ML18139A755: Difference between revisions

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* e U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT e CONTROL BLOCK: .... I _,____.__.___.___..___,I G) 1 6 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) I v I A I s I P I s I 2 101 o Io I -Io Io I ol ol o I -I o I o 101 4 ! 1 !1 I 1 ! 1101 1
* e U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT e CONTROL BLOCK: .... I _,____.__.___.___..___,I G) 1 6 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) I v I A I s I P I s I 2 101 o Io I -Io Io I ol ol o I -I o I o 101 4 ! 1 !1 I 1 ! 1101 1
* 10 :::. 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 . 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58 kE]
* 10 :::. 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 . 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58 kE]
L2J© I o I s I o I o I o 1 2 1 s 11 1011 I o I o I 3 I s I o 101 1 1 o 1::1 I 6 I s I o I G) 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@  
L2J© I o I s I o I o I o 1 2 1 s 11 1011 I o I o I 3 I s I o 101 1 1 o 1::1 I 6 I s I o I G) 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@
:2J2J I With Unit #2 at 100% power, Periodic Test 27D revealed that the amperage for Circuit 2A Panel 10 (Unit 112 BIT inlet line and valves MOV-2867 A & B) was below the Accept-ance Criteria stipulated in the .PT. The redundant Heat Tracing Circuit was operable. This is a degraded mode of operation as specified in T. S. 3. 3. B. 5 and is report ab le in accordance with T.S.6.6.2.b(2).
:2J2J I With Unit #2 at 100% power, Periodic Test 27D revealed that the amperage for Circuit 2A Panel 10 (Unit 112 BIT inlet line and valves MOV-2867 A & B) was below the Accept-ance Criteria stipulated in the .PT. The redundant Heat Tracing Circuit was operable. This is a degraded mode of operation as specified in T. S. 3. 3. B. 5 and is report ab le in accordance with T.S.6.6.2.b(2).
The health and safety of the public were not affected.  
The health and safety of the public were not affected.  
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____   
____   
* ***
* ***
* e e ATTACHMENT 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2 DOCKET NO: 50-281 REPORT NO: 80-025/03L-O EVENT DATE: 10-03-80 TITLE OF REPORT: HEAT TRACING FAILURE 1. Description of Event: With Unit 2 at 100% power, Pe.riodic T.est 27D revealed that the amp readings for circuit 2A Panel.10 (Unit #2 BIT inlet line and valv.es) were below the Acceptance Criteria stipulated in the PT. This is a degraded mode of operation as specified in T.S.3.3.B.5 and is portable in accordance with T.S.6.6.2.b(2).  
* e e ATTACHMENT 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2 DOCKET NO: 50-281 REPORT NO: 80-025/03L-O EVENT DATE: 10-03-80 TITLE OF REPORT: HEAT TRACING FAILURE 1. Description of Event: With Unit 2 at 100% power, Pe.riodic T.est 27D revealed that the amp readings for circuit 2A Panel.10 (Unit #2 BIT inlet line and valv.es) were below the Acceptance Criteria stipulated in the PT. This is a degraded mode of operation as specified in T.S.3.3.B.5 and is portable in accordance with T.S.6.6.2.b(2).
: 2. Prob ab le Consequences  
: 2. Prob ab le Consequences  
& Status of Redundant Systems: 3. 4. The Heat Tracing is intended to ,maintain a temperature above that needed for flow. The redundant Heat Tracing Circuit was operable, therefore, the.health and safety of the public were not affected.
& Status of Redundant Systems: 3. 4. The Heat Tracing is intended to ,maintain a temperature above that needed for flow. The redundant Heat Tracing Circuit was operable, therefore, the.health and safety of the public were not affected.
Cause: The *Heat Tracing Tape was damaged during . .erection of scaffolding to support* mechanical work in the nearby area. Immediate Corrective Action: The immediate corrective action was to verify that the redundant circuit was operable.  
Cause: The *Heat Tracing Tape was damaged during . .erection of scaffolding to support* mechanical work in the nearby area. Immediate Corrective Action: The immediate corrective action was to verify that the redundant circuit was operable.
: 5. Subsequent Corrective Action: The defective Heat Tracing Circuit was replaced within the time span specified by the Technical Specifications.  
: 5. Subsequent Corrective Action: The defective Heat Tracing Circuit was replaced within the time span specified by the Technical Specifications.
: 6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:
: 6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:
No additional  
No additional  
*actions are deemed necessary.  
*actions are deemed necessary.
: 7. Generic Implications:
: 7. Generic Implications:
The task force has reviewed the total. spectrum of the Heat Tracing sys tern and a Design Change is being prepared as a .result of the Task Force Study. Long lead items are b.eing procured . I J}}
The task force has reviewed the total. spectrum of the Heat Tracing sys tern and a Design Change is being prepared as a .result of the Task Force Study. Long lead items are b.eing procured . I J}}

Revision as of 11:03, 25 April 2019

LER 80-025/03L-0:on 801003,w/Unit 2 at 100% Power,Periodic Test 27D Revealed That Amperage for Circuit 2A Panel 10 Was Below Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Damaged Heat Tracing Tape.Verified That Redundant Circuit Was Operable
ML18139A755
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 10/16/1980
From: WILSON J L
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18139A602 List:
References
LER-80-025-03L-03, LER-80-25-3L-3, NUDOCS 8010200524
Download: ML18139A755 (2)


Text

i RC. FORM 3.66. 7;'17} ,."

