Text

Issuance of Amendments Nos. 319 and 264, Regarding Revision to Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times TSTF 505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times – RITS
	ML22297A146
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	12/22/2022
From:	John Lamb; NRC/NRR/DORL/LPL2-1
To:	Gayheart C; Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
	EPID L-2021-LLA-0199
	Download: ML22297A146 (149)
	v • d • e

December 22, 2022 Ms. Cheryl A. Gayheart Regulatory Affairs Director Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc.

3535 Colonnade Parkway Birmingham, AL 35243

SUBJECT:

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS NOS. 319 AND 264 REGARDING REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TO ADOPT RISK-INFORMED COMPLETION TIMES TSTF-505, REVISION 2, PROVIDE RISK-INFORMED EXTENDED COMPLETION TIMES - RITSTF INIATIVE 4b (EPID L-2021-LLA-0199)

Dear Ms. Gayheart:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 319 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 and Amendment No. 264 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant (Hatch), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the technical specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated October 26, 2021, as supplemented by letters dated April 29, August 18, September 30, and October 27, 2022.

The amendments revise Hatch, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, TSs requirements to permit the use of risk-informed completion times for actions to be taken when limiting conditions for operation are not met. The changes are based on Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commissions monthly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

John G. Lamb, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch II-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 319 to DPR-57

2. Amendment No. 264 to NPF-5

3. Safety Evaluation cc: Listserv

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA DOCKET NO. 50-321 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 319 Renewed License No. DPR-57

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 1 (the facility) Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 filed by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (the licensee), acting for itself, Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the owners), dated October 26, 2021, as supplemented by letters dated April 29, August 18, September 30, and October 27, 2022, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations;

D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 is hereby amended to read, in part, as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications (Appendix A) and the Environmental Protection Plan (Appendix B), as revised through Amendment No. 319, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 180 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Michael T. Markley, Chief Plant Licensing Branch II-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: December 22, 2022 Michael T.

Markley Digitally signed by Michael T. Markley Date: 2022.12.22 15:26:31 -05'00'

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 319 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-57 DOCKET NO. 50-321 Replace the following pages of the License and the Appendix A, Technical Specifications (TSs) with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Pages Insert Pages License License 4

4 TSs TSs 1.3-11 1.3-11 1.3-12 1.3-12 1.3-13 3.1-17 3.1-17 3.3-1 3.3-1 3.3-1a 3.3-2 3.3-2 3.3-28 3.3-28 3.3-29 3.3-29 3.3-30 3.3-30 3.3-30a 3.3-30a 3.3-31 3.3-31 3.3-32 3.3-32 3.3-33 3.3-33 3.3-35 3.3-35 3.3-36 3.3-36 3.3-36a 3.3-47 3.3-47 3.3-48 3.3-48 3.3-51 3.3-51 3.3-52 3.3-52 3.3-53 3.3-53 3.3-54 3.3-54 3.5-1 3.5-1 3.5-2 3.5-2 3.5-2a 3.5-10 3.5-10 3.6-5 3.6-5 3.6-7 3.6-7 3.6-8 3.6-8

Remove Pages Insert Pages TSs TSs 3.6-9 3.6-9 3.6-10 3.6-10 3.6-11 3.6-11 3.6-12 3.6-12 3.6-25 3.6-25 3.6-26 3.6-26 3.6-27 3.6-27 3.6-28 3.6-28 3.6-29 3.6-29 3.6-30 3.6-30 3.7-1 3.7-1 3.7-2 3.7-2 3.7-3 3.7-3 3.7-4 3.7-4 3.7-5 3.7-5 3.7-5a 3.7-5a 3.8-2 3.8-2 3.8-3 3.8-3 3.8-4 3.8-4 3.8-4a 3.8-4b 3.8-5 3.8-5 3.8-6 3.8-6 3.8-26 3.8-26 3.8-27 3.8-27 3.8-27a 3.8-40 3.8-40 3.8-41 3.8-41 5.0-19 5.0-19 5.0-19a 5.0-19a Renewed License No. DPR-57 Amendment No. 319 for sample analysis or instrument calibration, or associated with radioactive apparatus or components (6)

Southern Nuclear, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.

(C)

This renewed license shall be deemed to contain, and is subject to, the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I: Part 20, Section 30.34 of Part 30, Section 40.41 of Part 40, Section 50.54 of Part 50, and Section 70.32 of Part 70; all applicable provisions of the Act and the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1) Maximum Power Level Southern Nuclear is authorized to operate the facility at steady-state reactor core power levels not in excess of 2,804 megawatts thermal.

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications (Appendix A) and the Environmental Protection Plan (Appendix B), as revised through Amendment No. 319, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

The Surveillance Requirement (SR) contained in the Technical Specifications and listed below, is not required to be performed immediately upon implementation of Amendment No. 195. The SR listed below shall be successfully demonstrated before the time and condition specified:

SR 3.8.1.18 shall be successfully demonstrated at its next regularly scheduled performance.

(3)

Fire Protection Southern Nuclear Operating Company shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c), as specified in the licensee amendment request dated April 4, 2018, supplemented by letters dated May 28, August 9, October 7, and December 13, 2019, and February 5, and March 13, 2020, and as approved in the NRC safety evaluation (SE) dated June 11, 2020. Except where NRC approval for changes or deviations is required by 10 CFR 50.48(c), and provided no other regulation, technical specification, license condition or requirement would require prior NRC approval, the licensee may make changes to the fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission if those changes satisfy the provisions set forth in 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c), the change does not require a change to a technical specification or a license condition, and the criteria listed below are satisfied.

Completion Times 1.3 HATCH UNIT 1 1.3-11 Amendment No. 319 1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.3-7 (continued)

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Verify affected subsystem isolated.

AND A.2 Restore subsystem to OPERABLE status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

B.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND B.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours Required Action A.1 has two Completion Times. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time begins at the time the Condition is entered and each "Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter" interval begins upon performance of Required Action A.1.

If, after Condition A is entered, Required Action A.1 is not met within either the initial 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or any subsequent 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months interval from the previous performance (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2),

Condition B is entered. The Completion Time clock for Condition A does not stop after Condition B is entered, but continues from the time Condition A was initially entered. If Required Action A.1 is met after Condition B is entered, Condition B is exited and operation may continue in accordance with Condition A, provided the Completion Time for Required Action A.2 has not expired.

(continued)

Completion Times 1.3 HATCH UNIT 1 1.3-12 Amendment No. 319 1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.3-8 (continued)

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One Subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Restore Subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

B.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND B.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours When a subsystem is declared inoperable, Condition A is entered. The 7 day Completion Time may be applied as discussed in Example 1.3-2.

However, the licensee may elect to apply the Risk Informed Completion Time Program which permits calculation of a Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) that may be used to complete the Required Action beyond the 7 day Completion Time. The RICT cannot exceed 30 days. After the 7 day Completion Time has expired, the subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within the RICT or Condition B must also be entered.

The Risk Informed Completion Time Program requires recalculation of the RICT to reflect changing plant conditions. For planned changes, the revised RICT must be determined prior to implementation of the change in configuration. For emergent conditions, the revised RICT must be determined within the time limits of the Required Action Completion Time (i.e., not the RICT) or 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after the plant configuration change, whichever is less.

(continued)

Completion Times 1.3 HATCH UNIT 1 1.3-13 Amendment No. 319 1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.3-8 (continued)

If the 7 day Completion Time clock of Condition A has expired and subsequent changes in plant condition result in exiting the applicability of the Risk Informed Completion Time Program without restoring the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status, Condition B is also entered and the Completion Time clocks for Required Actions B.1 and B.2 start.

If the RICT expires or is recalculated to be less than the elapsed time since the Condition was entered and the inoperable subsystem has not been restored to OPERABLE status, Condition B is also entered and the Completion Time clocks for Required Actions B.1 and B.2 start. If the inoperable subsystems are restored to OPERABLE status after Condition B is entered, Condition A is exited, and therefore, the Required Actions of Condition B may be terminated.

IMMEDIATE When "Immediately" is used as a Completion Time, the Required Action COMPLETION should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner.

TIME

SLC System 3.1.7 HATCH UNIT 1 3.1-17 Amendment No. 319 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System LCO 3.1.7 Two SLC subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

Sodium pentaborate solution not within Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-1 or 3.1.7-2, but within the Region B limits.

A.1 Restore sodium pentaborate solution to within Region A limits.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months B.

One SLC subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.

B.1 Restore SLC subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C.

Two SLC subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.

C.1 Restore one SLC subsystem to OPERABLE status.

8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months D.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

D.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-1 Amendment No. 319 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.1.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

According to Table 3.3.1.1-1.

ACTIONS

NOTE-------------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more required channels inoperable.

A.1 Place channel in trip.

OR 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR

NOTE----------

Not applicable to Functions 7.a, 7.b and 10.

In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-1a Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

(continued)

A.2

NOTE-----------

Not applicable for Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, and 2.f.

Place associated trip system in trip.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR

NOTE----------

Not applicable to Functions 7.a, 7.b, and 10.

In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B.

NOTE-------------

Not applicable for Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, and 2.f.

One or more Functions with one or more required channels inoperable in both trip systems.

B.1 Place channel in one trip system in trip.

OR 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months OR

NOTE---------

Not applicable to Functions 7.a, 7.b and 10 In a accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-2 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

(continued)

B.2 Place one trip system in trip.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months OR

NOTE---------

Not applicable to Functions 7.a, 7.b, and 10.

In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C.

One or more Functions with RPS trip capability not maintained.

C.1 Restore RPS trip capability.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months D.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met.

D.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1 for the channel.

Immediately E.

As required by Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.

E.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER to < 27.6%

RTP.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months F.

As required by Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.

F.1 Be in MODE 2.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months G.

As required by Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.

G.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months H.

As required by Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.

H.1 Initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies.

Immediately (continued)

EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-28 Amendment No. 319 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4.1 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.4.1

a.

Two channels per trip system for each EOC-RPT instrumentation Function listed below shall be OPERABLE:

1.

Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) - Closure; and

2.

Turbine Control Valve (TCV) Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low.

OR

b.

LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," limits for inoperable EOC-RPT as specified in the COLR are made applicable.

APPLICABILITY:

THERMAL POWER 27.6% RTP.

ACTIONS

NOTE------------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more required channels inoperable.

A.1 Restore channel to OPERABLE status.

OR 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-29 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

(continued)

A.2

NOTE----------

Not applicable if inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker.

Place channel in trip.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B.

One or more Functions with EOC-RPT trip capability not maintained.

AND MCPR limit for inoperable EOC-RPT not made applicable.

B.1 Restore EOC-RPT trip capability.

OR B.2 Apply the MCPR limit for inoperable EOC-RPT as specified in the COLR.

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 2 hours C.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

C.1

NOTE------------

Only applicable if inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable RPT breaker.

Remove the affected recirculation pump from service.

OR C.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER to < 27.6%

RTP.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months 4 hours

EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-30 Amendment No. 319 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTE------------------------------------------------------------

When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains EOC-RPT trip capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.1.2 Verify TSV - Closure and TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 27.6% RTP.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Allowable Values shall be:

TSV - Closure: 10% closed; and TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low: 600 psig.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.1.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST including breaker actuation.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.1.5

NOTE------------------------------

Breaker interruption time may be assumed from the most recent performance of SR 3.3.4.1.6.

Verify the EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME is within limits.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-30a Amendment No. 319 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.1.6 Determine RPT breaker interruption time.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

ATWS-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-31 Amendment No. 319 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4.2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT)

Instrumentation LCO 3.3.4.2 Two channels per trip system for each ATWS-RPT instrumentation Function listed below shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - ATWS-RPT Level; and

b.

Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - High.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1.

ACTIONS

NOTE------------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more channels inoperable.

A.1 Restore channel to OPERABLE status.

OR 14 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

ATWS-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-32 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

(continued)

A.2

NOTE------------

Not applicable if inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker.

Place channel in trip.

14 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B.

One Function with ATWS-RPT trip capability not maintained.

B.1 Restore ATWS-RPT trip capability.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months C.

Both Functions with ATWS-RPT trip capability not maintained.

C.1 Restore ATWS-RPT trip capability for one Function.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months D.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

D.1

NOTE----------

Only applicable if inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable RPT breaker.

Remove the affected recirculation pump from service.

OR D.2 Be in MODE 2.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 6 hours

ATWS-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-33 Amendment No. 319 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTE------------------------------------------------------------

When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains ATWS-RPT trip capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Allowable Values shall be:

a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level -

ATWS-RPT Level: -73 inches; and

b.

Reactor Steam Dome Pressure -

High: 1175 psig.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.2.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST including breaker actuation.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-35 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

(continued)

B.2

NOTE------------

Only applicable for Functions 3.a and 3.b.

Declare High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System inoperable.

AND B.3 Place channel in trip.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery of loss of HPCI initiation capability 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OR

NOTE----------

Not applicable to Function 2.e.

In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C.

As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1.

C.1

NOTE----------

Only applicable for Functions 1.c, 2.c, 2.d, and 2.f.

Declare supported feature(s) inoperable.

AND 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery of loss of initiation capability for feature(s) in both divisions (continued)

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-36 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

(continued)

C.2 Restore channel to OPERABLE status.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OR

NOTE---------

Not applicable to Function 3.c.

In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program D.

As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1.

D.1

NOTE-----------

Only applicable if HPCI pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool.

Declare HPCI System inoperable.

AND D.2.1 Place channel in trip.

OR D.2.2 Align the HPCI pump suction to the suppression pool.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery of loss of HPCI initiation capability 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (continued)

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-36a Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.

As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1.

E.1

NOTE----------

Only applicable for Functions 1.d and 2.g.

Declare supported feature(s) inoperable.

AND E.2 Restore channel to OPERABLE status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery of loss of initiation capability for subsystems in both divisions 7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-47 Amendment No. 319 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5.3 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5.3 The RCIC System instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.

ACTIONS

NOTE------------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more channels inoperable.

A.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.3-1 for the channel.

Immediately B.

As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.3-1.

B.1 Declare RCIC System inoperable.

AND B.2 Place channel in trip.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C.

As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.3-1.

C.1 Restore channel to OPERABLE status.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (continued)

RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-48 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.3-1.

