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NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3150~104 (4-95)
EXPIRES 4/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
LICENSEE EVENT.REP.ORT (LER)
REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE
- t LICENSING PROCCSS AND FED.*BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION ~ND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (r-6 F33).
{See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)
U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON. DC 20555-0001. AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (315M104).
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET.
WASHINGTON. DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
PAGE (3)
SURRY POWER STATION, Unit 1 05000 - 280 1 OF 4 TITLE (4)
Improper Bypass Breaker Testinq Due to Inadequate Definition of In Service EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 8)
SEQUENTIAL REVISION FACILITY NAME DOCUMENT NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR Surry Unit 2 05000-281 NUMBER NUMBER 10 30 97 97
-- 0 l l --
00 11 26 97 FACILITY NAME DOCUMENT NUMBER 05000-OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §. (Check one or more) (11)
MODE (9)
N 20.2201(b) 20.2203{a){2)(v)
X 50.73(a){2)(i) 50.73{a){2){viii)
POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203{a){3){i)
- 50. 73(a){2){ii) 50.73{a){2){x)
LEVEL (10) 100 °"
20.2203(a){2){i) 20.2203(a){3){ii)
- 50. 73(a){2){iii) 73.71 20.2203(a){2){ii) 20.2203{a){4) 50.73(a){2)(iv)
OTHER 20.2203(a)(2){iii) 50.36{c){1) 50.73{a){2){v)
Specify in Abstract below 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36{c){2)
- 50. 73(a){2){vii) or in NRC Form 366A LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12 NAME 1
(;;;~N;;;:;R~;;e Area Code)
D. A. Christian, Station Manager COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT/131
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE I
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR I YES IN I NO SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
DATE ABSTRACT {Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
On October 30, 1997, with Unit 1 at 100% power and Unit 2 reactor critical with low power testing in progress, it was determined that the periodic test (PT) procedures for testing the reactor trip bypass breakers did not test the manual undervoltage trip prior to placing the breaker in service. Testing of the undervoltage trip had previously been conducted with the reactor trip bypass breakers racked into the connect position. Therefore, the breakers were actually in service at the time of the testing. The event was caused by a mis-interpretation of the term "in-service" and how it applied to the bypass breakers. The TS requirements were not properly incorporated into PT procedurF <, when they were revised. The PT procedures have been corrected and the bypass breakers have been satisfactorily tested.
No conditions adverse to safety resulted from this event and the health and safety of the public were not affected because testing of the reactor trip bypass breakers took place immediately after closing the bypass breakers and before the reactor trip breakers were open for testing. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
9712020116 971126 PDR ADOCK 05000280 S
PDR (4-95)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION, FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
SURRY POWER STATION, Unit 1 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 05000 - 280 97
--011--
00 TEXT (If more space is required. use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) 1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT PAGE (3) 20F 4
. Following the 1983 Salem Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) Event, Generic Letter (GL) 83-28, Generic Actions for Licensees and Staff in Response to the ATWS Events at Salem, Unit 1, was issued. Item 4.3 of this letter, Reactor Trip System Reliability, became the subject of GL 85-09, Technical Specifications (TS) for GL 83-28, Item 4.3 for Westinghour'3 Plants, and concluded that TS changes should be processed.
TS Amendment 117 dated February 17, 1988, for Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2, was issued by the NRG requiring surveillance testing of the reactor trip bypass breakers [EIIS-AA,BKR].
The TSs for bypass breaker surveillance testing were revised again by Amendment 137, dated February 5, 1990, for Surry Units 1 and 2, to reflect the current testing conditions. The current TSs specify that a test of the reactor trip bypass breakers be conducted once per month by tripping the remote manual undervoltage coil [EIIS-AA,CL]
prior to placing the breaker in service.
The reactor trip bypass breakers, Westinghouse Type DB-50, were maintained in the connect position during power operation. Periodic test (PT) procedures for performing the channel functional test on the bypass breaker specified that the breaker be closed and then tripped open from the test panel to verify operability.
