ML12355A631

SNCH082-RPT-02, Ver. 1.0, Edwin I. Hatch, Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Part 2 of 11

ML12355A631
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	11/26/2012
From:	Stewart W Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NL-12-2269 SNCH082-RPT-02, Ver. 1.0
Download: ML12355A631 (176)

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NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 PROJECT REPORT VERSION 1.0 COVER SHEET Page 1 of 60 Edwin I. Hatch Unit 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT, RER SNC425082 For Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Prepared by:

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HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC E

__________________ ______________________jPAGE 2 OF 60 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE.......................... I..................................................................

4 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH..........

5 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS

SUMMARY

6 3.1 DESIGN BASIS EARTHQUAKE....................................................................................

6 3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND METHODS......................................................

8 4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS......................................................................................

9 4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES........................................................

10 4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES.............................................................................

12 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING....................................................................

19 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT.................................

20 6.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 1 20 6.2 DEVELOPM ENT OF SW EL 2........................................................................................

23 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS..........................................................

25 7.1 IN A CCESSIBLE ITEM S.................................................................................................

27 8.0 RESULTS.................................................................................................................................

32 8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS............................

32 8.2 EQUIPM ENT OPERABILITY........................................................................................

52 8.3 PLANT CHANGES......................................................

i... 52 8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS......................................................................

52 9.0 PEER REVIEW........................................................................................................................

53 9.1 PEER REV IEW PROCESS.........................................

53 9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS

SUMMARY

53 10.0 REFEREN CES.........................................................................................................................

58 11.0 ATTACH M ENTS.....................................................................................................................

60

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 3 OF 60 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

The Seismic Walkdowns at Hatch Unit 2 in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" are not complete as all items on the SWEL have not been accessible. A supplementary report will be required. The walkdowns are being performed using the methodology outlined in the NRC endorsed "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" (EPRI Report number 1025286).

Plant Hatch Unit 2 had no significant degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions that warranted modification to the plant. Plant Hatch Unit 2 had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 4 OF 60 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE The objective of this report is to document the results of the Seismic Walkdowns at E. I. Hatch Unit 2 in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3:

Seismic" (Reference 10.1).

The Seismic Walkdowns followed the guidance contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2),

which was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. The scope of the walkdowns was to identify potentially degraded, unanalyzed, or nonconforming conditions relative to the seismic licensing basis.

The 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns for Hatch Unit 2 are not complete as all items on the SWEL have not been accessible. A supplementary report will be required. This report documents the findings from all Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys completed to date.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC

__________________ _______________________PAGE 5 OF 60 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH The requirements of the 50.54(f) Letter are satisfied by application of and compliance with the NRC endorsed methodology provided inEPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). In accordance with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), the following topics are addressed in this report:

Documentation of the seismic licensing basis for the SSCs in the plant (Section 3.0);

Assignment of appropriately qualified personnel (Section 4.0);

• Reporting of actions taken to reduce/eliminate seismic vulnerabilities identified by the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) program (Section 5.0);

Selection of SSCs to be inspected in the plant (Section 6.0);

Performance of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys (Section 7.0);

Evaluation of potentially adverse seismic conditions with respect to the seismic licensing bases (Section 8.0); and Performance of Peer Reviews (Section 9.0).

While the Seismic Walkdowns were in progress at Hatch Unit 2, supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse conditions was received on September 18, 2012. This required the opening of cabinets, electrical boxes, and switchgear to inspect the internals for potentially-adverse seismic conditions, even when opening the components was not required to inspect the anchorage. Implementation of the supplemental guidance was incorporated into the walkdowns by first identifying the affected components.

During the Seismic Walkdowns of Hatch Unit 2, electrical cabinets (where no extensive disassembly was required) were opened to inspect the cabinet internals for mounting of internal components, inspect the condition of fasteners of adjacent cabinets, and confirm the absence of any other adverse seismic conditions. The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWE) followed the supplemental guidance for all cabinets that were accessible during plant operation, even where opening the cabinets was not required to inspect the anchorage. However, some that could not be opened (due to personnel safety or due to the sensitivity of the equipment) were scheduled during an outage to have the component doors opened.

Section 7.0 identifies cabinets that were inaccessible for internal inspections. Table 7-1 and Table 7 provide the schedule to complete the cabinet internal inspections.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 6 OF 60 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS

SUMMARY

This section provides a summary of the licensing bases for the Seismic Category I Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) in the plant. It includes a discussion of the Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) and the codes and standards used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the plant-specific seismic licensing basis requirements.

3.1 DESIGN BASIS EARTHQUAKE The plant site geologic and seismologic investigations are covered in Section 2.5 of the Hatch Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Based on this data, the peak ground accelerations for the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) (referred to as the Design Basis Earthquake - DBE) and Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) are established as 0.15 g and 0.08 g, respectively, as discussed in subsection 2.5.2 of the Hatch Unit 2 FSAR (Reference 10.7).

The basic description of the earthquake is provided by spectrum response curves. Separate curves are used for the OBE of 0.08 g horizontal acceleration and the DBE of 0.15 g horizontal acceleration. The spectrum response curves are provided in FSAR, Figures 3.7A-1 and 3.7A-2 for OBE and DBE respectively.

The response of the structure to the earthquake is obtained by using the spectrum response technique.

Appropriate response levels are read from the earthquake spectrum curve corresponding to the natural frequencies of the structure.

During the original design of Plant Hatch a set of seismic response spectra was developed by GE using the modified El Centro earthquake ground motion, as discussed in the Hatch Unit 2 FSAR, Section 3.7A (Reference 10.7).

In 1984 another set of spectra was generated to correct a broadening error found in the original spectra.

The 1984 spectra were generated using the artificial time histories that more closely enveloped the ground spectra. These are the Seismic Floor Response Spectra of Record (FRS of Record).

In 1989 a Seismic Margins Assessment (SMA) was performed in part to-resolve the errors in peak broadening and soil velocity found in the 1984 spectra. The effect of the soil velocity error is that the peak acceleration for each spectrum is shifted to a higher frequency content. Therefore, a new non-design basis set of spectra was generated using seismic margin techniques for use in the SMA. These spectra are called the Seismic Margin Earthquake (SME) spectra. The SME spectra are based on a maximum ground horizontal acceleration of 0.3 g, which is twice that of the Plant Hatch DBE (0.15 g).

As a result of the SMA, the NRC concluded that the spectra used in the design of Plant Hatch resulted in a safe overall design. The NRC determined that the FRS of Record was adequate as the licensing basis spectra. As recognition of the shifting of the maximum seismic response to a higher frequency,

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 7 OF 60 Southern Nuclear elected to consider the SME spectra, factored by 1/22 to account for the increased ground input, in conjunction with the design basis earthquake (DBE) for all designs. This practice results in a seismic demand that is more conservative than that which would result from a corrected FRS, but avoids a license revision. The NRC agreed with this approach and the NRC also agreed that the SME spectra, when reduced by a factor of one-half (V2 SME), best approximates current seismic regulatory requirements for Plant Hatch.

POWER GENERATION DESIGN BASES Seismic Category I systems, structures and components are designed so that stresses remain within normal code allowable limits during the OBE and to ensure that they will perform their safety-related functions during and/or after a DBE.

MAJOR COMPONENT DESIGN BASES The horizontal and vertical OBE and DBE in-structure response spectra curves form the basis for the seismic qualification and design of Category I SSCs and for demonstrating the structural integrity of Seismic Category 2 SSCs, where required. In addition, systems running between structures shall be designed to withstand the seismic relative displacements.

The seismic analysis of safety related systems, equipment, and components is generally based on the response spectra method. Alternatively, Seismic Category I equipment is analyzed using the methodology based on earthquake experience data developed by the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) and documented in the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP), Revision 2, plus any addition to the GIP reviewed and accepted by the NRC for resolving Unresolved Safety Issue A-46 in response to NRC Generic Letter 87-02. The SQUG GIP may be used to verify the seismic adequacy of currently installed equipment after the equipment has been walked down and any outliers resolved.

New and replacement equipment within the scope of the GIP may also be seismically qualified using the same SQUG methodology.

This alternative method is acceptable where no specific NRC commitment to use IEEE 344-1975 has been made.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 8 OF 60 3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND METHODS An extensive list of design codes, standards, methods, studies and tests utilized for seismic design is provided in the FSAR (Reference 10.7). Examples of the pertinent codes, standards, and methods used for the design of Seismic Category I structures, systems and components is provided here:

• USAS B3 1.1, Code for Power Pressure Piping, 1967 Edition

• USAS B31.7, Nuclear Power Piping, 1969 Edition 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 2, "Design Basis for Protection Against Natural Phenomena!

IEEE 323-1971, Standard for Qualifying Class 1 E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations IEEE 323-1974, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations IEEE 344-1971, IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generation Stations IEEE 344-1975, IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class lE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generation Stations

• NRC Generic Letter 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment In Operating Reactors (USI A-46)

Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment, Revision 2, Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG)

American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC), 7 th Edition

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 9 OF 60 4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS Table 4-1 identifies the project team members and their project responsibilities -per EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Table 4-2 identifies the Peer Review Team members and responsibilities.

Section 4.1 provides an overview of the project responsibilities. Section 4.2 includes brief experience summaries for all project personnel in alphabetical order.

Table 4-1 Project Team Members and Responsibilities Site Equipment Seismic Licensing Name Point of Selection /

Plant Walkdown Basis Contact IPEEE Operations Engineer Reviewer (POC)

Reviewer (SWE)

Warren Barr X

Chris Burke X

X David Edenfield X

Jeffrey Horton X

X Patrick Kelly X

X Kursat Kinali X

X Johnathon McFarland X

X Michael Steele*

X X

X X

Winston Stewart*

X X

James Tootle X

X Juan Vizcaya X

X Wesley Williams X

X X

Alan Wolfe X

X

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 10 OF 60 Table 4-2 Peer Review Team Members and Responsibilities Peer SWEL Walkdown Licensing Submittal Review SeL Pedw Basis Report Name Team Peer Peer Peer ea Reviewer Reviewers eer Leader RReviewer Reviewers Robert Ashworth*

X X

X X

Melanie Brown*

X X

X X

Richard Starck*

X X

Kenneth Whitmore*

X X

X X

Notes (Table 4-1 and Table 4-2):

1)

• Indicates Seismic Capability Engineer

2)

As stated in Section 7.0, all potentially adverse conditions were entered into the plant Corrective Action Program (CAP) system. However, as part of the process of entering the condition into the CAP, the SWEs made a preliminary assessment of the condition with respect to the plant licensing basis.

Further licensing basis reviews were performed as discussed in Section 8.0 as part of the CAP resolution process by personnel not directly involved in the walkdowns.

4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES The Site Point of Contact (POC) is a site engineer from Southern Nuclear that has experience with the site equipment, site procedures, plant operations, and overall personnel organization. The site POC coordinated site access for walkdown personnel and any resources required for the walkdowns such as inspection equipment and support from plant operations. The POC was responsible for development of the walkdown schedule and any updates to the schedule based on equipment availability.

Equipment Selection Personnel (ESP) were responsible for identifying the sample of SSCs for the Seismic Walkdowns.

The ESP have knowledge of plant operations, plant documentation, and associated SSCs.

The ESP also have knowledge of the IPEEE program.

For this project, site engineers and plant operations personnel participated in the equipment selection. The ESP also performed the responsibilities of the IPEEE Reviewers. The IPEEE Reviewers also ensured that the walkdown scope included a sample of equipment that had IPEEE seismic vulnerabilities.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 11 OF 60 Plant Operations Personnel provided detailed review of the sample of SSCs to ensure the walkdown scope included equipment located in a variety of environments, equipment in a variety of systems, and equipment accessible for a walkdown. For the Hatch Unit 2 project, the Plant Operations Personnel were either former or currently licensed Senior Reactor Operators.

The SWEs were trained on the NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, and on the material contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEs who had previously completed the Seismic Walkdown Training Class developed by the SQUG were not required to complete training on the NTTF Seismic recommendations but were trained on the differences between SQUG activities and activities associated with the NTTF Seismic recommendations.

The Licensing Basis Reviewer was responsible for determining whether any potentially adverse seismic conditions identified by the SWEs met the plant seismic licensing basis. The Licensing Basis Reviewer has knowledge of and experience with the seismic licensing basis and documentation for the SSCs at Hatch Unit 2.

A Peer Review Team was formed for this project to provide both oversight and review of all aspects of the walkdowns. The Peer Review Team members have extensive experience in seismic design and qualification of structures, systems and components as well as extensive field experience. The Peer Review Team for this project interfaced with the ESP and SWEs to ensure that the walkdown program satisfied the guidance in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 12OF 60

.4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES Robert Ashworth, SCE (MPR)

Mr. Ashworth has more than six years of experience providing engineering solutions for a wide variety of nuclear power plant components and systems. His experience includes equipment walkdowns at industrial facilities to assess material condition, structural modeling and analyses; and seismic qualification in accordance with current industry standards for mechanical and electrical equipment in nuclear power plants. Mr. Ashworth has completed the training course for the EPRI Report 1025286 and is also a Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) as defined in the SQUG GIP for resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46.

Warren Barr (SNC)

Mr. Barr is currently a Senior Plant Support Engineer at the Hatch Plant. He has over forty-three (43) years of on-site and off-site nuclear power related experience in the area of mechanical design and engineering for Southern Company nuclear units. Experience consists of new plant design, unit start-up, unit recovery, modification design and implementation, system design and operation, engineering support, outage support, maintenance support, problem resolution, vendor interface, project management, and project and group coordination and supervision.

Melanie Brown, SCE (SNC)

Ms. Brown has over 31 years of experience with Southern Company, the majority of which has been serving the nuclear fleet. Ms. Brown's most recent assignment was as a Seismic Qualification Engineer in the Fleet Design Department, where she was responsible for performing activities associated with the Governance, Oversight, Support, and Perform (GOSP) Model including:

Management of the seismic design bases, Seismic equipment qualification, Seismic evaluation of plant structures and components, Design documentation and configuration management.

She is currently serving as the Southern Nuclear Seismic Technical Lead for the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns for all three Southern Nuclear plants.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 13 OF 60 Chris Burke (SNC)

Mr. Burke is currently the Operations Support Manager for the Hatch site. He has a Bachelor of Science Degree in Aerospace Engineering and 15 years of nuclear plant experience within the Engineering and Operations departments.

Mr. Burke obtained a Senior Reactor Operator license from the NRC in 2005. In addition to his current function, Mr. Burke has served in various leadership roles in support of plant operation including Shift Support Supervisor, Shift Supervisor, and Shift Manager.

David Edenfield (SNCQ Mr. Edenfield is currently the Risk Analyst for the Hatch Site. He has a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering and 34 years of nuclear plant experience including 10 years in plant construction and 24 years in plant support at Plant Hatch.

Some of his related experience and responsibilities includes, Maintenance Rule Expert Panel member, On-site administrator for EPRI software package EOOS (Equipment Out of Service), reviewer for all design change packages for EOOS model impact, High and Low Voltage Switchyard System Engineer, and Component Engineer for Relays (Protective, Control, and Timing) and Large Transformers.

Jeffrey Horton, SWE (ENERCON)

Mr. Horton, P.E., is a degreed Professional Engineer with 37 years of experience specializing in applied mechanics with an emphasis on structural analysis of mechanical components and piping.

His experience includes structural and thermal design of Nuclear Pressure Vessels, structural design of Nuclear Pipe Systems, Pipe Support Analysis, and Concrete Design. Mr. Horton holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Aerospace Engineering and a Master of Science degree in Material Science specializing in Solid Mechanics. Mr. Horton has performed numerous ANSI B31.1, B31.7, ASME Section I, III, and VIII component structural calculations and design verifications for Oyster Creek, TMI-1 and other nuclear facilities.

Mr. Horton has used AutoPIPE since 1989 for pipe stress evaluations at Oyster Creek, TMI-1 and other nuclear facilities. Most recently, Mr. Horton was involved in the pipe stress and pipe support analysis for the James A. Fitzpatrick HPCI Steam Trap Valve replacement project, and the Oyster Creek 2010 buried pipe project where he performed the pipe design for the Condensate Storage Tank overflow pipe using AutoPIPE.

Mr. Horton has significant field experience including extended site assignments at Oyster Creek, TMI and Perry, and has performed equipment walkdowns at numerous facilities.

Mr. Horton completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC

__________________j______________________PAGE 14OF 6O Patrick Kelly, SWE (ENERCON)

Mr. Kelly, P.E., has a Master's degree in Civil Engineering with over 5 years of engineering experience in commercial and nuclear plant design having prepared and developed several design change packages, calculations, evaluations and engineering judgments.

Mr. Kelly brings considerable experience in structural analysis, building evaluations, conduit evaluations, and miscellaneous structural analysis.

He has supported various security related projects at SNC.

Additionally, Mr. Kelly was the lead civil engineer on the recent detailed and final designs packages for the Unit 1 and 2 Diesel Generator Excitation Panel Replacement projects at Plant Hatch. Mr.

Kelly completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.

Kursat Kinali, SWE (ENERCON)

Mr. Kinali, Ph.D., P.E., is a Civil/Structural Engineer and Responsible Engineer for modifications.

Dr. Kinali has M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in Structural Engineering with industry experience in commercial and nuclear design. He is a registered Professional Engineer. He is experienced in seismic analysis, reinforced concrete design, and seismic performance assessment of existing structures. Dr. Kinali worked on Southern California Edison's SONGS Units 3&4 for design of removable bar panels on a Large Organism Exclusion Device (LOED). He was the responsible structural engineer for designing and detailing the stainless steel removable bar panels. These frames employed a fail-open mechanism that prevents damage to the rest of the LOED frame during extreme wave or seismic events. Dr. Kinali was one of the responsible engineers for an Engineering Change (EC) package at Robinson which involved ballistic resistant enclosure (BRE) replacement. He was also the primary reviewer for BRE drop analysis for the Farley Nuclear Plant. He reviewed the calculation which investigated the possible effects of BRE drop on safety-related underground features.

For the last couple years, he has been working on numerous design change packages associated with 10 CFR 73.55 security compliance projects for all four Progress Energy's plants, where he was responsible for designing/detailing the reinforced concrete foundations for buildings and miscellaneous equipment, designing electrical duct banks running under a heavy-haul path, preparing/reviewing calculations and drawings for conduit supports and miscellaneous component mountings, and preparing/reviewing (EC) packages.

Mr. Kinali completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE15OF60 Johnathon McFarland, SWE (ENERCON)'

Mr. McFarland, P.E., is a Civil/Structural Engineer providing engineering support for various nuclear generating stations. Mr. McFarland has a B.S. in Civil Engineering and over 5 years of experience in civil/structural design, including ECCS Suction Strainers, seismic and hydrodynamic analysis, yard modifications and field engineering. Mr. McFarland has significant experience at Florida Power and Light's Turkey Point Plant, and at the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Station (WCNOC).

Mr.

McFarland supported various modifications at WCNOC including providing outage support.

Additionally, Mr. McFarland provided EPU related support at Turkey Point including the analysis and walkdowns of structural systems.

He supported structural analysis of shipping casks.

Mr.

McFarland completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.

Richard Starck, SCE (MPR)

Mr. Starck is a registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic qualification of nuclear plant equipment. He is the principal author of the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document (EPRI Report 1025286, Reference 10.2).

He developed and taught the six sessions of the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course to more than 200 engineers. He has provided technical oversight of work for various SQUG projects aimed at resolving USI A-46. Mr.

Starck developed for SQUG the generic guidelines, criteria, and procedure for identifying safe shutdown equipment for resolution of USI A-46, is the editor and principal author of the SQUG GIP, and has interfaced with the NRC Staff and the SQUG Steering Group to resolve open issues on several revisions of the GIP. Mr. Starck is a SCE and has performed Seismic Walkdowns and evaluations of nuclear plant electric and mechanical equipment as part of the NRC required USI A-46 program. This work included equipment qualification, anchorage evaluation, seismic interaction review, outlier resolution, and operability determination.

Michael Steele, SCE (SNC)

Mr. Steele is currently a Principal Design Engineer at Plant Hatch. He has a Bachelor's of Science Degree in Civil Engineering and 20 years of experience as a structural engineer. He is a qualified SQUG Seismic Capability Engineer and Certified Lead Auditor. He has comprehensive and in-depth technical experience in nuclear facilities structural design, construction, modification and maintenance.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 16 OF 60 Winston Stewart, SCE (ENERCON)

Mr. Stewart is a Mechanical Engineer with over eight years of experience in various capacities including: Modification Engineer, Engineering Mentor, 10CFR50.59 Evaluator, Apparent Cause Evaluator, Contract Administration and Designated Representative, Project Manager, Procedure Technical Reviewer, and Environmental Monitoring Team Leader for Emergency Response Organization. Mr. Stewart was responsible for the preparation of technical evaluations for various configuration changes to plant systems, structures, or components; as well as the preparation and revision of civil/structural calculations, pipe stress calculations, and other design documents. Mr.

Stewart served as subject matter expert for Pipe Stress Analysis and Pipe Flaw Evaluation (ASME B31.1,Section III and Section XI). During this time he qualified as SQUG Seismic Capability Engineer. Mr. Stewart completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3

- Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.

James Tootle, Jr. (SNC)

Mr. Tootle is the Hatch Severe Accident Management Program Manager. He holds a Bachelor's Degree in Civil Engineering Technology from Georgia Southern University. He has 30 years of experience at an operating nuclear plant. Mr. Tootle is currently licensed as an SRO and served ten years as Shift Support Supervisor. He also has supervisory experience in Operations Training and Nuclear Oversight. Mr. Tootle's certifications include the following:

Shift Supervisor Qualified (1998-2003)

Shift Support Supervisor (1993-2003)

Senior Reactor Operator (BWR) licensed (1993-present)

Station Nuclear Engineering / Shift Technical Advisor Certification - General Electric (1990)

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC

__________________I_______________________PAGE 17OF 60 Juan Vizcaya, SWE (ENERCON)

Mr. Vizcaya has over 30 years of structural engineering and design experience. He has significant experience being the structural lead engineer on ISFSI projects and overall nuclear plant modifications and has a wide range of design/engineering experience.

Projects range from the seismic analysis and design of concrete and steel structures and concrete pads to the analysis and design of restraint systems for a vertical cask vendor stack-up configurations. Other projects include heavy load drop assessments and the analysis and design of protective structures, foundations and various mechanical and structural modifications using sophisticated finite element models.

Mr.

Vizcaya is skilled at using finite element analyses in the design process, and at the practical design of mechanical components, along with concrete and steel structures. He leads a group structural staff on issues involving structures, stress analysis, and site work such as layout, excavation, roads, drainage and subterranean structures. Mr. Vizcaya has extensive field experience including during construction of the Laguna Verde Nuclear Plant. Mr. Vizcaya completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.

Kenneth Whitmore, SCE (ENERCON)

Mr. Whitmore is a Registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic design and seismic equipment qualification in nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore is a Seismic Capability Engineer that was involved in the development of the SQUG methodology for verification of nuclear plant components. Specifically, Mr. Whitmore served on the sub-committee that developed the SQUG methodology for evaluation of raceways and on the sub-committee that performed the peer review of the SQUG walkdown training class. Mr. Whitmore performed A-46 and IPEEE walkdowns at Oyster Creek and Three-Mile Island and has subsequently performed SQUG evaluations at numerous nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore served as both Chairman and Technical Chairman of the Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Service (SQRTS), has witnessed numerous seismic tests and is a recognized industry expert in seismic qualification of components. Mr. Whitmore has significant experience in all aspects of structural analysis and design and has extensive experience in performing plant walkdowns associated with seismic issues. Mr.

Whitmore completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 18 OF60 Wesley Williams, SWE (SNC)

Mr. Williams has a degree in Civil Engineering from the University of South Alabama. He is a System Engineer for Southern Nuclear at Plant Hatch in Baxley, GA.

He has participated in numerous Structural Monitoring Walkdowns at Plant Hatch which are governed by 10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants."

In addition, Mr. Williams had the opportunity to work in the Civil Design Group at Southern Nuclear Corporate Headquarters as a summer intern before he graduated. Mr. Williams completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 - Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.

Alan Wolfe (SNC)

Mr. Wolfe has a BS in Nuclear Engineering Technology. He has more than 33 years of experience in the nuclear industry, all in the Operations department at Plant Hatch. He obtained a Reactor Operator's License in 1982 and a Senior Reactor Operator's License in 1987.

Mr. Wolfe held positions of System Operator, Licensed Nuclear Plant Operator, Shift Supervisor, Shift Technical Advisor, Shift Manager, and Operations Superintendent prior to retiring in 2010. Following retirement he returned to the plant in January 2012 to support the Severe Accident Management team in response to the accident in Japan.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 19 OF 60 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING Information on the seismic vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program are reported in.

Within this context, "vulnerabilities" means seismic anomalies, outliers, or other findings.

For each vulnerability, Attachment 5 also reports a description of the action taken to eliminate or reduce the seismic vulnerability.

The Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) for Hatch Unit 2 included six (6) components for which seismic vulnerabilities were previously identified during the IPEEE program.

During the Seismic Walkdowns, the walkdown teams verified that the resolutions to IPEEE vulnerabilities for 4 of the 6 SWEL components are implemented as stated in the IPEEE outlier resolution (Attachment 5).

The extent of this verification is discussed in the individual SWCs for the components with identified IPEEE seismic vulnerabilities.

The following components with IPEEE vulnerabilities could not be verified due to inaccessibility.

Completion of the walkdowns, for both components, is deferred until the next refueling outage (2R22) which is scheduled February of 2013.

1) 2R22-S005, 4160V SWGR EMERGENCY BUS 2E -

The anchorage was previously determined to be inadequate. Also, there are interaction concerns with the overhead lights. notes that additional anchorage was installed and the light fixtures were tied up to prevent falling per design change request (DCR)94-017 and DCR 90-10.

However, the Seismic Walkdown team could not verify anchorage since the switchgear could not be opened at that time.

2) 2R22-S007, 4160V SWGR EMERGENCY BUS 2G -

The anchorage was previously determined to be inadequate. Attachment 5 notes that additional anchorage was installed per DCR 94-017. However, the Seismic Walkdown team could not verify anchorage since the switchgear could not be opened at that time.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 20 OF 60 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT A team of individuals with extensive knowledge of Plant Hatch systems and components developed the SWEL.

Qualifications of the personnel responsible for developing the SWEL are provided in Section 4.0 of this report.

The equipment selection personnel used an SNC-template to ensure compliance with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and consistency across the fleet.

Two SWELs were developed (SWEL 1 and SWEL 2) consistent with the guidance in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 1 consists of a sample of equipment related to safe shutdown of the reactor and maintaining containment integrity as described in Section 3.0 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 2 consists of items related to the spent fuel pool as described in Section 3.0 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The two SWELs form the overall SWEL for the plant. provides the final SWEL 1 and SWEL 2.

In some cases, components listed on the SWEL were removed from the SWEL or were replaced with equivalent components.

These changes were made when it was determined during the Seismic Walkdown that access to the equipment on the original SWEL would be impractical to achieve during a walkdown. For example, components located very high overhead were replaced with equivalent items that could be seen without erecting scaffolding. All such changes meet the provisions of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

The SWELs provided in Attachment 1 reflect the final SWELs with all changes incorporated.

6.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 1 SWEL 1 was developed using the four screens described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

Screens 1 to 3 Screens 1 to 3 were used to select Seismic Category I equipment that do not undergo regular inspection and support the five safety functions.

In accordance with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2, Page 3-3), Screens 1 through 3 can be satisfied using previous equipment lists developed for the IPEEE program. Consequently, the Seismic Review Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) developed for the Hatch Nuclear Plant's response to Generic Letter 88-20 (Reference 10.3) was included in Base List 1 for the development of SWEL 1.

Additional items were added to Base List 1 from the USI A-46 Summary Report (Reference 10.9) and the Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (Reference 10.7), Tables 3.A1-l and 4.Al-1, to provide components to address the twenty-one classes of equipment from Appendix B of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 21 OF 60 The specific guidance used to create the IPEEE Seismic SSEL was EPRI Report NP-6041, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin" (Reference 10.10).

The Seismic SSEL from IPEEE - Seismic was checked and verified to meet the intentions set forth in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The intent of the Base List 1 was to provide an equipment list of the SSCs used to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment integrity following a Design Basis Earthquake. The EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2, Page 3-1) listed three screens to use in selecting the Base List 1 if a utility was to not start from an existing equipment list used in previous plant evaluations. Applying these three screens would result in an acceptable base list that was comprised of Seismic Category I SSCs associated with maintaining the following five safety functions listed in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2):

Reactor reactivity control Reactor coolant pressure control Reactor coolant inventory control Decay heat removal, and Containment function.

The criteria used in selection of the Seismic SSEL are detailed in Section 3.1.2.2 of the IPEEE -

Seismic Report (Reference 10.8). Specifically, one preferred and one alternate path capable of achieving and maintaining a safe-shutdown condition for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a Seismic Margin Earthquake (SME) was selected for each unit. Further, it was assumed that a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) had occurred and as such, the paths were also selected as being capable of mitigating a SBLOCA following an SME.

Therefore, based upon the review of the Base List 1, it was determined that the list satisfied the requirements as specified in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Base List 1 is presented in.

Screen 4 Screen 4 is the sample considerations to select components from the Base List 1. The selection of components for SWEL 1 was developed through an iterative process that ensured a representative sample (i.e., Screen 4 from EPRI Report 1025286 - Reference 10.2). Various drafts of SWEL 1 were provided to Hatch Licensed Senior Reactor Operators (SROs) for review and input.

The SROs identified and recommended inclusion of additional equipment important to plant operations.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 22 OF 60 The following list summarizes the sample considerations used to develop SWEL 1:

Variety of systems Major new or replacement equipment Classes of equipment Variety of environments Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program Risk Significance Variety of Systems - EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) specifies that equipment from a variety of plant systems must be included on the SWEL 1. The systems represented in the Base List were reviewed and components from a majority of these systems are included on the SWEL.

Major New and Replacement Equipment - Major new or replacement equipment installed within the previous 15 years was identified through a search of work order (WO) histories for selected equipment and input from the plant personnel familiar with plant modification and from the PRA group on equipment changes to components that are included in the PRA.

Variety of Equipment Classes - A list of the 21 Classes of Equipment that should be included on the SWEL is provided in Appendix B of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 1 includes components from each equipment class.

Variety of Environments - The EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) specifies that the SWEL contain components located in various plant environments, including environments subject to corrosion and high temperatures.

SWEL 1 includes equipment in three environment types. These include Harsh (e.g. Reactor Building), Mild (e.g. Control Room, Diesel Generator Building), and Outdoors/Intake Structures (e.g. Plant Service Water Intake Structure, Yard Valve Pits).

IPEEE Vulnerabilities - SWEL 1 includes equipment identified with seismic vulnerabilities identified in Hatch Nuclear Plant's response to Generic Letter 88-20 (Reference 10.3).

Risk Significance - The risk ranking was performed using the at-power internal events PRA model and by identifying those components that, in the model, have a Risk Achievement Worth of 2.0 or greater, or a Risk Reduction Worth of 1.005 or greater. The importance ranking spreadsheet contained in calculation PRA-BC-H-10-008 (Reference 10.6) was the actual document used as a source.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC

____________________ __________________________PAGE 23 OF 60 6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 2 SWEL 2 is developed using four screens described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 2 is presented in Attachment 1.

Screens 1 to 2 The equipment selected through Screens 1 and 2 provide any Seismic Category I components associated with the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) that are also suitable for a walkdown. For Hatch Unit 2, the only Seismic Category 1 equipment associated with the SFP is the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System.

The Base List 2 includes components from the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System that are suitable for a walkdown per Screens 1 and 2 from EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

Screen 3 Screen 3 is the sample considerations that ensure that a broad category of equipment from Base List 2 is included in SWEL 2. These considerations include:

Variety of systems Major new or replacement equipment Classes of equipment

• Variety of environments The Hatch SFP System has a very basic system design with very limited component types. SWEL 2 includes components associated with maintaining seals around the SFP gates, which are Seismic Category I components. There were no new/replacement equipment in SWEL 2 because there have been no major modifications to the Spent Fuel Pool systems that would affect equipment that meets the screening requirements. Equipment associated with cooling of the SFP are located in locked areas (due to radiation) and are not suitable for a walkdown.

The Decay Heat Removal System is the only major new or replaced equipment associated with the SFPs. However, the Decay Heat Removal System is Non-Safety Related and all piping connected to the SFP either terminates greater than 10 feet above the fuel or has anti-siphon holes located greater than 10 feet above the fuel to prevent rapid drain-down of the SFP.

For Hatch Unit 2, SWEL 2 contains all the equipment on Base List 2. Thus, sampling was not a consideration in developing SWEL 2.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC

_______________________________________________PAGE 24 OF 60 Screen 4 Screen 4 identifies any items that could potentially lead to rapid drain down of the SFP. These include any penetrations in the SFP that are below 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.

For Hatch Unit 2, there are no SFP penetrations within 10 feet above the fuel in the SFP. All piping connected to the SFP, either terminates more than 10 feet above the fuel or has anti-siphon holes, located more than 10 feet above the fuel, to prevent rapid drain-down of the SFP.

Based on a review of plant documents, the only items that could potentially lead to rapid drain down of the pool are the Seismic Class 2 items that could contribute to deflation of the air seal in the seismic gap located in the transfer canal between the spent fuel pools. Air accumulators and gate seal ball valves that could contribute to deflation of the air gap, if damaged during a seismic event, are included in SWEL 2.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 25 OF 60 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS Walkdowns were performed for all components on the (combined) SWEL except for those that were inaccessible (see Section 7.1).

A Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) was completed for each component and an Area Walk-by Checklist (AWC) was completed for each area containing equipment on the SWEL. Copies of the SWCs and AWCs are provided in Attachments 3 and 4, respectively.

The personnel performing walkdowns received training on the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown guidance.

