ML101330372

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Submittal of Selected Licensee Commitments Manual
ML101330372
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/10/2010
From: Baxter D
Duke Energy Carolinas
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML101330372 (30)
v • d • e


Text

,

lmm&~uDA VE BAXTER

-u Vice President L

Energy.

Oconee Nuclear Station Duke Energy ON61 VP / 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672 864-873-4460 864-873-4208 fax dave. baxter@duke-energy. com May 10, 2009 U.

S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station Docket 50-269,

-270,

-287 Selected Licensee Commitments Manual (SLC)

Gentlemen:

Pursua-fit to 10 CFR 50.4 and 50.71, please find attached the latest revisions to the Oconee Selected Licensee Commitments Manual (SLC).

SLC Change 2009-05 will revise SLC 16.9.11a, Auxiliary Building Flood Protection Measures, to reflect the addition of manual valves.

This is being done per design change EC80207.

Sincerely, Dave Baxter Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station RGJ/rgj Attachment www.duke-energy. com

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission May 10, 2010 Page 2 xc:

Mr. Luis Reyes Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave.,

NE Suite 1200

Atlanta, Ga.

30303-1257 Mr.

John Stang Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-8 G9A Washington, DC 20555 Mr.

Andy Sabisch Senior NRC Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station Bxc: ELL ONS Document Management MR Coordinator (Ron Harris)

May 10, 2010

Subject:

Oconee Selected Licensee Commitments Manual (SLC)

Revision On 3/29/10, Station Management approved Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC)

Change 2009-05 for SLC 16.9.11a, AB Flood Protection Measures, to reflect the addition of manual valves, 3LWD-1179 and 1180.

This is being done per design change EC80207.

Please revise your manual as instructed below.

Remove these pages Insert these pages SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC LOEP Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Pages 1-12 16.9.11a-I 16.9.11a-2 16.9.1la-3 16.9.11a-4 16.9.lla-5 16.9. lla-6 16.9. la-7

16. 9.la-8
16. 9. lla-9 16.9. la-10 16.9. la-il 16.9. lla-12 16.9. lla-13 16.9. lla-14 16.9. 1a-15 SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC SLC LOEP Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Page Pages 1-12 16.9. 1a-i 16.9. lla-2
16. 9.1la-3
16. 9.lla-4
16. 9.lla-5 16.9. lla-6 16.9. lla-7
16. 9.lla-8
16. 9.1la-9 16.9.11a-10 16.9.11a-lI 16.9.11a-12 16.9.11a-13 16.9.11a-14 16.9.11a-15 Any questions concerning these Kent Alter at 864-873-3255.

revisions may be directed to Regulatory Compliance By: Gail Joyner Regulatory Compliance

I I

. I Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 05/05/10 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date LOEP 1 05/05/10 LOEP 2 2/05/08 LOEP 3 02/16/10 LOEP 4 10/20/09 LOEP 5 1/04/07 LOEP 6 12/10/08 LOEP 7 05/05/10 LOEP 8 12/21/09 LOEP 9 11/25/09 LOEP 10 09/30/09 LOEP 11 03/22/10 LOEP 12 9/10/07 16.0-1 11/25/09 16.0-2 11/25/09 16.0-3 11/25/09 16.0-4 11/25/09 16.0-5 11/25/09 16.0-6 11/25/09 16.1-1 10/15/07 16.2-1 3/27/99 16.2-2 3/27/99 16.2-3 3/27/99 16.3-1 3/27/99 16.5.1-1 7/18/00 16.5.1-2 7/18/00 16.5.1-3 7/18/00 16.5.2-1 5/11/99 16.5.2-2 5/11/99 16.5.2-3 5/11/99 16.5.2-4 Delete 5/11/99 16.5.2-5 Delete 5/11/99 16.5.3-1 02/21/07 16.5.3-2 02/21/07 16.5.3-3 02/21/07 16.5.4-1 1/05/06 16.5.4-2 1/05/06 16.5.5-1 Delete 5/16/09 16.5.5-2 Delete 5/16/09 16.5.5-3 Delete 5/16/09 16.5.5-4 Delete 5/16/09 16.5.5-5 Delete 5/16/09 LOEP 1

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 05/05/10 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Date 16.5.6-1 02/05/08 16.5.6-2 02/05/08 16.5.7-1 12/13/06 16.5.7-2 12/13/06 16.5.7-3 12/13/06 16.5.7-4 12/13/06 16.5.7-5 12/13/06 16.5.7-6 12/13/06 16.5.8-1 01/31/07 16.5.8-2 01/31/07 16.5.8-3 01/31/07 16.5.8-4 01/31/07 16.5.8-5 01/31/07 16.5.8a-1 5/19/05 16.5.8a-2 5/19/05 (Delete) 16.5.8a-3 5/19/05 (Delete) 16.5.9-1 3/27/99 16.5.9-2 3/27/99 16.5.10-1 10/8/03 16.5.10-2 10/8/03 16.5.11-1 1/31/00 16.5.12-1 3/27/99 16.5.13-1 3/27/99 16.5.13-2 12/01/99 16.5.13-3 12/01/99 16.6.1-1 03/14/07 16.6.1-2 03/14/07 16.6.1-3 03/14/07 16.6.1-4 03/14/07 16.6.1-5 Delete 16.6.2-1 01/31/07 16.6.2-2 01/31/07 16.6.2-3 01/31/07 16.6.2-4 01/31/07 16.6.2-5 01/31/07 16.6.2-6 01/31/07 16.6.2-7 01/31/07 16.6.2-8 Delete 16.6.2-9 Delete 16.6.2-10 Delete 16.6.2-11 Delete LOEP 2