D.1

NOTE-------------

Only applicable if RCIC pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool.

Declare RCIC System inoperable.

AND D.2.1 Place channel in trip.

OR D.2.2 Align RCIC pump suction to the suppression pool.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months E.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B, C, or D not met.

E.1 Declare RCIC System inoperable.

Immediately

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-51 Amendment No. 319 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6.1 The primary containment isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

According to Table 3.3.6.1-1.

ACTIONS

NOTES-----------------------------------------------------------

1.

Penetration flow paths except for 18 inch purge valve penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2.

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more required channels inoperable.

A.1

NOTE--------------

Only applicable to Functions 2.a, 2.b, 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b.

Place channel in trip.

AND 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR

NOTE----------

Not applicable to Functions 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b.

In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-52 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

(continued)

A.2

NOTE-------------

Not applicable to Functions 2.a, 2.b, 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b.

Place channel in trip.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OR

NOTE-----------

Not applicable to Functions 2.c, 2.d, 2.e, and 6.a.

In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B.

NOTE-------------

Not applicable for Function 5.c.

One or more automatic Functions with isolation capability not maintained.

B.1 Restore isolation capability.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months C.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met.

C.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1 for the channel.

Immediately D.

As required by Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

D.1 Isolate associated main steam line (MSL).

OR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND D.2.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 12 hours 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-53 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.

As required by Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

E.1 Be in MODE 2.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months F.

As required by Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

F.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path(s).

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months G.

As required by Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

G.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path(s).

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months H.

As required by Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

OR Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition F or G not met.

H.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND H.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours I.

As required by Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

I.1 Declare Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System inoperable.

OR I.2 Isolate the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 1 hour J.

As required by Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

J.1 Initiate action to restore channel to OPERABLE status.

Immediately

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.3-54 Amendment No. 319 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTES-----------------------------------------------------------

1.

Refer to Table 3.3.6.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Primary Containment Isolation Function.

2.

When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.1.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.1.6 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

ECCS - Operating 3.5.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-1 Amendment No. 319 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating LCO 3.5.1 Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function of six of seven safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3, except high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and ADS valves are not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressure 150 psig.

ACTIONS

NOTE-------------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to HPCI.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable.

OR One LPCI pump in both LPCI subsystems inoperable.

A.1 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

B.1

NOTE-----------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (continued)

ECCS - Operating 3.5.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-2 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

One LPCI pump in one subsystem or one LPCI pump in both LPCI subsystems inoperable.

AND One CS subsystem inoperable.

C.1 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program D.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C not met.

D.1 Be in MODE 2.

AND D.2 Be in MODE 3.

AND D.3 Be in MODE 4.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 12 hours 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months E.

HPCI System inoperable.

E.1 Verify by administrative means RCIC System is OPERABLE.

AND E.2 Restore HPCI System to OPERABLE status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 14 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program F.

HPCI System inoperable.

AND Condition A entered.

F.1 Restore HPCI System to OPERABLE status.

OR 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

ECCS - Operating 3.5.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-2a Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F.

(continued)

F.2 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program G.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition E or F not met.

G.1

NOTE-------------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in Mode 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months H.

Two or more ADS valves inoperable.

H.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND H.2 Reduce reactor steam dome pressure to 150 psig.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours I.

Two or more low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or C.

OR HPCI System and two or more ADS valves inoperable.

I.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.

Immediately

RCIC System 3.5.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.5-10 Amendment No. 319 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.3 RCIC System LCO 3.5.3 The RCIC System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.

ACTIONS

NOTE-------------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to RCIC.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

RCIC System inoperable.

A.1 Verify by administrative means high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)

System is OPERABLE.

AND A.2 Restore RCIC System to OPERABLE status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 14 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

B.1

NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

Primary Containment Air Lock 3.6.1.2 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-5 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

(continued)

B.3

NOTE-------------

Air lock doors in high radiation areas or areas with limited access due to inerting may be verified locked closed by administrative means.

Verify an OPERABLE door is locked closed.

Once per 31 days C.

Primary containment air lock inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B.

C.1 Initiate action to evaluate primary containment overall leakage rate per LCO 3.6.1.1, using current air lock test results.

AND C.2 Verify a door is closed.

AND C.3 Restore air lock to OPERABLE status.

Immediately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 24 hours OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program D.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

D.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND D.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-7 Amendment No. 319 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)

LCO 3.6.1.3 Each PCIV, except reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers, shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3 ACTIONS

NOTES-----------------------------------------------------------

1.

Penetration flow paths except for 18 inch purge valve penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2.

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

3.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by PCIVs.

4.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," when PCIV leakage results in exceeding overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

NOTE---------------

Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs.

One or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable for reasons other than Condition D.

A.1

NOTE-------------

Not applicable to main steam line.

Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.

AND 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-8 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

(continued)

A.2

NOTE--------------

Only applicable to main steam line.

Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.

AND A.3

NOTES-----------

1. Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2. Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by administrative means.

Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated.

8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program Once per 31 days following isolation for isolation devices outside primary containment AND Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days, for isolation devices inside primary containment.

(continued)

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-9 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

NOTE---------------

Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs.

One or more penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs inoperable for reasons other than Condition D.

B.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months C.

NOTE-------------

Only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one PCIV.

One or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable for reasons other than Condition D.

C.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

AND C.2

NOTES----------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2. Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by administrative means.

Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months except for excess flow check valve (EFCV) line and penetrations with a closed system AND 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for EFCV line and penetrations with a closed system Once per 31 days following isolation (continued)

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-10 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

One or more secondary containment bypass leakage rate, MSIV leakage rate, or EFCV leakage rate not within limit.

D.1 Restore leakage to within limit.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for secondary containment bypass leakage AND 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for MSIV leakage AND 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for EFCV leakage E.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, or D not met.

E.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND E.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.1

NOTE-----------------------------

Not required to be met when the 18 inch primary containment purge valves are open for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA, or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open.

Verify each 18 inch primary containment purge valve is closed.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-11 Amendment No. 319 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.2

NOTES---------------------------

1.

Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2.

Not required to be met for PCIVs that are open under administrative controls.

Verify each primary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located outside primary containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.3

NOTES----------------------------

1.

Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2.

Not required to be met for PCIVs that are open under administrative controls.

Verify each primary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is located inside primary containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.

Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days SR 3.6.1.3.4 Verify continuity of the traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valve explosive charge.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.5 Verify the isolation time of each power operated, automatic PCIV, except for MSIVs, is within limits.

In accordance with the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM (continued)

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-12 Amendment No. 319 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.6 Verify the isolation time of each MSIV is 3 seconds and 5 seconds.

In accordance with the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM SR 3.6.1.3.7 Verify each automatic PCIV, excluding EFCVs, actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.8 Verify each reactor instrumentation line EFCV (of a representative sample) actuates to restrict flow to within limits.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.9 Remove and test the explosive squib from each shear isolation valve of the TIP system.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.10 Verify combined MSIV leakage rate for all four main steam lines is 100 scfh when tested at 28.0 psig and < 50.8 psig.

OR Verify combined MSIV leakage rate for all four main steam lines is 144 scfh when tested at 50.8 psig.

In accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.11 Deleted SR 3.6.1.3.12 Cycle each 18 inch excess flow isolation damper to the fully closed and fully open position.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.13 Verify the combined leakage rate for all secondary containment bypass leakage paths is 0.02 La when pressurized to Pa.

In accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

RHR Suppression Pool Cooling 3.6.2.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-25 Amendment No. 319 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling LCO 3.6.2.3 Two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Restore RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

B.1

NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months C.

Two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems inoperable.

C.1 Restore one RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem to OPERABLE status.

8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months D.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C not met.

D.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND D.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours

RHR Suppression Pool Cooling 3.6.2.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-26 Amendment No. 319 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.3.1 Verify each RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.2.3.2 Verify RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.2.3.3 Verify each required RHR pump develops a flow rate 7700 gpm through the associated heat exchanger while operating in the suppression pool cooling mode.

In accordance with the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM

RHR Suppression Pool Spray 3.6.2.4 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-27 Amendment No. 319 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray LCO 3.6.2.4 Two RHR suppression pool spray subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One RHR suppression pool spray subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Restore RHR suppression pool spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B.

Two RHR suppression pool spray subsystems inoperable.

B.1 Restore one RHR suppression pool spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months C.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

C.1

NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

RHR Suppression Pool Spray 3.6.2.4 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-28 Amendment No. 319 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.4.1 Verify each RHR suppression pool spray subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.2.4.2 Verify RHR suppression pool spray subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.2.4.3 Verify each suppression pool spray nozzle is unobstructed.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

RHR Drywell Spray 3.6.2.5 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-29 Amendment No. 319 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.5 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Drywell Spray LCO 3.6.2.5 Two RHR drywell spray subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One RHR drywell spray subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Restore RHR drywell spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B.

Two RHR drywell spray subsystems inoperable.

B.1 Restore one RHR drywell spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months C.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

C.1

NOTE--------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

RHR Drywell Spray 3.6.2.5 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-30 Amendment No. 319 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.5.1 Verify each RHR drywell spray subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.2.5.2 Verify RHR drywell spray subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.2.5.3 Verify each drywell spray nozzle is unobstructed.

Following maintenance which could result in nozzle blockage.

RHRSW System 3.7.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-1 Amendment No.319 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System LCO 3.7.1 Two RHRSW subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One RHRSW pump inoperable.

A.1 Restore RHRSW pump to OPERABLE status.

30 days B.

One RHRSW pump in each subsystem inoperable.

B.1 Restore one RHRSW pump to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C.

One RHRSW subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.

NOTE-----------------

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.7, Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System - Hot Shutdown, for RHR shutdown cooling made inoperable by RHRSW System.

C.1 Restore RHRSW subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

RHRSW System 3.7.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-2 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met.

D.1

NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months E.

Both RHRSW subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition B.

NOTE------------------

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.7 for RHR shutdown cooling made inoperable by RHRSW System.

E.1 Restore one RHRSW subsystem to OPERABLE status.

8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months F.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition E not met.

F.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND F.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.1.1 Verify each RHRSW manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

PSW System and UHS 3.7.2 HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-3 Amendment No. 319 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.2 Plant Service Water (PSW) System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)

LCO 3.7.2 Two PSW subsystems and UHS shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One PSW pump inoperable.

A.1 Restore PSW pump to OPERABLE status.

30 days B.

One PSW turbine building isolation valve inoperable.

B.1 Restore PSW turbine building isolation valve to OPERABLE status.

30 days C.

One PSW pump in each subsystem inoperable.

C.1 Restore one PSW pump to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program D.

One PSW turbine building isolation valve in each subsystem inoperable.

D.1 Restore one PSW turbine building isolation valve to OPERABLE status.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

PSW System and UHS 3.7.2 HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-4 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, or D not met.

E.1

NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months F.

One PSW subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Conditions A and B.

NOTES-----------------

1.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources -

Operating," for diesel generator made inoperable by PSW System.

2.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.7, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Hot Shutdown," for RHR shutdown cooling made inoperable by PSW System.

F.1 Restore the PSW subsystem to OPERABLE status.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

PSW System and UHS 3.7.2 HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-5 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME G.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition F not met.

OR Both PSW subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Conditions C and D.

OR UHS inoperable.

G.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND G.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.2.1 Verify the water level in each PSW pump well of the intake structure is 60.5 ft mean sea level (MSL).

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months when water level is 61.7 ft MSL SR 3.7.2.2

NOTE-------------------------------

Isolation of flow to individual components or systems does not render PSW System inoperable.

Verify each PSW subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow paths servicing safety related systems or components, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

PSW System and UHS 3.7.2 HATCH UNIT 1 3.7-5a Amendment No. 319 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.2.3 Verify each PSW subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated initiation signal, except for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the actuated position.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-2 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS

NOTE-------------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to DGs.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One required offsite circuit inoperable.

A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for OPERABLE required offsite circuits.

AND A.2 Declare required feature(s) with no offsite power available inoperable when the redundant required feature(s) are inoperable.

AND A.3 Restore required offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months from discovery of no offsite power to one 4160 V ESF bus concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s) 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-3 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

One Unit 1 or the swing DG inoperable.

B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for OPERABLE required offsite circuit(s).

AND B.2 Declare required feature(s), supported by the inoperable DG, inoperable when the redundant required feature(s) are inoperable.

AND B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE DG(s) are not inoperable due to common cause failure.

OR B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2.a for OPERABLE DG(s).

AND B.4 Restore DG to OPERABLE status 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months from discovery of Condition B concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s) 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 24 hours 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-4 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

One required Unit 2 DG inoperable C.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for OPERABLE required offsite circuit(s).

AND C.2 Declare required feature(s), supported by the inoperable DG, inoperable when the redundant required feature(s) are inoperable.

AND C.3.1 Determine OPERABLE DG(s) are not inoperable due to common cause failure.

OR C.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2.a for OPERABLE DG(s).

AND C.4 Restore required DG to OPERABLE status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months from discovery of Condition C concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s) 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 24 hours 7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-5 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

Two or more required offsite circuits inoperable.

D.1 Declare required feature(s) with no offsite power available inoperable when the redundant required feature(s) are inoperable.

AND D.2 Restore all but one required offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months from discovery of Condition D concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s) 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program E.

One required offsite circuit inoperable.

AND One required DG inoperable.

NOTE------------------

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems - Operating,"

when Condition E is entered with no AC power source to one 4160 V ESF bus.

E.1 Restore required offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

OR E.2 Restore required DG to OPERABLE status.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-6 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F.

Two or more (Unit 1 and swing) DGs inoperable.

F.1 Restore all but one Unit 1 and swing DGs to OPERABLE status 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months G.

No DGs capable of supplying power to any Unit 1 LPCI valve load center.

G.1 Restore one DG capable of supplying power to Unit 1 LPCI valve load center to OPERABLE status.

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months H.

Required Action and Associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, D, E, F, or G not met.

H.1

NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months I.

One or more required offsite circuits and two or more required DGs inoperable.

OR Two or more required offsite circuits and one required DG inoperable.

I.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.

Immediately

DC Sources - Operating 3.8.4 HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-26 Amendment No. 319 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating LCO 3.8.4 The following DC electrical power subsystems shall be OPERABLE:

a.

