ML22292A106

5 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 9, Appendices 9B Thru 9C

ML22292A106
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Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	10/05/2022
From:	Constellation Energy Generation
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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NMP Unit 2 USAR APPENDIX 9B APPENDIX R REVIEW SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title 9B.1 INTRODUCTION 9B.2 DEFINITIONS 9B.3 DELETED 9B.4 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CAPABILITY 9B.4.1 Introduction 9B.4.2 Safe Shutdown Model 9B.4.3 Safe Shutdown Capability 9B.4.4 Safe Shutdown Analysis 9B.4.4.1 Event Description 9B.4.4.2 Assumptions 9B.4.4.3 Results 9B.4.4.3.1 Shutdown with HPCS Available 9B.4.4.3.2 Shutdown with RCIC Available 9B.4.4.3.3 Shutdown With ADS "Pseudo" LPCI 9B.4.4.3.4 Auxiliary and Support Systems 9B.4.4.3.5 Safe Shutdown Control Monitoring Systems 9B.4.4.4 Conclusions 9B.4.5 Safe Shutdown Electrical Power Supply 9B.4.6 Safe Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation 9B.5 ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS 9B.5.1 Introduction 9B.5.2 Analysis 9B.5.3 Spurious Operation 9B.5.3.1 Reactivity Control 9B.5.3.2 Decay Heat Removal 9B.5.3.3 Reactor Coolant Inventory Control 9B.5.3.4 Containment Isolation 9B.6 METHODOLOGY FOR FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION 9B.6.1 Introduction 9B.6.2 Fire Area/Zone Identification Chapter 09 9B-i Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd.)

Section Title 9B.6.3 Methodology for Fire Protection Evaluation 9B.7 EQUIPMENT AND CABLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER DESCRIPTIONS APPENDIX 9B 9B.8 RESULTS OF FIRE PROTECTION ANALYSIS FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX R 9B.8.1 Balance of Plant Areas 9B.8.2 Control Room and Relay Room 9B.8.2.1 Safe Shutdown Systems 9B.8.2.2 Safe Shutdown Scenario 9B.8.2.3 Solutions to Control/Relay Room Fire 9B.8.2.4 Conclusions 9B.9 ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS 9B.9.1 Introduction 9B.9.2 Description 9B.10 LIGHTING 9B.11 CONCLUSIONS 9B.12 SAFE SHUTDOWN CONCERNS Chapter 09 9B-ii Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR APPENDIX 9B LIST OF TABLES Table Number Title 9B.5-1 HIGH-/LOW-PRESSURE INTERFACES 9B.6-1 FIRE AREA/FIRE SUBAREA/FIRE ZONE IDENTIFICATION 9B.6-2 DELETED 9B.6-3 LIST OF FIRE ZONES/AREAS BY DRAWING NUMBERS 9B.8-1 LIST OF AFFECTED SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT BY FIRE AREA/FIRE ZONE 9B.8-2 RESULTS OF FIRE PROTECTION ANALYSIS FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX R - BALANCE OF PLANT AREAS 9B.8-3 APPENDIX R CONTROL ROOM/RELAY ROOM FIRE CIRCUIT ANALYSIS Chapter 09 9B-iii Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR APPENDIX 9B LIST OF FIGURES Figure Number Title 9B.4-1 FUNCTIONAL PERFORMANCE CRITERIA REQUIRED FOR STATION SHUTDOWN 9B.4-2 SAFE SHUTDOWN TRAINS 9B.6-1 SAFE SHUTDOWN EVALUATION FLOW DIAGRAM Chapter 09 9B-iv Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 9B.1 INTRODUCTION On November 19, 1980, a revised Section 10CFR50.48 and a new Appendix R to 10CFR50 regarding fire protection features of nuclear power plants were published. The revised Section 50.48 and Appendix R became effective on February 17, 1981.Section III of Appendix R contains 15 subsections, lettered A through O, each of which specifies requirements for a particular aspect of the fire protection features at a nuclear power plant. This submittal specifically outlines the methodology used to address the provisions of Section III.G, III.J, and III.L of Appendix R, which deals with the fire protection of safe shutdown and remote shutdown capability, and emergency lighting. Other subsections of Section III outlining the fire protection methods and administrative procedures are addressed in Appendix 9A.

Subsequent to the issuance of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.75 Revision 1, "Physical Independence of Electrical Systems," in January 1975 and the Browns Ferry Fire accident, substantial changes were made to provide barrier type separation between redundant safety areas of the plant. This resulted in a plant design which inherently met the intent of Appendix R in the areas like cable spreading and cable routing rooms, cable tunnels, etc. This approach, however, could not be applied to some general plant areas like the reactor building where the combination of trains/divisions was unavoidable. The purpose of this study is to evaluate in sufficient detail the effects of fire in such areas and to recommend means for the safe shutdown of the plant.

This submittal outlines the methodology used to assemble, analyze, and document the results of the assessment of the fire protection features at Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station - Unit 2 (Unit 2) Nuclear Generating Station for conformance to the specific requirements of Section III.G, III.J and III.L of Appendix R to 10CFR50.

Chapter 09 9B.1-1 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 9B.2 DEFINITIONS For the purpose of this analysis, the following definitions are provided:

Safe Shutdown (SSD) - Hot or cold shutdown (reactor subcritical) with control and coolant inventory and decay heat removal.

Hot Shutdown - The reactor is shut down, the reactor coolant inventory is being controlled while the reactor is being depressurized, and the reactor temperature is greater than 200°F.

Cold Shutdown - The reactor is shut down, the reactor coolant inventory is being maintained with the reactor depressurized so that decay heat is being removed from the reactor vessel and transferred to the ultimate heat sink, and reactor temperature is less than or equal to 200°F.

Fire Area - Areas within the plant that are totally enclosed by 3-hr fire barriers. Under certain circumstances, barriers of less than 3 hr are acceptable (see 9A.3.1.2.5 and BTP CMEB 9.5-1). Structural steel forming a part or supporting such fire barriers to be protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier. A Fire Area consists of one or more Fire Zones. The Fire Zones are defined below.

Fire Subarea - A fire subarea is defined as a subdivision of a fire area that is totally separated from other plant areas by a combination of acceptable fire boundaries as defined in Appendix R, III.G.2, or exemptions. A Fire Subarea consists of one or more Fire Zones. The Fire Zones are defined below.

Fire Zone - A plant area whose boundaries need not consist of rated or approved fire barriers, but are chosen based on the plant's physical design, convenience and layout of the fire detection and suppression system.

Associated Circuits1 - Those cables (safety related, nonsafety related, Class 1E, and non-Class 1E) that:

1 The definition of the associated circuits is not exactly the same as the definition presented in IEEE-384-1977.

Chapter 09 9B.2-1 Rev. 25, October 2022

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1. Have a physical separation less than that required by Section III.G.2 of Appendix R, and

2. Have one of the following:

a. A common power source with the shutdown equipment (redundant or alternative) and the power source is not electrically protected from the circuit of concern by coordinated breakers, fuses or similar devices, or

b. A connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation would adversely affect the shutdown capability, or

c. A common enclosure with the shutdown cables and, (1) are not protected by circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices, or (2) will allow propagation of the fire into the common enclosure.

Safe Shutdown System (SSDS) - A safe shutdown system includes components, panels, cable raceways, conduits, etc., necessary for the system to perform a safe shutdown function. A safe shutdown system is one of several combinations of various plant systems that is capable of achieving safe shutdown of the plant.

Safety Division I - Those systems that receive their emergency ac power from standby diesel generator 2EGS*EG1.

Safety Division II - Those systems that receive their emergency ac power from standby diesel generator 2EGS*EG3.

Safety Division III - Those systems that receive the emergency ac power from high-pressure core spray (HPCS) diesel generator 2EGS*EG2.

Chapter 09 9B.2-2 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 9B.3 THE INFORMATION ON THIS PAGE HAS BEEN DELETED.

Chapter 09 9B.3-1 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 9B.4 SAFE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CAPABILITY 9B.4.1 Introduction When considering the effects of fire, those systems associated with achieving and maintaining safe shutdown conditions assume major importance to plant and public safety. The methodology for this analysis consisted of establishing performance criteria for achieving safe shutdown, identifying those systems which would be utilized in attaining the required performance criteria, then evaluating those systems as to their safe shutdown capability. The system requirements for the safe shutdown analysis were established from Standard Review Plan (SRP) 9.5.1, Revision 3, which states that "one train of equipment necessary to achieve hot shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station(s) must be maintained free of fire damage by a single fire, including an exposure fire..." and that "both trains or equipment necessary to achieve cold shutdown may be damaged by a single fire, including an exposure fire, but damage must be limited so that at least one train can be repaired or made operable within 72 hr using onsite capability."

9B.4.2 Safe Shutdown Model The limiting safety consequences that have been established and are used in evaluating a fire event at Unit 2 are:

1. No calculated fuel failures.

2. Reactor coolant boundary integrity.

3. Primary containment integrity.

These limiting safety consequences have been translated into a set of functional performance criteria to establish system requirements for safe shutdown with or without offsite power available. These performance criteria are (Figure 9B.4-1):

1. Reactivity control - achieve and maintain reactor subcritical.

2. Decay Heat Removal to Hot Shutdown - provide a heat sink for decay heat removal to hot shutdown.

Chapter 09 9B.4-1 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR

3. Peak Cladding Temperature - ensure that the peak cladding temperature remains below 1500°F.

4. Depressurize - safely reduce reactor vessel pressure.

5. Decay Heat Removal to Cold Shutdown - provide a heat sink for decay heat removal to cold shutdown.

9B.4.3 Safe Shutdown Capability In the event of a fire, safe shutdown of Unit 2 can be achieved in several diverse means depending upon the location of the fire, the availability of electrical power, and the components rendered inoperable. A fire event coincident with a loss of offsite power (LOOP) is the limiting scenario and generally represents a "worst case" approach. For this reason the safe shutdown capability of fire areas, with the exception of fire area 60 (service water pump area), has been analyzed for a fire that occurs in any one subarea simultaneously with a LOOP. For fire area 60, an analysis was performed and concluded that this area does not contain any alternative shutdown equipment which requires the assumption of a LOOP to the equipment, and a fire in this area will not induce a LOOP. Therefore, for fire area 60, a LOOP assumption was not applied. However, assumption of a LOOP concurrent with a fire in a fire area is more limiting than any other scenarios wherein offsite power is available. In the fire scenario where offsite power remains available, a maximum of flexibility is afforded in the selection of systems unaffected by the fire which could be used to reach safe shutdown conditions.

The options available to achieve a safe shutdown in the event of a LOOP are:

1. If the HPCS system is available, reactor water level can be maintained, as required, using HPCS. Reactor overpressurization can be relieved by the main steam safety relief valves (SRVs). Suppression pool cooling can be accomplished by the residual heat removal (RHR) system. To achieve cold shutdown from this point, it may be necessary to manually depressurize the reactor vessel using the SRVs automatic depressurization system (ADS), so that the shutdown cooling mode of RHR can be initiated.

Chapter 09 9B.4-2 Rev. 25, October 2022

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2. If reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) is available, it can be used, as required, to maintain vessel inventory.

3. If HPCS and RCIC are not available, the "pseudo" LPCI mode of RHR can be used to maintain vessel inventory.

Controls for HPCS are not available from the RSP and RCIC is postulated to be unavailable.

"Pseudo" LPCI Mode An alternate method of maintaining level in the reactor vessel is provided. This alternate method is described as the "pseudo" LPCI mode of RHR and is used for maintaining reactor level subsequent to an Appendix R fire in the control room.

The "pseudo" LPCI mode will take suction from the suppression pool and deliver water to the reactor vessel through remote manual shutdown cooling valve 2RHS*MOV40A/B via the discharge piping of 2RCS*P1A or 2RCS*P1B. This valve can be operated from the remote shutdown room. This mode differs from the normal shutdown cooling mode of RHR in that relatively cold water from the suppression pool is delivered to the RCS, which is at near rated temperature. Due to the significant differential water temperature between the RPV and the suppression pool, this mode can be used one time only for the postulated Appendix R fire.

For this "pseudo" LPCI mode of RHR, it is postulated that the high-pressure injection systems of HPCS and RCIC are not available. Controls for HPCS are not available from the remote shutdown panel (RSP), and RCIC is postulated to be inoperable due to hot shorts resulting from a fire in the main control room. Thus, to depressurize the RPV to allow the RHR pumps to operate, four of the SRVs will be used since the controls for only four SRVs are available from the RSPs.

The ADS "pseudo" LPCI mode of RHR will satisfy the safe shutdown criteria, and allow the reactor water level to be maintained, such that peak cladding temperature remains below 1500°F, while plant operation is from the RSP or control room during and after a Chapter 09 9B.4-3 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR postulated fire in any area of the plant, including the control room/relay room.

Suppression pool cooling can be accomplished by RHR. To achieve cold shutdown from this point, it may be necessary to manually depressurize the reactor vessel using the SRVs (ADS) so that the shutdown cooling mode of RHR can be initiated.

Two redundant trains of systems are available to achieve a safe shutdown under each of these options. Each train is powered from a separate emergency diesel generator (2EGS*EG1-Division I and 2EGS*EG3-Division II). Either train, in conjunction with RCIC, HPCS, or ADS "pseudo" LPCI can be relied upon to shut down the plant.

Likewise, should a fire affect a portion of one train, the corresponding portion in the other train can remain available.

The HPCS system is powered from a separate diesel generator (2EGS*EG2-Division III). If both HPCS and RCIC equipment and cables required for safe shutdown are located in the same fire area, an analysis was performed and corrective actions taken to ensure that at least one train is always available to safely shut down the plant.

For a detailed description of those systems required to achieve a shutdown, the following cross-reference is provided:

System FSAR Section ADS 6.3 HPCS 6.3 LPCS 6.3 RCIC 5.4.6 RHR 5.4.7 Service Water 9.2.1 Diesel Generator Support Systems 9.5.4 to 9.5.8 HVAC Systems 9.4 Onsite Power Systems 8.3 Control Systems for ESF Systems 7.3 Control Systems Required for Safe 7.4 Shutdown Other Control Systems Required for 7.6 Safety Safety-Related Display Instrumentation 7.5 (other than those provided at remote shutdown panels)

Chapter 09 9B.4-4 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR 9B.4.4 Safe Shutdown Analysis The SSDSs have been divided into a total of four trains consistent with the options discussed in Section 9B.4.3 (Figure 9B.4-2).

9B.4.4.1 Event Description The evaluation fire event is selected to cover the range of postulated conditions required by SRP 9.5.1 Revision 3. The reactor is operating at rated power when a fire event occurs in and is confined to a single fire area. The safe shutdown train is evaluated for all fire areas except fire area 60 (service water pump area) assuming that offsite power is not available for 72 hr. For fire area 60, an analysis performed concluded that this area does not contain any alternative shutdown equipment which requires the assumption of a LOOP for 72 hr and a fire in this area will not induce a LOOP condition. However, the LOOP assumption results in a loss of feedwater and main condenser as a heat sink.

9B.4.4.2 Assumptions This analysis of the SSDSs is based on the following assumptions:

1. No credit is assumed for offsite power except in fire area 60.

2. Reactor scrams automatically or Operator scrams reactor. All control rods are fully inserted.

3. All of the SSDSs not affected by the fire event are considered to be available and to function normally.

4. For all fire areas except fire area 60 (service water pump area), the fire event does not occur simultaneously or coincident with any other abnormal conditions except a LOOP. For fire area 60, an analysis was performed and concluded that this area does not contain any alternative shutdown equipment requiring a LOOP assumption and, in addition, will not cause a fire-induced LOOP condition. Therefore, a LOOP assumption was not applied to fire area 60. No other challenges to the SSDSs are considered as part of this analysis.

Chapter 09 9B.4-5 Rev. 25, October 2022

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5. Plant operating and system actuation parameters are consistent with the plant safety analysis and Technical Specifications for the initiating event.

6. Components inside the primary containment are not affected by the fire since it is inerted.

9B.4.4.3 Results An analysis was performed to evaluate the capability of the four principal trains of systems to achieve the objectives specified in SRP 9.5.1. The minimum required components within each train were analyzed to demonstrate the ability of the subsystems within each train to meet the performance goals. In addition, environmental control systems were identified and evaluated to ensure the operability of the required safe shutdown equipment.

9B.4.4.3.1 Shutdown with HPCS Available There are at least two distinct trains of systems available to reach a safe shutdown under this option. Safe shutdown can be accomplished with either Division I or Division II components available. These two cases represent the most limiting cases, since a maximum of flexibility is afforded when both divisions are available.

In this scenario, it is assumed that the reactor is isolated (i.e., main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) closed) due to the scram and LOOP. The pressure buildup within the vessel resulting from the scram can be limited by the actuation of the main steam SRVs. HPCS can be initiated upon low water level to make up for the steam that is being blown down to the suppression pool through the SRVs. The SRVs can cycle opened and closed periodically as reactor vessel temperature and pressure rise and fall. HPCS can also operate periodically to maintain reactor water inventory, as necessary. In addition, low-pressure core spray (LPCS) and low-pressure coolant injection (LPCI) can be used to maintain water level once the vessel pressure has been sufficiently reduced.

The suppression pool cooling mode of RHR (either Division I-loop A or Division II-loop B or both if available) can be initiated to limit the peak suppression pool temperature and to provide a path for the removal of core decay heat to the UHS through the RHR heat exchanger(s) and the service water (SWP) system.

Chapter 09 9B.4-6 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR Once hot shutdown has been achieved and it is decided to proceed to a cold shutdown, it may be necessary to manually actuate the SRVs (ADS) (either Division I or Division II or both if available) to further depressurize the vessel to 335°F and 95 psig. At this point, the shutdown cooling mode of RHR can be initiated to reach cold shutdown.

9B.4.4.3.2 Shutdown with RCIC Available There are at least two distinct trains of systems available to reach a safe shutdown under this option, too. Safe shutdown can again be accomplished with RCIC and either Division I or Division II components available.

It is again assumed that the reactor is isolated due to the scram and LOOP. RCIC can be initiated upon low water level to make up for the steam that is being blown down to the pool through the SRVs. In addition, LPCS and LPCI can be used to maintain water level once the vessel pressure has been sufficiently reduced.

The pool cooling mode of RHR can be initiated to limit the peak suppression pool temperature and to provide a path for the removal of core decay heat to the UHS through the RHR heat exchanger(s) and the SWP system.

Once hot shutdown has been achieved and it is decided to proceed to a cold shutdown, it may be necessary to manually actuate the SRVs (ADS) (either Division I or Division II or both, if available) to further depressurize the vessel to 335°F and 95 psig. At this point, the shutdown cooling mode of RHR can be initiated to reach cold shutdown.

9B.4.4.3.3 Shutdown With ADS "Pseudo" LPCI In the event of control room/relay room fire, or fire in any other fire area, and loss of the RCIC/HPCS systems, ADS with pseudo injection of the LPCI system (through the recirculation lines) can be used to accomplish safe shutdown.

Once hot shutdown has been established and it is decided to proceed to a cold shutdown, it may be necessary to manually actuate the SRVs (either Division I or II or both, if available) to further depressurize the vessel to 95 psig and 335°F. At this point, the shutdown cooling mode of RHR can be initiated to achieve cold shutdown.

Chapter 09 9B.4-7 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR 9B.4.4.3.4 Auxiliary and Support Systems All of the auxiliary and support systems that are required to operate to ensure a safe shutdown of the plant have two distinct trains. The analysis assumed that either the Division I or Division II portions of these systems were always available. In case both Divisions were to be available, maximum flexibility would be provided since either or both trains could be operated as needed to support safe shutdown.

The auxiliary and support systems reviewed include:

1. SWP System - Required to provide cooling water for:

a. RHR heat exchangers

b. RHR pump seal coolers

c. Spent fuel heat exchangers

d. Diesel generators

e. Safety-related heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC) systems

2. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (SFC) System - If needed to remove decay heat generated within the spent fuel pool.

3. HVAC Systems - Required to maintain environmental control. These systems include:

a. Reactor Building Ventilation (HVR) - Provides space cooling within the reactor building and auxiliary bays for safety-related components.

b. Control Building Ventilation (HVC) and Chilled Water (HVK) - Provide cooling for control room, relay rooms, standby switchgear area, battery areas, and the remote shutdown area.

c. Yard Structures Ventilation (HVY) - Provides space cooling for the SWP pumps.

d. Diesel Generator Building Ventilation (HVP) -

Provides space cooling for the diesel generator building.

Chapter 09 9B.4-8 Rev. 25, October 2022

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4. Diesel Generator Support Systems - Required to support the startup and operation of the diesel generators.

These systems include:

a. Diesel Generator Air Startup (EGA)

b. Diesel Generator Fuel Oil (EGF)

5. Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water (CCP)

System - The only portions of CCP required to operate are the block valves that must close to allow for cooling water flow to the residual heat system (RHS) pump seal coolers, and the SFC heat exchangers from the SWP system instead of the CCP system.

9B.4.4.3.5 Safe Shutdown Control Monitoring Systems There are certain parameters which must be controlled to ensure that safe shutdown is achieved and the fission product release barriers are retained.

Fuel integrity is ensured if reactivity is controlled and heat transfer from the reactor core to the primary coolant is maintained within limits.

Heat rejection from the reactor coolant system (RCS) at an acceptable rate ensures that the reactor vessel pressure limits are not exceeded.

Containment integrity is ensured if there are no failures in the isolation features and pressure limits are not exceeded.

For a discussion of the control systems provided to control and monitor a safe shutdown, see Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

Sections 7.3, 7.4, and 7.6. These instrumentation systems are redundant so that at least one division can be available.

9B.4.4.4 Conclusions The above analysis demonstrates that at least four distinct trains are available to achieve a safe shutdown. When HPCS is available, the two trains discussed achieve a shutdown in a similar manner, the only difference being electrical power supply, Division I or Division II. Likewise, the two trains discussed for the case in which RCIC is available achieve a shutdown in a similar manner, the only difference again being Chapter 09 9B.4-9 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR electrical supply power, Division I or Division II. This analysis demonstrates that each of the four principal trains satisfies the five functional performance criteria given in Section 9B.4.2 and, therefore, does not exceed any of the limiting safety consequences.

9B.4.5 Safe Shutdown Electrical Power Supply The emergency electrical power sources and distribution systems required to maintain operability of safe shutdown equipment are discussed in detail in Chapter 8 of the FSAR.

9B.4.6 Safe Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation There are certain parameters that must be controlled to ensure that safe shutdown is achieved and the fission product release barriers are retained.

Detailed descriptions of systems to monitor these parameters are given in FSAR Chapter 7.

Chapter 09 9B.4-10 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 9B.5 ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS 9B.5.1 Introduction Associated circuits are circuits which are not completely independent of the SSDSs and components. Failure of these circuits can potentially affect the SSDSs. A fire in a given fire area can potentially affect systems and components which were thought to be independent of that area. The three categories of the associated circuits are:

1. Circuits that are not needed for safe shutdown but share a common power supply with safe shutdown circuits and are susceptible to fire.

2. Circuits which can affect components whose spurious operation would adversely affect safe shutdown capability and are susceptible to fire.

3. Circuits which share an enclosure (raceway, panel, junction box, etc.) with safe shutdown circuits but are themselves not needed for safe shutdown and are susceptible to fire.

9B.5.2 Analysis Each of the three safety divisions (I, II, and III) supplies its own safety loads on Unit 2. The design of the electrical distribution system does not permit connection of an out-of-division or nonsafety load to a safety bus (without interposing a qualified and coordinated isolation device). In addition, redundant divisions are physically separated in accordance with Section III.G-2 of Appendix R. These design features negate the possibility of Type 1 and 3 associated circuits as defined above. However, an analysis performed identified a small number of Type 1 associated circuits. These circuits are administratively controlled in the event of a fire to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. In addition, the results of the multiple high-impedance faults (MHIF) analysis conclude that all Appendix R associated circuits by common power source are appropriately protected so that any fire-induced MHIF in any fire area will not adversely affect the safe shutdown capability of the plant.

Chapter 09 9B.5-1 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR Associated circuits of Type 2 that result as a consequence of spurious operation of certain devices are described in Section 9B.5.3.

9B.5.3 Spurious Operation Spurious operation of powered components can potentially have a serious effect on the safety of the plant. Spurious operation is the result of a hot short for components which are energized to actuate. Open circuits and short-to-ground will not affect energized-to-actuate components (motor-operated valves [MOVs],

pumps, fans, etc.). De-energized to actuate components (fail-safe air-operated valve [AOV], solenoid-operated valve

[SOV], or a relay) can change position on loss of power.

The approach that will be used in the evaluation of spurious operation will be to:

1. Identify remotely-controlled components or groups of components that would have an adverse effect on safe shutdown as a result of spurious operation.

2. Determine the electrical circuits that are electrically associated with the devices identified in Item 1.

3. Determine routing of cables by fire area.

4. Determine if spurious operation is both possible as a result of routing and unacceptable for safe shutdown.

Spurious operation will be evaluated on a function-by-function basis. Those functions are:

1. Reactivity control.

2. Decay heat removal control.

3. Reactor coolant inventory control.

4. Containment isolation control.

Important components will be identified for each function and mode of operation. Once it is determined that cables for important components are susceptible to fire, a further evaluation of the specific cable will be performed.

Chapter 09 9B.5-2 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR The following guidelines will be used in evaluating the potential for spurious operation.

1. Phase-to-phase hot shorts in a 3-phase cable will not cause operation except in high/low interface.

2. Open circuits are of no consequence in normally de-energized-to-operate circuits.

3. Hot shorts in control cables can cause spurious operation.

4. There has to be a mechanistic short in a cable that is in the fire area for spurious operation to take place (i.e., a motor starter can be spuriously actuated if its contactor is energized). This can only happen in certain wires, not all wires. Therefore, the appropriate wire(s) must be in the fire zone for spurious operation to occur.

Valves can be mispositioned, thus causing a variety of effects on plant systems. Closure can block required flow paths.

Opening can divert fluid from the process via the primary system connection or can bypass a heat exchanger or create a flow path that bypasses the core.

9B.5.3.1 Reactivity Control Reactivity control is attained by insertion of the control rods into the reactor. The control rod drive (CRD) system provides the means to insert and retract the control rods within the reactor core.

Once the reactor has been shut down by the insertion of the control rods, there is no available mechanism for a return to criticality other than rod withdrawal. The design layout of the reactor protection system (RPS) and the CRD system does not provide any mechanism for return to criticality other than manual control rod withdrawal by the Operators.

9B.5.3.2 Decay Heat Removal Identification of Systems and Components Those systems needed for decay heat removal were determined by first identifying heat transfer paths between the reactor core Chapter 09 9B.5-3 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR and the UHSs. Those systems which are necessary for the maintenance of these heat transfer paths were then identified.

