NL-12-2269, SNCH082-RPT-02, Ver. 1.0, Edwin I. Hatch Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Part 1 of 11

SNCH082-RPT-02, Ver. 1.0, Edwin I. Hatch Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, Part 1 of 11

ML12355A637
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	11/26/2012
From:	Stewart W Southern Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NL-12-2269 SNCH082-RPT-02, Ver. 1.0
Download: ML12355A637 (64)

Text

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant -Unit 2 Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdown Report Requested by NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, dated March 12. 2012 Enclosure 1 Hatch Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 PROJECT REPORT VERSION 1.0 COVER SHEET Page I of 60 Edwin L Hatch Unit 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT, RER SNC425082 For Resolution of Fukusbima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic Prepared by: Reviewed by: 65rý ,Vf4S5Ps14?Ww~tr Date: Winston Stewart*0R0 IrkeCrd 1J, Ix-,__ ePigIcA KLLJ Date:/1- 20,/2 it So 1Z//-7 -zi / .-L I " Patrick Kelly peA 116t&Co Approved by:. (ENERCON)Project Manawgr or Designee Date:: Bill Heome Approved by: (SNc)Tedwica Lead or Designee Pea Review Team Leadr Approved by: (SNC)-Melanie Brown David Whitman Date: Date: Project Mosaga or Desigme HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 2 OF 60 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE

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4 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH ...................

5 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS

SUMMARY

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6 3.1 DESIGN BASIS EARTHQUAKE

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6 3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND METHODS ......................................................

8 4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS

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9 4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES

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10 4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES

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12 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING

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19 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT

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20 6.1 DEVELOPM EN T OF SW EL 1 ........................................................................................

20 6.2 DEVELOPM EN T OF SW EL 2 ........................................................................................

23 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS ......................................................

25 7.1 IN A C C ESSIB LE ITEM S .................................................................................................

27 8.0 R E SU LT S ..................................................................................................................................

32 8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS

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32 8.2 EQUIPM EN T OPERA BILITY ........................................................................................

52 8.3 PLA N T C H A N G E S ..............................................................................................................

52 8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS

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52 9.0 PEER RE V IEW ........................................................................................................................

53 9.1 PEER REV IEW PRO CESS .............................................................................................

53 9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS

SUMMARY

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53 10.0 R EFEREN CES .........................................................................................................................

58 11.0 ATTACH M ENTS .....................................................................................................................

60 HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 3 OF 60 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

The Seismic Walkdowns at Hatch Unit 2 in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012,"Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" are not complete as all items on the SWEL have not been accessible.

A supplementary report will be required.

The walkdowns are being performed using the methodology outlined in the NRC endorsed "Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" (EPRI Report number 1025286).Plant Hatch Unit 2 had no significant degraded, non-conforming or unanalyzed conditions that warranted modification to the plant. Plant Hatch Unit 2 had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 4 OF 60 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE The objective of this report is to document the results of the Seismic Walkdowns at E. I. Hatch Unit 2 in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic" (Reference 10.1).The Seismic Walkdowns followed the guidance contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), which was endorsed by the NRC on May 31, 2012. The scope of the walkdowns was to identify potentially degraded, unanalyzed, or nonconforming conditions relative to the seismic licensing basis.The 2.3: Seismic Walkdowns for Hatch Unit 2 are not complete as all items on the SWEL have not been accessible.

A supplementary report will be required.

This report documents the findings from all Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys completed to date.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 5 OF 60 2.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH The requirements of the 50.54(f) Letter are satisfied by application of and compliance with the NRC endorsed methodology provided in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). In accordance with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), the following topics are addressed in this report:* Documentation of the seismic licensing basis for the SSCs in the plant (Section 3.0);" Assignment of appropriately qualified personnel (Section 4.0);* Reporting of actions taken to reduce/eliminate seismic vulnerabilities identified by the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) program (Section 5.0);* Selection of SSCs to be inspected in the plant (Section 6.0);* Performance of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys (Section 7.0);* Evaluation of potentially adverse seismic conditions with respect to the seismic licensing bases (Section 8.0); and" Performance of Peer Reviews (Section 9.0).While the Seismic Walkdowns were in progress at Hatch Unit 2, supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse conditions was received on September 18, 2012. This required the opening of cabinets, electrical boxes, and switchgear to inspect the internals for potentially adverse seismic conditions, even when opening the components was not required to inspect the anchorage.

Implementation of the supplemental guidance was incorporated into the walkdowns by first identifying the affected components.

During the Seismic Walkdowns of Hatch Unit 2, electrical cabinets (where no extensive disassembly was required) were opened to inspect the cabinet internals for mounting of internal components, inspect the condition of fasteners of adjacent cabinets, and confirm the absence of any other adverse seismic conditions.

The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWE) followed the supplemental guidance for all cabinets that were accessible during plant operation, even where opening the cabinets was not required to inspect the anchorage.

However, some that could not be opened (due to personnel safety or due to the sensitivity of the equipment) were scheduled during an outage to have the component doors opened.Section 7.0 identifies cabinets that were inaccessible for internal inspections.

Table 7-1 and Table 7-2 provide the schedule to complete the cabinet internal inspections.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 6 OF 60 3.0 SEISMIC LICENSING BASIS

SUMMARY

This section provides a summary of the licensing bases for the Seismic Category I Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) in the plant. It includes a discussion of the Design Basis Earthquake (DBE)and the codes and standards used in the design of the Seismic Category I SSCs for meeting the plant-specific seismic licensing basis requirements.

3.1 DESIGN BASIS EARTHQUAKE The plant site geologic and seismologic investigations are covered in Section 2.5 of the Hatch Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). Based on this data, the peak ground accelerations for the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) (referred to as the Design Basis Earthquake

-DBE) and Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) are established as 0.15 g and 0.08 g, respectively, as discussed in subsection 2.5.2 of the Hatch Unit 2 FSAR (Reference 10.7).The basic description of the earthquake is provided by spectrum response curves. Separate curves are used for the OBE of 0.08 g horizontal acceleration and the DBE of 0.15 g horizontal acceleration.

The spectrum response curves are provided in FSAR, Figures 3.7A-1 and 3.7A-2 for OBE and DBE respectively.

The response of the structure to the earthquake is obtained by using the spectrum response technique.

Appropriate response levels are read from the earthquake spectrum curve corresponding to the natural frequencies of the structure.

During the original design of Plant Hatch a set of seismic response spectra was developed by GE using the modified El Centro earthquake ground motion, as discussed in the Hatch Unit 2 FSAR, Section 3.7A (Reference 10.7).In 1984 another set of spectra was generated to correct a broadening error found in the original spectra.The 1984 spectra were generated using the artificial time histories that more closely enveloped the ground spectra. These are the Seismic Floor Response Spectra of Record (FRS of Record).In 1989 a Seismic Margins Assessment (SMA) was performed in part to resolve the errors in peak broadening and soil velocity found in the 1984 spectra. The effect of the soil velocity error is that the peak acceleration for each spectrum is shifted to a higher frequency content. Therefore, a new non-design basis set of spectra was generated using seismic margin techniques for use in the SMA. These spectra are called the Seismic Margin Earthquake (SME) spectra. The SME spectra are based on a maximum ground horizontal acceleration of 0.3 g, which is twice that of the Plant Hatch DBE (0.15 g).As a result of the SMA, the NRC concluded that the spectra used in the design of Plant Hatch resulted in a safe overall design. The NRC determined that the FRS of Record was adequate as the licensing basis spectra. As recognition of the shifting of the maximum seismic response to a higher frequency, HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 7 OF 60 Southern Nuclear elected to consider the SME spectra, factored by 1/22 to account for the increased ground input, in conjunction with the design basis earthquake (DBE) for all designs. This practice results in a seismic demand that is more conservative than that which would result from a corrected FRS, but avoids a license revision.

The NRC agreed with this approach and the NRC also agreed that the SME spectra, when reduced by a factor of one-half (V2 SME), best approximates current seismic regulatory requirements for Plant Hatch.POWER GENERATION DESIGN BASES Seismic Category I systems, structures and components are designed so that stresses remain within normal code allowable limits during the OBE and to ensure that they will perform their safety-related functions during and/or after a DBE.MAJOR COMPONENT DESIGN BASES The horizontal and vertical OBE and DBE in-structure response spectra curves form the basis for the seismic qualification and design of Category I SSCs and for demonstrating the structural integrity of Seismic Category 2 SSCs, where required.

In addition, systems running between structures shall be designed to withstand the seismic relative displacements.

The seismic analysis of safety related systems, equipment, and components is generally based on the response spectra method. Alternatively, Seismic Category I equipment is analyzed using the methodology based on earthquake experience data developed by the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) and documented in the Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP), Revision 2, plus any addition to the GIP reviewed and accepted by the NRC for resolving Unresolved Safety Issue A-46 in response to NRC Generic Letter 87-02. The SQUG GIP may be used to verify the seismic adequacy of currently installed equipment after the equipment has been walked down and any outliers resolved.New and replacement equipment within the scope of the GIP may also be seismically qualified using the same SQUG methodology.

This alternative method is acceptable where no specific NRC commitment to use IEEE 344-1975 has been made.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 8 OF 60 3.2 DESIGN CODES, STANDARDS, AND METHODS An extensive list of design codes, standards, methods, studies and tests utilized for seismic design is provided in the FSAR (Reference 10.7). Examples of the pertinent codes, standards, and methods used for the design of Seismic Category I structures, systems and components is provided here:* USAS B31.1, Code for Power Pressure Piping, 1967 Edition* USAS B31.7, Nuclear Power Piping, 1969 Edition* 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 2, "Design Basis for Protection Against Natural Phenomena"* IEEE 323-1971, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations* IEEE 323-1974, Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations* IEEE 344-1971, IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generation Stations* IEEE 344-1975, IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generation Stations 0 NRC Generic Letter 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment In Operating Reactors (USI A-46)0 Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Plant Equipment, Revision 2, Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG)* American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC), 7 th Edition HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 9 OF 60 4.0 PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS Table 4-1 identifies the project team members and their project responsibilities per EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Table 4-2 identifies the Peer Review Team members and responsibilities.

Section 4.1 provides an overview of the project responsibilities.

Section 4.2 includes brief experience summaries for all project personnel in alphabetical order.Table 4-1 Project Team Members and Responsibilities Site Equipment Seismic Licensing Name Point of Selection

/ Plant Walkdown Basis Contact IPEEE Operations Engineer Reviewer (POC) Reviewer (SWE)Warren Barr X Chris Burke X X David Edenfield X Jeffrey Horton X X Patrick Kelly X X Kursat Kinali X X Johnathon McFarland X X Michael Steele* X X X X Winston Stewart* X X James Tootle X X Juan Vizcaya X X Wesley Williams X X X Alan Wolfe X X HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE10OF60 Table 4-2 Peer Review Team Members and Responsibilities Peer SWEL Walkdown Licensing Submittal Name Review Peer Peer Basis Report TeamPer Pr Leader Reviewer Reviewers Peer Peer Leader Reviewer Reviewers Robert Ashworth*

X X X X Melanie Brown* X X X X Richard Starck* X X Kenneth Whitmore*

X X X X Notes (Table 4-1 and Table 4-2): 1)

• Indicates Seismic Capability Engineer 2) As stated in Section 7.0, all potentially adverse conditions were entered into the plant Corrective Action Program (CAP) system. However, as part of the process of entering the condition into the CAP, the SWEs made a preliminary assessment of the condition with respect to the plant licensing basis. Further licensing basis reviews were performed as discussed in Section 8.0 as part of the CAP resolution process by personnel not directly involved in the walkdowns.

