ML20129F896
| ML20129F896 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 07/05/1985 |
| From: | Anderson C, Paulitz F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20129F869 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-85-11, NUDOCS 8507170485 | |
| Download: ML20129F896 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000429/2005003
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-443/85-11
Docket No.
50-443
License No. CPPR-135
Priority
Category
B
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Licensee:
Public Service of New Hampshire
P. O. Box 330
Manchester, New Hampshire 03105
Facility Name:
Seabrook Station, Unit 1
Inspection At:
Seabrook, New Hampshire
Inspection Conducted: April 29 - May 3, 1985
Inspector:
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F.
. Paul tz,
rEfgineer
date
Approved by:
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C. J. %nde/ son, Chief Plant Systems,
date
Section, DRS
Inspection Summary:
Inspection on April 29 - May 3, 1985 (Inspection
Report No. 50-443/85-11)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of activities pertaining to
the installation of electrical safety-related equipment and the status of
previous inspection findings. The inspection involved 44 hours5.092593e-4 days <br />0.0122 hours <br />7.275132e-5 weeks <br />1.6742e-5 months <br /> on site by
one region-based inspector.
Results:
No violations were id w ified.
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DETAILS
1.0 Persons Contacted
1.1 New Hampshire Yankee
- J. W. Singleton, Assistant Q.A. Manager
- R. P. Grippardi, Assistant Q.A. Manager
- G. Kingston, Station Staff Compliance Manager
- L. Monteith, Field Q.A. Engineer
- J. Marchi, Site Q.C. Manager
- D. G. McLaine, Startup Manager
- G. A. Kann, Startup Test Department (STD)
- F. W. Bean, Field Q.A. Engineer
- W. T. Middleton, Staff Q.A. Engineer
G. F. Mcdonald, Construction Q. A. Manager
W. J. Temple, STD Q.A. Supervisor
J. G. Tefft, STD
D. W. Perkins, Q. A. Engineer
J. O. Azzopardi, Q.A. Engineer
R. E. Guillette, Assistant Construction Q.A. Manager
1.2 Yankee Atomic Engineering Corporation
- R. A. Jeffery, Site Engineer
1.3 United Engineering and Constructors, Inc.
D. C. Lambert, Project Field Q.C. Manager
- B. E. O'Connor, Field Site Q.C.
1.4
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
A. Cerne, Senior Resident Inspector
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H. Westcott, Resident Inspector
L. E. Briggs, Lead Reactor Engineer
R. Barkley, Reactor Engineer
2.0 Licensee Action or Previous Inspection Findings
2.1 (0 pen) Nonconformance (83-20-01) Cable Tie Connection
2.1.1
Cable. tie connection mounts in safety-related equipment
were a problem for the following reasons:
-- The mounts were detached which could affect the seismic
analysis of the equipment.
-- The epoxy material used to adhere the mounts to the
equipment
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was used beyond the materials effective date for field
applications.
-- There was no procedure which permitted this type of mounting
for field applications, in safety related equipment.
The licensee response to this violation SBN-638 dated
March 19, 1984 stated that cable-tie connectors were to sup-
port internal wiring harnesses in a neat and workman like
manner.
Random detachment of the cable-tie connectors dur-
ing a seismic event will not affect the operation of the
control panels since their proper function is not dependent
on the support of the cable-tie connectors. This will be
verified with the manufacturer. Corrective action was to
be complete by April 30, 1984.
United Engineers & Contractors (UE&C) letter SBU-91281 dated
October 23, 1984 stated that various vendors of electrical
equipment were contacted regarding the impact of random de-
tachment of epoxy attached cable-tie mounts. Based upon
the response from two manufactures, Westinghouse and Brown
Boveri, UE&C has concluded that detachment during a seismic
event does not affect the operation of the equipment.
2.1.2
The inspector reviewed the responses from the above two manu-
facturers and concluded that, for these manufacturers, random
detachment of the cable tie connection niounts is not a safe-
ty issue. This is because the cable tie connectors are not
the primary cable support.
However, other vendors use cable tie connectors, using
epoxy for mount adhesion, in safety related equipment at
Seabrook.
Information from other vendors was not provided
to the inspector. The information from the two vendors is
not sufficient to conclude that detached cable tie connec-
tion mounts for the other vendors is acceptable.