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 05/05/10 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Date 16.6.2-12 Delete 16.6.3-1 3/27/99 16.6.4-1 3/13/07 16.6.4-2 3/13/07 16.6.4-3 3/13/07 16.6.4-4 3,/13/07 16.6.4-5 3/13/07 16.6.4-6 3/13/07 16.6.5-1 12/14/00 16.6.6-1 3/27/99 16.6.7-1 3/27/99 16.6.8-1 3/27/99 16.6.9-1 6/12/01 16.6.9-2 3/27/99 16.6.10-1 02/16/10 16.6.10-2 02/16/10 16.6.10-3 02/16/10 16.6.11-1 10/1/02 16.6.11-2 10/1/02 16.6.12-1 03/14/07 16.6.12-2 03/14/07 16.6.12-3 03/14/07 16.6.12-4 5/17/05 (Delete) 16.6.12-5 Delete 16.6.12-6 Delete 16.6.12-7 Delete 16.6.13-1 03/31/08 16.6.13-2 03/31/08 16.6.13-3 03/31/08 16.6.14-1 8/15/02 16.6.14-2 8/15/02 16.6.14-3 8/15/02 16.6.14-4 8/15/02 16.6.15-1 03/14/07 16.6.15-2 03/14/07 16.7.1-1 3/27/99 16.7.1-2 3/27/99 16.7.2-1 12/14/04 16.7.2-2 12/14/04 16.7.2-3 12/14/04 16.7.3-1 3/27/99 LOEP 3

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 05/05/10 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Date 16.7.3-2 3/27/99 16.7.4-1 7/14/05 16.7.4-2 7/14/05 16.7.4-3 7/14/05 16.7.5-1 10/8/03 16.7.5-2 10/8/03 16.7.5-3 10/8/03 16.7.5-4 10/8/03 16.7.6-1 3/27/99 16.7.7-1 3/27/99 16.7.7-2 3/27/99 16.7.8-1 3/27/99 16.7.8-2 3/27/99 16.7.9-1 10/23/03 16.7.10-1 3/27/99 16.7.10-2 3/27/99 16.7.11-1 3/9/06 16.7.11-2 3/9/06 16.7.11-3 3/9/06 16.7.12-1 6/30/04 16.7.12-2 6/30/04 16.7.13-1 6/30/04 16.7.13-2 6/30/04 16.7.13-3 6/30/04 16.7.14-1 2/17/00 16.7.14-2 2/17/00 16.7.14-3 2/17/00 16.7.14-4 2/17/00 16.8.1-1 8/09/01 16.8.1-2 8/09/01 16.8.2-1 2/10/05 16.8.2-2 2/10/05 16.8.3-1 10/20/09 16.8.3-2 10/20/09 16.8.3-3 10/20/09 16.8.3-4 10/20/09 16.8.3-5 10/20/09 16.8.3-6 10/20/09 16.8.3-7 10/20/09 16.8.4-1 2/10/05 16.8.4-2 2/10/05 LOEP 4

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 05/05/10 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date 16.8.4-3 2/10/05 16.8.4-4 2/10/05 16.8.4-5 Delete 2/10/05 16.8.4-6 Delete 2/10/05 16.8.4-7 Delete 2/10/05 16.8.4-8 Delete 2/10/05 16.8.4-9 Delete 9/25/04 16.8.5-1 4/27/06 16.8.5-2 4/27/06 16.8.5-3 4/27/06 16.8.5-4 Delete 12/21/04 16.8.5-5 Delete 12/21/04 16.8.6-1 01/04/07 16.8.6-2 01/04/07 16.8.6-3 01/04/07 16.8.7-1 1/31/00 16.8.8-1 1/31/00 16.8.9-1 6/21/05 16.8.9-2 6/21/05 16.8.9-3 6/21/05 16.8.9-4 6/21/05 16.9.1-1 1/31/00 16.9.1-2 3/27/99 16.9.1-3 3/27/99 16.9.1-4 3/27/99 16.9.1-5 6/12/01 16.9.2-1 6/28/05 16.9.2-2 6/28/05 16.9.2-3 6/28/05 16.9.2-4 6/28/05 16.9.2-5 6/28/05 16.9.3-1 1/14/04 16.9.3-2 1/14/04 16.9.4-1 1/31/00 16.9.4-2 1/31/00 16.9.4-3 1/31/00 16.9.4-4 3/27/99 16.9.4-5 6/12/01 16.9.5-1 1/31/00 16.9.5-2 4/29/99 16.9.5-3 4/29/99 LOEP 5

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 05/05/10 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date 16.9.5-4 6/12/01 16.9.6-1 12/10/08 16.9.6-2 12/10/08 16.9.6-3 12/10/08 16.9.6-4 12/10/08 16.9.6-5 12/10/08 16.9.6-6 12/10/08 16.9.6-7 12/10/08 16.9.6-8 12/10/08 16.9.6-9 12/10/08 16.9.7-1 09/30/08 16.9.7-2 09/30/08 16.9.7-3 09/30/08 16.9.7-4 09/30/08 16.9.7-5 09/30/08 16.9.7-6 09/30/08 16.9.7-7 09/30/08 16.9.7-8 09/30/08 16.9.7-9 Delete 16.9.8-1 2/15/06 16.9.8-2 2/15/06 16.9.8-3 Delete 2/15/06 16.9.8-4 Delete 16.9.8-5 Delete 16.9.8-6 Delete 16.9.8-7 Delete 16.9.8a-1 2/7/05 16.9.8a-2 2/7/05 16.9.8a-3 2/7/05 16.9.9-1 11/27/07 16.9.9-2 11/27/07 16.9.9-3 11/27/07 16.9.9-4 11/27/07 16.9.10-1 1/12/04 16.9.10-2 1/12/04 16.9.11-1 09/30/08 16.9.11-2 09/30/08 16.9.11-3 09/30/08 16.9.11-4 09/30/08 16.9.11-5 09/30/08 16.9.11-6 09/30/08 LOEP 6

