NL-12-2268, Edwin I. Hatch, Unit 1, SNCH082-RPT-01, Ver. 1.0, Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Part 1 of 11

Edwin I. Hatch, Unit 1, SNCH082-RPT-01, Ver. 1.0, Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Part 1 of 11

ML12355A049
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	11/26/2012
From:	Stewart W Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NL-12-2268 SNCH082-RPT-01, Ver. 1.0
Download: ML12355A049 (303)

Text

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant -Unit 1 Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdown Report Requested by NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dailchi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 Enclosure 1 Hatch Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 PROJECT REPORT VERSION 1.0 COVER SHEET Page I of 68 Edwin I. Hatch Unit I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT, RER SNC425046 For Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Prepared by: Reviewed by: Approved by- (ENERCON)Project Manager or Designee M rWI. J7e~ pA ate: iLStewart L~f¶.~ Fo PMrC~e=W~FoA tMItCK KSU.f Patrick Kelly PC= Bill Henne Date: Date: 11-26 -20/Az If.- 26 --2o Approved by: (SNO Technical Lead or Designee Peer Review Team Leader Approved by: (SNC)$~~ZAY Date: w f Melanie Brown David z6 Date: Project Manager or Designee HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 2 OF 68 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE

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4 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH ..................

5 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS

SUMMARY

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6 3.1 DESIGN BASIS EARTHQUAKE

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6 3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND METHODS ......................................................

8 4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS

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9 4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES

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10 4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES

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12 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING

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19 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT

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21 6.1 D EV ELOPM EN T OF SW EL 1 ........................................................................................

21 6.2 DEVELOPM EN T OF SW EL 2 ...........................................................................................

24 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS ......................................................

26 7.1 IN A C C ESSIB LE ITEM S .................................................................................................

28 8.0 R E SU L T S ..................................................................................................................................

33 8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS

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33 8.2 EQUIPM EN T OPERABILITY

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60 8.3 PL A N T C H A N G E S ..............................................................................................................

60 8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS

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60 9.0 PEER R EV IEW ........................................................................................................................

61 9.1 PEER REVIEW PRO CESS .............................................................................................

61 9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS

SUMMARY

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61 10.0 R EFER EN CE S .........................................................................................................................

66 11.0 A TTA CH M EN TS .....................................................................................................................

68 HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 3 OF 68 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

The Seismic Walkdowns at Hatch Unit 1 in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012,"Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" are not complete as all items on the SWEL have not been accessible.

A supplementary report will be required.

The walkdowns are being performed using the methodology outlined in the NRC endorsed "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" (EPRI Report number 1025286).Plant Hatch Unit 1 had no significant degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions that warranted modification to the plant.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 4 OF 68 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE The objective of this report is to document the results of the Seismic Walkdowns at E. I. Hatch Unit I in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" (Reference 10.1).The Seismic Walkdowns followed the guidance contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), which was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. The scope of the walkdowns was to identify potentially degraded, unanalyzed, or nonconforming conditions relative to the seismic licensing basis.The 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns for Hatch Unit I are not complete as all items on the SWEL have not been accessible.

A supplementary report will be required.

This report documents the findings from all Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys completed to date.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 5 OF 68 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH The requirements of the 50.54(f) Letter are satisfied by application of and compliance with the NRC endorsed methodology provided in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). In accordance with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), the following topics are addressed in this report:* Documentation of the seismic licensing basis for the SSCs in the plant (Section 3.0);* Assignment of appropriately qualified personnel (Section 4.0);* Reporting of actions taken to reduce/eliminate seismic vulnerabilities identified by the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) program (Section 5.0);* Selection of SSCs to be inspected in the plant (Section 6.0);* Performance of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys (Section 7.0);* Evaluation of potentially adverse seismic conditions with respect to the seismic licensing bases (Section 8.0); and" Performance of Peer Reviews (Section 9.0).While the Seismic Walkdowns were in progress at Hatch Unit 1, supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse conditions was received on September 18, 2012. This required the opening of cabinets, electrical boxes, and switchgear to inspect the internals for potentially adverse seismic conditions, even when opening the components was not required to inspect the anchorage.

Implementation of the supplemental guidance was incorporated into the walkdowns by first identifying the affected components.

During the Seismic Walkdowns of Hatch Unit 1, electrical cabinets (where no extensive disassembly was required) were opened to inspect the cabinet internals for mounting of internal components, inspect the condition of fasteners of adjacent cabinets, and confirm the absence of any other adverse seismic conditions.

The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWE) followed the supplemental guidance for all cabinets that were accessible during plant operation, even where opening the cabinets was not required to inspect the anchorage.

However, some that could not be opened (due to personnel safety or due to the sensitivity of the equipment) were scheduled during an outage to have the component doors opened.Section 7.0 identifies cabinets that were inaccessible for internal inspections.

Table 7-1 and Table 7-2 provide the schedule to complete the cabinet internal inspections.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 6 OF 68 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS

SUMMARY

This section provides a summary of the licensing bases for the Seismic Category I Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) in the plant. It includes a discussion of the Design Basis Earthquake (DBE)and the codes and standards used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the plant-specific seismic licensing basis requirements.

The Hatch Unit 1 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) uses the term "Seismic Class 1" instead of"Seismic Category I". The definition of Seismic Class I structures, piping and equipment is provided in Section 12.3 of the FSAR (Reference 10.7). For the purpose of the Seismic Walkdowns, in accordance with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), the term "Seismic Class I" is synonymous with "Seismic Category I." 3.1 DESIGN BASIS EARTHQUAKE The plant site geologic and seismologic investigations are covered in Section 2.5 of the Hatch Unit 1 FSAR. However, subsections of the Hatch Unit 1 FSAR reference the Hatch Unit 2 FSAR for information.

Based on this data, the peak ground accelerations for the SSE (referred to as the Design Basis Earthquake

-DBE) and Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) are established as 0.15 g and 0.08 g, respectively, as discussed in subsection 2.5.7 of the Hatch Unit 1 FSAR (Reference 10.7).The basic description of the earthquake is provided by spectrum response curves. Separate curves are used for the OBE of 0.08 g horizontal acceleration and the DBE of 0.15 g horizontal acceleration.

The spectrum response curves are provided in FSAR Figures 2.5-2 and 2.5-3 for OBE and DBE, respectively.

The response of the structure to the earthquake is obtained by using the spectrum response technique.

Appropriate response levels are read from the earthquake spectrum curve corresponding to the natural frequencies of the structure.

During the original design of Plant Hatch a set of seismic response spectra was developed by GE using the modified El Centro earthquake ground motion, as discussed in the Hatch Unit I FSAR, Section 12.6 (Reference 10.7).In 1984 another set of spectra was generated to correct a broadening error found in the original spectra.The 1984 spectra were generated using the artificial time histories that more closely enveloped the ground spectra. These are the Seismic Floor Response Spectra of Record (FRS of Record).

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 7 OF 68 In 1989 a Seismic Margins Assessment (SMA) was performed in part to resolve the errors in peak broadening and soil velocity found in the 1984 spectra. The effect of the soil velocity error is that the peak acceleration for each spectrum is shifted to a higher frequency content. Therefore, a new non-design basis set of spectra was generated using seismic margin techniques for use in the SMA. These spectra are called the Seismic Margin Earthquake (SME) spectra. The SME spectra are based on a maximum ground horizontal acceleration of 0.3 g, which is twice that of the Plant Hatch DBE (0.15 g).As a result of the SMA, the NRC concluded that the spectra used in the design of Plant Hatch resulted in a safe overall design. The NRC determined that the FRS of Record was adequate as the licensing basis spectra. As recognition of the shifting of the maximum seismic response to a higher frequency, Southern Nuclear elected to consider the SME spectra, factored by V2 to account for the increased ground input, in conjunction with the design basis earthquake (DBE) for all designs. This practice results in a seismic demand that is more conservative than that which would result from a corrected FRS, but avoids a license revision.

The NRC agreed with this approach and the NRC also agreed that the SME spectra, when reduced by a factor of one-half (V2 SME), best approximates current seismic regulatory requirements for Plant Hatch.POWER GENERATION DESIGN BASES Seismic Category I systems, structures and components are designed so that stresses remain within normal code allowable limits during the ODE and to ensure that they will perform their safety-related functions during and/or after a DBE.MAJOR COMPONENT DESIGN BASES The horizontal and vertical OBE and DBE in-structure response spectra curves form the basis for the seismic qualification and design of Category I SSCs and for demonstrating the structural integrity of Seismic Category 2 SSCs, where required.

In addition, systems running between structures shall be designed to withstand the seismic relative displacements.

The seismic analysis of safety related systems, equipment, and components is generally based on the response spectra method. Alternatively, Seismic Category I equipment is analyzed using the methodology based on earthquake experience data developed by the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) and documented in the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP), Revision 2, plus any addition to the GIP reviewed and accepted by the NRC for resolving Unresolved Safety Issue A-46 in response to NRC Generic Letter 87-02. The SQUG GIP may be used to verify the seismic adequacy of currently installed equipment after the equipment has been walked down and any outliers resolved.New and replacement equipment within the scope of the GIP may also be seismically qualified using HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 8 OF" 68 the same SQUG methodology.

This alternative method is acceptable where no specific NRC commitment to use IEEE 344-1975 has been made.3.2, DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND METHODS An extensive list of design codes, standards, methods, studies and tests utilized for seismic design is provided in the FSAR (Reference 10.7). Examples of the pertinent codes, standards, and methods used for the design of Seismic Category I structures, systems and components is provided here:* USAS B3 1.1, Code for Power Pressure Piping, 1967 Edition* USAS B31.7, Nuclear Power Piping, 1969 Edition* 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 2, "Design Basis for Protection Against Natural Phenomena"* IEEE 323-1971, Standard for Qualifying Class I E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations* IEEE 323-1974, Standard for Qualifying Class 1 E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 0 IEEE 344-1971, IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generation Stations* IEEE 344-1975, IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generation Stations* NRC Generic Letter 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment In Operating Reactors (USI A-46)0 Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment, Revision 2, Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG)* American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC), 7 th Edition HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT TNO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 9 OF 68 4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS Table 4-1 identifies the project team members and their project responsibilities per EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Table 4-2 identifies the Peer Review Team members and responsibilities.

Section 4.1 provides an overview of the project responsibilities.

Section 4.2 includes brief experience summaries for all project personnel in alphabetical order.Table 4-1 Project Team Members and Responsibilities Site Equipment Seismic Licensing Name Point of Selection

/ Plant Walkdown Basis Contact IPEEE Operations Engineer Reviewer (POC) Reviewer (SWE)Warren Barr X Chris Burke X X David Edenfield X Jeffrey Horton X X Patrick Kelly X X Kursat Kinali X X Johnathon McFarland X X Michael Steele* X X X X Winston Stewart* X X James Tootle X X Juan Vizcaya X X Wesley Williams X X X Alan Wolfe X X HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 10OF 68 Table 4-2 Peer Review Team Members and Responsibilities Peer SWEL Walkdown Licensing Submittal Review Basis Report Name Tem Peer Peer Reviewer Reviewers Peer Peer Leader Reviewer Reviewers Robert Ashworth*

X X X X Melanie Brown* X X X X Richard Starck* X X Kenneth Whitmore*

X X X X Notes (Table 4-1 and Table 4-2): 1)

• Indicates Seismic Capability Engineer 2) As stated in Section 7.0, all potentially adverse conditions were entered into the plant Corrective Action Program (CAP) system. However, as part of the process of entering the condition into the CAP, the SWEs made a preliminary assessment of the condition with respect to the plant licensing basis. Further licensing basis reviews were performed as discussed in Section 8.0 as part of the CAP resolution process by personnel not directly involved in the walkdowns.

4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES The Site Point of Contact (POC) is a site engineer from Southern Nuclear that has experience with the site equipment, site procedures, plant operations, and overall personnel organization.

The site POC coordinated site access for walkdown personnel and any resources required for the walkdowns such as inspection equipment and support from plant operations.

The POC was responsible for development of the walkdown schedule and any updates to the schedule based on equipment availability.

Equipment Selection Personnel (ESP) were responsible for identifying the sample of SSCs for the Seismic Walkdowns.

The ESP have knowledge of plant operations, plant documentation, and associated SSCs. The ESP also have knowledge of the IPEEE program. For this project, site engineers and plant operations personnel participated in the equipment selection.

The ESP also performed the responsibilities of the IPEEE Reviewers.

The IPEEE Reviewers also ensured that the walkdown scope included a sample of equipment that had IPEEE seismic vulnerabilities.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 1 1 OF 68 Plant Operations Personnel provided detailed review of the sample of SSCs to ensure the walkdown scope included equipment located in a variety of environments, equipment in a variety of systems, and equipment accessible for a walkdown.

For the Hatch Unit 1 project, the Plant Operations Personnel were either former or currently licensed Senior Reactor Operators.

The SWEs were trained on the NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, and on the material contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEs who had previously completed the Seismic Walkdown Training Class developed by the SQUG were not required to complete training on the NTTF Seismic recommendations but were trained on the differences between SQUG activities and activities associated with the NTTF Seismic recommendations.

The Licensing Basis Reviewer was responsible for determining whether any potentially adverse seismic conditions identified by the SWEs met the plant seismic licensing basis. The Licensing Basis Reviewer has knowledge of and experience with the seismic licensing basis and documentation for the SSCs at Hatch Unit 1.A Peer Review Team was formed for this project to provide both oversight and review of all aspects of the walkdowns.

The Peer Review Team members have extensive experience in seismic design and qualification of structures, systems and components as well as extensive field experience.

The Peer Review Team for this project interfaced with the ESP and SWEs to ensure that the walkdown program satisfied the guidance in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC____ ___ ___ ___ ____ _ _ ___ ___ ____ ___ ___ ___ ___ PAGE 12OF 68 4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES Robert Ashworth, SCE (MPR)Mr. Ashworth has more than six years of experience providing engineering solutions for a wide variety of nuclear power plant components and systems. His experience includes equipment walkdowns at industrial facilities to assess material condition, structural modeling and analyses; and seismic qualification in accordance with current industry standards for mechanical and electrical equipment in nuclear power plants. Mr. Ashworth has completed the training course for the EPRI Report 1025286 and is also a Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) as defined in the SQUG GIP for resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46.Warren Barr (SNC)Mr. Barr is currently a Senior Plant Support Engineer at the Hatch Plant. He has over forty-three (43) years of on-site and off-site nuclear power related experience in the area of mechanical design and engineering for Southern Company nuclear units. Experience consists of new plant design, unit start-up, unit recovery, modification design and implementation, system design and operation, engineering support, outage support, maintenance support, problem resolution, vendor interface, project management, and project and group coordination and supervision.

Melanie Brown, SCE (SNC)Ms. Brown has over 31 years of experience with Southern Company, the majority of which has been serving the nuclear fleet. Ms. Brown's most recent assignment was as a Seismic Qualification Engineer in the Fleet Design Department, where she was responsible for performing activities associated with the Governance, Oversight, Support, and Perform (GOSP) Model including:

• Management of the seismic design bases,* Seismic equipment qualification,* Seismic evaluation of plant structures and components," Design documentation and configuration management.

She is currently serving as the Southern Nuclear Seismic Technical Lead for the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns for all three Southern Nuclear plants.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 13OF 68 Chris Burke (SNC)Mr. Burke is currently the Operations Support Manager for the Hatch site. He has a Bachelor of Science Degree in Aerospace Engineering and 15 years of nuclear plant experience within the Engineering and Operations departments.

Mr. Burke obtained a Senior Reactor Operator license from the NRC in 2005. In addition to his current function, Mr. Burke has served in various leadership roles in support of plant operation including Shift Support Supervisor, Shift Supervisor, and Shift Manager.David Edenfield (SNC)Mr. Edenfield is currently the Risk Analyst for the Hatch Site. He has a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering and 34 years of nuclear plant experience including 10 years in plant construction and 24 years in plant support at Plant Hatch. Some of his related experience and responsibilities includes, Maintenance Rule Expert Panel member, On-site administrator for EPRI software package EOOS (Equipment Out of Service), reviewer for all design change packages for EOOS model impact, High and Low Voltage Switchyard System Engineer, and Component Engineer for Relays (Protective, Control, and Timing) and Large Transformers.

Jeffrey Horton, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Horton, P.E., is a degreed Professional Engineer with 37 years of experience specializing in applied mechanics with an emphasis on structural analysis of mechanical components and piping.His experience includes structural and thermal design of Nuclear Pressure Vessels, structural design of Nuclear Pipe Systems, Pipe Support Analysis, and Concrete Design. Mr. Horton holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Aerospace Engineering and a Master of Science degree in Material Science specializing in Solid Mechanics.

Mr. Horton has performed numerous ANSI B331.1, B31.7, ASME Section I, III, and VIII component structural calculations and design verifications for Oyster Creek, TMI-I and other nuclear facilities.

Mr. Horton has used AutoPIPE since 1989 for pipe stress evaluations at Oyster Creek, TMI-1 and other nuclear facilities.

Most recently, Mr. Horton was involved in the pipe stress and pipe support analysis for the James A. Fitzpatrick HPCI Steam Trap Valve replacement project, and the Oyster Creek 2010 buried pipe project where he performed the pipe design for the Condensate Storage Tank overflow pipe using AutoPIPE.

Mr. Horton has significant field experience including extended site assignments at Oyster Creek, TMI and Perry, and has performed equipment walkdowns at numerous facilities.

Mr. Horton completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE14OF68 Patrick Kelly, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Kelly, P.E., has a Master's degree in Civil Engineering with over 5 years of engineering experience in commercial and nuclear plant design having prepared and developed several design change packages, calculations, evaluations and engineering judgments.

Mr. Kelly brings considerable experience in structural analysis, building evaluations, conduit evaluations, and miscellaneous structural analysis.

He has supported various security related projects at SNC.Additionally, Mr. Kelly was the lead civil engineer on the recent detailed and final designs packages for the Unit 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Excitation Panel Replacement projects at Plant Hatch. Mr.Kelly completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.Kursat Kinali, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Kinali, Ph.D., P.E., is a Civil/Structural Engineer and Responsible Engineer for modifications.

Dr. Kinali has M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in Structural Engineering with industry experience in commercial and nuclear design. He is a registered Professional Engineer.

He is experienced in seismic analysis, reinforced concrete design, and seismic performance assessment of existing structures.

Dr. Kinali worked on Southern California Edison's SONGS Units 3&4 for design of removable bar panels on a Large Organism Exclusion Device (LOED). He was the responsible structural engineer for designing and detailing the stainless steel removable bar panels. These frames employed a fail-open mechanism that prevents damage to the rest of the LOED frame during extreme wave or seismic events. Dr. Kinali was one of the responsible engineers for an Engineering Change (EC) package at Robinson which involved ballistic resistant enclosure (BRE) replacement.

He was also the primary reviewer for BRE drop analysis for the Farley Nuclear Plant. He reviewed the calculation which investigated the possible effects of BRE drop on safety-related underground features.

For the last couple years, he has been working on numerous design change packages associated with 10 CFR 73.55 security compliance projects for all four Progress Energy's plants, where he was responsible for designing/detailing the reinforced concrete foundations for buildings and miscellaneous equipment, designing electrical duct banks running under a heavy-haul path, preparing/reviewing calculations and drawings for conduit supports and miscellaneous component mountings, and preparing/reviewing (EC) packages.

Mr. Kinali completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 15OF 68 Johnathon McFarland, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. McFarland, P.E., is a Civil/Structural Engineer providing engineering support for various nuclear generating stations.

Mr. McFarland has a B.S. in Civil Engineering and over 5 years of experience in civil/structural design, including ECCS Suction Strainers, seismic and hydrodynamic analysis, yard modifications and field engineering.

Mr. McFarland has significant experience at Florida Power and Light's Turkey Point Plant, and at the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Station (WCNOC). Mr.McFarland supported various modifications at WCNOC including providing outage support.Additionally, Mr. McFarland provided EPU related support at Turkey Point including the analysis and walkdowns of structural systems. He supported structural analysis of shipping casks. Mr.McFarland completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.Richard Starck, SCE (MPR)Mr. Starck is a registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic qualification of nuclear plant equipment.

He is the principal author of the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document (EPRI Report 1025286, Reference 10.2). He developed and taught the six sessions of the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course to more than 200 engineers.

He has provided technical oversight of work for various SQUG projects aimed at resolving USI A-46. Mr.Starck developed for SQUG the generic guidelines, criteria, and procedure for identifying safe shutdown equipment for resolution of USI A-46, is the editor and principal author of the SQUG GIP, and has interfaced with the NRC Staff and the SQUG Steering Group to resolve open issues on several revisions of the GIP. Mr. Starck is a SCE and has performed Seismic Walkdowns and evaluations of nuclear plant electric and mechanical equipment as part of the NRC required USI A-46 program. This work included equipment qualification, anchorage evaluation, seismic interaction review, outlier resolution, and operability determination.

Michael Steele, SCE (SNC)Mr. Steele is currently a Principal Design Engineer at Plant Hatch. He has a Bachelor's of Science Degree in Civil Engineering and 20 years of experience as a structural engineer.

He is a qualified SQUG Seismic Capability Engineer and Certified Lead Auditor. He has comprehensive and in-depth technical experience in nuclear facilities structural design, construction, modification and maintenance.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC____ ___ ___ ___ ____ ___ ___ ___ ____ ___ ___ ___ PAGE 16OF 68 Winston Stewart, SCE (ENERCON)Mr. Stewart is a Mechanical Engineer with over eight years of experience in various capacities including:

Modification Engineer, Engineering Mentor, IOCFR50.59 Evaluator, Apparent Cause Evaluator, Contract Administration and Designated Representative, Project Manager, Procedure Technical Reviewer, and Environmental Monitoring Team Leader for Emergency Response Organization.

Mr. Stewart was responsible for the preparation of technical evaluations for various configuration changes to plant systems, structures, or components; as well as the preparation and revision of civil/structural calculations, pipe stress calculations, and other design documents.

Mr.Stewart served as subject matter expert for Pipe Stress Analysis and Pipe Flaw Evaluation (ASME B31.1,Section III and Section XI). During this time he qualified as SQUG Seismic Capability Engineer.

Mr. Stewart completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3-Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.James Tootle, Jr. (SNC)Mr. Tootle is the Hatch Severe Accident Management Program Manager. He holds a Bachelor's Degree in Civil Engineering Technology from Georgia Southern University.

He has 30 years of experience at an operating nuclear plant. Mr. Tootle is currently licensed as an SRO and served ten years as Shift Support Supervisor.

He also has supervisory experience in Operations Training and Nuclear Oversight.

Mr. Tootle's certifications include the following:

• Shift Supervisor Qualified (1998-2003)

• Shift Support Supervisor (1993-2003)

• Senior Reactor Operator (BWR) licensed (1993-present)" Station Nuclear Engineering

/ Shift Technical Advisor Certification

-General Electric (1990)

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC____ ___ ___ ___ ___ _ _ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ PAGE 17OF 68 Juan Vizcaya, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Vizcaya has over 30 years of structural engineering and design experience.

He has significant experience being the structural lead engineer on ISFSI projects and overall nuclear plant modifications and has a wide range of design/engineering experience.

Projects range from the seismic analysis and design of concrete and steel structures and concrete pads to the analysis and design of restraint systems for a vertical cask vendor stack-up configurations.

Other projects include heavy load drop assessments and the analysis and design of protective structures, foundations and various mechanical and structural modifications using sophisticated finite element models. Mr.Vizcaya is skilled at using finite element analyses in the design process, and at the practical design of mechanical components, along with concrete and steel structures.

He leads a group structural staff on issues involving structures, stress analysis, and site work such as layout, excavation, roads, drainage and subterranean structures.

Mr. Vizcaya has extensive field experience including during construction of the Laguna Verde Nuclear Plant. Mr. Vizcaya completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.Kenneth Whitmore, SCE (ENERCON)Mr. Whitmore is a Registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic design and seismic equipment qualification in nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore is a Seismic Capability Engineer that was involved in the development of the SQUG methodology for verification of nuclear plant components.

Specifically, Mr. Whitmore served on the sub-committee that developed the SQUG methodology for evaluation of raceways and on the sub-committee that performed the peer review of the SQUG walkdown training class. Mr. Whitmore performed A-46 and IPEEE walkdowns at Oyster Creek and Three Mile Island and has subsequently performed SQUG evaluations at numerous nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore served as both Chairman and Technical Chairman of the Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Service (SQRTS), has witnessed numerous seismic tests and is a recognized industry expert in seismic qualification of components.

Mr. Whitmore has significant experience in all aspects of structural analysis and design and has extensive experience in performing plant walkdowns associated with seismic issues. Mr.Whitmore completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC___ ___ ___ ___ ___ __ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ PAGE 1 8OF 68 Wesley Williams, SWE (SNC)Mr. Williams has a degree in Civil Engineering from the University of South Alabama. He is a System Engineer for Southern Nuclear at Plant Hatch in Baxley, GA. He has participated in numerous Structural Monitoring Walkdowns at Plant Hatch which are governed by 10 CFR 50.65,"Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants." In addition, Mr. Williams had the opportunity to work in the Civil Design Group at Southern Nuclear Corporate Headquarters as a summer intern before he graduated.

Mr. Williams completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.Alan Wolfe (SNC)Mr. Wolfe has a BS in Nuclear Engineering Technology.

He has more than 33 years of experience in the nuclear industry, all in the Operations department at Plant Hatch. He obtained a Reactor Operator's License in 1982 and a Senior Reactor Operator's License in 1987. Mr. Wolfe held positions of System Operator, Licensed Nuclear Plant Operator, Shift Supervisor, Shift Technical Advisor, Shift Manager, and Operations Superintendent prior to retiring in 2010. Following retirement he returned to the plant in January 2012 to support the Severe Accident Management team in response to the accident in Japan.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE19OF68 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING Information on the seismic vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program are reported in Attachment

5. Within this context, "vulnerabilities" means seismic anomalies, outliers, or other findings.

For each vulnerability, Attachment 5 also reports a description of the action taken to eliminate or reduce the seismic vulnerability.

The Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) for Hatch Unit 1 included nineteen (19) components for which seismic vulnerabilities were previously identified during the IPEEE program. During the Seismic Walkdowns, the walkdown teams verified that the resolutions to IPEEE vulnerabilities for 16 of the 19 SWEL components are implemented as stated in the IPEEE outlier resolution (Attachment 5).The extent of this verification is discussed in the individual SWCs for the components with identified IPEEE seismic vulnerabilities.

The following IPEEE vulnerability was found to be potentially unresolved during the Seismic Walkdown: I) IZ41-F009B, AIR-ACTUATED DAMPER B003B INLET -The air line support was previously considered inadequate and therefore an IPEEE outlier. Attachment 5 notes that supports were added per design change request (DCR)93-055. However, the Seismic Walkdown team concluded that the air line was not currently adequately supported for seismic loads. Therefore, condition report (CR) # 525292 was written to address the seismic support of the air line. Subsequent to the initiation of the CR, the SWEs judged the airline will perform its design function because of the very light weight of the air line being supported at the floor support. Corrective Actions will include installation of missing pipe clamps.The following SWEL components with IPEEE vulnerabilities could not be verified due to inaccessibility.

Completion of the walkdowns, for both components, is deferred until the next refueling outage (1 R26) which is scheduled for February of 2014.1) 1R24-S025, 600/208V ESS DIV 1 MCC IA -The anchorage was previously determined to not meet the GIP screening criteria.

Attachment 5 notes that the anchorage and connection to the adjacent panel was modified per DCR 88-334. Modification of the anchorage per DCR 88-334 was verified during the Seismic Walkdown.

However, the Seismic Walkdown team could not verify the internal connection between the cabinets since the MCC could not be opened at that time.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-PPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 20 OF 68 2) 1R24-S027, 600/208V ESS DIV 2 MCC IC -The anchorage was previously determined to not meet the GIP screening criteria.

Attachment 5 notes that the anchorage and connection to the adjacent panel was modified per DCR 88-334. Modification of the anchorage per DCR 88-334 was verified during the Seismic Walkdown.

However, the Seismic Walkdown team could not verify the internal connection between the cabinets since the MCC could not be opened at that time.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC_______________________________________PAGE 21 OF68 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT A team of individuals with extensive knowledge of Plant Hatch systems and components developed the SWEL. Qualifications of the personnel responsible for developing the SWEL are provided in Section 4.0 of this report. The equipment selection personnel used an SNC-template to ensure compliance with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and consistency across the fleet.Two SWELs were developed (SWEL I and SWEL 2) consistent with the guidance in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL I consists of a sample of equipment related to safe shutdown of the reactor and maintaining containment integrity as described in Section 3.0 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 2 consists of items related to the spent fuel pool as described in Section 3.0 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The two SWELs form the overall SWEL for the plant.Attachment 1 provides the final SWEL I and SWEL 2.In some cases, components listed on the SWEL were removed from the SWEL or were replaced with equivalent components.

These changes were made when it was determined during the Seismic Walkdown that access to the equipment on the original SWEL would be impractical to achieve during a walkdown.

For example, components located very high overhead were replaced with equivalent items that could be seen without erecting scaffolding.

All such changes meet the provisions of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The SWELs provided in Attachment I reflect the final SWELs with all changes incorporated.

6.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL I SWEL 1 was developed using the four screens described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).Screens 1 to 3 Screens I to 3 were used to select Seismic Category I equipment that do not undergo regular inspection and support the five safety functions.

In accordance with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2, Page 3-3), Screens I through 3 can be satisfied using previous equipment lists developed for the IPEEE program. Consequently, the Seismic Review Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) developed for the Hatch Nuclear Plant's response to Generic Letter 88-20 (Reference 10.3) was included in Base List I for the development of SWEL 1.Additional items were added to Base List I from the USI A-46 Summary Report (Reference 10.9) and the Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (Reference 10.7), Tables 3.Al-1 and 4.Al-1, to provide components to address the twenty-one classes of equipment from Appendix B of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 22 OF 68 The specific guidance used to create the IPEEE Seismic SSEL was EPRI Report NP-6041, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin" (Reference 10.10). The Seismic SSEL from IPEEE-Seismic was checked and verified to meet the intentions set forth in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The intent of the Base List 1 was to provide an equipment list of the SSCs used to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment integrity following a Design Basis Earthquake.

The EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2, Page 3-1) listed three screens to use in selecting the Base List I if a utility was to not start from an existing equipment list used in previous plant evaluations.

Applying these three screens would result in an acceptable base list that was comprised of Seismic Category I SSCs associated with maintaining the following five safety functions listed in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2): " Reactor reactivity control* Reactor coolant pressure control* Reactor coolant inventory control" Decay heat removal, and" Containment function.The criteria used in selection of the Seismic SSEL are detailed in Section 3.1.2.2 of the IPEEE -Seismic Report (Reference 10.8). Specifically, one preferred and one alternate path capable of achieving and maintaining a safe-shutdown condition for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a Seismic Margin Earthquake (SME) was selected for each unit. Further, it was assumed that a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) had occurred and as such, the paths were also selected as being capable of mitigating a SBLOCA following an SME.Therefore, based upon the review of the Base List 1, it was determined that the list satisfied the requirements as specified in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Base List I is presented in Attachment 1.Screen 4 Screen 4 is the sample considerations to select components from the Base List 1. The selection of components for SWEL I was developed through an iterative process that ensured a representative sample (i.e., Screen 4 from EPRI Report 1025286 -Reference 10.2). Various drafts of SWEL I were provided to Hatch Licensed Senior Reactor Operators (SROs) for review and input. The SROs identified and recommended inclusion of additional equipment important to plant operations.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC____ ___ ___ ___ ___ __ ____ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ PAGE 23 OF 68 The following list summarizes the sample considerations used to develop SWEL 1:* Variety of systems* Major new or replacement equipment* Classes of equipment* Variety of environments

• Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program* Risk Significance Variety of Systems -EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) specifies that equipment from a variety of plant systems must be included on the SWEL 1. The systems represented in the Base List were reviewed and components from a majority of these systems are included on the SWEL.Major New and Replacement Equipment

-Major new or replacement equipment installed within the previous 15 years was identified through a search of work order (WO) histories for selected equipment and input from the plant personnel familiar with plant modification and from the PRA group on equipment changes to components that are included in the PRA.Variety of Equipment Classes -A list of the 21 Classes of Equipment that should be included on the SWEL is provided in Appendix B of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL I includes components from each equipment class.Variety of Environments

-The EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) specifies that the SWEL contain components located in various plant environments, including environments subject to corrosion and high temperatures.

SWEL 1 includes equipment in three environment types. These include Harsh (e.g. Reactor Building), Mild (e.g. Control Room, Diesel Generator Building), and Outdoors/Intake Structures (e.g. Plant Service Water Intake Structure, Yard Valve Pits).IPEEE Vulnerabilities

-SWEL 1 includes equipment identified with seismic vulnerabilities identified in Hatch Nuclear Plant's response to Generic Letter 88-20 (Reference 10.3).Risk Significance

-The risk ranking was performed using the at-power internal events PRA model and by identifying those components that, in the model, have a Risk Achievement Worth of 2.0 or greater, or a Risk Reduction Worth of 1.005 or greater. The importance ranking spreadsheet contained in calculation PRA-BC-H-10-008 (Reference 10.6) was the actual document used as a source.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC________________________________________PAGE 24 OF 68 6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 2 SWEL 2 is developed using four screens described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 2 is presented in Attachment 1.Screens 1 to 2 The equipment selected through Screens 1 and 2 provide any Seismic Category I components associated with the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) that are also suitable for a walkdown.

For Hatch Unit 1, the only Seismic Category I equipment associated with the SFP is the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System.The Base List 2 includes components from the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System that are suitable for a walkdown per Screens I and 2 from EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).Screen 3 Screen 3 is the sample considerations that ensure that a broad category of equipment from Base List 2 is included in SWEL 2. These considerations include:* Variety of systems" Major new or replacement equipment* Classes of equipment* Variety of environments The Hatch SFP System has a very basic system design with very limited component types. SWEL 2 includes components associated with maintaining seals around the SFP gates, which are Seismic Category I components.

There were no new/replacement equipment in SWEL 2 because there have been no major modifications to the Spent Fuel Pool systems that would affect equipment that meets the screening requirements.

Equipment associated with cooling of the SFP are located in locked areas (due to radiation) and are not suitable for a walkdown.The Decay Heat Removal System is the only major new or replaced equipment associated with the SFPs. However, the Decay Heat Removal System is Non-Safety Related and all piping connected to the SFP either terminates greater than 10 feet above the fuel or has anti-siphon holes located greater than 10 feet above the fuel to prevent rapid drain-down of the SFP.For Hatch Unit 1, SWEL 2 contains all the equipment on Base List 2. Thus, sampling was not a consideration in developing SWEL 2.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 25 OF 68 Screen 4 Screen 4 identifies any items that could potentially lead to rapid drain down of the SFP. These include any penetrations in the SFP that are below 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.

For Hatch Unit 1, there are no SFP penetrations within 10 feet above the fuel in the SFP. All piping connected to the SFP, either terminates more than 10 feet above the fuel or has anti-siphon holes, located more than 10 feet above the fuel, to prevent rapid drain-down of the SFP.Based on a review of plant documents, the only items that could potentially lead to rapid drain down of the pool are the Seismic Class 2 items that could contribute to deflation of the air seal in the seismic gap located in the transfer canal between the spent fuel pools. Air accumulators and gate seal ball valves that could contribute to deflation of the air gap, if damaged during a seismic event, are included in SWEL 2.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 26 OF 68 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS Walkdowns were performed for all components on the (combined)

SWEL except for those that were inaccessible (see Section 7.1). A Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) was completed for each component and an Area Walk-by Checklist (AWC) was completed for each area containing equipment on the SWEL. Copies of the SWCs and AWCs are provided in Attachments 3 and 4, respectively.

The personnel performing walkdowns received training on the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown guidance.Prior to the walkdown teams arriving onsite, walkdown packages were assembled into folders that contained the SWCs and AWCs and other pertinent information (e.g., calculations, test reports, IPEEE walkdowns, equipment location, and layout drawings).

Each walkdown team consisted of two SWEs.The walkdown teams spent the first week on site obtaining unescorted plant access and organizing for the walkdowns.

Organization included assignment of specific components to the teams; review of the walkdown packages; development of a process for tracking the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys; and familiarization with the plant.The second week began with peer reviewers (Whitmore and Ashworth) providing an overview on the information contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Expectations for the walkdowns were discussed and questions were answered.

After this overview, each walkdown team performed an initial Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by. This initial walkdown was performed in the presence of the other teams and at least one peer reviewer.

The purpose of this initial walkdown was to ensure consistency between the different teams, to reinforce the expectations for identifying potentially adverse seismic conditions, and to allow team members to provide and obtain feedback.Following the initial walkdowns, the walkdown teams began performing the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

Support from plant personnel (operators, electricians, engineering) was obtained as required to open equipment and to assist in locating and identifying components.

All component Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were documented on the SWCs and AWCs, respectively.

The final status of all SWCs and AWCs indicated one of the three following statuses:* "Y" -Yes, the equipment is free from potentially adverse seismic conditions;" "N" -No, the equipment is not free from at least one potentially adverse seismic condition;

• "U" -Undetermined, a portion(s) of the walkdown could not be completed due to equipment inaccessibility and the condition is not known.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC____ ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ ___ PAGE 27 OF 68 The walkdown focused on anchorage and seismic spatial interactions but also included inspections for other potentially adverse seismic conditions.

Anchorage in all cases was considered to be anchorage to the structure.

This included anchor bolts to concrete walls or floors, structural bolts to structural steel and welds to structural steel or embedded plates. For welds, the walkdown team looked for cracks and corrosion in the weld and base metal. Other bolts such as flange bolts on in-line components were not considered to be anchorage.

These connections were evaluated and any potentially adverse seismic concerns were documented under "other adverse seismic conditions".

As part of the walkdown, the anchorage of at least 50% of the anchored components was evaluated to verify if the anchorage was consistent with plant documentation.

The document that provides the anchorage configuration was identified on the SWC and the anchorage in the field was compared to the information on this referenced document.

In cases where the anchorage could not be observed (e. g.where the anchorage is inside a cabinet that could not be opened at the time of the walkdown), the items related to anchorage were marked as "U" (Undetermined) and deferred until equipment is available for inspection.

However, all other possible inspections associated with that item were completed and the results were documented on the SWC. These items were considered to be incomplete at the time of this report preparation and have been deferred to a time when they would be available for inspection (see Section 7.1). All "U" items have been deferred until during Refueling Outage 1R26 which is scheduled for February 2014.In cases where the Seismic Walkdown team members identified a potentially adverse condition, the condition was noted on the SWC or on the AWC and a CR was written to document and evaluate/resolve the condition.

As part of the process of generating the CR, preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs during the walkdowns.

Additionally, detailed licensing basis reviews were conducted as part of the resolution of the CR, as required.

Conditions that were not obviously acceptable were documented on the checklists and a basis was provided for why the observed condition was determined to be acceptable.

Area Walk-bys were performed in the rooms containing the SSCs for walkdowns.

For cases in which the room where a component was located was large, the extent of the area encompassed by the Area-Walk-by was clearly indicated on the AWCs. For large areas, the walk-by included all structures, systems and components within a 35-foot radius of the equipment being walked down, as described on the AWC. The AWCs are included in Attachment

4.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 28 OF 68 SWEL I Walkdowns A total of 88 of the 111 SWEL I Component Seismic Walkdowns have been performed to date.However, 8 must be revisited in order to inspect for other adverse conditions inside the cabinets.

In addition, 23 of the 111 SWEL I components were delayed due to inaccessibility.

The schedule for performing the remaining component walkdowns is presented in Tables 7-1 and 7-2. All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.SWEL 2 Walkdowns A total of 4 component Seismic Walkdowns were performed.

In addition, a total of 2 Area Walk-bys were completed.

All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.7.1 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS Table 7-1 identifies the components originally determined to be inaccessible for walkdowns.

These items are located throughout the plant and the required Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were not completed for these items during the initial phase of walkdowns.

Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope# Item No. Description Access Remaining Schedule Walkdown for Scope Completion

1. IR23-S003 600V SWGR EMERGENCY BUS See Note 2 SWC and Outage IC & 4160-600V XFMR AWC I R26 2. 600V SWGR EMERGENCY BUS See Note 2 SWC and Outage I D & 4160-600V XFMR AWC 1 R26 3. 250V DC BATTERY DIV I See Note 2 SWC and Outage 1 R22-S016 SWGR IA AWC 1 R26 4. 4160V SWGR EMERGENCY See Note 2 SWC and Outage I R22-S005 BUS 1E AWC 1 R26 HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC____ ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ ___ PAGE 29 OF 68 Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope Item No. Description Access Remaining Schedule Walkdown for Scope Completion

5. 4160V SWGR EMERGENCY See Note 2 SWC and Outage BUS IF AWC 1 R26 6. 4160V SWGR EMERGENCY See Note 2 SWC and Outage BUS IG AWC 1 R26 7. See Note I SWC and Outage 1P41-F043B PSW DW AIR CLR 7B IN AOV AWC 1R26 8. See Note I SWC and Outage 1P41-F045A PSW DW AIR CLR 8A [N AOV AWC 1R26 9. See Note I SWC and Outage IEI I-F060A RHR INJECTION VLV AWC 11R26 10. IT47-B009 Clin A See Note I SWC and Outage AWC 1RD26 13. 1 T47-BO08A DW Cooling System Unit See Note I SWC and Outage AWC 1R26 12. See Note 2 SWC and Outage 1T47-B007B DW Cooling System Unit AWC 11R26 13. See Note 2 SWC and Outage IT47-B009A DW Cooling System Unit AWC 1 R26 14. RPS POWER DISTRIBUTION See Note 2 SWC and Outage 1 C71 -P001 PANEL BUS A AWC 1 R26 1R25-S001 125V DC DIV 1 CAB IASeNoe2WCad Otg AWC 11(26 HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC____ ___ ___ ___ ____ ___ ___ ___ ____ ___ ___ ___ PAGE 30 OF 68 Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope Item No. Description Access Remaining Schedule Walkdown for Scope Completion

16. See Note 2 SWC and Outage 1 R25-S002 125V DC DIV 2 CAB lB AWC 1R26 17. See Note 2 SWC and Outage 1 R25-S004 125V DC CAB 1D AWC 1 R26 18. See Note 2 SWC and Outage lR2S5-005 125V DC CAB lE AWC 1R26 19. See Note 2 SWC and Outage 1R25-S036 120/208V AC ESS CAB lB AWC 1 R26 20. See Note 2 SWC and Outage 1R25-S105 125V DC CAB ID ESS DIV I AWC 1 R26 21. See Note 2 SWC and Outage 1R25-S125 120/208V AC ESS DIV I CAB AWC 1R26 22. 120/208V AC VITAL CAB lA See Note 2 SWC and Outage 1 R25-S064 INSTR BUS IA AWC 1R26 23. See Note 2 SWC and Outage 1R25-Sl 16 120/208V AC ESS DIV 2 CAB AWC IR26 HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE31OF68 Table 7-2 provides a list of components determined to be inaccessible to open doors to perform inspections for other adverse conditions.

The anchorage for these components was visible without opening all panels of the cabinet and was therefore inspected during the initial walkdowns.

Table 7-2. Inaccessible Equipment Resulting from Guidance on Opening Cabinets to Inspect for Other Adverse Conditions Item No. Description Access Remaining Schedule Walkdown for Scope Completion

1. See Note 2 Inspect Outage 1R24-S009 600/208V MCC 1A Internals 1IR26 2. See Note 2 Inspect Outage 1R24-S011 600V ESS DIV I MCC 1C Internals 1R26 3. See Note 2 Inspect Outage IR24-S025 600/208V ESS DIV I MCC IA Internals 1R26 4. See Note 2 Inspect Outage R24-S012 600V ESS D.IV 2 MCC 1B Internals 1R26 5. See Note 2 Inspect Outage I R24-S022 125/250V DC ESS DIV 2 MCC IB Internals I R26 6. See Note 2 Inspect Outage 1R24-S027 600/208V ESS DIV 2 MCC IC Internals I R26 7. See Note 2 Inspect Outage 1R24-S048 DG BLDG 600/208V MCC 1D Internals 1 R26 8. See Note 2 Inspect Outage IR11-S004 575-120/208VAC XFMR ID Internals I R26 HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC____ ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ ___ PAGE 32 OF 68 Notes (Table 7-1 and Table 7-2): 1) The component was located inside an area of the plant not accessible during normal plant operation.

Walkdowns of these components and of the associated plant areas were deferred to an outage.2) Inspection of the cabinet's internals could not be performed without opening the doors of the equipment.

Opening doors on these types of components was not permitted by plant operations at the time of the Seismic Walkdowns due to equipment deemed too sensitive to permit access, or requiring special, planned precautions, to open the doors.3) While the Seismic Walkdowns were in progress at Hatch Unit 1, supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse conditions was received on September 18, 2012. This required the opening of cabinets, electrical boxes and switchgear and the inspection of internals for SWC attributes, even when opening the components was not required to inspect the anchorage.

However, the affected components were identified and scheduled for re-inspection with component doors opened.4) Hatch Unit I has 7 transformers (Equipment Class 4) in the SWEL-1. With the exception of components (MPL #) 1R23-S003, 1R23-S004, and IRI I-S004, which were deferred as stated above, the transformers were inspected to the extent practical.

All visible anchors, hardware and surfaces were inspected.

The anchorage for the transformers was visible without opening the component.

To inspect the transformer further would require disassembly and therefore would not be considered part of a normal electrical inspection.

The inspection of the transformers meets the requirements of the guidance document and the 50.54(f) letter. Listed below are the 4 transformers for which inspections were completed:

MPL # IRI 1-S039 45KVA 600-120/208V XFMR MPL# IRII-S041 600-120/208VAC XFMR IB MPL # 1SII-S009 4160/600V STA SERV XFMR IFI MPL # IS11-S012 4160/600V STA SERV XFMR IF2 Note that some of these MPL numbers include both the switchgear and the transformer.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 33 OF 68 8.0 RESULTS This section discusses the results of the Seismic Walkdowns that were performed in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic".

As potentially adverse conditions were identified conditions reports were initiated in the Plant CAP program and evaluated.

The sections below discuss the results of these walkdowns and evaluations.

8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS All potentially adverse conditions were conservatively entered into the site Corrective Action Program (CAP) per Southern Nuclear expectations in a timely fashion. While some preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs as part of the generation of the CAP entries, the items did not first undergo a detailed seismic licensing basis review as described in EPRI Report 1025286.Consequently, the as-found conditions in Table 8-1 below do not necessarily indicate that SSCs are deficient or not in conformance with their seismic licensing basis. Instead, it is an indication that Southern Nuclear has a very low threshold for CRs and actively uses the system.SNC personnel familiar with the Plant Hatch Seismic Licensing basis, Plant Hatch seismic qualification methods and documentation, and Southern Nuclear requirements and procedures for entering items into the CAP reviewed and dispositioned all of the potentially adverse seismic conditions as part of the CAP process. The subsections below summarize the key findings from the CAP reviews that pertain to equipment operability, SSC conformance with the seismic licensing basis, and any required plant changes.During the course of the seismic walkdowns, a total of 52 Unit I Potentially Adverse Conditions were identified and entered into the Corrective Action Program. In addition, another 5 were entered that are Common to both Units I and 2. Table 8-1 provides additional details on the SSCs that were identified during the walkdowns and entered into the CAP as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed relative to their seismic licensing basis.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKaOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 34 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR# Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit I An electrical pull box orjunction box cover 512613 It isjudged the cover would stay attached with just one Replace missing screws Open Reactor (approximately 12"x 12") was found to be screw during a seismic event, per work order Due Building attached to its box with only I screw. The SNC431589 11/27/2013 el 130' box is located on the wall above elevation 130' of the Unit I Reactor Building.

The box is located above TBI-1376 and TBI-1377 and is in the same area as MCC 1R25-SOI I (near the corner).Unit I Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed 513284 Missing nut on electrical conduit camp was determined Replace nut per work Open Reactor electrical conduit was missing a nut for the to not to have an adverse effect on equipment.

order SNC431866 Due Building NW clamp. The missing nut was located in Unit 1 11/27/2013 Diagonal NW Diagonal elevation 116' proximity of IT41-B001A and above IG11-F2051.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 35 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR1# Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit I Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed a step 513335 The ladder and cart need to be removed or stored per Action was taken by Closed Control ladder stored between Battery Charger I R42- the Seismic Configuration Control Requirements, Operations to correct the Building S026 and I R42-S027 on the 130' elevation in Drawing B-45555. configuration of the el 130' Room C 114 of the Unit I Control Building.

stored equipment 9/7/12.In the occurrence of a seismic event, this ladder could potentially cause damage to the Battery Chargers.

Also in the same room, an equipment cart with loose equipment stored on it was tied off on one comer of the cart to a conduit near Switchgear 1R22-SO 16. The wheels were not chalked, so during a seismic event the cart could potentially roll and damage the Switchgear.

The equipment stored on the cart could also fall off potentially damaging the switchgear.

Unit I Seismic Walkdown Engineers in Unit 1 513346 Seismic Walkdown Engineers determined that the The Eyewash Station Closed Reactor Reactor Building elevation 203' in close temporary eye wash station would not adversely affect was properly restrained Building proximity to SBLC Area observed a the condition of any safety related equipment.

9/7/12.el 203' temporary eye wash station tie down to a pipe I P42-F029.