4.1 OVERVIEW OF PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES The Site Point of Contact (POC) is a site engineer from Southern Nuclear that has experience with the site equipment, site procedures, plant operations, and overall personnel organization.

The site POC coordinated site access for walkdown personnel and any resources required for the walkdowns such as inspection equipment and support from plant operations.

The POC was responsible for development of the walkdown schedule and any updates to the schedule based on equipment availability.

Equipment Selection Personnel (ESP) were responsible for identifying the sample of SSCs for the Seismic Walkdowns.

The ESP have knowledge of plant operations, plant documentation, and associated SSCs. The ESP also have knowledge of the IPEEE program. For this project, site engineers and plant operations personnel participated in the equipment selection.

The ESP also performed the responsibilities of the IPEEE Reviewers.

The IPEEE Reviewers also ensured that the walkdown scope included a sample of equipment that had IPEEE seismic vulnerabilities.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 11 OF 60 Plant Operations Personnel provided detailed review of the sample of SSCs to ensure the walkdown scope included equipment located in a variety of environments, equipment in a variety of systems, and equipment accessible for a walkdown.

For the Hatch Unit 2 project, the Plant Operations Personnel were either former or currently licensed Senior Reactor Operators.

The SWEs were trained on the NTTF Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, and on the material contained in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEs who had previously completed the Seismic Walkdown Training Class developed by the SQUG were not required to complete training on the NTTF Seismic recommendations but were trained on the differences between SQUG activities and activities associated with the NTTF Seismic recommendations.

The Licensing Basis Reviewer was responsible for determining whether any potentially adverse seismic conditions identified by the SWEs met the plant seismic licensing basis. The Licensing Basis Reviewer has knowledge of and experience with the seismic licensing basis and documentation for the SSCs at Hatch Unit 2.A Peer Review Team was formed for this project to provide both oversight and review of all aspects of the walkdowns.

The Peer Review Team members have extensive experience in seismic design and qualification of structures, systems and components as well as extensive field experience.

The Peer Review Team for this project interfaced with the ESP and SWEs to ensure that the walkdown program satisfied the guidance in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE12OF60 4.2 TEAM EXPERIENCE SUMMARIES Robert Ashworth, SCE (MPR)Mr. Ashworth has more than six years of experience providing engineering solutions for a wide variety of nuclear power plant components and systems. His experience includes equipment walkdowns at industrial facilities to assess material condition, structural modeling and analyses; and seismic qualification in accordance with current industry standards for mechanical and electrical equipment in nuclear power plants. Mr. Ashworth has completed the training course for the EPRI Report 1025286 and is also a Seismic Capability Engineer (SCE) as defined in the SQUG GIP for resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46.Warren Barr (SNC)Mr. Barr is currently a Senior Plant Support Engineer at the Hatch Plant. He has over forty-three (43) years of on-site and off-site nuclear power related experience in the area of mechanical design and engineering for Southern Company nuclear units. Experience consists of new plant design, unit start-up, unit recovery, modification design and implementation, system design and operation, engineering support, outage support, maintenance support, problem resolution, vendor interface, project management, and project and group coordination and supervision.

Melanie Brown, SCE (SNC)Ms. Brown has over 31 years of experience with Southern Company, the majority of which has been serving the nuclear fleet. Ms. Brown's most recent assignment was as a Seismic Qualification Engineer in the Fleet Design Department, where she was responsible for performing activities associated with the Governance, Oversight, Support, and Perform (GOSP) Model including: " Management of the seismic design bases,* Seismic equipment qualification,* Seismic evaluation of plant structures and components," Design documentation and configuration management.

She is currently serving as the Southern Nuclear Seismic Technical Lead for the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns for all three Southern Nuclear plants.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT -NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 13 OF 60 Chris Burke (SNC)Mr. Burke is currently the Operations Support Manager for the Hatch site. He has a Bachelor of Science Degree in Aerospace Engineering and 15 years of nuclear plant experience within the Engineering and Operations departments.

Mr. Burke obtained a Senior Reactor Operator license from the NRC in 2005. In addition to his current function, Mr. Burke has served in various leadership roles in support of plant operation including Shift Support Supervisor, Shift Supervisor, and Shift Manager.David Edenfield (SNC)Mr. Edenfield is currently the Risk Analyst for the Hatch Site. He has a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering and 34 years of nuclear plant experience including 10 years in plant construction and 24 years in plant support at Plant Hatch. Some of his related experience and responsibilities includes, Maintenance Rule Expert Panel member, On-site administrator for EPRI software package EOOS (Equipment Out of Service), reviewer for all design change packages for EOOS model impact, High and Low Voltage Switchyard System Engineer, and Component Engineer for Relays (Protective, Control, and Timing) and Large Transformers.

Jeffrey Horton, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Horton, P.E., is a degreed Professional Engineer with 37 years of experience specializing in applied mechanics with an emphasis on structural analysis of mechanical components and piping.His experience includes structural and thermal design of Nuclear Pressure Vessels, structural design of Nuclear Pipe Systems, Pipe Support Analysis, and Concrete Design. Mr. Horton holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Aerospace Engineering and a Master of Science degree in Material Science specializing in Solid Mechanics.

Mr. Horton has performed numerous ANSI B31.1, B31.7, ASME Section I, III, and VIII component structural calculations and design verifications for Oyster Creek, TMI-I and other nuclear facilities.

Mr. Horton has used AutoPIPE since 1989 for pipe stress evaluations at Oyster Creek, TMI-1 and other nuclear facilities.

Most recently, Mr. Horton was involved in the pipe stress and pipe support analysis for the James A. Fitzpatrick HPCI Steam Trap Valve replacement project, and the Oyster Creek 2010 buried pipe project where he performed the pipe design for the Condensate Storage Tank overflow pipe using AutoPIPE.

Mr. Horton has significant field experience including extended site assignments at Oyster Creek, TMI and Perry, and has performed equipment walkdowns at numerous facilities.

Mr. Horton completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT -NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKULSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE14OF60 Patrick Kelly, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Kelly, P.E., has a Master's degree in Civil Engineering with over 5 years of engineering experience in commercial and nuclear plant design having prepared and developed several design change packages, calculations, evaluations and engineering judgments.

Mr. Kelly brings considerable experience in structural analysis, building evaluations, conduit evaluations, and miscellaneous structural analysis.

He has supported various security related projects at SNC.Additionally, Mr. Kelly was the lead civil engineer on the recent detailed and final designs packages for the Unit I and 2 Diesel Generator Excitation Panel Replacement projects at Plant Hatch. Mr.Kelly completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.Kursat Kinali, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Kinali, Ph.D., P.E., is a Civil/Structural Engineer and Responsible Engineer for modifications.

Dr. Kinali has M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in Structural Engineering with industry experience in commercial and nuclear design. He is a registered Professional Engineer.

He is experienced in seismic analysis, reinforced concrete design, and seismic performance assessment of existing structures.

Dr. Kinali worked on Southern California Edison's SONGS Units 3&4 for design of removable bar panels on a Large Organism Exclusion Device (LOED). He was the responsible structural engineer for designing and detailing the stainless steel removable bar panels. These frames employed a fail-open mechanism that prevents damage to the rest of the LOED frame during extreme wave or seismic events. Dr. Kinali was one of the responsible engineers for an Engineering Change (EC) package at Robinson which involved ballistic resistant enclosure (BRE) replacement.

He was also the primary reviewer for BRE drop analysis for the Farley Nuclear Plant. He reviewed the calculation which investigated the possible effects of BRE drop on safety-related underground features.

For the last couple years, he has been working on numerous design change packages associated with 10 CFR 73.55 security compliance projects for all four Progress Energy's plants, where he was responsible for designing/detailing the reinforced concrete foundations for buildings and miscellaneous equipment, designing electrical duct banks running under a heavy-haul path, preparing/reviewing calculations and drawings for conduit supports and miscellaneous component mountings, and preparing/reviewing (EC) packages.

Mr. Kinali completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 15 OF 60 Johnathon McFarland, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. McFarland, P.E., is a Civil/Structural Engineer providing engineering support for various nuclear generating stations.

Mr. McFarland has a B.S. in Civil Engineering and over 5 years of experience in civil/structural design, including ECCS Suction Strainers, seismic and hydrodynamic analysis, yard modifications and field engineering.

Mr. McFarland has significant experience at Florida Power and Light's Turkey Point Plant, and at the Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Station (WCNOC). Mr.McFarland supported various modifications at WCNOC including providing outage support.Additionally, Mr. McFarland provided EPU related support at Turkey Point including the analysis and walkdowns of structural systems. He supported structural analysis of shipping casks. Mr.McFarland completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.Richard Starck, SCE (MPR)Mr. Starck is a registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic qualification of nuclear plant equipment.

He is the principal author of the EPRI Seismic Walkdown Guidance Document (EPRI Report 1025286, Reference 10.2). He developed and taught the six sessions of the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown Training Course to more than 200 engineers.

He has provided technical oversight of work for various SQUG projects aimed at resolving USI A-46. Mr.Starck developed for SQUG the generic guidelines, criteria, and procedure for identifying safe shutdown equipment for resolution of USI A-46, is the editor and principal author of the SQUG GIP, and has interfaced with the NRC Staff and the SQUG Steering Group to resolve open issues on several revisions of the GIP. Mr. Starck is a SCE and has performed Seismic Walkdowns and evaluations of nuclear plant electric and mechanical equipment as part of the NRC required USI A-46 program. This work included equipment qualification, anchorage evaluation, seismic interaction review, outlier resolution, and operability determination.

Michael Steele, SCE (SNC)Mr. Steele is currently a Principal Design Engineer at Plant Hatch. He has a Bachelor's of Science Degree in Civil Engineering and 20 years of experience as a structural engineer.

He is a qualified SQUG Seismic Capability Engineer and Certified Lead Auditor. He has comprehensive and in-depth technical experience in nuclear facilities structural design, construction, modification and maintenance.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE16OF60 Winston Stewart, SCE (ENERCON)Mr. Stewart is a Mechanical Engineer with over eight years of experience in various capacities including:

Modification Engineer, Engineering Mentor, 1OCFR50.59 Evaluator, Apparent Cause Evaluator, Contract Administration and Designated Representative, Project Manager, Procedure Technical Reviewer, and Environmental Monitoring Team Leader for Emergency Response Organization.

Mr. Stewart was responsible for the preparation of technical evaluations for various configuration changes to plant systems, structures, or components; as well as the preparation and revision of civil/structural calculations, pipe stress calculations, and other design documents.

Mr.Stewart served as subject matter expert for Pipe Stress Analysis and Pipe Flaw Evaluation (ASME B31.1,Section III and Section XI). During this time he qualified as SQUG Seismic Capability Engineer.

Mr. Stewart completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3-Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.James Tootle, Jr. (SNC)Mr. Tootle is the Hatch Severe Accident Management Program Manager. He holds a Bachelor's Degree in Civil Engineering Technology from Georgia Southern University.

He has 30 years of experience at an operating nuclear plant. Mr. Tootle is currently licensed as an SRO and served ten years as Shift Support Supervisor.

He also has supervisory experience in Operations Training and Nuclear Oversight.

Mr. Tootle's certifications include the following:

• Shift Supervisor Qualified (1998-2003)" Shift Support Supervisor (1993-2003)" Senior Reactor Operator (BWR) licensed (1993-present)

• Station Nuclear Engineering

/ Shift Technical Advisor Certification

-General Electric (1990)

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE17OF60 Juan Vizcaya, SWE (ENERCON)Mr. Vizcaya has over 30 years of structural engineering and design experience.

