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{{#Wiki_filter:0410212013 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page I Part 21 (PAR)Event# 48863 Rep Org: INTEGRATED RESOURCES, INC. Notification Date / Time: 03/28/2013 15:53 (EDT)Supplier:
{{#Wiki_filter:0410212013                     U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report                     Page I Part 21 (PAR)                                                                                 Event#       48863 Rep Org: INTEGRATED RESOURCES, INC.                             Notification Date / Time: 03/28/2013 15:53     (EDT)
INVENSYS (FOXBORO METER CO.) Event Date / Time: 03/27/2013 15:30 (CDT)Last Modification:
Supplier: INVENSYS (FOXBORO METER CO.)                               Event Date / Time: 03/27/2013 15:30     (CDT)
04/01/2013 Region: 4 Docket #: City: NEBRASKA CITY Agreement State: Yes County: License #: State: NE NRC Notified by: JOHN F. BROSEMER Notifications:
Last Modification: 04/01/2013 Region:     4                                               Docket #:
GREG PICK R4DO HQ Ops Officer: HOWIE CROUCH PAUL KROHN R1DO Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY PART 21 GROUP EMAIL 10 CFR Section: DEBORAH SEYMOUR R2DO 21.21(d)(3)(i)
City:   NEBRASKA CITY                           Agreement State:           Yes County:                                                   License #:
DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE JULIO LARA R3DO PART 21 REPORT -FOXBORO POWER SUPPLY POTENTIAL FAILURES DUE TO DEFECTIVE TIE WRAPS AND HOLDERS Mr. John F. Brosemer, President of Integrated Resources, Inc., reported discovery of repeated defects in Foxboro Meter Company's N-2ARPS-A6, Style D power supplies.
State:   NE NRC Notified by: JOHN F. BROSEMER                       Notifications:   GREG PICK                       R4DO HQ Ops Officer: HOWIE CROUCH                                             PAUL KROHN                       R1DO Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY                                             PART 21 GROUP                   EMAIL 10 CFR Section:                                                         DEBORAH SEYMOUR                 R2DO 21.21(d)(3)(i)       DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE                             JULIO LARA                       R3DO PART 21 REPORT - FOXBORO POWER SUPPLY POTENTIAL FAILURES DUE TO DEFECTIVE TIE WRAPS AND HOLDERS Mr. John F. Brosemer, President of Integrated Resources, Inc., reported discovery of repeated defects in Foxboro Meter Company's N-2ARPS-A6, Style D power supplies. When manufactured, the power supplies utilized Thomas and Betts TC105A aluminum wire tie holders in random numbers and placements. As the power supplies age, the tie wrap holder adhesive degrades and the tie wraps embrittle resulting in the separation of the tie wraps and loss of holder adhesion to the power supply enclosure. This causes the wraps and holders to fall to the bottom of the enclosure which could result in shorts when the aluminum comes in contact with electronic components. In one particular power supply, all tie wrap holders in use failed and separated from the enclosure.
When manufactured, the power supplies utilized Thomas and Betts TC105A aluminum wire tie holders in random numbers and placements.
The power supplies are used in Foxboro SPEC-200 cabinetry that are used throughout the industry. At the time of this notification, Integrated Resources has one power supply from Three Mile Island and two power supplies from Ft. Calhoun undergoing refurbishment. Integrated Resources will be following up this telephonic notification with a written report once their internal investigation is done.
As the power supplies age, the tie wrap holder adhesive degrades and the tie wraps embrittle resulting in the separation of the tie wraps and loss of holder adhesion to the power supply enclosure.
Recommended corrective actions are for affected facilities to open and inspect all power supplies and remove the aluminum tie wrap holders and replace the tie wraps and holders with Teflon types.
This causes the wraps and holders to fall to the bottom of the enclosure which could result in shorts when the aluminum comes in contact with electronic components.
  * *
In one particular power supply, all tie wrap holders in use failed and separated from the enclosure.
* UPDATE FROM BROSEMER TO SNYDER AT 1530 EDT ON 4/1/13                   ***
The power supplies are used in Foxboro SPEC-200 cabinetry that are used throughout the industry.
  "Suspecting this to be a common mode failure IRI [Integrated Resources, Inc.] opened and inspected two Foxboro N-2ARPS-A6 power supplies which were sent to IRI for refurbishment by Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station.
At the time of this notification, Integrated Resources has one power supply from Three Mile Island and two power supplies from Ft. Calhoun undergoing refurbishment.
Examination revealed that both of the power supplies have the same failures of the tie wrap aluminum mounting plates adhesive with the majority of the plates being held on the wire bundles by age embrittled nylon wire ties.
Integrated Resources will be following up this telephonic notification with a written report once their internal investigation is done.Recommended corrective actions are for affected facilities to open and inspect all power supplies and remove the aluminum tie wrap holders and replace the tie wraps and holders with Teflon types.* *
 
