ML20129F896

Insp Rept 50-443/85-11 on 850429-0503.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Activities Re Installation of Electrical safety-related Equipment & Status of Previous Insp Findings

ML20129F896
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	07/05/1985
From:	Anderson C, Paulitz F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20129F869	List: ML20129F861 ML20129F896
References
50-443-85-11, NUDOCS 8507170485
Download: ML20129F896 (8)

See also: IR 05000429/2005003

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report No. 50-443/85-11

Docket No. 50-443

License No. CPPR-135 Priority ---

Category B

Licensee: Public Service of New Hampshire

P. O. Box 330

Manchester, New Hampshire 03105

Facility Name: Seabrook Station, Unit 1

Inspection At: Seabrook, New Hampshire

Inspection Conducted: April 29 - May 3, 1985

Inspector: [ 6@b

F. . Paul tz, rEfgineer date

Approved by: 7 )

C. J. %nde/ son, Chief Plant Systems, date

Section, DRS

Inspection Summary: Inspection on April 29 - May 3, 1985 (Inspection

Report No. 50-443/85-11)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of activities pertaining to

the installation of electrical safety-related equipment and the status of

previous inspection findings. The inspection involved 44 hours5.092593e-4 days <br />0.0122 hours <br />7.275132e-5 weeks <br />1.6742e-5 months <br /> on site by

one region-based inspector.

Results: No violations were id w ified.

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DETAILS

1.0 Persons Contacted

1.1 New Hampshire Yankee

• J. W. Singleton, Assistant Q.A. Manager

• R. P. Grippardi, Assistant Q.A. Manager

• G. Kingston, Station Staff Compliance Manager

• L. Monteith, Field Q.A. Engineer

• J. Marchi, Site Q.C. Manager

• D. G. McLaine, Startup Manager

• G. A. Kann, Startup Test Department (STD)

• F. W. Bean, Field Q.A. Engineer

• W. T. Middleton, Staff Q.A. Engineer

G. F. Mcdonald, Construction Q. A. Manager

W. J. Temple, STD Q.A. Supervisor

J. G. Tefft, STD

D. W. Perkins, Q. A. Engineer

J. O. Azzopardi, Q.A. Engineer

R. E. Guillette, Assistant Construction Q.A. Manager

1.2 Yankee Atomic Engineering Corporation

• R. A. Jeffery, Site Engineer

1.3 United Engineering and Constructors, Inc.

D. C. Lambert, Project Field Q.C. Manager

• B. E. O'Connor, Field Site Q.C.

1.4 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

A. Cerne, Senior Resident Inspector

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H. Westcott, Resident Inspector

L. E. Briggs, Lead Reactor Engineer

R. Barkley, Reactor Engineer

2.0 Licensee Action or Previous Inspection Findings

2.1 (0 pen) Nonconformance (83-20-01) Cable Tie Connection

2.1.1 Cable. tie connection mounts in safety-related equipment

were a problem for the following reasons:

-- The mounts were detached which could affect the seismic

analysis of the equipment.

-- The epoxy material used to adhere the mounts to the

equipment

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was used beyond the materials effective date for field

applications.

-- There was no procedure which permitted this type of mounting

for field applications, in safety related equipment.

The licensee response to this violation SBN-638 dated

March 19, 1984 stated that cable-tie connectors were to sup-

port internal wiring harnesses in a neat and workman like

manner. Random detachment of the cable-tie connectors dur-

ing a seismic event will not affect the operation of the

control panels since their proper function is not dependent

on the support of the cable-tie connectors. This will be

verified with the manufacturer. Corrective action was to

be complete by April 30, 1984.

United Engineers & Contractors (UE&C) letter SBU-91281 dated

October 23, 1984 stated that various vendors of electrical

equipment were contacted regarding the impact of random de-

tachment of epoxy attached cable-tie mounts. Based upon

the response from two manufactures, Westinghouse and Brown

Boveri, UE&C has concluded that detachment during a seismic

event does not affect the operation of the equipment.

2.1.2 The inspector reviewed the responses from the above two manu-

facturers and concluded that, for these manufacturers, random

detachment of the cable tie connection niounts is not a safe-

ty issue. This is because the cable tie connectors are not

the primary cable support.

