Text

Issuance of Amendments Nos. 317 & 262, Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-207-A, Completion Time for Restoration of Various Excessive Leakage Rates
	ML22192A117
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	09/02/2022
From:	John Lamb; NRC/NRR/DORL/LPL2-1
To:	Gayheart C; Southern Nuclear Operating Co
	Lamb J, NRR/DORL/LPL2-1
References
	EPID L-2021-LLA-0129
	Download: ML22192A117 (29)
	v • d • e

September 2, 2022 Ms. Cheryl A. Gayheart Regulatory Affairs Director Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc.

3535 Colonnade Parkway Birmingham, AL 35243

SUBJECT:

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS NOS. 317 AND 262, REGARDING LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO REVISE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TO ADOPT TSTF 207 A, COMPLETION TIME FOR RESTORATION OF VARIOUS EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE RATES (EPID L-2021-LLA-0129)

Dear Ms. Gayheart:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 317 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 and Amendment No. 262 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant (Hatch), Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments consist of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated December 6, 2021.

The proposed license amendment request (LAR) would revise technical specifications (TSs) to adopt Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF)-207-A, Revision 5, Completion Time for Restoration of Various Excessive Leakage Rates. Specifically, the LAR proposes administrative changes and changes to Completion Times (CTs) for restoring leakage rates of Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs).

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commissions monthly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

John G. Lamb, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch II-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 317 to DPR-57

2. Amendment No. 262 to NPF-5

3. Safety Evaluation cc: Listserv

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA DOCKET NO. 50-321 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 317 Renewed License No. DPR-57

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 1 (the facility) Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 filed by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (the licensee), acting for itself, Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the owners), dated December 6, 2021, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications (Appendix A) and the Environmental Protection Plan (Appendix B), as revised through Amendment No. 317, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Michael T. Markley, Chief Plant Licensing Branch II-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: September 2, 2022 Shawn A.

Williams Digitally signed by Shawn A. Williams Date: 2022.09.02 08:44:31 -04'00'

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 317 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-57 DOCKET NO. 50-321 Replace the following pages of the License and the Appendix A Technical Specifications (TSs) with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Pages Insert Pages License License DPR-57, Page 4 DPR-57, Page 4 TSs TSs 3.6-7 3.6-7 3.6-8 3.6-8 3.6-9 3.6-9 3.6-10 3.6-10 3.6-11 3.6-11 3.6-12 3.6-12 Renewed License No. DPR-57 Amendment No. 317 for sample analysis or instrument calibration, or associated with radioactive apparatus or components (6)

Southern Nuclear, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.

(C)

This renewed license shall be deemed to contain, and is subject to, the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I: Part 20, Section 30.34 of Part 30, Section 40.41 of Part 40, Section 50.54 of Part 50, and Section 70.32 of Part 70; all applicable provisions of the Act and the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1) Maximum Power Level Southern Nuclear is authorized to operate the facility at steady-state reactor core power levels not in excess of 2,804 megawatts thermal.

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications (Appendix A) and the Environmental Protection Plan (Appendix B), as revised through Amendment No. 317, are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

The Surveillance Requirement (SR) contained in the Technical Specifications and listed below, is not required to be performed immediately upon implementation of Amendment No. 195. The SR listed below shall be successfully demonstrated before the time and condition specified:

SR 3.8.1.18 shall be successfully demonstrated at its next regularly scheduled performance.

(3)

Fire Protection Southern Nuclear Operating Company shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c), as specified in the licensee amendment request dated April 4, 2018, supplemented by letters dated May 28, August 9, October 7, and December 13, 2019, and February 5, and March 13, 2020, and as approved in the NRC safety evaluation (SE) dated June 11, 2020. Except where NRC approval for changes or deviations is required by 10 CFR 50.48(c), and provided no other regulation, technical specification, license condition or requirement would require prior NRC approval, the licensee may make changes to the fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission if those changes satisfy the provisions set forth in 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c), the change does not require a change to a technical specification or a license condition, and the criteria listed below are satisfied.

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-7 Amendment No. 317 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)

LCO 3.6.1.3 Each PCIV, except reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers, shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

NOTES-----------------------------------------------------------

1.