The eye wash station has the potential to move in a seismic event.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 36 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR1# Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit I A nitrogen bottle was found adjacent to the 513731 While the team judges that it is unlikely that the bottle Nitrogen bottle was Closed Reactor CRD drive units at elevation 130' in the Unit I will come completely loose from the rope, there is still properly restrained with Building Reactor Building.

This nitrogen bottle was a potential that the bottle could impact one or two of a second rope placed el 130' found near the eastern-most CRD drive unit, the CRD drive units located nearby. The bottle safety with spatial distance next to the railroad bay. The bottle was cap is properly installed and the team judges that the between the ropes on the secured to a structural support with a single cap would remain in place even if the bottle were to bottle 9/7/12.rope. The seismic walkdown team members fall over.determined that the bottle could potentially fall over due to being secured with only a single rope.Unit I A cart was found adjacent to MCC Panel 513776 The cart should be stored where equipment cannot Action was taken to Closed Reactor I R24-S01 8A in the Unit I Reactor Building at potentially slide off and hit sensitive equipment.

correct the configuration Building elevation 130'. The cart was tied off at the of the stored equipment el 130' wall at RL and R9, and the wheels were 9/7/12.chalked. However, equipment was on the cart that could slide off and hit the MCC panel.Unit I Seismic Walkdown Engineers found an 513948 The Seismic Walkdown Engineers judged the supports The missing anchor bolts Open Reactor anchor bolt missing from two separate adequate to support the ductwork during a seismic should be replaced per Due Building supports on the same ductwork in the event due to the number of existing bolts remaining in work order SNC432457 11/27/2013 el 164' Ventilating Room, elevation 164', of the Unit each of the two supports and the close support spacing I Reactor Building.

The ductwork enters the of all supports on the duct run.room through the east wall along column line RB at penetration number 1T43-H527J and turns north. The second support north of the duct turn has an anchor bolt missing at the base plate on the wall beneath the duct. The fourth support north of the duct turn near column line R7 has an anchor bolt missing at the base plate on the floor.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 37 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit I Seismic Walkdown Engineers found a crack 513954 The Seismic Walkdown Engineers judge the capacity Structural Monitoring Open Reactor in the concrete wall between the Ventilating of the one bolt to be reduced, however, there is Engineers to monitor and Due Building Room, R207, and the Standby Gas Filter & adequate support provided to the conduit by this trend any growth or 11/27/2012 el 164' Fan Room R-207C, of the Unit I Reactor support based on the three remaining anchor bolts that worsening of this Building at elevation 164'. This crack runs are in good condition and have no edge distance issues, particular crack.near, but not through, an anchor bolt for a conduit support. The conduit supported by The 2' -2" thick concrete wall runs east-west on this support runs to a pull box with a number column line R3. The doorway is on the west end of the on the box cover that appears to be marked wall. The crack propagates from the top eastem-most ESS-11-J362.

The crack creates a slightly comer of the doorway and runs at approximately 45 lessened edge distance for one of the four degrees through a core-drilled piping penetration.

The anchor bolts holding the conduit support to the Seismic Walkdown Engineers judge the crack started wall; thereby reducing the pull-out and shear because of the close proximity of the core drill to the capacity of this one bolt. comer of the doorway. The crack is relatively narrow and appears stable.Unit I Diesel The light fixture at the Southwest corner of 513990 Should the one rod come loose in such an event, it A new tie wire was Closed Gen Building Switchgear Room I E in the Diesel Generator could potentially swing down and impact equipment installed 9/8/2012 SGR Room Building has one tie wire broken at the 1H21-P176.

Consistent with details provided in DCR I E location where it is hooked to the ceiling. This90-010, use 12 gauge annealed wire to tie light. Wrap wire was originally installed to insure the wire around rod below hanger with a minimum of three hook would not come loose during a seismic complete twists around wire. Wrap wire around anchor event. Should the one rod come loose in such or support structure with a minimum of three complete an event, it could potentially swing down and twists around wire.impact equipment I H21-P176.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 38 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Control Building el 112' Battery Room IA Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs)identified three cracks in the concrete ceiling (located at el 130') of the IA battery room in the Control Building, Elevation 112'.-One crack is located in ceiling at the North-West Corner of the IA battery room. The crack has oil stains around the crack and there is also signs ofoil dripping on the 112' floor.Room C 117 (Oil Conditioning/Oil Reservoir Room) is located on elevation 130' and is immediately above the crack and may be the source of the oil drippings.

This crack spans between two vertical supports used for a 1.5 ton monorail crane in the room, passing close to the crane anchor bolts.-The second and third cracks are located in the ceiling (elevation 130') of the IA battery room adjacent to two separate vertical supports used to secure conduit and HVAC ductwork, respectively.

The cracks near these two supports are in close proximity to the anchor bolts, but there are at least two other anchor bolts located far from the cracks.513992 Crack located in ceiling at the North-West Comer of the IA battery room. The crane appears inactive and to not have been used in many years. Photographs from the Structural Monitoring program indicate there has been no noticeable change in the crack since at least 1996. It is recommended this crack continue to be followed/monitored under the Structural Monitoring Program.Cracks located in the ceiling (elevation 130') of the IA battery room -The SWEs judge the structural capacities of the vertical supports are sufficient for seismic demands.In response to CR 2008100637 and CR 2008100632, the I R42S00 IA, 1R42S001B, 2R42S001A and 2R42S001B Station Service batteries and battery room were checked for signs of oil or degradation.

No additional cell degradation related to the original event was found in any of the 4 batteries.

A crack with signs ofoil was observed in the Northwest comer of the 1R42-SOOIA battery room on the ceiling. This crack is not above the 1 R42-SOOIA battery, and does not pose a threat to the battery. The oil in this crack appeared older (darker color), however it did look like the same type fluid as in the 2A SS Room. See WO 1080328001.

Open Due 4/30/14 HIATCHI UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCHO82-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PG306 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR P Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit I Seismic Walkdown Engineers in Unit I 514831 Nitrogen bottle tied to support between CRDs -Team The Nitrogen bottles Closed Reactor Reactor Building elevation 130' noticed judges that it is likely that the bottle will come were tied off properly Building Nitrogen bottles that were not properly tie off. completely loose from the rope due to the slack, with a where there was no slack el 130' potential that the bottle could impact one or two of the in the rope.One, was located tied to a support in-between CRD drive units located nearby. The bottle safety cap CRD 46-39 & 42-27. The seismic walkdown is properly installed and the team judges that the cap team members determined that the bottle would remain in place even if the bottle were to fall could potentially fall over due to being over.secured with only a single rope.Second nitrogen bottle located next Scram Fuse Panel The second nitrogen bottle that is not tied off (1C71-PO02F).

The seismic walkdown team members properly is located next Scram Fuse Panel determined that the bottle could potentially fall over (IC71-PO02F).

The seismic walkdown team due to being secured only at the top of the bottle. The members determined that the bottle could bottle safety cap is missing from the nitrogen bottle.potentially fall over due to being secured only at the top of the bottle. The bottle safety cap is missing from the nitrogen bottle.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 40 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit I Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed 515108 In a seismic event, the ramps would not fall and strike Given that the CR Closed Diesel Gen racking devices in several Diesel Generator or slide into any safety related equipment because of initiator identified there Building Building Switchgear Rooms not plugged in. the aisle width and the height of the concrete curb is no seismic concern SWGR A sign on the units state "UPS must remain nearby panels sit on. However, the ramps should be with the manner in Rooms plugged in when not in use". All racking stored/secured the same way in each room. This is which the ramps are devices should be plugged in to maintain more of a personnel safety issue for when walking stored and considering charge. around these ramps. that the high visibility contrast and the low Also, the ramp for each racking device was frequency of the area stored differently in each switchgear room being traversed inspected, Some were leaned against the wall minimizes any personnel beside the racking device, some were stored safety concerns, no between the racking device and the wall, and action is required others were stored lying flat on the floor. concerning the ramp storage.IR24-S012 There is a missing bolt which connects frame 515117 Per the Seismic Walkdown Engineers judgment it Replace the missing bolt. Open 15 to frame 16 at the south face (front) of appears the missing anchorage is limited to this one Due MCC IR2.4-S012 at the 130' elevation of the bolt. When the lower panel was removed at all other 4/30/2014 Reactor Building.

The adjacent panels are panels for inspection of anchor bolts, all other bolts secured at the bottom with a bolt at the north fastening the panels together were present, front and face (back of MCC panel), back.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 41 OF68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)1R24-S022 The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs)identified a nut not properly tightened to its bolt in frame 5 of MCC panel 1 R24-S022 in the north end of room 109A of Unit I Reactor Building elevation 130'. The loose nut and bolt is one of two bolts fastening the front of frame 5 to the base channel. The nut and bolt can be accessed by removing the base panels of the MCC.The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs)identified drawing H 16240, Version 23, locates instrument 1 T41-N022A on the diagonal (torus) wall in the Southwest diagonal of the Unit I Reactor Building.

The instrument is actually located on the South wall (column line RI 3) at the stair landing.PDMS Location Data has the correct location.515614 The condition was judged to not be a seismic issue since each frame is bolted to the adjacent frame, allowing loads to transfer and be resisted by the anchorage provided by the properly fastened bolts in this and all other frames of this MCC.Properly tighten the loose bolt and nut.Open Due 4/30/2014-I I- -I I IT41-N022A 515915 The anchorage wasjudged to be seismically adequate.The drawing needs to be revised to indicate the correct location of the instrument.

CR/TE to be issued to get drawing revised.Drawing needs to be revised.Open Due 11/27/2013 HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 42 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit I Reactor Building el 130'Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed two anchor bolts not properly installed for a support for the barrier plate assembly covering the auxiliary steam piping (see drawings H-16279 and H- 15173) in the Unit I Reactor Building, elevation 130'. The support is located behind and above MCC.panel IR24-012 approximately 10' -9" east of column line RE and is anchored to the north wall of the reactor building.516278 As described below, it is judged by the Seismic Walkdown Engineers that the seismic Il/I criteria is met by the existing support structures without relying on the support anchor bolts in question.The support consists of a horizontal wide flange arm and vertical brace to the wall. Two anchors that secure the base plate of the horizontal arm to the wall are in question.

One nut of one anchor is engaging by only one or two turns of the nut. The other anchor fastens to the wall through an enlarged hole in the base plate. No oversized washer covers the hole in the base plate.The barrier plate assembly and piping have independent support systems. Per the Seismic Walkdown Engineers' judgment, the barrier plate assembly is stiff enough to span to adjacent supports either side of the support in question should the anchor bolts not hold the support during a seismic event. The adjacent supports are constructed well and all anchorage to the wall is in good condition.

The adjacent supports appear robust enough to hold any additional weight of the barrier plate assembly not carried by the support in question.

Also, the box-shaped barrier plate assembly surrounds the steam pipe and cannot fall off of the pipe. The 10-inch diameter steam pipe and its supports are very robust and are judged capable of carrying any additional load applied by the barrier plate assembly.

Further evaluation should be performed to determine a resolution to the as-found condition, whether it is to leave the condition as-is or to replace or modify the anchor bolts.An evaluation needs to be prepared to determine if this condition can stay as is or if the anchor bolts need to be replaced/modified.

Open Due 4/30/2014 I. ______ +/- _______________________________________

L __________________

j _________

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 43 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)IRI 1-S020 Seismic Walkdown Engineers found out that 516325 The Seismic Walkdown Engineers judged the support Bolts with inadequate Open Transformer I RI 1-S020 was bolted to to be adequate during a seismic event due to the threaded engagements Due channel with minimal threaded engagement of geometry and the number of existing bolts remaining should be replaced.

11/27/2013 bolts and nuts. This transformer is located on each side of the transformer.

behind the MCC 1R24-S0 12, attached to the north wall with channels.Intake Seismic Walkdown Engineers found that 516327 Prompt resurfacing and coating is needed to interrupt Prompt resurfacing and Open Structure numerous piping, instrumentation, and degradation.

coating is needed to Due el 110' conduit/equipment supports in the Intake interrupt degradation per 11/27/2013 Structure elevation 110' has general coatings work order SNC433192 degradation and minor surface rusting. Note that this potentially adverse seismic condition is common to both units.I R43-C0IOB Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed a 516335 The broken housing can expose personnel to flying Replace screen Open broken piece of housing screen on Air parts from the air compressor intemals.

Due Compressor 1R43-C01OB located in Room lB Il1/27/2013 of the Diesel Building.Diesel Gen Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed a light 516344 Based on engineering judgment the light will not A cable is to be installed Open Building fixture using a hook for support in Diesel disengaged from the conduit due to configuration, for proper support and Due Room IC Generator IC Room does not have a cable for Wire tie needs to be replaced.

stop the light from 11/27/2013 supplemental support as required.

In a seismic disengaging from the event, the light's hook fixture could dislodge ceiling.and fall on the fuel lines for Generator.

The light is located in the southeast section of the room. A cable is to be installed for proper support and stop the light from disengaging from the ceiling.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 44 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)I R43-C0 I fC Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed that 516348 These two screws are to be added to the housing to Install two screws. Open the housing for the Air Compressor I R43- reflect as design condition.

Due CO1OC located in room IC, of the Diesel 11/27/2013 Generator Building, has two screws missing.The absence of these two screws imposes additional loads on the adjacent screws and increases the vibration of the housing panel.These two screws are to be added to the housing to reflect as design condition.

I R24-S01 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed a 517041 Seismic Walkdown Engineers judged the MCC will Bolt needs to be Open missing bolt connection at the base of south perform its design function during a seismic event as installed.

Due face for MCC I R24-SO 12 between frames 15 there are 7 out of the 8 remaining bolts connecting the 11/27/2013 and 16. The MCC is located in the north end frames together, which are adequate to transfer the load of Room 109A for Reactor Building, elevation to the MCC anchorage and eliminate the chatter effect.130'. Bolt needs to be installed per plant procedures.

Unit I Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed an 517171 If this screw were to become loosened during a seismic Replace the screw. Open Control electrical junction box attached to the post event, the other three cap screws would be sufficient to Due Building next to Battery IR42-SOI7B on the 112' hold the load of the box cover in place. The post is far 11/27/2013 elevation of the Unit I Control Building has enough from the battery rack that the screw will not four cap screws attaching the cover to the box. impact the batteries, so there is no potentially adverse One of the cap screws on the top end of the seismic condition.

side of the box is either loose or cross-threaded.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCHO82-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAE4OF6 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/L Resolve the Condition closed)1T41-BO02A There was a discussion between SNC personnel and the NRC Resident Inspector concerning the inspections performed to date.The Resident Inspector chose five components from the Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists to walk down with the Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) or to verify independently.

While inspecting the RHR Core Spray Pump Room Cooler, MPL number 1T41-B002A, the Inspector identified conditions that appeared to be potentially adverse conditions in a seismic event that were not at least discussed in the completed Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) for this component.

The concerns identified during the meeting and a walkdown of the component with the Resident Inspector included:-Three bolts were identified as missing that secured the cooler housing to the support frame. The bolt holes identified where bolts were missing were on the eastem-most end of the cooler.-Crooked bolts fastening the cooler frame to the platform appeared improperly installed.

-The fan motor mounting bolts appeared unusual since they were providing the support for the motor as if they were effectively column structures.

518594 By inspection, even with three bolts missing, the large number of installed fasteners attaching the housing to the cooler frame ensures the housing will remain fastened in a seismic event and the cooler will continue to perform its design function.

These bolts are not related to the equipment anchorage.

The crooked bolts and fan motor mounting bolts were identified and evaluated during the SQUG GIP walkdowns performed in 1988. Welded tube steel attachments between the cooler frame and platform were installed as a result of the SQUG evaluation to replace the crooked bolts and ensure the design function of the cooler is maintained.

The crooked bolts could be removed if they interfered with replacement anchorage as noted on the design documents for the modification.

The fan motor mount bolt stresses were determined as a result of the SQUG evaluation to meet their design function.While the identified conditions have been determined to have no adverse effect on seismic adequacy of the component, these potentially adverse seismic conditions should be identified in the SWC and evaluated whether they are consistent with the Current Licensing Basis.This condition report is written to ensure missing bolts are replaced and to perform a re-inspection of this component by the SWEs to document in the SWC notes the missing housing bolts, the crooked bolts, and the fan motor mounting bolts in the SWC.Replace the missing bolts.Open Due 11/27/2013 HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 46 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Intake Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed 519024 Engineers judged no measurable loss of structures was Supports and piping Open Structure numerous piping, instrumentation, and conduit observed, and all of the supports and embedded plates need to be cleaned and Due el 110' supports on the walls of the suction pit are are judged structurally acceptable at present. Supports painted before any 11/27/2013 showing coatings degradation and minor and piping need to be cleaned and painted before any significant degradation surface rusting in the intake structure suction significant degradation occurs. Condition Reports occurs.pit. 2006101925 and 2006101952 were written during Structural Monitoring walkdowns to document similar findings in the past.Unit I Seismic Walkdown Engineers on the 519644 The remaining 16 anchor bolts are judged to be seismic The deficient anchorage Open WO Reactor Refueling Floor in Unit I Reactor Building adequate to support the component in a seismic event, should be Finish Building against the East wall found some anchor bolts Therefore, it is judged that there is no potentially replaced/repaired 11/27/2013 for the HVAC duct base attachment to the adverse seismic condition and will have no impact on floor appear deficient.

Three of the anchors operability.

The anchors should be installed properly.have top nuts not engaged and one of the anchors is bent.Unitl Seismic Walkdown Engineers on the 519650 Due to the size of the fire suppression line, it has been Install grout under Open Reactor Refueling Floor in Unit I Reactor Building judged that the base plate will provide sufficient baseplate.

Due Building against the East wall found a base plate near capacity during a seismic event. Therefore, it is judged 11/27/2013 Refueling column RK-R5 has no grout and the gap under that there is no potentially adverse seismic condition Floor the base plate is greater than 1/4". The base and will have no impact on operability.

plate is supporting a 3" fire suppression line.Without the grout, the anchors undergo bending which adds additional stress to the bolts.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHtMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 47 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)I D2 I -NO02E Seismic Walkdown Engineers on the 519655 1 D2 I -NO02E is not near any sensitive equipment, Equipment was properly Closed Refueling Floor in Unit I Reactor Building therefore, it is judged that there is no potentially secured.Unit I against the North wall found component adverse seismic condition and will have no impact on Reactor I D21-NO02E is not secured on the floor and operability.

The component should be secured in place.Building could move doing a seismic event.Refueling Floor Unit I Seismic Walkdown Engineers on the 519657 These ladders should be secured to the wall or stored Ladders secured by tying Closed Reactor Refueling Floor in Unit I Reactor Building somewhere else. to the building.Building against the North wall found some ladders Refueling stored vertically.

It is located near the Floor condenser outlet nozzle. During a seismic event, these ladders have the potential to move during a seismic event.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 48 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)I H I 1-P602 Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs)determined that three bolts were missing at the location where Main Control Room Panel 11H1 l-P601 connects to adjacent panel IH-11-P602. Based on the configuration of the bolting on adjacent panels, the interface connecting two panels typically consisted of nine bolts (5/8" diameter each). Five of the nine bolts are installed on the front vertical edge, and four bolts are installed on the rear vertical edge. The three missing bolts were located at the rear of the panel. Only the bottom bolt was installed at the rear. The bolts at the front edge of the panel were not visible except for one bolt located at the top (approximately 2" from the top), one bolt located approximately 3ft from the top and one bolt located at the bottom (approximately 2" from the bottom of the cabinet).

Any other bolts were hidden by the cables and equipment within the cabinet.519666 The Screening and Evaluation Worksheet (SEWS)packages for I H II -P601 and I H II -P602 completed during the SQUG GIP walkdowns performed in 1988 were reviewed.

These SQUG packages represent the design basis documents for these panels. As stated in the SQUG packages, neither panel IH II-P601 nor panel I H II -P602 contain any essential relays.Therefore, potential slight impact between the two panels will not adversely impact the function of the panel or any of its sub-components.

Panel HI l-P601 is adequately attached to adjacent panel HI 1-P653 and panel H II -P602 is adequately attached to adjacent panel HI 1-P603. All bolts that could be seen were determined to be free of potentially adverse seismic concerns.

Therefore, per the Seismic Walkdown Engineers' judgment the I H II -P601 will perform its design function in a seismic event.Replace missing bolts.Open Due 4/30/2014 HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 49 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit I Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 519998 The concrete crack passes between two legs of one of Evaluation to determine Open Station identified a crack in the ceiling of the Unit I the four supports anchoring one 8lx1 8.4 rail for the if the crack affects the Due Service Station Battery Room in the Northwest corner overhead gantry crane supported from the ceiling in lifting capacity of the 4/30/2014 Battery (ref. CR 513992). This condition report is that room (ref. drawing SX-12097).

There are two 81 crane.Room written to not allow the overhead crane to be rails supporting the crane; one on each side of the used to lift batteries in this room until an room. The crack does not pass through an anchor bolt, evaluation is performed to determine if the but near enough to slightly affect the edge distance of crack affects the lifting capacity of the crane, some anchor bolts at the one support point. All other anchor bolts supporting the crane were inspected and determined to be free of potentially adverse seismic This is precautionary to insure safe lifting of concerns.

Therefore, the Seismic Walkdown batteries in the Unit I Station Battery Room. Engineersjudged the anchorage is adequate as-is to support the self-weight of the crane and any seismic loads on the crane structure (ref. calculation SCNH-93-010).I H21-P202 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed that 520072 The cabinet door has three hinges, one on top, one on Reattach hinge on door. Open there is a loose hinge on cabinet MPL I H2 I -the bottom and one on the middle. The hinge in the Due P202 located in the Diesel Building Room 1G. middle is the one missing the screws; therefore, it is 11/27/2013 The hinge is to be reattached to the door to considered that the door will perform its function.meet its original intent. Therefore, there is no potentially adverse seismic condition and operability is not impacted.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01_

FOR RESOLUTION OF FIJKUSilIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PG5O6 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR1# Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)IH21-P173 While performing SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic 520076 Of these three items, the first two are considered Remove box of lamps, Open Walkdowns for Plant Hatch Units I and 2, housekeeping issues, while the third one is considered remove loose screws, Due Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed the to affect the structural integrity of the cabinet. This and replace missing 11/27/2013 following on the Shutdown Instrument Panel, portion of the panel is to be supported by 6 bolts, while screws.item number 1H21-PI73 located in the Unit I one is missing, it is determined that the panel will not Reactor Building, elevation 130', Room be adversely affected in a seismic event. Therefore, 109A: there is no potentially adverse seismic condition and operability is not impacted.I )There is a box of lamps stored inside the panel, as shown on the attached picture.2)There are two screws lying on the floor inside the panel as shown on the attached picture.3) There is a screw missing from the panel, as shown on the attached picture.I HI -P603 Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 520086 Per the Seismic Walkdown Engineers' judgment, the Replace the missing Open identified a rear panel cover plate on back of remaining 6 screws were determined to be sufficient to screws. Due the Main Control Room Panel IHI I-P603 that support the cover plate and ensure it remains fastened 11/27/2013 is missing 4 out of 10 screws. The cover plate to the I HI 1-P603 panel during a seismic event because is marked with "MM", "LL", "KK", and "JJ" of the relatively small mass and location of the sheet along its top edge. metal cover.I El I -R608A Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 520122 Per the Seismic Walkdown Engineers' judgment, this Replace the missing Open identified inside the Main Control Room condition is judged not to be a seismic concern because screw. Due Panel I HI I-P601 that the back cover for of the very small mass of the cover being held fast by 11/27/2013 component I El I -R608A is missing I out of 3 two properly installed screws.screws.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 51 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)IC82-P001 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed the 520191 These covers are small and represent an insignificant Install the missing Open following on the Remote Shutdown Panel amount of mass relative to the overall weight of the screws. Due E51, IC82-P001 located in the Unit I Reactor panel. The screws currently installed are adequate to 11/27/2013 Building, elevation 158', Room 2R103: hold these enclosures in place. It is judged that the panel is seismically adequate.

Therefore, there is no I) Internal enclosure identified as PBI-513 potentially adverse seismic condition and operability is has a top screw missing. This screw is to be not impacted.installed.

2) Internal enclosure identified as PB1-51 I has five top screws missing. These screws are to be installed.

I H I 1 -P652 Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 520462 After the area walk-by, several Unit I Main Control Restrain, cover or Open identified a long fluorescent light fixture Room cabinets were identified as having similarly long replace fluorescent light Due (approximately 4LF) with two tubes mounted fluorescent lights mounted inside cabinets.

They also tubes. 4/30/2014 at the center of the inside of the panel I H II -pass through several of the cabinet bays and are P652 in Unit I Main Control Room. There is restrained by the bay walls. Small fluorescent light not a cover or any restraints over the fixtures were also observed mounted inside some fluorescent tubes. The fluorescent tubes pass cabinets at the top of the back wall. The SWEs judged through several bays of the cabinet and judged the possibility of the small fluorescent tubes falling to be restrained by the bay walls should the loose is not an operability concern because the very tubes come loose from the light fixture during small mass of each tube would not adversely impact a seismic event, components or cables inside the back of the cabinets.It is recommended by the SWEs that the fluorescent light tubes be restrained, covered or replaced by screw-in-type lights bulbs. Two zip-ties around light fixtures and the fluorescent tubes would be an acceptable solution.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 52 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)2X41- Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed that 523328 These two bolts are to be installed in the respective These two bolts are to be Open C010A the bolts missing on the covers of the equipment, installed in the Due following equipment located on the DGB The cover panels are supported with multiple bolts, it is respective equipment.

11/27/2013 1 X41-C006E Roof: There is a bolt missing in the cover judged that the absence of one bolt on each panel will panel of MPL # 2X4 I-CO I OA. There is a bolt not adversely affect the functionality or the seismic missing in the cover panel of MPL # IX41- capability of the dampers.C006E. Note that this potentially adverse condition is common to both units.Intake The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 523476 This pipe is supported in this area of the room by a Replace U bolts. Open Structure observed rusting U-bolts supporting the 4" combination of U-bolts securing the pipe to structural Due Pump Room diameter fire protection line at two support tube steel supports.

It is judged by the SWEs that the 11/27/2013 locations above the MCC Panels I R24-S009 U-bolts will perform their intended function since no and 2R24-S009 in the Intake Structure Pump measurable material appears to be lost. However, Room. This pipe is supported in this area of because of the extensive surface rust on the U-bolts, it the room by a combination of U-bolts is recommended that they be replaced rather than just securing the pipe to structural tube steel cleaned and coated. Surface rust on the support steel supports.

and fire protection piping should also be cleaned and coated per procedure NMP-MA-0 11.I R24-S009 Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 523481 The cover panels are supported with multiple bolts and, The missing bolt in Open 2R24-S009 observed the following in the Pump Room of by observation of the SWEs, the function of each MCC I R24-S009 should be Due the Intake Structure at Elevation III': is not affected by a panel secured with one less bolt. replaced.

11/27/2013-A bolt is missing fastening the rear cover The missing bolt in each panel is to be replaced.panel of the MCC MPL # I R24-S009.

The missing bolt in-A bolt is missing fastening the rear cover 2R24-S009 should be panel of the MCC MPL # 2R24-S009.

replaced.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 53 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Carbon Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 523486 The nuts on the U-bolts need to be properly fastened to The nuts on the U-bolts Open Dioxide observed loose nuts on two U-bolts securing secure the loose U-bolts to the pipe and supports.

need to be properly Due piping on the carbon dioxide piping to supports on the fastened to secure the 11/27/2013 Diesel Diesel Generator Building roof Note that loose U-bolts to the pipe Building this potentially adverse condition is common and supports.Roof to both units.I R41-BO02A Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed the 523730 The housing is supported with multiple screws; it is Replace missing screws. Open housing on IT41-B002A has 3 out of 18 judged that the absence of 3 screws on housing will not Due screws missing on the back cover located in adversely affect the functionality or the seismic 11/27/2013 Unit I Reactor Building SE Diagonal on capability of the housing.elevation 107'.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 54 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Diesel Building The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs)observed loose U-bolts securing two of the four fuel oil lines to a support adjacent to the Diesel Generator IA. The support serves as an anchor point between the piping and the flex hose connections to the diesel according to vendor drawings S05765 through S05768.Two U-bolts fasten each of the four pipes to the support angle at the end of the floor trench.One of the two U-bolts is loose on the pipe farthest to the east which is the 3/4" diameter pressure return according to drawing H 11236, Detail G. The drawing shows the same pipe capped at some point inside the diesel support skid. The one U-bolt securely fastening the pressure return pipe to the support steel will restrain the pipe in the east-west direction and prevent the pipe from interacting with the other three fuel lines.One of the two U-bolts is loose on the pipe farthest to the west which is the 3/4" diameter pressure return according to drawing H 11236, Detail G. The one U-bolt securely fastening the pressure return pipe to the support steel will restrain the pipe in the east-west direction and prevent the pipe from interacting with the other three fuel lines.523764 In both cases where one of the two U-bolts is loose, the pipe is still securely fastened by one U-bolt to prevent the pipes from interacting with adjacent fuel pipes.The next support is located in the floor trench about 4.5LF from the anchor in question and restrains all four pipes in the north-south direction.

This second restraint reduces possible deflection of the pipe away from the diesel generator.

The SWEs judge the existing support configuration will support the pipe and prevent interactions adjacent piping and the diesel generator in a seismic event.The loose U-bolts need to be properly tightened or replaced.Closed+/- ______ _______________________________________

I __________________

+/- _________

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE55OF68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Control Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 524541 Adjacent supports are about 8' apart from this one Cable Tray connection Open Building observed a connection plate that connects the support, so this support load is minimal. The cable plate to be connected Due el 180' Cable Tray to the support is not connected, tray is to be attached to the supporting structure using properly 11/27/2013 The Cable Tray is near equipment IZ41- the connection plate. Due to the light weight of the B003A, (drawing H-13324) located on Cable Tray, the remaining supports are judged elevation 180' of the Control Room Roof. The sufficient by the SWEs to keep the cable tray secure cable tray (ESS-1 TQA7 04) is not bolted to and not interact with any other SSCs during a seismic the appropriate support structure, event.1R43-C001A Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 524556 Per the SWEs, by inspection the belt housing will Replace the missing Open observed that the compressor (1 R43-C00 IA) perform as designed.

screw. Due belt housing located in Diesel Generator 11/27/2013 Room IA of the DGB is missing a screw near the motor.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALK1OWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE56OF68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)1H21-P291A Seismic Walkdowvn Engineers (SWEs) 525130 Each panel is restrained from sliding sideways since it The missing hardware Open observed missing channel nuts and bolts for is held between the U-supports fastened to the wall on should be installed.

Due I H2 I -P293A securing the Diesel Battery IA Fuse Monitor each side of the panel. Each panel is also restrained 11/27/2013 Panel, MPL 1H2I-P291A, in Battery Room vertically and perpendicularly from the wall by the IA and the Diesel Battery IC Fuse Monitor existing support hardware.

The panels are secured Panel, MPL I H2 I -P293A, in Battery Room adequately to perform their design function.IC to the walls. The panels are fastened to the wall with Cooper B-Line hardware (or equivalent).

Each panel is fastened to B-Line B22 struts at the top and bottom of each panel. The struts are fastened to the concrete walls with U-supports located at each end of each strut.The panels are located between the U-support hardware.

Two expansion anchors fasten each U-support to the concrete.

One set of bolt and channel nut hardware is supposed to fasten each U-support to the strut. However, the bolt and channel nut is missing at all four U-supports for each panel.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE57OF68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)I X41- The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 525153 All fasteners are present, but the support frame should Support frame should be Open C008A observed that the fan ventilator hood for fan be repaired at the fastener connections or replaced to repaired at the fastener Due I X41-C008A bolted connections above the provide proper connections.

connections or replaced 11/27/2013 roof curb on the Diesel Generator Building to provide proper roof is deteriorating.

The bolt holes in the connections.

metal frame are oversized and irregular.

A combination of corrosion and wear appears to be the cause for the irregular holes. Some bolts are not fastened squarely across the joined steel surfaces because of the irregular holes. All fasteners are present, but the support frame should be repaired at the fastener connections or replaced to provide proper connections.

Diesel Gen Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 525155 By inspection, the SWEs judge the remaining three The missing nut should Open Building observed an anchor bolt nut missing on an air anchor bolts are adequate for the support to meet its be installed.

Due Room IA pipe support base plate in the Diesel design function.

11/27/2013 Generator Room IA at elevation 130'. The support is for a I inch diameter air pipe line near the Air Receiver Tank, I R43-A003A.

Approximately twelve linear feet of piping weighing about twenty pounds is supported.

This support is located in Diesel Generator Room IA at elevation 130'.Unit I Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed Unit I 525156 Due to numerous supports located throughout the area Clean and coat per Open Nitrogen Nitrogen Storage Tank Area contain some the load is minimal on each support. Therefore, procedure.

Due Storage Tank general coatings degradation and surface supports and piping were judged to be seismically 11/27/2013 area corrosion on the nearby pipe supports and adequate by SWEs.piping. I HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE58OF68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit I Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed Unit 1 525159 Due to the load distributed throughout the supports, Clean and coat per Open Nitrogen Nitrogen Storage Tank Supports contain some surface corrosion will not have an adverse effect the procedure.

Due Storage Tank general coatings degradation and surface functionality of the support. These were judged to be 11/27/2013 area corrosion.

seismically adequate by SWEs.Unit I Recirc Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 525292 The SWEs judge the air line will perform its design Install missing pipe Open Line identified a pipe clamp is missing for function because of the very light weight of the air line clamp. Due Isolation supporting the air line to the air-actuated being supported at the floor support. Any swaying of 11/27/2013 Damper damper IZ41-F009B.

A pipe clamp is the cantilevered section of piping is judged to be 1Z41 -F009B missing that fastens the air pipe to a dampened by the flexible hose connection at the top of Globestrut-type strut welded to a wide flange the run. There is enough slack in the flexible pipe support column. The air line is supported connection to not pull away from the damper.at the floor and turns vertically and runs approximately six feet. A flex connection ties the air line to the damper. The missing clamp is intended for supporting the vertical run of the approximately 1/2" diameter rigid air pipe.Unit I Torus Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 525296 The conduit is not is contact with the clamp due to the The conduit needs to be Open observed that there is an unsupported and sheared off connection.

Once the conduit was sheared repaired to be properly Due dislodged conduit that carries cables for the off, the conduit was forced in the opposite direction up supported and to be 11/27/2013 lights located in Bay I of the Torus. The off of the clamp. The conduit has to be repaired to be connected at the light conduit is not in contact with the clamp due to supported and to be connected at light fixture, fixture.the sheared-off connection.

Once the conduit was sheared off, the conduit was forced in the opposite direction up off of the clamp.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 59 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)iT48- Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 525303 Temperature element IT48-NO09A was initially The conduit was Closed N009A/ identified that there is an unsupported conduit declared inoperable.

The condition was further supported at both Unit I Torus carrying cables to the Torus Water evaluated (under CR 543194/TE 544188) by supports with Room Temperature Element, MPL #1T48-NO09A, calculation SCNH-12-070 that determined the appropriate clamps.located in Bay I of the Unit I Torus Room. temperature element performed its design function The conduit is not supported at adjacent even with the conduit in the nonconforming condition.

supports CS-25-79 and at CS-25-80.Unit I Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 525477 The remaining screws for the junction box in question Replace the missing Open Yard Pit observed in UI Division I Yard Pit a junction are judged adequate to maintain connection during a screws. Due box with I out of 4 missing screw in the back seismic event due to the weight of the cover. The 11/27/2013 and 2 out of 4 on the front cover, missing screws in the back are also judged adequate to maintain the connection between junction box and the concrete wall, so there is no potentially adverse seismic condition resulting.

IZ41-B008A Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 525669 Per Vendor Calculation SX 19845, "Seismic Analysis The washer and Open identified that there are two nuts and a of Refrigeration Condensing Unit for Control Room", corresponding nuts are to Due compression washer missing from one sheets 19 and 22, each spring is always in compression be re-installed at each 11/27/2013 adjustable vertical restraint bolt (ref vendor and horizontal displacements are restricted by the cage support point to meet the drawing SX16241, .pdf sheet 101 of 144) on (or channel frames within the spring isolators).

intended design two different spring isolators for the Therefore, negligible loads are applied to the adjustable requirements.

Condensing Unit I Z41-B008A located on vertical restraint bolts.elevation 180' of the Control Room Roof.There are two adjustable vertical restraint bolts per spring isolator and a spring isolators at each of the four corners of the condenser.

All other vertical restraint bolts are properly installed on each spring isolator.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC____ ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ ___ PAGE 60 oF 68 During the course of the walkdowns the team identified issues that, while not rising to the level of a seismic concern, warranted evaluation to determine if programmatic enhancements are necessary.

These issues have been entered into the SNC corrective action program.CR # 516003 -The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) identified that drawing B-45555, Version 1.0, "Seismic Configuration Control Requirements General Notes & Specifications", does not provide clear guidance how to restrain gas bottles when stored near safety-related equipment in the plant.CR # 517213 -The Resident Inspector noted that several components inspected had various problems with bolting. He questioned the craftsmanship involving bolted connections as well as supervisory oversight of the maintenance activities involving bolted connections for the plant in general. The condition report was written for Maintenance management to determine the extent of the condition regarding the quality of bolting connections following maintenance activities.

8.2 EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY Plant Hatch Unit 1 had one as-found condition that was conservatively assessed during the Walkdowns as preventing the SSC from performing its required safety function.

A calculation was generated further evaluating the as-found condition and concluded that the unsupported length of the conduit would perform its safety function in the as-found condition.

Conduit supports were later installed that resolved the nonconforming condition.

8.3 PLANT CHANGES There were no plant changes that resulted from the as-found conditions.

Plant changes are any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features (i.e., plant modifications) that result from the Seismic Walkdowns or Area Walk-bys.8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS Housekeeping items were identified during walkdowns and walk-bys that were not potentially seismic adverse conditions.

All such items were brought to the attention of plant personnel and CRs were generated as necessary.

These issues included water on the floor and loose items (small tools, trash, etc.) stored in the plant areas. These items were processed through the site CAP process and are not specifically documented in this report though are available in the Plant CAP database.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 61 0F68 9.0 PEER REVIEW 9.1 PEER REVIEW PROCESS The peer review for the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns was performed in accordance with Section 6 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The peer review included an evaluation of the following activities: " review of the selection of the structures, systems, and components, (SSCs) that are included in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL);" review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys;" review of licensing basis evaluations and decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions in to the plant's Corrective Action Plan (CAP); and* review of the final submittal report.This report provides results of the review process for each review activity as well as the results of the peer review.9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS

SUMMARY

9.2.1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Development The selection of items for the SWEL underwent peer review according to the guidance in Section 3 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The SSCs to be evaluated during the Seismic Walkdown were selected as described in Section 6.0 of this report. The list of components was provided to the members of the Peer Review Team, which consisted of all four peer reviewers listed in Section 4.0. The Peer Review Team members independently provided comments to the personnel who selected the components on the SWEL. All comments were addressed and the Peer Review Team reviewed the changes made to the SWEL and the final SWEL, to ensure all recommendations from the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2)were met. Specifically, the peer reviewers confirmed that all SSCs in SWEL I and 2 were Seismic Category I components that do not undergo regular inspections.

Specific considerations for the peer review process are described below for SWEL I and SWEL 2. The peer review check sheet of the SWEL is provided in Attachment

2.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC____ ___ ___ ___ ___ __ ____ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ PAGE 62 OF 68 For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team verified that the list of SSCs represented a diverse sample of the equipment required to perform the following five safety functions, as specified by EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2): " Reactor Reactivity Control" Reactor Coolant Pressure Control" Reactor Coolant Inventory Control" Decay Heat Removal and* Containment Function For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team also verified that the SSCs included an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes: " Various types of systems" Major new and replacement equipment" Various types of equipment" Various environments" Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE and" Risk insight consideration The final SWEL 1 contains items that perform each of the five safety functions specified by EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Numerous components perform more than one of the safety functions and all five safety functions are well represented by the components on the list.SWEL I contains components from all the classes of equipment listed in Appendix B of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), except for cases where there are no safety-related components at the plant that fall into that specific equipment class. The list contains major new and replacement items, and items enhanced based on the IPEEE as well as equipment located in various environments and areas of the plant. All major safety-related systems are represented and risk factors were considered in development of the list.For SWEL 2, the Peer Review Team determined that the process to select spent fuel pool related items complied with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Portions of the spent fuel pool cooling system at Hatch Unit I are Seismic Category I and all different types of components associated with the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system are represented on the SWEL 2. The Peer Review Team concluded that the bases for including/excluding items associated HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE63OF68 with the spent fuel pool were well documented and that the final SWEL 2 complies with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).In summary, all of the Peer Review comments made during development of SWEL I and SWEL 2 were resolved by the team that prepared the SWELs. The resolutions were reviewed by the Peer Review Team and it was determined that all comments were adequately addressed.

The SWEL was determined to incorporate all comments made by the Peer Review Team during the process.During the process of conducting the walkdowns, a small number of isolated components that were not accessible were removed from the list and in some cases, equivalent items that were determined to be accessible were added. The Peer Review Team reviewed all changes made to the SWELs and determined that these changes had no impact on the adequacy of the SWELs with respect to the provisions contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The Peer Review Team concludes that the team that developed the SWELs appropriately followed the SWEL development process described in Section 3 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).The Peer Review Checklist for development of the SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.9.2.2 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys The Peer Review Team was on-site and very involved with the Seismic Component Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

The Peer Review was performed as follows: " Each of the three walkdown teams performed an initial equipment Seismic Walkdown and an Area Walk-by while being observed by the other teams and at least one member of the walkdown Peer Review Team. The Peer Review Team provided comments and suggestions and answered questions raised by the team performing the walkdown and the other walkdown teams." During the first week of walkdowns, a member of the walkdown Peer Review Team individually accompanied each of the SWE walkdown teams and observed the SWE team conducting the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

The Peer Review Team confirmed first-hand that the SWE walkdown teams performed the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys as described in Section 4 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). A Peer Review Team member accompanied each of the three walkdown teams on at least one full day of walkdowns.

SWE walkdown teams were encouraged and expected to carry a copy of Section 4 from the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and refer to it as necessary, during conduct of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 64 OF 68 During the remaining weeks of walkdowns, at least one Peer Review Team member remained on site until the majority of the walkdowns were completed.

The Peer Review Team member reviewed essentially all the SWCs and AWC prepared by the three walkdown teams. When the walkdown team members had questions or potential concerns, the Peer Review Team member walked down the specific component or area along with the walkdown team to provide additional input to the seismic evaluations.

At least one member of the walkdown Peer Review Team reviewed the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages to ensure that the checklists were completed in accordance with the guidance provided in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The walkdown Peer Review Team confirmed that the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages were consistent, thorough, and the packages accurately reflected the results of the walkdowns and walk-bys as witnessed during the first week of walkdowns.

The Peer Review Team concluded that the SWE teams were familiar with the process for Seismic Equipment Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

The SWE teams adequately demonstrated their ability to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions such as adverse anchorage, adverse spatial interaction, other adverse conditions related to anchorage, and perform anchorage configuration verifications, where applicable.

The SWEs also demonstrated the ability to identify seismically-induced flooding interactions and seismically-induced fire interactions.

The SWEs documented the results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys on the appropriate checklists from Appendix C of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).The Peer Review Team reviewed approximately 40% of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-by checklists and at least one member of the walkdown peer review team reviewed more than 90% of the packages.

Peer review of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys identified minor editorial errors and also some instances where comments in the checklists required additional explanation and information.

Mr. Ashworth and Mr. Whitmore provided verbal feedback to the SWEs to adjust these entries accordingly.

The SWEs understood the comments and incorporated the recommendations and updates from the Peer Review Team.Since the peer review occurred at the start of the Seismic Walkdowns, the peer reviewers were able to provide comments at every stage of the walkdown process to ensure consistency in the reporting for all packages.

Therefore, the Peer Review Team considered the number of completed walkdown packages reviewed to be appropriate.

In addition, all members of the Peer Review team, including Mr. Ashworth, Ms. Brown, Mr. Starck and Mr. Whitmore were available by phone as necessary during the entire Walkdown process.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 65 OF 68 9.2.3 Licensing Basis Evaluations All potentially adverse seismic conditions identified were immediately entered into the plant CAP for further review and disposition as discussed in Section 8.1 of this report. Therefore, the Seismic Walkdown teams did not perform licensing basis evaluations apart from evaluations performed for the CAP. The Peer Review Team considers this CAP process approach fully comprehensive and acceptable for addressing the potentially adverse seismic conditions observed during the Seismic Walkdowns.

9.2.4 Submittal Report The Peer Review Team was provided with drafts of the submittal report. This allowed the Peer Review Team to verify that the submittal report would meet the objectives and requirements of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).The Peer Review Team provided both verbal and written comments on the draft reports and was active in ensuring the report was thorough, complete and accurate.

The final version of the submittal report includes all necessary elements of the Peer Review and meets the requirements of the 50o54(f) letter.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 66 OF 68

10.0 REFERENCES

10.1 I0CFR50.54(f)

Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-lchi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 10.2 EPRI 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, June 2012 10.3 Generic Letter No. 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities 10.4 Generic Letter No. 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 10.5 Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) Procedure:

Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Power Plant Equipment, Revision 3A, December 2001 10.6 SNC Calculation PRA-BC-H-10-008, Hatch Unit I PRA Model, Revision 4 (applicable to both units)10.7 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for Edwin 1. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit I 10.8 Hatch Letter 5102, dated January 26, 1996, and titled 'Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Response to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4', Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366 10.9 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, USI A-46 Summary Report 10.10 EPRI Report NP-6041, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin 10.11 USAS B3 1.1, Code for Power Pressure Piping, 1967 Edition 10.12 USAS B31.7, Nuclear Power Piping, 1969 Edition 10.13 IEEE 323-1971, Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 67 OF 68 10.14 IEEE 323-1974, Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 10.15 IEEE 344-1971, IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generation Stations 10.16 IEEE 344-1975, IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generation Stations 10.17 American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC), 7 th Edition HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 68 OF 68 11.0 ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT I -SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS ATTACHMENT 2 -UNIT I -PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL I AND 2 ATTACHMENT 3 -SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS ATTACHMENT 4 -AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS ATTACHMENT 5 -IPEEE VULNERABILITIES INFORMATION ATTACHMENT 6 -SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEER CERTIFICATIONS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 PROJECT REPORT VERSION 1.0 COVER SHEET Page I of 68 Edwin I. Hatch Unit I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT, RER SNC425046 For Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Prepared by: Reviewed by: Approved by: (ENERCON)Project Manager or Dealignec Winston Stewart ~pr EtZAD-2-0/4 Fog PAI~iCi(~

K&V~f Date: " ] Patrick Kelly peg TLcotJ Date:: Bill Henne Approved by: (SNC)Tecnical Lead or De~gncee Peer Review Team Leader Approved by: (SNC Project Manager or Designe Date: Melanie Brown L David Whitman~IL zi Date:

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 2 OF 68 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE

..................................................................................................

4 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH ......................

5 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS

SUMMARY

......................................................................

6 3.1 DESIGN BASIS EARTHQUAKE

....................................................................................

6 3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND METHODS ......................................................

8 4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS

.......................................................................................

9 4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES

..............................................................

10 4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES............................................................................

12 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING

...................................................................

19 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT

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21-6.1 DEVELOPM ENT OF SW EL 1 ........................................................................................

21 6.2 DEV ELOPM EN T OF SW EL 2 ............................................................................................

24 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS ......................................................

26 7.1 IN A CCESSIBLE ITEM S .................................................................................................

28 8.0 RE SULTS ...................................................................................................................................

33 8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS

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33 8.2 EQUIPM ENT OPERABILITY

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60 8.3 PLA N T CH A N G ES .........................................................................................................

60 8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS

........................................................................

60 9.0 PEER REVIEW ........................................................................................................................

61 9.1 PEER REV IEW PROCESS .............................................................................................

61 9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS

SUMMARY

........................................................................

61

10.0 REFERENCES

.........................................................................................................................

66 11.0 ATTACHM ENTS ......................................................................................

..............................

68 HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 3 OF 68 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

The Seismic Walkdowns at Hatch Unit 1 in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012,"Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" are not complete as all items on the SWEL have not been accessible.

A supplementary report will be required.

The walkdowns are being performed using the methodology outlined in the NRC endorsed "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" (EPRI Report number 1025286).Plant Hatch Unit 1 had no significant degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions that warranted modification to the plant.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 4 OF 68 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE The objective of this report is to document the results of the Seismic Walkdowns at E. I. Hatch Unit 1 in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" (Reference 10.1).The Seismic Walkdowns followed the guidance contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), which was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. The scope of the walkdowns was to identify potentially degraded, unanalyzed, or nonconforming conditions relative to the seismic licensing basis.The 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns for Hatch Unit 1 are not complete as all items on the SWEL have not been accessible.

A supplementary report will be required.

This report documents the findings from all Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys completed to date.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 5 OF 68 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH The requirements of the 50.54(f) Letter are satisfied by application of and compliance with the NRC endorsed methodology provided in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). In accordance with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), the following topics are addressed in this report:* Documentation of the seismic licensing basis for the SSCs in the plant (Section 3.0);* Assignment of appropriately qualified personnel (Section 4.0);" Reporting of actions taken to reduce/eliminate seismic vulnerabilities identified by the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) program (Section 5.0);" Selection of SSCs to be inspected in the plant (Section 6.0);.Performance of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys (Section 7.0);* Evaluation of potentially adverse seismic conditions with respect to the seismic licensing bases (Section 8.0); and* Performance of Peer Reviews (Section 9.0).While the Seismic Walkdowns were in progress at Hatch Unit 1, supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to. inspect for adverse conditions was received on September 18, 2012. This required the opening of cabinets, electrical boxes, and switchgear to inspect the internals for potentially adverse seismic conditions, even when opening the components was not required to inspect the anchorage.