Pending licensee receipt and NRC review of information
from the remaining vendors this issue remains open.
2.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (84-18-03) Class IE Batteries Replacement
The licensee had previously identified a problem with polycarbonate
jars leaking at the tcp and side interface. The batteries had been
returned to the vendor two times for rejarring because of the leaks.
However, this third time they were rejarred with styreneacrylonitrile
(SAN) jars and jar covers. The work requests, battery intercell
resistance test and specific gravity were reviewed and found accept-
able. The licensee QC personnel had identified missing vendor test
reports. They issued Nonconformance Reports to assure that these
reports were replaced. This item is closed.
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2.3 (Closed) Unresolved item (84-18-04) Compression Fittings
The use of Cryofit couplings as replacement for welded couplings and
compression fittings was an unresolved item because the licensee had
not provided the inspector with the following information:
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Procedures for installing the Cryofit Couplings.
Personnel training.
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Test data _ supporting manufacturer's claims.
Justification for use of the Cryofit Couplings as a replacement
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for welded couplings.
A QA/QC procedure advance notice No. 221 January 4,1985 to Quality
Control Procedure QCP-13 " Handling and Storage Control" was made to
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include a new paragraph IVA.3.a(6) Cryofit Coupling Storage to assure
couplings are stored as required by manufacturers instructions.
The vendor Raychem Corporation Instruction Manual FP97663 "Cryofit
Monolitic Pipe Couplings" relative to the vendor installation speci-
fication was reviewed by the licensee as required by Administrative
Procedure No. 37 on March 22, 1984.
Field Instrumentation Procedure No. 34 " General Installation of
Instrumentation Systems" was revised by Interim Procedure Change
Notice No. 5 to include the following:
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Reference 4.2.10 FP-97663 Installation Instruction for Cryofit
Monolithic Pipe Couplings.
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Reference 4.3.14 QC Installation Report for Cryofit Coupling
(Final) February 15, 1985.
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Detail Procedure 5.15 Cryofit Heat Recoverable Couplings.
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Quality Requirements 6.2.12 Cryofit Coupling surrveillance of
in process activities.
Quality Requirements 6.2.13 Cryofit Coupling final inspected
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and documented.
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2.3.1
The inspector reviewed related training records that indicate,
as of February 1985, workmen were trained in the installation
of Cryofit Couplings. The inspector verified that two workers
installing Cryofit Couplings had been trained in the handling
and installation of these couplings.
Report No. EDR-5116 " Elevated Temperature Performance Test
of Raychem Cryofit Brand Heat Recoverable Pipe Couplings dated
May 25, 1984.was reviewed and it was noted that the following
performance tests had been conducted:
-- Leak test, at ambient temperature, with nitrogen gas at
1000 PSI.
-- Proof pressure test, as ambient temperature, with
hydraulic fluid at 9000 PSI.
-- Burst test at 700 F.
-- Thermalcycling from ambient to 700 F, then burst tested.
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-- Thermal aging at 700 F, then burst tested.
-- Tensil Testing at 700 F.
The following summary of the results of above tests indicates
that the Cryofit Couplings satisfy the performance require-
ments at 700 F:
-- No coupling leakage
-- Burst always occurred in the pipe or tube at locations
removed from the Cryofit Coupling
-- Tensile pull out was 1.5 to 3 times the yield strength of
the pipe or tube.
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As justification for the replacement of welded couplings with
Cryofit Couplings the licensee offered an ASME Code letter.
The code inquiry reply letter from The American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) dated May-19,1980 to Raychem Cor-
poration states that compression type fittings of proprietary
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design made from materials not listed in ANSI /ASME B31.1,
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Table 126.1 are acceptable for B31.1 construction.
Additional justification for the use of the fittings included
a report "ASME Code Requirements for Raychem Cryofit and
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Cryoweld Products" by Reedy, Herbert, Gibbons and Associates,
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Revision 2 dated January 4, 1983, to show that Cryofit and
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Cryoweld Fittings, one inch nominal pipe size and less,
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manufactured by Raychem are in compliance with the applicable
requirements of the ASME code.
