RA-18-0280, Submittal of Ufsar/Selected Licensee Commitment Changes

Submittal of Ufsar/Selected Licensee Commitment Changes

ML19184A118
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	06/21/2019
From:	Burchfield J Duke Energy Carolinas
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RA-18-0280
Download: ML19184A118 (43)

Text

J_"-) DUKE

~ ENERGY J. Ed Burchfield, Jr.

Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station Duke Energy ON01VP I 7800 Rochester Hwy RA-18-0280 10 CFR 50.71(e) Seneca, SC 29672 o 864.873.3478

f. 864.873.4208 Ed.Burchfield@duke-energy.com June 21, 2019 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Numbers 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 Renewed License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55 UFSAR/Selected Licensee Commitment Changes Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.71(e), please find attached the latest revisions to the Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) Manual. The SLC Manual constitutes Chapter 16 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

Any questions regarding this information should be directed to Sheila Dalton, Manager Nuclear Support Services, at (864) 873-3657.

I certify that I am a duly authorized officer of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, and that the inforrmation contained herein accurately represents changes made to Chapter 16 of the UFSAR since the previous submittal. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and corr~ct. Executed on June 21, 2019.

Sincerely,

} CJf1JPJ/ ~

J. Ed Burchfield, Jr.

Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station www.duke-energy.com

RA-18-0280 June 21, 2019 Page 2 Attachments: Revised Oconee Nuclear Station SLC Manual Pages SLC List of Effective Pages (LOEPs), Rev. 029 LOEP 1-4 SLC Table of Contents, Rev. 008 TOC 1-7 SLC 16.9.4 Fire Hose Stations, Rev. 003 16.9.4 1-9 SLC 16.9.20 Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors and Feedwater Accumulator, Rev. 003 16.9.20 1-6 SLC 16.9.8 Control Room Ventilation System Booster Fans *DELETED* 16.9.8 N/A SLC 16.5.12 RCS Leak Testing Following Opening of System, Rev. 001 16.5.12 1- 1 SLC 16.13.1 Minimum Station Staffing Requirements, Rev. 002 16.13.1 1 - 12

RA-18-0280 June 21, 2019 Page 3 cc: Ms. Catherine Haney Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 Ms. Audrey Klett, Project Manager (ONS)

(by electronic mail only)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop 0-08B1A Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Mr. Adam Ruh Acting Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 11/28/2018 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Number Implementation Date 16.0 005 08/16/17 16.1 000 10/15/07 16.2 000 08/25/14 16.3 001 06/29/15 16.4 --- PENDING 16.5.1 000 11/26/12 16.5.2 000 11/15/12 16.5.3 000 02/21/07 16.5.4 --- Deleted 03/28/18 16.5.5 --- Deleted 05/16/09 16.5.6 --- Deleted 02/10/14 16.5.7 000 12/13/06 16.5.8 000 01/31/07 16.5.8a --- Deleted 05/19/05 16.5.9 000 11/15/12 16.5.10 000 10/08/03 16.5.11 000 01/31/00 16.5.12 001 10/17/18 16.5.13 000 03/27/99 16.6.1 000 07/23/12 16.6.2 000 01/31/07 16.6.3 000 11/15/12 16.6.4 000 11/15/12 16.6.5 000 12/14/00 16.6.6 000 11/15/12 16.6.7 000 03/27/99 16.6.8 000 03/27/99 16.6.9 000 11/15/12 16.6.10 000 11/15/12 16.6.11 000 11/15/12 16.6.12 000 11/15/12 16.6.13 000 03/31/08 16.6.14 000 04/21/14 16.6.15 000 11/15/12 16.7.1 000 11/15/12 Oconee Nuclear Station LOEP 1 Revision 029

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 11/28/2018 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Number Implementation Date 16.7.2 000 11/15/12 16.7.3 000 11/15/12 16.7.4 000 07/14/05 16.7.5 000 11/15/12 16.7.6 000 04/08/14 16.7.7 000 11/15/12 16.7.8 000 03/27/99 16.7.9 000 10/23/03 16.7.10 000 11/15/12 16.7.11 000 11/15/12 16.7.12 000 06/30/04 16.7.13 000 12/05/12 16.7.14 000 11/15/12 16.7.15 000 04/08/14 16.7.16 000 10/14/15 16.7.17 000 07/14/16 16.8.1 000 08/09/01 16.8.2 000 02/10/05 16.8.3 001 01/26/16 16.8.4 000 02/10/05 16.8.5 000 05/21/15 16.8.6 000 01/04/07 16.8.7 000 01/31/00 16.8.8 000 01/31/00 16.8.9 000 06/21/05 16.9.1 001 08/16/16 16.9.2 002 08/16/16 16.9.3 --- Deleted 01/08/18 16.9.4 003 07/17/18 16.9.5 002 08/16/16 16.9.6 005 12/19/17 16.9.7 001 08/16/16 16.9.8 --- Deleted 09/26/18 16.9.8a 000 02/07/05 16.9.9 002 08/16/17 Oconee Nuclear Station LOEP 2 Revision 029

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 11/28/2018 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Number Implementation Date 16.9.10 000 01/12/04 16.9.11 001 06/29/15 16.9.11a 001 06/06/17 16.9.12 001 09/21/15 16.9.13 000 01/31/07 16.9.14 000 10/28/04 16.9.15 000 03/27/99 16.9.16 000 10/15/14 16.9.17 000 05/23/01 16.9.18 000 07/15/14 16.9.19 000 03/31/05 16.9.20 003 07/17/18 16.9.21 000 07/09/09 16.9.22 --- Deleted 08/16/17 16.9.23 001 08/16/17 16.9.24 003 11/18/16 16.9.25 001 08/16/17 16.10.1 000 11/15/12 16.10.2 000 12/02/03 16.10.3 000 03/27/99 16.10.4 000 11/15/12 16.10.5 --- Deleted 08/24/04 16.10.6 000 03/27/99 16.10.7 001 09/21/15 16.10.8 000 11/27/06 16.10.9 000 11/25/09 16.11.1 000 03/15/11 16.11.2 000 01/31/00 16.11.3 000 11/20/08 16.11.4 000 06/30/14 16.11.5 000 10/30/02 16.11.6 000 11/08/13 16.11.7 000 01/31/00 16.11.8 000 12/21/09 16.11.9 000 03/22/10 Oconee Nuclear Station LOEP 3 Revision 029

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 11/28/2018 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Number Implementation Date 16.11.10 000 05/14/14 16.11.11 000 03/27/99 16.11.12 000 04/10/03 16.11.13 000 03/27/99 16.11.14 000 03/27/99 16.12.1 000 03/27/99 16.12.2 000 05/03/07 16.12.3 000 05/01/03 16.12.4 000 03/27/99 16.12.5 000 03/27/99 16.12.6 000 11/08/07 16.13.1 002 11/28/18 16.13.2 000 12/15/04 16.13.3 000 12/15/04 16.13.4 000 03/27/99 16.13.5 --- Deleted 11/30/99 16.13.6 000 03/27/99 16.13.7 000 12/15/04 16.13.8 000 03/27/99 16.13.9 000 03/27/99 16.13.10 000 03/27/99 16.13.11 000 03/27/99 16.14.1 000 11/15/12 16.14.2 000 07/23/12 16.14.3 000 03/27/99 16.14.4 --- Deleted 03/15/11 16.14.4.a 000 03/15/11 16.15.1 000 04/12/06 16.15.2 000 11/15/12 16.15.3 000 11/15/12 Note: With the introduction of Fusion in June 2015, all controlled documents require a three-digit revision number. Thus, the revision numbers were set to 000 in the summer of 2015. As such, the revision dates for Revision 000 are based on the implementation dates for revisions in effect prior to this change.

Oconee Nuclear Station LOEP 4 Revision 029

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE NO 16.0 SELECTED LICENSEE COMMITMENTS 16.1-1

16.1 INTRODUCTION

16.1-1 16.2 APPLICABILITY 16.2-1 16.3 DEFINITIONS 16.3-1 16.4 COMMITMENTS RELATED TO REACTOR COMPONENTS Pending 16.5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 16.5.1-1 16.5.1 Reactor Coolant System Vents 16.5.1-1 16.5.2 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System 16.5.2.1 16.5.3 Loss of Decay Heat Removal 16.5.3-1 16.5.4 [DELETED] 16.5.4-1 16.5.5 [DELETED] 16.5.5-1 16.5.6 [DELETED] 16.5.6-1 16.5.7 Chemistry Requirements 16.5.7-1 16.5.8 Pressurizer 16.5.8-1 16.5.8a [DELETED] 16.5.8a-1 16.5.9 Testing Following Opening of System (Core Barrel Bolt Inspections) 16.5.9.1 16.5.10 Loss of Reactor Coolant 16.5.10-1 16.5.11 Subcriticality 16.5.11-1 16.5.12 RCS Leakage Testing Following Opening of System 16.5.12-1 16.5.13 High Pressure Injection and the Chemical Addition Systems 16.5.13-1 16.6 COMMITMENTS RELATED TO ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES 16.6.1-1 (NON-ESF SYSTEMS) 16.6.1 Containment Leakage Tests 16.6.1-1 16.6.2 Reactor Building Post-Tensioning System 16.6.2-1 16.6.3 Containment Heat Removal Verification Frequency 16.6.3-1 16.0-1 Rev. 008