Implementation of the supplemental guidance was incorporated into the walkdowns by first-identifying the affected components.

During the Seismic Walkdowns of Hatch Unit 1, electrical cabinets (where no extensive disassembly was required) were opened to inspect the cabinet internals for mounting of internal components, inspect the condition of fasteners of adjacent cabinets, and confirm the absence of any other adverse seismic conditions.

The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWE) followed the supplemental guidance for all cabinets that were accessible during plant operation, even where opening the cabinets was not required to inspect the anchorage.

However, some that could not be opened (due to personnel safety or due to the sensitivity of the equipment) were scheduled during an outage to have the component doors opened.Section 7.0 identifies cabinets that were inaccessible for internal inspections.

Table 7-1 and Table 7-2 provide the schedule to complete the cabinet internal inspections.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC I PAGE 6 OF 68 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS

SUMMARY

This section provides a summary of the licensing bases for the Seismic Category I Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) in the plant. It includes a discussion of the Design Basis Earthquake (DBE)and the codes and standards used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the plant-specific seismic licensing basis requirements.

The Hatch Unit 1 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) uses the term "Seismic Class 1" instead of"Seismic Category I". The definition of Seismic Class 1 structures, piping and equipment is provided in Section 12.3 of the FSAR (Reference 10.7). For the purpose of the Seismic Walkdowns, in accordance with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), the term "Seismic Class 1" is synonymous with "Seismic Category I." 3.1 DESIGN BASIS EARTHQUAKE The plant site geologic and seismologic investigations are covered in Section 2.5 of the Hatch Unit 1 FSAR. However, subsections of the Hatch Unit 1 FSAR reference the Hatch Unit 2 FSAR for information.

Based on this data, the peak ground accelerations for the SSE (referred to as the Design Basis Earthquake

-DBE) and Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) are established as 0.15 g and 0.08 g, respectively, as discussed in subsection 2.5.7 of the Hatch Unit 1 FSAR (Reference 10.7).The basic description of the earthquake is provided by spectrum response curves. Separate curves are used for the OBE of 0.08 g horizontal acceleration and the DBE of 0.15 g horizontal acceleration.

The spectrum response curves are provided in FSAR Figures 2.5-2 and 2.5-3 for OBE and DBE, respectively.

The response of the structure to the earthquake is obtained by using the spectrum response technique.

Appropriate response levels are read from the earthquake spectrum curve corresponding to the natural frequencies of the structure.

During the original design of Plant Hatch a set of seismic response spectra was developed by GE using the modified El Centro earthquake ground motion, as discussed in the Hatch Unit 1 FSAR, Section 12.6 (Reference 10.7).In 1984 another set of spectra was generated to correct a broadening error found in the original spectra.The 1984 spectra were generated using the artificial time histories that more closely enveloped the ground spectra. These are the Seismic Floor Response Spectra of Record (FRS of Record).

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 7 OF 68 In 1989 a Seismic Margins Assessment (SMA) was performed in part to resolve .the errors in peak broadening and soil velocity found in the 1984 spectra. The effect of the soil velocity error is that the peak acceleration for each spectrum is shifted to a higher frequency content. Therefore, a new non-design basis set of spectra was generated using seismic margin techniques for use in the SMA. These spectra are called the Seismic Margin Earthquake (SME) spectra. The SME spectra are based on a maximum ground horizontal acceleration of 0.3 g, which is twice that of the Plant Hatch DBE (0.15 g).As a result of the SMA, the NRC concluded that the spectra used in the design of Plant Hatch resulted in a safe overall design. The NRC determined that the FRS of Record was adequate as the licensing basis spectra. As recognition of the shifting of the maximum seismic response to a higher frequency, Southern Nuclear elected to consider the SME spectra, factored by V2 to account for the increased ground input, in conjunction with the design basis earthquake (DBE) for all designs. This practice results in a seismic demand that is more conservative than that which would result from a corrected FRS, but avoids a license revision.

The NRC agreed with this approach and the NRC also agreed that the SME spectra, when reduced by a factor of one-half (1/2 SME), best approximates current seismic regulatory requirements for Plant Hatch.POWER GENERATION DESIGN BASES Seismic Category I systems, structures and components are designed so that stresses remain within normal code allowable limits during the OBE and to ensure that they will perform their safety-related functions during and/or after a DBE.MAJOR COMPONENT DESIGN BASES The horizontal and vertical OBE and DBE in-structure response spectra curves form the basis for the seismic qualification and design of Category I SSCs and for demonstrating the structural integrity of Seismic Category 2 SSCs, where required.

In addition, systems running between structures shall be designed to withstand the seismic relative displacements.

The seismic analysis of safety related systems, equipment, and components is generally based on the response spectra method. Alternatively, Seismic Category I equipment is analyzed using the methodology based on earthquake experience data developed by the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) and documented in the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP), Revision 2, plus any addition to the GIP reviewed and accepted by the NRC for resolving Unresolved Safety Issue A-46 in response to NRC Generic Letter 87-02. The SQUG GIP may be used to verify the seismic adequacy of currently installed equipment after the equipment has been walked down and any outliers resolved.New and replacement equipment within the scope of the GIP may also be seismically qualified using HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 8 OF 68 the same SQUG methodology.

This alternative method is acceptable where no specific NRC commitment to use IEEE 344-1975 has been made.3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND METHODS An extensive list of design codes, standards, methods, studies and tests utilized for seismic design is provided in the FSAR (Reference 10.7). Examples of the pertinent codes, standards, and methods used for the design of Seismic Category I structures, systems and components is provided here: 0 USAS B31.1, Code for Power Pressure Piping, 1967 Edition* USAS B31.7, Nuclear Power Piping, 1969 Edition* 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 2, "Design Basis for Protection Against Natural Phenomena" 0 IEEE 323-1971, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations* IEEE 323-1974, Standard for Qualifying Class lE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 0 IEEE 344-1971, IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generation Stations* IEEE 344-1975, IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generation Stations 0 NRC Generic Letter 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment In Operating Reactors (USI A-46)e Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment, Revision 2, Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG)* American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC), 7 th Edition HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 9 OF 68 4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS Table 4-1 identifies the project team members and their project responsibilities per EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Table 4-2 identifies the Peer Review Team members and responsibilities.

Section 4.1 provides an overview of the project responsibilities.

Section 4.2 includes brief experience summaries for all project personnel in alphabetical order.Table 4-1 Project Team Members and Responsibilities Site Equipment Seismic Licensing Name Point of Selection

/ Plant Walkdown Basis Contact IPEEE Operations Engineer Reviewer (POC) Reviewer (SWE)Warren Barr X Chris Burke X X David Edenfield X Jeffrey Horton X X Patrick Kelly X X Kursat Kinali X X Johnathon McFarland X X Michael Steele* X X X X Winston Stewart* X X James Tootle X X Juan Vizcaya X X Wesley Williams X X X Alan Wolfe X X HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 10 OF68 Table 4-2 Peer Review Team Members and Responsibilities Name Robert Ashworth*Melanie Brown*Richard Starck*Kenneth Whitmore*Notes (Table 4-1 and Table 4-2): 1)

• Indicates Seismic Capability Engineer 2) As stated in Section 7.0, all potentially adverse conditions were entered into the plant Corrective Action Program (CAP) system. However, as part of the process of entering the condition into the CAP, the SWEs made a preliminary assessment of the condition with respect to the plant licensing basis. Further licensing basis reviews were performed as discussed in Section 8.0 as part of the CAP resolution process by personnel not directly involved in the walkdowns.

4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES The Site Point of Contact (POC) is a site engineer from Southern Nuclear that has experience with the site equipment, site procedures, plant operations, and overall personnel organization.

The site POC coordinated site access for walkdown personnel and any resources required for the walkdowns such as inspection equipment and support from plant operations.

The POC was responsible for development of the walkdown schedule and any updates to the schedule based on equipment availability.

Equipment Selection Personnel (ESP) were responsible for identifying the sample of SSCs for the Seismic Walkdowns.

The ESP have knowledge of plant operations, plant documentation, and associated SSCs. The ESP also have knowledge of the IPEEE program. For this project, site engineers and plant operations personnel participated in the equipment selection.

The ESP also performed the responsibilities of the IPEEE Reviewers.

The IPEEE Reviewers also ensured that the walkdown scope included a sample of equipment that had IPEEE seismic vulnerabilities.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC P____ ___ ___ ___ ___ _ _ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ PAGE 11 0F68 Plant Operations Personnel provided detailed review of the sample of SSCs to ensure the walkdown scope included equipment located in a variety of environments, equipment in a variety of systems, and equipment accessible for a walkdown.

For the Hatch Unit 1 project, the Plant Operations Personnel were either former or currently licensed Senior Reactor Operators.

The SWEs were trained on the NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, and on the material contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEs who had previously completed the Seismic Walkdown Training Class developed by the SQUG were not required to complete training on the NTTF Seismic recommendations but were trained on the differences between SQUG activities and activities associated with the NTTF Seismic recommendations.

The Licensing Basis Reviewer was responsible for determining whether any potentially adverse seismic conditions identified by the SWEs met the plant seismic licensing basis. The Licensing Basis Reviewer has knowledge of and experience with the seismic licensing basis and documentation for the SSCs at Hatch Unit 1.A Peer Review Team was formed for this project to provide both oversight and review of all aspects of the walkdowns.

The Peer Review Team members have extensive experience in seismic design and qualification of structures, systems and components as well as extensive field experience.

The Peer Review Team for this project interfaced with the ESP and SWEs to ensure that the walkdown program satisfied the guidance in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC____ ___ ___ ___ ___ __ ____ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ PAGE 12 OF 68 4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES Robert Ashworth, SCE (MPR)Mr. Ashworth has more than six years of experience providing engineering solutions for a wide variety of nuclear power plant components and systems. His experience includes equipment walkdowns at industrial facilities to assess material condition, structural modeling and analyses; and seismic qualification in accordance with current industry standards for mechanical and electrical equipment in nuclear power plants. Mr. Ashworth has completed the training course for the EPRI Report 1025286 and is also a Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) as defined in the SQUG GIP for resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46.Warren Barr (SNC)Mr. Barr is currently a Senior Plant Support Engineer at the Hatch Plant. He has over forty-three (43) years of on-site and off-site nuclear power related experience in the area of mechanical design and engineering for Southern Company nuclear units. Experience consists of new plant design, unit start-up, unit recovery, modification design and implementation, system design and operation, engineering support, outage support, maintenance support, problem resolution, vendor interface, piroject management, and project and group coordination and supervision.

Melanie Brown, SCE (SNC)Ms. Brown has over 31 years of experience with Southern Company, the majority of which has been serving the nuclear fleet. Ms. Brown's most recent assignment was as a Seismic Qualification Engineer in the Fleet Design Department, where she was responsible for performing activities associated with the Governance, Oversight, Support, and Perform (GOSP) Model including:

• Management of the seismic design bases," Seismic equipment qualification," Seismic evaluation of plant structures and components,* Design documentation and configuration management.

She is currently serving as the Southern Nuclear Seismic Technical Lead for the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns for all three Southern Nuclear plants.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 13OF 68 Chris Burke (SNC)Mr. Burke is currently the Operations Support Manager for the Hatch site. He has a Bachelor of Science Degree in Aerospace Engineering and 15 years of nuclear plant experience within the Engineering and Operations departments.

Mr. Burke obtained a Senior Reactor Operator license from the NRC in 2005. In addition to his current function, Mr. Burke has served in various leadership roles in support of plant operation including Shift Support Supervisor, Shift Supervisor, and Shift Manager.David Edenfield (SNC)Mr. Edenfield is currently the Risk Analyst for the Hatch Site. He has a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering and 34 years of nuclear plant experience including 10 years in plant construction and 24 years in plant support at Plant Hatch. Some of his related experience and responsibilities includes, Maintenance Rule Expert Panel member, On-site administrator for EPRI software package EOOS (Equipment Out of Service), reviewer for all design change packages for EOOS model impact, High and Low Voltage Switchyard System Engineer, and Component Engineer for Relays (Protective, Control, and Timing) and Large Transformers.

Jeffrey Horton, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Horton, P.E., is a degreed Professional Engineer with 37 years of experience specializing in applied mechanics with an emphasis on structural analysis of mechanical components and piping.His experience includes structural and thermal design of Nuclear Pressure Vessels, structural design of Nuclear Pipe Systems, Pipe Support Analysis, and Concrete Design. Mr. Horton holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Aerospace Engineering and a Master of Science degree in Material Science specializing in Solid Mechanics.

Mr. Horton has performed numerous ANSI B31.1, B31.7, ASME Section I, III, and VIII component structural calculations and design verifications for Oyster Creek, TMI-1 and other nuclear facilities.

Mr. Horton has used AutoPIPE since 1989 for pipe stress evaluations at Oyster Creek, TMI-1 and other nuclear facilities.

Most recently, Mr. Horton was involved in the pipe stress and pipe support analysis for the James A. Fitzpatrick HPCI Steam Trap Valve replacement project, and the Oyster Creek 2010 buried pipe project where he performed the pipe design for the Condensate Storage Tank overflow pipe using AutoPIPE.

Mr. Horton has significant field experience including extended site assignments at Oyster Creek, TMI and Perry, and has performed equipment walkdowns at numerous facilities.

Mr. Horton completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 14 OF 68 Patrick Kelly, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Kelly, P.E., has a Master's degree in Civil Engineering with over 5 years of engineering experience in commercial and nuclear plant design having prepared and developed several design change packages, calculations, evaluations and engineering judgments.

Mr. Kelly brings considerable experience in structural analysis, building evaluations, conduit evaluations, and miscellaneous structural analysis.

He has supported various security related projects at SNC.Additionally, Mr. Kelly was the lead civil engineer on the recent detailed and final designs packages for the Unit 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Excitation Panel Replacement projects at Plant Hatch. Mr.Kelly completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.Kursat Kinali, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Kinali, Ph.D., P.E., is a Civil/Structural Engineer and Responsible Engineer for modifications.

Dr. Kinali has M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in Structural Engineering with industry experience in commercial and nuclear design. He is a registered Professional Engineer.

He is experienced in seismic analysis, reinforced concrete design, and seismic performance assessment of existing structures.

Dr. Kinali worked on Southern California Edison's SONGS Units 3&4 for design of removable bar panels on a Large Organism Exclusion Device (LOED). He was the responsible structural engineer for designing and detailing the stainless steel removable bar panels. These frames employed a fail-open mechanism that prevents damage to the rest of the LOED frame during extreme wave or seismic events. Dr. Kinali was one of the responsible engineers for an Engineering Change (EC) package at Robinson which involved ballistic resistant enclosure (BRE) replacement.

He was also the primary reviewer for BRE drop analysis for the Farley Nuclear Plant. He reviewed the calculation which investigated the possible effects of BRE drop on safety-related underground features.

For the last couple years, he has been working on numerous design change packages associated with 10 CFR 73.55 security compliance projects for all four Progress Energy's plants, where he was responsible for designing/detailing the reinforced concrete foundations for buildings and miscellaneous equipment, designing electrical duct banks running under a heavy-haul path, preparing/reviewing calculations and drawings for conduit supports and miscellaneous component mountings, and preparing/reviewing (EC) packages.

Mr. Kinali completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 15 OF 68 Johnathon McFarland, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. McFarland, P.E., is a Civil/Structural Engineer providing engineering support for various nuclear generating stations.

Mr. McFarland has a B.S. in Civil Engineering and over 5 years of experience in civil/structural design, including ECCS Suction Strainers, seismic and hydrodynamic analysis, yard modifications and field engineering.

Mr. McFarland has significant experience at Florida Power and Light's Turkey Point Plant, and at the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Station (WCNOC). Mr.McFarland supported various modifications at WCNOC including providing outage support.Additionally, Mr. McFarland provided EPU related support at Turkey Point including the analysis and walkdowns of structural systems. He supported structural analysis of shipping casks. Mr.McFarland completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.Richard Starck, SCE (MPR)Mr. Starck is a registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic qualification of nuclear plant equipment.

He is the principal author of the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document (EPRI Report 1025286, Reference 10.2). He developed and taught the six sessions of the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course to more than 200 engineers.

He has provided technical oversight of work for various SQUG projects aimed at resolving USI A-46. Mr.Starck developed for SQUG the generic guidelines, criteria, and procedure for identifying safe shutdown equipment for resolution of USI A-46, is the editor and principal author of the SQUG GIP, and has interfaced with the NRC Staff and the SQUG Steering Group to resolve open issues on several revisions of the GIP. Mr. Starck is a SCE and has performed Seismic Walkdowns and evaluations of nuclear plant electric and mechanical equipment as part of the NRC required USI A-46 program. This work included equipment qualification, anchorage evaluation, seismic interaction, review, outlier resolution, and operability determination.

Michael Steele, SCE (SNC)Mr. Steele is currently a Principal Design Engineer at Plant Hatch. He has a Bachelor's of Science Degree in Civil Engineering and 20 years of experience as a structural engineer.

He is a qualified SQUG Seismic Capability Engineer and Certified Lead Auditor. He has comprehensive and in-depth technical experience in nuclear facilities structural design, construction, modification and maintenance.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE16OF68 Winston Stewart, SCE (ENERCON)Mr. Stewart is a Mechanical Engineer with over eight years of experience in various capacities including:

Modification Engineer, Engineering Mentor, 1OCFR50.59 Evaluator, Apparent Cause Evaluator, Contract Administration and Designated Representative, Project Manager, Procedure Technical Reviewer, and Environmental Monitoring Team Leader for Emergency Response Organization.

Mr. Stewart was responsible for the preparation of technical evaluations for various configuration changes to plant systems, structures, or components; as well as the preparation and revision of civil/structural calculations, pipe stress calculations, and other design documents.

Mr.Stewart served as subject matter expert for Pipe Stress Analysis and Pipe Flaw Evaluation (ASME B31.1,Section III and Section XI). During this time he qualified as SQUG Seismic Capability Engineer.

Mr. Stewart completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3-Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.James Tootle, Jr. (SNC)Mr. Tootle is the Hatch Severe Accident Management Program Manager. He holds a Bachelor's Degree in Civil Engineering Technology from Georgia Southern University.

He has 30 years of experience at an operating nuclear plant. Mr. Tootle is currently licensed as an SRO and served ten years as Shift Support Supervisor.

He also has supervisory experience in Operations Training and Nuclear Oversight.

Mr. Tootle's certifications include the following:

• Shift Supervisor Qualified (1998-2003)" Shift Support Supervisor (1993-2003)

• Senior Reactor Operator (BWR) licensed (1993-present)

• Station Nuclear Engineering

/ Shift Technical Advisor Certification

-General Electric (1990)

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC__________________I_______________________PAGE 17 OF68 Juan Vizcaya, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Vizcaya has over 30 years of structural engineering and design experience.

He has significant experience being the structural lead engineer on ISFSI projects and overall nuclear plant modifications and has a wide range of design/engineering experience.

Projects range from the seismic analysis and design of concrete and steel structures and concrete pads to the analysis and design of restraint systems for a vertical cask vendor stack-up configurations.

Other projects include heavy load drop assessments and the analysis and design of protective structures, foundations and various mechanical and structural modifications using sophisticated finite element models. Mr.Vizcaya is skilled at using finite element analyses in the design process, and at the practical design of mechanical components, along with concrete and steel structures.

He leads a group structural staff on issues involving structures, stress analysis, and site work such as layout, excavation, roads, drainage and subterranean structures.

Mr. Vizcaya has extensive field experience including during construction of the Laguna Verde Nuclear Plant. Mr. Vizcaya completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.Kenneth Whitmore, SCE (ENERCON)Mr. Whitmore is a Registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in, seismic design and seismic equipment qualification in nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore is a Seismic Capability Engineer that was involved in the development of the SQUG methodology for verification of nuclear plant components.

Specifically, Mr. Whitmore served on the sub-committee that developed the SQUG methodology for evaluation of raceways and on the sub-committee that performed the peer review of the SQUG walkdown training class. Mr. Whitmore performed A-46 and IPEEE walkdowns at Oyster Creek and Three Mile Island and has subsequently performed SQUG evaluations at numerous nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore served as both Chairman and Technical Chairman of the Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Service (SQRTS), has witnessed numerous seismic tests and is a recognized industry expert in seismic qualification of components.

Mr. Whitmore has significant experience in all aspects of structural analysis and design and has extensive experience in performing plant walkdowns associated with seismic issues. Mr.Whitmore completed the EPRI training on Near Term -Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 18 OF 68 Wesley Williams, SWE (SNC)Mr. Williams has a degree in Civil Engineering from the University of South Alabama. He is a System Engineer for Southern Nuclear at Plant Hatch in Baxley, GA. He has participated in*numerous Structural Monitoring Walkdowns at Plant Hatch which are governed by 10 CFR 50.65,"Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants." In addition, Mr. Williams had the opportunity to work in the Civil Design Group at Southern Nuclear Corporate Headquarters as a summer intern before he graduated.

Mr. Williams completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.Alan Wolfe (SNC)Mr. Wolfe has a BS in Nuclear Engineering Technology.

He has more than 33 years of experience in the nuclear industry, all in the Operations department at Plant Hatch. He obtained a Reactor Operator's License in 1982 and a Senior Reactor Operator's License in 1987. Mr. Wolfe held positions of System Operator, Licensed Nuclear Plant Operator, Shift Supervisor, Shift Technical Advisor, Shift Manager, and Operations Superintendent prior to retiring in 2010. Following retirement he returned to the plant in January 2012 to support the Severe Accident Management team in response to the accident in Japan.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 19OF68 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING Information on the seismic vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program are reported in Attachment

5. Within this context, "vulnerabilities" means seismic anomalies, outliers, or other findings.

For each vulnerability, Attachment 5 also reports a description of the action taken to eliminate or reduce the seismic vulnerability.

The Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) for Hatch Unit 1 included nineteen (19) components for which seismic vulnerabilities were previously identified during the IPEEE program. During the Seismic Walkdowns, the walkdown teams verified that the resolutions to IPEEE vulnerabilities for 16 of the 19 SWEL components are implemented as stated in the IPEEE outlier resolution (Attachment 5).The extent of this verification is discussed in the individual SWCs for the components with identified IPEEE seismic vulnerabilities.

The following IPEEE vulnerability was found to be potentially unresolved during the Seismic Walkdown: 1) 1Z41-F009B, AIR-ACTUATED DAMPER B003B INLET -The air line support was previously considered inadequate and therefore an IPEEE outlier. Attachment 5 notes that supports were added per design change request (DCR)93-055. However, the Seismic Walkdown team concluded that the air line was not currently adequately supported for seismic loads. Therefore, condition report (CR) # 525292 was written to address the seismic support of the air line. Subsequent to the initiation of the CR, the SWEs judged the airline will perform its design function because of the very light weight of the air line being supported at the floor support. Corrective Actions will include installation of missing pipe clamps.The following SWEL components with IPEEE vulnerabilities could not be verified due to inaccessibility.

Completion of the walkdowns, for both components, is deferred until the next refueling outage (1R26) which is scheduled for February of 2014.1) 1R24-S025, 600/208V ESS DIV 1 MCC IA -The anchorage was previously determined to not meet the GIP screening criteria.

Attachment 5 notes that the anchorage and connection to the adjacent panel was modified per DCR 88-334. Modification of the anchorage per DCR 88-334 was verified during the Seismic Walkdown.

However, the Seismic Walkdown team could not verify the internal connection between the cabinets since the MCC could not be opened at that time.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 20 OF 68 2) 1R24-S027, 600/208V ESS DIV 2 MCC IC -The anchorage was previously determined to not meet the GIP screening criteria.

Attachment 5 notes that the anchorage and connection to the adjacent panel was modified per DCR 88-334. Modification of the anchorage per DCR 88-334 was verified during the Seismic Walkdown.

However, the Seismic Walkdown team could not verify the internal connection between the cabinets since the MCC could not be opened at that time.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC____ ___ ___ ___ ___ __ ____ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ PAGE 21 OF 68 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT A team of individuals with extensive knowledge of Plant Hatch systems and components developed the SWEL. Qualifications of the personnel responsible for developing the SWEL are provided in Section 4.0 of this report. The equipment selection personnel used an SNC-template to ensure compliance with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and consistency across the fleet.Two SWELs were developed (SWEL 1 and SWEL 2) consistent with the guidance in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 1 consists of a sample of equipment related to safe shutdown of the reactor and maintaining containment integrity as described in Section 3.0 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 2 consists of items related to the spent fuel pool as described in Section 3.0 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The two SWELs form the overall SWEL for the plant.Attachment 1 provides the final SWEL 1 and SWEL 2.In some cases, components listed on the SWEL were removed from the SWEL or were replaced with equivalent components.

These changes were made when it was determined during the Seismic Walkdown that access to the equipment on the original SWEL would be impractical to achieve during a walkdown.

For example, components located very high overhead were replaced with equivalent items that could be seen without erecting scaffolding.

All such changes meet the provisions of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The SWELs provided in Attachment 1 reflect the final SWELs with all changes incorporated.

6.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 1 SWEL 1 was developed using the four screens described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).Screens 1 to 3 Screens 1 to 3 were used to select Seismic Category I equipment that do not undergo regular inspection and support the five safety functions.

In accordance with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2, Page 3-3), Screens 1 through 3 can be satisfied using previous equipment lists developed for the IPEEE program. Consequently, the Seismic Review Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) developed for the Hatch Nuclear Plant's response to Generic Letter 88-20 (Reference 10.3) was included in Base List 1 for the development of SWEL 1.Additional items were added to Base List 1 from the USI A-46 Summary Report (Reference 10.9) and the Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (Reference 10.7), Tables 3.Al-1 and 4.Al-1, to provide components to address the twenty-one classes of equipment from Appendix B of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 22 OF 68 The specific guidance used to create the IPEEE Seismic SSEL was EPRI Report NP-6041, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin" (Reference 10.10). The Seismic SSEL from IPEEE-Seismic was checked and verified to meet the intentions set forth in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The intent of the Base List 1 was to provide an equipment list of the SSCs used to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment integrity following a Design Basis Earthquake.

The EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2, Page 3-1) listed three screens to use in selecting the Base List 1 if a utility was to not start from an existing equipment list used in previous plant evaluations.

Applying these three screens would result in an acceptable base list that was comprised of Seismic Category I SSCs associated with maintaining the following five safety functions listed in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2):* Reactor reactivity control" Reactor coolant pressure control" Reactor coolant inventory control" Decay heat removal, and* Containment function.The criteria used in selection of the Seismic SSEL are detailed in Section 3.1.2.2 of the IPEEE -Seismic Report (Reference 10.8). Specifically, one preferred and one alternate path capable of achieving and maintaining a safe-shutdown condition for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a Seismic Margin Earthquake (SME) was selected for each unit. Further, it was assumed that a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) had occurred and as such, the paths were also selected as being capable of mitigating a SBLOCA following an SME.Therefore, based upon the review of the Base List 1, it was determined that the list satisfied the requirements as specified in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Base List 1 is presented in Attachment 1.Screen 4 Screen 4 is the sample considerations to select components from the Base List 1. The selection of components for SWEL 1 was developed through an iterative process that ensured a representative sample (i.e., Screen 4 from EPRI Report 1025286 -Reference 10.2). Various drafts of SWEL 1 were provided to Hatch Licensed Senior Reactor Operators (SROs) for review and input. The SROs identified and recommended inclusion of additional equipment important to plant operations.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 23 OF 68 The following list summarizes the sample considerations used to develop SWEL 1: " Variety of systems* Major new or replacement equipment* Classes of equipment* Variety of environments

• Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program* Risk Significance Variety of Systems -EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) specifies that equipment from a variety of plant systems must be included on the SWEL 1. The systems represented in the Base List were reviewed and components from a majority of these systems are included on the SWEL.Major New and Replacement Equipment

-Major new or replacement equipment installed within the previous 15 years was identified through a search of work order (WO) histories for selected equipment and input from the plant personnel familiar with plant modification and from the PRA group on equipment changes to components that are included in the PRA.Variety of Equipment Classes -A list of the 21 Classes of Equipment that should be included on the SWEL is provided in Appendix B of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 1 includes components from each equipment class.Variety of Environments

-The EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) specifies that the SWEL contain components located in various plant environments, including environments subject to corrosion and high temperatures.

SWEL 1 includes equipment in three environment types. These include Harsh (e.g. Reactor Building), Mild (e.g. Control Room, Diesel Generator Building), and-Outdoors/Intake Structures (e.g. Plant Service Water Intake Structure, Yard Valve Pits).IPEEE Vulnerabilities

-SWEL 1 includes equipment identified with seismic vulnerabilities identified in Hatch Nuclear Plant's response to Generic Letter 88-20 (Reference 10.3).Risk Significance

-The risk ranking was performed using the at-power internal events PRA model and by identifying those components that, in the model, have a Risk Achievement Worth of 2.0 or greater, or a Risk Reduction Worth of 1.005 or greater. The importance ranking spreadsheet contained in calculation PRA-BC-H-10-008 (Reference 10.6) was the actual document used as a source.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 24 OF 68 6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 2 SWEL 2 is developed using four screens described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 2 is presented in Attachment 1.Screens 1 to 2 The equipment selected through Screens 1 and 2 provide any Seismic Category I components associated with the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) that are also suitable for a walkdown.

For Hatch Unit 1, the only Seismic Category 1 equipment associated with the SFP is the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System.The Base List 2 includes components from the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System that are suitable for a walkdown per Screens 1 and 2 from EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).Screen 3 Screen 3 is the sample considerations that ensure that a broad category of equipment from Base List 2 is included in SWEL 2. These considerations include:* Variety of systems* Major new or replacement equipment* Classes of equipment" Variety of environments The Hatch SFP System has a very basic system design' with very limited component types. SWEL 2 includes components associated with maintaining seals around the SFP gates, which are Seismic Category I components.

There were no new/replacement equipment in SWEL 2 because there have been no major modifications to the Spent Fuel Pool systems that would affect equipment that meets the screening requirements.

Equipment associated with cooling of the SFP are located in locked areas (due to radiation) and are not suitable for a walkdown.The Decay Heat Removal System is the only major new or replaced equipment associated with the SFPs. However, the Decay Heat Removal System is Non-Safety Related and all piping connected to the SFP either terminates greater than 10 feet above the fuel or has anti-siphon holes located greater than 10 feet above the fuel to prevent rapid drain-down of the SFP.For Hatch Unit 1, SWEL 2 contains all the equipment on Base List 2. Thus, sampling was not a consideration in developing SWEL 2.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 25 OF 68 Screen 4 Screen 4 identifies any items that could potentially lead to rapid drain down of the SFP. These include any penetrations in the SFP that are below 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.

For Hatch Unit 1, there are no SFP penetrations within 10 feet above the fuel in the SFP. All piping connected to the SFP, either terminates more than 10 feet above the fuel or has anti-siphon holes, located more than 10 feet above the fuel, to prevent rapid drain-down of the SFP., Based on a review of plant documents, the only items that could potentially lead to rapid drain down of the pool are the Seismic Class 2 items that could contribute to deflation of the air seal in the seismic gap located in the transfer canal between the spent fuel pools. Air accumulators and gate seal ball valves that could contribute to deflation of the air gap, if damaged during a seismic event, are included in SWEL 2.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 26 OF 68 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS Walkdowns were performed for all components on the (combined)

SWEL except for those that were inaccessible (see Section 7.1). A -Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) was completed for each component and an Area Walk-by Checklist (AWC) was completed for each area containing equipment on the SWEL. Copies of the SWCs and AWCs are provided in Attachments 3 and 4, respectively.

The personnel performing walkdowns received training on the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown guidance.Prior to the walkdown teams arriving onsite, walkdown packages were assembled into folders that contained the SWCs and AWCs and other pertinent information (e.g., calculations, test reports, IPEEE walkdowns, equipment location, and layout drawings).

Each walkdown team consisted of two SWEs.The walkdown teams spent the first week on site obtaining unescorted plant access and organizing for the walkdowns.

Organization included assignment of specific components to the teams; review of the walkdown packages; development of a process for tracking the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys; and familiarization with the plant.The second week began with peer reviewers (Whitmore and Ashworth) providing an overview on the information contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Expectations for the walkdowns were discussed and questions were answered.

After this overview, each walkdown team performed an initial Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by. This initial walkdown was performed in the presence of the other teams and at least one peer reviewer.

The purpose of this initial walkdown was to ensure consistency between the different teams, to reinforce the expectations for identifying potentially adverse seismic conditions, and to allow team members to provide and obtain feedback.Following the initial walkdowns, the walkdown teams began performing the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

Support from plant personnel (operators, electricians, engineering) was obtained as required to open equipment and to assist in locating and identifying components.

All component Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were documented on the SWCs and AWCs, respectively.

The final status of all SWCs and AWCs indicated one of the three following statuses: " "Y" -Yes, the equipment is free from potentially adverse seismic conditions;

• "N" -No, the equipment is not free from at least one potentially adverse seismic condition;" "U" -Undetermined, a portion(s) of the walkdown could not be completed due to equipment inaccessibility and the condition is not known.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR, RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 27 OF 68 The walkdown focused on anchorage and seismic spatial interactions but also included inspections for other potentially adverse seismic conditions.

Anchorage in all cases was considered to be anchorage to the structure.

This included anchor bolts to concrete walls or floors, structural bolts to structural steel and welds to structural steel or embedded plates. For welds, the walkdown team looked for cracks and corrosion in the weld and base metal. Other bolts such as flange bolts on in-line components were not considered to be anchorage.

These connections were evaluated and any potentially adverse seismic concerns were documented under "other adverse seismic conditions".

As part of the walkdown, the anchorage of at least 50% of the anchored components was evaluated to verify if the anchorage was consistent with plant documentation.

The document that provides the anchorage configuration was identified on the SWC and the anchorage in the field was compared to the information on this referenced document.

In cases where the anchorage could not be observed (e. g.where the anchorage is inside a cabinet that could not be opened at the time of the walkdown), the items related to anchorage were marked as "U" (Undetermined) and deferred until equipment is available for inspection.

However, all other possible inspections associated with that item were completed and the results were documented on the SWC. These items were considered to be incomplete at the time of this report preparation and have been deferred to a time when they would be available for inspection (see Section 7.1). All "U" items have been deferred until during Refueling Outage 1R26 which is scheduled for February 2014.In cases where the Seismic Walkdown team members identified a potentially adverse condition, the condition was noted on the SWC or on the AWC and a CR was written to document and evaluate/resolve the condition.

As part of the process of generating the CR, preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs during the walkdowns.

Additionally, detailed licensing basis reviews were conducted as part of the resolution of the CR, as required.

Conditions that were not obviously acceptable were documented on the checklists and a basis was provided for why the observed condition was determined to be acceptable.

Area Walk-bys were performed in the rooms containing the SSCs for walkdowns.

For cases in which the room where a component was located was large, the extent of the area encompassed by the Area-Walk-by was clearly indicated on the AWCs. For large areas, the walk-by included all structures, systems and components within a 35-foot radius of the equipment being walked down, as described on the AWC. The AWCs are included in Attachment

4.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC_________________I______________________PAGE 28 OF 68 SWEL 1 Walkdowns A total of 88 of the 111 SWEL 1 Component Seismic Walkdowns have been performed to date.However, 8 must be revisited in order to inspect for other adverse conditions inside the cabinets.

In addition, 23 of the 111 SWEL 1 components were delayed due to inaccessibility.

The schedule for performing the remaining component walkdowns is presented in Tables 7-1 and 7-2. All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.SWEL 2 Walkdowns A total of 4 component Seismic Walkdowns were performed.

In addition, a total of 2 Area Walk-bys were completed.

All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.7.1 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS Table 7-1 identifies the components originally determined to be inaccessible for walkdowns.

These items are located throughout the plant and the required Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were not completed for these items during the initial phase of walkdowns.

Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope# Item No. Description Access Remaining Schedule Walkdown for Scope Completion

1. R23-03 600V SWGR EMERGENCY BUS See Note 2 SWC and Outage IC & 4160-600V XFMR AWC 1R26 2. 600V SWGR EMERGENCY BUS See Note 2 SWC and Outage 1D & 4160-600V XFMR AWC 1R26 3. 250V DC BATTERY DIV 1 See Note 2 SWC and Outage 1R22-S016 SWGR 1A AWC 1R26 4. 4160V SWGR EMERGENCY See Note 2 SWC and Outage BUS 1E AWC 1R26 HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 29 OF 68 Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope# Item No. Description Access Remaining Schedule Walkdown for Scope Completion

5. 4160V SWGR EMERGENCY See Note 2 SWC and Outage 1R22-S006 BUS IF AWC 1R26 6. 4160V SWGR EMERGENCY See Note 2 SWC and Outage 1R22-S007 BUS 1G AWC 1R26 7. See Note 1 SWC and Outage 1P41-F043B PSW DW AIR CLR 7B IN AOV AWC 1R26 8. 1P41-F045A PSW DW AIR CLR 8A IN AOV See Note I SWC and Outage AWC 1R26 9. See Note 1 SWC and Outage 1El 1-F060A RHR INJECTION VLV AWC 1R26 10. lEl 1-F009 RHR SD CLG INBOARD MOV See Note 1 SWC and Outage AWC 1R26 11. IT47-BO07B DW Cooling System Unit See Note 1 SWC and Outage AWC 1R26 12. See Note 1 SWC and Outage 1T47-BO09B DW Cooling System Unit AWC 1R26 13. See Note 1 SWC and Outage 1T47-BO08A DW Cooling System Unit AWC 1R26 14. RPS POWER DISTRIBUTION See Note 2 SWC and Outage 1C7 1-PO01 PANEL BUS A AWC 1R26 15. R25-SO1 125V DC DIV 1 CAB A See Note 2 SWC and Outage AWC 1R26 HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 30 OF 68 Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope# Item No. Description Access Remaining Schedule Walkdown for Scope Completion

16. 1R25-S002 125V DC DIV 2 CAB 1B See Note 2 SWC and Outage AWC 1R26 17. IR25-S004 125V DC CAB 1D See Note 2 SWC and Outage AWC IR26 18. IR25-S005 125V DC CAB IE See Note 2 SWC and Outage AWC 1R26 19. See Note 2 SWC and Outage 1R25-S036 120/0V DC ES CAB 1B AWC 1R26 20. 1R25-S105 125V DC CAB 1D ESS DIV 1 See Note 2 SWC and Outage AWC 1R26 20. 1R25-S125 120/208V AC ESS DIV I CAB See Note 2 SWC and Outage AWC 1R26 22. 120/208V AC VITAL CAB IA See Note 2 SWC and Outage INSTR BUS IA AWC IR26 23. 1R25-S 116 120/208V AC ESS DIV 2 CAB See Note 2 SWC and Outage AWC 1R26 HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 31 OF68 Table 7-2 provides a list of components determined to be inaccessible to open doors to perform inspections for other adverse conditions.

The anchorage for these components was visible without opening all panels of the cabinet and was therefore inspected during the initial walkdowns.

Table 7-2. Inaccessible Equipment Resulting from Guidance on Opening Cabinets to Inspect for Other Adverse Conditions

1. Item No. Description Access Remaining Schedule Walkdown for Scope Completion

1. See Note 2 Inspect Outage 1R24-S009 600/208V MCC 1A Internals 1R26 2. See Note 2 Inspect Outage 1R24-S011 600V ESS DIV 1 MCC iC Internals 1R26 3. See Note 2 Inspect Outage 1R24-S025 600/208V ESS DIV 1 MCC 1A Internals IR26 4 See Note 2 Inspect Outage 1R24-S012 600V ESS DIV 2 MCC lB Internals 1R26 5. See Note 2 Inspect Outage 1R24-S022 125/250V DC ESS DIV 2 MCC 1B Internals 1R26 6. See Note 2 Inspect Outage 1R24-S027 600/208V ESS DIV 2 MCC 1C Internals 1R26 7. See Note 2 Inspect Outage 1R24-S048 DG BLDG 600/208V MCC ID Internals 1R26 8. See Note 2 Inspect Outage 1R11-S004 575-120/2O8VAC XFMR 1D Internals 1R26 HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC____ ___ ___ ___ ___ __ ____ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ PAGE 32 OF 68 Notes (Table 7-1 and Table 7-2): 1) The component was located inside an area of the plant not accessible during normal plant operation.

Walkdowns of these components and of the associated plant areas were deferred to an outage.2) Inspection of the cabinet's internals could not be performed without opening the doors of the equipment.

Opening doors on these types of components was not permitted by plant operations at the time of the Seismic Walkdowns due to equipment deemed too sensitive to permit access, or requiring special, planned precautions, to open the doors.3) While the Seismic Walkdowns were in progress at Hatch Unit 1, supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse conditions was received on September 18, 2012. This required the opening of cabinets, electrical boxes and switchgear and the inspection of internals for SWC attributes, even when opening the components was not required to inspect the anchorage.

However, the affected components were identified and scheduled for re-inspection with component doors opened.4) Hatch Unit 1 has 7 transformers (Equipment Class 4) in the SWEL-1. With the exception of components (MPL #) 1R23-S003, 1R23-S004, and 1RI1-S004, which were deferred as stated above, the transformers were inspected to the extent practical.

All visible anchors, hardware and surfaces were inspected.

The anchorage for the transformers was visible without opening the component.

To inspect the transformer further would require disassembly and therefore would not be considered part of a normal electrical inspection.

The inspection of the transformers meets the requirements of the guidance document and the 50.54(f) letter. Listed below are the 4 transformers for which inspections were completed:

MPL # IRI1-S039 45KVA 600-120/208V XFMR MPL# 1RiI-S041 600-120/208VAC XFMR 1B'MPL# H S11-S009 4160/600V STA SERV XFMR IFI MPL # ISII-S012 4160/600V STA SERV XFMR 1F2'Note that some of these MPL numbers include both the switchgear and the transformer.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 33 OF 68 8.0 RESULTS This section discusses the results of the Seismic Walkdowns that were performed in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3; Recommendation 2.3: Seismic".

As potentially adverse conditions were identified conditions reports were initiated in the Plant CAP program and evaluated.

The sections below discuss the results of these walkdowns and evaluations.

8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS All potentially adverse conditions were conservatively entered into the site Corrective Action Program (CAP) per Southern Nuclear expectations in a timely fashion. While some preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs as part of the generation of the CAP entries, the items did not first undergo a detailed seismic licensing basis review as described in EPRI Report 1025286.Consequently, the as-found conditions in Table 8-1 below do not necessarily indicate that SSCs are deficient or not in conformance with their seismic licensing basis. Instead, it is an indication that Southern Nuclear has a very low threshold for CRs and actively uses the system.SNC personnel familiar with the Plant Hatch Seismic Licensing basis, Plant Hatch seismic qualification methods and documentation, and Southern Nuclear requirements and procedures for entering items into the CAP reviewed and dispositioned all of the potentially adverse seismic conditions as part of the CAP process. The subsections below summarize the key findings from the CAP reviews that pertain to equipment operability, SSC conformance with the seismic licensing basis, and any required plant changes.During the course of the seismic walkdowns, a total of 52 Unit 1 Potentially Adverse Conditions were identified and entered into the Corrective Action Program. In addition, another 5 were entered that are Common to both Units 1 and 2. Table 8-1 provides additional details on the SSCs that were identified during the walkdowns and entered into the CAP as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed relative to their seismic licensing basis.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 34 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit 1 An electrical pull box or junction box cover 512613 It is judged the cover would stay attached with just one Replace missing screws Open Reactor (approximately 12"x 12") was found to be screw during a seismic event, per work order Due Building attached to its box with only 1 screw. The SNC431589 11/27/2013 el 130' box is located on the wall above elevation 130' of the Unit 1 Reactor Building.

The box is located above TB1-1376 and TB1-1377 and is in the same area as MCC 1R25-SO 1I (near the comer).Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed 513284 Missing nut on electrical conduit camp was determined Replace nut per work Open Reactor electrical conduit was missing a nut for the to not to have an adverse effect on equipment.

order SNC431866 Due Building NW clamp. The missing nut was located in Unit 1 11/27/2013 Diagonal NW Diagonal elevation 116' proximity of 1T41-B001A and above 1GI 1-F2051.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 35 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed a step 513335 The ladder and cart need to be removed or stored per Action was taken by Closed Control ladder stored between Battery Charger 1 R42- the Seismic Configuration Control Requirements, Operations to correct the Building S026 and 1R42-S027 on the 130' elevation in Drawing B-45555. configuration of the el 130' Room C 114 of the Unit 1 Control Building.

stored equipment 9/7/12.In the occurrence of a seismic event, this ladder could potentially cause damage to the Battery Chargers.

Also in the same room, an equipment cart with loose equipment stored on it was tied off on one comer of the cart to a conduit near Switchgear 1R22-S016.

The wheels were not chalked, so during a seismic event the cart could potentially roll and damage the Switchgear.

The equipment stored on the cart could also fall off potentially damaging the switchgear.

Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Engineers in Unit 1 513346 Seismic Walkdown Engineers determined that the The Eyewash Station Closed Reactor Reactor Building elevation 203' in close temporary eye wash station would not adversely affect was properly restrained Building proximity to SBLC Area observed a the condition of any safety related equipment.

9/7/12.el 203' temporary eye wash station tie down to a pipe 1P42-F029.

The eye wash station has the potential to move in a seismic event.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC_________________

______________________PAGE 36 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit 1 A nitrogen bottle was found adjacent to the 513731 While the team judges that it is unlikely that the bottle Nitrogen bottle was Closed Reactor CRD drive units at elevation 130' in the Unit 1 will come completely loose from the rope, there is still properly restrained with Building Reactor Building.

This nitrogen bottle was a potential that the bottle could impact one or two of a second rope placed el 130' found near the eastern-most CRD drive unit, the CRD drive units located nearby. The bottle safety with spatial distance next to the railroad bay. The bottle was cap is properly installed and the team judges that the between the ropes on the secured to a structural support with a single cap would remain in place even if the bottle were to bottle 9/7/12.rope. The seismic walkdown team members fall over.determined that the bottle could potentially fall over due to being secured with only a single rope.Unit 1 A cart was found adjacent to MCC Panel 513776 The cart should be stored where equipment cannot Action was taken to Closed Reactor 1R24-SO 1 8A in the Unit 1 Reactor Building at potentially slide off and hit sensitive equipment.

correct the configuration Building elevation 130'. The cart was tied off at the of the stored equipment el 130' wall at RL and R9, and the wheels were 9/7/12.chalked. However, equipment was on the cart that could slide off and hit the MCC panel.Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Engineers found an 513948 The Seismic Walkdown Engineers judged the supports The missing anchor bolts Open Reactor anchor bolt missing from two separate adequate to support the ductwork during a seismic should be replaced per Due Building supports on the same ductwork in the event due to the number of existing bolts remaining in work order SNC432457 11/27/2013 el 164' Ventilating Room, elevation 164', of the Unit each of the two supports and the close support spacing 1 Reactor Building.

The ductwork enters the of all supports on the duct run.room through the east wall along column line RB at penetration number 1T43-H527J and turns north. The second support north of the duct turn has an anchor bolt missing at the base plate on the wall beneath the duct. The fourth support north of the duct turn near column line R7 has an anchor bolt missing at the base plate on the floor.

0 HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 37 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Engineers found a crack 513954 The Seismic Walkdown Engineers judge the capacity Structural Monitoring Open Reactor in the concrete wall between the Ventilating of the one bolt to be reduced, however, there is Engineers to monitor and Due Building Room, R207, and the Standby Gas Filter & adequate support provided to the conduit by this trend any growth or 11/27/2012 el 164' Fan Room R-207C, of the Unit 1 Reactor support based on the three remaining anchor bolts that worsening of this Building at elevation 164'. This crack runs are in good condition and have no edge distance issues, particular crack.near, but not through, an anchor bolt for a conduit support. The conduit supported by The 2' -2" thick concrete wall runs east-west on this support runs to a pull box with a number column line R3. The doorway is on the west end of the on the box cover that appears to be marked wall. The crack propagates from the top eastern-most ESS-II-J362.

The crack creates a slightly comer of the doorway and runs at approximately 45 lessened edge distance for one of the four degrees through a core-drilled piping penetration.

The anchor bolts holding the conduit support to the Seismic Walkdown Engineers judge the crack started wall; thereby reducing the pull-out and shear because of the close proximity of the core drill to the capacity of this one bolt. comer of the doorway. The crack is relatively narrow and appears stable.Unit 1 Diesel The light fixture at the Southwest comer of 513990 Should the one rod come loose in such an event, it A new tie wire was Closed Gen Building Switchgear Room IE in the Diesel Generator could potentially swing down and impact equipment installed 9/8/2012 SGR Room Building has one tie wire broken at the 1H21-P176.