Prior to the walkdown teams arriving onsite, walkdown packages were assembled into folders that contained the SWCs and AWCs and other pertinent information (e.g., calculations, test reports, IPEEE walkdowns, equipment location, and layout drawings). Each walkdown team consisted of two SWEs.

The walkdown teams spent the first week on site obtaining unescorted plant access and organizing for the walkdowns. Organization included assignment of specific components to the teams; review of the walkdown packages; development of a process for tracking the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys; and familiarization with the plant.

The second week began with peer reviewers (Whitmore and Ashworth) providing an overview on the information contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Expectations for the walkdowns were discussed and questions were answered. After this overview, each walkdown team performed an initial Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by. This initial walkdown was performed in the presence of the other teams and at least one peer reviewer. The purpose of this initial walkdown was to ensure consistency between the different teams, to reinforce the expectations for identifying potentially adverse seismic conditions, and to allow team members to provide and obtain feedback.

Following the initial walkdowns, the walkdown teams began performing the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. Support from plant personnel (operators, electricians, engineering) was obtained as required to open equipment and to assist in locating and identifying components. All component Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were documented on the SWCs and AWCs, respectively. The final status of all SWCs and AWCs indicated one of the three following statuses:

• "Y" - Yes, the equipment is free from potentially adverse seismic conditions;

• "N" - No, the equipment is not free from at least one potentially adverse seismic condition;

• "U" - Undetermined, a portion(s) of the walkdown could not be completed due to equipment inaccessibility and the condition is not known.

The walkdown focused on anchorage and seismic spatial interactions but also included inspections for other potentially adverse seismic conditions. Anchorage in all cases was considered to be anchorage to

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 26 OF 60 the structure. This included anchor bolts to concrete walls or floors, structural bolts to structural steel and welds to structural steel or embedded plates. For welds, the walkdown team looked for cracks and corrosion in the weld and base metal. Other bolts such as flange bolts on in-line components were not considered to be anchorage. These connections were evaluated and any potentially. adverse seismic concerns were documented under "other adverse seismic conditions".

As part of the walkdown, the anchorage of at least 50% of the anchored components was evaluated to verify if the anchorage was consistent with plant documentation. The document that provides the anchorage configuration was identified on the SWC and the anchorage in the field was compared to the information on this referenced document. In cases where the anchorage could not be observed (e. g.

where the anchorage is inside a cabinet that could not be opened at the time of the walkdown), the items related to anchorage were marked as "U" (Undetermined) and deferred until equipment is available for inspection.

However, all other possible inspections associated with that item were completed and the results were documented on the SWC.

These items were considered to be incomplete at the time of this report preparation and have been deferred to a time when they would be' available for inspection (see Section 7.1).

All "U" items have been deferred until the earliest opportunity during Refueling Outage 2R22 or Refueling Outage 2R23, which are scheduled for February 2013 and February 2015 respectively.

In cases where the Seismic Walkdown team members identified a potentially adverse condition, the condition was noted on the SWC or on the AWC and a CR was written to document and evaluate/resolve the condition. As part of the process of generating the CR, preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs during the walkdowns. Additionally, detailed licensing basis reviews were conducted as part of the resolution of the CR, as required. Conditions that were not obviously acceptable were documented on the checklists and a basis was provided for why the observed condition was determined to be acceptable.

Area Walk-bys were performed in the rooms containing the SSCs for walkdowns. For cases in which the room where a component was located was large, the extent of the area encompassed by the Area-Walk-by was clearly indicated on the AWCs. For large areas, the walk-by included all structures, systems and components within a 35-foot radius of the equipment being walked down, as described on the AWC. The AWCs are included in Attachment 4.

SWEL 1 Walkdowns A total of 81 of the 104 SWEL 1 Component Seismic Walkdowns have been performed to date.

However 3 must be revisited in order to inspect for other adverse conditions inside the cabinets.

In addition, 23 of the 104 SWEL 1 components were delayed due to inaccessibility. The schedule for

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 27 OF 60 performing the remaining component walkdowns is presented in Tables 7-1 and 7-2. All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.

SWEL 2 Walkdowns A total of 2 component Seismic Walkdowns were performed. In-addition, a total of 2 Area Walk-bys were completed. All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.

7.1 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS Table 7-1 identifies the components originally determined to be inaccessible for walkdowns. These items are located throughout the plant and the required Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were not completed for these items during the initial phase of walkdowns.

Plant Hatch Unit 2 2013 Refueling Outage (2R22) is scheduled to begin on February 11, 2013. Due to the proximity of the start date of 2R22 to the NTTF 2.3: Seismic walkdowns, those Unit 2 SWEL items that were deemed inaccessible during the 180-day response period, and that require special planning for a Unit outage to complete inspection, will be walked down in the 2015 Refueling Outage (2R23).

The outage scope and schedule, and all associated tag-outs, for 2R22 had been set prior to beginning the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, and there are currently no electrical tag-outs in 2R22 that will accommodate walkdowns of the Unit 2 inaccessible SWEL items. Plant Hatch has chosen to defer the Unit 2 inaccessible SWEL items that require special outage planning for inspection to 2R23. Other inaccessible items will be walked down during 2R22.

Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope Item No.

Description Access Remaining Schedule Walkdown for Scope Completion I

2R23-03 600V STATION SERVICE See Note 2 SWC and Outage SWGR 2C & XFMR AWC 2R23

2.

600V STATION SERVICE See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2R23-S004 SWGR 2D & XFMR AWC 2R23

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 28 OF 60 Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope Item No.

Description Access Remaining Schedule Walkdown for Scope Completion

3.

See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2R22-S016 250V DC BATTERY SWGR 2A AWC 2R23

4.

4160V SWGR EMERGENCY See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2R22-S005 BUS 2E AWC 2R23

5.

4160V SWGR EMERGENCY See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2R22-S007 BUS 2G AWC 2R23

6.

2P64-F039 RBCHW COIL INLET ISO AOV See Note 1 SWC and Outage AWC 2R22

7.

2P64-F029 RBCHW COIL INLET ISO AOV See Note 1 SWC and Outage AWC 2R22

8.

See Note 1 SWC and Outage 2E I1 -FO60A LOOP A ISO GATE VALVE AC22 2E41 -F009 SHUTDOWN COOL INBRD ISO See Note 1 SWC and Outage AWC 2R22

10.

2T47-BOO7A DW See Note 1 SWC and Outage AWC 2R22

11.

See Note 1 SWC and Outage 2T47-B009A DW Cooling System UnitS AWC 2R22

12.

See Note 1 SWC and Outage 2T47-BO08B DW Cooling System Unit AWC 2R22

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 29 OF 60 Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope Item No.

Description Access Remaining Schedule Walkdown for Scope Completion

13.

H2/02 ANALYZER SAMPLE See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2P33-B001A CHILLER AWC 2R22

14.

RPS POWER DISTRIBUTION See Note 2 SWC and Outage PANEL AWC 2R22

15.

See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2R25-S001 125V DC DIV 2 CAB 2A AWC 2R22

16.

See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2R25-S002 125V DC DIV 2 CAB 2B AWC 2R22

17.

See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2R25-S004 125V DC CAB 2D AWC 2R22

18.

See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2R25-S005 125V DC CAB 2E AWC 2R22

19.

See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2R25-S036 120/208V AC ESS CAB 2A AWC 2R22

20.

120/208V AC VITAL CAB 2A See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2R25-S064 INSTR BUS AWC 2R22

21.

See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2R25-S037 120/208V AC ESS CAB 2B AWC 2R22

22.

See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2R24-S021 2A RX BLDG 250V DC MCC AWC 2R22

23.

See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2R24-S018B 600 VAC MCC 2E-B AWC 2R22

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 30 OF 60 Table 7-2 provides a list of components determined to be inaccessible to open doors to perform inspections for other adverse conditions. The anchorage for these components was visible without opening all panels of the cabinet and was therefore inspected during the initial walkdowns.

Table 7-2. Inaccessible Equipment Resulting from Guidance on Opening Cabinets to Inspect for Other Adverse Conditions Item No.

Description Access Remaining Schedule Walkdown for Scope Completion 1

See Note 2 Internal of Outage 2R24-S011 600V MCC 2C ESS DIV 1 panel 2R22 2.

2.

125/250V DC MCC 2B ESS See Note 2 Internal of Outage 2R24-S022 DIV 2 panel 2R22 3.

3.

H2/02 ANALYZER SAMPLE See Note 2 Internal of Outage 21`33-13001B CHILLER panel 2R22 Notes (Table 7-1 and Table 7-2):

1) The component was located inside an area of the plant not accessible during normal plant operation. Walkdowns of these components and of the associated plant areas were deferred to an outage.

2) Inspection of the cabinet's internals could not be performed without opening the doors of the equipment. Opening doors on these types of components was not permitted by plant operations at the time of the Seismic Walkdowns due to equipment deemed too sensitive to permit access, or requiring special, planned precautions, to open the doors.

3)

While the Seismic Walkdowns were in progress at Hatch Unit 2, supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse conditions was received on September 18, 2012. This required the opening of cabinets, electrical boxes and switchgear and the inspection of internals for SWC attributes, even when opening the components was not

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 31 OF 60 required to inspect the anchorage. However, the affected components were identified and scheduled for re-inspection with component doors opened.

4) Hatch Unit 2 has 6 transformers (Equipment Class 4) in the SWEL-1. With the exception of components (MPL #) 2R23-S003 and 2R23-S004, which were deferred as stated above, the transformers were inspected to the extent practical. All visible anchors, hardware and surfaces were inspected. The anchorage for the transformers was visible without opening the component.

To inspect the transformer further would require disassembly and therefore would not be considered part of a normal electrical inspection. The inspection of the transformers meets the requirements of the guidance document and the 50.54(f) letter.

Listed below are the 4 transformers for which inspections were completed:

MPL #

MPL #

MPL #

MPL #

2R ll-S004 2RII-S041 2S1l-S009 2Sll-S012 45KVA 600-120/208V PWR XFMR 600-120/208 V ESSENTIAL XFMR 4160/600V225KVA XFMR 4160/600V 75KVA XFMR Note that some of these MPL numbers include both the switchgear and the transformer.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC

__________________ _______________________PAGE 32 OF 60 8.0 RESULTS This section discusses the results of the Seismic Walkdowns that were performed in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic". As potentially adverse conditions were identified conditions reports were initiated in the Plant CAP program and evaluated. The sections below discuss the results of these walkdowns and evaluations.

8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS All potentially adverse conditions were conservatively entered into the site Corrective Action Program (CAP) per Southern Nuclear expectations in a timely fashion. While some preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs as part of the generation of the CAP entries, the items did not first undergo a detailed seismic licensing basis review as described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

Consequently, the as-found conditions in Table 8-1 below do not necessarily indicate that SSCs are deficient or not in conformance with their seismic licensing basis. Instead, it is an indication that Southern Nuclear has a very low threshold for CRs and actively uses the system.

SNC personnel familiar with the Plant Hatch Seismic Licensing basis, Plant Hatch seismic qualification methods and documentation, and Southern Nuclear requirements and procedures for entering items into the CAP reviewed and dispositioned all of the potentially adverse seismic conditions as part of the CAP process. The subsections below summarize thl' key findings from the CAP reviews that pertain to equipment operability, SSC conformance with the seismic licensing basis, and any required plant changes.

During the course of the seismic walkdowns, a total of 49 Unit 2 Potentially Adverse Conditions were identified and entered into the Corrective Action Program. In addition, another 5 were entered that are Common to both Units 1 and 2. Table 8-1 provides additional details on the SSCs that were identified during the walkdowns and entered into the CAP as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed relative to their seismic licensing basis.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSH1MA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 33 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR #

Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status

/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/

(open/

Resolve the Condition closed)

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed two 513069 Seismic Walkdown Engineers determined that the lights Repair or replace clasp Closed Reactor overhead lights with open clasp hooks. The would remain supported by the electrical cable if lights hooks.

Building lights in question are in the Unit 2 Reactor dislodged from the clasp. Consequently, this condition el 203' Bldg, elevation 203', by the SBLC Boron does not pose any adverse condition that would affect Solution Tank Area (2C41-AOO1). Lights are the function of the equipment.

in proximity to safety related equipment and have the potential to fall out of the hooks during a seismic event.

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed what 515100 Hammer should be removed.

Build scaffold to remove Open Reactor appears to be a hammer lying loose on top of hammer.

Due Building conduit near the ceiling above the aisle way 3/16/2013 el 130' between MCC panel 2R24-S022 and the CRDs in the Unit 2 Reactor Building elevation 130'. This tool needs to be removed.

2R43-C005C Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed the Southeast anchor of the DG 2C Air Compressor (2R43-CO05C) is missing the required grout as contained on the other three anchor bolts.

515115 Seismic Walkdown Engineers judge the as-found anchorage adequate to support the compressor in a seismic event. Grout is provided under the other three anchor bolts. Any potential bending of this bolt in a seismic event is minimized by all four anchor bolts clamping the compressor support frame securely to the concrete pad. Adding grout will also further protect the anchor bolt from corrosion.

Install the grout per site procedures.

Open Due 11/27/2013

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 34 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR #

Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status

/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/

(open/

Resolve the Condition closed) 2R43-The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 515118 The flexible conduit presently has no adverse conditions, Install padding to soften Open C005C identified a condition on the DG 2C Air but may experience fretting in the long term as the the hard edge.

Due Compressor (2R43-C005C) located in the compressor operates and introduces vibratory loads on 11/27/2013 Diesel Building, Elevation 130'.

the flexible conduit.

A flexible conduit that spans to 2R43-CO05C lies against the hard edge of a tube track.

2R43-The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 515119 The first condition - The flexible conduit presently has Install padding to soften Open C006C identified two conditions on the DG 2C Air no adverse conditions, but may experience fretting in the the hard edge.

Due Compressor (2R43-CO06C) located in the long term as the compressor operates and introduces 11/27/2013 Diesel Building, Elevation 130'.

vibratory loads on the flexible conduit. It is Install missing screw.

recommended that a padding be installed to soften the The first condition is a flexible conduit that hard edge.

spans from 2E23-247 to 2R43-C006C and lies against the hard edge of a tube track.

The second condition - The screw is not a required for structural adequacy of the cover.

The second condition is a missing screw on the fan belt cover plate on compressor.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC

___________________PAGE 35 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR #

Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status

/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/

(open/

Resolve the Condition closed)

Unit 2 HPCI Seismic Walkdown Engineers in Unit 2 515489 The knee-brace is one of a pair of supports for a small Install missing anchor Open Room 1-PCI Room noticed a knee-brace for conduit conduit near the wall. The second knee brace is fairly bolt.

Due support near Valve 2E41-F007 near the large and has all anchor bolts, so it is judged to have 11/27/2013 2T41-B005B HPCI cooler in the Unit 2 sufficient capacity to support the small conduit during a HPCI Room has only one anchor bolt. There seismic event. However, it is against good engineering is a hole in the base plate and the wall for the practice to have a support with only one bolt.

second bolt, but it appears that only one bolt was ever installed. The knee-brace is one of a pair of supports for a small conduit near the wall. The second knee brace is fairly large and has all anchor bolts, so it is judged to have sufficient capacity to support the small conduit during a seismic event. However, it is against good engineering practice to have a support with only one bolt.,

2R25-S006 The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 515500 Seismic Walkdown Engineers judged the panel will Replace the missing Open identified a screw missing from the top left perform its design function during a seismic event in the screw.

Due comer of the front panel of distribution panel as-found condition with the one screw missing based on 11/27/2013 2R25-S006.

an evaluation of a similar panel with only one screw present at each of the four comers (reference DOEJ-HX-3528 1-C001, "Evaluate Capacity of 4 Screws to Hold Door in Place".

0 HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 36 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR #

Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status

/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/

(open/.

Resolve the Condition closed) 2R25-S031 The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 515506 Seismic Walkdown Engineers judged the panel will Replace the missing Open identified a screw missing at the bottom of perform its design function during a seismic event in the screw.

Due the front panel of distribution panel 2R25-as-found condition with the one screw missing based on 11/27/2013 S031.

an evaluation of a similar panel with only one screw present at each of the four comers (reference DOEJ-HX-3528 1-C061, "Evaluate Capacity of 4 Screws to Hold Door in Place".

2T41-Seismic Walkdown Engineers in Unit 2 515661 While it appears that the capacity of some of the bolts Clean and coat anchor Open D007/8 Reactor Building elevation 203' noticed may be slightly reduced, the overall seismic adequacy of bolts, or replace.

Due more than mild surface corrosion on the bolts the installation is judged not to be adversely impacted at 11/27/2013 that anchor down the Standby Gas Treatment this time. This judgment is based on the fact that the Filter Train (SBGT) 2T41-D007/8. The equipment is anchored with at least 20 anchors and only extent of corrosion on some bolts appears a small number (approximately 3 or 4) appear to have sufficient to slightly reduce the structural more than mild corrosion. However, the corrosion capacity of these bolts.

appears to be getting progressively worse based on observations of other anchors and comiponents in the area. Therefore, the corrosion on the bolts needs to be investigated and corrected to ensure that the seismic adequacy of the SBGT is maintained.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC Table_ 8-1.PotentiallyAdversPAGE 37 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR #

Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status

/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/

(open/

Resolve the Condition closed)

Unit 2 Corroded plates and welds were found 515700 Currently, it has been judged to perform its function, Corroded members and Open Reactor adjacent to SBGT Filter Train, 2T46-DOO1B however, corrosion appears to be getting progressively connections should be Due Building in the Unit 2 Reactor Building at elevation

worse, replaced.

11/27/2013 el 185' 185'. Galvanized Unistrut members seem to be not corroded. However the welded connection and the small baseplate is corroded. This Unistrut framing system is needed to support the conduits from the panel of the filter train.

2R24-S027 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed a 515721 Loose piece should be properly installed and tightened.

Properly install and Open broken, or loose, piece of raceway 2E23448 tighten loose piece.

Due exiting MCC MIPL number 2R24-S027 and 4/30/2013 entering cable tray 2LBC801. Any sharp edge on this piece of raceway could potentially damage the cable jacket within raceway.

2H2 1 -P021 Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed there 515727 There are seven other anchors in good condition, and the Replace the missing Open is one anchor missing on the south side of the rack frame is very stiff. It is judged that the remaining anchor bolt.

Due support for Instrument Rack 2H221 -P021 on anchors have sufficient strength to restrain the rack 11/27/2013 the 87' elevation of the Unit 2 SE Diagonal in during a seismic event.

the Reactor Building. A good deal of debris in the hole, so it is unsure whether the anchor is broken off, was removed, or was never installed.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 38 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR #

Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status

/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/

(open/

Resolve the Condition closed)

Unit 2 SE Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed on the 515734 There are intact pipe clamps above and below the open Replace the missing bolt.

Open Diagonal 87' 87' elevation of the Unit 2 SE Diagonal in the clamp, so the unrestrained span of the conduit is small.

Due Reactor Building, there is a Unistrut pipe The existing pipe clamps offer enough support to prevent 11/27/2013 clamp on the west wall missing a bolt. The significant movement during a seismic event.

pipe clamp is spread open, offering no restraint to the supported pipe.

2T46-Seismic Walkdown Engineers found an 515744 The train currently has 17 anchors (9 on one side and 8 The missing anchor bolt Open D001B anchor bolt missing from the support of the on the other side). The Seismic Walkdown Engineers should be replaced.

Due SBGT Filter Train (2T46-DOO1B) in Room judged the support to be adequate during a seismic event 11/27/2013 2R303, elevation 185', of the Unit 2 Reactor due to the number of existing bolts remaining on each Building.

side of the train.

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed on the 515750 The nozzles are small and relatively light, so they are The nozzles were Closed Reactor 158' elevation of the Unit 2 Reactor Building, unlikely to cause any structural damage during a seismic removed.

Building there are two brass nozzles sitting loose on event. However, due to their location on the support for el 158' top of the Gas Cylinder Location 2P33-P066 a high trip hazard panel, there is a concern that the and two brass nozzles sitting on the frame for nozzles could cause a trip event.

panel 2H21-P405B, which is a high trip hazard.

Unit 2 Reactor Building SBGT Area A crack was found on the concrete floor on elevation 203' of Unit 2 Reactor Building where the SBGT filter train is located. This crack goes through one of the base plates supporting the exhaust fan (2T41 -CO05B). It appears that the crack goes through one of the post-installed anchor bolts. Due to this crack, the capacity of the anchor is reduced.

515779 The Seismic Walkdown Engineers judged the support to be adequate for the ductwork during a seismic event due to the number of existing nearby supports and relatively light loading on the base plates.

Repair crack.

Open Due 11/27/2013

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 39 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR #

Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status

/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/

(open/

Resolve the Condition closed)

Intake Seismic Walkdown Engineers found that 516327 Perform prompt resurfacing and coating as needed to Prompt resurfacing and Open Structure numerous piping, instrumentation, and interrupt degradation.

coating is needed to Due el 110' conduit/equipment supports in the Intake interrupt degradation per 11/27/2013 Structure elevation 110' has general coatings work order SNC433192 degradation and minor surface rusting. Note that this potentially adverse seismic condition is common to both units.

2E 11-F252A Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs)

-516572 The Seismic Walkdown Engineers judged the support to A new anchor bolt Open observed that there is one anchor bolt be adequate during a seismic event and is therefore should be installed.

Due missing from a two-bolt support for the judged to not be a potentially adverse seismic condition.

11/27/2013 tubing near valve 2El 1-F252A in the NE

,diagonal on the 97' elevation of the Unit 2 Reactor Building.

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 516577 The section of grating is extremely small and is welded Repair or replace grating.

Open Reactor observed there is a small section of grating to the kick plate around the pipe going through the Due Building NE broken near the comer of the 2T41-B003B grating at that location. The grating is not in immediate 11/27/2013 Diagonal RHR/CS Pump Room Cooler in the NE danger of separating and becoming an impact hazard and 108' diagonal on the 108' elevation of the Unit 2 does not affect the larger grating panel's ability to Reactor Building.

support load. The Seismic Walkdown Engineers judged the grating to be seismically adequate.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 40 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR #

Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status

/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/

(open/

Resolve the Condition closed) 2E 11-Seismic Walkdown Engineers found 2E 11-516593 The bolts are welded to the steel frame, providing CR for documentation Closed BOO1A BOO 1A RHR Heat Exchanger A in the NE additional support for the connection. In addition, the purposes only.

diagonal on the 97' elevation of the Unit 2 heat exchanger is also supported by four sway struts Reactor Building has eight anchors to the below the roof above to prevent overturning of the steel frame. Two of the bolts have full thread equipment. The shear strength is not impacted, engagement but do not have the required overturning is restrained, and the center of gravity of the minimum of two threads above the nut; an equipment is below the bolts and the vertical seismic additional two bolts have bolts approximately acceleration at that level will not exceed 1.0, so the 1/4" below the nuts and so do not have full largest tension load the bolts will see is the preload, thread engagement.

which is already applied. Therefore, the bolts are judged to be acceptable and do not create a potentially adverse seismic condition.

2El 1-BOOlB Seismic Walkdown Engineers found 2El 1-516595 The bolts are welded to the steel frame, providing CR for documentation Closed BOO lB RHR Heat Exchanger B in the SE additional support for the connection. In addition, the purposes only.

diagonal on the 97' elevation of the Unit 2 heat exchanger is also supported by four sway struts Reactor Building has eight anchors to the below the roof above to prevent overturning of the steel frame. Two of the bolts have full thread equipment. The shear strength is not impacted, engagement but do not have the required overturning is restrained, and the center of gravity of the minimum of two threads above the nut.

equipment is below the bolts and the vertical seismic acceleration at that level will not exceed 1.0, so the largest tension load the bolts will see is the preload, which is already applied. Therefore, the bolts are judged to be acceptable and do not create a potentially adverse seismic condition.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 41 OF60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR #

Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status

/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/

(open/

Resolve the Condition closed) 2H21-P305 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed 5 516713 Seismic Walkdown Engineers judged the panel will Replace the 5 missing Open missing slip connectors out of 12 for the door perform its design function during a seismic event in the connectors.

Due to timer panel 2H21-P305 located in the as-found condition with the 7 remaining connectors 11/27/2013 Diesel Generator Building Switchgear Room installed based on conclusions outlined in DOEJ-HX-2G.

3528 1-COO1, "Evaluate Capacity of 4 Screws to Hold Door in Place".

2R24-S022 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed a 516767 This MCC is composed of 10 frames which are bolted' Replace missing bolt.

Open bolt inside MCC 2R24-S022 that is down in each corner, so 4 bolts for each frame in Due misaligned and not in full contact with the addition to the frames being bolted to each other. This 11/27/2013 surface. Due to the misalignment, it cannot bolt misalignment occurs on one of the bolts of Frame 7 be determined whether the bolt is properly which is an internal frame. As such, by engineering installed and whether it is fully engaged and judgment it is determined that having one bolt out of the fully tightened. It was observed in the field total 40 not properly tightened, the MCC would still be and documented in the attached picture that, adequate to maintain its integrity during a seismic event.

most likely, the bolt is misaligned due to the fact that there is an interfering object in back of the cabinet. The bolt is to be checked to assure that it is properly tighten and that it is fully engaged as noted in the design documents. If not, adequate measures are to be taken to meet the design documents and have the bolt properly tightened and in full contact with the surface.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC

_______________________PAGE 42 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR #

Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status

/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/

(open/

Resolve the Condition closed) 2R43-P0O1C The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 518617 Per the SWEs judgment this condition is not considered Replace missing screws.

Open identified two screws missing on the back to be a seismic concern based on the proper installation Due panel of 2R43-P001C. The screws function of the remaining screws. The stiffness of the cabinet is 11/27/2013 to fasten the panel cover to the cabinet, not significantly degraded and the remaining screws are sufficient to fasten the panel to the cabinet.

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed in Bay 518746 The ACC is the only sensitive equipment in the area, and Restrain ladder properly.

Closed Reactor 10 of the Torus Room on the 87' elevation of it is protected by a large conduit between the component.

Building the Unit 2 Reactor Building, there is a ladder and the ladder. The valve is chained into position, so el 87' left leaning against the wall adjacent to ESS incidental contact will not cause the valve to change Bay 10 of Air ACC 2P52-AOO1. The ladder is not position. Therefore, it is judged that there is no Torus Room secured at the top of the bottom, so it is free potentially adverse seismic condition and will not affect to move during a seismic event, operability.

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed in Bay 518751 There is a second vertical support a few feet away that is Install missing anchor Open Reactor 10 of the TorusRoom on the 87' elevation of fully intact, and the conduit is also supported at the wall bolt.

Due Building the Unit 2 Reactor Building, there is a four-with a fully intact support. The conduit is very light, and 11/27/2013 el 87' bolt vertical support for a small conduit it is judged that the remaining anchors have sufficient Bay 10 of running to 2E5 1-F003 that is missing one capacity to restrain the conduit during a seismic event.

Torus Room anchor bolt.

Therefore, it is judged that there is no potentially adverse seismic condition and will not affect operability.

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed there 519481 The remaining three bolts are judged to have sufficient Tighten nut.

Open Control is a HVAC duct directly over the 2R42-S031 capacity due to the strength of the bolts to restrain the Due Building battery charger on the 130' elevation of the HVAC at the wall under a seismic event, however good 11/27/2013 el 130' Unit 2 Control Building. The lower left hand engineering practice requires that the nut be tightened bolt has a loose nut on what appears to be a fully.

seismic restraint for the HVAC at the wall.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 43 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR #

Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status I Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/

(open/

Resolve the Condition closed) 2R11-S041 Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed there 519565 The remaining screws are judged sufficient to restrain Install missing screws.

Open are 8 screws missing out of 40 (six on the top the relatively light panel cover in the case of a seismic Due and two on the bottom) on the front panel event. Therefore, there is no potentially adverse seismic 11/27/2013 cover of 2R1 1-S041 that is adjacent to condition and operability is not impacted.

Penetration 2Z43-H1002D in Room 2L48-C34 on the 130' elevation of the Unit 2 Control Building.

2R43-SO17B Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed the 519568 There are three existing screws and two holes in the Replace missing screw.

Open junction box attached to battery rack 2R42-cover plate that are not meant to have screws. The Due S017B is missing one screw out of four in the existing screws are judged to be sufficient to hold the 11/27/2013 top right comer of the cover plate.

cover plate in the case of a seismic event. Therefore, it is judged that there is no potentially adverse seismic condition and will have no impact on operability.

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed a loose 519680 The support is lightly loaded and will be in compression Tighten nut.

Open Control nut on a conduit support for Conduit due to the configuration of the support. Therefore, it is Due Building 2E21611 in the 2R42-SOO1B battery room on judged that the other three anchors have sufficient 11/27/2013 el 112' the 112' elevation of the Unit 2 Control strength to restrain the support during a seismic event, so Building.

there is no potentially adverse seismic condition and will have no impact on operability.

0 HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 44 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR #

Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status

/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/

(open/

Resolve the Condition closed)

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed a 519729 The frame acts as lateral support for a sheet metal duct, Replace missing bolt.

Open Reactor cantilever frame supporting a 12" diameter which by nature does not impose significant loads on the Due Building sheet-metal duct located in Unit 2 Reactor structure. Based on engineering judgment, no potentially 11/27/2013 el 130' Building elevation 130'on the West wall of adverse seismic condition and will have no impact on room 2R103 in the vicinity of the airlock, operability.

This frame is supposed to have six anchor bolts supporting it to the structure. Of the six bolts, the upper most bolt on the north leg of the support is missing.

2H21-P008 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed MPL 519996 The legs are very thin plates (1/8") with no significant Replace missing bolt.

Open 2H2 1-P008 located in the Unit 2 Reactor stiffness. By engineering judgment, it is considered that Due Bldg elevation 130' Room 2R103. The the absence of the third bolt on the one leg will not 11/27/2013 supporting structure has two legs that are adversely affect the stability of the panel structure. There supposed to have three bolts on the base of are no safety related components in the vicinity of this each leg. Both legs are supposed to have two panel. Therefore, there is no potentially adverse seismic bolts on the edge and one in the middle. One condition and operability is not impacted.

leg was observed to have a middle bolt missing. Also, the pliers should be removed from support area as well.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 45 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR #

Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status

/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/

(open/

Resolve the Condition closed)

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed in 519997 The column supports miscellaneous conduits of various The nuts are to be Open Reactor Room 2R103 of the Unit 2 Reactor Building sizes and it spans from the floor up to the ceiling. The removed, cleaned and Due Building Elevation 130' that a miscellaneous support column is a made up of tube steel with stiffeners at the replaced to be in full 11/27/2013 el 130' column has washers that are not in contact base. During a seismic event the column would deflect contact as was intended with two of the nuts for the base plate. There 1/8" perpendicular to the main axis prior to stressing the in their designed is a gap of approximately 1/8" between the member. Considering the member is long slender condition.

nuts and their corresponding washers.

column and the fact that the conduits being supported do not contribute significant loads, it is determined by engineering judgment that the temporary effects of this gap will not adversely affect the stability of the support.

Therefore, there is no potentially adverse seismic condition and operability is not impacted.

2R42-S052 Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 520297 The other three fasteners supporting the charger are The bent unistrut-type Open observed that the top Globe Strut channel properly fastened. A vertical conduit fastened to the member should be Due supporting the 2R42-S052 24V Battery bottom of the panel provides additional support to the replaced.

11/27/2013 Charger 2B is bent out from the wall at the battery charger in the vertical direction. Therefore, the far end of the member. The charger is SWE's judge that the attachment of the battery charger supported by two Globe Strut channels near to the wall will perform its design function during a the top and bottom of the charger. The bolt seismic event based on the properly installed attaching the charger to the bent portion of connections.

the Globe Strut channel appears to be over-tightened to the point that the Globe Strut channel is sprung and the lower edge of the spring nut does not make proper contact with the inner edge of the channel. This condition reduces the capacity of the connection compared to a properly installed spring nut connection.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 46 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR #

Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status

/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/

(open/

Resolve the Condition closed)

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 522935 During a seismic event, the ladder would not be able to Properly restrain ladder.

Closed Reactor identified a 6' metal scaffold ladder left impact anything except the support steel. The impact is Building NE unrestrained behind the 2H2 1 -P018 R14R judged by the SWEs to be credible but not significant.

Diagonal Instrument Rack and a support structure in Therefore, there is no potentially adverse seismic el 87' the Unit 2 Reactor Building Northeast condition and design function of any nearby component Diagonal at elevation 87'. The ladder was is not affected.

laid horizontally and leaned against the east Reactor Building wall behind the diagonal support steel for the rack and a steel column.

Unit 2 The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 523085 The longer contributory span adds less than 10 pounds of Missing U-bolt should be Open Reactor identified an approximately 1" diameter weight to each of the adjacent supports. The adjacent reinstalled.

Due Building NE demineralized water line in the NE Diagonal supports are judged by the SWEs to adequately carry the 11/27/2013 Diagonal on the 87' elevation of the Unit 2 Reactor additional contributory weight and seismic loads of the el 87' Building that appears to be missing a U-bolt small diameter water piping because of the short support connection to a support. There is an angle member spans and stiffness. Therefore, there is no supported from the platform steel above with potentially adverse seismic condition that would cause two holes drilled in it immediately adjacent the demineralized water piping to affect nearby to the pipe located above the 2P2 1-F006 components.

valve and the 2H2 1-POOl instrument rack.

This support looks like it was intended to be connected to this pipe. There is approximately 14 linear feet of piping between the adjacent supports because of the apparently missing support point.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE47OF60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR #

Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status

/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/

(open/

Resolve the Condition closed) 2H21-Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed one 523140 The flex conduits are clamped down appropriately in The one hole metal Open P414A/B hole metal clamps were not properly holding other locations on the back of the Instrument Racks.

clamps should be Due down flex conduit on the back of Instrument Therefore, there is no potentially adverse seismic appropriately positioned 11/27/2013 Racks 2H21-P414A/B located in Unit 2 condition and operability is not impacted.

on the flex conduit.

HPCI Room elevation 87'.