He has significant experience being the structural lead engineer on ISFSI projects and overall nuclear plant modifications and has a wide range of design/engineering experience.

Projects range from the seismic analysis and design of concrete and steel structures and concrete pads to the analysis and design of restraint systems for a vertical cask vendor stack-up configurations.

Other projects include heavy load drop assessments and the analysis and design of protective structures, foundations and various mechanical and structural modifications using sophisticated finite element models. Mr.Vizcaya is skilled at using finite element analyses in the design process, and at the practical design of mechanical components, along with concrete and steel structures.

He leads a group structural staff on issues involving structures, stress analysis, and site work such as layout, excavation, roads, drainage and subterranean structures.

Mr. Vizcaya has extensive field experience including during construction of the Laguna Verde Nuclear Plant. Mr. Vizcaya completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.Kenneth Whitmore, SCE (ENERCON)Mr. Whitmore is a Registered Professional Engineer with more than 30 years of experience in seismic design and seismic equipment qualification in nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore is a Seismic Capability Engineer that was involved in the development of the SQUG methodology for verification of nuclear plant components.

Specifically, Mr. Whitmore served on the sub-committee that developed the SQUG methodology for evaluation of raceways and on the sub-committee that performed the peer review of the SQUG walkdown training class. Mr. Whitmore performed A-46 and IPEEE walkdowns at Oyster Creek and Three Mile Island and has subsequently performed SQUG evaluations at numerous nuclear power plants. Mr. Whitmore served as both Chairman and Technical Chairman of the Seismic Qualification Reporting and Testing Service (SQRTS), has witnessed numerous seismic tests and is a recognized industry expert in seismic qualification of components.

Mr. Whitmore has significant experience in all aspects of structural analysis and design and has extensive experience in performing plant walkdowns associated with seismic issues. Mr.Whitmore completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC___ ___ ___ ___ ___ __ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___ PAGE I8OF 60 Wesley Williams, SWE (SNC)Mr. Williams has a degree in Civil Engineering from the University of South Alabama. He is a System Engineer for Southern Nuclear at Plant Hatch in Baxley, GA. He has participated in numerous Structural Monitoring Walkdowns at Plant Hatch which are governed by 10 CFR 50.65,"Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants." In addition, Mr. Williams had the opportunity to work in the Civil Design Group at Southern Nuclear Corporate Headquarters as a summer intern before he graduated.

Mr. Williams completed the EPRI training on Near Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3 -Plant Seismic Walkdowns as an SWE.Alan Wolfe (SNC)Mr. Wolfe has a BS in Nuclear Engineering Technology.

He has more than 33 years of experience in the nuclear industry, all in the Operations department at Plant Hatch. He obtained a Reactor Operator's License in 1982 and a Senior Reactor Operator's License in 1987. Mr. Wolfe held positions of System Operator, Licensed Nuclear Plant Operator, Shift Supervisor, Shift Technical Advisor, Shift Manager, and Operations Superintendent prior to retiring in 2010. Following retirement he returned to the plant in January 2012 to support the Severe Accident Management team in response to the accident in Japan.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE19OF60 5.0 IPEEE VULNERABILITIES REPORTING Information on the seismic vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program are reported in Attachment

5. Within this context, "vulnerabilities" means seismic anomalies, outliers, or other findings.

For each vulnerability, Attachment 5 also reports a description of the action taken to eliminate or reduce the seismic vulnerability.

The Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL) for Hatch Unit 2 included six (6) components for which seismic vulnerabilities were previously identified during the IPEEE program. During the Seismic Walkdowns, the walkdown teams verified that the resolutions to IPEEE vulnerabilities for 4 of the 6 SWEL components are implemented as stated in the IPEEE outlier resolution (Attachment 5).The extent of this verification is discussed in the individual SWCs for the components with identified IPEEE seismic vulnerabilities.

The following components with IPEEE vulnerabilities could not be verified due to inaccessibility.

Completion of the walkdowns, for both components, is deferred until the next refueling outage (2R22)which is scheduled February of 2013.1) 2R22-S005, 4160V SWGR EMERGENCY BUS 2E -The anchorage was previously determined to be inadequate.

Also, there are interaction concerns with the overhead lights.Attachment 5 notes that additional anchorage was installed and the light fixtures were tied up to prevent falling per design change request (DCR)94-017 and DCR 90-10. However, the Seismic Walkdown team could not verify anchorage since the switchgear could not be opened at that time.2) 2R22-S007, 4160V SWGR EMERGENCY BUS 2G -The anchorage was previously determined to be inadequate.

Attachment 5 notes that additional anchorage was installed per DCR 94-017. However, the Seismic Walkdown team could not verify anchorage since the switchgear could not be opened at that time.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE20OF60 6.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST DEVELOPMENT A team of individuals with extensive knowledge of Plant Hatch systems and components developed the SWEL. Qualifications of the personnel responsible for developing the SWEL are provided in Section 4.0 of this report. The equipment selection personnel used an SNC-template to ensure compliance with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and consistency across the fleet.Two SWELs were developed (SWEL I and SWEL 2) consistent with the guidance in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL I consists of a sample of equipment related to safe shutdown of the reactor and maintaining containment integrity as described in Section 3.0 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 2 consists of items related to the spent fuel pool as described in Section 3.0 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The two SWELs form the overall SWEL for the plant.Attachment I provides the final SWEL I and SWEL 2.In some cases, components listed on the SWEL were removed from the SWEL or were replaced with equivalent components.

These changes were made when it was determined during the Seismic Walkdown that access to the equipment on the original SWEL would be impractical to achieve during a walkdown.

For example, components located very high overhead were replaced with equivalent items that could be seen without erecting scaffolding.

All such changes meet the provisions of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The SWELs provided in Attachment I reflect the final SWELs with all changes incorporated.

6.1 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 1 SWEL I was developed using the four screens described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).Screens 1 to 3 Screens I to 3 were used to select Seismic Category I equipment that do not undergo regular inspection and support the five safety functions.

In accordance with the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2, Page 3-3), Screens I through 3 can be satisfied using previous equipment lists developed for the IPEEE program. Consequently, the Seismic Review Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) developed for the Hatch Nuclear Plant's response to Generic Letter 88-20 (Reference 10.3) was included in Base List I for the development of SWEL 1.Additional items were added to Base List I from the USI A-46 Summary Report (Reference 10.9) and the Safe Shutdown Analysis Report (Reference 10.7), Tables 3.Ai-I and 4.Al-1, to provide components to address the twenty-one classes of equipment from Appendix B of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE21OF60 The specific guidance used to create the IPEEE Seismic SSEL was EPRI Report NP-6041, "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin" (Reference 10.10). The Seismic SSEL from IPEEE -Seismic was checked and verified to meet the intentions set forth in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The intent of the Base List I was to provide an equipment list of the SSCs used to safely shut down the reactor and maintain containment integrity following a Design Basis Earthquake.

The EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2, Page 3-1) listed three screens to use in selecting the Base List I if a utility was to not start from an existing equipment list used in previous plant evaluations.

Applying these three screens would result in an acceptable base list that was comprised of Seismic Category I SSCs associated with maintaining the following five safety functions listed in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2):* Reactor reactivity control* Reactor coolant pressure control* Reactor coolant inventory control* Decay heat removal, and* Containment function.The criteria used in selection of the Seismic SSEL are detailed in Section 3.1.2.2 of the IPEEE -Seismic Report (Reference 10.8). Specifically, one preferred and one alternate path capable of achieving and maintaining a safe-shutdown condition for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a Seismic Margin Earthquake (SME) was selected for each unit. Further, it was assumed that a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) had occurred and as such, the paths were also selected as being capable of mitigating a SBLOCA following an SME.Therefore, based upon the review of the Base List 1, it was determined that the list satisfied the requirements as specified in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Base List I is presented in Attachment 1.Screen 4 Screen 4 is the sample considerations to select components from the Base List I. The selection of components for SWEL 1 was developed through an iterative process that ensured a representative sample (i.e., Screen 4 from EPRI Report 1025286 -Reference 10.2). Various drafts of SWEL 1 were provided to Hatch Licensed Senior Reactor Operators (SROs) for review and input. The SROs identified and recommended inclusion of additional equipment important to plant operations.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC________________________PAGE 22 OF 60 The following list summarizes the sample considerations used to develop SWEL 1: " Variety of systems* Major new or replacement equipment" Classes of equipment" Variety of environments" Equipment enhanced due to vulnerabilities identified during the IPEEE program* Risk Significance Variety of Systems -EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) specifies that equipment from a variety of plant systems must be included on the SWEL 1. The systems represented in the Base List were reviewed and components from a majority of these systems are included on the SWEL.Major New and Replacement Equipment

-Major new or replacement equipment installed within the previous 15 years was identified through a search of work order (WO) histories for selected equipment and input, from the plant personnel familiar with plant modification and from the PRA group on equipment changes to components that are included in the PRA.Variety of Equipment Classes -A list of the 21 Classes of Equipment that should be included on the SWEL is provided in Appendix B of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL I includes components from each equipment class.Variety of Environments

-The EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) specifies that the SWEL contain components located in various plant environments, including environments subject to corrosion and high temperatures.

SWEL I includes equipment in three environment types. These include Harsh (e.g. Reactor Building), Mild (e.g. Control Room, Diesel Generator Building), and Outdoors/Intake Structures (e.g. Plant Service Water Intake Structure, Yard Valve Pits).IPEEE Vulnerabilities

-SWEL I includes equipment identified with seismic vulnerabilities identified in Hatch Nuclear Plant's response to Generic Letter 88-20 (Reference 10.3).Risk Significance

-The risk ranking was performed using the at-power internal events PRA model and by identifying those components that, in the model, have a Risk Achievement Worth of 2.0 or greater, or a Risk Reduction Worth of 1.005 or greater. The importance ranking spreadsheet contained in calculation PRA-BC-H-10-008 (Reference 10.6) was the actual document used as a source.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUJKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 23 OF 60 6.2 DEVELOPMENT OF SWEL 2 SWEL 2 is developed using four screens described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). SWEL 2 is presented in Attachment 1.Screens 1 to 2 The equipment selected through Screens I and 2 provide any Seismic Category I components associated with the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) that are also suitable for a walkdown.

For Hatch Unit 2, the only Seismic Category I equipment associated with the SFP is the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System.The Base List 2 includes components from the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System that are suitable for a walkdown per Screens I and 2 from EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).Screen 3 Screen 3 is the sample considerations that ensure that a broad category of equipment from Base List 2 is included in SWEL 2. These considerations include: " Variety of systems* Major new or replacement equipment* Classes of equipment" Variety of environments The Hatch SFP System has a very basic system design with very limited component types. SWEL 2 includes components associated with maintaining seals around the SFP gates, which are Seismic Category I components.

There were no new/replacement equipment in SWEL 2 because there have been no major modifications to the Spent Fuel Pool systems that would affect equipment that meets the screening requirements.

Equipment associated with cooling of the SFP are located in locked areas (due to radiation) and are not suitable for a walkdown.The Decay Heat Removal System is the only major new or replaced equipment associated with the SFPs. However, the Decay Heat Removal System is Non-Safety Related and all piping connected to the SFP either terminates greater than 10 feet above the fuel or has anti-siphon holes located greater than 10 feet above the fuel to prevent rapid drain-down of the SFP.For Hatch Unit 2, SWEL 2 contains all the equipment on Base List 2. Thus, sampling was not a consideration in developing SWEL 2.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 24 OF 60 Screen 4 Screen 4 identifies any items that could potentially lead to rapid drain down of the SFP. These include any penetrations in the SFP that are below 10 feet above the top of the fuel assemblies.