Decay heat removal systems can fail from spurious operation which:

1. Blocks flow.

2. Diverts flow such as bypass of a heat exchanger.

3. Diverts fluid inventory from the cooling path.

4. Fails an auxiliary system that can cause failure of a component in the heat removal path.

Those components that can cause system failure due to spurious operations will be identified as part of the analysis.

There are two redundant loops for each of the decay heat removal systems (ADS, suppression pool cooling mode of RHR, and shutdown cooling mode of RHR), the SWP system, and other support systems.

Flow blockage or bypassing of flow around a RHR heat exchanger in one loop is not a concern, provided that the remaining loop is available to remove decay heat.

9B.5.3.3 Reactor Coolant Inventory Control The reactor vessel water level must be maintained such that peak cladding temperature remains below 1500°F. This objective is achieved by ensuring that inventory loss does not exceed inventory makeup. The potential for loss of inventory was investigated by review of the plant fluid systems interfacing with the reactor vessel. It is determined that, considering plant design bases and Appendix R assumption for spurious operations of devices, loss of inventory is not a concern.

The review also included high-pressure to low-pressure interfaces that exist in the systems that interface with the reactor vessel. These interfaces were examined to determine whether spurious actuation of a sufficient number of devices could result in the overpressurization and subsequent failure of low pressure systems leading to a loss of inventory. Changes necessary for those valves identified as the boundary between the high pressure to low pressure systems were identified and implemented. Table 9B.5-1 lists the system boundaries reviewed, and identified resolution.

Chapter 09 9B.5-4 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR The reactor vessel level can also decrease if there is ADS blowdown or a decrease in makeup from the core spray or injection systems (HPCS, RCIC, LPCS, and LPCI). Review of the present design layout and system operations indicated that, based on Appendix R design base requirements and assumptions, for a single fire in any fire area of the plant, at minimum one train of core spray and/or injection system would be available which can maintain vessel water level.

9B.5.3.4 Containment Isolation Containment integrity is ensured if the containment is not overpressurized and containment leakage paths are isolated.

Pathways with an excess flow check valve or a reverse flow check valve are not included in the Appendix R analysis since they will prevent containment leakage. Pathways that form a closed loop with the containment are not considered since they do not provide a leakage path. Instrument and other small lines (1 in and less) also are excluded since any inventory loss would be insignificant. Only those systems which penetrate the containment and have the potential for releasing coolant inventory to the environment are included in the Appendix R program.

Chapter 09 9B.5-5 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.5-1 HIGH-/LOW-PRESSURE INTERFACES System Boundaries Description Resolution DER-Reactor Building Equipment Drain WCS drain valve Note 1 2DER*MOV128 MSS-Main Steam 2MSS*MOV112 Main steam drain Note 1 2MSS*AOV6A, B, C, D Main steam isolation Note 3 2MSS*AOV7A, B, C, D Main steam isolation Note 3 2MSS*MOV118 Reactor Head Vent Valve Note 4 2MSS*MOV119 Reactor Head Vent Valve Note 4 RHS-Residual Heat Removal 2RHS*MOV113 Shutdown cooling suction Note 1 2RHS*MOV67A, B Shutdown cooling return Note 1 2RHS*MOV112 Shutdown cooling supply isolation valve Note 1 2RHS*MOV142 RHR drain to radwaste isolation valve Note 1 2RHS*MOV149 RHR drain to radwaste isolation valve Note 1 WCS-Reactor Water Cleanup 2WCS-MOV106 Drain to liquid waste Note 1 2WCS-MOV107 Drain to main condenser Note 1 2WCS-AOV26A, B, C, D Demineralizer vent/drain Note 2a 2WCS-AOV28A, B, C, D Demineralizer vent/drain Note 2b 2WCS-AOV29A, B, C, D Demineralizer vent/drain Note 2b 2WCS-AOV30A, B, C, D Demineralizer vent/drain Note 2b 2WCS-AOV44A, B, C, D Demineralizer vent/drain Note 2b 2WCS-AOV51A, B, C, D Demineralizer vent/drain Note 2b 2WCS-AOV52A, B, C, D Demineralizer vent/drain Note 2a 2WCS-AOV53A, B, C, D Demineralizer vent/drain Note 2c 2WCS-AOV54A, B, C, D Demineralizer vent/drain Note 2c 2WCS-AOV61A, B, C, D Demineralizer vent/drain Note 2b NOTES:

1. Valve is de-energized and disconnected from power source (breaker open, fuse pulled) during normal plant operation. This is not meant to preclude use of these valves during normal operation but to ensure that valves remain de-energized when not in use.

2a. Outboard AOVs 2WCS-AOV26A, B, C and D are in series with inboard AOVs 2WCS-AOV52A, B, C and D. The mechanical air supply valve to these outboard and inboard AOVs is normally closed during plant normal operation. This is not meant to preclude use of these Chapter 09 9B.5-6 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.5-1 (contd.)

valves during normal operation but to ensure that valves remain closed when not in use. Changes to inboard AOVs 2WCS-AOV52A, B, C and D are not required but the inboard and outboard valves are supplied by the same mechanical air supply.

2b. Control circuits of these AOVs are wired in series with redundant isolation switch contacts located in different fire areas separated by 3-hr fire barriers. No single fire could cause sufficient spurious operations to violate the high-/low-pressure interface paths. Isolation switches will be normally in open position during plant normal operation. This is not meant to preclude use of these valves during normal operation but to ensure that valves remain closed when not in use.

2c. Outboard AOVs 2WCS-AOV53A, B, C and D are in series with inboard AOVs 2WCS-AOV54A, B, C and D. The mechanical air supply valve to these outboard AOVs is normally closed during normal plant operation. This is not meant to preclude use of these valves during normal operation but to ensure that valves remain closed when not in use. Changes to inboard AOVs 2WCS-AOV54A, B, C and D are not required because mechanical air supply to outboard AOVs is administratively controlled and spurious actuation of inboard AOVs would not cause high-/low-pressure interface failure.

3. These valves are normally open in the event of a control room fire. They are closed by the Operator and subsequently disconnected from their power source to ensure no spurious operation.

4. 2MSS*MOV118 and 2MSS*MOV119 are 2 vent lines that connect to the suppression pool through 1/4 tubing. The valves are in series, normally closed, remote manually controlled motor-operated valves which fail in the as-is position. The valves are not required during an accident or post accident condition other than to maintain the pressure boundary integrity of the main steam system. As per NER-2E-005, no additional requirements are applied due to minimal inventory loss from instrument tubing of 1 and less.

Chapter 09 9B.5-7 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 9B.6 METHODOLOGY FOR FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION 9B.6.1 Introduction This section documents the methodology used to demonstrate the safe shutdown capability of Unit 2 consistent with the fire protection goals of the regulations in 10CFR50, Appendix R. The flow path for the fire protection analysis is shown on Figure 9B.6-1. This methodology is utilized to perform the analysis as described in Section 9B.8.

9B.6.2 Fire Area/Zone Identification The boundaries of the individual fire areas are defined by the plant layout (walls, ceilings, floors, doors, etc.), and based on Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and ANI guidelines.

Those areas that do not meet the requirements of Section III.G.2 are classified as follows:

1. The existing protection features provide an equivalent level of protection.

2. Justification is provided or an exemption is requested to qualify these areas as fire subareas.

Table 9B.6-1 lists the fire areas/fire subareas/fire zones.

Table 9B.6-3 provides a cross-reference of the fire zones and the fire zone plans shown in Figures 9A.3-2 through 9A.3-8.

9B.6.3 Methodology for Fire Protection Evaluation The following is a description of the step-by-step procedure for analyzing the adequacy of the fire protection features for safe shutdown of Unit 2 to meet the specific requirements of Section III.G of Appendix R to 10CFR50. These steps are also summarized in Figure 9B.6-1.

Step 1 - Identification of the Fire Areas/Zones The first step in the evaluation is to divide the plant into fire areas/zones as identified in Table 9B.6-1. Physical plan and unique identification of each fire zone are marked on Figures 9A.3-2 through 9A.3-8.

Chapter 09 9B.6-1 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR Step 2 - Identification of Systems, Equipment, and Instruments Required for Shutdown The next step in the evaluation is to identify the systems, components, and instruments, including the auxiliary support systems, pertaining to the three safety shutdown divisions.

Step 3 - Listing of Equipment in Each Fire Area Starting with one fire area, list all the safe shutdown equipment and components in each fire area. For convenience of handling volume of data, this step is first done by fire zone and then all fire zones forming the fire area are combined together.

Step 4 - Listing of Safety-Related Cables and Equipment Select a single fire area. List all equipment pertaining to Division I, Division II, and Division III that are inoperable due to the fire occurring in the area considered (either because it is located inside this area or because it is served by a circuit that traverses the area).

Determine if any of the equipment listed is an electrical power source feeding numerous safety-related equipment in the same or different fire area. If so, add all such equipment in the list of safety-related equipment. For convenience of handling volume of data, this step was first performed per fire zone and then all the fire zones forming the fire area were combined together.

Step 5 - Comparison of the Two Lists Compare the results of Steps 3 and 4 to ensure that all equipment in each fire area under consideration has been included.

Step 6 - Assignment of Safe Shutdown Train Assign the appropriate safe shutdown train number 1, 2, 3, or 4 for the applicable system component. Discard any cable or equipment that is not required for safe shutdown at this stage.

Step 7 - Identify Consequences of Spurious Operation Chapter 09 9B.6-2 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR Identify spurious operation by system (see Section 9B.5.3).

List equipment and cables affected by spurious operation in different fire areas.

Step 8 - Evaluation of the Effects of a Postulated Fire Postulate an exposure fire in each of the fire areas and determine whether a safe shutdown is achievable with equipment and cable not affected by the fire by actuation from the control room. (The effects of spurious operation of equipment should be considered [see Step 7] in making this determination.) If a safe shutdown can be achieved, no further action is required.

If a safe shutdown cannot be achieved, proceed to Step 9.

Step 9 - Recommended Modifications Based on the fire area/zone in question, consider the following options for hot/cold shutdown:

1. If the fire area is equipped with a fire detection system and an automatic fire suppression system, enclose one train in a 1-hr fire barrier.

2. If the fire area is not equipped with a fire detection system and an automatic fire suppression system, a cost study should be conducted so that a choice can be made between the following:

a. Relocate one train in another area.

b. Install a fire detection system and an automatic fire suppression system, and enclose one train in a 1-hr fire barrier.

c. Protect one train in a 3-hr fire barrier.

Step 10 - Implementation Proceed to implement the recommendation made in Step 9.

Chapter 09 9B.6-3 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.6-1 FIRE AREA/FIRE SUBAREA/FIRE ZONE IDENTIFICATION Fire Area/Fire Subarea Fire Zone Description North Aux Bldg/FA1 201SW LPCS Room, North Auxiliary Bay, El 175 ft 202SW RHS Pump Room A, North Auxiliary Bay, El 175 ft 203SW RHS Heat Exchanger Room A, North Auxiliary Bay, El 175 ft 211SW North Auxiliary Bay, El 198 ft 231SW North Auxiliary Bay, Electrical Room, El 240 ft 221SW Auxiliary Bay, North Access Area B, El 215 ft Reactor Bldg/FA2 204SW Reactor Building, RCIC Pump Room, El 175 ft South Aux Bldg/FA3 207SW RHS Pump Room B, South Auxiliary Bay, El 175 ft 208SW RHS Pump Room C, South Auxiliary Bay, El 175 ft 206SW RHS Heat Exchanger Room B, South Auxiliary Bay, El 175 ft 214SW South Auxiliary Bay, El 198 ft 239SW South Auxiliary Bay, Electrical Room, El 240 ft 224SW Auxiliary Bay, South Access Area B, El 215 ft Reactor Bldg/ FA4 205NZ Reactor Building, HPCS Room, El 175 ft FA8 301NW Electrical Tunnel, 140° 302NW Electrical Tunnel, 35° Control Bldg/FA21 327NW Control Building, HPCS Cable Routing Area, El 244 ft 342XL Control Building, HPCS Switchgear Room, El 261 ft Diesel Gen Bldg/ FA28 402SW Division I, Diesel Generator Room Division I, Diesel Generator Control Room FA29 403SW Division II, Diesel Generator Room Division II, Diesel Generator Control Room FA30 404SW Division III, HPCS Diesel Generator Room Division III, HPCS Diesel Generator Control Room Control Bldg/FA75 339NZ Control Building, Division III, Battery Room, El 261 ft Control Building/ FA16 306NZ Control Building General Area, El 214 ft 312NZ Control Building General Area, East, El 214 ft 321NW Control Building Cable Chase, West, El 237 ft 332NW Control Building Cable Chase, West, El 261 ft 352NW Control Building Cable Chase, West, El 288 ft 371NW Control Building Cable Chase, West, El 306 ft FA17 305NW Control Building Cable Chase, West, El 214 ft 322NW Control Building, Division I Cable Routing Area, El 237 ft Chapter 09 9B.6-4 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.6-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Area/Fire Subarea Fire Zone Description 325NW Control Building, Division I, Cable Routing Area, El 244 ft 333XL Control Building, Division I Standby Switchgear Room, El 261 ft 334NZ Control Building, Division I Battery Room, El 261 ft 343NZ Control Building Remote Shutdown Room, West FA18 304NW Electrical Tunnel, 230° 309NW Control Building Cable Chase, East, El 214 ft 324NW Control Building Cable Chase, East, El 237 ft 337NW Control Building Cable Chase, East, El 261 ft 359NW Control Building Cable Chase, East, El 288 ft 377NW Control Building Cable Chase, East, El 306 ft FA19 323NW Control Building, Division II, Cable Routing Area, El 237 ft 326NW Control Building, Division II, Cable Routing Area, El 244 ft 336XL Control Building, Division II, Standby Switchgear Room, El 261 ft 335NZ Control Building, Division II Battery Room, El 261 ft 338NZ Control Building Remote Shutdown Room, East FA22 340NZ Control Building, Division I, HVAC Room, El 261 ft FA23 341NZ Control Building, Division II, HVAC Room, El 261 ft FA24 356NZ Control Building, PGCC Relay Room, El 288 ft 353SG Control Building, PGCC Relay Room, El 288 ft 354SG Control Building, PGCC Relay Room, El 288 ft 357XG Control Building, PGCC Computer Room, El 288 ft 358XG Control Building, PGCC Computer Room, El 288 ft 362SG Control Building, PGCC Relay Room, El 288 ft FA25 360NZ Control Building, Division I, HVAC Room, El 288 ft FA26 373NZ Control Building, Main Plant Control Room, El 306 ft 374SG Control Building, PGCC Underfloor, West, El 306 ft 375SG Control Building, PGCC Underfloor, East, El 306 ft 376XG Control Building, PGCC Underfloor, South, El 306 ft 381SG Control Building, PGCC Underfloor Bench, El 306 ft FA27 378NZ Control Building, Division II, HVAC Room, El 306 ft FA72 351NZ Control Building Corridor/Instrument Shop, El 288 ft FA76 380NZ Control Building Corridor, Lunch Room, Work Release Room, and Ladies'

& Men's Toilet Rooms, El 306 ft FA88 331NW Control Building Corridor, El 261 ft Chapter 09 9B.6-5 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.6-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Area/Fire Subarea Fire Zone Description Tunnels/FA50 256NZ Main Steam Tunnel FA48 236NZ Electrical Tunnel Vent Room, El 237 ft, Div. I FA55 361NZ Pipe Tunnel 363NZ Pipe Tunnel, El 244 ft 237NZ Electrical Tunnel Vent Room, El 237 ft, Div. II 362NZ Radwaste Tunnel Service Water Pump Area/FA60 807NZ Service Water Pump Room B FA61 806NZ Service Water Pump Room A Intake Area/FA71 802NZ Intake Area 803NZ Screenwell Building Reactor Building/FSA34 212SW Reactor Building General Area, North, El 175 ft & El 196 ft 222SW Reactor Building General Area, North, El 215 ft 232SW Reactor Building General Area, North, El 240 ft 243SW Reactor Building General Area, North, El 261 ft 252SW Reactor Building General Area, North, El 289 ft 261SW Reactor Building General Area, North, El 306 ft 271SW Reactor Building General Area, Northwest, El 328 ft 273SW Reactor Building General Area, Northeast, El 328 ft 281NZ Reactor Building General Area FSA35 213SW Reactor Building General Area, South, El 175 ft & El 196 ft 223SW Reactor Building General Area, South, El 215 ft 238SW Reactor Building General Area, South, El 240 ft 245SW Reactor Building General Area, South, El 261 ft 255SW Reactor Building General Area, South, El 289 ft 262SW Reactor Building General Area, South, El 306 ft 274SW Reactor Building General Area, Southeast, El 328 ft FA87 087SW Reactor Building Division I, SFC Pump Room, El 289 ft Chapter 09 9B.6-6 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.6-2 THIS TABLE HAS BEEN DELETED Chapter 09 9B.6-7 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.6-3 LIST OF FIRE ZONES/AREAS BY DRAWING NUMBERS Fire Zone Drawing No. Building/Elevation I.D. Numbers Figure 9A.3-2 Reactor Bldg LPCS Room North Aux Bay El 175'-0" 201SW Reactor Bldg RHS Pump Rm A North Aux Bay El 175'-0" 202SW Reactor Bldg RHS Heat Exchanger Rm A North Aux Bay El 175'-0" 203SW Reactor Bldg RCIC Pump Rm El 175'-0" 204SW Reactor Bldg HPCS Room El 175'-0" 205NZ Reactor Bldg RHS Heat Exchanger Rm B South Aux Bay El 175'-0" 206SW Reactor Bldg RHS Pump Rm B South Aux Bay El 175'-0" 207SW Reactor Bldg RHS Pump Rm C South Aux Bay El 175'-0" 208SW North Aux Bay El 198'-0" 211SW Reactor Bldg General Area North El 175'-0" & El 196'-0" 212SW Reactor Bldg General Area South El 175'-0" & El 196'-0" 213SW South Aux Bay El 198'-0" 214SW Figure 9A.3-3 Access Area B North Aux Bay El 215'-0" 221SW Reactor Bldg General Area North El 215'-0" 222SW Reactor Bldg General Area South El 215'-0" 223SW South Aux Bay El 215'-0" 224SW Electrical Tunnel 140° 301NW Electrical Tunnel 35° 302NW Electrical Tunnel 315° 303NW Electrical Tunnel 230° 304NW Control Bldg Cable Chase West El 214'-0" 305NW Control Bldg General Area West El 214'-0" 306NZ Control Bldg Cable Chase East El 214'-0" 309NW Control Bldg General Area East El 214'-0" 312NZ Pipe Tunnel El 244'-0" 363NZ Chapter 09 9B.6-8 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.6-3 (Cont'd.)

Fire Zone Drawing No. Building/Elevation I.D. Numbers Figure 9A.3-4 North Aux Bay Motor Control Centers El 240'-0" 231SW Reactor Bldg General Area North El 240'-0" 232SW HVAC Rm Div 1 El 237'-0" 236NZ HVAC Rm Div 2 El 237'-0" 237NZ Reactor Bldg General Area South El 240'-0" 238SW South Aux Bay Motor Control Centers El 240'-0" 239SW Control Bldg Cable Chase West El 237'-0" 321NW Control Bldg Div 1 Cable Routing Area El 237'-0" 322NW Control Bldg Div 2 Cable Routing Area El 237'-0" 323NW Control Bldg Cable Chase East El 237'-0" 324NW Control Bldg Div 1 Cable Routing Area El 244'-0" 325NW Control Bldg Div 2 Cable Routing Area El 244'-0" 326NW Control Bldg HPCS Cable Routing Area El 244'-0" 327NW Pipe Tunnel El 244'-0" 361NZ Pipe Tunnel El 244'-0" 362NZ Pipe Tunnel El 244'-0" 363NZ Service Water Pump Room A and Stairwell Enclosures El 224'-0" 806NZ Service Water 807NZ Figure 9A.3-5 Reactor Bldg General Area North El 261'-0" 243SW Reactor Bldg General Area South El 261'-0" 245SW Standby Gas Treatment Rm A El 261'-0" 247NZ Standby Gas Treatment Rm B El 261'-0" 248NZ Main Steam Tunnel El 240'-0" 256NZ Control Bldg Corridor El 261'-0" 331NW Control Bldg Div 1 Cable Chase West El 261'-0" 332NW Control Bldg Div 1 Standby Switchgear Room El 261'-0" 333XL Control Bldg Div 1 Battery Room El 261'-0" 334NZ Control Bldg Div 2 Battery Room El 261'-0" 335NZ Control Bldg Div 2 Standby Switchgear Rm El 261'-0" 336XL Control Bldg Div 2 & 3 Cable Chase West El 261'-0" 337NW Control Bldg Remote Shutdown Room B El 261'-0" & HVAC Rm El 274'-0" 338NZ Control Bldg HPCS Battery Room El 261'-0" 339NZ Control Bldg Div 1 Chiller Room B El 261'-0" 340NZ Control Bldg Div 2 Chiller Room El 261'-0" 341NZ Control Bldg High Pressure Core Spray Switchgear Room 342XL Control Bldg Remote Shutdown Rm A El 261'-0" & HVAC Rm El 274'-0" 343NZ Div 1 Diesel Generator Rm El 261'-0" & Day Tank Rm El 272'-0" 402SW Chapter 09 9B.6-9 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.6-3 (Cont'd.)

Fire Zone Drawing No. Building/Elevation I.D. Numbers Figure 9A.3-5 Div 2 Diesel Generator Rm El 261'-0" & Day Tank Room El 272'-0" 403SW (cont'd.) HPCS Diesel Generator Rm El 261'-0" & Day Tank Room El 272'-0" 404SW Service Water Intake and Discharge Shafts 802NZ Screenwell Bldg El 261'-0" 803NZ Diesel Fire Pump Room 804NW Service Water Pump Room A 806NZ Service Water Pump Room B 807NZ Figure 9A.3-6 Standby Gas Treatment Bldg HVAC Room El 286'-0" 251NW Reactor Bldg General Area North El 289'-0" 252SW Reactor Bldg General Area South El 289'-0" 255SW Control Bldg Instrument Shop and Corridor El 288'-6" 351NZ Control Bldg Cable Chase West El 288'-6" 352NW Control Bldg PGCC Relay Rm El 288'-6" 353SG Control Bldg PGCC Relay Rm El 288'-6" 354SG Control Bldg PGCC Computer Rm El 288'-6" 357XG Control Bldg PGCC Computer Rm El 288'-6" 358XG Control Bldg PGCC Relay Rm El 288'-6" 362SG Control Bldg PGCC Relay Rm El 288'-6" 356NZ Reactor Bldg Div 1 SFC Pump Room El 289'-0" 087SW Control Bldg Div 2 & 3 Cable Chase East El 288'-6" 359NW Control Bldg Div I HVAC Rm El 288'-6" 360NZ Turbine Bldg Cols 8-12 El 277'-6" 731SW Screenwell Bldg El 261'-0" 803NZ Figure 9A.3-7 Reactor Bldg Pipe Chase El 306'-6" 261SW Reactor Bldg General Area South El 306'-6" 262SW Control Bldg Div 1 Cable Chase West El 306'-0" 371NW Control Bldg Main Plant Control Room El 306'-0" 373NZ Control Bldg PGCC Underfloor West El 306' 374SG Control Bldg PGCC Underfloor East El 306' 375SG Control Bldg PGCC Underfloor South El 306' 376XG Control Bldg PGCC Underfloor Bench El 306' 381SG Control Bldg Div 2 & 3 Cable Chase East El 306'-0" 377NW Control Bldg Div 2 HVAC Rm El 306'-0" 378NZ Control Bldg Corridor El 306'-0" 380NZ Screenwell Bldg El 261'-0" 803NZ Chapter 09 9B.6-10 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.6-3 (Cont'd.)

Fire Zone Drawing No. Building/Elevation I.D. Numbers Figure 9A.3-8 Reactor Bldg General Area NW El 328'-10" 271SW Reactor Bldg General Area NE El 328'-10" 273SW Reactor Bldg General Area SE El 328'-10" 274SW Reactor Bldg General Area El 353'-10" & 409'-3 1/4" 281NZ Chapter 09 9B.6-11 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 9B.7 EQUIPMENT AND CABLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER DESCRIPTIONS Equipment and scheduled cable in the plant are uniquely identified and readily traceable through the system with which they are associated. Examples of mechanical equipment, electrical equipment, and cable identification are given as follows:

1. Mechanical Equipment ID No. Example 2SWP*MOV107A 2 - Nine Mile Point Unit 2 SWP - Service Water System

• - Nuclear Safety Related MOV - Motor-Operated Valve 107A - Unique Identification Number

2. Electrical Equipment ID No. Example 2ENS*MCC101 2 - Nine Mile Point Unit 2 ENS - Emergency 600 V Motor Control Center System

• - Nuclear Safety Related (Class 1E)

MCC - Motor Control Center 101 - Unique Identification Number

3. Cable ID No. Example 2CSLAGC200 2 - Nine Mile Point Unit 2 CSL - Low-Pressure Core Spray System A - Alpha or Numeric Character Designating Associated Group of Like Equipment G - Color Designation:

O = Orange Y = Yellow P = Purple B = Blue N = No Color G = Green C - Control Level J - 13,800 V ac Power H - 4,160 V ac Power L - 600 V ac Power K - 600 V ac Power and Lower C - 120 V ac and 125 V dc Control X - Instrumentation 200 - Three-Digit Numeric Sequential Cable ID No.

Chapter 09 9B.7-1 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 9B.8 RESULTS OF FIRE PROTECTION ANALYSIS FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX R 9B.8.1 Balance of Plant Areas The results of the fire protection analysis for the SSDSs by fire areas/subareas where safe shutdown equipment is located are provided in Tables 9B.8-1 and 9B.8-2. Table 9B.8-1 lists by fire area/fire zone all equipment located in the fire area and required for safe shutdown in the event of a fire. This list also indicates the safe shutdown train associated with each item of equipment. Table 9B.8-2 gives the conclusion of the analysis.

The assumptions used in this analysis are as follows:

1. Fire occurs in any one fire area at a time.

2. All safe shutdown cables and equipment located in the fire area where the fire occurs are lost.

3. All safe shutdown equipment located outside of the fire area, but fed by the cables passing through the fire area, is disabled.

4. Spurious maloperation of the equipment fed by cables passing through the fire area may occur under the condition stated in Section 9B.5.3.

5. Safe shutdown cables not passing through the fire area where the fire occurs remain unaffected.

The evaluation considered cable routing as of April 30, 1988.

Controls have been established to ensure that future cable routing will not affect the safe shutdown analysis (SSA).

The primary containment was not included in the evaluation since it is inerted.