Consistent with details provided in DCR 1 E location where it is hooked to the ceiling. This90-010, use 12 gauge annealed wire to tie light. Wrap wire was originally installed to insure the wire around rod below hanger with a minimum of three hook would not come loose during a seismic complete twists around wire. Wrap wire around anchor event. Should the one rod come loose in such or support structure with a minimum of three complete an event, it could potentially swing down and twists around wire.impact equipment 1H2 1-P 176.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 38 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status I Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Control Building el 112' Battery Room 1A Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs)identified three cracks in the concrete ceiling (located at el 130') of the IA battery room in the Control Building, Elevation 112'., One crack is located in ceiling at the North-West Corner of the IA battery room. The crack has oil stains around the crack and there is also signs of oil dripping on the 112' floor.Room C 117 (Oil Condifioning/Oil Reservoir Room) is located on elevation 130' and is immediately above the crack and may be the source of the oil drippings.

This crack spans between two vertical supports used for a 1.5 ton monorail crane in the room, passing close to the crane anchor bolts.° The second and third cracks are located in the ceiling (elevation 130') of the IA battery room adjacent to two separate vertical supports used to secure conduit and HVAC ductwork, respectively.

The cracks near these two supports are in close proximity to the anchor bolts, but there are at least two other anchor bolts located far from the cracks.513992 Crack located in ceiling at the North-West Corner of the IA battery room. The crane appears inactive and to not have been used in many years. Photographs from the Structural Monitoring program indicate there has been no noticeable change in the crack since at least 1996. It is recommended this crack continue to be followed/monitored under the Structural Monitoring Program.Cracks located in the ceiling (elevation 130') of the IA battery room -The SWEs judge the structural capacities of'the vertical supports are sufficient for seismic demands.In response to CR 2008100637 and CR 2008100632, the lR42SOO1A, 1R42SOO1B, 2R42S001A and 2R42S001B Station Service batteries and battery room were checked for signs of oil or degradation.

No additional cell degradation related to the original event was found in any of the 4 batteries.

A crack with signs of oil was observed in the Northwest comer of the 1R42-SOO1A battery room on the ceiling. This crack is not above the 1R42-SOO1A battery, and does not pose a threat to the battery. The oil in this crack appeared older (darker color), however it did look like the same type fluid as in the 2A SS Room. See WO 1080328001.

Open Due 4/30/14 HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 39 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Engineers in Unit 1 514831 Nitrogen bottle tied to support between CRDs -Team The Nitrogen bottles Closed Reactor Reactor Building elevation 130' noticed judges that it is likely that the bottle will come were tied off properly Building Nitrogen bottles that were not properly tie off. completely loose from the rope due to the slack, with a where there was no slack el 130' potential that the bottle could impact one or two of the in the rope.One, was located tied to a support in-between CRD drive units located nearby. The bottle safety cap CRD 46-39 & 42-27. The seismic walkdown is properly installed and the team judges that the cap team members determined that the bottle would remain in place even if the bottle were to fall could, potentially fall over due to being over.secured with only a. single rope.Second nitrogen bottle located next Scram Fuse Panel The second nitrogen bottle that is not tied off (1C71-PO02F).

The seismic walkdown team members properly is located next Scram Fuse Panel determined that-the bottle could potentially fall over (I C71-PO02F).

The seismic walkdown team due to being secured only at the top of the bottle. The members determined that the bottle could bottle safety cap is missing from the nitrogen bottle.potentiallyfall over due to being secured only at the top of the bottle. The bottle safety cap is missing from the nitrogen bottle.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC__________________

_______________________JPAGE 40 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed 515108 In a seismic event, the ramps would not fall and strike Given that the CR Closed Diesel Gen racking devices in several Diesel Generator or slide into any safety related equipment because of initiator identified there Building Building Switchgear Rooms not plugged in. the aisle width and the height of the concrete curb is no seismic concern SWGR A sign on the units state "UPS must remain nearby panels sit on. However, the ramps should be with the manner in Rooms plugged in when not in use". All racking stored/secured the same way in each room. This is which the ramps are devices should be plugged in to maintain more of a personnel safety issue for when walking stored and considering charge. around these ramps. that the high visibility contrast and the low Also, the ramp for each racking device was frequency of the area stored differently in each switchgear room being traversed inspected.

Some were leaned against the wall minimizes any personnel beside the racking device, some were stored safety concerns, no between the racking device and the wall, and action is required others were stored lying flat on the floor. concerning the ramp storage.1R24-S012 There is a missing bolt which connects frame 515117 Per the Seismic Walkdown Engineers judgment it Replace the missing bolt. Open 15 to frame 16 at the south face (front) of appears the missing anchorage is limited to this one Due MCC 1R24-S012 at the 130' elevation of the bolt. When the lower panel was removed at all other 4/30/2014 Reactor Building.

The adjacent panels are panels for inspection of anchor bolts, all other bolts secured at the bottom with a bolt at the north fastening the panels together were present, front and face (back of MCC panel). back.

0 HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 41 OF 68, Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions

'Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)1R24-S022 The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 515614 The condition was judged to not be a seismic issue Properly tighten the Open identified a nut not properly tightened to its since each frame is bolted to the adjacent frame, loose bolt and nut. Due bolt in frame 5 of MCC panel 1R24-S022 in allowing loads to transfer and be resisted by the 4/30/2014 the north end of room 109A of Unit 1 Reactor anchorage provided by the properly fastened bolts in Building elevation 130'. The loose nut and this and all other frames of this MCC.bolt is one of two bolts fastening the front of frame 5 to the base channel. The nut and bolt can be accessed by removing the base panels of the MCC.1T41-N022A The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs)identified drawing H 16240, Version 23, locates instrument 1T41-N022A on the diagonal (torus) wall in the Southwest diagonal of the Unit 1 Reactor Building.

The instrument is actually located on the South wall (column line R13) at the stair landing.PDMS Location Data has the correct location.515915 The anchorage was judged to be seismically adequate.The drawing needs to be revised to indicate the correct location of the instrument.

CR/TE to be issued to get drawing revised.Drawing needs to be revised.Open Due 11/27/2013 HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 42 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/!!_ Resolve the Condition closed)Unit 1 Reactor Building el 130'Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed two anchor bolts not properly installed for a support for the barrier plate assembly covering the auxiliary steam piping (see drawings H-16279 and H-15 173) in the Unit 1 Reactor Building, elevation 130'. The support is located behind and above MCC panel 1R24-012 approximately 10' -9" east of column line RE and is anchored to the north wall of the reactor building.516278 As described below, it is judged by the Seismic Walkdown Engineers that the seismic Il/I criteria is met by the existing support structures without relying on the support anchor bolts in question.The support consists of a horizontal wide flange arm and vertical brace to the wall. Two anchors that secure the base plate of the horizontal arm to the wall are in question.

One nut of one anchor is engaging by only one or two turns of the nut. The other anchor fastens to the wall through an enlarged hole in the base plate. No oversized washer covers the hole in the base plate.The barrier plate assembly and piping have independent support systems. Per the Seismic Walkdown Engineers' judgment, the barrier plate assembly is stiff enough to span to adjacent supports either side of the support in question should the anchor bolts not hold the support during a seismic event. The adjacent supports are constructed well and all anchorage to the wall is in good condition.

The adjacent supports appear robust enough to hold any additional weight of the barrier plate assembly not carried by the support in question.

Also, the box-shaped barrier plate assembly surrounds the steam pipe and cannot fall off of the pipe. The 10-inch diameter steam pipe and its supports are very robust and are judged capable of carrying any additional load applied by the barrier plate assembly.

Further evaluation.

should be performed to determine a resolution to the as-found condition, whether it is to leave the condition as-is or to replace or modify the anchor bolts.An evaluation needs to be prepared to determine if this condition can stay as is or if the anchor bolts need to be replaced/modified.

Open Due 4/30/2014 HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION.2.3:

SEISMIC PAGE 43 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)IRI 1-S020 Seismic Walkdown Engineers found out that 516325 The Seismic Walkdown Engineers judged the support Bolts with inadequate Open Transformer 1 Ri 1-S020 was bolted to to be adequate during a seismic event due to the threaded engagements Due channel with minimal threaded engagement of geometry and the number of existing bolts remaining should be replaced.

11/27/2013 bolts and nuts. This transformer is located on each side of the transformer.

behind the MCC 1R24-SO 12, attached to the north wall with channels.Intake Seismic Walkdown Engineers found that 516327 Prompt resurfacing and coating is needed to interrupt Prompt resurfacing and Open Structure numerous piping, instrumentation, and degradation.

coating is needed to Due el 110' conduit/equipment supports in the Intake interrupt degradation per 11/27/2013 Structure elevation 110' has general coatings work order SNC433192 degradation and minor surface rusting. Note that this potentially adverse seismic condition is common to both units.1R43-CO10B Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed a 516335 The broken housing can expose personnel to flying Replace screen Open broken piece of housing screen on Air parts from the air compressor internals.

Due Compressor 1R43-COIOB located in Room 1B 11/27/2013 of the Diesel Building.Diesel Gen Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed a light 516344 Based on engineering judgment the light will not A cable is to be installed Open Building fixture using a hook for support in Diesel disengaged from the conduit due to configuration.

for proper support and Due Room IC Generator 1C Room does not have a cable for Wire tie needs to be replaced.

stop the light from 11/27/2013 supplemental support as required.

In a seismic disengaging from the event, the light's hook fixture could dislodge ceiling.and fall on the fuel lines for Generator.

The light is located in the southeast section of the room. A cable is to be installed for proper support and stop the light from disengaging from the ceiling.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 44 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)1R43 -CO 1 OC Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed that 516348 These two screws are to be added to the housing to Install two screws. Open the housing for the Air Compressor 1R43- reflect as design condition.

Due CO 1 OC located in room 1 C, of the Diesel 11/27/2013 Generator Building, has two screws missing.The absence of these two screws imposes additional loads on the adjacent screws and increases the vibration of the housing panel.These two screws are to be added to the housing to reflect as design condition., 1R24-S012 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed a 517041 Seismic Walkdown Engineers judged the MCC will Bolt needs to be Open missing bolt connection at the base of south perform its design function during a seismic event as installed.

Due face for MCC 1R24-S012 between frames 15 there are 7 out of the 8 remaining bolts connecting the 11/27/2013 and 16. The MCC is located in the north end frames together, which are adequate to transfer the load of Room 109A for Reactor Building, elevation to the MCC anchorage and eliminate the chatter effect.130'. Bolt needs to be installed per plant procedures.

Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed an 517171 If this screw were to become loosened during a seismic Replace the screw. Open Control electrical junction box attached to the post event, the other three cap screws would be sufficient to Due Building next to Battery 1R42-SO17B on the 112' hold the load of the boxcover in place. The post is far 11/27/2013 elevation of the Unit 1 Control Building has enough from the battery rack that the screw will not four cap screws attaching the cover to the box. impact the batteries, so there is no potentially adverse One of the cap screws on the top end of the seismic condition.

side of the box is either loose or cross-threaded.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 45 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)1T41-BO02A There was a discussion between SNC personnel and the NRC Resident Inspector concerning the inspections performed to date.The Resident Inspector chose five components from the Seismic Walkdown Equipment Lists to walk down with the Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) or to verify independently.

While inspecting the RHR Core Spray Pump Room Cooler, MPL number 1T41-B002A, the Inspector identified conditions that appeared to be potentially adverse conditions in a seismic event that were not at least discussed in the completed Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) for this component.

The concerns identified during the meeting and a walkdown of the component with the Resident Inspector, included:-Three bolts were identified as missing that secured the cooler housing to the support frame. The bolt holes identified where bolts were missing were on the eastern-most end of the cooler.-Crooked bolts fastening the cooler frame to the platform appeared improperly installed.

-The fan motor mounting bolts appeared unusual since they were providing the support for the motor as if they were effectively column structures.

518594 By inspection, even with three bolts missing, the large number of installed fasteners attaching the housing to the cooler frame ensures the housing will remain fastened in a seismic event and the cooler will continue to perform its design function.

These bolts are not related to the equipment anchorage.

The crooked bolts and fan motor mounting bolts were identified and evaluated during the SQUG GIP walkdowns performed in 1988. Welded tube steel attachments between the cooler frame and platform were installed as a result of the SQUG evaluation to replace the crooked bolts and ensure the design function of the cooler is maintained.

The crooked bolts could be removed if they interfered with replacement anchorage as noted on the design documents for the modification.

The fan motor mount bolt stresses were determined as a result of the SQUG evaluation to meet their design function.While the identified conditions have been determined to have no adverse effect on seismic adequacy of the component, these potentially adverse seismic conditions should be identified in the SWC and evaluated whether they are consistent with the Current Licensing Basis.This condition report is written to ensure missing bolts are replaced and to perform a re-inspection of this component by the SWEs to document in the SWC notes the missing housing bolts, the crooked bolts, and the fan motor mounting bolts in the SWC.Replace the missing bolts.Open Due 11/27/2013 HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMICPAE4OF6 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Intake Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed 519024 Engineers judged no measurable loss of structures was Supports and piping Open Structure numerous piping, instrumentation, and conduit observed, and all of the supports and embedded plates need to be cleaned and Due el 110' supports on the walls of the suction pit are are judged structurally acceptable at present. Supports painted before any 11/27/2013 showing coatings degradation and minor and piping need to be cleaned and painted before any significant degradation surface rusting in the intake structure suction significant degradation occurs. Condition Reports occurs.pit. 2006101925 and 2006101952 were written during Structural Monitoring walkdowns to document similar findings in the past.Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Engineers on the 519644 The remaining 16 anchor bolts are judged to be seismic The deficient anchorage Open WO Reactor Refueling Floor in Unit 1 Reactor Building adequate to support the component in a seismic event, should be Finish Building against the East wall found some .anchor bolts Therefore, it is judged that there is no potentially replaced/repaired 11/27/2013 for the HVAC duct base attachment to the adverse seismic condition and will have no impact on floor appear deficient.

Three of the anchors operability.

The anchors should be installed properly.have top nuts not engaged and one of the anchors is bent.Unitl Seismic Walkdown Engineers on the 519650 Due to the size of the fire suppression line, it has been Install grout under Open Reactor Refueling Floor in Unit 1 Reactor Building judged that the base plate will provide sufficient baseplate.

Due Building against the East wall found a base plate near capacity during a seismic event. Therefore, it is judged 11/27/2013 Refueling column RK-R5 has no grout and the gap under that there is no potentially adverse seismic condition Floor the base plate is greater than 1/4". The base and will have no impact on operability.

plate is supporting a 3" fire suppression line.Without the grout, the anchors undergo bending which adds additional stress to the bolts.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 47 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)ID21-NO02E Seismic Walkdown Engineers on the 519655 1D21-NO02E is not near any sensitive equipment, Equipmentrwas properly Closed Refueling Floor in Unit 1 Reactor Building therefore, it is judged that there is no potentially secured.Unit 1 against the North wall found component adverse seismic condition and will have no impact on Reactor 1D21-NO02E is not secured on the floor and operability.

The component should be secured in place.Building could move doing a seismic event.Refueling Floor Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Engineers on the 519657 These ladders should be secured to the wall or stored Ladders secured by tying Closed Reactor Refueling Floor in Unit 1 Reactor Building somewhere else. to the building.Building against the North wall found some ladders Refueling stored vertically.

It is located near the Floor condenser outlet nozzle. During a seismic event, these ladders have the potential to move during a seismic event.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 48 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status I Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)IH 11-P602 Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 519666 The Screening and Evaluation Worksheet (SEWS) Replace missing bolts. Open determined that three bolts were missing at the packages for IH11 -P601 and IH1 1-P602 completed Due location where Main Control Room Panel during the SQUG GIP walkdowns performed in 1988 4/30/2014 1H1 l-P601 connects to adjacent panel 1H1 1- were reviewed.

These SQUG packages represent the P602. Based on the configuration of the design basis documents for these panels. As stated in bolting on adjacent panels, the interface the SQUG packages, neither panel 1H 1 -P601 nor connecting two panels typically consisted of panel 1111 1-P602 contain any essential relays.nine bolts (5/8" diameter each). Five of the Therefore, potential slight impact between the two nine bolts are installed on the front vertical panels will not adversely impact the function of the edge, and four bolts are installed on the rear panel or any of its sub-components.

Panel HI l-P601 is vertical edge. The three missing bolts were adequately attached to adjacent panel H 11-P653 and located at the rear of the panel. Only the panel H 11-P602 is adequately attached to adjacent bottom bolt was installed at the rear. The panel H 11 -P603. All bolts that could be seen were bolts at the front edge of the panel were not determined to be free of potentially adverse seismic visible except for one bolt located at the top concerns.

Therefore, per the Seismic Walkdown (approximately 2" from the top), one bolt Engineers' judgment the 1H 1l-P601 will perform its located approximately 3ft from the top and design function in a seismic event.one bolt located at the bottom (approximately 2" from the bottom of the cabinet).

Any other bolts were hidden by the cables and equipment within the cabinet.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 49 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 519998 The concrete crack passes between two legs of one of Evaluation to determine Open Station identified a crack in the ceiling of the Unit 1 the four supports anchoring one 81x 18.4 rail for the if the crack affects the Due Service Station Battery Room in the Northwest corner overhead gantry crane supported from the ceiling in lifting capacity of the 4/30/2014 Battery (ref. CR 513992). This condition report is that room (ref. drawing SX-12097).

There are two 81 crane.Room written to not allow the overhead crane to be rails supporting the crane; one on each side of the used to lift batteries in this room until an room. The crack does not pass through an anchor bolt, evaluation is performed to determine if the but near enough to slightly affect the edge distance of crack affects the lifting capacity of the crane, some anchor bolts at the one support point. All other anchor bolts supporting the crane were inspected and determined to be free of potentially adverse seismic This is precautionary to insure safe lifting of concerns.

Therefore, the Seismic Walkdown batteries in the Unit 1 Station Battery Room. Engineers judged the anchorage is adequate as-is to support the self-weight of the crane and any seismic loads on the crane structure (ref. calculation SCNH-93-010).1H21 -P202 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed that 520072 The cabinet door has three hinges, one on top, one on Reattach hinge on door. Open there is a loose hinge on cabinet MPL 1 H2 1- the bottom and one on the middle. The hinge in the Due P202 located in the Diesel Building Room 1G. middle is the one missing the screws; therefore, it is 11/27/2013 The hinge is to be'reattached to the door to considered that the door will perform its function.meet its original intent. Therefore, there is no potentially adverse seismic condition and operability is not impacted.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)1H21-P173 While performing SAM NTTF 2.3 Seismic 520076 Of these three items, the first two are considered Remove box of lamps, Open Walkdowns for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2, housekeeping issues, while the third one is considered remove loose screws, Due Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed the to affect the structural integrity of the cabinet. This and replace missing 11/27/2013 following on.the Shutdown Instrument Panel, portion of the panel is to be supported by 6 bolts, while screws.item number 1H21-P173 located in the Unit 1 one is missing, it is determined that the panel will not Reactor Building, elevation 130', Room be adversely affected in a seismic event. Therefore, 109A: there is no potentially adverse seismic condition and operability is not impacted.1)There is a box of lamps stored inside the panel, as shown on the attached picture.2)There are two screws lying on the floor inside the panel as shown on the attached picture.3) There is a screw missing from the panel, as shown on the attached picture.1H11-P603 Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 520086 Per the Seismic Walkdown Engineers' judgment, the Replace the missing Open identified a rear panel cover plate on back of remaining 6 screws were determined to be sufficient to screws. Due the Main Control Room Panel lH1 1-P603 that support the cover plate and ensure it remains fastened 11/27/2013 is missing 4 out of 10 screws. The cover plate to the IH 11-P603 panel during a seismic event because is marked with "MM", "LL", "KK", and "JJ" of the relatively small mass and location of the sheet along its top edge. metal cover.1E 11-R608A Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs)identified inside the Main Control Room Panel 11H1 l-P601 that the back cover for component 1El 1-R608A is missing 1 out of 3 screws.520122 Per the Seismic Walkdown Engineers' judgment, this condition is judged not to be a seismic concern because of the very small mass of the cover being held fast by two properly installed screws.Replace the missing screw.Open Due 11/27/2013 HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC Table_ 8-1.PotentiallyAdversPAGE 51 OFt68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)1C82-POO1 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed the 520191 These covers are small and represent an insignificant Install the missing Open following on the Remote Shutdown Panel amount of mass relative to the overall weight of the screws. Due E51, 1 C82-POOl located in the Unit 1 Reactor panel. The screws currently installed are adequate to 11/27/2013 Building, elevation 158', Room 2,R103: hold these enclosures in place. It is judged that the panel is seismically adequate.

Therefore, there is no 1) Internal enclosure identified as PB 1-513 potentially adverse seismic condition and operability is has a top screw missing. This screw is to be not impacted.installed.

2) Internal enclosure identified as PB 1-5 11 has five top screws missing. These screws are to be installed.

1H11 -P652 Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 520462 After the area walk-by, several Unit 1 Main Control Restrain, cover or Open identified a long fluorescent light fixture Room cabinets were identified as having similarly long replace fluorescent light Due (approximately 4LF) with two tubes mounted fluorescent lights mounted inside cabinets.

They also tubes. 4/30/2014 at the center of the inside of the panel 1H 11- pass through several of the cabinet bays and are P652 in Unit 1 Main Control Room. There is restrained by the bay walls. Small fluorescent light not a cover or any restraints over the fixtures were also observed mounted inside some fluorescent tubes. The fluorescent tubes pass cabinets at the top of the back wall. The SWEs judged through several bays of the cabinet and judged the possibility of the small fluorescent tubes falling to be restrained by the bay walls should the loose is not an operability concern because the very tubes come loose from the light fixture during small mass of each tube would not adversely impact a seismic event. components or cables inside the back of the cabinets.It is recommended by the SWEs that the fluorescent light tubes be restrained, covered or replaced by screw-in-type lights bulbs. Two zip-ties around light fixtures and the fluorescent tubes would be an acceptable solution.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 VERSION 1.0 PAGE 52 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)2X41- Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed that 523328 These two bolts are to be installed in the respective These two bolts are to be Open CO 10A the bolts missing on the covers of the equipment.

installed in the Due following equipment located on the DGB The cover panels are supported with multiple bolts, it is respective equipment.

11/27/2013 1X41-CO06E Roof: There is a bolt missing in the cover judged that the absence of one bolt on each panel will panel ofM1PL # 2 X 4 1TC010A. There is a bolt not adversely affect the functionality or the seismic missing in the cover panel of MPL # 1X41- capability of the dampers.C006E. Note that this potentially adverse condition is common to both units.Intake The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 523476 This pipe is supported in this area of the room by a Replace U bolts. Open Structure observed rusting U-bolts supporting the 4" combination of U-bolts securing the pipe to structural Due Pump Room diameter fire protection line at two support tube steel supports.

It is judged by the SWEs that the 11/27/2013 locations above the MCC Panels 1R24-S009 U-bolts will perform their intended function since no and 2R24-S009 in the Intake Structure Pump measurable material appears to be lost. However, Room. This pipe is supported in this area of because of the extensive surface rust on the U-bolts, it the room by a combination of U-bolts is recommended that they be replaced rather than just securing the pipe to structural tube steel cleaned and coated. Surface rust on the support steel supports.

and fire protection piping should also be cleaned and coated per procedure NMP-MA-011.

IR24-S009 2R24-5009 Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs), observed the following in the Pump Room of the Intake Structure at Elevation 111':-A bolt is missing fastening the rear cover panel of the MCC MPL # 1R24-S009.-A bolt is missing fastening therear cover panel of the MCC MPL # 2R24-S009.

523481 The cover panels are supported with multiple bolts and, by observation of the SWEs, the function of each MCC is not affected by a panel secured with one less bolt.The missing bolt in each panel is to be replaced.The missing bolt in 1R24-S009 should be replaced.The missing bolt in 2R24-S009 should be replaced.Open Due 11/27/2013 HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 53 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Carbon Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 523486 The nuts on the U-bolts need to be properly fastened to The nuts on the U-bolts Open Dioxide observed loose nuts on two U-bolts securing secure the loose U-bolts to the pipe and supports.

need to be properly Due piping on the carbon dioxide piping to supports on the fastened to secure the 11/27/2013 Diesel Diesel Generator Building roof. Note that loose U-bolts to the pipe Building this potentially adverse condition is common and supports.Roof to both units.1R41-BO02A Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed the 523730 The housing is supported with multiple screws; it is Replace missing screws. Open housing on 1T41-BO02A has 3 out of 18 judged that the absence of 3 screws on housing will not Due screws missing on the back cover located in adversely affect the functionality or the seismic 11/27/2013 Unit I Reactor Building SE Diagonal on capability of the housing.elevation 107'..

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC__________________

______________________PAGE 54 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adveise Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Diesel The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 523764 In both cases where one of the two U-bolts is loose, the The loose U-bolts need Closed Building observed loose U-bolts securing two of the pipe is still securely fastened by one U-bolt to prevent to be properly tightened four fuel oil lines to a support adjacent to the the pipes from interacting with adjacent fuel pipes. or replaced.Diesel Generator IA. The support serves as The next support is located in the floor trench about an anchor point between the piping and the 4.5LF from the anchor in question and restrains all four flex hose connections to the diesel according pipes in the north-south direction.

This second to vendor drawings S05765 through S05768. restraint reduces possible deflection of the pipe away Two U-bolts fasten each of the four pipes to from the diesel generator.

The SWEs judge the the support angle at the end of the floor existing support configuration will support the pipe and trench. prevent interactions adjacent piping and the diesel One of the two U-bolts is loose on the pipe generator in a seismic event.farthest to the east which is the 3/4" diameter pressure return according to drawing HI 1236, Detail G. The drawing shows the same pipe capped at some point inside the diesel support skid. The one U-bolt securely fastening the pressure return pipe to the support steel will restrain the pipe in the east-west direction and prevent the pipe from interacting with the other three fuel lines.One of the two U-bolts is loose on the pipe farthest to the west which is the 3/4" diameter pressure return according to drawing H 11236, Detail G. The one U-bolt securely fastening the pressure return pipe to the support steel will restrain the pipe in the east-west direction and prevent the pipe from interacting with the other three fuel lines.

HATCH UNIT I SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 VERSION 1.01 PAGE 55 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Control Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 524541 Adjacent supports are about 8' apart from this one Cable Tray connection Open Building observed a connection plate that connects the support, so this support load is minimal. The cable plate to be connected Due el 180' Cable Tray to the support is not connected, tray is to be attached to the supporting structure using properly 11/27/2013 The Cable Tray is near equipment 1Z41- the connection plate. Due to the light weight of the B003A, (drawing H-13324) located on Cable Tray, the remaining supports are judged elevation 180' of the Control Room Roof. The sufficient by the SWEs to keep the cable tray secure cable tray (ESS-L TQA7 04) is not bolted to and not interact with any other SSCs during a seismic the appropriate support structure.

event.1R43-COOA Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 524556 Per the SWEs, by inspection the belt housing will Replace the missing Open observed that the compressor (1R43-COO1A) perform as designed.

screw. Due belt housing located in Diesel Generator 11/27/2013 Room IA of the DGB is missing a screw near the motor.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 56 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)1H21-P291A Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 525130 Each panel is restrained from sliding sideways since it The missing hardware Open observed missing channel nuts and bolts for is held between the U-supports fastened to the wall on should be installed.

Due 1H21-P293A securing the Diesel Battery 1A Fuse Monitor each side of the panel. Each panel is also restrained 11/27/2013 Panel, MPL 1H21-P291A, in Battery Room vertically and perpendicularly from the wall by the IA and the Diesel Battery IC Fuse Monitor existing support hardware.

The panels are secured Panel, MPL 1 H21-P293A, in Battery Room adequately to perform their design function.IC to the walls. The panels are fastened to the wall with Cooper B-Line hardware (or equivalent).

Each panel is fastened to B-Line B22 struts at the top and bottom of each panel. The struts are fastened to the concrete walls with U-supports located at each end of each strut.The panels are located between the U-support hardware.

Two expansion anchors fasten each U-support to the concrete.

One set of bolt and channel nut hardware is supposed to fasten each U-support to the strut. However, the bolt and channel nut is missing at all four U-supports for each panel.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 57 OF 68 Table. 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)1X41- The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 525153 All fasteners are present, but the support frame should Support frame should be Open C008A observed that the fan ventilator hood for fan be repaired at the fastener connections or replaced to repaired at the fastener Due 1X41-CO08A bolted connections above the provide proper connections, connections or replaced 11/27/2013 roof curb on the Diesel Generator Building to provide proper roof is deteriorating.

The bolt holes in the connections.

metal frame are oversized and irregular.

A combination of corrosion and wear appears to be the cause for the irregular holes. Some bolts are not fastened squarely across the joined steel surfaces because of the irregular holes. All fasteners are present, but the support frame should be repaired at the fastener connections or replaced to provide proper connections.

Diesel Gen Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 525155 By inspection, the SWEs judge the remaining three The missing nut should Open Building observed an anchor bolt nut missing on an air anchor bolts are adequate for the support to meet its be installed.

Due Room IA pipe support base plate in the Diesel design function.

11/27/2013 Generator Room 1A at elevation 130'. The support is for a 1 inch diameter air pipe line near the Air Receiver Tank, 1R43-A003A.

Approximately twelve linear feet of piping weighing about twenty pounds is supported.

This support is located in Diesel Generator Room IA at elevation 130'.Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed Unit 1 525156 Due to numerous supports located throughout the area Clean and coat per Open Nitrogen Nitrogen Storage Tank Area contain some the load is minimal on each support. Therefore, procedure.

Due Storage Tank general coatings degradation and surface supports and piping were judged to be seismically 11/27/2013 area corrosion on the nearby pipe supports and adequate by SWEs.piping.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 58 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed Unit 1 525159 Due to the load distributed throughout the supports, Clean and coat per Open Nitrogen Nitrogen Storage Tank Supports contain some surface corrosion will not have an adverse effect the procedure.

Due Storage Tank general coatings degradation and surface functionality of the support; These were judged to be 11/27/2013 area corrosion, seismically adequate by SWEs.Unit 1 Recirc Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 525292 The SWEs judge the air line will perform its design, Install missing pipe Open Line identified a pipe clamp is missing for function because of the very light weight of the air line clamp. Due Isolation supporting the air line to the air-actuated being supported at the floor support. Any swaying of 11/27/2013 Damper damper 1 Z41-F009B.

A pipe clamp is the cantilevered section of piping is judged to be 1Z41-FO09B missing that fastens the air pipe to a dampened by the flexible hose connection at the top of Globestrut-type strut welded to a wide flange the run. There is enough slack in the flexible pipe support column. The air line is supported connection to not pull away from the damper.at the floor and turns vertically and runs approximately six feet. A flex connection ties the air line to the damper. The missing clamp is intended for supporting the vertical run of the approximately 1/2" diameter rigid air pipe.Unit 1 Torus Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 525296 The conduit is not is contact with the clamp due to the The conduit needs to be Open observed that there is an unsupported and sheared off connection.

Once the conduit was sheared repaired to be properly Due dislodged conduit that carries cables for the off, the conduit was forced in the opposite direction up supported and to be 11/27/2013 lights located in Bay 1 of the Torus. The off of the clamp. The conduit has to be repaired to be connected at the light conduit is not in contact with the clamp due to supported and to be connected at light fixture. fixture.the sheared-off connection.

Once the conduit was sheared off, the conduit was forced in the opposite direction up off of the clamp.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 59 OF 68 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)1T48- Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 525303 Temperature element 1T48-NO09A was initially The conduit was Closed N009A/ identified that there is an unsupported conduit declared inoperable.

The condition was further supported at both Unit 1 Torus carrying cables to the Torus Water evaluated (under CR 543194/TE 544188) by supports with Room Temperature Element, MPL #1T48-NO09A, calculation SCNH-12-070 that determined the appropriate clamps.located in Bay 1 of the Unit 1 Torus Room. temperature element performed its design function The conduit is not supported at adjacent even with the conduit in the nonconforming condition.

supports CS-25-79 and at CS-25-80.Unit 1 Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 525477 The remaining screws for the junction box in question Replace the missing Open Yard Pit observed in U 1 Division 1 Yard Pit a junction are judged adequate to maintain connection during a screws. Due box with l out of 4 missing screw in the back seismic event due to the weight of the cover. The 11/27/2013 and 2 out of 4 on the front cover, missing screws in the back are also judged adequate to maintain the connection between junction box and the concrete wall, so there is no potentially adverse seismic condition resulting.

1Z41-BO08A Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 525669 Per Vendor Calculation SX19845, "Seismic Analysis The washer and Open identified that there are two nuts and a of Refrigeration Condensing Unit for Control Room", corresponding nuts are to Due compression washer missing from one sheets 19 and 22, each spring is always in compression be re-installed at each 11/27/2013 adjustable vertical restraint bolt (ref. vendor and horizontal displacements are restricted by the cage support point to meet the drawing SX16241, .pdf sheet 101 of 144) on (or channel frames within the spring isolators).

intended design two different spring isolators for the Therefore, negligible loads are applied to the adjustable requirements.

Condensing Unit 1Z41-BO08A located on vertical restraint bolts.elevation 180' of the Control Room Roof.There are two adjustable vertical restraint bolts per spring isolator and a spring isolators at each of the four comers of the condenser.

All other vertical restraint bolts are properly installed on each spring isolator.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 60 OF 68 During the course of the walkdowns the team identified issues that, while not rising to the level of a seismic concern, warranted evaluation to determine if programmatic enhancements are necessary.

These issues have been entered into the SNC corrective action program.CR # 516003 -The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) identified that drawing B-45555, Version 1.0, "Seismic Configuration Control Requirements General Notes & Specifications", does not provide clear guidance how to restrain gas bottles when stored near safety-related equipment in the plant.CR # 517213 -The Resident Inspector noted that several components inspected had various problems with bolting. He questioned the craftsmanship involving bolted connections as well as supervisory oversight of the maintenance activities involving bolted connections for the plant in general. The condition report was written for Maintenance management to determine the extent of the condition regarding the quality of bolting connections following maintenance activities.

8.2 EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY Plant Hatch Unit 1 had one as-found condition that was conservatively assessed during the Walkdowns as preventing the SSC from performing its required safety function.

A calculation was generated further evaluating the as-found condition and concluded that the unsupported length of the conduit would perform its safety function in the as-found condition.

Conduit supports were later installed that resolved the nonconforming condition.

8.3 PLANT CHANGES There were no plant changes that resulted from the as-found conditions.

Plant changes are any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features (i.e., plant modifications) that result from the Seismic Walkdowns or Area Walk-bys.8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS Housekeeping items were identified during walkdowns and walk-bys that were not potentially seismic adverse conditions.

All such items were brought to the attention of plant personnel and CRs were generated as necessary.

These issues included water on the floor and loose items (small tools, trash, etc.) stored in the plant areas. These items were processed through the site CAP process and are not specifically documented in this report though are available in the Plant CAP database.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 61 OF68 9.0 PEER REVIEW 9.1 PEER REVIEW PROCESS The peer review for the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns was performed in accordance with Section 6 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The peer review included an evaluation of the following activities:

• review of the selection of the structures, systems, and components, (SSCs) that are included in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL);* review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys;* review of licensing basis evaluations and decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions in to the plant's Corrective Action Plan (CAP); and* review of the final submittal report.This report provides results of the review process for each review activity as well as the results of the peer review.9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS

SUMMARY

9.2.1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Development The selection of items for the SWEL underwent peer review according to the guidance in Section 3 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The SSCs to be evaluated during the Seismic Walkdown were selected as described in Section 6.0 of this report. The list of components was provided to the members of the Peer Review Team, which consisted of all four peer reviewers listed in Section 4.0. The Peer Review Team members independently provided comments to the personnel who selected the components on the SWEL. All comments were addressed and the Peer Review Team reviewed the changes made to the SWEL and the final SWEL, to ensure all recommendations from the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2)were met. Specifically, the peer reviewers confirmed that all SSCs in SWEL 1 and 2 were Seismic Category I components that do not undergo regular inspections.

Specific considerations for the peer review process are described below for SWEL 1 and SWEL 2. The peer review check sheet of the SWEL is provided in Attachment

2.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 62 OF 68 For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team verified that the list of SSCs represented a diverse sample of the equipment required to perform the following five safety functions, as specified by EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2):* Reactor Reactivity Control" Reactor Coolant Pressure Control* Reactor Coolant Inventory Control* Decay Heat Removal and 0 Containment Function For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team also verified that the SSCs included an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:

• Various types of systems* Major new and replacement equipment* Various types of equipment* Various environments

• Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE and* Risk insight consideration The final SWEL 1 contains items that perform each of the five safety functions specified by EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Numerous components perform more than one of the safety functions and all five safety functions are well represented by the components on the list.SWEL 1 contains components from all the classes of equipment listed in Appendix B of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), except for cases where there are no safety-related components at the plant that fall into that specific equipment class. The list contains major new and replacement items, and items enhanced based on the IPEEE as well as equipment located in various environments and areas of the plant. All major safety-related systems are represented and risk factors were considered in development of the list.For SWEL 2, the Peer Review Team determined that the process to select spent fuel pool related items complied with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Portions of the spent fuel pool cooling system at Hatch Unit 1 are Seismic Category 1 and all different types of components associated with the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system are represented on the SWEL 2. The Peer Review Team concluded that the bases for including/excluding items associated HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 63 OF 68 with the spent fuel pool were well documented and that the final SWEL 2 complies with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).In summary, all of the Peer Review comments made during development of SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 were resolved by the team that prepared the SWELs. The resolutions were reviewed by the Peer Review Team and it was determined that all comments were adequately addressed.

The SWEL was determined to incorporate all comments made by the Peer Review Team during the process.During the process of conducting the walkdowns, a small number of isolated components that were not accessible were removed from the list and in some cases, equivalent items that were determined to be accessible were added. The Peer Review Team reviewed all changes made to the SWELs and determined that these changes had no impact on the adequacy of the SWELs with respect to the provisions contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The Peer Review Team concludes that the team that developed the SWELs appropriately followed the SWEL development process described in Section 3 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).The Peer Review Checklist for development of the SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.9.2.2 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys The Peer Review Team was on-site and very involved with the Seismic Component Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

The Peer Review was performed as follows: " Each of the three walkdown teams performed an initial equipment Seismic Walkdown and an Area Walk-by while being observed by the other teams and at least one member of the walkdown Peer Review Team. The Peer Review Team provided comments and suggestions and answered questions raised by the team performing the walkdown and the other walkdown teams." During the first week of walkdowns, a member of the walkdown Peer Review Team individually accompanied each of the SWE walkdown teams and observed the SWE team conducting the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

The Peer Review Team confirmed first-hand that the SWE walkdown teams performed the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys as described in Section 4 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). A Peer Review Team member accompanied each of the three walkdown teams on at least one full day of walkdowns.

SWE walkdown teams were encouraged and expected to carry a copy of Section 4 from the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and refer to it as necessary, during conduct of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 S__FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 64 OF 68* During the remaining weeks of walkdowns, at least one Peer Review Team member remained on site until the majority of the walkdowns were completed.

The Peer Review Team member reviewed essentially all the SWCs and AWC prepared by the three walkdown teams. When the walkdown team members had questions or potential concerns, the Peer Review Team member walked down the specific component or area along with the walkdown team to provide additional input to the seismic evaluations.

• At least one member of the walkdown Peer Review Team reviewed the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages to ensure that the checklists were completed in accordance with the guidance provided in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The walkdown Peer Review Team confirmed that the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages were consistent, thorough, and the packages accurately reflected the results of the walkdowns and walk-bys as witnessed during the first week of walkdowns.

The Peer Review Team concluded that the SWE teams were familiar with the process for Seismic Equipment Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

The SWE teams adequately demonstrated their ability to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions such as adverse anchorage, adverse spatial interaction, other adverse conditions related to anchorage, and perform anchorage configuration verifications, where applicable.

The SWEs also demonstrated the ability to identify seismically-induced flooding interactions and seismically-induced fire interactions.

The SWEs documented the results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys on the appropriate checklists from Appendix C of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).The Peer Review Team reviewed approximately 40% of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-by checklists and at least one member of the walkdown peer review team reviewed more than 90% of the packages.

Peer review of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys identified minor editorial errors and also some instances where comments in the checklists required additional explanation and information.

Mr. Ashworth and Mr. Whitmore provided-verbal feedback to the SWEs to adjust these entries accordingly.

The SWEs understood the comments and incorporated the recommendations and updates from the Peer Review Team.Since the peer review occurred at the start of the Seismic Walkdowns, the peer reviewers were able to provide comments at every stage of the walkdown process to ensure consistency in the reporting for all packages.

Therefore, the Peer Review Team considered the number of completed walkdown packages reviewed to be appropriate.

In addition, all members of the Peer Review team, including Mr. Ashworth, Ms. Brown, Mr. Starck and Mr. Whitmore were available by phone as necessary during the entire Walkdown process.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 65 OF 68 9.2.3 Licensing Basis Evaluations All potentially adverse seismic conditions identified were immediately entered into the plant CAP for further review and disposition as discussed in Section 8.1 of this report. Therefore, the Seismic Walkdown teams did not perform licensing basis evaluations apart. from evaluations performed for the CAP. The Peer Review Team considers this CAP process approach fully comprehensive and acceptable for addressing the potentially adverse seismic conditions observed during the Seismic Walkdowns.

9.2.4 Submittal Report The Peer Review Team was provided with drafts of the submittal report. This allowed the Peer Review Team to verify that the submittal report would meet the objectives and requirements of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).The Peer Review Team provided both verbal and written comments on the draft reports and was active in ensuring the report was thorough, complete and accurate.

The final version of the submittal report includes all necessary elements of the Peer Review and meets the requirements of the 50.54(f) letter.

HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC_____________________

___________________________PAGE 66 OF 68

10.0 REFERENCES

10.1 1OCFR50.54(f)

Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 10.2 EPRI 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, June 2012, 10.3 Generic Letter No. 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities 10.4 Generic Letter No. 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 10.5 Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) Procedure:

Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Power Plant Equipment, Revision 3A, December 2001 10.6 SNC Calculation PRA-BC-H-10-008, Hatch Unit 1 PRA Model, Revision 4 (applicable to both units)10.7 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 1 10.8 Hatch Letter 5102, dated January 26, 1996, and titled 'Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Response to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4', Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366 10.9 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, USI A-46 Summary Report 10.10 EPRI Report NP-6041, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin 10.11 USAS B3 1.1, Code for Power Pressure Piping, 1967 Edition 10.12 USAS B31.7, Nuclear Power Piping, 1969 Edition 10.13 IEEE 323-1971, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC____________________