2X41-Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed that 523328 These two bolts are to be installed in the respective These two bolts are to be Open C010A the bolts missing on the covers of the equipment.

installed in the respective Due following equipment located on the DGB The cover panels are supported with multiple bolts, it is equipment.

11/27/2013 1X41-Roof: There is a bolt missing in the cover judged that the absence of one bolt on each panel will C006E panel of MPL # 2X41-CO10A. There is a not adversely affect the functionality or the seismic bolt missing in the cover panel of MPL #

capability of the dampers.

1 X41-C006E. Note that this potentially adverse condition is common to both units.

Carbon Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 523486 The nuts on the U-bolts need to be properly fastened to The nuts on the U-bolts Open Dioxide observed loose nuts on two U-bolts securing secure the loose U-bolts to the pipe and supports.

need to be properly Due piping on the carbon dioxide piping to supports on the fastened to secure the 11/27/2013 Diesel Diesel Generator Building roof. Note that loose U-bolts to the pipe Building this potentially adverse condition is common and supports.

Roof to both units.

2T41-130413 Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed 2T41-B004B RCIC Pump Room Cooler Unit is missing a bolt. The cooler is located in the NW Diagonal of the Unit 2 Reactor Building elevation 104'.

523718 The cooler is support by additional bolts throughout; there are bolts on both side of the missing bolt. The additional bolts are about 6 inches from the hole in both directions. Therefore, missing a single bolt will not adversely affect the functionality or the seismic capability of the housing.

Install missing bolt.

Open Due 11/27/2013

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC

________________________________________PAGE 48 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR #

Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status I Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/

(open/

Resolve the Condition closed)

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed top 523720 This was judged not to be a seismic concern since the Tighten nut.

Open Reactor bolt of one of the supports for the ladder in ladder is far from other equipment in the area.

Due Building the area has a loose nut. The location of this 11/27/2013 el 158' support is Unit 2 Reactor Building elevation 158' against the East wall (RL column).

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed two 524309 Due to the light weight of the cover plate, the remaining Install missing screws.

Open Control pull boxes near Penetration 2Z43-H1064C screws are judged sufficient by the SWEs to keep the Due Building with missing screws on the cover plates. The cover plates secure and not interact with any other SSCs 11/27/2013 el 112' pull boxes are located on the 112' elevation during a seismic event.

of the Unit 2 Control Building in the Station Battery 2A Room. There are three out of six cover plate screws missing on one box and one out of six cover plate screws missing on the second box.

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed on 524311 All screws are present securing the corresponding strap Replace missing screw.

Open Control the 112' elevation of the Unit 2 Control on the opposite side of the duct. The single remaining Due Building Building in Room C027 that there is a screw screw for the strap in question is judged adequate to 11/27/2013 el 112' missing securing a support strap to one side maintain the connection between the strap and the Room C027 of the HVAC duct near Penetration 2Z43-HVAC and there is no potentially adverse seismic H1 82C. The strap wraps under the HVAC condition resulting.

duct and is secured by one screw on the bottom of the duct.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 49 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR #

Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status

/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/

(open/

Resolve the Condition closed) 2R25-S129 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed on 524321 The remaining four screws are sufficient to hold the light Replace the missing Open the 130' elevation of the Unit 2 Control gauge cover plate, so there is no potentially adverse screw and washer.

Due Building in Room C-010 that there is one seismic condition affecting the design function of the 11/27/2013 screw missing and one screw missing a panel.

washer on the Q2R25-S 129 distribution panel.

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed on 524549 The support strap wraps under the duct and is secured Replace missing screws Open Control the 130' elevation of the Unit 2 Control with one screw fastened into the bottom of the duct. The Due Building Building above transformer IR1 1-S041 that corresponding HVAC duct support strap on the opposite 11/27/2013 el 130' there are three screws missing from a duct side of the duct has all screws fastened. The adjacent support strap on the side of an HVAC duct.

duct support has all screws present and fastened tightly.

The support strap wraps under the duct and is The HVAC duct is in good condition and all joints secured with one screw fastened into the fastened securely in the inspected area. Based on these bottom of the duct.

observations, the duct will perform its design function and have no adverse effects on other SSCs.

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed on 524552 The HVAC is supported at the wall by the flanged Replace missing bolts.

Open Control the 130' elevation of the Unit 2 Control connection to the fire damper in the wall and by a strap Due Building Building in Room 2C 114 that there are eight support about two feet east of the flanged connection.

11/27/2013 el 130' bolts missing from the north flange of the Therefore, there is negligible load from the duct on the 56" x 30" HVAC duct at Penetration 2Z43-flanged connection. Eighteen bolts properly installed on H750D on the west wall.

the other visible sides of the duct at the flanged connection are judged sufficient to restrain the duct. The fire damper is not adversely affected by the flanged connection with the missing bolts. Therefore, there is no potentially adverse seismic condition created by the missing bolts.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 50 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR #

Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status

/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/

(open/

Resolve the Condition closed) 2R42-S032A Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed a 524998 The 125 Volt Battery Charger has another hinge located Loose hinge nut should Open loose hinge nut on the inside door panel of at the bottom of the door that is properly secured. The be tightened.

Due 2R42-S032A located in the Diesel Building remaining hinge for the door in question is judged 11/27/2013 Switchgear 2E on elevation 130'.

adequate to maintain the connection between the door and panel. Therefore, there is no potentially adverse seismic condition resulting.

2El1 -F004 Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 525108 The grating is considered flexible compared to the valve Portions of the grating Open identified that the 2El l-F004 Torus Suction operator and valve stem. So damage of the valve is should be removed to Due Valve Motor Operator does not have a unlikely. But having safety related valve operators this provide a minimum of 11/27/2013 minimum of 1" space between the operator close to building structures is not seismically acceptable, about 1" clearance at all and the platform grating in NE Diagonal of due to the potential for creating high stresses.

locations around the the Unit 2 Reactor Building. The operator valve operator. Do not for the subject valve is almost resting on the Therefore, portions of the grating should be removed, as remove any existing platform at the 118'- 10" elevation of the NE required, to provide a minimum of about 1" clearance at support steel for the Diagonal Room. The predicted seismic all locations around the valve operator. Do not remove grating. Additional movement of the valve operator will any existing support steel for the grating. Additional grating support steel may potentially cause impact between the motor grating support steel may be required to support the be required to support operator and the platform grating.

grating around the cut out section.

the grating around the cut out section.

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed Unit 525163 Due to multiple supports located throughout the area the Clean and coat per Open Nitrogen 2 Nitrogen Storage Tank Area contain some load is minimal on each support. Therefore, supports and procedure.

Due Storage general coatings degradation and surface piping were judged to be seismically adequate by SWEs.

11/27/2013 Tank area corrosion on the nearby pipe supports and piping.

HATCH UNIT2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC

_________________________________________PAGE 51 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR #

Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status

/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/

(open/

Resolve the Condition closed) 2T48-R075 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed 525168 These items are light weight components that are Replace missing screws.

Open and 2T48-Oxygen Analyzer (2T48-R075) on the wall screwed into a concrete wall. Therefore, the remaining Due R076 has 2 of the 4 bolts missing. These missing screws for the analyzers in question are judged adequate 11/27/2013 screws are located in the Unit 2 Nitrogen to maintain the connection between analyzer and the Storage Tank Room of the Reactor Building.

concrete wall, so there is no potentially adverse seismic Also, Oxygen Analyzer (2T48-R076) on the condition resulting.

wall has 1 of the 4 bolts missing.

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed on 525221 The cover plate is very light, and the four remaining Replace missing screws.

Open Reactor the 118' elevation of the Southeast diagonal screws have sufficient capacity to restrain the cover Due Building in the Unit 2 Reactor, there is a junction box plate, so there is no potentially adverse seismic 11/27/2013 el 118' above conduit 2MR9314 with two out of six condition.

SE Diagonal cover plate screws missing.

Unit 2 Div I Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 525473 The remaining screws for the splitter box in question are Replace missing screws.

Open Yard Pit observed one out of four missing screws was judged adequate to maintain connection during a seismic Due observed on the front of the splitter box and event due to the weight of the cover. Chemelex box is a 11/27/2013 one out of four screws missing on the light weight components that is screwed into a concrete Chemelex box supported against the wall.

wall. Therefore, the Chemelex box in question is judged These missing screws are located in U2 adequate to maintain the connection between Chemelex Division 1 Yard Pit.

box and the concrete wall, so there is no potentially adverse seismic condition resulting.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC

_____________________ ___________________________PAGE 52 OF 60 During the course of the walkdowns the team identified issues that, while not rising to the level of a seismic concern, warranted evaluation to determine if programmatic enhancements are necessary.

These issues have been entered into the SNC corrective action program.

CR # 516003 - The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) identified that drawing B-45555, Version 1.0, "Seismic Configuration Control Requirements General Notes & Specifications", does not provide clear guidance how to restrain gas bottles when stored near safety-related equipment in the plant.

CR # 517213 - The Resident Inspector noted that several components inspected had various problems with bolting. He questioned the craftsmanship involving bolted connections as well as supervisory oversight of the maintenance activities involving bolted connections for the plant in general.

The condition report was written for Maintenance management to determine the extent of the condition regarding the quality of bolting connections following maintenance activities.

8.2 EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY Plant Hatch Unit 2 had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.

8.3 PLANT CHANGES There were no plant changes that resulted from the as-found conditions. Plant changes are any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features (i.e., plant modifications) that result from the Seismic Walkdowns or Area Walk-bys.

8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS Housekeeping items were identified during walkdowns and walk-bys that were not potentially seismic adverse conditions. All such items were brought to the attention of plant personnel and CRs were generated as necessary. These issues included water on the floor and loose items (small tools, trash, etc.) stored in the plant areas. These items were processed through the site CAP process and are not specifically documented in this report though are available in the Plant CAP database.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 53 OF 60 9.0 PEER REVIEW 9.1 PEER REVIEW PROCESS The peer review for the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns was performed in accordance with Section 6 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The peer review included an evaluation of the following activities:

review of the selection of the structures, systems, and components, (SSCs) that are included in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL);

review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys; review of licensing basis evaluations and decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions in to the plant's Corrective Action Plan (CAP); and review of the final submittal report.

This report provides results of the review process for each review activity as well as the results of the peer review.

9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS

SUMMARY

9.2.1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Development The selection of items for the SWEL underwent peer review according to the guidance in Section 3 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The SSCs to be evaluated during the Seismic Walkdown were selected as described in Section 6.0 of this report. The list of components was provided to the members of the Peer Review Team, which consisted of all four peer reviewers listed in Section 4.0. The Peer Review Team members independently provided comments to the personnel who selected the components on the SWEL. All comments were addressed and the Peer Review Team reviewed the changes made to the SWEL and the final SWEL, to ensure all recommendations from the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) were met. Specifically, the peer reviewers confirmed that all SSCs in SWEL 1 and 2 were Seismic Category I components that do not undergo regular inspections.

Specific considerations for the peer review process are described below for SWEL 1 and SWEL 2. The peer review check sheet of the SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.

For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team verified that the list of SSCs represented a diverse sample of the equipment required to perform the following five safety functions, as specified by EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2):

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC

_______________________________________________PAGE 54 OF 60 Reactor Reactivity Control Reactor Coolant Pressure Control Reactor Coolant Inventory Control Decay Heat Removal and Containment Function For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team also verified that the SSCs included an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:

Various types of systems Major new and replacement equipment Various types of equipment Various environments Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE and Risk insight consideration The final SWEL 1 contains items that perform each of the five safety functions specified by EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Numerous components perform more than one of the safety functions and all five safety functions are well represented by the components on the list.

SWEL 1 contains components from all the classes of equipment listed in Appendix B of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), except for cases where there are no safety-related components at the plant that fall into that specific equipment class. The list contains major new and replacement items, and items enhanced based on the IPEEE as well as equipment located in various environments and areas of the plant. All major safety-related systems are represented and risk factors were considered in development of the list.

For SWEL 2, the Peer Review Team determined that the process to select spent fuel pool related items complied with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Portions of the spent fuel pool cooling system at Hatch Unit 2 are Seismic Category 1 and all different types of components associated with the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system are represented on the SWEL

2. The Peer Review Team concluded that the bases for including/excluding items associated with the spent fuel pool were well documented and that the final SWEL 2 complies with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

In summary, all of the Peer Review comments made during development of SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 were resolved by the team that prepared the SWELs. The resolutions were reviewed

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 55 OF 60 by the Peer Review Team and it was determined that all comments were adequately addressed.

The SWEL was determined to incorporate all comments made by the Peer Review Team during the process.

During the process of conducting the walkdowns, a small number of isolated components that were not accessible were removed from the list and in some cases, equivalent items that were determined to be accessible were added. The Peer Review Team reviewed all changes made to the SWELs and determined that these changes had no impact on the adequacy of the SWELs with respect to the provisions contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The Peer Review Team concludes that the team that developed the SWELs appropriately followed the SWEL development process described in Section 3 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

The Peer Review Checklist for development of the SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.

9.2.2 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys The Peer Review Team was on-site and very involved with the Seismic Component Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. The Peer Review was performed as follows:

Each of the three walkdown teams performed an initial equipment Seismic Walkdown and an Area Walk-by while being observed by the other teams and at least one member of the walkdown Peer Review Team. The Peer Review Team provided comments and suggestions and answered questions raised by the team performing the walkdown and the other walkdown teams.

During the first week of walkdowns, a member of the walkdown Peer Review Team individually accompanied each of the SWE walkdown teams and observed the SWE team conducting the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. The Peer Review Team confirmed first-hand that the SWE walkdown teams performed the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys as described in Section 4 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). A Peer Review Team member accompanied each of the three walkdown teams on at least one full day of walkdowns. SWE walkdown teams were encouraged and expected to carry a copy of Section 4 from the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and refer to it as necessary, during conduct of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

During the remaining weeks of walkdowns, at least one Peer Review Team member remained on site until the majority of the walkdowns were completed. The Peer Review Team member reviewed essentially all the SWCs and AWC prepared by the three walkdown teams. When the walkdown team members had questions or potential concerns,

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 56 OF 60 the Peer Review Team member walked down the specific component or area along with the walkdown team to provide additional input to the seismic evaluations.

At least one member of the walkdown Peer Review Team reviewed the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages to ensure that the checklists were completed in accordance with the guidance provided in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The walkdown Peer Review Team confirmed that the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages were consistent, thorough, and the packages accurately reflected the results of the walkdowns and walk-bys as witnessed during the first week of walkdowns.

The Peer Review Team concluded that the SWE teams were familiar with the process for.

Seismic Equipment Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys. The SWE teams adequately demonstrated their ability to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions such as adverse anchorage,,

adverse spatial interaction, other adverse conditions related to anchorage, and perform anchorage configuration verifications, where applicable. The SWEs also demonstrated the ability to identify seismically-induced flooding interactions and seismically-induced fire interactions. The SWEs documented the results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys on the appropriate checklists from Appendix C of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

The Peer Review Team reviewed approximately 40% of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-by checklists and at least one member of the walkdown peer review team reviewed more than 90% of the packages.

Peer review of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys identified minor editorial errors and also some instances where comments in the checklists required additional explanation and information. Mr. Ashworth and Mr. Whitmore provided verbal feedback to the SWEs to adjust these entries accordingly. The SWEs understood the comments and incorporated the recommendations and updates from the Peer Review Team.

Since the peer review occurred at the start of the Seismic Walkdowns, the peer reviewers were able to provide comments at every stage of the walkdown process to ensure consistency in the reporting for all packages. Therefore, the Peer Review Team considered the number of completed walkdown packages reviewed to be appropriate. In addition, all members of the Peer Review team, including Mr. Ashworth, Ms. Brown, Mr. Starck and Mr. Whitmore were available by phone as necessary during the entire Walkdown process.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 57 OF 60 9.2.3 Licensing Basis Evaluations All potentially adverse seismic conditions identified were immediately entered into the plant CAP for further review and disposition as discussed in Section 8.1 of this report. Therefore, the Seismic Walkdown teams did not perform licensing basis evaluations apart from evaluations performed for the CAP. The Peer Review Team considers this CAP process approach fully comprehensive and acceptable for addressing the potentially adverse seismic conditions observed during the Seismic Walkdowns.

9.2.4 Submittal Report The Peer Review Team was provided with drafts of the submittal report. This allowed the Peer Review Team to verify that the submittal report would meet the objectives and requirements of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

The Peer Review Team provided both verbal and written comments on the draft reports and was active in ensuring the report was thorough, complete and accurate. The final version of the submittal report includes all necessary elements of the Peer Review and meets the requirements of the 50.54(f) letter.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 58 OF 60

10.0 REFERENCES

10.1 10CFR50.54(f) Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 10.2 EPRI 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, June 2012 10.3 Generic Letter No. 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities 10.4 Generic Letter No. 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 10.5 Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) Procedure: Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Power Plant Equipment, Revision 3A, December 2001 10.6 SNC Calculation PRA-BC-H-10-008, Hatch Unit 1 PRA Model, Revision 4 (applicable to both units) 10.7 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 2 10.8 Hatch Letter 5102, dated January 26, 1996, and titled 'Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Response to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4', Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366 10.9 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, USI A-46 Summary Report 10.10 EPRI Report NP-6041, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin 10.11 USAS B3 1.1, Code for Power Pressure Piping, 1967 Edition 10.12 USAS B31.7, Nuclear Power Piping, 1969 Edition 10.13 IEEE 323-1971, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 59 OF 60 10.14 IEEE 323-1974, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 10.15 IEEE 344-1971, IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generation Stations 10.16 IEEE 344-1975, IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class lE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generation Stations 10.17 American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC), 7 th Edition

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC

_________________________________________PAGE 60 OF 60 11.0 ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT 1 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS ATTACHMENT 2 - UNIT 2 - PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 ATTACHMENT 3 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS ATTACHMENT 4 - AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS ATTACHMENT 5 - IPEEE VULNERABILITIES INFORMATION ATTACHMENT 6 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEER CERTIFICATIONS

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 1 UNIT 2 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 Equipment List Pages Unit 2 - Base List 1 3-36 Unit 2 - SWEL 1 37-41 Unit 2 - Base List 2 42-57 Unit 2 - SWEL 2 58-60 Page 1 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS UNIT 2 - BASE LIST 1 NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 Equipment List Pages Unit 2 - Base List 1 3-36 Unit 2 - SWEL 1 37-41 Unit 2 - Base List 2 42-57 Unit 2 - SWEL 2 58-60 Page 2 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 HATCH2R4 6/14/2012 1000001W o o..........

000003 000003 000005 1000006 000007 000009 000010 000011 000012 000013 1000014 000015 000016 000017 1000018 1000019 000021 000022 000023 000024 000025 000026 000027 000028 000029 000030 000031 000032 000033 000034 000035 1000036 000037 000040 0000541 0o7 07 07 07

" *07:".::

07 07 08A 08A 08A 08A 005 05 05 08A 08A 08A 08A 08A

.08A 08A

08A 08A 07

.08A 08A-08A 08B1 0

0 07 18 18

18 18 18 18 18 LMARK NO 2B21-F028A 2B21-FO28B 2B21-F098C

~2B2 1-F028D 2321-F`004 2B21-FO13D 2 B21-FO13G

~2B21-F013A 2B21-FO013K 213214F019 2E32-FO01B 2E32-F001F 2E32-FOO01K 2E32-FOO1P 2E41-COO1 2E41-C002 2E41-C002-3 2E41-F001 2E41-F002 2E41-FO03 2E41-F1004 2E41-F006 2E41-FO07 2E41-FO08

,2E41-F012 2E41-F041 12E41-F042

,2E41-EOS51 2E41-FO59 2E41-F104 i2E~41-F11 1 12E41-F124 111iE.4 1 F3.Oi52

2E41-F3053 2E41-FO26 i2E41-K601 2E41-K601 2E41-K603

~2E41-K615 2E41-K616 2 E41-N008 2E41-N050 DESCRIPT F DRAWINI OUTBOARDL MSH-26000 OUTBOARD MS H--26000 OUBOR M

,ý1'1,lS H-26000 OUJTBOARD MS H-26000_

RPV READ VEN H-26000

'RPV SAFETY/RE H-26000 RPV SAFETY/RE RPV SAFETY/RE RPV SAFETY/RE STEAM DRAIN I MSIV LEAKAGE MSIV LEAKAGE MSIV LEAKAGE MSIV LEAKAGE HPCI PUMP HPCI TURBINE HPCI LUBE OIL HPCI TURBINE H-26000 H-2600*

H-26000 H-26000 H-26022 H-26022 H-26022 H-26022 H-26021 H-26021 H-51165 H-26020 HPCI STEAM SU H-26020 HPCI STEAM SU H-26020 HPCI PUMPSU H-26020 HPCI PUMP N1B H-26020 HPCI PUMP OU H-26020 HPCI BYPASS TE H-26020 G BUILDINGS REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR DRYWELL DRYWELL-DRYWELL DRYWELL DRYWELL REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR_____

REACTOR REACTOR DRYWELL REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR IREACTOR REACTOR

ýREACTOR

ýREACTOR REACTOR REACTOR CONTROL____

CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL REACTOR REACTOR HPCI MINIMJ HPCI PUMP SU HPCI PUMP SU HPCI SUPP POO HPCI BAR CON HPCI VACUUM HPCI VACUUM H PCI R EM OTE HPC' TURBINE HPCI TURBINE BAR COND & L FLOW TRANSM DISCH. FLOW S H-26020 H-26020 H-26020 H-26020 H-26021 H-26020 H -26020 H-26021 H-26021 H-26021 H-26021 H-26020 H -26020 DC/AC INVERTE Hd-26020 HPCI DISCHARG H-26020 HPCI DISCHARG H-26020 HPCI DISCH. FL H-26020 HPCI DISCH. PR 11-26020 Page 3 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 HATCH2R4 6/14/2012 NUMBER 000043 000044 000045 000046 1000047 000048 000049 000050 000051 000052

'000053 000054 000055 000056 000057 00O0058.. '::,::.

000059 000060 000061 000062 1000063 000064~

1000065

ý000066 000067 000068 000069 000070 000071 000072 1000073 000074 000075 00007~6 000077 000078:.*;:

1000079 000080 000081 000082 1000083 000084;:

18 is8 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 188 18 18 18 18 18 CLASS MARK-_NO 2E41-NO51 2E41-N053 2E41-NOS5A 2E41*N055B 2E41-NO55C 2E41-NO55D*

2E41-NO56B 2E41-N056D 2E41-NO57A 2E41-N057B 2E41-N058A 2E41-N058B 2E41-N058C 2E41-N058D 2E41-N062B 2E41-N062D 2E41-N074 2E41-N650 2E41-N651 2E41-N653 2E41-N655A 2E41-N655B 2E41-N6ssC 2E41-N655D 2E41-N656B 2E41-N656D0 2E41-N657A 2E41-N657B 2E41-N658A 2E41-N658B 2E41-N658C 2E41-N6580 2E41-N660A 2E41-N660B DESCRIPT HPCI DISCHARG HPCI PUMP SU HPCI TURB EXH HPCI TURB EXH HPCI TURB EXH HPCI TURB EXH HPCI TURBINE HPCI TURBINE HPCI STEAM LI HPCI STEAM Ilb H PCI STEAM LI HPCI STEAM LI HPCI STEAM LI HPCI STEAM LI I'DRAWING H-26020 H-26021 H-26021 H-26021 H-26021 H-26021 H-26021 H-26021 H-26020 H-26020 H-26020 H-26020 H-26020 H-26020 SUPPRESSION P H-26020 SUPPRESSION P H-26020 HPCI TURBINE H-26021 HPCI DISCH PRE H-26020 HPCI DISCH DP HPCI PUMP SU TURB EXH RUP TURB EXH RUP TURB EXH RUP TURB EXH RUP HPCI TURB EXH

.HPCI TURB EXH HPCI STM LINE HPCI STM LINE HPCI STM LINE

[APCI STIM LINE HPCI STM LINE HPCI STFM LINEE HPCI STM LINE HPCI STM LINE H-26020 H-26021 H-26021 H-26021 H-26021 H-26021 H-26021 H-26021 H-26020 1H-26020Q H-26020 H-26020 H-26020 H-26020 H-26020 H1-26020*

BUILDING REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL REACTOR

'REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR>

18 18 18

18 08A 08A 06 08A 2E41-N662B 2E41-N662D 2E41-R612 2E41-R613 2Ell-FO91B 2El1-E140A 2E21-C001B 2E2E1-FOO1B SUPP POOL LEV H-26020 SUPP POOL LEV-H-26020 HPCI FLOW CO H-26020 HPCI FLOW IND H-26020 HPCI DISCH TO H-26014 HPCI STEAM TO H-26015 CORE SPRAY PU H-26018 CORE SPRAY TO H-26018 Page 4 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 HATCH2R4 6/14/2012 V NUMBER 0.1000 8.6:........

I000087 10000818 000089 1000090 000091 0000923':

1000094; 000095

!000096 1000097 16-6-0O9:9 7

000098 Jd6oolol 1000101 000103 000104 000106 bbo107 000108 0001110 000113 000114 1000114 1 -

000117

'000118 oo0L

,o-------

....i.....

10901201111:ý-

'000121 000122

000123, 000124 0900126

'08A 0J8A.

8 08A

ý07 t8A 18 1.8A 118 18A

'20

,21 06 06 08A 08A 08A 08A 08A_

08A 08A 08A 08A 08A 08A 08A 08A S08A 08A 18A 18 1 8.

18 18

~18 i.

..... 'is............ 4 i MijARK~NO

'2E21-FOO4B 2E2 1-F0O5B 2E21-FO15B

'2E21-FO19B j2E21-F031lB 2E21-K600B 2E21-NO03B 2E21-NOS1B 2E21-N651B

~2E21-R601B 2E11-B13B11 2E11-COO1D>

2E11-COO2B 2E11-FOO3B 2E11-FOO4B 2Ell-FOO6B 2E11-F007B 2E11-FO11B 2E11-F`016B1 2Ell-FO24B 2E11-F026B 2E11-FO27B 2E11-FO28B 2E11-FO47B 2E11-FO48B 2E11-F049 42E l1-F065B 2Ell-FO68B

• 2E11-FO73B 2EI1-FO91B 2E11-F*O4B l2Ell-F119B

'2El1-K600B 2E11-NO02B 2Ell-NO07B 2E11-NO17B 2E11-NO17D 2E11-N082B

'2Ell-N682B

'2EII-R600B CORE SPRAY TOiH-26018 CORE SPRAY TO H-26018 CORE SPRAY TE H-26018 CORE SPRAY TOFLH26018 CORE SPRAY MI H-26018 CORE SPRAY FL H-26018 CORE SPRAY FL H-26018 CORE SPRAY FL H-26018 CORE SPRAY FL H-26018

~CORE SPRAY FL H-26018 RHR HEAT EXC H-26014

.- HRSWPUMP H-21039 RHR PUMP 2B H-26014 RHR HX)B DISC H-26014 RHR PUMP 2B SH-26014 RHR SDC SUCTI H-26014 RHR PUMP 2D H-26014 RHR HX HDR CR H-26014 RHR HX B DRAI H-26014 CONT SPRAY DI H-26014 RHR TEST LINE H-26014 RHR HX TO RCI H-26014 SUPP POOL SPR H-26014 RHR INLET TO S H-26014 RHR HX B INLET H-26014 RHR HX B BYPA H-26014 RHR RADWAST H-26014 RHR PUMP 2B S H-26014 RHR HX B TUBE H-21039 RHR HX B SERV[IH-26014 HPCI DISCH TO H-26014 RHR HIX B VENT H-26014-RHR HX B BYPA H-21039 RHR HDR FLOW H-26014 RHR HX B TUBE H-26014 RHRSW FLOW TH-21039 RHR HX B DISC H-26014 RHR HX B INLET H-21039 RHR HX B INLET H-21039 RHR PUMP 213 H-26014 RHR PUMP 2B& H-26014 RHR HXB TIBE H11-26014 REAC'TOR.

,REACTOR

,REACTOR:

R.....................

,REACTOR REACTOR

°.....................................

'REACTOR

!CONTROL CONTROL

-REACTOR INTAKE REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR

REACTOR, REACTOA REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR:,

REAC R........

REACTOR REACTOR

~REACTOR REACTOR

-CONTROL."

REACTOR REACTOR.

REACTOR

]REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR CONTROL RECTONRO Page 5 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 HATCH2R4 6/14/2012 NUMBER 000127 000128 000129 000130 000131 0001'32 000133 000134 000135 000136 000137 001438 000141 000142

ý000143 D00144

000145 0001o46 000147 000148

,000149

000151 000152 000153 P00156

'000155 000156

!000157

• J00f58*:....

.000159 o00f60:

,000161 U00162 1000163 000164<~.....

000 165 i000166Ž

!000167 000168:1..

000169 000170 :i*:i 18 18 07 07 07 0)7 07 08A 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 08B 07 07 07 08B 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 08A

08A 08A 06 08A 08A 08A

08B:

08A 03A 08A

• 08A:

08A

08A

CL~s~

MARK [P) 2E11-R603B 2E11-S600B 2B21-F022A 2B21-F022B 2B21-F022C

'2B21-F022D 22B21-F003 2B21-F016 2B21-FO13B 2B 21-FO13F 2B21-FO13H 2B21-FO3M 2C11-FO10A 2C11-F010B 2C11-F011 2C11-F$$0B 2Cll-FO35A 2C1I-FO35B 2CIl-F037 2C11-F110A 2C71-53A 2C71-S3B 2C71-S3C 2C71-S3D 2C71-S3A 2C71-S3B1 2C71-S3C 2C7*4S3D 2B31-F023A 2E1l-FO04A 2EII-FO06A 2EI1-CO02A 2EIl-FO07A 2EII-F026A 22E11-F1O4A 2EIl-F079A 2EI1-F048A 2EI1-FO91A 2E17-FO10 2Ell-F028A 2E11-F016A 2EIl-FO17A DESCRIPT D

DRAWING RHR HX B DISC H-26014 RHR HIXB TUBE H-26014 INBOARD MSIV H-26000 INBOARD MSIV H-26000 INBOARD MSIV H-26000 INBOARD MSIV H-26000 RPV HEAD VEN H-26000 STEAM DRAIN I H-26000 RPV SAFETY/RE H-26000 RPV SAFETY/RE H-26000 RPV SAFETY/RE H-26000 RPV SAFETY/RE H-26000 SCRAM DISCH H-26007 SCRAM DISCH H-26007 SCRAM DISCH H-26007 BACKUP SCRA H-26007 SCRAM DISCH H-26007 SCRAM DISCH H-26007 SCRAM DISCH H-26007 BACKUP SCRAK H-26007 MANUAL SCRA MANUAL SCRA MANUAL SCRA MANUAL:SCRA MANUAL SCRA MANUAL SCRA MANUAL SCRA MANUAL SCRA RECIRC PUMP S H-26003 TORUS SUCTIO H-26015 SHUTDOWN C H-26015 RHR PUMP 2A H-26015 RHR PUMP MI H-26015 RHR FHX DRAIN H-26015 RHR HX VENT H-26015 RHR HX SAMPL H-26015 RHR HX BYPASS H-26015 FHPCI STEAM TO H-26015 b' RHR HX HDR CR H-26015 iTORUS SPRAY H-26015 CONTAINMENT H-26015 RHR LPCI DISCH H-26015 BUILDING CONTROL CONTROL DRYWELL DRYWELL DRYWELL DRYWELL DRYWELL DRYWELL DRYWELL DRYWELL DRYWELL DRYWELL REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL DRYWELL REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR Page 6 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 HATCH2R4 6/14/2012

• N U MBER*

1000171 000172 000173 090174 000175 000176 1000177.

10010 J

1000182 000183 000184 000185 000186 000187 000188 000189 1000190 000191 000192 000193 000194 000195 00001*7 1000197 1000189 1000199 10002019 19P0194 10002107

ý002118 000209 1000212 1000214 1000207 000216 08A 21 i18

.18

.18 018 i18 108A

.:08A 108A i06

.08A

• 08A

• 08A

• 08B

.08A i08A

• 08A i08A 08A 08A 08A 21 18

, 18 18 18 07 08A 08A 06 08A 08A 08A 20 18 18 18 18 CLASS I

MARKNO 2E11-F015A

.2E11-B0l01A 2Ell-NO15A 2Ell-K600A

!2E11-R603A

• *2E11-N082A 2E11-N682A 2B31-F023A S 2EII-FO04A*

i2Ell-FO06A

~2!Ell-C002A:

2Ell-FO07A

• 2E11-F026A 2E11-F104A Q2E11-F079A' 2E11-F048A

'2EI.IF091A

.2E11-FO10 21E1 1-F028A 2EII-FO16A

• 2E11-FO17A 2E1l-FO15A 2E11-BOO01A 2EII-NO1SA 2E11-K600A 2E11-R603A "2EI1-N082A 2E11-N682A

$2Ell-K603A 2EI1-F065A

'2E11-F006C 2EIl-F047A 2E11-CO01A 2E11-F119A 2E11-F068A 2E11-F073A 2E11-K613A

• 2E11-N002A 22E11-R600A 2E11-S600A

-2E11-NO17A

',DESCRIPT

,. IIDRAWING INBOARD INJEC H-26015 RHR HEAT EXC H-26015

• RHR DISCH HEA H-26015 RHR DISCH HEA H-26015 RHR DISCH HEA H-26015 RHR PUMP FLO H-26015

.RHR PUMP FLO H-26015 POWER SUPPLY H-26015

.RECIRC PUMP S H-26003 TORUS SUCTIO IH-26015 SHUTDOWN C H-26015 RHR PUMP 2A H-26015

.RHR PUMP MI H-26015

ýRH.R HX DRAIN H-26015 RHR HX VENT H-26015 RHR HX SAMPL H-26015 RHR HX BYPASS H-26015 HPCI STEAM TOHl-26015 RHR HX HDR CR H-26015 TORUS SPRAY H-26015 CONTAINMENT H-26015 RHR LPCI DISCH H-26015 INBOARD INJEC H-26015 RHR HEAT EXC H-26015 RHR DISCH HEA H-26015 RHR DISCH HEA H-26015 RHR DISCH HEA H-26015 RHR PUMP FLO H-26015 RHR PUMP FLO H-26015 POWER SUPPLY H-26015 RHR PUMP 2A H-26015 SHUTDOWN C H-26015 RHR HX INLET H-26015 RHRSW PUMP H-21039 RHRSW SYSTE H-21039 RHRSW HX FLO H-21039 RHRSW TO RHR H-26015 CONTROL AMP H-26015 RHR HXTUBET H-26015 RHR HX TUBE T H-26015 F068A POSITIO H-26015

RHRSW HX INL H-21039 KBUILDING REACTOR REACTOR K REACTOR CONTROL CONTROL REACTOR CONTROL CONTROL DRYWELL REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR

~REACTOR REACTOR CONTROL CONTROL REACTOR CONTROL CONTROL REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR INTAKE REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR CONTROL REACTOR CONTROL CONTROL REACTOR Page 7 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 HATCH2R4 6/14/2012 NUMBER CLASS.

