ONS-2015-107, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (Ufsar), Selected Licensee Commitments Change

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Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (Ufsar), Selected Licensee Commitments Change
ML15303A013
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/20/2015
From: Batson S
Duke Energy Carolinas
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ONS-2015-107
Download: ML15303A013 (33)


Text

DUKE ENERGYV Vice cottsL.President IE~~E~I5~Oconee Nuclear Station Duke Energy ONO1VP I 7800 Rochester Hwy Seneca, SC 29672 o; 864.873.3274 ONS-201 5-107 10 CER 50.71(e) I. 864.873.4208 Scott.Batsont~duke-energy.com October 20, 2015 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2746

Subject:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Numbers 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 UFSAR/Selected Licensee Commitments Change Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.71(e), please find attached the latest revision to the Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) Manual. The SLC Manual constitutes Chapter 16 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

Any questions regarding this information should be directed to Sandra Severance, Regulatory Affairs, at (864) 873-3466.

I certify that I am a duly authorized officer of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, and that the information contained herein accurately represents changes made to Chapter 16 of the UFSAR since the previous submittal. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on October 20, 2015.

Sincerely, Scott L. Batson Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station Attachment www.duke-energy.com

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission October 20, 2015 Page 2 cc: Mr. Leonard D. Wert, Jr.

Administrator, Region II (Acting)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 Mr. James R. Hall, Senior Project Manager (ONS)

(By electronic mail only)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop O-8G9A Rockville, MD 20852-2746 Mr. Jeffrey A. Whited, Project Manager (By electronic mail only)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop O-8B1A Rockville, MD 20852-2746 Mr. Eddy L. Crowe Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station

O NS-201 5-107 October 20, 2015 Attachment Revised Oconee Nuclear Station SLC Manual Pages SLC List of Effective Pages (LOEPs), Rev. 003 LOEP 1 - 4 SLC 16.9.12, Additional LPSW and SSW Operability Requirements, 16.9.12-1 thru 17 Rev. 001 SLC 16.10.7, Alternate Source of EFW, Rev. 001 16.10.7- 1 thru 9

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 09/21115 List of Effective Pages

_PaQe Revision Number Implementation Date 16.0 000 05/21/15 16.1 000 10/15/07 16.2 000 08/25/14 16.3 001 06/29/15 16.4 -- PENDING 16.5.1 000 11/26/12 16.5.2 000 11/15/12 16.5.3 000 02/21/07 16.5.4 000 11/15/12 16.5.5 -- Deleted 5/16/09 16.5,6 -- Deleted 02/10/14 16.5.7 000 12/13/06 16.5.8 000 01/31/07 16.5,8a -- Deleted 5/19/05 16.5.9 000 11/15/12 16.5.10 000 10/08/03 16.5.11 000 01/31/00 16.5.12 000 03/27/99 16.5.13 000 03/27/99 16.6.1 000 07/23/12 16,6.2 000 01/31/07 16,6.3 000 11/15/12 16.6,4 000 11/15/12 16.6.5 000 12/14/00 16,6.6 000 11/15/12 16.6.7 000 03/27/99 16.6.8 000 03/27/99 16.6.9 000 11/15/12 16.6,10 000 11/15/12 16.6.11 000 11/15/12 16.6,12 000 11/15/12 16.6.13 000 03/31/08 16.6.14 000 04/21/14 16.6.15 000 11/15/12 16.7.1 000 11/15/12 Oconee Nuclear StationLEP1Rvso03 LOEP 1 Revision 003

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 09/21/15 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Number Implementation Date 16.7.2 000 11/15/12 16.7.3 000 11/15/12 16.7.4 000 07/14/05 16.7.5 000 11/15/12 16.7.6 000 04/08/14 16.7.7 000 11/15/12 16.7.8 000 03/27/99 16.7.9 000 10/23/03 16.7.10 000 11/15/12 16.7.11 000 11/15/12 16.7.12 000 06/30/04 16.7.13 000 12/05/12 16.7.14 000 11/15/12 16.7.15 000 04/08/14 16.8.1 000 08/09/01 16.8.2 000 02110/05 16.8.3 000 10/20/09 16.8.4 000 02/10/05 16.8.5 000 05/21/15 16.8.6 000 01/04/07 16.8.7 000 01/31/00 16.8.8 000 01/31/00 16.8.9 000 06/21/05 16.9.1 000 12/05/12 16.9.2 000 12/31/12 16.9.3 000 12/31/12 16.9.4 000 12101/14 16.9.5 000 1213 1/12 16.9.6 001 08/03/15 16.9.7 000 07/23/12 16.9.8 000 02115/06 16.9.8a 000 02107/05 16.9.9 000 01/30/15 16.9.9a 000 01 /30/15 16.9.10 000 01/1 2104 Oconee Nuclear StationLEP2Rvso03 LOEP 2 Revision 003

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 09/21/15 List of Effective Pages PaeRevision Number Implementation Date 16.9,11 001 06/29/15 16.9.11a 000 10/20/14 16.9.12 001 09/21/15 16.9.13 000 01/31/07 16.9.14 000 10/28/04 16.9.15 000 03/27/99 16.9.16 000 10/15/14 16.9.17 000 05/23/01 16.9.18 000 07/15/14 16,9.19 000 03/31/05 16.9.20 000 05/28/14 16,9.21 000 07/09/09 16.9.22 000 06/13/14 16.9.23 pending PENDING 16.9.24 pending PENDING 16.10.1 000 11/15/12 16.10.2 000 12/02/03 16.10.3 000 03/27/99 16.10.4 000 11/15/12 16.10.5 -- Deleted 08/24/04 16.10.6 000 03/27/99 16.10.7 001 09/21/15 16.10.8 000 11/27/06 16.10.9 000 11/25/09 16.11.1 000 03/15/11 16.11.2 000 01/31/00 16.11.3 000 11/20/08 16.11.4 000 06/30/14 16.11.5 000 10/30/02 16.11.6 000 11/08/13 16.11.7 000 01/31/00 16.11.8 000 12/21/09 16.11.9 000 03/22/10 16.11.10 000 05/14/14 16.11.11 000 03/27/99 Oconee Nuclear Station LOEP LE3Rvso3 Revision 003 0

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 09/21/15 List of Effective Pages PaQe Revision Number Implementation Date 16.11.12 000 04/10/03 16.11.13 000 03/27/99 16.11.14 000 03/27/99 16.12.1 000 03/27/99 16.12.2 000 05/03/07 16.12.3 000 05/01/03 16.12.4 000 03/27/99 16.12.5 000 03/27/99 16.12.6 000 11/08/07 16.13.1 000 10/06/14 16.13.2 000 12/15/04 16.13.3 000 12/15/04 16.13.4 000 03/27/99 16.13.5 --- Deleted 11/30/99 16.13.6 000 03/27/99 16.13.7 000 12/15/04 16.13.8 000 03/27/99 16.13.9 000 03/27/99 16.13.10 000 03/27/99 16.13.11 000 03/27/99 16.14.1 000 11/15/12 16.14.2 000 07/23/12 16.14.3 000 03/27/99 16.14.4 --- Deleted 03/15/11 16.14.4.a 000 03/15/11 16.15.1 000 04/12/06 16.15.2 000 11/15/12 16.15.3 000 11/15/12 Note: With the introduction of Fusion in June 2015, all controlled documents require a three-digit revision number. Thus, the revision numbers were set to "000" in the summer of 2015. As such, the revision dates for Revision 000 are based on the implementation dates for revisions in effect prior to this change.

'"""'ee N""'ea Station L.vI,-I I ('*I=D C~ID 4A Revision 003

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.12 Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) And Siphon Seal Water (SSW) System OPERABILITY Requirements COMMITMENT The following Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs) shall be OPERABLE:

a. LPSW-4 ("A" LPI COOLER SHELL OUTLET)
b. LPSW-5 ("B" LPI COOLER SHELL OUTLET)
c. LPSW Pump Minimum Flow Recirculation Lines
d. LPSW-1 39 (LPSW SUPPLY TO TB NON-ESSENTIAL HOR)
e. LPSW-251 ("A" LPI COOLER LPSW CONTROL)
f. LPSW-252 ("B" LPI COOLER LPSW CONTROL)
g. LPSW flow to each Reactor Building Cooling Unit (RBCU)
h. LPSW-1054, 1055, 1061, 1062
i. One required SSW Header
j. LPSW Pump(s) required for SSW Header OPERABILITY as defined by TS 3.7.7 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. LPSW flowpath through A.1 Declare associated LPI Immediately an LPI cooler isolated train inoperable.

by a manual valve.

B. LPSW-4 inoperable and B.1 Declare associated LPI Immediately closed, train inoperable.

OR LPSW-5 inoperable and closed.

16.9.12-1 Rv 0 Rev. 001 I

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. LPSW flowpath through C.1 Verify all required Immediately an LPI cooler not LPSW Pumps are isolated by manual OPERABLE valve.

AND AND LPSW-4 inoperable and C.2 Restore LPSW-4 to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> not closed. OPERABLE status.

D. LPSW flowpath D.1 Verify all required Immediately through an LPI cooler LPSW Pumps are not isolated by OPERABLE.

manual valve.

AND AN_.D D.2 Restore LPSW-5 to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LPSW-5 inoperable OPERABLE status.

and not closed.

16.9.12-2 001 16.9.12-2Rev.

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. One required LPSW E.1 Restore required LPSW 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> pump minimum flow pump minimum flow recirculation line recirculation line to inoperable. OPERABLE status.

OR Two required Unit 3 LPSW Pump minimum flow recirculation lines inoperable OR Two required Unit 1&2 LPSW Pump minimum flow recirculation lines inoperable when two LPSW pumps are required to be OPERABLE by TS 3.7.7.

F. Two or more Unit 1 and F.1 Declare affected LPSW Immediately 2 LPSW pump Pumps inoperable.

minimum recirculation lines inoperable when three LPSW pumps are required to be OPERABLE by TS 3.7.7.

16.9.12-3 001 16.912-3Rev.

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

-NOTE------G.1 Verify all required LPSW Immediately If either Unit 1 or Unit 2 is in Pumps are OPERABLE.

the MODE of APPLICA-BILITY, then both 1LPSW- AND 139 and 2LPSW-139 are required to be OPERABLE.

G.2 Restore LPSW-139 to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OPERABLE status G. LPSW-139 inoperable and associated flow path not isolated by a manual valve.

H. 1LPSW-139 inoperable H.1 Verify all required LPSW Immediately and associated flow Pumps OPERABLE.

path not isolated by a manual valve.

AND AND 2LPSW-139 inoperable H.2 Restore LPSW-139 on 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and associated flow Unit 1 and 2 to path not isolated by a OPERABLE status.

manual valve.

AND Total Unit 1 and 2 LPSW non-essential header flow is less than 10,000 gpm.

16.9.12-4 Rv 0 Rev. 001 I

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 1LPSW-139 inoperable 1.1 Declare all Unit 1 and 2 Immediately and associated flow LPSW Pumps inoperable.

path not isolated by a manual valve.

AND 2LPSW-1 39 inoperable and associated flow path not isolated by a manual valve.

AND Total Unit 1 and 2 LPSW non-essential header flow is 10,000 gpm or greater.

J. LPSW-251 inoperable J.1 Declare associated LPI Immediately and not failed open. train inoperable.

OR LPSW-252 inoperable and not failed open.