The Unit 1 Division 1 and Division 2 station service DC electrical power subsystems;

b.

The Unit 1 and the swing DGs DC electrical power subsystems; and

c.

The Unit 2 DG DC electrical power subsystems needed to support the equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System,"

and LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating."

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

Swing DG DC electrical power subsystem inoperable due to performance of SR 3.8.4.3 or SR 3.8.6.6.

OR One or more required Unit 2 DG DC electrical power subsystems inoperable.

A.1 Restore DG DC electrical power subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

DC Sources - Operating 3.8.4 HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-27 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

Required Unit 1 DG DC battery charger on one subsystem inoperable.

OR Required swing DG DC battery charger inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.

B.1 Restore battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage.

AND B.2 Verify battery float current is 5 amps.

AND B.3 Restore battery charger(s) to OPERABLE status.

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 72 hours OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C.

One Unit 1 DG DC electrical power subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition B.

OR Swing DG DC electrical power subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B.

C.1 Restore DG DC electrical power subsystem to OPERABLE status.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

DC Sources - Operating 3.8.4 HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-27a Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

One or more required Unit 1 station service DC battery chargers on one subsystem inoperable.

D.1 Restore battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage.

AND D.2 Verify battery float current is 20 amps.

AND D.3 Restore battery charger(s) to OPERABLE status.

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 72 hours OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program E.

One Unit 1 station service DC electrical power subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition D.

E.1 Restore station service DC electrical power subsystem to OPERABLE status.

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program F.

Required Action and Associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, D, or E not met.

F.1

NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months G.

Two or more DC electrical power subsystems inoperable that result in a loss of function.

G.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.

Immediately

Distribution Systems - Operating 3.8.7 HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-40 Amendment No. 319 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating LCO 3.8.7 The following AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Unit 1 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems comprised of:

1.

4160 V essential buses 1E, 1F, and 1G;

2.

600 V essential buses 1C and 1D;

3.

120/208 V essential cabinets 1A and 1B;

4.

120/208 V instrument buses 1A and 1B;

5.

125/250 V DC station service buses 1A and 1B;

6.

DG DC electrical power distribution subsystems;

7.

Critical Instrumentation Buses 1A and 1B; and

b.

Unit 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System," and LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating."

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more required Unit 2 AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable.

A.1 Restore required Unit 2 AC and DC subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

Distribution Systems - Operating 3.8.7 HATCH UNIT 1 3.8-41 Amendment No. 319 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

One or more (Unit 1 or swing bus) DG DC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable.

B.1 Restore DG DC electrical power distribution subsystem to OPERABLE status.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C.

One or more (Unit 1 or swing bus) AC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable.

C.1 Restore AC electrical power distribution subsystem to OPERABLE status.

8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program D.

One Unit 1 station service DC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable.

D.1 Restore Unit 1 station service DC electrical power distribution subsystem to OPERABLE status.

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program E.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, or D not met.

E.1

NOTE-----------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months F.

Two or more electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable that result in a loss of function.

F.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.

Immediately

Programs and Manuals 5.5 HATCH UNIT 1 5.0-19 Amendment No. 319 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.15 Battery Monitoring and Maintenance Program (continued)

4.

In Regulatory Guide 1.129, Regulatory Position 3, Subsection 5.4.1, State of Charge Indicator, the following statements in paragraph (d) may be omitted: When it has been recorded that the charging current has stabilized at the charging voltage for three consecutive hourly measurements, the battery is near full charge. These measurements shall be made after the initially high charging current decreases sharply and the battery voltage rises to approach the charger output voltage.

5.

In lieu of RG 1.129, Regulatory Position 7, Subsection 7.6, Restoration, the following may be used: Following the test, record the float voltage of each cell of the string.

b.

The program shall include the following provisions:

1.

Actions to restore battery cells with float voltage < 2.13 V;

2.

Actions to determine whether the float voltage of the remaining battery cells is 2.13 V when the float voltage of a battery cell has been found to be < 2.13 V;

3.

Actions to equalize and test battery cells that had been discovered with electrolyte level below the top of the plates;

4.

Limits on average electrolyte temperature, battery connection resistance, and battery terminal voltage; and

5.

A requirement to obtain specific gravity readings of all cells at each discharge test, consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

5.5.16 Risk Informed Completion Time Program This program provides controls to calculate a Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) and must be implemented in accordance with NEI 06-09-A, Revision 0, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines. The program shall include the following:

a.

The RICT may not exceed 30 days;

b.

A RICT may only be utilized in MODE 1; (Continued)

Programs and Manuals 5.5 HATCH UNIT 1 5.0-19a Amendment No. 319 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.16 Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

c.

When a RICT is being used, any change to the plant configuration, as defined in NEI 06-09-A, Appendix A, must be considered for the effect on the RICT.

1.

For planned changes, the revised RICT must be determined prior to implementation of the change in configuration.

2.

For emergent conditions, the revised RICT must be determined within the time limits of the Required Action Completion Time (i.e., not the RICT) or 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after the plant configuration change, whichever is less.

3.

Revising the RICT is not required if the plant configuration change would lower plant risk and would result in a longer RICT.

d.

For emergent conditions, if the extent of condition evaluation for inoperable structures, systems, or components (SSCs) is not complete prior to exceeding the Completion Time, the RICT shall account for the increased possibility of common cause failure (CCF) by either:

1.

Numerically accounting for increased possibility of CCF in the RICT calculation; or

2.

Risk Management Actions (RMAs) not already credited in the RICT calculation shall be implemented that support redundant or diverse SSCs that perform the function(s) of the inoperable SSCs, and, if practicable, reduce the frequency of initiating events that challenge the function(s) performed by the inoperable SSCs.

e.

The risk assessment approaches and methods shall be acceptable to the NRC. The plant PRA shall be based on the as-built, as-operated, and maintained plant; and reflect the operating experience at the plant, as specified in Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 2. Methods to assess the risk from extending the Completion Times must be PRA methods used to support this license amendment, or other methods approved by the NRC for generic use; and any change in the PRA methods to assess risk that are outside these approval boundaries require prior NRC approval.

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA DOCKET NO. 50-366 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 264 Renewed License No. NPF-5

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 2 (the facility) Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 filed by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (the licensee), acting for itself, Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the owners), dated October 26, 2021, as supplemented by letters dated April 29, August 18, September 30, and October 27, 2022, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations;

D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 is hereby amended to read, in part, as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications (Appendix A) and the Environmental Protection Plan (Appendix B), as revised through Amendment No. 264, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 180 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Michael T. Markley, Chief Plant Licensing Branch II-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: December 22, 2022 Michael T.

Markley Digitally signed by Michael T. Markley Date: 2022.12.22 15:28:50 -05'00'

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 264 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-5 DOCKET NO. 50-366 Replace the following pages of the License and the Appendix A, Technical Specifications (TSs) with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Pages Insert Pages License License 4

4 TSs TSs 1.3-11 1.3-11 1.3-12 1.3-12 1.3-13 3.1-17 3.1-17 3.3-1 3.3-1 3.3-1a 3.3-2 3.3-2 3.3-28 3.3-28 3.3-29 3.3-29 3.3-30 3.3-30 3.3-30a 3.3-30a 3.3-31 3.3-31 3.3-32 3.3-32 3.3-33 3.3-33 3.3-35 3.3-35 3.3-36 3.3-36 3.3-36a 3.3-47 3.3-47 3.3-48 3.3-48 3.3-51 3.3-51 3.3-52 3.3-52 3.3-53 3.3-53 3.3-54 3.3-54 3.3-54a 3.3-54a 3.5-1 3.5-1 3.5-2 3.5-2 3.5-2a 3.5-3 3.5-3 3.5-11 3.5-11 3.6-5 3.6-5

Remove Pages Insert Pages TSs TSs 3.6-7 3.6-7 3.6-8 3.6-8 3.6-9 3.6-9 3.6-10 3.6-10 3.6-11 3.6-11 3.6-12 3.6-12 3.6-25 3.6-25 3.6-26 3.6-26 3.6-27 3.6-27 3.6-28 3.6-28 3.6-29 3.6-29 3.6-30 3.6-30 3.7-1 3.7-1 3.7-2 3.7-2 3.7-3 3.7-3 3.7-4 3.7-4 3.7-5 3.7-5 3.7-5a 3.7-5a 3.8-2 3.8-2 3.8-3 3.8-3 3.8-4 3.8-4 3.8-4a 3.8-4b 3.8-5 3.8-5 3.8-5a 3.8-5b 3.8-6 3.8-6 3.8-26 3.8-26 3.8-27 3.8-27 3.8-27a 3.8-40 3.8-40 3.8-41 3.8-41 5.0-19 5.0-19 5.0-19a 5.0-19a

Renewed License No. NPF-5 Amendment No. 264 (6)

Southern Nuclear, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.

(C)

This renewed license shall be deemed to contain, and is subject to, the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I: Part 20, Section 30.34 of Part 30, Section 40.41 of Part 40, Section 50.54 of Part 50, and Section 70.32 of Part 70; all applicable provisions of the Act and the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and the additional conditions2 specified or incorporated below:

(1)

Maximum Power Level Southern Nuclear is authorized to operate the facility at steady sate reactor core power levels not in excess of 2,804 megawatts thermal, in accordance with the conditions specified herein.

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications (Appendix A) and the Environmental Protection Plan (Appendix B); as revised through Amendment No. 264 are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

(3)

Additional Conditions The matters specified in the following conditions shall be completed to the satisfaction of the Commission within the stated time periods following the issuance of the renewed license or within the operational restrictions indicated. The removal of these conditions shall be made by an amendment to the license supported by a favorable evaluation by the Commission.

(a)

Fire Protection Southern Nuclear Operating Company shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c),

as specified in the licensee amendment request dated April 4, 2018, supplemented by letters dated May 28, August 9, October 7, and December 13, 2019, and February 5, and March 13, 2020, and as approved in the NRC safety evaluation (SE) dated June 11, 2020.

Except where NRC approval for changes or deviations is required by 10 CFR 50.48(c), and provided no other regulation, technical specification, license condition or requirement would 2

The original licensee authorized to possess, use, and operate the facility with Georgia Power Company (GPC). Consequently, certain historical references to GPC remain in certain license conditions.

Completion Times 1.3 HATCH UNIT 2 1.3-11 Amendment No. 264 1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.3-7 (continued)

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Verify affected subsystem isolated.

AND A.2 Restore subsystem to OPERABLE status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

B.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND B.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours Required Action A.1 has two Completion Times. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months Completion Time begins at the time the Condition is entered and each "Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter" interval begins upon performance of Required Action A.1.

If, after Condition A is entered, Required Action A.1 is not met within either the initial 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or any subsequent 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months interval from the previous performance (plus the extension allowed by SR 3.0.2),

Condition B is entered. The Completion Time clock for Condition A does not stop after Condition B is entered, but continues from the time Condition A was initially entered. If Required Action A.1 is met after Condition B is entered, Condition B is exited and operation may continue in accordance with Condition A, provided the Completion Time for Required Action A.2 has not expired.

(continued)

Completion Times 1.3 HATCH UNIT 2 1.3-12 Amendment No. 264 1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.3-8 (continued)

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Restore subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

B.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND B.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours When a subsystem is declared inoperable, Condition A is entered. The 7 day Completion Time may be applied as discussed in Example 1.3-2.

However, the licensee may elect to apply the Risk Informed Completion Time Program which permits calculation of a Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) that may be used to complete the Required Action beyond the 7 day Completion Time. The RICT cannot exceed 30 days. After the 7 day Completion Time has expired, the subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within the RICT or Condition B must also be entered.

The Risk Informed Completion Time Program requires recalculation of the RICT to reflect changing plant conditions. For planned changes, the revised RICT must be determined prior to implementation of the change in configuration. For emergent conditions, the revised RICT must be determined within the time limits of the Required Action Completion Time (i.e., not the RICT) or 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after the plant configuration change, whichever is less.

(continued)

Completion Times 1.3 HATCH UNIT 2 1.3-13 Amendment No. 264 1.3 Completion Times EXAMPLES EXAMPLE 1.3-8 (continued)

If the 7 day Completion Time clock of Condition A has expired and subsequent changes in plant condition result in exiting the applicability of the Risk Informed Completion Time Program without restoring the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status, Condition B is also entered and the Completion Time clocks for Required Actions B.1 and B.2 start.

If the RICT expires or is recalculated to be less than the elapsed time since the Condition was entered and the inoperable subsystem has not been restored to OPERABLE status, Condition B is also entered and the Completion Time clocks for Required Actions B.1 and B.2 start. If the inoperable subsystems are restored to OPERABLE status after Condition B is entered, Condition A is exited, and therefore, the Required Actions of Condition B may be terminated.

IMMEDIATE When "Immediately" is used as a Completion Time, the Required Action COMPLETION should be pursued without delay and in a controlled manner.

TIME

SLC System 3.1.7 HATCH UNIT 2 3.1-17 Amendment No. 264 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System LCO 3.1.7 Two SLC subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

Sodium pentaborate solution not within Region A limits of Figure 3.1.7-1 or 3.1.7-2, but within the Region B limits.

A.1 Restore sodium pentaborate solution to within Region A limits.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months B.

One SLC subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.

B.1 Restore SLC subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C.

Two SLC subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.

C.1 Restore one SLC subsystem to OPERABLE status.

8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months D.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

D.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-1 Amendment No. 264 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.1.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

According to Table 3.3.1.1-1.

ACTIONS

NOTE-----------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more required channels inoperable.

A.1 Place channel in trip.

OR 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR

NOTE---------

Not applicable to Functions 7.a, 7.b, and 10.

In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-1a Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

(continued)

A.2

NOTE-----------

Not applicable for Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, and 2.f.

Place associated trip system in trip.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR

NOTE---------

Not applicable to Functions 7.a, 7.b, and 10.

In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B

NOTE-----------

Not applicable for Functions 2.a, 2.b, 2.c, 2.d, and 2.f.

One or more Functions with one or more channel inoperable in both trip systems.

B.1 Place channel in one trip system in trip.

OR 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months OR

NOTE---------

Not applicable to Functions 7.a, 7.b, and 10.