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 05/05/10 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date 16.9.11-7 09/30/08 16.9.11-8 09/30/08 16.9.11a-1 05/05/10 16.9.11a-2 05/05/10 16.9.11a-3 05/05/10 16.9.11a-4 05/05/10 16.9.11 a-5 05/05/10 16.9.11a-6 05/05/10 16.9.1 la-7 05/05/10 16.9.1 la-8 05/05/10 16.9.11 a-9 05/05/10 16.9.11a-10 05/05/10 16.9.11a-11 05/05/10 16.9.11 a-12 05/05/10 16.9.11 a-13 05/05/10 16.9.1lla-14 05/05/10 16.9.11 a-15 05/05/10 16.9.11a-16 Deleted 3/10/08 16.9.12-1 5/31/04 16.9.12-2 5/31/04 16.9.12-3 5/31/04 16.9:12-4 5/31/04 16.9.12-5 5/31/04 16.9.12-6 5/31/04 16.9.12-7 5/31/04 16.9.12-8 5/31/04 16.9.12-9 5/31/04 16.9.12-10 5/31/04 16.9.12-11 5/31/04 16.9.12-12 5/31/04 16.9.12-13 5/31/04 16.9.12-14 5/31/04 16.9.12-15 5/31/04 16.9.12-16 5/31/04 16.9.12-17 5/31/04 16.9.12-18 5/31/04 16.9.12-19 5/31/04 16.9.12-20 5/31/04 16.9.12-21 5/31/04 16.9.12-22 5/31/04 16.9.13-1 01/31/07 LOEP 7

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 05/05/10 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date 16.9.13-2 01/31/07 16.9.13-3 01/31/07 16.9.13-4 01/31/07 16.9.14-1 10/28/04 16.9.14-2 10/28/04 16.9.15-1 3/27/99 16.9.15-2 3/27/99 16.9.15-3 3/27/99 16.9.16-1 4/01/08 16.9.16-2 4/01/08 16.9.16-3 4/01/08 16.9.17-1 5/23/01 16.9.17-2 3/27/99 16.9.18-1 5/02/07 16.9.18-2 5/02/07 16.9.18-3 5/02/07 16.9.18-4 5/02/07 16.9.18-5 5/02/07 16.9.18-6 5/02/07 16.9.18-7 5/02/07 16.9.18-8 5/02/07 16.9.18-9 5/02/07 16.9.18-10 5/02/07 16.9.18-11 5/02/07 16.9.18-12 5/02/07 16.9.18-13 5/02/07 16.9.18-14 5/02/07 16.9.18-15 5/02/07 16.9.18-16 5/02/07 16.9.19-1 3/31/05 16.9.19-2 3/31/05 16.9.20-1 12/21/09 16.9.20-2 12/21/09 16.9.20-3 12/21/09 16.9.20-4 12/21/09 16.9.20-5 12/21/09 16.9.21-1 07/09/09 16.9.21-2 07/09/09 16.9:21-3 07/09/09 16.9.21-4 07/09/09 16.10.1-1 Deleted 9/18/03 LOEP 8

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 05/05/10 List of Effective Pages Paqe Revision Date 16.10.1-2 Deleted 9/18/03 16.10.1-3 Deleted 9/18/03 16.10.2-1 12/2/03 16.10.2-2 12/2/03 16.10.3-1 3/27/99 16.10.3-2 3/27/99 16.10.4-1 1/31/00 16.10.5-1 Deleted 8/24/04 16.10.6-1 3/27/99 16.10.7-1 4/29/99 16.10.7-2 4/29/99 16.10.7-3 1/31/00 16.10.7-4 4/29/99 16.10.7-5 4/29/99 16.10.7-6 4/29/99 16.10.7-7 4/29/99 16.10.7-8 4/29/99 16.10.7-9 4/29/99 16.10.8-1 11/27/06 16.10.8-2 11/27/06 16.10.8-3 11/27/06 16.10.8-4 11/27/06 16.10.8-5 11/27/06 16.10.9-1 11/25/09 16.10.9-2 11/25/09 16.10.9-3 11/25/09 16.10.9-4 11/25/09 16.10.9-5 11/25/09 16.11.1-1 08/14/08 16.11.1-2 08/14/08 16.11.1-3 08/14/08 16.11.1-4 08/14/08 16.11.1-5 08/14/08 16.11.1-6 08/14/08 16.11.1-7 08/14/08 16.11.2-1 1/31/00 16.11.2-2 3/27/99 16.11.2-3 1/31/00 16.11.2-4 3/27/99 16.11.2-5 1/31/00 16.11.2-6 1/31/00 LOEP 9

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 05/05/10 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Date 16.11.3-1 11/20/08 16.11.3-2 11/20/08 16.11.3-3 11120/08 16.11.3-4 11/20/08 16.11.3-5 11/20/08 16.11.3-6 11/20/08 16.11.3-7 11/20/08 16.11.3-8 11/20/08 16.11.3-9 11/20/08 16.11.3-10 11/20/08 16.11.3-11 11/20/08 16.11.3-12 11/20/08 16.11.3-13