K. LPSW flow to any K.1 Restore acceptable flow 7 days RBCU is less than 420 to RBCU.

gpm.

OR AND The LPSW inlet K.2.1 Close LPSW inlet 7 days isolation valve for the isolation valve for the associated RBCU is not associated RBCU.

closed.

AND K.2.2 Enter TS 3.6.5 if required. Immediately 16.9.12-5 001 I 16.912-5Rev.

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME L. LPSW-1 054, 1055, L.1 Enter TS 3.6.5 or TS Immediately 1061, or 1062 not 3.7.7, if required.

OPERABLE to close by the LPSW AND Waterhammer Prevention System L.2.1 Restore to OPERABLE 7 days status AND OR LW10051,an 1054,no L.2.2.1 Close either LPSW- 7 days 1055,sad 15 o 1051, 1054, 1055, or 1058 OR AND L.2.2.2 Close either LPSW- 7 days LPSW-1059, 1061, 1059, 1061, 1062, or 1062 and 1065 not 1065 closed M. A and B SSW headers M.1 Declare all ECCW Immediately inoperable, headers inoperable.

N. One SSW header N.1 Restore A and B SSW 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> inoperable, headers to OPERABLE status.

AND OR One required LPSW Pump inoperable on N.2 Restore required LPSW 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Unit supplying pump to OPERABLE OPERABLE SSW status.

header as defined by TS 3.7.7.

16.9.12-6 001 16.9.12-6Rev.

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

0. Required ACTION and 0.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> assoc~iated Completion Time not met for AND Condition C, D, E, G, H, or N. 0.2 Be in MODE 5. 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.9.12.1 Test LPSW-4, LPSW-5, LPSW-1 39, and In accordance with the check valves in the SSW headers in Inservice Testing accordance with the Inservice testing Program Program.

SR 16.9.12.2 Verify that the LPSW pump minimum flow 24 months recirculation lines can pass required flow.

SR 16.9.12.3 Verify that each RBCU that has an open inlet Every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> isolation valve has LPSW flow that is 420 gpm or greater.

SR 16.9.12.4 Verify LPSW-1 054, 1055, 1061, and 1062 are 18 months operable and capable of closure when demanded by the LPSW RB Waterhammer Prevention System (WPS) 16.9.12-7 Rv 0 Rev. 001 I

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 BASES BACKGROUND The Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) System provides cooling water for normal and emergency services throughout the station. Safety related functions served by this system include the Reactor Building cooling units (RBCUs), Low Pressure Injection (LPI) coolers, and coolers for the High Pressure Injection (HPI) and Emergency Feedwater (EFW) motors. LPSW also provides cooling water for the non-safety related Reactor Building Auxiliary Cooling units (RBAC) and the Reactor Coolant Pump Motors (RCPM).

The Siphon Seal Water (SSW) System consists of two full capacity headers.

The "A" SSW header is supplied by the Unit 1 and 2 LPSW system. The Unit 3 LPSW System supplies the "B" SSW header. Each SSW header is capable of providing sealing flow to Unit 1, 2 and 3's ESV pumps.

APPLI CABLE Sufficient LPSW System flow is required to meet the acceptance criteria of SAFETY containment heat removal safety analyses. In addition, LPSW piping inside ANALYSES containment forms a closed loop. The pressure boundary of the RBCU piping and the RCPM piping form a closed loop inside containment and must be maintained to ensure containment integrity following an accident or transient. The RBAC piping has containment isolation valves and the piping inside containment is not acting as the "second barrier" for containment.

The analysis to support Generic Letter 96-06 determined the magnitude of the waterhammer pressure pulses in the LPSW System resulting from column closure and condensation induced waterhammers during Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and Main "Steam Line Break (MSLB) events (Refs.

15 and 16). The calculation determined that severe waterhammers could occur that are not bounded by existing analysis during a LOCA/LOOP or MSLB/LOOP scenario if the required LPSW flow or alignment is not maintained to the RBCUs. Later analysis for the LPSW Waterhammer Prevention System (WPS) requires that the piping run be full normally to prevent preexisting voids at the time the WPS actuates. Consistent with past values, 420 gpm through each operating RBCU is required (Ref. 20 and 21) unless LPSW flow through the RBCU is isolated by closing the RBCU inlet isolation valve. There are no waterhammer concerns with the RBCU inlet isolation valve closed and the associated outlet isolation valve open. If an RBCU is hydraulically isolated by closing the inlet and outlet RBCU isolation valves, the isolated piping within containment must be drained or vented to prevent overpressurization during any of the above events. The LPSW piping to and from the RBACs has been separated from the "B" RBCU piping. Waterhammer is also possible in the RBACs if the RBAC Isolation Circuitry is bypassed or not operational.

16.9.12-8 001 I 16.9.12-8Rev.

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 BASES APPLICABLE The RBACs contain a total of 16 cooling coils with individual isolation valves.

SAFETY Flow through all RBACs is isolated by closing either LPSW-1 051, 1054, ANALYSES 1055, or 1058. Valves LPSW-1054, 1055, 1061, and 1062 are automatically (continued) closed upon either actuation of the LPSW RB WPS or actuation of ES Channels 5 & 6. There are no waterhammer concerns when either LPSW-1051, 1054, 1055, or 1058 is closed since flow following an LPSW pump restart is blocked. The RBACs are assumed isolated in the analysis that demonstrates waterhammer prevention in the RBCUs and RCPMs, which is achieved by automatically closing LPSW-1 054, 1055, 1061, and 1062 as described above. These valves are not automatically reopened upon restoration of LPSW system pressure.

The SSW System is a support system to the ECCW System. Maintaining the ECCW siphon headers OPERABLE during accident and transient events is an assumption in the accident and transient analysis. The SSW System is required to ensure ECCW siphon header piping remains sufficiently primed to supply siphon flow to the LPSW suction piping.

SSW header OPERABILITY requires that it be supplied from LPSW.

OPERABILITY of an ESV pump requires that it be supplied by at least one OPERABLE SSW header. Each SSW header has a non-safety related HPSW backup. Since the HPSW supply is not safety related, HPSW is not credited to supply the SSW system during a design basis accident. If an ESV pump is operated without seal water, degradation can occur within minutes.

COMMITMENT

  • LPSW-4 and LPSW-5 are considered OPERABLE when the valves are capable of being throttled from the Control Room.
  • LPSW-1 39 is considered OPERABLE if capable of being closed from the Control Room unless previously closed or isolated.
  • LPSW-251 and LPSW-252 are considered OPERABLE when they maintain the capability to fail open either as directed from the Control Room or on a loss of Instrument Air.
  • The required LPSW alignment is maintained to each out Of service RBCU.
  • LPSW flow through each RBCU aligned for flow is 420 gpm or greater to ensure waterhammers are prevented when the LPSW RB Waterhammer Prevention System actuates.
  • LPSW-1054, 1055, 1061, and 1062 are required to close upon actuation of the LPSW RB Waterhammer Prevention System (WPS).

16.9.12-9 001 I 16.912-9Rev.

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 BASES COMMITMENT

LPSW Pump(s) shall be OPERABLE to support OPERABILITY of the required SSW header as defined by TS 3.7.7.

APPLICABILITY This SLC applies in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. This applicability is consistent with the LPSW System OPERABILITY requirements in Technical Specification 3.7.7 and ECCW OPERABILITY requirements in TS 3.7.8. In MODES 5 and 6 the OPERABILITY requirements of the LPSW System are determined by the system it supports.

ACTIONS A.1 If the LPSW flowpath through an LPI cooler is isolated due to a closed manual valve, although LPSW pump NPSH and LPSW flow to other safety related loads would be adequate, LPSW flow to the affected LPI cooler would not be sufficient. The affected LPI train shall be declared inoperable immediately.

B.1I During normal operation, LPSW flow is isolated to the LPI coolers with block valves LPSW-4 and LPSW-5 in the closed position. If a LOCA occurs, LPSW-4 and LPSW-5 are required to be opened after Reactor Building Emergency Sump (RBES) recirculation is established. If LPSW-4 or LPSW-5 is closed and not capable of throttling LPSW flow, then LPSW pump NPSH and LPSW flow to the other safety related loads would be adequate.

However, the LPSW flow to the affected LPI cooler would not be adequate.

Thus, if LPSW-4 or LPSW-5 is closed and do not have throttle capability, then the affected LPI train shall be declared inoperable immediately.

C.1. C.2. D.1, D.2 If LPSW-4 or LPSW-5 are not closed and do not have throttle capability, OPERABILITY of all required LPSW pumps shall be verified immediately to ensure adequate LPSW pump NPSH and flow to safety related loads. In addition, LPSW-4 and/or LPSW-5 must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> completion time is consistent with TS 3.7.7.

For Units 1 & 2, both units would be affected if a valve on either unit is inoperable. In Condition C or D, LPSW pump NPSH and LPSW flow to the safety-related loads may be inadequate. If a single failure of an LPSW pump is not assumed, then sufficient LPSW flow to, and NPSH for, the safety related loads would exist.

16.9.12-10 Rev.

Rv 001 0

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 BASES ACTIONS E. 1 (continued)

LPSW-4 and LPSW-5 are not actuated by an ES signal. By maintaining isolation of LPSW flow to the LPI Coolers during the initial phase of a LOCA, the potential exists for the LPSW pumps to be operated below the manufacturer's recommended minimum continuous flow rate. If all LPSW pumps successfully start and operate during the event, the potential exists for a stronger pump to deadhead a weaker pump during low flow conditions. To avoid damaging a pump due to minimum flow concerns, minimum flow recirculation piping exists for each LPSW pump. The minimum flow recirculation lines ensure the OPERABILITY of a deadheaded pump until LPSW-4 or LPSW-5 are open on the LOCA unit after RBES recirculation is established. If an LPSW pump's minimum flow recirculation line is inoperable, the LPSW system cannot withstand a single failure and still be capable of fulfilling its safety function. Thus ACTION must be taken to restore the recirculation line to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> which is consistent with TS 3.7.7.

If both Unit 3 LPSW pump minimum flow recirculation lines are inoperable, the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is still appropriate because the stronger LPSW pump will always have sufficient flow and will maintain operability. Likewise, if the Unit 1&2 LPSW system is in a condition that only requires two OPERABLE LPSW pumps per TS 3.7.7, the minimum flow recirculation lines associated with both OPERABLE pumps may be simultaneously inoperable for a duration of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. LPSW pump minimum flow recirculation lines are not required to be OPERABLE if the associated pumps are inoperable.

F.1I If Unit 1 and 2 are in a MODE that requires three OPERABLE LPSW pumps (per TS 3.7.7) and two or more minimum flow recirculation lines are out-of-service, the affected LPSW Pumps shall be declared inoperable immediately.

In the event of a LOCA, LPSW-1 39 is credited to close after RBES Recirculation is established, but prior to opening valves LPSW-4 and LPSW-5. Since the Unit 1 & 2 LPSW system is shared, both 1 LPSW-1 39 and 2LPSW-1 39 shall be closed ifthe non-LOCA unit has tripped due to a concurrent Loss-Of-Offsite-Power (LOOP). Closing LPSW-1 39 maintains sufficient LPSW pump NPSH and adequate LPSW flow to the safety related loads.

16.9.12-11 001 I 16.9.2-11Rev.