However, other vendors use cable tie connectors, using

epoxy for mount adhesion, in safety related equipment at

Seabrook. Information from other vendors was not provided

to the inspector. The information from the two vendors is

not sufficient to conclude that detached cable tie connec-

tion mounts for the other vendors is acceptable.

Pending licensee receipt and NRC review of information

from the remaining vendors this issue remains open.

2.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (84-18-03) Class IE Batteries Replacement

The licensee had previously identified a problem with polycarbonate

jars leaking at the tcp and side interface. The batteries had been

returned to the vendor two times for rejarring because of the leaks.

However, this third time they were rejarred with styreneacrylonitrile

(SAN) jars and jar covers. The work requests, battery intercell

resistance test and specific gravity were reviewed and found accept-

able. The licensee QC personnel had identified missing vendor test

reports. They issued Nonconformance Reports to assure that these

reports were replaced. This item is closed.

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2.3 (Closed) Unresolved item (84-18-04) Compression Fittings

The use of Cryofit couplings as replacement for welded couplings and

compression fittings was an unresolved item because the licensee had

not provided the inspector with the following information:

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Procedures for installing the Cryofit Couplings.

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Personnel training.

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Test data _ supporting manufacturer's claims.

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Justification for use of the Cryofit Couplings as a replacement

for welded couplings.

A QA/QC procedure advance notice No. 221 January 4,1985 to Quality

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Control Procedure QCP-13 " Handling and Storage Control" was made to

include a new paragraph IVA.3.a(6) Cryofit Coupling Storage to assure

couplings are stored as required by manufacturers instructions.

The vendor Raychem Corporation Instruction Manual FP97663 "Cryofit

Monolitic Pipe Couplings" relative to the vendor installation speci-

fication was reviewed by the licensee as required by Administrative

Procedure No. 37 on March 22, 1984.

Field Instrumentation Procedure No. 34 " General Installation of

Instrumentation Systems" was revised by Interim Procedure Change

Notice No. 5 to include the following:

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Reference 4.2.10 FP-97663 Installation Instruction for Cryofit

Monolithic Pipe Couplings.

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Reference 4.3.14 QC Installation Report for Cryofit Coupling

(Final) February 15, 1985.

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Detail Procedure 5.15 Cryofit Heat Recoverable Couplings.

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Quality Requirements 6.2.12 Cryofit Coupling surrveillance of

in process activities.

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Quality Requirements 6.2.13 Cryofit Coupling final inspected

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and documented.

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2.3.1 The inspector reviewed related training records that indicate,

as of February 1985, workmen were trained in the installation

of Cryofit Couplings. The inspector verified that two workers

installing Cryofit Couplings had been trained in the handling

and installation of these couplings.

Report No. EDR-5116 " Elevated Temperature Performance Test

of Raychem Cryofit Brand Heat Recoverable Pipe Couplings dated

May 25, 1984.was reviewed and it was noted that the following

performance tests had been conducted:

-- Leak test, at ambient temperature, with nitrogen gas at

1000 PSI.

-- Proof pressure test, as ambient temperature, with

hydraulic fluid at 9000 PSI.

-- Burst test at 700 F.

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-- Thermalcycling from ambient to 700 F, then burst tested.

-- Thermal aging at 700 F, then burst tested.

-- Tensil Testing at 700 F.

The following summary of the results of above tests indicates

that the Cryofit Couplings satisfy the performance require-

ments at 700 F:

-- No coupling leakage

-- Burst always occurred in the pipe or tube at locations

removed from the Cryofit Coupling

-- Tensile pull out was 1.5 to 3 times the yield strength of

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the pipe or tube.

As justification for the replacement of welded couplings with

Cryofit Couplings the licensee offered an ASME Code letter.

The code inquiry reply letter from The American Society of

Mechanical Engineers (ASME) dated May-19,1980 to Raychem Cor-

, poration states that compression type fittings of proprietary

design made from materials not listed in ANSI /ASME B31.1,

L Table 126.1 are acceptable for B31.1 construction.

Additional justification for the use of the fittings included

a report "ASME Code Requirements for Raychem Cryofit and

f Cryoweld Products" by Reedy, Herbert, Gibbons and Associates,

t Revision 2 dated January 4, 1983, to show that Cryofit and

f Cryoweld Fittings, one inch nominal pipe size and less,

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manufactured by Raychem are in compliance with the applicable

requirements of the ASME code.