2.3.2
In conclusion the vendor's test have established that Cryofit
Couplings are an accep;able replacement for welded or compres-
sion fittings and meet the ASME Code requirements. The
licensee has p-ocedures for storing, quality control and
installing the Cryofit Couplings. The instrument tubing
installation personnel have been trained using this procedure.
This item is closed.
3.0 Facility Tour
3.1 The Inspector observed work activities in progress, completed work
and plant status in several areas during a general inspection of
Unit 1.
The inspector examined work items _ for obvious defects or
noncompliance with NRC requirements or licensee commitments.
Par-
ticular note was taken regarding the presence of quality control
inspection personnel. The quality control inspectors were observed
by the inspector, monitoring cable routing from the spreading room
for termination within equipment in the control room. The inspector
observed wiring modifications within the main control board and
noted that the wire termination tools used were within their recali-
bration dates.
The inspector observed indications of quality control
activities through visual evidence such as inspection records,
material identification, nonconformance and acceptance tags.
3.2 During the inspection of the class 1E batteries, dirt was observed
on the top of the battery cells and on the floor of battery room C.
A quantity of baking soda was noted on the floor of both battery
room C and D.
In addition, the electrolyte fill plastic covers were
broken on battery B, cells 4, 23, 33, 41 and 43.
The integrity of
these covers is necessary to prevent foreign materials from entering
the battery cells. Tha inspector informed the licensee of the above
batteries and battery rooms condition and the licensee took prompt
corrective action.
The inspector noted that the space between the end jars and the
seismic rack varied from zero to one inch.
The licensee is evalu-
ating if a 10 CFR 50.55(e) report is to be submitted concerning this
gap, based upon the vendors seismic qualification program.
3.3 The inspector observed that electronic components, within the diesel
generator control panels, were being replaced by the vendor
personnel. The inspector determined that the activity was being
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conducted in accordance with the work request and monitored by quality
control personnel. In addition the inspector verified that tha screw
driver used by quality control personnel was set to the correct torque
setting and within the required calibration date.
Equipment within
the diesel generator rooms was covered and protected from overhead
work.
The generator space heaters were energized to protect the
insulation from moisture.
The inspector observed that deflector plates had been installed above
the diesel generator exhaust stack where they terminate in the verti-
cal direction above the roof line. The need for these deflector
plates was identified .in the Safety Evaluation Report, to prevent
clogging from dust, ice and snow. The licensee agreed, in a letter
dated November 12, 1982, to the installation of the deflector plate
and the addition of a pressure relief device (PRD) on the exhaust
stack. The pressure relief device was to assure diesel generator
operation in the event that a tornado missile strikes the exhaust
stack. The licensee has re-evaluated its' commitment for the in-
stallation of the pressure relief device. The licensee has proposed
to include the diesel generator exhaust stack in an ongoing probabi-
lity study of tornado missiles. The results of this study may pre-
clude the pressure relief device modification. The results of this
study are under review by NRR.
3.4 The inspector observed that the motor space heaters were operational
for the charging pumps, safety injection pumps, and the containment
spray pumps.
The open gratings, above RHR pump motors, were covered
to prevent dirt from overhead work getting into the motors. All of
the above motors intake and exhaust air vents were covered with
filters.
4.0 Engineer Safety Feature System (ESFS)
A potential failure of the ESFS from the permissive reset interlock P-4
reactor trip breakers, was reported to the NRC by Westinghouse,
November 19, 1979.
The licensee also reported this as required by 10 CFR 50.55(e) on December 6, 1979.
This was identified as an unresolved item
79-00-04 and closed in Inspection Report 82-01 based upon the Westinghouse
proposed verification procedure. The Westinghouse verification procedure
is to provide assurance that the P-4 interlock, which is activated during
reactor breaker testing, will not prevent ESFS actuation. However, the
. licensee's review of the Westinghouse procedure identified that the proposed
procedure was' inadequate. This was reported to the NRC in PSNH letter
.SBN-794 dated April 23, 1985. This item is unresolved pending NRC review
of the Westinghouse verification procedure (85-11-01).
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5.0 Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
order.to. ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or
deviations. .An unresolved items disclosed during the inspection is
discussed in paragraph 4.
6.0 Exit Interview
The inspector met with the. licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph
1) on May 3,1985, and summarized the purpose, scope and findings of the
. inspection. At no time during this inspection was written material
provided to the licensee by the inspector.
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