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 BASES ACTIONS If LPSW-1 39 is not capable of closing and a single failure of an LPSW pump (continued) occurs, LPSW pump flow to the safety related loads might be insufficient and LPSW pump NPSH may be inadequate. In this Condition, all required LPSW pumps shall be verified OPERABLE immediately and LPSW-139 shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Since the Unit 1 & 2 LPSW system is shared and 1 LPSW-139 and 2LPSW-139 are normally open, the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time applies to both Units 1 and 2 if either 1 LPSW-1 39 or 2LPSW-139 is inoperable.

If all required LPSW pumps are available, LPSW pump NPSH and LPSW flow to the safety-related loads will be sufficient. If 1 LPSW-1 39 or 2LPSW-139 is closed or isolated by system block valves, e.g. for maintenance during a unit outage, remote closure capability of the valve is not required.

H.1, H.

If both 1LPSW-139 and 2LPSW-139 are inoperable and not isolated by a manual valve, and total Unit 1 & 2 LPSW non-essential header flow is less than 10,000 gpm, OPERABILITY of all required LPSW pumps shall be verified immediately to ensure that there will be sufficient LPSW pump flow to, and NPSH for safety related loads. Additionally, 1 LPSW-139 and 2LPSW-139 must be restored to OPERABLE status within the stated 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time.

1.1 If 1 LPSW-1 39 and 2LPSW-1 39 are inoperable and not isolated by a manual valve, and total Unit 1 & 2 LPSW non-essential header flow is greater than 10,000 gpm, sufficient LPSW pump flow to, and NPSH for the safety related loads would not be available, even with all three LPSW pumps available.

Consequently, all of the Unit 1 and 2 LPSW pumps shall be declared inoperable immediately.

16.9.12-12 001 I 16.9.2-12Rev.

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 BASES ACTIONS J.__

(continued)-

Air operated valves LPSW-251 and LPSW-252 are the normal LPI cooier fiow control valves. The control valves fail open on a loss of Instrument Air (IA). If a LOCA occurs, IA and Auxiliary Instrument Air (AlA) are assumed unavailable since they are not safety related. With LPSW-251 and LPSW-252 failed open, LPSW-4 and LPSW-5 are credited for throttling LPI cooler shell side flow to maintain sufficient LPSW pump Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) and adequate LPSW flow to the safety related loads. LPSW-251 and LPSW-252 may also be failed open by placing the Fail Switch in the FAIL OPEN position or by isolating instrument air to the valve actuator and bleeding air pressure from the actuator. Should either LPSW-251 or LPSW-252 become inoperable and not fail open, the associated LPI train shall be declared inoperable immediately.

If a LOCA/LOOP or MSLB/LOOP were to occur while in this Condition, a waterhammer could occur; however, the piping is not expected to fail. The Completion Time is consistent with TS 3.7.7 for conditions that have the LPSW WPS inoperable. A waterhammer could occur upon LPSW pump restart following a LOOP due to the pipe not running full when operating at reduced flow rates. When the pipe does not run full, voids can form prior to WPS actuation. Consequently, either the affected RBCU inlet isolation valve must be closed, or the flow rate restored to a value greater than the minimum required value. Isolation of flow to a RBCU could make it inoperable and TS 3.6.5 would need to be entered.

When both the inlet and outlet RBCU piping is isolated, the RBCU isolated piping must be vented to containment or drained to preclude thermal over-pressurization.

16.9.12-13 Rv 0 Rev. 001 I

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 BASES ACTIONS Li1 L.2 (continued)

If a LOCA/LOOP or MSLB/LOOP were to occur while in this Condition, a waterhammer could occur; however, the piping is not expected to fail. The RBACs are assumed to be isolated from the RBCU and RCPM piping (in the thermal-hydraulic analysis of the LPSW system response during actuation of the LPSW WPS) and LPSW-1 054, 1055, 1061, and 1062 perform that function. Thus, these valves must be capable of closing upon actuation of the LPSW WPS. If these valves are not capable of closure and the RBAC's are aligned to LPSW, the LPSW WPS may be inoperable since the system is in an unanalyzed configuration. The Completion Time is consistent with TS 3.7.7 for conditions that have the LPSW WPS inoperable. Isolating the supply header to the RBAC by closing either LPSW-1 051, 1054, 1055, or 1058 prevents the possibility of waterhammer. Closing LPSW-1 059, 1061, 1062, or 1065 isolates the RBAC return to make the flow path hydraulically isolated from the RBCU/RCPM flow path in order to be consistent with the analysis. Required Action L.1 requires entering the applicable TSs (TS 3.6.5 or TS 3.7.7) immediately, if required, as the WPS for the RBCUs may not be OPERABLE.

M.1 One SSW header shall be OPERABLE to support the ESV pumps and ECCW siphon headers. If no SSW header is OPERABLE, all ECCW siphon headers are inoperable.

N.1, N.2 At least one SSW header is required to be OPERABLE and aligned to the ESV pumps. TS 3.7.7 requires OPERABILITY of the LPSW Pumps and allows one required LPSW pump on each LPSW System to be inoperable for a limited duration. OPERABILITY of the SSW headers requires OPERABILITY of the LPSW Pumps as allowed by TS 3.7.7. If one required LPSW pump is inoperable on the LPSW System supplying the required SSW header and only one SSW header is OPERABLE, the ESV system is not single failure proof. ACTION must be taken to either restore the inoperable SSW header to OPERABLE status or restore the required LPSW Pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Reference Bases table 16.9.12-1. The 72-hour Completion Time is consistent with the Completion Times for LPSW and ESV. If both SSW headers are OPERABLE and aligned to each ESV pump and one required LPSW pump is out of service on the Unit 1 and 2 and/or Unit 3 LPSW System, the SSW supply to the ESV pumps is single failure proof and no Condition entry is required.

16.9.12-14 Rv 0 Rev. O01 I

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 BASES ACTIONS O.1, 02 (continued)

If the Required ACTION and associated Completion Times of Conditions C, D, E, G, H or 0 are not met, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the SLC does not apply, i.e., in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and MODE 5 within 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br />. These Completion Times are consistent with the Completion Times for LPSW and ESV.

SURVEILLANCE SR 16.9.12.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires that LPSW-4, LPSW-5, LPSW-1 39, and check valves in the SSW headers be tested per Oconee's IST Program. Testing under this program is adequate to assure OPERABILITY.

SR 16.9.12.2 This SR requires that the LPSW pump minimum flow recirculation lines be tested every 24 months. A 24 month frequency is adequate to ensure significant degradation has not occurred due to service water related fouling.

SR 16.9.12.3 This SR requires that LPSW flow to each RBCU that is not isolated from LPSW flow be verified once per shift to be > 420 gpm. The inlet or outlet LPSW flow gauge may be used.

This surveillance can also be met by verifying one of the following system alignments:

1. The RBCU inlet and outlet LPSW motor operated isolation valves are full open and the required LPSW pumps are in operation.
2. The RBCU inlet LPSW isolation valve is closed and the outlet isolation valve is open.
3. The RBCU inlet and outlet LPSW isolation valves are closed with the RBCU piping vented to containment or drained. If the RBCU outlet is isolated with its ES actuated valve, its breaker shall be open to prevent the valve from automatically opening on ES.

This frequency is adequate to ensure the required alignment is maintained.

16.9.12-15 Rv 0 I Rev. 001

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 BASES SURVEILLANCE SIR 16.9.12.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Ensure that LPSW-1 054, 1055, 1061, and 1062 are operable to close when demanded by the LPSW RB Waterhammer Prevention System (WPS). This ensures that the RBAC's are protected from a waterhamnmer following a LOOP, MSLB/LOOP, and LOCA/LOOP as well as indirectly protecting the RBCU's by ensuring the system configuration is consistent with the analysis

[Ref. 21]. The frequency of 18 months is judged sufficient based on similar valves in similar service.

REFERENCES 1. OSS-0254.00-00-1039, Design Basis Specification for the Low Pressure Service Water System, rev. 26.

2. OSC-2280, LPSW Pump NPSH and Minimum Required Lake Level, rev.

16.

3. OSC-4672, Unit 1&2 LPSW System Response to a Large Break LOCA Using a Benchmarked Computer Hydraulic Model, rev. 9
4. OSC-4489, Predicted Unit 3 LPSW System Response to a Large Break LOCA Using a Benchmarked Computer Hydraulic Model, rev. 7.
5. PTI11A/02511023, LPSW System Flow Test, performed on 11/16/97.
6. PTI2/AI0251/023, LPSW System Flow Test, performed on 4/20/96.
7. PT/3A1A02511023, LPSW System Flow Test, performed on 1/19/97.
8. PT/I1,31AI0251101, LPSW Pump Test.
9. TS 3.5.3, 3.7.7 and 3.7.8.
10. Oconee UFSAR Section 9.2.2, 12/31/02 update.
11. Letter from J. W. Hampton, (DPC), to USNRC, dated June 6, 1996, Proposed Technical Specification amendment for LPSW-4, -5.
12. NRC Safety Evaluation Report, dated August 19, 1996, Technical Specification Amendment 217/217/214.
13. Deleted
14. OSC-7445.05, Waterhammer Analysis of Reactor Building Cooling Units, rev. 0.
15. OSC-7445.06, Waterhammer Analysis of Reactor Building Cooling Units, rev. 0.
16. Letter from Altran Corporation to Timothy Brown dated 12/30/98, "Letter Report: Response to Additional Items for Waterhammer."
17. OSC-5409 rev. 7, Single Failure Analysis of the ECCW System Supply to the LPSW System.
18. Deleted
19. Deleted
20. OSC-8144, Mechanical Design Input Calculation for NSM ON-x3117.
21. OSC-9049, Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis of LPSW RB Waterhammer Prevention System with 15 psig Setpoint 16.9.12-16 Rv 0 Rev. O01 I

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 TABLE 16.9.12-1 Operability Status of SSW Headers SBoth SSW Headers "A" SSW Header "B" SSW Header Operable Inoperable inoperable One Required *72 hr Required Action *72 hr Required

  • 72 hr Required LPSW Pump Completion Time on Action Completion Action Completion Inoperable on Unit 1 and 2 per TS Time on Unit 1 and 2 Time on Unit 1 and 2 Unit 1 and 2 3.7.7. per TS 3.7.7. per TS 3.7.7.
  • 72 hr Required Action Completion Time on Unit 1, 2, and 3, per this SLO.

One Required *72 hr Required Action ° 72 hr Required *72 hr Required LPSW Pump Completion Time on Action Completion Action Completion Inoperable on Unit 3 per TS 3.7.7. Time on Unit 3 per Time on Unit 3 per Unit 3 TS 3.7.7. TS 3.7.7.

  • 72 hrRequired Action Completion Time on Unit 1,2, and 3, per this SLC.

NOTE: Table assumes Unit 1, 2, and 3 are in Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4.

16.9.12-17 001

16. 9.12-17Rev.

Alternate Source of EFW 16.10.7 16.10 STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEMS 16.10.7 Alternate Source of Emergency Feedwater (EFW)

COMMITMENT An alternate source of EFW from another unit shall be OPERABLE as follows:

A. The Condensate Storage Tank (CST), Upper Surge Tank (UST) and Hotwell (HW) associated with the credited alternate unit shall be OPERABLE.

AND B.1 Two motor-driven EFW pumps associated with the credited alternate unit shall be OPERABLE.