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

SECTION TITLE PAGE NO 16.6.4 Low Pressure Injection System Leakage 16.6.4-1 16.6.5 Core Flood Tank Discharge Valve Breakers 16.6.5-1 16.6.6 Core Flooding System Test 16.6.6-1 16.6.7 BWST Outlet Valve Control 16.6.7-1 16.6.8 LPI System Valve Test Restrictions 16.6.8-1 16.6.9 Containment Purge Valve Testing 16.6.9-1 16.6.10 Trisodium Phosphate (TSP) 16.6.10-1 16.6.11 Containment Debris Sources 16.6.11-1 16.6.12 Additional High Pressure Injection (HPI) Requirements 16.6.12-1 16.6.13 Additional Requirements to Support Low Pressure Injection (LPI) 16.6.13-1 Operability 16.6.14 Control of HPI and LPI/RBS Pump Room Temperatures 16.6.14-1 16.6.15 High Pressure Injection (HPI) and Liquid Waste Disposal (LWD) 16.6.15-1 Leakage 16.7 INSTRUMENTATION 16.7.1-1 16.7.1 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation 16.7.1-1 16.7.2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram 16.7.2-1 16.7.3 Emergency Feedwater System 16.7.3-1 16.7.4 Hydrogen Analyzers 16.7.4-1 16.7.5 Steam Generator Overfill Protection 16.7.5-1 16.7.6 Diverse Actuation Systems 16.7.6-1 16.7.7 Position Indicator Channels 16.7.7-1 16.7.8 Incore Instrumentation 16.7.8-1 16.7.9 RCP Monitor 16.7.9-1 16.7.10 Core Flood Tank Instrumentation 16.7.10-1 16.7.11 Display Instrumentation 16.7.11-1 16.0-2 Rev. 008

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

SECTION TITLE PAGE NO 16.7.12 SSF Diesel Generator (DG) Air Start System Pressure 16.7.12-1 Instrumentation 16.7.13 SSF Instrumentation 16.7.13-1 16.7.14 Rod Withdrawal Alarm Limit 16.7.14-1 16.7.15 Engineered Safeguards Protective System (ESPS) Voter Trouble Alarm 16.7.15-1 16.7.16 Spent Fuel Pool - Wide Range Level Instrumentation 16.7.16-1 16.7.17 Reactor Protective System Instrumentation Setpoints 16.7.17-1 16.8 ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS 16.8.1-1 16.8.1 Control of Room Temperatures for Station Blackout 16.8.1-1 16.8.2 Additional Requirements to Support Keowee Hydro Unit (KHU) 16.8.2-1 OPERABILITY 16.8.3 Power Battery Parameters 16.8.3-1 16.8.4 Keowee Operational Restrictions 16.8.4-1 16.8.5 [DELETED] 16.8.5-1 16.8.6 Lee/Central Alternate Power System 16.8.6-1 16.8.7 Auctioneering Diodes 16.8.7-1 16.8.8 External Grid Trouble Protection 16.8.8-1 16.8.9 Keowee Governor Speed Out Of Tolerance (OOT) Alarm 16.8.9-1 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.1-1 16.9.1 Fire Suppression Water System 16.9.1-1 16.9.2 Sprinkler and Spray Systems 16.9.2-1 16.9.3 [DELETED] 16.9.3-1 16.9.4 Fire Hose Stations 16.9.4-1 16.9.5 Fire Barriers 16.9.5-1 16.9.6 Fire Detection Instrumentation 16.9.6-1 16.9.7 Keowee Lake Level 16.9.7-1 16.0-3 Rev. 008

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

SECTION TITLE PAGE NO 16.9.8 [DELETED] 16.9.8-1 16.9.8a HPSW System Requirements to Support Loss of LPSW 16.9.8a-1 16.9.9 Additional Protected Service Water (PSW) System Commitments 16.9.9-1 16.9.10 Component Cooling and HPI Seal Injection to Reactor 16.9.10-1 Coolant Pumps 16.9.11 Turbine Building Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11-1 16.9.11a Auxiliary Building Flood Protection Measures 16.9.11a-1 16.9.12 Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) And 16.9.12-1 Siphon Seal Water (SSW) System Operability Requirements 16.9.13 Spent Fuel Cooling System 16.9.13-1 16.9.14 SSF Diesel Generator (DG) Inspection Requirements 16.9.14-1 16.9.15 Radioactive Material Sources 16.9.15-1 16.9.16 Reactor Building Polar Crane and Auxiliary Hoist 16.9.16-1 (RCS System Open) 16.9.17 Reactor Building Polar Crane (RCS at elevated 16.9.17-1 temperature and pressure) 16.9.18 Snubbers 16.9.18-1 16.9.19 Gravity Induced Reverse Flow to Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) 16.9.19-1 Through a Unit 2 Condensate Cooler 16.9.20 Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors 16.9.20-1 16.9.21 Standby Shutdown Facility External Flood Protection 16.9.21-1 16.9.22 [DELETED] 16.9.22-1 16.9.23 Alternate Chilled Water (AWC) and Alternate Reactor Building Cooling 16.9.23-1 (RBC) Systems 16.9.24 FLEX - Equipment and Connections 16.9.24-1 16.9.25 Spent Fuel Pool Area Isolation 16.9.25-1 16.0-4 Rev. 008

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

SECTION TITLE PAGE NO 16.10 COMMITMENTS RELATED TO STEAM & POWER CONVERSION 16.10.1-1 SYSTEMS 16.10.1 Local Start of Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump 16.10.1-1 16.10.2 Steam Generator Secondary Side Pressure and 16.10.2-1 Temperature (P/T) Limits 16.10.3 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump and Valve Testing 16.10.3-1 16.10.4 Low Presssure Service Water System Testing 16.10.4-1 16.10.5 [DELETED] 16.10.5-1 16.10.6 Emergency Feedwater Controls 16.10.6-1 16.10.7 Alternate Source of Emergency Feedwater (EFW) 16.10.7-1 16.10.8 Upper Surge Tank (UST) Riser Branch Line Automatic Isolation Valves 16.10.8-1 16.10.9 Air Operated Valves (AOVs) Required to Support Standby Shutdown 16.10.9-1 Facility (SSF) During Station Blackout (SBO) 16.11 RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS CONTROL 16.11.1-1 16.11.1 Radioactive Liquid effluents 16.11.1-1 16.11.2 Radioactive Gaseous Effluents 16.11.2-1 16.11.3 Radioactive Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation 16.11.3-1 16.11.4 Operational Safety Review 16.11.4-1 16.11.5 Solid Radioactive Waste 16.11.5-1 16.11.6 Radiological Environmental Monitoring 16.11.6-1 16.11.7 Dose calculations 16.11.7-1 16.11.8 Reports 16.11.8-1 16.11.9 Radioactive effluent release report 16.11.9-1 16.11.10 Radiological Environmental Operating Reports 16.11.10-1 16.11.11 Iodine Radiation Monitoring Filters 16.11.11-1 16.0-5 Rev. 008

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

SECTION TITLE PAGE NO 16.11.12 Radioactive Material in Outside Temporary 16.11.12-1 Tanks Exceeding Limit 16.11.13 Radioactive Material in Waste Gas Holdup 16.11.13-1 Tank Exceeding Limit 16.11.14 Explosive Gas Mixture 16.11.14-1 16.12 REFUELING OPERATIONS 16.12.1-1 16.12.1 Decay Time for Movement of Irradiated Fuel 16.12.1-1 16.12.2 Area Radiation Monitoring for Fuel Loading and Refueling 16.12.2-1 16.12.3 Communication Between Control Room and Refueling Personnel 16.12.3-1 16.12.4 Handling of Irradiated Fuel Assemblies 16.12.4-1 16.12.5 Loads Suspended over Spent Fuel in Spent Fuel Pool 16.12.5-1 16.12.6 Fuel Damage During Fuel Handling Operations in Containment 16.12.6-1 16.13 CONDUCT OF OPERATION 16.13.1-1 16.13.1 Minimum Station Staffing Requirements 16.13.1-1 16.13.2 [DELETED] 16.13.2-1 16.13.3 [DELETED] 16.13.3-1 16.13.4 Reactivity Anomaly 16.13.4-1 16.13.5 Deleted 16.13.5-1 16.13.6 Retraining and Replacement of Station Personnel 16.13.6-1 16.13.7 Procedures for Control of Ph in Recirculated 16.13.7-1 Coolant after Loss-of-coolant Accident & Long-term Emergency Core Cooling Systems 16.13.8 Respiratory Protective Program 16.13.8-1 16.13.9 Startup Report 16.13.9-1 16.13.10 Core Operating Limits Reports 16.13.10-1 16.13.11 Procedure for Station Survey Following an Earthquake 16.13.11-1 16.0-6 Rev. 008

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

SECTION TITLE PAGE NO 16.14 CONTROL RODS AND POWER DISTRIBUTION 16.14.1-1 16.14.1 APSR Movement 16.14.1-1 16.14.2 Control Rod Program Verification 16.14.2-1 16.14.3 Power Mapping 16.14.3-1 16.14.4 [DELETED] 16.14.4-1 16.14.4.a Engineering Work Station 16.14.4.a-1 16.15 VENTILATION FILTER TESTING PROGRAM 16.15.1-1 16.15.1 [DELETED] 16.15.1-1 16.15.2 Control Room Pressurization and Filtering System 16.15.2-1 16.15.3 Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation System 16.15.3-1 16.0-7 Rev. 008

Fire Hose Stations 16.9.4 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.4 Fire Hose Stations COMMITMENT The Power Block Fire Hose Stations listed in Table 16.9.4-1 shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Required Fire Hose A.1 Provide additional 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Station outside reactor equivalent capacity fire building non-functional. hose of length to reach unprotected area at FUNCTIONAL hose station.