__________________________PAGE 67 OF 68 10.14 IEEE 323-1974, Standard for Qualifying Class lE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 10.15 IEEE 344-1971, IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class lE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generation Stations 10.16 IEEE 344-1975, IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class lE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generation Stations 10.17 American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC), 7th Edition HATCH UNIT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 68 OF 68 11.0 ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT 1 -SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS ATTACHMENT 2 -UNIT 1 -PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 ATTACHMENT 3 -SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS ATTACHMENT 4 -AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS ATTACHMENT 5 -IPEEE VULNERABILITIES INFORMATION ATTACHMENT 6 -SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEER CERTIFICATIONS ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT 1 -SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 Equipment List Pages Unit 1 -Base List 1 3-94 Unit 1 -SWEL 1 95-100 Unit 1 -Base List 2 101-121 Unit 1 -SWEL 2 122-124 Page 1 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS UNIT 1 -BASE LIST 1 SNCH082-RPT-01 Equipment List Pages Unit 1 -Base List 1 3-94 Unit 1 -SWEL 1 95-100 Unit 1 -Base List 2 101-121 Unit 1 -SWEL 2 122-124 Page 2 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Copy of HATCH1R5 Thursday, June 14, 2012 10:35:19 AM NUMBER CLASS 0001 14 MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN C71-P001 RPS N/A POWER DISTRIBU TION PANEL BUSA LAYOUT_BUILDING ELEV ROOM TG/T12 EVALTY H40181, H40179 CONTROL 130 SR 0010 04 Rl1-S004 45KVA 600-120/208V PWR XFMR 1D 0011 04 Rll-SO05 45KVA 600-120/208V PWR XFMR 1E 0013 04 Rll-S039 45KVA 600-120/208V N/A N/A H40144, H40268 H40145, H40268 DIESEL DIESEL 130 130 D/02 S E/02 S N/A H42851 REACTOR 130 RF/R13 S TRANSFO RMER.0014 04 Rl1-S040 45KVA 600-120/208V N/A H42841* REACTOR 130 RF/R02 S TRANSFO RMER 0015 04 Rll-S041 112.5 KVA 600-120/208V N/A H40179 CONTROL 130 TF/Tll S ESSENTIA LXFMR 1B 0016 04 Rl1-S042 112.5 KVA 600-120/208V N/A H40182, H40178 CONTROL 130 TD/Tl1 S ESSENTIA LXFMR iC Page 1 of 77 Page 3 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS 0012 04 MARKN Rll-S006 DESCRIPT DRAWIN 45 KVA N/A 600-120/208V PWR XFMR IF LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY F/02 S H40146, H40268 DIESEL 130 0017 03 R22-S005 4160V SWGR EMERGE NCY BUS 1E 0018 03 R22-S006 4160V SWGR EMERGE NCY BUS IF 0019 03 R22-S007 4160V SWGR EMERGE NCY BUS 1G 0020 02 R22-S016 250V DC BATTERY DIV 1 SWGR 1A N/A H40144 DIESEL 130 D/03 SR N/A H40145 DIESEL 130 E/03 SR N/A N/A H40146 DIESEL 130 F/03 SR TF/T11 SR 0021 02 R22-S017 250V DC BATTERY DIV 2 SWGR 1B N/A 0022 02 R23-S003 600V SWGR EMERGE NCY BUS ic &4160-600V XFMR 0023 02 R23-S004 600V SWGR EMERGE NCY BUS ID &4160-600V XFMR N/A N/A H40185, H40179 H40185, H40178 H40185, H40179 H40185, H40178 CONTROL 130 CONTROL 130 TB/Tl SR CONTROL 130 CONTROL 130 TE/T1O SR TC/T1O SR 0024 01 R24-S009 600/208V N/A MCC 1A 0025 01 R24-S010 600/208V N/A MCC 1B H40159 INTAKE 111 H40159 INTAKE 111 S S Page 2 of 77 Page 4 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY 0026 01 R24-SO11 600V ESS N/A H42851, REACTOR 130 RH/R13 S DIV 1 H42848 MCC iC 0027 01 R24-S012 600VESS N/A H42841, REACTOR 130 RF/R02 S DIV 2 H42838 MCC 1B 0028 01 R24- 600V ESS N/A H42845 REACTOR 130 RL/R08 S S018A DIV 1 MCC 1E-A 0029 01 R24- 600V ESS N/A H42845 REACTOR 130 RL/R08 S S018B DIV 2 MCC 1E-B 0032 01 R24-S022 125/250V N/A H42838 REACTOR 130 RF/R02 S DC ESS DIV 2 MCC 1B 0033 01 R24-S025 600/208V N/A H40144 DIESEL 130 D/03 S ESS DIV 1 MCC 1A 0034 01 R24-S026 600/208V N/A H40145 DIESEL 130 E/03 SR ESS DIV B MCC 1B 0035 01 R24-S027 600/208V N/A H40146 DIESEL 130 F/03 S ESS DIV 2 MCC 1C 0036 14 R25-S001 125V DC N/A H40179 CONTROL 130 TE/T1l S DIV 1 CAB 1A 0037 14 R25-S002 125V DC N/A H40179 CONTROL 130 TE/T1l S DIV 2 CAB lB 0038 14 R25-S004 125V DC N/A H40268, DIESEL 130 D/02 S CAB ID H40144 0039 14 R25-S005 125V DC N/A H40268, DIESEL 130 E/02 S CAB lE H40145 0040 14 R25-S006 125V DC N/A H40268, DIESEL 130 F/02 S CAB iF H40146 0041 14 R25-S029 120/208V N/A H40268, DIESEL 130 D/02 S AC CAB H40144 ii 0042 14 R25-S030 120/208V N/A H40268, DIESEL 130 E/02 S AC CAB H40145 1K Page 3 of 77 Page 5 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER 0043 CLASS 14 MARI(_N R25-S031 DESCRIPT DRAWIN 120/208V N/A AC CAB 1L LAYOUT_H40268, H40146 BUILDING ELEV DIESEL 130 ROOM F/02 EVAL TY S 0044 14 R25-S036 120/208V N/A AC ESS CAB IA 0045 14 R25-S037 120/208V N/A AC ESS CAB 1B 0047 14 R25-S064 120/208V N/A AC VITAL CAB 1A INSTR BUS 1A 0048 14 R25-S065 120/208V N/A AC CAB 1B INSTR BUS 1B 0049 14 R25-S105 125V DC N/A CAB 1D ESS DIV I 0050 14 R25-$106 125V DC N/A CAB 1E ESS DIV II H40179 CONTROL 130 H40178 CONTROL 130 H40179 CONTROL 130 H40179 CONTROL 130 H40178 CONTROL 130 H40178 CONTROL 130 H42848 REACTOR 130 TF/T1O S TD/TO S TG/Tl S TG/T12 S TE/T1l S TB/T10 S RF/R13 0056 0 R25-$125 120/208V N/A AC ESS DIV 1 CAB R25-S116 120/208V N/A AC ESS DIV 2 CAB 0057 0 H42841 REACTOR 130 RF/R02 0068 15 R42- 125/250V N/A S001A STATION BATTERY 1A 0069 15 R42- 125/250V N/A S001B STATION BATTERY 1B H40183, H13160 H40184, H13160 H40144, H40268 CONTROL 112 TE/Tl S CONTROL 112 TD/Tll S 0070 15 R42- 125V S002A DIESEL SYSTEM BATTERY IA N/A DIESEL 130 D/02 5 Page 4 of 77 Page 6 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ELEV ROOM EVALiTY 130 E/02 S NUMBER CLASS 0071 15 MARKN DESCRIPT R42- 125V S002B DIESEL SYSTEM BATTERY 2B DRAWIN LAYOUT BUILDING N/A H40145, DIESEL H40268 0072 15 R42- 125V S002C DIESEL SYSTEM BATTERY ic N/A H40146, H40268 DIESEL 130 0051 18 R25-SI10 120/208V N/A CAB IA (R25-S064)FUSE BOX 0052 18 R25-S111 120/208V N/A CAB IC (R25-S065)FUSE BOX 0053 18 R25-S112 120/208V N/A MCC-1A (R24-S025)FUSE BOX 0054 18 R25-S113 120/208V N/A MCC-1B (R24-S026)FUSE BOX H40179 CONTROL 130 H40179 CONTROL 130 H40144, DIESEL 130 H40268 F/02 S S S D/02 S H40145, H40268 DIESEL 130 E/02 S 0059 18 R26- 125V DC MO31A 600A THROWO VER SWITCH IA 0060 18 R26- 125V DC MO31B 600A THROWO VER SWITCH 1B 0061 18 R26- 125V DC M031C 600A THROWO VER SWITCH iC N/A H40179 CONTROL 130 TE/Tl S N/A H40179 CONTROL 130 TE/Tll S N/A H40178 CONTROL 130 TB/T11 S Page 5 of 77 Page 7 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER 0062 CLASS MARK N DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY TB/Tl1 S 18 R26- 125V DC MO31D 600A THROWO VER SWITCH 1D N/A H40178 CONTROL 130 0063 18 R26- 125V DC M032A THROWO VER SWITCH 1E 0064 18 R26- 125V DC M032B THROWO VER SWITCH IF 0065 18 R26- 125V DC M032C THROWO VER SWITCH iG 0066 18 R26- 600V M077 BREAKER N/A H40268 DIESEL 130 D/02 S N/A N/A N/A N/A H40268 DIESEL 130 E/02 S H40268 DIESEL 130 F/02 S H40186 CONTROL 147 H40186 CONTROL 147 0067 18 R26- 600V M078 BREAKER 0055 18 R25-5114 120/208V N/A MCC-1C (R24-S027)FUSE BOX H40146, H40268 DIESEL 130 TH/T14 S TH/T14 S F/02 S TE/Tll S 0073 15 R42-S026 125V BATTERY CHARGER 1A 0074 16 R42-S027 125V BATTERY CHARGER 1B 0076 16 R42-S029 125V BATTERY CHARGER 1D 0077 16 R42-S030 125V BATTERY CHARGER 1E N/A H40179 CONTROL 130 N/A H40179 CONTROL 130 TE/Tl S N/A H40178 CONTROL 130 TB/T11 S N/A H40178 CONTROL 130 TB/T11 S Page 6 of 77 Page 8 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN 0079 16 R42-S032A DESCRIPT 125V BATTERY CHARGER 1G DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING N/A H40144, DIESEL H40268 ELEV ROOM 130 D/02 EVALTY S 0080 16 R42- 125V S032B BATTERY CHARGER 1H 0081 16 R42- 125V S032C BATTERY CHARGER ii 0099 17 R43- DIESEL SO01A GENERAT OR lA 0100 17 R43- DIESEL SO01B GENERAT OR lB 0101 17 R43- DIESEL SO01C GENERAT OR 1C 0085 16 R44-S002 DC/AC INVERTER FOR MCC 1E-A 0086 16 R44-S003 DC/AC INVERTER FOR MCC 1E-B N/A H40145, H40268 H40146, H40268 DIESEL 130 E/02 S N/A DIESEL 130 F/02 S N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A H40144 DIESEL 130 H40145 DIESEL 130 H40146 DIESEL 130 H40186 CONTROL 147 H40186 CONTROL 147 H40145 DIESEL 130 C/02 SR D/02 SR E/02 SR TI/T14 S TH/T14 S E/03 S 0088 04 S11-S009 4160/600 N/A V STA SERV XFMR iF1 0089 18 TB1-211 125V DC BATTERY 1A FUSE BOX 0090 18 TB1-212 125V DC BATTERY 1B FUSE BOX 0091 18 TB1-213 125V DC BATTERY 1C FUSE BOX N/A H40268 DIESEL 130 D/02 5 N/A N/A H40268 DIESEL 130 H40268 DIESEL 130 E/02 S F/02 S Page 7 of 77 Page 9 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER 0092 CLASS 18 MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY TF/Tll S H21-P285 125/250V N/A STATION BATT 1A FUSE BOX H40184 CONTROL 112 0093 18 H21-P286 125/250V N/A STATION BATT IA FUSE BOX 0094 18 H21-P287 125/250V N/A STATION BATT IA FUSE BOX 0095 18 H21-P288 125/250V N/A STATION BATT 1B FUSE BOX 0096 18 H21-P289 125/250V N/A STATION BATT 1B FUSE BOX 0097 18 H21-P290 125/250V N/A STATION BATT 1B FUSE BOX H40183 CONTROL 112 H40184 CONTROL 112 H40183 CONTROL 112 H40183 CONTROL 112 H40183 CONTROL 112 H42845 REACTOR 130 TE/TIl S TF/T11 S TC/T11 S TE/Tl S TD/T10 S RL/R09 S RG/R01 S RL/R02 S RL/RO1 SR RL/RO1 SR 0107 01 R27-S005 LOCAL STARTER FOR Ell-FO17A 0109 05 E41-CO01 HPCI PUMP 0110 05 E41-C002 HPCI TURBINE 0111 05 E41- HPCI C002-3 LUBE OIL PUMP 0112 08A E41-FOO1 HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VLV N/A H16333 H16131 REACTOR 087 H16333 H40269 REACTOR 087 N/A H40269 REACTOR 087 H16332 1H40269 REACTOR 087 0113 08A E41-F002 STEAM SUPPLY INBOARD H16332 H16264 REACTOR 130 RH/R07 R ISOLATIO N Page 8 of 77 Page 10 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN 0114 08A E41-F003 DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY STEAM H16332 H42039 REACTOR 130 RH/R07 R SUPPLY OUTBOA RD ISOLATIO N 0115 08A 0116 08A 0117 08A 0118 08A E41-FO04 HPCI PUMP SUCT FROM CST E41-FO06 HPCI PUMP INBO DISCH VLV E41-FO07 HPCI PUMP OUTBD DISCH VLV E41-FO08 BYPASS TEST VALVE TO CST E41-F012 HPCI MIN FLOW BYPASS VLV E41-F026 BAR COND &LUBE OIL COOLER DRN E41-F035 HPCI PCV FOR BAR COND &OIL COOL H16332 H40269 REACTOR 087 H16332 H40202 REACTOR 087 H16332 H40269 REACTOR 087 RH/R02 R H16332 H40269 REACTOR 087 RH/RO1 SR RA/R07 SR RH/R02 R 0119 08A H16332 H40269 REACTOR 087 RH/R02 SR 0120 08A H16333 H16134 REACTOR 087 RG/RO1 R 0121 0 H16333 H16134 REACTOR 087 RH/R02 0122 08 E41-F041 HPCI PUMP SUCT FROM SUPP POOL H16332 H40269 REACTOR 087 RH/RO1 SR Page 9 of 77 Page 11 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT 0123 08A E41-F042 HPCI PUMP SUCT FROM SUPP POOL 0124 07 E41-F051 SUPP POOL SUCT ISOL VLV DRAWIN H16332 LAYOUT BUILDING ELEV H40269 REACTOR 087 ROOM RH/R02 EVAL TY SR H16332 H16131 REACTOR 087 RF/R02 R 0125 08A 0126 08B E41-F059 BAR COND COOLING WATER VLV E41-F124 HPCI REMOTE MANUAL TRIP SOLENOI D H16333 H40269 REACTOR 087 H16333 H40207 REACTOR 087 RL/R02 SR RL/R02 BOX 0127 07 E41- HPCI F3052 TURBINE CONTROL VALVE 0128 07 E41- HPCI F3053 TURBINE STOP VALVE H16333 H16264 REACTOR 087 H16333 H16264 REACTOR 087 RL/R02 BOX RL/R02 BOX 0129 18 E41-K600 TRANSMI H16332 TTE R POWER SUPPLY H11-P612 0130 18 E41-K601 DISCH. H16332 FLOW SQ.ROOT CONVERT ER 0131 18 E41-K603 DC/AC H16332 INVERTER 0132 01 E41-K615 HPCI H16332 DISCHAR GE CONTROL LER H16249 CONTROL 164 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16249 CONTROL 164 H11-P612 H11-P612 H11-P612 H11-P612 Page 10 of 77 Page 12 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT-- BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY H11-P612 0133 18 E41-K616 HPCI DISCHAR GE CONTROL LER AMP H16332 H16249 CONTROL 164 0134 18 E41-NO02 CST LOW LEVEL SWITCH 0135 18 E41-NO03 CST LOW LEVEL SWITCH 0136 0 E41-NO07 HPCI SYSTEM FLOW ELEMENT 0137 18 E41-NO08 HPCI FLOW TRANSMI TTER H21-P414A 0138 18 E41-NO50 HPCI PRESS TRANSMI TTER H21-P414B 0139 18 E41-NO51 HI/LOW FLOW TRANSMI TTER H21-P414A 0140 18 E41- SUPP N062B POOL HIGH LEVEL TRANSMI-TEER 0141 18 E41- SUPP N062D POOL HIGH LEVEL TRANSMI TTER H16332 H16332 H40267 CST 130 H40267 CST 130 B/03 D/02 RG/RO1 H21-P414A H16332 H16131 REACTOR 087 H16332 H16131 REACTOR 087 H16332 H16131 REACTOR 087 H21-P414B H16332 H16131 REACTOR 087 H21-P414A H21-P414B H16332 H16240 REACTOR 118 H16332 H16240 REACTOR 118 H21-P434 Page 11 of 77 Page 13 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN 0142 18 E41-N074 HPCI H16333 STOP VLV POS.SWITCH E41-C002 LAYOUT H16131 BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY REACTOR 087 H21-P414A 0143 18 E41-N650 DISCH H16332 PRESS IND.SWITCH 0144 18 E41-N651 FLOW DP H16332 INDICATI NG SWITCH 0145 18 E41- SUPP H16332 N662B POOL HI LEVEL IND.SWITCH 0146 18 E41- SUPP H16332 N662D POOL HI LEVEL IND.SWITCH H16249 CONTROL 164 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16249 CONTROL 164 H11-P926 R H11-P926 R H21-P414B H21-P414B R R 0147 18 E41-R612 HPCI FLOW CONTROL LER H16332 H16332 Hll-P601 R Hll-P601 R 0148 18 E41-R613 HPCI FLOW INDICATO R 0149 18 E41-N053 LOW SUCT PRESS TRANSMI TTER 0150 18 E41- TURB N055A EXH VENT PRESS TRANSMI TTER 0151 18 E41- TURB N055B EXH VENT PRESS TRANSMI TTER H16332 H16240 REACTOR 087 H21-P414B H16333 H16240 REACTOR 087 H16333 H16240 REACTOR 087 H21-P434 H21-P414A Page 12 of 77 Page 14 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN 0152 18 E41-N055C DESCRIPT TURB EXH VENT PRESS TRANSMI TTER DRAWIN H16333 LAYOUT-H16240 BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY H21-P434 REACTOR 087 0153 18 E41- TURB N055D EXH VENT PRESS TRANSMI TTER 0154 18 E41- TURB N056B EXH PRESS TRANSMI TTER 0155 18 E41- TURB N056D EXH PRESS TRANSMI TTER 0156 18 E41- STEAM N057A LINE HIGH DP TRANS 0157 18 E41- STEAM N057B LINE HIGH DP TRANS 0158 18 E41- STM HDR N058A LOW PRESS TRANS 0159 18 E41- STM HDR N058B LOW PRESS TRANS 0160 18 E41- STM HDR N058C LOW PRESS TRANS 0161 18 E41- STM HDR N058D LOW PRESS TRANS H16333 H16240 REACTOR 087 H16333 H16240 REACTOR 087 H16333 H16240 REACTOR 087 H16332 H16332 H16332 H16332 H16332 H16332 H16026 REACTOR 130 H16241 REACTOR 130 H16241 REACTOR 130 H16241 REACTOR 130 H16241 REACTOR 130 H16241 REACTOR 130 H21-P414A H21-P414B H21-P414B H21-P016 H21-P036 H21-P016 H21-P036 H21-P016 H21-P036 Page 13 of 77 Page 15 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT 0166 18 E41-N653 LOW SUCT PRESS IND.SWITCH 0167 18 E41- EXH N655A VENT PRESS IND.SWITCH 0168 18 E41- EXH N655B VENT PRESS IND.SWITCH 0169 18 E41- EXH N655C VENT PRESS IND.SWITCH 0170 18 E41- EXH N655D VENT PRESS IND.SWITCH 0171 18 E41- TURB N656B EXH PRESS IND.SWITCH 0172 18 E41- TURB N656D EXH PRESS IND.SWITCH 0173 18 E41- STM N657A LINE HIGH DP IND SWITCH 0174 18 E41- STM N657B LINE HIGH DP IND SWITCH DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV H16332 H16249 CONTROL 164 ROOM EVALTY H11-P926 R H16333 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16333 H16249 CONTROL 164 H11-P925 R H11-P926 R H16333 H16249 CONTROL 164 H11-P925 R H16333 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16333 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16333 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16332 H16249 CONTROL 164 H11-P926 R H11-P926 R H11-P926 R H11-P925 R H16332 H16249 CONTROL 164 H11-P926 R Page 14 of 77 Page 16 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS 0175 18 MARKN DESCRIPT E41- STM N658A LINE LOW PRESS IND SWITCH DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV H16332 H16249 CONTROL 164 ROOM EVALTY H11-P925 R 0176 18 E41- STM N658B LINE LOW PRESS IND SWITCH 0177 18 E41- STM N658C LINE LOW PRESS IND SWITCH 0178 18 E41- STM N658D LINE LOW PRESS IND SWITCH H16332 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16332 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16332 H16249 CONTROL 164 H11-P926 R Hll-P925 R Hll-P926 R 0179 18 E41- STM N660A LINE HIGH DP IND SWITCH H16332 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16332 H16249 CONTROL 164 H11-P925 R Hll-P926 R 0180 18 E41- STM N660B LINE HIGH DP IND SWITCH 0289 21 Ell- RHR B001A HEAT EXCHANG ERA 0290 06 Ell- RHR CO01A SERVICE WATER PUMP 1A 0292 06 Ell- RHR CO02A PUMP 2A H16330 H16115 REACTOR 087 RL/R13 D11004 H40146 INTAKE 111 SR H16330 H16113 REACTOR 087 H40210 REACTOR 087 RL/R11 SR RH/R13 R 0293 08A Ell- RHR HX H16330 FOO3A A DISCH VALVE Page 15 of 77 Page 17 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS 0294 08A 0295 08A 0297 08A 0299 08A MARKN DESCRIPT Ell- RHR FOO4A PUMP 2A SUCTION VALVE Ell- RHR SDC FOO6A SUCT ISOL VALVE Eli- RHR SDC FO06C SUCT ISOL VALVE Ell- RHR FOO7A PUMP 2A & 2C MIN FLOW BYPASS VLV Ell-FO10 RHRHX HDR BYPASS VALVE Eli- RHR HX FOllA A DRN TO SUPP POOL VLV Eli- RHR LPCI FO5A DISCHAR GE VALVE DRAWIN H16330 H16330 H40211 REACTOR 087 RH/Rll R LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY H40212 REACTOR 087 RH/R13 R H16330 H40210 REACTOR 087 RL/Rll R RL/Rl1 H16330 H40212 REACTOR 087 0302 08A H16330 H16115 REACTOR 087 RL/R07 R 0303 08A H16330 H40209 REACTOR 087 RH/R1 R 0304 08A 0305 08A 0306 08A 0307 08A H16330 Ell- CONTAIN H16330 FO16A MENT SPRAY DISCH VALVE Ell- RHR LPCI H16330 F017A DISCHAR GE VALVE Ell- RHR HX H16330 F026A ATO RCIC VALVE H40164 REACTOR 130 H40170 REACTOR 158 H40164 REACTOR 130 H16115 REACTOR 087 RJ/R08 SR RH/R08 R RJ/R08 RJ/Rll R Page 16 of 77 Page 18 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN S0308 08A ElI-F028A DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY RH/R09 R RHR INLET TO SUPP POOL VLV H16330 H40203 REACTOR 087 0309 08A 0310 08A 0311 08A 0312 08A 0313 08A Ell- RHR HX F047A A INLET VALVE Ell- RHR HX F048A A BYPASS VALVE Ell- RHR HX F068A A TUBE TO SHELL OUTLET Ell- RHR HX F073A A SERV WATER DISCH VALVE Ell- HPCI F091A DISCH TO RHR HX A VLV Ell- RHR HX F104A A VENT VALVE Ell- RHR HX F119A A BYPASS VALVE H16330 H40210 REACTOR 087 H16330 H40210 REACTOR 087 RL/R13 R RL/R13 H16330 H40210 REACTOR 087 H16330 H16115 REACTOR 087 RH/RI3 SR RL/R07 R RH/R11 R H16330 H40203 REACTOR 087 0314 08A 0315 08A H16330 H16330 H40209 REACTOR 087 H40203 REACTOR 087 RH/R13 R RL/R07 R 0316 18 Ell- RHR HDR K600A FLOW SQUARE ROOT CONV 0317 18 Ell- RHR HX N002A ATUBE TO SHELL DP TRANS H16330 H16249 CONTROL 164 Hl1-P613 H16330 H16025 REACTOR 087 H21-P018 S Page 17 of 77 Page 19 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN 0318 0 Ell- RHRSW H16330 NOO6A PUMP A& C DISCH FLOW ELEM 0319 18 Eli- RHRSW H16330 N007A HXA FLOW TRANSMI TTER LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY H16115 REACTOR 087 H16025 REACTOR 087 RH/RIO H21-PO18 S RH/R09 0320 0 Ell- RHR NO14A PUMP A&C DISCH FLOW ELEMENT H16330 H16115 REACTOR 087 0321 18 Ell- RHR HX H16330 N015A A DISCH HDR FLOW TRANS 0322 18 Ell- RHR HX H16330 NO17A A INLET PRESSUR E SWITCH 0323 18 Ell- RHR HX H16330 N017C A INLET PRESSUR E SWITCH 0324 18 Ell- RHR H16330 N082A PUMP A&C FLOW DP TRANS 0325 18 Ell- RHR H16330 N682A PUMP A& C FLOW DP TRIP UNIT 0326 18 Ell- RHR HX H16330 R600A A TUBE TO SHELL DP PI CONT H16240 REACTOR 087 H21-PO18 H16115 REACTOR 087 H16115 REACTOR 087 H16240 REACTOR 087 H16240 CONTROL 164 RH/R13 S RH/R13 S RL/RIO S Hll-P925 H11-P613 H16249 CONTROL 164 Page 18 of 77 Page 20 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS 0327 20 MARKN Ell-R602A DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM H16330 H16249 CONTROL 164 Hll-P601 EVALTY RHRSW HXA INLET FI 0328 20 Ell- RHR HX R603A A DISCH HDR FLOW IND 0329 18 Ell- RHR HX S600A A TUBE TO SHELL POS MOD H16330 H16249 CONTROL 164 HlI-P601 H16330 H16249 CONTROL 164 H1--P613 0330 08B Ell- RHR F079A PROCESS SAMPLE VALVE H16330 H16118 REACTOR 087 RL/R13 R 0331 06 Ell- RHR C002A PUMP 2A H16330 H16113 REACTOR 087 0332 08A 0333 08A 0334 08A 0335 08A Ell- RHR HX F003A A DISCH VALVE Ell- RHR FO04A PUMP 2A SUCTION VALVE Eli- RHRSDC F006A SUCT ISOL VALVE Ell- RHR FO07A PUMP 2A & 2C MIN FLOW BYPASS VLV Ell-FO10 RHR HX HDR BYPASS VALVE Ell- RHR HX FOllA A DRN TO SUPP POOL VLV H16330 H16330 H40212 REACTOR 087 H40210 REACTOR 087 H16330 H40211 REACTOR 087 RH/R11 RH/R13 RH/R13 RH/Ri1 H16330 H40212 REACTOR 087 RL/Rll SR 0336 08A 0337 08A H16330 H16115 REACTOR 087 H16330 H40209 REACTOR 087 RL/R07 RH/Rll Page 19 of 77 Page 21 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS 0338 08A MARK N Eli-F015A DESCRIPT DRAWIN RHR LPCI H16330 DISCHAR GE VALVE LAYOUT BUILDING ELEV ROOM H40164 REACTOR 130 RJ/RO8 EVALTY 0339 08A Eli- CONTAIN H16330 FO16A MENT SPRAY DISCH VALVE Eli- RHR LPCI H16330 FO17A DISCHAR GE VALVE H40170 REACTOR 158 RH/R08 0340 08A 0341 08A 0342 08A H40164 REACTOR 130 H16115 REACTOR 087 RJ/R08 SR Eli- RHR HX F026A ATO RCIC VALVE Ell- RHR F028A INLET TO SUPP POOL VLV Ell- RHR HX F047A A INLET VALVE Eli- RHR HX F048A A BYPASS VALVE H16330 RJ/Rll RH/R09 H16330 H40203 REACTOR 087 0343 08A H16330 H40210 REACTOR 087 RL/Ri3 0344 08A H16330 H40210 REACTOR 087 RL/R13 SR 0301 07 Ell- RHR F065A PUMP 2A SUPP POOL SUCT VALVE H16330 H40203 REACTOR 087 RH/Rul 0346 08A 0347 08A Eli- HPCI FO91A DISCH TO RHR HX A VLV Ell- RHR HX F1O4A A VENT VALVE H16330 H40203 REACTOR 087 RH/Rll RH/Ri3 Hll-P613 H16330 H16330 H40209 REACTOR 087 H16249 CONTROL 164 0348 18 Eli- RHR HDR K600A FLOW SQUARE ROOT CONV Page 20 of 77 Page 22 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY RH/R09 0349 0 Eli- RHR N014A PUMP A& C DISCH FLOW ELEMENT H16330 H16115 REACTOR 087 0350 18 Ell- RHR HX NO15A A DISCH HDR FLOW TRANS 0351 18 Ell- RHR N082A PUMP A& C FLOW DP TRANS 0352 18 Ell- RHR N682A PUMP A& C FLOW DP TRIP UNIT 0353 20 Ell- RHR HX R603A A DISCH HDR FLOW IND 0354 21 Ell- RHR BOOlA HEAT EXCHANG ERA H16330 H16240 REACTOR 087 H21-PO18 RL/R1O H16330 H16240 REACTOR 087 H16330 CONTROL 164 Hl1-P925 H16330 H16249 CONTROL 164 Hl1-P601 H16330 H16115 REACTOR 087 RL/R13 S 0355 08B Eli- RHR F079A PROCESS SAMPLE VALVE H16330 H16118 REACTOR 087 RL/R13 0356 21 Ell- RHR BOO1B HEAT EXCHANG ER B 0357 06 Ell- RHR CO01D SERVICE WATER PUMP 1D 0358 06 Ell- RHR CO02D PUMP 2D H16329 H16114 REACTOR 087 RL/R03 S D11004 11142 INTAKE 111 SR H16329 H16113 REACTOR 087 RL/R02 SR Page 21 of 77 Page 23 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER 0359 CLASS 08A MARKN Ell-F003B DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT BUILDING ELEV RHR HX H16329 H16115 REACTOR 087 B DISCHAR GE VALVE ROOM EVAL TY RJ/R03 R 0360 08A 0361 08A 0362 08A 0363 08A 0364 08A Ell- RHR F004D PUMP 2D SUCTION VALVE Ell- RHRSDC FOO6D SUCT ISOL VALVE Ell- RHR FOO7B PUMP 2B & 2D MIN FLOW BYPASS VLV Ell-F010 RHR HX HDR BYPASS VALVE Ell- RHR HX FOlB B DRAIN TO SUPP POOL Ell- CONTAIN FO16B MENT SPRAY DISCH VALVE Ell- RHR F024B TEST LINE TORUS ISO Ell- RHR HX F026B BTO RCIC VALVE Ell- SUPP F027B POOL SPRAY VALVE H16329 H16329 H16113 REACTOR 087 H16329 H16113 REACTOR 087 RL/R03 SR H16115 REACTOR 087 H16330 H16115 REACTOR 087 H16329 H16118 REACTOR 087 RL/R07 RL/R03 R RH/R08 R RL/R03 R RL/R03 0365 08A H16329 H16116 REACTOR 158 0366 08A H16329 H16115 REACTOR 087 RL/R05 SR 0367 08A H16329 H16115 REACTOR 087 RJ/R03 R 0368 08A H16329 H16115 REACTOR 087 RL/R05 R Page 22 of 77 Page 24 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARK N DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV 0 0369 ROOM EVALTY RL/R05 SR 08A 0370 08A Ell- RHR F028B INLET TO SUPP POOL VALVE Ell- RHR HX F047B B TO INLET VALVE Ell- RHR HX F048B B BYPASS VALVE Ell-F049 RHR RADWAS TE DISCH ISOL VALVE H16329 H16329 H16115 REACTOR 087 H16115 REACTOR 087 RJ/R02 R 0371 08A 0372 08A H16329 H16115 REACTOR 087 RJ/R02 SR RL/R05 R H16329 H16115 REACTOR 087 0373 07 Ell- RHR FO65D PUMP 2D SUPP POOL SUCT VLV H16329 H16113 REACTOR 087 RL/R07 R 0374 08A 0375 08A 0376 08A Ell- RHR HX F068B B TUBE TO SHELL OUTLET Ell- RHR HX F073B B SERVICE WATER DISCH Ell- HPCI F091B DISCH TO HX B VALVE Ell- RHR HX F1O4B B VENT VALVE Ell- RHR HX F119B B BYPASS VALVE H16329 H16118 REACTOR 087 RH/R02 SR H16329 H16115 REACTOR 087 RL/R07 R RH/R03 R H16329 H16262 REACTOR 087 0377 08A 0378 08A H16329 H16118 REACTOR 087 RJ/R02 R RL/R07 R H16329 H16329 H16115 REACTOR 087 H16249 CONTROL 164 0379 18 Ell- RHRHDR K600B FLOW SQUARE ROOT CONV Hll-P612 Page 23 of 77 Page 25 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER 0380 CLASS 18 MARKN Ell-N002B DESCRIPT RHR HX B TUBE TO SHELL DP TRANS DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVAL TY H16329 H16118 REACTOR 087 H21-P021 S 0381 0 Ell- RHRSW NOO6B PUMP B&D DISCH FLOW ELEM 0382 18 Ell- RHRSW NOO7B HX B FLOW TRANSMI TTER 0383 0 Ell- RHR NO14B PUMP B&D DISCH FLOW ELEMENT 0384 18 Ell- RHR HX NO15B B DISCH HDR FLOW TRANS 0385 18 Ell- RHR HX NO17B B INLET PRESSUR E SWITCH 0386 18 Ell- RHR HX NO17D B INLET.PRESSUR E SWITCH 0387 18 Ell- RHR N082B PUMP 2B&2D FLOW DP TRAN 0388 18 Ell- RHR N682B PUMP 2B & 2D FLOW DP TRIP UNIT H16329 H16115 REACTOR 087 H16329 H16025 REACTOR 087 H16329 H16115 REACTOR 087 H16329 H16115 REACTOR 087 H16329 H16115 REACTOR 087 H16329 H16115 REACTOR 087 H16329 H16240 REACTOR 087 H16329 H16249 CONTROL 164 RH/R07 RL/R03 S RH/R05 H21-P021 RL/R02 S RL/R02 S RL/R05 S Hl-P926 Page 24 of 77 Page 26 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS 0389 18 MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY H16249 CONTROL 164 H11-P613 Ell- RHR HX R600B B TUBE TO SHELL DP CONT H16329 0390 20 Ell- RHRSW H16329 R602B HX B INLET FI 0391 20 Ell- RHR HX H16329 R603B B DISCH HDR FLOW IND 0392 18 Ell- RHR HX H16329 S600B B TUBE TO SHELL POS MOD H16249 CONTROL 164 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16249 CONTROL 164 Hl1-P601 H11-P601 Hll-P612 0393 08A Ell- RHR LPCI H16329 FO15B DISCHAR GE VALVE H16116 REACTOR 130 0394 06 E21- CORE CO01B SPRAY PUMP B H16331 H16121 REACTOR 087 RH/R06 R RL/R02 SR RH/R02 R RF/R04 R 0395 08A E21- TORUS H16331 FOO1B SUCTION VALVE H16121 REACTOR 087 0396 08A 0397 08A E21- CORE FO04B SPRAY OUTBOA RD VALVE E21- CORE F005B SPRAY INLET VALVE E21- CORE F015B SPRAY TEST BYPASS VALVE H16331 H16123 REACTOR 158 H16331 H16123 REACTOR 158 RF/R04 SR 0398 08A H16331 H16121 REACTOR 123 RL/R02 R 0399 07 E21- TORUS FO19B SUCTION VALVE 0400 08A E21- MINIMU FO31B M FLOW BYPASS VALVE H16331 H16121 REACTOR 087 RJ/R03 R RL/R02 SR H16331 H16121 REACTOR 087 Page 25 of 77 Page 27 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER 0401 CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT 0 E21- CORE NOO2B SPRAY FLOW ELEMENT DRAWIN H16331 LAYOUT_H16121 BUILDING REACTOR ELEV 087 ROOM EVALTY RL/R02 0402 18 E21- CORE NOO3B SPRAY FLOW TRANSMI TTER 0403 18 E21- CORE NO51B SPRAY FLOW TRANSMI TTER 0404 18 E21- CORE N651B SPRAY FLOW TRIP UNIT 0405 20 E21- CORE R601B SPRAY FLOW INDICATO R H16331 H16121 REACTOR 087 H21-P019 H16331 H16331 REACTOR 087 CONTROL 164 RL/R02 S H11-P928 H11-P601 H16331 H16249 CONTROL 164 0406 06 P41- PLANT C001A SERVICE WATER PUMP 1A DllO01 H11142 INTAKE 111 SR 0407 07 P41- RHR H16011 H16094 REACTOR 087 F037A PUMP COOLER 2A INLET VALVE 0408 07 P41- RHR/CS H16011 H16094 REACTOR 087 F039A ROOM COOLER 2A VALVE 0410 07 P41-F067 PSW H16011 H16094 REACTOR 124 INLET VALVE RL/R13 SR RL/Rll SR RL/R07 R 0411 08 P41- PSW F303A VALVE 0412 08 P41- PSW F310A TURBINE BLDG ISOL VALVE H11024 H11340 YARD H11600 H11146 YARD R SR Page 26 of 77 Page 28 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 I* NUMBER CLASS 0413 08 MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY P41-F312 PSW D11001 H11142 INTAKE 098 RETURN LINE ISOL VALVE 0414 08A 0415 08A P41- PSW F313A STRAINER A ISOL VALVE P41- DIV. I F317A PSW TO DIESEL 1A & 1B D11001 H11142 INTAKE 094 H11600 H11146 YARD R R 0416 08A 0417 08A 0418 08A 0419 08A P41- PSW RX H11600 F380A BLDG.ISOL VALVE P41- PSW 1B H11600 F4O1A DIESEL ISOL VALVE P41- PSW 1B H11600 F402B DIESEL ISOL VALVE P41- PSW 1A H11600 F403A DIESEL ISOL VALVE H11146 YARD H11204 DIESEL H11204 DIESEL H11204 DIESEL R 140 140 140 D/01 R D/01 R C/01 R 0420 18 P41- PSW N200A STRAINER DP SWITCH D11001 H11258 INTAKE 087 S 0424 10 T41- RHR/CS H16011 BOO2A PUMP ROOM COOLER 0426 06 P41- PLANT D11001 CO01B SERVICE WATER PUMP 1B H40210 REACTOR 087 RL/R11 SR H11142 INTAKE 111 SR 0428 07 P41- RHR/CS H16011 H16094 REACTOR 087 F036B ROOM COOLER INLET VALVE RL/R03 SR Page 27 of 77 Page 29 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER 0429 CLASS 07 MARK N DESCRIPT P41- RHR F037D PUMP COOLER 2D INLET VALVE DRAWIN LAYOUT H16011 H16094 BUILDING ELEV REACTOR 087 ROOM RL/R03 EVALTY SR 0430 07 P41-F066 PSW INLET VALVE 0431 08A 0432 08A 0433 08A 0434 08A 0435 08A P41- PSW F310B TURBINE BLDG ISOL VALVE P41- PSW F313B STRAINER B ISOL VALVE P41- DIV. II F317B PSW TO DIESEL 1B & 1C P41- PSW RX F380B BLDG.ISOL VALVE P41- PSW iC F4O1B DIESEL ISOL VALVE H16011 H16094 REACTOR 124 H11600 H11146 YARD D11001 H11142 INTAKE 094 H11600 H11146 YARD H11600 H11146 YARD RL/R07 R SR R R R H11600 H11204 DIESEL 140 E/01 R 0436 18 P41- PSW N200B STRAINER DP SWITCH Dl1001 H11258 INTAKE 087 S 0437 10 T41- RHR/CS H16011 BOO3B PUMP ROOM COOLER H40207 REACTOR 087 RL/R03 SR 0439 06 2P41- PSW C002 STANDBY PUMP 1B DIESEL 0440 07 2P41- PSW F340 ISOL VALVE TO lB DIESEL H21033 H40159 INTAKE 111 SR H11600 H21102 DIESEL 138 D/01 SR Page 28 of 77 Page 30 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ELEV ROOM EVALTY NUMBER 0441 CLASS 08A 0442 08A 0443 08A 0444 08A 0445 0 MARKN DESCRIPT P41- PSW F303A VALVE P41-F312 PSW RETURN LINE ISOL VALVE P41- PSW 1B F402A DIESEL ISOL VALVE P41- PSW 1B F403B DIESEL ISOL VALVE B21- AIR A003A ACCUM FOR RELIEF VALVE A B21- AIR A003B ACCUM FOR RELIEF VALVE B B21- AIR A003C ACCUM FOR RELIEF VALVE C B21- AIR A003E ACCUM FOR RELIEF VALVE E Dl1001 H11142 INTAKE 098 DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING H11024 H11340 YARD H11600 H11204 DIESEL 140 D/01 R H11600 H11204 DIESEL 140 H16299 H16287 DRYWELL 148 SR D/01 R AZ043 S 0446 0 H16299 H16287 DRYWELL 148 AZ077 S 0447 0 0449 0 H16299 H16287 DRYWELL 148 H16299 H16287 DRYWELL 148 AZ073 S AZ088 S 0450 07 P70- DW FOOA PNEUMA TIC NITROGE N SUPPLY VALVE H16286 H16288 REACTOR 087 RA/R02 SR 0451 08A P70-F004 DW PNEUMA TIC HIGH FLOW ISOL VALVE H16286 H16288 REACTOR 145 RA/R06 R Page 29 of 77 Page 31 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER 0452 CLASS 08A MARKN P70-FOOS DESCRIPT DRAWIN DW H16286 PNEUMA TIC HIGH FLOW ISOL VALVE LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV H16288 REACTOR 145 ROOM RA/R06 EVALTY R 0453 0 P70-N021 DRYWELL H16286 H16977 REACTOR 142 RA/R06 PNEUMA TIC FLOW ELEMENT 0454 18 P70-N022A DRYWELL H16286 H17273 REACTOR 130 PNEUMA TIC FLOW TRANS DRYWELL H16286 H17273 REACTOR 130 RA/R06 S 0455 18 P70-N022B RA/R06 S PNEUMA TIC FLOW TRANS.0456 21 T48-AO01 UNIT 1 NITROGE N STORAGE TANK H16000 H16147 YARD H16000 H40165 REACTOR 130 S RE/1113 R 0457 08A 0458 0 0460 08A 0462 08B T48- UNIT 2 F013A ISOLATIO N VALVE T48-F111 NITROGE N HEADER ISOLATIO N VALVE B31- RECIRC F023A PUMP CO01A SUCTION VALVE Cll- SDV F009A VENT &DRAIN PILOT VALVE H16000 H16148 REACTOR 130 RB/R09 H16066 H16025 DRYWELL 117 RF/R07 SR RA/R05 SR H16065 H17664 REACTOR 130 Page 30 of 77 Page 32 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS 0463 07 0464 07 0465 0466 07 08B 0467 08B 0468 0469.0470 0471 0 07 07 08B MARK N DESCRIPT Cli- SDV F010A VENT VALVE Cli- SDV FOOB VENT VALVE C11-F011 SDV DRAIN VALVE Cli- PILOT D001-117 SCRAM SOLENOI D Cll- PILOT D001-118 SCRAM SOLENOI D Cli- SCRAM D001-125 ACCUMU LATOR Cll- SCRAM D001-126 INLET VALVE Cll- SCRAM D001-127 OUTLET VALVE Cll- ROD D001-120 POSITION CONTROL VALVE Cll- ROD D001-121 POSITION CONTROL VALVE Cli- ROD D001-122 POSITION CONTROL VALVE Cli- ROD D001-123 POSITION CONTROL VALVE DRAWIN H16065 H16065 H16065 H16064 LAYOUT H17273 H17273 H17275 S17945 REACTOR REACTOR BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVAL TY 130 130 REACTOR 130 REACTOR 130 RH/R12 S H16064 S17945 REACTOR 130 HCU SR RH/R03 RB/R03 HCU S S SR H16064 H16064 H16064 H16064 S17945 S17945 S17945 S17945 REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR 130 130 130 130 HCU HCU HCU HCU S S S 0472 08B 0473 08B 0474 08B H16064 S17945 REACTOR 130 H16064 S17945 REACTOR 130 H16064 S17945 REACTOR 130 HCU HCU HCU Page 31 of 77 Page 33 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER 0476 CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVAL -TY 20 C71-S3A MANUAL SCRAM SWITCH N/A N/A S18164 CONTROL 164 S18164 CONTROL 164 0477 20 C71-S3B MANUAL SCRAM SWITCH H11-P603 R H11-P603 R RA/R05 SR 0479 08B Cll- SDV FO40A VENT &DRAIN PILOT VALVE H16065 H16947 REACTOR 130 0480 07 Cll- SDV F035A VENT VALVE 0481 07 Cll- SDV F035B VENT VALVE 0482 07 Cll-F037 SDV DRAIN VALVE H16065 H17273 REACTOR 130 H16065 H17273 REACTOR 130 H16065 H17275 REACTOR 130 RH/R12 S RH/R12 S RB/R04 S HCU 0483 0 Cll- SCRAM H16064 S17945 REACTOR 130 D001-125 ACCUMU LATOR 0484 07 Cll- SCRAM D001-126 INLET VALVE 0485 07 Cll- SCRAM D001-127 OUTLET VALVE H16064 H16064 S17945 REACTOR 130 S17945 REACTOR 130 S17945 REACTOR 130 HCU HCU HCU 0486 08B Cll- ROD H16064 D001-120 POSITION CONTROL VALVE 0487 08B Cll- ROD D001-121 POSITION H16064 S17945 REACTOR 130 HCU CONTROL VALVE 0488 08B Cll- ROD H16064 D001-122 POSITION S17945 REACTOR 130 HCU CONTROL VALVE Page 32 of 77 Page 34 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN 0489 08B Cli- ROD H16064 D001-123 POSITION LAYOUT BUILDING ELEV S17945 REACTOR 130 ROOM EVALTY HCU CONTROL VALVE 0491 08B 0492 08B Cll- BACKUP F110A SCRAM VALVE Cll- BACKUP F110B SCRAM VALVE H16065 H16065 H17664 REACTOR 130 H17664 REACTOR 130 S18164 CONTROL 164 S18164 CONTROL 164 0493 20 C71-S3A MANUAL N/A SCRAM SWITCH 0494 20 C71-S3B MANUAL SCRAM SWITCH N/A 0507 16 R42-S051 BATTERY N/A CHARGER 1A 0509 16 R42-S052 BATTERY N/A CHARGER 1B 0510 16 R42-S053 BATTERY N/A CHARGER iC 0512 16 R42-S054 BATTERY N/A CHARGER 1D 0513 18 R26- 24 VDC M041A THROWO VER SW 1A 0514 18 R26- 24 VDC M041B THROWO VER SW 1B 0515 18 R26- 24 VDC M041C THROWO VER SW iC 0516 18 R26- 24 VDC M041D THROWO VER SW 1D N/A H13124, H13121 H13124, H13121 H13124, H13121 H13124, H13121 H13124, H13121 H13124, H13121 H13124, H13121 H13124, H13121 CONTROL 130 CONTROL 130 CONTROL 130 CONTROL 130 CONTROL 130 RA/R05 SR RA/R05 SR H11-P603 H11-P603 TG/T12 S TG/T12 S TG/T12 S TG/T12 S TG/T12 S N/A CONTROL 130 TG/T12 S N/A N/A CONTROL 130 CONTROL 130 TG/T12 S TG/T12 S Page 33 of 77 Page 35 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY TG/T12 S 0517 18 TB1-139 TERMINA N/A L BOX 0518 18 TB1-140 TERMINA N/A L BOX H13124, CONTROL 130 H13121 H13124, CONTROL 130 H13121 H13265 CONTROL 130 TG/T12 S TG/T12 S 0519 14 R25-SO15 24/48 VDC CABINET 1A 0520 14 R25-S016 24/48 VDC CABINET 1B N/A N/A H13264 CONTROL 130 TG/T12 S 0521 18 R26- DISCONN N/A M073 ECT SW FOR Cl-F040A 0522 18 R26- DISCONN N/A M074 ECTSW FOR Cl-F040B H13121 CONTROL 130 H13121 CONTROL 138 TG/T12 S TG/T12 S 0523 08B 0524 08B Cll- SDV F009B VENT &DRAIN PILOT VALVE Cll- SDV F040B VENT &DRAIN PILOT VALVE H16065 H17664 REACTOR 130 H16065 H16747 REACTOR 130 RA/R05 SR RA/R05 SR 0525 0 P70- EMERGE H16286 B18290 REACTOR 130 A002A NCY NITROGE N BOTTLE 0526 0 P70- EMERGE H16286 B18290 REACTOR 130 A002B NCY NITROGE N BOTTLE 0527 0 P70- EMERGE H16286 B18290 REACTOR 130 AO02C NCY NITROGE N BOTTLE 0528 0 P70-F084 EMERGE H16286 H16288 REACTOR 130 NCY NITROGE N ISOL VALVE RL/R09 S RL/R09 S RL/R09 S RL/R09 S Page 34 of 77 Page 36 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER 0529 CLASS MARK N 0 P70-F141 DESCRIPT DRAWIN EMERGE H16286 NCY NITROGE N ISOL VALVE LAYOUT_B18290 BUILDING ELEV REACTOR 130 ROOM RL/R09 EVAL__TY S 0530 0 B21- AIR A003F ACCUM FOR RELIEF VALVE F H16299 H16287 DRYWELL 148 AZ295 S 0531 0 0532 0 B21- AIR A003G ACCUM FOR RELIEF VALVE G B21- AIR A003H ACCUM FOR RELIEF VALVE H B21- AIR A003J ACCUM FOR RELIEF VALVEJ H16299 H16287 DRYWELL 148 AZ266 S H16299 H16287 DRYWELL 148 AZ331 S 0533 0 H16299 H16287 DRYWELL 148 AZ320 S 0535 20 T47-R611 DRYWELL H16007 H16331 CONTROL 164 H11-P657 COOLING TEMP RECORDE R 0536 20 T48-K620 TEMP SIGNAL R/V CONVERT ER H16395 H 16249 CONTROL 164 H11-P691 0537 19 T48- TORUS H16024 N009A WATER TEMP ELEMENT 0538 19 T48- TORUS H16024 N009C WATER TEMP ELEMENT 0539 18 T48- TORUS H16024 N010A WATER LEVEL TRANS H40202 REACTOR 087 H40201 REACTOR 087 H16240 REACTOR 087 RA/R07 RL/R07 RF/R13 S Page 35 of 77 Page 37 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER 0540 CLASS 20 MARK_N T48-R622A DESCRIPT TORUS WATER LEVEL IND DRAWIN H16024 LAYOUT_H16249 BUILDING ELEV CONTROL 164 ROOM EVALTY H11-P657 0541 20 T47-R612 DRYWELL H16007 H17680 CONTROL 164 H11-P654 R COOLING TEMP RECORDE R 0542 20 T47-K600 TEMP SIGNAL R/V CONVERT ER H16394 H16249 CONTROL 164 Hll-P691 0543 19 T48- TORUS H16024 NOO9B WATER TEMP ELEMENT 0544 19 T48- TORUS H16024 N009D WATER TEMP ELEMENT H40202 REACTOR 087 H40204 REACTOR 087 H40402 REACTOR 087 H16249 CONTROL 164 RF/R02 RF/R13 RF/R02 S H11-P654 0545 18 T48- TORUS NOOB WATER LEVEL TRANS H16024 H16024 0546 20 T48- TORUS R622B WATER LEVEL IND 0548 18 B21- SHROUD N085B LEVELLT 0549 18 B21- RPV NO90A LOW PRESSUR E PT 0550 18 B21- RPV NO91A LEVEL 2& I LT 0551 18 B21- RPV N095A LEVEL 3 LT 0565 20 B21- RPV N685B LEVEL 0 LIS H16063 H16241 REACTOR 130 H16063 H16243 REACTOR 158 H16063 H16243 REACTOR 158 H16063 H16243 REACTOR 158 H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 H21-P410 H21-P404A H21-P404A H21-P404B H11-P926 Page 36 of 77 Page 38 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVAL-TY 0566 20 B21- RPV H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 H11-P927 N690A PRESSUR E LOW PIS 0567 20 B21- RPV H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 Hll-P925 N691A LEVEL 1 LIS 0569 20 B21- RPV H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 H11-P925 N693C LEVEL 8 LS 0570 20 B21- RPV H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 H11-P925 N695A LEVEL 3 LIS 0571 20 B21- RPV H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 H11-P603 R604A LEVEL (HOT LEG) LI 0572 20 B21-R610 RPV H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 Hll-P601 SHROUD LEVEL LI 0573 20 B21- RPV H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 H11-P601 R623A LEVEL/PR ESSURE RECORDE R 0574 18 B21- REFUELIN H16063 H16028 REACTOR 158 H21-N027 G LEVEL P405B LT 0576 18 B21- RPV H16063 H16243 REACTOR 158 H21-NOOD LOW P405A PRESSUR E PT 0577 18 B21- RPV H16063 H16243 REACTOR 158 H21-N091B LEVEL 2 P405A& 1 LT 0578 18 B21- RPV H16063 H16028 REACTOR 158 H21-N095B LEVEL 3 P405B LT 0592 20 B21- RPV H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 Hl1-P928 N690D PRESSUR E LOW PIS 0593 20 B21- RPV H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 H11-P926 N691B LEVEL 1 LIS Page 37 of 77 Page 39 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV 0595 20 B21- RPV N693D LEVEL8 LS 0596 20 B21- RPV N695B LEVEL 3 LIS 0597 20 B21- RPV R604B LEVEL (HOT LEG) LI 0598 20 B21-R605 RPV REFUELIN G LEVEL Li 0599 20 B21- RPV R623B LEVEL/PR ESSURE RECORDE R H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 ROOM EVALTY Hll-P926 Hll-P926 Hll-P603 Hll-P602 H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 Hi1-P601 0600 08B 0601 08B 0602 08B R43- DIESEL FO15A AIR START SOLENOI D VALVE R43- DIESEL FO16A AIR START SOLENOI D VALVE R43- DIESEL FO17A AIR VENT SOLENOI D VALVE H11631 H40144 DIESEL 130 H11631 H11631 C/oI R H40144 DIESEL 130 H40144 DIESEL 130 C/01 R C/01 R 0622 20 R43- DSLGEN POO1A 1A CONT PNL 0624 17 R43- DIESEL SO01A GENERAT OR lA N/A H11631 H40144 DIESEL 130 H40144 DIESEL 130 H40144 YARD C/01 D/02 SR 0625 06 Y52- DSL 1A H11637 C001A FUEL OIL PUMP lAl SR 0627 21 R43- AIR AOO3A RECEIVER H11631 H11252 DIESEL 130 D/01 S Page 38 of 77 Page 40 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS 0628 21 MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY R43- AIR A007A RECEIVER H11631 H11252 DIESEL 130 H11037 H11236 DIESEL 130 D/01 S D/01 S 0629 21 R43- FUEL AO01A DAY TANK 1A 0630 21 R43- FUEL A002A STORAGE TANK 1A H11037 H11236 YARD S 0631 08B 0632 08B 0633 08B R43- DIESEL H11631 H40145 DIESEL 130 F015B AIR START SOLENOI D VALVE R43- DIESEL H11631 H40145 DIESEL 130 F016B AIR START SOLENOI D VALVE R43- DIESEL H11631 H40145 DIESEL 130 F017B AIR VENT SOLENOI D VALVE D/01 R D/01 R D/01 R.0653 20 R43- DSL GEN N/A P001B 1B CONT PNL H40145 DIESEL 130 0655 17 R43- DIESEL H11631 40145 S001B GENERAT OR lB 0656 06 Y52- DSL 1B H11037 C101B FUEL OIL PUMP 11B2 0658 21 R43- AIR H11631 H1125 A003B RECEIVER DIESEL 130 YARD E/02 SR E/0 1 SR E/01 S E/01 S E/01 S 2 DIESEL 130 0659 21 R43- AIR A007B RECEIVER 0660 21 R43- FUEL AO0IB DAY TANK 1B 0661 21 R43- FUEL A002B STORAGE TANK 1B H11631 H11236 DIESEL 130 H11037 H11236 DIESEL 130 H11037 H11236 YARD S Page 39 of 77 Page 41 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS 0662 08B 0663 08B 0664 08B 0684 20 0686 17 0688 06 0689 21 0690 21 0691 21 0692 21 0693 07 0694 07 0695 07 0696 07 0697 07 MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT- BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY R43- DIESEL H11631 DIESEL 130 E/01 R F015C AIR START SOLENOI D VALVE R43- DIESEL H11631 DIESEL 130 E/01 R F016C AIR START SOLENOI D VALVE R43- DIESEL H11631 DIESEL 130 E/01 R F017C AIR VENT SOLENOI D VALVE R43- DSL GEN N/A H40146 DIESEL 130 F/02 SR P001C IC CONT PNL R43- DIESEL H11631 H40146 DIESEL 130 E/01 S001C GENERAT OR IC Y52- DSL 1C H11037 YARD SR ClOiC FUEL OIL PUMP 1C2 R43- AIR H11631 H11252 DIESEL 130 F/01 S A003C RECEIVER R43- AIR H11631 H11252 DIESEL 130 F/01 S A007C RECEIVER R43- FUEL H11037 H11236 DIESEL 130 F/01 S A001C DAY TANK IC R43- FUEL H11037 H11236 YARD S A002C STORAGE TANK IC B21- INBOARD H16062 H16026 DRYWELL 130 RB/R07 SR F022A MSIV B21- INBOARD H16062 H16026 DRYWELL 130 RB/R07 SR F022B MSIV B21- INBOARD H16062 H16026 DRYWELL 130 RB/R07 SR F022C MSIV B21- INBOARD H11062 H16026 DRYWELL 130 RB/R07 SR F022D MSIV B21- OUTBOA H16062 H16026 REACTOR 130 RB/R07 SR F028A RD MSIV Page 40 of 77 Page 42 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN 0698 07 B21- OUTBOA F028B RD MSIV 0699 07 B21- OUTBOA F028C RD MSIV 0700 07 B21- OUTBOA F028D RD MSIV 0701 07 B21- RPV F013A PRESSUR E RELIEF VALVE 0702 07 B21- RPV F013B SAFETY RELIEF VALVE 0703 07 B21- RPV F013C PRESSUR E RELIEF VALVE 0705 07 B21- RPV F013E SAFETY RELIEF VALVE H16062 H16062 H16062 LAYOUT BUILDING ELEV H16026 REACTOR 130 H16026 REACTOR 130 H16026 REACTOR 130 ROOM EVAL TY RB/R07 SR RB/R07 SR RB/R07 SR AZ036 SR AZ054 SR H16062 H16074 DRYWELL 148 H16062 H16074 DRYWELL 148 H16062 H16074 DRYWELL 148 AZ064 SR 0706 07 B21- RPV FO13F SAFETY RELIEF VALVE H16062 H16074 DRYWELL 148 H16062 H16074 DRYWELL 148 H16062 H16074 DRYWELL 148 H16062 H16074 DRYWELL 148 AZ056 SR AZ304 SR AZ293 SR AZ324 SR 0707 07 821- RPV FO13G PRESSUR E RELIEF VALVE 0708 07 B21- RPV FO13H PRESSUR E RELIEF VALVE 0709 07 B21- RPV F013J SAFETY RELIEF VALVE 0712 15 R42- BATTERY S017A 1A 24/48 V 0713 15 R42- BATTERY S017B 1B 24/48 V H16062 H16074 DRYWELL 148 AZ306 SR N/A N/A H13165 CONTROL 112 H13165 CONTROL 112 H13165 CONTROL 112 TC/Tll S TC/T12 S TE/T12 S 0714 18 H21-P294 TERMINA N/A L BOX Page 41 of 77 Page 43 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 0 NUMBER 0715 CLASS 18 MARK N DESCRIPT DRAWIN H21-P295 TERMINA N/A L BOX LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV H13165 CONTROL 112 ROOM EVAL TY TE/T12 S 0716 18 TB1-229- TERMINA 7 L BOX 0717 18 TB1-230- TERMINA 8 L BOX 0718 18 TB1-231- TERMINA 8 L BOX 0719 18 B21- RPV N090C LOW PRESSUR E PT 0720 20 B21- RPV N690C PRESSUR E LOW PIS 0721 18 B21- RPV N091C LEVEL 2& 1 LT 0722 20 B21- RPV N691C LEVEL 1 LIS 0723 18 B21- SHROUD N085A LEVEL LT 0724 20 B21- RPV N685A LEVEL 0 LIS 0725 20 B21-R615 RPV SHROUD LEVEL LR 0726 18 B21- RPV N093A LEVEL 8 LT 0727 20 B21- RPV N693A LEVEL 8 LS 0728 18 B21- RPV N091D LEVEL 2&I LT 0729 20 B21- RPV N691D LEVEL 1 LIS 0730 18 B21- RPV N093B LEVEL 8 LT N/A N/A N/A H16063 H16063 H40144, H40268 H13039, H40268 H13039, H40268 H16026 DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL REACTOR 130 130 130 158 D/02 E/02 F/02 H21-P409 S S S H16249 REACTOR 164 H16063 H16249 REACTOR 158 H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16063 H16063 H16026 H16249 REACTOR CONTROL 158 164 H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16063 H16243 REACTOR 158 H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16063 H16243 REACTOR 158 H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16063 H16243 REACTOR 158 H11-P927 H21-P404A H11-P925 H21-P409 Hll-P925 H11-P601 RH/R08 S H11-P925 H21-P405A HI1-P926 RH/R04 S Page 42 of 77 Page 44 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS 0731 20 MARKN B21-N693B DESCRIPT RPV LEVEL8 DRAWIN H16063 LAYOUT H16249 BUILDING ELEV CONTROL 164 ROOM H11-P926 H21-P410 EVAL TY LS 0732 18 B21- RPV N090B LOW PRESSUR E PT 0733 20 B21- RPV N690B PRESSUR E LOW PIS 0734 20 H11-P601 REACTOR& CONT COOLING.& ISOLA CONTROL PANEL H16063 H16026 REACTOR 130 H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 H11-P928 N/A 0735 20 Hll-P602 REACTOR N/A WTR CLEAN UP&RECIR CONTROL PANEL H16249 CONTROL 164 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16249 CONTROL 164 N/A N/A N/A S S S 0736 20 Hll-P603 REACTOR N/A CONTROL PANEL 0737 20 Hll- DIV 1 P605A ANALOG SIG CONV/IS OLATION 0738 20 Hll- DIV 2 P605B ANALOG SIG CONV/IS OLATION 0739 20 H11-P606 START U RANGE NEUTRO N MONTOR ING 0740 20 H11-P609 CHAN A PRI ISO SYS REAC PROT SYS N/A H16429 CONTROL 164 N/A S N/A N/A N/A H16249 CONTROL 164 H16429 CONTROL 164 H16429 CONTROL 164 N/A N/A N/A S S S Page 43 of 77 Page 45 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER 0741 CLASS MARKN 20 H11-P611 DESCRIPT CHAN B PRI ISO SYS REAC PROT SYS 0742 20 Hll-P612 FW &RECIR INSTRUM ENTATIO N PANEL 0743 20 Hll-P617 CHAN A RHR CORE SPRAY RELAY PANEL.0744 20 H11-P618 CHAN B RHR CORE SPRAY RELAY PANEL 0745 20 H11-P620 HPCI RELAY COMPUT ER EQUIPME NT PANEL DRAWIN N/A N/A N/A LAYOUT_ BUILDING H16429 CONTROL ELEV 164 ROOM N/A EVALTY S H16249 CONTROL 164 H16249 CONTROL 164 N/A S N/A S N/A H16249 CONTROL 164 N/A S N/A H16249 CONTROL 164 N/A S 0746 20 H11-P622 INBOARD N/A-PRI CONTROL H16249 CONTROL 164 N/A S ISOLATIO N RELAYS PANEL 0747 20 Hll-P623 OUTBOA RD-PRI CONTAIN ISOLATIO N RELAYS PANEL 0748 20 Hll-P626 CORE SPRAY CONTR PNL DIV I N/A N/A H16249 CONTROL 164 H16249 CONTROL 164 N/A N/A S S Page 44 of 77 Page 46 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS 0749 20 MARKN Hl1-P627 DESCRIPT DRAWIN CORE N/A SPRAY CONTR PNL DIV II LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV H16249 CONTROL 164 ROOM N/A EVALTY S 0750 20 H11-P650 TURB, FW &COND CONTROL N/A H16249 CONTROL 164 N/A S CONSOLE 0751 20 Hll-P651 GEN &STA SER CONTROL N/A H16249 CONTROL 164 N/A S CONSOLE 0752 20 H11-P652 ELEC AUX PWR CONTROL N/A H16249 CONTROL 164 N/A S CONSOLE 0753 20 H21-P175 HOT SHUTDO WN PUMP CONTROL PANEL 0754 20 H21-P200 DIESEL GEN 1A -RELAY PANEL 1A 0755 20 H21-P201 DIESEL GEN 1B -RELAY PANEL lA 0756 20 H21-P202 DIESEL GEN 1C -RELAY PANEL lA 0757 20 H21-P230 DEISEL GEN 1A -RELAY PANEL 1B 0758 20 H21-P231 DIESEL GEN 1B-RELAY PANEL 1B N/A H40146 DIESEL 130 N/A S N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A H40144 DIESEL 130 H40145 DIESEL 130 H40146 DIESEL 130 H40144 DIESEL 130 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A H40145 DIESEL 130 Page 45 of 77 Page 47 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER 0759 CLASS MARKN 20 H21-P232 DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM DIESEL GEN IC -RELAY PANEL 1B N/A H40146 DIESEL 130 N/A 0760 20 H21-P245 600 VOLT SWGR IC CONTROL PANEL 0761 20 H21-P246 600 VOLT SWGR ID CONTROL PANEL N/A N/A 0762 20 H21-P255 MOV & N/A FUEL PUMP CTRL PANEL 1A -DIV I 0763 20 H21-P256 MOV & N/A FUEL PUMP CTRL PANEL 1B -DIV II 0764 20 H21-P257 GEN IA N/A HEAT &VENT CONTROL PANEL H40179 CONTROL 130 N/A H40178 CONTROL 130 N/A H40144 DIESELDB 130 N/A H40146 DIESEL 130 N/A H13026 DIESEL 130 N/A H40159 INTAKE 111 N/A EVALTY S S S S S S S S S 0765 20 H21-P266 MOV CONTROL PANEL 1A-DIV I 0767 20 H21-P303 DIESEL 1A LEAD TIMER PANEL 0768 20 H21-P304 DIESEL 1B LEAD TIMER PANEL 0769 20 H21-P305 DIESEL IC LEAD TIMER PANEL N/A N/A N/A N/A H40144 DIESEL 130 H40145 DIESEL 130 H40146 DIESEL 130 N/A N/A N/A S Page 46 of 77 Page 48 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARK N DESCRIPT DRA 0770 20 2H21- DIESEL N/A P231 GEN 2B -RELAY PANEL 2B 0772 18 H21-P018 RHR N/A INSTRUM ENT RACK-CHANNEL A 0773 20 H21-P173 SHUTDO N/A WN INSTRUM ENT PANEL 0774 20 H21-P267 MOV N/A CONTROL PANEL lB-DIV II 0775 20 C82-P002 REMOTE N/A SHUTDO WN PANEL 0776 18 H21-P021 RHR N/A CHANNEL B RACK 0777 18 H21-P019 CORE N/A SPRAY SYSTEM B RACK 0778 18 H21- INSTRUM N/A P405B ENT RACK 0779 18 H21-P409 INSTRUM N/A ENT RACK 0780 18 H21-P410 INSTRUM N/A ENT RACK 0781 18 H21- INSTRUM N/A P404A ENT RACK 0782 18 H21- INSTRUM N/A P405A ENT RACK 0783 18 H21- INSTRUM N/A P404B ENT RACK 0784 18 H21- INSTRUM N/A P414A ENT RACK WIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV H23023 DIESEL 130 H17295 REACTOR 087 H17273 REACTOR 130 H40159 INTAKE 111 H17268 REACTOR 158 H16025 REACTOR 087 H16025 REACTOR 087 ROOM N/A EVAL TY SR RL/R13 S RL/R03 S N/A S RH/R05 S RL/R03 S RL/R03 S H16026 H16026 REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR 158 130 130 158 158 158 087 RH/R03 RH/R1o RF/R03 RH/R08 RH/R03 RH/R08 RJ/R02 S S S S S S S Page 47 of 77 Page 49 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1,0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN 0785 18 H21- INSTRUM N/A P414B ENT RACK 0786 18 H21-P016 CS/HPCI N/A LEAK DET RACK 0787 18 H21-P036 HPCI LEAK DET RACK N/A LAYOUT BUILDING ELEV REACTOR 087 H16026 REACTOR 130 H16026 REACTOR 130 REACTOR 087 H23029 DIESEL 130 H23023 DIESEL 130 ROOM EVALTY RJ/R02 S RF/R04 S RF/R04 S RJ/R02 S 0788 18 H21-P434 INSTRUM N/A ENT RACK 0789 01 2R27- LOCAL S037 STARTER FOR 2P41-C002 0790 03 2R22- 4160V S006 SWGR EMERGE NCY BUS 2F 0791 0 R34- SURGE S005A PROT PANEL FOR P41-C001A 0792 0 R34- SURGE S005B PROT PANEL FOR P41-C001B 0793 0 R34- SURGE S006A PROT PANEL FOR ElI-CO01A 0794 0 R34- SURGE S006D PROT PANEL FOR Ell-CO02D 0795 20 H1l-P654 GAS TREAT &VENT VERTICAL PANEL N/A N/A C/02 SR C/03 SR N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A H40159 INTAKE 111 H40159 INTAKE 111 H40159 INTAKE 111 H40159 INTAKE 111 H16249 CONTROL 164 N/A S Page 48 of 77 Page 50 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT 0 0796 20 H11-P657 VENT & N/A DRYWELL INERT VERTICAL PANEL 0797 20 H11-P691 ANALOG N/A SIGNAL CONVERS ION/ISOL ATION PANEL 0798 20 H11-P700 ANALYZE N/A R/VENT& LEAK DETECTIO N PANEL 0799 20 H11-P921 ATTS RPS N/A PANEL 0800 20 Hll-P922 ATTS RPS N/A PANEL 0801 20 H11-P923 ATTS RPS N/A PANEL 0802 20 H11-P924 ATTS RPS N/A PANEL 0802 20 H11-P925 ATTS N/A ECCS PANEL 0804 20 H11-P926 ATTS N/A ECCS PANEL 0805 20 H11-P927 ATTS N/A ECCS PANEL 0806 20 Hll-P928 ATTS N/A ECCS PANEL 0807 20 Hll-P608 POWER N/A RANGE NEUTRO N MONITO RING PANEL WIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY H16249 CONTROL 164 N/A S H13166 CONTROL 164 H16249 CONTROL 164 N/A S H16249 H16249 H16249 H16249 H16249 CONTROL 164 CONTROL 164 CONTROL 164 CONTROL 164 CONTROL 164 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A H16249 CONTROL 164 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16249 CONTROL 164 Page 49 of 77 Page 51 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN 0808 20 H11-P613 DESCRIPT DRAWIN PROCESS N/A INSTRUM ENTATIO N PANEL LAYOUT BUILDING ELEV ROOM H16249 CONTROL 164 N/A EVALTY S 0809 20 Hll-P628 AUTOMA N/A TIC BLOWDO WN RELAY PANEL H16249 CONTROL 164 N/A S 0810 20 2H11- ELECT P652 AUX PWR CONTROL N/A H16249 CONTROL 164 N/A SR CONSOLE 0103 01 R27-S035 LOCAL STARTER FOR E41-F006 0104 01 R27-S036 LOCAL STARTER FOR E41-F007 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0105 01 R27-S037 LOCAL STARTER FOR E41-F008 0106 01 R27-S066 LOCAL STARTER FOR E41-F002 0820 0 R34- NEUTRAL S004A RESISTOR 1A 0821 0 R34- NEUTRAL S004B RESISTOR 1B 0822 0 R34- NEUTRAL S004C RESISTOR iC 0823 18 2R43B- DIESEL B Mol UNIT 1/2 MODE SWITCH H42837 REACTOR 130 H40269 REACTOR 112 H40269 REACTOR 112 H42839 REACTOR 130 DIESEL 130 DIESEL 130 DIESEL 130 DIESEL 130 RH/R02 S RH/R02 S RH/R02 S RL/R04 S S S S SR N/A Page 50 of 77 Page 52 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN 18 H21-P248 DESCRIPT DRAWIN 250V DC N/A SWITCHG LAYOUT H-13117 BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY TF/T11 S 0817 DIESEL 130 EAR CONTROL PANEL 0818 18 H21-P249 250V DC N/A SWITCHG EAR CONTROL PANEL H-13117 DIESEL 130 0815 04 R11-S071 MISC POWER TRANSFO RMER N/A 0819 04 Sll-S012 STA SERV N/A XFMR 1F2 4160/600 V 0816 01 R24-S048 600/208V N/A MCC 1D 0862 14 R25-S035 120/208V N/A AC CABINET 0824 09 X41- DG H12I C006A SWITCHG EAR ROOM 1E FAN 0825 09 X41- DG H12i C006C SWITCHG EAR ROOM 1F FAN 0826 09 X41- DG H121 C006E SWITCHG EAR ROOM 1G FAN DIESEL 130 DIESEL 130 H-13029 DIESEL 130 DIESEL 130 619 H-12619 DIESEL 150 619 H-12619 DIESEL 150 619 H-12619 DIESEL 150 TB/T11 S S S S S SR SR SR SR 0827 09 X41- DG H12619 H-12619 DIESEL 150 C002A ROOM 1A FAN 0828 09 X41- DG C002C ROOM 1B FAN H12619 H-12619 DIESEL 150 SR Page 51 of 77 Page 53 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARK_N DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV H-12619 DIESEL 150 ROOM EVAL TY SR 0829 09 X41- DG C002E ROOM 1C FAN H12619 0831 0 X41- DG C005B ROOM 1B LOUVER 0832 0 X41- DG C005C ROOM ic LOUVER 0833 0 X41- DG CO07A SWITCHG EAR ROOM 1E LOUVER 0834 0 X41- DG C007B SWITCHG EAR ROOM 1F LOUVER H12619 H-12619 DIESEL 130 SR H12619 H-12619 DIESEL 130 SR H12619 H-12619 DIESEL 130 SR H12619 H-12619 DIESEL 130 SR.0835 0 X41- DG C007C SWITCHG EAR ROOM 1G LOUVER H12619 H-12619 DIESEL 130 SR 0836 10 T41- HPCI BOO5B PUMP ROOM COOLER 0837 07 P41- HPCI FO35B ROOM COOLER INLET VALVE H16011 H40207 REACTOR 087 H16011 H-16095 REACTOR 087 RL/R03 SR RL/RO1 SR 0811 08A E41-F111 VACUUM H16332 H16262 REACTOR 087 BREAKER LINE MOV E41-F104 VACUUM H16332 H16262 REACTOR 087 RF/R02 R 0812 08A RF/R02 R BREAKER LINE MOV Page 52 of 77 Page 54 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARK_N B21-F003 0813 08B DESCRIPT DRAWIN RPV H16062 HEAD VENT LAYOUT H16203 BUILDING ELEV DRYWELL 193 ROOM EVALTY RF/R07 R 0814 08A W32- FLUME F001 WASH WATER MOV H11001 H11142 INTAKE 108 R 0860 0 X41- DG C005A ROOM 1A LOUVER H12619 H12619 DIESEL 130 SR 0495 08A 0861 08B B31- RECIRC F023A PUMP C001A SUCTION VALVE B21-F004 RPV HEAD VENT H16066 H16025 DRYWELL 117 H16062 H16203 DRYWELL 193 RF/R07 RF/R07 R TG/T12 S SR 0838 18 R26- RPS DIST M021 CAB THROWO VER SW N/A N/A H13121 CONTROL 130 H13121 CONTROL 130 0839 18 C71-S002 LINE VOLTAGE REGULAT OR 0840 18 C71- PROTECTI N/A P003E ON PANEL 0841 18 C71- PROTECTI N/A P003F ON PANEL H13121 CONTROL 130 H13121 CONTROL 130 TF/T12 SR TF/T12 SR 0863 20 B21- RPV N692B LEVEL 2 LS 0864 20 B21- RPV N692D LEVEL 2 LS 0865 18 B21- PRV N078A PRESS SCRAM PT H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16063 H16249 CONTROL 164 H16063 16028 REACTOR 158 Hll-P926 Hll-P926 H21-P404C Page 53 of 77 Page 55 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY 0866 18 B21- RPV N078B PRESS SCRAM PT 0867 18 B21- PRV N078C PRESS SCRAM PT 0868 18 B21- RPV N078D PRESS SCRAM PT 0869 18 B21- RPV NO80A LEVEL 3 LT 0870 18 B21- RPV NO80B LEVEL 3 LT 0871 18 B21- RPV N080C LEVEL 3 LT 0872 18 B21- RPV N080D LEVEL 3 LT 0873 20 B21- RPV N678A PRESS SCRAM PIS 0874 20 B21- RPV N678B PRESS SCRAM PIS 0875 20 821- RPV N678C PRESS SCRAM PIS 0876 20 B21- RPV N678D PRESS SCRAM PIS 0877 20 B21- RPV N680A LEVEL 3 LIS 0878 20 B21- RPV N680B LEVEL 3 LIS H16063 16028 REACTOR 158 H16063 16028 REACTOR 158 H16063 16028 REACTOR 158 H16063 16028 REACTOR 158 H16063 16028 REACTOR 158 H16063 16028 REACTOR 158 H16063 16249 REACTOR 158 H16063 16249 CONTROL 164 H16063 16249 CONTROL 164 H16063 16249 CONTROL 164 H21-P404D H21-P405C H21-P405D H21-P404C H21-P404D H21-P405C H21-P405D H11-P921 H11-P922 H11-P923 H16063 16249 CONTROL 164 H11-P924 H16063 16249 CONTROL 164 H16063 16249 CONTROL 164 H11-P921 H11-P922 Page 54 of 77 Page 56 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER 0879 CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVAL TY 20 B21- RPV N680C LEVEL 3 LIS H16063 16249 CONTROL 164 H16063 16249 CONTROL 164 0880 20 B21- RPV N680D LEVEL 3 LIS 0102 14 C71-POO1 RPS POWER DISTRIBU TION PANEL BUS B 0885 18 X41- D/G RM NOO4A 1A FAN THERMO STAT 0886 18 X41- D/G RM N004B lB FAN THERMO STAT 0887 18 X41- D/G RM N004C 1C FAN THERMO STAT 0888 18 X41- D/G RM N005A IA FAN THERMO STAT 0889 18 X41- D/G RM N005B 1B FAN THERMO STAT 0890 18 X41- D/G RM NO05C 1C FAN THERMO STAT 0891 20 X41- D/G RM N045A 1A FAN FLOW SWITCH 0892 20 X41- D/G RM N045B 1A FAN FLOW SWITCH H11-P923 H11-P924 TG/T12 N/A H40181, H40179 CONTROL 130 H12619 H13395 DIESEL 130 C/01 S H12619 H12619 H12619 H12619 H12619 H13396 DIESEL 130 H13397 DIESEL H13395 DIESEL H13396 DIESEL H13397 DIESEL 130 130 130 130 130 130 D/01 S E/01 S D/02 S E/01 S F/02 S C/02 D/02 H12619 H13395 DIESEL H12619 H13395 DIESEL Page 55 of 77 Page 57 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER 0893 CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT 20 X41- D/G RM N045C 1B FAN FLOW SWITCH DRAWIN H12619 LAYOUT, H13396 BUILDING DIESEL ELEV 130 ROOM C/02 EVAL TY 0894 20 X41- D/G RM N045D 1B FAN FLOW SWITCH 0895 20 X41- D/G RM N045E IC FAN FLOW SWITCH 0896 20 X41- D/G RM N045E 1C FAN FLOW SWITCH H12619 H13396 DIESEL H12619 H13397 DIESEL H12619 H13397 DIESEL 130 130 130 D/02 E/02 D/02 0898 10 Z41- CONTROL H16042 B003A ROOM AIR HANDLIN G UNIT CONTROL 180 CONTROL 180 0899 11 Z41- B003A B008A CONDEN SING UNIT 0903 09 Z41- D004A C012A BOOSTER FAN 0904 07 Z41- AIR F007A OPERATE D DAMPER B003A IN 0905 07 Z41- AIR FO07C OPERATE D DAMPER BO03C IN 0906 07 Z41- AIR F009A OPERATE D DAMPER B003A IN H16042 TD/T12 SR TB/T11 SR TF/T13 SR TD/T12 SR H 16042 H16042 CONTROL 180 CONTROL 180 H 16042 CONTROL 180 TF/T12 SR H16042 CONTROL 180 TE/T12 R Page 56 of 77 Page 58 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT- BUILDING ELEV 0907 07 Z41- AIR F009C OPERATE D DAMPER BO03C IN H16042 CONTROL 180 ROOM EVAL TY TF/T12 R TG/T12 SR 0909 07 Z41-FO11 AIR OPER DMPR D004A/B BYPASS 0910 07 Z41- AIR F013A OPERATE D DAMPER D004A IN 0912 07 Z41- AIR F014A OPERATE D DAMPER D004A IN 0914 07 Z41-F015 AIR OPERATE D DAMPER D003 BYPASS 0916 07 Z41- AIR OPER FO17A INLET VANE C011A IN 0917 07 Z41- AIR OPER FO17B INLET VANE C011B IN 0918 07 Z41-F019 AIR OPERATE D DAMPER RESTROO M 0919 07 Z41-F020 AIR OPERATE D DAMPER RESTROO M H16042 CONTROL 180 H16042 CONTROL 180 H16042 CONTROL 180 TH/T13 SR TH/T12 SR TH/T12 SR H16042 CONTROL 180 H16042 CONTROL 180 TD/Tll R TE/Tll R H 16042 CONTROL 180 H16042 CONTROL 180 TH/T13 SR TH/T13 SR H16042 CONTROL 180 Page 57 of 77 Page 59 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN 0 0920 07 H16042 LAYOUT BUILDING ELEV CONTROL 180 ROOM EVALTY Z41- AIR F030A OPERATE D DAMPER B010A OUT TF/T13 R 0921 07 Z41- AIR F030C OPERATE D DAMPER B010C OUT 0925 18 Z41- B003A N003A DISCHAR GE FS.0923 18 Z41- C012A N005A DISCHAR GE FS 0926 18 Z41- B003A N600A COMPRE SSOR TIS 0929 20 Z41- CTRL R615A ROOM OUTSIDE AIR INLET RIS H16042 CONTROL 180 H16042 H16042 H16042 H16042 CONTROL 180 CONTROL 180 CONTROL 180 CONTROL 164 TF/T13 R TE/T13 SR TF/T13 SR TD/T12 SR Hll-P657 R 0931 08A 0897 08B P41- Z41-F421A B008B ISOL GLOBE MOV P41- Z41-F123A B025 PSW INLET ISOL SV P41- Z41-F422A B008B ISOL GLOBE MOV P41- Z41-F422B B008C ISOL GLOBE MOV H11609 CONTROL 180 TB/T11 H11611 CONTROL 180 TB/T11 SR 0933 08A H11609 CONTROL 180 TB/T11 0934 08A H11609 CONTROL 180 TB/T12 R Page 58 of 77 Page 60 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS 0935 18 MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY TB/T11 SR P41-N521 PSW CD H11609 A/C-1B DII DPS 0939 10 Z41- CONTROL H 16042 B003B ROOM AIR HANDLIN G UNIT CONTROL 180 CONTROL 180 CONTROL 180 0940 11 Z41- B003B B008B CONDEN SING UNIT 0941 09 Z41- D004B C012B BOOSTER FAN 0943 07 Z41- AIR F008B OPERATE D DAMPER B003B IN 0944 07 Z41- AIR F008C OPERATE D DAMPER B003C IN 0945 07 Z41- AIR F009B OPERATE D DAMPER B003B IN 0946 07 Z41- AIR F009C OPERATE D DAMPER B003C IN 0947 07 Z41- AIR F010A OPERATE D DAMPER B003B IN 0948 07 Z41- AIR F010B OPERATE D DAMPER B003B IN H16042 H16042 H 16042 CONTROL 180 CONTROL 180 TE/T12 SR TB/T11 SR TG/T12 SR TE/T12 SR TF/T12 SR TE/T12 SR H16042 CONTROL 180 H16042 CONTROL 180 H16042 CONTROL 180 TF/T12 H 16042 CONTROL 180 TE/T04 SR TE/T04 R H16042 CONTROL 180 Page 59 of 77 Page 61 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER 0949 CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN 07 Z41-FO12 AIR OPER H16042 DMPR DOO4A/B BYPASS LAYOUT BUILDING CONTROL ELEV ROOM 180 TF/T12 EVALTY SR 0957 07 Z41- AIR F013B OPERATE D DAMPER D004B IN 0953 07 Z41- AIR F014B OPERATE D DAMPER D004B IN 0955 07 Z41-F016 AIR OPERATE D DAMPER D003 ISOL 0956 07 Z41- AIR F018A OPERATE D DAMPER C011A IN 0951 07 Z41- AIR FO18B OPERATE D DAMPER C011B IN 0960 07 Z41- AIR F028A OPERATE D DAMPER B010B OUT 0962 07 Z41- AIR F030C OPERATE D DAMPER B010C OUT 0963 18 Z41- B003B N003B DISCHAR GE FS 0964 18 Z41- C012B NOO5B DISCHAR GE FS H16042 CONTROL 180 TH/T12 SR TH/T12 SR H16042 CONTROL 180 H16042 CONTROL 180 TH/T12 R H16042 CONTROL 180 H16042 CONTROL 180 TE/T12 SR TE/T12 SR TE/T13 SR H16042 CONTROL 180 H 16042 CONTROL 180 TF/T13 H16042 H16042 CONTROL 180 CONTROL 180 TE/T13 SR TF/T12 SR Page 60 of 77 Page 62 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO, SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS 0965 18 MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY Z41- CONTROL H16042 N015B RM OUTSIDE AIR INLET RE CONTROL 180 TH/T13 SR 0968 18 Z41- BOO3B N600B COMPRE SSOR TIS 0970 18 Z41- CTRL R615B ROOM OUTSIDE AIR INLET RIS H16042 H16042 CONTROL 180 CONTROL 164 TE/T12 SR H11-P654 R 0972 08B 0973 08A P41- Z41-F123B B025 PSW INLET ISOL SV P41- Z41-F420A BOO8A ISOL GLOBE MOV P41- Z41-F421A BOO8B ISOL GLOBE MOV P41- Z41-F422A BOO8B ISOL GLOBE MOV H11611 CONTROL 180 TB/T11 SR H11609 CONTROL 180 TB/T11 R 0974 08A H11609 CONTROL 180 TB/T11 R 0975 08A H11609 CONTROL 180 TB/Tll RS 0976 18 P41-N520 PSW CB A/C-1B DI DPS 0977 09 X41- INTAKE CO09B STRUCTU RE VENT FAN 1B 0978 09 X41- INTAKE C009C STRUCTU RE VENT FAN 1C H11609 H44073 CONTROL 180 INTAKE 150 TB/T11 S SR SR H44073 INTAKE 150 Page 61 of 77 Page 63 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARK N DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY.0979 18 X41- INTK NOO2B STRUC VENT FAN 1B THERMO STAT H44073 INTAKE ill PUMP RM SR 0980 18 X41- INTK N002C STRUC VENT FAN 1C THERMO STAT H44073 INTAKE 111 PUMP RM SR 0981 0 0982 0 0983 0 X41- INTAKE C031A STRUCTU RE AUTO DAMPER X41- INTAKE C031B STRUCTU RE AUTO DAMPER X41- INTAKE C032A STRUCTU RE AUTO DAMPER X41- INTAKE C032B STRUCTU RE AUTO DAMPER H44073 INTAKE H44073 INTAKE WET PIT AREA WET PIT AREA WET PIT AREA WET PIT AREA H44073 INTAKE 0984 0 H44073 INTAKE 0985 09 X41- INTAKE CO09A STRUCTU RE VENT FAN 1A 0986 09 X41- INTAKE C009C STRUCTU RE VENT FAN 1C 0987 18 X41- INTK N002A STRUC VENT FAN 1A THERMO STAT 0988 18 X41- INTK NO02C STRUC VENT FAN IC THERMO STAT H44073 INTAKE 150 SR H44073 INTAKE 150 H44073 INTAKE 111 PUMP RM SR H44073 INTAKE 111 PUMP RM Page 62 of 77 Page 64 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER 0989 CLASS 0 MARKN X41-C031A DESCRIPT INTAKE STRUCTU RE AUTO DAMPER DRAWIN H44073 LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV INTAKE 1002 0 1000 0 1001 0 X41- INTAKE C032B STRUCTU RE AUTO DAMPER X41- INTAKE C031B STRUCTU RE AUTO DAMPER X41- INTAKE C032A STRUCTU RE AUTO DAMPER H44073 INTAKE ROOM WET PIT AREA WET PIT AREA WET PIT AREA WET PIT AREA RL/R07 EVALTY H44073 INTAKE H44073 INTAKE 1003 07 Ell- RHR F065D PUMP 2D SUPP POOL SUCT VLV H16329 REACTOR 087 1004 08A 1005 08A Ell- RHR FO04D PUMP 2D SUCTION VALVE Ell- RHRSDC F006D SUCT ISO L VALVE H16329 REACTOR 087 RL/R03 RL/R03 H16329 REACTOR 087 1006 06 Ell- RHR C002D PUMP 2D H16329 H 16329 REACTOR 087 REACTOR 087 1007 08A 1008 08A 1009 08A Ell- RHR F007B PUMP 2B & 2D MIN FLOW BYPASS VLV Ell- RHR HX F048B B BYPASS VALVE Ell- RHR HX F047B BTO INLET VALVE RL/R02 RL/R03 RJ/R02 RJ/R02 H16329 H16329 REACTOR 087 REACTOR 087 Page 63 of 77 Page 65 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER 1010 CLASS 08A MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVAL TY RH/R03 Eli- HPCI F091B DISCH TO HX B VALVE H16329 REACTOR 087 1011 21 Ell- RHR B001B HEAT EXCHANG ER B H16329 REACTOR 087 RL/R03 1012 08A Ell- RHR HX H16329 F104B B VENT VALVE REACTOR 087 REACTOR 087 RJ/R02 1013 18 Ell- RHR HX N002B B TUBE TO SHELL DP TRANS 1014 18 Ell- RHR HX R600B B TUBE TO SHELL DP CONT 1015 18 Ell- RHR HX S600B B TUBE TO SHELL POS MOD H16329 H21-P021 H16329 CONTROL 164 H11-P613 H16329 CONTROL 164 H11-P612 1016 08A 1017 08A Ell- RHR HX H16329 F026B B TO RCIC VALVE Ell- RHR HX H16329 F011B B DRAIN TO SUPP POOL Ell- RHR HX H16329 FO03B B DISCHAR GE VALVE REACTOR 087 REACTOR 087 RJ/R03 RL/R03 1018 08A REACTOR 087 RJ/R03 1019 18 Ell- RHR HX H16329 N015B B DISCH HDR FLOW TRANS 1020 18 Ell- RHR HDR H16329 K600B FLOW SQUART ROOT CONV REACTOR 087 CONTROL 164 H21-P021 Hll-P612 Page 64 of 77 Page 66 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARK N DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY 1021 20 Eli- RHR HX R603B B DISCH HDR FLOW IND H16329 CONTROL 164 1022 18 Ell- RHR N082B PUMP 2B & 2D FLOW DP TRAN 1023 20 Ell- RHR N682B PUMP 2B & 2D FLOW DP TRIP UNIT H16329 REACTOR 087 Hll-P601 RL/R05 Hll-P926 H16329 CONTROL 164 1024 08A 1025 08A 1026 08A 1027 08A 1028 08A 1029 08A 1030 08A Ell-FO10 RHR HX HDR BYPASS VALVE Ell- RHR F028B INLET TO SUPP POOL VALVE Ell- RHR F024B TEST LINE TORUS ISO Ell- SUPP F027B POOL SPRAY VALVE Ell- RHR LPCI F015B DISCHAR GE VALVE H16330 REACTOR 087 H16329 REACTOR 087 H16329 H16329 REACTOR 087 REACTOR 087 RL/R07 RL/R05 RL/R05 RL/R05 S RH/R06 RH/R08 S RH/R08 S H16329 Ell- CONTAIN H16329 F016B MENT SPRAY DISCH VALVE REACTOR 130 REACTOR 158 REACTOR 158 Ell- CONT F021B SPRAY INBRD GATE MOV H16329 Page 65 of 77 Page 67 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY H11-P612 1031 20 Ell- POWER H16330 K603B SUPPLY CONTROL 164 INTAKE 111 1032 06 Ell- RHR C001D SERVICE WATER PUMP 1D D11004 1033 08A 1034 08A Ell- RHR HX H16329 F073B B SERVICE WATER DISCH Ell- RHR HX H16329 F119B B BYPASS VALVE 1035 18 Ell- RHRSW H16329 NO07B HX B FLOW TRANSMI TTER REACTOR 087 REACTOR 087 REACTOR 087 CONTROL 164 REACTOR 087 RL/R07 RL/R07 1036 20 Ell- RHRSW R602B HX B INLET FI 1037 18 Ell- RHR HX N017B B INLET PRESSUR E SWITCH 1038 18 Eli- RHR HX N017D B INLET PRESSUR E SWITCH H16329 H16329 RL/R03 H11-P601 RL/R02 RL/R02 H16329 REACTOR 087 1039 08A Ell- RHR HX F068B B TUBE TO SHELL OUTLET H16329 REACTOR 087 RH/R02 1040 07 Ell- RHR FO65A PUMP 2A SUPP POOL SUCT VALVE H16330 REACTOR 087 RH/R1l 1041 08A Ell- RHR FOO4A PUMP 2A SUCTION VALVE H16330 REACTOR 087 RH/R13 Page 66 of 77 Page 68 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN.1042 08A Ell-FO06A DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_RHRSDC H16330 SUCT ISOL VALVE BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY REACTOR 087 RH/R11 1043 06 Ell- RHR C002A PUMP2A H16330 H16330 REACTOR 087 REACTOR 087 1044 08A 1045 08A 1046 08A 1047 08A Ell- RHR F007A PUMP 2A & 2C MIN FLOW BYPASS VLV Ell- RHR HX F048A A BYPASS VALVE Ell- RHR HX F047A A INLET VALVE Ell- HPCI FO91A DISCH TO RHR HX A VLV RL/Ri1 RL/Rll RL/Ri3 RL/R13 RH/R11 H16330 H16330 H16330 REACTOR 087 REACTOR 087 REACTOR 087 1048 21 Ell- RHR B001A HEAT EXCHANG ERA H16330 REACTOR 087 RL/R13 1049 08A Ell- RHR HX F1O4A A VENT VALVE H16330 H16330 REACTOR 087 REACTOR 087 RH/R13 1050 18 Ell-. RHR HX N002A A TUBE TO SHELL DP TRANS 1051 18 Ell- RHR HX R600A A TUBE TO SHELL DP PI CONT 1052 18 Ell- RHR HX S600A A TUBE TO SHELL POS MOD H16330 CONTROL 164 H21-P018 Hll-P613 Hll-P613 H16330 CONTROL 164 Page 67 of 77 Page 69 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS 1053 08A 1054 08A MARKN DESCRIPT Eli- RHR HX F026A ATO RCIC VALVE Ell- RHR HX FOI1A A DRN TO SUPP POOL VLV Ell- RHR HX F003A A DISCH VALVE DRAWIN LAYOUT_H16330 BUILDING ELEV REACTOR 087 H16330 ROOM EVALTY RJ/Rll REACTOR 087 RH/Rll 1055 08A H16330 H16330 REACTOR 087 REACTOR 087 RH/R13 1056 18 Eli- RHR HX N015A A DISCH HDR FLOW TRANS 1057 18 Eli- RHR HDR K600A FLOW SQUARE ROOT CONV 1058 20 Ell- RHR HX R603A A DISCH HDR FLOW IND 1059 18 Ell- RHR N082A PUMP A&C FLOW DP TRANS 1060 20 Ell- RHR N682A PUMPA&C FLOW DP TRIP UNIT H16330 CONTROL 164 H21-PO18 HII-P613 HII-P601 RL/RlO H16330 CONTROL 164 H 16330 REACTOR 087 H16330 CONTROL 164 H11-P925 1061 08A 1062 08A Ell-FO10 RHR HX HDR BYPASS VALVE Ell- RHR F028A INLETTO SUPP POOL VLV H16330 REACTOR 087 RL/R07 RH/R09 H16330 REACTOR 087 Page 68 of 77 Page 70 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY 1063 08A 1064 08A Eli- RHR F024A TEST LINE TORUS ISO Eli- SUPP F027A POOL SPRAY VALVE Ell- RHR LPCI F015A DISCHAR GE VALVE H16330 H16330 REACTOR 087 REACTOR 087 RH/Rio RJ/R1O S 1065 08A 1066 08A H16330 REACTOR 130 REACTOR 158 RJ/R08 Ell- CONTAIN H16330 FO16A MENT SPRAY DISCH VALVE RH/R08 S 1067 08A Ell- CONT F021A SPRAY INBRD GATE MOV H16330 REACTOR 158 RH/R08 S 1068 20 Ell- POWER K603A SUPPLY 1069 06 Ell- RHR CO01A SERVICE WATER PUMP 1A H16330 D11004 CONTROL 164 INTAKE iii HlI-P613 1070 08A Ell- RHR HX F073A A SERV WATER DISCH VALVE Ell- RHR HX F119A A BYPASS VALVE H16330 REACTOR 087 RL/R07 1071 08A H16330 REACTOR 087 RL/R07 1072 18 Ell- RHRSW NO07A HXA FLOW TRANSMI TTER 1073 20 Ell- RHRSW R602A HXA INLET FI H16330 REACTOR 087 H21-P018 H16330 CONTROL 164 Hll-P601 Page 69 of 77 Page 71 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN 1074 18 Ell-NO17A DESCRIPT DRAWIN RHR HX H16330 A INLET PRESSUR E SWITCH LAYOUT BUILDING ELEV REACTOR 087 ROOM RH/R13 EVAL-TY 1075 18 Ell- RHR HX H16330 N017C A INLET PRESSUR E SWITCH REACTOR 087 RH/R13 1076 08A 1077 08A Ell- RHR HX H16330 F068A A TUBE TO SHELL OUTLET REACTOR 087 DRYWELL 158 RH/R13 AZ 170 S G31-FOO1 RWCU INBOARD ISO GATE VLV H16188 1078 08A G31-F004 RWCU OUTBOA RD ISO VLV H16188 REACTOR 158 RH/R07 S 1079 07 Gll-F019 DRYWELL H16176 EQ DR PMP ISO VLV 1080 07 G11-F020 DRYWELL H16176 EQ DR PMP ISO VLV 1081 07 G11-F003 DRYWELL H16176 FL DR PMP ISO VLV 1082 07 G11-F004 DRYWELL H16176 FL DR PMP ISO VLV 1083 07 T48-F310 TORUS H16024 VAC BRK ISO BTRFLY 1084 07 T48-F311 TORUS H16024 VAC BRK ISO BTRFLY 1085 09 X41- BATTERY H12619 CO08C ROOM 1B FAN REACTOR 087 RB/R05 S REACTOR 087 RB/RO5 S REACTOR 087 RE/R03 S REACTOR 087 RE/R03 S REACTOR 121 RE/Rio REACTOR 121 DIESEL 150 RE/R11 SR Page 70 of 77 Page 72 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER 1086 1087 CI LASS MARK N DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT BUILDING ELEV 09 X41- BATTERY CO08E ROOM 1C FAN 0 X41- BATTERY C027B ROOM 1B LOUVER H12619 H12619 DIESEL 150 DIESEL 130 ROOM EVALTY SR D/01 SR 1088 0 X41- BATTERY C027C ROOM 1C LOUVER H12619 DIESEL 130 E/01 SR 1089 09 X41- BATTERY CO08A ROOM 1A FAN 1090 0 X41- BATTERY C027A ROOM 1A LOUVER 1091 09 Z41-C015 BATT ROOM EMERGE NCY EXH H12619 H12619 DIESEL 150 DIESEL 130 SR C/01 SR TD/T11 SR H 16040 CONTROL 112 1097 09 Z41-C014 BATT ROOM EMERGE NCY EXH H16040 CONTROL 112 TD/T12 SR 1092 0 Z41-FD- FIRE F006 DMPR STN BATTERY 1B 1093 0 Z41-FD- FIRE FOO5 DMPR STN BATTERY 1B 1098 0 Z41-FD- FIRE F020 DMPR STN BATTERY 1A H16041 CONTROL 112 H16041 CONTROL 112 TC/T11 SR TD/T11 SR TF/Tll SR H16041 CONTROL 112 1099 0 Z41-FD- FIRE H16041 F004 DMPR STN BATTERY 1A CONTROL 112 TE/Tl1 SR Page 71 of 77 Page 73 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT 1103 01 R24-S002 600V/208 V MCC 1B 1104 01 R24-S003 600V/208 V MCC iC 1105 01 R24-S029 600V MCC 1E 0924 18 Z41- CONTROL N015A RM OUTSIDE AIR INLET RE 1106 20 X43- PNEU-P006A ELECTRO RELAY CAB 1107 20 X43- PNEU-P006B ELECTRO RELAY CAB 1108 20 X43- PNEU-P006C ELECTRO RELAY CAB 1109 18 X41- SWGR NO06A RM 1E FAN THERMO STAT 1110 18 X41- SWGR N006B RM IF FAN THERMO STAT 1111 18 X41- SWGR N006C RM 1G FAN THERMO STAT 1112 01 R24-5031 600V MCC IG 1113 20 H21- FAN 1A P530A PANEL 1114 20 H21- FAN lB P530B PANEL 1115 20 H21- FAN 1C P530C PANEL DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV H13365 CONTROL 180 N/A CONTROL 180 N/A CONTROL 180 H 16042 CONTROL 180 ROOM EVALTY TE/T1l S TE/T1l S TD/T11 S TH/T13 SR C/01 S D/01 S E/01 S C/03 S H13026 DIESEL 130 H13025 DIESEL 130 H13025 DIESEL 130 H12619 DIESEL 130 H 12619 DIESEL 130 D/03 S H12619 DIESEL 130 N/A H13610 H 13610 H 13028 CONTROL INTAKE INTAKE INTAKE Page 72 of 77 180 111 111 111 E/03 S TB/T1l S N/A S N/A S N/A S Page 74 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER.0844 CLASS MARKN 20 Hll-P601 DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV REACTOR N/A CONTROL 164& CONT COOLING& ISOLA CONTROL PANEL ROOM EVALTY N/A 0845 20 H11-P602 REACTOR N/A WTR CLEAN UP&RECIR CONTROL PANEL 0846 20 H11-P603 REACTOR N/A CONTROL 164 CONTROL 164 N/A N/A CONTROL PANEL 0850 20 H11-P650 TURB, FW &COND CONTROL N/A CONTROL 164 N/A CONSOLE.0852 20 H11-P652 ELEC AUX PWR CONTROL N/A CONTROL 164 N/A CONSOLE 0849 20 H11-P628 AUTOMA TIC BLOWDO WN RELAY PANEL 0855 20 C82-P002 REMOTE SHUTDO WN PANEL 0882 0 X41- DG C017A ROOM 1A ROLL-UP FIRE DOOR N/A CONTROL 164 N/A N/A REACTOR 158 RH/R05 H12619 DIESEL 130 SR Page 73 of 77 Page 75 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT 0883 0 X41- DG CO17B ROOM 1B ROLL-UP FIRE DOOR 0884 0 X41- DG C017C ROOM 1C ROLL-UP FIRE DOOR 0842 20 Hll-P610 RPS TEST MON VB 1116 18 Ell- RHR N055A PUMP A DISCHAR GEPT 1117 18 Ell- RHR NOSB PUMP B DISCHAR GE PT 1118 18 Ell- RHR N055C PUMP C DISCHAR GE PT 1119 18 Ell- RHR N055D PUMP D DISCHAR GE PT 1120 18 Ell- RHR N056A PUMP A DISCHAR GE PT 1121 18 Ell- RHR N056B PUMP B DISCHAR GE PT 1122 18 Eli- RHR N056C PUMP C DISCHAR GE PT 1123 18 Ell- RHR N056D PUMP D DISCHAR GE PT DRAWIN H12619 LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY SR DIESEL 130 H12619 DIESEL 130 N/A CONTROL 164 REACTOR 087 SR TE/T1l S RJ/R12 SR RL/R03 SR H16330 H16329 REACTOR 087 H16330 REACTOR 087 RJ/R12 SR H16329 REACTOR 087 H16330 REACTOR 087 H16329 REACTOR 087 RJ/R03 SR RJ/R12 SR RL/R03 SR RJ/R12 SR RJ/R03 SR H16330 REACTOR 087 H16329 REACTOR 087 1124 18 Ell- DRYWELL H16330 N094A PT REACTOR 158 RC/R08 SR Page 74 of 77 Page 76 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_Ell- DRYWELL H16329 BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY REACTOR 158 RJ/R04 SR 1125 18 N094B PT 1126 18 Ell- DRYWELL H16329 N094C PT 1127 18 Ell- DRYWELL N094D PT 1128 18 E21- CS PUMP N055A COOlA HIGH PRESS 1129 18 E21- CS PUMP N055B C001B HIGH PRESS 1130 18 E21- CS PUMP N052A C001A HIGH PRESS 1131 18 E21- CS PUMP N052B C001B HIGH PRESS 1132 20 H11-P614 NUCLEAR STEAM RECORDE RVB H16329 H16331 REACTOR 158 REACTOR 158 REACTOR 087 RC/R08 SR RJ/R04 SR RJ/R12 SR RL/R03 SR RJ/R12 SR H16331 REACTOR 087 H16331 REACTOR 087 H16331 REACTOR 087 RL/R03 SR H17763 CONTROL 164 TE/Tl S 0990 08A P41- Z41-F422B BO08C ISOL GLOBE MOV H11609 CONTROL 180 TB/T12 0936 10 Z41- CONTROL H16042 BO03C ROOM AIR HANDLIN G UNIT CONTROL 180 TF/T12 0937 11 Z41- BO03C B008C CONDEN SING UNIT H16042 CONTROL 180 TB/T12 SR 0938 0 Z41- CONTROL H16042 D004B ROOM FILTER TRAIN CONTROL 180 TG/T13 S Page 75 of 77 Page 77 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARK N DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVAL TY 0966 18 Z41- B003C NO03C DISCHAR GE FS 0967 18 Z41- B003C N600C COMPRE SSOR TIS H16042 H16042 H11609 CONTROL 180 CONTROL 180 CONTROL 180 TF/T13 SR TF/T12 SR 0932 08A P41- Z41-F420A B008A ISOL GLOBE MOV TB/T11 0901 10 Z41- CONTROL H16042 BO03C ROOM AIR HANDLIN G UNIT CONTROL 180 TF/T12 SR 0902 11 Z41- B003C B008C CONDEN SING UNIT H16042 CONTROL 180 TB/T12 0900 0 Z41- CONTROL H16042 D004A ROOM FILTER TRAIN CONTROL 180 TG/T13 S 0922 18 Z41- B003C N003C DISCHAR GE FS 0927 18 Z41- B003C N600C COMPRE SSOR TIS 0991 07 2P41- 2P64/2E5 F066 1 Cooler Isolation 0992 07 2P41- PSW Div.F067 I-I1 1101 20 H21-P258 GEN 1B H&V CONT PNL 1102 20 H21-P259 GEN 1C H&V CONT PNL H16042 H16042 H-26050 H-26051 H-13396 CONTROL 180 CONTROL 180 REACTOR 120 REACTOR 125 DIESEL 130 TF/T13 TF/T12 RB/R19 R RB/R19 R DO1 E01 S S H-13397 DIESEL 130 Page 76 of 77 Page 78 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 NUMBER CLASS MARKN DESCRIPT DRAWIN LAYOUT_ BUILDING ELEV ROOM EVALTY.0345 07 Ell- RHR H16330 H40203 REACTOR 087 RH/Rll R F065A PUMP 2A SUPP POOL SUCT VALVE 833 Page 77 of 77 Page 79 of 124

.ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALK2DOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCHO82-RPT-O1, VERSIQOA E L Hatoli11ecr la~nt Units l and 2 R-'L Sale Shtstdownn Analysis Reptort TablsS.A1

-1 lSbm IIof 15)Urnit lSafc Sletdo- Ecimopssa-t ast NntPReqnlsl t s PFa App. R0 B2l-F003A C C 1 3 RFV Saf ylet/R ldVa oe .LLS 1201 H-16074 H: -16062 A745 B2-F0U3A C VAR 2 RVSfesV id Valve , J.1 1201 H-16074 "-1-l6062 154 AZ04J 021-I3.130 C C I 2 3 RPVSstyl.ejlsefValw-ADS 1201ý H116074 >'4-16062 154 AZO54 B'21- C013 G C ' C 1 RPVS styJa lValve-L S 1201 H16074 ' 1H-16062 154AZO64 B21-013C C VAR 2 3 RPVSafl/ReoVslvaw-IUS .J>>>>, 1201 H1 1-6062 154AZ2064 B21-O1I3D C C 1 2 3, RPVSafyd~ReavaV-ADS H .1201 1.16074 H-16062 15413A072 B21l-l36 C ," c 1 2 3 RPV Sy/rsOinfClvaADS v.V<%>! & 120 0154 AZ340*B21-3. 44 C C 1 2 3 RPVSaf efValvs-ADS 1201 H_16074 11-1062 154 AZ3D0 B21 -0130 1, C VAR I 3 RPV afdyJRslstValoe -LUS 120 H1074 H-16062 154 A2003'4 *21-013(1 C. C 1VSafetyfitellValv

-US 1201 H:16074 H1-6062 154'A2l93 4 B2 I -FD13 C 'VAR I 3 OV .!