In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-2 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

(continued)

B.2 Place one trip system in trip.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months OR

NOTE-------

Not applicable to Functions 7.a, 7.b, and 10.

In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C.

One or more Functions with RPS trip capability not maintained.

C.1 Restore RPS trip capability.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months D.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met.

D.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1 for the channel.

Immediately E.

As required by Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.

E.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER to < 27.6%

RTP.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months F.

As required by Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.

F.1 Be in MODE 2.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months G.

As required by Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.

G.1 Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months H.

As required by Required Action D.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.1.1-1.

H.1 Initiate action to fully insert all insertable control rods in core cells containing one or more fuel assemblies.

Immediately (continued)

EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-28 Amendment No. 264 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4.1 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.4.1

a.

Two channels per trip system for each EOC-RPT instrumentation Function listed below shall be OPERABLE:

1.

Turbine Stop Valve (TSV) - Closure; and

2.

Turbine Control Valve (TCV) Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low.

OR

b.

LCO 3.2.2, "MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR)," limits for inoperable EOC-RPT as specified in the COLR are made applicable.

APPLICABILITY:

THERMAL POWER 27.6% RTP.

ACTIONS

NOTE----------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more required channels inoperable.

A.1 Restore channel to OPERABLE status.

OR 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-29 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued)

A.2

NOTE-----------

Not applicable if inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker.

Place channel in trip.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B.

One or more Functions with EOC-RPT trip capability not maintained.

AND MCPR limit for inoperable EOC-RPT not made applicable.

B.1 Restore EOC-RPT trip capability.

OR B.2 Apply the MCPR limit for inoperable EOC-RPT as specified in the COLR.

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months 2 hours C.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

C.1

NOTE------------

Only applicable if inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable RPT breaker.

Remove the affected recirculation pump from service.

OR C.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER to < 27.6%

RTP.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months 4 hours

EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-30 Amendment No. 264 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTE----------------------------------------------------------

When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains EOC-RPT trip capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.1.2 Verify TSV - Closure and TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is 27.6% RTP.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Allowable Values shall be:

TSV - Closure: 10% closed; and TCV Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low: 600 psig.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.1.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST including breaker actuation.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.1.5

NOTE-------------------------------

Breaker interruption time may be assumed from the most recent performance of SR 3.3.4.1.6.

Verify the EOC-RPT SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME is within limits.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

EOC-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-30a Amendment No. 264 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.1.6 Determine RPT breaker interruption time.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

ATWS-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-31 Amendment No. 264 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4.2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT)

Instrumentation LCO 3.3.4.2 Two channels per trip system for each ATWS-RPT instrumentation Function listed below shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level - ATWS-RPT Level; and

b.

Reactor Steam Dome Pressure - High.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1.

ACTIONS

NOTE------------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more channels inoperable.

A.1 Restore channel to OPERABLE status.

OR 14 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

ATWS-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-32 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

(continued)

A.2

NOTE-----------

Not applicable if inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable breaker.

Place channel in trip 14 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B.

One Function with ATWS-RPT trip capability not maintained.

B.1 Restore ATWS-RPT trip capability.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months C.

Both Functions with ATWS-RPT trip capability not maintained.

C.1 Restore ATWS-RPT trip capability for one Function.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months D.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

D.1

NOTE----------

Only applicable if inoperable channel is the result of an inoperable RPT breaker.

Remove the affected recirculation pump from service.

OR D.2 Be in MODE 2.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 6 hours

ATWS-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-33 Amendment No. 264 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTE----------------------------------------------------------

When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains ATWS-RPT trip capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The Allowable Values shall be:

a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level -

ATWS-RPT Level: -73 inches; and

b.

Reactor Steam Dome Pressure -

High: 1175 psig.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.4.2.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST including breaker actuation.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-35 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued)

B.2

NOTE------------

Only applicable for Functions 3.a and 3.b.

Declare High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)

System inoperable.

AND B.3 Place channel in trip.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery of loss of HPCI initiation capability 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OR

NOTE-----------

Not applicable to Function 2.e.

In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C.

As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1.

C.1

NOTE-----------

Only applicable for Functions 1.c, 2.c, 2.d, and 2.f.

Declare supported feature(s) inoperable.

AND 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery of loss of initiation capability for feature(s) in both divisions (continued)

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-36 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. (continued)

C.2 Restore channel to OPERABLE status.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OR

NOTE----------

Not applicable to Function 3.c.

In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program D.

As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1.

D.1

NOTE-----------

Only applicable if HPCI pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool.

Declare HPCI System inoperable.

AND D.2.1 Place channel in trip.

OR D.2.2 Align the HPCI pump suction to the suppression pool.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery of loss of HPCI initiation capability 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months (continued)

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-36a Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.

As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1.

E.1

NOTE-----------

Only applicable if for Functions 1.d and 2.g.

Declare supported feature(s) inoperable.

AND E.2 Restore channel to OPERABLE STATUS.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery of loss of initiation capability for subsystems in both divisions 7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-47 Amendment No. 264 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5.3 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5.3 The RCIC System instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.5.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.

ACTIONS

NOTE------------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more channels inoperable.

A.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.3-1 for the channel.

Immediately B.

As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.3-1.

B.1 Declare RCIC System inoperable.

AND B.2 Place channel in trip.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-48 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.3-1.

C.1 Restore channel to OPERABLE status.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months D.

As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.3-1.

D.1

NOTE------------

Only applicable if RCIC pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool.

Declare RCIC System inoperable.

AND D.2.1 Place channel in trip.

OR D.2.2 Align RCIC pump suction to the suppression pool.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months from discovery of loss of RCIC initiation capability 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months E.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition B, C, or D not met.

E.1 Declare RCIC System inoperable.

Immediately

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-51 Amendment No. 264 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6.1 The primary containment isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

According to Table 3.3.6.1-1.

ACTIONS

NOTES-----------------------------------------------------------

1.

Penetration flow paths except for 18 inch purge valve penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2.

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each channel.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more required channels inoperable.

A.1 --------------NOTE---------

Only applicable to Functions 2.a, 2.b, 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b.

Place channel in trip.

AND 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR

NOTE-------

Not applicable to Functions 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b.

In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.

(continued)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 (continued)

HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-52 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued)

A.2

NOTE-----------

Not applicable to Functions 2.a, 2.b, 6.b, 7.a, and 7.b.

Place channel in trip.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OR

NOTE-----------

Not applicable to Functions 2.c, 2.d, 2.e, and 6.a.

In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program.

B.

NOTE--------------

Not applicable for Function 5.c.

One or more automatic Functions with isolation capability not maintained.

B.1 Restore isolation capability.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months C.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met.

C.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1 for the channel.

Immediately D.

As required by Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

D.1 Isolate associated main steam line (MSL).

OR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND D.2.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 12 hours 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-53 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.

As required by Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

E.1 Be in MODE 2.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months F.

As required by Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

F.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path(s).

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months G.

As required by Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

G.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path(s).

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months H.

As required by Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

OR Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition F or G not met.

H.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND H.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours I.

As required by Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

I.1 Declare Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System inoperable.

OR I.2 Isolate the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 1 hour J.

As required by Required Action C.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.6.1-1.

J.1 Initiate action to restore channel to OPERABLE status.

Immediately

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-54 Amendment No. 264 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTES-----------------------------------------------------------

1.

Refer to Table 3.3.6.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Primary Containment Isolation Function.

2.

When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.1.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.3.6.1.6 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.3-54a Amendment No. 264 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.7

NOTE-------------------------------

Channel sensors are excluded.

Verify the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME is within limits.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

ECCS - Operating 3.5.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-1 Amendment No. 264 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating LCO 3.5.1 Each ECCS injection/spray subsystem and the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) function of six of seven safety/relief valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3, except high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and ADS valves are not required to be OPERABLE with reactor steam dome pressure 150 psig.

ACTIONS

NOTE--------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to HPCI.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem inoperable.

OR One LPCI pump in both LPCI subsystems inoperable.

A.1 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

B.1

NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months (continued)

ECCS - Operating 3.5.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-2 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

One LPCI pump in one subsystem or one LPCI pump in both LPCI subsystems inoperable.

AND One CS subsystem inoperable.

C.1 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program D.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C not met.

D.1 Be in MODE 2.

AND D.2 Be in MODE 3.

AND D.3 Be in MODE 4.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months 12 hours 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months E.

HPCI System inoperable.

E.1 Verify by administrative means RCIC System is OPERABLE.

AND E.2 Restore HPCI System to OPERABLE status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 14 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program F.

HPCI System inoperable.

AND Condition A entered.

F.1 Restore HPCI System to OPERABLE status.

OR 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

ECCS - Operating 3.5.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-2a Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. (continued)

F.2 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program G.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition E or F not met.

G.1

NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months H.

Two or more ADS valves inoperable.

H.1 Be in MODE 3 AND H.2 Reduce reactor steam dome pressure to 150 psig.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours I.

Two or more low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or C.

OR HPCI System and two or more ADS valves inoperable.

I.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.

Immediately

ECCS - Operating 3.5.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-3 Amendment No. 264 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.1.1 Verify, for each ECCS injection/spray subsystem, locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.1.2

NOTES-----------------------------

1. Low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) subsystems may be considered OPERABLE during alignment and operation for decay heat removal with reactor steam dome pressure less than the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) low pressure permissive pressure in MODE 3, if capable of being manually realigned and not otherwise inoperable.

2. Not required to be met for system vent flowpaths opened under administrative control.

Verify each ECCS injection/spray subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.5.1.3 Verify ADS air supply header pressure is 90 psig.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

RCIC System 3.5.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.5-11 Amendment No. 264 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS), RPV WATER INVENTORY CONTROL, AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM 3.5.3 RCIC System LCO 3.5.3 The RCIC System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 with reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.

ACTIONS

NOTE--------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to RCIC.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

RCIC System inoperable.

A.1 Verify by administrative means high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)

System is OPERABLE.

AND A.2 Restore RCIC System to OPERABLE status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 14 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

B.1

NOTE-----------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

Primary Containment Air Lock 3.6.1.2 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-5 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

(continued)

B.3

NOTE------------

Air lock doors in high radiation areas or areas with limited access due to inerting may be verified locked closed by administrative means.

Verify an OPERABLE door is locked closed.

Once per 31 days C.

Primary containment air lock inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B.

C.1 Initiate action to evaluate primary containment overall leakage rate per LCO 3.6.1.1, using current air lock test results.

AND C.2 Verify a door is closed.

AND C.3 Restore air lock to OPERABLE status.

Immediately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 24 hours OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program D.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

D.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND D.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-7 Amendment No. 264 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)

LCO 3.6.1.3 Each PCIV, except reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers, shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

NOTES------------------------------------------------------------

1.

Penetration flow paths except for 18 inch purge valve penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2.

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

3.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by PCIVs.

4.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," when PCIV leakage results in exceeding overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

NOTE---------------

Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs.

One or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable for reasons other than Condition D.

A.1

NOTE----------

Not applicable to main steam line.

Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.

AND 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-8 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

(continued)

A.2

NOTE-----------

Only applicable to main steam line.

Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.

AND A.3

NOTES-----------

1. Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2. Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by administrative means.

Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated.

8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program Once per 31 days following isolation devices outside primary containment AND Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days, for isolation devices inside primary containment (continued)

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-9 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

NOTE---------------

Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs.

One or more penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs inoperable for reasons other than Condition D.

B.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months C.

NOTE-------------

Only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one PCIV.

One or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable for reasons other than Condition D.

C.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

AND C.2

NOTES----------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2. Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by administrative means.

Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months except for excess flow check valve (EFCV) line and penetrations with a closed system AND 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for EFCV line and penetrations with a closed system Once per 31 days following isolation (continued)

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-10 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

One or more secondary containment bypass leakage rate, MSIV leakage rate, or EFCV leakage rate not within limit.

D.1 Restore leakage to within limit.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for secondary containment bypass leakage AND 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for MSIV leakage AND 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for EFCV leakage E.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, or D not met.

E.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND E.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.1

NOTE------------------------------

Not required to be met when the 18 inch primary containment purge valves are open for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA, or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open.

Verify each 18 inch primary containment purge valve is closed.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-11 Amendment No. 264 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.2

NOTES---------------------------

1.

Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2.

Not required to be met for PCIVs that are open under administrative controls.

Verify each primary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located outside primary containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.3

NOTES----------------------------

1.

Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2.

Not required to be met for PCIVs that are open under administrative controls.

Verify each primary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is located inside primary containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.

Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days SR 3.6.1.3.4 Verify continuity of the traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valve explosive charge.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.5 Verify the isolation time of each power operated, automatic PCIV, except for MSIVs, is within limits.

In accordance with the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM (continued)

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-12 Amendment No. 264 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.6 Verify the isolation time of each MSIV is 3 seconds and 5 seconds.

In accordance with the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM SR 3.6.1.3.7 Verify each automatic PCIV, excluding EFCVs, actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.8 Verify each reactor instrumentation line EFCV (of a representative sample) actuates to restrict flow to within limits.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.9 Remove and test the explosive squib from each shear isolation valve of the TIP system.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.10 Verify the combined leakage rate for all secondary containment bypass leakage paths is 0.02 La when pressurized to Pa.

In accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.11 Verify combined MSIV leakage rate for all four main steam lines is 100 scfh when tested at 28.8 psig and 47.3 psig.

OR Verify combined MSIV leakage rate for all four main steam lines is 144 scfh when tested at 47.3 psig.

In accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.12 Deleted SR 3.6.1.3.13 Cycle each 18 inch excess flow isolation damper to the fully closed and fully open position.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

RHR Suppression Pool Cooling 3.6.2.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-25 Amendment No. 264 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling LCO 3.6.2.3 Two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Restore RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

B.1

NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months C.

Two RHR suppression pool cooling subsystems inoperable.

C.1 Restore one RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem to OPERABLE status.

8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months D.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition C not met.

D.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND D.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours

RHR Suppression Pool Cooling 3.6.2.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-26 Amendment No. 264 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.3.1 Verify each RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.2.3.2 Verify RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.2.3.3 Verify each required RHR pump develops a flow rate 7700 gpm through the associated heat exchanger while operating in the suppression pool cooling mode.

