ML12221A183

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Selected Licensee Commitments Manual (SLC)
ML12221A183
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/07/2012
From: Gillespie T
Duke Energy Carolinas
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML12221A183 (32)
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Text

aDuke 0 Energy T. PRESTON GILLESPIE, JR.

Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station Duke Energy ON01 VP / 7800 Rochester Hwy.

Seneca, SC 29672 864-873-4478 864-873-4208 fax T. Gillespie@duke-energy.com August 7, 2012 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Numbers 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 Selected Licensee Commitments Manual (SLC)

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10CFR 50.4 and 50.71, please find attached the latest revisions to the Oconee Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) Manual. SLC 16.6.1, Containment Leakage Tests; SLC 16.8.5, Keowee Hydro Unit Steady State Frequency; and SLC 16.9.7, Keowee Lake Level were revised to correct editorial errors. SLC 16.14.2, Control Rod Verification Program was revised to remove obsolete references to the "Control Rod Drive Control System with the digital upgrade not complete."

Sincerely, T'reston, Gillespie, Jr.

Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station Attachment www. duke-energy. com

I, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission August 7, 2012 Page 2 xc:

Mr. Victor M. McCree, Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 Mr. John P. Boska, Project Manager (By electronic mail only)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation One White Flint North, M/S O-8G9A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Mr. Andrew T. Sabisch NRC Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station

August 7, 2012

Subject:

Oconee Selected Licensee Commitments Manual (SLC) Revision On July 13, 2012, Station Management approved the following Oconee Selected Licensee Commitments. SLC 16.6.1, Containment Leakage Tests; SLC 16.8.5, Keowee Hydro Unit Steady State Frequency; and SLC 16.9.7, Keowee Lake Level were revised to correct editorial errors. SLC 16.14.2, Control Rod Verification Program was revised to remove obsolete references to the "Control Rod Drive Control System with the digital upgrade not complete."

Please revise your manual as instructed below.

Remove these pages SLC LOEP Pages 1-12 SLC Page 16.6.1-1 SLC Page 16.6.1-2 SLC Page 16.6.1-3 SLC Page 16.6.1-4 SLC Page 16.8.5-1 SLC Page 16.8.5-2 SLC Page 16.8.5-3 SLC Page 16.9.7-1 SLC Page 16.9.7-2 SLC Page 16.9.7-3 SLC Page 16.9.7-4 SLC Page 16.9.7-5 SLC Page 16.9.7-6 SLC Page 16.9.7-7 SLC Page 16.9.7-8 SLC Page 16.14.2-1 SLC Page 16.14.2-2 Insert these pages SLC LOEP Pages 1-12 SLC Page 16.6.1-1 SLC Page 16.6.1-2 SLC Page 16.6.1-3 SLC Page 16.6.1-4 SLC Page 16.8.5-1 SLC Page 16.8.5-2 SLC Page 16.8.5-3 SLC Page 16.9.7-1 SLC Page 16.9.7-2 SLC Page 16.9.7-3 SLC Page 16.9.7-4 SLC Page 16.9.7-5 SLC Page 16.9.7-6 SLC Page 16.9.7-7 SLC Page 16.9.7-8 SLC Page 16.14.2-1 SLC Page 16.14.2-2 Any questions concerning these revisions may be directed to Kent Alter at 864-873-3255.

Regulatory Compliance By: Gail Joyner Regulatory Compliance

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 07/23/12 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date LOEP 1 07/23/12 LOEP 2 07/23/12 LOEP 3 02/28/11 LOEP 4 6/03/11 LOEP 5 07/23/12 LOEP 6 07/23/12 LOEP 7 10/18/11 LOEP 8 6/03/11 LOEP 9 6/03/11 LOEP 10 05/31/12 LOEP 11 05/31/12 LOEP 12 07/23/12 16.0-1 3/15/11 16.0-2 6/03/11 16.0-3 6/03/11 16.0-4 3/15/11 16.0-5 3/15/11 16.0-6 3/15/11 16.1-1 10/15/07 16.2-1 3/27/99 16.2-2 3/27/99 16.2-3 3/27/99 16.3-1 3/27/99 16.5.1-1 7/18/00 16.5.1-2 7/18/00 16.5.1-3 7/18/00 16.5.2-1 5/11/99 16.5.2-2 5/11/99 16.5.2-3 5/11/99 16.5.2-4 Delete 5/11/99 16.5.2-5 Delete 5/11/99 16.5.3-1 02/21/07 16.5.3-2 02/21/07 16.5.3-3 02/21/07 16.5.4-1 1/05/06 16.5.4-2 1/05/06 16.5.5-1 Delete 5/16/09 16.5.5-2 Delete 5/16/09 16.5.5-3 Delete 5/16/09 16.5.5-4 Delete 5/16/09 16.5.5-5 Delete 5/16/09 LOEP 1

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 07/23/12 List of Effective Pages Revision Date Paqe 16.5.6-1 16.5.6-2 16.5.7-1 16.5.7-2 16.5.7-3 16.5.7-4 16.5.7-5 16.5.7-6 16.5.8-1 16.5.8-2 16.5.8-3 16.5.8-4 16.5.8-5 16.5.8a-1 16.5.8a-2 16.5.8a-3 16.5.9-1 16.5.9-2 16.5.10-1 16.5.10-2 16.5.11-1 16.5.12-1 16.5.13-1 16.5.13-2 16.5.13-3 16.6.1-1 16.6.1-2 16.6.1-3 16.6.1-4 16.6.1-5 16.6.2-1 16.6.2-2 16.6.2-3 16.6.2-4 16.6.2-5 16.6.2-6 16.6.2-7 16.6.2-8 16.6.2-9 16.6.2-10 16.6.2-11 02/05/08 02/05/08 12/13/06 12/13/06 12/13/06 12/13/06 12/13/06 12/13/06 01/31/07 01/31/07 01/31/07 01/31/07 01/31/07 5/19/05 5/19/05 (Delete) 5/19/05 (Delete) 11/11/10 11/11/10 10/8/03 10/8/03 1/31/00 3/27/99 3/27/99 12/01/99 12/01/99 07/23/12 07/23/12 07/23/12 07/23/12 Delete 01/31/07 01/31/07 01/31/07 01/31/07 01/31/07 01/31/07 01/31/07 Delete Delete Delete Delete LOEP 2