For Hatch Unit 2, there are no SFP penetrations within 10 feet above the fuel in the SFP. All piping connected to the SFP, either terminates more than 10 feet above the fuel or has anti-siphon holes, located more than 10 feet above the fuel, to prevent rapid drain-down of the SFP.Based on a review of plant documents, the only items that could potentially lead to rapid drain down of the pool are the Seismic Class 2 items that could contribute to deflation of the air seal in the seismic gap located in the transfer canal between the spent fuel pools. Air accumulators and gate seal ball valves that could contribute to deflation of the air gap, if damaged during a seismic event, are included in SWEL 2.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 25 OF 60 7.0 SEISMIC WALKDOWNS AND AREA WALK-BYS Walkdowns were performed for all components on the (combined)

SWEL except for those that were inaccessible (see Section 7.1). A Seismic Walkdown Checklist (SWC) was completed for each component and an Area Walk-by Checklist (AWC) was completed for each area containing equipment on the SWEL. Copies of the SWCs and AWCs are provided in Attachments 3 and 4, respectively.

The personnel performing walkdowns received training on the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdown guidance.Prior to the walkdown teams arriving onsite, walkdown packages were assembled into folders that contained the SWCs and AWCs and other pertinent information (e.g., calculations, test reports, IPEEE walkdowns, equipment location, and layout drawings).

Each walkdown team consisted of two SWEs.The walkdown teams spent the first week on site obtaining unescorted plant access and organizing for the walkdowns.

Organization included assignment of specific components to the teams; review of the walkdown packages; development of a process for tracking the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys; and familiarization with the plant.The second week began with peer reviewers (Whitmore and Ashworth) providing an overview on the information contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Expectations for the walkdowns were discussed and questions were answered.

After this overview, each walkdown team performed an initial Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by. This initial walkdown was performed in the presence of the other teams and at least one peer reviewer.

The purpose of this initial walkdown was to ensure consistency between the different teams, to reinforce the expectations for identifying potentially adverse seismic conditions, and to allow team members to provide and obtain feedback.Following the initial walkdowns, the walkdown teams began performing the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

Support from plant personnel (operators, electricians, engineering) was obtained as required to open equipment and to assist in locating and identifying components.

All component Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were documented on the SWCs and AWCs, respectively.

The final status of all SWCs and AWCs indicated one of the three following statuses:* "Y" -Yes, the equipment is free from potentially adverse seismic conditions;" "N" -No, the equipment is not free from at least one potentially adverse seismic condition;

• "U" -Undetermined, a portion(s) of the walkdown could not be completed due to equipment inaccessibility and the condition is not known.The walkdown focused on anchorage and seismic spatial interactions but also included inspections for other potentially adverse seismic conditions.

Anchorage in all cases was considered to be anchorage to HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE26OF60 the structure.

This included anchor bolts to concrete walls or floors, structural bolts to structural steel and welds to structural steel or embedded plates. For welds, the walkdown team looked for cracks and corrosion in the weld and base metal. Other bolts such as flange bolts on in-line components were not considered to be anchorage.

These connections were evaluated and any potentially adverse seismic concerns were documented under "other adverse seismic conditions".

As part of the walkdown, the anchorage of at least 50% of the anchored components was evaluated to verify if the anchorage was consistent with plant documentation.

The document that provides the anchorage configuration was identified on the SWC and the anchorage in the field was compared to the information on this referenced document.

In cases where the anchorage could not be observed (e. g.where the anchorage is inside a cabinet that could not be opened at the time of the walkdown), the items related to anchorage were marked as "U" (Undetermined) and deferred until equipment is available for inspection.

However, all other possible inspections associated with that item were completed and the results were documented on the SWC. These items were considered to be incomplete at the time of this report preparation and have been deferred to a time when they would be available for inspection (see Section 7.1). All "U" items have been deferred until the earliest opportunity during Refueling Outage 2R22 or Refueling Outage 2R23, which are scheduled for February 2013 and February 2015 respectively.

In cases where the Seismic Walkdown team members identified a potentially adverse condition, the condition was noted on the SWC or on the AWC and a CR was written to document and evaluate/resolve the condition.

As part of the process of generating the CR, preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs during the walkdowns.

Additionally, detailed licensing basis reviews were conducted as part of the resolution of the CR, as required.

Conditions that were not obviously acceptable were documented on the checklists and a basis was provided for why the observed condition was determined to be acceptable.

Area Walk-bys were performed in the rooms containing the SSCs for walkdowns.

For cases in which the room where a component was located was large, the extent of the area encompassed by the Area-Walk-by was clearly indicated on the AWCs. For large areas, the walk-by included all structures, systems and components within a 35-foot radius of the equipment being walked down, as described on the AWC. The AWCs are included in Attachment 4.SWEL I Walkdowns A total of 81 of the 104 SWEL I Component Seismic Walkdowns have been performed to date.However 3 must be revisited in order to inspect for other adverse conditions inside the cabinets.

In addition, 23 of the 104 SWEL 1 components were delayed due to inaccessibility.

The schedule for HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUIKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE27OF60 performing the remaining component walkdowns is presented in Tables 7-1 and 7-2. All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.SWEL 2 Walkdowns A total of 2 component Seismic Walkdowns were performed.

In addition, a total of 2 Area Walk-bys were completed.

All areas of the plant that contain items on the SWEL were included in the Area Walk-bys.7.1 INACCESSIBLE ITEMS Table 7-1 identifies the components originally determined to be inaccessible for walkdowns.

These items are located throughout the plant and the required Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys were not completed for these items during the initial phase of walkdowns.

Plant Hatch Unit 2 2013 Refueling Outage (2R22) is scheduled to begin on February 11, 2013. Due to the proximity of the start date of 2R22 to the NTTF 2.3: Seismic walkdowns, those Unit 2 SWEL items that were deemed inaccessible during the 180-day response period, and that require special planning for a Unit outage to complete inspection, will be walked down in the 2015 Refueling Outage (2R23).The outage scope and schedule, and all associated tag-outs, for 2R22 had been set prior to beginning the NTTF 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns, and there are currently no electrical tag-outs in 2R22 that will accommodate walkdowns of the Unit 2 inaccessible SWEL items. Plant Hatch has chosen to defer the Unit 2 inaccessible SWEL items that require special outage planning for inspection to 2R23. Other inaccessible items will be walked down during 2R22.Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope# Item No. Description Access Remaining Schedule Walkdown for Scope Completion 2R23-I.03 600V STATION SERVICE See Note 2 SWC and Outage SWGR 2C & XFMR AWC 2R23 2. 2R23-S004 600V STATION SERVICE See Note 2 SWC and Outage SWGR 2D & XFMR AWC 2R23 HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE28OF60 Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope Item No. Description Access Remaining Schedule Walkdown for Scope Completion

3. 2R22-S016 250V DC BATTERY SWGR 2A See Note 2 SWC and Outage AWC 2R23 4. 2R22-05 4160V SWGR EMERGENCY See Note 2 SWC and Outage BUS 2E AWC 2R23 5. 2R22-S007 4160V SWGR EMERGENCY See Note 2 SWC and Outage BUS 2G AWC 2R23 6. 2P64-F039 RBCHW COIL INLET ISO AOV See Note I SWC and Outage AWC 2R22 7. 2P64-F029 RBCHW COIL INLET ISO AOV See Note I SWC and Outage AWC 2R22 8. 2El I-F060A LOOP A ISO GATE VALVE See Note I SWC and Outage AWC 2R22 9. 2E1 I-F009 SHUTDOWN COOL INBRD ISO See Note I SWC and Outage AWC 2R22 10. See Note I SWC and Outage 2T47-B007A DW Cooling System Unit AWC 2R22 12. 2T47-BO09A DW Cooling System Unit See Note I SWC and Outage AWC 2R22 12. See Note I SWC and Outage 2T47-B008B DW Cooling System Unit AWC 2R22 HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC____ ___ ___ ___ ____ _ _ ___ ___ ____ ___ ___ ___ ___ PAGE 29 OF 60 Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope# Item No. Description Access Remaining Schedule Walkdown for Scope Completion

13. H2/02 ANALYZER SAMPLE See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2P33-B001A CHILLER AWC 2R22 14. RPS POWER DISTRIBUTION See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2C71-P001 PANEL AWC 2R22 15. 2R25-S001 125V DC DIV 2 CAB 2A See Note 2 SWC and Outage AWC 2R22 16. See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2R25-S002 125V DC DIV 2 CAB 2B AWC 2R22 17. 2R25-S004 125V DC CAB 2D See Note 2 SWC and Outage AWC 2R22 18. See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2R25-S005 125V DC CAB 2E AWC 2R22 19. See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2R25-S036 120/208V AC ESS CAB 2A AWC 2R22 20. 2R25-S064 120/208V AC VITAL CAB 2A See Note 2 SWC and Outage INSTR BUS AWC 2R22 21. See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2R25-S037 120/208V AC ESS CAB 2B AWC 2R22 22. See Note 2 SWC and Outage 2R24-S021 2A RX BLDG 250V DC MCC AWC 2R22 23. 2R24-S018B 600VAC MCC 2E-B See Note 2 SWC and Outage AWC 2R22 HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUISHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE30OF60 Table 7-2 provides a list of components determined to be inaccessible to open doors to perform inspections for other adverse conditions.

The anchorage for these components was visible without opening all panels of the cabinet and was therefore inspected during the initial walkdowns.

Table 7-2. Inaccessible Equipment Resulting from Guidance on Opening Cabinets to Inspect for Other Adverse Conditions Item No. Description Access Remaining Schedule Walkdown for Scope Completion

1. See Note 2 Internal of Outage 2R24-SOI I 600V MCC 2C ESS DIV 1 panel 2R22 2.12R24-S022 125/250V DC MCC 2B ESS See Note 2 Internal of Outage DIV 2 panel 2R22 H2/02 ANALYZER SAMPLE See Note 2 Internal of Outage 2P3 3-B01 B CHILLER panel 2R22 Notes (Table 7-1 and Table 7-2): 1) The component was located inside an area of the plant not accessible during normal plant operation.

Walkdowns of these components and of the associated plant areas were deferred to an outage.2) Inspection of the cabinet's internals could not be performed without opening the doors of the equipment.

Opening doors on these types of components was not permitted by plant operations at the time of the Seismic Walkdowns due to equipment deemed too sensitive to permit access, or requiring special, planned precautions, to open the doors.3) While the Seismic Walkdowns were in progress at Hatch Unit 2, supplemental guidance/clarification for opening cabinets to inspect for adverse conditions was received on September 18, 2012. This required the opening of cabinets, electrical boxes and switchgear and the inspection of internals for SWC attributes, even when opening the components was not HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 31 OF 60 required to inspect the anchorage.

However, the affected components were identified and scheduled for re-inspection with component doors opened.4) Hatch Unit 2 has 6 transformers (Equipment Class 4) in the SWEL-1. With the exception of components (MPL #) 2R23-S003 and 2R23-S004, which were deferred as stated above, the transformers were inspected to the extent practical.

All visible anchors, hardware and surfaces were inspected.

The anchorage for the transformers was visible without opening the component.

To inspect the transformer further would require disassembly and therefore would not be considered part of a normal electrical inspection.

The inspection of the transformers meets the requirements of the guidance document and the 50.54(f) letter. Listed below are the 4 transformers for which inspections were completed:

MPL #MPL #MPL #MPL #2Rl 1-S004 2R1 1-S041 2S11-S009 2S11-S012 45KVA 600-120/208V PWR XFMR 600-120/208 V ESSENTIAL XFMR 4160/600V225KVA XFMR 4160/600V 75KVA XFMR Note that some of these MPL numbers include both the switchgear and the transformer.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 32 OF 60 8.0 RESULTS This section discusses the results of the Seismic Walkdowns that were performed in response to the NRC 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012, "Enclosure 3, Recommendation 2.3: Seismic".