Penetration flow paths except for 18 inch purge valve penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2.

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

3.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by PCIVs.

4.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," when PCIV leakage results in exceeding overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

NOTE---------------

Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs.

One or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable for reasons other than Condition D.

A.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.

AND 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months except for main steam line AND 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for main steam line (continued)

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-8 Amendment No. 317 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

(continued)

A.2

NOTES----------

1.

Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2.

Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by administrative means.

Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated.

Once per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment AND Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days, for isolation devices inside primary containment B.

NOTE---------------

Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs.

One or more penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs inoperable for reasons other than Condition D.

B.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (continued)

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-9 Amendment No. 317 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

NOTE-------------

Only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one PCIV.

One or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable for reasons other than Condition D.

C.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

AND C.2

NOTES----------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2. Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by administrative means.

Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months except for excess flow check valve (EFCV) line and penetrations with a closed system AND 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for EFCV line and penetrations with a closed system Once per 31 days D.

One or more secondary containment bypass leakage rate, MSIV leakage rate, or EFCV leakage rate not within limit.

D.1 Restore leakage to within limit.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for secondary containment bypass leakage AND 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for MSIV leakage AND 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for EFCV leakage (continued)

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-10 Amendment No. 317 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, or D not met.

E.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND E.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.1

NOTE------------------------------

Not required to be met when the 18 inch primary containment purge valves are open for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA, or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open.

Verify each 18 inch primary containment purge valve is closed.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.2

NOTES---------------------------

1.

Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2.

Not required to be met for PCIVs that are open under administrative controls.

Verify each primary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located outside primary containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-11 Amendment No. 317 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.3

NOTES----------------------------

1.

Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2.

Not required to be met for PCIVs that are open under administrative controls.

Verify each primary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is located inside primary containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.

Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days SR 3.6.1.3.4 Verify continuity of the traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valve explosive charge.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.5 Verify the isolation time of each power operated, automatic PCIV, except for MSIVs, is within limits.

In accordance with the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM SR 3.6.1.3.6 Verify the isolation time of each MSIV is 3 seconds and 5 seconds.

In accordance with the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM SR 3.6.1.3.7 Verify each automatic PCIV, excluding EFCVs, actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.8 Verify each reactor instrumentation line EFCV (of a representative sample) actuates to restrict flow to within limits.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 1 3.6-12 Amendment No. 317 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.9 Remove and test the explosive squib from each shear isolation valve of the TIP system.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.10 Verify combined MSIV leakage rate for all four main steam lines is 100 scfh when tested at 28.0 psig and < 50.8 psig.

OR Verify combined MSIV leakage rate for all four main steam lines is 144 scfh when tested at 50.8 psig.

In accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.11 Deleted SR 3.6.1.3.12 Cycle each 18 inch excess flow isolation damper to the fully closed and fully open position.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.13 Verify the combined leakage rate for all secondary containment bypass leakage paths is 0.02 La when pressurized to Pa.

In accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA DOCKET NO. 50-366 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 262 Renewed License No. NPF-5

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment to the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 2 (the facility) Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 filed by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (the licensee), acting for itself, Georgia Power Company, Oglethorpe Power Corporation, Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia, and City of Dalton, Georgia (the owners), dated December 6, 2021, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations as set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is hereby amended by page changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications (Appendix A) and the Environmental Protection Plan (Appendix B), as revised through Amendment No. 262 are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 90 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Michael T. Markley, Chief Plant Licensing Branch SII-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: September 2, 2022 Shawn A.

Williams Digitally signed by Shawn A. Williams Date: 2022.09.02 08:45:23 -04'00'

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 262 EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-5 DOCKET NO. 50-366 Replace the following pages of the License and the Appendix A Technical Specifications (TSs) with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove Pages Insert Pages License License NPF-5, Page 4 NPF-5, Page 4 TSs TSs 3.6-7 3.6-7 3.6-8 3.6-8 3.6-9 3.6-9 3.6-10 3.6-10 3.6-11 3.6-11 3.6-12 3.6-12

Renewed License No. NPF-5 Amendment No. 262 (6)

Southern Nuclear, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.