9B.8.2 Control Room and Relay Room The main control and relay rooms fire protection analysis postulates a fire in the main control or relay rooms that necessitates evacuation of the main control room and verifies Chapter 09 9B.8-1 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR that capability for safe shutdown of the plant exists from the remote shutdown room and other local control stations outside the main control or relay rooms. An exposure fire in the main control or relay rooms involving in situ combustibles which may disable all safe shutdown trains is not considered a credible event. A fire involving transient combustibles in the main control or relay rooms which disables all safe shutdown trains is also considered unlikely since the main control room is continuously manned; both the main control and relay rooms are provided with ionization-type smoke detection and Halon suppression systems (for floor sections or modules); and, administrative procedures would generally limit transient combustibles from being brought into the main control or relay rooms. However, since the NRC requires that a major fire be postulated in the control or relay rooms, the following information addresses this contingency.

The fire areas and fire zones involved are as follows:

Fire Area FA26, Main Control Room, El 306 ft Fire Zones 373 NZ Control room panels 374 SG PGCC underfloor, west 375 SG PGCC underfloor, east 376 XG PGCC underfloor, south 381 SG PGCC underfloor bench Fire Area FA24, Relay Room, El 288 ft Fire Zones 353 SG PGCC Relay Room 354 SG PGCC Relay Room 356 NZ PGCC Relay Room 357 XG PGCC Computer Room 358 XG PGCC Computer Room 362 SG PGCC Relay Room The assumptions used in this analysis are as follows:

1. A fire occurs and requires evacuation of the main control room. Operators scram the reactor and initiate MSIV closure before evacuating the area.

Chapter 09 9B.8-2 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR

2. The entire main control or relay room is considered lost; no automatic initiation signals for mitigating systems are available after evacuation.

3. LOOP occurs coincidental with the fire in the main control or relay rooms (this provides the limiting safe shutdown scenario).

4. A single, spurious maloperation in addition to the loss of all automatic signals is considered for evaluation purposes for components controlled from the main control room. The worst-case spurious maloperation is one SRV remaining open until corrected by Operator action. The loss-of-coolant inventory is the worst-case scenario since other scenarios, such as vessel overfill due to failure to isolate the feedwater system, is not a credible scenario.

Multiple hot shorts are required to cause an event worse than a loss-of-coolant scenario. However, for RHR shutdown cooling mode of operation, the worst-case maloperation is loss of any one of the shutdown cooling supply line isolation valves.

5. In cases of high-/low-pressure interface, multiple devices located in series and controlled from the main control room may spuriously maloperate, resulting in any one high-/low-pressure interface failure at a time.

9B.8.2.1 Safe Shutdown Systems Selected equipment in safe shutdown trains 1, 2, 3, and 4 are used to mitigate the effect of fires in the main control or relay rooms. Most of this equipment is located in the remote shutdown room and includes manual control of four ADS SRVs, the RCIC system, the "pseudo" LPCI, and the shutdown cooling and suppression pool cooling modes of the RHR system. In the case of shutdown from the remote shutdown panel (RSP), and availability of the RCIC system, RCIC operation followed by RHR shutdown cooling is the preferred safe shutdown method. The ADS "pseudo" LPCI operation would be utilized if the RCIC system is not available.

Due to the control room fire, alternate shutdown cooling may be required to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. Manual Chapter 09 9B.8-3 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR manipulation of the RHR minimum flow valves and the RHR LPCI injection valves for alternate shutdown cooling would be required.

A more complete description follows:

Various systems that may be used for safe shutdown of the plant in case of a fire in the main control or relay rooms are as follows:

1. RCIC/

"Pseudo" LPCI - To maintain reactor water level.

2. ADS - To depressurize the reactor pressure vessel (RPV), if required.

3. RHR - To maintain suppression pool temperature within design limits and for shutdown cooling.

4. CMS/ - Instrumentation systems to indicate plant RSS parameters necessary to perform the shutdown function, such as reactor water level and pressure, suppression pool level and temperature, etc.

5. Other support systems

a. EGA, EGS, EGF - Emergency diesel generators (Divisions I and II) and their auxiliary systems (such as fuel oil and starting air).

b. ENS/EJS/EHS/BYS/LAC - Onsite emergency power distribution systems.

c. SWP - Cooling water for the emergency diesel generator jacket coolers, SFC and RHR heat exchangers, and various area unit coolers as required.

d. Ventilation and air conditioning for cooling remote shutdown room, emergency switchgear rooms, diesel generator rooms, electrical tunnels, and others.

e. SFC - To cool the spent fuel pool.

Chapter 09 9B.8-4 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR All of the above systems, except EJS and EHS, have monitoring/control automatic actuation circuits in the main control room. The necessary instrumentation and controls for monitoring and operating RCIC, SRV, RHR, CMS, RSS, and SWP are provided at the RSP.

The necessary controls/monitoring for diesel generator support systems are available on local control panels outside the main control or relay rooms.

The equipment associated with the above systems that may be used for safe shutdown from the RSP are listed in Table 9B.8-3.

9B.8.2.2 Safe Shutdown Scenario The sequence of plant response and Operator actions assumed in this analysis after a major fire in the control/relay room, including the spurious maloperation, is as follows:

Time Event 0 Control Room Operator initiates reactor scram by placing the reactor mode switch in shutdown position, closes MSIVs and trips the feedwater pumps from the main control room.

LOOP occurs.

Time Event Note:

Operators leave main control room (control building el 306'-0").

3-5 sec MSIVs close.

<10 sec Main steam SRVs lift discharging to suppression pool; one SRV fails to reclose due to fire-initiated spurious maloperation.

<90 sec Operator operates the disconnect switch (control building el 306'-0") to ensure that the feedwater pumps are tripped.

Chapter 09 9B.8-5 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR 5 min Operator action is taken (such as de-energizing MSIV solenoid breakers) which provides confirmation that the MSIV closure has occurred (control building el 261'-0").

Operators operate disconnect switches (control building el 306'-0") to isolate the control room.

15 min Operators operate transfer switches in RSP to transfer control to RSP (control building el 261'-0").

Complete start of RCIC from the RSP (if not already running). Note: In the event of RCIC failure to operate, the ADS "pseudo" LPCI mode of RHR operation should be initiated within 10 min.

De-energize (close) the open SRV from the RSP.

At this point, hot shutdown is achieved.

Operators locally control cooling fans 2HVP*FN1A-D and reposition the recirculation dampers 2HVP*MOD6A-D and/or discharge dampers 2HVP*MOD1A-D as appropriate to maintain acceptable temperature conditions in the diesel generator rooms.

25 min As required, other support systems are started locally.

Time Event

>30 min If required to maintain suppression pool temperature within limits, the Operator initiates suppression pool cooling with Division I RHR system.

>60 min As required, other support systems are started locally.

<120 min Operators turn off standby unit coolers and lights to ensure the north and south auxiliary bay switchgear room temperatures do not exceed 120°F.

>120 min After reactor pressure decreases to <105 psig, Operators initiate Division II RHR shutdown Chapter 09 9B.8-6 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR cooling to place the reactor in cold shutdown condition from the RSP.

72 hr The reactor reaches cold shutdown (200°F) condition.

The reactor vessel/core containment parameters and spent fuel pool will remain within acceptable limits during this scenario.

9B.8.2.3 Solutions to Control/Relay Room Fire

1. Administrative controls

2. Justification by analysis

3. Modifications In case of a fire in the main control or relay rooms, design modifications were implemented to maintain availability and controllability of systems required for safe shutdown and to prevent spurious maloperations of the control circuits. This included the following:

1. Added manual control switches on the RSP.

See Table 9B.8-3 for circuits that are added to the RSP.

2. Provided disconnect switches outside the main control or relay rooms to prevent spurious maloperations.

See Table 9B.8-3 for circuits provided with disconnect switches.

3. Removed permissives/interlocks from the main control/relay rooms under RSP operating mode.

Specific procedures have been developed to address administrative control of this equipment to ensure safe operation from the RSP.

4. Provided control switch shorting contacts (shunts) to short valve opening contactor coils to prevent spurious valve openings.

5. Provided additional protection for control power supplies to circuits on the RSP.

Chapter 09 9B.8-7 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR Additional protection for control power supplies to the circuits on the RSP has been provided by adding an additional fuse in parallel with each existing fuse, connected through the transfer switches. When the transfer switches are operated to isolate the control and relay rooms and establish control of the RSP, the new sets of fuses are put into service. This eliminates the possibility of loss of control power supply at the RSP due to a fire in the control or relay rooms.

Table 9B.8-3 lists the circuits provided with the additional fuse.

9B.8.2.4 Conclusions With the above design modifications, capability exists for safe shutdown of the plant from the RSP and other local control stations outside the main control and relay rooms in the unlikely event of a fire in the main control or relay rooms, requiring evacuation of these areas. After scram, tripping of the feedwater system (FWS) pumps, and MSIV closure, all manual operations, including the initiation of core cooling, can be completed within 15 min of evacuation of the main control room.

After this initial period, additional actions can be initiated from the RSP or locally, as required, to bring the reactor to cold shutdown. The reactor vessel/core containment fuel pool parameters remain within acceptable limits during the postulated scenario. Necessary administrative procedures, operating instructions, and Operator training are provided for the main control and relay rooms fire event.

Chapter 09 9B.8-8 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 LIST OF AFFECTED SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT BY FIRE AREA/FIRE ZONE Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks FA1 201SW 2CSL*FE107 3 Aux. Bay 2CSL*P1 3 North 2CSL*P2 3 El 175, 198 2HVR*TIS22A 1,3 215 & 240 2HVR*TIS22B 1,3 2HVR*UC402A-M1/M2 1,3 2HVR*UC402B-M1/M2 1,3 2HVR*MST402A 1,3 2HVR*MST402B 1,3 CABLES 1,3 202SW 2CCP*AOV37A 1,3 2CCP*AOV38A 1,3 2CCP*SOV37A 1,3 2CCP*SOV38A 1,3 2HVR*TIS23A 1,3 2HVR*TIS23D 1,3 2HVR*UC401A 1,3 2HVR*UC401D 1,3 2HVR*MST401A 1,3 2HVR*MST401D 1,3 2RHS*FE14A 1,3 2RHS*MOV2A 1,3 2RHS*P1A 1,3 2RHS*V1 1,3 2RHS*V39 1,3 2SWP*AOV20A 1,3 2SWP*AOV22A 1,3 2SWP*SOV20A 1,3 2SWP*SOV22A 1,3 CABLES 1,3 2*JB0207 1,3 2*JB0208 1,3 203SW 2HVR*TIS116 1,3 2RHS*CE11A 1,3 2RHS*MOV12A 1,3 Chapter 09 9B.8-9 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2RHS*MOV8A 1,3 2RHS*TE13A 1,3 2RHS*V23 1,3 2RHS*V24 1,3 2RHS*V27 1,3 2RHS*V270 1,3 2RHS*V271 1,3 2RHS*V28 1,3 2RHS*V29 1,3 2RHS*V30 1,3 2SWP*MOV33A 1,3 2SWP*MOV90A 1,3 2SWP*TE12A 1,3 CABLES 1,3 FA1 211SW 2HVR*UC405 1,3 Aux. Bay 2HVR*MST405 1,3 North 2RHS*MOV26A 1,3 El 198' 2RHS*MOV27A 1,3 2RHS*MOV9A 1,3 2RHS*TE10A 1,3 2RHS*V183 1,3 2RHS*V196 1,3 2SWP*PT140A 1,3 CABLES 1,3 FA1 221SW 2*JB0020 1,3 Aux. Bay 2*JB0022 1,3 North 2*JB0060 1,3 El 215' 2*JB0085 1,3 2*JB0355 1,3 2SWP*MOV19A 1,3 CABLES 1,3,4 NOTE 19 FA1 231SW 2CMS*AE6A 1,3 Aux. Bay 2CMS*AE71A 1,3 North 2CMS*E/I6A 1,3 El 240' 2CMS*E/I71A 1,3 2CMS*PNL66A 1,3 Chapter 09 9B.8-10 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2CMS*PNL73A 1,3 2CMS*SOV64A 1,3 2CMS*SOV65A 1,3 2DMS*MCCA1 1,3 2EHS*MCC102 1,3 2EJA*PNL100A 1,3 2EJA*XD100A 1,3 2EJS*PNL101A 1,3 2EJS*PNL103A 1,3 2EJS*PNL104A 1,3 2HVR*TIS19A 1,3 2HVR*TIS19B 1,3 2HVR*UC408A 1,3 2HVR*UC408B 1,3 2HVR*MST408A 1,3 2HVR*MST408B 1,3 2ICS*MOV129 1,3,4 NOTE 19 2SCV*PNL101A 1,3 2SCV*XD101A 1,3 CABLES 1,3,4 NOTE 19 FA2 204SW 2*JB0743 1,3 Reactor 2*JB0815 1,3 Bldg. RCIC 2*TB7060 1,3 Pump Room 2HVR*TIS30A 1,3 El 175' 2HVR*UC412A 1,3 2HVR*MST412A 1,3 2ICS*ED1 1,3,4 2ICS*ED2 1,3,4 2ICS*E1 1,3,4 2ICS*FE101 3,4 2ICS*HYV151 3,4 2ICS*LS132 3,4 2ICS*MOV116 3,4 2ICS*MOV120 3,4 2ICS*MOV124 3,4 2ICS*MOV150 3,4 2ICS*PCV115 3,4 2ICS*P1 1,3,4 2ICS*P2 1,3,4 2ICS*T1 1,3,4 Chapter 09 9B.8-11 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks CABLES 1,3,4 2ICS*I/P115 3,4 2ICS*E/I115 1,3,4 FA3 206SW 2*JB0356 2,4 Aux. Bay 2HVR*TIS115 2,4 South 2RHS*CE11B 2,4 El 175, 198 2RHS*MOV12B 2,4 215, & 240 2RHS*V25 2,4 2RHS*V26 2,4 2RHS*V272 2,4 2RHS*V273 2,4 2RHS*V31 2,4 2RHS*V32 2,4 2RHS*V33 2,4 2RHS*V34 2,4 2SWP*MOV33B 2,4 2SWP*MOV90B 2,4 2SWP*TE12B 2,4 CABLES 2,4 207SW 2*JB0184 2,4 2*JB0209 2,4 2*JB0210 2,4 2CCP*AOV37B 2,4 2CCP*AOV38B 2,4 2CCP*SOV37B 2,4 2CCP*SOV38B 2,4 2HVR*TIS23C 2,4 2HVR*TIS23F 2,4 2HVR*UC401C 2,4 2HVR*UC401F 2,4 2HVR*MST401C 2,4 2HVR*MST401F 2,4 2RHS*MOV149 2,4 2RHS*MOV4B 2,4 2RHS*MOV8B 2,4 Chapter 09 9B.8-12 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2RHS*P1B 2,4 2RHS*TE13B 2,4 2RHS*V11 2,4 2RHS*V2 2,4 2RHS*V42 2,4 2RHS*V5 2,4 2RHS*V89 2,4 2RHS-V91 2,4 2RHS*MOV142 1,3 NOTE 27 2SWP*AOV20B 2,4 2SWP*AOV22B 2,4 2SWP*SOV20B 2,4 2SWP*SOV22B 2,4 CABLES 2,4 208SW 2HVR*TIS23B 2,4 2HVR*TIS23E 2,4 2HVR*UC401B 2,4 2HVR*UC401E 2,4 2HVR*MST401B 2,4 2HVR*MST401E 2,4 2RHS*MOV4C 2,4 2RHS*P1C 4 2RHS*V3 2,4 2RHS*V6 2,4 CABLES 2,4 2RHS*FE14B 2,4 2RHS*FE14C 2,4 FA3 214SW 2*JB0021 2,4 Aux. Bay 2*JB0023 2,4 South 2HVR*UC406 2,4 El 198' 2HVR*MST406 2,4 2RHS*MOV26B 2,4 2RHS*MOV27B 2,4 2RHS*MOV9B 2,4 2RHS*TE10B 2,4 2RHS*V189 2,4 CABLES 2,4 Chapter 09 9B.8-13 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks FA3 224SW CABLES 2,4 Aux. Bay South El 215' FA3 239SW 2CMS*AE6B 2,4 Aux. Bay 2CMS*AE71B 2,4 South 2CMS*AIZ6B 2,4 El 240' 2CMS*E/I6B 2,4 2CMS*E/I71B 2,4 2CMS*PNL66B 2,4 2CMS*PNL73B 2,4 2CMS*SOV64B 2,4 2CMS*SOV65B 2,4 2DMS*MCCB1 2,4 2EHS*MCC302 2,4 2EJA*PNL300B 2,4 2EJA*XD300B 2,4 2EJS*PNL302B 2,4 2EJS*PNL303B 2,4 2EJS*PNL304B 2,4 2HVR*TIS16A 2,4 2HVR*TIS16B 2,4 2HVR*UC409A 2,4 2HVR*UC409B 2,4 2HVR*MST409A 2,4 2HVR*MST409B 2,4 2SCV*PNL301B 2,4 2SCV*XD301B 2,4 CABLES 2,4 NOTE 19 FA4 205NZ 2CSH*FE105 1,2 Reactor Bldg. 2CSH*P1 1,2 HPCS Room 2CSH*P2 1,2 El 175' 2CSH*RV113 1,2 2CSH*RV114 1,2 2CSH*TW126 1,2 2CSH*V17 1,2 2CSH*V55 1,2 2CSH*V59 1,2 2CSH*V9 1,2 Chapter 09 9B.8-14 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2HVR*TIS24A 1,2 2HVR*TIS24B 1,2 2HVR*UC403A 1,2 2HVR*MST403A 1,2 CABLES 1,2 FA8 301NW 2SWP*RE23A 1,3 Elec. 2SWP*FS23A 1,3 Tunnel 2SWP*CAB23A 1,3 140° CABLES 1,3,4 NOTE 29 and 35° 302NW CABLES 1,3,4 NOTE 29 FA21 327NW 2*JB5053 1,2 Control 2*JB5054 1,2 Bldg. 2*JB5055 1,2 HPCS 2*JB5056 1,2 Cable Area 2*JB5058 1,2 El 244' 2*JB5339 1,2 2*JB8018 1,2 2*JB8019 1,2 2*JB8030 1,2 2*JB8089 1,2 2*JB8090 1,2 CABLES 1,2 Note 30 342XL 2BYS*CHGR2C1 1,2 2BYS*CHGR2C2 1,2 2EHS*MCC201 1,2 2EJS*X2 1,2 2ENS*SWG102 1,2 2HVC*TE111 1,2 2HVC*UC102 1,2 2LAC*PNLE03 1,2 2SCV*XD200P 1,2 2SCV*PNL200P 1,2 2SWP*AOV581 1,2 2SWP*SOV581 1,2 2LAC*XLE03 1,2 2HVC*MST102 1,2 CABLES 1,2 Chapter 09 9B.8-15 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks FA28 402SW 2*JB8000 1,3 Div. I 2*JB8057 1,3 Diesel Gen. 2*JB8058 1,3 Room 2*JB8059 1,3 2*JB8060 1,3 2*JB8061 1,3 2*JB8062 1,3 2*JB8063 1,3 2*JB8064 1,3 2*JB8065 1,3 2*JB8155 1,3 2*JB8156 1,3 2*JB8397 1,3 2*JB8476 1,3 2*TB5000 1,3 2BYS*PNL204A 1,3 2CES*IPNL406 1,3 2CES*IPNL407 1,3 2EGA-C1A 1,3 2EGA-C2A 1,3 2EGA*FLT1A 1,3 2EGA*PCV25A 1,3 2EGA*PCV26A 1,3 2EGA*PS10A 1,3 2EGA*PS19A 1,3 2EGA*PS20A 1,3 2EGA*PS21A 1,3 2EGA*PS6A 1,3 2EGA*PS7A 1,3 2EGA*PS9A 1,3 2EGA-SV1A 1,3 2EGA-SV2A 1,3 2EGA*SV3A 1,3 2EGA*SV4A 1,3 2EGA*TK1A 1,3 2EGA*TK2A 1,3 2EGA*TRP1A 1,3 2EGA-TRP2A 1,3 2EGA-LI17A 1,3 2EGA-LI18A 1,3 2EGA-PI11A 1,3 Chapter 09 9B.8-16 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2EGA-PI12A 1,3 2EGA-PI13A 1,3 2EGA-PI14A 1,3 2EGA-PI15A 1,3 2EGF*FE13A 1,3 2EGF*LS12A 1,3 2EGF*LS5A 1,3 2EGF*LS7A 1,3 2EGF*LS8A 1,3 2EGF*P1A 1,3 2EGF*P1C 1,3 2EGF*STR1A 1,3 2EGF*STR1C 1,3 2EGF*TK1A 1,3 2EGF*TK3A 1,3 2EGF*V20 1,3 2EGF-FIS13A 1,3 2EGF-LT10A 1,3 2EGF-LI11A 1,3 2EGF-LT15A 1,3 2EGF-PDIS20A 1,3 2EGF-PDIS20C 1,3 2EGF-PI14A 1,3 2EGF-PI14C 1,3 2EGO*P1A 1,3 Chapter 09 9B.8-17 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK Chapter 09 9B.8-18 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2EGS*EG1 1,3 2EGS*PNL11 1,3 2EGS*P1A 1,3 2EGT*CH2 1,3 2EGT*CH4 1,3 2HVP*AOD4A 1,3 2HVP*AOD4C 1,3 2HVP*DMP15A 1,3 2HVP*DMP15B 1,3 2HVP*DMP17A 1,3 2HVP*DMP19A 1,3 2HVP*DMP19C 1,3 2HVP*FN1A 1,3 2HVP*FN1C 1,3 2HVP*FS8A 1,3 2HVP*FS8C 1,3 2HVP*MOD1A 1,3 2HVP*MOD1C 1,3 2HVP*MOD6A 1,3 2HVP*MOD6C 1,3 2HVP*SOV4A 1,3 2HVP*SOV4C 1,3 2HVP*TE10A 1,3 2HVP*TE11A 1,3 2HVP*TIS13A 1,3 2HVP*UC1A 1,3 2HVP*MST1A 1,3 2SWP*FT76A 1,3 2SWP*MOV66A 1,3 2SWP*MOV95A 1,3 2SWP*PT66A 1,3 2SWP*PT95A 1,3 CABLES 1,3,4 FA29 403SW 2*JB8001 2,4 Div. II 2*JB8008 2,4 Diesel Gen. 2*JB8044 2,4 Room 2*JB8073 2,4 2*JB8098 2,4 2*JB8157 2,4 Chapter 09 9B.8-19 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2*JB8158 2,4 2*JB8194 2,4 2*JB8195 2,4 2*JB8477 2,4 2*TB5001 2,4 2BYS*PNL204B 2,4 2CES*IPNL408 2,4 2CES*IPNL412 2,4 2EGA-C1B 2,4 2EGA-C2B 2,4 2EGA*FLT1B 2,4 2EGA-LI17B 2,4 2EGA-LI18B 2,4 2EGA*PS10B 2,4 2EGA*PS19B 2,4 2EGA*PS20B 2,4 2EGA*PS21B 2,4 2EGA*PS6B 2,4 2EGA*PS7B 2,4 2EGA*PS9B 2,4 2EGA-SV1B 2,4 2EGA-SV2B 2,4 2EGA*SV3B 2,4 2EGA*SV4B 2,4 2EGA*TK1B 2,4 2EGA*TK2B 2,4 2EGA*TRP1B 2,4 2EGA-TRP2B 2,4 2EGA-PI11B 2,4 2EGA-PI12B 2,4 2EGA-PI13B 2,4 2EGA-PI14B 2,4 2EGA-PI15B 2,4 2EGF*FE13B 2,4 2EGF*LS12B 2,4 2EGF*LS5B 2,4 2EGF*LS7B 2,4 2EGF*LS8B 2,4 2EGF*P1B 2,4 2EGF*P1D 2,4 Chapter 09 9B.8-20 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2EGF*STR1B 2,4 2EGF*STR1D 2,4 2EGF*TK1B 2,4 2EGF*TK3B 2,4 2EGF*V40 2,4 2EGF-FIS13B 2,4 2EGF-LT10B 2,4 2EGF-LT15B 2,4 2EGF-LI11B 2,4 2EGF-PDIS20B 2,4 2EGF-PDIS20D 2,4 2EGF-PI14B 2,4 2EGF-PI14D 2,4 2EGO*P1B 2,4 2EGS*EG3 2,4 2EGS*PNL31 2,4 2EGS*P1B 2,4 2EGT*CH3 2,4 2EGT*CH5 2,4 2HVP*AOD4B 2,4 2HVP*AOD4D 2,4 2HVP*DMP15C 2,4 2HVP*DMP15D 2,4 2HVP*DMP17B 2,4 2HVP*DMP19B 2,4 2HVP*DMP19D 2,4 2HVP*FN1B 2,4 2HVP*FN1D 2,4 2HVP*FS8B 2,4 2HVP*FS8D 2,4 2HVP*MOD1B 2,4 2HVP*MOD1D 2,4 2HVP*MOD6B 2,4 2HVP*MOD6D 2,4 2HVP*SOV4B 2,4 2HVP*SOV4D 2,4 2HVP*TE10B 2,4 2HVP*TE11B 2,4 2HVP*TIS13B 2,4 2HVP*UC1B 2,4 Chapter 09 9B.8-21 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2HVP*MST1B 2,4 2SWP*FT76B 2,4 2SWP*MOV66B 2,4 2SWP*MOV95B 2,4 2SWP*PT66B 2,4 2SWP*PT95B 2,4 CABLES 2,4 2*JB8398 2,4 FA30 404SW 2*JB5332 1,2 Div. III 2*JB5333 1,2 HPCS 2*JB5334 1,2 Diesel Gen. 2*JB8002 1,2 Room 2*JB8003 1,2 2*JB8159 1,2 2*JB8160 1,2 2CES*IPNL413 1,2 2CES*IPNL414 1,2 2EGA-C3 1,2 2EGA-C4 1,2 2EGA*FLT2 1,2 2EGA*PCV115 1,2 2EGA*PCV116 1,2 2EGA*PS106 1,2 2EGA*PS109 1,2 2EGA*PS110 1,2 2EGA*PS117 1,2 2EGA*PS119 1,2 2EGA*PS120 1,2 2EGA*PS121 1,2 2EGA*PS122 1,2 2EGA*SV111 1,2 2EGA*SV112 1,2 2EGA*TK3 1,2 2EGA*TK4 1,2 2EGA-TRP4 1,2 2EGA-PI113 1,2 2EGA-PI114 1,2 2EGA-SV101 1,2 2EGA-SV102 1,2 Chapter 09 9B.8-22 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2EGF*FE104 1,2 2EGF*IPNL112 1,2 2EGF*LS103 1,2 2EGF*LS106 1,2 2EGF*LS108 1,2 2EGF*LS109 1,2 2EGF*P2A 1,2 2EGF*P2B 1,2 2EGF*STR2A 1,2 2EGF*STR2B 1,2 2EGF*TK2 1,2 2EGF*TK4 1,2 2EGF*V60 1,2 2EGF-FIS104 1,2 2EGF-LT101 1,2 2EGF-LT105 1,2 2EGF-LI102 1,2 2EGF-PDIS24A 1,2 2EGF-PDIS24B 1,2 2EGF-PI16A 1,2 2EGF-PI16B 1,2 2EGS*EG2 1,2 2HVP*AOD5A 1,2 2HVP*AOD5B 1,2 2HVP*DMP16A 1,2 2HVP*DMP16B 1,2 2HVP*DMP18 1,2 2HVP*DMP20A 1,2 2HVP*DMP20B 1,2 2HVP*FN2A 1,2 2HVP*FN2B 1,2 2HVP*FS9A 1,2 2HVP*FS9B 1,2 2HVP*MOD2A 1,2 2HVP*MOD2B 1,2 2HVP*MOD7A 1,2 2HVP*MOD7B 1,2 2HVP*SOV5A 1,2 2HVP*SOV5B 1,2 2HVP*TE103 1,2 Chapter 09 9B.8-23 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2HVP*TE107 1,2 2HVP*TIS120 1,2 2HVP*UC2 1,2 2HVP*MST2 1,2 2SWP*FT535 1,2 2SWP*MOV94A 1,2 2SWP*MOV94B 1,2 CABLES 1,2 FA75 339NZ 2BYS*BAT2C 1,2 Control Bldg. CABLES 1,2 Div. III Batt. Room El 261' FA16 306NZ CABLES 1,3 NOTE 19 Control 312NZ CABLES 1,3,4 Bldg. 321NW 2*JB5016 1,3 2*JB5081 1,3 2*JB5147 1,3 2*JB8014 1,3 2*JB8015 1,3 CABLES 1,3,4 NOTES 25, 29 332NW 2*JB5118 1,3 2HVC*AOD169 1,3 2HVC*SOV169 1,3 CABLES 1,3,4 NOTES 25, 29 352NW 2*JB5047 1,3 2BYS*PNL201A 1,3 2BYS*PNL202A 1,3 2SCM*PNL101A 1,3 2SCM*PNL102A 1,3 2SCM*PNL103A 1,3 2SCM*PNL104A 1,3 2SCM*PNL105A 1,3 2SCM*XD101A 1,3 2SCM*XD102A 1,3 2SCM*XD103A 1,3 Chapter 09 9B.8-24 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2SCM*XD104A 1,3 2SCM*XD105A 1,3 2VBS*PNL101A 1,3 CABLES 1,3 NOTE 29 371NW 2VBS*PNLA103 1,3 2CES*PNL415 1,3 2CES-PNL417 CABLES 1,3 NOTE 29 CABLES 4 NOTES 25, 29 2RHS*MOV104 1,3 NOTE 27 FA17 305NW CABLES 1,3 Control CABLES 4 NOTE 25 Bldg. 322NW 2*JB5004 1,3 2*JB5014 1,3 2*JB5018 1,3 2*JB5039 1,3 2*JB5043 1,3 2*JB5092 1,3 2*JB5093 1,3 2*JB5119 1,3 2*JB5128 1,3 2*JB5150 1,3 2*JB5160 1,3 2*JB8028 1,3 2*JB8080 1,3 2*JB8082 1,3 2*JB8084 1,3 2*JB8091 1,3 2HVC*AOD170 1,3 2HVC*AOD213 1,3 2HVC*FS172 1,3 2HVC*SOV170 1,3 2HVC*SOV213 1,3 2HVC*TE174 1,3 2HVC*UC106 1,3 2HVC*MST106 1,3 2SWP*AOV573 1,3 2SWP*SOV573 1,3 Chapter 09 9B.8-25 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2VBA*TRS2C 1,3 2VBA*XD2C 1,3 CABLES 1,3 NOTE 29 CABLES 4 NOTES 25, 29 2*JB5126 1,3 2VBA*UPS2C 1,3 325NW 2*JB5049 1,3 CABLES 1,3 CABLES 4 NOTE 25 333XL 2BYS*CHGR2A1 1,3 2BYS*CHGR2A2 1,3 2BYS*SWG002A 1,3 2EHS*MCC103 1,3 NOTE 25 2EJA*PNL101A 1,3 2EJA*XD101A 1,3 2EJS*PNL100A 1,3 2EJS*US1 1,3 2EJS*X1A 1,3 2EJS*X1B 1,3 2ENS*SWG101 1,3 2HVC*TE38A 1,3 2LAC*PNL100A 1,3 2LAC*XLE01 1,3 2LAC*PNLE01 1,3 2LAC*XLE04 1,3 2LAC*XLE06 1,3 2VBA*UPS2A 1,3 2VBA*TRS2A 1,3 CABLES 1,3 CABLES 4 NOTE 25 334NZ 2*JB5153 1,3 2BYS*BAT2A 1,3 2HVC*UC101A 1,3 2HVC*UC108A 1,3 2HVC*MST101A 1,3 2HVC*MST108A 1,3 2SWP*AOV154A 1,3 2SWP*AOV78A 1,3 2SWP*SOV154A 1,3 Chapter 09 9B.8-26 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