IVARK NO~

000217 is Ell68-NO17C

[00218 118 2EIB-NO07A 000219.

2Ell-R602A 000220 18 22El1-R628A 000221 08A 2ECl-FO03A 000222 18 2EPI?200B 000223 20 2EPl-K603B 000224

18 2EP4-R628B 1000225 20 2El1-K613B 000226 08B 2CP1-F319 000227 08B 201-1`040 000228 06 2P41-COO1B 000229 0,A 2P41-F316B 000230 08A 2P41-F315B 000231 08A 2P41-F312B 000232 077 2P41-F339B 000233

• 08A 2P41-F310 000234 08A.

1P41-6313C 000235 07 2P41-F037B 000236

,.07 2P41-FO36B 000237 07 2P41-Fo35B 0002384 08A 2N71-F313

[000239 118 2P41-K6O1B 000240 18 2P41-N303B 000241 18 2P41-R6F1B 000242 072PSAO6 000243 06 2P41-COO1A 000244

'08A, IP41-F313D 000245 08A i2P41-F312A 000246 107 i2P41-F339A 000247 08A i2P41-F315A 0002N48 2P41-F316A0

[000249 107 2P41-F066 000250

'107 2P41-F037A

[900251

'07 1P4L-F039A

[000.252

~

18 2P41-N3O3A

[000253 18 2P41-R6O1A 000254

., 118 2P41-K601A

[000255 08A 2N71-F012 000256 10 2T41-B002B 000257 10 2T41-B005B 1000258 19 2T41-NO19B 1~DESCRlPTi DRAWING~ JBUILDING~

RHRSW HX INL H-21039 REACTOR RHRSWHFIXTINL H-21039 REACTOR RHRSW HXINL H-21039

"'CONTROL RHRSW CONTR H-26015 CONTROL RHR HX OUTLEH-61 RECO RHRSW HEAT E H-21039

~CONTROL POWER SUPPLY H-26015 CONTROL RHR SERVICE W H-26014 CONTROL AMPLIFIER (K62 H-26014 CONTROL PILOTAIR HEA H-26007 s

REACTOR PILOT AIR HEA H-26007 REACTOR PLANT SERVICE H-21033 INTAKE TURBINE BUILD H-21033 YARD REACTOR BUL H:21033

YARD DIESEL GENERA H-21033 YARD DIESELGENERA H-21033 DIESEL RADWASTE DIL H-21033 YARD UNIT 2 PSW IS D-11001 INTAKE E11COO2B CON H-26051 REACTOR T41BO02B CON H-26051 REACTOR T41BO05B CON H-26051 REACTOR CIRC WATER BL H-21026 YARD ELECTRICAL SU H-21033 CONTROL PSW DISCHARG H-21033 INTAKE PSW DIV. 2 PI H-21033 CONTROL PSW DIV. I-11 H-26054 REACTOR PLANT SERVICE :H-21033 INTAKE UNIT 2 PSW IS D-11001 YARD DIESEL GENERA H-21033

'ARD DIESEL GENERA H-21033 DIESEL REACTOR BUlL H-21033 YARD

.TURBINE BUILD H-21033 YARD 2P64/2E51 CO H-26050 REACTOR 2E1lCO022A CO H-26050 REACTOR 2T41B300A CO'ý(-

H-26050

-~REACTOR PSW DISCHARG H-21033 INTAKE,--

PSW DIV. I P1 1H-21033

'CONTROL ELECTRICAL SU H-21033 CONTROL CIRC WATER M H--21026 Y

.ARD CS/RHR PUMP H-26071 REACTOR IHPCI PUMP RO H-26071 REACTOR HPCI PUMP RO 11-26071 REACTOR Page 8 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 HATCH2R4 6/14/2012

'l NMBER 1000259 1000261 1006262 00063i 000264 000265 000266 100267 1000269 10002....

1000271 000273 000275 000276 000279 000281 000282 000283 000285 000287 1000288 1000289 000291

.1-

-o.1-1000293 000294 000295 000296 1000297 000b298 1000299 lo*o19.0-3 i19 18 118 110

• 19 io8 0

07

'0 0

07 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

07 07 07 08 08

,07 2i 207 108B i0 187 20 120 18 20 20 118 MARK-NO 2T41-NO20B

.2T41-R609B.

2T41-R610B 2T41-BOO03A 2T41-NO21A

• 2T41-R611A

_ 2B21-A003D

2821-AO03G 2B21-AO03H 2B21-AOO3M 2T48-F112B 2P70-AOO2A 2P70-AO02B 2P70-AOO2C 2P70-F138A

<2P70-F`138B 2P70-F`138C

.2P70-F 141 2P70-F084 2B21-AOO3A 2B21-AO03B 2B21-AOO3F 2B21-AO03K 2T48-AOO1 2T48-F112A

.2T48-F104 2P70-F001A 2P70-F054 2P70-F005 2T48-F321 2T48-F325 2B21-N691B 2B21-N091B 282 1-R623B 2B21-N690D 282 1-N090:

282 1-R610 282 1-N 6858 282 1-N085B 282 1-R604A 282 1-N691A DESCRIPTh DRAWII CS/RHR PUMP H-26071 SHPCI PUMP RO H-26071 CS/RHR PUMP H-26071 CS/RHR PUMP H-26071 CS/RHR PUMP H-26071 CS/RHR PUMP >H -26071 SRV AIR ACCU H-26000 SRV AIR ACCU H-26000 SRV AIR ACCU H-26000 SRV AIR ACCU H-26000 NITROGEN FLO H-26083 EMERGENCY NI H-26066 EMERGENCY NI H-26066 EMERGENCY NI H-26066 EMERGENCY NI H-26066 EMERGENCY NI H-26066 EMERGENCY NIH-26066 EMERGENCY NI H-26066 EMERGENCY NI H-26066 SRV AIR ACCU~ H-28023 SRV AIR ACCU H-28023 SRV AIR ACCU H-28023 SRV AIR ACCU H-28023 NITROGEN STO 'H-26083 NITROGEN FLO H-26083 NITROGEN SUP H-26083 NITROGEN BAC H--26066 DRYWELL PNEL IdH-26066 DRYWELL PNEU [H-26066 N Gt~

BUILDING REACTOR CONTROL CONTROL

'REACTOR-REACTOR CONTROL DRYWELL

.DRYWELL DRYWELL DRYWELL REACTOR REACTOR___

REACTOR REACTOR' REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR

.REACTOR DRYWELL DRYWELL DRYWELL DRYWELL YARD REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR CONTROL 1CONTROL

REACTOR, CONTROL CONTROL REACTOR CONTROL

__CONTROL REACTOR

~CONTROL CONTROL DRYWELL NITR DRYWELL/TOR RPV WATER LE RPV WATER LE RPV WATER LE RPV PRESSURE RPV PRESSURE RPV PRESSURE RPV WATER LE RPV WATER LE RPV WATER LE RPV WATER LE RPV WATER LE H-I-2.6083, 1--26083

~H-26001 H-26001 H-26001 H-26001 HI-26001 H-26001 H-26001 H -2 6001 H-26001 H -2 6001 H -26001 Page 9 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 HATCH2R4 6/14/2012 NUMBER 000301.............

1)(10302 000303 0600304 -'--

1000305 boo£306:.:,:,!

1000307 1000309 000309 000311 1000312 1000315 ooo3Y 6.............

1000315 1000317 0003 19 0001320.

10. 0 0

1 000321 100036 000327 1000328 1000329 000O330 7 1000332 1000333 0J00334 1000336 1000 336 1d60340 1000341 1000342 20

.20 i18 20 20 18 18~

18

.18

~18 18 18 07.

07 18 18 18 18 18 118 18

.071

.07

08A"

~08A

.06 08A 08A 08A 08B 08A 08A 08A 08A 08A 08A 21

-2B21-N091A 2B21-R623A 282 1-N 690A 2B21-NO9OA 2 B21-R615 2B21-N)685A' 282 1-NO85A jOESCRIPT RPV WATER LE RPV PRESSURE RPV PRESSURE RPV PRESSURE

RPV WATER LE RPV WATER ILE RPV WATER LE DRWN ~

BUILDIN!G~

H-26001 H-26001 1H--26001 H-26001.

H-26001 H-26001-HI-26001 2T47-R627.

TORUS TEMPER H-26074 2T48-NO09B

~2T48-N009D

~2T47-K600 2T48-k604 2T48-NO10B 2T48-R622B 2T48-K621B 2T48-F 36 lB 2T48-F362B 2T~47-R626 2T48-NO09A j2T48-NO09C 2T48-K622 TORUS WATER TORUS WATER

,SIGNAL CONVE

INSTRUMENT D TORUS WATER TORUS WATER TORUS LEVEL I TORUS LEVEL I TORUS LEVEL I

.H-26084 H-:26084 H-26284 H-26284 H-2 6084 H-26084 H-26284 H-26084 H-26084 TORUS TEMPER H-26074 TORUS WATER H-26084 TORUS WATER :H-26084

TORUS TEMPER*'

H-26285 REACTOR CONTROL CONTROL REACTOR CONTROL ACONTROL REACTOR CONTROL REACTOR

{REACTOR CONTROL CONTROL REACTOR CONTROL CONTROL REACTOR REACTOR CONTROLR REACTOR

REACTOR CONTROL

~CONTROL REACTOR CONTROL CONTROL

~CONTRO L REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR 1REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR

.2X75-K651A POWER DISTRI 2T48-NO10A TORUS WATER 2T48-R622A TORUS WATER 2Ti48-K604A INSTRUMENT D

~2T48-K621A TORUS WATER 2T48-F36iA TORUS LEVEL I 2T48-F362A TORUS LEVEL I t2E11-F004A TORUS SUCTIO i2Ei"-FO06A SHUTDOWN C 2E11-COO2A RHR PUMP 2A 2EI1-FO07A

-RHR PUMP MI 2E11-F026A RHR HIX DRAIN

'2E-llFlO4A' RHR HX VENT 2El1-F079A RHR HX SAMPL 2E1l-F048A RHR HX BYPASS 2E11-F091A HPCI STEAM TO 2E11-FO1O RHR HX HDR CR 2E11-F028A TORUS SPRAY

~2E11-F016A CONTAINMENT 2EIl-FO15A INBOARD INJEC

2EI=-B00iA

:RHR HEAT EXC H-26285 H-26084 H-26084 H -26284 H-26285 H -26084 H-26084.

'H-26015 H-26015',

H-26015 H-26015 H -26015

~H-26015 H-26015 H-26015;.

H-26015 H-26015 H-26015

~H-26015 HL-26015 H-26015 Page 10 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 HATCH2R4 6/14/2012 NUMBER 1000343 1000344 000345 000346 1000347 1000349 000350 000351 1000351 1 1 1 1111.................

1000353 000354 1000355 000357 000359 000361 000362 000363 000362 000367 000369 000375 000373 0003674 000375 160-003769 000377 000378 1000373 000381 000382 1000383 lo0 382 L'CLA-S')

NO 18 2Ell-NO1SA 18 2E11-K600A 18 2Ell-R603A 18 2E11-N682A 18

'2E11-N682A 18 2E11-K603A 08A 2E11-F047A 06

~

2E11-C001A 08A 2E11-F119A 08A 2E11-FO68A 08A 2E11-F073A 20 2E11-K613A 18 2E11-NO02A 18 2E11-R600A i18 2El!-R600A 18 2E11-NO17A 8i 2E11-NO17C 18 2E11-NOO7A 18 21-6A 18 i2[E11-R628A 08A 2E11-FOO3A 07>

~

2E11-F7065A 08A

!2E11-F027A 08A 2E11-F024A.

08A 2E11-FO21A 21 2E11-BOO1B 06 2E11-CO01D 06 2E1:-COO2B 08A

.2E11-FO03B 08A 2EIl-FO04B 08A 2Ell-FO06B 08A 2E11-FOO07B 08A 2E11-F010 08A 2E11-1`O1613 08A 2E11-F024B 08A Q2E11-F`02613 08A 2El1-F027B 08A 2 El1-F028B 08A 2E114F04713 08A 2Ell-FO48B 08A 2El1-F049 07' 2EII-FO65B RH DESCHI-T DRAWING0 RHR DISCH HEA H-26015 RHR DISCH HEA 11-26015 RHR DISCH HEA H-26015 RHR PUMP FLO H-26015 RHR PUMP FLO H-26015 POWER SUPPLY H-26015 RHR HX INLET H-26015 RHRSW PUMP H I 2103..9:...............

ýRHRSW SYSTE H-21039 RHRSW HX FLO H-21039 RHRSW TO RHR H-26015 CONTROL AMP H-26015.

RHR HXTUBE T H-26015 RHR FXIXTUBET TH-26015 F068A POSITIO RHRSW HX INL RHRSW HX INL RHRSW HX INL RHRSW HX INL RHRSW CONTR IRHR HX OUTLE RHR PUMP 2A TORUS SPRAY I TEST LINE TOT*

H-26015 H-21039 H-2 1039 H-21039 H-2 1039 H-26015 H-26015 1H-26015, H-26015 H-26015,

{"BUILDING REACTOR CONTROL CONTROL REACTOR CONTROL CONTROL REACTOR 1INTAKE "REACTOR R........

REACTOR REACTOR CONTROL CONTROL REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR iCONTROL

,CONTROL IREACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR iREACTOR

'REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR' REACTOR REACTOR

ýREACTOR

ýREACTOR

!REACTOR

ýREACTOR REACTOR REACTOR" CONTAINMENT H-26015 RHR HEAT EXC H-26014 RHRSW PUMP H-21039 RHR PUMP 2B H-26014 RHR HX B DISC H-26014 RHR PUMP 2B S H-26014 RHR SDC SUCTI H-26014 RHR PUMP 2D H-26014, RHR HX HDR CR H-26014 CONT SPRAY DI H-26014 RHR TEST LINE H-26014 RHR HX TO RCI H-26014 SUPP POOL SPR H-26014 RHR INLET TO S H-26014 RHR HX B INLET H-26014 RHRHX B BYPA H-26014 RHR RADWAST H-26014 RHIR PUMP 2B S H-26014 Page 11 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 HATCH2R4 6/14/2012 NUMBER 000385 000386 000387

!000388:*.

j000389 000391 000391 000392.

1000393 000394 000395 000397 000398 booo 3....

S00401 000402 000403 000404 000405 ob04O,6 000407 00040 8 000409

-000410 000411 000412 000413 000414.

000o415 000416 000417 000418 000419 000421 P00422 000423 000425 00042,6K CLASS 08A 08A 08A 08A 08A 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 20 18 20 08A 08A 17

.21 21

.05 18 0

0

§09 i1 0

09

.0 17 21 21 05 18 0

09 MARKNO 2Ell-FO68B 2Ell-F073B 2E1l-FO91B 2E11+104B1 2Ell-Fl19B 2E1.-K600B.

2Eli-NOO2B 2EII-N007B 2E11-NO15B 2Ell-NO17B 2E11-N017D 2E11-N082B 2Ell-N682B 2E1l-R600B

2Ell-R603B 2E11-S600B

,2E11-R602 B 2E11-K6038 2E11-K613B 2EIl-FO15B 2E1l-FO21B

ý2R43-SO0lA

" 2Y52-A1OlA 2Y52-AOO1A 2Y52-cOOlA 2R43-NO01A

• 2R43-AO05A

.2R43-AO06A 2X41-C0lOA 2X41-N 01 lA

.2X41-C013A i2X41-CO16A 2X41-C028A, 2R43-SO01C 2Y52-AO01C 2Y52-ClO1C 2R43-NO03C

,2R43-AOO5C

2R43-A006C

.2X41-CO10C DESCRIPT DAING fBUILDING RHR HXBTUBE H-21039, REACTOR RHR HX B SERVI H-26014 REACTOR HPCI DISCH TO H-26014 REACTOR RHR HX B VENT H-26014 REACTOR RHR HX B BYPA H-21039 REACTOR RHR HDR IFLOW H-26014

.CONTROL 11R H H D. F O

l.

l-O L........

RHR HX B TUBE H-26014 REACTOR RHRSW FLOW TH-21039 REACTOR RHR HX B DISC H-26014 REACTOR RHR HX B.INLET.H.21039 REACTOR RHR HX B INLET H-21039 REACTOR

" RH PU P 2B :,]*::2 0i4................

.............R.A....

RHR PUMP 2B H-26014 REACTOR RHR PUMP 2B& H-26014 CONTROL RHR HX BTUBE H-26014 CONTROL RHIRHX B DISC :H-26014

__CONTROL RHR HX B TUBE fH-26014 CONTROL RHRSW HEAT E H-21039 CONTROL POWER SUPPLY'lH-26015.

CONTROL RHR SERVICE W H-26014 CONTROL AMPLIFIER (K621H'26014 CONTROL INBOARD INJEC H-26014 REACTOR CONTAINMENT H-26014 REACTOR

,DIESEL GENERA:H-21074 iDIESEL DG 2A FUEL OIL H-21074 DIESEL

ýDG 2A FUEL OIL H-21074

YARD DG 2A FUEL OILH-21074 YARD

.DG 2A DAY TAN:H-21074 DIESEL DG'2A STARTIN ý172l074 DIESEL

.DG 2A STARTIN H-21074 DIESEL DG 2AROOME H-12619 DIESEL DG 2A ROOM F H-12619 DIESEL

• DG 2A ROOM LzH-12619 DIESEL

.DG 2A BATTERYiH-12619 DIESEL

ýDG 2A BATTERYIH-12619 DIESEL

,DIESEL GENERA H-21074 DIESEL DG 2C FUEL OIL H-21074 DIESEL DG 2C FUEL OIL H-21074 YARD DG 2C FUEL OIL H-21074 YARD DG 2C DAY TAN H-21074

.DIESEL DG2CSTARTIN H-21074 DIESEl

.DG 2C STARTIN :H-21074

'DIESEL DG 2C ROOM E IH-12619 DIESEL Page 12 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 HATCH2R4 6/14/2012

_NUMBER CLASS

[

MARK'_NO

}i 'DESCRIPT

-DRAWING BUILDING

]000427 18 2X41-NO11B DG 2C ROOM F H-12619 DIESEL 000428

.0 2X41-CO13B DG 2C ROOM L H-12619 DIESEL 09 2X41-C016C DG 2C BAITERY H-12619 DIESEL 000430 0

2X41-C028B DG 2C BATTERY H-12619' DIESEL 000431 03 2R22-S005 4160V STA SVC H-23023 DIESEL i000432 02 2R22-S016 250 V DC BATT H-23239 CONTROL i000433 02 2R23-S003 600 V STA SVC H-23240 CONTROL 000434 01 2R24-S009 600/208 V MCC H-23027 INTAKE 1000435 0

2R24-S011 600 V MCC 2C H-27279 REACTOR 1000436 01 2R24-SO11A 600 V MCC ESS H-27296 REACTOR 1000437 01 2R24-S018A 600 V MCC 2E- _H-27279 REACTOR 000438

'01 2R24:-S021 125/250 VDC

-2728 REACTOR i000439

'01 2R24-S025 600/208 V MCCiH-23023 DIESEL j000440 114 2R25-S0D1 125 V DC CA BI IH-23239 CONTROL

'000441 14 2R25-S004 125 V DC CABI H-23025 DIESEL 000442

'14 2R25-S29 120/208.VAC C H-23025 DIESEL 000443 14 2R25-So36 120/208 V AC E H-23240

""CONTROL 1000445 -

14 2R25-S064 120/208VAC C H-23240

.CONTROL 000446 14.2R25-S10

. 120/208 V ESS H-27279.

1REACTOR 000447 114 2R25-$129 125 V DC DISTR H-23239 CONTROL

000448 15 2R42-SOO1A

.125/250 V STA H-23220 CONTROL i000449.

15 2R42-SO02A 125 V DIESEL S H-23022

'DIESEL

.000450 16 2R42-S026 125 V BATTERY H-23240 CONTROL

005 62R42-5027 12 ATR 220 CONTROL

000452 16 i2R42-5032A 125 V BATTERY H-23025 DIESEL 1000453 16

'2R44-S002 STATIC INVERT "H-13131 CONTROL 1044 04 1-S4 CN BLDG ESSIH-23240 CGONTROL

...... ~

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ------

IT*'

000455 04 2R11-S004 600-120/208 V jH-23025 DIESEL 1000456 118 2R20N-POO1 FUSETBOX S H-23240 ICONTROL i000461

!20.

- 2 1...

ERY -2A-FU-H-230 2.....*

j0004571 04 2R20 01 600i/2 VOXFM H-23027 "

ARD

,000458 18 i2R26-MO31B

.125 V DCTHRO jH-23240 ICONTROL

0004659 18047 R26-M032A

125 V DCFTHRO H-230257 IESE 00O0460 20 2H21-P198 AMMETER SHU IH-23025 IDIESEL 1000461

'20 2H21-P291 BATTERY 2A FU

-H23022

!DIESEL 000462 18

.2R26-M 2.2R25-..64 DS H-23240 CONTROL 00O0463:

-'118

2R20M-POO1 FUSE BOX H--2302' IDIESEL 0046 48 2R26-MO31A

.125 V DC THRO IH-23240 CONTROL 0045 04 2H1-2031..

600/208T VXFBO H-27279 REACTOR 000466

'20 2H21-P285 SHUNT BOX A !H-23235 CONTROL

006 20 2H21-P286 SH UNT BOX.B

~H-23235 CONTROL 0048 20 2H21-P287 SHULNT BOX C H-23235 CONTROL i

_06

.03 2R22-S0107 4160V STA SVC H-23023 DIESEL -

Page 13 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 HATCH21R4 6/14/2012 NUMBER CLASS MARK_NO1*O DESCRIPTF DRAWING>1 <BUILDING 1000470 02 2R22-S017 250 V DC BATT H-23239 CONTROL 000471 02 2R23-S004<

600 V STA SVC H-23240 CONTROL 000472 01 2R24-S010 600/208 V MCC H-23027 INTAKE 000473 01 2R24-S012 600 VMCC2B H-27281 REACTOR 000474 01 2R24-SO12B 600 V ESS MCC H-27298 REACTOR

]006475 01 2R24-S022 125/250V DC H-27281 REACTOR 1000476 01 2R24-S027 600/208 V MCC H-23023 DIESEL 1000478 01 2R24-SO18B 600 V MCC 2E-H-27279 REACTOR 1000479 14 2R25-S002 125 V DC CABI H-23240 CONTROL 000480 14 2R25-S006 125 V DC CABI H-23023 DIESEL 1000481 14 2R25-S031 120/208 V AC C H-23023 DIESEL 1000482 14 2R25-S037 120/208 V AC E H-23240 CONTROL 1000484 14 2R25-S065 120/208 V AC C H-23240 CONTROL 1000485 1

2R25-S130 125 V DC DISTR H-23239 7' CONTROL 1000486 15 2R42-SOO1B 125/250 V DC S H-23235 CONTROL 1000487 15 2R42-S002C 125 V DIESELS H-23022*'

DIESEL i]00488 16 2R42-S029 125 V BATTERY H-23240 CONTROL 000489 16 2R42-S030 125 V BATTERY H-23240 CONTROL 1000490 16 2R42-S032C 125 V BATTERY H-23025 DIESEL 1000491 16 2R44-S003 STATIC INVERT H-13131

,CONTROL 1000492 04 2RI1-S042 CONT BLDG ESS H-23240 CONTROL

!00493 04 2Rll-S006 LTG & MISC PO H-23023

!' DIESEL 1000494 18 2R20M-P002 FUSE BOX H-23023 DIESEL 1000495 18 2R20N-P0O2?,

FUSE BOX H-23240 CONTROL 1000496 04 2Rl1-S012 600/208 V XFM H-23027 YARD 000497 18 2R26-MO31iC" 125 V DC THRO H-23240 CONTROL 000498 18 2R26-MO31D 125 V DC THRO H-23240 CONTROL 3000499 18 2R26-M032C 125 V DC THRO H-23025 DIESEL 000500 20 2H21-P199 AMMETER SHU H-23025 DIESEL 000501 20 2H21-P293*

'BATTERY 2C FU H-23022" DIESEL 1000502 18 2R26-M004 2R25-SO25 DIS H-23240

'CONTROL 000503 20, 2H21-P288-BATTERY SHUN H-23235 CONTROL

]00504 20 2H21-P289 BATTERY SHUN H-23235 CONTROL l00505

'.20 2H21-P290 BATTERY SHUN H-23235'

'CONTROL 000733 01 2R27-5093 LOCAL STARTER H-27991 REACTOR 000527' 09 7'

2Z41-C014 STN BAIT RM E H-26093 TURBINE 000528 09 2Z41-C015 STN BATT RM E H-26093 TURBINE 000529 09 2X41-CO14E SWGR RM 2G FE H-12619 7DIESEL 1000530

.0 2X41-CO15C SWGR RM 2G L H-12619 DIESEL 0005o31 18!

2X41-NO13C SWGR RM 2G6L H-12619 DIESEL 1000532 18 2X41-N042 FLOW SWITCH H-12619 DIESEL 10005337' is.

2X41-N061 FLOW SWITCH H-12619 DIESEL" Page 14 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 HATCH2R4 6/14/2012 NUMBER CLASS-"

MARKNO DESCRIPT DRAWING BUILDING

ý000534 09 2X41-CO14A SWGR RM 2E F H-12619 DIESEL 000535 0

2X41-CO.1SA SWGR RM 2E L H1-12619" DIESEL i000536 18 2X41-NO13A SWGR RM 2E L H-12619 DIESEL 000537 18 2X41-N044 FLOW SWITCH H-12619:

DIESEL 000538 18 2X41-N046 FLOW SWITCH H-12619 DIESEL 000539 08B 2G11-1`003 DRYWELL FL DR H-26026 REACTOR 0000540 8B 2G11-F004 DRYWELL FL DR H-26026 REACTOR 000541 08B 2G11-F019 DRYWELL EQ D H-26026 REACTOR 000542 08B 2G11-F020 DRYWELL EQ D H-26026 REACTOR 000543 08A*

2G31-FO01 RWCU INBOAR H-26036 DRYWELL

000544 08A 2G31-F004 RWCU OUTBOA H-26036 REACTOR

,000545 08B 2T48-F310 TORUS VAC BR HH-26084 REACTOR

ý000546 08B 2T48-F311 TORUS VAC BR H-26084 REACTOR

000507 08A 2El-FO11A RHR HX A DRAI H-260

14 REACTOR 000632

.20 2H11-P601 REAC CNTMT C H-13138 CONTROL 5000633 20 212H11-P602 REAC WTR CLN H-23259 CONTROL 1000634 20 22H11-P603 REAC CONTROL H-23258 CONTROL 000635 20 2H1-1-P604 PROCESS RAD H-23259 CONTROL

'000636 20 2Hl1-P605A CNTMT ATM 01 H-23733 CONTROL 000637 20 2H11-P605B CNTMT ATM 01 H-23733 CONTROL 000638 20 2H11-P606 STARTUP NEUT H-23259 CONTROL 000639 20 2H11-P608 RWR RNGE NE H-23259 CONTROL

'000640

.20 22H11-P609 CH A PRI ISOL & H-23259 CONTROL 000641 20 22H11-P611 CH B PRI ISOL & H-23247 CONTROL i000642 20 22H11-P612 FW AND RECIR H-23247 CONTROL

ý000643 20 2H111-P613 PROCESS INST H-23258 CONTROL 000644 20 2H11-P614 NSSS TEMP DETH-23258 CONTROL 000645 20 2H11-P617 CHAN A RHR RE H1-23258 CONTROL i000646 20 2H11-P618 CHAN B RHR RE CONTROL 000647 20 2H1-1-P620 HPCI RELAY:VE H-13138*

CONTROL j000648 20 2H11-P622 INBD ISO VLV V H-13138 CONTROL 000649 20 2H11-P623 OUTBID ISO VLV H-23257 CONTROL

'000650 20 2H11-P626 CORE SPRAY CT H-13138 CONTROL 000651 20 22H11-P627 CORE SPRAY CT :H-13138 CONTROL 2000652 0

21H-11-P628 ADS RELAY PAN H-23258 CONTROL 000653 20 2H.I-P650 TURB FDWTR 7 H-23258 CONTROL 000654 20 2H11-P652 DSL GEN & EM CONTROL

00.

20 2H.-P654 GAS TREATVENH-23257 CONTROL

ý000656 20 21-11 P656 TURB AUX SYST H-23257 CONTROL 020 21111P657 VNT DRYWE..LL I H-23258 CONTROL

'000658 20 2H11-P664 MSIV LEAK CTR CONTROL 000659 20 2H11-P674 START UP XFM CONTROL Page 15 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 HATCH2R4 6/14/2012 NUMBER

'000660 000661 1000662

,000663 000664 000665 1000666 000667 000668 000669 000670 j000671 000672 1000673 000674 000675 1000676 000677 1000678 1000679 000680 000682 000684 000685 000686 000687 000688 i000689 000690 000691 1000692:

1000693 1000694 000695 000696 000697 000698 000699 000700 i000701 000702 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 120 18 18 18 28 20 20 20 20 18 12 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 18 18 1818 CLASS MARKNO 2H1 1-P675 2H11-P679 2H11-P691 2HllP700 2H11-P921 2HI-P922 22H11-P923

!2H*l-P924 2H11-P925 2Hl,-P926 2H11-P927 2H11-P928 22H21-P002 2H21-P016 2H21-P018 2H21-P036 22H21-P052 2H221-P173 2H21-P200 2H21-P202 2H21-P220 2-2H21-P225 2H21-P230 2H21-P232 2H21-P245 2H21-P246 2H21-P248 2H21-P249 2H21-P255 2H21-P256 2H21-P257 2H21-P259 2H21-P260 2H21-P262 2H21-P266 2H21-P267 2H21-P303 2H21-P305 2H21-P401 2H21-P404A 2H21-P404B 2H21-P404C DESCRIPT DRAWING START UP XFM H-23666 STA SERV XFMR H-23257 ANALOG SIG C ANALOG VNT L H-23246 RPS TRIP UNIT H-16249 RPS TRIP UNIT H-16249-RPS TRIP UNIT H-16249 RPS TRIP UNIT H-16249 ECCS TRIP UNIT H-16249 ECCS TRIP UNIT H-16249 ECCS TRIP UNIT H-16249 ECCS TRIP UNIT H-16249 REACTOR WAT MAIN STEAM F RHR INST RACK HPCI SYS LOCAL HPCI TEST VLV SHUTDOWN IN DIESEL GEN 2A DIESEL GEN 2C H-26100 H-27279 H-27267 1H-27281 H-27271 H-27284 H-23071 H-23071 TURBINE BUILD H-23067 TURBINE BUILD H-23067 BUILDING CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR DIESEL DIESEL TURBINE TU RBINE DIESEL DIESEL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL INTAKE INTAKE DIESEL DIESEL REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR

~REACTOR RELAY PANEL 2 RELAY PANEL 2 600 VOLT BUS 600 VOLT BUS 250 VOLT DC S 250 VOLT DC S DG FUEL PMP DG FUEL PMP H-23071 H-23023 H-23240 H-23240 H-23240 1--23240 H-23071 H-23071 D/G 2A HT/VEN H-23071 D/G 2C HT/VEN H-23071 SWGR 2E RM H H-23071 SWGR 2G RM H H123023 MOV CONTROL H-23027 MOV CONTROL H1-23027 DG 2A LOADIN H-23340 DG 2C LOADIN H-23071 CS INSTRUMEN H-26096 RPV LVL/PRESS*H-26100 RPV LVL/PRESS H-26100 RPV LVI/PRESS* H-26100 Page 16 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 HATCH2R4 6/14/2012 NUMBER CLA*S'S MARKNO DESCRIPT DRAWING BUILDING 000703 18 2H21-P404D RPV LVL/PRESS H-26100 REACTOR 000704 18 2H21-P404E RPV LVL/PRESS H-26100 REACTOR

!000705 18 2H21-P405A RPV LVL/PRESS H-26100 REACTOR 000706

• 8 22H21-P405B RPV LVL/PRESS 1H-26100 REACTOR 000707 18 2H21-P405C RPV LVL/PRESS H-26100 REACTOR

'100709 18 2H21-P405E RPV LVL/PRESS H-26100 REACTOR 000708 18 2H21-P405D RPV LVL/PRESS H-26100 REACTOR 000710 18 2H21-P409 JET PUMP INST H-26098 REACTOR

.000711 18 2H21-P410 JET PUMP INST H-26098 REACTOR 000712

18.