LIS 1201 H-16074 1H-16062 145 A2320 B21-F01312 C C 2 3 RPV afeby/uclidVnle-L 1201 H- 16074 135 AZ320 B21-H-0131 C C 1 2 3 RFVýSafey/Rcd Valve- ADS 1201 H- 6074 1H-16062 154 AZ306 '1 B21-F0.3K C C 122 3 t RoVdMy/R.Val

.-ADS 1201 H-16074 >11-16062, 154CA0Z8 021-10131 C C 1 2 3 RPrVSs y1 -l*Va-ADS 1201 >- 1 201 167 16 A142272 B21 _0016 ~ C C H> St1 I Lineoasis lbkod Castsesmutalalsbssvsl(MOV) 1201 H1-162D1' 1116062 4132 AZ340 B21-0O19 C C 11 u OnnlsaAtnc mOudsaed CntahmmtalsslsteVahv (11OV) 4 207 11-16201 >> 1-l6062% 132 RDR107 B21-F022A C C 1" 3' boardMSlV 1201 1H-16201 H-16062 135 AZ10 B2 1-0022B C C 1 3 5nbsaoMSlV 1201 H-1-6201>

H4116062>

132 52030 1321-F022C C C 2 3 Insbe MSIV > H-16201 H-16062 1353"Z330 B21-N022D C C I 3 ls-b R aSLlrV " 4,120134 B1-16201 H-16062 135AZ350 B21-N428A C C *2 O3teWalvdIV 1206 11-16201 11-16062 '1232RC10-0 B21-N002811 C C 2 Olsol -Wmsr6 v 12035 H-16201 1H-16062 /133 RR0C6 B21-N028C C C 2 O"ubead ,1 -.V 2I Z03 H-16201 H-16062 133RC,00 " 112140=20 C C 2 Oastb-d MSIOV , 12D3 H1-16201 11-16062.

133 R0007 B21-N0136 ON ON 3 RPV W""nlasl diendIl H21-010)).

1262' H-16026 H-10063 130 -RH1110 B21-N1062.

ON ON 3 NOV Wsrte .ellsunaiswRfll-P004)

-, 1203 H. H-16026 H-16063 1583R00-6 B21-N097D ON ON 3 RPV lSeoslWalanlbrwnR y 1205 H-16242 H-16063 130 8RR04 B21- N095A ON ON I :RShned (SuIb-,Ae) p -.W 1203 11.16026 11-16063 1580R01100 B21-N093B ON ON. 2 RFV SlodWal.f-1zelflmilw21-O61

-(S-abwspene) 1/4 120w 11H-16026 H-16063 B2 -N140A0 ON, ON ' I RPVPOý7ni bnadonRIltCsseSpayPedni)

I12-009 (Snbnspaso)

'1203 V10-16243 11-16062 1501611168 1621-N1090B ON01 ON 12 1O LePlstesssts12140)(nenw)1205 11 16026 H1-1063 12010014 021-ND90C ON ON I RPVlnn tsisinmTheoodtes (M12-P409)1 3Scmac)123 B 6026 H1-16063 138161100 02,1-N140D0 ON ON 1 2 'NOV Pr==Tsneflmssa(R11NJCm Spay Pamisaiva) a162-P4025) (OSdsossspe)

> 1202 11 16243 11-116063 120861LR03 B21-N0915 ON ON I RPV WaneLevTenlasflrRCiC"tOli(121-P4045)(SOnbe s) ..1203 H. 6-1243 H1-16063 1581R.R03 B21-N091 B ON ON. 2 RNV WaW LeelT rnsferl-tPl l41flwmlswl-P405A)tSu~compI45)

.. 1205 13-16243 11-16063 1.1 6 RR 1 y 0 3 .B21-N091C OON ON I

":4A3(OS:bnnpe" 1203 H-16243 H 16063 2R00 1113 B21-N0910.

ON ON 2 OV W el- sansmie-fwL6llSn (121-P405A) (Ss-) I 2 05 H-16243 H1 6063 5 R1016163 112 -N14303: ON ON 1 NOV W=reea~anmtnLel (Subc-anpee) 1 1203 11 16243 It-16063 1201611160 0ý121-N(0630 ON ON 2 01 -ý rsrfýOau)(u

ý 1205 H16M2 1116063 130010106"' Netos ae iskd m pa 1.5 of 12 ."'Mode : 00pmAO-Owb vAe=vonnFs allNn- fionlncom 0 tntl)F"'Pesssynspssslpass sosoatswt aess-f -e61fAees&assle3l3 l 0 natL'4I>

Page 80 of 124 OACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS F. L HaMb Nowl IPlot Uift 1 od 2 SacO 30114.0 Arwris Report NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSIQO TobI03Al-1 (Sh2 of1335 U.,I W Sofo- FhodF-t Liu N-oPl t Ro49ool", B21 -N095A ON ON I B21-NM95B ON ON 2 B21 -NI20A ON ON I B121-M2WB

.k ON ON 2 B21-NI20C k ON ON I B21-1N20D k ON ON 2 B21-NI22A k ON ON I B21-NI22B k ON ON 2 B21-N]22C k ON ON I B21-NI22D k ON ON 2 821-NI27A k ON ON I B21-NI27B k ON ON 2 021-NI27C k ON ON " B21-N 127D k ON ON 2 B21-N620A k ON ON I B21-N620B 0 k ON ON 2 B21-N620C k ON ON I.21-8N620D k ON ON *2 B21-N621A k ON ON I B21-N621B k ON ON 2 B21-N621]C k ON ON 1 H2,-N621D k ON ON> 2 B21-N622A k ON ON I B21-N622B k ON ON 2 m21>N622C k ON ON I, B21-N622D k ON ON 2 0121-N641B k ON ON '-2 B21-N641C0 k ON ON I B2I-N642A k ON ON I: B21-8N642B k ON ON 2 B21-N643A k ON ON I B21-N643B k -ON ON 2 B21-N6IOA O/ON G/ON I B21-N63B.

0 /ON O/ON 2 B21-N690A O/ON VA?/ON I B212-N690B1 o, VAR 2 B21-N690C 0 VAR I"B21-N690D 0/ON VAR/ON 2 B21-N691A O/ON 0/ON I B21-N691B:

"/ON OON : 2 RPV WoowILoolTtoooioW(121.P404B) (Sbcwopto)

'>0PVWm00Lovo7000orow=fl-P405)(Subooopoý~)

RNV USftP,1uooouoow(R821P404A)

RNV LLS ooooolw12.p0B RNU LS P80.. 7rmit B21-F060A11 01PV US Pressort, Tustrunitte(121-P403A)

>'RNV US ft- ooIenmitt0012.

OUIO4) .RNV US PorsueToo1'toow teOM(82-P403B2 RNV Frems-oooo.truieitrr E21-P4048)

RN P-TreIosWoow(102-P4OSB)

RNV Poow7.oowo03(1821-PA4C)

RFNPrm=Trtueoi0w(001-M45D)

RNV L-w Pm- 06T RNV L-oP- MrU RNV Lowph-rrMTU RNY LoýP- STU RNV Lao,ý a8.. STU RNv 14. Pmo SiTU RN Luow amt slu RNV Loý oessrr S`W RNp L-, Pm Ným RNV Low Pm MO l RNV Lo, P~~.- STU RNY Lowy Pftooo-STU RNV Lo, ~w,o r5ThS RNV L- Pm- 18T RN Low Pr.oo NMTU RNV Slooo Wet. Lood 0 MTU (Sohooopwo RNV Presuiw Otiooool A Wicatocoo 0671 to B2 1-11623A (Sub-opwwo)

RNLow Pwviisuo 0670 (to Cori Spoey)RN01) (Sublwonento)

, RNV L.. F-MoacM (96 Cao Sjo.Y/0UM) (Slýocopof)

RN P-aoomQi B o41.6a.MflUto 21-1602301 (Sob P-00)'RN WaoloLavl0d~ko~on067to B21.15604A1(Su 5mea ,<1205.1205, 1203><12,05 1203 1205 ,<1205 1203 1205 0024 0024 0020>0024.0024 0524 005204"0024 00204 00204 0024 0024 0024..0024 0020 App. R2 13-16028 141-16026 11-16028 18-16028 H1-1602,8 H8-16028 H8-16028 10-16058 U2-16028 H0-16028>H0-16025 H8-16028 18-16028 18-16249 H8-16249'H0.16249 10- 16249.H0.162,49 18-18249<H0-16249 B106249 H8-16249 H-10-62,49 10-16249<10-16249.,1-16249 H0-16249;11-16249k H1-16209>H4;,6249 H1-16249 H0-16249 10-16209 H1-16249 H1-16249>-1H-16063" 18-16963:H-16063 1i-16063.H-16063 H-16063>0H-16062 H-16063 0H-16063 11- 16062 H-16062 H8-16062;H6-16062 1H-16063 1H-16063 H' 16063.B1- 1063..>5-160.W H-J66 H8-16063 H0-16063 H2-16063.H- 16063 H8-16063'H0- 16063>35-38063 11-16063.18-10063.H8-16063'H0-16063 18-16063 1d58 RH,,D8 158 RI00 3158 RHRO3 S158 RHR08;.158 RHRD4' :158 RHR04 1390111909' 1580118010 159 0116014 13601180108 1560300 1111-P66 1HI 1-,P92>111-1926

-H01 -P926, H11-P926 H 11 -?9z5 1H81-P926 1811-0623 H,351-P925 H11-P927>Nob9. -0lstd 0 009p06 152 o2m ModoAbbr-atoooo O=Op=. C=0034d VAR=Vzou&OO.

=FuuoWooo looswl 6 000ooow.0£o r ~ ooo .ooponobops I os.fo soToblo.3.Al-2.

pr.0ooooy cooopooot/ssoaaot oos.op01 ao.ofmoo C61c 3.AI-3. Also o.oto6 Page 81 of 124

.ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS E. L H .h Nuclw PI9 00 i I aod 2 Solo Ihotd- An.])- Rtpoo NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSIOO R-o 35 robin 3.A1-1 (0b003d!f13ý Unit I Saft Shut Equp- "stJ9 N-101I~ Rrunin1 0ýB2i.N69IC ON ON I B21-N69ID ON ON 2 B21-N692A<A' 0 VAR I B2 .R1N6K2< 0 VAR 2'021-N692C 0 VAR I B21 -N692D " 0 VAR 2 B21-N693A:'

0 VAR I B21-N693 0 VAR 2 B21-N693C.

' , .0 VAR I B 2 1-N 6 9 3 3DO-!! '0 VAR 2 B21-N695A 0 VAR I B21-N69ý3

0. VAR 2 1321-N697A k 0 VAR I B21-N697B k 0 VAR 2 B21-N697C k 0 VAR I B210-1697D k 0 VAR' 2 k 0: VAR I IB21]N697F k 0 VAR I" k 0 VAR I.121 N697H- k 0 VAR 2 B21-N697J k 0 VAR 2 B21-N697K k 0 VAR 2 B21-N697L k 0 o VAR I B21-N697M k 0 VAR 2 B21-Rfl04A ON ON 3 B21-R010B ON ON " 3'21-R070 ON ON .3 B21-R604A ON ON 1: B21-R604B" ON ON.' 2'RPV W-` L-1 M (Suboooponmao RPVW-r L., el MTU ISubcautpotea)

VMWater 1-l2 STU fRc1C (i~oSobw.poot RPVWnanoav1-&2 sru k1PcHm Tit~tknob,.(nkpat)

RPV Watr Lw1a 2 MUl fbn RCIC lsI0.n (Souooomp-o.

RPV Wat. Level 2 ST k, HPC. WA Sa4 : RFVW.w Lcvclg MTU fbcRcICSIonf21mn RPVWnowl-vI 6MTU64-11P0 ( tof0bop 099 Watr flnod 0STU ft RCIC Snuaff.(Sn-b

ý )RPV Wa0terwIme 9 M71 6.HC M. (.- -RNV WaterLeval 3 OATU)(ooo~o0 RPV WaterL.~c 3 KM~ (Oodooypaoo)

RPVLI.OP Mblu R0Y Le PressreaM7U RPV 1-Press-n NMl RNp L- Prsavn MT71 RPV LmrwPrn- M3i RN FLmw rrSil RNY Lo- ft-on g RN 1w10ow Sil RNV I-Press-Shi RNV L-w P-m0 SI!RNV L-w P-oo STUJ ItYIn. P00atSowTh RNV Pft=n Judi-n nOIl14004)

RN Ptezs-IM 110135.906)

'RN 14004WweLdhonir.40jHI-PI73)

RPVW.69l-odbw06o I RNVWateL.,abl ficl N&- App. R j W'0 2 " H-1624 9 004'A H0-1 6249 0024 H-0-16249 002A H1-16249 0024 H1-16249"0024, H1-16249 0024 H-16249 ,0024 H1-16249 0024 H 0-16249 0024' H01I6249~0024 H1-16249'0024', 01-16249'0024' H-16249 004' H1-16249 0024 H1-16249 0024 H1-16249 0024 H41-6249 002A H0-16249 102A3 H-16202 1002 0162437 0024~ H-16249 0H024 H1-16249 14-16063 ý1p H1- 16063 " 119926 H~0-16063 0111-P937'

'B0-16063 Ill11-9929 01-16063' 0111-9928 H1-16063 0111-9925 01-16063 01119922 01-16063 0111 9926 H1-16063>

011-P926 H1-16063 0111920 H1-16063' mlý-I927 011-6063 HI1-P926 H0-16063, H1114927 H-1l6063 0121-9928 01-160623 0111-9927 H1-16062-3 01-P927 H1-16062-6 H11-1'027-H4-160623 0111-190.01-160629' 011-P928>11-190623 0111-P928 H-11606n3.H 01-P927 11-1606201 001-9292 B4-6063 1520R0R09 H1-1 6063 158 RI06IN 01-1663~ 130 RR0R4~H1-16063' H11-P603'H1-16063 -ffl-P603 H1-16063 HI 01-P601 01-16063' H1P-P60I, No- .130 RLRD4 B0-165677H I- 011~92.01-6063 '1596R1103 N-1 130001190 li-16567 0111-9902 D-11004 11-7AIM D- 11 004 INTAKE5 H -16330.87 RL~011 B2l-R623A.B2 1_R623B C32-KC70, r02.0640 C32-NO70 C32-NI1O C32-R0270.

C.32-R65 Ell -=OIA Hl1140010B ElI -0063A ON ON ON ON ON ON ON:,.>ON OFF SOFF.ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON I RNV Uwoo- R.-ter 2 RNV LvelffircemareRnow6.

3 P-tn Siop"6C32-N1070 and R070OU 02-9173) (Oohonpmn) 1 2 Fccdow lot MLopP-0oppl (Sabooo=o8,0) 3 RNV~astoovTnootmao(Sobooowooo) 1 2 RN .WRoMoeII oofooon(9121P4653B)(Sobooipooo 3 RNpoprooarhnAoobn(B121-P173) 1 2 RFNW=0 ol Iodhh.0 I ItHR.Sairvoo foor Rp I A2 3 0010 SriooW- .FF .o I B I .1RMPusupIA o024 0024 12001 2050 1205 0024 1203 01-16249 1H-16249'H0-42837 0H16249 H-40168'3-16029 H1-16026 H-16249 H14013 H1-16113'N-n -10160-0pop915 of IaýMo& AbbowinklooO=OPoo COClctnd VAR.Vadoo,~

P7Pooooooo1 (Noo-pooltooa1 c~p ><'0'l p-moY ooopouctat/

submponool cxt-onhoo.sieltOO3AI,-2.'" Ponojony copooool 8100 .ownfio opooootl oouo-onoo=sTobl.

3.A-3. Ali,.n'o0k.

-Page 82 of 124

• AACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKODOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCHO82-RPT-O1, VERSIO*E. LHa~h NucjrsWhaU~inruand2 9-935 Safe Sbutdovawnuaiyis Rcpon>>>Talbz3.Al I-i > >)F-p App. R Ell-CD02B120 OF N 231Jf*I -40207>> 1-1632 F00LA02<3 El i-l43A 0 0 1 RHR Heat xdi~a. gA Dl~axg Valn(MOV)20 H421 H-639 11 R3 Ei-03. 0 0 2 3 RHR RestAEzdxW B DintrVelw

(.N0V? 1205 H140206 11-16329 112101110 Eil-TO04A 0 0 1 RHflPump IA Twve uedaVaLve vIOV3 12D3 14-40212411-16330 90151013'Eli 111D4B 0 0 2 RHR FwnpllBTmvankluo+/-AnVal-Cmov)> 1205 11-40209>9>H-16329' 01106-02-El 1-0000 0 VAR 3 1111 Pop lB 7muswi 1.mVhlvemOV) 1205, & 1-40209 11-16329 9011102 Ell-0006A C C 1 3 Rl06PomplIASDC oumni.Valve(91V)

I~ '123 H1-40211 &16330"'0711411 ElI-0006B C C <2 11 Puemp IS SIDC Suoon Vilv (1,&0v) 1206 H1-40207-11-16329 Eli-OO 611 C VAR 3 lRlPmp Il SI2C SmnVa]ve(MOV) 1205 H1-40207 11,1632097110 Eli -006C C C ' 3 RHfPuplIC SDC limn mVtlv(MOV) 12D3 1140210 11-16330 11111 >>>Ell-REOD C C 3 lRR PamplDF)SEC oalcoValv(MOV) " 12035 H-40206 H1-16329 145103 El1-04007A 0 VA I 110Pump. IA mo lCPMoiiom FlowBypm Valve (1V3 912,03 1-40212 H1-16330 0111'E 1-9007B 0 VAR 2 ,23 llffiPmsu1al1094lmdID MiniP~ovv1 2 mnvlvee p.am v) ,> >" 12U5 H1-402,08 E-16329 93110 , '9 E011-000 C 0 3 IRIOIOC Section otbomteCooeomo Isnhlnlo Valve (NIOV) I ><1203 10401644 5-16329 1389111R101 ElI :-0M f C c H 11 ESllfC SattimOolb-dIConloahmen hllme-VW,,c(MOV)9

§i 1203 H1-40 164 H1-lon 13612006 El -0009 'c 0 ' 3 Rl]llDC Setonouobomd Cnainmoumt aolaniValve

()610v) '9>>>'5'> 201 511ý6116, H-16329 137423 El11-0009 f C c H< 11 R SD S"Jn mmemIeme av m 1201 1116116 H1-16329 137 A2223"*.ElII-00l d C C 1 2 3 IRURHeat IoumgwmmwpeavQV

'P 203 B-16-1115 H1-16330 §121 Ri107 631-0011A C C I lflkHe" dmqAxfumlppajou

&I. o(940V3 1203 11-40209 51146330 12,21R1I011

>>Ell-FO15A c 20 h~imo~owfob~upwi~~aw~Os

> 1205 11-40205 H1-16329 §12215100 611-13 CH 0 ~ fLPCIllnboooslamdzp~ulv, UOV) >,1203 11-4014 H1-16330 133 RJR08 EII-0013A C 11H R51R L. llbond udmbap Valve (50V3 1203 11-40164 H1-16330 133131R06 Ell-FDI39 C 2 50)cooo~idu 6 avu1V 1205 H-16116 14-16329 1471111006

! ; H11 CH 11 a 15Jlhbom4Ol uoogoValve 1040V3 12D5 H1-16116<

H-16329 '147 RH3060 ElII-FO16A C C I cuolmbend pmhOufteedlahnb64.alvet wov) '1203 H140170, H5-16330 1601110606

..11-FO1611 C 2 3 CanalaaaedSlusotetutboaialaflvalvo(MOV) 1205 <11-016 H-1632.9 '130RHRO06 El1-0017A "0 0 1 I ~ 10llOo1uftsd lsoOilgVd (mo.Avs 1203 '1-40164>

H-16330, 133110 RI 011I-FO17B 0 2 3 6306 LPCI Olbo-m-Dh rje Vdul(MO6dV) 10> 1110,1-62 4100 011-0026A d C 3C ~ ln~cagntlEov(1V 12a2 1116115 11-l6330ý 11913011O 01-0261 d C c 13 RI1051eat EucliipogArtoR=lValve(MOV) 1202 H.11-420 --15339p ,1219RJI El~~~~~ 3-OO CH Cca Exhne Bwo wpy5H Tint lion c Cobmo .41 ave 1202 11-402035 1-1633.U 10100 E1l-0028B C C 2 3 Ton 3p~n/fiM Test lane Ou5hod lmoulton Volv CMOV3 1203 11-4020 H -16329 '1201112U9 011-047A 0 0 =HIy R5R1lu1om~k~lM Va) NOV"1202 1-4G010 11-16330 115111113 0110471 0 a 1 2D 3 HElulnf0n~lnMV

,' 1-40206 11-16329 '15111102 011-F3484 0 VAR 'I RHRfBelEAl1+/-mooABylpmuValyeavlOV)

> ,203 11-40210 11-16330 115110R13 El1I-00469 0 VAR 2 3 RHR fzE. onBlnmav(O)'10 1426 5-62>>15110 1-04 Cp C~h 23 10oadnolwilv (MOV3 H151 1-49"0 11-1639 12215 1102 Ell-FO65A 0 0 1 1111 Pump IA Spp-inmwPool 040.m. Valv (40V3 >> 12 H4003 ' A 1-330 01,11011 81"W"63 0 0 2 3 lRBtPupll Sopp-mobP-ollocdanlv(Aov)

'~1205 11-4020 I p-t, 9,1I0 E11-0068A C VAR RRR IHR-mI-vclmoA S.-aeW.-n RoCowolVflve(MaV3 91203 1140210 H1-1ý6330 1121513 Ell, 068,cVAR 2 3 RHR1Hoot EoaangmflonvlWarFlt.

CiniolValve (SaV) 1203 1-4O6 -6I1 'u"Nctes are 5trl mpage 15 d 3.'McdoAbbonvimn- (NpC=od VAomoa Pmdcllo-pomioul eo-ai3 9//1/2Rnpmynpiomicoo-xae-mfn n al A1 t 9> >>>K'~' mjomn~vepmvt/aovo amoloo omontlcw-rnineontanTabn Al 3M Page 83 of 124 O ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSIO*S&f Shnul-o. A11ly-i Rq-n" T.19o3AM (Sb- 5 df 15)UbI I Sofo 3hlEiowoEq.opo-flIo Ell.19l73A C C I E1R =IoW.6tE1RQ.&8oe-6OV)

'~ ~ 1203 Ell.0573B C C 2 3 RMlS ofooWUMM010RU2Qý%M041OV) 12 Ell-FI04A C C 1 E11EtF1o-goAlV=1lzva(M0V M EII-P1I060 C C 2 3 01E1iEdoEVoRloMV 1205 Ell-FJI9A C C c HRlE koal 1aloM1203 Eli 9I19B C 2 3 RHE3SilftoWm, pwstioVat" (dOV) 1. '202<Eli I 1F22A C 11 H LMDw"'C~kWePýE~td a A 1201 ElII F 22B C 11 H LIMih~~tc.df~t=qli~l 1O)201 Ell 11070 ON ON 3 Sq- RootllCýHfbrEll-NE7ý0(H21-P173) (Suboompý)

~<' 205 jEllK07 ON ON 3 1~~ofE I K0.Ol-40(9P173) (Sobowop-aw)

~ 12D,:ElI.K023 ON ON 3 05=o=fmwRE1-Xo7l sod 01-1ý071(1-121-P173) (Sob amnso) 12a3;E1I K6073 ON ON 3 E1EýS1odrifoogolA 12odp311sodcMI-I73)oSqoosopsolC l~a" Eli 1(K000 ON ON 2 RIME HsoR5CAOEDhsbwzopHl o1FSqooRoolC-mýjSbooo-psoo):K 0024 EliJ K603A ON ON I REM HedlExohmqofA:Dlo,3nHds Fowo Lmop Po3Supply ISolbcomot)

K0024 El Il(_603B3 ON ON 2 EHR 1W Ko1EIC1B.DiwobOlgO11.dm oNOWLm PNSup.ply (Su--1 Dm02 ElI I N)03 B ON ON 3 1000Hý 11iioubmog B T16c wSbass D3flfoolao P- luff.ldý 2o(I121.P021)

.1203 ElI-N027A ON ON I R11R soIExdu6O.OA S- 1-hýFwT-ý(L.

S--t 203 El1-11007B ON ON 2 RHR EHw ooos DS-iolsW-1.1d Fl-osTh-oLQ. (Lal)(Sob-mpo)'

,1205 EI I-NOISA ON ON I RHE Hod-gA>~uHýn -ta(nIP19 Sl--) 1203 EII-NOIIB51 ON ON 2 E1001100EodooAB L"~dFv~nU(I1P2)Sb.p-1205 Ell.NO17A , C:, 0 1 RIMN Ha& o~h'woA 0-.W W --Sw~ S-p- 203 El -NO17B '>,. , 0 2 RIMEH BboosSovl Wo 1,1,t PswSwdods(0oooSubooo).

.1205 EI I-NO17C C 0 1 RIMEO. o~sSOIV4oWOWS.hooOOOO SOS4*O (Subooomp-2 1203 ElI-N1,0170)

C 0 2 EllflEt dExd=W,. B S.os oW-001.1dlfP-oSoiob (Subco-poo)

~. 205.EI1I-'N0211

.C/ON 3A/O R F MEl lýhH( l.Df -WS Sb 1203 EIl-NO55A k ON O N R> I~ ij I p<,hP- f-U -1203" EII-N.0551 k.ON ON 2> R II R Ftuuop HighI'omlyumi=

0-D 1205 EII1-NO55C k ON ON I RHE PupHigh Pssoosoloo-ooo(Lo.D 1203 El I-NO55D k ON .ON 2 EH hwHE~op3oSaFomoolosO C-o) >> 1205 EII-N4056A k ON 'ON I -R-lP o~High mdw-ool) "' "' <10.EII-N016E 1, ON ON 2 RHEPpWHlghPosoooooslu(oo

~< "' 2W EII-NO56C k ON ON I .0 RHFpbh9M-tý-

1203 ElI.NO56D) k ON ON 2 Rist Puplzh Pm,- Taoooos0-0o 1205<El I-NO70 ON ON 3 91001Had Exm BooGosO OW uwI11ooIhoooWjooso~os9, K Ku 1205K E11-N3071 ON ON 3 RHR H=ed t~ioExcag EoSmim Waw Went Flow, T-t 'S-ua1205 EII-NO92A ON~. ON I E1~o~cogs~tbsolds1o~fmo?~~osmIo~ooo>lE>

El -N082B ON~ ON 2 ENERos EOI=gI0DI~dOO(SHOOdý11O osoobOIPoUO losoosý(Solsossoo) 1201 Ell-N094A

'k ON: ON I RH Hih.~m mmm Lm 1203 El1-ND094B k .ON ON 2 RHlE Hsgls ~ Tysftl P0ooohosoiloosLoa 1205 Ell-N094C k ON ON I EEig lyllbsolo03to)'1202 Nosbol pg,~E 150of1b.SMods Abb-m-oos O=Opcn. C=Ckso4 VAR=VoslooI-%I If a~o6ss (p-00610000 I~pn0yt0Ioopsss~bwcofn

-Toblo3.AI-2.,*' fFpowmryo ooras / -poor ootoobos ooosp=-: Wlwrdfsoloo=

oiT61l 3M-3. AL, Loooo R-.35 App. E<'-316115 B~>-16330 1lI4RLRO7 H4 02601 R-1>6329K>'114 RlRM7 H1-40209 'H-16330 '123ERHR13 H-4050 H1- 16329' 122 R11E H1-4M030 11-16633039 119RLR07~, 31-16116 H- 1116330 "114AZZ20 H2-16116 H1-16329K.

114 AZIlE"03-2S37 H3-16329 130 RLR04 11H42837' H0-16329 K130 RLEE4 I"0 23-4 7 H1-16329 1301(12106 IIA1-2837 H'1-16329 130 0104'03- 16249 H-1116330 HII1-1013 11-16249<

H-163209 111-P613 K H3-16249, 11-.6332H9 01-P613 H1016111 11-16329, Hl7P1.21 H-16025 oH630 97 RLE13,>H3-10&2 -1,32 67 RIRD3 H-16240H130 , 1 F c0,>11-16113 H3-6330 21, 7R19EIN]H9-16115 H11,6320 1171(1100,>

19-16113,5 11-3632 1,7031002'1-16115 19-16320 11001.007 11-40212 H1-I6330 " 17R21'~'0-40208 11-163220 j-,0213 ku "'H-012 1116330 <870RJR12" H-402084K11-6329 ,E7ELR03'H1-40212<41-1633D

'67ER2E2 H.1-4WA0 ",1-16329, 870120 .'K HA-4212 11-16330 87011R12 11-40202 11-16320 87010023~H-16240 li-16329" 9001002 10-16240' H.16329 K9001.002 H0-16240.

'1-16330 'K119 R1.R1 U H1-16240.

H1-16329 119EL005, 11-40172 1 630 "15103004 11-40171' 1-1633 ~~1I, I 0 Page 84 of 124 O ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION& L Hatch Nucla Plant Uniti jand 2 Safe Sholdowam Anolyml RopWa R.y. 35 Tlhla3.AI-1 ( tof 1( ) he6 ', Uni I Safe Sliolto Eq#ip:ot Lir MPLNo, ElI-N094D El I -N655A El I-N6.5B El 1_-N635C El I-N655I El l-N656B El -N656H EII-N662A El l-N6O2B El l-N60BA El 1-14694X El l-N694C El I-R6T40 El i-M,0i: EIIJ-R0r71 EII-ROOZA El El I-R603A El 14460381 E21-CI B E21-F001B E21-FD04B E21-F00A E21-FO05B E21-FUM"B E21-F015B E21-FO19B E21-lO31B E21-IK137A E21-F(137B E21-K600B E21-NO03B E21"-NOSI E21-NO52B 6E2 -N651B E2l-N652B E2I -N65B E21-R601B:

NonaoP Roqubvd: t NmP Mod :0:M Mod P5 k ON ON 2 k c VAR I k C VAR '2 k C VAR I k C VAR 2 k C VAR I C' VAR. ,2 k C .VAR I1 k, C VAR 2 C 'VAR I1 c , :VAR' 2'k C VAR I It C VAR 2 t C. 'VAR I1l>ON ON -3:'ON ON 3: ON ON I ON 'ON' 2 2 ON ON I ON ON 2 a OFF ON 2 a 0 * '70 2: S 0< 0 2 C C H c 0 :: : 2:: H© C : : : C :Ni: a 0 0 2 0 VAR 2 d C C H: d C C H ON ON' 2 a ON ON 2:927 a ON ON 2 oek ON ON 2 o~.ON ON 2 o: C VAR 2 o c C VAR 2.k C : VAR 2:, ON ON 2 KlRpBR HighD

ý -(.L .,o ,, ..ca. -,., ,)RmR 3mP WI&P.f MTU RH anpWM&

RUlE Pump High uresar Mrh"mN " moR wg.RH-- P1 ghW)nTM RHR Nghflhl A &I bnM0 l -2U(~bp-Pn tips I &y ID... imo.......atW MTV (Suhin RIME H. PnOo Tonu TU W RHE I loROS p-aa O M ..RHREr9 N 07.1 Oz r-l MonTat111 RHRE High Doyw49ThpresuoeMM EdooB lx ýhmr Headit Plw Id s .(H2lI -P" 73)'RH Heal = BESwv Ia ý W U l H2Dlw h .iiba W I2-P1 73)RHR Heat Aanu S- ~Wt. 110 l-j~lo RHR Hadt Eaohener A OodiopfHeadenrFowlona Can Spiy PoMp 18 OuthaadoTonxivutaoulaoValvo (90V)C-o Sposy lSBt IRPV Outld aoolrla (IOV3 2 cm.tSpiylIA Coatoionaholation Valve (hOV), cuat Spiy lB Cooilatnia too hoolaValve (NOV)C=oSpiny lBCatnooiaootkdlaoalnVol~ct(dOV)'

Coot SponyPatap18Tistypnno.Volvo (PiIV)CamSpty Pumap 12 lakaird Tooni Suqtan Valta(WV)CamSpray Pain;, 18 Moaa FowtoiaPeoa, Y" (NoloOV)CootSpny lAM-toalvc Vu lao-noo -4pooala~1vt(V)\" CornSpiny 1lBahe&Vainpeeuaooooqoalo Valt~a(AOV)

Cant p Spn [np laný Lanomolp Poaves Supply (Suhonlttfl)>

Can-pn LoapE PlawflaTW.ll(lw(-P0l9) lSohooom ea Coo pnyLo B Hoghhtsomn tamlll -P49)CmitSpnany Lopalflgh ftwiooTeoamall(H2l P419)Coo Spny PupI 18 Pdooitot Fl.w'Cwfulh96IUlStoIitopaoa C-t Spiay Loop B H~igh PavýutottWl C-a Spiny LooflPan aloo F-n 0024+S, *0024.1204" S0024" 0024' 0024 1205 1285 S 1205 S " 1205, S i:00724 Rn4 RG2 App.. .R'" H-40168 :H-16329,: H-162,49 H-16330 W:-16249 .H-I 6329, 1H-16249 1H-16330 H1-16249 H-16329, H-16249 B11-16330 1H-16249 H-1632i*,216249 461630 ,-.H-I6249.I U;-163N 11-16249 H-jim'33 H'2016249 11- 163 29'H-1624" H-1i633m H-16249 H-163hi H16249 1' 2162'30 H-16249..

H-16329 H-42137 '. H-16329 H-42&37 11-hi63m 1~j6249 H-him H.16249 ' 6329~F1.-161249 "B-16330 "" H-16249 "-16329 64020 'H1-16331' H-40206. H-16331>4,1-4168

'X216331'H-16123 " Hl633'409169" &206331>,40H.149 11ý-H631-40250 &-16331 H16121' 2016331.164029 1116331 H16123 ' -1116331, H16123, 20-16331: H016249, 2163 H640208' 20146331 ,612 51633j H161-420 1-1633 1 Ht2240208 P,16331'64249 H-16331' H21116249 2146331 H-6249 H006331'16249 11-16331 1. 31 -]027 ,.HII1-P902','

' HI I-P927 -HI F-`92"8 "nHý H j-926 '<SHII-P62" >:1611-2027 1, 6 97702 HI 31-_2I2K ,130RU0, MAD4 '2'13DRIRD4

.1431-P601:

2 11-P660 H11 -P601 95 RI1M0RFRO4 138 RPRI 0 179 RPRO4.":179 RFR04 1238 172 AZ270 172 AZ090 1lý61-212>9' 98R1102 '87 RLR02 87 RLRo2 HI1-P928 1111-P2028 ,HiT-p92 m Panpainoiy cuaoopoaoa aohooopaoo oooitfon Table 3A1-2.~'Fur piaimoY eeoapanetal suipoln aoaooilo -oiP-a oon-orino Tab~ile3Aj-3.

Alia; 00 -te k.Page 85 of 124

• ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSIO *T.11k3AI-1 (3hý7.fUI)

U- I Sde14osst16qupoteLai Nosmalu Roqslie4 ' App.... l> _k. SS MH .:m ....... .... -.B41-cmi~120 F" O 211aFP 'l I16131 1116333 87 110160 41 I OFF .,OFF ,3 *Hp = ,1205 I H-16131 1H-16333 RGRO r41-COO OFF ON 2 H11:C1fme (Sut, mpen40) 201.05 H-40269 Ht' 1.l6333 931130 2 E4 I.CtOZ-3 0FF ON14 2 11PC elee .0eboO puws 1205 S45-5506 H-f1640 87161301b c 0 2 -. .C ineSmasppSuVply Vh(MOV) .12055 H1-40269 H-16332 931621601 041-1102, b 0 'VAR 2 NPCI Thltloeumu.Supply hlcaulOnnt6 MolI.- VM V0) 0 V 1201 H1-1626-4 li-i6332 133 AZI60 41-103 b 0 VAR 2 HM MbimpOStuomSupplyOutmo tCac, oioo NO:V) :." .Z .H-16264 H-16332, 1 3 E414-04 0" VAR 2 HMpeup e S, nVoeIA vot. CST (MM H-4M.6 H46332 93<RHR01 E41-0406 C 0 2 HPCTPtmpldfdl n V.olo:1AV) i1205 3--1202 H= -16332 '129 2RR02: E41 -F057 0 0 2 8 P=P.. O..... "OtD ovave :vo( V) 1205 H4=9 .H.-16332 1 00 1162 1041.050W C C 2 HM omop Disclup BypanTcgt Valve0,CtDM(MOV)

L'>Y~' ~ '205 H140269 H1-6332 ~93 RHRO2 941-FO12 C VAR ' 2 Hm PO ka 1esFlowypm valveto Smppý stPool(MOV)

"125 11-405269 H1-6332 1081611162 041-0D43 C VAR 2 Hlenoopl0Suctihon Os (ppmt 1h(040V) 1 1 )2 H12 6-49 6 H-16332 I95R6012 541-NFW ON HCP 041-N054 k C 0 2 1C p Socnfit" SuppratP o1 OtutW lbod21-P4V1)(mOV) 1205 11-40269 -16332 95 RPUZ02 0541-05 k 0 0 2 H 11C *udm f:!i :S.p:pooi bkoad hold Vahm oAOV) -1205 H-16131 H,-16332 '901691605C 0 2 WOLC Bum C ton ol Labe 0 Oo oil Cud. W- S H 10 11-40569 1-16333 E41-FAO4 0 0 2 u"e.ov:l"."mOV)

"' "205 l11-16262 1-1l6332 r,.14 l C 0 0 2 WO C7miwmEisuo1Tn 1P0)umo Biilui dals a (bOp " 1205 H-40202 11-16332 1 7.2 16100'3 1341-N124 b ON VAR 2 HM RotD Mwmnal Z F. V " -105 1-40207 H-16333 93RIM' .EýIFA2 c VA 2 19C~ut~ucnt1l205 S-15506 H1-162333

'93 RU1M0 1641-93032 b C 0A 2 HM9 7WttuteC0V"1.(l1OV)

(0ub..puut~)

1' 205S-1550 H1-16333 '93163362 041-1100 ON ON' 2 11OHM oop~~oo1o9onspjS1otow' 0024~ H'116249 11-16332 1111-0512 1141-K1603 ON 'ON ~ 2 Nlndostwbolo 050'2 1164 '1-" 32 1111-051 041E-11006 ON ON 2 HOO19tpODWob..~l-Tbm.o.n(fl-OI414A) (0SbootWet

.1203 1- 6240-.H1-633322 871101603'ý E41-NM03 ON ON 2 119C1 Potp 0hodmp h mueT161U M1I-P14B) (OSbcotltott , 1205, H-16240 B1-16332' 87 RURO)0,41-11331 ON ON 2 H0CPO uDlha*R EDiffm eWP-Tmilo(0 CM-P14A) (SO-o~powo)

.1205 H1-1 6240 11-1 6332" 8716311602 641-M503 k N O 2 HCPup SaoanlffPtusmbe

ý(121-P414B)

'~1205 H1-16240 11-16332' 86116 R1162 E41-NO55A k ON ON '2 I4PCrllb-%n16lP-r o T-1101-P434) , ~ ~1205 H1-40269 11-16333, 93R16130 E41_NO55B k ON ON 2 6F0 CIbb Twbhs Pi-4 tI=ntt 121 414A) 25 H429 H-63 7G1-B41-NO55C k ON ON 2 HPQ~brn&19mi.Thoo(1 -P434) 12G5 H-40269 11-16333 >>~95161302

" B41-NO55D k ON ON 2 ~ '12035 H140269 11-16333 8 716111662:

E166-N10616 k ON ON 2 HPI Tuttina Exl~ooo Floss T-o (1121-941416) 1203 1140269 11-16333 0716111602!

041-N1036D k ON ON 2 q>lkrVh m~(11F44)1205 11-40269 11- 16333 97 R) Lo r~041-N1337A k ON ON 2 HPCIýbmunLine F-os7h-.1121-P016) 1203 11-42641 11-16332 1301191604 041-110379 k ON ON 2 NI0Stiuum1at03oTh.~(HO1-05 120 11-42941 11-16332 3RKG 1341-1,05BA 6,k ON ON 2 189 1060h.0 osFlTn (1121 0516) 1203 11-42641 H1-16332 .1301691604 E41-N10361 A' ON, ON 2 PCI W 1wo~.el'1osubo(121-0534 1202 H142841 [A-16332 131091104 1641-N0IC:

k O ON 2 14 Cl~StoetLmoplsoTao.(11-0516)

1205 1142841 11-16332 120119164 041-ND530D k 011 O 2 HM SItomUCi'e P= T- (1121-962) 1205 11-42841 H1-16332 13016FRO4 E41-N1062B k ON ON 2 l49CITomt lhi 1 1 Wow Lado PumaurTdosLe.1a-)

1203 H8-402013 H1-16332 133169113 041-N10620 k ON ON 2 BF0 To- Wib WalcrLoosIRla oo1ý1m0oo.0 1205 11-40202 11-16332 I118160502 16060 axe listed mx 050013 Of 13. -Mode Altxbxtto.

O=lat C=(2exed.

VARxVimos9Poao (Non-p-iliano c opoa.6 F.t petetoy O~cpotz oItcotbpxm -oio4no .eT6.1~3.AI-2.

I Page 86 of 124

.ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSIOO 0E.. [Much Nud -r Plait Unt I -o6 2 Sole Sbuiduco A-tyo Ropai Revc. 35 Toblo3A]-l (sb lQof U ilt l S9, ShordW- Equprnrn tLrn NOOdOI Roq .. d" E41-N070A k ON ON 2 E41-N07DB k ON ON 2 641-N14MIA k ON ON 2 151.1-407111 .k ON ON 2 E41-N074 0 VAR 2 1141-N060

0 VAR 2 E41-N65 1 0 VAR 2 B41-N653 k 0 .VAR 2 1191-N635A

'k- 0 VAR i. 2 1,41ý-N655B k ' 0 VAR 2 ,41-N655C k 0 VAR 2 r,41-N65 5D 0

• VAR ;..'2,

k. o VAR 2" 41%I-656" Ik 0 VAR 2 B41-N657A 1 0 VAR 2 134"-6571 k 0 VAR 2 E411-N65SA k 0 VAR 2 B41-N658B k 0 VAR 2 B41-N638C k 0 VAR 2<, B41-N6580,'

-0 .VAR 2 E4 ,-N660A kc 0 VAR 2 E41--N660B 6k 0 VAR 2 1314-N662

.k- 0 VAR 2 041-N16620 1 0 VAR 2 B41-N670A k 0 VAR 2 E141-N670B k 0 VAR 2 1541-N671A,:k

.1 0 VAR 2 r141-N6711B k ; 0aV: 2 E'115 0 c 2 E41-R612 ON ON 2 E5 1fi"-0 OFF ON F51-C0m OFF ON ES1-C662-I OFF VAR i4 3 F51-F003 0 0 ' 1 r51-1o42o7 0 VAR I F5 -149O8 0 VAR I ES I-14I2 0 VAR 1 3 E5-1913 C 0 1 03 E5031.1M9 C VAR 1 3 HPO PpFlnnzawokiOO~t.okDrnRTD 1490 P4p. Pm Roo SuflIý D4TDI HPOIM-- Fwol-wVohvoCtrnzuoMTU(Soboornpcrnr NP~lTrnloezboonOM-l 'HM0 Tabi. Eohcw 601 I4PCISTwrn twoh MWI'HPCI STurbne &[zooldil I0'0 Sworn two IOU 11PC3 StcxmLOmSMM HPCI Sworn Lioo SilU 1110 BmitA- Ccatr S~ot. ekfDe dTl HPO[FlpcFmRooSwornLrk~1M7U.

HMd flfbrno AooLkry Lob. O1l Pomp Nrnno Sidh (Submsprnrni HF0 Pmp DolwtmoS.

wD. Ctlr.(Sobcrnp-a.