* UPDATE FROM BROSEMER TO SNYDER AT 1530 EDT ON 4/1/13 ***"Suspecting this to be a common mode failure IRI [Integrated Resources, Inc.] opened and inspected two Foxboro N-2ARPS-A6 power supplies which were sent to IRI for refurbishment by Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station.Examination revealed that both of the power supplies have the same failures of the tie wrap aluminum mounting plates adhesive with the majority of the plates being held on the wire bundles by age embrittled nylon wire ties.
0410212013                   U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report                     Paffe 2 Part 21 (PAR)                                                                                   Event#       48863 "Confirmation of the common mode failure by inspection of the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Stations was on or about 1530 CDT on March 27, 2013.
0410212013 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Paffe 2 Part 21 (PAR) Event# 48863"Confirmation of the common mode failure by inspection of the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Stations was on or about 1530 CDT on March 27, 2013."IRI is not the OEM or Original supplier for this power supply and cannot provide the number nor locations of these components.
"IRI is not the OEM or Original supplier for this power supply and cannot provide the number nor locations of these components. However, by searching the RAPID database IRI has found the power supplies at the following:
However, by searching the RAPID database IRI has found the power supplies at the following: "Arizona Public Service -Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station; Constellation Energy -Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant; Detroit Edison -Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant; Dominion Nuclear -Millstone Nuclear Power Plant;Dominion Nuclear -Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant; Eletronnuclear  
  "Arizona Public Service - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station; Constellation Energy - Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant; Detroit Edison - Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant; Dominion Nuclear - Millstone Nuclear Power Plant; Dominion Nuclear - Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant; Eletronnuclear - Angra Nuclear Power Plant; Entergy Nuclear - Arkansas Nuclear One; Entergy Nuclear - Indian Point Energy Center; Entergy Nuclear - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant; Entergy Nuclear - J. A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Exelon Corporation - Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant; Exelon Corporation - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station; NextEra Energy - Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant; Progress Energy Florida - Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant; Southern California Edison - San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.
-Angra Nuclear Power Plant; Entergy Nuclear -Arkansas Nuclear One; Entergy Nuclear -Indian Point Energy Center; Entergy Nuclear -Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant; Entergy Nuclear -J. A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Exelon Corporation  
  "IRI suspects several other utilities and units are affected by this report.
-Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant; Exelon Corporation  
Corrective action taken: "IRI's preliminary suggestion is inspection and removal of failed tie wrap mounting plates which are being held on to wire bundles by aging nylon tie wraps. IRI also suggests replacement of age embrittled nylon tie wraps with Tefzel tie wraps."
-Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station; NextEra Energy -Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant; Progress Energy Florida -Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant; Southern California Edison -San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station."IRI suspects several other utilities and units are affected by this report.Corrective action taken: "IRI's preliminary suggestion is inspection and removal of failed tie wrap mounting plates which are being held on to wire bundles by aging nylon tie wraps. IRI also suggests replacement of age embrittled nylon tie wraps with Tefzel tie wraps." Contact Information:
Contact Information:
John F. Brosemer; President Integrated Resources, Inc.113 South 9th Street Nebraska City, NE 68410 Notified R1 DO (Dwyer), R2DO (Seymour), R3DO (Daley), R4DO (Kellar) and Part 21 Reactors (Email).
John F. Brosemer; President Integrated Resources, Inc.
LNU EGRATED RESOURCES, INC.April 1, 2013 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C., 20555-0001
113 South 9th Street Nebraska City, NE 68410 Notified R1 DO (Dwyer), R2DO (Seymour), R3DO (Daley), R4DO (Kellar) and Part 21 Reactors (Email).
 