2H21-P414A HPCI INSTR RACIH-26096 REACTOR 000713 18 2H21-P414B HPCI INSTR RACH-26096 REACTOR

.000715 18 2H21-P415B MAIN STM FLO H-26098 REACTOR 000714 18 2H21-P415A MAIN STM FLO H-26098 REACTOR 000716 18 2H21-P418A RHR INSTRUME H-26096 REACTOR 000717 18 2H21-P418B RHR INSTRUME H-26096 REACTOR 000718 18 2H21-P419 CS INSTRU MEN H-26096 REACTOR 000719 18 2H21-P421A RHR INSTRUME H-26096 REACTOR 000720 18 2H21-P421B RHR INSTRUME H-26096 REACTOR 000721 18 2H21-P425A RHR INSTRUME H-26096 REACTOR 000722 is 2H21-P425B RHR INSTRUME H-26098 REACTOR 900723 18 2H21-P434 HPCI INSTRUM H-26098 REACTOR 000724 20 2R43-POO1A DIESEL GEN 2A H-23022 DIESEL 000725 20 2C82-P001 REMOTE SHUT H-27284 REACTOR 000726 20 2R43-POO1C DIESEL GEN 2C DIESEL 000727 20 2U61-PO01 LEAK DETECTIO H-23240 CONTROL

'000728 20 2U61-PO02 LEAK DETECTIO iH-23240 CONTROL 000729 20 2U61-PO03 LEAK DETECTIO H-23240 CONTROL

000730 20 2U61-PO04 LEAK DETECTIO H-23240 CONTROL

000731 20 2X43-POO3A C02 ZONE 1 CO H-23747 DIESEL 000732 20 2X43-PO03B C02 ZONE 2 COH-23747 DIESEL 000506 01 2R27-S096 LOCAL STARTER]H-27281 REACTOR 000740 08B 2C11-D001-117 PILOT SCRAM S H-26006 REACTOR 1000741 08B 2CII-DO01-118 PILOT SCRAM S H-26006 REACTOR 000742 08B 2C11I-DOO1-120 ROD POSITION H-26006 REACTOR

000745 08B 2C11-DOO1-123 ROD POSITION H-26006 REACTOR 000744 08B 2C11bDOO1-122 ROD POSITION H-26006 REACTOR

000743 08B 2C11-DOO1-121 ROD POSITION H-26006 REACTOR 000746 0

2CI11D0014125 SCRAM ACCUM H-26006 REACTOR' 000747 07 2C11-DOOI-126 SCRAM INLET V H-26006 REACTOR 000748 07 2CI1-DOO1-127 SCRAM INLET V H-26006 REACTOR

ý000749 08B 2C11-DOO1-120 ROD POSITION H-26006 REACTOR 000750 08B 2CII-DO01-121 ROD POSITION H-26006 REACTOR Page 17 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS HATCH2R4 NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 6/14/2012 NUMBER 1000751 100729.

[000753 1000754 booms*4 1000755 1000756.

000757 000761 000765

!000763 1000764 1000765 00076.........

7 100076 1000770 000677 000772 000773 o000774 1000776 1000778 000779 1000780 1000776 1000782 10,00780 1000785 1060782 1000788 1000789 1000790 1000791 100,0792 10,0079 9 CLA 08B 08B 0

J07 107 0

0 10

!0 1818 18 18 18 18 018 01

-0 0

0

~20 20 120

'20 20 20 20 20 5'

1MARK NO~ [J9ESCRIPT :~DRAWIN(

2C1-D01-22 ODPOSITION H-26006 2C11-DOO1-123 ROD POSITION H-26006 2Cll-DO01-125 SCRAM ACCUM H-26006 2CII-DO01-126 SCRAM INLETV H-26006 2CII-DO01-127 SCRAM INLET V H-26006

.2L48-D134 21L48-D 137 2X41-CO24A 2X4 1-C024B 12X41-C024C 2X41-C024D 2X41-CO30A 2X41-CO3OB3

'2X41-C030C 2X41-CO300 2B21-N093B 2C71-NO5OC 2C71-N050D 2E11-N094A

.. 2El1-N*94B 2E1l-N094C 2E11-N094D 2R24-S012A 2R34-S005B 2R34-S005A 2 R34-SOO6A 2R34-SO06D 2R34.S.06A 2R34-S006D 2C82-P0O1 2H21-P002 2H11-P603

~2H 11-P606 12Hll-P608 2H11-P609 2H11-P 611 32H11-P628~

2H11-P650 2H11-P652 2H11-P656

'2H11-P664 D/G RM 2A FIR H-23395 D/G RM 2C FIR H-23395 D/G BATT RM 2 H-23395 DIG BATT RM 2 Hd-23395 D/G BATT RM 2 H-23395 D/G BATT RM 2 H-23395 DiG RM 2A FIR D/G RM 2C FIR D/G RM 2A FIR

,D/G RM 2C FIR RPV LEVEL 8 LT

.DRYWELL PRIES DRYWELL PRES DRYWELL PRES DRYWELL PRES DRYWELL PRES DRYWELL PRES 600 V AC MCC SURGE PAK FO SURGE PAK FO SURGE, PAK FO SURGE PAK FO SURGE PAK FO SURGE PAK FO REMOTE SHUT REACTOR WAT REAC CNTMT C

.REACCONTROL STARTUP NEUT

.RWR RNGE NE H-23395 H-23395 H-23395 H-23395 H-26001 H-28001 H-28001 H -260 15 H-26014 H-26015 H-26014

,H-23699 H-27656 H-27656 H-27656 1--27656 H -27284 H-2 6100 H -13 138 H-23258 H-23259 G BUILDING REACTOR REACTOR

ýREACTOR REACTOR

_4REACTOR iREACTOR DIESEL

.DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL DIESEL:

.DIESEL R E A CT OR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR REACTOR i-e

• T -..............

REACTOR INTAKE INTAKE INTAKE INTAKE INTAKE REACTOR REACTOR CONTROL

,CONTROL

.CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL

ýCONTROL

'CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CH A PRI ISOL & H-23259 CH B PRI [SOL & H-23247 ADS RELAY PAN H-23258 TURB FDWTR 7 H-23258 DSL GEN & EM TURB AUX SYST H-23257 MSIV LEAK CTR Page 18 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 HATCH2R4 6/14/2012 KNUMBER 000794 000795 000683 000796 1000800 ooo20s.

i -------

1000797 60801 000805 0 00798 000802 00079 9 j000803 CLASS 20 20 20 _

18

18 18 ----------

18 18 18 18 18 18 07 jjjMARKNO 2H11-P674 2H11-P700

.2H21-P231 2JE1-N0914A

.2Ell-N094A 2Ell-N094C 2E11-N094BC 2Ell-NO94B 2Ell-N094B:

2El1-N094D.

2El1-N094D)

.)Ell-F065A PI-'SCRIPI

\\DRAWING jBUILDING~

ýSTART UP XFM___

CONTROL ANALOG VNT L ýH-23246 CONTROL

ýRLYPANEL 2 ýH-23071 DIESEL ODRYWELL PRIES ~H-26015 REACTOR

....i* "

.. " 1

: : :*.. L : :. :..

DRYWELL PRES fH-26015 REACTOR D.RYWELL PRES IH-26015 :.

REACTOW**:*!:

]DRYWELL PRES H-26015 REACTOR

RYWELL PRES 1H-26015'

REACTOR.

1DRYWELL PRES H-26015

ýREACTOR 1DRYWELL PRES H-26014 REACTOR

)DRYWELL PRES H-26014 REACTOR DRYWELL PRES IH-26014 REACTOR DRYWELL PRES H-26014 REACTOR RHIR PUMP 2A H-26015 REACTOR Page 19 of 60

A ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKIDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS O0 NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 E. L1HatnchNuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 SafelShutdown Analysis Report Rev. '5 Table 4.A -l (Shect 1 of 17)

Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Equipment List Nonnalo)

Requiredt )

m MPLNo.

Ngle 1 t'l Mode SSDM Md Path 2B21-FI13A C

C

.1 23

>2B21 -F013B

~

C VAR

1.

3 2B21-11113B '>7 C

C1/2A 2'

2B21-FO13C C

C 1 2 3 2B21-FOI3D C

C 1>

3 2B21-1013D, C

VAR 2

i 2B21-0F13E0 C

C 1 2 3 2B21PF013F C

VAR 1

3 2B21-1013F C

C 2

2B21-FO13G C

C 1

3 2521-1013G3 C

,VAR 2

2B21-F013H C

C 1 2"3

'<2B21-F013K C

C 1 23 Z221-F013K C

C 1 2:3

-2B21-R1l3M C

C 1 2 3 2B21-F016 C

C H

2B21-+019 C

C H

2B21-F022A C

C 1

3 2B21-F022B C

C 1

3 2B21-F022C C

C 1>

3 2B21-F022D C

C 1

3 2B21-F028A C

C 2

2B21-FD28B C

C 2

2B21-11128C>

C C

6>2 2521-0028D C

C

<>2 2B21-N031A"'

ON ON 3

2B21-NO36 ON ON

.3 2B21-N042A ON ON 3

2B21-NO85A ON ON I

2B21-N085M ON ON 2

2B21-NO9GA ON ON I.

2M21-NO40B ON.'

ON 2.

'2B21-N090C ON ON I

2121-N0901 ON ON 2

2B21-NO9IA ON ON I

2B21-N91B ON ON 26>

>2B21-NO91C

'ON ON I

2B21-NO91D ON ON

/

2 2121-N093A ON ON I

Pre AppR Ar-m flam

• RPV Safety/Relief Valve - ADS RPVM S afety/elief Valve-IS-RPV Safety/Relef Valve - LL.S RPV Safety/Relief Valve-ADS SPV oafety!Resef Valve-LS RPY Safety/Relief Valve -

$'S RPV SafeliRef W

-Valve

-ADS Rv Safey/RceefValve - U

".S RPV Safey/elief Valve -LS':"

RPV Safety/Relief Valve - ULS"

'6 R Py sf~ety/Rlief Valv,,- LMS RPV Safejty/Rlief Valve - ADS 6

RPV Safety/Refief Valve - ADS 6

RPV SiAf*eljReiValve ASc6

'RPV Safety lief Valve-ADS Steam Line Drain Inboard Coastinmnis Isolation Valve (MOV)

Steam Line Drain Outboard Coainnuast Isolation Valve (MOV)

Inboard MSIV

• Inboard MSIV

'y,!.

Inboard MSIV Inboard MSIV Outboard MSIV Outboard MSlV Outboard MSlV666>6

{>>

4

,RPV Water Level Transmitter (2121 P*oo4).

6.

7 6<

6 RPV Shoud Water Level Indicator (2H21-P010)

RPV Water Level Indicator (2H21-P004)

RPV Stroud Water Level Transmitter (2H21 -P409) (Subcomponent)

• RPV ShrboudWater Level Transminter (21121-P410) (Subcomponent)

RPV Presamue Transmitter (RHR/Corae Spray Permissive) (2112 I-P404A) (Subcompcm)nt)

RPV Low Pzrse rc isaee(

2-40 (S'ubenso et) 6 RPV Low P urss Transmitter (21121-P409) (St2i21p-o

)

RNV Pres.sur lTransmitter (RHR/Come Spray Permssive) (2112 1-P4OSA) (Subomponent)

RPV Water Level Transitter for RCIC Initiation (2H21-P404A) (Subcomponent)

RPV Water Level Tramiter for HPCI Initiation (2H21-P405A) (Sabcomponent)

RPV Waler Level Truansanter f**rRCIC Itiation (21121-PsA)*(Su"bcporp. nr.)

RPV Water Level Transmitter for HPCi Iitintian (2112lI-P405A) (Sabcomaponent) 6 6

RNV Water Level Transmitter (Local) (Subcomaponent).

2201 2201 2201 2201 2201 2201 2201 220'1 2201 2201 2201 2201 201 2201 2201 2201 2201 2201 2201 2201 2201 2205 2205 2205 2205 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203

~22051

>2203 2205 2203 2205 2203 2205 2205 H-26000 H-26000 H-26000 H-26000 6

H1-26UDO H-26000 11-26000 H1-26000 H-26000 H-26000 H-26000 H-26000 6 6 -260D0 6-2 62 1H-26000 H-26000 H1-24612' H1-26000 H-24623~:

H-26D00 6 H-26000",

6 H-26000 H-26DOO H-26000 H-26000

-26 3

666 1H-26000 H1-26DO0 H1-26000

.H-26001 H-24623 H1-26001 H-*26001

,H-24623 H-26001 H-24625" H-26001 H-24627 1H-26001 H1-24625 H-26001 H-24623 H-26001 H-24629 H-26001 11-24627 11-26001 11-24629 11-26001 H'-26001 H-26001 11-26001

' Locatinon ii 148 AZ235 148 AZ235 S148:AZ135 :

'148 AZ2095 148 >AZ135 148 AZ 135 148 AZ235 148 A>260 148 AZ2260' 148 AZ095 148 AZ095 6148 AZI 35 148 AZ2260 148 AZ270

>148 AZ2090

'>6127A 170

>130 RBR19

'127 AZ190 127>

A220 6127 AZ160

<127 A2175 130 I3RBRIP 130 RBR18 130 RSR2O 130 RBR19 158 RER 16 I30 RPRI 6 158 RER16>

130 RGORI 6

130 RHR22 158 RHRR18 130oR-M226 6 130 RGR*S' 6 6158 RHR122 15 8 R1R186 15 8 RH1R22 6158 RHR18 158 R34R22 158 RH1R22 Notes ame listed on -page 17 of 17.6.

6

'AMode Abbreviairons: O=-Opear, CzClosed, VAR=Vsainus, F3-lrunctional (Non-posieirmal component) i4For prmr componenst /sunbcomponent ciross-inference, tee Table 4.A1-2.

FPor primary compjonent /spurinous actuation component croas-refercrice, see Table 4.AI1-3. Also, see notek-Page 20 of 60

OTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS 0

NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION.0 F, L Hatch Nuclear Plant Units I and 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis Report Rev.35 I.

Table4.A1-l (Shect2of17)

Unit 2 Safl Shutdown Equi t List Nornas]

0 t Retlsired~

t 2B21-N093B ON 2B21-N095A ON 2B21 -NO95B ON 2B21-N120X k ON 2B21-NI20B k

'ON 2121-NI20C k ON 2B21-NI20D k ON 2B21-N122A k

ON 2B21-N122B ik ON 2B21-N122C k

ON 2B21-N122D ýk ON 2321-N127A '-k ON 2B21-NI27B ik ON 2B21-N127C k

ON 2B21-N127D k ON I22 l-N620A k

ON 2B21-N620B k

ON 2B21-N620C k

ON 2B21-N620D k

ON 2B21-N621A k ON 2B21-N621B k

ON 2B21-N621C k

ON 2B21-N621D k ON 2B21-N622A ki ON

2B21-N622B k

ON 2B21-N622C k

ON 2B21-N622D k ON 2B21-N641B k

ON 2B21-N641C k

ON 2B21-N642A k ON 21B21-N642B k

ON 2B21-N643A ki ON 2B21-N643B k

ON 2B21-N685A O/ON 2B21-N685B O/ON 2B21-N690A O/ON 2B21-N690B o

2B21-N690C 0

2B21 -N690D W/ON ON 2

ON I

ON 2

ON I

ON 2

ON I

ON 2

ON 1

ON 2

ON I

ON 2

ON 1

ON 2

ON ON 2

ON ON ON ON 2

ON i

ON 2

ON ON 2

ON 1

ON 2

ON ON 2

ON 2

ON l

ON I

ON 2

ON 1

ON 2

OION I

0ION 2

VAR/ON I

VAR 2

VAR I

VAR/ON 2

RPV Water Level Tranesminter (Local) (Subomapottent)

RPV Water Level Tansmitter (2H21.

"B)

(Suhctpo.n

)

RPV Water L.vel Tranmit-M I.-P4O5B),(Suhmpne)

MU Pressutre T mi=e(2fH2-P404A)

RPV.LS Pressure Tramimtter 221-P405A)

RNV US Pressure tasitter (2H21-P404B)

RNV LS Prtesure Transmitter (2121-P405B)

RPV US Pressure Tranmitter (2H21-P404A)

RPV 11 Pressure Tansmitter (2H21-P405A)

RV US Preasure Transmitter (2H21-P404B)

RNV US Ptesas= Transmitter (211l-P405)

RNV Pressure Transmitter (2H121

-P404B)

RNV Prsure Transmitter (2H21IP4051B)

RNV Prss:ure Tr smitter (2H21.P404C)

RN PressureTannsin, (21-12*1

-P405 D)

RNV Low PnteSseMru RPV Low PressuamM RPV Low Pieasire MTU RNV Low Pressure MTU RN VLow Pseasute S'l RPV Low Presa*ie STU RPV Low P*esur STU RNV Low Ptesute STU RNV Low Pressure STU RNV Low Pressure MTU RPV Low Pe~surc*

TU, RPV Low Pressure STU RNV Low Pressure STU RNV Low Pteasure MI RPV Low Pressure STU RNV Low Preasure SIU RFV Low Pressure MrU RNV ShroudWater Level 0 MTU (Subcomponent)

Rv Shroud.Wat Level 0 MTo (Subcomponent)

RPV pmes Chanel A Indlication WM to 2B21-R623A (Subcomponent)

RPV Low Presur MTU (to Core Spray/RHR) (Subcomponont)

RPV Low Preasure MTU (to Core SptyR

) (S2beo(uponect)

RNV Press Channel B Ind icatinn MTU to 2132 1-R623B.(Subcomponesi)

Ffre App.R A-e

Dn*y MID Loction 2203 2203 2205 2203 2205 2203 2205 2203 2203 2203 2205 2203 2205 2203 2205 0024 O024~

0024 0024 10024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024' 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 OD24 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 H-24627 H-26001 158 RHRI7 11-26001 158 RHRI8 H-24627 H-26001 158 RH2 H-26001 158 RHR16 H-26001 158 RBR22 H-26001 158 RHlRI6

H-26001 158 RHR22

" H-26001 158 RI-R16 H-26001 158 RHR22 H-26001 158 RHRA16 H-26Doo 158RBR22 H-26001 158 RHR16

" H-26001 158 RHR236 1H-26001 158 RHR16 H-26001 158 FMR, 23 H-26001 2H*l.TP 92 5',

H-26001 21111-1926 H-26001 2H 211-P925 H-26001 2-111 -P926 H-26001 2HI I-P925 H-26001 2HIl-P926 H-26001 21111-P925 H-26001 2H1-P926 H-26001 2-11 1-P925 H-26001 2H11-P926 H-26001 2HI1-P925

" H-26001 2H1I 1-P926 1H-26001 2HI1-P925 1H-26001 2Hll-P926 11-26001 2111 -P926 H-26001 2HII-P927 1H-26001 2HI1-P925

-H-26001 2H1I -P926 1H-26001 2HII-P925 H1-26001 21111-P928 H1-26001 2H11-P927 H1-26001 2111 -P928

.9! Notes am listed on page 17 of 17.

t Mode Abbreviations: O=Op.

C=Closed, VAR=Various F=-Functmonal (Non-positional component)

For primary component / subcomponeat ctoss-refeencr see Table 4AI-2.

for primary.component / spurious actuation component cmess-rcný, ee Table 4A1-3. Also secnoe k.

Page 21 of 60

9 TACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSIONI.0 E. L Hatch NuclearPlant Units I and2 Safe Shutdown Analysis Report Rev.S 35 Table4.AI-I (Sheet3of 17)

Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Equipmnt List NormalI2 RequiedQt MPLNo.

Notes' Mode SSD Mode Pat Functional Dcic tiopd'-

41 Fire App. R Are Drawtg 2B21-N691A 2B21-N691B 2112 -N691C 2B21-N691D 2B21-N692A 2B321-N69B 2B21-N692C 2B21-N692D 2B21-N693A 2B21-N693B 2B21-N693C 2B21-N693D 21121-NM9A 2B21-N695B 2B21-N697A k 2B21-N697B k

2B21-N697C k

2B21-N697D k

2B21-N697E k

2B21-N697p2 k

2B21-N697G k

2B21-N69711 kt 2B21-N6971 k

2B121-N6597K kt 2B21-N697L k

2B21-N697M It 2B21-ROO4A 2B21-ROD4B ZB21-R604A 2B21-R604B 2B21-R623A 2B21-R623B 2C32-K660 b

2C32-INOIO '

2C32-R655 b

2C82-K002 2082-K010 0/ON 0/ON ON ON 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

10

'0 0

0 0

0 0.

ON ON ON ON O/ON 0/ON ON ON VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR ON ON ON ON I

RPV Wale Level Indication MTU to 2B21 -R604A (Subcompnonest) 2 RPVWale* Level Indication MTU to 2B21 -X604B (Subhenpomn)

" RPV Wal*Level MTU(rRCompninc b

2 RPVWater Level Mi2U (SubcmHponnt)

I RPV Wair Level 2 STU for RCIC Initiation (Subom)ponent) 2 RPV Water Level 2 STU for HM Initiation (Subcomponent)

I RPV Water Level 2 STU for RCIC

-netinon (Subreom iet) 2 RPV Water Level 2 STU for HPCI Initiation (Subcomiponent).

I RPV Water level 8 MTU for RCIC Shutoff (Subegoponem)

.2 RPV Water levrel 8 MIUJ for hP6I 5Stof '(Subcomponent)

IRPV` Wante Level 8 STU for RCIC Shutoff (Subcomponent) 2 RPV Water Level 8 STU for HPCI Shutoff (Subcotnt)

I RPV Water Level 3 MTU (Subeompomit) 2 RPV Water Level 3 MTU (Suboormpo* )

RPV Low Pessue MWU 2

RPV Low Pressure MTU I

RPV Low Pessure MMU 2

R"V*Low Pessure MTU i... /

,RPVX.

• eautSFU I

RPV Low Presmur STU I

RPV low Pr, ufe STU 2

RPV Low Prasure STU 2

RPV Low Press= STU 2

RPV Low Preisume SMI RPV Low Press=n STU 3

RPV Pressure Indicator(21V I P004) 3 RPV Prejssue Indikatar WE I -P005)

I RPV Water Level Indicator 2

RPV Water Level lndicator I

RPV Level/Pressure Recorder 12 RPV Levnl/Presuure ectxder 1 2 Feedwater last. Loop Power Supply (Subcomponent) 1 2 RPV Water Level Trantmi= (Subcomponent) 1 2 RPV Water Level Indicator 3

Inverte for RCIC REM S/D Flow Cont (2C82-PGOO)

(Subcomponent) 3; Power Supply for REM SID lost(2C82-POOI) (Subcotmpotient)

D024 0024 D024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024.

0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024.

2203 2205 0024 0024 H-26001 H-26001 1"-26001 H-26001 H-26001 H1-26001 1H-26001 H-26001 H-26001 H-26001 H-26001 H1-26001 H-26001 H-26001 H-26000 H-26000.

`H-260(0 H,26000 H-26000 H-26000 H-26000 H-260D0 H-26000 H-26000 H-26000 H-26100 "H-26001 H-26100 H-26001 H-24613 H-26001 H-24613.

H-26001..

2I111 -P925 2HI1 -P926

• 21111-P27.

,,2H11-P928

'2Hll-P925 2H1I I-P926 21111-P927 2HII-P928'

• 211 -P925 2111 i.P926 2H)11 -P925 2HI I-P926 21-11i]-P*2.5 2H11 I-P926 2H111-P927 2H11.-P928 2H11.P927 2HIli-P928 21111,-P27 211 -P927 2HIi*-P928 21HIl-P928 22HI1-P928 2H I I-P927 2HI 1-P928 158 RER16 158 RHR22 2H 1IP603 2Hi1-P603 2111-P601 H I I -P601 ON ON ON ON 0024 H-24613 H-26001 0024 1

H-24613 1H-26001 ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON 0024 2205 0024 2203 2203 H-24613 NAS-23,98 2Hl1-P612 H-24627 H-2600

• ' 158 RBRi7 H-24613 H-26001 2H111-P602 H-24623 130 RAR15 H1-24623 H1-26014 130 RARI 5 I

Notes are listed n page 17of 17.

'I Mode Abbreviations: O=Opec, C=Closed, VAR=Variots, FPFuncfional (Non-posilional romponent)

' For primary component / subcomponent cross-reference. sre Table 4AI-2.

' For ptmary component/ spurious actuation component cross-ref*ercne see Table 4.A1-3. Also, see note L Page 22 of 60

A 1

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKIDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 E. L Hatch Nuclear Plant Units I and 2 Safe Shutdown Anaysis Report NoNrnaal)

Dequ MPLNo.

N_.s.l Mo*

SSD M 2C82-NOOI ON O

2C82-N005 ON

'ON 2C82-N006 ON ON 2C82-ROD1 ON ON

,2C82-R004 ON ON 2C82-R005 ON ON 2C82-R006 ON ON

~2Ell-CDOI A OF ON 2EII-COOIB" OFF ON 2E11I-COOZA OFF ON 2E1I-COO2B OFF ON 2EI1-003A 0

0 2EI I-F003B>k 0#

O 0

2E I I-FUO4A 0

0 2EI I0-04B 0

0 2E111-FO04B 0

VAR 2EI I-0006A C

C 2E11I-FOO6B C

C

2Ell-FO06B C

VAR 2E I1-006D C

C

.4 17 3

RCIC Flow Indicatng Cont 3

RHR System Flow Indicatot 3

RPV Level Indicator (2C82-3 RPV Prus hIunicator (2C 23 1H-26014 23 H.-26DI 23 H-26001

~RHR Seavie Water Pump 2A 2 3

~RiIR Sace WaterPump 2B I

RHR Pump 2A 2 3 RHR Pump 2B I

RIM Heat Exchanger A Discharge 2 3 RHR Heat Exchanger B Discharge I

RHR Pump 2 A Torus Suction Vali 2

RHR Pump 2B Turns Suction Val) 3 IIHR Pump 2B Torus Suction Vali 2E 1-,-JU07A 0

VAR I

RHR Put 2EI1-F007B 0

VAR 2 3 R3 Re Pu 22E1!-F008 C

0 3

RHR SD

,2EI*I-F*OS f,

C

,C H

RIR:SD4 2EI4UW9

~

>C 0

3 31/2RHR SD<

2EI1-F009 f

C C

H' RHRSD(

2Z14101l g

C C

1 2 3 RHRHea 213114-011A C

C I

'RHR Hea 2E11-1OtIB C

C 2 3 RIIRHR a 2EI1-4015A C

0 1

RHR LPC

• 2E]l-F00A:

C C

H RHRLPC 2E1 t-0156iB~'

C 0

2 3 RHiRU'C

• 2E1RI IJ;1513 C

~

C H

RHR LPC 2EI I-FO16A C

C I

Coolainni 22E I-F016B C

C 2 3 Contaim 2.E1.-0:17A 0

0 1

RHRLPC 2EI11-FO17B 0

0 2 3 RHRRLPC

...Notr are listed on page 17o01 17.

• Mode Abbreviations: O=Ope, CaClosed, VAR=Vartous, F-Functiona

'For pinm* y component / suhempon'nt cross-referece, aee Table 4AI*

'~For primary component / spurious actuation component cross-reference, Us D5 iye (MOV) lve (MOV) oV)

OV) anal Car U-J3. A Page 23 of 60

A CHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 9 E. L Hatch Nuclear Plant UnitslIand 2 Rev 15"

" K""4L.

Saf Shutdown Anevsi 3eor Table 4.A-I (Shee5 oft17)

Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Equipmet ist KNonnaP' Reqsliul11 Fie pp K

MPL-No. "Note")

Mode SSlOMode Pah FuctoalDq 0t3.4,'

Area Dawig pK oc 2E111

-F026A "g qC C

1" 3 ItHRlHemtExchanger Ato RClC Valvei(M6V)

"2203 11-24618 H-126015 110 RLR14 21111-Rt26B g

C C

2 3 RHRlHewiExchangerfBtokClC Valvegvtov) 2205 H1-24621 H1-26014 1011RR4 2El1t-11*28A C

C I

TorusSpray/RIR Test Line Outboard Imolation Valve (MOV) 220 H-24616 H-26015

<124R111R14 K

,""211-)8 C1 K

RlR 1eti rmrgar

<i* :

n iiiii 116ii1i 111114tt A '

2E- -R28A

§ C

23 Torus Spmy/1 Tast Line Outboard Isolation Valve 2203 H1-24619 H

1 RHR24 2E111-FO47B1 0

0 2 3 RIR Heat ExchangerBlInlet Valve (MOV)%

2 <205 H1-24621 tH-26014 116R11R24 2E,,

1I-F048A 0

VAR I

RH1R1HewExchangerABypasValve(MOV) 2203 "H-24618 H-26015 112R* R14.

21111-06 I

4 0

VAR 2 3 RHRHeat ExchangerB*f* lsRsI VaIve(MOV)i 2205 H-24621 H-26014 115 ORLR24 2E I-F2A.49 C

C 2 3 1

to eIsolato Valve ROV T0 "4

H6 11 2,, 1-9065A Q0.

0.

RR

.P.prZA Suppression PoolSuclton ValveMAOV) 2203 H-24616 H-26015 12174RHR11 2E:

11-F65B 0

0, 2 3 RHR.

Pup2BlSuppreslion Pool Sucidon Valve(AOV) 2205 H-24619 H-26014 087 1RR22 <""K 2EI11-1168A C

VAR I

RHRHatExageASeWajrFlwContrlValve(iOV) 2203 H-24618 11-21039 110114

<"K.

2EI1-F068BA C

VAR 2 3 RHR Heitnlxchangr BServce WaterlowContol Valve (MOV) 2205 H-24621 1-21039

,10 R1HR'24" 2E II-1073A C

C I

RHRServceWatero RHR CmossieValve(MOV)

<3/4 2203 H-24616 H-260I5<'

123111RHR15 2EI-,73B C

K.C 2 3K Service Water to RHReCr6cValve MOV)...

2205 H-24619 087H-26014 087 l

R 2EII-FI04A-Cm C

I Heat.xch.g A Vet Valve (mov) 2203.

H '24618 H-26015 1201111114 21111-F04B C

2 3 R,: Hew Exchanger B Vent Valve(MOV) 22053 H-246218 H-26014 120RLR424 21311 -Fl19A C

C.

I RHRService*We= CrosniValve(MOV) 2203 H-24622 1H-21039 121RIM4 8 2EII -FI19B C

C 2,t 2,3.&

RIHRvSriceWater.CssfieValve(MOV) 2205 H11-24622" H-21039 120112 K

C" 1-F22A C<

,H LP 2DCkValve Pressequli Valve (AOV)<1 2201 H-26015 148 AZ315<

2111i-F1222B

C "

C.H

..PCIDischargCheckValvePeuuaiValv(AOV)

>2201 H-26014 148*AD45 2 111-K071 ON ON 3

Square Rotos*CuvertrPFOR2ElI-N071 (2H2I-PI73)(Subic mponent 2203 H-24623 1-21039 130*ARJ117 2EI1:.073 3N ON Power Sourcefbr2E1ll--K071 &21111-N071 (21121-P173)C(Subcomponet) 2203 1H-24623<

H-21039 130RA.R17 2E1I-K600A ON

.ON "I

HRI.l.*:

Ieat DiscHeaderFlowSqeRoot Crv(Snbcomponent) 0024

• 1-26015 21II-P613 21111-K6003A ON ON

2.

1H cHBDisclHead erFow SquareRoot Conv (Subcompns ent")4

<4 11-26014 21111P612 "K-2EtI-K603A ON'.

ON2 1

IK 12 K R1R' 1Ht xc A HDRcFlowLoopIPwrSuppiy(Subcomp

)

onent)iK 0024 11-26015 2111-P613 21111-N603B ON ON 2

H:"

1t Ee B Disc HD Plow Loop P-Supply (Subcomoponent) 0024 1-26015 2 11

• P612 2EII-NO03H ON ON 3

mR HeatExchangerButeoShelleDlPfes sldkator(21121-p021) 2205 1H-24621 H1-26014 093 RIR24 2EIl-NO07A ON ON I2 r.ow:RHRHt gASeviceWatInleFlow1Trammrit(2H2IP418A)(Submpo 2203 H"-24618 "H1-21039 096RLRI4 K

2E I I -NO'7B ON O

2,*K2.'05

.1 gerBService1Water1InltFlowTmamitt (2V21P421A)(Subopoet 2205 H-24621 H-21039 087 RL*24 <AK 2EI I -NO0SA "ON "ON I

RHRHeat Exchang A Disch geHeadF1ow

.ae.... I....

8.... A)

(Su.om,,,.nen) 223 H-24618 11-26015 102 2EI11-NOI5B ON""

ON" 2

RHR. HeatExchang Discharge HeaderF TwnmsmittW(2ml-P421A)((Subcomponent) 22054 iH-24621 H-26014 087R1-*24 "K "K 2EI1-NO17A C

0 1

RHR HemtExchangerAServiceWaternletPressunrSwitch(Subcomponen) 2203 H-24618 11-21039 I1111RR14

.. 2E1]1-N017B1 C

0 2

Heat Exchanger B Water.nletPressre.Swi(Subcomponet) 2205 11-24621 11-21039 1111111..24 I"213111-NO17C C

0 1

RH etEcagrASrieWtrIltPisun wth(ucmoet 2203 11-24618 H213 11RR4 211t1-NO17D C

0 2

R.

Hew E r

i r

e Sw (Subc t) 2205 H-24621 H-21039 ii I1111 RHR24 2EI1-N02!IB C/ON VARION 3

RHRHeatExcBDlscHederFlowDiffPressIndS(Su ne) 2205 H-24621 H-26014

• i**092RL"23 2EI11-NO55A kK ON ON 1

H Pmanp HighPresusre1XTrasmi~tter21U I1P418B) 2203 H-l2601"5 096RLR14 2E11-NO55B k

ON ON 2 2, RHRPump11igh Pressrnmsmarter (21121.P42 I. )

2205I H1-26014 0871RR24

"'Notes are listed on page 17 of17.

KK

~

V, ModeAbbeviioo: O=Op=_

V ncional (Nootpositional compon..ent)

KK*

K "Forprimary component/T subcomponent cross-rcamc& see Table 4A-1-2.