(C)

This renewed license shall be deemed to contain, and is subject to, the conditions specified in the following Commission regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I: Part 20, Section 30.34 of Part 30, Section 40.41 of Part 40, Section 50.54 of Part 50, and Section 70.32 of Part 70; all applicable provisions of the Act and the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and the additional conditions2 specified or incorporated below:

(1)

Maximum Power Level Southern Nuclear is authorized to operate the facility at steady sate reactor core power levels not in excess of 2,804 megawatts thermal, in accordance with the conditions specified herein.

(2)

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications (Appendix A) and the Environmental Protection Plan (Appendix B); as revised through Amendment No. 262 are hereby incorporated in the renewed license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

(3)

Additional Conditions The matters specified in the following conditions shall be completed to the satisfaction of the Commission within the stated time periods following the issuance of the renewed license or within the operational restrictions indicated. The removal of these conditions shall be made by an amendment to the license supported by a favorable evaluation by the Commission.

(a)

Fire Protection Southern Nuclear Operating Company shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c),

as specified in the licensee amendment request dated April 4, 2018, supplemented by letters dated May 28, August 9, October 7, and December 13, 2019, and February 5, and March 13, 2020, and as approved in the NRC safety evaluation (SE) dated June 11, 2020.

Except where NRC approval for changes or deviations is required by 10 CFR 50.48(c), and provided no other regulation, technical specification, license condition or requirement would 2

The original licensee authorized to possess, use, and operate the facility with Georgia Power Company (GPC). Consequently, certain historical references to GPC remain in certain license conditions.

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-7 Amendment No. 262 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)

LCO 3.6.1.3 Each PCIV, except reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers, shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

NOTES------------------------------------------------------------

1.

Penetration flow paths except for 18 inch purge valve penetration flow paths may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2.

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

3.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by PCIVs.

4.

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1.1, "Primary Containment," when PCIV leakage results in exceeding overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

NOTE---------------

Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs.

One or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable for reasons other than Condition D.

A.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.

AND 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months except for main steam line AND 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for main steam line (continued)

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-8 Amendment No. 262 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

(continued)

A.2

NOTES-----------

1. Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2. Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by administrative means.

Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated.

Once per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment AND Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days, for isolation devices inside primary containment B.

NOTE---------------

Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs.

One or more penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs inoperable for reasons other than Condition D.

B.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months (continued)

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-9 Amendment No. 262 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C.

NOTE---------------

Only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one PCIV.

One or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable for reasons other than Condition D.

C.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange.

AND C.2

NOTES-----------

1. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2. Isolation devices that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured may be verified by administrative means.

Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months except for excess flow check valve (EFCV) line and penetrations with a closed system AND 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for EFCV line and penetrations with a closed system Once per 31 days D.

One or more secondary containment bypass leakage rate, MSIV leakage rate, or EFCV leakage rate not within limit.

D.1 Restore leakage to within limit.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for secondary containment bypass leakage AND 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for MSIV leakage AND 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for EFCV leakage (continued)

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-10 Amendment No. 262 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E.

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, C, or D not met.

E.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND E.2 Be in MODE 4.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months 36 hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.1

NOTE------------------------------

Not required to be met when the 18 inch primary containment purge valves are open for inerting, de-inerting, pressure control, ALARA, or air quality considerations for personnel entry, or Surveillances that require the valves to be open.

Verify each 18 inch primary containment purge valve is closed.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.2

NOTES---------------------------

1.

Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2.

Not required to be met for PCIVs that are open under administrative controls.

Verify each primary containment isolation manual valve and blind flange that is located outside primary containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-11 Amendment No. 262 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.3

NOTES----------------------------

1.

Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means.

2.

Not required to be met for PCIVs that are open under administrative controls.

Verify each primary containment manual isolation valve and blind flange that is located inside primary containment and not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured and is required to be closed during accident conditions is closed.

Prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4 if primary containment was de-inerted while in MODE 4, if not performed within the previous 92 days SR 3.6.1.3.4 Verify continuity of the traversing incore probe (TIP) shear isolation valve explosive charge.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.5 Verify the isolation time of each power operated, automatic PCIV, except for MSIVs, is within limits.