OR B.2 The turbine-driven EFW pump associated with the credited alternate unit shall be OPERABLE.

AND C. A flow path connecting each required EFW pump from the credited alternate unit to the subject unit's EFW System shall be OPERABLE.

-NOTE------------------------...........

If a unit's EFW system is being utilized to remove decay heat from that unit, then it cannot be utilized to meet the requirements of this SLC.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 16.10.7-1 1.071Rv 0 ]

Rev. 001

Alternate Source of EFW 16.10.7 ACTIONS _________

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Alternate source of A.1-------NOTE-----...

EFW inoperable. If the alternate source of EFW is inoperable due to planned maintenance, then these activities shall be performed in a prompt manner without delay.

Initiate action to restore Immediately alternate source of EFW to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS__________

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.10.7.1---------NOTE-------

This SR may be satisfied by ITS SR 3.7.6.1 for the credited alternate unit.

Verify combined inventory in the credited 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> alternate unit's UST, CST, and HW is >

72,000 gallons.

AND Inventory in the credited alternate unit's UST is > 30,000 gallons.

(continued)

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 16.10.7-2 1.072Rv Rev. 001 0

Alternate Source of EFW 16.10.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.10.7.2 ---------- NOTE-------.............

This SR may be satisfied by ITS SR 3.7.5.1 for the credited alternate unit.

Verify that each EFW manual, and non- 31 days automatic power operated valve in the required EFW flow path(s) from the credited alternate unit to the subject unit and, if required, the steam supply flow path to the credited alternate unit's turbine-driven EFW pump that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 16.10.7.3 ---------- NOTE-------.............

This SR may be satisfied by ITS SR 3.7.5.2 for the credited alternate unit.

Verify the developed head of the credited In accordance with the alternate unit's required EFW pump(s) at the Inservice Testing flow test point is greater than or equal to the Program required developed head.

SR 16.10.7.4 Cycle the required cross-connect valves in the In accordance with the flow path between the credited alternate unit Inservice Testing and the subject unit. Program SR 16.10.7.5-----------------NOTE-------------

This SR may be satisfied by ITS SR 3.3.14.2 for the credited alternate unit.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for 92 days the manual initiation circuit for the credited alternate unit's EFW pump(s).

OCONEE UNITSl1,2, &3 1.073Rv 16.10.7-3 0 Rev. 001 I

Alternate Source of EFW 16.10.7 BASES BACKGROUND Each unit has an EFW System which is comprised of two motor driven EFW pumps and one turbine driven EFW pump. Each unit's EFW System: 1) normally receives a supply of water from the associated upper surge tanks (UST); 2) can be aligned to the associated hotwell (HW); and 3) has an additional source of water which can be pumped to the USTs (i.e., the associated condensate storage tank (CST)). Each unit's steam turbine driven EFW pump receives steam from either of the associated unit's two main steam headers upstream of the main turbine stop valves (TSVs), or from the Auxiliary Steam System. Each unit's EFW pumps discharge into two distribution headers. Each unit's distribution headers can be cross-connected to a distribution header that is common to all three units. The EFW unit cross-connect valves (i.e., FDW-313 and FDW-314 on each unit) are normally closed. Any EFW pump from the other units can feed either of the steam generators on the subject unit.

For each unit, the steam generators function as a heat sink for core decay heat. The heat load is dissipated by releasing steam to the atmosphere from the steam generators via the associated main steam relief valves (ITS LCO 3.7.1, "Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs)"), or atmospheric dump valves. If the main condenser is available, steam may be released via the Turbine Bypass System and recirculated to the HW.

The EFW Systems are described in the UFSAR, Section 10.4.7, (Ref. 1 ).

APPLI CABLE In the event the subject unit's EFW System is rendered SAFETY unavailable following a High Energy Line Break (HELB)

ANALYSES coincident with a single active failure of the subject unit's EFW System, operator action is required to supply feedwater from another unit.

COMMITMENT This Commitment provides controls to ensure that feedwater can be supplied from another unit's EFW System to mitigate the consequences of an event that renders the subject unit's EFW System unavailable. The EFW System from the credited alternate unit is considered OPERABLE when the components required to provide adequate EFW flow from it to the subject unit's steam generators are OPERABLE.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 16.10.7-4 1.074Rv 0 Rev. 001 I

Alternate Source of EFW 16.10.7 BASES COMMITMENT An alternate source of EFW from another unit shall be OPERABLE (continued) as follows:

a. The CST, UST and HW from the credited alternate unit shall be OPERABLE;
b. Two motor-driven EFW pumps or the turbine-driven EFW pump from the credited alternate unit shall be OPERABLE; and
c. One flow path connecting each required EFW pump from the credited alternate unit to the subject unit's EFW System shall be OPERABLE.

If the motor-driven EFW pumps are being credited, then they must be capable of being powered from the offsite power source and the emergency power supply. If the turbine-driven pump is being credited, then its steam supply flow path shall be OPERABLE. Also, the manual initiation circuit for the credited EFW pump(s) must be OPERABLE.

To support the required flow path(s), the cross-connect valves (i.e., FDW-313 and FDW-314) and the EFW flow instrumentation and controls associated with the subject unit are required to be OPERABLE. In addition, the following components from the credited alternate unit are required to be OPERABLE to support the required flow path(s):

a. If the motor-driven EFW pumps are being credited, then cross-connect valves FDW-313 and FDW-314 associated with the credited alternate unit must be OPERABLE; or
b. If the turbine-driven EFW pump is being credited, then only one of the cross-connect valves (i.e., FDW-313 or FDW-314) associated with the credited alternate unit must be OPERABLE.

The OPERABILITY of the credited alternate unit's CST, UST, and HW is determined by maintaining the tank inventory at or above the minimum required inventory.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 16.10.7-5 1.075Rv 0 I Rev. 001

Alternate Source of EFW 16.10.7 BASES COMMITMENT The Commitment is modified by a Note which states that if a (continued) unit's EFW system is being utilized to remove decay heat from that unit, then it cannot be utilized to meet the requirements of this SLC.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, and MODE 4 when relying upon a steam generator for heat removal for the subject unit, an alternate source of EFW is required to be OPERABLE. These requirements ensure that the alternate source of EFW is capable of mitigating an event that renders the subject unit's EFW system unavailable (i.e., HELB coincident with a single active failure of the subject unit's EFW System). In MODE 4 for the subject unit, the steam generators are used for heat removal unless the DHR System is in operation; the steam generators are relied upon for heat removal whenever an RCS loop is required to be OPERABLE or operating to satisfy LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - Mode 4."

In MODES 5 and 6 for the subject unit, the steam generators are not used for DHR. Thus, an alternate unit's EFW System is not required.

ACTIONS A.1 In the event the alternate source of feedwater is inoperable, action must be initiated to restore the alternate source of EFW to an OPERABLE status immediately. The alternate source of feedwater is comprised of equipment from another unit; thus, its inoperability does not impact the ability of the subject unit's EFW System to perform its function. Typically, while operating in accordance with an Action, an additional single failure is not required to be assumed. Thus, the subject unit's EFW System would remain available to mitigate a HELB. Additional defense-in-depth is provided by the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) Auxiliary Service Water (ASW) System. The OPERABILITY requirements for the subject unit's EFW System and the SSF ASW System are contained within ITS 3.7.5 and ITS 3.10.1, respectively.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 16.10.7-6 1.076Rv 0 Rev. 001 I

Alternate Source of EFW 16.10.7 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued)

This Action is appropriate, because it ensures that action is taken promptly and without delay to restore the ability to supply feedwater to the subject unit via the required equipment of another unit's EFW System.

This Action is modified by a Note which states that if the alternate source of EFW is inoperable due to planned maintenance, then that activity shall be performed in a prompt manner without delay. This means that continuous coverage of the activity should be utilized, and the alternate source of EFW restored to an OPERABLE status as soon as practicable.

SURVEILLANCE SR 16.10.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the credited alternate unit's CST, UST, and HW contain the required inventory of cooling water. The 12-hour Frequency is based on operating experience and the need for operator awareness of unit evolutions that may affect the CST, UST, and HW inventory between checks. The 12-hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications in the credited alternate unit's control room, including alarms to alert the operator to abnormal deviations in CST, UST, and HW levels.

This SR is modified by a NOTE which states that ITS SR 3.7.6.1 can be utilized to meet the requirement of this SR. This would occur when the credited alternate unit is being operated in a MODE or condition which requires its CST, UST, and HW to be OPERABLE.

SR 16.10.7.2 Verifying the correct alignment for manual and non-automatic power-operated valves in the required EFW flow path(s) from the credited alternate unit to the subject unit and the required steam supply flow path to the credited alternate unit's turbine-driven EFW pump provides assurance that the proper flow path(s) exist for operation of the required portion of the credited alternate unit's EFW system. This SR does not apply OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 16.10.7-7 1.077Rv 0 I Rev. 001

Alternate Source of EFW 16.10.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 16.10.7.2 (continued)

REQU IREMENTS to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since those valves are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing.

This SR also does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position.

The 31-day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.

This SR is modified by a NOTE which states that ITS SR 3.7.5.1 can be utilized to meet the requirement of this SR. This would occur when the credited alternate unit is being operated in a MODE or condition which requires its EFW System to be OPERABLE.

SR 16.10.7.3 Verifying that the developed head of the credited alternate unit's EFW pump(s) is greater than or equal to the required developed head at the flow test point ensures that EFW pump performance has not degraded below the acceptance criteria during the cycle. Flow and differential head are normal indications of pump performance required by the ASME OM Code (Ref. 2).

Because it is undesirable to introduce cold EFW into the steam generators while they are operating, this test may be performed on a test flow path.

This test confirms OPERABILITY, trends performance, and detects incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. Performance of inservice testing in the ASME OM Code (Ref. 2), at 3 month intervals, satisfies this requirement.

This SR is modified by a NOTE which states that ITS SR 3.7.5.2 can be utilized to meet the requirement of this SR. This would occur when the credited alternate unit is being operated in a MODE or condition which requires its EFW System to be OPERABLE.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 16.10.7-8 1.078Rv Rev. 001 0

Alternate Source of EFW 16.10.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 16.10.7.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR verifies that each required cross-over valve in the cross-connect flow path from the credited alternate unit to the subject unit can be manually cycled (FDW-313 and FDW-314 for both the subject and credited alternate unit). Performance of inservice testing in the ASME OM Code (Ref. 2), at 3 month intervals, satisfies this requirement.

SR 16.10.7.5 This SR requires the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the manual initiation circuit for the credited alternate unit's required EFW pump(s). This test verifies that the initiating circuitry is OPERABLE and will actuate the required EFW pump(s) by starting the motor-driven EFW pumps or opening the steam isolation valve that isolates the supply of steam to the drive for the turbine-driven EFW pump. The 92-day Frequency is consistent with the Frequency established in ITS 3.3.14, "Emergency Feedwater (EFW)

Pump Initiation Circuitry."

This SR is modified by a NOTE which states that ITS SR 3.3.14.2 can be utilized to meet the requirement of this SR. This would occur when the credited alternate unit is being operated in a MODE or condition which requires the manual initiation circuit for each EFW pump to be OPERABLE.

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 10.4.7.