2.3.2 In conclusion the vendor's test have established that Cryofit

Couplings are an accep;able replacement for welded or compres-

sion fittings and meet the ASME Code requirements. The

licensee has p-ocedures for storing, quality control and

installing the Cryofit Couplings. The instrument tubing

installation personnel have been trained using this procedure.

This item is closed.

3.0 Facility Tour

3.1 The Inspector observed work activities in progress, completed work

and plant status in several areas during a general inspection of

Unit 1. The inspector examined work items _ for obvious defects or

noncompliance with NRC requirements or licensee commitments. Par-

ticular note was taken regarding the presence of quality control

inspection personnel. The quality control inspectors were observed

by the inspector, monitoring cable routing from the spreading room

for termination within equipment in the control room. The inspector

observed wiring modifications within the main control board and

noted that the wire termination tools used were within their recali-

bration dates. The inspector observed indications of quality control

activities through visual evidence such as inspection records,

material identification, nonconformance and acceptance tags.

3.2 During the inspection of the class 1E batteries, dirt was observed

on the top of the battery cells and on the floor of battery room C.

A quantity of baking soda was noted on the floor of both battery

room C and D. In addition, the electrolyte fill plastic covers were

broken on battery B, cells 4, 23, 33, 41 and 43. The integrity of

these covers is necessary to prevent foreign materials from entering

the battery cells. Tha inspector informed the licensee of the above

batteries and battery rooms condition and the licensee took prompt

corrective action.

The inspector noted that the space between the end jars and the

seismic rack varied from zero to one inch. The licensee is evalu-

ating if a 10 CFR 50.55(e) report is to be submitted concerning this

gap, based upon the vendors seismic qualification program.

3.3 The inspector observed that electronic components, within the diesel

generator control panels, were being replaced by the vendor

personnel. The inspector determined that the activity was being

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conducted in accordance with the work request and monitored by quality

control personnel. In addition the inspector verified that tha screw

driver used by quality control personnel was set to the correct torque

setting and within the required calibration date. Equipment within

the diesel generator rooms was covered and protected from overhead

work. The generator space heaters were energized to protect the

insulation from moisture.

The inspector observed that deflector plates had been installed above

the diesel generator exhaust stack where they terminate in the verti-

cal direction above the roof line. The need for these deflector

plates was identified .in the Safety Evaluation Report, to prevent

clogging from dust, ice and snow. The licensee agreed, in a letter

dated November 12, 1982, to the installation of the deflector plate

and the addition of a pressure relief device (PRD) on the exhaust

stack. The pressure relief device was to assure diesel generator

operation in the event that a tornado missile strikes the exhaust

stack. The licensee has re-evaluated its' commitment for the in-

stallation of the pressure relief device. The licensee has proposed

to include the diesel generator exhaust stack in an ongoing probabi-

lity study of tornado missiles. The results of this study may pre-

clude the pressure relief device modification. The results of this

study are under review by NRR.

3.4 The inspector observed that the motor space heaters were operational

for the charging pumps, safety injection pumps, and the containment

spray pumps. The open gratings, above RHR pump motors, were covered

to prevent dirt from overhead work getting into the motors. All of

the above motors intake and exhaust air vents were covered with

filters.

4.0 Engineer Safety Feature System (ESFS)

A potential failure of the ESFS from the permissive reset interlock P-4

reactor trip breakers, was reported to the NRC by Westinghouse,

November 19, 1979. The licensee also reported this as required by 10 CFR

50.55(e) on December 6, 1979. This was identified as an unresolved item

79-00-04 and closed in Inspection Report 82-01 based upon the Westinghouse

proposed verification procedure. The Westinghouse verification procedure

is to provide assurance that the P-4 interlock, which is activated during

reactor breaker testing, will not prevent ESFS actuation. However, the

. licensee's review of the Westinghouse procedure identified that the proposed

procedure was' inadequate. This was reported to the NRC in PSNH letter

.SBN-794 dated April 23, 1985. This item is unresolved pending NRC review

of the Westinghouse verification procedure (85-11-01).

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5.0 Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in

order.to. ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or

deviations. .An unresolved items disclosed during the inspection is

discussed in paragraph 4.

6.0 Exit Interview

The inspector met with the. licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph

1) on May 3,1985, and summarized the purpose, scope and findings of the

. inspection. At no time during this inspection was written material

provided to the licensee by the inspector.