As potentially adverse conditions were identified conditions reports were initiated in the Plant CAP program and evaluated.

The sections below discuss the results of these walkdowns and evaluations.

8.1 POTENTIALLY ADVERSE SEISMIC CONDITIONS All potentially adverse conditions were conservatively entered into the site Corrective Action Program (CAP) per Southern Nuclear expectations in a timely fashion. While some preliminary licensing basis evaluations were performed by the SWEs as part of the generation of the CAP entries, the items did not first undergo a detailed seismic licensing basis review as described in EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Consequently, the as-found conditions in Table 8-1 below do not necessarily indicate that SSCs are deficient or not in conformance with their seismic licensing basis. Instead, it is an indication that Southern Nuclear has a very low threshold for CRs and actively uses the system.SNC personnel familiar with the Plant Hatch Seismic Licensing basis, Plant Hatch seismic qualification methods and documentation, and Southern Nuclear requirements and procedures for entering items into the CAP reviewed and dispositioned all of the potentially adverse seismic conditions as part of the CAP process. The subsections below summarize the key findings from the CAP reviews that pertain to equipment operability, SSC conformance with the seismic licensing basis, and any required plant changes.During the course of the seismic walkdowns, a total of 49 Unit 2 Potentially Adverse Conditions were identified and entered into the Corrective Action Program. In addition, another 5 were entered that are Common to both Units I and 2. Table 8-1 provides additional details on the SSCs that were identified during the walkdowns and entered into the CAP as degraded, nonconforming, or unanalyzed relative to their seismic licensing basis.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 33 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed two 513069 Seismic Walkdown Engineers determined that the lights Repair or replace clasp Closed Reactor overhead lights with open clasp hooks. The would remain supported by the electrical cable if lights hooks.Building lights in question are in the Unit 2 Reactor dislodged from the clasp. Consequently, this condition el 203' Bldg, elevation 203', by the SBLC Boron does not pose any adverse condition that would affect Solution Tank Area (2C41-A001I.

Lights are the function of the equipment.

in proximity to safety related equipment and have the potential to fall out of the hooks during a seismic event.Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed what 515100 Hammer should be removed. Build scaffold to remove Open Reactor appears to be a hammer lying loose on top of hammer. Due Building conduit near the ceiling above the aisle way 3/16/2013 el 130' between MCC panel 2R24-S022 and the CRDs in the Unit 2 Reactor Building elevation 130'. This tool needs to be removed.2R43- Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed the 515115 Seismic Walkdown Engineers judge the as-found Install the grout per site Open C005C Southeast anchor of the DG 2C Air anchorage adequate to support the compressor in a procedures.

Due Compressor (2R43-C005C) is missing the seismic event. Grout is provided under the other three 11/27/2013 required grout as contained on the other three anchor bolts. Any potential bending of this bolt in a anchor bolts. seismic event is minimized by all four anchor bolts clamping the compressor support frame securely to the concrete pad. Adding grout will also further protect the anchor bolt from corrosion.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 34 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)2R43- The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 515118 The flexible conduit presently has no adverse conditions, Install padding to soften Open C005C identified a condition on the DG 2C Air but may experience fretting in the long term as the the hard edge. Due Compressor (2R43-C005C) located in the compressor operates and introduces vibratory loads on 11/27/2013 Diesel Building, Elevation 130'. the flexible conduit.A flexible conduit that spans to 2R43-C005C lies against the hard edge of a tube track.2R43- The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 515119 The first condition

-The flexible conduit presently has Install padding to soften Open C006C identified two conditions on the DG 2C Air no adverse conditions, but may experience fretting in the the hard edge. Due Compressor (2R43-C006C) located in the long term as the compressor operates and introduces 11/27/2013 Diesel Building, Elevation 130'. vibratory loads on the flexible conduit. It is Install missing screw.recommended that a padding be installed to soften the The first condition is a flexible conduit that hard edge.spans from 2E23-247 to 2R43-C006C and lies against the hard edge of a tube track. The second condition

-The screw is not a required for structural adequacy of the cover.The second condition is a missing screw on the fan belt cover plate on compressor.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKOOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 35 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit 2 HPCI Seismic Walkdown Engineers in Unit 2 515489 The knee-brace is one of a pair of supports for a small Install missing anchor Open Room HPCI Room noticed a knee-brace for conduit conduit near the wall. The second knee brace is fairly bolt. Due support near Valve 2E41-F007 near the large and has all anchor bolts, so it is judged to have 11/27/2013 2T41-B005B HPCI cooler in the Unit 2 sufficient capacity to support the small conduit during a HPCI Room has only one anchor bolt. There seismic event. However, it is against good engineering is a hole in the base plate and the wall for the practice to have a support with only one bolt.second bolt, but it appears that only one bolt was ever installed.

The knee-brace is one of a pair of supports for a small conduit near the wall. The second knee brace is fairly large and has all anchor bolts, so it is judged to have sufficient capacity to support the small conduit during a seismic event. However, it is against good engineering practice to have a support with only one bolt.2R25-S006 The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 515500 Seismic Walkdown Engineers judged the panel will Replace the missing Open identified a screw missing from the top left perform its design function during a seismic event in the screw. Due comer of the front panel of distribution panel as-found condition with the one screw missing based on 11/27/2013 2R25-S006.

an evaluation of a similar panel with only one screw present at each of the four comers (reference DOEJ-HX-35281-COOl, "'Evaluate Capacity of4 Screws to Hold Door in Place".

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH-082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FITKUSHIIIA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 36 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)2R.25-S031 The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 515506 Seismic Walkdown Engineersjudged the panel will Replace the missing Open identified a screw missing at the bottom of perform its design function during a seismic event in the screw. Due the front panel of distribution panel 2R25- as-found condition with the one screw missing based on 11/27/2013 S031. an evaluation of a similar panel with only one screw present at each of the four comers (reference DOEJ-HX-3528 1-COO1, "Evaluate Capacity of 4 Screws to Hold Door in Place".2T41- Seismic Walkdown Engineers in Unit 2 515661 While it appears that the capacity of some of the bolts Clean and coat anchor Open D007/8 Reactor Building elevation 203' noticed may be slightly reduced, the overall seismic adequacy of bolts, or replace. Due more than mild surface corrosion on the bolts the installation is judged not to be adversely impacted at 11/27/2013 that anchor down the Standby Gas Treatment this time. This judgment is based on the fact that the Filter Train (SBGT) 2T41-D007/8.

The equipment is anchored with at least 20 anchors and only extent of corrosion on some bolts appears a small number (approximately 3 or 4) appear to have sufficient to slightly reduce the structural more than mild corrosion.

However, the corrosion capacity of these bolts, appears to be getting progressively worse based on observations of other anchors and components in the area. Therefore, the corrosion on the bolts needs to be investigated and corrected to ensure that the seismic adequacy of the SBGT is maintained.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 37 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR N Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit 2 Corroded plates and welds were found 515700 Currently, it has been judged to perform its function, Corroded members and Open Reactor adjacent to SBGT Filter Train, 2T46-D001 B however, corrosion appears to be getting progressively connections should be Due Building in the Unit 2 Reactor Building at elevation worse, replaced.

11/27/2013 el 185' 185'. Galvanized Unistrut members seem to be not corroded.

However the welded connection and the small baseplate is corroded.

This Unistrut framing system is needed to support the conduits from the panel of the filter train.2R24-S027 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed a 515721 Loose piece should be properly installed and tightened.

Properly install and Open broken, or loose, piece of raceway 2E23448 tighten loose piece. Due exiting MCC MPL number 2R24-S027 and 4/30/2013 entering cable tray 2LBC801. Any sharp edge on this piece of raceway could potentially damage the cable jacket within raceway.2H21-P021 Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed there is one anchor missing on the south side of the support for Instrument Rack 2H21-P021 on the 87' elevation of the Unit 2 SE Diagonal in the Reactor Building.

A good deal of debris in the hole, so it is unsure whether the anchor is broken off, was removed, or was never installed.

515727 There are seven other anchors in good condition, and the rack frame is very stiff. It is judged that the remaining anchors have sufficient strength to restrain the rack during a seismic event.Replace the missing anchor bolt.Open Due 11/27/2013 IATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLtrrION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PACE 38 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit 2 SE Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed on the 515734 There are intact pipe clamps above and below the open Replace the missing bolt. Open Diagonal 87' 87' elevation of the Unit 2 SE Diagonal in the clamp, so the unrestrained span of the conduit is small. Due Reactor Building, there is a Unistrut pipe The existing pipe clamps offer enough support to prevent 11/27/2013 clamp on the west wall missing a bolt. The significant movement during a seismic event.pipe clamp is spread open, offering no restraint to the supported pipe.2T46- Seismic Walkdown Engineers found an 515744 The train currently has 17 anchors (9 on one side and 8 The missing anchor bolt Open D001B anchor bolt missing from the support of the on the other side). The Seismic Walkdown Engineers should be replaced.

Due SBGT Filter Train (2T46-D00 I B) in Room judged the support to be adequate during a seismic event 11/27/2013 2R303, elevation 185', of the Unit 2 Reactor due to the number of existing bolts remaining on each Building.

side of the train.Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed on the 515750 The nozzles are small and relatively light, so they are The nozzles were Closed Reactor 158' elevation of the Unit 2 Reactor Building, unlikely to cause any structural damage during a seismic removed.Building there are two brass nozzles sitting loose on event. However, due to their location on the support for el 158' top of the Gas Cylinder Location 2P33-P066 a high trip hazard panel, there is a concern that the and two brass nozzles sitting on the frame for nozzles could cause a trip event.panel 2H21-P405B, which is a high trip hazard.Unit 2 A crack was found on the concrete floor on 515779 The Seismic Walkdown Engineers judged the support to Repair crack. Open Reactor elevation 203' of Unit 2 Reactor Building be adequate for the ductwork during a seismic event due Due Building where the SBGT filter train is located. This to the number of existing nearby supports and relatively 11/27/2013 SBGT Area crack goes through one of the base plates light loading on the base plates.supporting the exhaust fan (2T41-CO05B).

It appears that the crack goes through one of the post-installed anchor bolts. Due to this crack, the capacity of the anchor is reduced.

HATCtI UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKtISHIIIA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 39 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Intake Seismic Walkdown Engineers found that 516327 Perform prompt resurfacing and coating as needed to Prompt resurfacing and Open Structure numerous piping, instrumentation, and interrupt degradation.

coating is needed to Due el 110' conduit/equipment supports in the Intake interrupt degradation per 1l1/27/2013 Structure elevation 110' has general coatings work order SNC433192 degradation and minor surface rusting. Note that this potentially adverse seismic condition is common to both units.2EI l-F252A Seismic Walkdown Engineers ISWEs) 516572 The Seismic Walkdown Engineers judged the support to A new anchor bolt Open observed that there is one anchor bolt be adequate during a seismic event and is therefore should be installed.

Due missing from a two-bolt support for the judged to not be a potentially adverse seismic condition.

11/27/2013 tubing near valve 2El l-F252A in the NE diagonal on the 97' elevation of the Unit 2 Reactor Building.Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 516577 The section of grating is extremely small and is welded Repair or replace grating. Open Reactor observed there is a small section of grating to the kick plate around the pipe going through the Due Building NE broken near the comer of the 2T411-B003B grating at that location.