2. ASME, OM Code.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, &3 16.10.7-9 1613- Rev.

Rv 0010

DUKE ENERGYV Vice cottsL.President IE~~E~I5~Oconee Nuclear Station Duke Energy ONO1VP I 7800 Rochester Hwy Seneca, SC 29672 o; 864.873.3274 ONS-201 5-107 10 CER 50.71(e) I. 864.873.4208 Scott.Batsont~duke-energy.com October 20, 2015 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2746

Subject:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station Docket Numbers 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 UFSAR/Selected Licensee Commitments Change Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.71(e), please find attached the latest revision to the Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) Manual. The SLC Manual constitutes Chapter 16 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).

Any questions regarding this information should be directed to Sandra Severance, Regulatory Affairs, at (864) 873-3466.

I certify that I am a duly authorized officer of Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, and that the information contained herein accurately represents changes made to Chapter 16 of the UFSAR since the previous submittal. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on October 20, 2015.

Sincerely, Scott L. Batson Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station Attachment www.duke-energy.com

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission October 20, 2015 Page 2 cc: Mr. Leonard D. Wert, Jr.

Administrator, Region II (Acting)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 Mr. James R. Hall, Senior Project Manager (ONS)

(By electronic mail only)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop O-8G9A Rockville, MD 20852-2746 Mr. Jeffrey A. Whited, Project Manager (By electronic mail only)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Mail Stop O-8B1A Rockville, MD 20852-2746 Mr. Eddy L. Crowe Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station

O NS-201 5-107 October 20, 2015 Attachment Revised Oconee Nuclear Station SLC Manual Pages SLC List of Effective Pages (LOEPs), Rev. 003 LOEP 1 - 4 SLC 16.9.12, Additional LPSW and SSW Operability Requirements, 16.9.12-1 thru 17 Rev. 001 SLC 16.10.7, Alternate Source of EFW, Rev. 001 16.10.7- 1 thru 9

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 09/21115 List of Effective Pages

_PaQe Revision Number Implementation Date 16.0 000 05/21/15 16.1 000 10/15/07 16.2 000 08/25/14 16.3 001 06/29/15 16.4 -- PENDING 16.5.1 000 11/26/12 16.5.2 000 11/15/12 16.5.3 000 02/21/07 16.5.4 000 11/15/12 16.5.5 -- Deleted 5/16/09 16.5,6 -- Deleted 02/10/14 16.5.7 000 12/13/06 16.5.8 000 01/31/07 16.5,8a -- Deleted 5/19/05 16.5.9 000 11/15/12 16.5.10 000 10/08/03 16.5.11 000 01/31/00 16.5.12 000 03/27/99 16.5.13 000 03/27/99 16.6.1 000 07/23/12 16,6.2 000 01/31/07 16,6.3 000 11/15/12 16.6,4 000 11/15/12 16.6.5 000 12/14/00 16,6.6 000 11/15/12 16.6.7 000 03/27/99 16.6.8 000 03/27/99 16.6.9 000 11/15/12 16.6,10 000 11/15/12 16.6.11 000 11/15/12 16.6,12 000 11/15/12 16.6.13 000 03/31/08 16.6.14 000 04/21/14 16.6.15 000 11/15/12 16.7.1 000 11/15/12 Oconee Nuclear StationLEP1Rvso03 LOEP 1 Revision 003

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 09/21/15 List of Effective Pages Page Revision Number Implementation Date 16.7.2 000 11/15/12 16.7.3 000 11/15/12 16.7.4 000 07/14/05 16.7.5 000 11/15/12 16.7.6 000 04/08/14 16.7.7 000 11/15/12 16.7.8 000 03/27/99 16.7.9 000 10/23/03 16.7.10 000 11/15/12 16.7.11 000 11/15/12 16.7.12 000 06/30/04 16.7.13 000 12/05/12 16.7.14 000 11/15/12 16.7.15 000 04/08/14 16.8.1 000 08/09/01 16.8.2 000 02110/05 16.8.3 000 10/20/09 16.8.4 000 02/10/05 16.8.5 000 05/21/15 16.8.6 000 01/04/07 16.8.7 000 01/31/00 16.8.8 000 01/31/00 16.8.9 000 06/21/05 16.9.1 000 12/05/12 16.9.2 000 12/31/12 16.9.3 000 12/31/12 16.9.4 000 12101/14 16.9.5 000 1213 1/12 16.9.6 001 08/03/15 16.9.7 000 07/23/12 16.9.8 000 02115/06 16.9.8a 000 02107/05 16.9.9 000 01/30/15 16.9.9a 000 01 /30/15 16.9.10 000 01/1 2104 Oconee Nuclear StationLEP2Rvso03 LOEP 2 Revision 003

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 09/21/15 List of Effective Pages PaeRevision Number Implementation Date 16.9,11 001 06/29/15 16.9.11a 000 10/20/14 16.9.12 001 09/21/15 16.9.13 000 01/31/07 16.9.14 000 10/28/04 16.9.15 000 03/27/99 16.9.16 000 10/15/14 16.9.17 000 05/23/01 16.9.18 000 07/15/14 16,9.19 000 03/31/05 16.9.20 000 05/28/14 16,9.21 000 07/09/09 16.9.22 000 06/13/14 16.9.23 pending PENDING 16.9.24 pending PENDING 16.10.1 000 11/15/12 16.10.2 000 12/02/03 16.10.3 000 03/27/99 16.10.4 000 11/15/12 16.10.5 -- Deleted 08/24/04 16.10.6 000 03/27/99 16.10.7 001 09/21/15 16.10.8 000 11/27/06 16.10.9 000 11/25/09 16.11.1 000 03/15/11 16.11.2 000 01/31/00 16.11.3 000 11/20/08 16.11.4 000 06/30/14 16.11.5 000 10/30/02 16.11.6 000 11/08/13 16.11.7 000 01/31/00 16.11.8 000 12/21/09 16.11.9 000 03/22/10 16.11.10 000 05/14/14 16.11.11 000 03/27/99 Oconee Nuclear Station LOEP LE3Rvso3 Revision 003 0

Oconee Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments Revised 09/21/15 List of Effective Pages PaQe Revision Number Implementation Date 16.11.12 000 04/10/03 16.11.13 000 03/27/99 16.11.14 000 03/27/99 16.12.1 000 03/27/99 16.12.2 000 05/03/07 16.12.3 000 05/01/03 16.12.4 000 03/27/99 16.12.5 000 03/27/99 16.12.6 000 11/08/07 16.13.1 000 10/06/14 16.13.2 000 12/15/04 16.13.3 000 12/15/04 16.13.4 000 03/27/99 16.13.5 --- Deleted 11/30/99 16.13.6 000 03/27/99 16.13.7 000 12/15/04 16.13.8 000 03/27/99 16.13.9 000 03/27/99 16.13.10 000 03/27/99 16.13.11 000 03/27/99 16.14.1 000 11/15/12 16.14.2 000 07/23/12 16.14.3 000 03/27/99 16.14.4 --- Deleted 03/15/11 16.14.4.a 000 03/15/11 16.15.1 000 04/12/06 16.15.2 000 11/15/12 16.15.3 000 11/15/12 Note: With the introduction of Fusion in June 2015, all controlled documents require a three-digit revision number. Thus, the revision numbers were set to "000" in the summer of 2015. As such, the revision dates for Revision 000 are based on the implementation dates for revisions in effect prior to this change.

'"""'ee N""'ea Station L.vI,-I I ('*I=D C~ID 4A Revision 003

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 16.9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 16.9.12 Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) And Siphon Seal Water (SSW) System OPERABILITY Requirements COMMITMENT The following Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs) shall be OPERABLE:

a. LPSW-4 ("A" LPI COOLER SHELL OUTLET)
b. LPSW-5 ("B" LPI COOLER SHELL OUTLET)
c. LPSW Pump Minimum Flow Recirculation Lines
d. LPSW-1 39 (LPSW SUPPLY TO TB NON-ESSENTIAL HOR)
e. LPSW-251 ("A" LPI COOLER LPSW CONTROL)
f. LPSW-252 ("B" LPI COOLER LPSW CONTROL)
g. LPSW flow to each Reactor Building Cooling Unit (RBCU)
h. LPSW-1054, 1055, 1061, 1062
i. One required SSW Header
j. LPSW Pump(s) required for SSW Header OPERABILITY as defined by TS 3.7.7 APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. LPSW flowpath through A.1 Declare associated LPI Immediately an LPI cooler isolated train inoperable.

by a manual valve.

B. LPSW-4 inoperable and B.1 Declare associated LPI Immediately closed, train inoperable.

OR LPSW-5 inoperable and closed.

16.9.12-1 Rv 0 Rev. 001 I

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. LPSW flowpath through C.1 Verify all required Immediately an LPI cooler not LPSW Pumps are isolated by manual OPERABLE valve.

AND AND LPSW-4 inoperable and C.2 Restore LPSW-4 to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> not closed. OPERABLE status.

D. LPSW flowpath D.1 Verify all required Immediately through an LPI cooler LPSW Pumps are not isolated by OPERABLE.

manual valve.

AND AN_.D D.2 Restore LPSW-5 to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LPSW-5 inoperable OPERABLE status.

and not closed.

16.9.12-2 001 16.9.12-2Rev.

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. One required LPSW E.1 Restore required LPSW 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> pump minimum flow pump minimum flow recirculation line recirculation line to inoperable. OPERABLE status.

OR Two required Unit 3 LPSW Pump minimum flow recirculation lines inoperable OR Two required Unit 1&2 LPSW Pump minimum flow recirculation lines inoperable when two LPSW pumps are required to be OPERABLE by TS 3.7.7.

F. Two or more Unit 1 and F.1 Declare affected LPSW Immediately 2 LPSW pump Pumps inoperable.

minimum recirculation lines inoperable when three LPSW pumps are required to be OPERABLE by TS 3.7.7.

16.9.12-3 001 16.912-3Rev.

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

-NOTE------G.1 Verify all required LPSW Immediately If either Unit 1 or Unit 2 is in Pumps are OPERABLE.

the MODE of APPLICA-BILITY, then both 1LPSW- AND 139 and 2LPSW-139 are required to be OPERABLE.

G.2 Restore LPSW-139 to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OPERABLE status G. LPSW-139 inoperable and associated flow path not isolated by a manual valve.

H. 1LPSW-139 inoperable H.1 Verify all required LPSW Immediately and associated flow Pumps OPERABLE.

path not isolated by a manual valve.

AND AND 2LPSW-139 inoperable H.2 Restore LPSW-139 on 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and associated flow Unit 1 and 2 to path not isolated by a OPERABLE status.

manual valve.

AND Total Unit 1 and 2 LPSW non-essential header flow is less than 10,000 gpm.

16.9.12-4 Rv 0 Rev. 001 I

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 1LPSW-139 inoperable 1.1 Declare all Unit 1 and 2 Immediately and associated flow LPSW Pumps inoperable.

path not isolated by a manual valve.

AND 2LPSW-1 39 inoperable and associated flow path not isolated by a manual valve.

AND Total Unit 1 and 2 LPSW non-essential header flow is 10,000 gpm or greater.

J. LPSW-251 inoperable J.1 Declare associated LPI Immediately and not failed open. train inoperable.

OR LPSW-252 inoperable and not failed open.

K. LPSW flow to any K.1 Restore acceptable flow 7 days RBCU is less than 420 to RBCU.

gpm.

OR AND The LPSW inlet K.2.1 Close LPSW inlet 7 days isolation valve for the isolation valve for the associated RBCU is not associated RBCU.

closed.