2SWP*SOV78A 1,3 CABLES 1,3 CABLES 4 NOTE 25 343NZ 2CES*PNL405 1,3 NOTE 17 2HVC*ACU3A 1,3 2HVC*TIS22A 1,3 2HVK*FE28A 1,3 2HVK*RV37A 1,3 2HVK*TW26A 1,3 2HVK*TW27A 1,3 2SWP*FI200A 1,3 2SWP*FI200C 1,3 2SWP*FI200E 1,3 2SWP*FI201A 1,3 2SWP*FY200A 1,3 2SWP*FY200C 1,3 2SWP*FY200E 1,3 2SWP*FY201A 1,3 2SWP*PWRS200A 1,3 2SWP*PWRS200C 1,3 2SWP*PWRS200E 1,3 2SWP*PWRS201A 1,3 CABLES 1,3 2RHS*MOV104 1,3 NOTE 27 FA18 304NW 2SWP*CAB23B 2,4 Control 2SWP*RE23B 2,4 Bldg., 2SWP*FS23B 2,4 Elec CABLES 2,4 NOTE 26 Tunnel CABLES 1,3 NOTES 26, 230° 17 309NW NONE -

324NW 2*JB5148 2,4 2*JB5149 2,4 CABLES 2,4 NOTE 26 CABLES 1,3 NOTES 26, 18 Chapter 09 9B.8-27 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 337NW 2*JB5123 2,4 2HVC*AOD177 2,4 2HVC*SOV177 2,4 CABLES 2,4 NOTE 26 CABLES 1,3 NOTES 26, 18 359NW 2BYS*PNL201B 2,4 2BYS*PNL202B 2,4 2SCM*PNL301B 2,4 2SCM*PNL302B 2,4 2SCM*PNL303B 2,4 2SCM*PNL304B 2,4 2SCM*PNL305B 2,4 2SCM*XD301B 2,4 2SCM*XD302B 2,4 2SCM*XD303B 2,4 2SCM*XD304B 2,4 2SCM*XD305B 2,4 2VBS*PNL301B 2,4 CABLES 2,4 NOTE 26 CABLES NOTES 26, 18 377NW 2VBS*PNLB103 2,4 2CES*PNL416 2,4 CABLES 2,4 NOTE 26 CABLES 1,3 NOTES 26, 18 FA19 323NW 2*JB5015 2,4 Control 2*JB5019 2,4 Bldg. 2*JB5026 2,4 2*JB5040 2,4 2*JB5044 2,4 2*JB5050 2,4 2*JB5082 2,4 2*JB5094 2,4 2*JB5105 2,4 2*JB5124 2,4 2*JB5138 2,4 2*JB5163 2,4 Chapter 09 9B.8-28 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2*JB8075 2,4 2*JB8077 2,4 2*JB8079 2,4 2*JB8081 2,4 2*JB8083 2,4 2*JB8085 2,4 2*JB8092 2,4 2HVC*AOD178 2,4 2HVC*AOD179 2,4 2HVC*AOD214 2,4 2HVC*AOD215 2,4 2HVC*FS196 2,4 2HVC*SOV178 2,4 2HVC*SOV179 2,4 2HVC*SOV214 2,4 2HVC*SOV215 2,4 2HVC*TE198 2,4 2HVC*UC107 2,4 2HVC*MST107 2,4 2SWP*AOV574 2,4 2SWP*SOV574 2,4 2VBA*TRS2D 2,4 2VBA*XD2D 2,4 CABLES 1,2,4 NOTE 18 2*JB5127 2,4 2VBA*UPS2D 2,4 326NW 2*JB5017 2,4 2*JB8016 2,4 2*JB8017 2,4 2*JB8029 2,4 CABLES 1,2,4 NOTE 18 335NZ 2*JB5155 2,4 2BYS*BAT2B 2,4 2HVC*UC101B 2,4 2HVC*UC108B 2,4 2HVC*MST101B 2,4 2HVC*MST108B 2,4 2SWP*AOV154B 2,4 2SWP*AOV78B 2,4 2SWP*SOV154B 2,4 Chapter 09 9B.8-29 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2SWP*SOV78B 2,4 CABLES 1,2,4 336XL 2BYS*CHGR2B1 2,4 2BYS*CHGR2B2 2,4 2BYS*SWG002B 2,4 2EHS*MCC303 2,4 NOTE 26 2EJA*PNL301B 2,4 2EJA*XD301B 2,4 2EJS*PNL300B 2,4 2EJS*US3 2,4 2EJS*X3A 2,4 2EJS*X3B 2,4 2ENS*SWG103 2,4 2HVC*TE38B 2,4 2LAC*PNL300B 2,4 2LAC*XLE02 2,4 2LAC*PNLE02 2,4 2LAC*XLE05 2,4 2LAC*XLE07 2,4 2VBA*UPS2B 2,4 2VBA*TRS2B 2,4 CABLES 1,2,4 NOTES 18, 19 338NZ 2CES*PNL405 2,4 NOTE 17 2HVC*ACU3B 2,4 2HVC*TIS22B 2,4 2HVK*FE28B 2,4 2HVK*RV37B 2,4 2HVK*TW26B 2,4 2HVK*TW27B 2,4 2SWP*FI200B 2,4 2SWP*FI200D 2,4 2SWP*FI200F 2,4 2SWP*FI201B 2,4 2SWP*FY200B 2,4 2SWP*FY200D 2,4 2SWP*FY200F 2,4 2SWP*FY201B 2,4 2SWP*PWRS200B 2,4 2SWP*PWRS200D 2,4 Chapter 09 9B.8-30 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2SWP*PWRS200F 2,4 2SWP*PWRS201B 2,4 CABLES 1,2,4 NOTES 18, 19 Chapter 09 9B.8-31 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks FA22 340NZ 2*JB5069 1,3 Control 2*JB5116 1,3 Bldg. 2*JB5117 2,4 NOTE 3 2EJS*PNL102A 1,3 2HVC*AOD54A 1,3 2HVC*AOD54B 2,4 NOTE 3 2HVC*FS56A 1,3 2HVC*FS56B 2,4 NOTE 3 2HVC*FS56C 2,4 NOTE 3 2HVC*FS56D 1,3 2HVC*SOV54A 1,3 2HVC*SOV54B 2,4 NOTE 3 2HVC*TIS29A 1,3 2HVC*UC103A 1,3 2HVC*MST103A 1,3 2HVK*CHL1A 1,3 2HVK*FE15A 1,3 2HVK*FT15A 1,3 2HVK*LS16A 1,3 2HVK*LS41A 1,3 2HVK*P1A 1,3 2HVK*RV14A 1,3 2SWP*FT29A 1,3 2SWP*MOV67A 1,3 2SWP*PT79A 1,3 2SWP*P2A 1,3 2SWP*TE35A 1,3 2SWP*TE91A 1,3 2SWP*TV35A 1,3 CABLES 1,3 CABLES 2,4 NOTES 3, 19 FA23 341NZ 2*JB5070 2,4 Control 2EJS*PNL301B 2,4 Bldg. 2HVC*TIS29B 2,4 2HVC*UC103B 2,4 2HVC*MST103B 2,4 2HVK*CHL1B 2,4 2HVK*FE15B 2,4 Chapter 09 9B.8-32 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2HVK*FT15B 2,4 2HVK*LS16B 2,4 2HVK*P1B 2,4 2SWP*FT29B 2,4 2SWP*MOV67B 2,4 2SWP*PT79B 2,4 2SWP*P2B 2,4 2SWP*TE35B 2,4 2SWP*TE91B 2,4 2SWP*TV35B 2,4 CABLES 2,4 FA24 See Section 9B.8.2 Control Bldg.

Relay Room FA25 360NZ 2*JB5006 1,3 Control Bldg. 2*JB5008 1,3 HVAC Room 2*JB5009 2,4 NOTES 2, El 288' 19 2*JB5032 1,3 2*JB5045 1,3 2*JB5079 1,3 2*JB5113 1,3 2*JB5114 1,3 2HVC*ACU1A 1,3 2HVC*ACU2A 1,3 2HVC*AOD12A 1,3 2HVC*AOD148 1,3 2HVC*AOD6A 1,3 2HVC*CH12A 1,3 2HVC*FLT1A 1,3 2HVC*FN4A 1,3 2HVC*FS13A 1,3 2HVC*FS16A 2,4 NOTES 25, 19 2HVC*FS23A 2,4 NOTES 25, 19 Chapter 09 9B.8-33 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2HVC*FS24A 1,3 2HVC*FS26A 2,4 NOTES 2, 19 2HVC*FS36A 1,3 2HVC*FS9A 1,3 2HVC*PNLCH12A 1,3 2HVC*SOV12A 1,3 2HVC*SOV148 1,3 2HVC*SOV6A 1,3 2HVC*TE37A 1,3 2HVC*TE37B 2,4 NOTES 2, 19 2HVK*SOV36A 1,3 2HVK*TV21A/2HVK*SOV21A 1,3 2HVK*TV22A/2HVK*SOV22A 1,3 2HVK*TW10A 1,3 2HVK*TW11A 1,3 2HVK*TW12A 1,3 2HVK*TW13A 1,3 2HVK*FE20A 1,3 CABLES 1,3 CABLES 2,4 NOTES 2, 5,25,19 FA26 See Section 9B.8.2 Control Bldg.

PGCC El 306' FA27 378NZ 2*JB5007 2,4 Control 2*JB5046 2,4 Bldg. 2*JB5080 2,4 Div. II 2*JB5109 2,4 HVAC 2*JB5110 2,4 2HVC*ACU1B 2,4 2HVC*ACU2B 2,4 2HVC*AOD12B 2,4 2HVC*AOD6B 2,4 2HVC*CH11B 2,4 Chapter 09 9B.8-34 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2HVC*FLT1B 2,4 2HVC*FN4B 2,4 2HVC*FS13B 2,4 2HVC*FS16B 1,3 NOTES 25, 19 2HVC*FS23B 1,3 NOTES 25, 19 2HVC*FS24B 2,4 2HVC*FS26B 1,3 NOTES 2, 19 2HVC*FS35A 1,3 NOTES 2, 19 2HVC*FS35B 2,4 2HVC*FS9B 2,4 2HVC*SOV12B 2,4 2HVC*SOV6B 2,4 2HVC*TE34A 1,3 NOTES 2, 19 2HVC*TE34B 2,4 2HVK*TV21B/2HVK*SOV21B 2,4 2HVK*TV22B/2HVK*SOV22B 2,4 2HVK*TW10B 2,4 2HVK*TW11B 2,4 2HVK*TW12B 2,4 2HVK*TW13B 2,4 2HVK*FE20B 2,4 CABLES 2,4 CABLES 1,3 NOTES 2, 25,19 FA76 380NZ 2*JB5115 1,3 Control Bldg. 2HVC*AOD61A 1,3 Corridor, 2HVC*SOV61A 1,3 Lunch Room, CABLE 1,3 Work Release CABLE 2,4 NOTES 7, Room, and 19 Ladies and Mens Toilet Rooms El 306' Chapter 09 9B.8-35 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks FA50 256NZ 2MSS*AOV7A 1,3 NOTE 14 Main 2MSS*AOV7B 1,3 NOTE 14 Steam 2MSS*AOV7C 1,3 NOTE 14 Tunnel 2MSS*AOV7D 1,3 NOTE 14 CABLES 1,3 731SW NONE FA48 236NZ 2HVC*TE155 1,3 Elec. 2HVC*UC104 1,3 Tunnel 2HVC*MST104 1,3 Vent Room, CABLES 1,3 Div. I El 237' Chapter 09 9B.8-36 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks FA55 237NZ 2*JB0359 2,4 2*JB0578 2,4 2*JB5125 2,4 2HVC*AOD192 2,4 2HVC*AOD193 2,4 2HVC*FS161 2,4 2HVC*SOV192 2,4 2HVC*SOV193 2,4 2HVC*TE165 2,4 2HVC*UC105 2,4 2HVC*MST105 2,4 2SWP*AOV571 2,4 2SWP*SOV571 2,4 CABLES 2,4 CABLES 1,3 NOTES 9, 23,22 361NZ 2*JB8148 1,3 NOTE 10 2*JB8149 2,4 2*JB8088 1,3 2*JB8087 2,4 2SWP*FT523 2,4 2SWP*FT533 2,4 2SWP*FV47A 1,3 NOTE 9 2SWP*FV47B 2,4 2SWP*SOV47A 1,3 2SWP*SOV47B 2,4 2SWP*MOV93B 2,4 2SWP*PT142B 2,4 2SWP*PT267B 2,4 2SWP*FV54B 2,4 2SWP*SOV54A 1,3 2SWP*SOV54B 2,4 2SWP*FV54A 1,3 NOTE 9 2SWP*CAB146B 2,4 2SWP*RUW146B 2,4 CABLES 1,3 NOTE 9 CABLES 2,4 Chapter 09 9B.8-37 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 362NZ 2CSH*LT3A 1,2 NOTE 22 2CSH*LT3B 1,2 NOTE 22 2ICS*LT3A 1,3 NOTE 22 2ICS*LT3C 1,3 NOTE 22 CABLES 2,4 CABLES 1,3 NOTES 9, 22,23 363NZ CABLES 1,3 NOTE 12 FA60 807NZ 2*JB2001 2,4 Service 2*JB2003 2,4 Water 2*JB2044 2,4 Pump Area 2*JB2046 2,4 2*JB2048 2,4 2*JB2051 2,4 2*JB2053 2,4 2*JB2055 2,4 2*JB2057 2,4 2*JB2059 2,4 2*JB2300 2,4 2EHS*MCC301 2,4 2HVY*TIS33B 2,4 2HVY*TIS33D 2,4 2HVY*UC2B 2,4 2HVY*UC2D 2,4 2HVY*MST2B 2,4 2HVY*MST2D 2,4 2SWP*FT200B 2,4 2SWP*FT200D 2,4 2SWP*FT200F 2,4 2SWP*FT96B 2,4 2SWP*FT96D 2,4 2SWP*FT96F 2,4 2SWP*MOV1B 2,4 2SWP*MOV1D 2,4 2SWP*MOV1F 2,4 2SWP*MOV3B 2,4 2SWP*MOV50B 2,4 2SWP*MOV74B 2,4 2SWP*MOV74D 2,4 Chapter 09 9B.8-38 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2SWP*STR4D 2,4 2SWP*STR4F 2,4 2SWP*TE31B 2,4 2SWP*MOV50A 1,3 NOTE 1 2SWP*SSR4B 2,4 2SWP*SSR5B 2,4 2SWP*SSR6B 2,4 CABLES 2,4 CABLES 1,3 NOTES 1, 12 2SWP*MOV74F 2,4 2SWP*PDT1B 2,4 2SWP*PDT1D 2,4 2SWP*PDT1F 2,4 2SWP*PT2B 2,4 2SWP*PT4B 2,4 2SWP*PT4D 2,4 2SWP*PT4F 2,4 2SWP*PT6B 2,4 2SWP*PT6D 2,4 2SWP*PT6F 2,4 2SWP*PT139B 2,4 2SWP*P1B 2,4 2SWP*P1D 2,4 2SWP*P1F 2,4 2SWP*STR4B 2,4 Chapter 09 9B.8-39 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks FA61 806NZ 2*JB2000 1,3 Service 2*JB2002 1,3 Water 2*JB2045 1,3 Pump Area 2*JB2047 1,3 2*JB2049 1,3 2*JB2050 1,3 2*JB2052 1,3 2*JB2054 1,3 2*JB2056 1,3 2*JB2058 1,3 2*JB2303 1,3 2EHS*MCC101 1,3 2HVY*TIS33A 1,3 2HVY*TIS33C 1,3 2HVY*UC2A 1,3 2HVY*UC2C 1,3 2HVY*MST2A 1,3 2HVY*MST2C 1,3 2SWP*FT200A 1,3 2SWP*FT200C 1,3 2SWP*FT200E 1,3 2SWP*FT96A 1,3 2SWP*FT96C 1,3 2SWP*FT96E 1,3 2SWP*MOV1A 1,3 2SWP*MOV1C 1,3 2SWP*MOV1E 1,3 2SWP*MOV3A 1,3 2SWP*MOV74A 1,3 2SWP*MOV74C 1,3 2SWP*MOV74E 1,3 2SWP*PDT1A 1,3 2SWP*PDT1C 1,3 2SWP*PDT1E 1,3 2SWP*PT139A 1,3 2SWP*PT2A 1,3 Chapter 09 9B.8-40 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2SWP*PT4A 1,3 2SWP*PT4C 1,3 2SWP*PT4E 1,3 2SWP*PT6A 1,3 2SWP*PT6C 1,3 2SWP*PT6E 1,3 2SWP*P1A 1,3 2SWP*P1C 1,3 2SWP*P1E 1,3 2SWP*STR4A 1,3 2SWP*STR4C 1,3 2SWP*STR4E 1,3 2SWP*TE31A 1,3 2SWP*SSR4A 1,3 2SWP*SSR5A 1,3 2SWP*SSR6A 1,3 CABLES 1,3 FA71 802NZ 2SWP*MOV77A 1,3 NOTE 12 Intake 2SWP*MOV77B 2,4 NOTE 12 Area 2SWP*LS30A 1,3 NOTE 12 2SWP*MOV30A 1,3 NOTE 12 2SWP*TE64A 1,3 NOTE 12 2SWP*TE65A 1,3 NOTE 12 2SWP*LS30B 2,4 NOTE 12 2SWP*MOV30B 2,4 NOTE 12 2SWP*TE64B 2,4 NOTE 12 2SWP*TE65B 2,4 NOTE 12 CABLES 2,4 NOTE 12 CABLES 1,3 NOTE 12 803NZ 2SWP*LS73A 1,3 NOTE 12 2SWP*LS73B 2,4 NOTE 12 CABLES 2,4 NOTE 12 CABLES 1,3 NOTE 12 FA72 351NZ CABLES 2,4 NOTE 7 Control CABLES 1,3 NOTE 7 Bldg.

Corridor/

Inst.