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 07/23/12 List of Effective Pages Pa.qe Revision Date 16.6.2-12 Delete 16.6.3-1 2/28/11 16.6.4-1 3/13/07 16.6.4-2 3/13/07 16.6.4-3 3/13/07 16.6.4-4 3/13/07 16.6.4-5 3/13/07 16.6.4-6 3/13/07 16.6.5-1 12/14/00 16.6.6-1 3/27/99 16.6.7-1 3/27/99 16.6.8-1 3/27/99 16.6.9-1 6/12/01 16.6.9-2 3/27/99 16.6.10-1 02/16/10 16.6.10-2 02/16/10 16.6.10-3 02/16/10 16.6.11-1 10/1/02 16.6.11-2 10/1/02 16.6.12-1 03/14/07 16.6.12-2 03/14/07 16.6.12-3 03/14/07 16.6.12-4 5/17/05 (Delete) 16.6.12-5 Delete 16.6.12-6 Delete 16.6.12-7 Delete 16.6.13-1 03/31/08 16.6.13-2 03/31/08 16.6.13-3 03/31/08 16.6.14-1 8/15/02 16.6.14-2 8/15/02 16.6.14-3 8/15/02 16:6.14-4 8/15/02 16.6.15-1 03/14/07 16.6.15-2 03/14/07 16.7.1-1 3/27/99 16.7.1-2 3/27/99 16.7.2-1 12/14/04 16.7.2-2 12/14/04 16.7.2-3 12/14/04 16.7.3-1 3/27/99 LOEP 3

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 07/23/12 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date 16.7.3-2 3/27/99 16.7.4-1 7/14/05 16.7.4-2 7/14/05 16.7.4-3 7/14/05 16.7.5-1 10/8/03 16.7.5-2 10/8/03 16.7.5-3 10/8/03 16.7.5-4 10/8/03 16.7.6-1 6/03/11 16.7.6-2 6/03/11 16.7.6-3 6/03/11 16.7.6-4 6/03/11 16.7.7-1 3/27/99 16.7.7-2 3/27/99 16.7.8-1 3/27/99 16.7.8-2 3/27/99 16.7.9-1 10/23/03 16.7.10-1 3/27/99 16.7.10-2 3/27/99 16.7.11-1 3/9/06 16.7.11-2 3/9/06 16.7.11-3 3/9/06 16.7.12-1 6/30/04 16.7.12-2 6/30/04 16.7.13-1 6/30/04 16.7.13-2 6/30/04 16.7.13-3 6/30/04 16.7.14-1 2/17/00 16.7.14-2 2/17/00 16.7.14-3 2/17/00 16.7.14-4 2/17/00 16.7.15-1 6/03/11 16.7.15-2 6/03/11 16.7.15-3 6/03/11 16.8.1-1 8/09/01 16.8.1-2 8/09/01 16.8.2-1 2/10/05 16.8.2-2 2/10/05 16.8.3-1 10/20/09 16.8.3-2 10/20/09 16.8.3-3 10/20/09 LOEP 4

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 07/23/12 List of Effective Pages Pacqe Revision Date 16.8.3-4 10/20/09 16.8.3-5 10/20/09 16.8.3-6 10/20/09 16.8.3-7 10/20/09 16.8.4-1 2/10/05 16.8.4-2 2/10/05 16.8.4-3 2/10/05 16.8.4-4 2/10/05 16.8.4-5 Delete 2/10/05 16.8.4-6 Delete 2/10/05 16.8.4-7 Delete 2/10/05 16.8.4-8 Delete 2/10/05 16.8.4-9 Delete 9/25/04 16.8.5-1 07/23/12 16.8.5-2 07/23/12 16.8.5-3 07/23/12 16.8.5-4 Delete 12/21/04 16.8.5-5 Delete 12/21/04 16.8.6-1 01/04/07 16.8.6-2 01/04/07 16.8.6-3 01/04/07 16.8.7-1 1/31/00 16.8.8-1 1/31/00 16.8.9-1 6/21/05 16.8.9-2 6/21/05 16.8.9-3 6/21/05 16.8.9-4 6/21/05 16.9.1-1 1/31/00 16.9.1-2 3/27/99 16.9.1-3 3/27/99 16.9.1-4 3/27/99 16.9.1-5 6/12/01 16.9.2-1 6/28/05 16.9.2-2 6/28/05 16.9.2-3 6/28/05 16.9.2-4 6/28/05 16.9.2-5 6/28/05 16.9.3-1 1/14/04 16.9.3-2 1/14/04 16.9.4-1 1/31/00 16.9.4-2 1/31/00 LOEP 5

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 07/23/12 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date 16.9.4-3 1/31/00 16.9.4-4 3/27/99 16.9.4-5 6/12/01 16.9.5-1 1/31/00 16.9.5-2 4/29/99 16.9.5-3 4/29/99 16.9.5-4 6/12/01 16.9.6-1 04/26/12 16.9.6-2 04/26/12 16.9.6-3 04/26/12

.16.9.6-4 04/26/12 16.9.6-5 04/26/12 16.9.6-6 04/26/12 16.9.6-7 04/26/12 16.9.6-8 04/26/12 16.9.6-9 04/26/12 16.9.7-1 07/23/12 16.9.7-2 07/23/12 16.9.7-3 07/23/12 16.9.7-4 07/23/12 16.9.7-5 07/23/12 16.9.7-6 07/23/12 16.9.7-7 07/23/12 16.9.7-8 07/23/12 16.9.7-9 Delete 16.9.8-1 2/15/06 16.9.8-2 2/15/06 16.9.8-3 Delete 2/15/06 16.9.8-4 Delete 16.9.8-5 Delete 16.9.8-6 Delete 16.9.8-7 Delete 16.9.8a-1 2/7/05 16.9.8a-2 2/7/05 16.9.8a-3 2/7/05 16.9.9-1 11/27/07 16.9.9-2 11/27/07 16.9.9-3 11/27/07 16.9.9-4 11/27/07 16.9.10-1 1/12/04 16.9.10-2 1/12/04 LOEP 6