The grating is not in immediate 11/27/2013 Diagonal RHR/CS Pump Room Cooler in the NE danger of separating and becoming an impact hazard and 108' diagonal on the 108' elevation of the Unit 2 does not affect the larger grating panel's ability to Reactor Building.

support load. The Seismic Walkdown Engineers judged the grating to be seismically adequate.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALK-DOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 40 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)2El I- Seismic Walkdown Engineers found 2El 1- 516593 The bolts are welded to the steel frame, providing CR for documentation Closed BOOIA BOO IA RHR Heat Exchanger A in the NE additional support for the connection.

In addition, the purposes only.diagonal on the 97' elevation of the Unit 2 heat exchanger is also supported by four sway struts Reactor Building has eight anchors to the below the roof above to prevent overturning of the steel frame. Two of the bolts have full thread equipment.

The shear strength is not impacted, engagement but do not have the required overturning is restrained, and the center of gravity of the minimum of two threads above the nut: an equipment is below the bolts and the vertical seismic additional two bolts have bolts approximately acceleration at that level will not exceed 1.0, so the 1/4" below the nuts and so do not have full largest tension load the bolts will see is the preload, thread engagement.

which is already applied. Therefore, the bolts are judged to be acceptable and do not create a potentially adverse seismic condition.

2El I-BOOt B Seismic Walkdown Engineers found 2El I1- 516595 The bolts are welded to the steel frame, providing CR for documentation Closed BOO IB RHR Heat Exchanger B in the SE additional support for the connection.

In addition, the purposes only.diagonal on the 97' elevation of the Unit 2 heat exchanger is also supported by four sway struts Reactor Building has eight anchors to the below the roof above to prevent overturning of the steel frame. Two of the bolts have full thread equipment.

The shear strength is not impacted, engagement but do not have the required overturning is restrained, and the center of gravity of the minimum of two threads above the nut. equipment is below the bolts and the vertical seismic acceleration at that level will not exceed 1.0, so the largest tension load the bolts will see is the preload, which is already applied. Therefore, the bolts are judged to be acceptable and do not create a potentially adverse seismic condition.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 41 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)2H21-P305 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed 5 516713 Seismic Walkdown Engineers judged the panel will Replace the 5 missing Open missing slip connectors out of 12 for the door perform its design function during a seismic event in the connectors.

Due to timer panel 2H21-P305 located in the as-found condition with the 7 remaining connectors 11/27/2013 Diesel Generator Building Switchgear Room installed based on conclusions outlined in DOEJ-HX-2G. 35281-COO1, "Evaluate Capacity of 4 Screws to Hold Door in Place".2R24-S022 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed a 516767 This MCC is composed of 10 frames which are bolted Replace missing bolt. Open bolt inside MCC 2R24-S022 that is down in each comer, so 4 bolts for each frame in Due misaligned and not in full contact with the addition to the frames being bolted to each other. This 11/27/2013 surface. Due to the misalignment, it cannot bolt misalignment occurs on one of the bolts of Frame 7 be determined whether the bolt is properly which is an internal frame. As such, by engineering installed and whether it is fully engaged and judgment it is determined that having one bolt out of the fully tightened.

It was observed in the field total 40 not properly tightened, the MCC would still be and documented in the attached picture that, adequate to maintain its integrity during a seismic event.most likely, the bolt is misaligned due to the fact that there is an interfering object in back of the cabinet. The bolt is to be checked to assure that it is properly tighten and that it is fully engaged as noted in the design documents.

If not, adequate measures are to be taken to meet the design documents and have the bolt properly tightened and in full contact with the surface.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKOIOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PACE 42 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)2R43-P00IC The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 518617 Per the SWEs judgment this condition is not considered Replace missing screws. Open identified two screws missing on the back to be a seismic concern based on the proper installation Due panel of2R43-P0OIC.

The screws function of the remaining screws. The stiffness of the cabinet is 11/27/2013 to fasten the panel cover to the cabinet, not significantly degraded and the remaining screws are sufficient to fasten the panel to the cabinet.Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed in Bay 518746 The ACC is the only sensitive equipment in the area, and Restrain ladder properly.

Closed Reactor 10 of the Torus Room on the 87' elevation of it is protected by a large conduit between the component Building the Unit 2 Reactor Building, there is a ladder and the ladder. The valve is chained into position, so el 87' left leaning against the wall adjacent to ESS incidental contact will not cause the valve to change Bay 10 of Air ACC 2P52-A001.

The ladder is not position.

Therefore, it is judged that there is no Torus Room secured at the top of the bottom, so it is free potentially adverse seismic condition and will not affect to move during a seismic event, operability.

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed in Bay 518751 There is a second vertical support a few feet away that is Install missing anchor Open Reactor 10 of the Torus Room on the 87' elevation of fully intact, and the conduit is also supported at the wall bolt. Due Building the Unit 2 Reactor Building, there is a four- with a fully intact support. The conduit is very light, and 11/27/2013 el 87' bolt vertical support for a small conduit it is judged that the remaining anchors have sufficient Bay 10 of running to 2E5 1-F003 that is missing one capacity to restrain the conduit during a seismic event.Torus Room anchor bolt. Therefore, it is judged that there is no potentially adverse seismic condition and will not affect operability.

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed there 519481 The remaining three bolts are judged to have sufficient Tighten nut. Open Control is a HVAC duct directly over the 2R42-S031 capacity due to the strength of the bolts to restrain the Due Building battery charger on the 130' elevation of the HVAC at the wall under a seismic event, however good 11/27/2013 el 130' Unit 2 Control Building.

The lower left hand engineering practice requires that the nut be tightened bolt has a loose nut on what appears to be a fully.seismic restraint for the HVAC at the wall.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 43 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)2RI I-S041 Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed there 519565 The remaining screws are judged sufficient to restrain Install missing screws. Open are 8 screws missing out of40 (six on the top the relatively light panel cover in the case of a seismic Due and two on the bottom) on the front panel event. Therefore, there is no potentially adverse seismic 11/27/2013 cover of2RI 1-S041 that is adjacent to condition and operability is not impacted.Penetration 2Z43-H I 002D in Room 2L48-C34 on the 130' elevation of the Unit 2 Control Building.2R43-S017B Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed the 519568 There are three existing screws and two holes in the Replace missing screw. Open junction box attached to battery rack 2R42- cover plate that are not meant to have screws. The Due S017B is missing one screw out of four in the existing screws are judged to be sufficient to hold the 11/27/2013 top right comer of the cover plate. cover plate in the case of a seismic event. Therefore, it is judged that there is no potentially adverse seismic condition and will have no impact on operability.

Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed a loose 519680 The support is lightly loaded and will be in compression Tighten nut. Open Control nut on a conduit support for Conduit due to the configuration of the support. Therefore, it is Due Building 2E21611 in the 2R42-S00 I B battery room on judged that the other three anchors have sufficient 11/27/2013 el 112' the 112' elevation of the Unit 2 Control strength to restrain the support during a seismic event, so Building.

there is no potentially adverse seismic condition and will have no impact on operability.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 44 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed a 519729 The frame acts as lateral support for a sheet metal duct, Replace missing bolt. Open Reactor cantilever frame supporting a 12" diameter which by nature does not impose significant loads on the Due Building sheet-metal duct located in Unit 2 Reactor structure.

Based on engineering judgment, no potentially 11/27/2013 el 130' Building elevation 130'on the West wall of adverse seismic condition and will have no impact on room 2R103 in the vicinity of the airlock. operability.

This frame is supposed to have six anchor bolts supporting it to the structure.

Of the six bolts, the upper most bolt on the north leg of the support is missing.2H.21-P008 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed MPL 519996 The legs are very thin plates (1/8") with no significant Replace missing bolt. Open 2H21-P008 located in the Unit 2 Reactor stiffness.

By engineering judgment, it is considered that Due Bldg elevation 130' Room 2R103. The the absence of the third bolt on the one leg will not 11/27/2013 supporting structure has two legs that are adversely affect the stability of the panel structure.

There supposed to have three bolts on the base of are no safety related components in the vicinity of this each leg. Both legs are supposed to have two panel. Therefore, there is no potentially adverse seismic bolts on the edge and one in the middle. One condition and operability is not impacted.leg was observed to have a middle bolt missing. Also, the pliers should be removed from support area as well.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLIFFION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 45 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed in 519997 The column supports miscellaneous conduits of various The nuts are to be Open Reactor Room 2R103 of the Unit 2 Reactor Building sizes and it spans from the floor up to the ceiling. The removed, cleaned and Due Building Elevation 130' that a miscellaneous support column is a made up of tube steel with stiffeners at the replaced to be in full 11/27/2013 el 130' column has washers that are not in contact base. During a seismic event the column would deflect contact as was intended with two of the nuts for the base plate. There 1/8" perpendicular to the main axis prior to stressing the in their designed is a gap of approximately 1/8" between the member. Considering the member is long slender condition.

nuts and their corresponding washers, column and the fact that the conduits being supported do not contribute significant loads, it is determined by engineering judgment that the temporary effects of this gap will not adversely affect the stability of the support.Therefore, there is no potentially adverse seismic condition and operability is not impacted.2R42-S052 Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 520297 The other three fasteners supporting the charger are The bent unistrut-type Open observed that the top Globe Strut channel properly fastened.

A vertical conduit fastened to the member should be Due supporting the 2R42-S052 24V Battery bottom of the panel provides additional support to the replaced.

11/27/2013 Charger 2B is bent out from the wall at the battery charger in the vertical direction.

Therefore, the far end of the member. The charger is SWE's judge that the attachment of the battery charger supported by two Globe Strut channels near to the wall will perform its design function during a the top and bottom of the charger. The bolt seismic event based on the properly installed attaching the charger to the bent portion of connections.

the Globe Strut channel appears to be over-tightened to the point that the Globe Strut channel is sprung and the lower edge of the spring nut does not make proper contact with the inner edge of the channel. This condition reduces the capacity of the connection compared to a properly installed spring nut connection.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 46 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 522935 During a seismic event, the ladder would not be able to Properly restrain ladder. Closed Reactor identified a 6' metal scaffold ladder left impact anything except the support steel. The impact is Building NE unrestrained behind the 2H21 I-P018 RHR judged by the SWEs to be credible but not significant.

Diagonal Instrument Rack and a support structure in Therefore, there is no potentially adverse seismic el 87" the Unit 2 Reactor Building Northeast condition and design function of any nearby component Diagonal at elevation 87". The ladder was is not affected.laid horizontally and leaned against the east Reactor Building wall behind the diagonal support steel for the rack and a steel column.Unit 2 The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 523085 The longer contributory span adds less than 10 pounds of Missing U-bolt should be Open Reactor identified an approximately F" diameter weight to each of the adjacent supports.

The adjacent reinstalled.

Due Building NE demineralized water line in the NE Diagonal supports are judged by the SWEs to adequately carry the 11/27/2013 Diagonal on the 87' elevation of the Unit 2 Reactor additional contributory weight and seismic loads of the el 87" Building that appears to be missing a U-bolt small diameter water piping because of the short support connection to a support. There is an angle member spans and stiffness.

