05000280/LER-1980-064-03, /03L-0:on 800916,w/Unit 1 at Cold Shutdown & Unit 2 at 100% Power,Auxiliary Bldg Filter Banks Found to Be Less Efficient than Required.Caused by Settling of Charcoal in Filters.Filters Replaced

/03L-0:on 800916,w/Unit 1 at Cold Shutdown & Unit 2 at 100% Power,Auxiliary Bldg Filter Banks Found to Be Less Efficient than Required.Caused by Settling of Charcoal in Filters.Filters Replaced

ML18139A604
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	10/16/1980
From:	Joshua Wilson VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML18139A602	List: 05000280/LER-1980-016-03, /03L-0:on 800916,w/unit Operating Steady State at 100% power,TV-SS-201B Would Not Remain Closed When Control Switch Was Released.Cause Undetermined.Inside Trip Valve Closed & Air Secured to TV-SS-201B 05000280/LER-1980-025-03, /03L-0:on 801003,w/Unit 2 at 100% Power,Periodic Test 27D Revealed That Amperage for Circuit 2A Panel 10 Was Below Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Damaged Heat Tracing Tape.Verified That Redundant Circuit Was Operable 05000280/LER-1980-064-03, /03L-0:on 800916,w/Unit 1 at Cold Shutdown & Unit 2 at 100% Power,Auxiliary Bldg Filter Banks Found to Be Less Efficient than Required.Caused by Settling of Charcoal in Filters.Filters Replaced 05000280/LER-1980-065-03, /03L-0:on 800917,w/unit at Refueling Shutdown, MOV-SW-103B Did Not Operate Electrically During Flush of Recirculation Spray Heat Exchangers.Cause Undetermined,But Marine Growth Suspected.Valve Manually Cycled ML18139A601
References
LER-80-064-03L-01, LER-80-64-3L-1, NUDOCS 8010200506
Download: ML18139A604 (2)

LER-1980-064, /03L-0:on 800916,w/Unit 1 at Cold Shutdown & Unit 2 at 100% Power,Auxiliary Bldg Filter Banks Found to Be Less Efficient than Required.Caused by Settling of Charcoal in Filters.Filters Replaced

Event date:
Report date:
2801980064R03 - NRC Website

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I With Unit 1 at cold shutdown and Unit 2 at 100% power, the Auxiliary Building filter

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banks_ were found to be less efficient th.an reguired by T.S.-4.12.B.

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The air passing through these filters is continously monitored along with periodic

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Settling of the charcoal in the filters caused the formation of void areas, and a bent support rod for the HEPA filters.

The charcoal-filters were subsequently replaced and tested satisfactory.

The support rod for the HEPA filters was repaired and tested I satisfactory.

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ATTACHMENT 1 SURRY POWER DOCKET NO:

STATION, Unit 1 50-280 80-064/03L-O 09-16-80 REPORT NO:

EVENT DATE:

TITLE OF REPORT:

DEFECTIVE CHARCOAL FILTER

1.

Description of Event

With Unit 1 at cold shutdown and Unit 2 at full power the charcoal filters 3A and 3B located in the Auxiliary Building, were determined not to be ac-ceptable as a result of DOP and Freon 112 testing as required by T. S. 4.12. B.

This testing was performed in preparation for refueling of Unit 1.

This event is reportable per T.S. 6.6.2.b(2).

2.

Probable Consequences:

These filters are designed for use during refueling or,a LOCA, as well as intermittent use during normal operations.

Local air samples are routinely taken in the Aux. Building.

Those samples taken during the time the filter bank was not at the required efficiency did not indicate any abnormal con-ditions.

The air passing through the Ventilation Vent radiation monitor, which is in continuous operation, showed normal readings since the last time the filters were tested satisfactorly on April 3, 1980.

Refueling was not commence(j°until the filters were returned to design efficiency.

Therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3.

Cause

Settling of the charcoal in the filters caused the formation of voids in the charcoal loading, and bent support rod in the HEPA filter housing.

4.

Immediate Corrective Action

The immediate corrective action was to initiate activities to replace the defective filt~r material.

5.

Subsequent Corrective Action:

The subsequent corrective action was to rep~ace banks prior to commencing refueling operations.

filters was repaired ~nd treated satisfactory.

the charcoal in the filters The Support rod for HEPA

6.

Action To Prevent Recurrence:

7.

A design change to the Auxiliary Building filter system is presently in progress.

This change will upgrade the system and provide for improved surveillance.

Generic Implications:

None l