OR A.2 Complete an evaluation as Prior to terminating permitted by NRC RIS Required Action A.1 2005-07 and implement alternative compensatory measures as required.

B. Required Fire Hose B.1 Ensure availability of 6 N/A Station inside reactor portable fire extinguishers building non-functional outside the reactor building (water not available to in the personnel air lock isolation valves LPSW- area of the auxiliary building 563 and LPSW-564). for fire brigade use upon entering reactor building.

16.9.4-1 Rev. 003

Fire Hose Stations 16.9.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.9.4.1 Perform visual inspection, including inspection 31 days of coupling gaskets, of the fire hose stations located outside the reactor building and inside reactor building that are accessible during power operation.

SR 16.9.4.2 Perform visual inspection, including inspection 24 months of coupling gaskets, of reactor building fire hose stations that are inaccessible during power operation.

SR 16.9.4.3 Partially stroke test Fire Hose Station Valves. 36 months SR 16.9.4.4 Subject each fire hose to hydrostatic test at 36 months pressure 50 psig greater than the maximum pressure at the station.

SR 16.9.4.5 Perform maintenance inspection including 36 months removal and reracking the hoses and inspection of coupling gaskets.

16.9.4-2 Rev. 003

Fire Hose Stations 16.9.4 Table 16.9.4-1 Fire Hose Stations Fire Fire Fire Hose Fire Hose Valve No.

Area Zone Station # Station Location TB 001 T-1-D-53 D-53 3HPSW 336 TB 002 T-1-G-56 G-56 3HPSW 364 TB 003 T-1-J-54 J-54 3HPSW 360 TB 003 T-1-M-53 M-53 3HPSW 356 TB 005 T-1-J-50 J-50 3HPSW 352 TB 005 T-1-J-47 J-47 3HPSW 348 TB 006 T-1-D-45 D-45 3HPSW 332 TB 008 T-1-J-43 J-43 3HPSW 344 TB 009 T-1-M-43 M-43 3HPSW 340 TB 010 T-1-D-39 D-39 2HPSW 236 TB 011 T-1-F-42 F-42 2HPSW 464 TB 012 T-1-M-39 M-39 2HPSW 324 TB 012 T-1-J-40 J-40 2HPSW 328 TB 012 T-1-J-36 J-36 2HPSW 318 TB 012 T-1-M-36 M-36 2HPSW 314 TB 015 T-1-D-28 D-28 2HPSW 195 TB 015 T-1-D-31 D-31 2HPSW 233 TB 018 T-1-M-31 M-31 2HPSW 306 TB 018 T-1-J-32 J-32 2HPSW 310 TB 018 T-1-J-28 J-28 2HPSW 242 TB 018 T-1-M-29 M-29 2HPSW 246 TB 019 T-1-B-23 B-23 1HPSW 282 TB 019 T-1-D-24 D-24 1HPSW 281 TB 022 T-1-M-24 M-24 1HPSW 212 TB 022 T-1-J-23 J-23 1HPSW 211 TB 024 T-1-F-13 F-13 1HPSW 209 TB 024 T-1-D-16 D-16 1HPSW 210 TB 024 T-1-B-19 B-19 1HPSW 283 TB 025 T-1-J-19 J-19 1HPSW 366 TB 025 T-1-M-19 M-19 1HPSW 213 TB 025 T-1-M-16 M-16 1HPSW 214 TB 025 T-1-J-15 J-15 1HPSW 215 TB 026 T-3-D-53 D-53 3HPSW 335 TB 027 T-3-G-56 G-56 3HPSW 363 TB 028 T-3-J-47 J-47 3HPSW 347 TB 028 T-3-J-50 J-50 3HPSW 351 TB 028 T-3-J-54 J-54 3HPSW 359 TB 028 T-3-M-53 M-53 3HPSW 355 TB 029 T-3-D-45 D-45 3HPSW 331 TB 029 T-3-J-43 J-43 3HPSW 343 TB 029 T-3-M-43 M-43 3HPSW 339 16.9.4-3 Rev. 003

Fire Hose Stations 16.9.4 Fire Fire Zone Fire Hose Fire Hose Valve No.

Area Station # Station Location TB 031 T-3-D-39 D-39 2HPSW 238 TB 031 T-3-F-42 F-42 2HPSW 466 TB 032 T-3-J-32 J-32 2HPSW 309 TB 032 T-3-J-36 J-36 2HPSW 317 TB 032 T-3-J-40 J-40 2HPSW 327 TB 032 T-3-M-39 M-39 2HPSW 323 TB 032 T-3-M-37 M-37 2HPSW 575 TB 033 T-3-D-28 D-28 2HPSW 194 TB 033 T-3-D-31 D-31 2HPSW 230 TB 033 T-3-J-28 J-28 2HPSW 241 TB 033 T-3-M-29 M-29 2HPSW 245 TB 033 T-3-M-31 M-31 2HPSW 305 TB 034 T-3-J-23 J-23 1HPSW 174 TB 034 T-3-D-24 D-24 1HPSW 175 TB 034 T-3-M-24 M-24 1HPSW 176 TB 035 T-3-J-15 J-15 1HPSW 179 TB 035 T-3-J-19 J-19 1HPSW 173 TB 035 T-3-M-18 M-18 1HPSW 177 TB 035 T-3-M-16 M-16 1HPSW 178 TB 036 T-3-D-16 D-16 1HPSW 172 TB 038 T-5-D-45 D-45 3HPSW 330 TB 038 T-5-D-53 D-53 3HPSW 334 TB 038 T-5-J-43 J-43 3HPSW 342 TB 038 T-5-J-54 J-54 3HPSW 358 5th Floor T.O. South End Stairwell TB 038 TOH-1 Office 3HPSW 362 TB 039 T-5-M-53 M-53 3HPSW 354 TB 039 T-5-J-50 J-50 3HPSW 350 TB 039 T-5-J-47 J-47 3HPSW 346 5th Floor T.O. south End Outside TB 039 TOH-2 SW Stairwell 3HPSW 577 Unit 3 T.O. 1st Level Center of TB 039 TOH-3 Room West Wall 3HPSW 338 TB 040 T-5-D-28 D-28 2HPSW 30 TB 040 T-5-D-31 D-31 2HPSW 227 TB 040 T-5-D-39 D-39 2HPSW 239 TB 040 T-5-F-42 F-42 2HPSW 467 TB 040 T-5-J-40 J-40 2HPSW 326 TB 040 T-5-J-36 J-36 2HPSW 316 TB 040 T-5-J-32 J-32 2HPSW 308 TB 040 T-5-J-28 J-28 2HPSW 240 TB 041 T-5-M-39 M-39 2HPSW 322 TB 041 T-5-M-36 M-36 2HPSW 312 16.9.4-4 Rev. 003

Fire Hose Stations 16.9.4 Fire Fire Zone Fire Hose Fire Hose Valve No.

