager D. Dageforde, Systems Engineer
  • Denotes those present during the exit interview conducted on February 16, 198 The NRC inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees during the inspection perio . Followup of Plant Events (93702)

13, 1989, the monthly operability test of Diesel On February (DG) No. I was being performed. Approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> into the Generator surveillance, licensee personnel manually shut down DG No. I after observing control air system pressure decreasing, as indicated on a local pressure gauge. After shutdown, the DG was declared inoperabl The licensee determined that air pressure was decreasing due to a cracked fitting connecting a control air pressure gauge to the overspeed trip mechanism. This fitting had previously failed on January 17, 1989. If

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the DG had not been manually shut down, the cracked fitting would have eventually allowed 30 psi control air to bleed off from the overspeed trip valve. The loss of control air to the overspeeo trip mechanism would then secure 80 psi air to the fuel racks. The fuel racks would have closed, shutting off fuel flow to the cylinders, thereby stopping the engin After the DG failure on January 17, part of the licensee's corrective u

action was to replace the cracked fitting. During the repair activity, I

the licensee determined that no exact replacement nipple for the fitting was available on site. The cognizant engineer determined that a thin-walled nipple was satisfactory as a replacement for the failed nipple. This determination was made without performing the required Equipment Specification Change for form, fit, and function. The thin-walled nipple did not meet vibration resistance requirements and subsequently l

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I failed after the diesel had been operated for less than 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />. The replacement part did not allow DG No. I to perform its intended function, therefore, DG No. I was inoperable from the time of its initial failure (January 17,1989). Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.F.1 allows reactor operation for only seven days with one DG inoperable. Operating from January 17 to February 13, 1989, with one DG inoperable was identified by the NRC inspectors as a potential violatio In response to the February 13, 1989, failure, the licensee reduced reactor power and replaced the failed fitting with a required thick-walled fittin In addition, Maintenance Work Requests (MWR) 89-0853 and 89-0868 were approved which replaced a large portion of control air, fuel oil, and lube oil tubing. The MWRs also installed stainless steel flexible tubing on the overspeed safety shutdown valve to reduce vibration between the j

diesel engine and off-engine components. The NRC inspectors observed that the modifications were properly reviewed and approved by the Station Operations Review Committee on February 13 and February 15, 1989. The modifications were performed in accordance with the MWRs and approved maintenance procedures. Postmaintenance testing was specified in the MWR and properly performed and documente During the maintenance activities on the DGs, TS required surveillance were properly performed and Limiting Conditions for Operations were correctly followed. Maintenance was completed on DG No. I and it was declared operable on February 16, 1989. Maintenance was then performed on DG No. 2, and it was declared operable on February 1 Additionally, an NPPD investigation team consisting of the QA Division Manager, the CNS QA Manager, the Nuclear Overview Manager, and the Nuclear Licensing and Safety Manager assembled to evaluate the history and root cause of the DG No.1 failure. The team discovered that a thin-walled Nonconformance fitting Report (failure NCR) No.had occurred 16 was issued previousl on November 27, 1973, documenting a failed nipple in the control air system of DG No. 2. Corrective action for the NCR was to replace all fittings with thick-walled nipples in both DG This NCR was not discovered during root cause analysis for the January 17, 1989, fitting failure or for a previous air system failure which occurred on DG No. 2 on October 21, 1988. The licensee's program requires that NCRs be reviewed for only the last 5 years during root cause determinatio In addition, no changes had been made to the applicable drawings or specifications to require that thick-walled fittings be installed. The team also identified several other instances of vibration induced failures on both DGs. The team noted several other documents which indicated a continuing problem with vibration associated failures on diesel generators which, if they had been properly evaluated, could have prevented the failure in January 1989 or ensured that the subsequent repair would have been identical to the previous installation. The licensee has committed to implementing design modifications to move vibration sensitive instruments from the DG to instrument racks, and to upgrade tubing during the 1989 refueling outag . . -

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-5-An inoperable DG,in excess of 7 days was identified as a potential'

violation. The cause for the inoperability was~an inadequate replacement part installed after a previous DG failur The root cause was determined to be personnel error and inadequate corrective actions in response to previous failure . Exit Interview (30703)'

An exit interview was conducted February 16, 1989, with licensee I representatives (identified in paragraph 1). During this interview, the NRC inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspector <

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