During the testing of the bypass breaker, Operations entered a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> clock as soon as the bypass breaker was closed, in accordance with TS Table 3.7-1, Reactor Trip Breaker Instrument Operability Conditions.
On October 30, 1997, with Unit 1 at 100% power and Unit 2 reactor critical with low power physics testing in progress, it was determined that testing of the bypass breaker may not be in verbatim compliance with TSs in that the breakers were actually connected and in service at the time of the testing. Therefore, operability was not being verified prior to placing the bypass breaker in service.
This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. (4-95)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION. ~~-~~~,u.--=*========.=====4 FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER-NUMBER /6)
PAGE (3)
SURRY POWER STATION, Unit 1 YEAR I s~~~:;~AL I ~~~!'i~
05000 - 280 97
--011--
00 30F4 TEXT (If more space is required. use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
2.0 SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
No conditions adverse to safety resulted from this event and the health and safety of the
. public were not affected. The reactor trip bypass breakers were determined to be operable immediately upon closure by verifying that tripping the undervoltage coil would trip the bypass breakers. The bypass breakers were tested prior to opening the reactor trip breakers for testing. In addition, when the bypass breakers were closed, a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> clock was entered for an inoperable reactor trip crannel.
Prior to and subsequent to this event, testing of the reactor trip bypass breakers demonstrated that the breakers tripped on demand with no failures.
3.0 CAUSE
The event was caused by a mis-interpretation of the term " in-service" and how it applied to the bypass breakers. The surveillance test procedures for the reactor trip breakers were revised in 1985 to test the bypass breakers by racking the bypass breaker into the connect position, closing the breaker, and then opening the bypass breaker by pushing the trip pushbutton on the test panel. On February 17, 1988, TS Amendment 117 was approved that required bypass breaker testing prior to placing the breaker in service. No changes were made to the surveillance procedures that modified the sequence of testing the bypass breakers. The reactor trip bypass breaker was understood to be in service when the reactor trip breaker for the opposite train was opened.
4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
A Station Deviation Report was submitted documenting the verbatim compliance issue with the reactor trip bypass breaker surveillance testing.
5.0 ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The surveillance test procedures controlling the reactor trip bypass breaker testing were revised to ensure that bypass breakers are tested prior to placing them in service.
The procedure requires the bypass breakers to be racked to the test position, the breaker closed, and then tripped open from the test panel.
Surveillance tests for Unit 1 and Unit 2 reactor trip bypass breakers were successfully completed following the revision to the surveillance procedures.
FACILITY NAME (1)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION.
DOCKET U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
SURRY POWER STATION, Unit 1 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 05000 - 280 97
--011--
00 40f 4 TEXT (If more space is required. use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) 6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE None
7.0 SIMILAR EVENTS
None
8.0 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
None
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| 05000281/LER-1997-001-01, :on 970218,manual Reactor Trip & ESF Actuation Occurred Due to Loss of EHC Control Power.Caused by Momentary Short.Relay Card Was Replaced |
- on 970218,manual Reactor Trip & ESF Actuation Occurred Due to Loss of EHC Control Power.Caused by Momentary Short.Relay Card Was Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000280/LER-1997-001, :on 970123,shutdown Occurred Due to Drain Line Weld Leak.Inspected & Tested Turbine Trip Actuation Circuitry |