LNU EGRATED               RESOURCES, INC.
April 1, 2013 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C., 20555-0001


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
10 CFR Part 21 Report Notification, Foxboro, Co. N-2ARPS-A6 Power Supplies Common Mode Failure of Thomas and Betts Model TC 1 05A Ty-Rap Mounting Plates Adhesive.
10 CFR Part 21 Report Notification, Foxboro, Co. N-2ARPS-A6 Power Supplies Common Mode Failure of Thomas and Betts Model TC 105A Ty-Rap Mounting Plates Adhesive.


==Dear Sir or Madam:==
==Dear Sir or Madam:==
The purpose of this letter is to confirm Integrated Resources, Inc., (IRI) verbal report dated 28 March 2013, at 1553 EDT, to Mr. H. Crouch (U.S. NRC) of a potential common mode failure of the Ty-Rap mounting plates adhesive used in Foxboro, Co. Power Supplies Model N-2ARPS-A6.The \riten report lCquilrCd b) thlis parlagraph Shall in clude. butet iceI [lot b Il liteld to. the loltlowing i formation.
 
to th hextent e ,nlo\W.: ('i) Name anid address olIthe indi-idual or individuals infbrniine the C'"Tiission.
The purpose of this letter is to confirm Integrated Resources, Inc., (IRI) verbal report dated 28 March 2013, at 1553 EDT, to Mr. H. Crouch (U.S. NRC) of a potential common mode failure of the Ty-Rap mounting plates adhesive used in Foxboro, Co. Power Supplies Model N-2ARPS-A6.
John F. Brosemer President Integrated Resources, Inc.113 South 9"h Street Nebraska City, NE 68410 Dale Overbeck Quality Assurance Manager Integrated Resources, Inc.113 South 9"h Street Nebraska City, NE 68410 (iI) Idelli.icatioll of the f ili ity. the act\itv. olr the )basic Comp1)OlnenlIt supplied ibr such faclte IM or suLch acii\vity within the United Slates which li ils to comIply.)1 or contains a deflct.N-2ARPS-A6, Power Supply, Nuclear Safety Related, manufactured by FOXBORO, METER Co., Foxboro, MA.P.O. BOX 310
The \riten report lCquilrCd b) thlis parlagraph Shall in clude. butet iceI     [lot b Il liteld to. the loltlowing i formation. to thhextent e       ,nlo\W.:
* NEBRASKA CITY, NE 68410 * (402) 873-5859 (iii) dicti tificatiot olhc t i1rm construciiil the l iil.t K ) Upplxinfl lh0 b1.,ic componcSt xxi\ ic h 1,i Is to compily or conltain.s a defect.FOXBORO METER, Co.Foxboro, MA Now referred to as: Invensys, Operation Management 10900 Equity Drive Houston, TX 77041 (713) 329-1600 (ix") NatUlrC of'thc del'cct or I il eI to co011p1v ai Id thc sal ctx had.aI xx hich is creaCtd or coulhi be ctdICM. b\" such dCeect or 1iilurC to con iply.IRI found a one inch by 1/22 inch Ty-Rap aluminum mounting plate loose in the bottom of a safety related Foxboro Model N-2ARPS-A6 power supply being refurbished for Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant.Further examination of the power supply found that the adhesive had failed on 14 of the 15 remaining aluminum mounting plates leaving the plates attached to the wire harnesses by age embrittled nylon wire ties. The only mounting plate that had not failed was not used (no tie wrap was used).Suspecting this to be a common mode failure IRI opened and inspected two Foxboro N-2ARPS-A6 power supplies which were sent to IRI for refurbishment by Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station. Examination