Area Station # Station Location TB 041 T-5-M-31 M-31 2HPSW 304 TB 041 T-5-M-29 M-29 2HPSW 244 TB 041 TOH-4 5th Floor Inside Entrance to S.P.A. 2HPSW 576 TB 042 T-5-G-13 G-13 1HPSW 181 TB 042 T-5-D-16 D-16 1HPSW 182 TB 042 T-5-D-24 D-24 1HPSW 38 TB 042 T-5-J-23 J-23 1HPSW 40 TB 042 T-5-J-19 J-19 1HPSW 39 TB 042 T-5-J-15 J-15 1HPSW 16 TB 043 T-5-M-16 M-16 1HPSW 15 TB 043 T-5-M-24 M-24 1HPSW 183 TB 043 T-5-M-19 M-19 1HPSW 41 5th Floor T.O. Unit 2 1st Level North TB 043 TOH-5 Entry 1HPSW 577 5th Floor T.O. Unit 1st Level South TB 043 TOH-6 Entry 1HPSW 576 TB 044 T-3-F-13 F-13 1HSPW 180 AB 058 AXH-5 South End Hallway 1st Floor 3HPSW 208 AB 058 AXH-4 Outside U-3 Pers. Elevator Lobby 3HPSW 207 AB 061 AXH-14 U-3 HPI Pump Hatch Area Rm. 157 3HPSW 449 AB 061 AXH-17 Next to Spiral Stairs (Rm. 253) 3HPSW 455 Hallway Across From Stairwell AB 064 AXH-3 Between U-2 3HPSW 206 Hallway Outside Pers. Elevator AB 065 AXH-2 Lobby U-2 2HSPW 205 AB 072 AXH-13 HPI Hatch Area 1HPSW 448 AB 076 AXH-1 Beside U-1 Freight Elevator 1HPSW 204 AB 077 AXH-12 Hallway South End U-3 3HPSW 108 AB 077 AXH-11 Hallway Outside (Rm. 166) 3HPSW 19 AB 077 AXH-10 Hallway Across From Room 150 3HPSW 18 AB 079 AXH-15 CC Pump Room 252 3HPSW 454 AB 081 AXH-9 Outside Room 222 2HPSW 201 AB 081 AXH-8 Hallway Outside U-2 Elevator Lobby 2HPSW 200 AB 083 AXH-16 Room 216 U-2 CC Cooler Room 1HPSW 456 AB 085 AXH-6 Outside Room 206 1HPSW 198 AB 085 AXH-7 Hallway at U-1 Freight Elevator 1HPSW 199 AB 086 AXH-18 U-3 Hatch Area Col. Q98 3HPSW 440 AB 086 AXH-19 Hallway Outside U-3 Change Room 3HPSW 458 AB 090 AXH-20 Hallway Across U-2 Pers. Hatch 2HPSW 440 AB 094 AXH-21 Hallway Across U-1 Change Room 1HPSW 457 AB 094 AXH-22 Unit 1 Hatch Area Col. Q64 1HPSW 440 Hot Machine Shop S. Wall at Stairs AB 096 AXH-46 to Mezz 1HPSW-509 WP3 098 AXH-44 West Pene. Room 455 3HPSW 445 16.9.4-5 Rev. 003

Fire Hose Stations 16.9.4 Fire Fire Zone Fire Hose Fire Hose Valve No.

Area Station # Station Location AB 099 AXH-29 East Pene. Room 452 3HPSW 444 AB 101 AXH-31 W. Stairwell Room 450 3HPSW 437 AB 101 AXH-30 U-3 Elev. Lobby S. of Cable Rm. 3HPSW 436 WP2 102 AXH-43 West Pene Room 410 U-2 2HPSW 445 AB 103 AXH-32 U-2 Elevator Lobby 4th Floor 2HPSW 436 AB 103 AXH-42 East Pene Room 407 U-2 2HPSW 444 West Stairwell From Cable Rm. To AB 105 AXH-33 Control Rm. 2HPSW 437 WP1 107 AXH-36 West Pene Rm. 409 U-1 1HPSW 445 AB 108 AXH-45 East Pene Rm. 402 U-1 1HPSW 444 AB 108 AXH-35 Stairwell Outside Rm. 402 1HPSW 436 Rx Bldg Purge Room (Room 666)

AB 115 AXH-40 U-3 3HPSW 446 AB 116 AXH-41 U-3 Vent Equipment Room 650 3HPSW 462 AB 118 AXH-39 Purge Room 618 2HPSW 446 AB 119 AXH-38 Col. Q-73 Room 603 2HPSW 447 AB 121 AXH-37 East Wall U-1 Purge Room 600 1HPSW 446 RB1 122 RBH 1-1 1st Floor - East Side 1LPSW 471 RB1 122 RBH 1-2 2nd Floor - East Side 1LPSW 473 RB1 122 RBH 1-3 4th Floor - East Side 1LPSW 475 RB1 122 RBH 1-4 4th Floor - West Side 1LPSW 465 RB1 122 RBH 1-5 2nd Floor - West Side 1LPSW 467 RB1 122 RBH 1-6 1st Floor - West Side 1LPSW 469 RB2 123 RBH 2-1 Basement - East Side 2LPSW 471 RB2 123 RBH 2-2 2nd Floor - East Side 2LPSW 473 RB2 123 RBH 2-3 4th Floor - East Side 2LPSW 475 RB2 123 RBH 2-4 4th Floor - West Side 2LPSW 465 RB2 123 RBH 2-5 2nd Floor - West Side 2LPSW 467 RB2 123 RBH 2-6 Basement - West Side 2LPSW 469 RB3 124 RBH 3-1 Basement - East Side 3LPSW 471 RB3 124 RBH 3-2 2nd Floor - East Side 3LPSW 473 RB3 124 RBH 3-3 4th Floor - East Side 3LPSW 475 RB3 124 RBH 3-4 4th Floor - West Side 3LPSW 465 RB3 124 RBH 3-5 2nd Floor - West Side 3LPSW 467 RB3 124 RBH 3-6 Basement - West Side 3LPSW 469 KEO KEO KH-1 Operating Deck (NW) SW 111 KEO KEO KH-2 Operating Deck (NE) SW 112 KEO KEO KH-3 Operating Deck (SW) SW 113 KEO KEO KH-4 Operating Deck (SE) SW 114 KEO KEO KH-5 Mechanical Equipment Gallery SW 115 KEO KEO KH-6 Control Room SW 116 KEO KEO KH-7 Spiral Case Gallery SW 117 KEO KEO KH-8 Draft Tube Gallery SW 118 YARD ESV ESVH-1 Essential Siphon Vacuum Building HPSW 916 16.9.4-6 Rev. 003

Fire Hose Stations 16.9.4 Fire Fire Zone Fire Hose Fire Hose Valve No.

Area Station # Station Location East Door Essential Siphon Vacuum Building YARD ESV ESVH-2 West Door HPSW 917 YARD Radwaste RWH-1 North End of RW 102 Roll-up Door HPSW 499 YARD Radwaste RWH-2 Col. 14-F HPSW 497 YARD Radwaste RWH-3 South End Corridor 1st Floor HPSW 491 YARD Radwaste RWH-4 East Stairwell Room 105 HPSW 492 YARD Radwaste RWH-5 North End Stairwell HPSW 498 YARD Radwaste RWH-6 West Wall Hallway Col. 14-F HPSW 494 YARD Radwaste RWH-7 South End of Isle Room (202) HPSW 489 YARD Radwaste RWH-8 Hallway Outside Supv. Office HPSW 495 YARD Radwaste RWH-9 East Stairwell Col. 14-C HPSW 493 YARD Radwaste RWH-10 Mezz Floor Carbon Filter Train HPSW 496 YARD Radwaste RWH-11 South Stairs Room 304 HPSW 490 SSF SSF SSF-H-1 Pump Room Level HPSW 391 SSF SSF SSF-H-2 Stairwell DG Level HPSW 394 SSF SSF SSF-H-3 DG Room HPSW 390 SSF SSF SSF-H-4 Stairwell Ground Level HPSW 389 SSF SSF SSF-H-5 Stairwell Outside HVAC Room HPSW 406 YARD Intake IH-1 West End of Intake HPSW 479 YARD Intake IH-2 Center of Intake HPSW 480 YARD Intake IH-3 East End of Intake HPSW 481 East Side PSW Building (North PSW PSW PSW-H-1 Entry Door) HPSW-976 East Side PSW Building (South PSW PSW PSW-H-2 Entry Door) HPSW-977 TB Lower Roof TBR-1, (Hose Valve Near Access Hatch TBR-2, with Three Cabinets Along the TB TB-ROOF TBR-3 Pump Aisle at Units 1, 2& 3) HPSW-983 Unit 2 TB Upper Roof TB TB-ROOF TBR-4 (Near Access Door) HPSW-986 Unit 3 TB Upper Roof (Hose Valve Near SW Corner, Hose TB TB-ROOF N/A is located in Hose Cabinet TBR-4) HPSW-985 16.9.4-7 Rev. 003

Fire Hose Stations 16.9.4 BASES On June 16, 2004, the NRC revised its regulation Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Section 50.48 to include a new paragraph 50.48(c) that incorporates by reference National Fire Protection Association 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants 2001 Edition, hereafter referred to as NFPA 805. On December 29, 2010, the NRC issued Oconees Safety Evaluation Report (SER) approving adoption of a performance-based (PB) fire protection program (FPP) as an alternative to the existing, deterministic fire protection regulations. Specifically, NFPA 805 allows the use of PB methods, such as fire modeling, and risk-informed (RI) methods, such as fire probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), to demonstrate compliance with the nuclear safety performance criteria. As a result of transitioning to the NFPA 805 Licensing Basis, certain Fire Protection Systems and Features are required to satisfy either the NFPA 805 Chapter 3 fundamental fire protection program safety goals or the NFPA 805 Chapter 4 performance based/risk informed safety goals. These required Fire Protection Systems and Features are being placed into SLCs since they comprise the safety basis of the new fire protection program.

Allowed out of service times and action statements along with some surveillance requirements are being revised to be consistent with the new NFPA 805 licensing basis and safety goals.

The documentation of these required fire protection systems and features is provided in the Fire Protection Design Basis Specification. All power block hose stations are included in this SLC to meet the requirements of NFPA 805, Chapter 3, Section 3.6.1.

The equipment contained in this SLC is considered part of the NFPA 805 Power Block. Power Block structures, systems, and components (SSCs) typically include safety-related and balance-of-plant systems and components required for operation, including radioactive waste processing and storage, the 230 kV switchyard, and Keowee Dam and associated structures.