.11/20/08 16.11.3-14 11/20/08 16.11.3-15 11/20/08 16.11.3-16 11/20/08 16.11.3-17 11/20/08 16.11.3-18 11/20/08 16.11.3-19 11/10/04 (Deleted) 16.11.4-1 09/30/09 16.11.4-2 09/30/09 16.11.4-3 09/30/09 16.11.4-4 09/30/09 16.11.4-5 09/30/09 16.11.4-6 09/30/09 16.11.4-7 09/30/09 16.11.4-8 11/10/04 (Delete) 16.11.5-1 10/30/02 16.11.5-2 10/30/02 16.11.5-3 10/30/02 16.11.5-4 10/30/02 16.11.6-1 2/1/05 16.11.6-2 2/1/05 16.11.6-3 2/1/05 16.11.6-4 2/1/05 16.11.6-5 2/1/05 16.11.6-6 2/1/05 16.11.6-7 2/1/05 16.11.6-8 2/1/05 16.11.6-9 2/1/05 16.11.6-10 2/1/05 LOEP 10

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 05/05/10 List of Effective Pages Revision Date Page 16.11.7-1 16.11.7-2 16.11.7-3 16.11.7-4 16.11.8-1 16.11.8-2 16.11.9-1 16.11.9-2 16.11.9-3 16.11.10-1 16.11.10-2 16.11.11-1 16.11.12-1 16.11.12-2 16.11.13-1 16.11.13-2 16.11.14-1 16.11.14-2 16.12.1-1 16.12.2-1 16.12.2-2 16.12.3-1 16.12.3-2 16.12.4-1 16.12.5-1 16.12.6-1 16.13.1-1 16.13.1-2 16.13.1-3 16.13.1-4 16.13.1-5 16.13.1-6 16.13.1-7 16.13.1-8 16.13.1-9 16.13.2-1 16.13.2-2 16.13.2-3 16.13.2-4 16.13.3-1 16.13.3-2 1/31/00 1/31/00 3/27/99 1/31/00 12/21/09 12/21/09 03/22/10 03/22/10 03/22/10 2/25/03 2/25/03 3/27/99 4/10/03 4/10/03 3/27/99 3/27/99 3/27/99 3/27/99 3/27/99 5/3/07 5/3/07 5/1/03 5/1/03 3/27/99 3/27/99 11/08/07 5/13/04 5/13/04 5/13/04 5/13/04 5/13/04 5/13/04 5/13/04 5/13/04 5/13/04 12/15/04 Delete 12/15/04 Delete 12/15/04 Delete 12/15/04 12/15/04 Delete 12/15/04 LOEP 11

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 05/05/10 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Date 16.13.4-1 3/27/99 16.13.5-1 Delete 16.13.5-2 Delete 16.13.6-1 3/27/99 16.13.7-1 12/15/04 16.13.7-2 12/15/04 16.13.8-1 3/27/99 16.13.9-1 3/27/99 16.13.9-2 3/27/99 16.13.10-1 3/27/99 16.13.11-1 3/27/99 16.14.1-1 3/27/99 16.14.2-1 12/14/04 16.14.2-2 12/14/04 16.14.3-1 3/27/99 16.14.4-1 12/14/04 16.14.4.a-1 12/14/04 16.15.1-1 4/12/06 16.15.1-2.

Deleted 4/12/06 16.15.1-3 Deleted 4/12/06 16.15.1-4 Deleted 4/12/06 16.15.1-5 Deleted 4/12/06 16.15.2-1 09/10/07 16.15.2-2 09/10/07 16.15.2-3 09/10/07 16.15.2-4 09/10/07 16.15.2-5 09/10/07 16.15.3-1 4/12/06 16.15.3-2 4/12/06 16.15.3-3 4/12/06 16.15.3-4 4/12/06 16.15.3-5 4/12/06 LOEP 12

AB Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11a 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.11 a Auxiliary Building Flood Protection Measures COMMITMENT Auxiliary Building (AB) Flood Protection Measures shall be OPERABLE as follows:

a.

AB Flood Barriers

1.

Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) piping structural integrity shall be intact.

2.

HPSW 21 and HPSW-958 shall be closed to isolate the 16 inch HPSW supply in the AB. 3HPSW-453 shall be closed to isolate the alternate 4 inch HPSW supply in the AB.

3.

LPSW-427 and LPSW-428 shall be closed to isolate the flushing supply to the waste monitor tank.

4.

1 HPSW-561 shall be closed to isolate the fire hose header that passes over the Unit 1 and 2 Low Pressure Injection (LPI) pump hatch area.

5.

First and second floor AB curbs shall be in place to the LPI hatch areas.

6.

Turbine/Auxiliary Building wall, as well as other AB wall, floor and penetration seals credited shall be intact.

7.

High Pressure Injection (HPI)/LPI Pump Room walls and penetration seals shall be intact.

b.

AB Flood Detection

1. Seismic trigger and statalarm shall be operable.
2. The High Activity Waste Tank (HAWT) and Low Activity Waste Tank (LAWT) sump level detection systems shall be capable of generating a level alarm in the control room.
3. The LPI sump level detection system-shall be capable of generating a level alarm in the control room.
c.

AB Flood Mitigating Equipment

1. Critical, manual valves used to isolate a potential flooding source shall be capable of closing.

16.9.11 a-1 05/05/10 1

AB Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11 a

2. Flow limiting valves that restrict potential breakflows shall be capable of limiting.flow.
3. Check valves that prevent back flow through a potential break location are operable.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

AB Flood Protection A.1 ---------- NOTE-----

Measures If AB Flood Protection commitments a.2 Measures are (HPSW-21 & 958, inoperable due to 3HPSW-453), a.3 planned activities, (LPSW-427 & 428), or then these activities a.4 (1HPSW-561) not shall be performed in met.

a prompt manner without delay.