Shop El 288' Chapter 09 9B.8-41 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks FSA34 212SW 2*JB0016 1,3 Reactor 2*JB0094 1,3 Bldg. 2*JB0295 1,3 North 2*JB0297 1,3 Half 2*JB0299 1,3 2*JB0301 1,3 2*JB0303 1,3 2*JB0305 1,3 2*JB0693 1,3 2*JB0744 2,3,4 2*JB0813 1,3,4 2*JB0915 1,3 2*JB1216 1,3,4 2CES*RAK001 1,3 2CES*RAK017 1,3 2CES*RAK018 1,3 Chapter 09 9B.8-42 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2CMS*EFV9A 1,3 2CMS*LT11A 1,3 2CMS*LT9A 1,3 2CMS*TE50A 1,3 2CMS*TE50B 2,4 NOTE 13 2CMS*TE50C 1,3 2CMS*TE50D 2,4 NOTE 13 2CMS*TE51A 1,3 2CMS*TE51B 2,4 NOTE 13 2CMS*TE51C 1,3 2CMS*TE51D 2,4 NOTE 13 2CMS*TE52A 1,3 2CMS*TE52B 2,4 NOTE 13 2CMS*TE52C 1,3 2CMS*TE52D 2,4 NOTE 13 2CMS*TE53A 1,3 2CMS*TE53B 2,4 NOTE 13 2CMS*TE53C 1,3 2CMS*TE53D 2,4 NOTE 13 2CMS*TE54A 1,3 2CMS*TE54B 2,4 NOTE 13 2CMS*TE54C 1,3 2CMS*TE54D 2,4 NOTE 13 2CMS*V80A 1,3 2CMS*V81A 1,3 CABLES 1,3 CABLES 2,4 NOTES 13, 21 FSA34 212SW 2HVR*TIS25A 1,3 Reactor 2HVR*TIS25B 1,3 Bldg. 2HVR*UC404A 1,3 North Half 2HVR*UC404B 1,3 2HVR*MST404A 1,3 2HVR*MST404B 1,3 2ICS*FT101 3,4 2ICS*FT102 3,4 2ICS*MOV122 3,4 2ICS*MOV136 3,4 Chapter 09 9B.8-43 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2ICS*MOV143 3,4 2ICS*MOV124 1,3 2ICS*MOV148 2,3,4 NOTE 27 2ICS*MOV164 1,3,4 2ICS*PDT167 1,3,4 2ICS*PT1A 1,3,4 2ICS*PT1B 1,3,4 2ICS*PT103 1,3,4 2ICS*PT105 1,3,4 2ICS*PT106 1,3,4 2ICS*PT167X 1,3,4 2ICS*PT167Y 1,3,4 2RHS*FT14A 1,3 2RHS*FT60A 1,3 2RHS*FT86A 1,3 2RHS*FV38A 1,3 2RHS*MOV1A 1,3 2RHS*MOV4A 1,3 2RHS*PDT18A 1,3 2RHS*PI87A 1,3 2RHS*PT111 1,3 2RHS*PT3A 1,3 2RHS*PT5A 1,3 2RHS*PT6A 1,3 2RHS*PT7A 1,3 2RHS*V10 1,3 2RHS-V178 1,3 2RHS-CE101 1,3 2RHS-TE140 1,3 2SWP*FT13A 1,3 2SWP*FT201A 1,3 2SWP*MOV17A 1,3 2SWP*MOV18A 1,3 222SW 2*JB0005 1,3 2*JB0014 1,3 2*JB0433 1,3 2*JB0695 1,3 2*JB0702 1,3 2*JB0919 1,3 2*JB1689 1,3 Chapter 09 9B.8-44 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2*JB1650 1,3 2CCP*MOV14A 1,3 2CCP*MOV18A 1,3 2CES*RAK010 1,3 2CES*Z57E 1,3 2CMS*EFV8A 1,3 2CMS*SOV26C 1,3 2CMS*SOV35A 1,3 2CMS*V78A 1,3 2CMS*V79A 1,3 2CSH*MOV105 1,2 NOTE 24 2CSH*V7 1,2 NOTE 6 2HVR*TIS26A 1,3 2HVR*TIS26B 1,3 2HVR*TIS26C 1,3 2HVR*UC407A 1,3 2HVR*UC407B 1,3 2HVR*UC407C 1,3 2HVR*MST407A 1,3 2HVR*MST407B 1,3 2HVR*MST407C 1,3 2ISC*LT13A 1,3 2SFC*E1A 1,3 2SFC*FE36A 1,3 2SFC*FT36A 1,3 2SFC*HV37A 1,3 2SFC*TE8A 1,3 2SFC*TW7A 1,3 2SFC*TW9A 1,3 2SFC*V225 1,3 2SFC*V37A 1,3 2SFC*V39A 1,3 2SFC*V70A 1,3 2SFC-PI14A 1,3 2SFC-PI15A 1,3 2SFC-TI7A 1,3 2SFC-TI9A 1,3 2WCS*FT67X 1,3 CABLES 1,3,4 NOTE 29 Chapter 09 9B.8-45 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 232SW 2CES*Z07E 1,3 2CES*Z08E 1,3 2CES*Z09E 1,3 2CES*Z10E 1,3 NOTE 29 2HVR*TIS27A 1,3 2HVR*UC410A 1,3 2HVR*MST410A 1,3 2RHS*MOV40A 1,3 2RHS*V71 1,3 CABLES 1,3,4 243SW 2*JB0152 1,3 2*JB0629 1,3 2*JB0631 1,3 Chapter 09 9B.8-46 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK Chapter 09 9B.8-47 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2CES*RAK004 1,3 2CES*RAK005 1,2 NOTE 19 2CMS*SOV32A 1,3 2DER-PT134 1,3 2HVR*TIS28A 1,3 2HVR*TIS35A 1,3 2HVR*UC411A 1,3 2HVR*UC414A 1,3 2HVR*MST411A 1,3 2HVR*MST414A 1,3 2ISC*LT10B 1,2 NOTE 19 2ISC*LT10D 1,2 NOTE 19 2ISC*LT11A 1,3 2ISC*LT7C 1,3 2ISC*PT15C 1,3 2ISC*PT16B 1,2 NOTE 19 2ISC*PT16D 1,2 NOTE 19 2ISC*LT11D 1,3 2ISC*LT12A 1,3 2ISC*LT7D 1,3 2ISC*LT8A 1,3 2ISC*LT8B 1,3 2ISC*LT9A 1,3 2ISC*LT9C 1,3 2ISC*PT15D 1,3 2ISC*PT17A 1,3 2ISC*PT17C 1,3 2ISC*PT2A 1,3 2ISC*PT2B 1,3 2ISC*PT4C 1,3 2ISC*PT4D 1,3 2ISC*PT5A 1,3 2ISC*PT5D 1,3 2ISC*PT6A 1,3 2RHS*PDT24A 1,3 2RSS*LT114 1,3 2RSS*PT102 1,3 CABLES 1,3,4 CABLES 1,2 NOTE 19 Chapter 09 9B.8-48 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 252SW 2*JB0064 1,3 2*JB0067 1,3 2*JB0121 1,3 2*JB0122 1,3 2*JB0123 1,3 2*JB0340 1,3 2*JB0346 1,3 2*JB0814 1,3,4 2*JB1671 1,3 2*JB1672 2,4 NOTE 15 2CSL*MOV104 1,3 2CSL*MOV112 1,3 2HVR*AOD1A 1,3 2HVR*AOD204 1,3 2HVR*AOD34A 1,3 2HVR*AOD6A 1,3 2HVR*AOD9A 1,3 2HVR*SOVX1A 1,3 2HVR*SOVX1B 1,3 2HVR*SOVX6A 1,3 2HVR*SOVX6B 1,3 2HVR*SOVX9A 1,3 2HVR*SOVX9B 1,3 2HVR*SOV204 1,3 2HVR*SOV34A 1,3 2HVR*TIS31A 1,3 2HVR*UC413A 1,3 2ICS*V156 1,3,4 2ICS*MOV126 1,3,4 2RHS*MOV24A 1,3 2RHS*V143 2,4 NOTE 6 2RHS*V70 1,3 2SWP*AOV97A 1,3 2SWP*SOV97A 1,3 2SWP*SOV97B 2,4 2HVR*UC413B 2,4 NOTES 15, 18 CABLES 1,3,4 CABLES 2,4 NOTES 15, 18 Chapter 09 9B.8-49 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 261SW 2*JB0600 1,3 2SFC*V227A 1,3 2SFC*V227B 2,4 NOTE 6 CABLES 1,3 271SW 2*JB0019 1,3 2*JB0027 1,3 2*JB0448 1,3 2*JB0450 1,3 2SFC*AOV19A 1,3 2SFC*AOV33A 1,3 2SFC*HV35A 1,3 2SFC*HV54A 1,3 2SFC*LS33A 1,3 2SFC*LS33C 1,3 2SFC*LS34A 1,3 2SFC*SOV19A 1,3 2SFC*SOV33A 1,3 2SFC*SOV35A 1,3 2SFC*SOV54A 1,3 2SFC*TE31A 1,3 2SFC*V100B 1,3 2SFC*V101B 1,3 2SFC*V102B 1,3 2SFC-V260A 1,3 2SFC-LT2A 1,3 CABLES 1,3 273SW 2SFC*V100A 1,3 2SFC*V101A 1,3 2SFC*V102A 2,4 NOTE 6 2SFC*V104B 1,3 2SFC*V105B 1,3 2SFC*V107 2,4 NOTE 6 2SFC-V260B 2,4 NOTE 6 2SFC*V9 1,3 CABLES 1,3 CABLES 2,4 NOTE 15 281NZ 2HVR*AOD10A 1,3 2HVR*SOVX10A 1,3 2HVR*SOVY10A 1,3 CABLES 1,3 Chapter 09 9B.8-50 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks FA87 FA087* 2SFC*P1A 1,3 NOTE 19 SFC Pump -SW 2SFC*FE58A 1,3 NOTE 19 Room A 2SFC*FT58A 1,3 NOTE 19 Div. I 2SFC-PI60A 1,3 NOTE 19 CABLES 1,3 NOTE 19 2SFC*V13A 1,3 NOTE 19 2SFC*V20A 1,3 NOTE 19 2SFC*V21A 1,3 NOTE 19 2SFC*V256A 1,3 NOTE 19

• This zone number is used for editorial purposes only.

Chapter 09 9B.8-51 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK Chapter 09 9B.8-52 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks FSA35 213SW 2*JB0017 2,4 Reactor 2*JB0084 2,4 Bldg. 2*JB0170 2,4 South Half 2*JB0296 2,4 2*JB0298 2,4 2*JB0300 2,4 2*JB0302 2,4 2*JB0304 2,4 2*JB0306 2,4 2*JB0694 2,4 2CES*RAK021 2,4 2CES*RAK024 1,2 2CES*RAK029 2,4 2CMS*EFV9B 2,4 2CMS*LT11B 2,4 2CMS*LT9B 2,4 2CMS*TE55A 1,3 NOTES 13, 19 2CMS*TE55B 2,4 2CMS*TE55C 1,3 NOTES 13, 19 2CMS*TE55D 2,4 2CMS*TE56A 1,3 NOTES 13, 19 2CMS*TE56B 2,4 2CMS*TE56C 1,3 NOTES 13, 19 2CMS*TE56D 2,4 2CMS*TE57A 1,3 NOTES 13, 19 2CMS*TE57B 2,4 2CMS*TE57C 1,3 NOTES 13, 19 2CMS*TE57D 2,4 2CMS*TE58A 1,3 NOTES 13, 19 2CMS*TE58B 2,4 2CMS*TE58C 1,3 NOTES 13, 19 Chapter 09 9B.8-53 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2CMS*TE58D 2,4 2CMS*TE59A 1,3 NOTES 13, 19 2CMS*TE59B 2,4 2CMS*TE59C 1,3 NOTES 13, 19 2CMS*TE59D 2,4 2CMS*V80B 2,4 2CMS*V81B 2,4 2CSH*EFV2 1,2 NOTES 18, 20 2CSH*FT104 1,2 NOTES 18, 20 2CSH*FT105 1,2 NOTES 18, 20 2CSH*LT123 1,2 NOTES 18, 20 2CSH*LT124 1,2 NOTES 18, 20 2CSH*MOV101 1,2 NOTES 18, 20 2CSH*MOV118 1,2 NOTES 18, 20 2CSH*PDT109 1,2 NOTES 18, 20 2CSH*PI103 1,2 NOTES 18, 20 2CSH*PT102 1,2 NOTES 18, 20 2CSH*PT105 1,2 NOTES 18, 20 2CSH*PT117 1,2 NOTES 18, 20 2CSH-PI128 1,2 NOTES 18, 20 2HVR*TIS25C 2,4 2HVR*TIS25D 2,4 2HVR*UC403B 1,2 2HVR*UC404C 2,4 Chapter 09 9B.8-54 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2HVR*UC404D 2,4 2HVR*MST403B 1,2 2HVR*MST404C 2,4 2HVR*MST404D 2,4 2ICS*PDT168 2,3,4 2ICS*PT168X 2,3,4 2ICS*PT168Y 2,3,4 2RHS*FT14B 2,4 2RHS*FT14C 2,4 2RHS*FT60B 2,4 2RHS*FT86B 2,4 2RHS*FT86C 2,4 2RHS*MOV1B 2,4 2RHS*MOV1C 2,4 2RHS*MOV2B 2,4 2RHS*PI50C 2,4 2RHS*PI87B 2,4 2RHS*PI87C 2,4 2RHS*PT3B 2,4 2RHS*PT3C 2,4 2RHS*PT5B 2,4 2RHS*PT5C 2,4 2RHS*PT6B 2,4 2RHS*PT6C 2,4 2RHS*PT7B 2,4 2RHS*PT7C 2,4 2RSS*LT105 2,4 2SWP*FT13B 2,4 2SWP*FT201B 2,4 2SWP*MOV15A 1,2 2SWP*MOV15B 1,2 2SWP*MOV17B 2,4 2SWP*MOV18B 2,4 CABLES 2,4 CABLES 1,3 NOTE 13 223SW 2*JB0061 2,4 2*JB0160 2,4 2*JB0434 2,4 2*JB0632 2,4 Chapter 09 9B.8-55 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2*JB0696 2,4 2*JB0703 2,4 2*JB0920 2,4 2CCP*MOV14B 2,4 2CCP*MOV18B 2,4 2CES*Z58E 2,4 2CMS*EFV8B 2,4 2CMS*SOV26D 2,4 2CMS*V78B 2,4 2CMS*V79B 2,4 2HVR*TIS26D 2,4 2HVR*TIS26E 2,4 2HVR*UC407D 2,4 2HVR*UC407E 2,4 2HVR*MST407D 2,4 2HVR*MST407E 2,4 2RHS*FV38B 2,4 2SFC*E1B 2,4 2SFC*FE36B 2,4 2SFC*FT36B 2,4 2SFC-PI14B 2,4 2SFC-PI15B 2,4 2SFC*TE8B 2,4 2SFC*TW7B 2,4 2SFC*TW9B 2,4 2SFC*V37B 2,4 2SFC*V39B 2,4 2SFC*V70B 2,4 2SFC-TI7B 2,4 2SFC-TI9B 2,4 CABLES 2,4 NOTE 29 CABLES 1,2,3 238SW 2*JB0012 2,4 2CES*Z19E 2,4,3 2CES*Z20E 2,4,3 NOTES 18, 19, 29 2CES*Z21E 2,4 2CES*Z25E 2,4 Chapter 09 9B.8-56 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2HVR*TIS27B 2,4 2HVR*TIS27C 2,4 2HVR*UC410B 2,4 2HVR*UC410C 2,4 2HVR*MST410B 2,4 2HVR*MST410C 2,4 2RHS*MOV113 1,3 NOTE 27 2RHS*MOV40B 2,4 2RHS*V22 2,4 2RHS*V38 1,3 NOTE 6 CABLES 2,4 CABLES 1,2,3,4 NOTES 27, 18, 19, 4 245SW 2*JB0630 2,4 2CES*RAK009 2,4 2CES*RAK026 1,2 Chapter 09 9B.8-57 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK Chapter 09 9B.8-58 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2CES*RAK027 2,4 2CMS*SOV32B 2,4 2HVR*TIS28B 2,4 2HVR*TIS28C 2,4 2HVR*TIS35B 2,4 2HVR*UC411B 2,4 2HVR*UC411C 2,4 2HVR*UC414B 2,4 2HVR*MST411B 2,4 2HVR*MST411C 2,4 2HVR*MST414B 2,4 2ICS*MOV121 1,3,4 NOTE 28 2ISC*LT13B 2,4 2ISC*LT10A 1,2 2ISC*LT10C 1,2 2ISC*LT11B 2,4 2ISC*LT11C 1,2 2ISC*LT12B 2,4 2ISC*LT7A 1,2 2ISC*LT7B 2,4 2ISC*LT8C 2,4 2ISC*LT8D 2,4 2ISC*LT9B 2,4 2ISC*LT9D 2,4 2ISC*PT15A 1,2 2ISC*PT15B 2,4 2ISC*PT16A 1,2 2ISC*PT16C 1,2 2ISC*PT2C 2,4 2ISC*PT2D 2,4 2ISC*PT4A 1,2 2ISC*PT4B 2,4 2ISC*PT6B 2,4 2RHS*PDT24B 2,4 2RHS*PDT24C 2,4 2SFC*PT3B 2,4 2SFC*PT30B 2,4 CABLES 2,4 CABLES 1,3 NOTE 7 255SW 2*JB0039 2,4 2*JB0065 2,4 Chapter 09 9B.8-59 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

Fire Fire Affected Affected Area Zone Equipment Train Remarks 2*JB0066 2,4 2*JB0452 2,4 2*JB0646 1,2 2CSH*MOV107 1,2 2RHS*FT105 2,4 2RHS*MOV104 1,3 NOTE 4 2RHS*MOV24B 2,4 2RHS*MOV24C 2,4 2RHS*V159 2,4 2RHS*V79 2,4 2SFC*FE58A 1,3 NOTE 6 2SFC*FE58B 2,4 2SFC*FT58A 1,3 NOTE 7 2SFC*FT58B 2,4 2SFC*HV17B 2,4 2SFC*HV6B 2,4 2SFC-PI60A 1,3 NOTE 6 2SFC*P1B 2,4 2SFC*SOV17B 2,4 2SFC*SOV6B 2,4 2SFC*V13A 1,3 NOTE 6 2SFC*V13B 2,4 2SFC*V20A 1,3 NOTE 6 2SFC*V20B 2,4 2SFC*V21A 1,3 NOTE 6 2SFC*V21B 2,4 2SFC*V256A 1,3 NOTE 6 2SFC*V256B 2,4 2SFC-PI60B 2,4 CABLES 2,4 CABLES 1,3 NOTES 7,4 262SW 2SFC*V7 2,4 CABLES 2,4 274SW CABLES 2,4 272SW NONE FA88 331NW CABLES 1,2,3 Control Bldg.

Corridor El 261 Chapter 09 9B.8-60 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

LEGEND OF NOTES NOTE 1 - This fire area does not contain any alternative shutdown equipment requiring the LOOP assumption.

In addition, a fire in this area will not cause and induce offsite power condition. Therefore, LOOP assumption is not applied for this fire area.

Motor-operated valves 2SWP*MOV50A and 50B are normally open and, even if it remains open during a fire condition, safe shutdown can be achieved.

NOTE 2 - In case of loss of this device, the associated air conditioning unit can be manually energized from the control room; therefore, safe shutdown capability exists.

NOTE 3 - In case of loss of this device, enough infiltration will be available to maintain design temperature; therefore, safe shutdown capability exists.

NOTE 4 - In case of loss of this equipment, an alternate shutdown cooling path will be used; therefore, safe shutdown capability exists.

NOTE 5 - The damper operates in safe mode in case of loss of power supply; therefore, safe shutdown capability exists.

NOTE 6 - Mechanical devices are not affected by failure of electrical systems.

NOTE 7 - Alternate equipment is available in another fire subarea.

NOTE 8 - Deleted.

NOTE 9 - This equipment is fail-safe design; therefore, safe shutdown capability exists.

NOTE 10 - The junction box feeds fail-safe design equipment; therefore, safe shutdown capability exists.

NOTE 11 - Deleted.

NOTE 12 - In case of a fire in this area, the auto function of the MOV could be affected. Although this function is not credited for safe shutdown, if required, MOV can be operated manually using an administrative procedure.

Chapter 09 9B.8-61 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

LEGEND OF NOTES (Cont'd.)

NOTE 13 - In case of a fire in this area, pool cooling will be initiated through proper administrative procedure.

NOTE 14 - In case of loss of these outboard isolation valves, inboard isolation valves are available to close the main steam lines.

NOTE 15 - The unmitigated fire load in fire zone 252SW is less than 1 min. A concrete barrier is provided between 2HVR*UC413A and 2HVR*UC413B. The wall is 2-ft thick, extends 1.25 ft above the top, 8 ft beyond the end of each unit cooler which contains the fan motor, and 1 ft beyond the opposite end.

The unit coolers are noncombustible except for motor insulation which is contained within the steel fan casing. The only credible fire (involving motor insulation) would be contained within the casing and would not involve both unit coolers.

A fire involving transient combustibles would be limited to either side of the wall due to the lack of continuity of combustibles in the area.

NOTE 16 - Deleted.

NOTE 17 - Remote shutdown panel 2CES*PNL405 is divided into two separate sections located in separate fire zones/fire areas. All green components and cables are located in the green section (343NZ/FA17), and all yellow components and cables are located in the yellow section (338NZ/FA19).

NOTE 18 - For fire in any fire area outside the control room/relay room, controls associated with the available safe shutdown train/trains for the fire area, as indicated in Table 9B.8-2, will be used.

NOTE 19 - Loss of this device will not impair safe shutdown capability.

NOTE 20 - The functional failure of this component does not affect safe shutdown capability since only the operation of the HPCS system is impacted. Alternate safe shutdown path is available.

Chapter 09 9B.8-62 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

LEGEND OF NOTES (Cont'd.)

NOTE 21 - This valve is "fail closed," and closing is the safe mode of operation. Loss of power to this valve does not affect safe shutdown capability.

NOTE 22 - In case of loss of this device, RCIC suction can be transferred to the suppression pool manually from the control room, if required.

NOTE 23 - Even if this equipment is lost, the temperature in the electrical tunnel will not exceed the design temperature for the cables.

NOTE 24 - This equipment is not required for safe shutdown.

It is required to protect CSH pump internals from overheating caused by operating the pump continuously at shutoff head. Since HPCS pump is operating and no other single failure is assumed (Appendix R requires only LOOP with fire), this equipment is not required to operate.

NOTE 25 - In case of a fire in this fire area, this equipment could be lost. Due to this loss, the control room Division I air conditioning units 2HVC*ACU1A/2A could be inoperable. The redundant division air conditioning units will be initiated through proper administrative procedures.

NOTE 26 - In case of a fire in this fire area, this equipment could be lost. Due to this loss, the control room Division II air conditioning units 2HVC*ACU1B/2B could be inoperable. The redundant division air conditioning units will be initiated through proper administrative procedures.

NOTE 27 - No impact on the system operation or safe shutdown requirement since valve feeder breaker is in OPEN position and MOV is disconnected from the power source; therefore, no spurious operation is anticipated.

Chapter 09 9B.8-63 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

LEGEND OF NOTES (Cont'd.)

NOTE 28 - This component is located in an area with no combustible material (pipe chase area at 185° of the reactor building) and isolated from fire area FSA 35.

NOTE 29 - A confirmed fire in either of the following fire areas has the potential to cause spurious operation of the main steam SRVs. In case of inadvertent spurious operation of any of the SRVs, Operator actions in accordance with N2-SOP-34, "Stuck Open Safety Relief Valve," are required.

• FSA34, Fire Zone 222SW, 232SW

• FSA35, Fire Zone 223SW, 238SW

• FA8, Fire Zone 301NW, 302NW

• FA16, Fire Zone 321NW, 332NW, 352NW, 371NW

• FA17, Fire Zone 322NW NOTE 30 - A section of this fire zone is maintained as a combustible-free area to limit ignition sources to address multiple spurious operation (MSO) scenario NEI 00-01 2x (Diversion of suppression pool inventory to CST via HPCS). Reference SAIC technical report on identification, classification, and proposed resolution of MSOs in NMP2 fire areas.

Chapter 09 9B.8-64 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-1 (Cont'd.)

LEGEND OF NOTES (Cont'd.)

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK Chapter 09 9B.8-65 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-2 RESULTS OF FIRE PROTECTION ANALYSIS FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10CFR50 APPENDIX R BALANCE OF PLANT AREAS Fire Area FA1, Auxiliary Bay North, El 175, 198, 215, & 240 ft Fire Zones in This Fire Area 201SW LPCS Room 202SW RHS Room A 203SW RHS Heat Exchanger Room A 211SW North Auxiliary Bay, El 198 ft 221SW Auxiliary Bay, North Access Area B, El 215 ft 231SW North Auxiliary Bay, Electrical Room, El 240 ft Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown train 2.

Fire Area FA2, Reactor Building, El 175 ft Fire Zones in This Fire Area 204SW RCIC Pump Room Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown train 2.

Fire Area FA3, Auxiliary Bay South, El 175, 198, 215, 240 ft Fire Zones in This Fire Area 206SW RHS Heat Exchanger Room B 207SW RHS Pump Room B 208SW RHS Pump Room C 214SW South Auxiliary Bay, El 198 ft 224SW Auxiliary Bay, South Access Area B, El 215 ft 239SW South Auxiliary Bay, Electrical Room, El 240 ft Chapter 09 9B.8-66 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-2 (Cont'd.)

Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown trains 1 and 3.

Fire Area FA4, Reactor Building, El 175 ft Fire Zones in This Fire Area 205NZ HPCS Room Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown trains 3 and 4.

Fire Area FA8, Electrical Tunnel Fire Zones in This Fire Area 301NW Electrical Tunnel, 140° 302NW Electrical Tunnel, 35° Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown train 2.

Fire Area FA21, Control Building Fire Zones in This Fire Area 327NW HPCS Cable Routing Area, El 244 ft 342XL HPCS Switchgear Room, El 261 ft Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown trains 3 and 4.

Chapter 09 9B.8-67 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-2 (Cont'd.)

Fire Area FA28, Diesel Generator Building Fire Zones in This Fire Area 402SW Division I Diesel Generator Room Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown train 2.

Fire Area FA29, Diesel Generator Building Fire Zones in This Fire Area 403SW Division II Diesel Generator Room Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown trains 1 and 3.

Fire Area FA30, Diesel Generator Building Fire Zones in This Fire Area 404SW Division III Diesel Generator Room Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown trains 3 and 4.

Fire Area FA75, Control Building, El 261 ft Fire Zones in This Fire Area 339NZ Division III Battery Room Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown trains 3 and 4.

Chapter 09 9B.8-68 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-2 (Cont'd.)

Fire Area FA16, Control Building Fire Zones in This Fire Area 306NZ General Area, El 214 ft 312NZ Control Building General Area, El 214 ft 321NW Cable Chase West, El 237 ft 332NW Cable Chase West, El 261 ft 352NW Cable Chase West, El 288 ft 371NW Cable Chase West, El 306 ft Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown train 2.

Fire Area FA17, Control Building Fire Zones in This Fire Area 305NW Cable Chase Area, El 214 ft 322NW Division I Cable Routing Area, El 237 ft 325NW Division I Cable Routing Area, El 244 ft 333XL Division I Switchgear Room, El 261 ft 334NZ Division I Battery Room, El 261 ft 343NZ Remote Shutdown Room A Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown train 2.

Fire Area FA18, Control Building Fire Zones in This Fire Area 304NW Electrical Tunnel 230° 309NW Cable Chase East, El 214 ft 324NW Cable Chase East, El 237 ft 337NW Cable Chase East, El 261 ft 359NW Cable Chase East, El 288 ft 377NW Cable Chase East, El 306 ft Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown Division I ADS/ADS "pseudo" LPCI.

Chapter 09 9B.8-69 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-2 (Cont'd.)

Fire Area FA19, Control Building Fire Zones in This Fire Area 323NW Division II Cable Routing Area, El 237 ft 326NW Division II Cable Routing Area, El 244 ft 335NZ Division II Battery Room, El 261 ft 336XL Division II Switchgear Room, El 261 ft 338NZ Remote Shutdown Room B Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown Division I ADS/ADS "pseudo" LPCI.

Fire Area FA22, Control Building Fire Zones in This Fire Area 340NZ Division I HVAC Room, El 261 ft Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown trains 2 and 4.

Fire Area FA23, Control Building Fire Zones in This Fire Area 341NZ Division II HVAC Room, El 261 ft Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown trains 1 and 3.

Fire Area FA24, Control Building PGCC Relay Room, El 288 ft See Section 9B.8.2.

Fire Area FA25, Control Building Fire Zones in This Fire Area 360NZ Division I HVAC Room, El 288 ft Chapter 09 9B.8-70 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-2 (Cont'd.)

Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, the operation of both unit coolers for the control room may be affected, which may require control room evacuation. Safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown trains 2 and 4.

Fire Area FA48, Electrical Tunnel, Ventilation Room, Div. 1, El 237 ft Fire Zones in This Fire Area 236NZ Division I Electrical Tunnel Ventilation Room, El 237 ft Conclusion In case of fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown trains 2 and 4.

Fire Area FA27, Control Building Fire Zones in This Fire Area 378NZ Division II HVAC Room, El 306 ft Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, the operation of both unit coolers for the control room and relay room may be affected, which may require control room evacuation. Safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown trains 1 and 3.

Fire Area FA76, Control Building Fire Zones in This Fire Area 380NZ Corridor, Lunch Room, Work Release Room, and Ladies' and Mens' Toilet Rooms, El 306 ft Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown train 3.

Chapter 09 9B.8-71 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-2 (Cont'd.)

Fire Area FA50, Main Steam Tunnel Fire Zones in This Fire Area 256NZ Main Steam Tunnel Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown trains 2 and 4.

Fire Area FA55, Pipe Tunnel Fire Zones in This Fire Area 237NZ Division II Electrical Tunnel Ventilation Room, El 237 ft 361NZ Pipe Tunnel, El 245 ft 362NZ Radwaste Tunnel, El 237 ft 363NZ Pipe Tunnel, El 244 ft Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown train 3.