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 07/23/12 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date 16.9.11-1 10/18/11 16.9.11-2 10/18/11 16.9.11-3 10/18/11 16.9.11-4 10/18/11 16.9.11-5 10/18/11 16.9.11-6 10/18/11 16.9.11-7 10/18/11 16.9.11-8 10/18/11 16.9.11 a-1 01/31/11 16.9.1 la-2 01/31/11 16.9.11a-3 01/31/11 16.9.1 la-4 01/31/11 16.9.11a-5 01/31/11 16.9.11a-6 01/31/11 16.9.11 a-7 01/31/11 16.9.11a-8 01/31/11 16.9.11a-9 01/31/11 16.9.11 a-10 01/31/11 16.9.11 a-ll 01/31/11 16.9.11 a-12 01/31/11 16.9.11a-13 01/31/11 16.9.11 a-14 01/31/11 16.9.11 a-15 01/31/11 16.9.11 a-16 Deleted 3/10/08 16.9.12-1 5/31/04 16.9.12-2 5/31/04 16.9.12-3 5/31/04 16.9.12-4 5/31/04 16.9.12-5 5/31/04 16.9.12-6 5/31/04 16.9.12-7 5/31/04 16.9.12-8 5/31/04 16.9.12-9 5/31/04 16.9.12-10 5/31/04 16.9.12-11 5/31/04 16.9.12-12 5/31/04 16.9.12-13 5/31/04 16.9.12-14 5/31/04 16.9.12-15 5/31/04 16.9.12-16 5/31/04 16.9.12-17 5/31/04 LOEP 7

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 07/23/12 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date 16.9.12-18 5/31/04 16.9.12-19 5/31/04 16.9.12-20 5/31/04 16.9.12-21 5/31/04 16.9.12-22 5/31/04 16.9.13-1 01/31/07 16.9.13-2 01/31/07 16.9.13-3 01/31/07 16.9.13-4 01/31/07 16.9.14-1 10/28/04 16.9.14-2 10/28/04 16.9.15-1 3/27/99 16.9.15-2 3/27/99 16.9.15-3 3/27/99 16.9.16-1 4/01/08 16.9.16-2 4/01/08 16.9.16-3 4/01/08 16.9.17-1 5/23/01 16.9.17-2 3/27/99 16.9.18-1 5/02/07 16.9.18-2 5/02/07 16.9.18-3 5/02/07 16.9.18-4 5/02/07 16.9.18-5 5/02/07 16.9.18-6 5/02/07 16.9.18-7 5/02/07 16.9.18-8 5/02/07 16.9.18-9 5/02/07 16.9.18-10 5/02/07 16.9.18-11 5/02/07 16.9.18-12 5/02/07 16.9.18-13 5/02/07 16.9.18-14 5/02/07 16.9.18-15 5/02/07 16.9.18-16 5/02/07 16.9.19-1 3/31/05 16.9.19-2 3/31/05 16.9.20-1 12/21/09 16.9.20-2 12/21/09 16.9.20-3 12/21/09 16.9.20-4 12/21/09 LOEP 8

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 07/23/12 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date 16.9.20-5 12/21/09 16.9.21-1 07/09/09 16.9.21-2 07/09/09 16.9.21-3 07/09/09 16.9.21-4 07/09/09 16.10.1-1 05/06/10 16.10.1-2 05/06/10 16.10.1-3 Deleted 9/18/03 16.10.2-1 12/2/03 16.10.2-2 12/2/03 16.10.3-1 3/27/99 16.10.3-2 3/27/99 16.10.4-1 1/31/00 16.10.5-1 Deleted 8/24/04 16.10.6-1 3/27/99 16.10.7-1 4/29/99 16.10.7-2 4/29/99 16.10.7-3 1/31/00 16.10.7-4 4/29/99 16.10.7-5 4/29/99 16.10.7-6 4/29/99 16.10.7-7 4/29/99 16.10.7-8 4/29/99 16.10.7-9 4/29/99 16.10.8-1 11/27/06 16.10.8-2 11/27/06 16.10.8-3 11/27/06 16.10.8-4 11/27/06 16.10.8-5 11/27/06 16.10.9-1 11/25/09 16.10.9-2 11/25/09 16.10.9-3 11/25/09 16.10.9-4 11/25/09 16.10.9-5 11/25/09 16.11.1-1 3/15/11 16.11.1-2 3/15/11 16.11.1-3 3/15/11 16.11.1-4 3/15/11 16.11.1-5 3/15/11 16.11.1-6 3/15/11 16.11.1-7 3/15/11 LOEP 9

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 07/23/12 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date 16.11.2-1 1/31/00 16.11.2-2 3/27/99 16.11.2-3 1/31/00 16.11.2-4 3/27/99 16.11.2-5 1/31/00 16.11.2-6 1/31/00 16.11.3-1 11/20/08 16.11.3-2 11/20/08 16.11.3-3 11/20/08 16.11.3-4 11/20/08 16.11.3-5 11/20/08 16.11.3-6 11/20/08 16.11.3-7 11/20/08 16.11.3-8 11/20/08 16.11.3-9 11/20/08 16.11.3-10 11/20/08 16.11.3-11 11/20/08 16.11.3-12 11/20/08 16.11.3-13 11/20/08 16.11.3-14 11/20/08 16.11.3-15 11/20/08 16.11.3-16 11/20/08 16.11.3-17 11/20/08 16.11.3-18 11/20/08 16.11.3-19 11/10/04 (Deleted) 16.11.4-1 09/30/09 16.11.4-2 09/30/09 16.11.4-3 09/30/09 16.11.4-4 09/30/09 16.11.4-5 09/30/09 16.11.4-6 09/30/09 16.11.4-7 09/30/09 16.11.4-8 11/10/04 (Delete) 16.11.5-1 10/30/02 16.11.5-2 10/30/02 16.11.5-3 10/30/02 16.11.5-4 10/30/02 16.11.6-1 05/31/12 16.11.6-2 05/31/12 16.11.6-3 05/31/12 16.11.6-4 05/31/12 LOEP 10