Restore AB flood 7 days protection measures commitments a.2, a.3, or a.4 to OPERABLE status.

B.

AB Flood Protection B.1.1 In MODES 1-3, NA Measures perform a risk commitments other assessment using the than those specified in Electronic Risk Condition A not met.

Assessment Tool.

OR B.1.2 In MODES 4-6, NA develop a risk management plan in accordance with NSD-403.

16.9.11 la-2 05/05/10 1

AB Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11a CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME (continued)

AND B.1.3 Implement 7 days compensatory actions in accordance with Table 16.9.1 la-1.

C. Required Actions and C.1 Initiate a PIP.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Associated Completion Times not met.

16.9.11 a-3 05/05/10 1

AB Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11a SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.9.1 la.1 Verify that the LPI hatch area curbs are 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> in place and not obstructed.

SR 16.9.11a.2 Verify that HPSW-21 and 958 and 31 days 3HPSW-453 are closed; unless locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position.

SR 16.9.1 1a.3 Verify that LPSW-427 and 428 are 31 days closed; unless locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position.

SR 16.9.11a.4 Verify that 1HPSW-561 is closed; 31 days unless locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position.

SR 16.9.11 a.5 Verify that the seismic trigger and 18 months statalarm are operable.

SR 16.9.11 a.6 Verify that the LAWT, HAWT, and LPI 18 months sump level detection systems provide an alarm in the control room and associated level instrumentation is calibrated.

SR 16.9.1.1a.7

Note Only applicable to Units with flood impoundment modifications completed.

Verify OPERABILITY of the 18 months Turbine/Auxiliary Building and HPI/LPI rooms wall, and other credited AB walls/floors and penetration seals.

16.9.11a-4 05/05/10 1

AB Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11a SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.9.11 a.8 Verify that critical manual valves used 2 years in the AB flood abnormal operating procedure are capable of being closed.

SR 16.9.11 a.9 Verify that all credited check valves are 2 years operable.

SR 16.9.11a.10 Inspect/replace all credited flow limiting 5 years valves to verify capability to limit flow.

SR 16.9.11 a. 11 Inspect the structural integrity of the In accordance with the Service LPSW and HPSW piping by performing Water Inspection Program ultrasonic or radiographic inspections of the associated piping.

16.9.11 a-5 05/05/10 1

AB Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11a Table 16.9.1 la-1 Compensatory Actions Com#

Protective Measure Compensatory Action a.1 LPSW and HPSW piping structural

1. Isolate affected section, or integrity shall be intact.
2. Station a watch near the affected section a.5 First and second floor curbs shall
1. Station a continuous watch near the be in place.

removed curb, and

2. Restore curb (or an equivalent) in the event of a flood, or
3. Install equivalent curb.

a.6 Building and penetration seals shall

1. Assess impact of leak rate through the be intact and capable of preventing location of the degradation. Determine if water egress.

any additional action is prudent, or

2. Provide temporary seals or dams to prevent leakage past seal.

a.7 HPI/LPI Pump room walls and

1. Assess impact of leak rate through the penetration seals shall be intact.

location of the degradation. Determine if any additional action is prudent, or

2. Provide temporary seals or dams to prevent leakage past seal.

b.1 Seismic trigger and statalarm shall NA be operable.

b.2 The HAWT and LAWT sump level Survey affected section every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

detection systems shall be capable of generating a level alarm in the control room.

b.3 LPI sump level detection systems Survey affected section every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

shall be capable of generating a level alarm in the control room.

c. 1 Critical, manual valves used to
1. Isolate the source outside of the AB, or isolate a potential flooding source
2. Identify an equivalent isolation device in shall be capable of closing, event of a flood.

c.2 Flow limiting valves that restrict

1. Isolate the source outside of the AB, or potential break flows shall be
2. Identify needed isolation, including

.capable of limiting flow.

timeliness, in the event of a flood.

c.3 Check valves that prevent back

1. Isolate the source outside of the AB, or flow through a potential break
2. Identify needed isolation, including location are operable.

timeliness, in-the event of a flood.

16.9.11 la-6 05/05/10 I

AB Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11a BASES In a letter dated September 26, 1972, the AEC requested Oconee to: "Review Oconee Nuclear Station Units 1, 2, and 3 to determine whether the failure of any non-category I (seismic) equipment, particularly in the circulating water system and fire protection, could result in a condition, such as flooding or the release of chemicals, that might potentially adversely affect the performance of safety-related equipment required for safe shutdown of the facilities or to limit the consequences of an accident."

If a non-seismically designed system retaining water located in the AB were to fail, then the water would drain to either the LAWT or in some cases, to the LPI pump room sumps. If the source of the flood was continuous and was not secured, the water would eventually flood the HPI pump rooms, the LPI and Building Spray (BS) pump rooms, and the floor above (elevation 771 ft.) which contains the Component Cooling (CC) pump breakers. If both the HPI pumps and the CC pumps were lost and the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) was not OPERABLE, a Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) could occur.

The objective of this Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) is to minimize the unavailability of barrier, detection, and mitigating equipment to reduce the consequences of an AB flood event.

Compensatory actions will be implemented to reduce the risk associated with inoperable equipment. Since the consequences of an AB flood event increases if certain Structures, Systems, or Components (SSCs) beyond the scope of this SLC are out of service, a risk analysis will be performed in MODES 1, 2, and 3 using the Electronic Risk Assessment Tool and a risk management plan will be developed in MODES 4, 5 and 6 upon entry into the SLC for all commitments except a.2, a.3, and a.4. A risk analysis has already been performed for these commitments and concluded the valves can be open < 7 days without a significant increase in risk.