Fire Area FA60, Service Water Pump Pit Fire Zones in This Fire Area 807NZ Service Water Pump Room B Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown trains 1 and 3.

Fire Area FA72, Control Building, El 288 ft, Corridor and Instrument Shop Fire Zones in this Fire Area 351NZ Control Building, Corridor and Instrument Shop, El 288 ft Chapter 09 9B.8-72 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-2 (Cont'd.)

Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown train 4.

Fire Area FA61, Service Water Pump Pit Fire Zones in This Fire Area 806NZ Service Water Pump Room A Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown trains 2 and 4.

Fire Area FA71, Intake Area Fire Zones in This Fire Area 802NZ Intake and Discharge Shaft Building 803NZ Screenwell Building Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown trains 1 and 3.

Fire Subarea FSA34, Reactor Building, North Half Fire Zones in This Fire Subarea 212SW General Area, El 175 ft 222SW General Area, El 215 ft 232SW General Area, El 240 ft 243SW General Area, El 261 ft 252SW General Area, El 289 ft 261SW General Area, El 306 ft 271SW General Area, El 328 ft 273SW General Area, El 328 ft 281NZ General Area, El 328 ft Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown train 2.

Chapter 09 9B.8-73 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-2 (Cont'd.)

Fire Subarea FSA35, Reactor Building, South Half Fire Zones in This Fire Subarea 213SW General Area, El 175 ft, 196 ft 223SW General Area, El 215 ft 238SW General Area, El 240 ft 245SW General Area, El 261 ft 255SW General Area, El 288 ft 262SW General Area, El 306 ft 274SW General Area, El 328 ft Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown Division I ADS/ADS "pseudo" LPCI.

Fire Area FA87 Fire Zones in This Fire Area 087SW Reactor Building Division I SFC Pump Room Conclusion In case of fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown trains 2 and 4.

Fire Area FA88, Control Building, Corridor, El 261 ft Fire Zones in This Fire Area 331NW Control Building, Corridor, El 261 ft Conclusion In case of a fire in this fire area, safe shutdown capability exists through safe shutdown train 4.

Chapter 09 9B.8-74 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-3 APPENDIX R CONTROL ROOM/RELAY ROOM FIRE CIRCUIT ANALYSIS Controlled Electrical From RSS System Equipment Description Division Panel Control Circuit Arrangement ABS 2ABS-XI Auxiliary Boiler Service Transformer Black No Disconnected at ENS Switchgear BYS 2BYS*CHGR2A2 125-V Battery Charger Division I Green No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC BYS 2BYS*CHGR2A1 125-V Battery Charger Standby Division I Green No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC BYS 2BYS*CHGR2B2 125-V Battery Charger Division II Yellow No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC BYS 2BYS*CHGR2B1 125-V Battery Charger Standby Division II Yellow No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC BYS 2BYS*SWG002A 125-V dc Switchgear Division I Green No N/R, Fused Both Inside and Outside PGCC BYS 2BYS*SWG002B 125-V dc Switchgear Division II Yellow No N/R, Fused Both Inside and Outside PGCC BYS 2BYS*PNL201A 125-V dc Distribution Panel Division I Green No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC BYS 2BYS*PNL204A 125-V dc Distribution Panel Division II Green No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC BYS 2BYS*PNL201B 125-V dc Distribution Panel Division I Yellow No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC BYS 2BYS*PNL204B 125-V dc Distribution Panel Division II Yellow No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC BYS 2BYS*BAT2A 125-V Standby Battery Division I Green No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC BYS 2BYS*BAT2B 125-V Standby Battery Division II Yellow No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC CCP(2) 2CCP*MOV18A RBCLCW Spent Fuel HX 2SFC*E1A Green No N/R CCP(2) 2CCP*MOV18B RBCLCW Spent Fuel HX 2SFC*E1B Yellow No N/R CCP(2) 2CCP*AOV37A RBCLCW 2RHS*P1A SL Coolers Green No N/R CCP(2) 2CCP*AOV37B RBCLCW 2RHS*P1B SL Coolers Yellow No N/R CCP(2) 2CCP*AOV38A RBCLCW 2RHS*P1A SL Coolers Green No N/R CCP(2) 2CCP*AOV38B RBCLCW 2RHS*P1B SL Coolers Yellow No N/R CMS 2CMS*TE50A Suppression Pool Temperature Elements Green Yes TE Wired to 2RSS*TI103 CMS 2CMS*TE51B Suppression Pool Temperature Elements Yellow Yes TE Wired to 2RSS*TI104 CMS 2CMS*TE52A Suppression Pool Temperature Elements Green Yes TE Wired to 2RSS*TI103 CMS 2CMS*TE53B Suppression Pool Temperature Elements Yellow Yes TE Wired to 2RSS*TI104 CMS 2CMS*TE54A Suppression Pool Temperature Elements Green Yes TE Wired to 2RSS*TI103 CMS 2CMS*TE55B Suppression Pool Temperature Elements Yellow Yes TE Wired to 2RSS*TI104 CMS 2CMS*TE56A Suppression Pool Temperature Elements Green Yes TE Wired to 2RSS*TI103 CMS 2CMS*TE57B Suppression Pool Temperature Elements Yellow Yes TE Wired to 2RSS*TI104 CMS 2CMS*TE58A Suppression Pool Temperature Elements Green Yes TE Wired to 2RSS*TI103 CMS 2CMS*TE59B Suppression Pool Temperature Elements Yellow Yes TE Wired to 2RSS*TI104 CSH(2) 2CSH*MOV110 HPCS Test Bypass to CND Tank Purple No Note 6 CSL(2) Various Various Green No N/R DER(2) 2DER*MOV128 Reactor Water Drain Isolation Valve Black No Note 6 DER(2) 2DER*MOV129 Reactor Water Drain Isolation Valve Black No N/R, In Series with 2DER*MOV128 Chapter 09 9B.8-75 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-3 (Contd.)

Controlled Electrical From RSS System Equipment Description Division Panel Control Circuit Arrangement DMS 2DMS*MCCA1 125-V dc MCC Reactor Building El 240 Green No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC DMS 2DMS*MCCB1 125-V dc MCC Reactor Building El 240 Yellow No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC EGA(3) Various Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air Green/Yellow No N/R System EGF(3) Various Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System Green/Yellow No N/R (LCL Controls with no PGCC Interlock)

Chapter 09 9B.8-76 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-3 (Cont'd.)

Controlled Electrical From RSS System Equipment Description Division Panel Control Circuit Arrangement EGP 2EGS*EG1 4160-V ACB-101-1 Division I EDG Output Green No Dedicated Disconnect Switch to Isolate PGCC Controls and Engage Local Test Switch EGP 2EGS*EG3 4160-V ACB-103-14 Division II EDG Output Yellow No Dedicated Disconnect Switch to Isolate PGCC Controls and Engage Local Test Switch EGP 2EGS*EG1 4160-V ACB-101-N1 Division I EDG Neutral Green No N/R for Diesel Generator Operation EGP 2EGS*EG3 4160-V ACB-103-N1 Division II EDG Neutral Yellow No N/R for Diesel Generator Operation EGS(3) 2EGS*EG1 2EGS*EG1 Control Green No Dedicated Disconnect Switch to Isolate PGCC Dedicated Disconnect Switch to Bypass PGCC to Permit Auto Start/Control EGS(3) 2EGS*EG3 2EGS*EG3 Control Yellow No Dedicated Disconnect Switch to Isolate PGCC Dedicated Disconnect Switch to Bypass PGCC to Permit Auto Start/Control EHS 2EHS*MCC101 600-V MCC Screenwell El 261 Green No Individually Listed in Respective Systems EHS 2EHS*MCC102 600-V MCC Reactor Building El 240 Green No Individually Listed in Respective Systems EHS 2EHS*MCC103 600-V MCC Control Building Room A 240 Green No Individually Listed in Respective Systems EHS 2EHS*MCC301 600-V MCC Screenwell El 261 Yellow No Individually Listed in Respective Systems EHS 2EHS*MCC302 600-V MCC Reactor Building El 240 Yellow No Individually Listed in Respective Systems EHS 2EHS*MCC303 600-V MCC Control Building Room B El 240 Yellow No Individually Listed in Respective Systems EJA 2EJA*PNL100A Reactor Building 120-V Heater Panel Green No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC EJA 2EJA*PNL101A Control Building 120/240 Heater Panel Green No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC EJA 2EJA*PNL300B Reactor Building 120-V Heater Panel Yellow No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC EJA 2EJA*PNL301B Control Building 120/240 Heater Panel Yellow No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC EJS 2EJS*US1 4.16-kV FDR to Transformer 2EJS*X1A/1B Green No Disconnect Switch to Isolate PGCC EJS 2EJS*US3 4.16-kV FDR to Transformer 2EJS*X3A/3B Yellow No Control and Engage Local Test Switch EJS 2EJS*US1 600-V U.S. Emergency Switchgear Normal Green No Disconnect Switch to Isolate PGCC Supply Breaker EJS 2EJS*US3 600-V U.S. Emergency Switchgear Normal Yellow No Control and Engage Local Test Switch Supply Breaker EJS 2EJS*PNL100A Switchgear Room A Emergency 600-V Panel Green No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC EJS 2EJS*PNL300B Switchgear Room B Emergency 600-V Panel Yellow No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC EJS 2EJS*PNL101A Switchgear Room A Emergency 600-V Panel Green No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC EJS 2EJS*PNL103A AB-N Emergency 600-V Panel Green No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC EJS 2EJS*PNL104A AB-N Emergency 600-V Panel Green No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC EJS 2EJS*PNL302B AB-S Emergency 600-V Panel Yellow No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC EJS 2EJS*PNL303B AB-S Emergency 600-V Panel Yellow No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC EJS 2EJS*PNL304B AB-S Emergency 600-V Panel Yellow No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC EJS 2EJS*PNL301B Switchgear Room B Emergency 600-V Panel Yellow No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC EJS 2EJS*US1 600-V U.S. Emergency Switchgear Altn Supply Green No N/R, Not Used for Appendix R Control Room Fire Breaker Scenario EJS 2EJS*US3 600-V U.S. Emergency Switchgear Altn Supply Yellow No N/R, Not Used for Appendix R Control Room Fire Breaker Scenario EJS 2EJS*PNL102A AB-N Emergency 600-V Panel Green No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC Chapter 09 9B.8-77 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-3 (Cont'd.)

Controlled Electrical From RSS System Equipment Description Division Panel Control Circuit Arrangement ENS 2ENS*SWG101 4160-V ACB-101-11 Feed to Normal Bus Green No Disconnect Switch to Isolate PGCC Control and 2NNS-SWG014 Engage Local Test Switch ENS 2ENS*SWG101 4160-V ACB-101-10, 101-13 Feed From RSST Green No Disconnect Switch to Isolate PGCC Control and Engage Local Test Switch ENS 2ENS*SWG103 4160-V ACB-103-8 Feed to Normal Bus Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Isolate PGCC Control and 2NNS-SWG015 Engage Local Test Switch ENS 2ENS*SWG103 4160-V ACB-103-2, 103-4 Feed From RSST Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Isolate PGCC Control and Engage Local Test Switch ENS 2ENS*SWG101 LOCA Activated Relays 71X1, 71X3 for Diesel Green No Disconnect Switch to Isolate Local Relays from Generator Auto Start PGCC ENS 2ENS*SWG103 LOCA Activated Relays 71X1, 71X3 for Diesel Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Isolate Local Relays from Generator Auto Start PGCC EPS 2EPS*SWG001 13.8-kV Emergency SWG001 Green No N/R, Not on Diesel Generator Buses. Controls are Fail-Safe Design EPS 2EPS*SWG003 13.8-kV Emergency SWG003 Green No N/R, Not on Diesel Generator Buses. Controls are Fail-Safe Design EPS 2EPS*SWG002 13.8-kV Emergency SWG002 Yellow No N/R, Not on Diesel Generator Buses. Controls are Fail-Safe Design EPS 2EPS*SWG004 13.8-kV Emergency SWG004 Yellow No N/R, Not on Diesel Generator Buses. Controls are Fail-Safe Design FWS 2FWS-P1A Reactor Feed Pump P1A Breaker 1-8 Black No Dedicated Disconnect Switch to Preclude Vessel Overfill FWS 2FWS-P1B Reactor Feed Pump P1B Breaker 3-7 Black No Dedicated Disconnect Switch to Preclude Vessel Overfill FWS 2FWS-P1C Reactor Feed Pump P1C ACB 1-13 Black No Dedicated Disconnect Switch to Preclude Vessel Overfill FWS 2FWS-P1C Reactor Feed Pump P1C ACB 3-12 Black No Dedicated Disconnect Switch to Preclude Vessel Overfill GTS 2GTS*MOV1A Standby Gas Treatment Filter Train A Inlet Green No Not Required for Safe Shutdown GTS 2GTS*AOV2A Standby Gas Treatment Filter Train A Inlet Green No Not Required for Safe Shutdown GTS 2GTS*FN1A *Flt 1A Discharge Fan Green No Not Required for Safe Shutdown GTS 2GTS*MOV1B Standby Gas Treatment Filter Train B Inlet Yellow No Not Required for Safe Shutdown GTS 2GTS*AOV2B Standby Gas Treatment Filter Train B Inlet Yellow No Not Required for Safe Shutdown GTS 2GTS*FN1B *Flt 1B Discharge Fan Yellow No Not Required for Safe Shutdown Chapter 09 9B.8-78 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-3 (Cont'd.)

Controlled Electrical From RSS System Equipment Description Division Panel Control Circuit Arrangement HVC(3) 2HVC*FN4B Battery Room Exhaust Fan Division II Yellow No Disconnect Switch and Second Fuse at MCC to Start and Run Equipment HVC(3) 2HVC*FN4A Battery Room Exhaust Fan Division I Green No Disconnect Switch and Second Fuse at MCC to Start and Run Equipment HVC(3) 2HVC*UC101A Standby Switchgear Room A Unit Cooler Green No Disconnect Switch and Second Fuse at MCC to Start and Run Equipment HVC(3) 2HVC*UC101B Standby Switchgear Room B Unit Cooler Yellow No Disconnect Switch and Second Fuse at MCC to Start and Run Equipment HVC(3) 2HVC*UC104 Control Building Cable Tunnel Unit Cooler Green No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to Start and Run Equipment HVC 2SWP*AOV572 Electrical Tunnel N*UC104 Service Water Vlv Green No Disconnect Switch to Open Service Water Valve Chapter 09 9B.8-79 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-3 (Cont'd.)

Controlled Electrical From RSS System Equipment Description Division Panel Control Circuit Arrangement HVC(3) 2HVC*UC105 Control Building Cable Tunnel Unit Cooler Yellow No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to Start and Run Equipment HVC 2SWP*AOV571 Electrical Tunnel S*UC105 Service Water Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Open Service Water Valve Valve HVC(3) 2HVC*UC106 Cable Area Base Unit Cooler Green No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to Start and Run Equipment HVC 2SWP*AOV573 Cable Area Division I *UC106 Service Water Green No Disconnect Switch to Open Service Water Valve Valve HVC(3) 2HVC*UC107 Cable Area Base Unit Cooler Yellow No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to Start and Run Equipment HVC 2SWP*AOV574 Cable Area Division II *UC107 Service Water Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Open Service Water Valve Valve HVC(3) 2HVC*UC108A Control Building Standby Switchgear Room A Green No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to Start and Run Equipment HVC 2SWP*AOV154A Standby Switchgear Room *UC101A Service Green No Disconnect Switch to Open Service Water Valve Water Valve HVC(3) 2HVC*AOD170 HVC Unit Cooler Discharge Dampers Green No Disconnect to Open Discharge Dampers HVC(3) 2HVC*AOD178 HVC Unit Cooler Discharge Dampers Yellow No Disconnect to Open Discharge Dampers HVC(3) 2HVC*AOD183 HVC Unit Cooler Discharge Dampers Green No Disconnect to Open Discharge Dampers HVC(3) 2HVC*AOD193 HVC Unit Cooler Discharge Dampers Yellow No Disconnect to Open Discharge Dampers HVC(3) 2HVC*UC108B Control Building Standby Switchgear Room B Yellow No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to Start and Run Equipment HVC 2SWP*AOV154B Standby Switchgear Room *UC101B Service Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Open Service Water Valve Water Valve HVC 2SWP*AOV78A Control Building Standby Switchgear Room A Green No Disconnect Switch to Open Service Water Valve Unit Cooler *UC108A Service Water Valve HVC 2SWP*AOV78B Control Building Standby Switchgear Room A Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Open Service Water Valve Unit Cooler *UC108B Service Water Valve HVK(3) Various Various Green/Yellow No Manual Alignment of SWP for Long-Term Cooling HVP(3) 2HVP*AOD4A 2EGS*G1 Room Inlet Damper Green No Disconnect Switch to Open Dampers HVP(3) 2HVP*FN1A Safety-Related Axial Fans - DG Green No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to Start and Run Equipment HVP(3) 2HVP*MOD1A Standby Diesel Generator Room Exhaust Green No Disconnect Switch to Open Dampers HVP(3) 2HVP*AOD4C 2EGS*G1 Room Inlet Damper Green No Disconnect Switch to Open Dampers HVP(3) 2HVP*FN1C Safety-Related Axial Fans - DG Green No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to Start and Run Equipment HVP(3) 2HVP*MOD1C Standby Diesel Generator Room Exhaust Green No Disconnect Switch to Open Dampers HVP(3) 2HVP*AOD4B 2EGS*G3 Room Inlet Damper Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Open Dampers HVP(3) 2HVP*FN1B Safety-Related Axial Fans - DG Yellow No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to Start and Run Equipment HVP(3) 2HVP*MOD1B Standby Diesel Generator Room Exhaust Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Open Dampers HVP(3) 2HVP*AOD4D 2EGS*G3 Room Inlet Damper Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Open Dampers HVP(3) 2HVP*FN1D Safety-Related Axial Fans - DG Yellow No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to Start and Run Equipment HVP(3) 2HVP*MOD1D Standby Diesel Generator Room Exhaust Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Open Dampers HVP(3) 2HVP*UC1A DG 1 Unit Cooler Standby Diesel Generator Green No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to Start and Run Room Equipment Chapter 09 9B.8-80 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-3 (Cont'd.)

Controlled Electrical From RSS System Equipment Description Division Panel Control Circuit Arrangement HVP(3) 2HVP*UC1B DG 3 Unit Cooler Standby Diesel Generator Yellow No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to Start and Run Room Equipment HVP(3,2) 2HVP*MOD6A Standby Diesel Generator Room Recirc Dmpr Green No Manual Repositioning of Dampers to Maintain Acceptable Temperature Conditions 2HVP*MOD6C Standby Diesel Generator Room Recirc Dmpr Green No Manual Repositioning of Dampers to Maintain Acceptable Temperature Conditions 2HVP*MOD6B Standby Diesel Generator Room Recirc Dmpr Yellow No Manual Repositioning of Dampers to Maintain Acceptable Temperature Conditions 2HVP*MOD6D Standby Diesel Generator Room Recirc Dmpr Yellow No Manual Repositioning of Dampers to Maintain Acceptable Temperature Conditions HVR 2HVR*TIS23A RHR Pump Room A Green No N/R HVR(3) 2HVR*UC401A RHR Pump Room A - Unit Cooler Green No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to Start and Run Equipment HVR(3) 2HVR*UC401D RHR Pump Room A - Unit Cooler Green No N/R HVR(3) 2HVR*UC401F RHR Pump Room B - Unit Cooler Yellow No N/R HVR 2HVR*TIS23C RHR Pump Room B Yellow No N/R HVR(3) 2HVR*UC401C RHR Pump Room B - Unit Cooler Yellow No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to Start and Run Equipment HVR 2HVR*TIS116 RHR Heat Exchanger Room A Green No N/R HVR(3) 2HVR*UC405 RHR Heat Exchanger Room - Unit Cooler Green No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to Start and Run Equipment HVR 2HVR*TIS115 RHR Heat Exchanger Room B Yellow No N/R HVR(3) 2HVR*UC406 RHR Heat Exchanger Room - Unit Cooler Yellow No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to Start and Run Equipment HVR 2HVR*TIS30A General Area El 261 Green No N/R HVR(3) 2HVR*UC412A RCIC Pump Room - Unit Cooler Green No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to Start and Run Equipment HVR 2HVR*TIS31A *UC413A Inlet Temperature Green No N/R HVR(3) 2HVR*UC413A Emergency Recirc Unit Cooler Green No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to Start and Run Equipment HVR(3) 2HVR*AOD6A *UC413A Inlet Damper Green No Disconnect Switch to Open Damper HVR(2) 2HVR*FS18A Reactor Building Emergency Recirc *UC413A Green No N/R HVR(2) 2HVR*FS18C Reactor Building Emergency Recirc *UC413A Green No N/R HVR(3) 2HVR*UC408A/B AB North Unit Coolers Green No N/R HVR(3) 2HVR*UC409A/B AB South Unit Coolers Yellow No N/R Chapter 09 9B.8-81 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-3 (Cont'd.)

Controlled Electrical From RSS System Equipment Description Division Panel Control Circuit Arrangement HVY(3) 2HVY*UC2A SWP Pump Bay A Unit Cooler Green No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to Start and Run Equipment HVY 2HVY*TIS33A SWP Pump Bay A Area Temperature Green No N/R HVY(3) 2HVY*UC2B SWP Pump Bay B Unit Cooler Yellow No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to Start and Run Equipment HVY 2HVY*TIS33B SWP Pump Bay B Area Temperature Yellow No N/R IAS(3) 2IAS*SOVX181 ADS Header "A" Flow Green Yes Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse at RSS Panel IAS(3) 2IAS*SOVY181 ADS Header "A" Flow Green No Disconnect Switch to Prevent Valve Opening IAS(3) 2IAS*SOVX186 ADS Header "B" Flow Yellow Yes Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse at RSS Panel IAS(3) 2IAS*SOVY186 ADS Header "B" Flow Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Prevent Valve Opening IAS(3) 2IAS*SOV164 Instrument Air Containment Isolation Valve Green Yes Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse at RSS Panel IAS(3) 2IAS*SOV165 Instrument Air Containment Isolation Valve Yellow Yes Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse at RSS Panel Chapter 09 9B.8-82 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-3 (Cont'd.)

Controlled Electrical From RSS System Equipment Description Division Panel Control Circuit Arrangement ICS(3) 2ICS*MOV129 Pump Suction from Condensate Storage Tank Green Yes RSS Transfer Switch Disconnects PGCC and Enables Emergency Fuse at MCC ICS(3) 2ICS-C1 Gland Seal Compressor Green No N/R ICS(3) 2ICS*MOV124 RCIC Test FCV to Condensate Storage Tank Green Yes RSS Transfer Switch Disconnects PGCC and Enables Emergency Fuse at MCC ICS(3) 2ICS*FV108 Test Bypass to Condensate Storage Tank Green Yes RSS Transfer Switch Disconnects PGCC and Enables Emergency Fuse at MCC ICS(3) 2ICS*MOV116 RCIC Lube Oil Water Supply Green Yes RSS Transfer Switch Disconnects PGCC and Enables Emergency Fuse at MCC ICS(3) 2ICS*MOV122 RCIC Turbine Exhaust to Suppression Pool Green Yes RSS Transfer Switch Disconnects PGCC and Enables Emergency Fuse at MCC ICS(3) 2ICS*MOV136 RCIC Pump Suction from Suppression Pool Green Yes RSS Transfer Switch Disconnects PGCC and Enables Emergency Fuse at MCC ICS(3) 2ICS*MOV143 RCIC Minimum Flow to Suppression Pool Green No N/R ICS(3) 2ICS*MOV148 RCIC Vacuum Breaker Isolation Valve Yellow Yes RSS Transfer Switch Disconnects PGCC and Enables (Inboard) Emergency Fuse at MCC ICS(3) 2ICS*MOV164 RCIC Vacuum Breaker Isolation Valve Green Yes RSS Transfer Switch Disconnects PGCC and Enables (Outboard) Emergency Fuse at MCC ICS(3) 2ICS*MOV150 2ICS-T1 Turbine Throttle Valve Green Yes RSS Transfer Switch Disconnects PGCC and Enables Emergency Fuse at MCC ICS(3) 2ICS*HYV151 2ICS-T1 Turbine Governing Valve Green No N/R (local control)

ICS(3) 2ICS*MOV120 RCIC Steam Supply Valve to Turbine Green Yes RSS Transfer Switch Disconnects PGCC and Enables Emergency Fuse at MCC ICS(3) 2ICS*MOV126 RCIC Injection Shutoff Valve Green Yes RSS Transfer Switch Disconnects PGCC and Enables Emergency Fuse at MCC ICS(3) 2ICS*MOV121 Steam Supply Line Isolation Valve Green Yes RSS Transfer Switch Disconnects PGCC and Enables (Outboard) Emergency Fuse at MCC ICS(3) 2ICS*MOV128 RCIC Steam Supply Line Isolation Valve Yellow Yes RSS Transfer Switch Disconnects PGCC and Enables (Inboard) Emergency Fuse at MCC ICS(3) 2ICS*MOV170 RCIC Steam Line Warmup Yellow Yes RSS Transfer Switch Disconnects PGCC and Enables Emergency Fuse at MCC ICS(3) 2ICS*P2 RCIC System Pressure Pump Green No N/R ISC(2) Various Various Yellow No See Individual System LAC 2LAC*PNL100A Control Room A Emergency Lighting Panel Green No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC LAC 2LAC*PNL300B Control Room B Emergency Lighting Panel Yellow No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC LAC 2LAC*PNLE01 Lighting Panel Green No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC LAC 2LAC*PNLE04 Lighting Panel Green No N/R, Fusing Outside PGCC is Sufficient LAC 2LAC*PNLE06 Lighting Panel Green No N/R, Fusing Outside PGCC is Sufficient LAC 2LAC*PNLE02 Lighting Panel Yellow No N/R, Not Controlled in PGCC LAC 2LAC*PNLE05 Lighting Panel Yellow No N/R, Fusing Outside PGCC is Sufficient LAC 2LAC*PNLE07 Lighting Panel Yellow No N/R, Fusing Outside PGCC is Sufficient Chapter 09 9B.8-83 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-3 (Cont'd.)