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 07/23/12 List of Effective Pages Pa e Revision Date 16.11.6-5 05/31/12 16.11.6-6 05/31/12 16.11.6-7 05/31/12 16.11.6-8 05/31/12 16.11.6-9 05/31/12 16.11.6-10 05/31/12 16.11.7-1 1/31/00 16.11.7-2 1/31/00 16.11.7-3 3/27/99 16.11.7-4 1/31/00 16.11.8-1 12/21/09 16.11.8-2 12/21/09 16.11.9-1 03/22/10 16.11.9-2 03/22/10 16.11.9-3 03/22/10 16.11.10-1 2/25/03 16.11.10-2 2/25/03 16.11.11-1 3/27/99 16.11.12-1 4/10/03 16.11.12-2 4/10/03 16.11.13-1 3/27/99 16.11.13-2 3/27/99 16.11.14-1 3/27/99 16.11.14-2 3/27/99 16.12.1-1 3/27/99 16.12.2-1 5/3/07 16.12.2-2 5/3/07 16.12.3-1 5/1/03 16.12.3-2 5/1/03 16.12.4-1

.3/27/99 16.12.5-1 3/27/99 16.12.6-1 11/08/07 16.13.1-1 5/13/04 16.13.1-2 5/13/04 16.13.1-3 5/13/04 16.13.1-4 5/13/04 16.13.1-5 5/13/04 16.13.1-6 5/13/04 16.13.1-7 5/13/04 16.13.1-8 5/13/04 16.13.1-9 5/13/04 LOEP 11

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 07/23/12 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Date 16.13.2-1 12/15/04 16.13.2-2 Delete 12/15/04 16.13.2-3 Delete 12/15/04 16.13.2-4 Delete 12/15/04 16.13.3-1 12/15/04 16.13.3-2 Delete 12/15/04 16.13.4-1 3/27/99 16.13.5-1 Delete 16.13.5-2 Delete 16.13.6-1 3/27/99 16.13.7-1 12/15/04 16.13.7-2 12/15/04 16.13.8-1 3/27/99 16.13.9-1 3/27/99 16.13.9-2 3/27/99 16.13.10-1 3/27/99 16.13.11-1 3/27/99 16.14.1-1 3/27/99 16.14.2-1 07/23/12 16.14.2-2 07/23/12 16.14.3-1 3/27/99 16.14.4-1 Deleted 3/15/11 16.14.4.a-1 3/15/11 16.15.1-1 4/12/06 16.15.1-2 Deleted 4/12/06 16.15.1-3 Deleted 4/12/06 16.15.1-4 Deleted 4/12/06 16.15.1-5 Deleted 4/12/06 16.15.2-1 09/10/07 16.15.2-2 09/10/07 16.15.2-3 09/10/07 16.15.2-4 09/10/07 16.15.2-5 09/10/07 16.15.3-1 4/12/06 16.15.3-2 4/12/06 16.15.3-3 4/12/06 16.15.3-4 4/12/06 16.15.3-5 4/12/06 LOEP 12

Containment Leakage Tests 16.6.1 16.6 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES 16.6.1 Containment Leakage Tests COMMITMENT APPLICABILITY The local leak rate shall be measured for the containment penetrations listed in Table 16.6-1 in accordance with ITS SR 3.6.1.1.

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

NA A.1 NA NA SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.6.1.1 NA NA BASES This commitment establishes the list of penetrations that require local leak rate testing in accordance with ITS SR 3.6.1.1. This list was removed from the Technical Specifications in accordance with the guidance in NRC Generic Letter 91-08.

The requirement to leak test the blind isolation flanges on the containment Hydrogen Recombiner System permanent piping after each installation was relocated from CTS 4.4.3.1.b during conversion to the ITS.

The Containment Leak Rate Testing Program (Type A and Type B Tests only) is credited in Oconee License Renewal with managing aging of steel components of the Reactor Building Containment for the period of extended operation.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix J.
2. NRC Generic Letter 91-08.
3. UFSAR section 3.8.1.7.4, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, and Table 18-1.
4. OSS-0274.00-00-0016, Oconee License Renewal Commitments.

16.6.1-1 07/23/12 I

Containment Leakage Tests 16.6.1 Table 16.6-1 List of Penetrations With 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Requirements Penetration System Type A Test Local Leak Remarks Number System Test Condition 1

2 3

4 5a 5a 5b Pressurizer sample line (Unit 1 only)

OTSG A Sample line Component Cooling inlet line OTSG B drain line RB normal sump drain line portion Hydrogen Recombiner drains portion Post Accident Liquid Sample Line Letdown line RC Pump seal return line Pressurizer Aux. Spray Line Loop A nozzle warming line RCS normal makeup line and HP injection "A" loop RC Pump B1 seal injection Vented -

Note 1, 2 Not Vented Vented -

Note 1, 2 Not Vented Not Vented Not Vented Vented -

Note 1, 2 Vented -

Note 1, 2 Not Vented Not Vented Not Vented Not Vented Not Vented Not Vented Type C None Required Type C None required None required None required Type C Type C Type C None Required None Required None Required 6

7 8a 8b 9

10a 10b 11a 11b 11c 12a 12b Note 3 Type C Type C RC Pump B2 seal injection 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Fuel transfer tube cover portion RC Makeup Pump suction portion Fuel transfer tube drain portion Fuel transfer tube cover portion RC Makeup Pump discharge portion RB Spray inlet line RB Spray inlet line LPI and DHR inlet line LPI and DHR inlet line OTSG B Emergency FDW line Quench tank vent line RB purge inlet line RB purge outlet line Not Vented Vented -

Note 1, 2 Vented -

Note 1, 2 Not Vented Vented -

Note 1, 2 Not Vented Not Vented Not Vented Not Vented Not Vented Vented -

Note 1, 2 Vented - Note 1 Vented - Note 1 Type B Type C Type C Type B Type C None Required None Required None Required None Required None Required Type C Type C Type C Note 3 Note 3 Note 3 16.6.1-2 07/23/12 I