AND K.2.2 Enter TS 3.6.5 if required. Immediately 16.9.12-5 001 I 16.912-5Rev.

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME L. LPSW-1 054, 1055, L.1 Enter TS 3.6.5 or TS Immediately 1061, or 1062 not 3.7.7, if required.

OPERABLE to close by the LPSW AND Waterhammer Prevention System L.2.1 Restore to OPERABLE 7 days status AND OR LW10051,an 1054,no L.2.2.1 Close either LPSW- 7 days 1055,sad 15 o 1051, 1054, 1055, or 1058 OR AND L.2.2.2 Close either LPSW- 7 days LPSW-1059, 1061, 1059, 1061, 1062, or 1062 and 1065 not 1065 closed M. A and B SSW headers M.1 Declare all ECCW Immediately inoperable, headers inoperable.

N. One SSW header N.1 Restore A and B SSW 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> inoperable, headers to OPERABLE status.

AND OR One required LPSW Pump inoperable on N.2 Restore required LPSW 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Unit supplying pump to OPERABLE OPERABLE SSW status.

header as defined by TS 3.7.7.

16.9.12-6 001 16.9.12-6Rev.

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME

0. Required ACTION and 0.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> assoc~iated Completion Time not met for AND Condition C, D, E, G, H, or N. 0.2 Be in MODE 5. 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.9.12.1 Test LPSW-4, LPSW-5, LPSW-1 39, and In accordance with the check valves in the SSW headers in Inservice Testing accordance with the Inservice testing Program Program.

SR 16.9.12.2 Verify that the LPSW pump minimum flow 24 months recirculation lines can pass required flow.

SR 16.9.12.3 Verify that each RBCU that has an open inlet Every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> isolation valve has LPSW flow that is 420 gpm or greater.

SR 16.9.12.4 Verify LPSW-1 054, 1055, 1061, and 1062 are 18 months operable and capable of closure when demanded by the LPSW RB Waterhammer Prevention System (WPS) 16.9.12-7 Rv 0 Rev. 001 I

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 BASES BACKGROUND The Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) System provides cooling water for normal and emergency services throughout the station. Safety related functions served by this system include the Reactor Building cooling units (RBCUs), Low Pressure Injection (LPI) coolers, and coolers for the High Pressure Injection (HPI) and Emergency Feedwater (EFW) motors. LPSW also provides cooling water for the non-safety related Reactor Building Auxiliary Cooling units (RBAC) and the Reactor Coolant Pump Motors (RCPM).

The Siphon Seal Water (SSW) System consists of two full capacity headers.

The "A" SSW header is supplied by the Unit 1 and 2 LPSW system. The Unit 3 LPSW System supplies the "B" SSW header. Each SSW header is capable of providing sealing flow to Unit 1, 2 and 3's ESV pumps.

APPLI CABLE Sufficient LPSW System flow is required to meet the acceptance criteria of SAFETY containment heat removal safety analyses. In addition, LPSW piping inside ANALYSES containment forms a closed loop. The pressure boundary of the RBCU piping and the RCPM piping form a closed loop inside containment and must be maintained to ensure containment integrity following an accident or transient. The RBAC piping has containment isolation valves and the piping inside containment is not acting as the "second barrier" for containment.

The analysis to support Generic Letter 96-06 determined the magnitude of the waterhammer pressure pulses in the LPSW System resulting from column closure and condensation induced waterhammers during Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) and Main "Steam Line Break (MSLB) events (Refs.

15 and 16). The calculation determined that severe waterhammers could occur that are not bounded by existing analysis during a LOCA/LOOP or MSLB/LOOP scenario if the required LPSW flow or alignment is not maintained to the RBCUs. Later analysis for the LPSW Waterhammer Prevention System (WPS) requires that the piping run be full normally to prevent preexisting voids at the time the WPS actuates. Consistent with past values, 420 gpm through each operating RBCU is required (Ref. 20 and 21) unless LPSW flow through the RBCU is isolated by closing the RBCU inlet isolation valve. There are no waterhammer concerns with the RBCU inlet isolation valve closed and the associated outlet isolation valve open. If an RBCU is hydraulically isolated by closing the inlet and outlet RBCU isolation valves, the isolated piping within containment must be drained or vented to prevent overpressurization during any of the above events. The LPSW piping to and from the RBACs has been separated from the "B" RBCU piping. Waterhammer is also possible in the RBACs if the RBAC Isolation Circuitry is bypassed or not operational.

16.9.12-8 001 I 16.9.12-8Rev.

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 BASES APPLICABLE The RBACs contain a total of 16 cooling coils with individual isolation valves.

SAFETY Flow through all RBACs is isolated by closing either LPSW-1 051, 1054, ANALYSES 1055, or 1058. Valves LPSW-1054, 1055, 1061, and 1062 are automatically (continued) closed upon either actuation of the LPSW RB WPS or actuation of ES Channels 5 & 6. There are no waterhammer concerns when either LPSW-1051, 1054, 1055, or 1058 is closed since flow following an LPSW pump restart is blocked. The RBACs are assumed isolated in the analysis that demonstrates waterhammer prevention in the RBCUs and RCPMs, which is achieved by automatically closing LPSW-1 054, 1055, 1061, and 1062 as described above. These valves are not automatically reopened upon restoration of LPSW system pressure.

The SSW System is a support system to the ECCW System. Maintaining the ECCW siphon headers OPERABLE during accident and transient events is an assumption in the accident and transient analysis. The SSW System is required to ensure ECCW siphon header piping remains sufficiently primed to supply siphon flow to the LPSW suction piping.

SSW header OPERABILITY requires that it be supplied from LPSW.

OPERABILITY of an ESV pump requires that it be supplied by at least one OPERABLE SSW header. Each SSW header has a non-safety related HPSW backup. Since the HPSW supply is not safety related, HPSW is not credited to supply the SSW system during a design basis accident. If an ESV pump is operated without seal water, degradation can occur within minutes.

COMMITMENT

  • LPSW-4 and LPSW-5 are considered OPERABLE when the valves are capable of being throttled from the Control Room.
  • LPSW-1 39 is considered OPERABLE if capable of being closed from the Control Room unless previously closed or isolated.
  • LPSW-251 and LPSW-252 are considered OPERABLE when they maintain the capability to fail open either as directed from the Control Room or on a loss of Instrument Air.
  • The required LPSW alignment is maintained to each out Of service RBCU.
  • LPSW flow through each RBCU aligned for flow is 420 gpm or greater to ensure waterhammers are prevented when the LPSW RB Waterhammer Prevention System actuates.
  • LPSW-1054, 1055, 1061, and 1062 are required to close upon actuation of the LPSW RB Waterhammer Prevention System (WPS).

16.9.12-9 001 I 16.912-9Rev.

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 BASES COMMITMENT

LPSW Pump(s) shall be OPERABLE to support OPERABILITY of the required SSW header as defined by TS 3.7.7.

APPLICABILITY This SLC applies in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. This applicability is consistent with the LPSW System OPERABILITY requirements in Technical Specification 3.7.7 and ECCW OPERABILITY requirements in TS 3.7.8. In MODES 5 and 6 the OPERABILITY requirements of the LPSW System are determined by the system it supports.

ACTIONS A.1 If the LPSW flowpath through an LPI cooler is isolated due to a closed manual valve, although LPSW pump NPSH and LPSW flow to other safety related loads would be adequate, LPSW flow to the affected LPI cooler would not be sufficient. The affected LPI train shall be declared inoperable immediately.

B.1I During normal operation, LPSW flow is isolated to the LPI coolers with block valves LPSW-4 and LPSW-5 in the closed position. If a LOCA occurs, LPSW-4 and LPSW-5 are required to be opened after Reactor Building Emergency Sump (RBES) recirculation is established. If LPSW-4 or LPSW-5 is closed and not capable of throttling LPSW flow, then LPSW pump NPSH and LPSW flow to the other safety related loads would be adequate.

However, the LPSW flow to the affected LPI cooler would not be adequate.

Thus, if LPSW-4 or LPSW-5 is closed and do not have throttle capability, then the affected LPI train shall be declared inoperable immediately.

C.1. C.2. D.1, D.2 If LPSW-4 or LPSW-5 are not closed and do not have throttle capability, OPERABILITY of all required LPSW pumps shall be verified immediately to ensure adequate LPSW pump NPSH and flow to safety related loads. In addition, LPSW-4 and/or LPSW-5 must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> completion time is consistent with TS 3.7.7.

For Units 1 & 2, both units would be affected if a valve on either unit is inoperable. In Condition C or D, LPSW pump NPSH and LPSW flow to the safety-related loads may be inadequate. If a single failure of an LPSW pump is not assumed, then sufficient LPSW flow to, and NPSH for, the safety related loads would exist.

16.9.12-10 Rev.

Rv 001 0

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 BASES ACTIONS E. 1 (continued)

LPSW-4 and LPSW-5 are not actuated by an ES signal. By maintaining isolation of LPSW flow to the LPI Coolers during the initial phase of a LOCA, the potential exists for the LPSW pumps to be operated below the manufacturer's recommended minimum continuous flow rate. If all LPSW pumps successfully start and operate during the event, the potential exists for a stronger pump to deadhead a weaker pump during low flow conditions. To avoid damaging a pump due to minimum flow concerns, minimum flow recirculation piping exists for each LPSW pump. The minimum flow recirculation lines ensure the OPERABILITY of a deadheaded pump until LPSW-4 or LPSW-5 are open on the LOCA unit after RBES recirculation is established. If an LPSW pump's minimum flow recirculation line is inoperable, the LPSW system cannot withstand a single failure and still be capable of fulfilling its safety function. Thus ACTION must be taken to restore the recirculation line to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> which is consistent with TS 3.7.7.

If both Unit 3 LPSW pump minimum flow recirculation lines are inoperable, the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is still appropriate because the stronger LPSW pump will always have sufficient flow and will maintain operability. Likewise, if the Unit 1&2 LPSW system is in a condition that only requires two OPERABLE LPSW pumps per TS 3.7.7, the minimum flow recirculation lines associated with both OPERABLE pumps may be simultaneously inoperable for a duration of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. LPSW pump minimum flow recirculation lines are not required to be OPERABLE if the associated pumps are inoperable.

F.1I If Unit 1 and 2 are in a MODE that requires three OPERABLE LPSW pumps (per TS 3.7.7) and two or more minimum flow recirculation lines are out-of-service, the affected LPSW Pumps shall be declared inoperable immediately.

In the event of a LOCA, LPSW-1 39 is credited to close after RBES Recirculation is established, but prior to opening valves LPSW-4 and LPSW-5. Since the Unit 1 & 2 LPSW system is shared, both 1 LPSW-1 39 and 2LPSW-1 39 shall be closed ifthe non-LOCA unit has tripped due to a concurrent Loss-Of-Offsite-Power (LOOP). Closing LPSW-1 39 maintains sufficient LPSW pump NPSH and adequate LPSW flow to the safety related loads.

16.9.12-11 001 I 16.9.2-11Rev.

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 BASES ACTIONS If LPSW-1 39 is not capable of closing and a single failure of an LPSW pump (continued) occurs, LPSW pump flow to the safety related loads might be insufficient and LPSW pump NPSH may be inadequate. In this Condition, all required LPSW pumps shall be verified OPERABLE immediately and LPSW-139 shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Since the Unit 1 & 2 LPSW system is shared and 1 LPSW-139 and 2LPSW-139 are normally open, the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time applies to both Units 1 and 2 if either 1 LPSW-1 39 or 2LPSW-139 is inoperable.