Controlled Electrical From RSS System Equipment Description Division Panel Control Circuit Arrangement MSS(3) 2MSS*AOV6A Main Steam Isolation Valve (Inboard) Green/Yellow No Manually pull inboard/outboard isolation breakers MSS(3) 2MSS*AOV6B Main Steam Isolation Valve (Inboard) Green/Yellow No Manually pull inboard/outboard isolation breakers MSS(3) 2MSS*AOV6C Main Steam Isolation Valve (Inboard) Green/Yellow No Manually pull inboard/outboard isolation breakers MSS(3) 2MSS*AOV6D Main Steam Isolation Valve (Inboard) Green/Yellow No Manually pull inboard/outboard isolation breakers MSS(3) 2MSS*AOV7A Main Steam Isolation Valve (Outboard) Green/Yellow No Manually pull inboard/outboard isolation breakers MSS(3) 2MSS*AOV7B Main Steam Isolation Valve (Outboard) Green/Yellow No Manually pull inboard/outboard isolation breakers MSS(3) 2MSS*AOV7C Main Steam Isolation Valve (Outboard) Green/Yellow No Manually pull inboard/outboard isolation breakers MSS(3) 2MSS*AOV7D Main Steam Isolation Valve (Outboard) Green/Yellow No Manually pull inboard/outboard isolation breakers MSS(2) 2MSS*MOV111 Main Steam Drain Isolation Valve (Inboard) Yellow No N/R MSS(2) 2MSS*MOV112 Main Steam Drain Isolation Valve (Outboard) Green No Note 6 MSS(2) 2MSS*MOV208 Inboard MSIV Drain Green No N/R MSS(3) 2MSS*PSV121 Main Steam Line A Safety/Relief Valve Green/Yellow Yes Disconnect Switch to Disconnect PGCC Interlocks MSS(3) 2MSS*PSV127 Main Steam Line B Safety/Relief Valve Green/Yellow Yes Disconnect Switch to Disconnect PGCC Interlocks MSS(3) 2MSS*PSV129 Main Steam Line C Safety/Relief Valve Green/Yellow Yes Disconnect Switch to Disconnect PGCC Interlocks MSS(3) 2MSS*PSV137 Main Steam Line D Safety/Relief Valve Green/Yellow Yes Disconnect Switch to Disconnect PGCC Interlocks MSS(2) 2MSS*PSV126 Main Steam Line B Safety/Relief Valve Green/Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Disconnect Relief Valve Function MSS(2) 2MSS*PSV130 Main Steam Line C Safety/Relief Valve Green/Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Disconnect Relief Valve Function MSS(2) 2MSS*PSV134 Main Steam Line D Safety/Relief Valve Green/Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Disconnect Relief Valve Function MSS(2) 2MSS*PSV120 Main Steam Line A Safety/Relief Valve Green/Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Disconnect Relief Valve Function MSS(2) 2MSS*PSV122 Main Steam Line A Safety/Relief Valve Green/Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Disconnect Relief Valve Function MSS(2) 2MSS*PSV123 Main Steam Line A Safety/Relief Valve Green/Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Disconnect Relief Valve Function MSS(2) 2MSS*PSV124 Main Steam Line B Safety/Relief Valve Green/Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Disconnect Relief Valve Function MSS(2) 2MSS*PSV125 Main Steam Line B Safety/Relief Valve Green/Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Disconnect Relief Valve Function MSS(2) 2MSS*PSV128 Main Steam Line B Safety/Relief Valve Green/Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Disconnect Relief Valve Function MSS(2) 2MSS*PSV131 Main Steam Line C Safety/Relief Valve Green/Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Disconnect Relief Valve Function MSS(2) 2MSS*PSV132 Main Steam Line C Safety/Relief Valve Green/Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Disconnect Relief Valve Function MSS(2) 2MSS*PSV133 Main Steam Line C Safety/Relief Valve Green/Yellow NO Disconnect Switch to Disconnect Relief Valve Function Chapter 09 9B.8-84 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-3 (Cont'd.)

Controlled Electrical From RSS System Equipment Description Division Panel Control Circuit Arrangement MSS(2) 2MSS*PSV135 Main Steam Line D Safety/Relief Valve Green/Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Disconnect Relief Valve Function Disconnect Switch to Disconnect Relief Valve Function MSS(2) 2MSS*PSV136 Main Steam Line D Safety/Relief Valve Green/Yellow No N/R N/R SVV(8) 2SVV-TE129 Main Steam Line C Relief Temp Black No SVV(8) 2SVV-TE137 Main Steam Line D Relief Temp Black No NNS 2NNS-SWG016 4160-V Switchgear 16 Black No N/R, Not Required for Safe Shutdown NNS 2NNS-SWG017 4160-V Switchgear 17 Black No N/R, Not Required for Safe Shutdown NNS 2NNS-SWG018 4160-V Switchgear 18 Black No N/R, Not Required for Safe Shutdown RCS(2) 2RCS*SOV104 2RCS-P1A Discharge Sample Isolation Yellow No N/R Valve (Inboard)

RCS(2) 2RCS*SOV105 2RCS-P1A Discharge Sample Isolation Green No N/R Valve (Outboard)

RHS(2) 2RHS*MOV15A RHR A Reactor Containment Spray Green No Control Switch Shorting Contact to Prevent Spurious Valve Opening RHS(2) 2RHS*MOV25A RHR A Reactor Containment Spray Green No Control Switch Shorting Contact to Prevent Spurious Valve Opening RHS(2) 2RHS*MOV15B RHR B Reactor Containment Spray Yellow No Control Switch Shorting Contact to Prevent Spurious Valve Opening RHS(2) 2RHS*MOV25B RHR B Reactor Containment Spray Yellow No Control Switch Shorting Contact to Prevent Spurious Valve Opening RHS(2) 2RHS*MOV33A RHR A Suppression Pool Spray Green No Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse to MCC RHS(2) 2RHS*MOV33B RHR B Suppression Pool Spray Yellow No To Drive Valve Closed RHS(2) 2RHS*SOV120 Sampling System Test Return Green No N/R RHS(2) 2RHS*SOV121 Sampling System Test Return Yellow No N/R RHS(2) 2RHS*MOV26A RHR H. E. A Vent to Suppression Pool Green No N/R RHS(2) 2RHS*MOV27A RHR H. E. A Vent to Suppression Pool Green No N/R RHS(2) 2RHS*MOV26B RHR H. E. B Vent to Suppression Pool Yellow No N/R RHS(2) 2RHS*MOV27B RHR H. E. B Vent to Suppression Pool Yellow No N/R RHS(2) 2RHS*SOV35A RHR A Reactor Sampling System Yellow No N/R Isolation Valve RHS(2) 2RHS*SOV36A RHR A Reactor Sampling System Green No N/R Isolation Valve RHS(2) 2RHS*SOV35B RHR B Reactor Sampling System Green No N/R Isolation Valve RHS(2) 2RHS*SOV36B RHR B Reactor Sampling System Yellow No N/R Isolation Valve RHS(2) 2RHS*MOV115 RHR Service Water Crosstie Yellow No N/R RHS(2) 2RHS*MOV116 RHR Service Water Crosstie Yellow No N/R RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV9A RHR Heat Exchanger A Shell Side Inlet Green Yes Second Fuse at MCC RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV9B RHR Heat Exchanger B Shell Side Inlet Yellow Yes Second Fuse at MCC RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV12A RHR Heat Exchanger A Shell Side Outlet Green Yes Second Fuse at MCC Chapter 09 9B.8-85 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-3 (Cont'd.)

Controlled Electrical From RSS System Equipment Description Division Panel Control Circuit Arrangement RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV12B RHR Heat Exchanger B Shell Side Outlet Yellow Yes Second Fuse at MCC RHS(3) 2RHS*P1A Residual Heat Removal Pump A Green Yes Second Fuse at Switchgear RHS(3) 2RHS*P1B Residual Heat Removal Pump B Yellow Yes Second Fuse at Switchgear RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV40A RHR A Shutdown Cooling Return Green Yes Second Fuse at MCC RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV40B RHR B Shutdown Cooling Return Yellow Yes Second Fuse at MCC RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV67A RHR A Shutdown Cooling CV Bypass Green Yes Note 6 RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV67B RHR B Shutdown Cooling CV Bypass Yellow Yes Note 6 RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV112 RHR Shutdown Cooling Suction Isolation Yellow Yes Second Fuse at MCC, Note 6 RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV113 RHR Shutdown Cooling Suction Isolation Green Yes Note 6 RHS(3) 2RHS*FV38A RHR Loop A Test Return Green Yes Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse at MCC RHS(3) 2RHS*FV38B RHR Loop B Test Return Yellow Yes Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse at MCC RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV104 RHR Head Spray Isolation Green Yes Second Fuse to MCC, Note 6 RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV142 RHR Discharge to Radwaste Green Yes Second Fuse at MCC, Note 6 RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV1A RHR Pump P1A Suction Green Yes Second Fuse at MCC RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV1B RHR Pump P1B Suction Yellow Yes Second Fuse at MCC RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV2A RHR A Shutdown Cooling Suction Green Yes Second Fuse at MCC RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV2B RHR B Shutdown Cooling Suction Yellow Yes Second Fuse at MCC RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV8A RHR H. E. E1A Bypass Green Yes Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse at MCC RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV8B RHR H. E. E1B Bypass Yellow Yes Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse at MCC RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV149 RHR Discharge to Radwaste Yellow Yes Second Fuse at MCC, Note 6 RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV30A RHR A Return to Suppression Pool Isolation Green Yes Second Fuse at MCC RHS(3) 2RHS*MOV30B RHR B Return to Suppression Pool Isolation Yellow Yes Second Fuse at MCC RHS(7) 2RHS*MOV24A RHR LPCI Injection Green No Not Required RHS(7) 2RHS*MOV24B RHR LPCI Injection Yellow No Not Required RHS(7) 2RHS*MOV4A RHR Min. Flow Green No Not Required RHS(7) 2RHS*MOV4B RHR Min. Flow Yellow No Not Required RTX 2RTX-XSR1A 115/13.8-kV Reserve Transformer A Black No No Fix Required; In Case of Loss of This, Emergency Diesel Will Start RTX 2RTX-XSR1B 115/13.8-kV Reserve Transformer B Black No No Fix Required; In Case of Loss of This, Emergency Diesel Will Start Chapter 09 9B.8-86 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-3 (Cont'd.)

Controlled Electrical From RSS System Equipment Description Division Panel Control Circuit Arrangement SCM 2SCM*XD102A Dist Transformer 600-V - 120/240 Green No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SCM 2SCM*XD104A Dist Transformer 600-V - 120/240 Green No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SCM 2SCM*XD302B Dist Transformer 600-V - 120/240 Yellow No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SCM 2SCM*XD304B Dist Transformer 600-V - 120/240 Yellow No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SCM 2SCM*XD103A Dist Transformer 600-V - 120/240 Green No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SCM 2SCM*XD101A Dist Transformer 600-V - 120/240 Green No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SCM 2SCM*XD105A Dist Transformer 600-V - 120/240 Green No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SCM 2SCM*XD303B Dist Transformer 600-V - 120/240 Yellow No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SCM 2SCM*XD301B Dist Transformer 600-V - 120/240 Yellow No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SCM 2SCM*XD305B Dist Transformer 600-V - 120/240 Yellow No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SCM 2SCM*PNL102A 120-V Dist Panel Green No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SCM 2SCM*PNL104A 120-V Dist Panel Green No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SCM 2SCM*PNL103A 120-V Dist Panel Green No Not Required for Safe Shutdown Chapter 09 9B.8-87 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-3 (Cont'd.)

Controlled Electrical From RSS System Equipment Description Division Panel Control Circuit Arrangement SCM 2SCM*PNL101A 120-V Dist Panel Green No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SCM 2SCM*PNL105A 120-V Dist Panel Green No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SCM 2SCM*PNL302B 120-V Dist Panel Yellow No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SCM 2SCM*PNL304B 120-V Dist Panel Yellow No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SCM 2SCM*PNL301B 120-V Dist Panel Yellow No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SCM 2SCM*PNL303B 120-V Dist Panel Yellow No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SCM 2SCM*PNL305B 120-V Dist Panel Yellow No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SCV 2SCV*PNL101A GTS Miscellaneous 120/240-V Panel Green No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SCV 2SCV*PNL301B GTS Miscellaneous 120/240-V Panel Yellow No Not Required for Safe Shutdown SFC(1,2) 2SFC*HV35A 2SFC*TK1A Inlet Valve Green No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term SFC(1,2) 2SFC*HV35B 2SFC*TK1B Inlet Valve Yellow No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term SFC(1,2) 2SFC*HV54A Skimmer Surge Tank Outlet Green No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term SFC(1,2) 2SFC*HV54B Skimmer Surge Tank Outlet Yellow No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term SFC(1,2) 2SFC*HV6A Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Water Cross Connect Green No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term SFC(1,2) 2SFC*HV6B Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Water Cross Connect Yellow No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term SFC(2) 2SFC*LS33A Skimmer Surge Tank Level Green No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term SFC(2) 2SFC*LS33C Skimmer Surge Tank Level Green No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term SFC(2) 2SFC*AOV33A Skimmer Surge Tank Level Control Green No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term SFC(2) 2SFC*LS33B Skimmer Surge Tank Level Yellow No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term SFC(2) 2SFC*LS33D Skimmer Surge Tank Level Yellow No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term SFC(2) 2SFC*AOV33B Skimmer Surge Tank Level Yellow No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term SFC(2) 2SFC*LT32A Spent Fuel Pool Surge Tank Water Level Green No N/R, PGCC Indication Only SFC(2) 2SFC*LT32B Spent Fuel Pool Surge Tank Water Level Yellow No N/R, PGCC Indication Only SFC(2) 2SFC*LS34A SFC Skimmer Surge Tank High Level Green No N/R SFC(2) 2SFC*LS34B SFC Skimmer Surge Tank High Level Yellow No N/R SFC(2) 2SFC*TE31A Spent Fuel Pool Surge Tank Outlet Green No N/R Temperature SFC(2) 2SFC*TE31B Spent Fuel Pool Surge Tank Outlet Yellow No N/R Temperature SFC (2) 2SFC*PT3A Spent Fuel Pool Circulating Pump A Suction Green No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term Pressure SFC (2) 2SFC*PT3B Spent Fuel Pool Circulating Pump B Suction Yellow No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term Pressure SFC (2) 2SFC*PT30A Spent Fuel Pool Circulating Pump A Green No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term Discharge Pressure SFC (2) 2SFC*PT30B Spent Fuel Pool Circulating Pump B Yellow No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term Discharge Pressure SFC (2) 2SFC*FT36A Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Flow Green No N/R SFC(2) 2SFC*FT36B Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Flow Yellow No N/R SFC(2) 2SFC*FT58A SFC Pump Discharge Flow Green No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term SFC(2) 2SFC*FT58B SFC Pump Discharge Flow Yellow No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term SFC(2) 2SFC*P1A SFC Water Circulating Pump A Green No Disconnect Switch to Disconnect PGCC Control SFC(2) 2SFC*P1B SFC Water Circulating Pump B Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Disconnect PGCC Control SFC(1,2) 2SFC*AOV154 SFC Filter Header Inlet Isolation Valve Yellow No N/R, Manual Closer of Valve Long Term SFC(1,2) 2SFC*AOV153 SFC Filter Header Inlet Isolation Valve Green No N/R, Manual Closer of Valve Long Term SFC(1,2) 2SFC*HV18A 2SFC-FLT1A Inlet Green No N/R, Manual Closer of Valve Long Term SFC(1,2) 2SFC*HV18B 2SFC-FLT1B Inlet Yellow No N/R, Manual Closer of Valve Long Term Chapter 09 9B.8-88 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-3 (Cont'd.)

Controlled Electrical From RSS System Equipment Description Division Panel Control Circuit Arrangement SFC(1,2) 2SFC*HV17A 2SFC-FLT1A Bypass Green No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term SFC(1,2) 2SFC*HV17B 2SFC-FLT1B Bypass Yellow No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term SFC(1,2) 2SFC*HV37A 2SFC*E1A Heat Exchanger Green No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term SFC(1,2) 2SFC*HV37B 2SFC*E1B Heat Exchanger Yellow No N/R, Manual Alignment of System Long Term SFC(1,2) 2SFC*AOV19A 2SFC-FLT1A Outlet Green No N/R SFC(1,2) 2SFC*AOV19B 2SFC-FLT1B Outlet Yellow No N/R SFC(2) 2SFC*TE8A Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Outlet Green No N/R Temperature SFC(2) 2SFC*TE8B Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Outlet Yellow No N/R Temperature SWP(3) 2SWP*P1A SWP Pumps *P1A Green Yes Dedicated SWP Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse SWP(3) 2SWP*P1C SWP Pumps *P1C Green Yes Dedicated SWP Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse SWP(3) 2SWP*P1E SWP Pumps *P1E(9) Green Yes Dedicated SWP Disconnect Switch SWP(3) 2SWP*P1B SWP Pumps *P1B Yellow Yes Dedicated SWP Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse SWP(3) 2SWP*P1D SWP Pumps *P1D Yellow Yes Dedicated SWP Disconnect Switch/Second Fuse SWP(3) 2SWP*P1F SWP Pumps *P1F(9) Yellow Yes Dedicated SWP Disconnect Switch SWP(3) 2SWP*MOV74A SWP Pump 2SWP*P1A Discharge Valve Green Yes RMS/Transfer to RSS Panel/Second Fuse to MCC SWP(3) 2SWP*MOV74C SWP Pump 2SWP*P1C Discharge Valve Green Yes RMS/Transfer to RSS Panel/Second Fuse to MCC SWP(3) 2SWP*MOV74E SWP Pump 2SWP*P1E Discharge Valve Green Yes RMS/Transfer to RSS Panel/Second Fuse to MCC SWP(3) 2SWP*MOV74B SWP Pump 2SWP*P1B Discharge Valve Yellow Yes RMS/Transfer to RSS Panel/Second Fuse to MCC SWP(3) 2SWP*MOV74D SWP Pump 2SWP*P1D Discharge Valve Yellow Yes RMS/Transfer to RSS Panel/Second Fuse to MCC SWP(3) 2SWP*MOV74F SWP Pump 2SWP*P1F Discharge Valve Yellow Yes RMS/Transfer to RSS Panel/Second Fuse to MCC SWP(3) 2SWP*STR4A SWP Str (Motor-Operated) and Backwash Green No Dedicated SWP Disconnect Switch to Start and Run and MOV1A Valve (Motor-Operated) Equipment/Open Valve SWP (3) 2SWP*STR4C SWP Str (Motor-Operated) and Backwash Green No Dedicated SWP Disconnect Switch to Start and Run and MOV1C Valve (Motor-Operated) Equipment/Open Valve SWP (3) 2SWP*STR4E SWP Str (Motor-Operated) and Backwash Green No Dedicated SWP Disconnect Switch to Start and Run and MOV1E Valve (Motor-Operated) Equipment/Open Valve SWP (3) 2SWP*STR4B SWP Str (Motor-Operated) and Backwash Yellow No Dedicated SWP Disconnect Switch to Start and Run and MOV1B Valve (Motor-Operated) Equipment/Open Valve SWP (3) 2SWP*STR4D SWP Str (Motor-Operated) and Backwash Yellow No Dedicated SWP Disconnect Switch to Start and Run and MOV1D Valve (Motor-Operated) Equipment/Open Valve SWP (3) 2SWP*STR4F SWP Str (Motor-Operated) and Backwash Yellow No Dedicated SWP Disconnect Switch to Start and Run and MOV1F Valve (Motor-Operated) Equipment/Open Valve SWP (3) 2SWP*MOV3A SWP to TBCLCW Isolation Valve Green No Dedicated SWP Disconnect Switch to Close Valve/Second Fuse at MCC SWP (3) 2SWP*MOV3B SWP to TBCLCW Isolation Valve Yellow No N/R SWP(2) 2SWP*MOV19A SWP to CCP Heat Exchanger Isolation Valve Green No Dedicated SWP Disconnect Switch to Close Valve/Second Fuse at MCC SWP(2) 2SWP*MOV19B SWP to CCP Heat Exchanger Isolation Valve Yellow No N/R SWP(2) 2SWP*FV47A SWP to Circulating Water Isolation Valve Green No Dedicated SWP Disconnect Switch SWP(2) 2SWP*FV54A SWP to Circulating Water Isolation Valve Green No N/R SWP(2) 2SWP*FV47B SWP to Circulating Water Isolation Valve Yellow No Dedicated SWP Disconnect Switch SWP(2) 2SWP*FV54B SWP to Circulating Water Isolation Valve Yellow No N/R SWP(2) 2SWP*MOV599 Turbine Building Discharge Isolation Valve Green No N/R SWP(2) 2SWP*MOV93A Reactor Building Discharge Isolation Valve Green No Dedicated SWP Disconnect Switch to Close Valve/Second Fuse at MCC SWP(2) 2SWP*MOV93B Reactor Building Discharge Isolation Valve Yellow No N/R Chapter 09 9B.8-89 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-3 (Cont'd.)

Controlled Electrical From RSS System Equipment Description Division Panel Control Circuit Arrangement SWP(2) 2SWP*MOV50A Service Water Cross Header Isolation Valve Green No N/R SWP(2) 2SWP*MOV50B Service Water Cross Header Isolation Valve Yellow No N/R SWP(2) 2SWP*MOV21A SWP to SFC Isolation Valve Green No N/R SWP(2) 2SWP*MOV21B SWP to SFC Isolation Valve Yellow No N/R SWP(3) 2SWP*MOV66A SWP to 2EGS*EG1 Cooler Green Yes RMS/Transfer to RSS Panel/Second Fuse at MCC SWP(3) 2SWP*MOV66B SWP to 2EGS*EG3 Cooler Yellow Yes RMS/Transfer to RSS Panel/Second Fuse to MCC SWP(3) 2SWP*MOV33A Service Water FR 2RHS*E1A Green Yes Fuse at MCC SWP(3) 2SWP*MOV33B Service Water FR 2RHS*E1B Yellow Yes Fuse at MCC SWP(3) 2SWP*MOV90A Service Water to Heat Exchanger 2RHS*E1A Green Yes Second Fuse at MCC SWP(3) 2SWP*MOV90B Service Water to Heat Exchanger 2RHS*E1B Yellow Yes Second Fuse at MCC SWP(3) 2SWP*SSR1A, SWP Bar Rack Heater Intake Structure #1 Green No --

2A, 3A l SWP(3) 2SWP*SSR4A, SWP Bar Rack Heater Intake Structure #2 Green No l 5A, 6A l Add Dedicated SWP Disconnect Switch to SWP(3) 2SWP*SSR1B, SWP Bar Rack Heater Intake Structure #1 Yellow No l Activate Heaters - Second Fuse to MCC 2B, 3B l SWP(3) 2SWP*SSR4B, SWP Bar Rack Heater Intake Structure #2 Yellow No l 5B, 6B --

SWP(3) 2SWP*SOV20A RHS Pump P1A Seal Green No N/R SWP(3) 2SWP*SOV20B RHS Pumps P1B&C Seal Yellow No N/R SWP(3) 2SWP*SOV22A RHS Pump P1A Seal Green No N/R SWP(3) 2SWP*SOV22B RHS Pumps P1B&C Seal Yellow No N/R VBA 2VBA*UPS2A Division I Control UPS Green No Disconnect Switch to Disconnect PGCC Metering VBA 2VBA*UPS2C Division I Control UPS Green No Disconnect Switch to Disconnect PGCC Metering VBA 2VBA*UPS2B Division II Control UPS Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Disconnect PGCC Metering VBA 2VBA*UPS2D Division II Control UPS Yellow No Disconnect Switch to Disconnect PGCC Metering VBS 2VBS*PNL101A 120-V UPS Distribution Panel Green No N/R VBS 2VBS*PNL301B 120-V UPS Distribution Panel Yellow No N/R VBS 2VBS*PNL102A 120-V UPS Distribution Panel Green No N/R, Not Used for REM Shutdown VBS 2VBS*PNL302B 120-V UPS Distribution Panel Yellow No N/R, Not Used for REM Shutdown WCS(2) 2WCS-MOV106 RWCU Drain to Waste Collector Tank Black No Note 6 WCS(2) 2WCS-MOV107 RWCU Drain to Main Condenser Black No Note 6 Chapter 09 9B.8-90 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 9B.8-3 (Cont'd.)

(1) Time to reach 150°F is 4.8 hr following the loss of cooling during normal operation.

(2) Denotes evaluated for spurious action.

(3) Denotes required for safe shutdown.

(4) Deleted.

(5) Deleted.

(6) Operating procedures to require valve to be maintained in the closed/de-energized state, de-energized from the power sources.

(7) Valves need to be manually manipulated to initiate alternate shutdown cooling.

(8) Capability to monitor SRV tail piece thermocouple for temperature is provided at junction box 2-JB5511. This can be used for verification of cold shutdown.

(9) Operation from remote shutdown requires control fuse replacement.

Chapter 09 9B.8-91 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 9B.9 ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS 9B.9.1 Introduction The results of the Appendix R SSA (Section 9B.8) show that, at minimum, one of the four trains of SSDSs will remain free of damage due to a fire in any fire area except for the power generation control complex (PGCC), which includes the main control room and relay room. A remote shutdown system (RSS) is provided to achieve and maintain hot and cold shutdown in case of a fire in the PGCC. The design of the RSS meets the requirements of Section III.L of Appendix R.

9B.9.2 Description The RSPs are located in separate fire areas in the control building, el 261 ft, in an area enclosed by 3-hr fire-rated barriers (Fire Areas [FA]19 and FA17, Figure 9A.3-5).

The RSS design is described in detail in Section 7.4.1.4.

Manual keylock transfer switches are provided in the RSPs.

These transfer switches isolate controls from the main control room and transfer controls to the remote shutdown room. Control power supplies and control logics are also transferred.

Control switches are provided on the RSP for manual control of the systems required for hot and cold shutdown.

Instrumentation is provided in the RSP to indicate necessary plant parameters.

The remote shutdown room is divided into two separate rooms, each enclosed by 3-hr rated barriers. FA19 (zone 338NZ) contains Division II components which constitute safe shutdown trains 2 and 4, while FA17 (zone 343NZ) contains Division I components which constitute safe shutdown trains 1 and 3.

Access to the remote shutdown room is administratively controlled.

Chapter 09 9B.9-1 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 9B.10 LIGHTING NRC Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1, Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Plants, Revision 2, July 1981, has recognized that lighting is vital to the plant safe shutdown and the emergency response to a fire. As such, the following requirements are included in Section c.5.g.

"1) Fixed, self contained lighting units with individual 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> minimum battery power supplies should be provided in areas that must be manned for safe shutdown and for access and egress routes to and from all areas. Safe shutdown areas include those areas required to be manned if the Control Room must be evacuated.

2) Suitable sealed beam, battery powered portable hand lights should be provided for emergency use by the fire brigade and other operations personnel required to achieve safe shutdown."

The NMP2 SSA requires that proper lighting systems be provided at all times for all areas required for safe shutdown. The safe shutdown lighting system must assure that sufficient illumination is provided for all work stations necessary for safe shutdown in case of a fire in any fire area, and in access and egress routes thereto.