revealed that both of the power supplies have the same failures of the Ty-Rap aluminum mounting plates adhesive with the majority of the plates being held on the wire bundles by age embrittled nylon wire ties.v The date on which tlhe 'InI ,jrmtlon ol such defect or fti IluIr to corn\ply \xxas obt-`i icd.Confirmation of the common mode failure by inspection of the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Stations was on or about 1530 CDT on March 27, 2013.(vi) In the case of a basic component Wxhich CoMtains a dCelect or fl[ils to complN. the n1umber and location of these comlponents in uL;SC aýt. s5)pl icd ft10 bei.n SUlp)lied fr., o01 miay be SLpI)liCd OLr.rManuafictured.
('i) Name anid address olIthe indi-idual or individuals infbrniine the C'"Tiission.
o0 beilngi mnu1aciLrCjd bl r one or n1ore laci lit ics o' ac ix itics subject to the I-cUulations in this part.
John F. Brosemer President Integrated Resources, Inc.
IRI is not the OEM or Original supplier for this power supply and cannot provide the number nor locations of these components.
113 South 9 "hStreet Nebraska City, NE 68410 Dale Overbeck Quality Assurance Manager Integrated Resources, Inc.
However, by searching the RAPID database IRI has found the power supplies at the following:
113 South 9 "hStreet Nebraska City, NE 68410 (iI) Idelli.icatioll of the f iliity. the act\itv. olr the )basicComp1)OlnenlIt supplied ibr such   faclte IM or suLch acii\vity within the United Slates which li ils to comIply.)1 or contains a deflct.
Arizona Public Service -Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Constellation Energy -Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant Detroit Edison -Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant Dominion Nuclear -Millstone Nuclear Power Plant Dominion Nuclear -Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Eletronnuclear  
N-2ARPS-A6, Power Supply, Nuclear Safety Related, manufactured by FOXBORO, METER Co., Foxboro, MA.
-Angra Nuclear Power Plant Entergy Nuclear -Arkansas Nuclear One Entergy Nuclear -Indian Point Energy Center Entergy Nuclear -Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant Entergy Nuclear -J. A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant Exelon Corporation  
P.O. BOX 310
-Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant Exelon Corporation  
* NEBRASKA CITY, NE 68410                           * (402) 873-5859
-Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Nextera Energy -Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant Progress Energy Florida -Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant Southern California Edison -San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station IRI suspects several other utilities and units are affected by this report.(vii).he Corrective action \wh ich hals been. is bciel .or \\ill be t1aen: the a1n1e ol thCe indi\iduill or o'gan.ization responsible Ir the actioll: and llce jclngth of' tine thair has bkcnl or %\ill bc taken it complete the action.IRI's preliminary suggestion is inspection and removal of failed Ty-Rap mounting plates which are being held on to wire bundles by aging nylon tie-wraps.
 