Power Block SSCs are required for the safe and reliable operation of the plant. Calculation OSC-10650, Oconee NFPA 805 Power Block, defines the Power Block for Oconee.

The Reactor Building (RB) hose stations cannot meet the system demands of pressure and flow as required for fire fighting with hose stations in the RBs as required by NFPA 14, 1978 edition. The Fire Protection SER dated December 29, 2010 documents the NRC review and approval of this deviation. The basis for acceptance is as follows:

• No credit for manual suppression is given in the containment Fire PRA.

• Duke committed to use the LPSW to supply the hose stations/standpipes in the RBs.

The LPSW pumps were not designed to be able to provide the required pressures for the RB hose stations.

• The RB fire hazards are minimized. Higher pressure for hose station operations is provided at the lower elevations where there is a higher concentration of combustibles.

• The ONS fire brigade has low-pressure nozzles available and is trained on their use.

• There are six carbon dioxide fire extinguisher staged at each RB personnel hatch.

• The primary purpose of the hose stations in containment is to act as back-up manual suppression during non-power operation (NPO) modes.

The expected response to a fire in containment during power operations is not to enter the RB and let the fire burn out either via fuel consumption or lack of oxygen. The fire brigade is 16.9.4-8 Rev. 003

Fire Hose Stations 16.9.4 trained and standard operating procedures direct them to preferably only enter an area to fight a fire with a charged hose line which would be connected to the HPSW system via Auxiliary Building hose stations with an alternative connection supplied from a yard fire hydrant. A hose station connected to the LPSW system is available at the personnel hatch. Fire brigade personnel will determine if fire is within the capabilities of these hose stations.

The FUNCTIONALITY of the NRC committed Fire Suppression System ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring at the Oconee or Keowee facilities. The regulatory requirement is to have NRC committed Fire Hose Stations FUNCTIONAL only when the equipment it is protecting is required OPERABLE / FUNCTIONAL for plant safety. However, to protect the equipment for property conservation and minimize equipment loss due to fire; the Oconee and Keowee NRC committed Fire Hose Stations will be required to be FUNCTIONAL at all times.

In the event that portions of the Fire Suppression Systems are non-functional, alternate backup fire-fighting equipment is required to be made available for the affected areas until the non-functional equipment is restored to service.

The testing requirements provide assurance that the minimum FUNCTIONALITY requirements of the Fire Suppression System are met.

This Selected Licensee Commitment is part of the Oconee Fire Protection Program and therefore subject to the provisions of Oconee Facility Operating License Conditions.

REFERENCES:

1. Oconee UFSAR, Chapter 9, Section 9.5.1 and UFSAR, Chapter 18, Table 18-1 (Portions of this SLC are credited in the Fire Protection Program for License Renewal).

2. Oconee License Renewal Commitments, OSS-0274.00-00-0016.

3. Oconee Fire Protection SER dated December 29, 2010.

4. Oconee Design Basis Specification for Fire Protection Program, (OSS-0254.00-00-4008),

as required.

5. OSC-10650, Oconee NFPA 805 Power Block.

6. OSC-9677, NFPA 14 Code Conformance Review

7. RIS 2005-07, Compensatory Measures to Satisfy the Fire Protection Program Requirements.

16.9.4-9 Rev. 003

Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors and Feedwater Accumulator 16.9.20 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.20 Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors and Feedwater Accumulator COMMITMENT a. Two Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors shall be FUNCTIONAL for the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF).

b. The Feedwater Accumulator shall be FUNCTIONAL for the MFCVs and SFCVs.

---

NOTE-----------------------------------------

The Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors shall be FUNCTIONAL for the MFCVs and SFCVs when used to comply with Required Actions.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 for the SSF.

MODES 1, 2, and 3 with Main Steam header pressure 700 psig for MFCVs and SFCVs:

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required Diesel A.1 Place one Diesel Driven 4 hrs Driven Service Air Service Air Compressor in Compressor continuous operation.

nonfunctional B. Two required Diesel B.1 Place one Diesel Driven Immediately Driven Service Air Service Air Compressor in Compressors continuous operation.

nonfunctional OR OR B.2.1 Declare the SSF ASW Immediately Required Action and inoperable.

associated Completion Time of Condition A not AND met B.2.2 Enter applicable TS Immediately Condition.

16.9.20-1 Rev. 003

Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors and Feedwater Accumulator 16.9.20 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Feedwater Accumulator C.1.1 Verify required Diesel Immediately nonfunctional Driven Service Air Compressors are FUNCTIONAL.

AND C.1.2 Complete an engineering 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> evaluation.

OR C.2.1 Declare all affected Immediately MFCVs and SFCVs inoperable.

AND C.2.2 Enter applicable TS Immediately Condition(s).

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.9.20.1 Start and run Diesel Driven Service Air 31 days Compressors.

SR 16.9.20.2 Perform Auto Start test 12 months SR 16.9.20.3 Test the Feedwater Accumulator affected 24 months pressure boundary.

16.9.20-2 Rev. 003

Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors and Feedwater Accumulator 16.9.20 BASES BACKGROUND Original plant analysis of the Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) indicated that sufficient air capacity existed in the Instrument Air (IA) system such that the Main and Start-up Feedwater Control Valves could be closed following a Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) and a concurrent Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP). However, it was later determined that small steam line breaks could require AFIS isolation a significant amount of time after the initial break and LOOP, which would have resulted in a decay in air system pressure (Ref. 3). For small steam line breaks the pressure could decay such that the Feedwater Control Valves would not close if demanded by AFIS (Refs. 1 and 3). During such an event, the Feedwater Accumulator has sufficient compressed air available to close the Feedwater Control Valves if demanded by AFIS.

A Feedwater Accumulator can be made up of one or more tanks.

For the MFCVs and SFCVs, the Modes of Applicability and Allowed Completion Times support TS LCO(s) 3.3.11, 3.3.12, and 3.3.13 which are associated with AFIS. The air provided by the Feedwater Accumulator is necessary to support Feedwater Isolation functions during small steam line breaks which cause AFIS actuation a significant amount of time after the initiating LOOP and MSLB. TS LCO 3.7.3 provides operability requirements for the MFCVs and SFCVs.

A loss of the air supply renders these valves inoperable.

The ability of the SSF to mitigate Station Blackout (SBO) can be compromised if steam leakage is excessive. The corrective action program (Ref. 8) provides an Operability Evaluation that discusses the allowable steam leakage during SBO with IA available. To prevent excessive steam leakage, AOVs shall be functional and not fail open during a SBO. The commitments for SLC 16.10.9, Main Steam (MS), Auxiliary Steam (AS), and Steam Seal Header (SSH) Air Operated Valves (AOVs) Required to Support SSF During Station Blackout provides the AOVs that must be functional. During a SBO event, the Diesel Driven Service Air compressors will start and supply the IA system to support the AOVs addressed in the commitments for SLC 16.10.9 to continue function and limit steam leakage. Note: The Feedwater Accumulator only provides backup air to the MFCVs and SFCVs and not to AOVs addressed by SLC 16.10.9 that support SSF operability.

For the SSF, the Modes of Applicability and Allowed Completion Times are based on the applicability of LCO 3.10.1 and stated separately because they are more restrictive. The air supplied by the Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors is necessary to support minimization of MS, AS, and SSH leakage during SBO.

SLC COMMITMENT SLC Commitment (a) requires any two of the three Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors to be FUNCTIONAL for the SSF. SLC Commitment (b) requires the Feedwater Accumulator to be FUNCTIONAL for the MFCVs and SFCVs. SLC Commitment (b) is modified by a note indicating that the Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors shall be FUNCTIONAL for the MFCVs and SFCVs when used to comply with Required Actions. The Diesel Driven Air Compressor is considered FUNCTIONAL when it is capable of automatically starting and supplying sufficient air to maintain system pressure on a LOOP or SBO and low IA system 16.9.20-3 Rev. 003

Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors and Feedwater Accumulator 16.9.20 header pressure. The Diesel Driven Air Compressor is also considered FUNCTIONAL when continuously operating in manual, capable of supplying sufficient air to maintain IA system pressure. The Feedwater Accumulator is considered FUNCTIONAL when it is capable of providing sufficient compressed air to close (10 minutes after a LOOP and MSLB in containment) and maintain closed the MFCVs and SFCVs for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> thereafter.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSIS Sufficient air pressure (> 68 psig) is necessary in order to assure that the MFCVs and SFCVs will close when demanded by AFIS. The Feedwater Accumulator provides sufficient compressed air for operation of the MFCVs and SFCVs to assure they will close when demanded by AFIS. Closure of these valves is necessary to terminate Feedwater flow. The accumulator provides a safety related passive air supply to replace the non-safety related diesel air compressors to resolve the OPERABILITY problem identified in AR 1906479. Sufficient air pressure is also required to ensure the AOVs addressed in SLC 16.10.9 commitments operate properly to prevent excessive steam leakage during SBO.