Containment Leakage Tests 16.6.1 Table 16.6-1 List of Penetrations With 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Requirements Penetration System Type A Test Local Leak Remarks Number System Test Condition 21 22 23a 23b 24a 24b 25 26 27 28 29 30, 31,32 33, 34, 35 36, 37 38 39a (Unit 2, 3 only) 39b 40 40 41 42a 42b 43 44 45a 45b 45c (Units 2 & 3) 48 LPSW to RC Pump motors and lube oil coolers inlet LPSW from RC Pump motors and lube oil coolers outlet RC Pump Al seal injection RC Pump A2 seal injection RB H2 Analyzer Train A RB H2 Analyzer Train A OTSG B Feedwater line OTSG A Main steam line OTSG A Feedwater line OTSG B Main steam line Quench tank drain line LPSW for RB Cooling units inlet line LPSW for RB cooling units outlet line RB emergency sump recirculation line Quench tank cooler inlet line CFT Vent Line HP Nitrogen supply RB emergency sump drain line LDST drain line portion Instrument air supply & ILRT verification line RB H2 Analyzer Train B RB H2 Analyzer Train B OTSG A drain line Component cooling to control rod drive inlet line ILRT instrument line ILRT instrument line ILRT instrument line Breathing air inlet Not Vented Not Vented Not Vented Vented - Note 1 Vented - Note I Not Vented Not Vented Not Vented Not Vented Vented -

Note 1, 2 Not Vented Not Vented Not Vented Vented -

Note 1, 2 Vented -

Note 1, 2 Vented - Note 1 Not Vented Not Vented Vented - Note 1 Vented - Note 1 Vented - Note 1 Not Vented Vented -

Note 1, 2 Vented -

Note 1, 2 Vented -

Note 1, 2 Vented -

Note 1,2 Vented - Note 1 Not Vented None Required None Required Type C Type C Type C Type C None Required None Required None required None required Type C None required None required None required Type C Type C Type C None required None required Type C Type C Type C None required Type C Type C Type C Type C Type C Note 3 16.6.1-3 07/23/12 I

Containment Leakage Tests 16.6.1 List of Penetrations With Penetration Number System 49 49 (Unit 1 only) 50 51 52 53a (All) 53b (Units 2,3) 54 55 56 LP Nitrogen supply OTSG A Emergency FDW line ILRT Pressurization line HP injection to 'B' loop HP Nitrogen supply to 'A' core flood tank LP Nitrogen supply Component cooling outlet line Demineralized water supply Spent fuel canal fill and drain DHR return line Pressurizer sample line OTSG B sample line CF tank sample line RB sample line (outlet)

RB sample line (inlet)

DHR return line LPSW RBAC Supply LPSW RBAC Return Table 16.6-1 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Requirements Type A Test Local Leak Remarks System Test Condition Vented - Note 1 Type C Not Vented None required Vented - Note 1 Type C Not Vented None required Vented - Note 1 Type C Vented - Note 1 Type C Vented -

Type C Note 3 Note 1, 2 Vented -

Type C Note 1, 2 57 (Unit 1 only) 58a (Unit 2, 3) 58b (All) 59 60 61 62 (Units 2, 3 Only) 63 Vented -

Note 1, 2 Not Vented Vented -

Note 1, 2 Not Vented Not Vented Vented - Note 1 Vented - Note 1 Not Vented Vented -

Note 1,2 Vented -

Note 1,2 Type C None required Type C None required None required Type C Type C None required Type C Type C Type B Type B Type B Type B Note 3 Note 3 64 90 Personnel hatch 91 92 101 through 105 Equipment hatch Emergency hatch Electrical Penetrations Vented Vented Vented NOTE 1 Pathways shall be vented to the containment atmosphere during the test. Vented pathways shall be drained of fluid to the extent necessary to expose the pathway to post accident differential pressure.

NOTE 2 Pathways which are Type B or Type C tested within the previous 24 months need not be vented or drained during the Type A test.

NOTE 3 Reverse direction test of inside containment isolation valve authorized. Leakage results are conservative.

GENERAL NOTE:

Refer to OSS-0254.00-00-4001 for specific penetration testing and alignment bases.

16.6.1-4 07/23/12 I

KHU Steady State Frequency 16.8.5 16.8 ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM 16.8.5 Keowee Hydro Unit (KHU) Steady State Frequency COMMITMENT APPLICABILITY:

Keowee Hydro Unit (KHU) Steady State Frequency shall be >! 59.4 Hz and

< 61.8 Hz when isolated from the grid in emergency mode of operation.

When KHU is OPERABLE.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

KHU Steady State A.1 Enter applicable TS Immediately Frequency not met.

Condition(s) and Required Actions for an inoperable KHU(s).

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.8.5.1 Verify on an actual or simulated emergency 12 months actuation signal each KHU achieves steady state frequency > 59.4 Hz and < 61.8 Hz (>

127.3 rpm and < 132.5 rpm).

BACKGROUND Each KHU can initially be either idle or generating to the grid. If the KHU is idle when an emergency start signal is generated, the unit is required to be operating between 57 and 63 Hz within 23 seconds by Technical Specifications (TS). If the Unit is initially generating to the grid when the emergency start signal is generated, the Unit is disconnected from the grid, frequency increases as the governor responds to bring the frequency down to 60 Hz, and is connected to Oconee loads when the frequency is less than 66 Hz and decreasing. The frequency is further reduced as the Oconee switchgear is energized and various Oconee loads are started.

TS SR 3.8.1.9 requires frequency to be within 57 to 63 Hz in 23 seconds or less. Discussions with the NRC in 2000 led to issues with the frequency overshoot of KHU and compliance with TS SR 3.8.1.9. A need to update design calculations to include the transient voltage and 16.8.5-1 07/23/12 I

KHU Steady State Frequency 16.8.5 frequency effects during a KHU startup was identified. In October 2000, ONS Engineering studied the scope of updating various design calculations to include overshoot effects. The results of this study concluded that modifications should be implemented to reduce the overshoot. Plans were made to implement a digital governor modification as a solution to the overshoot TS compliance issue.

With the digital governor installation, the appropriate calculations were revised to reflect the 5%

overshoot conditions expected with the digital governor and were also analyzed to determine steady state frequency limits for Keowee. Acceptable steady state limits were determined to be

-1% to +3% nominal frequency (59.4 Hz to 61.8 Hz) and were established based on the effect of frequency variations on key mechanical safety systems. Small perturbations outside of the steady state criteria (-1% to +3%) due to expected load additions or removals are permitted.