The following flood barriers, mitigating equipment, and flood detection devices are currently used to minimize the consequences of an auxiliary building flood:

AB Flood Barriers LPSW and HPSW Pipingq Structural Integqrity Several water systems with non-safety piping in the AB have a limited water volume and can not flood the HPI pump motors or the CC pump breakers. Examples include the Chilled Water (WC), CC, and Recirculating Cooling Water (RCW) systems.

However, a pipe break in the LPSW and HPSW systems could result in a large, continuous flood that might eventually submerge the HPI, LPI, and BS pump motors as well as the CC pump breakers if not isolated.

Maintaining the structural integrity of the LPSW and HPSW piping system is the first line of defense against an AB flood event. Examples of unacceptable structural integrity include:

1. A general reduction in the thickness of the piping below acceptable levels per the Service Water Inspection program.
2. Damaged hangers or other supports below acceptable levels as evaluated by Mechanical/Civil Engineering (MCE)-Civil.

16.9.11 la-7 05/05/10 1

AB Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11a Leakage from pump seals, valve piping, or pipe pin holes is considered acceptable. Opening portions of the LPSW and HPSW systems for maintenance is treated as a critical activity to reduce the risk of an inadvertent flood.

The applicable surveillance to verify structural integrity per SR 16.9.1 la. 11 is as follows:

Ultrasonic inspections of the associated piping by the Service Water Inspection program.

HPSW-21/958, LPSW-427/428, 1HPSW-561 and 3HPSW-453 HPSW-21 and 958 are used to isolate the 16 inch HPSW header in the AB. This is the largest potential non-seismic pipe break source in the auxiliary building. Maintaining the valves in a closed position eliminates the potential for flooding if any section of HPSW piping were to fail.

3HPSW-453 is used to isolate the 4 inch HPSW header into the AB. This header is normally maintained closed since it is not flow limited. A normal flow limit supply of HPSW is maintained around HPSW-958.

LPSW-427 and 428 isolate the flush water supply to the waste monitor tank. Even though the associated supply is much smaller than the 16 inch HPSW supply header, the valves are still maintained in the closed position to eliminate any potential for flooding if the downstream piping were to break.

1 HPSW-561 isolates the fire header from the AB to the hot machine shop to prevent potential flooding of the Unit 1 and 2 LPI pump rooms.

The position of these valves will be periodically checked using SR 16.9-11a.2, SR 16.9.1 la.3, and SR 16.9.1 la.4.

AB First and Second Floor Curbs The following curbs are critical to the prevention of LPI/BS room flooding:

LPI Hatch Area Entrance Curbs Curb outside "Overlook" onto Unit 1 HPI Hatch Area The LPI/BS rooms have a much smaller allowable flood volume than the HPI rooms. The curbs delay flooding of these rooms in the event of an AB flood and allow sufficient time for operators to terminate the source of the flood.

Acceptable surveillances for this portion of SR 16.9.1 la.1 are as follows:

Operations verifies and documents that the curbs are installed during shift rounds.

These curbs are periodically inspected by the auxiliary building flood program coordinator.

Auxiliary/Turbine Buildinq and HPI/LPI Room Walls, Floors and Penetration Seals The following walls, floors and penetration seals ensure that a break on the upper elevations of the AB does not adversely impact equipment in adjacent rooms:

16.9.11a-8 05/05/10 1

AB Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11a Spent Fuel Cooler Room Floor Penetrations Expansion Joints above LPI Hatch Area HPI/LPI Room walls and penetrations Auxiliary/Turbine Building walls and penetrations East Penetration floor seals Applicable surveillances for SR 16.9.11 a.7 are as follows:

The building and penetration seals, above, are periodically inspected during fire barrier inspections or

" As part of the AB Flood program Surveillance of the East Penetration floor seals is not required to be established until December 31, 2007, which coincides with completion of the flood impoundment modifications. This surveillance is modified by a note that states it is only applicable to units that have the flood impoundment modifications installed. The flood impoundment modifications are OD100505, OD200506, and OD300507.

Flood Detection Seismic Trigger and Statalarm The seismic trigger and associated statalarm provides indication of an earthquake. Upon identification of the earthquake, operators will be dispatched to the AB to inspect its structural integrity in accordance with the earthquake AP. Any floods resulting from an earthquake, would, as a minimum, be identified in this manner.

The applicable surveillance for SR 16.9.11 a.5 is as follows:

Instruments are calibrated and alarms are checked via instrument procedures.

There are no compensating actions for an inoperable seismic trigger and statalarm since operations would sense building motion during a large earthquake.

Level Detection Systems The LAWT, HAWT, and LPI sump level detection systems provide an early means of detecting a flood. In order to be OPERABLE, each system should generate an alarm in the control room.

Although the LAWT level detection system will be the source of detection for most large floods, the other two systems provide detection of smaller floods or leaks. If left unsecured, the smaller leaks or floods could damage critical equipment. Additionally, a number of closed system drains discharge into the LPI room sumps. Also, there are non-seismic pipes (such as RCW) that could break in the areas that would drain to these sumps. If these drains go unsecured, the LPI rooms could flood due to the small volume below the pumps in these rooms.

16.9.11 a-9 05/05/10 1

AB Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11a The applicable surveillance for SR 16.9.1 la.6 is as follows:

Tests are performed to verify that the LAWT, HAWT, and LPI sump level detection systems provide an alarm in the control room in the event of high level.

" Associated level instrumentation is calibrated.

Mitigating Equipment Manual Valves used in the Auxiliary Building Flood Abnormal Procedure In order to preserve safety equipment subsequent to a flood, the flood source must be isolated.