In accordance with the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM

RHR Suppression Pool Spray 3.6.2.4 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-27 Amendment No. 264 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray LCO 3.6.2.4 Two RHR suppression pool spray subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One RHR suppression pool spray subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Restore RHR suppression pool spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B.

Two RHR suppression pool spray subsystems inoperable.

B.1 Restore one RHR suppression pool spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months C.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

C.1

NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

RHR Suppression Pool Spray 3.6.2.4 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-28 Amendment No. 264 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.4.1 Verify each RHR suppression pool spray subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.2.4.2 Verify RHR suppression pool spray subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.2.4.3 Verify each suppression pool spray nozzle is unobstructed.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

RHR Drywell Spray 3.6.2.5 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-29 Amendment No. 264 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.2.5 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Drywell Spray LCO 3.6.2.5 Two RHR drywell spray subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One RHR drywell spray subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Restore RHR drywell spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B.

Two RHR drywell spray subsystems inoperable.

B.1 Restore one RHR drywell spray subsystem to OPERABLE status.

8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months C.

Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

C.1

NOTE-------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

RHR Drywell Spray 3.6.2.5 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-30 Amendment No. 264 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.2.5.1 Verify each RHR drywell spray subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.2.5.2 Verify RHR drywell spray subsystem locations susceptible to gas accumulation are sufficiently filled with water.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.2.5.3 Verify each drywell spray nozzle is unobstructed.

Following maintenance which could result in nozzle blockage.

RHRSW System 3.7.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-1 Amendment No. 264 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System LCO 3.7.1 Two RHRSW subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One RHRSW pump inoperable.

A.1 Restore RHRSW pump to OPERABLE status.

30 days B.

One RHRSW pump in each subsystem inoperable.

B.1 Restore one RHRSW pump to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C.

One RHRSW subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.

NOTE-----------------

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.7, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

Shutdown Cooling System - Hot Shutdown," for RHR shutdown cooling made inoperable by RHRSW System.

C.1 Restore RHRSW subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

RHRSW System 3.7.1 5HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-2 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met.

D.1

NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months E.

Both RHRSW subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Condition B.

NOTE------------------

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.7 for RHR shutdown cooling made inoperable by RHRSW System.

E.1 Restore one RHRSW subsystem to OPERABLE status.

8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months F.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition E not met.

F.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND F.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.1.1 Verify each RHRSW manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position or can be aligned to the correct position.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

PSW System and UHS 3.7.2 HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-3 Amendment No. 264 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.2 Plant Service Water (PSW) System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)

LCO 3.7.2 Two PSW subsystems and UHS shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One PSW pump inoperable.

A.1 Restore PSW pump to OPERABLE status.

30 days B.

One PSW turbine building isolation valve inoperable.

B.1 Restore PSW turbine building isolation valve to OPERABLE status.

30 days C.

One PSW pump in each subsystem inoperable.

C.1 Restore one PSW pump to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program D.

One PSW turbine building isolation valve in each subsystem inoperable.

D.1 Restore one PSW turbine building isolation valve to OPERABLE status.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

PSW System and UHS 3.7.2 HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-4 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, or D not met.

E.1

NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months F.

One PSW subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Conditions A and B.

NOTES----------------

1.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources -

Operating," for diesel generator made inoperable by PSW System.

2.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.7, "Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Hot Shutdown," for RHR shutdown cooling made inoperable by PSW System.

F.1 Restore the PSW subsystem to OPERABLE status.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

PSW System and UHS 3.7.2 HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-5 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME G.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition F not met.

OR Both PSW subsystems inoperable for reasons other than Conditions C and D.

OR UHS inoperable.

G.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND G.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.2.1 Verify the water level in each PSW pump well of the intake structure is 60.5 ft mean sea level (MSL).

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program AND 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months when water level is 61.7 ft MSL SR 3.7.2.2

NOTE------------------------------

Isolation of flow to individual components or systems does not render PSW System inoperable.

Verify each PSW subsystem manual, power operated, and automatic valve in the flow paths servicing safety related systems or components, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

PSW System and UHS 3.7.2 HATCH UNIT 2 3.7-5a Amendment No. 264 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.2.3 Verify each PSW subsystem actuates on an actual or simulated initiation signal, except for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the actuated position.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-2 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS

NOTE--------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable to DGs.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One required offsite circuit inoperable.

A.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for OPERABLE required offsite circuits.

AND A.2 Declare required feature(s) with no offsite power available inoperable when the redundant required feature(s) are inoperable.

AND A.3 Restore required offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months from discovery of no offsite power to one 4160 V ESF bus concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s) 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-3 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

One Unit 2 or the swing DG inoperable.

B.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for OPERABLE required offsite circuits.

AND B.2 Declare required feature(s), supported by the inoperable DG, inoperable when the redundant required feature(s) are inoperable.

AND B.3.1 Determine OPERABLE DG(s) are not inoperable due to common cause failure.

OR B.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2.a for OPERABLE DG(s)

AND B.4 Restore DG to OPERABLE status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months from discovery of Condition B concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s) 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 24 hours 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-4 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

One required Unit 1 DG inoperable.

C.1 Perform SR 3.8.1.1 for OPERABLE required offsite circuit(s).

AND C.2 Declare required feature(s), supported by the inoperable DG, inoperable when the redundant required feature(s) are inoperable.

AND C.3.1 Determine OPERABLE DG(s) are not inoperable due to common cause failure.

OR C.3.2 Perform SR 3.8.1.2.a for OPERABLE DG(s).

AND C.4.

Restore required DG to OPERABLE status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months thereafter 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months from discovery of Condition C concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s) 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 24 hours 7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-5 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

Two or more required offsite circuits inoperable.

D.1 Declare required feature(s) with no offsite power available inoperable when the redundant required feature(s) are inoperable.

AND D.2 Restore all but one required offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months from discovery of Condition D concurrent with inoperability of redundant required feature(s) 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program E.

One required offsite circuit inoperable.

AND One required DG inoperable.

NOTE-----------------

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.7, "Distribution Systems -

Operating," when Condition E is entered with no AC power source to one 4160 V ESF bus.

E.1 Restore required offsite circuit to OPERABLE status.

OR E.2 Restore required DG to OPERABLE status.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-6 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F.

Two or more (Unit 2 and swing) DGs inoperable.

F.1 Restore all but one Unit 2 and swing DGs to OPERABLE status.

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months G.

No DGs capable of supplying power to any Unit 2 LPCI valve load center.

G.1 Restore one DG capable of supplying power to Unit 2 LPCI valve load center to OPERABLE status.

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months H.

Required Action and Associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, D, E, F, or G not met.

H.1

NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months I.

One or more required offsite circuits and two or more required DGs inoperable.

OR Two or more required offsite circuits and one required DG inoperable.

I.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.

Immediately

DC Sources - Operating 3.8.4 HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-26 Amendment No. 264 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating LCO 3.8.4 The following DC electrical power subsystems shall be OPERABLE:

a.

The Unit 2 Division 1 and Division 2 station service DC electrical power subsystems;

b.

The Unit 2 and the swing DGs DC electrical power subsystems; and

c.

The Unit 1 DG DC electrical power subsystems needed to support the equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System";

LCO 3.7.4, "Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC)

System"; LCO 3.7.5, "Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System";

and LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating."

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

Swing DG DC electrical power subsystem inoperable due to performance of SR 3.8.4.3 or SR 3.8.6.6.

OR One or more required Unit 1 DG DC electrical power subsystems inoperable.

A.1 Restore DG DC electrical power subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

DC Sources - Operating 3.8.4 HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-27 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

Required Unit 2 DG DC battery charger on one subsystem inoperable.

OR Required swing DG DC battery charger inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.

B.1 Restore battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage.

AND B.2 Verify battery float current is 5 amps.

AND B.3 Restore battery charger(s) to OPERABLE status.

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 72 hours OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C.

One Unit 2 DG DC electrical power subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition B.

OR Swing DG DC electrical power subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B.

C.1 Restore DG DC electrical power subsystem to OPERABLE status.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

DC Sources - Operating 3.8.4 HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-27a Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D.

One or more required Unit 2 station service DC battery chargers on one subsystem inoperable.

D.1 Restore battery terminal voltage to greater than or equal to the minimum established float voltage.

AND D.2 Verify battery float current is 20 amps.

AND D.3 Restore battery charger(s) to OPERABLE status.

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 72 hours OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program E.

One Unit 2 station service DC electrical power subsystem inoperable for reasons other than Condition D.

E.1 Restore station service DC electrical power subsystem to OPERABLE status.

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program F.

Required Action and Associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, D, or E not met.

F.1

NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months G.

Two or more DC electrical power subsystems inoperable that result in a loss of function.

G.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.

Immediately

Distribution Systems - Operating 3.8.7 HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-40 Amendment No. 264 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating LCO 3.8.7 The following AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Unit 2 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems comprised of:

1.

4160 V essential buses 2E, 2F, and 2G;

2.

600 V essential buses 2C and 2D;

3.

120/208 V essential cabinets 2A and 2B;

4.

120/208 V instrument buses 2A and 2B;

5.

125/250 V DC station service buses 2A and 2B;

6.

DG DC electrical power distribution subsystems;

7.

Critical instrumentation Buses 2A and 2B; and

b.

Unit 1 AC and DC electrical power distribution subsystems needed to support equipment required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.6.4.3, "Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System"; LCO 3.7.4, "Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) System";

LCO 3.7.5, "Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) System"; and LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating."

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One or more required Unit 1 AC or DC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable.

A.1 Restore required Unit 1 AC and DC subsystem(s) to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

Distribution Systems - Operating 3.8.7 HATCH UNIT 2 3.8-41 Amendment No. 264 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B.

One or more (Unit 2 or swing bus) DG DC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable.

B.1 Restore DG DC electrical power distribution subsystem to OPERABLE status.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program C.

One or more (Unit 2 or swing bus) AC electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable.

C.1 Restore AC electrical power distribution subsystem to OPERABLE status.

8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program D.

One Unit 2 station service DC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable.

D.1 Restore Unit 2 station service DC electrical power distribution subsystem to OPERABLE status.

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program E.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, or D not met.

E.1

NOTE---------

LCO 3.0.4.a is not applicable when entering MODE 3.

Be in MODE 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months F.

Two or more electrical power distribution subsystems inoperable that result in a loss of function.

F.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3.

Immediately

Programs and Manuals 5.5 HATCH UNIT 2 5.0-19 Amendment No. 264 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.15 Battery Monitoring and Maintenance Program (continued)

4.

In Regulatory Guide 1.129, Regulatory Position 3, Subsection 5.4.1, State of Charge Indicator, the following statements in paragraph (d) may be omitted: When it has been recorded that the charging current has stabilized at the charging voltage for three consecutive hourly measurements, the battery is near full charge. These measurements shall be made after the initially high charging current decreases sharply and the battery voltage rises to approach the charger output voltage.

5.

In lieu of RG 1.129, Regulatory Position 7, Subsection 7.6, Restoration, the following may be used: Following the test, record the float voltage of each cell of the string.

b.

The program shall include the following provisions:

1.

Actions to restore battery cells with float voltage < 2.13 V;

2.

Actions to determine whether the float voltage of the remaining battery cells is 2.13 V when the float voltage of a battery cell has been found to be < 2.13 V;

3.

Actions to equalize and test battery cells that had been discovered with electrolyte level below the top of the plates;

4.

Limits on average electrolyte temperature, battery connection resistance, and battery terminal voltage; and

5.

A requirement to obtain specific gravity readings of all cells at each discharge test, consistent with manufacturer recommendations.

5.5.16 Risk Informed Completion Time Program This program provides controls to calculate a Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) and must be implemented in accordance with NEI 06-09-A, Revision 0, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines. The program shall include the following:

a.

The RICT may not exceed 30 days;

b.

A RICT may only be utilized in MODE 1; (continued)

Programs and Manuals 5.5 HATCH UNIT 2 5.0-19a Amendment No. 264 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.16 Risk Informed Completion Time Program (continued)

c.

When a RICT is being used, any change to the plant configuration, as defined in NEI 06-09-A, Appendix A, must be considered for the effect on the RICT.

1.

For planned changes, the revised RICT must be determined prior to implementation of the change in configuration.

2.

For emergent conditions, the revised RICT must be determined within the time limits of the Required Action Completion Time (i.e.,

not the RICT) or 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after the plant configuration change, whichever is less.

3.

Revising the RICT is not required if the plant configuration change would lower plant risk and would result in a longer RICT.

d.

For emergent conditions, if the extent of condition evaluation for inoperable structures, systems, or components (SSCs) is not complete prior to exceeding the Completion Time, the RICT shall account for the increased possibility of common cause failure (CCF) by either:

1.

Numerically accounting for the increased possibility of CCF in the RICT calculation; or

2.

Risk Management Actions (RMAs) not already credited in the RICT calculation shall be implemented that support redundant or diverse SSCs that perform the function(s) of the inoperable SSCs, and, if practicable, reduce the frequency of initiating events that challenge the function(s) performed by the inoperable SSCs.

e.

The risk assessment approaches and methods shall be acceptable to the NRC. The plant PRA shall be based on the as-built, as-operated, and maintained plant; and reflect the operating experience at the plant, as specified in Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 2. Methods to assess the risk from extending the Completion Times must be PRA methods used to support this license amendment, or other methods approved by the NRC for generic use; and any change in the PRA methods to assess risk that are outside these approval boundaries require prior NRC approval.

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 319 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-57 AND AMENDMENT NO. 264 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-5 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-321 AND 50-366

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated October 26, 2021 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. ML21300A153), as supplemented by letters dated April 29, 2022 (ML22119A144), August 18, 2022 (ML22230C465), September 30, 2022 (ML22273A096), and October 27, 2022 (ML22300A260), Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC, the licensee) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units Nos. 1 and 2 (Hatch). The amendments would revise Hatch technical specification (TS) requirements to permit the use of risk-informed completion times (RICTs) for actions to be taken when limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) are not met. The proposed changes are based on Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b, dated July 2, 2018 (ML18183A493). The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) issued a final revised model safety evaluation (SE) to be used when preparing a plant-specific SE of an LAR to adopt TSTF-505, Revision 2, on November 21, 2018 (ML18269A041).