" "K For pri.m component I spurious

• • "KK" component Page 24 of 60

4TACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION.0 E.. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units I and 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis Report Rev..35 1

Table 4.AI-l (Sheet 6 of 17)

Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Equipmeat list Normal{St Reqttiredtot Fim App. R Fanetional Dnm -rivfid-'4 221-N4055C : k 2EII-N055D k

21l l-NO56A k 2EII-N056B k

'2E1I1-N056C k

221 1-N056D k

2E21 -NO71 2E21I-N082A 2E1 -N082B 2EII-N094A k 2E1 I-NO94B k

21EI-N094C k

2EI l-N094D k

2E11-NI04A 2EII-NI04B 22l-N655A k

2E I-N655B k 2EtI-N655C k

2E1t-N655D k 2E1I-N656A k 2E2I-N656B k

2Elt-N656C k 2E1t-N656D k 2Et l-N682A 2Et 1-N682B 2El -N694A k 2ElI-N694B k 2El1-N694C k 2EtI-N694D k 2EII-Rtl71 2E11-R602A 2E-I-R602B 2E2 1-R603A 20 1-1R603B 2E21-c001A on 2E21-C001B e

2E21-FOOIA m

2E221-FOI1B e

ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON' ON ON ON ON ON ON ON C

C C

C C

C C

C C

C C

C C

C ON ON ON ON ON OFF OFF 0

0

,ON

,ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON.

VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR ON ON ON ON ON ON ON 0

O:

RHR Pump High Prsme Transmiter (221l-P418B) 2203 2

RHR Pump High PRsstre Transmittr* (2H21-P421B) 2205 1

RR Pmp:Hgh P0 at am r (

8N S) 2203 2

RHR Pul*pHigh Pressure Tansitter (21

-P4214B)

,2205 RIM Pump High ueTnsmitt"er2 M3 1418B) 2203 2

RHR* pi

,ghtm "rueTnsminer(2H2l-P421B) 2205 3

RHR Heat Exchanger B Service Water Inlet FlowTranitter (local) (Subhcmposmt) 2205 RHR Heat ExchangrA. Discharge Hcader Ho*w Diff Pea Trana (2H21-P4l8AXSubhmponent) 2203 2

RHR Heat Exchanger B Discharge Header Flow DiffPrs Tranm (2H21-,P421 A) (Subcomponent) 2205 1

RHlI High Dry~wett Pressure T-

-sitte (Local) 2203 2

RHR High Drywell Pressure Trtsmitter (local) 2205 1

ERR High Drywell Preasure Transmnitter (Local) 2203 2

REH High Drywell PreasancTramnsmtter o.cal) 2205

'RHR Heat Exchanger A Service Water nlet Flow Cut t Transmtter I/ solator (Subomp*nent) 0024

2 RHR Heat Excanger B ServiceWate Inlet FlHow Ctm t Tranmitner / Isolator (Subcomponmst) 0024 1

RHR Pump High Pre-u-e MTU 0024 2

RHR Pump High Presture MTU 0024 1

RHR Pump High Pressure MTU 0024 2

RHR PHutmp HighP pessureMTU, 0024 1

RHR Pump High Pressure MTU 0024 2

RHR Pump High Pressure MTU 0024 I

RHlE PUMP High PseUure MIII 0024 2

RHR Pump High Pressure MIII 0024 1

RHR Pumps 2A& 2C Minimum Flow,09orol MTU (Suhcompoaenl) 0024 2

RHR Pumps 2B & 2D Mianuum FloXw Control MTU (Subcompcanal) 0024 I

RHR High Dwll Pessure M'U 0024 2

RHRl High Drfyel Pre*surs MTU 0924 1

RR High Drywell PiaM M'rU 0024 2

RHR High Dywell Ptesure MTU 0024 3

RHR Heat Exchanges B Service Water Inlet Flow Indicator (221M-PI73) 2203 RHR Heat Exchanger A Service Water Inlat Flow Indicator 0024 2

RHR Heat Exchanger B Service Wate Inlet Flow Indicator 0024 1

RHR Heat Exchanger A Dischasge Header Flow Indicator 0024 2

RHR Heat Exchanger B Discharge Head*r Flow Indicator 0024 H-26015 H-26014 H-26015 H-26014 26015 H-26014 H-27267 H1-21039 1-1.24618 11-26015 H.24621 1H-26014 H-26015 1-26014 H1-26015 11-26014 11-21039 1H-21039 H-26015, H-26014 H-26015 H-26014 H-26015 H1-26014 H-26015 H-26014 H-26015' 11:26014 H-26015 H-26014 H-26015 11-26014 H-24623 H-21039 H-24613 1H-21039 H-246"13" H21039 H-24613 H-26015 H-24613 H-26014 H-26018 11-2601S 4-26018 H-24621 11-26018 096 RLRI4 087 RER24 096 RLR14 0.8 RLR24 096RLR14 087 RLR24 097 RLR24 102 RLR14 087 RLR24 158 RER16 158RMEIO 158 R

.HR21 2HI1-P612 21HII-P612

.2HI 1 P928/

2HII-P927 2HI1-P928 2H 11 -P927 2HI 1 -P928 2111 1-P927 ZH 111-P928 2HI 1-P927 2H11-P928

>2111-P925 2111 -P928 2111l-F92 21-11 1-P927 2111 1-P928 130 RAR17 2111 l-P601 2H13..P601 2HI 1--P601 087 RLRI4 087 RLR24 087oRHR14 095 RHRE24 Core Spray Pump 2A Corn Spray Pump 2B Core Spray Pump 2A Outboard Torus Suction Valve (MOV)

Core Spray Pump 2B Outboard Toms Suclion Valve (MOV) 2203 2205 2203 2205

"'Notes are listed on page 17 of 17.

Mode Abbreviations: O=Open, C=Closed. VAR'Various, F-=Functional (Nan-positional component) t For primary component / subcomponent cross-refmence, see Table 4.AI-2.

'* For primary comaponeat /spurious actuation component cross-refeence. ae Table 4A1-3. Also, se note k.

Page 25 of 60

OTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 E. 1. Hatch Nuclear Plant Units I and 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis Report Rev.35 I

Table4AI-1 (Sheet7of 17)

Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Equiprmat Liat Normal01 Required' MPL No.'

Nos( Mode

'SSDMode.

Pat Functional, Descrintion*4 Fire App. R

,Ag Drawing

.21321-17004A mn

.2E21-FOO4B

'C 2E21-KIO5A mn 21321-R1`05A' 2E21-FtO05Be 2E21-H105B

ýý2E21-Fl15A an 2E21-FO15B e

2E21-F1719A to 21321-1`01911 e

2E21-Fl331A mo 2E21-H1031Be 21321

-Fl37A 2132140l3711 2E321-K600A. to 2E21-1C60B e

2E21-N003A mn 21321-1,00311 e

2E21-NO5IA mn 2E21-NO5IB e

2E121-N4052A mnk 2E21-NO52B e~k 21121-NO55A m~k 2E21-NOS5B e~k 2E21-N651A an 2E21-N651B e

2E21-N652A M~k 2E21-N652B e~k ME2-N655A rnk 2E21-N655B ek 2E21-R601A to

ý2E21-R16OIB e

21541-COOI 2E41-CDOI 2Ei4 I-C02 21341-C002-3 21141-F0101 c 213140-102 c

0 0'

C C

C C

C C

0 0.

0 0

'C ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON C

C C

C C

C ON ON OFF OFF ON OFF C

0 0

0 0

C X

C 0

0 VAR

• VAR

':C C

ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR ON ON ON OFF ON ON 0

VAR Core Spray 2A to RPV Outboard Valve (MOV) 2 Core Spray 2BmtoRPV Outboatd Valve (MOV)

I Core Spray 2A Containmet Isolation Valve (MOV)

H Core Spray 2A Containmeat Isolatiota Valve (MOV) 2 Core Spray 2B Containment Isolation Valve (MOV)

H Core Spray 2B Ctntaimnnt Ilanion Valve (MOV)

I

'Core Spray Pump 2A Test ByparaValve (MOV) 2 Com Spray Pump 2B Test Bypass Valve (MOV)

I Core Spray Pump 2A Inboard Tonrs Suction Valve (AOV) 2 Core Spray Pump 2B Inboard Toms Suction Valve (AOV)

S Care Spray Pnup 2A Minimum Flow Bypass Valve (MOV) 2 Core Spray Pump 2BM Miamu Fow Bypeas Valve (MOV)

ý,H Cote ýSpray 2A Check Valve Pleansure

]34utaihiug Valve (AOV)

%. Core Spray 2B Check Valvep s Equalizing Valve (AOV)

CS Loop A Plow, instr Loop Piower Supl (Sbeo rponeat) 2 CS Loop B Plow mtr Loop Power Supply (Subcomponent)

CoCar Spray Loop A Flow TPaonmitt- (2H21 -P419) (Subcompomnet) 2 Core Spray Loop B Flow Transmitter (221-P419) (Subcomponent)

ICure Spray Loop A Flow Diff Press Trans (Local) (Subcomponent) 2 Core Spray Loop B Flow Diff Plres Tran (Local) (Subcomponent).

I Cae Spray Loop A High PremsuTrae milacsr21121-P401) 2 Core Spray L-p B High Preasure Transmitter M2U-P419)

Core Spray Loop A High Preasune Tramnituor (2H21-P401).

2 Core Spray Loop B High Pasre

-Tr--mait-(2H21-P419)

Core Spray Pump 2A Minimum Flow Control MTU (Subcompponnt) 2 Core Spray Pump 2B Miniuma Flow Control MTU (Subomponent)

Core Spray Loop A High Pessure MTU 2

Core Spray Loop B High Pleasure MTU Core Spray Loop A High Pressure MT "J

2 ComeSpray Loop B High Presus MTU Core Spray L.oop A Fow Indicator 2

Core Spray Loop B Flow Indicaor 2203 2205 2203 2203 2205 2205 2203 2205 2203 2205 220D3 2205 2203 2201 0024 0024 2203 2205 2203 2205 2203 2205 2203 2205 0024 G024*

0024 0024 0024 0024 0024-2205 2205 2205 2205 2205 2201 H-26018 H-24629 '#H-26018, H-24627

'H-26018, H-24627 H-26018 H-24629 1H-26018 1H-24629 H-26018, H-26018' 1H-24621 H-26018 H-26018 1H-24621 H-26018 H-26018 H

-24621 H-26018

" H-26018

.H-26018 H1-26018

-H-26018 H-26018

'H-26018 1H-26018 H-26018

-H-26018 H-126018 1.-26018 1H-26018 1H-26018

.H-26018 H1-26018 H1-26018 11-26018

'H-26018 11-24613 H1-26018.

1l5S RFR17

~158,RIFR21

'158 RFRI7 158 Hi tR2i 158 RFR2*,I

'118 RLR]5

~087 RLR2.3 087 MR1l 4~

0071RHR241 087 RLR14 087 RLR24 171 AZO9O 171 AZO90 2H111-P613 12HI l-P612

,087 RLR14'

~087 RLR24 087 RLR14' 087 R1LR24 087 RLR14 087 R1LR24, 087 R11R14 087 RLR24 211 I-P927 2111 -P928 2HII-P927, 2j111-P928 2H] I-P927 2H11-P9r28 211 I I-P601 2H111-P601' 087 RLR25 087 R1R2.5

'087 RGR24 087 RGR24 087 R1GR5 127 AZo20 2

3 2

2 2

-2 HPCIPump HPCI Pump HPCI Turbinet (Subcomponentr)

HPCI Turbine Ass Labe Oil Pump HPC* Turbine Steam Supply Valve (MOV)"Valve HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Inboard Cctairan at iWdve(MOV)i, H-24621

.1H-24621 1H-24621 H-24621 H1-24621 H-26021 H-26021l H-26021:

1H151165

,H-26020

H-26020

."Notes are listed an page 7 of 17.

" Mode Abbreviations: O=Op C=-Closed. VAR=Various, F=F"nctional (Non-positional componeat)

"' For pnimary compoent / subecomponent creas-refronace, see Table 4.A1-2.r

" For prary component / spurious actuation component cross-referuce, see Table 4.AI-3. AIso, see note i Page 26 of 60

A ATTACHMENT 1:. SEISMIC WALKIDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION.00 E. L Hatch Nuclear Plant Units I and 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis Report Rev. 35 I

Table 4.AI- (Sheet 8 of 17)

Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Equipment List Normala')

Reqauiresl MPL No.

Nol tes Mode SSD Mod Path Fire App. RI Ara Drawig 2E41-FV03 c

'2E41-P004 2E,41-F006 2B41-F008 2B41-0912,

'2E41-F042

,2E41-F05'q 2E4]-F104 2E4l-Fl1I

'2E41-F124 c

2E41,-F3052 c

2E4f-P3053ýý

~2Eý4l-065.

2E I4i-K600 2E41-K(6)3, 2E41-N0)08 2E4l-NO5O 2E41-IN051 2E41-N053 k

2E41-N055A kt 2E4l-NO5SB k

'2E4t-N055C k 2E4l-N055D~ k 2E41-N056B* k 2E~l-N056D k, 2E41-N0S7A k' 2E41-N057B-k 2E41-NO58A k 2E41-N058B k 2E41-NO8C, kt

,2B4l-N058D, k 2E41-N062B It 2E41-N062D k 2E41-NO7OA k 2E41-N070B It 2E41-NO7lA ý',k 0

0 C

0 C

C C

C 0

C 0

0 C

ýC

-C ON ON ON ON ON ON ON" ON ON ON ON ON:"

.ON.

ON ON

,ON ON ON ON ON, ON ON ON ON VAR VAR R

0 C

VAR VAR 0

00 0

VAR VAR 0

ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON:

ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Outboard Conanent Isolanirm Valve (MOV) 2205 HPCl Pump Suction Valve from CST (MOV:)

2205 HPCI Pump Inboard Discharge Valve (MOV) 2205 HPCl Pump Outboard Discharge Valve (MOV) 2205 HPC-Pump Discharge Bypass Teat Va*lve to CST (MOV) 2205 HPCI Pump Minimum Floaw Bypass Valve to Suppreasion Pool (MOV) 2205 HPCI Pump Suction from Suppression Pool Valve (MOV) 2205 HP Pump Suan fm Suppres*ion Pool Outboard Isolaioan Valve (MOV) 2205 HPCl Pomp Suction fium Suppression Pool Inboard Isobistl Valve (AOV) 2205 HPCI Batroneti Condenserand Lube Oil Cooler Cooling Watlr Supply Valve (MOVy) 2205 HPCI Turbine Exhaust Vacuum Breaker Isolation Valve (MOV),

~

2205 HPCI Turbine Exhaust Vacuum Breaker Isolation Valve (MOV) 2205 HPCi R-emo IMaual T*ip Solenoid Valve (Subccmupont) 2205 HPCI Turbine Control Valve (HOV) (Subcomponmet) 2205 HPCI Turbine StopValve (0OV) (Subompo t) 220 HpCI BOM Pov-ý Supply (Suboomponcal) 02 HPCI Discharge Flow Transmitter Power Supply (Suhcomponent) 0024 HPCI lasnumeat Power Inverter (Subcompo*.nt) 0024 HPCI Pump D Fcharge low Transmilter (21121 -P414A) (Sub.opo t) 2205 HPCI Pump Dicharge Pressure Tranmloer (Subcomponeit) 2205 HPCI Pump Disclhage Flow Differential Presure ansmittr (2H21-P414A) (Subcom{rpont) 2205 HPM Pump Suction Diff Press T*ans (2H21-P414B) 2205 HPCl Turbine Exhaust Press Trans (2H21-P434) 2205 HPCI Turbine Exhaus (2222P414A) 2205 HMTurbine Eahaust Press Trans CMHI1-P434) 2205 HPCl Turbilne ExhaustPress Trinus (K21 2-P414A) 2205 HPC Turbine Exhaust Press Trans (21121-P414B) 7205 HPCI TurbineExhaust Prs Trans (2H21-P414B) 2205 HPCl Steam Line Press Trans (2H21-P016) 2205 HPCI steam line Press Trans (2112-P036) 2205 IPCl Steai Line Preissa (2H21-P016) 2205 HPCI Stcam lne Pres Tm (2H21-I P36) 2205 HPCI SteamLIne PMus Trans

=2HI1-P01

6) 2205 HPCI Steam Line Pes; Tmans(2112l-P036) 2205 HPCI Toms High WalerLevel Pessune Transmiter (Local) 2205 PC Toms High Ware Level Ie'ssure Transmtter (Loca 2205 HPCl Emr AmraCoo Stm Leak Der RTD 2205 HIPI Enmes Area Cooler Stins Leak Der RTD 2205 HP0 Pipe P Room StinLeakDatR 2205 H-24625 11-26020 H-24621 H-26020 H-24622 H-26020 1H-24621

.H-26020 H-24621" H-26020 H-24621 H-26020M H124621

H-26020 H-24621

.H-26020

-H-24619 1H-26020 H-24621 H-20021 H-24619 H-26020 H-24619 H-26020

~H-26021 1-24621 H-26021 H-24621 H-26021 H-26020 11-26020 1H-24621 H-26020 B-24621 H-26020 H-24621 H-26020 H-260210 H-26021 H1-26021 S H-26021

" H-26021 H1-26021 H1-26021 H-26020 H-26020

-*-26020 11-:26020 11-26020)

H1-26020 H-26020 H-26020 H-26021 H-26021 H-26021 130R1ER19

094R RR25 121 RBRR9

,llOFJGR25 112RGR24 087 ROR24

~094 RLR25~

095 RGUR24 090 RPR24 091 RGR24 M 3RFR2.3 087 RPR23.

090 RGR25 087 RGR24 087 RGR24 2HI1-P6l21 21-11-P612 087 1kLR24 087 RLR24~

087 RLR2IM 087 FM 087 RLR24 087 RLR24~

087 RLR24~

087 RLR124 087 RLRt24 087 RLR24 087 RGR24 087 RGR24 087 RGR24

'087 RGR24 087 RGR24 087 RGR24 117 RGR24 087 RGR24 100 RGR25 130 RJR20

" Note ame listed oan page 17of 17.

' Mode Abbmvations: O=Open, C=CWsom, VAR=Various, F=Pamctinmal (No -pmitional camponeat)

For primary componont / subcomponeat cross-reference see Table 4.AI-2.

t For primary component / spurious achtutine componenl

,mss-refereac see Table 4.AW. Also, see note L Page 27 of 60

ANTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 9

E~,

'E. Hatch Nuclear Plant UnitslIand 2 I>Rev.

35 Safe Shutdown Analysis Report S1Tablc4.Al-l Shmtgof17)

Unit 2Safe Shutdown Equipment List MINo o()Normal"'

Required" t

Fire App.R

~

AQ~k SSD Mode Pat Fuctionl srrt A-a Drawing P&' TD1 Location 2F4 1-NO7lIB k

ON' ON 2

HPCl Pipe Pen Room StaiLeak Der RTD 2205" H-26021 130 RIR20 2E41-N074 0

VAR 2

HPCI Turbine Stop Valve Position Switch (Local) (Subcompont) 2205:

H-26021 087 RGR24 2E41-N650 0

VAR 22 HPClMinimumFlowValveControlMTU(Subcomponent) 0024 H-26020 2H11-P926 2E41-N651 0

VK' VAR 2

HPCI Minimum Flow Valve Contral MTU (Subcomponent) 0024 H-26020 2H11-F926 2E41-N653 k

0 VAR 2..

.HPCPumpSuction MTI 0024 H-26021

'2HI I1-P926" 2F41-N655A k

0 VAR

2)

HPClTurbine ExhautMTUI 0024 H-26021 2 2HIl-P925 2F.41-N655B k

0 VAR 2

HPCI Turbine Exhaui t MTU 0024 H-26021 2H II-P926 :

2E41-N655C ki 0

VAR 2

HUClTurbine ExhautMTU 0024 H-26021 2H I'I-P925',.

2E41-N655D k'>

0 VAR 2

HPCI Turbine Exhaust MTV ~

0024 H1-26021

,2H1I1I-P926K, 2E41-N656B k

0 VAR

2.

4CI ExhaustMTU 0024 H-26021

.II-P926.

2E41-N656D k

0 VAR 2

HPClITurbine Exhaust MTU 0024 H-26021 2111I-P926 2E41-N656A k

0 VAR 2

Iil0 S Lee in U 0024 H-26020 I -P25 2F41-N657D k"

0 VAR 2

HMStem*LF*e MTU

0024, H-26020 2H 1-P926 2E41-N657A k

0 VAR 2

HPCI Steam Line MTU

'0024 1H-26020 2H1I I -P925 2E41-N658AB k-,

0 VAR 2

HPCISteamLineMTU K

0024 H-26020 2H1-P925

'2E41-N658B It 0

VAR 2

HCI Steam Line MTU

'K 0024 H-26020 2H]!i

-P926 2E41-N658C k

0 VAR 2

HPCISteamLineNMTU

.0024 H-26020 2H I I-P925 2E41-N658D. k 0

VAR 2

HPCI Steam Line MTU

• 0024' t

H-26020 2H111

-P9265 2E41-N660A ki 0

VAR 2

HiPIFSieamLinSTU

.".0024 1 H-26020 2*1*1-P925 2E41 -N660B kI 0

VAR 2 K H1CItT sm LighWate Level MTU 0024 H-26020' 2i 26 I I-92 2E41-N662D k

0 VAR 2

HPCITcasa High Water Level MTU K

0024 H-26020 2121 I-P928 2E41-N670A k

0 VAR 2

HPCLIEmer* eaCoolueStmLeakDerM7U 0024 H-26021 21.11-P927 2E41-N670B k

0 VAR 2

C-Er.Arrea CoolerSunLea etMDer TU 0024 i

H-26021 2111 8-1928 2E41AN671A k

0 VAR 2

HPC1 PipePenRoomSteam LakDetMTU 'i'00241 H-26021 KK2HlI-P927 2E41-N671B k

0 VAR 2

HPC Pipe PernRomSteam Leak Det MTU 0024 26021 21411-P928 2641-R612 ON ON 2

H-PC1 Pump Discharge How Controller(Subcomponent) 0024

-H-26020 2HII -P601 2E51-C001 OFF ON 1

3 RCIC.Pump 2203 1H-24618 H-26024 091IERIB 5 2E,51-C002 OFF ON 1

3 RCICTurbine(Subcomponeact)

" 2203 1H-24618 H-26024 090 RBR16 2E51-C002-1 OFF' VAR 1

3 RCIC Barometric Conde*

s*r Condensate Pump 2203 H-26096 H-26024 087RCRI5 251-0003 0

0 1

3 RCICPumpSucin*eromSuppressionPoolInltoard solation Valve(AOV) 2203'K H-24622 H-26023 089 RAR18 2E51-I:07 0

VAR 1

3 RCIC Steam Supply lnboardlsolationValve (MOV) 2201

-26023 142 AZ..85 2E51K'0008>-

0 VAR I

3 RCICSte-amSupplyOuibo'holatiocralve(MOV) 2205 H-24623 1H-26023 142 RBR19 2E51-`010 0

VAR 1

3 RClCPumpSuctionValvefromCST(MOV)

2203 H-24618 H-26023 101 RBR15 2E51-F012 0

0 1

3 RCIC Pump Outboard Dischage Valve (MOV) 2203 H-24622 H11-26023' 123 RBI9 2151-F013 C

0 1

3 RCIC pomp Inboard Discharge Valve (MOV) 2203 H-24622 H-26023 123 RBR19 2F-51-1119 C

VAR 1

3 RCC Pump Minin How Bypass Valve to Suppression Pool (MOV) 2203 H-24618 H-26023, 095 IiBRI5 2E51-F022 C

C 1

3

,RClCPumpTestBypaassValvetoCST(MOV) 2203 H-24622 H-26023 123 RARI9 2E51-FM29 C

VAR

1.

1 3

RCIC Pump Suction from SuppressionPool Valve(MOV)'

2203 H-24618 H-26023 102 RAR15 U Notes are listed on page 17 of 17.

...,.,"K

' Mode Abbreviations: Oý=Opna, C=Closed, VAR=Vario usa, F---Fc

.Tona l

(Non-posiiea lomPonmit)

For primary component / subconiponent cross-reference, see Table 4A1-2.

SFor' prmropnetIsuiu actuaaion component cmsrf mecse Table 4AI-3. Also, seesionteot L

Page 28 of 60

At CHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS 0

NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 E. L Hatch Nuclear Plant Units I and 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis Report Rev. 35 1

Table4Al-I (Sheet l0of,17)

Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Eq*lipinmt List I. I II Noantalo)

Required(2)

, IL No N=0 l1 I M~k SSD Mod Pl BRuctional Descrintiono 4)

Fire App. R Are Drwig I

L-ocation 2E5 1-R1431 2E51-Pl145 2E5l-F

046

• 2E5l-FlG4 2E551-FI05 2E51-F523 2E51-F523 2E51-F524 2E51-F524 2E51-KO65 2E51-K6DO 2E51-K603 2E5 I-Mý602A -ks 2E51-M602B It 2E5l-M603A'k 2E5l1v8603B Ak 2E51-N003 2ESI-NO50 2E51-N051 2E51 -N056A It 2E51-N056C k

2E51-N057A k

2E51-N057B k

2E51-N058A k

2E51-N058B k

2E51-N058C k

2E51-N058D k

2E51-NO61A kt 2E51-N061B kt 2E51-N063A k

2115 -N063B k

2E-51-N063C k

2E51-N063D k

2E51-N064A k

2E51-N064W k

'2E1-N064 kt 2E51-N064D 'k 2E51-N066A k

2E51-N066B k

C C

C 0

0 0

0

• ON ON ON OFF OFF OFF OFF ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON.

ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON

.VAR 00 O

0 VAR 0

VAR ON ON ON OFF OFF OFF OFN ON ON ON ON ON ON ON' ON ON ON ON ON ON

'ON ON' ON ON ON ON ON ON ON 3

RCIC Pump Suction from Suppreasion Pool Outboard Isolation Valve (MOV) 3 RCIC Turbine Steam Supply Valve (MOV):.

3 RCIC Baromacic Condeaser and Lube Oil Coolo Cooling Water Supply Valve (MOV) 3 RCIC Turbine Exhaust Vacuum Breakar solation Valve (MOV) 1

-3 RCIC Turbine Eh-astVacuumBtkf Isolation Valve (MOV)

'I

'RCIC.Twtine Governing Valve (by) (tSubcompooent.,

3 RClCTuhbine Governing Valve (HOV) (Subcomponent)

I RCIC Turbine Trip and Throttle Valve (MOV) 3 RCIC Turbine Trip and Throttle Valve (MOV)

I RCIC EBM Power Supply (Subcomponent)

I RCIC Pump Discharge Flw Loop Pow* Supply (Subcoonmot) 1 RCIC Instrment Powr Invmter (Subcomponent)

I RCIC Torus Auea Stm Leak Dt 'rw I,

RCIC Torus Area Sr.Leak Det Tune 2

HPC Toru Area Son Leak Det Ti=

2 1-PCI Tonta Area Stm Leak Det To=i.

3 RCIC Pump Discharge Plow Tnmmi (2H21-P4!7A) (Subcomponeat)

RCIC Pump Dicharge ure Trattnm er (21121 -P417B) (Sabcomponent)

I RCIC Pump Dischag Plo'w.Differential Pressure Trasnsmiter (2H12

-P417A) (Subcotmponent)

RCIC Turbine Exhan t Gage Ptessue Trans (2H21-P417B)

RCIC Turbine Exhaaat Gage Pmssuat Trans (2H21-P41713)

RCIC Steam Line Prsus Tr,(2121-P435)

RCIC Stam Lino Piess Tiai (2 B21 -P'38)

RCIC Steam Lite Pres Tras (21121-P435)

RCIC Steam Line Pres Trans (2=21-P038)

RCIC Steam Line Prus Tkans (2H21 -P435)

RCIC Steam Line Press Tra(2il-1038)

RCIC Equip Room RID (Local)'

RCIC Equip Room RTD (Local)

RCIC Tors RTD (DLoca)-

I RCIC Tmoru RTD (Local) 2 HPCI Torus RTD (Local) 2 HPCI Tom RTD (Local)

I RCIC Tons RTD (Local)

I RCIC Tomus RTD (Local) 2 HPClTo-usRTD (Local) 2 1HPCI Toms RTD (Local)

I RCIC Toms RTD (Local)

I RCIC Torus RTD (Local).

2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203

'2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 H-24618 H-26023

,H-24618

',. H-26024 H1-24618>

H-26024 H-24622 H-26023 H-24622 H-26023'

.H-26024 1H-26024 H-26024 H-26024 11-26023 H1-26023 H1-26024 H-26024 11-26024 H1-26024 1-24618 H1-26023 H1-24618 H-26023 H1-24618 H1-26023 H1-261024 H1-26024 H1-26023 H1-26023 H1-26023.

H1-26023 H1-26023 11-260234 H1-260234 H1-260234 H1-26024 11-26024 H:26024 H 1 H-26024

. 1 H-26024

" H-26024 11-26024 H-26024 H-26024 102 RAR I '

092 RAR15~

091 RAR15 122 RBRI8 122 RBRI9*

087 RAR14i 087 RAR14*

087 RAR14 087 RARI4 2.-1 I-P621 2H11-P613 2H11 -P613 2H1I-P614 21111 l-P614 2H 11-P614 21,11-P614>

087 RAR14 087 RAR14 087 RARI4 087 RARI4 087 RAR14 130 RFR16 087 RARI4 130 RFRi64 087 RARI94 130 RPR16 087 RAR14 087 RAR16 087 RARI16 0901111114, 09011811W 090 RBR14 0901181114

'118 RA.R19 118 RAR19 118 RAR19 I1 IRAR19' 087 RAR19 087 RLR19

.. Notes are listed on page 17 of 17.

• " Mode Abbreviations: O=Open, C=Closed, VAR=Various, l-=Funciooal (Non-pcaittonal component)

For primary component subcomprone ctus-refuce. see Table 4.AI-2.

' For primary component / spurious actuation component crtns-refetcý see Table 4.AI-3. Also, re no*e L Page 29 of 60

A 1

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKIDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 E L Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis Report Rev. 35 I

Table4.AI-I (Sheet I1 of 17)

Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Equipment List Normnlal* Requirdor MPLNo.

Notes(1) Mode SSD Mode ka, IFuctional Description '1 Fin App-.R Ann Dn11mgn E LJ f i 2E51-N066C k

ON 2E5 I-N066D k

ON 2E51-N083 k

ON 2E51-N085A k ON 2E51 -NO85B k

ON 2E51-N085C k

ON 2E51 -N085D k

ON 2E51-N650 0

2E51-N651 0

2E51-N656A k

0.

2E I-N656C k

0.

2E51-N657A k

0 2E51-N657B k

0 2E01-N658A k 0

2E51-N658B 0k 2E51-N658C k

0 2ESI-N658D k 0

2E51-N660A k

0 2E51-N660B1 k

0 2E51-N661A k

0 2E51-N661B k

0 2E51-N663A k

0 2E51-N663B k

0 2E51-N663C k

0 2E51-N663D k

0 2E51-N664A k

0 2E51-N664B It 0

2E51-N664C k 0

2E51 -N664D k 0

2E51-N665A k

0 2E51-N665B k

0 2E51-N665C' k 0

2E51-N665D k

0 2E51-N666A k

0 2E51-N666B k

0 2E51-N666C k'

0 2E51-N666D k

0 2E51-N683' k

0 2E51-N684 k

0 ON ON ON ON ON ON ON VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR 2

HPCI Tom RTD (Local) 2

• HPC Torus RTD (Local).

RCIC Pump Suction Diff Pres Xmor RCIC Turtie Exhaust Diff Piss X=r I

RCIC Turbine Exhast Diff Pea~m,Xnm RCIC Turbine Fhaust Di& Pres xror RCIC T*bmEhaust Diff Prs Xottr RCIC Pump Minimum Flow Valve Contmi MTU (Subcomponent)

RCIC Pump Mnimum Flow Valve Control MWiJ (Subcomponent)

RCICTurbineEithaustMTU RCIC Turbine Exhaust MTU RCIC Steatm in e MTU RCIC Steam LiW MTU RCIC Steam Line MTU RCIC Steam LneMTU RCIC Steam Line MTU I RCIC Ste a Lin MTU 1 RCIC Stwam Lin. STU

'RCIC Steiam Line STU 1

RCIC Equip Room Arab Hi Temp MTU RCIC Equip Room Antb Hi Temp MTU 1

RCIC Tonis Arab Hi Temp MTU RCIC Toms Arab HiTemp MTU 2

HPCI Tms Amb Hi Temp MTU 2

HPCI Toms Arab Hi Temp mTU 1

RCIC Tous Arab Hi TempMIU.

1

.RCIC Torus Artb Hi Temp MTU%

2 HP6I Tours Arabs 1Temp MT, 2

HPCI TOMS Anb sHi Temp MTU 1

RCIC Torus Antb Hi Temp MTU 1

RCICTors Arab I 7Hi TmpMTU 2

HPO Tomu Antab Hi Tep MTU 2

HPCI Torus~m AnHi Temp MTU I

RCICTorus Anbt Hi Temp M I

RCICTorus Amb Hi Temp MTU 2

HPCI Torus Arab Hi Temp MTU 2

HPCl TusAmbHi Teump MTU 1

RC3C PumpSuction mTU I

RCIC Pump Sucion STU 2203 2205 2203 2203 2203 2203 2203 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 D024 0024 0024 0024 O024 0024 0024 D024 0024 0024/

0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024 0024

1H-26024 087 RFR14' H-26024 117 RPR24 H-26024 087 RAR14 H-26024 087 RAR14 H-2602,4 *.*087 RAR14 H-26024.<

2 087 RAR14 1"-26024 087 RAR 14 H-26023 II1-P9251 H-26M 2H3I 211-P925 H-26024 2HII-P925 H-26024 2211u-P925 H-26023

'2111-P925 H-26023 2H11 I-P926 H-26023 21I1 I-P9257!

H-26023 2111H1-P926 H-26023 2H 1.-P925 ?

