RBG-36811, Responds to Exercise Weaknesses Noted in Insp Rept 50-458/92-01 on 920226.Corrective Actions:Short Notification Message Form Developed in Order to Meet 15 Minute Notification Guideline

Responds to Exercise Weaknesses Noted in Insp Rept 50-458/92-01 on 920226.Corrective Actions:Short Notification Message Form Developed in Order to Meet 15 Minute Notification Guideline

ML20096D368
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	05/07/1992
From:	Odell W GULF STATES UTILITIES CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
RBG-36811, NUDOCS 9205180009
Download: ML20096D368 (4)

Text

___ _ - _ _ - _ - _ - .-

i G U.L F SIA TE'S U TXLITJ1:.S* COMPANY

, , , , <s . u m-o,

. u miu u m usi es

+

Aq A ; al b..I 6% tL44 346 erb' May 7 , 1992 RBG. 36811 File Nos. G9.5, G15.4.1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

River Iknd Station - Unit 1 Dmktt No<$0-458/Rewa 92-01 This letter provides Gulf States Utilities Company's (GSU) response to the exercise weaknesses noted in NRC Inspecticn Report No. 50-458/92-01. This letter describes GSU's corrective actions regarding the weaknesses observed during our annual evaluated emergency response exercise conducted on February 26, .1992.

P. lease note that GSU is revising a corrective action associated with an inadequacy noted in the annual evaluated exercise conducted at River Bed Station March 1, 1989. In our letter dated March 17,1989, GSU stated that in order to facilitate timely transmission of messages to offsite agencies, the notification message form would be annotated to allow for rapid verbal transmission ofinformation required by NUREG-0654 in the event of the failure of the primary means of notincation

' to offsite agencies. A short notification message form has been developed in order to help meet the 15-minute notificaR, guideline. Therefore, the long noti 0 cation message form is no longer being annotated.

9205180009 920507 PDR i 0 ADOCK 05000458 g PDR l

m

\

\

, / Should you have :.ny questions, please contact Mr. L.A. England at (501) 381- 1 4145.

Sincerely, I (

W.H. Odell c

~

Manager - Oversight River Bend Nu:: lear C vup

/)(il9o  !!t%

,ENBlaVC/KES/WMS/kym cc: ~ U.S. Nuc'icar Regulatory Commission -

611 Ryan Plara Drive, Suite 400 ',

Arlingtoa, TX 76011 4

NRC Resident Inspector P.O. Box 1051 St. Francisville, LA 70775 f I

/

i 1

I

\

m l

I

_ x ~ __ _- a

NITACIIMENT 1 Response to Weakness 50-458/9201-01 REFERENCE letter - A.B. Beach to J.C. Deddens, dated March 31, 1992 DESCRWFION The inspectors observed that during the exercise vital ir. formation regarding a simulated major leak in the feedwat:r system was not adequately communicated to the Emerg. , '! rector.

At about 8: :n., a feedwater line break was simulated to have occurred in the stam tunnel. The control room staff recognized that a feedwater line break had occurred at about 8:55 a.m., and the control room staff discussed a probable ,

feedwater line break failure. At that time, the location was unknown to them.

This critical information vis not conveyed to the Emcrgency Director and Technical Support Center Manager by the Technical Support Center Operations Coordinator until 10:17 a.m.

.GELF STATES UTILI. TIES COMPANY'S_BESPONSE Vital information regarding a simulated major leak in the feedwater system was not adequately communicated to the Emergency Director. It took approximately I hour and 30 minutes for the information to reach the Emergency Director. The control room staff recognized that a feedwater line break had occurred approximately 10 minutes after the initiating event had occurred. The control room staff discussed a probable feedwater line bleak failure, but the location was -

unknown to them. It took approximately another 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 20 minutes before this information was given to the Emertency Director. The necessity of pmviding vital information or even suspicions of problems to the Emergency Director is very important to the ability the Emergency Director to mitigate the accident as quickly as possible, Inform uon flow between the control room staff members must be ongoing so everyone is kept informed. The Shift Supervisor j q must talk directly to the Emergency Director on vital issues. The control room / technical support cennr Communicator must keep a steady stream of information going to the technical support center from the control room. This type of information exchange will be addressed in _ future training for these individuals.

1 4

l l

t -

,, / ATTACIIMENT 2 HCEDDnses to Weakness 50-458/92_Ql-Q2 REFERENCE Letter - A.B. Beach to J.C. Deddens, dated March 31,1992 DESCRIITION During the exercise, simulated entries were made to the steam tunnel to free stuck valves. Prior to these entries, team members were appropriately briefed regarding external exposure hazards. Team members were told to don a self-containd breathing apparatus to protect themselves form internal exposure. The use v. a thyroid blocking agent, while checked-off by the operations support center Radiation Protection Foremaa during the team briefing, was not considered because of the use of self-contained breathing apparatus; nctwithstanding, the fact that protection factors for self-contained breathing apparatus are iinite (e.g.,

10,000). Under the extremely high concentrations of airborne radioactive.

materials involved in the simulated accident for the steam tunnel, exposures could result in a worker's inhaling airbome radioactive concentrations in excess of the 10 CFR Part 20 limits. The scenario data indicated that radiciodine I-131 concentrations were several ordeis of magnitude above the maximum permissible concentration (MPC). The inspectors noted that after adjusting for protection factor of 10,000 team members entering the steam tunnel could have been exposed to radioiodine concentrations greater than 3,000 MPC in the air inside the self-contained breathing apparatus face piece. This concentration, combined with a 15-minute exposure time, could have resulted in exposures in excess of the '

520 MPC-hour quarterly limit.

GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY'S RESPONSE Under e.xtremely high concentrations of airborne radioactive materials, use of an SCBA with a finite protection factor is not enough by itself to provide protection from exceeding the MPC. The importance of understanding the limits of protection provided by an SCBA will be emphasized during the 1992 training cycle. The use of KI as a safety factor and/or necessity will also be provided for emergency response organization management personnel during the 1992 training cycle.

_ _ _ _ - - -