However the transient peak values shall be within +/-5% frequency limits and of short time duration being no more than 10 seconds. This SLC addresses the steady state frequency requirements for those periods when Keowee is operating as an emergency power source for Oconee.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS The KHUs provide emergency power for Oconee Nuclear Station. The OPERABILITY of the KHU is required to ensure the OPERABILITY and the capability of the Emergency Power System. This SLC ensures that Keowee is capable of providing emergency power within acceptable limits.

APPLICABILITY The KHU steady state frequency is required to be within specified limits when the KHU is OPERABLE.

ACTIONS A.1 Condition A applies when the KHU governor steady state frequency is not met. Required Action A.1 requires the associated KHU be declared inoperable since the KHU is no longer capable of meeting design basis requirements.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 16.8.5.1 This surveillance verifies the KHUs steady state frequency to ensure key mechanical safety systems and equipment have adequate frequency for accident mitigation. Numerous mechanical calculations referenced in PIP 00-3229 (Ref. 5) established the 59.4 Hz to 61.8 Hz (127.3 rpm to 132.5 rpm) steady state frequency requirement. This surveillance is required to be performed every 12 months. The 12 month frequency for this SR is adequate based on the installation of an Out of Tolerance (OOT) statalarm which will alarm if frequency exceeds the

-1% to +3% nominal frequency limits. The 12 month frequency is consistent with KHU TS testing.

16.8.5-2 07/23/12 1

KHU Steady State Frequency 16.

8.5 REFERENCES

1. NSM ON-53080, Replace existing KHU Governor with Digital Controls.
2.

NSM ON-53014, Keowee Out of Tolerance Logic Protection.

3. APIOIAI20001002, Keowee Hydro Station - Emergency Start.
4. Probablistic Risk Assessment for Oconee Nuclear Station
5. PIP 0-00-3229
6. PIP 0-03-2846
7.

DBD OSS-0254.00-00-2005, Keowee Emergency Power Design Basis Document.

16.8.5-3 07/23/12 I

Keowee Lake Level 16.9.7 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.7 Keowee Lake Level COMMITMENT

a.

Maintain lake level _>

793.7 ft to support CCW gravity induced reverse flow.

b.

Maintain lake level _ 793 ft when "A" HPSW Pump running or switch in BASE.

c.

Maintain lake level > 793 ft when "A" HPSW Pump is capable of.

auto-starting on low EWST level and the "B" HPSW Pump is inoperable, switch OFF or switch in STANDBY.

d.

Maintain lake level Ž_ 792 ft to support CCW gravity induced reverse flow to the SSF service water pumps.

e.

Maintain lake level _ 791 ft to assure that the "A" HPSW Pump shall be OPERABLE.

f.

Maintain lake level _ 791 ft to assure that the LPSW Pumps shall be OPERABLE.

g.

Maintain lake level _ 790 ft to assure that the Chiller Condenser Service Water Pumps shall be OPERABLE.

h.

Maintain lake level >_ 789 ft to assure that the "B" HPSW Pump shall be OPERABLE.

Maintain lake level >_ 787 ft to prevent additional administrative controls on the Radwaste Equipment Cooling alignment.

j.

Maintain lake level > 787 ft to assure that adequate water supply shall be available for 7 days of Keowee emergency operation.

k.

Maintain lake level > 786 ft to assure that the ECCW System shall be OPERABLE.

I.

Maintain lake level > 783 ft to assure that the Keowee Oil Storage Room Water Spray System shall be OPERABLE.

m.

Maintain lake level > 780 ft to assure that the Keowee Step-up Transformer Mulsifyre System shall be OPERABLE.

16.9.7-1 07/23/12 1

Keowee Lake Level 16.9.7

ILJ r -----------------------------------------------------

1.

Commitments b, c, f, i, and k do not apply when defueled.

2.

Commitment g applies only in MODE 1, 2, 3, and 4.

3.

Commitment m does not apply in MODE 5, 6, or defueled when the Keowee Step-up Transformer is not required to be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

At all times ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

Keowee Lake Level

NOTE---------

< 793.7 ft.

Entry into the associated Condition results in unavailability for all three units.

A. 1 Log unavailability Immediately duration in the Operations Log for Maintenance Rule Performance Monitoring.

AND A.2 Perform a risk Immediately assessment using the Electronic Risk Assess-ment Tool or other means considering CCW gravity induced reverse flow not met for all three units.

16.9.7-2 07/23/12 1

Keowee Lake Level 16.9.7 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

Keowee Lake Level B.1 Verify all Required Unit Immediately

< 793 ft.

1 and 2 LPSW pumps OPERABLE.

AND AND "A" HPSW Pump running or switch in B.2.1 Restore Keowee Lake 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> BASE.

Level to _> 793 ft.

OR B.2.2 Place "A" HPSW Pump 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> switch in OFF or STANDBY.

C.

Keowee Lake Level C.1 Verify all Required Unit Immediately

< 793 ft.

1 and 2 LPSW pumps OPERABLE.

AND AND "A" HPSW Pump capable of auto-starting C.2.1 Restore Keowee Lake 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> on low EWST level.

Level to _> 793 ft.

AND OR "B" HPSW Pump C.2.2 Place "A" HPSW Pump 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> inoperable, switch OFF switch in OFF.

or switch in STANDBY.

OR C.2.3 Restore "B" HPSW 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Pump to OPERABLE status with switch in BASE.

D.

Keowee Lake Level D.1 Notify Security.

Immediately

< 792 ft.

16.9.7-3 07/23/12 I

Keowee Lake Level 16.9.7 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.

Keowee Lake Level E.1 Declare 'A' HPSW Immediately

< 791 ft.

pump inoperable.

AND E.2 Verify all Required Immediately LPSW pumps OPERABLE.

AND E.3 Restore Keowee Lake 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Level to _Ž 791 ft.

F.

Keowee Lake Level F.1 Declare both WC Immediately

<790 ft.

trains inoperable.

G.

Keowee Lake Level G.1 Declare 'B' HPSW Immediately

< 789 ft.

pump inoperable.

H.