In accordance with the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM SR 3.6.1.3.6 Verify the isolation time of each MSIV is 3 seconds and 5 seconds.

In accordance with the INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAM SR 3.6.1.3.7 Verify each automatic PCIV, excluding EFCVs, actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated isolation signal.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.8 Verify each reactor instrumentation line EFCV (of a representative sample) actuates to restrict flow to within limits.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (continued)

PCIVs 3.6.1.3 HATCH UNIT 2 3.6-12 Amendment No. 262 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.1.3.9 Remove and test the explosive squib from each shear isolation valve of the TIP system.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program SR 3.6.1.3.10 Verify the combined leakage rate for all secondary containment bypass leakage paths is 0.02 La when pressurized to Pa.

In accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.11 Verify combined MSIV leakage rate for all four main steam lines is 100 scfh when tested at 28.8 psig and 47.3 psig.

OR Verify combined MSIV leakage rate for all four main steam lines is 144 scfh when tested at 47.3 psig.

In accordance with the Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program SR 3.6.1.3.12 Deleted SR 3.6.1.3.13 Cycle each 18 inch excess flow isolation damper to the fully closed and fully open position.

In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 317 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-57 AND AMENDMENT NO. 262 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-5 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-321 AND 50-366

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated December 6, 2021 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML21340A255), Southern Nuclear Company (SNC, the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant (Hatch), Units 1 and 2. The requested changes revise TS 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs).

The proposed changes adopt certain aspects of TS Task Force (TSTF) Traveler TSTF-207-A, Revision 5, Completion Time for Restoration of Various Excessive Leakage Rates (ML003723258). The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff did not issue a letter approving TSTF-207-A, Revision 5; however, the language in TSTF-207-A is consistent with the language the NRC staff approved in the Standard Technical Specifications (STS) NUREG 1433, Standard Technical Specifications General Electric Plants, BWR/4, Revision 5 (ML21272A357).

There are no deviations from NUREG 1433 in the proposed Hatch, Units 1 and 2, TS changes.

Specifically, the LAR proposes administrative changes and changes to Completion Times (CTs) for restoring leakage rates of PCIVs and the proposed changes are consistent with the STS.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

Section 50.36 of Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) requires TS.

TS are required to include items in five specific categories related to facility operation.

The regulation 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) of 10 CFR, Technical specifications, requires that [a]

technical specification limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor must be established for each item meeting one or more of the [criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii)(A)-(D)].

When a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) is not met, 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i) requires the licensee to shut down the reactor or follow any remedial action permitted by the TS until the condition can be met.

The NRC staff assesses proposed remedial actions in accordance with the general standards for license amendments. Under 10 CFR 50.92(a), determinations on whether to grant an applied-for license amendment are to be guided by the considerations that govern the issuance of initial licenses or construction permits to the extent applicable and appropriate. Both the common standards for licenses and construction permits in 10 CFR 50.40(a), and those specifically for issuance of operating licenses in 10 CFR 50.57(a)(3), provide that there must be reasonable assurance that the activities at issue will not endanger the health and safety of the public.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 Existing and Proposed TS The following is the current and proposed TS changes for Conditions A, B, and C.

Current TS 3.6.1.3 CONDITION Proposed TS 3.6.1.3 CONDITION A. ----------------------NOTE-------------------

Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two PCIVs.

One or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable except due to leakage not within limit.

A. ----------------------NOTE-------------------

Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs.

One or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable for reasons other than Condition D.

B. ----------------------NOTE-------------------

Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two PCIVs.

One or more penetration flow paths with two PCIVs inoperable except due to leakage not within limit.

B. ----------------------NOTE-------------------

Only applicable to penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs.

One or more penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs inoperable for reasons other than Condition D.

C. ----------------------NOTE-------------------

Only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one PCIV.

One or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable except due to leakage not within limit.

C. ----------------------NOTE-------------------

Only applicable to penetration flow paths with only one PCIV.

One or more penetration flow paths with one PCIV inoperable for reasons other than Condition D.

TS 3.6.1.3 Condition D currently appears as follows.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. One or more penetration flow paths with leakage not within limit.