• H-26023 2H1 l-P726 H1-26023 2H11-P925 H-26023 21i1 1-P926

'H-26024 2HII -P927 H-26024 2H11-P928 11-26024 H 21111:P927, H-26024 2HI 1-P928 H-26024

~2HI1-P927 H-26024, 2]I1-P928 H-26024 211 -P927 H-26024 21111-P927 H1-26024 2HI I-P928 H-26024 j2.Hll-P927 H-26024~

21411l-P928 H-.26024 2111 -P927 11-26024 2111 -P928 H1-26024 2HI1-P927 H1-26024 2111 -P928 H1-26024 2H1 I I-P927 H204 2HI1-P928 H1-26024 21111-P925 H1-26024 2H I I-P925

"' Notes are listed on page 17 of 17.

" Mode Abbreviatiom: O=Ope, C=Cloaed. VAR=Vaxiou F=-Functional (Non-positional =conpmn)

"' For primary component / subcomponent cross-refence, see Table 4.AI -2.

t. For primary component / spurious acsration component comss--mrse aem Table 4.A1-3. Also, see note kI Page 30 of 60

OTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION.0 E. L Hach Nuclear Plant Units I and 2 Safe Shutdown Anayis Report RLev.

35 I

Table4.AI-1 (Shel 12 ofl7)

Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Equipment List Normalr)

Requireda)

MPL No.

N2,50 Mode SSD Mode Egh Fire App. R 21151-N685A k

2E51I-N685B k;

2E51-N6a5C, k.

2E51-N685D 'ký 2E51-N756 2E51-R612 2G31-P1733 2G3I-FIJ34 2031-11135 0

~0 0*

ON C

C C

VAR VAR VAR VAR VAR ON C

C C

1 RCIC Turbine Exhaust MTU RCIC Turbine Exhaust MTU RCIC Turbine Exhaust MTU RCIC TurbineExhaust MTU RCIC Barometric Condenser Level Switch High (Local) (Subcomnponent)

RCIC Pump Discharge Flow Indicating Controller (Subcomponent) 0024 0024 0024 0024 2203 0024 2205 2205 2205 H-26024-H-260243 H-26024" H-26024-3 H-26024 11-26023 H1-24629 14-26036 H1-24629 ~H-26036 H1-24629 H-26036 2H11-P9265 2H1I1I-P926 2H I -P926 087 RAR 14 21113-9602 158 RFR123 158 RER23 158 RE1R23 H

RWCU to Main Condenser Pow Contr*l Valve (AOV)

H RWCU to Main Condenser Isolation Valve (MOV)

RWCU to Radwate Isolation Valve (MOV) 2N71-F012 g

0 0

1 2 3 Cirlating WaterMake-up Valve (MOV) 2N'1-F013 g

C 1 2 3 CircutingWaterBlowdownValve (MOV) 2P1l-AI00 F

F 1 2 3 Condensate Storage Tank 2P1 I -D003 F

F 1 2 3 CST Level Gauge 2605 H-24640 H-21026 YARDi 2607 H-24639.

H-21026 YARD 2P4l1c00lA 2P41-C00IB 2P41-F035B 2P41-FO36B 2P41-F039A 2P41-IO40A 2P41-11366 2P41-F310 g

2P41-F312A g

2P41-F312B g

2P41-F3ISA g

2P41-F315B g

2P41.9316A 2P41-9316B 2P4]-F339A 2F41-F339B 2P41-K6OIA 2P41-K6OIB 2P41-N303A 2P41-N303B 2P41 -N3tI4A 2P4I-N304B VAR VAR C

C C

C 0

C 0

0 0

0 0

0 C

C ON ON ON ON C

C ON ON 0.

0 0

0 0

C 0

0 0

0 C

C 0

0 ON ON ON ON C

C 1

3 2 3 2

23 13 1

3 2 3 13 23 1

3 23 1 3 2 3 13 23 2

2 1 -3 2 3 Plant Service Water Pump 2A Plant Service Water Pmnp 2B

-IPCI Ptup Room Cooler Inlet Valve (AOV) (Subeomponent)

RHR & CS Pump Room Cooler Inlet Valve (AOV) (Subcomponent)

RHR & CS Pump Roons Cooler Inlet Valve (AOV) (Sutox.pon..nt)

RCICPump Room Coolernlet Valve,(AOV)(Suc ponet)

I Divisiounl PSW to RCIC Room Cooler & Dywell Chle Iolafio Valve (AOV)

Radwaste Dilution Isolation Valve (MOV)

Division I Plant Service Water to Diesel 2A (MOV)

Division 2 Plant Service Watr" to Dimel 2C (MOV)"

Reactor Building Division I Header Isolation Valve (MOV)

Reacutfo iigDivision 2 Header olaion Val*ve(MOV)

Turbine Building Division, IHeader solation Valve (MOV)

Turbine Building Division 2 Headerolation Valve (MOV) 15i~ Geiata 2A Outlet Isolation Valve (AOV)

Diesel Gneratur 2C Outlet Isolation Valve (AOV)

Power Supply for 2P41-N303A (Subcomponent)

Power Supplyfer 2P41-N303B (Subcompotee)

PSW Division I Header Discharge Prisme Transmitter (Loca) (Subcomponent)

PSW Diviio 2 Header Discharzge Preasur Tnartmirtte (LocD (Suhcomponont)

Plant Service Water Sur A Diff Pt sure Switch (Suhc puent)

Plant Service Water Strane Di8)'Si (Subcomorct) 2603 2603 0501 0501 2205 2205 2203~

2203

• 2203

~0501 2601 2602 2601

~2602 2601 2602 2403 2407 0024 0024 0501 0501 0501 0501l H-26020 YARD NA ~YARD H-24633 H-24633-H-24621 H-24621

~H-2461 9

H-24618

H-24622 H-24630 H-24639 H-24639 H-24639 H-24639 H1-24639 H1-24639 H-24634 H-24634.

H-24630 H1-24630 H1-24630 H1-24630 H-21033.

H-21033 H-26051

.H-26051 H-26050 B-26050 H-26050 1H-21033 H-21033 1H-21033 H-21033 H-21033 H-21033 H-21033 1H-21033 H*-21033 H-21033

-H-21033 H-21033 H-21033 H-21033 H1-21033 INTAKE IN4TAKE 106 RGR25.

112 RLR23 121l RURU5.

104 R*R14 123 RLRIg INTAKE YARD YARD YARD YARD YARD YARD 130 Al 130*B-I 21111 -P6.56 INTAKE INTAKE INTAKE INTAKE Notes are listed on page 17 of 17.

"Mode Abreviations: ýO=Opcn. C=Clead, VAR=Various, F--=Funxctio (Non-positional component)

"' For primary component / subcomponent crmss-referece, see Table 4.Al-2.

t-For primary component / spurious actuation component crcas-rerfrce.n see Table 4.AI-3. Al*a e nonrate k.

Page 31 of 60

9 TACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION

.0 E. L Hatch Nuclear Plant Units I and 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis Report

,,)Normal Requ MPL No.

, N~te*'

Mode SSD 2`4ý-1601A

-ON ON 2P4 -R6DIB ON ON 2P70-AO02A a

F F

2F70-A0O2B a

F F

2F70-AO02C a

F F

2P70-FG01A VAR

. VAR 2P]70-FOO1B VAR

• ,VAR

• 2POF-*o04 0'

0 0

2P7O-F;05 0~1 0O 2P70-F066 0

0 2P70-FO67 0

0 2P70-FD84 a

C 0

2P70-FI38A a

C 0

2P70-FI38B a

C 0

2P70-F138C a

C 0

2P70-F14J a

C 0

2P70-K601A k

ON ON 2P70-K601B k

ON ON 2P70-K602A k

0 0

2P70-K602B k

0 0

2P70-NO06A 0

VAR 2P70-N006B 0

VAR 2P70-NO20A k

ON ON

-2P7O-NO20B k ON ON 2P70-N022A k

ON ON 2P70-N022B k

ON ON 2R22-S005 ON ON 2R22-S007 ON ON 2R22-S016 ON ON

~2R22-SO17 O N~

<ON

$2R23-SO03, ON ON

'2R23-S004' ON

'ON 2R24-S009 ON ON 2R24-SOI*.

ON

, ON 2R24-SO12, It K

ON ON 2R24-S0128A ON ON 2R244IoSB ON oN scatff 2203 H-2 2203 H-2 2203 H-2 5U66 5066 5066 2

2 cywell Pn I]

LBRS8 LBRIS 1

3 4l6 V 2 3 4160 V 2 3 125/250 1 :3 600VS 2 3 600 V S 1 Servi

• s*a 33 vU)

Page 32 of 60

AACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION.0 E L Hatcl Nuclear Plant Units I and2

,Safe Shutdown Analysis Rev. 35 Table4.AI-l (Sheet14 of 17)

Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Equipam List Normalt 2t Requirce)

MPL No.

Notiest Mode SQhMoe ESth 2R24-S022 ON ON 2 3 2R24-S025 ON ON I

3 2R24-S027 ON ON 2 3 2R25-S001 ON ON 1

3 2R25-S002 ON ON 2 3 2R25-S004 ON ON 1

3 2R25-S006 ON ON

• 2 3 2R25-S029 ON ON 1

3 2R25-S031 ON ON 2 3 2R25-S036 ON ON 1

3 2R25-S037 ON ON 2 3 2R25-S064 ON ON 1

3 2R25-S065 ON ON 2 3 2R25-S101 ON ON 3

F-unctonal Iesyigtonote4) 125/250 V dc MCC 2B ESS Division 2 600/208 V MCC 2A 1.5 Division I 600/208 V MCC 2C ESS Division 2 125 Vdc Cabinet2A 125 V dc Cabinet 2B 125 V d# Cabinet 2D 125 V dc Cabinet 2F.

120/208 V a Cabinet 21 1204208 V ac Cabinet2L 120,208 V ac ESS Cabinet 2A 120/208 V ac ESS Cabinet 2B-120/208 Var Cabine 2A lnstrument Bus 120/208 VacrCablnct 2B Instrument Bus 120268 V ESS MsctPowerIPane 125 V'do Distribut*on Cabinet 2D 125-V &doDistrbution Cabinet 2E 125/250 V Station Haty 2A (Subcorpoe 1252,V iStain Battery 2B (Sulropor 125 V. D

,(imelSys eo aticr2A (Subcomj 125 V Diesel System Battery 2C (Subcomin Fire App.R

.2205 H-24625 NA 130 RHR24 2404 14-24635 NA

-1310B2.

2409 H-24635 NA 130C2,:

2016 NA 130 TDAT14 2014 H-24608 NA 136OTCaTl 3 2404 H-24635 NA 130B2*',

2409 H-24635 NA 130 C2

.2404 NA 130 B2 2409 Hi-24635 NA 130 C2 2021 H:-24608 NA:

130 TDaT13 2014 H4-24608 NA' 130 T~aTI3 2015 H-24609 NA 130 T-n13 2013 H-24609 NA 130 TGTI"2 2203 1,-24623 NA 130RBR14 2018,.

NA

'130MT1aT3 2R25-SI29

~2R2.5-Sl30

'2R42-SO0lA' 2R42-SOOIB 2R42-S002A 2R42-SOO2C 2R42-S026 2R424502!

2R42-50(28 2i42-S029 2R42-S030 2R42-S031 2R142-S032A 2R42-S032C 2R43-R142.A 2R43-F044C ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON 0

0 ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON C

C 0

0 0

C C

VAR 2

1 3

2 3 1

3 23 1

3 1 3 1

3 2 3 P;TI3 BT13 EIT13 3T1 3 2 3 125 V Bnmyarger 2E (Subeo pon t) 2 3 125 V Battery CZhatler 2F(Subopornptate) 1 3 125 ViBettay Charge 26 (Suhoomnpeanet) 2 3 125 V Battery, Charge 2J (Suhcootpmpos)

I Diesel Gcasmt" 2A Air Start Valve (SV) (Subc 2

Diesel Generator 2C Air Start Valve (SV) (Subc 2409 2403 2407 meet) mast)

NA 130C2 H-21074 130 Al 1H-21074 130B4I 2R43-1:O97C

,2R43-F098A a

2R43-F0498C a

2R43-FD99A a

2R43-F099C a

2R43-NOOIA C

C C

ý0 0

0 1

3 3

3 3

1 3

Diesel Geruator2C Air Start Valve (Subomaponest)

Diesel Gmerator2A Manual Air Start Valve (Subcomponmet)

Diesel Gmetaatr2C Manual Air StartWvalve (Sub)orapamnt)

Diesel Generator 2A Manual Air Start Valve (Subcooponett)

Diesel UG rartor 2C Manual Air Start Valve (Subcoapon=)

Diesel Generator 2A Day Tank Level Switch 2407 H-21074 1301BI 2403 H-21074 130Al 2407 H-21074 130oB1 2403 H-21074

.130 Al 2407 W421074 130 BI 2401 H-24634 H-21074' 137 BI Notesareml"seon page7of 17..

• " Mode Abbreviations: O=Open, C=ClosWd, VAR=Various, F=Funotional (Noo-posilional componnts)

For plmary oo

-nst/ subcomponent os-rcierence, see Table 4.A1-2.

For pnmary omponent / spurious artuaton onomponet cross-r.fmcncea, seTable 4.AI-3. Also, see note k.

Page 33 of 60

9 ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCHO82-RPT-02, VERSION 9

E. L Hatch Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis Reprt Rev. 35' I

Table4AI-I (Shee It of 17)

Unit 2 Safe Shutdown Equipment List Nortialrt)

Required')

MPL No.

Ne ts1)- Mode 55D Mode

&a2h 2R43-NO03C

'2R43-N022A k 2R43-N022C ks

'2R43-NO35A kt It3N05 2R43-S00IA

ý2R43-SDOIC 2T41-BO02B 2T41-BO03A 2T41-BO04A 2T41-BO05B, 2T47-K600 2T474R626 2T4i-k627 2Y48-A00I 2T48-F(126 g

2T48-11127 g

2T48-FIG4 2T48-FlI Il a~d 2T48-FI 12A 2T48-F1 13 2T48-FI 15 2T48-FI 18A 2T48-F I 8B 2T48-KO2IA k

2T4g-K070 2T48-K621A 2T48-K621B 2T48-K622 2T48-K627A k

2T48-K627B Is 2748-NO09A 2T48-N,009B 2T48-N009C~

2T48-N009D 2T748-NOIOAý 2T48-N01 OB 0

0 0

0-0 OFF:

OFF OFF OFF OFF OFF ON ON ON F

0' 0

C 0

C C

0 0

ON ON ON

'ON ON ON ON F

F F

F ON ON VAR 0

0 0

ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON

'ON ON.

F 0

0 C

IC C

C C

C C

ON ON ON ON ON ON ON F

F F

F ON ON 2 3 1

3 23 1

3 23 1

3

.23 Functional D*-dntiono0.4)

Diesel Generator 2C Day Tank Level Switch Diesel Gecnrator 2A Low Lube Oil Pressure Switch Diesel Gmerator 2C Low Lube Oil Pressure Switch Diesel Genrator 2A Low Lube Oil Pkmar Siwitch Diesel Generator 2C Low Lob Oil Pressur Switch Diesel Generator 2A Diesel Gnmerat 2C Fire App. R Area

Drawing, 2 3 RHR & Cor: Spray Pump Room Cooler 1

BRHR

& Core Spray Pump Room Cooler 1,

3 RCIC Pump Room Cooler 2

-PH I Pump Room Cooler 2

Temp Sig R/V Cony for 2T48-N009B&D to 2T47-R627 (Subcomponent)

Drywal] Cooling System Muli-Point Temperantre Recorder 2

DywelCooling SystcrMulti-Point Ternperatme Rorder 1 2 3

'Liquid Nitrogen Storage Tanik 1 2 3 Nitrogen Supply Unit I/Unit2 Creoss-lTsolation Valve (MOV)

I 2 3 Ni

' SuplyUnitI/Unl2 Cross-Tie Isolation Valve (MOV) 2 Tors and Drywell Normal Nitrgen Make-up Isolation Valve (AOV)

I 2 3 Nitrogen lesting System Header Isolation Valve 2

Drywll and Tors Nitroge Make-up Valve (AOV)

Drywall Nitrogen Make-up Isolatio NValve (AOV)

Torns Drywall NItoge"nMAko-up Isoltbion Valve (AOV)

DrywcallNora Nitroglen Makeup Valve (AOV) 1 Torus Normal Nitrogen Mkeup.Valvc (AOV) 3 Power Sousce for 2T49-N070 & 2T48-R070 (2H21-P173) (Subcomponent)

Current to Voltage Convertcr (Sulrconpoent) 2 Current to Voltage Converer (Su"b o.net)

I Temp Sig RNV Cony f0r'2T48-N009A&C to 2T47-R626 (Subcomponent) 1 2 Drywll Peunsae c Air Supply Isolator 1 2 DrywallPneumaaticAirSupplylsolator I

Tarus Wat Temperatu Element (Loa) (Subcomponent) 2 Toms Water Tempat Elemen t (Local)(Sbopoe=)

I Toums Water Temperature ElMment (IcIal) (Subroponet) 2 Turs Wate Texmp-=tr Element (oal) (Subcompo

)

1 Wide-Range Tor*s Water Level Transmitter (Sub)omccponen) 2 Wide-Range Torus Water Level Transmitter(Subc"omponent) 2405 2403 2407 2403 2407 2403 2407 2205 2203 2203 2205 0224 0024 0024 2604

'1203 2203 2205 2203 2205 2205 2205 2205 2205 2205 2203 0024 0024 0024

'0024 0024 2203 2205 2203 2203 2203 2205 H-24634:

H-21074 H-21074 H-21074 H-21074 H-21074 H-24634 H-21074 H-24634 H-21074 H-24621 H-24618 H-24618 1H-24621 H-24613 H-24613 1H-24638 H-24623 H-24619 B:-24619 H-24619 H-24619 H-24619 H-24619 H,24623 H-24622 H-24619 H1-24622.

H-24618,

.H-24616!

H-26071 H-26071 H-26071 H-26071 H-26074:I H-26083 H!-260837 H-26083 H-26083 H-26083 H-26083' H-26083 H-26083 H-26083 H-26083 H-26083 H-26084 H-26084 H-26283 11-26084.

H-26284 H-26084 H-26084'

,H-26094' 11-26084 H-26084 1-26084 H-26084 137.Cl 130 Al 130BlI 130 Al 130B11 130A1.

13081l 087 RLR24 114RLR14 087 RAR14 101 RGR25 2HlI-F691 2111 1-P650 YARD 140 RFRI3 146 RER 14 121RBR2I 130 RBRI7 122RER21 123 RHR21U 122 RER23*

121 RBR21 125 RFR23

'87 RER23 130 RAR17' 2111I1-P691 2HI1-P691 2H11 -P605A 2H1 I-PM0A o

090RAR19 093RFR23 100RLRI9 093 RFR14 091 RBRI4 091 RBR24 Notes are astae on page ut or 1i.

, Mode Abbreviations: O=Open, C=Closed. VAR=Various, F=-Functiotal (Non-positional component)

=

For primay component / subcomponent cross-refercce, see Table4A1-2.

• ' For primrmy component I spurious actuation component cross-referenice see Table 4A1-3. Also, see note k.

Page 34 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 E. L Hatch Nuclear Plant Units I and 2 R -

5:

S E.L11alcbNuclaPlantUni~ilandI2 K*

K K

K:1:

J t:*~i]i

!i~:i iiiiiiiii K

K

ilI~l~iII G: iii:

iiii: i Revli i

! i 35 i

Safe Shutdown Analysis Report i : i

T able 4.A I --I (S hex t 16 of 17)

K KKI.

NIL o

Nlel Md SSD Mode Pat (3l~a meifeal4)

At DmvKl Pa Locatio Z2T48-NO70 ON ON 3 sWide-Range, Torus Water Level Transmitter (Subomuponent) 2205' H-241 H-26084 087 RER24 2T48-N072KK" ON ON 3

TootsWater Tempertuenlement (Local)(Subcomponent) 2203 11-264123 H-26084 107 RA.R17

'KKK 2T48-RO70 ON ON 3

Wide-Range Tonts Water Lev'el Indicator (2B21-P173) 20

-42

-69 3

A1 2T48-R072<

ON ON 3

Torus WaterTemperature dicii (21-121-P173) 2203 H-24623 y' 1-260894 130 RAR 17 ~

2T48-R612A k

ON K

ON 2

Nitrogen Makup nw ndlcig Controller

.0024 KKH~1-26083".164TCT1 1

KK 1T8R62 O

ON I

Wide-Range Tturs WinerLevel Indicator 0024 H1-24613 H-26084 21111-P657 2T48-R672B

' ON ON 2]

.WidRange Torus WaterLevel Indicato 0024 *H-24613 H...

-26084 'KK'K21111-P654

.2X41-C010A j OFF

.ON.

1 '3 Dime] Gen o*rRoom*2A Fan 2403 3AH-24614 H-2619 10A K"K 4I-C0I0AAFS k 0 C

1K 3

.Diesel Generator Roam 2A FanAir FowSwitch K

2403 H1-24634 H1-12619 13GMAK T2X41-61013 j OFF ON 1

3 Diesel GeneratorRoam7 2A Fan 2403 H-24634 H..12619 13GM K2X41 '-COMOBAFS k 0

~C

~

1 3'

Diesel GeneratorRo A FanAirFow Switch

.2403 H1-24634 H4-12619 130A1 2X41-0C010C j OFF ON 3

Dieel Gen r Room 2C Fan 2407

24634 H-12619:

130BI 2X41-COIOCAFS k

0 :

C 2 2 3 Diesel GeneatorRoom2C FanAirFlowSwitch 2403 H-24634 H-12619 130AI 2X41-COIOD j

OFF ON 2 3 Di2 sel GDi

• eneratorRoom2C Fan 2407 H-24634 H-12619 130B:

2X41-COI0DAFS k

0 3,

DieselG ator.Room 2CFanAir lwSwitch t

'KK 2403 H-24634 H-12619 K 130AI 2X41-C013A C

0 1

3 Diesel GeneratoraRoom 2Aioouve 2403 H-24634' H12619 130AI 2X41-C013B O

"ON 2 3 DieselGeneatorRoom2CLuver 2407

H-24634 H.12619 13BI 2X41-NOIIA 0

C 1

'K 3 *~. Diesel Generator Rown2A FanThermostat(Subcomponent) 2403 1H-24634 H-12619 130AI

<2X41-N.IIB 0

C 2 3

'KDieselGeertorRom 2CFan Theennsto+/-(Subcoponent) 2407

H-24634 4H-12619 130B1 2X41-N0i2A k

0 K C 1

3 K

Diesel Generator Room 2A Louver Thermostat 2403 H

1-24634 H-12619 130Al 2X41-N0121 k

0 C

2 3 Diml GeneratorRoom2CLouverThermostat 2407 O1--24634 11 H-12619 130131 2Y52-A00lN A F

F 1

3 Diesel GeFe3ator 2A Fuel Oil Storage Tank 2610 11-21074 YARD 2Y52-AOOIC F

F 2 3K Diesel Generaor2C FuelOilStorageTank 2612 H1-21074 YARD 2Y52-A1I0A F

F 1

3 Diesel Generator2A Fuel Oil Day Tank 2401 1-21074 1301B1 2Y52-AIOIC F

F 2 3 Diesel Gentera2C Fuel OilDay Tank

'2405 H-21074 130 Cl K+K 2Y52-CO*IA OFF VAR 1

3 Diesel Genrator2A Fuel Oil Transfer Pup 2 I

2610 H:44 H

YARD 2Y2COC OFF VAR 2 3 Diesel Generator 2C Fuel Oil Transfe Pm 2C2

'jKK

~2610 H1-24640

.H-21074 YARD.'K

>1F41-F313C

'C

'K "C

KK'3 KPlant Service Water Strain B Ilsolation Valve (MOV) 0501 11-24630 D-1l1001 INTAKE 1P41-]313D C

K C>

1 3

Plan Sevc ae tanr slto av MV 0501 H1-24630 D-11001 INTAKE

'Kg8-,13A g

C C.

1 2 3 NitrogensMakeuptoUnit2InboardIsolationValve(MOV)

' K 1203 H-16000H 140 RFRI 3 I'

X41-CO09A n

VAR ON :

see note n Intake Structe Vent Fan IA 0501 H11-40159 :H-12613

INTAKEfrfl1: ::

IX41-C009B n VAR

'.ON see notena Intake StructureeVent Fanl "B

0501K K'K1140159 H-K 112613 INTA~KE 'g 1X41-COO9C n VAR K KKK ON'

'sKuee nnoenn aeStuctureVentFan IC' 0501 1-H40159 H-12613 INTAKE I X41 -NO02A 'n 0

C seenoten Intk Structu VentFan ]A Thermosta

(Subcomponent) 0501 1H-40159 1H-12613 INTAKE Notes a

• e-listed*on page*17*of 17.

K:"

K'"Mode Abbreviations: O=-Open, C-'Closeel,'VAR--Various, FýFuaciona (Nnpsta cmonenp~t)

KFor primary component I subcoreponet cross-reference, see Table 4A) -1

'K'

For primtary component / spurious actuation component crets-reference. see Table 4-A 1-3. Also, see note k.

Page 35 of 60

1TACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS 0

NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 E. L Hatch Nuclear Plant Umil Safe Shutdýw Analysis Repc Ncni

'MPL No, Not."~2' Mod, IlX4--NO02B n

O

~lX4i-NO02C n~

0 (a) Mechanical equipment to I (b) For path 1. this compoeno (c) To prevent HpC runaway (d) Requied for path 1 in fire Ls and 2 atI :::: :

Path see note n sea note n in in Dp*t Sa Hum mae of (n) 0U13 ian s rquom atimalio

Mode Abhreviations: O=Open. C=Clos

'~For primary component / subcomsponent

For primary componet / a purioun actun Page 36 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS UNIT 2 - SWEL 1 NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 Equipment List Pages Unit 2 - Base List 1 3-36 Unit 2 - SWEL 1 37-41 Unit 2 - Base List 2 42-57 Unit 2 - SWEL 2 58-60 Page 37 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Plant Hatch Unit2 SWEL-1 Plant Hatch Unit 2 SWEL-2 SWEL Revision Date:

October2_4 2012 1 4'-I.

J11 /,j Originator:

print: Mike Steele signature:

Da*e:(

U Dte.

Z Reviewer; print: J. DerwoorJ Tootle. Jr.

signature: -

Date; Ops Reviewer: pr E

Y gnature Date:

Peer Reviewer: print: Melanie H. Brown signature: &

Date:,9-2-.

-(

Peer Reviewer; print:Y-'ile.L.Nhh w-',i signature:.

Date-Peer Reviewer: print Peer Reviewer: print: cIFrdC. Sf4yrk ir slntu Date: _______

Page 38 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 NFRK-MMDA-ON 2,,: -1C -

-lWN X-

.3 177777 71777 2..77173 3777 ~

7ml I-177777300177 L-MAI

-OR I

2-77,7377-7

-773777-7077773777 877770 373707773 P007-7 77077 30737 770 781 7,777 77 737-P-73 10-37033377777 D1373-7L7 73337 3

3 0

3 7

7 37--

• 07,

-I__

7.772117787770777777777T7777707-7717717087737777I 313" 17773770 7

7011 AU3 33 0

77 7

71 P-l 37~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~

7' E77-L3 I'7073737777

-77707773707 7 7 7 777.77 777337-03777337727773 V77787 777.37._

77 2

.3...

-F 1-3A J-777 13 I*1*,H*99 ISEL11 1'

ii, -

I i

37777777033377, 1330777770 7773773177,7

__ t1 1

!77177771777

[z 373771777773-377A3 1737737 2141 I

^ i ^

^

^

Page 39 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 u

-R17"21 i -^

=11-4L X-X-x~II*nx

• -p

ýz

-'ti 14::

- I Ill I -i R i -i - i -

]ZIZL~ IZIZZIEI zi ~

~

Ir~

v I

-__ ILLA ýI a_

I I--

I-.

I -

I.

~DA~ ___ E]~I~IIIIIIIIIII ___________________EEI~EL:

Page 40 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCHQ82-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0

-~~~~~1 1-1--

-tI

-2

-2 BEALTEBE E WE LIDEEEETE N

ED B

SDLN 11 11 1-

-E

-E I

_j.GIIr

-4

-CI

-1 1

-1 11 R__ -,LBEL'EB ED--I IEIELB B

0G BL MEL ELNE ES-EL BI-L G-TEED TEE

.L.T.-

-1

-L B.LTB1 l

ETGDEEN2LNELN DE ELEBLL Z

-A LBM NELE

-T

-A-1 I

I, l.

I

-I U EL I-______

LGNL'NLRBESGWSCCISBECTNTELBLD ELGEEE B

N E

LELEE AZ AZ -

ECIE.TEE.EBENTNN.TNDEDTLBEBELGGEECI Page 41 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS UNIT 2 - BASE LIST 2 NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 Equipment List Pazes Unit 2 - Base List 1 3-36 Unit 2 - SWEL 1 37-41 Unit 2 - Base List 2 42-57 Unit 2 - SWEL 2 58-60 Page 42 of 60

AATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS 0

NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 10/25/201211:58 E,. Hatch Nuclear Plant Component Results.

1 of,14, Jn2

ý2

'2 7 2

.'10 ~2 9

2 10 2

1 '

2 j2

,B 2

9 12 Si_

.2

<J2

-23 2

'ý34 ý iZ!:::

,28 11 71 Rs7 2*ZI?

tion -

• U*U*;

a Built For in rianT use only.

Page 43 of 60

9 TACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION

.00 10/25/2012 11:58 E. 1. Hatch Nuclear Plant Componeant Reults Pasge 2 of14 Page 44 of 60

9 TACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSIOP 10/25/201211:58 E. I. Hatch Nuclear Plant ComponentResults Page3af14:

UJnitfT D

SUIi Slu

~#

Eklft~

Decr n.IpI~

Lack 2

EQ G41 F077 B-tT~]158BTEFYO B2~ 2~EQG41FO78 Built 12 GATE VALVE 03 2

EQ G41F079 Built.

WG VALVE1 INAO 1284

EQ G41F0#

Built I,

VALVE3 INAO 8.5s

-2 EQ G41Fl 8

Built 1

EMIN WTR RECYCLE TAt:

EQ G41F082

Built, I 2 UTFLYVALVE 3INAC I

87 I2 EQ 41Fm8 Built 1

1:M PWGA oVV

.2 EQ IG41FO4 a Bul-t 1

w 150# BAVTERFLY AOV 2

EQa G41F08S Built2 1 2 "GATEVALVE PC

!2*

EQ G41F086 Built i

1" L

CHECKVALVE 01T 2 EG41 F087 As___

Btuilt 12 '10#BAI.LAOV 02 EQ G41FOSS aBuilt 1 2*

T150#CHECKVALVE 1

EQ 41F089

'Built I

PWG VALVE 2

EQ G41 F090 a Built 1

't GATEVALVE T'

2 EQ O

u.l.t 1

GATEVALVE 0

2 EQ G1 FOB___a Built

ýT 2

PilU VALVE 9 _2 EQ G41 F094 eBuilt 1

4-110#BUTTERPLY AOV

-1 Q

4FR Built 1

I 2

M-MEVAL-V-E 9

12 EQ PG41F96Built 1

1'i GATE.VALV.E G1000_-_

2_

EQ G41 7

sBuilt 1

/2"NEEDLE VALVE i

01 2 EQ G41F098

:Bullt:

1

' /2¶NEEDLE VALVE 02-2iEQTG 1F099 Y

Built 1 L

/41500'GLOBEVLVN-12 03 o2 EQ G41 1

Fl 0 1

Built1 21/2' 1500# GLOBEVALVE 4

2 :

EQ

.41F211 Built 1

4l 150#BvERFLY VALv.

._EQ G41F212 As Built 1

G ATEVALVE L06 2

EQ G41F213 " :

s

,Bullt 1'

1 5W0#CHECKVALVE h07 2

EQ G41F214 AuIs.

K 1 2 I/2'SOLENOID;VALVE:

I2 EQ G1 F215 Bsuilft 1ý OW

)GATE VALVE SEQ G41F218 As Built 1" 2* ' PLUG*VALVE 2..AOV 110 2___

EQ G41F220 s, Buftt I *

"800 GATE VALVE "11

ýý2 EQ G41F221' Built 1

1:

ý

-150#:BUT7ERFLYVAL -

12,

'EQa G41F222 1_

.Built.

1 150#CHECKVALVE, J

1t13:i; 2*:i",! EQ; G41F223!,

al*sBuilt.":,'

1:

1:

k:

• 500# GLOBE VALVE'"

.11 2 4As Built i*15 EQ G41F224*s_

Built 1

.8" 15001 GLOBE VALVE

11i 2 _::

EQ G41F*2 Built I j A'51600#GLOBEVALVE LA 116 2

EQ G41F226 As Buit 1

.1500#GLOBEVALVE L::

I18 EQ G41F227 Built I

1**

1500# GLOBE VALVEME

.1:18:=i12 2-:: ::E0 041 F228

.Built :

I

• Zl0* L B :* ~ ':i * :

19:

2 EQ G41F229 ".

Built,

1 '2 81"00# GLO0EVALVE EQ 11 1600G1 GOBE VALVE For Internal 1-1. Hatch Nuclear Plant uae only.

Page 45 of 60

9 ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCHO82-RPT-02, VERSIOIN

.0 10/25/2012 11:58, E.

Hatch NtleatrPultnt "FComponent Results

~Page 4 of14 Unit IStatus C

D1,EditA9>

Descniption

`Lock 121 1tfl2 EQ G41F231 Built 1

RESSURE REQ VALVE

[122.' jjJ*]2 EQ 2G 41F232 Bu t~t

i*i

W I

U11 RES U

R EG -VALV E 122F.2 EQ G41 F233 Built 1 :.]

ORESSURE REG VALVE I

122

12 EQ G41F234 3 BuIlt 1

RESSURE REG VALVE:-" U 125 1, 2

EQ G41F235 Built 1

'1600#GLOBE VALVE 126 2

EQ G41F2357 Built I 1' N1500#1 GLOBE VALVE.