SNC has proposed variations from the TS changes approved in TSTF-505, Revision 2, which are provided in Section 2.3 of the LAR, and evaluated in Section 3.1 of this SE.

The NRC staff participated in a regulatory audit in April 2022 to ascertain the information needed to support its review of the application and to develop requests for additional information (RAIs), as needed. Following the regulatory audit, SNC submitted supplement letters dated April 29, 2022, August 18, 2022, and September 30, 2022, that included additional information resulting from the audit. On July 7, 2022, the NRC staff issued an audit summary (ML22186A002).

As part of its review of the supplemental information, the NRC staff issued RAIs by email correspondence dated May 20, and June 6, 2022 (ML22140A119 and ML22157A354, respectively). SNC provided responses to the RAIs by letter dated August 18, 2022, and a supplement, dated September 30, 2022. The supplement dated October 27, 2022, provided revised marked-up TS pages to account for Hatch Amendment Nos. 318 and 263 (ML22293A030).

The supplemental letters dated April 29, August 18, September 30, and October 27, 2022, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staffs original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register on December 28, 2021 (86 FR 73819).

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, provides the general provisions for the licensing of production and utilization facilities. The general provisions include but are not limited to establishing the regulatory requirements that a licensee must adhere to for the submittal of a license application. The NRC staff has identified the following applicable Sections within 10 CFR Part 50, along with the provision provided in 10 CFR Part 20, for the NRC staffs review of SNCs application to adopt TSTF-505, Revision 2:

10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, paragraphs (c)(2), Limiting conditions for operation, and (c)(5), Administrative controls.

10 CFR 50.55a, Codes and standards, paragraph (h), Protection and safety systems.

10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants (i.e., the Maintenance Rule).

10 CFR Part 20, Standards for Protection Against Radiation.

NRC Regulatory Guides (RGs) provide one way to ensure that the codified regulations continue to be met. The NRC staff considered the following guidance, along with industry guidance endorsed by the NRC, during its review of the proposed changes:

RG 1.200, Revision 2, An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities, (ML090410014).

RG 1.174, Revision 3, An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis, (ML13009A190).

RG 1.177, Revision 2, Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications, (ML20164A034).

NUREG-1855, Revision 1, Guidance on the Treatment of Uncertainties Associated with PRAs in Risk-Informed Decisionmaking, Final Report (ML17062A466).

NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR [Light-Water Reactor] Edition (SRP), Section 19.2, Review of Risk Information Used to Support Permanent Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis: General Guidance, (ML071700658), and Section 16.1, Risk-Informed Decision Making: Technical Specifications, (ML070380228).

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Topical Report (TR) 06-09-A, Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 4b, Risk-Managed Technical Specifications (RMTS) Guidelines

(ML122860402), which provides guidance for risk-informed TSs. The NRC staff issued a final SE approving NEI TR 06-09 on May 17, 2007 (ML071200238).

NUREG-1433, Revision 5, Standard Technical Specifications General Electric BWR/4 Plants, Volume 1, Specifications, (ML21272A357).

SNCs submittal is supported by an evaluation of the results of peer reviews and self-assessments to demonstrate consistency with the NRC guidance in Revision 2 of RG 1.200 (ML090410014). The RG has been updated to Revision 3 (ML20238B871). The NRC evaluated the licensees submittal for consistency with NRC-approved NEI TR 06-09-A and did not evaluate applicability against RG 1.200, Revision 3.

2.1 Description of Risk-Informed Completion Time Program The TS LCOs are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. When an LCO is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial or required action permitted by the TSs until the condition can be met. Specified with each stated remedial action (ACTIONS) are Condition(s), Required Action(s), Completion Time(s) (CT), and associated Note(s). The CTs are referred to as the front stops in the context of this SE. For certain Conditions, the TSs require exiting the Mode of Applicability of an LCO (i.e., shut down the reactor).

SNCs submittal requested approval to add an RICT Program to the Administrative Controls section of the Hatch TSs and modify selected CTs to permit extending the CTs, provided risk is assessed and managed as described in NEI TR 06-09-A. Consistent with Table 1, Conditions Requiring Additional Technical Justification NUREG-1433, BWR/4 STS [Standard Technical Specifications], of TSTF-505, Rev. 2. In Section 2.3 of the LAR, the licensee discusses 10 variations from the TS changes described in TSTF-505 or NRC model safety evaluation. The NRC staff review of these variations and the justification is provided in Section 3.1 of this SE.

SNC is proposing no changes to the design of the plant or any operating parameter, and no new changes to the design basis as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). The effect of the proposed changes when implemented will allow TS CTs to vary, based on the risk significance of the given plant configuration (i.e., the equipment out of service at any given time), provided that the system(s) retain(s) the capability to perform the applicable safety function(s) without any further failures (e.g., one train of a two-train system is inoperable).

These restrictions on inoperability of all required trains of a system ensure that consistency with the defense-in-depth (DID) philosophy is maintained by following existing guidance when the capability to perform TS safety function(s) is lost.

The proposed RICT Program uses plant-specific operating experience for component reliability and availability data. Thus, the allowances permitted by the RICT Program are directly reflective of actual component performance in conjunction with component risk significance.

For TS use and application:

Example 1.3-8 is proposed to be added to TS 1.3, Completion Times, and would read as follows:

EXAMPLE 1.3-8 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Restore subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program B. Required Action and associated Completion Time not met.

B.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND B.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours.

When a subsystem is declared inoperable, Condition A is entered.

The 7 day Completion Time may be applied as discussed in Example 1.3-2. However, the licensee may elect to apply the Risk Informed Completion Time Program which permits calculation of a Risk Informed Completion Time (RICT) that may be used to complete the Required Action beyond the 7 day Completion Time.

The RICT cannot exceed 30 days. After the 7 day Completion Time has expired, the subsystem must be restored to OPERABLE status within the RICT or Condition B must also be entered.

The Risk Informed Completion Time Program requires recalculation of the RICT to reflect changing plant conditions. For planned changes, the revised RICT must be determined prior to implementation of the change in configuration. For emergent conditions, the revised RICT must be determined within the time limits of the Required Action Completion Time (i.e., not the RICT) or 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after the plant configuration change, whichever is less.

If the 7 day Completion Time clock of Condition A has expired and subsequent changes in plant condition result in exiting the applicability of the Risk Informed Completion Time Program without restoring the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status, Condition B is also entered, and the Completion Time clocks for Required Actions B.1 and B.2 start.

If the RICT expires or is recalculated to be less than the elapsed time since the Condition was entered and the inoperable subsystem has not been restored to OPERABLE status, Condition B is also entered and the Completion Time clocks for Required Actions B.1 and B.2 start. If the inoperable subsystems are restored to OPERABLE status after Condition B is entered, Conditions A is exited, and therefore, the Required Actions of Condition B may be terminated.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

An acceptable approach for making risk-informed decisions about proposed TS changes, including both permanent and temporary changes, is to demonstrate that the proposed licensing basis (LB) changes meet the five key principles provided in Section C of RG 1.174, Revision 3 (ML17317A256), and the three-tiered approach outlined in Section C of RG 1.177, Revision 2 (ML20164A034).

The key principles as described in RG 1.174, Revision 3, are:

1. The proposed licensing basis change meets the current regulations unless it is explicitly related to a requested exemption (i.e., a specific exemption under 10 CFR 50.12).

2. The proposed licensing basis change is consistent with the defense-in-depth philosophy.

3. The proposed licensing basis change maintains sufficient safety margins.

4. When proposed licensing basis changes result in an increase in risk, the increases should be small and consistent with the intent of the Commissions policy statement on safety goals for the operations of nuclear power plants.

5. The impact of the proposed licensing basis change should be monitored using performance measurement strategies.

The key principles in RG 1.177, Revision 2, are:

1. Compliance with Current Regulations

2. Technical Specification Change Is Consistent with the Defense-in-Depth Philosophy

3. Technical Specification Change Maintains Sufficient Safety Margin

4. Evaluation of Risk Impact

5. Technical Specification Change Monitored Using Performance Measurement Strategies For the review of the Hatch TSTF-505 LAR, the NRC staff used the following key principles and tiers:

Principle 1:

The proposed LB change meets the current regulations unless it is

explicitly related to a requested exemption.

Principle 2:

The proposed LB change is consistent with the DID philosophy.

Principle 3:

The proposed LB change maintains sufficient safety margins.

Principle 4:

When the proposed LB change results in an increase in risk, the increase should be small and consistent with the intent of the Commissions policy statement on safety goals for the operations of nuclear power plants.

Tier 1: Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Capability and Insights Tier 2: Avoidance of High Risk-Significant Plant Configurations Tier 3: Risk-Informed Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP)

Principle 5:

The impact of the proposed LB change should be monitored by using performance measures strategies.

3.1 Method of NRC Staff Review Each of the key principles and tiers are addressed in NEI TR 06-09-A and approved in the final model SE issued by the NRC for TSTF-505, Revision 2. The industry guidance provides a methodology for extending existing CTs, and, thereby, delay exiting the operational mode of applicability or taking Required Actions if risk is assessed and managed within the limits and programmatic requirements established by a RICT Program. The NRC staffs evaluation of the licensees proposed use of RICTs against the above key safety principles is discussed below.

Key Principle 1: Evaluation of Compliance with Current Regulations Paragraph 50.36(c)(2) of 10 CFR states that LCOs are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility.

When an LCO of a nuclear reactor is not met, the licensee shall shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the TS until the condition can be met.

The CTs in the current TSs were established using experiential data, risk insights, and engineering judgement. The RICT Program provides the necessary administrative controls to permit extension of CTs and, thereby, delay reactor shutdown or Required Actions, if risk is assessed and managed appropriately within specified limits and programmatic requirements and the safety margins and DID remain sufficient. The option to determine the extended CT in accordance with the RICT Program allows the licensee to perform an integrated evaluation in accordance with the methodology prescribed in NEI TR 06-09-A and proposed TS 5.5.16. The RICT is limited to a maximum of 30 days (termed the back stop).

The typical CT is modified by the application of the RICT Program as shown in the following example. The changed portion is in italics.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Restore subsystem to OPERABLE status.

7 days OR In accordance with the Risk Informed Completion Time Program In Enclosure 1 of the LAR, as supplemented, SNC provided a list of the TSs, associated LCOs, and Required Actions for the CTs that included modifications and variations from the approved TSTF-505. The modifications and variations consisted of proposed changes to the Required Actions and CTs. Furthermore, consistent with Table 1 of TSTF-505, Rev. 2, for Hatch TS 3.3.4.1 and TS 3.6.1.2 in Table E1-2 in Enclosure 1 of the LAR, the licensee included additional technical justification to demonstrate the acceptability for including these TS in the RICT Program. The NRC staff reviewed the proposed changes to the TS, associated LCOs, Required Actions, and CTs provided by the licensee for the scope of the RICT Program and concluded that, with the incorporation of the RICT Program, the required performance levels of equipment specified in LCOs are not changed only the required CT for the Required Actions are modified, such that 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) will continue to be met. Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the TS program described in Section 2.1 of this SE, LCOs, Required Actions, and CTs meet the first key principle.

Key Principle 2: Evaluation of Defense in Depth In RG 1.174, Revision 3, the NRC identified the following considerations used for evaluation of how the LB change is maintained for the DID philosophy:

Preserve a reasonable balance among the layers of defense.

Preserve adequate capability of design features without an overreliance on programmatic activities as compensatory measures.

Preserve system redundancy, independence, and diversity commensurate with the expected frequency and consequences of challenges to the system, including consideration of uncertainty.

Preserve adequate defense against potential common-cause failures (CCFs).

Maintain multiple fission product barriers.

Preserve sufficient defense against human errors.

Continue to meet the intent of the plants design criteria.

SNC requested to use the RICT Program to extend the existing CTs for the respective TS LCOs described in Attachment 2 of the LAR, as supplemented. For the TS LCOs in Enclosure 1, Section 3, of the LAR, as supplemented, the licensee provided a description and assessment of the redundancy and diversity for the proposed changes.

The NRC staffs evaluation of the proposed changes for these LCOs assessed the plants redundant or diverse means to mitigate accidents to ensure consistency with the plant LB

requirements using the guidance in RG 1.174, RG 1.177, and TSTF-505 to ensure adequate DID (for each of the functions) to operate the facility in the proposed manner (i.e., that the changes are consistent with the DID criteria).

of the LAR provided information supporting the SNCs evaluation of the redundancy, diversity, and DID for each TS LCO and TS Required Action as it relates to Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) and electrical systems. The NRC staff confirmed that for the following TS LCOs, the above DID criteria were applicable except for the criteria for maintaining multiple fission product barriers.

TS 3.3.1.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation [I&C specific]

TS 3.3.4.1, End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT) Instrumentation [I&C specific]

TS 3.3.4.2, Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT)

Instrumentation [I&C specific]

TS 3.3.5.1, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation [I&C specific]

TS 3.3.5.3, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation [I&C specific]

TS 3.3.6.1, Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation [I&C specific]

TS 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating [electrical specific]

TS 3.8.4, DC Sources - Operating [electrical specific]

TS 3.8.7, Distribution Systems - Operating [electrical specific]

For the TS LCOs specific to I&C (i.e., TSs 3.3.1.1, 3.3.4.1, 3.3.4.2, 3.3.5.1, 3.3.5.3, and 3.3.6.1),

the NRC staff reviewed the specific trip logic arrangements, redundancy, backup systems, manual actions, and diverse trips specified for each of the protective safety functions and associated instrumentation as described in the associated UFSAR (ML20303A202), Chapter 7, Instrumentation and Control, Table 15C-8, and as reflected in Enclosure 1 of the LAR, as supplemented, for each I&C LCO above. The NRC staff examined, analyzed, and performed a confirmatory assessment for all affected functions, the number of operable channels under each RICT condition and identified the number of channels that are required to trip the specific safety function for all the design-basis accidents (DBAs). The NRC staff confirmed that a lossof-function (LOF) condition would not exist for the DBAs and RICT evaluated in the Hatch UFSAR.