- on 970123,shutdown Occurred Due to Drain Line Weld Leak.Inspected & Tested Turbine Trip Actuation Circuitry
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000281/LER-1997-002-01, :on 970713,main Steam High Range Radiation Monitor Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Equipment Failure. Preplanned Alternate Method of Monitoring Was Initiated IAW TS Table 3.7-6 |
- on 970713,main Steam High Range Radiation Monitor Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Equipment Failure. Preplanned Alternate Method of Monitoring Was Initiated IAW TS Table 3.7-6
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000281/LER-1997-002, :on 961213,automatic Reactor Trip Occurred During Planned Shutdown.Caused by Steam Flow/Feedwater Flow Mismatch.Rps Functioned as Designed & Plant Placed in Hot Shutdown |
- on 961213,automatic Reactor Trip Occurred During Planned Shutdown.Caused by Steam Flow/Feedwater Flow Mismatch.Rps Functioned as Designed & Plant Placed in Hot Shutdown
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000280/LER-1997-002, :on 970116,one Train of Auxiliary Ventilation Sys Was Inoperable Outside of Ts.Caused by Personnel Error. Submitted Deviation Rept Re Reverse Rotation of Fan & Work Request to Adjust Linkage |
- on 970116,one Train of Auxiliary Ventilation Sys Was Inoperable Outside of Ts.Caused by Personnel Error. Submitted Deviation Rept Re Reverse Rotation of Fan & Work Request to Adjust Linkage
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(8) | | 05000280/LER-1997-002-01, :on 970116,one Train of Auxiliary Ventilation Sys Declared Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Properly Adjusted Damper 1-VS-MOD-58B & Exited Seven Day LCO on 970116 |
- on 970116,one Train of Auxiliary Ventilation Sys Declared Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Properly Adjusted Damper 1-VS-MOD-58B & Exited Seven Day LCO on 970116
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000281/LER-1997-002-03, :on 970713,CR annunciator,2-RMA-A-7 for Main Steam Line Effluent High Range Radiation Monitors Alarmed. Caused by Intermittent Component Failure.Preplanned Alternate Method of Monitoring Initiated |
- on 970713,CR annunciator,2-RMA-A-7 for Main Steam Line Effluent High Range Radiation Monitors Alarmed. Caused by Intermittent Component Failure.Preplanned Alternate Method of Monitoring Initiated
| | | 05000281/LER-1997-003-02, :on 971014,Unit 2 MSSVs Revealed That Lift Setting for Two MSSVs Were Outside as Found Setpoint Tolerance.Caused by Minor Setpoint Drift.Repaired,Revised & Adjusted Safety Valves |
- on 971014,Unit 2 MSSVs Revealed That Lift Setting for Two MSSVs Were Outside as Found Setpoint Tolerance.Caused by Minor Setpoint Drift.Repaired,Revised & Adjusted Safety Valves
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000280/LER-1997-003, :on 970219,loss of Pressurizer Heaters Resulted in Manual U1 Trip & U2 ESF Actuation.Caused by Loss of Group C Pressurizer Proportional Heaters.Reactor Trip Breakers Were Verified Open |
- on 970219,loss of Pressurizer Heaters Resulted in Manual U1 Trip & U2 ESF Actuation.Caused by Loss of Group C Pressurizer Proportional Heaters.Reactor Trip Breakers Were Verified Open
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000281/LER-1997-004-02, :on 971202,invalid Mstv Indication Results in Manual Reactor Trip W/Esf Actuation Were Noted.Caused by Displaced Open Limit Switch Arms.Open Limit Switch for Mstv a Was Relocated Closer to Valve Position Bar |
- on 971202,invalid Mstv Indication Results in Manual Reactor Trip W/Esf Actuation Were Noted.Caused by Displaced Open Limit Switch Arms.Open Limit Switch for Mstv a Was Relocated Closer to Valve Position Bar
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000280/LER-1997-004, :on 970317,main Steam Safety Valve Was Outside as Found Setpoint Tolerance.Specific Cause Unknown,However, Minor Setpoint Drift Can Be Expected.No Immediate Corrective Actions Performed |
- on 970317,main Steam Safety Valve Was Outside as Found Setpoint Tolerance.Specific Cause Unknown,However, Minor Setpoint Drift Can Be Expected.No Immediate Corrective Actions Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000280/LER-1997-005, :on 970502,Unit 1 Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Was Inoperable Due to Personnel Error.Sro & STA That Were Involved in Event Were Counseled |