J

..2....

2 EQ G41F237 AsB Built I

V 1500#GLOBE.VALVE T T 128 l

2 EQ G41F239 Bult I '

'1 50011 GLOBE VALVE EQ 2

E Q G 4 1 F 2 4 0 A v.BBu llt

,A1

,B

• 2 0 0 # G A T E V A L V E 4'

2830 'IL 2 EQ f

G41F240B As'Built 1

/2' 600# GATE VALVE 2

.AEQ G41F2400 Bult.'

1 *

/2' 600#GATE VALVE.

i32 "..I2 I

EQ G 41F240D Built.1 1 /2" 800# GATE VALVE 133 2

EQ G41F240E Built I

I/2'600# GATE VALVE U

134 ii.* 2 EQ 2G41F240F;.::1

-?:.:0* :'; *'Built ;!!:::!:=,::

Ii.

; /2"600#GIATEVALVE....

[

135 2*.

2 EQ G41F240GC AS Built v,

1

/2600# GATE:VALVE r2 EQ G41F240H i

Butt7 1

t/2"600#GATEVALVE 13 2 '1[ 12 EQ G41F241A D A Built 1

12 800 1 GATE VALVE 13 3 2.

EQ G41F241B A

Bu tlt 1

_j 121 600# GATE VALVE U

394 2 "'

EQ G41F242A

• As.

Built 1

/Z '

1 600#1 GATE VALVE

< U

!240 2

2 EQ kG41F24 GB Built 1

I/2' 600#1GATEVALVE U

2 1 6 EQ G41F242C a Built I

' I12 ' 600# GATE VALVE U

142

2 2 EQ G41F242D.

Built 1

1 0 6 M G00 1 GATE VALVE E Q.2 ' #

B G 4 1 F 2 4 2 E1B 1

I / 2 " 60 0 # 1 G A TE V A L V E W44 Lj2 E

G41 2..3 Buit 1

600 IM GATE VALVENV-

• L ->2 EQ IG41 244 U2.

GATBult',

1 16 CHECK VALVE 4 8 ',, 2 EQ G 41 F260 Bi lt i, 1

'G LO BE V LV N 3B7A NV..

4 2

' EQ G41F261.

Built

'1 G4"GLOB(N 87B):NVZ4V N4 1

'.. 2 E Q G 4 1 F 26 2 A s_

B u ilt 1

6 0 GL O B CN 381) N V -4AL V

4 2.

12 E Q.G 4 1 F 2 463 A s B u lt 1

r I/2 'GL O B (N 3 8 1) N V -486 0.D G 6

0

• i _; 2:;~', "

E Q ZG 41F265 !; "q"

">',;i. 1:

.B ulLt '[*;

% 1!*i W

i I: 1 "I2

'G LO BE V A LVE (N 3 82).

1143 2"

EQ I41F268 E

'A' s Built

"]

/2'"G LOBE VALVE (N00 S) U 144

'2 E Q OG41P 267 4A Built 1

j

./2 GLOBE VALVE (N020)

U 0EQ 2 2 4

I_

Built 1

/2 'G LO BE VALVE (N 021) 1 i E Q 4 1 F 6' B u i l t G 4 I

1 G2 V L V N 0 1 2 G V -73A 105

. 2 EQ G41F270 Bu ilt 1

Y2"GLOB (N012)G V-739

15 a 2

EQ G41F271 s

Built I 1 GLOB (R020)GV-737 NV 148 2 EQ G1 F262 s Built I

1J' 4GLOB3(R022) NV4 I

O58 1 2 EQ G41F273 Built 1

1 4'G LOB(N 0B)LNV

-4735 2 ps i

]2 EQ G41F274

[As Built 1

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Page 46 of 60

9 TACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 10125/2012 11:58 E.L Hatch Nuclear Plant ConpanentResults '

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>7 Page 47 of 60

9 TACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS 0

NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 58 iRt Results Page 48 of 60

9 TACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSIONR SPage 7 of 14 10/'25/2012 11:58 E.

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Page 49 of 60

4TACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION

.00 10/212012 11:58 E.1. Hatch Nuclear Plant:

Component Results ft~~sa 9*~I Sb~i'~<

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9 TACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION

.00 10/2012 11:58 2l1. Hatch Nuclear Plant Component Results.

Page 9 of 14 Page 51 of 60

9 ACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS 10125/201211:58 NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 9

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0ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKIDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS 0

NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Page 53 of 60

9 TACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSIONOO 10/25/2012 1 I.

Page 54 of 60

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Page 55 of 60

AATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKIDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS O

NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0

-1 Page 56 of 60

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Page 57 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 1 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS UNIT 2 - SWEL 2 NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 Equipment List Pages Unit 2 - Base List 1 3-36 Unit 2 - SWEL 1 37-41 Unit 2 - Base List 2 42-57 Unit 2 - SWEL 2 58-60 Page 58 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Plant Hatch Unit 2 SWEL-1 Plant Hatch Unit 2 SWEL-2 SWEL Revision Date:

October2_4 2012 Originator:

print: Mike Steele signature; Date: L 4 /z Reviewer:

print:. Derwood Tootle, r, signature:

)'

Date:

Ops Reviewer: print&)Z?

lgna8ýý 41ntre:

Date: 1LI Peer Reviewer: print: Melanie H. Brown signature:

Date:

Peer Reviewer: print:K~deig.L.-A\\i~.w'cI signa~ture:

Date:,f Peer Reviewer: prlnt 0'd(.ij 0" e

,gnatu Date:

Peer Reviewer: print:l/t-dC. 5 frrh s

Q Date: _______

Page 59 of 60

ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS ATTACHMENT 1: SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS HATCH UNIT 2 SWEL 2 SPENT FUEL POOL RELATED ITEMS NTTF RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC WALKDOWNS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 SNCHOB2-RPT-02 Screen #3 Screen #4 Variety of types of equipment Anchorage check Major new (21 Classes Variety of environments required?

or from (50% of Column B)

Drawing Variety of replcmnt Appendix Rapid Drain-Walkdown MPL#

Description Building Elevation /

Systems equpmnt B)

Down Risk must be Location Signficance deferred?

Reference Hydraulic (i.e. outage) lines connected to the SFP and the equipment Not connected to Clans #

Subeerged Submerged Other Yes No those lines 1 2G41-FO54 CST MAKE-UP SPLY ISO AOV U2 RX 185RHR18 H-26121, H-26039 2G41 7

X X

In.

2 1P52-AO01 ESS AIR ACC U2 RX 130RERDS H-16933, H-16252 1P52 21 I

I n.

3 4

S 6

7 8

9 10 Notes:

1) Drawings H-10018 and H-10196 list all system codes.

Preparer Reviewer Reactor Operator Review Peer Reviewer Peer Reviewer Peer Reviewer Date:

Date:

Date:

Date:

Date:

Date:

Page 60 of 60

ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION. 1.0 ATTACHMENT 2 UNIT 2 - PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 Page 1 of 3

ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION. 1.0 Sheet 1 of 2 Peer Review Checklist for SWEL For Hatch Unit 2 Instructions for Completing Checklist This peer review checklist may be used to document the review of the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) in accordance with Section 6: Peer Review. The space below each question in this checklist should be used to describe any findings identified during the peer review process and how the SWEL may have changed to address those findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

1. Were the five safety functions adequately represented in the SWEL 1 selection?

YN NEil SWEL 1 for Hatch Unit 2 meets the requirements of having 90 to 120 items and addresses all five safety functions. Many components provide safetyfunctionsfor multiple systems, and/or are part offrontline support systems. Allfive safety functions discussed in EPRI Report 1025286 are well represented in the SWEL 1.

2. Does SWEL I include an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes:

a. Various types of systems?

YN N[1 Items included on the SWEL comprise a variety of systems such as Emergency Diesel Generators and Auxiliaries, Service Water System, Component Cooling Water System, Automatic Depressurization, Residual Heat Removal System, Vital A/C and D/C systems.

b. Major new and replacement equipment?

YZ NEi New and replacement components are identified in SWEL 1.

c. Various types of equipment?

YZ NEI SWEL I includes at least one example of each of the 21 classes of equipment.

In general, the number of components in each class is proportional to the number of safety-related components of that class in the plant as a whole, except that the number of in-line valves is proportionally smaller than anchored equipment.

Anchored equipment is more vulnerable to seismic loads.

d. Various environments?

Y[

Nil The SWEL contains components in mild, harsh, and outdoor environments. The components are located in different buildings, rooms, and/or on different building elevations. The SWEL also includes components located inside primary containment.

e. Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE (or equivalent) program?

YN NEil The SWEL included equipment that had been modified as a result of the IPEEE program. Section 5 and Attachment 5 of the submittal report provides information on resolution of the IPEEE findings. The SWEL and individual component checklists provide information about the IPEEE modifications and verification of modification incorporation.

Page 2 of 3

ATTACHMENT 2: PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL 1 AND 2 NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION. 1.0 Sheet 2 of 2 Peer Review Checklist for SWEL For Hatch Unit 2

f. Were risk insights considered in the development of SWEL 1?

YN NE]

SWEL I includes high risk components based on risk significance in the plant probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models. Section 6 of the submittal report discusses the risk insights used for SWEL development.

3. For SWEL 2:

a. Were spent fuel pool related items considered, and if applicable included in YN NWI SWEL 2?

SWEL 2 includes components associated with maintaining seals around the SFP gates, which are Seismic Category I components.

b. Was an appropriate justification documented for spent fuel pool related items not YN NWI included in SWEL 2?

Section 6.2 of the submittal report provides the justification for excluding items on SWEL 2. There were no components identified that could contribute to rapid SFP drain down. Note that there were no new/replacement equipment in SWEL 2 because there have been no major modifications to the Spent Fuel Pool systems that would have affected equipment that meets the screening requirements to be included on SWEL 2. Equipment associated with cooling of the SFP is located in locked areas (due to radiation) and is not suitable for a Walkdown.

4. Provide any other comments related to the peer review of the SWELs.

The peer review team reviewed the initial SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 and provided comments and suggestions for enhancement of the SWELs. Comments included suggestions to include additional electrical components and more equipment mounted to the structure, since such equipment has shown more potential to be adversely impacted by seismic loads than in-line mounted components. In addition, comments were made suggesting that certain equipment classes contain more components and that explanations be provided for not including certain equipment (e. g. there are no safety-related or Seismic Category I components in that equipment class installed in the plant). The peer reviewers ensured that the SWELs met the requirements of EPRI Report 1025286. Changes deemed necessary during the walkdown due to inaccessibility were reviewed by the peer reviewers to ensure that the changes did not impact the level of compliance to the EPRI report. The final SWEL meets all requirements of EPRI Report 1025286.

5. Have all peer review comments been adequately addressed in the final SWEL?

YM NW-(

b¢~/

,//

/V/

Peer Reviewer #1: Robert Ashworth i"

Peer Reviewer #2: Melanie Brown Date:

11/06/2012 Date:

1110612012 Page 3 of 3

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 ATTACHMENT 3 UNIT 2 - SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS (SWCs)

NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 Note: A partial walkdown was performed for the following components. The checklists for these components are included in this attachment. These components are energized cabinets which could not be opened for inspection during the initial walkdown. Therefore, a second walkdown is planned and scheduled for these components as stated in Section 7 of the Report (SNCH082-RPT-02).

Partial Walkdown Performed Item No.

Description Remaining Walkdown Schedule for Scope / CR Completion 1

2R24-SO1 1 600V MCC 2C ESS DIV 1 Internal of panel 2R22 2

2R24-S022 125/250V DC MCC 2B ESS DIV 2 Internal of panel 2R22 3

2P33-H2/02 ANALYZER SAMPLE Internal of panel 2R22 1300B1B CHILLER Page 1 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet I of 4 Status:, Y[],: NE] UN Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2R24-S011 Equip. Class, Equipment Description 600 V MCC 2C ESS Division I Location: Bldg. REACTOR Floor El. 130 Room, Area 107A Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Allis Chalmers Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questionsmay be-used to record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space isprovided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 51.0% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

YN NO

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

MCC is bolted to a base rail channel, which is welded to embedded steel on a concrete pad. See SEWS package dated 02/16/1994. MCC plates at south side were opened per work order SNC427039 to view welds. Welds located on inside of MCC of the south side were inaccessible and unable to be viewed. All: other'anchorage was determined to be consistent with anchorage configuration.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

See response to question 2.

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistentwith plant documentation?

(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

See response to question 2.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

See response to question 2.

This component has been inspected to the extent practical. However, to complete the inspection, the component must be opened. Due to personnel and plant safety issues, this action must be deferred until the component is accessible.

1 Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

YE NE UI0 N/AE YE NEI U0. N/AE YZ NEl UE N/AE' YE NE U0 N/AE YE] NE UN Page 2 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 4 Status: Y[1 NEI u!

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2R24-S011 Equip. ClassL Equipment Description 600 V MCC 2C ESS Division 1.

Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

YN NEI U N/AE

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Y!

No UI-I N/A]

,and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do. attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

YZ NEI UE' N/AE YN NE UE Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YN NEI UE-adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added, as necessary)

None.

Evaluated by: Juan Vizcava Patrick Kelly Date: 09/07/20,12 09/07/2012 Page 3 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 3 Of 4 Status: YEI NE] U[

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2R24-SO1 1 Equip. Class, I Equipment Description 600 V MCC 2C ESS Division 1 Photographs 1: Equipment MPL# (2R24-S01 1)

Page 4 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 4 of 4 2: Equipment Elevation (2R24-S01 1)

Page 5 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 1 of 4 Status: YN NE] u[]

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2R24-S022 Equip. Classi 1 Equipment Description 125/250V DC MCC 2B ESS DIV 2 Location: Bldg. REACTOR Floor El. 130 Room, Area RIO7A Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space. is provided at the end of this checklist for docum enting other comments.

Anchorage I, Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2, Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

There is a bolted connection in frame 7 that is not fully tightened and' slightly bent (see photograph 2). CR516767 has been written to address to bent bolt. MCC base panels were opened to view anchorage per work order SNC427042.

This MCC is composed of 10 frames which are bolted down in each corner, so there are 4 bolts for each frame: in addition to the frames being bolted to each other. This bolt misalignment occurs on one of the bolts of Frame 7 which is an internal frame. As such, by engineering judgment it is determined that having one bolt out of the total 40 not properly tightened, the MCC would still be adequate to maintain its integrity during a seismic event.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that, is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5.. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?

(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Anchorage is consistent as detailed in calculation SCNH-11-058, version 1. 0.

6. Based on the above anchorage:evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

See response to question. 2.

This component has been inspected to the extent practical. However, to complete the inspection, the component must be opened. Due to personnel and plant safety issues, this action must be deferred until the component is accessible.

Y0 NEI Y0 NO UE-N/A[l Y1 NEI UE-N/AE-YE NEI, Url N/A0l YI NEI UE-N/AEl Y0Z NEI UE]

I Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

Page 6 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 4 Status: YZ NE] U[]

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

EquipmentlID No. 2R24-S022 Equip. Class, I Equipment Description 1251250V DC MCC 2B ESS DIV 2 Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

YS NO U-N/AEJ

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YN NiO ULI N/AO-and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the' equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Y0 NEI U-N/AO YN NEI U-Other Adverse Conditions 11., Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YO NEI U-adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

See 2S I1-S009 Seismic Walkdown Checklist for Area Walkby Checklist information.

Evaluated by:,Juan: Vizcava A

Date: 09/10/2012 09/10/2012 Patrick Kelly Page 7 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2R24-S022 Equip. Class' I Equipment Description 125/250V DC MCC 2B ESS DIV 2 NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 3 of 4 Status: Y[

Nn U-]

Photographs 1: Equipment MPL# (2R24-S022)

Page 8 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 4 of 4 2: Slightly Bent Bolt at Base of MCC to Channel Connection (2R24-S022)

Page 9 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 1.of 6 Status: YX ND] Ut--]

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2R11-S004 Equip. Class' 3 Equipment Description 45KVA 60041201208V PWR XFMR Location: Bldg. DIESEL Floor'El. 130 Room, Area SWITCHGEAR ROOM 2E Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional.but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments, and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage 1, Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

Transformer is supported with anchor bolts on east side and three (3)-

3" long welds on the west side. Base rails exhibits slight bending on both sides (see photograph 3). This is not considered to a seismic concern as the gap at the bent location is small and the gaps are not present at weld or bolt locations.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?

(Note: This question. only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Weld installation is not consistent with that designed in calculation SCNH-99-001, Rev. 0. There are three (3) welds that are approximately 3" long and spaced at 10" center to center of the ends welds. The calculation designs for two (2) welds, 3"long, and spaced at 12" center to center. The, current installed configuration of welds increases the capacity of the anchorage compared to that designed.

Therefore, the anchorage is judged to be seismically adequate.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

See response to questions 2 and 5.

This component has been inspected to the extent practical. All visible anchors, hardware and surfaces were inspected. The, anchorage for this item is visible without opening the component.

To inspect the component further would require disassembly. Since the anchorage is-visible, the inspection meets the requirements of the guidance document.

Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

YZ NiO Y9 NO] UI N/A!]

YE NiO U!' N/AL]

YN NEI UO N/AU YZ NEI UL N/AlO Y

Ni U-1 Page 10 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 6 Status: YZ NF-] U[--

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2Rl1-SO04 Equip. Class' 3 Equipment Description 45KVA 600-120/208V PWR XFMR Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

YN Nn U1-N/A[:D

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Y10 NO Ul' N/AD and inasonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic intcraction effects?

YEK ND U1-N/AU Y

NOI U" Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YZ ND U1' adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Flex conduit 2E13 740 is in contact with the top southeast corner of the transformer (see photograph. 4). The conduit is flexible and the cables will not be damaged. This is not considered a seismic concern.

Comments (Additional pages may be added as~necessary)

None.

Evaluated by: Juan Vizcava L/-

9464 -ý-- ----

Date: 09/24/2012.

09/24/2012 Patrirk K/lly Page 11 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 3 of 6 Status: YZ N[:- UM Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2R11-SO04 Equip. Classi 3 Equipment Description 45KVA 600-120/208V PWR XFMR Photographs 1: Equipment MPL# (2R1 1-S004)

Page 12 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 4 of 6 2: Equipment Elevation (2R 1I -S004) 0 Page 13 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCHO82-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Q~atc nf A 3: Bent Base Rail (2R1 1-S004)

Page 14 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 4: Conduit 2E1 3740 in Contact with Transformer (2R1 1 -S004)

Page 15 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 1 of 5 Status: YM Nil U--

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2Rll-S041 Equip. Classý Equipment Description 600-120/208 V Essential Transf Location: Bldg. CONTROL Floor El. 130 Room, Area 2L48-C34 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?

(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

SEWS Package 2R1]-S041 (dated 2-16-94)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

This component has been inspected to the extent practical. All visible anchors, hardware and surfaces were inspected. The anchorage for this item is visible without opening the component.

To inspect the component further would require disassembly. Since the anchorage is visible, the inspection meets the requirements of the guidance document.

'Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

YZ NEI UW-N/A[

YN NF-U-- N/AF-1 Y[

NW UFW N/AW YZ NEI UW-1 N/AW Y[

N[-] U[-]

Page 16 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 5 Status: YZ N[Rh U[r]

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2R1 I-S041.

Equip. Class" 4 Equipment Description 600-4206208 V Essential Transformer Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

YV NO Un N/A[]

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Y$

NOIý XN!A and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

Masonry block walls in area verified as seismically qualified per Calculation SNC-85-084 Rev. 4.

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

YX NOI UO N/AO:

YZ NO UO Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YR NO Ur" adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

There are four holes, in the front of the transformer case, two on either side, that do not have screws in them. From inspection; it is clear that the holes provide options for attachment of the front case. The, front panel screws:are allpresent and no screws are missing, so there is no potentially adverse seismic condition.

Evaluated by: John McFarland Jeff Horton,_______

Date: 09/18/2012 09/1&/2012 Page 17 of 394

00 CD CD CD a

z 0

C/)

CA (3

3 0

0 a-0 C,

(3 C,

(A 0

m z

Cl) m Cl) 0 0

z m

C/)

CD 0

CA)

C.

z 0

Fl 0 cn z0 C/)

z 0

0OD C) m C/)

0 z

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 4 of 5 Figure 2 - Equipment Elevation (2R1I -S041)

Page 19 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 5 of 5 Figure 3 -Holes in Transformer Case (2R1 l-S041)

Page 20 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 1 of 4 Status: Y2 N[-] U[-]

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2S11-S009 Equip. Class' 4 Equipment Description 4160/600V225KVA XFMR Location: Bldg. CONTROL Floor El. 130 Room, Area SWITCHGEAR ROOM2F Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional spaceis provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the.50% of SWEL'items requiring such verification)?

YZ NO

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

Welded connection to embedded channel as recommended by calculation SNCH-90-048, Rev.. 1.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the: anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near. theanchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?

(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verificationis required.)

The anchorage configuration is consistent with calculation SNCH 048, Rev. 1.

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

This component has been inspected to the extent practical. All visible anchors, hardware and surfaces were inspected. The anchorage for this item is visible without opening the component.

To inspect the component further wouldrequire disassembly. Since the anchorage is visible, the inspection meets the requirements of the guidance document.

Y0 NE UI-N/At YZ NEI Ut N/AL YED NEI Ut-N/At]

Y0 NEI Ut] N/At Y23 NE] Ut]

Enter the equipment class name from.Appendix. B Classes of Equipment.

Page 21 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 4.

Status: YI N[-] U[-]

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2S1 1S009 Equip. Class, Equipment Description 41160/600 V225K VA XFMR Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

The 2 1/2" gap between transformer 2S 11 -S009 and the adjacent transformer 2R24-S048 is adequate.

YI NEI UE-N/AE

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YO NE, UE] N/AE and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

YZ NEI U0 N/AE1 YED NE) UIl Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YZ NEI UE-adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

None.

Evaluated by: Juan VizcavI Patrick Kelly Date: 09/12/2012 09/12/2012 Page 22 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2S1 1-S009 Equip. Class' 4 Equipment Description 4160/600V225KVA XFMR NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 3 of 4 Status: YE NO] Ur]

Photographs 1: Equipment MPL # (2S I1-S009)

Page 23 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 4 of 4 2: Equipment Elevation (2S 11-S009)

Page 24 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 1 of 4 Status: YN N-] U[-

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2S1l-S012 Equip. Class, 4 Equipment Description 4160/600V 75K.VA XFMR Location: Bldg. DIESEL Floor El. ý130 Room, Area: SWITCHGEAR ROOM 2F Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to documentrthe results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist.for documenting other comments.

Anchorage,

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

YEI NE

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

Equipment's rail channels are welded at base.

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more, than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?

(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

This component has been inspected to the extent practical. All visible anchors, hardware and surfaces were inspected. The anchorage for this item is visible without opening the component.

To inspect the component further would require disassembly. Since the anchorage is visible, the inspection meets the requirements of the guidance document.

'Enter the equipment class name from, Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

YN NEI UV-l N/Al YZ NE UE N/AO Y23 NE U(I N/Arl YE NE U-N/A9 YI NO U-Page 25 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

NO. SNCHO82-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 Of 4 Status: YN NEI-U-'

Equipment ID No, 2S11-SO12 Equip. Class' 4 Equipment Description 4160/600,V 75KVA XFMR Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

The approximately 3 1/4 inch gap between this equipment and equipment 2S 1 -S009 is adequate.

Y2 NEI U-' N/A[

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Y[9 No UO' N/AO and masonry block Walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above, seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse, seismic interaction effects?

YZ NOI UO N/A-YS ND UD Other-Adverse Conditions 11., Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YER NOI UO adversely affect the safety functions, of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

See 2S 11-S009 Seismic Walkdown Checklist for Area. Walkby Checklist information.

Date: 09/12112 Page 26 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKiDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 3 of 4 Status: YZ Nn-U0-Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No.

2S1 I-S012 Equip. Class'_ 4 Equipment Description 41601600 V 75K VA XFMR Page 27 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 4 of 4 2: Equipment Elevation (2S 11-SO 12)

Page 28 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 1 of 5 Status: YN NE] U0-Equipment ID NO. 2E41:-CO01 Equip, Class' 5 Equipment Description HPCI Main Location:- Bldg. REACTOR Floor El. 87 Room, Area HPCI Room Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may. be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage 1, Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the.item one of the 50% of SWEL items, requiring such verification)?

YVR NO

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion, that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible.cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is: the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?

(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Drawing 2F-1519 Rev. 0 (Byron Jackson Drawing)

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free. of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

YZ NEI UEJ N/A[]

YO NEI U[-

N/AEl Y0 NEI UJE N/AE]

Y0 NEI U-I N/AEi Y23 NQ UE-Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

Page 29 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 5 Status: Y[

NE] U[]

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2E4.1-CO01 Equip. Class' Equipment Description HPCI Main Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

Y0I NE] U-' N/AE"

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YZ NE] UMI N/Ar-and masonry, block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?.

Y9 NEI UE] N/A[]

YJ NE-I UE1 Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YER NEi UE]

adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

There is a:rollof duct tape stuck to the top of a conduit Support above 2E41-F025, adjacent to the pump. The roll of tape is very light and is not near any sensitive equipment., Therefore, there is no potentially adverse seismic condition.

Comments (Additional pages,may be added as necessary)

None Evaluated by: John McFarland.

Jeff Horton Z

7 Date: 09/11/2012 09/11/2012 Page 30 of 394

C 0

-I0

t.

0 o*

(D CA) 0

~12 ICA Cl,

>H z

Cl, 0.

0 0

a z

0 Cl) z0 0OD 0

f-t Z w z

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 4 of 5 Figure 2 - Equipment Elevation (2E4 1-C001)

Page 32 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Of 5 Figure 3 - Duct Tape on Conduit Support (2E41-COO1)

Page 33 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 1 of 3 Status: YZ N[-

ULI Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2E51-C0.01 Equip. Class!

Equipment Description RCIC PUMP Location: Bldg. REACTOR Floor El. 87 Room, Area NWDiagonal Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for:Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used, to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one YZI Nil]

of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

2. Is the, anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in'the concretenear theanchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?

(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Anchorage was compared against Drawing H-25016 Rev. 7.

6. Based on the above, anchorage evaluations, is the. anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

YZ NEI U-1 N/All Y0 NE] UEl N/Al YED Nil Url] N/Ar1 YN NEI Ur-N/AE-]

YN NEI ULE

'Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

Page 34 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 3 Status: YZ NE] U[]

SeismictWalkdown Checklist(SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2E51-C001 Equip. Class, 5 Equipment Description RCIC PUMP Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

YN Nn UE-N/Al0

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, YN NEil U-] N/AL]

and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

YN NEl UE] N/A[]

YN NEl UE]

Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked. for and found no other seismic conditions that could YZ NEl U-]

adversely affect the, safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added asnecessary)

None.

Evaluated by:

KURSATINALIDate:

9/24/201:2 WESLEY WILLIAMS 9/24/2012 Page 35 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2E51-C001 Equip. Class, 5 Equipment Description RCIC PUMP NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 3 of 3 Status: YN NEI U[

Photographs Page 36 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 1 of 6 Status: YN N[E UF]

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2E11-CO02A....

Equip. Class, Equipment Description RHR Pump 2A Location: Bldg. REACTOR F10or'El. 87 Room, Area NE Diagonal Manufacturer, Model,. Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWELitems requiring such verification)?

YN. NEI

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near theanchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?

(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage: configuration verification is required.)

Drawing H25019 and Calculation SCNH-91-045 Rev. 1

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Y0 NEI UrI N/AO Y0 NEI UE-N/AU' Y23 NE UE-N/AU3 YZ NEI UI-N/AZ Y2 NEI Uil Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

Page 37 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1,0 Sheet 2 of 6 Status: YJ NEI U[]

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2E l-COO2A Equip. Classi 56 Equipment Description. RHR PumP 2A Interaction-Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

YN NE] UL-N/AL]

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, Y21 NE] U[-1 N/A[]

and masonry block walls not likely to collapse onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

YZ NEI UIE] N/AL YN NOI Ui Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YN NE'] U-]

adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

There are four holes drilled in the building steel that do not have bolts in them. They appear to be for a support that was later removed or never installed, so there are no missing bolts for nearby equipment.

Therefore, there is no potentially adverse seismic condition.

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

See Component 2E11-FOO4A for Area Walk-by Checklist.

There is a small FME lanyard that was found lying on the floor next to the pump. The lanyard is very light and not near any sensitive equipment, so there is no potentially adverse seismic condition.

o-4 Evaluated by: John McFarland.

Jeff Horton Date: 09/24/2012 09/24/2012 Page 38 of 394

0 It 51 i3 z.pni C)

CO) 0 (D

0 rid CD tr1

-2 c,,

Li~

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 4 of 6 Figure 2 -L Equipment Elevation (2E, I-CO02A)

Page 40 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 5 of 6 Figure 3 - Empty Holes in Building Steel (2EII -C002A)

Page 41 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 6 of 6 Figure 4 - Lanyard on Floor (2F1 I-CO02A)

Page 42 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 1 of 4 Status: Y[

Ni-] U[]

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2E21-COOIB

. Equip. Class, Equipment Description Core Spray Pump 2B Location: Bldg. REACTOR Floor El. 87 Room, Area SE Diagonal Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklistmay be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results of judgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

YZ NEI

2. Is the anchorage free of bent, broken, missing or loose hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent with plant documentation?

(Note: This question Only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Drawing H-25019 Rev. 5

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

YZ NEI UL] N/AL]

YZ NEI UL-N/AZ YZ Nil UL) N/AZl YZ NEI U[] N/AZl YZ NEI UE-

'Enter the equipment class name. from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

Page 43 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 4 Status: Y[

Nn] U[i]

Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2E21-COO1B Equip. Class' 5 Equipment Description Core Spray Pump 28 Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse:onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines have adequate flexibility to avoid damage?

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free:

of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

YZ NEI U[] N/A[)

Y0 NEI UF' N/AOj Y0 NEI UI-I N/AE]

Y0 NEI UEI Other Adverse Conditions i1. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could YZ N[l UO]

adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

None Evaluated by: John McFarland Jeff Horton 4

I Date: 09/112012 0911112012 Page 44 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKIDOWN CHECKLISTS Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

Equipment ID No. 2E21I-COO 1B Equip. Class, Equipment Description Core Spray Pump 2B NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 3 of 4 Status: YN NM UI']

Photographs Figure 1 - Equipment ID No (2E21-COO1B)

Page 45 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 4 of 4 Figure 2 - Equipment Elevation (2E2 I-COOI B)

Page 46 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 1 of 6 Status: Y[

NEI] U[-

Equipment ID No. 2C41-C001A Equip. Class' 5 Equipment Description SBLC Injection Pump 2A Location: Bldg. CONTROL Floor El. 203 Room, Area RH-R23 Manufacturer, Model, Etc. (optional but recommended)

Instructions for Completing Checklist This checklist may be used to document the results of the Seismic Walkdown of an item of equipment on the SWEL. The space below each of the following questions may be used to record the results ofjudgments and findings. Additional space is provided at the end of this checklist for documenting other comments.

Anchorage

1. Is the anchorage configuration verification required (i.e., is the item one of the 50% of SWEL items requiring such verification)?

YZ NEl

2. Is the anchorage free of bent,. broken, missing or loose~hardware?

3. Is the anchorage free of corrosion that is more than mild surface oxidation?

4. Is the anchorage free of visible cracks in the concrete near the anchors?

5. Is the anchorage configuration consistent-with plant documentation?

(Note: This question only applies if the item is one of the 50% for which an anchorage configuration verification is required.)

Drawing H-25503 Rev. 4

6. Based on the above anchorage evaluations, is the anchorage free of potentially adverse seismic conditions?

Y0 NEI] U[J N/AO.

YN NO UFI N/AL-YZ NOI ULI N/A-Y9 NO-UL-N/A[-

Y23 NEl UL I Enter the equipment class name from Appendix B: Classes of Equipment.

Page 47 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC)

NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 2 of 6 Status: Ytg Nn ul-Equipment ID No. 2C41-C001A Equip. Class' Equipment Description SBLC Iniection Purnp 2A Interaction Effects

7. Are soft targets free from impact by nearby equipment or'structures?

8. Are overhead equipment, distribution systems, ceiling tiles and lighting, and masonry block walls not likely to collapse: onto the equipment?

9. Do attached lines haveadequate flexibility to avoid damage?

There is a section offlex conduit between the injection pump and: a conduit support with limited slack. The pump is rigidly attached to the floor and has a low center of gravity, and the conduit support is rigidly attached to the floor. Therefore, there will not be much differential movement between the two ends of the flex conduit. The existing slack isjudge to be sufficient for the very small differential movement, so there is no potentially adverse seismic condition.

10. Based on the above seismic interaction evaluations, is equipment free of potentially adverse seismic interaction effects?

Y9 NEI U-N/AU YN NEI UE-N/A-I Y!

NO U-N/AU Y* Nl UI Other Adverse Conditions

11. Have you looked for and found no other seismic conditions that could Y9 NEI U-adversely affect the safety functions of the equipment?

There are several threaded holes in the pumpframe that do not have anchor bolts. Based on a review of the frame and Drawing H-25503 Rev. 4, it is determined that the holes are for lifting lugs, and that no anchors are missing. Therefore, there is no potentially adverse seismic condition.

Comments (Additional pages may be added as necessary)

See Component 2C41-A 001 for Area Walk-by Checklist.

Evaluated by: John nd-an Jeff Horton Date: 09/25/2012 09/25/2012 Page 48 of 394

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ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 4 of 6 Figure 2 - Equipment Elevation (2C41-COO IA)

Page 50 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 5 of 6 Figure 3 - Flex Conduit with Limited Slack (2C41-COOIA)

Page 51 of 394

ATTACHMENT 3: SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS NO. SNCH082-RPT-02, VERSION 1.0 Sheet 6 of 6 Figure 4 - Holes for Lifting Lugs (2C4 I -C001 A)

Page 52 of 394