The NRC staff also verified independently that, in accordance with the Hatch UFSAR and equipment and actions credited in Enclosure 1 of the LAR, as supplemented, in all applicable operating modes, there is either at least one redundancy, or at least one diverse means available, and that the affected protective feature would perform its intended function by ensuring the ability to detect and mitigate the associated event or accident when the CT of a channel is extended. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the I&C TS LCOs for TSs 3.3.1.1, 3.3.4.1, 3.3.4.2, 3.3.5.1, 3.3.5.3, and 3.3.6.1 are acceptable in accordance TSTF-505, Revision 2.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that there is sufficient I&C redundancy, diversity, and DID to protect against CCFs and potential single failure for the Hatch instrumentation systems evaluated in Enclosure 1 of the LAR, as supplemented, during a RICT. There is at least one diverse means specified by the licensee for initiating mitigating action for each accident event, thus providing DID against a failure of instrumentation during the RICT for each TS LCO.

The DID specified by the licensee does not overly rely on manual actions as the diverse means; therefore, there is not overreliance of programmatic activities as compensatory measures.

Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the intent of the plants design criteria (e.g., safety functions) for the above TS LCOs related to I&C are maintained.

For the TS LCOs specific to electrical systems, the Hatch UFSAR states that the plant is designed such that the safety functions are maintained assuming a single failure within the electrical power system. Single-failure requirements are typically suspended for the time that a plant is not meeting an LCO (i.e., in an ACTION statement) for the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) subject to the inoperability and LCO entry. The NRC staff reviewed the information that the licensee provided in the LAR, as supplemented, for the proposed TS LCOs and TS Bases and the UFSAR to verify that the capability of the affected electrical systems to perform their safety functions (assuming no additional failures) is maintained. The NRC staff verified that the design success criteria for the affected TS LCOs reflect the redundant or absolute minimum electrical source/subsystem required to be operable to support the safety functions necessary to mitigate postulated DBAs, safely shut down the reactor, and maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition. In addition, the NRC staff reviewed the risk management action (RMA) examples, which provide reasonable assurance that the appropriate RMAs will be implemented to monitor and control risk. The NRC staff finds that the intent of the plants design criteria (e.g., safety functions) applicable to the electrical related TS LCOs is maintained.

The NRC staff notes that while in a TS LCO Condition, the redundancy of the affected system will be temporarily degraded and, consequently, the system reliability will be reduced accordingly. The NRC staff examined the design information from the Hatch UFSAR and the risk informed TS LCO Conditions for the affected safety functions. Based on this information, the NRC staff confirmed that under any given DBA evaluated in the Hatch UFSAR, the affected protective features would maintain adequate DID.

Considering that the CT extensions will be implemented in accordance with NEI TR 06-09-A guidance, that also considers RMAs, and the redundancy of the offsite and onsite electrical system, the NRC staff finds that the plant would maintain adequate DID. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the TS LCOs proposed by the licensee in Attachment 2 of the LAR, as supplemented, are acceptable for the RICT Program.

The NRC staff reviewed all changes to TS remedial actions proposed by the licensee in of the LAR, as supplemented, and concludes that the proposed changes do not alter the ways in which the Hatch systems fail and do not introduce new CCF modes and that the system independence is maintained.

The NRC staff finds that some proposed changes reduce the level of redundancy of the affected systems and that this reduction may reduce the level of defense against some CCFs; however, such reductions in redundancy and defense against CCFs are acceptable due to existing diverse means available to maintain adequate DID against a potential single failure during a RICT. The NRC staff finds that extending the selected CTs with the RICT Program following a loss of redundancy, but maintaining the capability of the system to perform its safety function, is an acceptable reduction in DID during the proposed RICT period provided that the licensee identifies and implements compensatory measures in accordance with the RICT Program during the extended CT.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that SNCs proposed changes are consistent with the NRC-endorsed guidance in NEI TR 06-09-A and satisfy the second key principle of DID and concludes that the changes are consistent with the DID philosophy.

Key Principle 3: Evaluation of Safety Margins Paragraph (h) of 10 CFR 50.55a requires, in part, that protection systems of nuclear power reactors of all types must meet the requirements specified in that paragraph. Section 2.2.2 of RG 1.177 states, in part, that sufficient safety margins are maintained when:

Codes and standards or alternatives approved for use by the NRC are met.

Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the final safety analysis report are met, or proposed revisions provide sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainties.

SNC is not proposing in its LAR to change any quality standard, material, or operating specification. In the LAR, the licensee proposed to add a new program, Risk Informed Completion Time Program, in TS 5.0, Administrative Controls, which would require adherence to NEI TR 06-09-A. NEI TR 06-09-A, Condition 2 stipulates, in part, that for the TS LCOs and action requirements to which the RMTS will apply, the LAR will provide justification with comparison of the TS functions to the PRA modeled functions of theSSCs subject to those LCO Actions or an appropriate disposition or programmatic restriction will be provided.

The NRC staff evaluated the effect on safety margins when the RICT is applied to extend the CT up to a backstop of 30 days in a TS condition with sufficient trains remaining operable to fulfill the TS safety function. Although the licensee will be able to have design-basis equipment out of service longer than the current TS would allow, any increase in unavailability is expected to be insignificant and is addressed by the consideration of the single-failure criterion in the design-basis analyses. Acceptance criteria for operability of equipment are not changed and, if sufficient trains remain operable to fulfill the TS safety function, the operability of the remaining train(s) ensures that sufficient safety margins are maintained. The NRC staff finds that, if the specified TS safety function remains operable, then, sufficient safety margins would be maintained during the extended CT of the RICT Program.

Safety margins are also maintained if PRA functionality is determined for the inoperable train, which would result in an increased CT. Credit for PRA functionality, as described in NEI TR 06-09-A, is limited to the inoperable train, loss-of-offsite power, or component.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the intent of the plant design criteria and design-basis analyses for Hatch remain applicable and unchanged, that sufficient safety margins would be maintained during the extended CT, and that the proposed changes to the TSs do not include any change in the standards applied or the safety analysis acceptance criteria. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed changes meet 10 CFR 50.55a(h) and, therefore, the third key principle concerning safety margins is maintained.

Key Principle 4: Change in Risk Consistent with the Safety Goal Policy Statement NEI TR 06-09-A provides a methodology for a licensee to evaluate and manage the risk impact of extensions to TS CTs. Permanent changes to the fixed TS CTs are typically evaluated by using the three-tiered approach described in SRP Section 16.1 (ML070380228), RG 1.177, and

RG 1.174. This approach addresses the calculated change in risk as measured by the change in core damage frequency (CDF) and change in large early release frequency (LERF), as well as the incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP) and incremental conditional large early release probability (ICLERP); the use of compensatory measures to reduce risk; and the implementation of a configuration risk management program (CRMP) to identify risk-significant plant configurations.

The NRC staff evaluated the licensees processes and methodologies for determining that the change in risk from implementation of RICTs will be small and consistent with the intent of the Commissions Safety Goal Policy Statement. In addition, the NRC staff evaluated SNCs proposed changes against the three-tiered approach stated above for the licensees evaluation of the risk associated with a proposed TS CT change. The results of the NRC staffs review are discussed below.

Tier 1: PRA Capability and Insights The first tier evaluates the impact of the proposed changes on plant operational risk. The Tier 1 review involves two aspects: (1) scope and acceptability of the PRA models and their application to the proposed changes and (2) a review of the PRA insights and results described in SNCs application.

Enclosures 2 and 4 of the LAR, as supplemented, identify the following modeled hazards and alternate methodologies that the licensee proposed to be used in the Hatch RICT Program to assess the risk contribution for extending the CT of a TS LCO.

Internal Events PRA model (includes internal floods)

Internal Fire Events PRA model Seismic Hazard: CDF penalty of 1.18 x 10-6 per year and a LERF penalty of 3.66 x 10-7 per year Other External Hazards: screened out from RICT Program based on Appendix 6-A of the ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009 PRA Standard Evaluation of Modeled PRAs For the modeled PRAs, which include the internal events (includes internal floods) (IEPRA) and internal fire (FPRA) PRAs in Enclosure 2 of the LAR, the licensee confirmed that the PRA models had been peer reviewed using RG 1.200, Revision 2.

Previous NRC staff reviews for the issuance of Hatch Amendment Nos. 304/249 and 305/250 for the adoption of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)-805 and 10 CFR 50.69 (ML20066F592 and ML20077J704), respectively, concluded that the IEPRA and FPRA were acceptable and consistent with RG 1.200, Revision 2. Therefore, the NRC staff considered the open F&Os, key assumptions and sources of uncertainty, credit for FLEX, and any PRA changes. For the open F&Os resulting from these peer reviews, SNC stated that closure of the F&Os was performed using an independent assessment process. The NRC staff confirmed that the licensee performed closure of the F&Os consistent with Appendix X to NEI TRs 05-04 and 07-12, as endorsed in RG 1.200, Revision 2.

The NRC evaluated the remaining open F&Os, along with the dispositions provided in Table E2-1, Peer Review F&O Not Closed, and concluded that the licensee had appropriately

assessed their impact with respect to the LAR. In Enclosure 9 of the LAR, SNC provided a brief discussion and list of the key assumptions and sources of uncertainty, along with their treatment for the application of TSTF-505. In Section 6.0 of Enclosure 2 of the LAR, the licensee stated that. Internal Events, Internal Flooding, and Fire PRA models credit only permanently installed FLEX equipment, since they are similar to other installed equipment and operated the same.

The modeling of FLEX equipment was reviewed in the Safety Evaluation related to Hatch 10 CFR 50.69 submittal (ML20077J704). Portable FLEX equipment was credited only in the Hatch seismic PRA (SPRA). The Hatch SPRA is not used as the direct basis for this risk application but rather is used to provide selected inputs into the calculation of SCDF and SLERF seismic penalty values The NRC staff determined that the licensees credit for FLEX equipment in the TSTF-505 application is appropriate, because SNC used consensus human reliability analysis methodologies and practices, acceptable failures rates, and performed sensitivity studies to assess the impact on the TSTF-505 application. The NRC staff review of the seismic hazards is provided below in this SE.

The NRC staff reviewed the PRA models peer review history provided by the licensee in of its LAR, as supplemented. The NRC determined that SNC adequately applied NEI TR 06-09, consistent with RG 1.200 for establishing PRA technical acceptability for the aforementioned models. (i.e., IEPRA (includes internal floods), and FPRA). The NRC staff further considered the key assumptions and sources of uncertainty identified by the licensee, proposed use of surrogates in the PRA models for specific TS functions, and credit for FLEX equipment.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds the Hatch modeled IEPRA (includes internal floods) and FPRA to be consistent with RG 1.200 and RG 1.174 and is, therefore, acceptable for use in the RICT Program.

Evaluation of Seismic Hazard SNCs approach for including the seismic risk contribution in the RICT calculation is to add a penalty seismic CDF and a penalty seismic LERF to each RICT calculation. The proposed bounding seismic CDF estimate is based on using the plant-specific seismic hazard curves developed in response to the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) recommendation 2.1 (ML14092A017), selected inputs from the seismic PRA, and a plant-level high confidence of low probability of failure (HCLPF) capacity of 0.3g referenced to peak ground acceleration (PGA) provided in the licensees submittal of its Individual Plant Examination for External Events (ML20097J441). The uncertainty parameter for seismic capacity was represented by a composite beta factor of 0.3. On page E4-15 of the letter dated October 26, 2021, the calculated seismic CDF penalty is 1.18 x 10-6 per year and is greater than the seismic PRA estimates for Hatch Unit Nos. 1 and 2. The NRC staff finds that the method to determine the baseline seismic CDF acceptable, because it is consistent with the available information for the seismic hazard and plant-level fragility for Hatch, and the approach used in Generic Issue (GI)-199, Implications of Updated Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Estimates in Central and Eastern United States on Existing Plants (ML100270582).

Concerning the proposed bounding seismic LERF estimate, SNC explains in the LAR that an estimate of the seismic LERF is obtained by multiplying the SCDF penalty (as described above) with the seismic conditional large early release probability (SCLERP) of 0.25 when the containment is inerted based on results from the Hatch SPRA.

For a de-inerted primary containment, the licensee proposed the SCLERP of 1.0. In an additional analysis in the supplement dated August 18, 2022, the licensee proposed to use a conservative SCLERP value of 0.31 for an inerted containment that accounts for the uncertainty associated with the portable FLEX equipment credited in the SPRA. Therefore, the calculated seismic LERF is 3.66 x 10-7 per year when containment is inerted and 1.18 x 10-6 per year when the primary containment is de-inerted. The NRC staff finds the licensees approach to determining a seismic LERF estimate acceptable, because it uses plant-specific information derived from the Hatch SPRA and adds conservatism by addressing the uncertainty of the influence of the portable FLEX equipment on RICTs.

The NRC staff noted a potential discrepancy with some of the values in Tables 3.5-1 and 3.5-2 (ML20213C715) of a Hatch LAR to revise the Required Actions of TS 3.8.1, AC Sources -

Operating, for a one-time extension of the CT for Unit No. 1 and swing emergency diesel generators. The licensee cited them in the audit as justification that the SCDF and SLERF penalties are conservative based on the results and insights from change-in-risk calculations for the proposed RICTs using the Hatch SPRA. Consequently, in its supplement dated August 18, 2022, SNC reported that the discrepancies were due to calculation errors, which were corrected. The licensee further confirmed that these errors did not impact the seismic risk penalties provided in Enclosure 4 to the LAR and, therefore, did not impact this application. The NRC staff reviewed the information in the licensees supplement dated August 18, 2022, and determined that SNC adequately identified and resolved the errors, and that the correction of the errors has no adverse impact on the seismic penalties proposed for use in the RICT Program.

The NRC staff finds that, during RICTs for SSCs crediIed in the design basis to mitigate seismic events, the licensees proposed methodology captures the risk associated with seismically induced failures of redundant SSCs, because such SSCs are assumed to be fully correlated. In summary, the NRC staff finds SNCs proposal to use the seismic CDF contribution of 1.18 x 10-6 per year and a seismic LERF contribution of 3.66 x 10-7 per year to be acceptable for the licensees RICT Program for Hatch, because (1) the licensee used the most current site-specific seismic hazard information for Hatch, (2) the licensee used an acceptably low plant level HCLPF value of 0.3g and a composite beta factor of 0.3 consistent with insights from the Hatch IPEEE and the information for Hatch in the GI-199 evaluation, (3) the licensee determined a seismic LERF penalty using an SCLERP based on the plants SPRA results accounting for FLEX equipment uncertainty, and (4) the licensee will conservatively add the baseline seismic risk to all RICT calculations.