If all required LPSW pumps are available, LPSW pump NPSH and LPSW flow to the safety-related loads will be sufficient. If 1 LPSW-1 39 or 2LPSW-139 is closed or isolated by system block valves, e.g. for maintenance during a unit outage, remote closure capability of the valve is not required.

H.1, H.

If both 1LPSW-139 and 2LPSW-139 are inoperable and not isolated by a manual valve, and total Unit 1 & 2 LPSW non-essential header flow is less than 10,000 gpm, OPERABILITY of all required LPSW pumps shall be verified immediately to ensure that there will be sufficient LPSW pump flow to, and NPSH for safety related loads. Additionally, 1 LPSW-139 and 2LPSW-139 must be restored to OPERABLE status within the stated 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time.

1.1 If 1 LPSW-1 39 and 2LPSW-1 39 are inoperable and not isolated by a manual valve, and total Unit 1 & 2 LPSW non-essential header flow is greater than 10,000 gpm, sufficient LPSW pump flow to, and NPSH for the safety related loads would not be available, even with all three LPSW pumps available.

Consequently, all of the Unit 1 and 2 LPSW pumps shall be declared inoperable immediately.

16.9.12-12 001 I 16.9.2-12Rev.

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 BASES ACTIONS J.__

(continued)-

Air operated valves LPSW-251 and LPSW-252 are the normal LPI cooier fiow control valves. The control valves fail open on a loss of Instrument Air (IA). If a LOCA occurs, IA and Auxiliary Instrument Air (AlA) are assumed unavailable since they are not safety related. With LPSW-251 and LPSW-252 failed open, LPSW-4 and LPSW-5 are credited for throttling LPI cooler shell side flow to maintain sufficient LPSW pump Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) and adequate LPSW flow to the safety related loads. LPSW-251 and LPSW-252 may also be failed open by placing the Fail Switch in the FAIL OPEN position or by isolating instrument air to the valve actuator and bleeding air pressure from the actuator. Should either LPSW-251 or LPSW-252 become inoperable and not fail open, the associated LPI train shall be declared inoperable immediately.

If a LOCA/LOOP or MSLB/LOOP were to occur while in this Condition, a waterhammer could occur; however, the piping is not expected to fail. The Completion Time is consistent with TS 3.7.7 for conditions that have the LPSW WPS inoperable. A waterhammer could occur upon LPSW pump restart following a LOOP due to the pipe not running full when operating at reduced flow rates. When the pipe does not run full, voids can form prior to WPS actuation. Consequently, either the affected RBCU inlet isolation valve must be closed, or the flow rate restored to a value greater than the minimum required value. Isolation of flow to a RBCU could make it inoperable and TS 3.6.5 would need to be entered.

When both the inlet and outlet RBCU piping is isolated, the RBCU isolated piping must be vented to containment or drained to preclude thermal over-pressurization.

16.9.12-13 Rv 0 Rev. 001 I

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 BASES ACTIONS Li1 L.2 (continued)

If a LOCA/LOOP or MSLB/LOOP were to occur while in this Condition, a waterhammer could occur; however, the piping is not expected to fail. The RBACs are assumed to be isolated from the RBCU and RCPM piping (in the thermal-hydraulic analysis of the LPSW system response during actuation of the LPSW WPS) and LPSW-1 054, 1055, 1061, and 1062 perform that function. Thus, these valves must be capable of closing upon actuation of the LPSW WPS. If these valves are not capable of closure and the RBAC's are aligned to LPSW, the LPSW WPS may be inoperable since the system is in an unanalyzed configuration. The Completion Time is consistent with TS 3.7.7 for conditions that have the LPSW WPS inoperable. Isolating the supply header to the RBAC by closing either LPSW-1 051, 1054, 1055, or 1058 prevents the possibility of waterhammer. Closing LPSW-1 059, 1061, 1062, or 1065 isolates the RBAC return to make the flow path hydraulically isolated from the RBCU/RCPM flow path in order to be consistent with the analysis. Required Action L.1 requires entering the applicable TSs (TS 3.6.5 or TS 3.7.7) immediately, if required, as the WPS for the RBCUs may not be OPERABLE.

M.1 One SSW header shall be OPERABLE to support the ESV pumps and ECCW siphon headers. If no SSW header is OPERABLE, all ECCW siphon headers are inoperable.

N.1, N.2 At least one SSW header is required to be OPERABLE and aligned to the ESV pumps. TS 3.7.7 requires OPERABILITY of the LPSW Pumps and allows one required LPSW pump on each LPSW System to be inoperable for a limited duration. OPERABILITY of the SSW headers requires OPERABILITY of the LPSW Pumps as allowed by TS 3.7.7. If one required LPSW pump is inoperable on the LPSW System supplying the required SSW header and only one SSW header is OPERABLE, the ESV system is not single failure proof. ACTION must be taken to either restore the inoperable SSW header to OPERABLE status or restore the required LPSW Pump to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Reference Bases table 16.9.12-1. The 72-hour Completion Time is consistent with the Completion Times for LPSW and ESV. If both SSW headers are OPERABLE and aligned to each ESV pump and one required LPSW pump is out of service on the Unit 1 and 2 and/or Unit 3 LPSW System, the SSW supply to the ESV pumps is single failure proof and no Condition entry is required.

16.9.12-14 Rv 0 Rev. O01 I

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 BASES ACTIONS O.1, 02 (continued)

If the Required ACTION and associated Completion Times of Conditions C, D, E, G, H or 0 are not met, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the SLC does not apply, i.e., in at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and MODE 5 within 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br />. These Completion Times are consistent with the Completion Times for LPSW and ESV.

SURVEILLANCE SR 16.9.12.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires that LPSW-4, LPSW-5, LPSW-1 39, and check valves in the SSW headers be tested per Oconee's IST Program. Testing under this program is adequate to assure OPERABILITY.

SR 16.9.12.2 This SR requires that the LPSW pump minimum flow recirculation lines be tested every 24 months. A 24 month frequency is adequate to ensure significant degradation has not occurred due to service water related fouling.

SR 16.9.12.3 This SR requires that LPSW flow to each RBCU that is not isolated from LPSW flow be verified once per shift to be > 420 gpm. The inlet or outlet LPSW flow gauge may be used.

This surveillance can also be met by verifying one of the following system alignments:

1. The RBCU inlet and outlet LPSW motor operated isolation valves are full open and the required LPSW pumps are in operation.
2. The RBCU inlet LPSW isolation valve is closed and the outlet isolation valve is open.
3. The RBCU inlet and outlet LPSW isolation valves are closed with the RBCU piping vented to containment or drained. If the RBCU outlet is isolated with its ES actuated valve, its breaker shall be open to prevent the valve from automatically opening on ES.

This frequency is adequate to ensure the required alignment is maintained.

16.9.12-15 Rv 0 I Rev. 001

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 BASES SURVEILLANCE SIR 16.9.12.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Ensure that LPSW-1 054, 1055, 1061, and 1062 are operable to close when demanded by the LPSW RB Waterhammer Prevention System (WPS). This ensures that the RBAC's are protected from a waterhamnmer following a LOOP, MSLB/LOOP, and LOCA/LOOP as well as indirectly protecting the RBCU's by ensuring the system configuration is consistent with the analysis

[Ref. 21]. The frequency of 18 months is judged sufficient based on similar valves in similar service.

REFERENCES 1. OSS-0254.00-00-1039, Design Basis Specification for the Low Pressure Service Water System, rev. 26.

2. OSC-2280, LPSW Pump NPSH and Minimum Required Lake Level, rev.

16.

3. OSC-4672, Unit 1&2 LPSW System Response to a Large Break LOCA Using a Benchmarked Computer Hydraulic Model, rev. 9
4. OSC-4489, Predicted Unit 3 LPSW System Response to a Large Break LOCA Using a Benchmarked Computer Hydraulic Model, rev. 7.
5. PTI11A/02511023, LPSW System Flow Test, performed on 11/16/97.
6. PTI2/AI0251/023, LPSW System Flow Test, performed on 4/20/96.
7. PT/3A1A02511023, LPSW System Flow Test, performed on 1/19/97.
8. PT/I1,31AI0251101, LPSW Pump Test.
9. TS 3.5.3, 3.7.7 and 3.7.8.
10. Oconee UFSAR Section 9.2.2, 12/31/02 update.
11. Letter from J. W. Hampton, (DPC), to USNRC, dated June 6, 1996, Proposed Technical Specification amendment for LPSW-4, -5.
12. NRC Safety Evaluation Report, dated August 19, 1996, Technical Specification Amendment 217/217/214.
13. Deleted
14. OSC-7445.05, Waterhammer Analysis of Reactor Building Cooling Units, rev. 0.
15. OSC-7445.06, Waterhammer Analysis of Reactor Building Cooling Units, rev. 0.
16. Letter from Altran Corporation to Timothy Brown dated 12/30/98, "Letter Report: Response to Additional Items for Waterhammer."
17. OSC-5409 rev. 7, Single Failure Analysis of the ECCW System Supply to the LPSW System.
18. Deleted
19. Deleted
20. OSC-8144, Mechanical Design Input Calculation for NSM ON-x3117.
21. OSC-9049, Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis of LPSW RB Waterhammer Prevention System with 15 psig Setpoint 16.9.12-16 Rv 0 Rev. O01 I

Additional Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW) and Siphon Seal Water (SSW)

System OPERABILITY Requirements 16.9.12 TABLE 16.9.12-1 Operability Status of SSW Headers SBoth SSW Headers "A" SSW Header "B" SSW Header Operable Inoperable inoperable One Required *72 hr Required Action *72 hr Required

  • 72 hr Required LPSW Pump Completion Time on Action Completion Action Completion Inoperable on Unit 1 and 2 per TS Time on Unit 1 and 2 Time on Unit 1 and 2 Unit 1 and 2 3.7.7. per TS 3.7.7. per TS 3.7.7.
  • 72 hr Required Action Completion Time on Unit 1, 2, and 3, per this SLO.

One Required *72 hr Required Action ° 72 hr Required *72 hr Required LPSW Pump Completion Time on Action Completion Action Completion Inoperable on Unit 3 per TS 3.7.7. Time on Unit 3 per Time on Unit 3 per Unit 3 TS 3.7.7. TS 3.7.7.

  • 72 hrRequired Action Completion Time on Unit 1,2, and 3, per this SLC.

NOTE: Table assumes Unit 1, 2, and 3 are in Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4.

16.9.12-17 001

16. 9.12-17Rev.

Alternate Source of EFW 16.10.7 16.10 STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEMS 16.10.7 Alternate Source of Emergency Feedwater (EFW)

COMMITMENT An alternate source of EFW from another unit shall be OPERABLE as follows:

A. The Condensate Storage Tank (CST), Upper Surge Tank (UST) and Hotwell (HW) associated with the credited alternate unit shall be OPERABLE.

AND B.1 Two motor-driven EFW pumps associated with the credited alternate unit shall be OPERABLE.

OR B.2 The turbine-driven EFW pump associated with the credited alternate unit shall be OPERABLE.