Keowee Lake Level H.1 Declare all ECCW Immediately

< 787 ft.

Headers aligned to Radwaste Equipment Cooling inoperable.

AND H.2 Cease commercial Immediately power generation using KHUs.

AND H.3 Notify the Plant Immediately Operations Review Committee (PORC) per NSD-308 and request plant operation (and reportability) guidance.

16.9.7-4 07/23/12 I

Keowee Lake Level 16.9.7 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

1.

Keowee Lake Level 1.1 Declare all ECCW Immediately

< 786 ft.

Siphon Headers inoperable.

J.

Keowee Lake Level J.1 Declare the Keowee Immediately

< 783 ft.

Oil Storage Room Water Spray System inoperable.

K.

Keowee Lake Level K.1 Declare Keowee Step-Immediately

< 780 ft.

up transformer Mulsifyre inoperable.

L.

Required Action and L.1 Declare all required Immediately associated Completion LPSW pumps Time not met for inoperable on Condition B, C or E.

applicable unit(s).

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.9.7.1 Verify Keowee lake level is within limits.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 16.9.7-5 07/23/121

Keowee Lake Level 16.9.7 BASES:

Instrument error must be added to the absolute lake levels in this SLC if using a computer point to verify level (Ref. 1). Lake level can be determined manually at the Keowee Hydro intake structure, but measurement error must also be added when using manual methods (Ref. 1).

HPSW System Commitments:

With lake level below 793 ft, additional administrative controls are placed on HPSW pump alignment to prevent adversely affecting LPSW pump NPSH (ref. 2). The worst case configuration for LPSW pump NPSH is the simultaneous operation of the "A" LPSW Pump, "B" LPSW Pump, and "A" HPSW Pump and a postulated single failure of the "C" LPSW Pump.

This configuration is worst case because all operating pumps take suction from a common 36" supply header. At lake levels below 793 ft, adequate LPSW pump NPSH is maintained if the "B" HPSW pump is the first HPSW pump to start on low EWST level. With the "B" HPSW Pump switch in BASE, the pump starts upon EWST low level. With the "A" HPSW Pump switch in STANDBY, the pump starts upon EWST emergency low level.

With lake level below 793 ft and the "A" HPSW pump running or its switch in Base, Unit 1 and 2 are in a condition where the LPSW System is vulnerable to single failure. In this condition, all required Unit 1 and 2 LPSW pumps shall be verified OPERABLE immediately to ensure adequate LPSW pump NPSH. Lake Level must be restored to _> 793 ft within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (Required Action B.2.1) or the "A" HPSW Pump switch shall be placed in OFF or STANDBY within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (Required Action B.2.2). The applicable Condition of SLC 16.9.1 (Ref. 13) must also be entered.

With lake level below 793 ft, the "A" HPSW pump capable of auto-starting on low EWST level, and the "B" HPSW pump inoperable, switch OFF, or switch in STANDBY; Unit 1 and 2 are in a condition where the LPSW System is vulnerable to single failure. In this condition, all required Unit 1 and 2 LPSW pumps shall be verified OPERABLE immediately to ensure adequate LPSW pump NPSH. Lake level must be restored to >_ 793 ft within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (Required Action C.2.1),

or the "A" HPSW Pump switch shall be placed in OFF within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (Required Action C.2.2),

or the "B" HPSW pump restored to OPERABLE status with switch in BASE within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> (Required Action C.2.3). The applicable Condition of SLC 16.9.1 (Ref. 13) must also be entered.

If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition B or C are not met, all required LPSW pumps must be declared inoperable immediately.

With lake level below 791 ft, the "A" HPSW Pump must be declared inoperable and the applicable Condition of SLC 16.9.1 (Ref. 13) entered because the pump has inadequate NPSH during ECCW siphon flow mode. With lake level below 789 ft, the "B" HPSW Pump must be declared inoperable and the applicable Condition of SLC 16.9.1 (Ref. 13) entered because the pump has inadequate NPSH during ECCW siphon flow mode (Ref. 3).

16.9.7-6 07/23/12 I

Keowee Lake Level 16.9.7 LPSW System Commitments:

With lake level below 791 ft, the LPSW pumps could experience inadequate NPSH during ECCW siphon flow mode if a single failure causes the loss of one required LPSW pump. The lake level limit also accounts for a postulated pipe break at a normally open seismic boundary valve. For Unit 1 and 2, the NPSH analysis (Ref. 2, 9) assumes the "A" HPSW Pump is in STANDBY and the "B" HPSW Pump is in BASE. For Unit 3, the analysis (Ref. 2, 9) assumes one HPSW pump is in operation. If all required LPSW pumps are available, adequate NPSH is available. Thus the Unit 1&2 and Unit 3 LPSW System are unable to withstand a single failure at lake levels below 791 ft. In this Condition, all required LPSW pumps shall be verified OPERABLE immediately to ensure adequate LPSW pump NPSH. Required Action E.3 requires lake level be restored to > 791 ft within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition E are not met, all required LPSW pumps must be declared inoperable immediately.

WC System Commitments:

With lake level below 790 ft, the Chiller Condenser Service Water Pumps (CCSWPs) may be adversely affected because the potential exists for air to de-entrain during ECCW siphon flow mode (Ref. 4). Since the CCSWPs support the Chilled Water (WC) System, both WC trains must be declared inoperable.

CCW System Commitments:

With lake level below 793.7 ft, gravity induced reverse flow through the CCW discharge piping and through the Condensate Coolers cannot supply adequate flow to the suction of the LPSW pumps and SSF ASW pump. See SLC 16.9.11 for additional information. (Note that commitment c of SLC 16.9.11 is not required to be met at lake levels below 793.7 feet). The licensing basis for Oconee takes credit for the SSF to mitigate a Turbine Building Flood, and there is no commitment to meet single failure criteria. However, maintaining the capability for decay heat removal using LPSW can reduce overall plant risk for some flood scenarios. There is no commitment to maintain the lake level above 793.7 ft at all times. The PRA addresses the probability of lake levels below 793.7 ft, resulting in loss of gravity induced reverse flow capability. However, reducing the lake level below 793.7 ft changes the risk levels associated with equipment out of service. Therefore, commitment A is included as a means to ensure that the loss of gravity induced reverse flow capability is adequately addressed for equipment out of service, as required by the Maintenance Rule, 10 CFR 50.65, paragraph a(4).