Evaluation of Other External Hazards Besides the seismic hazards discussed above, SNC confirmed that other external hazards for Hatch have insignificant contribution and proposed that these hazards be screened out from the RICT Program. In Enclosure 4 of the LAR, as supplemented, the licensee provided its evaluation of external hazards for the RICT Program and evaluated configuration-specific impacts on the RICT Program for these hazards. SNC provided its evaluation of all other external hazards in Table E4-4 of Enclosure 4 to the LAR, as supplemented.

The NRC staff notes that the list of hazards assessed is essentially the same list of hazards as presented in Table 4-1 of NUREG-1855, Revision 1. The licensee provided a screening disposition for each external hazard and concluded that no unique PRA model for these hazards is required to assess configuration risk for the RICT Program. In Enclosure 4 of the LAR, SNC also evaluated all external hazards impacts on configurations specific for the RICT Program and concluded that there are no impacts from the external hazards.

The NRC staff notes that the preliminary screening criteria and progressive screening criteria used are the same criteria presented in supporting requirements EXT-B1, EXT-B2, and EXT-C1 of the ASME/ANS Ra-SA 2009 PRA Standard.

Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the contributions from the other external hazards have an insignificant contribution to configuration risk and can be excluded from the calculation of the proposed RICTs, because they either do not challenge the plant or they are bounded by the external hazards analyzed for the plant.

Application of PRA Models, Results, and Insights in the RICT Program The Hatch base PRA models that have been determined to be sufficient in this SE for use in the RICT Program are expected to be modified as an application-specific PRA model (i.e., CRMP tool), that will be used by the licensee to analyze the risk for an extended CT. The CRMP tool produces results (i.e., risk metrics) that are consistent with the NEI TR 06-09-A guidance. In its LAR, SNC provided all information needed to support the requested LCO actions proposed for the Hatch RICT Program consistent with all the Limitations and Conditions in Section 4.0 of NEI TR 06-09-A.

The NRC staff did not identify insufficiencies in the licensees information or the CRMP tool as described in the Enclosure 8 of the LAR. As stated in Attachment 1 of the LAR for Hatch, the proposed change does not change the design, configuration, or method of operation of the plant. The Hatch PRA models and CRMP tool will continue to reflect the as-built, as-operated plant consistent with RG 1.200 for ensuring that PRA acceptability is maintained. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed application of the Hatch RICT Program is appropriate for use in the adoption of TSTF-505 for performing RICT calculations.

SNC provided in Enclosure 5 of the LAR, as supplemented, the estimated total CDF and LERF for the base PRA models to demonstrate that Hatch meets the 1 x 10-4/year CDF and 1 x 10-5/year LERF criteria of RG 1.174 consistent with the guidance in NEI TR 06-09-A and that these guidelines will be satisfied for implementation of a RICT.

The licensee has incorporated NEI TR 06-09-A into proposed new TS 5.5.16, Risk Informed Completion Time. The estimated current total CDF and LERF for Hatch PRAs meet the RG 1.174, Revision 3 guidelines; therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the PRA results and insights to be used by the licensee in the RICT Program will continue to be consistent with NEI TR 06-09-A.

Tier 1 Conclusions Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that SNC has satisfied the intent of Tier 1 stated above for determining the PRA acceptable, and that the scope of the modeled (i.e., IEPRA and FPRA)

PRA hazards, evaluation for other external hazards, and seismic methodology is appropriate for this application.

Tier 2: Avoidance of High Risk-Significant Plant Configurations As described above, Tier 2 evaluates the capability of the licensee to identify and avoid high risk-significant plant configurations that could result if equipment, in addition to that associated with the proposed change, is taken out of service simultaneously or if other risk-significant operational factors, such as concurrent system or equipment testing, are also involved. In Section 2 of Enclosure 10 of the LAR, as supplemented, SNC confirmed that the risk thresholds associated with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) will be coordinated with the RICT limits. The licensee identified in Enclosure 10 three kinds of RMAs (i.e., actions to provide increased risk awareness and control, actions to reduce the duration of maintenance activities, and actions to minimize the magnitude of the risk increase).

SNC also explained in the LAR that RMAs will be implemented, in accordance with current plant procedures, no later than the time at which the 1 x 10-6 incremental core damage probability (ICCDP) or 1 x 10-7 incremental large early release probability (ICLERP) threshold is reached and under emergent conditions when the instantaneous CDF and LERF thresholds are exceeded.

The NRC staff concludes that the RICT Program requirements, that include limits established for entry into a RICT, and implementation of RMAs are consistent with NEI TR 06-09-A. Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the proposed changes are consistent with the intent of Tier 2.

Tier 3: Risk-Informed Configuration Risk Management Tier 3 stipulates that a licensee should develop a program that ensures that the risk impact of out-of-service equipment is appropriately evaluated prior to performing any maintenance activity. The proposed RICT Program establishes a CRMP based on the underlying PRA models. The CRMP is then used to evaluate configuration-specific risk for planned activities associated with the RMTS extended CT, as well as emergent conditions that may arise during an extended CT. This required assessment of configuration risk, along with the implementation of compensatory measures and RMAs, is consistent with the principle of Tier 3 for assessing and managing the risk impact of out-of-service equipment.

Paragraph (c)(5) of 10 CFR 50.36 identifies administrative controls as the provisions relating to organization and management, procedures, recordkeeping, review and audit, and reporting necessary to assure operation of the facility in a safe manner. In Enclosure 8 of the LAR, as supplemented, SNC confirmed that future changes made to the baseline PRA models and changes made to the online model (i.e., CRMP) are controlled and documented by plant procedures. Enclosure 10 of the LAR, as supplemented, provides the attributes that the licensees RICT Program procedures will address, which are consistent with NEI TR 06-09-A.

The NRC staff finds that SNC has identified appropriate administrative controls consistent with NEI TR 06-09-A and 10 CFR 50.36(c)(5).

Based on the licensees incorporation of NEI TR 06-09-A in the TS, as discussed in LAR, as supplemented, and its use of RMAs as described in LAR Enclosures 10 and 12, and because the proposed changes are consistent with the above Tier 3, the NRC staff finds that SNCs Tier 3 program is acceptable and supports the proposed implementation of the RICT Program.

Key Principle 4: Conclusions SNC has demonstrated the technical acceptability and scope of its PRA models and alternative methods, including consideration of the impact of seismic events and other external hazards, and that the models can support implementation of the RICT Program for determining extensions to CTs. The licensee has made proper consideration of key assumptions and sources of uncertainty. The risk metrics are consistent with the approved methodology of NEI TR 06-09-A and the acceptance guidance in RG 1.177 and RG 1.174. The RICT Program will be controlled administratively through plant procedures and training and follows the NRC-approved methodology in NEI TR 06-09-A. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the RICT Program satisfies the fourth key principle stated above and is, therefore, acceptable.

Key Principle 5: Performance Measurement Strategies - Implementing and Monitoring RG 1.177 and RG 1.174 establish the need for an implementation and monitoring program to ensure that extensions to TS CTs do not degrade operational safety over time and that no adverse degradation occurs due to unanticipated degradation or common-cause mechanisms. 1 of the LAR states that the SSCs in the scope of the RICT Program are also in the scope of 10 CFR 50.65 for the Maintenance Rule. The Hatch Maintenance Rule monitoring programs will provide for evaluation and disposition of unavailability impacts which may be incurred from implementation of the RICT Program. Furthermore, in Enclosure 11 of the LAR, SNC confirmed that the cumulative risk is calculated at least every refueling cycle, but that the recalculation period does not exceed 24 months, which is consistent with NEI TR 06-09-A.

The NRC staff concludes that the RICT Program satisfies the fifth key principle stated above, because: (1) the RICT Program will monitor the average annual cumulative risk increase as described in NEI TR 06-09-A, thereby ensuring that the program, as implemented, continues to meet RG 1.174 and RG 1.177 guidance for small risk increases and (2) all affected SSCs are within the Maintenance Rule program, which is used to monitor changes to the reliability and availability of those SSCs.

3.2 Technical Conclusion The NRC staff evaluated the proposed changes against each of the five key principles in RG 1.177 and RG 1.174, including the optional variations from the approved TSTF-505 discussed in Section 3.1 of this SE. The NRC staff concludes that the changes proposed by SNC satisfy the key principles of risk-informed decision-making identified in RG 1.174 and RG 1.177 and, therefore, the requested adoption of the proposed changes to the TSs, implementation items, and associated guidance, is acceptable to the NRC staff to ensure that the Commissions regulations continue to be met.

3.3 Editorial and/or Administrative Changes By letter dated April 22, 2021 (ML21109A359), the NRC staff issued Amendment No. 254 for Hatch, Unit No. 2 under emergency circumstances. Amendment No. 254 revised TS 3.5.1, ECCS - Operating, Required Action A.2 to extend the CT from 7 days to 15 days only while repairs of the 2D Residual Heat Removal pump repair were ongoing, and only until May 1, 2021. SNC now requests deletion of the TS changes made under Amendment No. 254. This eliminates information on TS page 3.5-1. The NRC staff finds this administrative change

acceptable because the added TS language was for a one-time use only and expired on May 1, 2021.

By letter dated September 21, 2021 (ML21264A644), the NRC staff issued Amendment No. 311 for Hatch, Unit No. 1 under emergency circumstances. Amendment No. 311 revised TS 3.7.2, Plant Service Water (PSW) System and Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS), Condition A, One PSW pump inoperable, to allow a one-time increase in the CT from 30 days to 45 days. The 45-day CT expired on October 10, 2021. SNC now requests deletion of the TS changes made under Amendment No. 311. This eliminates information on TS page 3.7-3. The NRC staff finds this administrative change acceptable because the added TS language was for a one-time use only and expired on October 10, 2021.

By letter dated September 18, 2020 (ML20254A057), the NRC staff issued Amendment Nos.

307 and 252 for Hatch, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively, for a one-time extension of the CT for Unit No. 1 and swing emergency diesel generators (EDGs). Amendment Nos. 307 and 252 revised TS 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, to allow a one-time extension of the CT of Required Action B.4 for the Hatch, Unit No. 1 TS and of Required Actions B.4 and C.4 for the Hatch, Unit No. 2 TS for each Hatch Unit No. 1 EDG and the swing EDG from 14 days to 19 days. SNC now requests deletion of the TS changes made under Amendment Nos. 307 and 252. This eliminates information on TS pages 3.8-4a and 3.8-4b for Hatch, Unit No. 1 and on TS pages 3.8-4a, 3.8-4b, 3.8-5a, and 3.8-5b for Hatch, Unit No. 2. The NRC staff finds this administrative change acceptable because the added TS language was for a one-time use only and was only applicable until June 30, 2021.

With the addition of the RICT language reviewed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this SE and the deletion of the information related to Amendment Nos. 307 and 311 for Hatch, Unit No. 1, and Amendment Nos. 252 and 254 for Hatch, Unit No. 2, various Conditions and/or Required Actions rolled to other TS pages and/or were re-lettered or re-numbered. For Hatch, Unit No. 1, editorial changes were made on TS pages: 1.3-11, 1.3-13, 3.3-1a, 3.3-2, 3.3-29, 3.3-30, 3.3-30a, 3.3-32, 3.3-33, 3.3-36, 3.3-36a, 3.3-48, 3.3-52, 3.3-53, 3.3-54, 3.5-2, 3.5-2a, 3.6-9, 3.6-10, 3.6-11, 3.6-12, 3.6-26, 3.6-28, 3.6-30, 3.7-2, 3.7-3, 3.7-4, 3.7-5, 3.7-5a, 3.8-3, 3.8-4, 3.8-5, 3.8-27, and 3.8-27a. For Hatch, Unit No. 2, editorial changes were made on TS pages: 1.3-11, 1.3-13, 3.3-1a, 3.3-2, 3.3-29, 3.3-30, 3.3-30a, 3.3-32, 3.3-33, 3.3-36, 3.3-36a, 3.3-48, 3.3-52, 3.3-53, 3.3-54, 3.3-54a, 3.5-1, 3.5-2, 3.5-2a, 3.6-9, 3.6-10, 3.6-11, 3.6-12, 3.6-26, 3.6-28, 3.6-30, 3.7-2, 3.7-4, 3.7-5, 3.7-5a, 3.8-3, 3.8-4, 3.8-5, 3.8-27, and 3.8-27a. The NRC staff finds these editorial changes acceptable because the technical information remains the same.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commissions regulations, the Georgia State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments on September 9, 2022. On September 9, 2022, the State official confirmed that the State of Georgia had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change requirements with respect to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration published in the Federal Register on December 28, 2021 (86 FR 73819), and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: A. Brown, NRR/APLA J. Havertape, NRR/APLA K. Tetter, NRR/APLC S. Park, NRR/APLC A. Russell, NRR/STSB K. West, NRR/STSB B. Lee, NRR/SCPB C. Jackson, NRR/SNSB K. Ashcraft. NRR/EICB N. Khan, NRR/EEEB S. Wyman, NRR/EEEB Date: December 22, 2022

ML22297A146 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL2-1/PM NRR/DORL/LPL2-1/LA NRR/DSS/STSB/BC NRR/DRA/APLA/BC NAME JLamb KGoldstein (KEntz for)

VCusumano RPascarelli DATE 10/24/2022 11/14/2022 11/17/2022 11/17/2022 OFFICE OGC-NLO NRR/DORL/LPL2-1/BC NRR/DORL/LPL2-1/PM NAME JWachutka MMarkley JLamb DATE 12/13/2022 12/22/2022 12/22/2022

v t e Letter Sequence Approval
EPID:L-2021-LLA-0199, TSTF 505 (Approved, Closed)
Initiation Request Acceptance Supplement, Supplement, Supplement Administration Questions 20 May 2022 6 June 2022 Answers 18 August 2022 Results Approval, Approval Other: ML22048C223, ML22186A002
MONTHYEAR2022-03-01 [Table View]

ML22297A146

Text

SUBJECT:

Dear Ms. Gayheart:

Enclosures:

Attachment:

Attachment:

1.0 INTRODUCTION

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

6.0 CONCLUSION

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