The valves used to isolate a potential flood are identified in the abnormal procedure for AB flooding. The list of valves are provided in Table 16.9.1 la -2.

The applicable surveillance for SR 16.9.1 la.8 is as follows:

Verify that the essential valves used in the AB flood abnormal procedure are capable of being closed.

Flow Limiting Valves Flow limiting valves are used to limit the rate of flow into the AB if a line break should occur.

The limited flow rate ensures that operators have at least 45 minutes to secure the source of the flood. The valves currently credited are provided in Table 16.9.1 la-3.

The applicable surveillance for SR 16.9.11 a. 10 is as follows:

Inspect all credited flow limiting valves to ensure capability to limit flow. The flow limiting valves are spring loaded devices that reduce their cross sectional flow area as the flow attempts to increase. This SR can be met by replacing or dismantling and visually inspecting the valves.

Check Valves Credited in the AB Flood Analysis Check valves and elevation head prevent water from the discharge side of the LPSW from entering the AB in the event of a break. Where elevation head is insufficient to prevent back flow, the check valves should be capable of eliminating significant back flow through a break.

The valves currently credited are provided in Table 16.9.1 la-4.

The applicable surveillance for SR 16.9.11 a.9 is as follows:

Verify that all credited check valves restrict back flow sufficiently. This requirement can be verified by performing a leak test across the valve, dismantling and visually inspecting the valve or performing a UT or RT to verify that the valve closes. Since the check valves are passive devices, a surveillance frequency of 2 years is appropriate.

16.9.11 a-1 0 05/05/10 1

AB Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11a ACTIONS A._1 If the following AB Flood Barriers commitments are not met:

0 HPSW-21 and HPSW-958 shall be closed to isolate the 16 inch HPSW supply in the AB.

3HPSW-453 shall be closed to'isolate the 4 inch HPSW supply into the AB.

0 LPSW-427 and LPSW-428 shall be closed to isolate the flushing supply to the waste monitor tank.

1 HPSW-561 shall be closed to isolate the fire hose header that passes over the Unit 1 and 2 LPI pump hatch area.

Flood Protection measures shall be restored within 7 days. This is based on a risk analysis (Reference 4); the valves can be opened < 7 days per year without a significant increase in risk.

The Action is modified by a note that states if AB Flood Protection measures are inoperable due to planned activities, then these activities shall be performed in a prompt manner without delay.

B.1.1, B.1.2 and B.1.3 Required Action B.1.1 requires that the Electronic Risk Assessment Tool be used to determine the overall risk during MODES 1, 2, and 3. In these MODES, an increase in the probability of an AB flood increases the probability of the loss of RCP seal cooling. The loss of seal cooling results from the loss of the HPI pumps. The loss of RCP seal cooling could cause a Small Break LOCA. Consequently, the risk determined by the Electronic Risk Assessment Tool is sensitive to the condition of equipment that provides backup RCP seal cooling or that might aid in the mitigation of a LOCA. Examples of backup seal cooling include the component cooling system and the SSF reactor makeup system. Examples of systems that can be used to defend against a LOCA include LPI and BS.

In MODES 4, 5, and 6, Required Action B.1.2 requires that a risk management plan be generated in accordance with NSD-403, Shutdown Risk Management (Modes 4, 5, 6, and No-Mode) per 10CFR50.65(a)(4). In MODES 4, 5, and 6, an AB Flood could result in the loss of the LPI pumps and associated decay heat cooling. Consequently, the risk management plan will be sensitive to whether alternate forms of decay heat cooling are available. Alternates include secondary cooling (if the secondary is available for cooling and the primary is filled and not vented), water in the refueling cavity (if flooded), and gravity flow from the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST).

Required Action B. 1.3 implements compensatory actions to minimize the consequences of an AB flood while equipment important to the prevention, detection, or mitigation of a flood is inoperable.

Electronic Risk Assessment Tool/Risk Management Plan If the Electronic Risk Assessment tool or risk management plan reveals an elevated risk, actions can be taken at the station level in the planning or performance of work to minimize the risk.

16.9.1 la-11 05/05/10

AB Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11a An Electronic Risk Assessment and/or risk management plan may need to be generated for one or more units if the SLC is entered.

Example 1:

If substantial pipe degradation was discovered in the 4 inch HPSW header running through the lower elevations of the building, an Electronic Risk Assessment tool model or risk management plan would need to be developed for each unit. A break in the HPSW header would affect all three units. Units in MODES 1, 2, and 3 would use the Electronic Risk Assessment tool approach and units in MODES 4, 5, and 6 would use the risk management plan approach.

Example 2:

If the first floor curb were removed leading into the Unit 3 LPI room area, a risk assessment would only be performed for Unit 3. The unavailability of this barrier could only affect Unit 3.

C.1 If the required actions and associated completion times of Conditions A and B are not met, a PIP shall be initiated within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

REFERENCES

1. ONS Flood Protection Engineering Support Document.
2. Letter from R. A. Jones to the NRC, "Proposed License Amendment Regarding Revisions to the Licensing Basis for the UFSAR Section on Water Level (Flood) Design" dated November 1,2002.
3. PIP 0-98-3017.
4. Calculation SAAG-81 1, "Evaluation of Risk Associated with Periodic Opening of HPSW Header Isolation Valves."
5. UFSAR Section 3.4.1.1.1, "Current Flood Protection Measures for Turbine and Auxiliary Buildings."
6. PIP 04-5381.
7. PIP 99-1286 CA 29.
8. Drawing series 0-310K and O-310L.
9. OSC-8671, "Aux Bldg Flood Design Values."
10. NSD-415, "Operational Risk Management (MODES 1-3) per 10CFR50.65(a)(4)."
11. WPM-608, "Outage Risk Assessment Utilizing ORAM-Sentinel."
12. WPM-609, "Innage Risk Assessment Utilizing ORAM-Sentinel."
13. NSD-403, "Shutdown Risk Management (MODES 4, 5, 6, and No-MODE) per 10CFR50.65(a)(4).
14. WPM-612, "Short Cycle Work Process."
15. NSD-213, "Risk Management Process."