Two Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors are required to be FUNCTIONAL to allow for a failure of one to start on demand. Each compressor supplies about 1600 scfm which is more than sufficient to maintain system pressure (Ref. 2). A capacity of at least 1300 scfm at a pressure of 100 to 125 psig is required. The Compressor relief valve set point does not exceed Service Air system design pressure. Two Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors with auto start capabilities are always connected to the Service Air header or one Diesel Driven Service Air Compressor shall be operated loaded. Additional Diesel Driven Air Compressors may be connected as appropriate to support the SLC commitment. Additionally, the Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors shall start and operate without reliance upon station or offsite power.

A flow path(s) with the capability of 1300 SCFM must be operable in order to supply the IA system.

APPLICABILITY For the MFCVs and SFCVs, this SLC applies when any Unit is in MODES 1, 2, and MODE 3 with Main Steam header pressure 700 psig. In MODES 1, 2, and MODE 3 with Main Steam header pressure 700 psig the Steam Generator (SG) inventory contains enough energy to contribute significantly to the peak containment pressure and SG tube thermal stresses during a secondary side break. Feedwater must be isolated to limit the mass and energy releases to the Reactor Building.

For the MFCVs and SFCVs, once SG pressures have decreased below 700 psig, the Feedwater Accumulator is not required. In MODES 4, 5 and 6, the reactor coolant system temperatures are too low to allow the SGs to effectively remove energy. AFIS is not required; therefore, the Feedwater Accumulator is not required.

In support of the SSF, this SLC applies when any Unit is in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The AOVs addressed by the commitments of SLC 16.10.9 control steam flow to various components and fail open on loss of air during an SBO event. The AOVs shall remain OPERABLE to prevent excessive steam leakage that could cause overcooling of the SSF and prevent the SSF RC Makeup Pump from being able to properly control RCS inventory.

16.9.20-4 Rev. 003

Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors and Feedwater Accumulator 16.9.20 Since the Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors support common systems for all 3 Units this SLC is applicable when any Unit is in the MODE of Applicability.

ACTIONS A.1 When one of the two required Diesel Driven Service Air compressors becomes nonfunctional, a Diesel Driven Service Air Compressor capable of providing 1300 scfm at a pressure of 100 to 125 psig shall be started and run continuously within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> completion time is reasonable to allow manual starting of another diesel compressor. This is acceptable due to the low probability of the worst-case DBA occurring during this period.

B.1 and B.2 With both required Diesel Driven Service Air compressors nonfunctional or the Required Action and associated Completion Times of Condition A not met, a Diesel Driven Service Air compressor capable of providing 1300 scfm at a pressure of 100 to 125 psig shall be manually started immediately or the SSF ASW shall be declared inoperable immediately and the appropriate TS Condition (TS 3.10.1 Condition A for SSF ASW) shall be entered immediately.

C.1 and C.2 With the Feedwater Accumulator nonfunctional, verify required Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors are FUNCTIONAL (RA C.1.1). An engineering evaluation shall be performed within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to determine whether the nonfunctional accumulator has any impact on the ability of the Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors to close the MFCVs and SFCVs when demanded by AFIS (RA C.1.2). The 72-hour Completion Time is considered appropriate since the non-safety related Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors are FUNCTIONAL and have sufficient capacity to carry all the station instrument loads and require no operator action to start.

Alternatively, all affected MFCVs and SFCVs shall be declared inoperable immediately and TS 3.7.3 Conditions A and B shall be entered immediately (RA C.2.1 and C.2.2).

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 16.9.20.1 The Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors are required to manually start on the first attempt or automatically start and load within 90 seconds every 31 days. Battery condition, oil viscosity, and other factors influence how reliably the Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors start and run. Because of the location of the Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors, weather and time can significantly influence the start and run factors. By starting and running the compressors regularly, the ability to start is ensured and maintenance items can be detected. The Frequency of 31 days is acceptable based on engineering judgment.

16.9.20-5 Rev. 003

Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors and Feedwater Accumulator 16.9.20 SR 16.9.20.2 The Diesel Driven Service Air Compressors are required to automatically start and load within 90 seconds on a loss of power and low Instrument Air system header pressure. The automatic start circuitry is not subject to any short term degradation mechanisms. Therefore, the Annual Frequency is acceptable.

SR 16.9.20.3 This SR tests the Feedwater Accumulator periodically. The 24 month Frequency ensures the accumulator can hold the required 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of compressed air needed to operate the MFCVs and SFCVs after a 10 minute isolation of IA and stroking the valves closed.

REFERENCES

1. OSC-8222 - Anticipated Response Of The Instrument Air Header To A Loss Of Off-Site Power (Loop) Event And A Main Steam Line Break Event.

2. OSC-8653 - Design Input Calculation For OE-18827 Diesel Air Compressor Auto-Start Modification.

3. OSC-8700 - Reduced Air Pressure Sizing Evaluation for the Feedwater Main and Startup Control Valves, FDW-32, 35, 41, 44.

4. PIP O-04-02808 (AR #1906479), Questionable AFIS and MFDW Control Valve Operability

5. Letter dated July 6, 2004 from R. A. Jones (Duke) to Document Control Desk (NRC) -

Licensee Event Report 269/2004-02, Rev. 0.

6. Letter dated September 9, 2004 from R. A. Jones (Duke) to Document Control Desk (NRC)

- Licensee Event Report 269/2004-02, Rev. 1.

7. OE-18827 - Minor Mod Package to Install Auto-Start Circuitry for Diesel Compressors.

8. PIP O-06-7655 (AR #1906468), Procedure does not direct initial MS branch line isolation within 10 minutes.

9. OSC-8994 - MS System Responses During SBO with and without Instrument Air.

10. SLC 16.10.9 - Air Operated Valves (AOVs) Required to Support Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) During Station Blackout (SBO).

11. NRC SER for AFIS, dated Sept 26, 2001, Docket 50-269 for the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> mission time, and AFIS DBD and OSC 7997 for the 10 minute wait.

12. OSC-11412, Calculation for FDW Control Valve Accumulator.

16.9.20-6 Rev. 003

DELETED 16.9.8 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.8 [DELETED]

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 16.9.8-1 Rev. 002

RCS LEAK TESTING FOLLOWING OPENING OF SYSTEM 16.5.12 16.5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 16.5.12 RCS LEAK TESTING FOLLOWING OPENING OF SYSTEM COMMITMENT Perform specified SR.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, MODE 2 with Keff 1.0 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. N/A. A.1 N/A. N/A SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.5.12.1 Perform RCS leakage test at a pressure not Once following any less than the pressure corresponding to 100% opening of RCS rated reactor power.

BASES The requirement(s) of this SLC section were relocated from CTS 4.3.2 during the conversion to ITS.

Repairs or modifications made to the Reactor Coolant System are inspectable and testable under applicable codes. The specific code and edition thereof shall be consistent with 10 CFR 50.55a.

REFERENCES N/A 16.5.12-1 Rev.001

Minimum Station Staffing Requirements 16.13.1 16.13 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 16.13.1 Minimum Station Staffing Requirements COMMITMENT a. Minimum station staffing shall be as indicated in Table 16.13.1-1 and shall meet the following additional requirements:

1. At least one Reactor Operator (RO) per unit shall be present in the control room when fuel is in the reactor. In addition, while the unit is in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4, at least one licensed Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) shall be present in the control room.

2. At least one licensed operator shall be in the reactor building when fuel handling operations in the reactor building are in progress. In addition, during CORE ALTERATIONS including fuel loading and transfer, an SRO or an SRO limited to fuel handling shall be present to directly supervise the activity and, during this time, shall not be assigned to other licensed activities.

3. If the computer for a reactor is inoperable for more than eight hours, an operator, in addition to those specified in Improved Technical Specifications (ITS) 5.2.2.b and 10 CFR 50.54(m) shall supplement the control room staff.

b. The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) shall be an experienced SRO.

c. The Shift Fire Brigade shall have a minimum compliment of 10 members.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements for A.1 Restore minimum station 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> minimum station staffing levels.

staffing not met.

16.13.1-1 Rev. 002

Minimum Station Staffing Requirements 16.13.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.13.1.1 N/A N/A 16.13.1-2 Rev. 002

Minimum Station Staffing Requirements 16.13.1 Table 16.13.1-1 MINIMUM STATION STAFFING REQUIREMENTS THREE UNITS TWO UNITS IN TWO UNITS IN ONE UNIT IN THREE UNITS IN MODES 1-4 MODES 1-4 MODES 1-4 MODES 1 - 4 IN MODES 5 OR CONTROLLED CONTROLLED 6 OR NO MODE FROM TWO FROM ONE CONTROL CONTROL ROOMS ROOM SM 1 1 1 1 1 STA 1 1 1 1 1 1

SRO 4 4 4 4 4 3, 9 RO 6 6 6 6 6 1,2,5,7,9 NLO 9 9 9 9 8 4

FIN24 5 5 5 5 5 Chemistry 1 1 1 1 1 Technician RP Qualified 8 3 3 3 3 3 Individual Security 6, 7 4 4 4 4 3 Officer 1 Per the EPLAN, SROs must be increased by one if an SRO is serving as fire brigade leader. This decreases the required NLO number by one unless all three units are in MODES 5 or 6 or NO MODE.

2 NLO number must be increased by two when in ITS 3.5.2 Condition B (Reference 12).

3 RO number must be increased by one when in ITS 3.5.2 Condition B (Reference 12).

4 FIN24 number must be increased by two when time to boil for the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) is less than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (Reference 16).