D.1 Restore leakage to within limit.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months The proposed TS 3.6.1.3 Condition D is as follows.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. One or more secondary containment bypass leakage rate, MSIV leakage rate, or EFCV leakage rate not within limit.

D.1 Restore leakage to within limit.

4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for secondary containment bypass leakage AND 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for MSIV leakage AND 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for EFCV leakage Note: MSIV - Main Steam Isolation Valves EFCVs - Excess Flow Check Valves 3.2 NRC Staff Evaluation of TS Changes

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Background===

3.2.1 Background The Hatch, Units 1 and 2, containment systems are designed to prevent and mitigate the release of fission products to the environment during and after a design-basis accident. If a fission product release to the environment does occur, the design of the containment is such that the exposure limits of 10 CFR Part 100 will not be exceeded. Containment isolation mechanisms, such as valves and blind flanges, serve as a barrier between fluids inside and outside the containment. The licensees proposed TS changes pertain to containment isolation valves that are designed to be shut during accident conditions.

3.2.2 Administrative Changes to Align with TSTF-207 and STS The Note of TS 3.6.1.3, Conditions A and B, states that the Conditions are only applicable to penetration flow paths with two PCIVs. The amendment request proposes revising the Note such that it applies to penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs. Similarly, TS 3.6.1.3, Condition B is revised to require entry when one or more penetration flow paths with two or more PCIVs inoperable. Some penetration flow paths may have more than two PCIVs in series in the flow path (e.g., in some cases a third qualified isolation valve downstream of the outboard valve).

The NRC staff finds the proposed TS changes acceptable because (1) the proposed TS language is consistent with the language in NUREG 1433, Revision 5, and (2) the change clarifies that TS 3.6.1.3 Conditions A and B entry is the appropriate action for inoperable PCIVs in penetration flow paths with more than two PCIVs. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the proposed change continues to meet 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

TS 3.6.1.3, Conditions A, B, and C contain an exception for situations where PCIV inoperability is due to leakage rates not within limits. SNC is proposing to reword TS 3.6.1.3, Conditions A, B, and C such that the exception will be for PCIV inoperability for reasons other than Condition D.

Since TS 3.6.1.3, Condition D requires entry for leakage not within limits, SNC considers this change to be administrative. The NRC staff finds the proposed TS changes acceptable because (1) the proposed TS language is consistent with the language in NUREG 1433, Revision 5, and (2) the change clarifies what leakages are referred to in TS 3.6.1.3, Conditions A, B, and C.

Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the proposed change continues to meet 10 CFR 50.36.

3.2.3 Expansion of Condition D The licensee is proposing to revise TS 3.6.1.3, Condition D, to specify individual types of penetration flow paths (i.e., secondary containment bypass, MSIVs, and EFCVs) and provide associated CT (i.e., 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , and 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months respectively) for each penetration flow path type. These CT are consistent with TSTF 207-A, Revision 5 and the STSs in NUREG 1433, Revision 5.

3.2.3.1 Impact on Overall Containment OPERABILITY There is significant inherent safety margin with the proposed CTs in Condition D as they relate to the overall OPERABILITY of the containment. The individual PCIV leakage limits addressed by Hatch TS 3.6.1.3 are in addition to the overall containment leakage rate addressed by Hatch TS 3.6.1.1. As explained in TSTF-207, Rev. 5, if the overall containment leakage rate limit were exceeded due to an individual valve exceeding its specific leakage limit, LCO 3.6.1.3 ACTIONS Note 4 would require the appropriate ACTIONS of LCO 3.6.1.1 to be taken (which require primary containment to be restored within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ). The TSTF rationale applies to the Hatch TS because Hatch TS 3.6.1.3 has an identical Note 4 and Hatch TS 3.6.1.1 also requires primary containment to be restored to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months if the LCO is not met.

The NRC staff finds the extended CTs have a minimal impact on the overall OPERABILITY of the containment and therefore safety based on the more restrictive requirements of Hatchs LCO 3.6.1.1.

3.2.3.2 Secondary Containment Bypass - Completion Time of 4 Hours The Hatch TS Bases are being revised to state, The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time for secondary containment bypass leakage is reasonable considering the time required to restore the leakage by isolating the penetration and the relative importance to the overall containment function.