IRI also suggests replacement of age embrittled nylon tie wraps with Tefzel tie wraps.IRI will be continuing evaluation with our clients to provide any other required continuing corrective actions concerning this report. This continuing evaluation should be complete in 60 to 90 days.
t i1rm construciiil the l (iii) dicti tificatiot olhc                               iil.tK ) Upplxinfl lh0 b1.,ic componcSt xxi\ic h 1,i Is to compily or conltain.s a defect.
4 (viii) Ainl advice .elatcd to the del'ect o0' f il.re2 1o co0 1)1\ dl',oul the 1 hci itxii actVi. i lv. or basic comlponCnI that has been. is bein. or 0- iii be uiVCen to itichaser.
FOXBORO METER, Co.
or licensees.
Foxboro, MA Now referred to as:
Invensys, Operation Management 10900 Equity Drive Houston, TX 77041 (713) 329-1600 (ix") NatUlrC of'thc del'cct or I il eI to co011p1v ai Id thc sal ctx had.aI xxhich is creaCtd or coulhi be ctdICM. b\" such dCeect or 1iilurC to con iply.
IRI found a one inch by 1/22 inch Ty-Rap aluminum mounting plate loose in the bottom of a safety related Foxboro Model N-2ARPS-A6 power supply being refurbished for Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant.
Further examination of the power supply found that the adhesive had failed on 14 of the 15 remaining aluminum mounting plates leaving the plates attached to the wire harnesses by age embrittled nylon wire ties. The only mounting plate that had not failed was not used (no tie wrap was used).
Suspecting this to be a common mode failure IRI opened and inspected two Foxboro N-2ARPS-A6 power supplies which were sent to IRI for refurbishment by Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station. Examination revealed that both of the power supplies have the same failures of the Ty-Rap aluminum mounting plates adhesive with the majority of the plates being held on the wire bundles by age embrittled nylon wire ties.
v The date on which tlhe 'InI ,jrmtlonol such defect or ftiIluIr to corn\ply \xxas obt-`i icd.
Confirmation of the common mode failure by inspection of the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Stations was on or about 1530 CDT on March 27, 2013.
(vi) In the case of a basic component Wxhich CoMtains a dCelect or fl[ils to complN. the n1umber and location of these comlponents in uL;SC aýt. s5)pl icd ft10bei.n SUlp)lied fr., o01miay be SLpI)liCd OLr.
rManuafictured. o0 beilngi mnu1aciLrCjd blr one or n1ore laci lit ics o' ac ix itics subject to the I-cUulations in this part.
 
IRI is not the OEM or Original supplier for this power supply and cannot provide the number nor locations of these components. However, by searching the RAPID database IRI has found the power supplies at the following:
Arizona Public Service - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Constellation Energy - Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant Detroit Edison - Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant Dominion Nuclear - Millstone Nuclear Power Plant Dominion Nuclear - Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Eletronnuclear - Angra Nuclear Power Plant Entergy Nuclear - Arkansas Nuclear One Entergy Nuclear - Indian Point Energy Center Entergy Nuclear - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant Entergy Nuclear - J. A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant Exelon Corporation - Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant Exelon Corporation - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Nextera Energy - Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant Progress Energy Florida - Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant Southern California Edison - San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station IRI suspects several other utilities and units are affected by this report.
(vii).he Corrective action \wh ich hals been. is bciel . or \\ill be t1aen: the a1n1e ol thCe indi\iduill or o'gan.ization responsible Ir the actioll: and llce jclngth of' tine thair has bkcnl or %\illbc taken it complete the action.
IRI's preliminary suggestion is inspection and removal of failed Ty-Rap mounting plates which are being held on to wire bundles by aging nylon tie-wraps. IRI also suggests replacement of age embrittled nylon tie wraps with Tefzel tie wraps.
IRI will be continuing evaluation with our clients to provide any other required continuing corrective actions concerning this report. This continuing evaluation should be complete in 60 to 90 days.
 