5 NLO or Keowee Operator must be increased by one when Keowee Hydro Unit (KHU) assigned to the Underground Power Path is credited for TS 3.7.10. This NLO must be stationed at Keowee.

6 Two Security Officers are Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) qualified personnel. Security Officers may be reduced by a like number when MERT qualified personnel are supplied from another organization.

7 Positions are reduced by one when all three units in Modes 4, 5, 6, or No Mode. The Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) Submersible Pump does not need to be deployed nor SSF equipment verification.

8 One RP Qualified Individual must meet or exceed RP Technician minimum qualifications per TS 5.2.2.d.

9. Per the EPLAN, required ROs or NLOs must be increased by one if either position is serving as the local/state communicator. The number of SROs cannot be reduced.

16.13.1-3 Rev. 002

Minimum Station Staffing Requirements 16.13.1 BASES The requirements of this SLC consolidate ONS station staffing requirements into one document. This SLC includes the shift manning requirements of ITS 5.2.2 (Reference 5), 10 CFR 50.48.c (Reference 20), Reference 10, 10 CFR 50.54.m (Reference 6), ITS 3.5.2 (Reference 12), Loss of Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) cooling due to Protected Service Water (PSW)

Event (Reference 16), the Emergency Plan (EPLAN) (Reference 7), and additional requirement imposed by this SLC.

The requirements of this SLC are implemented by station procedures and manuals. The numbers for each position per shift are additive unless otherwise stated. For example, Table 16.13.1-1 requires a total of four SROs per shift (Three SROs are required by 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i) plus one additional SRO for ERO. When an SRO is serving as the Fire Brigade leader, the number or required SROs is increased to five.). The bases for the numbers in the first column of SLC Table 16.13.1-1 are as follows:

1 SM (active SRO) Required by 50.54(m)(2)(ii) and EPLAN Table B-1a. Implemented by OMP 2-01 (Reference 15).

1 STA (active or inactive SRO) Required by ITS 5.2.2.g and EPLAN Table B-1a.

Implemented by OMP 2-01.

4 SROs - ERO and Fire Brigade Required by 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i) and EPLAN Table B-1a. Implemented by OMP 2-01 and Oconee Fire Brigade Standard Operating Guide #2 (SOG-02) (Reference 3).

10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i) requires three SROs be onsite when all three units are in MODES 1-4. This number can be decreased by one when either two or three of the units are in MODES 5 or 6. When all three units are in MODES 5 or 6, one SROs is required.

Per ITS 5.2.2.b and 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(iii) two of the three SROs must be in the control room when the corresponding reactor is in MODES 1-4.

Per the EPLAN, four SROs are required independent of plant mode. These four are not additive to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i) unless one or more units are in MODES 5 or 6. One EPLAN-required SRO is the NRC (federal) communicator and may also be the local/state communicator.

16.13.1-4 Rev. 002

Minimum Station Staffing Requirements 16.13.1 The fire brigade leader may be fulfilled by an SRO or NLO; provided the SRO number for each column in Table 16.13.1-1 is increased by one. This also decreases the NLO number for each column in Table 16.13.1-1 by one unless all three units are in MODES 5 or 6 or NO MODE.

Reference 10 requires ten total fire brigade members.

1 SRO - CORE ALTERATIONS Required by 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(iv). The number of SROs in Table 16.13.1-1 is increased by one for each unit performing CORE ALTERATIONS per SLC 16.13.1.a.2.

6 ROs - SSF and ERO Required by 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i), ITS 5.2.2, and the EPLAN. Implemented by OMP 2-01.

10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i) requires five ROs be onsite when all three units are in MODES 1-4. This number can be decreased by one when either two or three of the units are in MODES 5 or 6. When all three units are in MODES 5 or 6, three ROs are required.

ITS 5.2.2.b and 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(iii) require three of the five ROs be present in the control room when fuel is in the corresponding reactor.

Per ITS 5.2.2.h, the manpower necessary to achieve alternate shutdown using the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be available at all times. When all three units are in MODES 1-3, one RO per unit must be available to be dispatched to the SSF. Since three ROs must be present in the Control Room, only two are available to dispatch to the SSF. Therefore, one additional RO, beyond what is required by 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i) is required. These ROs are exclusive of fire brigade and the minimum operating shift required in the Control Rooms.

The EPLAN requires six ROs independent of plant MODE. These six are not additive to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i) or ITS 5.2.2 unless one or more units are in MODES 5 or 6.

16.13.1-5 Rev. 002

Minimum Station Staffing Requirements 16.13.1 1 RO - ADV Amendments 314, 314, 314 (Reference 12) requires that staffing level be increased by an additional RO beyond what is required in Table 16.13.1-1 when in Condition B of ITS 3.5.2. The additional RO is designated to respond to an event requiring activation of the SSF for the unit operating under ITS 3.5.2 Condition B. The additional RO role may be fulfilled by an SRO as long as the SRO is not being counted towards the number of required SROs listed in Table 16.13.1-1 and is qualified to tasks involving operation of the SSF systems.

9 NLOs - SSF, ERO, and Fire Brigade Required by ITS 5.2.2, Reference 10, and the EPLAN. Implemented by OMP 2-01 and SOG-02.

ITS 5.2.2.a requires six NLOs be onsite when all three units are in MODES 1-4. This number can be decreased by one when either two or three of the units are in MODES 5 or 6. When all three units are in MODES 5 or 6, three NLOs are required.

Per ITS 5.2.2.h, the manpower necessary to achieve alternate shutdown using the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) will be available at all times. When all three units are in MODES 1-3, one NLO must be available for SSF equipment verification for the design basis fire. This NLO is exclusive of fire brigade and the minimum operating shift required in the Control Rooms.

Per the EPLAN, eight NLOs are required independent of plant MODE. Five are required for fire brigade if a NLO is the fire brigade leader and one NLO per unit is required to complete critical AP and EOP actions.

The fire brigade leader may be fulfilled by an SRO or NLO; provided the SRO number for each column in Table 16.13.1-1 is increased by one. This also decreases the NLO number for each column in Table 16.13.1-1 by one. Reference 10 requires ten total fire brigade members.

16.13.1-6 Rev. 002

Minimum Station Staffing Requirements 16.13.1 The five NLOs required by ITS 5.2.2.a are not additive to the requirements of the EPLAN. The NLO required by ITS 5.2.2.h is additive to the requirements of the EPLAN unless all three units are in MODES 4, 5, 6, or NO MODE since the SSF is not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

2 NLOs - ADV License Amendments 314, 314, 314 (Reference

12) requires that staffing levels be increased by an additional two NLOs beyond those required in Table 16.13.1-1 when in Condition B of ITS 3.5.2.

The additional NLOs are designated for the purpose of operating the Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) for the unit under ITS 3.5.2 Condition B. In addition, the NLOs with the responsibility for operating the ADVs will be designated to respond to the control room within five minutes and will not be given duties that will prevent this from happening.

1 NLO - Keowee When the Keowee Hydro Unit (KHU) assigned to the underground power path is credited for operability of PSW for TS 3.7.10, staffing levels shall be increased by an additional NLO or Keowee Operator beyond those required in Table 16.13.1-1.

The additional NLO or Keowee Operator is designated for the purpose of manually transferring auxiliary power supply for the KHU from Keowee transformer CX to Keowee auxiliary transformer 1X (for KHU-1) or 2X (for KHU-2) should an event mitigated by PSW occur and Keowee transformer CX be de-energized. This transfer is credited as being completed within 18 minutes of emergency start of the underground KHU. The NLO or Keowee Operator will be stationed at Keowee and will not be given duties that will prevent this from happening.

5 FIN24 - SSF Submersible Pump, Required by EPLAN Table B-1a and Reference 10.

ERO, and Fire Brigade Implemented by MD 9.1 (Reference 4) and SOG-02.

Consists of two instrumentation and electrical (IAE) maintenance technicians and two mechanical maintenance (MM) technicians (all four ERO qualified and knowledgeable of AM/0/A/1300/059 16.13.1-7 Rev. 002

Minimum Station Staffing Requirements 16.13.1 (Reference 17)). EPLAN Table B-1a requires two IAE technicians and two MM technicians.

One FIN24 supervisor or temporary supervisor is needed to perform callouts of maintenance personnel to establish the Operations Support Center (OSC) and support the OSC Maintenance Supervisor functions (Reference 4).

In the event of a fire, FIN24 will respond to the fire until directed to install the submersible pump. A total of five FIN24 personnel are assigned to the fire brigade. It is acceptable to consider these additional five Fire Brigade members to be available for other duties; such as installation of the SSF submersible pump (Reference 11). OMP 2-01 and SOG-02 contain guidance on allowing fire brigade members to be released from the brigade for operational needs at the discretion of the OSC/TSC.

The number of FIN24 personnel qualified as fire brigade members may be reduced; provided that the qualified fire brigade members from other organizations are increased by a like number. This does not change the total number of FIN24 personnel required; only the number required to be fire brigade qualified. Reference 10 requires ten total fire brigade members.