  • e U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT e CONTROL BLOCK: .... I _,____.__.___.___..___,I G) 1 6 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) I v I A I s I P I s I 2 101 o Io I -Io Io I ol ol o I -I o I o 101 4 ! 1 !1 I 1 ! 1101 1
  • 10 :::. 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 . 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58 kE]

L2J© I o I s I o I o I o 1 2 1 s 11 1011 I o I o I 3 I s I o 101 1 1 o 1::1 I 6 I s I o I G) 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES@

2J2J I With Unit #2 at 100% power, Periodic Test 27D revealed that the amperage for Circuit 2A Panel 10 (Unit 112 BIT inlet line and valves MOV-2867 A & B) was below the Accept-ance Criteria stipulated in the .PT. The redundant Heat Tracing Circuit was operable. This is a degraded mode of operation as specified in T. S. 3. 3. B. 5 and is report ab le in accordance with T.S.6.6.2.b(2).

The health and safety of the public were not affected.

]JI] B 9 SYSTEM CODE I cl BI@ 9 10 r;:;-.., LEA/RO LVENT YEAR REPORT I 8 ! O j NUMBER 21 22 CAUSE CAUSE COMP. CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUB CODE w@w@ I H I E I A I T I E I R 1@ 1.:£..J@)

11 12 i3 18 19 SEQUENTIAL OCCUR REN CE REPORT REPORT NO. CODE TYPE I I 10 12 I s I I/I IO I 3 I 23 24 26 2 7 28 29 30 VALVE SUBCODE ui@ 20 L:=J 31 REVISION NO. LQ.J 32 COMPONENT 80 ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWI\'

r:;;;,, ATTACHMENT NPRD..: PRIME COMP .

  • r~El@IT~OIG~)

0 r~AI@ MIE~HI I O I H~r~ Po ! SUiM~I@ Fr~ SI sr~1 I@) MANUFACTURER 33 34 3~ 36 37 40 41 42 43 IT I 11 Bj 51@ CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS @ 44 47 :Im The Heat Tracing Tape was; damaged during :erection*

of scaffolding to s_upport IILechanicall work in the nearby area. The defective Heat Tracing Tap~ was replaced and verified TIIJ .1-_o_p_e_r_a_b_l_e_.

______________________________________

_ ITD 1...' _________________________________________

_, IE) 8 *9 FACILITY '3o' METHOD OF A BO STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS I.;::;} DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Q}] L!J@ 111 0 IO I@ ..... ! __ N_A ____ ....... ~@)L....I

__ E_le_c_t_r_ic_i_an

__________

...J 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 ACTIVITY CONTENT Q,, RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY ~@~@I NA a 9 : 10 11 80 NA LOCATION OF RELEASE @ 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES Q,. NUl!iBER TYPE DESCRIPTION NA Q2J I 0 1 ° I O l0l:.J@ B 9 11 121 L.3,-. ------------------------------------...J80 PERSONNEL INJURIES Q tJUMBER DESCRIPTION~ I O 10 JO J@).__ _________

N_A _________________ 8 9 11 12 80 NA

  • LOSS OF OR D"'-t/.,'..GE TO FACILITY '43\ TYPE DESCRIPTION
  • l::.::.J ~@ 8 9. '-,o------------------------------------=--------.J80 Pc.:8L /CITY Q.. ISSUEC,Q DESCRIPT/01\1 NRC USE ONL y "' LE.le,.___

__________

--'-N=A~---------...J I I I I I I 11 I I I I I 8 d 9 . 10 68 69 80 .;: l O 2 ~11.li? 'REPARER . J. L. Wilson PHONE:_(_8_0_4_)_3_57_-_3_1_8_4

____

  • ***
  • e e ATTACHMENT 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2 DOCKET NO: 50-281 REPORT NO: 80-025/03L-O EVENT DATE: 10-03-80 TITLE OF REPORT: HEAT TRACING FAILURE 1. Description of Event: With Unit 2 at 100% power, Pe.riodic T.est 27D revealed that the amp readings for circuit 2A Panel.10 (Unit #2 BIT inlet line and valv.es) were below the Acceptance Criteria stipulated in the PT. This is a degraded mode of operation as specified in T.S.3.3.B.5 and is portable in accordance with T.S.6.6.2.b(2).
2. Prob ab le Consequences

& Status of Redundant Systems: 3. 4. The Heat Tracing is intended to ,maintain a temperature above that needed for flow. The redundant Heat Tracing Circuit was operable, therefore, the.health and safety of the public were not affected.

Cause: The *Heat Tracing Tape was damaged during . .erection of scaffolding to support* mechanical work in the nearby area. Immediate Corrective Action: The immediate corrective action was to verify that the redundant circuit was operable.

5. Subsequent Corrective Action: The defective Heat Tracing Circuit was replaced within the time span specified by the Technical Specifications.
6. Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

No additional

  • actions are deemed necessary.
7. Generic Implications:

The task force has reviewed the total. spectrum of the Heat Tracing sys tern and a Design Change is being prepared as a .result of the Task Force Study. Long lead items are b.eing procured . I J