4 (viii) Ainl advice .elatcd to the del'ect o0'f il.re2 1o co0 1)1\ dl',oul 1the hci itxii actVi. i lv. or basic comlponCnI that has been. is bein. or   0- iii be uiVCen to itichaser. or licensees.
The failure being reported requires two failures, however, since it appears that the Ty-Rap aluminum mounting plates adhesive failures are nearly 100%, the only failure required to allow the mounting plate to become a loose metallic object in an operating power supply is the age related embrittlement of the nylon tie wraps (known failure mechanism).
The failure being reported requires two failures, however, since it appears that the Ty-Rap aluminum mounting plates adhesive failures are nearly 100%, the only failure required to allow the mounting plate to become a loose metallic object in an operating power supply is the age related embrittlement of the nylon tie wraps (known failure mechanism).
IRI suspects but has not verified that this failure mechanism applies to most of the Foxboro, Co. Model "ARPS' power supplies both safety related and non-safety related.Some of these models include but are not limited to the following Foxboro, Co., Model numbers: N-2ARPS-A6 All Styles N-2ARPS05-A6 2ARPS-A6 (ix) III the case ol'Ian eall site peirna1it.
IRI suspects but has not verified that this failure mechanism applies to most of the Foxboro, Co. Model "ARPS' power supplies both safety related and non-safety related.
the cntilit s to \'\' horn anI Ce"Iv site periit \\"Is ti anlsleerrd.
Some of these models include but are not limited to the following Foxboro, Co., Model numbers:
N-2ARPS-A6 All Styles N-2ARPS05-A6 2ARPS-A6 (ix) III the case ol'Ian eall site peirna1it. the cntilit s to \'\' horn anICe"Iv site periit \\"Is ti anlsleerrd.
Not Applicable.
Not Applicable.
Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact John F. Brosemer, President, Integrated Resources, Inc., at (402) 873-5859.Sincerely, John F. Brosemer President Integrated Resources, Inc.(402) 873-5859}}
Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact John F. Brosemer, President, Integrated Resources, Inc., at (402) 873-5859.
Sincerely, John F. Brosemer President Integrated Resources, Inc.
(402) 873-5859}}

Latest revision as of 20:57, 4 November 2019

Part 21 Report - Foxboro Power Supply Potential Failures Due to Defective Tie Wraps and Holders
ML13093A153
Person / Time
Site: Millstone, Peach Bottom, Nine Mile Point, Palo Verde, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Point Beach, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Crystal River, San Onofre, FitzPatrick  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 04/02/2013
From: Brosemer J
Integrated Resources
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
48863
Download: ML13093A153 (6)
v • d • e


Text

0410212013 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report Page I Part 21 (PAR) Event# 48863 Rep Org: INTEGRATED RESOURCES, INC. Notification Date / Time: 03/28/2013 15:53 (EDT)

Supplier: INVENSYS (FOXBORO METER CO.) Event Date / Time: 03/27/2013 15:30 (CDT)

Last Modification: 04/01/2013 Region: 4 Docket #:

City: NEBRASKA CITY Agreement State: Yes County: License #:

State: NE NRC Notified by: JOHN F. BROSEMER Notifications: GREG PICK R4DO HQ Ops Officer: HOWIE CROUCH PAUL KROHN R1DO Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY PART 21 GROUP EMAIL 10 CFR Section: DEBORAH SEYMOUR R2DO 21.21(d)(3)(i) DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE JULIO LARA R3DO PART 21 REPORT - FOXBORO POWER SUPPLY POTENTIAL FAILURES DUE TO DEFECTIVE TIE WRAPS AND HOLDERS Mr. John F. Brosemer, President of Integrated Resources, Inc., reported discovery of repeated defects in Foxboro Meter Company's N-2ARPS-A6, Style D power supplies. When manufactured, the power supplies utilized Thomas and Betts TC105A aluminum wire tie holders in random numbers and placements. As the power supplies age, the tie wrap holder adhesive degrades and the tie wraps embrittle resulting in the separation of the tie wraps and loss of holder adhesion to the power supply enclosure. This causes the wraps and holders to fall to the bottom of the enclosure which could result in shorts when the aluminum comes in contact with electronic components. In one particular power supply, all tie wrap holders in use failed and separated from the enclosure.

The power supplies are used in Foxboro SPEC-200 cabinetry that are used throughout the industry. At the time of this notification, Integrated Resources has one power supply from Three Mile Island and two power supplies from Ft. Calhoun undergoing refurbishment. Integrated Resources will be following up this telephonic notification with a written report once their internal investigation is done.

Recommended corrective actions are for affected facilities to open and inspect all power supplies and remove the aluminum tie wrap holders and replace the tie wraps and holders with Teflon types.

  • *
  • UPDATE FROM BROSEMER TO SNYDER AT 1530 EDT ON 4/1/13 ***

"Suspecting this to be a common mode failure IRI [Integrated Resources, Inc.] opened and inspected two Foxboro N-2ARPS-A6 power supplies which were sent to IRI for refurbishment by Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station.