16.9.11 a-12 05/05/10 1

AB Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11a Table 16.9.1 la-2 Manual Valves Used in the Auxiliary Building Flood Abnormal Procedure Unit Valve No.

Valve Description Valve Location 0

CCW-460 A & B Chiller CCW Supply Isolation T-I/G-29, 3' NE 0

DW-55 RB/AB Header Supply T-1I/M-25, N 12' up 0

FW-15 TB Header Block Water Treatment Room, 15' E of Maintenance Shop door, against wall, 7' up 0

HPSW-3 A HPSW Pump Discharge T-1/J-26, A HPSW Pump Room 0

HPSW-6 B HPSW Pump Discharge T-1/G-29, B HPSW Pump Room 0

HPSW-9 HPSW Jockey Pump Discharge T-1/J-29, 10' SW 0

HPSW-1 1 A HPSW Pump Tie to High Pressure T-1I/H-26, 6' SW Header B 0

HPSW-959 HPSW Supply to Flow Limiter Block T-1/M-22 Valve 0

LPSW-66 Units 1 & 2 AB AHU Supply T-1/L-32, 2' NW 0

LPSW-260 AB AHU Supply Block T-1/L-32, 4' N 0

LPSW-943 Cooling Water Discharge to Storm T-1/Dd-28, 11' SW Drain Isolation 0

LPSW-944 Cooling Water Discharge to CCW T-1/Dd-28, 17' W Isolation 0

LWD-1 173 LPI Sump Isolation Valve T-72, LPI Hatch Room 0

PDW-106 Units 1 & 2 Supply Block A-4, Water Heater Room, N of 2CA & 2CB Battery Room, 6' off of floor 0

PDW-41 1 AB PDW Supply Isolation T-3/M-32 3

LPSW-500 Unit 3 AHU Return to CCW Discharge T-1/L-47, NW 12' up 3

LPSW-501 Unit 3 AHU Return to Storm Drains T-1/L-47, W 12' up 3

LPSW-770 AB AHU Supply T-1I/M-46, 8'S 3

LPSW-844 AB AHU Supply T-1I/M-46, 6' SE 3

LWD-1179 LWD DRN ISO TO LPI SUMP RM 81 A-1IT-87, Unit 3 LPI Hatch 3

LWD-1180 AHU 3-6 COND DRN ISO A-3W-90a, Unit 3 Cask Decon I

I__

IRm 16.9.11 a-13 05/05/10 1

  • q AB Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11a Table 16.9.1 la-3 Flow Limiting Valves Valve Flow Limit (gpm)

Equipment Supplied HPSW-960 600 HPSW to Aux Bldg flow limiting valve (Turbine Building Basement Column M-22)

LPSW-845 200 AHU 3, 4, 5 (Unit 1&2 HPI Pump Room)

AHU 6 (Unit 1 LPI Pump Room - Room

  1. 61)

AHU 7 (Unit 1&2 LPI Pump Room -

Room #62)

AHU 8 (Unit 2 LPI Pump Room - Room

  1. 63)

LPSW-846 700 AHU 9, 10 (Vent. Equip. Room - Elev.

838)

AHU 15, 16 (Vent. Equip. Room - Elev.

822)

AHU 1-19 (Unit 1 West Pen. Room)

AHU 1-20, 1-32, 1-33 (Unit 1 East Pen.

Room) 3LPSW-845 300 AHU 3-7, 3-8 (Vent. Equip. Room -

Elev. 822)

AHU 3-9, 3-10 (Vent. Equip. Room -

Elev. 838)

AHU 3-5, 3-32, 3-33 (Unit 3 East Pen.

Room)

AHU 3-6 (Unit 3 West Pen. Room)

LPSW-1181 120 Unit 1 &2 LPI Rooms AHUs LPSW flow limiter (Aux Building, Rm. 62, Col. S-73) 3LPSW-150 Unit 3 HPI/LPI Room AHU LPSW flow 1176 limiter (Turbine Building, Column M-46) 3LPSW-100 Unit 3 LPI Room 81 AHU 3-1 LPSW 1144 flow limiter (Column S-72 Room 77)

PDW-422 300 Aux Bldg Plant Drinking Water Flow Regulator 16.9.11 a-14 05/05/10 1

AB Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11a Table 16.9.1 la-4 Check Valves Used in the Auxiliary Building Flood Abnormal Procedure Unit Valve No.

Valve Description Valve Location 1&2 LPSW-1101 Unit 1 & 2 HPI/LPI Room LPSW T-1I/J-31, 8' SW Return Check Valve 1&2 LPSW-1 182 Unit 1 & 2 LPI Rooms 62 AHU 3-1 Aux. Building, Rm 62, LPSW Return Check Valve Col. S-73, 3' W 3

LPSW-1179 Unit 3 HPI/LPI Room LPSW Return T-1I/M-46, 4'S Check Valve 3

LPSW-1147 Unit 3 LPI Room 81 AHU 3-1 LPSW S-72, Rm 77, HPI I

Return Check Valve Pump Room 16.9.11 a-15 05/05/10 1

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