Therefore, there is no supported from the platform steel above with potentially adverse seismic condition that would cause two holes drilled in it immediately adjacent the demineralized water piping to affect nearby to the pipe located above the 2P21-F006 components.

valve and the 2H2 1-POOl instrument rack.This support looks like it was intended to be connected to this pipe. There is approximately 14 linear feet of piping between the adjacent supports because of the apparently missing support point.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 47 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)2H Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed one 523140 The flex conduits are clamped down appropriately in The one hole metal Open P414A/B hole metal clamps were not properly holding other locations on the back of the Instrument Racks. clamps should be Due down flex conduit on the back of Instrument Therefore, there is no potentially adverse seismic appropriately positioned 11/27/2013 Racks 2H2 1 -P414A/B located in Unit 2 condition and operability is not impacted.

on the flex conduit.HPCI Room elevation 87'.2X41- Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed that 523328 These two bolts are to be installed in the respective These two bolts are to be Open C010A the bolts missing on the covers of the equipment.

installed in the respective Due following equipment located on the DGB The cover panels are supported with multiple bolts, it is equipment.

11/27/2013 1X41- Roof: There is a bolt missing in the cover judged that the absence of one bolt on each panel will C006E panel of MPL # 2X4 I-C010A. There is a not adversely affect the functionality or the seismic bolt missing in the cover panel of MPL # capability of the dampers.I X4 I -C006E. Note that this potentially adverse condition is common to both units.Carbon Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 523486 The nuts on the U-bolts need to be properly fastened to The nuts on the U-bolts Open Dioxide observed loose nuts on two U-bolts securing secure the loose U-bolts to the pipe and supports.

need to be properly Due piping on the carbon dioxide piping to supports on the fastened to secure the 11/27/2013 Diesel Diesel Generator Building roof Note that loose U-bolts to the pipe Building this potentially adverse condition is common and supports.Roof to both units.2T41-B004B Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed 2T41- 523718 The cooler is support by additional bolts throughout; Install missing bolt. Open B004B RCIC Pump Room Cooler Unit is there are bolts on both side of the missing bolt. The Due missing a bolt. The cooler is located in the additional bolts are about 6 inches from the hole in both 11/27/2013 NW Diagonal of the Unit 2 Reactor Building directions.

Therefore, missing a single bolt will not elevation 104'. adversely affect the functionality or the seismic capability of the housing.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSMIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 48 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers noticed top 523720 This was judged not to be a seismic concern since the Tighten nut. Open Reactor bolt of one of the supports for the ladder in ladder is far from other equipment in the area. Due Building the area has a loose nut. The location ofthis 11/27/2013 el 158' support is Unit 2 Reactor Building elevation 158' against the East wall (RL column).Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed two 524309 Due to the light weight of the cover plate, the remaining Install missing screws. Open Control pull boxes near Penetration 2Z43-H 1064C screws are judged sufficient by the SWEs to keep the Due Building with missing screws on the cover plates. The cover plates secure and not interact with any other SSCs 11/27/2013 el 112' pull boxes are located on the 112' elevation during a seismic event.of the Unit 2 Control Building in the Station Battery 2A Room. There are three out of six cover plate screws missing on one box and one out of six cover plate screws missing on the second box.Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed on 524311 All screws are present securing the corresponding strap Replace missing screw. Open Control the 112' elevation of the Unit 2 Control on the opposite side of the duct. The single remaining Due Building Building in Room C027 that there is a screw screw for the strap in question is judged adequate to 11/27/2013 el 112' missing securing a support strap to one side maintain the connection between the strap and the Room C027 of the HVAC duct near Penetration 2Z43- HVAC and there is no potentially adverse seismic H 182C. The strap wraps under the HVAC condition resulting.

duct and is secured by one screw on the bottom of the duct.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 49 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)2R25-S129 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed on 524321 The remaining four screws are sufficient to hold the light Replace the missing Open the 130' elevation of the Unit 2 Control gauge cover plate, so there is no potentially adverse screw and washer. Due Building in Room C-010 that there is one seismic condition affecting the design function of the 11/27/2013 screw missing and one screw missing a panel.washer on the Q2R25-S129 distribution panel.Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed on 524549 The support strap wraps under the duct and is secured Replace missing screws Open Control the 130' elevation of the Unit 2 Control with one screw fastened into the bottom of the duct. The Due Building Building above transformer I RI 1-S041 that corresponding HVAC duct support strap on the opposite 11/27/2013 el 130' there are three screws missing from a duct side of the duct has all screws fastened.

The adjacent support strap on the side of an HVAC duct. duct support has all screws present and fastened tightly.The support strap wraps under the ducl and is The HVAC duct is in good condition and all joints secured with one screw fastened into the fastened securely in the inspected area. Based on these bottom of the duct. observations, the duct will perform its design function and have no adverse effects on other SSCs.Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed on 524552 The HVAC is supported at the wall by the flanged Replace missing bolts. Open Control the 130' elevation of the Unit 2 Control connection to the fire damper in the wall and by a strap Due Building Building in Room 2C 114 that there are eight support about two feet east of the flanged connection.

11/27/2013 el 130' bolts missing from the north flange of the Therefore, there is negligible load from the duct on the 56" x 30" HVAC duct at Penetration 2Z43- flanged connection.

Eighteen bolts properly installed on H750D on the west wall. the other visible sides of the duct at the flanged connection are judged sufficient to restrain the duct. The fire damper is not adversely affected by the flanged connection with the missing bolts. Therefore, there is no potentially adverse seismic condition created by the missing bolts.

HATCH UNIT2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLuTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 50 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)2R42-S032A Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed a 524998 The 125 Volt Battery Charger has another hinge located Loose hinge nut should Open loose hinge nut on the inside door panel of at the bottom of the door that is properly secured. The be tightened.

Due 2R42-S032A located in the Diesel Building remaining hinge for the door in question is judged 11/27/2013 Switchgear 2E on elevation 130'. adequate to maintain the connection between the door and panel. Therefore, there is no potentially adverse seismic condition resulting.

2El1 -F004 Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) 525108 The grating is considered flexible compared to the valve Portions of the grating Open identified that the 2E I1-F004 Torus Suction operator and valve stem. So damage of the valve is should be removed to Due Valve Motor Operator does not have a unlikely.

But having safety related valve operators this provide a minimum of 11/27/2013 minimum of I" space between the operator close to building structures is not seismically acceptable, about I" clearance at all and the platform grating in NE Diagonal of due to the potential for creating high stresses, locations around the the Unit 2 Reactor Building.

The operator valve operator.

Do not for the subject valve is almost resting on the Therefore, portions of the grating should be removed, as remove any existing platform at the 118'- 10" elevation of the NE required, to provide a minimum of about V' clearance at support steel for the Diagonal Room. The predicted seismic all locations around the valve operator.

Do not remove grating. Additional movement of the valve operator will any existing support steel for the grating. Additional grating support steel may potentially cause impact between the motor grating support steel may be required to support the be required to support operator and the platform grating. grating around the cut out section. the grating around the cut out section.Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed Unit 525163 Due to multiple supports located throughout the area the Clean and coat per Open Nitrogen 2 Nitrogen Storage Tank Area contain some load is minimal on each support. Therefore, supports and procedure.

Due Storage general coatings degradation and surface piping were judged to be seismically adequate by SWEs. 11/27/2013 Tank area corrosion on the nearby pipe supports and piping.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SN H082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHINIA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 51 OF 60 Table 8-1. Potentially Adverse Conditions Component Brief Description of Potentially Adverse CR # Brief Discussion of Analysis/Conclusion Action Taken or Status/ Area Seismic Condition Planned to Address/ (open/Resolve the Condition closed)2T48-R075 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed 525168 These items are light weight components that are Replace missing screws. Open and 2T48- Oxygen Analyzer (2T48-R075) on the wall screwed into a concrete wall. Therefore, the remaining Due R076 has 2 ofthe 4 bolts missing. These missing screws for the analyzers in question are judged adequate 11/27/2013 screws are located in the Unit 2 Nitrogen to maintain the connection between analyzer and the Storage Tank Room of the Reactor Building.

concrete wall, so there is no potentially adverse seismic Also, Oxygen Analyzer (2T48-R076) on the condition resulting.

wall has I of the 4 bolts missing.Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Engineers observed on 525221 The cover plate is very light, and the four remaining Replace missing screws. Open Reactor the 118' elevation of the Southeast diagonal screws have sufficient capacity to restrain the cover Due Building in the Unit 2 Reactor, there is a junction box plate, so there is no potentially adverse seismic 11/27/2013 el 118' above conduit 2MR9314 with two out of six condition.

SE Diagonal cover plate screws missing.Unit 2 Div I Yard Pit Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs)observed one out of four missing screws was observed on the front of the splitter box and one out of four screws missing on the Chemelex box supported against the wall.These missing screws are located in U2 Division I Yard Pit.525473 The remaining screws for the splitter box in question are judged adequate to maintain connection during a seismic event due to the weight of the cover. Chemelex box is a light weight components that is screwed into a concrete wall. Therefore, the Chemelex box in question is judged adequate to maintain the connection between Chemelex box and the concrete wall, so there is no potentially adverse seismic condition resulting.

Replace missing screws.Open Due 11/27/2013 HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC____ ___ ___ ___ ____ _ _ ___ ___ ____ ___ ___ ___ ___ PAGE 52 OF 60 During the course of the walkdowns the team identified issues that, while not rising to the level of a seismic concern, warranted evaluation to determine if programmatic enhancements are necessary.

These issues have been entered into the SNC corrective action program.CR # 516003 -The Seismic Walkdown Engineers (SWEs) identified that drawing B-45555, Version 1.0, "Seismic Configuration Control Requirements General Notes & Specifications", does not provide clear guidance how to restrain gas bottles when stored near safety-related equipment in the plant.CR # 517213 -The Resident Inspector noted that several components inspected had various problems with bolting. He questioned the craftsmanship involving bolted connections as well as supervisory oversight of the maintenance activities involving bolted connections for the plant in general. The condition report was written for Maintenance management to determine the extent of the condition regarding the quality of bolting connections following maintenance activities.

8.2 EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY Plant Hatch Unit 2 had no as-found conditions that would prevent SSCs from performing their required safety functions.

8.3 PLANT CHANGES There were no plant changes that resulted from the as-found conditions.

Plant changes are any planned or newly installed protection and mitigation features (i.e., plant modifications) that result from the Seismic Walkdowns or Area Walk-bys.8.4 OTHER NON-SEISMIC CONDITIONS Housekeeping items were identified during walkdowns and walk-bys that were not potentially seismic adverse conditions.

All such items were brought to the attention of plant personnel and CRs were generated as necessary.

These issues included water on the floor and loose items (small tools, trash, etc.) stored in the plant areas. These items were processed through the site CAP process and are not specifically documented in this report though are available in the Plant CAP database.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FtUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 53 OF 60 9.0 PEER REVIEW 9,1 PEER REVIEW PROCESS The peer review for the Near Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendation 2.3 Seismic Walkdowns was performed in accordance with Section 6 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The peer review included an evaluation of the following activities: " review of the selection of the structures, systems, and components, (SSCs) that are included in the Seismic Walkdown Equipment List (SWEL);" review of a sample of the checklists prepared for the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys;" review of licensing basis evaluations and decisions for entering the potentially adverse conditions in to the plant's Corrective Action Plan (CAP); and* review of the final submittal report.This report provides results of the review process for each review activity as well as the results of the peer review.9.2 PEER REVIEW RESULTS

SUMMARY

9.2.1 Seismic Walkdown Equipment List Development The selection of items for the SWEL underwent peer review according to the guidance in Section 3 of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The SSCs to be evaluated during the Seismic Walkdown were selected as described in Section 6.0 of this report. The list of components was provided to the members of the Peer Review Team, which consisted of all four peer reviewers listed in Section 4.0. The Peer Review Team members independently provided comments to the personnel who selected the components on the SWEL. All comments were addressed and the Peer Review Team reviewed the changes made to the SWEL and the final SWEL, to ensure all recommendations from the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2)were met. Specifically, the peer reviewers confirmed that all SSCs in SWEL I and 2 were Seismic Category I components that do not undergo regular inspections.