Examination revealed that both of the power supplies have the same failures of the tie wrap aluminum mounting plates adhesive with the majority of the plates being held on the wire bundles by age embrittled nylon wire ties.

0410212013 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report Paffe 2 Part 21 (PAR) Event# 48863 "Confirmation of the common mode failure by inspection of the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Stations was on or about 1530 CDT on March 27, 2013.

"IRI is not the OEM or Original supplier for this power supply and cannot provide the number nor locations of these components. However, by searching the RAPID database IRI has found the power supplies at the following:

"Arizona Public Service - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station; Constellation Energy - Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant; Detroit Edison - Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant; Dominion Nuclear - Millstone Nuclear Power Plant; Dominion Nuclear - Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant; Eletronnuclear - Angra Nuclear Power Plant; Entergy Nuclear - Arkansas Nuclear One; Entergy Nuclear - Indian Point Energy Center; Entergy Nuclear - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant; Entergy Nuclear - J. A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Exelon Corporation - Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant; Exelon Corporation - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station; NextEra Energy - Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant; Progress Energy Florida - Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant; Southern California Edison - San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station.

"IRI suspects several other utilities and units are affected by this report.

Corrective action taken: "IRI's preliminary suggestion is inspection and removal of failed tie wrap mounting plates which are being held on to wire bundles by aging nylon tie wraps. IRI also suggests replacement of age embrittled nylon tie wraps with Tefzel tie wraps."

Contact Information:

John F. Brosemer; President Integrated Resources, Inc.

113 South 9th Street Nebraska City, NE 68410 Notified R1 DO (Dwyer), R2DO (Seymour), R3DO (Daley), R4DO (Kellar) and Part 21 Reactors (Email).

LNU EGRATED RESOURCES, INC.

April 1, 2013 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C., 20555-0001

Subject:

10 CFR Part 21 Report Notification, Foxboro, Co. N-2ARPS-A6 Power Supplies Common Mode Failure of Thomas and Betts Model TC 105A Ty-Rap Mounting Plates Adhesive.

Dear Sir or Madam:

The purpose of this letter is to confirm Integrated Resources, Inc., (IRI) verbal report dated 28 March 2013, at 1553 EDT, to Mr. H. Crouch (U.S. NRC) of a potential common mode failure of the Ty-Rap mounting plates adhesive used in Foxboro, Co. Power Supplies Model N-2ARPS-A6.

The \riten report lCquilrCd b) thlis parlagraph Shall in clude. butet iceI [lot b Il liteld to. the loltlowing i formation. to thhextent e ,nlo\W.:

('i) Name anid address olIthe indi-idual or individuals infbrniine the C'"Tiission.

John F. Brosemer President Integrated Resources, Inc.

113 South 9 "hStreet Nebraska City, NE 68410 Dale Overbeck Quality Assurance Manager Integrated Resources, Inc.

113 South 9 "hStreet Nebraska City, NE 68410 (iI) Idelli.icatioll of the f iliity. the act\itv. olr the )basicComp1)OlnenlIt supplied ibr such faclte IM or suLch acii\vity within the United Slates which li ils to comIply.)1 or contains a deflct.

N-2ARPS-A6, Power Supply, Nuclear Safety Related, manufactured by FOXBORO, METER Co., Foxboro, MA.

P.O. BOX 310

  • NEBRASKA CITY, NE 68410 * (402) 873-5859

t i1rm construciiil the l (iii) dicti tificatiot olhc iil.tK ) Upplxinfl lh0 b1.,ic componcSt xxi\ic h 1,i Is to compily or conltain.s a defect.

FOXBORO METER, Co.

Foxboro, MA Now referred to as:

Invensys, Operation Management 10900 Equity Drive Houston, TX 77041 (713) 329-1600 (ix") NatUlrC of'thc del'cct or I il eI to co011p1v ai Id thc sal ctx had.aI xxhich is creaCtd or coulhi be ctdICM. b\" such dCeect or 1iilurC to con iply.