If Keowee lake level is > 792 ft and at least one gravity induced reverse flow path through the Unit 2 Condensate Cooler is aligned and OPERABLE to supply the Unit 2 CCW inlet pipe, gravity induced reverse flow is a viable method for supplying the SSF service water pumps.

Refer to SLC 16.9.19 for additional information.

With lake level below 787 ft, all ECCW Siphon Headers aligned to the Radwaste Equipment Cooling System must be declared inoperable immediately due to potential air inleakage from non-seismic piping during ECCW siphon flow mode. Seismic boundary valves CCW-319 and CCW-320 shall be closed to maintain operability of the ECCW Siphon Headers (Ref. 5, 9).

16.9.7-7 07/23/12 1

Keowee Lake Level 16.9.7 With lake level below 786 ft, all ECCW Siphon Headers must be declared inoperable immediately because the ECCW test acceptance criteria would be invalid (Ref. 6).

Keowee Hydro Station Commitment:

With lake level below 787 ft, the water supply (for Keowee Hydro Station to provide emergency power to the overhead path at 42.8 MVA and the underground path at 22.35 MVA) could be inadequate for 7 days of continuous operation at these levels. Neither Keowee Hydro or Oconee Nuclear Station should be considered inoperable at this lake level. Keowee Hydro should not generate to the grid at lake levels below 787 ft in order to ensure ample water capacity for emergency power operation (Ref. 8).

Keowee Oil Storage Room Commitment:

Should lake level fall below 783 ft, the Keowee Oil Storage Room water spray system may not provide the required flow rates because the system is dependent on lake level for driving head.

For this reason, the spray system must be declared inoperable (Ref. 7).

Keowee Main Start-up Transformer Commitment:

Should lake level fall below 780 ft, the Keowee main Step up Transformer Mulsifyre system may not provide the required flow rates because the system is dependent upon lake level for driving head. For this reason, the Mulsifyre should be declared inoperable (Ref. 7).

REFERENCES:

1. OSC-5325, Rev. 5, Keowee Lake Level Uncertainty Calculation.
2.

OSC-2280, Rev. 13, LPSW NPSH and Minimum Required Lake Level.

3.

OSC-6176, Rev. 1, HPSW Pump NPSHa.

4.

OSC-6550, Rev. 3, Hydraulic Model of Condenser Service Water for Chillers A and B.

5.

OSC-5304, Rev. 2, Minimum Lake Level for Radwaste Equipment Cooling (EC) System Isolation.

6.

OSC-6961, Rev. 2, ECCW Siphon Air Inleakage Model, ESV System Performance Model and Test Acceptance Criteria.

7.

OSC-2895, Rev. 4, Hydraulic Calculations for Keowee Deluge Systems.

8.

OSC-3528, Rev. 3, Keowee Lake Level Minimum Administrative Limits

9.

OSC-6081, Rev. 4, CCW Seismic-LOOP Response.

10.

ITS 3.7.7, Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) System, Amendment Nos. 300, 300, &

300.

11.

ITS 3.7.8, Emergency Condenser Circulating Water (ECCW) System, Amendment Nos.

300, 300, & 300.

12.

ITS 3.7.16, Control Room Area Cooling Systems (CRACS), Amendment Nos. 300, 300, &

300.

13.

SLC 16.9.1, Fire Suppression Water Supply Systems, 11/30/00.

14.

OSC-5349, Rev. 5, Minimum Lake Level Required to Maintain Sufficient NPSH to the LPSW Pumps via Gravity Flow.

15.

PIP 04-8459.

16.9.7-8 07/23/12 1

Control Rod Program Verification 16.14.2 16.14 CONTROL RODS AND POWER DISTRIBUTION 16.14.2 Control Rod Program Verification COMMITMENT APPLICABILITY:

CONTROL RODS shall be operated in their programmed functional position and group.

MODES 1 and 2 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

CONTROL ROD not A.1 Declare CONTROL Immediately operating in its ROD inoperable.

programmed functional position and group.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.14.2.1 Each control rod drive mechanism shall be Whenever the TMR selected from the control room and exercised Controller software by a movement of approximately two inches programs have been to verify that the proper rod has responded as completed and the input shown on the unit computer printout of that medium has been rod.

secured with password protection (after inspection, test, reprogramming, or maintenance).

SR 16.14.2.2 Independently verify that the power or Upon reconnecting after instrumentation cables to control rod drive assemblies atop the the cables have been reactor are connected, disconnected or removed 16.14.2-1 07/23/12 I

Control Rod Program Verification 16.14.2 BASES The requirement(s) of this SLC section were relocated from CTS 3.5.2.2.b.6 and CTS 4.7.2 during the conversion to ITS.

Each control rod has a relative and an absolute position indicator system. The PLC serves to process inputs from the reed switch matrix at each CRDM P1 tube (for absolute signals), and relative position indication is created by the PLC by counting the number and direction of power pulses sent to the CRDM. Either relative or absolute position display is selectable at the PI Panel, and both signals are sent to the OAC. The OAC associates each CRDM number (1 through 69) with the core position to which it is assigned. In the event a rod assignment error is made in the PLC software or connectors in the cables leading to the control rod drive assemblies or to the control room meter bank (PI Panel) are improperly transposed upon reconnection, these errors and transpositions will be discovered by a comparative check.

The comparative check is performed by: (1) selecting a specific rod from one group (e.g., Rod 1 in Regulating Group 6), (2) noting that the program-approved core position for this rod of the group (assume the approved core position is No. 53), (3) exercising of the selected rod and (4) noting that the computer prints out both absolute and relative position response for the approval core position (assumed to be position No. 53) and that the proper meter responds in the control room display bank (assumed to be Rod 1 in Group 6) for both absolute and relative meter positions. This type of comparative check will not assure detection of improperly connected cables inside the reactor building. For these, it is necessary for a responsible person, other than the one doing the work, to verify by appropriate means that each cable has been matched to the proper control rod drive assembly.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 7.6.

16.14.2-2 07/23/12 1

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