2 FIN24 - Loss of SFP Cooling Required by Loss of Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) cooling due to PSW Event. The minimum staffing number for FIN24 is increased by two when time to boil for the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) is less than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to support SFP Area Isolation due to SFP boiling caused by the loss of SFP cooling due to a PSW event. If the time to boil is less than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, the SFP Loading Bay roll-up door must be opened within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> due to increasing temperatures in the SFP area (Reference 16).

1 Chemistry Technician - ERO Required by EPLAN Table B-1a. Implemented by and Fire Brigade OMP 2-01 and Station Chemistry Manual 2.6 (Reference 9).

16.13.1-8 Rev. 002

Minimum Station Staffing Requirements 16.13.1 A Chemistry Technician who is fire brigade qualified may be credited toward fulfilling the ERO requirement and the fire brigade requirement. In the event of a fire, the Chemistry technician will respond to the fire until directed otherwise.

Reference 10 requires ten total fire brigade members.

3 RP Qualified Individuals - ERO One RP Technician is required by ITS 5.2.2.d to be and Fire Brigade onsite when fuel is in a reactor.

ERO requires three RP Qualified Individuals per EPLAN Table B-1a. Implemented by HP/0/B/1000/054 (Reference 19). RP Technicians may be counted toward fulfilling the RP Qualified Individual ERO Requirement (Reference 8).

RP technicians or qualified individuals who are fire brigade qualified may be credited toward fulfilling the ERO and TS requirements and the fire brigade requirement. In the event of a fire, the RP technician or qualified individuals will respond to the fire until directed otherwise. Reference 10 requires ten total fire brigade members.

4 Security Officers - SAS, MERT, Required by EPLAN Table B-1a. Consists of one and SSF Submersible Pump security officer for Accountability and two Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) qualified technicians. The number of security officers may be reduced provided that a like number of MERT qualified personnel are provided from other organizations. This reduces the total number of security officers required, but not the total number of individuals required to be MERT qualified.

Security will automatically supply one Security Officer when deploying the SSF Submersible Pump to open doors/gates and assist as needed with any maintenance activities performed. This individual is supplied from the security on-shift staffing. A Security Officer is not required to assist with deploying the SSF Submersible Pump when all three units are in Modes 5, 6, or No Mode; therefore, security personnel can be reduced by one.

16.13.1-9 Rev. 002

Minimum Station Staffing Requirements 16.13.1 Fire Brigade (Multiple Positions)

• The primary purpose of the Fire Protection Program (Reference 1) is to minimize both the probability and consequences of postulated fires. A properly trained and equipped Fire Brigade organization of at least ten members is needed to provide immediate response to fires that may occur at the site. Five Fire Brigade members are required by NFPA 805 (Reference 2). An additional five are required to meet the level committed to as a result of Fire Brigade staffing studies and operating experience as detailed in References 10 and 11.

The EPLAN (Reference 7) reflects a ten-member Fire Brigade compliment.

• The Fire Brigade requirement is normally met by using one SRO (or NLO qualified to be a fire brigade leader), four NLOs, and five SPOC personnel. However, this requirement can also be met by using personnel from other organizations (e.g., Chemistry, Radiation Protection, and Security). Fire Brigade SOG-02 (Reference 3) and Operations OMP 2-01 (Reference 15) provide additional details on staffing requirements and allowed duties for Fire Brigade personnel.

• The individual fulfilling the fire brigade leader position shall be a SRO or an NLO who is qualified to be a fire brigade leader (Required by NFPA 805 and EPLAN Table B-1a). Per OMP 2-01, this individual functions as fire brigade leader and is not available for control room activities when directing the fire brigade. NFPA 805 does not specify that the brigade leader be an SRO, it only specifies that the fire brigade leader and at least two brigade members have sufficient training and knowledge of nuclear safety systems to understand the effects of fire and fire suppressants on nuclear safety performance criteria.

• Fire Brigade training requirements relocated from TS 6.1.1.8 to SLC 16.13.1, Fire Brigade (dated 3/27/99) during the conversion to ITS have since been relocated to the Fire Protection Program (Reference 1).

ERO (Multiple Positions)

• Any changes to ERO roles in this SLC should be evaluated against the ERO On-Shift Staffing Analysis Report (Reference 18) in addition to any requirements listed in this SLC prior to implementing a change.

• The SRO required for ERO can be "licensed or previously licensed". This was a change from "active or inactive" implemented by SLC Change 2004-03 (References 13 and 14).

• The change from RP Technician to RP Qualified Individual in the EPLAN has been evaluated under the License Amendment Request (LAR) process. Amendments 376/378/377 were issued on July 29, 2011 (Reference 8).

• The local/state communicator position may be filled by a SRO, RO, or NLO. If a RO or NLO is filling this position, the RO or NLO number for each column in Table 16.13.1-1 is increased by one. This does not affect the SRO numbers in Table 16.13.1-1; as a SRO is still required to be the NRC (federal) communicator.

16.13.1-10 Rev. 002

Minimum Station Staffing Requirements 16.13.1 HISTORICAL INFORMATION Some of the requirement(s) of the SLC BASES section were relocated from TS 6.1.1.9 and TS Table 6.1-1 during the conversion to ITS. These requirements were initially relocated to SLC 16.13.5, Additional Operating Shift Requirements, dated 3/27/97. This SLC also includes the old staffing requirements of SLC 16.13.1, Fire Brigade, dated 3/27/99.

SLC 16.13.1.a.1 requires at least one RO per unit to be present in the control room when fuel is in the reactor and one SRO to be present in the control room while in MODES 1-4. This requirement is based on 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(iii) and ITS 5.2.2.b. The first part of SLC 16.13.1.a.2, which requires at least one licensed operator to be in the reactor building when fuel handling operations in the reactor building were in progress, was relocated during the ITS conversion from TS Table 6.1-1, Additional Requirement 3. This requirement has existed since the initial issuance of Oconee Technical Specifications. The second part of SLC 16.13.a.2, which requires that a SRO or an SRO limited to fuel handling activities be present to directly supervise CORE ALTERATIONS including fuel loading or transfer and be assigned no other duties, is based on 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(iv). SLC 16.13.1.a.3 which requires an operator, in addition to those specified in ITS 5.2.2.b to supplement the control room staff if the computer for a reactor is inoperable for more than eight hours, was relocated during the ITS conversion from TS Table 6.1-1, Additional Requirement 6. This requirement has also existed since the initial issuance of Oconee Technical Specifications. SLC 16.13.1.b, which specifies the STA shall be an experienced SRO was relocated during the ITS conversion from TS 6.1.1.9. The STA was previously referred to as the Shift Manager or Shift Work Manager (the present-day Shift Manager was referred to as the Shift Supervisor). Revision 50 to OMP 2-1 renamed the person fulfilling this position an STA. Note that pre-conversion TS Table 6.1-1, which implemented NUREG-0737 requirements, did not require an STA on shift when no units were in MODES 1-4. The SLC Table is more restrictive in that it requires an STA on shift at all times.

ACTIONS A.1 With the requirements for minimum station staffing not met, the minimum station staffing levels shall be restored within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Completion Time is consistent with ITS 5.2.2.c and d which allows 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to accommodate unexpected absence of on-duty shift crew members provided that immediate action is taken to restore the shift crew composition to within the minimum requirements.

16.13.1-11 Rev. 002

Minimum Station Staffing Requirements 16.

13.1 REFERENCES

1. Fire Protection Program Design Basis Document, OSS-0254.00-00-4008.

2. Amendments Regarding Transition to a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program in Accordance With 10 CFR 50.48(c), Amendments 371/373/372, issued December 29, 2010.

3. Oconee Fire Brigade Standard Operating Guide #2 (O-0-SOG-9000-002 / CSD-ONS-FS-002).

4. MD 9.1 - Emergency Preparedness Plan Activation, Revision 6.

5. ITS 5.2.2, Station Staff, Amendments 300/300/300.

6. 10 CFR 50.54, Conditions of Licenses, subparagraph (m).

7. Emergency Plan, Volume A, Section B, Onsite Emergency Organization, Table B-1a.

8. Amendments Regarding Changes to the Emergency Plan, Amendments 376/378/377, issued July 29, 2011 (ML11158A209).

9. Station Chemistry Manual 2.6, Chemistry Minimum Staffing and Scheduling Guidelines.

10. Problem Investigation Report Serial No. 1-089-0001 (Fusion ID: CAS - ON - AR - PIR 1 - 089 - 001 - 018922396).

11. AR 01883495 (PIP 4-O99-2987).

12. ITS 3.5.2, High Pressure Injection (HPI), Amendments 314/314/314.

13. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2002-16, Current Incident Response Issues.

14. AR 01739128 (PIP O-03-0233).

15. OMP 2-01 "Duties and Responsibilities of On-Shift Operations Personnel.

16. AR 01905054 (PIP O-12-2891)

17. AM/0/A/1300/059, Pump - Submersible - Emergency SSF Water Supply - Installation and Removal.

18. ONS-OSSA-12212012 Revision 0, ERO On-Shift Staffing Analysis Report.

19. HP/0/B/1000/054, Radiation Protection Routines.

20. 10 CFR 50.48, Fire Protection, subparagraph (c) National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805.

16.13.1-12 Rev. 002