IRI found a one inch by 1/22 inch Ty-Rap aluminum mounting plate loose in the bottom of a safety related Foxboro Model N-2ARPS-A6 power supply being refurbished for Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant.

Further examination of the power supply found that the adhesive had failed on 14 of the 15 remaining aluminum mounting plates leaving the plates attached to the wire harnesses by age embrittled nylon wire ties. The only mounting plate that had not failed was not used (no tie wrap was used).

Suspecting this to be a common mode failure IRI opened and inspected two Foxboro N-2ARPS-A6 power supplies which were sent to IRI for refurbishment by Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station. Examination revealed that both of the power supplies have the same failures of the Ty-Rap aluminum mounting plates adhesive with the majority of the plates being held on the wire bundles by age embrittled nylon wire ties.

v The date on which tlhe 'InI ,jrmtlonol such defect or ftiIluIr to corn\ply \xxas obt-`i icd.

Confirmation of the common mode failure by inspection of the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Stations was on or about 1530 CDT on March 27, 2013.

(vi) In the case of a basic component Wxhich CoMtains a dCelect or fl[ils to complN. the n1umber and location of these comlponents in uL;SC aýt. s5)pl icd ft10bei.n SUlp)lied fr., o01miay be SLpI)liCd OLr.

rManuafictured. o0 beilngi mnu1aciLrCjd blr one or n1ore laci lit ics o' ac ix itics subject to the I-cUulations in this part.

IRI is not the OEM or Original supplier for this power supply and cannot provide the number nor locations of these components. However, by searching the RAPID database IRI has found the power supplies at the following:

Arizona Public Service - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Constellation Energy - Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plant Detroit Edison - Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant Dominion Nuclear - Millstone Nuclear Power Plant Dominion Nuclear - Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Eletronnuclear - Angra Nuclear Power Plant Entergy Nuclear - Arkansas Nuclear One Entergy Nuclear - Indian Point Energy Center Entergy Nuclear - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant Entergy Nuclear - J. A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant Exelon Corporation - Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant Exelon Corporation - Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Nextera Energy - Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant Progress Energy Florida - Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant Southern California Edison - San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station IRI suspects several other utilities and units are affected by this report.

(vii).he Corrective action \wh ich hals been. is bciel . or \\ill be t1aen: the a1n1e ol thCe indi\iduill or o'gan.ization responsible Ir the actioll: and llce jclngth of' tine thair has bkcnl or %\illbc taken it complete the action.

IRI's preliminary suggestion is inspection and removal of failed Ty-Rap mounting plates which are being held on to wire bundles by aging nylon tie-wraps. IRI also suggests replacement of age embrittled nylon tie wraps with Tefzel tie wraps.

IRI will be continuing evaluation with our clients to provide any other required continuing corrective actions concerning this report. This continuing evaluation should be complete in 60 to 90 days.

4 (viii) Ainl advice .elatcd to the del'ect o0'f il.re2 1o co0 1)1\ dl',oul 1the hci itxii actVi. i lv. or basic comlponCnI that has been. is bein. or 0- iii be uiVCen to itichaser. or licensees.

The failure being reported requires two failures, however, since it appears that the Ty-Rap aluminum mounting plates adhesive failures are nearly 100%, the only failure required to allow the mounting plate to become a loose metallic object in an operating power supply is the age related embrittlement of the nylon tie wraps (known failure mechanism).

IRI suspects but has not verified that this failure mechanism applies to most of the Foxboro, Co. Model "ARPS' power supplies both safety related and non-safety related.

Some of these models include but are not limited to the following Foxboro, Co., Model numbers:

N-2ARPS-A6 All Styles N-2ARPS05-A6 2ARPS-A6 (ix) III the case ol'Ian eall site peirna1it. the cntilit s to \'\' horn anICe"Iv site periit \\"Is ti anlsleerrd.

Not Applicable.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact John F. Brosemer, President, Integrated Resources, Inc., at (402) 873-5859.

Sincerely, John F. Brosemer President Integrated Resources, Inc.

(402) 873-5859

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