AND C. A flow path connecting each required EFW pump from the credited alternate unit to the subject unit's EFW System shall be OPERABLE.

-NOTE------------------------...........

If a unit's EFW system is being utilized to remove decay heat from that unit, then it cannot be utilized to meet the requirements of this SLC.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 16.10.7-1 1.071Rv 0 ]

Rev. 001

Alternate Source of EFW 16.10.7 ACTIONS _________

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Alternate source of A.1-------NOTE-----...

EFW inoperable. If the alternate source of EFW is inoperable due to planned maintenance, then these activities shall be performed in a prompt manner without delay.

Initiate action to restore Immediately alternate source of EFW to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS__________

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.10.7.1---------NOTE-------

This SR may be satisfied by ITS SR 3.7.6.1 for the credited alternate unit.

Verify combined inventory in the credited 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> alternate unit's UST, CST, and HW is >

72,000 gallons.

AND Inventory in the credited alternate unit's UST is > 30,000 gallons.

(continued)

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 16.10.7-2 1.072Rv Rev. 001 0

Alternate Source of EFW 16.10.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 16.10.7.2 ---------- NOTE-------.............

This SR may be satisfied by ITS SR 3.7.5.1 for the credited alternate unit.

Verify that each EFW manual, and non- 31 days automatic power operated valve in the required EFW flow path(s) from the credited alternate unit to the subject unit and, if required, the steam supply flow path to the credited alternate unit's turbine-driven EFW pump that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 16.10.7.3 ---------- NOTE-------.............

This SR may be satisfied by ITS SR 3.7.5.2 for the credited alternate unit.

Verify the developed head of the credited In accordance with the alternate unit's required EFW pump(s) at the Inservice Testing flow test point is greater than or equal to the Program required developed head.

SR 16.10.7.4 Cycle the required cross-connect valves in the In accordance with the flow path between the credited alternate unit Inservice Testing and the subject unit. Program SR 16.10.7.5-----------------NOTE-------------

This SR may be satisfied by ITS SR 3.3.14.2 for the credited alternate unit.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for 92 days the manual initiation circuit for the credited alternate unit's EFW pump(s).

OCONEE UNITSl1,2, &3 1.073Rv 16.10.7-3 0 Rev. 001 I

Alternate Source of EFW 16.10.7 BASES BACKGROUND Each unit has an EFW System which is comprised of two motor driven EFW pumps and one turbine driven EFW pump. Each unit's EFW System: 1) normally receives a supply of water from the associated upper surge tanks (UST); 2) can be aligned to the associated hotwell (HW); and 3) has an additional source of water which can be pumped to the USTs (i.e., the associated condensate storage tank (CST)). Each unit's steam turbine driven EFW pump receives steam from either of the associated unit's two main steam headers upstream of the main turbine stop valves (TSVs), or from the Auxiliary Steam System. Each unit's EFW pumps discharge into two distribution headers. Each unit's distribution headers can be cross-connected to a distribution header that is common to all three units. The EFW unit cross-connect valves (i.e., FDW-313 and FDW-314 on each unit) are normally closed. Any EFW pump from the other units can feed either of the steam generators on the subject unit.

For each unit, the steam generators function as a heat sink for core decay heat. The heat load is dissipated by releasing steam to the atmosphere from the steam generators via the associated main steam relief valves (ITS LCO 3.7.1, "Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs)"), or atmospheric dump valves. If the main condenser is available, steam may be released via the Turbine Bypass System and recirculated to the HW.

The EFW Systems are described in the UFSAR, Section 10.4.7, (Ref. 1 ).

APPLI CABLE In the event the subject unit's EFW System is rendered SAFETY unavailable following a High Energy Line Break (HELB)

ANALYSES coincident with a single active failure of the subject unit's EFW System, operator action is required to supply feedwater from another unit.

COMMITMENT This Commitment provides controls to ensure that feedwater can be supplied from another unit's EFW System to mitigate the consequences of an event that renders the subject unit's EFW System unavailable. The EFW System from the credited alternate unit is considered OPERABLE when the components required to provide adequate EFW flow from it to the subject unit's steam generators are OPERABLE.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 16.10.7-4 1.074Rv 0 Rev. 001 I

Alternate Source of EFW 16.10.7 BASES COMMITMENT An alternate source of EFW from another unit shall be OPERABLE (continued) as follows:

a. The CST, UST and HW from the credited alternate unit shall be OPERABLE;
b. Two motor-driven EFW pumps or the turbine-driven EFW pump from the credited alternate unit shall be OPERABLE; and
c. One flow path connecting each required EFW pump from the credited alternate unit to the subject unit's EFW System shall be OPERABLE.

If the motor-driven EFW pumps are being credited, then they must be capable of being powered from the offsite power source and the emergency power supply. If the turbine-driven pump is being credited, then its steam supply flow path shall be OPERABLE. Also, the manual initiation circuit for the credited EFW pump(s) must be OPERABLE.

To support the required flow path(s), the cross-connect valves (i.e., FDW-313 and FDW-314) and the EFW flow instrumentation and controls associated with the subject unit are required to be OPERABLE. In addition, the following components from the credited alternate unit are required to be OPERABLE to support the required flow path(s):

a. If the motor-driven EFW pumps are being credited, then cross-connect valves FDW-313 and FDW-314 associated with the credited alternate unit must be OPERABLE; or
b. If the turbine-driven EFW pump is being credited, then only one of the cross-connect valves (i.e., FDW-313 or FDW-314) associated with the credited alternate unit must be OPERABLE.

The OPERABILITY of the credited alternate unit's CST, UST, and HW is determined by maintaining the tank inventory at or above the minimum required inventory.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 16.10.7-5 1.075Rv 0 I Rev. 001

Alternate Source of EFW 16.10.7 BASES COMMITMENT The Commitment is modified by a Note which states that if a (continued) unit's EFW system is being utilized to remove decay heat from that unit, then it cannot be utilized to meet the requirements of this SLC.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, and MODE 4 when relying upon a steam generator for heat removal for the subject unit, an alternate source of EFW is required to be OPERABLE. These requirements ensure that the alternate source of EFW is capable of mitigating an event that renders the subject unit's EFW system unavailable (i.e., HELB coincident with a single active failure of the subject unit's EFW System). In MODE 4 for the subject unit, the steam generators are used for heat removal unless the DHR System is in operation; the steam generators are relied upon for heat removal whenever an RCS loop is required to be OPERABLE or operating to satisfy LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - Mode 4."

In MODES 5 and 6 for the subject unit, the steam generators are not used for DHR. Thus, an alternate unit's EFW System is not required.

ACTIONS A.1 In the event the alternate source of feedwater is inoperable, action must be initiated to restore the alternate source of EFW to an OPERABLE status immediately. The alternate source of feedwater is comprised of equipment from another unit; thus, its inoperability does not impact the ability of the subject unit's EFW System to perform its function. Typically, while operating in accordance with an Action, an additional single failure is not required to be assumed. Thus, the subject unit's EFW System would remain available to mitigate a HELB. Additional defense-in-depth is provided by the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) Auxiliary Service Water (ASW) System. The OPERABILITY requirements for the subject unit's EFW System and the SSF ASW System are contained within ITS 3.7.5 and ITS 3.10.1, respectively.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 16.10.7-6 1.076Rv 0 Rev. 001 I

Alternate Source of EFW 16.10.7 BASES ACTIONS A.1 (continued)

This Action is appropriate, because it ensures that action is taken promptly and without delay to restore the ability to supply feedwater to the subject unit via the required equipment of another unit's EFW System.

This Action is modified by a Note which states that if the alternate source of EFW is inoperable due to planned maintenance, then that activity shall be performed in a prompt manner without delay. This means that continuous coverage of the activity should be utilized, and the alternate source of EFW restored to an OPERABLE status as soon as practicable.

SURVEILLANCE SR 16.10.7.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the credited alternate unit's CST, UST, and HW contain the required inventory of cooling water. The 12-hour Frequency is based on operating experience and the need for operator awareness of unit evolutions that may affect the CST, UST, and HW inventory between checks. The 12-hour Frequency is considered adequate in view of other indications in the credited alternate unit's control room, including alarms to alert the operator to abnormal deviations in CST, UST, and HW levels.

This SR is modified by a NOTE which states that ITS SR 3.7.6.1 can be utilized to meet the requirement of this SR. This would occur when the credited alternate unit is being operated in a MODE or condition which requires its CST, UST, and HW to be OPERABLE.

SR 16.10.7.2 Verifying the correct alignment for manual and non-automatic power-operated valves in the required EFW flow path(s) from the credited alternate unit to the subject unit and the required steam supply flow path to the credited alternate unit's turbine-driven EFW pump provides assurance that the proper flow path(s) exist for operation of the required portion of the credited alternate unit's EFW system. This SR does not apply OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 16.10.7-7 1.077Rv 0 I Rev. 001

Alternate Source of EFW 16.10.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 16.10.7.2 (continued)

REQU IREMENTS to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since those valves are verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing.

This SR also does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation; rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position.

The 31-day Frequency is based on engineering judgment, is consistent with the procedural controls governing valve operation, and ensures correct valve positions.

This SR is modified by a NOTE which states that ITS SR 3.7.5.1 can be utilized to meet the requirement of this SR. This would occur when the credited alternate unit is being operated in a MODE or condition which requires its EFW System to be OPERABLE.

SR 16.10.7.3 Verifying that the developed head of the credited alternate unit's EFW pump(s) is greater than or equal to the required developed head at the flow test point ensures that EFW pump performance has not degraded below the acceptance criteria during the cycle. Flow and differential head are normal indications of pump performance required by the ASME OM Code (Ref. 2).

Because it is undesirable to introduce cold EFW into the steam generators while they are operating, this test may be performed on a test flow path.

This test confirms OPERABILITY, trends performance, and detects incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. Performance of inservice testing in the ASME OM Code (Ref. 2), at 3 month intervals, satisfies this requirement.

This SR is modified by a NOTE which states that ITS SR 3.7.5.2 can be utilized to meet the requirement of this SR. This would occur when the credited alternate unit is being operated in a MODE or condition which requires its EFW System to be OPERABLE.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 16.10.7-8 1.078Rv Rev. 001 0

Alternate Source of EFW 16.10.7 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 16.10.7.4 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR verifies that each required cross-over valve in the cross-connect flow path from the credited alternate unit to the subject unit can be manually cycled (FDW-313 and FDW-314 for both the subject and credited alternate unit). Performance of inservice testing in the ASME OM Code (Ref. 2), at 3 month intervals, satisfies this requirement.

SR 16.10.7.5 This SR requires the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the manual initiation circuit for the credited alternate unit's required EFW pump(s). This test verifies that the initiating circuitry is OPERABLE and will actuate the required EFW pump(s) by starting the motor-driven EFW pumps or opening the steam isolation valve that isolates the supply of steam to the drive for the turbine-driven EFW pump. The 92-day Frequency is consistent with the Frequency established in ITS 3.3.14, "Emergency Feedwater (EFW)

Pump Initiation Circuitry."

This SR is modified by a NOTE which states that ITS SR 3.3.14.2 can be utilized to meet the requirement of this SR. This would occur when the credited alternate unit is being operated in a MODE or condition which requires the manual initiation circuit for each EFW pump to be OPERABLE.

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 10.4.7.

2. ASME, OM Code.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, &3 16.10.7-9 1613- Rev.

Rv 0010