RCIC Turbrn(Sohooo 4 ,rnwo)RCI BormnoculCnw

---ROC Purp Suctio hmr So~ Pool Thiba hdoil Volvo (AOV)ROClSirnr SopplylohoooWlaol -oVolyoQOV)

SCIC Sworni Supply Oulbornzl rLoIdr na lv(kOV)RCIC P.4~ Sca-Vl- V!xV CSTII,60V)

RflC Aurp OotowdfliocbrnpYýVe o(MOV3 RCC Pornp lobooo Olidmig Vol1o (MOV)RCIC Pomup OirNut- Flow Byrn. Voloow Soppoolr Pool (AOV)Fi- App.R" 1205 H1-40269 H1-16333V 95RLROI1 412'3 H-40269 1163 95lW>1205 H-,42839 14-16333 13S0XKR06 91205 11-42839 H 1-16333 13034JR07 05 S-1550 H1-1633393 01102 ,0024 H_-16249 H- 1-633 2 +111-1`926 0024 11-16249' H1-16332 "601-P92 002 1-16249' H1-16332 H1I-P9267 05Y26 H-16249 H- 1116333 ~1111-P925':

0024 11-16249 H 1-16333' H]; jp2 D>024 H.,1-16249 11-6333..

-1: 7-1933~0024 11-16249 11-16333 16S11-19W 002 "11-16249 "1-16333' 1112)0924 H-1-6249; H4-62333 IL-601-126

~0024 "/1-16249

'1-16332'H 11-1925+ '0024 H- 1162,49 H- 116332 1-P92,6>002A 11-16249 11-16332 H1I11-F925 09024' 11-16249 H-16332 601-606 0024 K11-16249 11-16332 1111-1923 D04 11164-I 632 HIP 0024 B-16249 11-16332 1:111-1926 0024 H1-16249 H1-16332 1111-1923 0024 H1-16249 11_16332 HI111-P92 6004. H916249 .1-16332 .1111-935.0924 11-16249 11-16232 HI-P11-920 0024 11-16249 H1-16333 ...111-1927.0024 11-162A9 H1-16333 1111-1929 120 11-40269 .1-11640.627 R=2 0024 11-16249 11-16332 H01-19P12 41203 H1-16108 11-16335 87 RAJ33 12,03 H'1-40177 11-162335 00RA1A32¶# 121D3 11-16100 1-116235 90 RAR12 1203> H1-40204 11-16334 94 RAR09>4 1201 11-16259 H.1-16334.

146AZ3250 1203 H440165 H1-16334 130340097 0203' H4177 H1-16334 90RARIO 1~ ~203 H1-40204 H4-6334 124 RA1107> 1203> H1-40204 11-16334' 1233411007 120 11-40204 11-16334 119gRBRI I 00cm me o-muoo pogec~ I l. ' , Mode A34reointiv/-

0=1ms C=0Ci.d, VARVrim clrF-rAcdm.l lo.4-)n)XitommqY co61bopmIoolbcornpeacol gooo-wloorn we oTobo3.Al-2.I'i Page 87 of 124

.ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSIO*E L Hrh Nud.le Plant Uits I and 2 Salt Shutdmon Aalyiish R-. 35 Table 3.A-1 (She 9 f 15)Uull 1Iat Sbultd-m Equipawnu Lst E51s-F22 E51-FN29:E51-.FO31:

51-FO46 E51-FI04 E5 I -F523 :* EMi-N'ab1:E51-F5Pl

E5t -K70 E:5I -KO71 Et1-K603:E51:-K605 ESM-M602A ES I-M602D ES.-.M603A E5 I:M603B EMl-NO03 E51-NOSO EM1-N051:ESI-N456A E51-N056C ES-N057A 51-NW57B E51-NW59A E51-NWSB EM1-NwsOC EM1-NO58D 1151 -N(31IB ES I ND6I B E1i-N63A E5 I-NB63B-NS63C E5I -NO63SO E5I-NIG4A E51-NO64E E51-N64dC c ': C: .' 1 C VAR I C' VAR I C 0 1 C 0 1 0 0: o a. o ' .1<~i O VAR I 0 0 O 0 1 O VAR.-ON ON: ON , ON ON, ON,, I ON ON I ON' ON I k OFF OFF I'k OFF' OFF I: k OFF OFF 2 k OFF OFF 2 ON ON I ON ON I ON ON " k ON- ON IW k ON ON I k ON ON I k -ON ON :<k ::ON ON , k ON ON <': k., ON 'ON t k ON :ON It ON ON 1 k ON: , ON I k ON 'ON I 0 ON 'ON I k ON ON 2 0 <ON ON 2 k -ON, ON I k ON ON I k ON ON 3 3 3 3 3:i 3<3'R lCCPump TWtypomuVolveloCST(MYOV) 0CIC Pimp'Sect-ft.. SuppemionPOWlValve(9dOV) 1CIC Pump Section bots Sopp-Iuoc Pool Outbosod hoabto Valve (0401)RCIC Tabinestana Suppy" VovoAOY)" 3/4<0CIC amoacComrmd Labe Oil CaolaCuulbzg WobnSupply VolvoCE6OV)

RclC~ibeEbu aumkh a~ Valv. (EOV) ~RClCTiabm heohut VacumBzholuarbam Volvo(041)-

ItCTl~tble GminuduV.I. (NOV) (Sahom~po-nl RPlCTlab-oalg~lelVa (Eubvmauo-EClC Turmth 'p sd Thronle Valve (MOYS RtcfC Pwap Dlwmp Pl- Loop Squooare RM vm-- (M I1-PI 73) (&6-eop-)am RCIC Pump OiachuogopFlow Loop Pow Supply (H21I-PI173) (Suhumopant)

RCIC ausumapumvpvu(uho~cn (Su-9 RCICEO Now SulyIaomnn)

RCIC Ton.A- So lau D lo RCLC Tio A16 S6n Leak Dto Tu NPCI Toeu Am St. Look Dot Tim 'RCIC Pump Doombaj Pleao Ihomdan(H12lI-P457A) (SuboouW-1) 0CIC PumpDnep Omolmq Plinlhninuos(JU I-N17B) (Sobooiopoou)

RO2C Pmp Dzadioeg-vf-am W F.-l ouTmmudbon(112 1 -NI7A)(S ubcompoon)

RC1CIMbioo Exbouart OWe ft- u rrol dVzI-P141 B~l)RCIC Thabuo ExhamlO pop Fný Ts (M121P417B)

RMC Steam ime p-u Tho (1121-PWS5) 0CIC St=o Lion Pla That (112-N3)RClcseowLmepluuelaIu-pWS)

RCIC Stea Lm UoneabuTema (112I-N35 EcCICSte-LtuiaPk.-M

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.ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS: SfrShndow Analysis Repalot NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSIOO , -S , TabUA6 3 Sd1q, 0 U.f5)1 HEk SSD~ Modo Eal E51-N064D k ON ON ::2 E51-N066A k.: ON ON 1"51-N1066B k ON ON 1 E51-N066C .k. ON ON 2 k ON ON 2 E51-1107O ON ON"E.1-N0RN3, , "ON ON I'E1I-N085A k ON ON I F51-.ND05B k6 ON ON: I F.51_NO05C k ON ON I E51-NOO5D k ON ON I 5::-N650 0 VAR I E5 11-N651 0 VAR I E51I-N656A k 0 VAR i E51-N656C k., 0 VAR I E5i-N657A k" 0 VAR I E5I-N657B k 0 VAR I E51-N658A k 0 VAR, I k 0 VAR I E51-N65OC k 0 VARýE11-N658D k 0 VAR I E5I-N660A k 0 VAR i E51-N660B k 0 VAR I F51-N661A k 0 VAR .'E5I-N661B 6 0 VAR i 1SI-N663A k 0 VAR 1 E3:-N663B1 k 0 VAR I: EI5-N663C

• k 0 VAR , 2::51.N663D k O ": VAR 2 E5I-N664A k O VAR I 31-N4664B k 0 VAR I'ESI-N664C k 0 VAR 2"531IN664D k 0 VAR 2 E51-N665A k 0 VAR i 1451-N665B k 0 VAR I E51-N665C k 0 VAR 2 E5 1-N66 k 0 VAR 2 E51-N666A k 0 VAR I E51-N6664 k 0 VAR _:j E51-11666C k 0 VAR 2:C0 CTam RTD (0.-c1)::RCIC Tow RTID(LocIa RIPCTý RTD(Lo-1)

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K LI.16335' III I-1927$H4-6335 1111-1920 0016335 1111-1928 11L16335 HI1I1-P927 H016335 5611-1928 11-16335 HII61-1927 KH-16335W1111.P928>

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.ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSIOS Page 90 of 124 O ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS E- L -H- hNne-. PlaatUaib Id2 Safe S:,al: : Analyui Reportt Table 3.AI I (Skeet]I Uale I Sae Skatfaw Sqi N-.&a$ Requaet9`M&N~. M9111;~ SZPD mo ilh EpRw ~m PID-RIOIA VAR VAR 1 3 DreeSf Pee.aaea System Otoej. Supply Velve P70-001B VAR: VAR 2 Dryaell Paemauie SystmnNiNuemg Suply Vlve C"P75-004 0 0 2 3 Div:I H18bDFlo W bValve or- iv 2 nOa epape P70-3035 0 0 2 3 ODiv2Nigb Flow halValve forDiv2zf2y4e Ac P70-FO66 0 0 1 3 .Div1I Hish law WalIuveafir DlvI DywepijF*SP70-1061 0 0 :~ 13:1 Divl~hPIaHwlwlVaiwaDlvllaytaeoma F70-4067.

0 0 1 3 ::::::Dh, 2 High Fl-ow IVel al to, Div I= DýJnf pt P70-F138 &e c 0 1 Oae:DeecyNlagcaHookupaSationholstionValve P'75-FqISA ne C 0 1 Ea-acocy NWmge Bottl P75AO02A Canmlea, P70-F) ll 30 ,a C 0 I Heagnay Nievgnl.Botle P7.O-Af05Caewnmt P5-P13C acC 0 I aMgnCy1eea SettlenBo P'70-AOD2C Ccoectiod P70-F 141 a,c C 0 1 Sif'ii Nite.0 V P70-K601A k .ON ON 1 2 .IyweU a S-r i t ,a.Sa ysl _cv l75-3000 0 .ON ON 1 2 :EeS e S P70-K602A k 0 0 1 2 Dly"a syem Ab, P70-oK62 k 0 0 1 2 Three peaad SyeAi'rSuppFlaw Stab MN0N6A 0 VAR I Deywe~llaeaaa Sy S u P70-NO06B 0' VAR 2 Da'Y- wesh " SYsme'Nlua Supply PS (Sub P70-NO20A 0 k ON, ON I> 1 r-1 DndThwnalSystem AirSupply FT F70-NO20B k ON ON .2 DipeS Pee eeail -1 sae.eslyr P -P70-N022A k O ON Ip. :i ywd: N ia Sy:lzme, kSapplyFr:

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Uait I Sellk OlasadnaaEqopoansLig MPLN", .N R2.5-006 R25-S029 R25-S031 R25-SO36 R25-3037 R25-S064 R25-1065 R25-$105 R25-S106 R25-S125 R42-SOlIA R42-S001B R42-S002A R42-S002 R42-S026 R42-=027 R42-S028 R42-S030 R42-S031 R42-S(32A R42-S032C R43-AO01A R43-AOOIC R43-AO02A R43-A002C R43-R115A -j R43-P'l3C R43-PR16A j R43-F016C j R43-NOI3A R43-NO14A R43-N0 5C R43-NO16C R43-SOO1A T41-8002A T41-B003B T41-B004A T41-BO05B T47-K600 N-1a 0'R-ýM~ft M 5o QM46 fol ON ON.ON ON;ON'ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON IF C C C C 0 C.0 C OFF OFF O0FF OFF OFF..ON, ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON: ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON F F F O 0*0 VAR VAR VAR VAR ON ON ON ON ON ,ON ON'23 1 3 2 3* 23 213 123 1 3 2 3'23 2 3 1 3 23 2 3 23 1 3 2 3 1 ', 3 23 03 2"3 13 23 1 3 223 23"23 2 3 2 2 E210208 Voo.oipv 31 125 V dc Cabinet IF:12MM2 V W: Callinet 120r208 Va Cabinet IL 1201200 V cESS Cabtý 1201208 VacS lB l2W0/2V.nCabhmtlAlaassaesnstm 1201208 Vac CabinetflIS IaranseaB.a 125 V d Cauinel ID 120F208 Vac Distiuin lbalimuet aa In.51 V Sba W- Hammy 1A (Stlx:maup.).

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.ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS a. L Huch Nuder PW nuit I Un]d 2 Safe Skhudown Awdyu Rqu 0 NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSIOO 4PL-R .T47-R611 T47-R612 T48-AO01 T48-F PII T48-KO70 T48-K620 T48-K623A T48-K623B T48-NOOA T49-NO09C T49-NO09D T48-NOI1A T48-NI10B T48-NWOJ T4&-N072 T48-R070 T48-R072 T48-R622A T48-R622D W32-NO16 X41-C002A" X41-C02B<X41-CSO2E X41-COW2F X41I-cfSA X41-C005C X41-C09A X41_caogB X41-C009C X41-NO02A X41-NO02B X41-NO2C X41-NO04A X41-NO04C X41-NOOSA X41-N05SC X41-N045A X41-N045B X41-N045E X41-ND45F ON ON a 0 ON ON ON ON F F F F ON ON ON F ON ON ON ON~p g OFF 9 OFF 9 OFF 9 ~OFF C h VAR h VAR h VAR h 0 b 0 Is 0 0 0 k 0 ON ON F c ON ON ON ON F F F F ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON 0 ON ON ON ON 0 C C C.C.C C ON k k k Is ks 0 0 0 0"Mdeýtn:uIWuO=Opos.

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.ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSIOO E L Hatc~h Nuceoo PlantUnits I and 2 Sate Sh-Wtloo Azilyaz Repeoo Rv. 35 Table 3.Al-I (Sht I of 15)Unit I Safe Sholdot EquiptetntLin Y52-C100A OFF VYAR I 3, Mcd ColeooobItA AW OilT-&totoPoop IA]Y52-C1IOC OFF1 VAR ~2,3 'DioteGotootlCiFuel~iloTraosierooplC2 Foo 1612 X1612 App. R 1"i-23 F= YARD H-11236 H-11037 YARD 114M26 11-11037 YARD, (a) Mehanlical equipmenl to be manually operaold.(b) To. povat RPCI nentway taotPath L. ono of thefolloing valvs omutt clae E41-.i5OI.F50, F003. F124. orF3052. Sot Puo 3, App. du 2 feeH lnzto y anaoysis.(*) Requtmth tfo Pholo 1 to gafo infooýo io t Ioot 1215I (d) T"it oqoipot boo riptovol doung otootolopetoot..(o) Loop B of o qspoy onlynotod for path2 illtoev00t oftospoioto ADS aooonpomiod by. a0 IoHRI.O B.(f) PoePol I od 2. titbo vWlvo2Ell-41oSr F9 mttttoobainolowd. inP003, Appmfdo2 f adotio ciueoil-eqpoototlyt oft bp L (g) Only t too io oqqu..d for each Diesel 6o-wto Roomo.(0) Only ommtoodotlott 10otoattttrequittdftatypothshoolotd

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2012 Originator:

print: Mika Steel signature:

Date: Reviewer.

print: .Derwood Tootle, Jr. signature: )" -r -Date: Opa Reviewer:

prn Ela sgnaur! ate: Peer Reviewer:

print: Melanie H, grown signature:

°te: " Peer Reviewer:

print: 4dde-M % slgnature' Date: k--Peer Reviewer:

print.P45EfLr1A1~qWT~

cigna Date: Peer Reviewer:

print: (S~ad .'Sftev44j signature:ýý O L Date: -h~,2 Page 96 of 124 0 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0..... I ---,- , -Page 97 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Ir M MIN!..........

5 E______: m ml~ý; i W;Im ___ HO Iw~INN 11 __ i 1 i I i 1-111.H 1ý .t-Page 98 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 i-I--I I ~ ~I -~ ~ -~'~- I.1 ~- ~ L-I'~ ~ 1~- I~J ~ I I I I I I '-i ýA '.. I -.L -W -I

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.ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSIO*Pag. 2 at 14 162312012 10:55 E .H-altch Nuolsa Plarit Componer Rasurm 1 TTnf CT' 1F1)A~.Sul, 1 Stan.Edit Bul Deacrnltlrla.w Lu As Built iD. OEAINA61'809 B-FLYVL- ::A 2 i1 EQ 1041FOO7B As Built 1- 1(341lOili8A AS built EO'I1(41PDOOB AS BUIB 1" i :: 1k Bdi I lýsSuiltj 1 EQ I G4F0gBB N 14F91oA EQ EQ EQ EQ tG41FD1013 IG41FO1IA 1641 FOllS 104lr0l2A As Bunlt As BultS As Built A. Built 11i~i=:ulI.1411"Ult EQ tG41FOI,-1 As Bnlt As Built As Built odldId T_-1 d6 ý1 57 : -;1:!1 I EQ EQ EQ EQ EQ EQ EQ EQ EO EO EO G41FO15D iG41 FO17A IG41FO18B tG41F016 IG41 FO19B 1041 FMOA 1G41 FillS IG41FO21A IG41 PUl IG41 FO30 As Builr ABuilt 4x6did I ý)jWIN BBISO#B-PLYVL L" CHECK VALVE 1 CECK VALVE 1 A OUrLET6'BS-R.Yi.

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.ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSIOO 10/32=12 1o.*5 E.1. Held Nud08r Plujut C-poin e Pqa 38f 14 rý1-1L-iC7'ID SuLIDLD B18fLm idi Diia 5 841 F050l OS G41 F0509 !AS BU181 lýJ flPt8 MP1A .8-GLUO13 Vi El 87'as 89 1 .EQ 1 EQ 1 EQ 1 EQ I EQ I 1041170511A.

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.ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSIO*10/2212012 1050 E. L. Hatcht Nimlaw Plant Conmponent Ronults Pae 5 '14 iýwtA ýT- H .I D- -ASi ID1 S=~i E& 0-- f~ Do'ot uk 1161 1 141 F221 is Bilt: t162 1¸EQ 1G41F222 -is Budit 1: ,164 ~1.1G41F223A 1 G41 1223B 1 G41 F224A" IG41F224B us Bu0t1 ZBIL M 1L~EQ EQ EO us BUflt VJ= LEAK DET V GATE VAJL tUIFINSHED BYFIELD-URNMSHED BY FIELD'IJRNISHED BY FIELD=URNISHED BY IELD WO? 600* GLOBE GV-229 I/2m 600M GLOBE GV-22=I/2 600# GLOBE GV-22P I/2"600# GLOBE GV-229;URNISHEDBY FELED 1641 F225A, 1G41P225B.

us Built-vs Built ED Bl 41 F221A~ u 170 ,1 EQ 1G41F226*B S Butll 11 EQ 172 1 1 3 -EC 17411-All--

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.ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSIONO Page 110 of 124 O ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSIOI 10/23/20121045 E1. IHa~h Nu~eU PlunI C-oen wu>>P.g. 10 of 14 7F njt T ID So~ST t LID n7mi #4 11f useaip~un Lock---i IN6-& B -t 561 K- 1 TIN 64N05us US1 LOIPmRCO1 Bd21 1 IN REA=R0 K~>>'BS WELL HIGHILS I3- 91 IN hG41NY7 'Bll I RUPTUREODETECT

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.ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS 10423(2012 10:55 NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSIO*<Page 11 ofl 1 4 CT ID kol I li IN 641 aBO ke IN G4iN3eaA_, ll IN 1413B MEil 11 IN 641N367A : 1' But IN 61407 Built "_ _, j 1 I 41N372 Built i A _Bil 407 Wi_ IN 041N5372 K :;

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• ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCHO82-RPT-01, VERSIO 4 1 i10123/2012 10".55 El1. Hatch Nuulmr Pitl" Componsti Resufts~Page 120of 14 Cu ltti Subut ID 1.LB DasmVt- Lmk... .. -... ... il. ... ... .. i I 1 ILVI;N O/4"3WY 12DVYL r " 1 OvW LMT 1 k45 11 1 XG4FO071 A--=l IX 041F071B-001 N9 Bult a Buit i-8:1 Sw LMT Li 447 _ Ii 448 J 1 V4V S.NOI.1 IX hG41F073-ilhl ka ada A. BWJt LmTýw IXJý4;il F073-002 VLV SLNO 114' 3 WYitI tl!4021 rl453 l IX 1Gq41F075B-001 IX OG4IOP&5-602i 6s Built 1'I sL M iD1/'3WY1(V 4151 tM~1l- i-ND 1/4 aWY120V, ks Built 1407 1462 IX 6411-O76B-0t 6141 P077-002 kA BUilN as Built sBulit i-1~ViOw l 3 YW BV 7T&V SLIND 4'3 WY120VA 1H 041 FttlA-tJ~i 1341 FO7WA=0 A. Buft As Bullt As Built 1-ii.1 L 11 1483 1 VLV SLND 1/4' 3 WY 120VA.r4: 1I: il 4D 1/4' 3 WY 120VA 1 IX IO41FOBOA-001 A. Built 0Butt 487 .47O0 1 I X G41 pOBB-0 A. Built V1.V 8LND 114' 3 WY 12DVA qwI "T VY::I2OVA 1" ix h X 41F081IWll 1 I IX G41FOBI-0il 47- 11ý72ý73 -ý74 1 1 1 ix ýqonaFl43-0u IX tG1O4I&lB-ili2 As Budlt As Built A. Built Au BuIlt As Built As Built AS BUMt hill 1.VLV SLND Ij4"SWY I20VA 47 ' IX 1104FH 1I~Sw LMT TIW VLSN1403V120VI F'A LMT VI-V LtU4114 3WY 1Lx10.478 1L 1479 11 IXj 04F08"-02,*IX 11041F087A-0O1 I oio7-02~I B.M IX 6I41F0878-0tnBuilt 11 VLV GLND 1/4 3 WY 12OV;---- -iw-11,7 LmT Fur bntemal E.l. Hutch Nudear P~astl -ae wy.Page 113 of 124 SACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCHO82-RPT-01, VERSIO*: 1012312012 10:55 E 1. tHth Nuolear P1ant Component Reoults Page 13 d V,--tjft 15 C IT I -D -SublD ---- Stahl-~I ITX 0141F094A-101Bl I I1XFG41P054A-022

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For lntema E. 1. Halch Nuclear PLanI -a ally.Page 114 of 124

.ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCHO82-RPT-01, VERSIO*10/23/201210:55 E L Hailuh Nudezx Plant Cumo-t Rasults Page 14 of 14'Unft CT ~ ID QSb IC Sla.ls f~~t E(" Da.,Ixo" Lack IX 1041RD05 " LAs uEt I THIS IS NOTELI'EQUIP J '1 i IX b41R05e ,. ,Bd & Re ed F IUPOFFOR WCC K4hZ I X 141RD75I---

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VALVE ,MV 1041F331 Bu"' t _7-, 1 W 14 SHUT.OF VALVE LJ 4 i MVl1G41F329 A Bu~lt 'I l14SHUTr-0FFVALVE:

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.ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCHO82-RPT-01, VERSIO@~Pg. 1 Of 1t12512012 11Z57 F-.1. Hatch Nule1ar Plant~Caircanerd Resuts i Linit CT~1!i! '. Q ID SubID Sttu#4 Edlt' DOuscp~uv La a 71BOO1A lttBan ITNiOS-d os Built As Built As Built I D.H.FL SYS COOUING TOW PRi CT REFtRC PUk liT As Butt i1: EC 7 G71CO01B 071CC02A G71CO2 (3711(01A 0 71 DOt1B As Built As BUit As Built A. Butt pRI CT RECIRC PUIN I D.RL SEC CT RECIRC PU.D.R. CLG TOWER BOO2A I1 10 I SCl FEC l--tl EEE k. Built AS Built , As Butt:1-1!3, 14ý7'EO EC , COHK VLV pPR PaMP DISCI 071 F002A G71 PO02B; A. Bult.SButt as Bu.tt iI 1 8*B.F. F EQ071F03 EQ 071003?"GLB VLV-DD02 BEKWASH E~pillluut

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I I E EGiG71F)11B lAs Bunt>1'S Bultt kAs Built 113S uilt'1 1OB.F.-BK PRESS REG 18S'B. S.F. BK PRESS RE-QBF I..EQ F ,71 F015 AS Builtý17 11~7 As Bultt AS BUt As 5Bu As But A Butt I B5-P01M BYPAS D ,B.,F.-rTN TO CLG TWR 15 B-..F.-RTNTO CL TWR I1 a- BACK PRESS REGUL TL-I1 1 SCJ 1 EC 0G71FOIBA

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• ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCHO82-RPT-01, VERSI0O 1025/201211.o-7 Component Resutt Page 2 of 4 1 1 IFEaIG1OB S_ ID stýI "# : E:ft DsrtmI-: Lo-k.Bu.9t'F, BK PRESS REG-P21 Wi....I i it GR , i :: : k V EQ G7 1O020A But EIN E MAKEUPTBO.

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.ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSIOI 10/2512112 11:67~E. IHat~h NUelar Pt~lat 1pi Resuflts PaS56 UNi CT ~ __ ID 071F047_2 G1Ioh71FD48

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-1 CENIP & FLTFI SYSTE V______ 1 NUP & FtTR SYSTM 177__ I FANOI 20ATO RESET Ih FAN B002B TS RESET ANFAN B0028OTS LAI OISNOT ELIEQUIP 1 IS~ NOT EIJ EQUIP_____I *SIS NOTEUI EQUIP 1 n! OISNOT Ed twP I I ýT tHS ISNOT EIEQUELP!, T a./8s Dull ks Buýt Aa Suft HOS (715W0H904 0SN71 OOPHBO HO ný1170PHPA16

/80Buil T~4- -k80SUNýz Bul~t isBuiltýsBuilt I11-~IN :1B71N005Q IN IG71NOO8A[1]: us Built IN 1G71NOOSA 21 : Built ks BUMt I IIX 1071T-102 1071T103 AD Built I IX IG71T104!07 _1 For bIaemal E. 1. Hatch Nuoloar Plant u-n only.Page 121 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS UNIT 1 -SWEL 2 SNCH082-RPT-01 Equipment List Pages Unit 1 -Base List 1 3-94 Unit 1 -SWEL 1 95-100 Unit 1 -Base List 2 101-121 Unit 1 -SWEL 2 122-124 Page 122 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Plant Hatch Unit 1 SWEL-1 Plant Hatch Unit I SWEL-2 SWEL Revision Date: October ?_4 2012 Originator:-

print: Mike Steele signature:

Date: Reviewer.

print: I. Derwood Tootle, Jr. signat ate Ope Reviewe r: prlnt: i gnat Date: L0 0i4.l Pear Reviewer:

print:

iown

'- Date: -Peer Reviewer:

print,, K.d-49' t-,jh140'r slgnature:

Date: .- Y/c'Peaer Reviewer:

p(n.15 cwff igna Date: (Peer Reviewer:

print:. &'Wclav Zi nydii signature:-

aj Date: 1-2 ,Z Page 123 of 124 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT USTS HATCH UNIT 1 SWEL 2 SPENT FUEL POOL RELATED ITEMS NTTF RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC WALKDOWNS SNCUISD2-RPT-UI Screen 113 Screen #14 V riety ay types of equipmen Anchorage check t (21 Varletyofenvironments required?Major new 0.-.es (50% of Column B)Variety or from of replommn Appendix Rapid Drain- Walkdown MPL# Destyption Buildiyg Ele-atlon/

Dratwin Systems eqprmnt B) Down Risk m-st be Comments Loc.tion Hydraulic tignfincye deleted?Reference lines connected to the SFP and the equipment connected Not to those Isn1# S ubmerged 1subMered Other Yes No lines 72P52-AOO1 ESSAIRACC U1 RX 087RAR19 H-26260, H-26070 2P52 2 X X U o 3 1PSIFS4g TORX CAV/FUEL PL GT SEAL US RX 228RFR9 H161U7 1PS1 U X no 4 SP51FS55 SATE SEAL 1- 1500 BALL VLV Ul RX 228RUSRO H16187 1PS`1 V no S IPSSFSS8 GATE SEAL S 150# BALL VLV Ul RX 228RFR9 H16187 fPS1 U no SU 9 101 Notes: 1) Drawingn H-10018 and H-10196 list all system codes.Preparer Reviewer Reactor Operator Review Peer Reviewer Peer Reviewer Peer Reviewer Date: Date: Date: Date: Date: Date: Page 124 of 124 ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 2 UNIT 1 -PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 Page 1 of 3 ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 1 of 2 Peer Review Checklist for SWEL For Hatch Unit 1 Instructions for Completing Checklist This peer review checklist may be used to document the review of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) in accordance with Section 6: Peer Review. The space below each question in this checklist should be used to describe any findings identified during the peer review process and how the SWEL may have changed to address those findings.

Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.1. Were the five safety functions adequately represented in the SWEL 1 selection?

Y[ NI-1 SWEL 1 for Hatch Unit ] meets the requirements of having 90 to 120 items and addresses allfive safety functions.

Many components provide safety functions for multiple systems, and/or are part offrontline support systems. Allfive safety functions discussed in EPRI Report 1025286 are well represented in the SWEL 1.2. Does SWEL I include an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:

a. Various types of systems? YZ N[-1 Items included on the SWEL comprise a variety of systems such as Emergency Diesel Generators and Auxiliaries, Service Water System, Component Cooling Water System, Automatic Depressurization, Residual Heat Removal System, Vital A/C and D/C systems.b. Major new and replacement equipment?

YZ Nil New and replacement components are identified in SWEL 1.c. Various types of equipment?

YN NEI SWEL I includes at least one example of each of the 21 classes of equipment.

In general, the number of components in each class is proportional to the number of safety-related components of that class in the plant as a whole, except that the number of in-line valves is proportionally smaller than anchored equipment.

Anchored equipment is more vulnerable to seismic loads.d. Various environments?

YN Nn The SWEL contains components in mild, harsh, and outdoor environments.

The components are located in different buildings, rooms, and/or on different building elevations.

The SWEL also includes components located inside primary containment.

e. Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE (or equivalent) program? Y[ NEI The SWEL included equipment that had been modified as a result of the IPEEE program: Section 5 and Attachment 5 of the submittal report provides information on resolution of the IPEEE findings.

The SWEL and individual component checklists provide information about the IPEEE modifications and verification of modification incorporation.

Page 2 of 3 ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 2 Peer Review Checklist for SWEL For Hatch Unit 1 f. Were risk insights considered in the development of SWEL 1? YZ NEi SWEL I includes high risk components based on risk significance in the plant probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models. Section 6 of the submittal report discusses the risk insights used for SWEL development.

3. For SWEL 2: a. Were spent fuel pool related items considered, and if applicable included in YN NEl SWEL 2?SWEL 2 includes components associated with maintaining seals around the SFP gates, which are Seismic Category I components.

b. Was an appropriate justification documented for spent fuel pool related items not YN NEI included in SWEL 2?Section 6.2 of the submittal report provides the justification for excluding items on SWEL 2. There were no components identified that could contribute to rapid SFP drain down. Note that there were no new/replacement equipment in SWEL 2 because there have been no major modifications to the Spent Fuel Pool systems that would have affected equipment that meets the screening requirements to be included on SWEL 2. Equipment associated with cooling of the SFP is located in locked areas (due to radiation) and are not suitable for a Walkdown.4. Provide any other comments related to the peer review of the SWELs.The peer review team reviewed the initial SWEL I and SWEL 2 and provided comments and suggestions for enhancements of the SWELs. Comments included suggestions to include additional electrical components and more equipment mounted to the structure, since such equipment has shown more potential to be adversely impacted by seismic loads than in-line mounted components.

In addition, comments were made suggesting that certain equipment classes contain more components and that explanations be provided for not including certain equipment (e. g. there are no safety-related or Seismic Category I components in that equipment class installed in the plant). The peer reviewers ensured that the SWELs met the requirements of EPRI Report 1025286. Changes deemed necessary during the walkdown due to inaccessibility were reviewed by the peer reviewers to ensure that the changes did not impact the level of compliance to the EPRI report. The final SWEL meets all requirements of EPRI Report 1025286.5. Have all peer review comments been adequately addressed in the final SWEL? YM NEI Peer Reviewer #1: Robert Ashworth Peer Reviewer #2: Melanie Brown Date: 11/06/2012 Date: 11/06/2012 I'It Page 3 of 3 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 3 UNIT 1 -SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS (SWCs)NO. SNCH082-RPT-01 Note: A partial walkdown was performed for the following components.

The checklists for these components are included in this attachment.

These components are energized cabinets which could not be opened for inspection during the initial walkdown.

Therefore, a second walkdown is planned and scheduled for these components as stated in Section 7 of the Report (SNCH082-RPT-01).Partial Walkdown Performed# Item No. Description Remaining Walkdown Schedule for Scope / CR Completion 1 1R24-S009 600/208V MCC IA Internal of panel 1R26 2 1R24-SO1 1 600V ESS DIV 1 MCC IC Internal of panel 1R26 3 1R24-S025 600/208V ESS DIV 1 MCC 1A Internal of panel 1R26 4 1R24-S012 600V ESS DIV 2 MCC lB Internal of panel 1R26 5 1R24-S022 125/250V DC ESS DIV 2 MCC lB Internal of panel 1R26 6 1R24-S027 600/208V ESS DIV 2 MCC 1C Internal of panel 1R26 7 1R24-S048 DG BLDG 600/208V MCC ID Internal of panel 1R26 8 1R11-S004 575-120/208VAC XFMR 1D Internal of panel 1R26 Page 1 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 1 of 7 Status: Y[E N U[-]Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. 1R24-S009 Equip.Equipment Description 600/208V MCC 1A Location:

Bldg. INTAKE Floor El. 111 Room, Area UNIT 2 PUMP ROOM Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.

Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchoraze 1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

MCC bottom panels were opened per work worder SNC426986.

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?MCC frames are bolted on interior of frames A1, 3, and 5. Welds are present on the outside.3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Anchorage is consistent with SEWS package dated 10/26/1988.

Original anchorage identified as IPEEE vulnerability.

Anchorage was modified per drawing B-43462, Rev. 0 and this was verified during walkdown to be consistent with drawing.6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free .of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

This component has been inspected to the extent practical.

However, to complete the inspection, the component must be opened. Due to personnel and plant safety issues, this action must be deferred until the component is accessible.

1 Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment YN NEI YZ NEI UE] N/AEI YZ N[] U[- N/A[]YN NEl UL] N/AF-YN NEl U[- N/All Y NE-I UI-Page 2 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 7 Status: YE] NO UL]Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. 1R24-S009 Equip. Class' I Equipment Description 600/208V MCC 1A Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment Or structureS?

8. Ate overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse ontothe equipment?

There is a fire protection water line supported by a U bolt fastened to a HSS hanger from the ceiling exhibiting more than, mild corrosion as well as the pipe directly overhead of the MCC (see photographs 3 and 4).In the bolt's current condition, while this is a potentially adverse seismic condition, it is judged to be seismically adequate.

However, for preventative measures, CR 523476 has been written to replace the U bolt.9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the, above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?YO NEI UL] N/AL]YI- NO UI- N/Ar-YN N'I Url N/AU YZ N[1 U0 Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YO NI U[]adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

There is a missing bolt on east cover plate of MCC (see photograph 5).The other bolts for the plate are present and are sufficient to secure the cover in place. It is judged to be seismically adequate.

CR 523481 has been written to replace the missing bolt.Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

See, IP41-C001B for AWC information.

Lv~ ~Evaluated by: Juan Vizcaya Ja 7 4W)(ýDate: 09/24/2012 09/24/2012 Patrick Kellv Page 3 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. 1R24-S009 Equip. Class, Equipment Description 600/208V MCC 1A NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 3 of 7 Status: Y[-] NE U"]Photographs 1: Equipment MPL# (1R24-S009)

Page 4 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 4 of 7 2: Equipment Elevation (lR24-S009)

Page 5 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS 4 4 ii ii NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 5 Of 7 re Than Mild Corrosion (I R24-S009)3: Overhead Water Line With Mc Page 6 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 6 of 7 4: Corroded U Bolt Supporting Water Line (1R24-S009)

Page 7 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 7 of 7 5: Missing Bolt on East Cover Plate (1 R24-S009)Page 8 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet i of 5 Status: NEI U0 EquipmentID No. 1R24-S01 1 Equip. Class' I Equipment Description 600V ESS DIV I MCC IC Location:

Bldg. REACTOR Floor El. 130 Room,. Area 109A Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document.the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions, maybe used to record the results of judgments and findings.

Additional

space is provided at the end of this checklist for documentingother comments.Anchorage I. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

Anchorage details are provided in the item SEWS package dated 12V2612012.

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?3. Is! the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is; theanchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the ýanchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?

(Note:: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Base panels of MCC were opened per work order SNC426986 to confirm anchorage configuration consistency.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

This component has been inspected to the extent practical.

However, to complete the inspection, the component must be opened. Due to personnel and plant safety issues, this action must be deferred until the component is accessible.

Y[ NEI YN NEI UEJ N/A'-NOI U- N/AD YZ NEI UOI N/AU-YJZ NO U- N/A-YZ NO U--I Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

Page 9 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 5 Status: YO NEI U[]Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment lID No. 1R24-SO11 Equip.,'Equipment Description 600V ESS DIV 1 MWC 1C Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Y[ NCI UC3 N/ACI 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceilingtiles and lighting, YZ NEI UC- N/AC-]and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?There is a 2" dia. RGS conduit which spans vertically from transformer 1R11-S039, sweeps North and then descends to MCC 1R24-S01 1. It is supported with a "U" shaped connector to the cable tray above. It is determined to have adequate flexibility in its length and available support. It is judged to be seimically adequate.

See photograph 3.t10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?YN NC-] UC- N/AC YN NEI UC Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YC9 NC UC adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

None.Evaluated by: Juan VizcaaDt 0 7/1 Date: 09/07/2012 0910712012 Page 10 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. 1R24-SO1 1 Equip. Class, Equipment Description 600V ESS DIV I MCC ICQ NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 3 of 5 Status: Y0 N[] U-]Photographs 1: Equipment MPL# (1R24-SO1 1)Page 11 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 4 of 5 2: Equipment Elevation (1R24-S01 1)Page 12 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 5 of 5 3: Conduit Between IRI 1-S039 and 1R24-SO 11 (1R24-SO11) 9 Page 13 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 1 of 6 Status: Y[] N[I UN Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. 1R24-S025 Equip. Class' I Equipment Description 600/208V ESS DIV I MCC 1A Location:

Bldg. DIESEL Floor El. 130 Room, Area SWITCHGEAR ROOM 1E Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item-of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.

Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e.,jis the item one YN NnI of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free' of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?MCC bays on north side are bolted to south side. MCC bays are welded to embedded channel through plates which were added per SEWS package dated 10/24/1988.

See photograph 3.3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?Cracks were not visible, however there was voided concrete areas around anchors on the north side of the MCC as noted in SEWS package dated 10/24/1988.

The SEWS packaged proposed welding .an angle to the front of each MCC bay and to bolt the front and back of the MCCs together.

Thru bolts near the base and plates at the top of the MCCs were observed to accomplish this.5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant -documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Originally identified as A46 & IPEEE outlier since the anchorage did not meet GIP screening criteria.

As a result, modifications were made as shown in drawings B-43457 and B-43458. The modification of the anchorage was confirmed.

The internal connection between the cabinets was not observed.6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

This component has been inspected to the extent practical.

However, to complete the inspection, the component must be opened. Due to personnel and plant safety issues, this action must be deferred until the component is accessible.

YE NEI UL- N/AL YZ NEI UMJ N/AL YN NFl U[L N/AL YL NEI U[ N/AL1 YZ N[-] UL-]'Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

Page 14 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 6 Status: YOI NO UN Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. 1R24-S025 Equip. Class' 1 Equipment Description 600/208V ESS DIV I MCC IA Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?YN N[E] UE- N/AE Y[D NE ULI N/AE YM NEI UE] N/AE YZ Nn UE-Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YZ NE- UE7]adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

Poor installation of concrete anchors as noted in SEWS package dated 10/24/1988 on north end of MCC. Proposed modifications were properly installed and no other modifications are recommended.

See photograph 4.Evaluated by: Juan Vizcaya cP Date: 09/07/2012 09/07/2012 Pptrirk Kt./lv Page 15 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 3 of 6 Status: Y[-] NF- UN Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. 1R24-S025 Equip. Class, I Equipment Description 600/208V ESS DIV I MCC 1A Photographs 1: Equipment MPL# (1 R24-S025)Page 16 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 4 of 6 rý 1 01,1 .aý2: Equipment Elevation (1 R24-S025)Page 17 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 5 of 6 3: Welded Plates Added per SEWS Package (IR24-S025)

Page 18 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 6 of 6 4: Poorly Installed Anchors (lR24-S025)

Page 19 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet i of 7 Status: YN N[-] U-Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. 1R24-S012 Equip. Class' I Equipment Description 600V ESS DIV 2 MCC 1B Location:

Bldg. REACTOR Floor El. 130 Room, Area 109A Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.

Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

Anchorage was viewed by opening MCC panels at base per work order SNC426989.

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?Base of MCC is bolted to a channel, which is welded to an embedded channel in the concrete pad. There is a missing bolt which fastens frame 15 to frame 16.3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Anchorage is consistent with drawing SX-13618, Ver. 0.5.6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

The missing bolt identified in question 2 is located very near the bottom of the panel. The purpose of this bolt is to transfer shear loads from one panel section to another to ensure that panel sections remain in contact to prevent relay chatter. The different sections of an MCC are typically bolted together at several locations (for example, see drawing B-52096, Revision 0 for MCC 2R24-SO12A).

Due to the fact that the MCC is attached to the building floor, the bottom bolts connecting the two panel sections together will see very little shear and no tension.Based on engineering experience, the remaining bolts are more than sufficient to ensure that the two sections of the panel will act together as designed.

CR 517041 has been written to replace the missing bolt.YM NEI YM NEI U-1 N/AEl YM N[-] U[] N/AEl YM NIl UE] N/AD YZ N[7 UED N/AD YZ Nil U[-]I Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

Page 20 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 7 Status: Y1 Nn] Ur-]Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. IR24-S12 -Equip. Class Equipment Description 600V ESS DIV 2 MCC 1B Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

There are improperly installed anchor bolts on the north wall of the reactor building for pipe 1P6i-GEE-1O" steel enclosure (see photographs 3 through 5). The overall support system for the enclosure is judged to be seismically adequate as described in CR 516278, -which has been written. to resolve the anchor installation issue..8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tilesand lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?YZ NEI UI- N/AF]Y0 NEI UI] N/A[]YN NEI U-] N/AU YI NEI U-]Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YZ NEI ULI adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

This component has been inspected to the extent practical.

However, to complete the inspection, the component must be opened. Due to personnel and plant safety issues, this action must be deferred until the component Is accessible.

Comments (Additional pages may be added asnecessary)

See 1H21-P036 for AWC information for this equipment.

Evaluated by:, Date: 09110/2012 09110/2012 Page 21 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. IR24-S012

-Equip., Equipment Description 600V ESS 01V2 MCC 1B NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 3 of 7 Status: Y[ Nn] U[]Photographs 1: Equipment MPL# (1R24-SO 12)Page 22 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 4 of 7 2: Equipment Elevation (IR24-SO12)

Page 23 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 5 of 7 3: 1P61-GEE-10" Enclosure Support (1R24-S012)

Page 24 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 9hppt A nf -7 4: 1P61-GEE-I' Enclosure Suppoit Connection (IR24-S012)

Page 25 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 7 of 7 I-Uhbi-iu-ihnclosure bupport Uonnec-con (IR24-SU12)

Page 26 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet I of 4 Status: Y[] NO U[]Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. 1R24-S022 Equip. Class, Equipment Description 125/250V DC.ESS DIV 2 MCC 1 B Location:

Bldg. REACTOR Floor El. 130 Room, Area 109A Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but, recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each, of the following questions may be used, to record the results ofjudgments and findings.

Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

Anchorage viewed by opening MCC panels at base per work order SNC426989.

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?It was observed that frame 5 of the MCC contained an anchor with an untightened nut (see picture 3). Frame 5 is bolted to its adjacent frame so that the entire MCC acts together.

As a result, itis judged to be seismically adequate.

CR 515614 was written to resolve this issue.3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Anchorage was check using details outlined in calculation SCNH-10-064, Version :1.0.6. Based on theabove anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

See response to question 2.This component has been inspected to the extent practical.

However, to complete the inspection, the component must be opened. Due to personnel and plant safety issues, this action must be deferred until the component is accessible.

YO NEI YEI NO UE] N/AE1 YN NEI UEi N/AD YO NEI UE] N/AE'-YO NEI UE- N/AE1 YE[ NO UE['Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

Page 27 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 4 Status: Yt] NZ. U[]Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)EquipmentiUNo.

1R24-S22 tEquip. Class]Equipment Description 125/250 V DC ESS DIV 2 MCC: 1 B Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Yt N[] UI-] N/AZ 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Y0K NEI U[J N/A'-and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction, evaluations,, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction:

effects?YN NE] UE] N/AZ1 YN NEI UE]Other Adverse. Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YN NEI U-]adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

See 1H21-P036 for AWC information.

Evaluated Date: 09/1012012 09/10 /20 12 Page 28 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. 1R24-S022 Equip. , Equipment Description 125/250V DC ESS DIV 2 A NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 3 of 4 Status: YZ NE] U[]fCC 1B Photoaraphs 1: Equipment MPL# (1 R24-S022)Page 29 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCHO82-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 4 of 4 2: Untightened Nut on Bolt at Frame 5 of MCC (1R24-S022)

Page 30 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 1 of 5 Status:, Y] NO-- UN Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. 1R24-S027 Equip. I Equipment Description 600/208V ESS DIV 2 MCC 1C Location:

Bldg. DIESEL Floor El. 130 Room, Area Switchgear Room IG Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used.to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings.

Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (ixe., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?There is a broken washer on the north side of MCC Frame 5 (see photograph 3). The effects of the broken washer are considered negligible.

Since the bolt is fully engaged, the bolt hole is not oversized and will perform the full design. function.3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion, that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question onlyapplies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Originally identified as A46 & IPEEE outlier since :the anchorage did not meet GIP screening criteria..

As a result, modifications were made as shown in drawings B-43457 and B-43458 and documented on calculation SCNH-90-33, Rev. 2. The modification of the anchorage was confirmed.

The internal connection between thel cabinets was not observed.6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

This component has been inspected to: the extent practical.

However, to complete.

the inspection,.

the component must be opened. Due to personnel and plant safety issues, this action must be deferred until the component is accessible.

YS NEI UEi N/AE-YN NEI UEi NIA'YZ NEI U0 N/AUl YEI NEI US N/A-1 YEI NEI US' Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

Page 31 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of s Status: YE] NEO UN Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment lD No. 1R246S027 Equip. ClassW Equipment Deseription 600/2/08V ESS&DIV2 MCC IC Interaction Effects: 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?" YZ NI U0] N/Al 8V Are overheadequipment.

distribution systems,-ceiling tiles and lighting, Y0, N] U-I .N/AE]and masonry bl'ok Wal.ls notlikely to clliaplse ontg, the equipmejt?

9. Do attached lines-have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?I0. Based~on the above seismic interactionevaluatibns, isequipment free, of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?NO U01 NIAPI Yo NO] u0 Other Adverse Conditions

1. Have you Iooked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Y9 NI] VI]adversely affect the safety functions of the equipmeni?

Comments:(Additibnai pages may: be dded as necessary)

None Evaluated by: Juan Vizcava Date: 9/10/2012 PatickKeliv, 9/10/2012 Page 32 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKIDOWN CHECKLISTS Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID) No. 1B94:S02 Equip. Class, Equipment Dlescription 600108V ES-S DIV2 MCC IC NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 3 of 5 Status: YE] N[- UZ Photographs 1: Equipment MPL# (1 R24-S027)Page 33 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 4 of 5 2: Equipment Elevation (1 R24-S027)Page 34 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 5 of 5 3: Washer in Frame 7 (1 R24-S027)Page 35 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 1 of 4 Status: YZ NEI U-]Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. 1R24-S048

-Equip. Class, Equipment Description DG BLDG 600/208V MCC ID Location:

Bldg. DIESEL Floor El. 130 Room, Area SWITCHGEAR ROOM IF Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings.

Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.Anchorage 1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

YN NEI 2. Is the anchorage free of bent; broken, missing or loose hardware?3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than. mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?(Note: This question only applies if the item~is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Anchorage verified per details outlined in SEWS package dated 06/27/1989.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

This component has been inspected to the extent practical.

However, to complete the inspection, the component must be opened. Due to personnel and plant safety issues, this action must be deferred until the component is accessible.

Yl N[i Ul1 N/AlU YER NEI UI- N/AL]YZ NEI U-1 N/AD YI Ni Ul] N/A-U Y19 NI U-E1 I Enterthe equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

Page 36 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 4 Status: Y[ Nr] UE-]Seismic Waikdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. 1R24-S048

-Equip. Classi Equipment Description, DG BLDG 600/208 V MCC ID Interaction Effects 7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

YO NEI UEI N/AEl 8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YN Nil UE" N/AI and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines haveadequate flexibility to avoid damage?10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?YlZ NEI UE] N/AE]Y9 NO U-Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YZ NEI UE-adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

None.4c~~Evaluated by: Juan .Vizcava Patrick Kellv Date: 09/10/2012 09/10/2012 Page 37 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKIDOWN CHECKLISTS Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)Equipment ID No. 1R24-S048

-Equip. Class, Equipment Description DG BLDG 6001208V MCC ID NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 3 of 4 Status: YN NEO uRl Photographs 1: Equipment MPL # (1 R24-S048)Page 38 of 436 ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-01, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 4 of 4 2: Equipment Elevation (1R24-S048)

Page 39 of 436