The NRC staff finds this CT acceptable, because it (1) is unchanged from the original TS CT, (2) is consistent with TSTF-207, and (3) is consistent with the STS.

3.2.3.3 MSIV - Completion Time of 8 Hours The Hatch TS Bases are being revised to state, For MSIV leakage, an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time is allowed. The Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for MSIV leakage allows a period of time to restore the MSIVs to OPERABLE status given the fact the MSIV closure will result in isolation of the main steam line(s) and potential for plant shutdown.

TSTF-207 states, The Completion Time of ISTS 3.6.1.3 Condition D to restore MSIV leakage to within the limit is revised to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months to be consistent with the time provided to restore an inoperable MSIV in ISTS 3.6.1.3 Required Action A.1. This change allows a period of time to restore the MSIV leakage rate to within the limit that takes into consideration the fact that isolation of main steam line(s) results in a potential for a plant shutdown.

The NRC staff finds this CT acceptable, because it (1) allows for operator action in a reasonable amount of time to restore operability with minimal impact on safety because Note 4, as discussed above, continues to provide reasonable assurance that MSIV leakage does not adversely impact Primary Containment OPERABILITY during the extended time (2) is consistent with TSTF-207, and (3) is consistent with the STS.

3.2.3.4 EFCVs - Completion Time of 72 Hours The Hatch TS Bases are being revised to state, The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time for EFCV is acceptable based on the instrument and the small pipe diameter of the penetration (hence reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary.

The Hatch TS Bases currently states, The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for penetrations with a closed system is reasonable considering the relative stability of the closed system (hence, reliability) to act as a penetration isolation boundary. The Bases also state, The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for EFCVs is also reasonable considering the instrument to act as a penetration isolation boundary and the small pipe diameter of the affected penetrations.

TSTF-207 states, The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time for hydrostatically tested lines leakage on a closed system [and EFCV] is deemed appropriate based in part on the approved generic change TSTF 30, Rev. 2 which provides a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Completion Time for single valve penetrations in a closed system.

The NRC staff finds this CT acceptable, because (1) the systems construction (small diameter pipe in a closed system) can reliably act as an isolation boundary, (2) it is supported by TSTF-207, and (3) it is consistent with the STS.

3.4 Technical Conclusion The proposed changes conform to the language in both TSTF-207 and the STS and adhere to the regulations contained in 10 CFR 50.36. Therefore, the NRC staff finds SNCs proposed TS changes acceptable for Hatch, Units 1 and 2.

The associated TS 3.6.1.3 Bases were revised in accordance with NUREG 1433, Revision 5, to reflect these changes. The NRC staff confirmed that the proposed Bases changes are consistent with the proposed changes made to the TS.

Based on the evaluation above, the NRC staff finds SNCs proposed TS changes to be acceptable.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commissions regulations, the State of Georgia official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment on July 9, 2022. The State official had no comments on July 9, 2022.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration (87 FR 3848, dated January 25, 2022), and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Derek Scully Date: September 2, 2022

ML22192A117 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL2-1/PM*

NRR/DORL/LPL2-1/LA NRR/DSS/STSB/BC NAME JLamb KGoldstein VCusumano DATE 7/8/2022 7/12/2022 7/13/2022 OFFICE NRR/DSS/SCPB/BC NRR/DSS/SNSB/BC NRR/DEX/EMIB/BC NAME BWittick SKrepel SBailey DATE 7/8/2022 7/12/2022 7/14/2022 OFFICE OGC - NLO NRR/DORL/LPL2-1/BC*

NRR/DORL/LPL2-1/PM NAME LShrum MMarkley (SWilliams for)

JLamb DATE 9/1/2022 9/2/2022 9/2/2022

v t e Letter Sequence Approval
EPID:L-2021-LLA-0129, TSTF-207 (Approved, Closed)
Initiation Request, Request Acceptance Administration Questions Answers Results Approval, Approval Other:
MONTHYEAR2021-08-20 [Table View]

ML22192A117

Text

SUBJECT:

Dear Ms. Gayheart:

Enclosures:

Attachment:

Attachment:

1.0 INTRODUCTION

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

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4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

6.0 CONCLUSION

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