- on 970502,Unit 1 Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Was Inoperable Due to Personnel Error.Sro & STA That Were Involved in Event Were Counseled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000280/LER-1997-006, :on 970320,loss of Refueling Integrity Due to Inadequate Containment Closure Process & Verification.Fuel Movement Stopped IAW Action Statement Requirements of TS 3.10.B |
- on 970320,loss of Refueling Integrity Due to Inadequate Containment Closure Process & Verification.Fuel Movement Stopped IAW Action Statement Requirements of TS 3.10.B
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000280/LER-1997-007, Forwards LER 97-007-00,per 10CFR50.73.Commitments Contained in Ltr,Listed | Forwards LER 97-007-00,per 10CFR50.73.Commitments Contained in Ltr,Listed | | | 05000280/LER-1997-007-01, :on 970930,determined That Plant Was Outside App R Design Basis Due to Vital Bus Isolation Issue.Caused by Personnel Error.Installed Circuit Protective Device During Oct 1997 Refueling Outage |
- on 970930,determined That Plant Was Outside App R Design Basis Due to Vital Bus Isolation Issue.Caused by Personnel Error.Installed Circuit Protective Device During Oct 1997 Refueling Outage
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000280/LER-1997-008, Forwards LER 97-008-00 Re Invalid Actuation Esfs,Due to Personnel Errors.Lessons Learned from Event Will Be Presented to Safety Preparers/Reviewers | Forwards LER 97-008-00 Re Invalid Actuation Esfs,Due to Personnel Errors.Lessons Learned from Event Will Be Presented to Safety Preparers/Reviewers | | | 05000280/LER-1997-008-01, :on 971011,invalid Actuation of ESF Occurred. Caused by Personnel Errors.Main CR Bottled Air Sys Isolated & Containment Hydrogen Analyzer Heat Tracing Actuation Signal Reset |
- on 971011,invalid Actuation of ESF Occurred. Caused by Personnel Errors.Main CR Bottled Air Sys Isolated & Containment Hydrogen Analyzer Heat Tracing Actuation Signal Reset
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000280/LER-1997-009, :on 971014,declared Intake Canal Level Probes Inoperable Due to Marine Growth.Caused by Inadequate Maint of Intake Canal Level Probes.Subject Probes Were Cleaned, Tested Satisfactorily & Returned to Operable Status |
- on 971014,declared Intake Canal Level Probes Inoperable Due to Marine Growth.Caused by Inadequate Maint of Intake Canal Level Probes.Subject Probes Were Cleaned, Tested Satisfactorily & Returned to Operable Status
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000280/LER-1997-009-01, Forwards LER 97-009-01,per 10CFR50.73.Commitments Made by Util,Listed | Forwards LER 97-009-01,per 10CFR50.73.Commitments Made by Util,Listed | | | 05000280/LER-1997-010, :on 971028,discovered Missed Fire Protection Surveillance Pt.Caused by Personnel Error.Satisfactorily Completed PT Procedure 0-OPT-FP-009 & Diesel Driven Fire Pump 1-FP-P-2 Declared Operable |
- on 971028,discovered Missed Fire Protection Surveillance Pt.Caused by Personnel Error.Satisfactorily Completed PT Procedure 0-OPT-FP-009 & Diesel Driven Fire Pump 1-FP-P-2 Declared Operable
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000280/LER-1997-011, :on 971030,determined That Periodic Test Procedures for Testing Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers Did Not Test Manual Undervoltage Trip.Caused by mis-interpretation of Term in-service. Procedures Revised |
- on 971030,determined That Periodic Test Procedures for Testing Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers Did Not Test Manual Undervoltage Trip.Caused by mis-interpretation of Term in-service. Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000280/LER-1997-012, :on 971028,loss of Power to Latching Mechanism on Several Doors Occurred.Caused by Tripping of Two Breakers in Security Distribution Panel.Reset Affected Breakers Which Restored Power to Security Systems & Affected Doors |
- on 971028,loss of Power to Latching Mechanism on Several Doors Occurred.Caused by Tripping of Two Breakers in Security Distribution Panel.Reset Affected Breakers Which Restored Power to Security Systems & Affected Doors
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000280/LER-1997-012-01, Forwards LER 97-012-01,per 10CFR50.73.Commitments Made by Util,Listed | Forwards LER 97-012-01,per 10CFR50.73.Commitments Made by Util,Listed | |
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