Specific considerations for the peer review process are described below for SWEL I and SWEL 2. The peer review check sheet of the SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team verified that the list of SSCs represented a diverse sample of the equipment required to perform the following five safety functions, as specified by EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2):

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC____ ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ ___ PAGE 54 OF 60* Reactor Reactivity Control" Reactor Coolant Pressure Control* Reactor Coolant Inventory Control" Decay Heat Removal and" Containment Function For SWEL 1, the Peer Review Team also verified that the SSCs included an appropriate representation of items having the following sample selection attributes: " Various types of systems" Major new and replacement equipment* Various types of equipment" Various environments" Equipment enhanced based on the findings of the IPEEE and* Risk insight consideration The final SWEL I contains items that perform each of the five safety functions specified by EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Numerous components perform more than one of the safety functions and all five safety functions are well represented by the components on the list.SWEL 1 contains components from all the classes of equipment listed in Appendix B of EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2), except for cases where there are no safety-related components at the plant that fall into that specific equipment class. The list contains major new and replacement items, and items enhanced based on the IPEEE as well as equipment located in various environments and areas of the plant. All major safety-related systems are represented and risk factors were considered in development of the list.For SWEL 2, the Peer Review Team determined that the process to select spent fuel pool related items complied with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). Portions of the spent fuel pool cooling system at Hatch Unit 2 are Seismic Category 1 and all different types of components associated with the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling system are represented on the SWEL 2. The Peer Review Team concluded that the bases for including/excluding items associated with the spent fuel pool were well documented and that the final SWEL 2 complies with EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).In summary, all of the Peer Review comments made during development of SWEL 1 and SWEL 2 were resolved by the team that prepared the SWELs. The resolutions were reviewed HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 55 OF 60 by the Peer Review Team and it was determined that all comments were adequately addressed.

The SWEL was determined to incorporate all comments made by the Peer Review Team during the process.During the process of conducting the walkdowns, a small number of isolated components that were not accessible were removed from the list and in some cases, equivalent items that were determined to be accessible were added. The Peer Review Team reviewed all changes made to the SWELs and determined that these changes had no impact on the adequacy of the SWELs with respect to the provisions contained in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The Peer Review Team concludes that the team that developed the SWELs appropriately followed the SWEL development process described in Section 3 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).The Peer Review Checklist for development of the SWEL is provided in Attachment 2.9.2.2 Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-Bys The Peer Review Team was on-site and very involved with the Seismic Component Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

The Peer Review was performed as follows: " Each of the three walkdown teams performed an initial equipment Seismic Walkdown and an Area Walk-by while being observed by the other teams and at least one member of the walkdown Peer Review Team. The Peer Review Team provided comments and suggestions and answered questions raised by the team performing the walkdown and the other walkdown teams." During the first week of walkdowns, a member of the walkdown Peer Review Team individually accompanied each of the SWE walkdown teams and observed the SWE team conducting the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

The Peer Review Team confirmed first-hand that the SWE walkdown teams performed the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys as described in Section 4 of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). A Peer Review Team member accompanied each of the three walkdown teams on at least one full day of walkdowns.

SWE walkdown teams were encouraged and expected to carry a copy of Section 4 from the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2) and refer to it as necessary, during conduct of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys." During the remaining weeks of walkdowns, at least one Peer Review Team member remained on site until the majority of the walkdowns were completed.

The Peer Review Team member reviewed essentially all the SWCs and AWC prepared by the three walkdown teams. When the walkdown team members had questions or potential

concerns, HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM -VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE56OF60 the Peer Review Team member walked down the specific component or area along with the walkdown team to provide additional input to the seismic evaluations.

At least one member of the walkdown Peer Review Team reviewed the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages to ensure that the checklists were completed in accordance with the guidance provided in the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2). The walkdown Peer Review Team confirmed that the Seismic Walkdown and Area Walk-by packages were consistent, thorough, and the packages accurately reflected the results of the walkdowns and walk-bys as witnessed during the first week of walkdowns.

The Peer Review Team concluded that the SWE teams were familiar with the process for Seismic Equipment Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys.

The SWE teams adequately demonstrated their ability to identify potentially adverse seismic conditions such as adverse anchorage, adverse spatial interaction, other adverse conditions related to anchorage, and perform anchorage configuration verifications, where applicable.

The SWEs also demonstrated the ability to identify seismically-induced flooding interactions and seismically-induced fire interactions.

The SWEs documented the results of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys on the appropriate checklists from Appendix C of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).The Peer Review Team reviewed approximately 40% of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-by checklists and at least one member of the walkdown peer review team reviewed more than 90% of the packages.

Peer review of the Seismic Walkdowns and Area Walk-bys identified minor editorial errors and also some instances where comments in the checklists required additional explanation and information.

Mr. Ashworth and Mr. Whitmore provided verbal feedback to the SWEs to adjust these entries accordingly.

The SWEs understood the comments and incorporated the recommendations and updates from the Peer Review Team.Since the peer review occurred at the start of the Seismic Walkdowns, the peer reviewers were able to provide comments at every stage of the walkdown process to ensure consistency in the reporting for all packages.

Therefore, the Peer Review Team considered the number of completed walkdown packages reviewed to be appropriate.

In addition, all members of the Peer Review team, including Mr. Ashworth, Ms. Brown, Mr. Starck and Mr. Whitmore were available by phone as necessary during the entire Walkdown process.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE57OF60 9.2.3 Licensing Basis Evaluations All potentially adverse seismic conditions identified were immediately entered into the plant CAP for further review and disposition as discussed in Section 8.1 of this report. Therefore, the Seismic Walkdown teams did not perform licensing basis evaluations apart from evaluations performed for the CAP. The Peer Review Team considers this CAP process approach fully comprehensive and acceptable for addressing the potentially adverse seismic conditions observed during the Seismic Walkdowns.

9.2.4 Submittal Report The Peer Review Team was provided with drafts of the submittal report. This allowed the Peer Review Team to verify that the submittal report would meet the objectives and requirements of the EPRI Report 1025286 (Reference 10.2).The Peer Review Team provided both verbal and written comments on the draft reports and was active in ensuring the report was thorough, complete and accurate.

The final version of the submittal report includes all necessary elements of the Peer Review and meets the requirements of the 50.54(f) letter.

HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 58 OF 60

10.0 REFERENCES

10.1 1OCFR50.54(f)

Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 10.2 EPRI 1025286, Seismic Walkdown Guidance for Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.3: Seismic, June 2012 10.3 Generic Letter No. 88-20, Supplement 4, Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities 10.4 Generic Letter No. 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46 10.5 Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG) Procedure:

Generic Implementation Procedure (GIP) for Seismic Verification of Nuclear Power Plant Equipment, Revision 3A, December 2001 10.6 SNC Calculation PRA-BC-H-10-008, Hatch Unit I PRA Model, Revision 4 (applicable to both units)10.7 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 2 10.8 Hatch Letter 5102, dated January 26, 1996, and titled 'Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Response to Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement 4', Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366 10.9 Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, USI A-46 Summary Report 10.10 EPRI Report NP-6041, A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin 10.11 USAS B3 1.1, Code for Power Pressure Piping, 1967 Edition 10.12 USAS B31.7, Nuclear Power Piping, 1969 Edition 10.13 IEEE 323-1971, Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE 59 OF 60 10.14 IEEE 323-1974, Standard for Qualifying Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 10.15 IEEE 344-1971, IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class lE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generation Stations 10.16 IEEE 344-1975, IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generation Stations 10.17 American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC), 7 th Edition HATCH UNIT 2 SEISMIC WALKDOWN REPORT NO. SNCH082-RPT-02 FOR RESOLUTION OF FUKUSHIMA NEAR-TERM VERSION 1.0 TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.3: SEISMIC PAGE60OF60 11.0 ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT I -SEISMIC WALKDOWN EQUIPMENT LISTS ATTACHMENT 2 -UNIT 2 -PEER REVIEW CHECKLIST FOR SWEL I AND 2 ATTACHMENT 3 -SEISMIC WALKDOWN CHECKLISTS ATTACHMENT 4 -AREA WALK-BY CHECKLISTS ATTACHMENT 5 -IPEEE VULNERABILITIES INFORMATION ATTACHMENT 6 -SEISMIC WALKDOWN ENGINEER CERTIFICATIONS Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant -Unit 2 Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdown Report Requested by NRC Letter, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near- Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, dated March 12, 2012 Enclosure 2 Commitment Table Enclosure 2 to NL-12-2269 Type Scheduled Commitment One-Time Continuing Completion Date Action Compliance (If Required)Complete the remaining NTTF 2.3 X 120 days from Seismic Walkdowns for inaccessible the end of 2R23 areas and provide the updated outage, currently walkdown report to the NRC. These scheduled for inaccessible areas are listed in Table March 7, 2015 7-1 and Table 7-2 of the Hatch Unit 2 Seismic Walkdown Report (Enclosure 1 of this letter). These inaccessible areas and scope are shown below: Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope# Item No. Description Remaining Walkdown Scope 1. 2R23-S003 600V STATION SERVICE SWGR 2C & SWO and AWC XFMR 2. 2R23-S004 600V STATION SERVICE SWGR 2D & SWO and AWC XFMR 2R22-S016 250V DC BATTERY SWGR 2A SWC and AWC 4. 2R22-05 4160V SWGR EMERGENCY BUS 2E SWO and AWC 2R22-S007 4160V SWGR EMERGENCY BUS 2G SWC and AWC 6. 2P64-F039 RBCHW COIL INLET ISO AOV SWC and AWC 2P64-F029 RBCHW COIL INLET ISO AOV SWC and AWC 8. 2E11 -F060A LOOP A ISO GATE VALVE SWC and AWC 2E1 1 -F009 SHUTDOWN COOL INBRD ISO SWC and AWC 10. 2T47-BOO7A DW Cooling System Unit SWC and AWC 11. 2T47-B009A DW Cooling System Unit SWC and AWC 12. 2T47-BO08B DW Cooling System Unit SWC and AWC 13. 2P33-B001A H2/02 ANALYZER SAMPLE CHILLER SWC and AWC E2 -1 Enclosure 2 to NL-12-2269 Table 7-1. Inaccessible Equipment per Original Walkdown Scope# Item No. Description Remaining Walkdown Scope 14. 2C71-P001 RPS POWER DISTRIBUTION PANEL SWC and AWC 15. 2R25-SO01 125V DC DIV 2 CAB 2A SWC and AWC 16. 2R25-S002 125V DC DIV 2 CAB 2B SWC and AWC 17. 2R25-S004 125V DC CAB 2D SWC and AWC 18. 2R25-S005 125V DC CAB 2E SWC and AWC 19. 2R25-S036 120/208V AC ESS CAB 2A SWC and AWC 20. 2R25-S064 120/208V AC VITAL CAB 2A INSTR BUS SWC and AWC 21. 2R25-S037 120/208V AC ESS CAB 2B SWC and AWC 22. 2R24-S021 2A RX BLDG 250V DC MCC SWC and AWC 23. 2R24-SO18B 600VAC MCC 2E-B SWC and AWC Table 7-2. Inaccessible Equipment Resulting from Guidance on Opening Cabinets to Inspect for Other Adverse Conditions

1. Item No. Description Remaining Walkdown Scope 2R24-SO1 1 600V MCC 2C ESS DIV 1 Internal of panel 2. 2R24-S022 125/250V DC MCC 2B ESS DIV 2 Internal of panel 3 2P33-B001 B H2/02 ANALYZER SAMPLE CHILLER Internal of panel E2 -2