The lighting systems necessary for safe shutdown are powered by one or a combination of the following methods:

1. Normal lighting system usually receives power from the normal Station 600-V load centers.

2. Emergency lighting system normally receives power from the offsite power sources via Class 1E load centers where, in the case of a LOOP, power is provided from the emergency diesel generators. The emergency lighting system provides lighting required for operating safety-related equipment during the emergency conditions. The emergency lighting system is divided into three separate divisions corresponding to Divisions I, II and III of the plant emergency ac distribution system.

Chapter 09 9B.10-1 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR

3. Essential lighting system is powered from the uninterruptible power supply (UPS) power system when no normal ac power, including onsite and offsite power sources, is available (for maximum duration of 2 hr).

The essential lighting system provides partial lighting for certain critical areas of the Station requiring continuous lighting, such as the control room, relay room, standby diesel generator rooms, emergency switchgear rooms, service water pump rooms, and for access and egress routes where 8-hr battery-pack emergency lighting is not required.

4. Eight-hr battery-pack lighting system powered from its own battery packs.

The lighting system as described meets the requirements of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section c.5.g.1, and applies to locations required for remote safe shutdown in the event of a control room fire and LOOP.

A fire in some areas may cause a reactor trip. It is postulated that a fire in the control room, relay room or switchgear room may also cause a LOOP. Although plant normal lighting may be available for a fire in all other areas, the Appendix R SSA does not credit the availability of the normal lighting system.

Therefore, an alternatively powered lighting system must be provided for a fire in any fire areas of the plant where safe shutdown equipment is located and Operator manual actions are required. In addition to the emergency powered lighting system, the essential powered lighting system and 8-hr battery-powered emergency lighting are provided at all work stations necessary for safe shutdown where Operator manual actions are required.

Table 9B.8-1 provides a list of safe shutdown equipment and any Operator manual action that may be required.

The illumination levels are at a minimum one foot-candle average maintained at the work stations (within a vertical viewing area for a vertical work station, and a horizontal viewing area for a horizontal work station). A one foot-candle average is maintained horizontal on the centerline of the access and egress routes.

All of the lighting systems, including the battery packs, are seismically supported. Details of Station lighting systems are provided in Section 9.5.3.

Chapter 09 9B.10-2 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 9B.11 CONCLUSIONS From the results of the analysis in Section 9B.8, it can be concluded that Unit 2 maintains safe shutdown capability in the event of a fire in any one fire area at a time, not coincident with any other design basis accident (DBA), except LOOP.

Chapter 09 9B.11-1 Rev. 25 October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 9B.12 SAFE SHUTDOWN CONCERNS The following are responses to NRC concerns given to Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) during a meeting held June 19, 1985, regarding safe shutdown capability.

1. The design basis event for considering the need for alternative shutdown is a postulated fire and a specific fire containing redundant safe shutdown cables and equipment in close proximity where it has been determined that the fire protection means cannot assure that safe shutdown capability will be preserved. Two cases should be considered: offsite power is available and offsite power is not available.

Response

We have evaluated the safe shutdown capability for Unit 2 and considered the need for alternative shutdown capability for each specific fire area in the plant. Safe shutdown can either be performed from the control room for a fire in any plant fire area except for the control room or relay room, or from the RSP in the case of a fire in the relay room or control room. For either of these conditions, we have determined that safe shutdown can be achieved with or without offsite power available. Additionally, we have evaluated the effects of spurious operation, and no single spurious operation will adversely affect safe shutdown.

2. No fission product monitoring integrity shall be affected, including fuel clad damage, rupture of the primary coolant or rupture of the containment boundary. The RCS process variables shall be within those values predicted for a LOOP, and the alternate shutdown capability shall be able to achieve and maintain subcritical conditions in the reactor, maintain reactor coolant inventory, maintain shutdown for extended periods of time, achieve cold shutdown within 72 hr, and maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter.

Response

Our evaluation of safe shutdown capability used the following as the acceptance criteria, that there be: no Chapter 09 9B.12-1 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR fuel damage, no rupture of the primary coolant boundary, and no rupture of the containment boundary. The RCS process variables are within those predicted for the LOOP and shutdown from the control room or locally using the RSPs (if the control room is not available) is able to achieve and maintain subcritical conditions, maintain sufficient reactor coolant inventory, achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions for extended periods of time, and attain cold shutdown conditions within 72 hr and maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter.

3. The reactivity control functions shall be capable of achieving and maintaining cold shutdown reactivity conditions.

Response

The redundant capability provided by the alternate rod insertion (ARI) recirculation pump trip (RPT), cessation of feedwater flow and capability to inject the standby liquid control system (SLCS) assures an insertion of negative reactivity sufficient to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions.

4. Reactor coolant makeup functions shall be capable of maintaining the reactor coolant level above the top of the core for boiling water reactors (BWR).

Response

Our evaluation ensures that reactor coolant makeup function is capable of maintaining reactor coolant above the top of the core and is the same as those predicted for the case of LOOP.

5. Reactor heat removal function shall be capable of achieving and maintaining decay heat removal.

Response

The reactor heat removal function has been determined to achieve and maintain decay heat removal. See Section 4.

6. The process monitoring function shall be capable of providing direct readings or process variables necessary to perform and control the above functions.

Chapter 09 9B.12-2 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR

Response

The process monitoring functions are capable of providing direct readings of the process variables necessary to perform and control safe shutdown functions. These are available either from the main control room or the RSP (see FSAR Section 7.4).

7. The supporting functions shall be capable of providing the process cooling, lubrication, etc., necessary to permit the operation of equipment used for safe shutdown by the systems identified in 3 through 5 above.

Response

The supporting functions were analyzed and are capable of providing their necessary function to permit operation of safe shutdown equipment. See Sections 9B.4 and 9B.8.

8. The equipment and systems used to achieve and maintain hot shutdown should be: 1) free of fire damage, 2) capable of maintaining such conditions for longer than 72 hr if the equipment required to achieve and maintain cold shutdown is not available due to fire damage, and 3) capable of being powered by onsite emergency power systems.

Response

Equipment and systems required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown will remain free from fire damage due to their separate locations within the plant, or are protected by a combination of fire barriers, sprinklers, and detectors.

Identified safe shutdown equipment can achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions for periods longer than 72 hr if cold shutdown systems are not available due to fire damages, and are capable of being powered by onsite emergency power systems. Additionally, the alternate shutdown capability can achieve and maintain cold shutdown within 72 hr, and is capable of being powered by onsite emergency power systems.

9. The equipment and systems used to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions should either be free of fire damage or the fire damage to such systems should be limited such that repairs can be made and cold shutdown conditions achieved within 72 hr. Equipment and systems used prior to 72 hr after the fire should be capable of being powered by an Chapter 09 9B.12-3 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR onsite emergency power system. Those used after 72 hr may be powered from an offsite power system.

Response

The equipment and systems used to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions will remain either free from fire damage due to their location or will be protected by a combination of fire barriers, fire suppression systems, and fire detectors.

Should the equipment be damaged by fire, sufficient capability will be provided onsite to ensure that cold shutdown systems are restored within 72 hr using repair procedures. Repair procedures are not necessary to restore cold shutdown systems. Sufficient systems are available either from the control room or the RSPs to achieve and maintain hot and cold shutdown conditions without the need for repairs.

10. Systems need not be designed to seismic Category 1 criteria, single-failure criteria, or cope with other plant accidents such as pipe breaks or stuck valves except those portions of those systems that interfere with or impact the existing safety systems.

Response

Many of the systems used for safe shutdown and cold shutdown during fires are seismic Category 1, must meet single-failure criteria, and can cope with other in-plant accidents such as pipe breaks or stuck relief valves.

However, those conditions are not necessary to be applied in the case of fire.

11. The following equipment is used for hot shutdown:

1) Reactor trip capability either by automatic or manual scram; 2) RCIC RHR including the SWP system and appropriate process monitoring capabilities such as reactor vessel level, pressure, suppression pool temperature, onsite emergency power, and dc power and distribution systems.

Systems used for cold shutdown include RHR system, SWP system, onsite dc and ac or offsite power systems.

Response

Chapter 09 9B.12-4 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR As shown on Figure 9B.4-2, the approach used for Unit 2 is similar to that described above. The reactor is either manually or automatically scrammed. Then one of four trains are used to provide makeup water and decay heat removal. Either HPCS or RCIC is used for high pressure makeup. If a blowdown were to occur either through the ADS or relief valves, makeup would be provided using the low pressure systems (LPCS or LPCI). Additionally, decay heat removal is provided by the RHR system.

In the event of a fire in the control room or relay room which forces evacuation of the control room, sufficient equipment to enable hot and cold shutdown is provided at the RSPs (FSAR Section 7.4) and through the use of local control. Viability of these circuits is assured by the use of transfer switches which electrically isolate the control room and transfer control to the local panels and the RSPs.

Redundant and isolated fuses are provided (in the emergency switchgear rooms) to maintain the power source to these circuits.

12. The description of the systems or portions thereof used to provide the shutdown capability and modifications required to achieve alternate shutdown capability if required.

Response

Appendix 9B and Section 7.4 of the FSAR provide descriptions of the shutdown systems and modifications and alternate shutdown capability from the remote shutdown room.

13. System design drawings which show normal and alternate shutdown control and power circuits, location of components and that wiring which is in an area and wiring which is out of the area required alternate system.

Response

System design drawings are available onsite as required to show normal and alternate shutdown control and power circuits, location of components and wiring in various fire areas. Cable routing in the plant is shown in Table 9B.8-1.

14. Demonstrate that changes to safety systems will not degrade safety systems. For example, new isolation switches and Chapter 09 9B.12-5 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR control switches should meet design criterion standards in the FSAR for electrical equipment in the system in which the switch is to be installed. Cabinets that switches are to be mounted in should also meet the same criteria as other safety-related cabinets and panels and, to avoid inadvertent isolation from the control room, isolation switches should be keylocked or alarmed in the control room if in the local or isolated position. Periodic checks should be made to verify that the switch is in the proper position for normal operation, and single transfer switch or other new device should not be a source for single failure to cause loss of redundant safety systems.

Response

Equipment which is being provided for safe shutdown will meet the criteria for the system in which it is installed.

Keylocks are provided on the transfer and disconnect switches to assure against inadvertent operation. Separate transfer switches are used for redundant divisions to ensure that both the divisions are not affected by any single failure. Actuation of the transfer switches is alarmed in the control room.

15. Demonstrate that wiring, including power sources for the control circuits and equipment, operations for the alternate shutdown method, is independent of equipment wiring in the area to be avoided.

Response

Table 9B.8-1 shows the circuits and equipment that are located in each fire area. Information is provided showing the location of the equipment that would be available for a fire in the area to be utilized for safe shutdown. A computer program was utilized to verify that cables were routed appropriately to maintain divisional separation and ensure safe shutdown capability in the event of a fire.

16. Demonstrate that alternative shutdown power sources, including all breakers, have isolation devices on control circuits that are routed through the area to be avoided even if the breaker is to be operated manually.

Response

Chapter 09 9B.12-6 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR Alternate shutdown power sources, including all breakers, are routed such that safe shutdown can be achieved independently of where the fire occurs. Alternative systems are available for safe shutdown. We have shown which components and electrical cabling are in each area and which can be used for safe shutdown when a fire is in any given area. Appropriate isolation devices (e.g.,

fuses, breakers, transfer switch contacts, etc.) have been used to mitigate the effects of fire damage to maintain independent power supply and availability.

17. Demonstrate that licensee procedures have been developed and describe the tasks to be performed to effect the shutdown methods.

Response

Procedures are presently being developed to enable safe shutdown in the event of a fire within the plant. These are available and personnel training will be completed prior to fuel load.

18. Demonstrate that spare fuses are available for control circuits where these fuses may be required in supplying power to control circuits used for the shutdown method and may be blown by the effects of a cable spreading room fire.

Spare fuses should be located conveniently to the existing fuses, and the shutdown procedures should inform the Operator to check these fuses.

Response

The controls for the safe shutdown equipment, in the event of fire in the control room (or relay room), are provided on the RSPs or locally (FSAR Section 7.4). All control circuits required for safe shutdown from the remote shutdown room that are subject to control room fire effects are provided with redundant fuses which are put into the circuit by the operation of a transfer or disconnect switch.

19. Demonstrate that the manpower required to perform the shutdown functions using the procedures of Item 18, as well as to provide Fire Brigade members to fight the fire, is available as required by the Fire Brigade Technical Specifications.

Chapter 09 9B.12-7 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR

Response

A demonstration will be conducted during initial testing to verify the capability to perform the safe shutdown functions considering a fire in any area of the plant, including the control room area.

20. Demonstrate that adequate acceptance tests are performed.

These should verify that equipment operates from the local control station when the transfer or isolation switch is placed in a location position, and that the equipment cannot be operated from the control room, and that equipment operates from the control room but cannot be operated in the local control station when the transfer or isolation switch is in the remote position.

Response

The preoperational test program will incorporate the requirements of the above testing.

21. Technical Specification of the surveillance requirements and limited conditions of operation for that equipment not already covered by existing Technical Specifications. For example, if new isolation and control switches are added for the SWP system, the existing Technical Specifications surveillance requirements for the SWP system should add a statement similar to the following. "Every third pump test should also verify that the pump starts from an alternative shutdown station after moving all service water system isolation switches to the local control position."

Response

Technical Specifications have been submitted which demonstrate operability of control circuits every 18 months.

22. Demonstrate that the systems available are adequate to perform the necessary shutdown functions. The functions required should be based on previous analysis if possible, such as loss of offsite ac power or shutdown on A Group 1 (RPV) isolation. Equipment required for the alternate capability should be the same or equivalent to that relied on in the above analysis.

Response

Chapter 09 9B.12-8 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR An analysis was performed to ensure that appropriate capability exists to shut down the plant on loss of offsite ac power. The results of this analysis are provided in Table 9B.8-2.

23. Demonstrate that repair procedures for cold shutdown systems are developed and materials for repairs are maintained onsite.

Response

Because of the separation, isolation, and redundancy provided, repairs have not been required to achieve safe shutdown and cold shutdown. Procedures are therefore not provided.

24. Provide a table that lists all equipment including instrumentation and support systems, equipment that is required by the alternate or dedicated method of achieving and maintaining shutdown.

Response

Equipment used to maintain or achieve hot shutdown from the remote shutdown room in the event of fire in the control room or relay room is shown on Table 9B.8-3. The systems required for safe shutdown from the remote shutdown room are described in Section 9B.8.2.

25. For each alternative shutdown equipment listed in Item 24 above, provide a table that lists essential cables that are located in the fire area.

Response

All equipment, instrumentation and control and power cables that are located in various fire areas are listed in Table 9B.8-1.

26. Provide a table that lists safety-related and nonsafety-related cables associated with equipment and cables constituting the alternate or dedicated method of shutdown that are located in the fire area.

Response

Chapter 09 9B.12-9 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR See Item 24 and 25 above.

27. Show that fire-induced failures of cables listed in Item 25 and 26 above will not prevent operation or cause maloperation of alternative or dedicated shutdown method.

Response

Spurious operation or maloperation of alternative or dedicated shutdown equipment was evaluated and is described in Section 9B.8.1.

28. For each cable listed in Item 26 above, provide detailed electrical schematic drawings that show on each cable is isolated from the fire area.

Response

Schematic drawings are available for onsite review during the Appendix R audit.

29. The RHR system is generally low pressure system that interfaces with high-pressure primary coolant system. To preclude a LOCA through this interface, we require compliance with the recommendation of BTP 9.5-1. Thus, this interface most likely consists of two redundant and independent MOVs. These two MOVs and their associated cable may be subject to a single fire hazard. It is our concern that this single fire could cause the two valves to open resulting in a fire-initiated LOCA through the subject high-/low-pressure system interface. To assure that this interface and other high-/low-pressure interfaces are adequately protected from the effects of a single fire, we required the following information.

A. Identify each high-/low-pressure interface that uses redundant, electrically controlled devices such as two series MOVs to isolate or preclude rupture of any primary coolant boundary.

Response

Each high-pressure and low-pressure interface point is described in Table 9B.5-1.

Chapter 09 9B.12-10 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR APPENDIX 9C THE CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NINE MILE POINT UNIT 2 Chapter 09 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR APPENDIX 9C TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title 1 INTRODUCTION 2 BASIS OF REVIEW 3 RESULTS OF REVIEW 4 HAZARD ELIMINATION TABLE 5 LIST OF FIGURES 6 LIFTING DEVICES 7 VERIFICATION OF TESTING, INSPECTION, AND MAINTENANCE 8 VERIFICATION OF CRANE DESIGN 9 OPERATOR TRAINING, QUALIFICATION, AND CONDUCT 10 NRC REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Chapter 09 9C-i Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR APPENDIX 9C LIST OF TABLES Table Number Title 3-1 OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS WHICH CARRY HEAVY LOADS OVER SAFE SHUTDOWN OR DECAY HEAT REMOVAL EQUIPMENT 3-2 OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS WHICH ARE EXCLUDED FROM FURTHER CONSIDERATION 3-3 2MHR-CRN1/POLAR CRANE LOADS 3-4 REACTOR BUILDING CRANES - LOADS HANDLED 3-5 SCREENWELL AREA TRAVELING CRANES - LOADS HANDLED 4-1 HAZARD ELIMINATION Chapter 09 9C-ii Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR APPENDIX 9C LIST OF FIGURES Figure Number Title 5-1 SAFE LOAD PATHS FOR HEAVY LOADS 5-2 SAFE LOAD PATHS FOR HEAVY LOADS REFUELING FLOOR 5-3 SAFE LOAD PATHS SCREENWELL BUILDINGS 5-4 CRANE RESTRICTED AREA (SHEETS 1 AND 2)

Chapter 09 9C-iii Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) letter dated December 22, 1980, to Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) contained NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants.

This letter requested a review of the controls for handling heavy loads to determine the extent to which general guidelines were addressed, and to identify changes and modifications that would be required to satisfy these guidelines.

The information presented in this report is a summary of the heavy loads analysis of Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station - Unit 2 (Unit 2). The concerns of the NRC staff as defined in NUREG-0612 have been specifically addressed in Section 3. The objective of NUREG-0612 to provide a maximum practical "defense-in-depth" approach to reduce risk involved in load-handling failures remains an ongoing objective.

Section 8.2 of this report provides a comparison and evaluation of the differences between the Unit 2 polar crane and NUREG-0554.

Chapter 09 9C.1-1 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 2 BASIS OF REVIEW A heavy load has been defined by NUREG-0612 as any weight greater than the combined weight of a single spent fuel assembly and its associated handling tool.

This report uses "greater than 1,000 pounds" as a basis for determining "heavy load." The actual weight for the spent fuel assembly and its associated handling tool is 1,129 lb. In the area of the reactor and spent fuel pool, all loads which are hoisted and handled were investigated. This report does not address temporary rigging/load handling systems which are erected as needed during the course of normal plant maintenance; these are controlled by administrative procedures in accordance with NUREG-0612.

The general guidelines identified in NUREG-0612 were used as a basis for this review.

Chapter 09 9C.2-1 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 3 RESULTS OF REVIEW The results of the review are listed as direct responses to of the NRC's December 22, 1980, letter. For convenience, the NRC requested information is repeated, followed by the Unit 2 response.

The following format corresponds point by point to Enclosure 3 of the NRC's letter:

2. INFORMATION REQUESTED FROM LICENSEE 2.1 General Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1, identifies several general guidelines related to the design and operation of overhead load-handling systems in the areas where spent fuel is stored, in the vicinity of the reactor core, and in other areas of the plant where a load drop could result in damage to equipment required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal. Information provided in response to this section should identify the extent of potentially hazardous load-handling operations at a site, and the extent of conformance to appropriate load-handling guidance.

2.1-1 Requested Information Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to identify all overhead handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks, Technical Specifications, operating procedures, or detailed structural analysis).

Response

This study included a systematic review of all permanent cranes, monorails, and hoists intended for use at Unit 2. The overhead handling systems, from which load drops may result in damage to a system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal, are listed in Table 3-1.

2.1-2 Requested Information Chapter 09 9C.3-1 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR Justify the exclusion of any overhead handling system from the above category by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load-impact point and any safety-related component to permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

Response

The overhead handling systems, which have been excluded from this study, are listed in Table 3-2. The specific justification for excluding each system is noted.

2.1-3 Requested Information With respect to the design and operation of heavy-load handling systems in the reactor building and those load-handling systems identified in Item 2.1-1, provide your evaluation concerning compliance with the guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1. The following specific information should be included in your reply:

a. Drawings or sketches sufficient to clearly identify the location of safe load paths, spent fuel, and safety-related equipment.

Response

See Section 5 for drawings which define safe load paths and show safety-related equipment.

b. A discussion of measures taken to ensure that load-handling operations remain within safe load paths, including procedures, if any, for deviation from these paths.

Response

Safe load paths will be referenced in procedures and shown on equipment layout Chapter 09 9C.3-2 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR drawings. Load paths will not be marked on the floor in the area where the load is to be handled. There are 10 to 15 load paths for the reactor building operating floor.

Load paths would be confusing and overlapped by other load paths. There are limit switches on the reactor building polar crane (RBPC) to limit movement of heavy loads over the spent fuel pool. Most of the other cranes discussed in Item 2.1-1 are monorail which inherently define the load path.

c. The tabulation of heavy loads to be handled by each crane which includes the load identification, load weight, its designated lifting device, and verification that the handling of such load is governed by a written procedure containing, as a minimum, the information identified in NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(2).

Response

See Tables 3-3, 3-4, and 3-5 for tabulation of heavy loads handled by cranes, hoists, and monorails. The procedures will comply with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(2), except that the safe load paths are not marked on the floors. These procedures will be available for onsite review.

d. Verification that lifting devices identified in Item 2.1-3c comply with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978 or ANSI B30.9-1971 as appropriate. For lifting devices where these standards, as supplemented by NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1(4) or 5.1.1(5), are not met, describe any proposed alternatives and demonstrate their equivalency in terms of load-handling reliability.

Response

See Section 6 for a discussion on lifting devices.

Chapter 09 9C.3-3 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR

e. Verification that ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2, has been invoked with respect to crane inspection, testing, and maintenance. Where any exception is taken to this standard, sufficient information should be provided to demonstrate the equivalency of proposed alternatives.

Response

See Section 7 for compliance with guidelines of ANSI B30.2-1976.

f. Verification that crane design complies with the guidelines of CMAA Specification No. 70 and Chapter 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, including the demonstration of equivalency of actual design requirements for instances where specific compliance with these standards is not provided.

Response

See Section 8 for verification of crane design.

g. Exceptions, if any, taken to ANSI B30.2-1976 with respect to Operator training, qualification, and conduct.

Response

See Section 9 for Operator training, qualification, and conduct.

2.2 Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in the Reactor Building NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.4, provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of spent fuel in the reactor vessel or in storage. Information provided in response to this section should demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that, in this area, either the likelihood of a load drop which might damage spent fuel is extremely small, or that the estimated consequences of such a drop will not exceed the limits set by the evaluation criteria of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1, Criteria I through III.

Chapter 09 9C.3-4 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR 2.2-1 Requested Information Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes physically capable (i.e.,

ignoring interlocks, moveable mechanic stops, or operating procedures) of carrying loads over spent fuel in the storage pool or in the reactor vessel.

Response

Equipment Name Type Capacity Designator

a. Reactor Building Polar 132/25/0.5 2MHR-CRN1 Crane ton

b. Fuel-Handling Jib 0.5 ton 2MHF-CRN-1

c. Fuel-Handling Jib 0.5 ton 2MHF-CRN-2

d. Channel-Handling Jib 200 lb 2MHF-CRN-3

e. Fuel Grapple Tele- NA scoping

f. Service Pole Hoist 0.25 ton NA Caddy 2.2-2 Requested Information Justify the exclusion of any crane in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads or are permanently prevented from movement of heavy load over stored fuel or into any location where, following any failure, such load may drop into the reactor vessel or spent fuel storage pool.

Response

The fuel-handling jib cranes, service pole caddy hoist, and the channel-handling jib crane can be excluded since loads handled are less than 1,000 lb. The fuel grapple handles only the fuel assembly and, therefore, is also excluded since Chapter 09 9C.3-5 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR previous analyses postulated worst-case accident for spent fuel assembly drop over the reactor core. The calculated exposures (design base accident [DBA]) were a small fraction of the allowable guidelines of 10CFR100 as discussed in Section 15.7.4 of the Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

2.2-3 Requested Information Identify any cranes listed in Item 2.2-1 which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load- handling system (i.e.,

crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1.*

Response

The main hook (132 ton) of the RBPC is a single-failure proof design which complies with the criteria of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6. See Section 8 for a more detailed summary of the RBPC design. See Table 3-3 for the crane loads.

• All attachments are those accompanying Enclosure 3 of the NRC's December 22, 1980, letter.

2.2-4 Requested Information For cranes identified in Item 2.2-1 not categorized according to Item 2.2-3, demonstrate that the criteria of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied. Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in response to Section 2.3 of this request. With respect to Criteria I through III, Chapter 09 9C.3-6 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation in the reactor building and your determination of compliance. This response should include the following information for each crane.

a. Where reliance is placed on the installation and use of electrical interlocks or mechanical stops, indicate the circumstances under which these protective devices can be removed or bypassed and the administrative procedures invoked to ensure proper authorization of such action. Discuss any related or proposed Technical Specifications concerning the bypass of such interlocks.

Response

In regards to the RBPC: electrical interlocks may be temporarily removed or bypassed with written approval of the Shift Manager (SM) and/or Plant General Manager.

The reasons for removal or bypassing will be included with the written approval. A site procedure which explains the conditions and requirements for temporary removal or bypassing will be developed.

b. Where reliance is placed on the operation of the standby gas treatment system (SGTS),

discuss present and/or proposed Technical Specifications and administrative or physical controls provided to ensure that these assumptions remain valid.

Response

Technical Specifications will address required operability of SGTS during fuel handling operations.

c. Where reliance is placed on other site-specific considerations (e.g.,

refueling sequencing), provide present or proposed Technical Specifications, and discuss administrative or physical controls Chapter 09 9C.3-7 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR provided to ensure the validity of such considerations.

Response

The fuel-handling procedures now being formulated will follow the guidelines of NUREG-0612.

d. Analyses performed to demonstrate compliance with Criteria I through III should conform to the guidelines of NUREG-0612 Appendix A.

Justify any exception taken to these guidelines and provide the specific information requested in Attachments 2, 3, or 4, as appropriate, for each analysis performed.

Response

No such analyses were required for this study.

2.3 Specific Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems Operating in Plant Areas Containing Equipment Required for Reactor Shutdown, Decay Heat Removal, or Spent Fuel Pool Cooling NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.5, provides guidelines concerning the design and operation of load-handling systems in the vicinity of equipment or components required for safe reactor shutdown and decay heat removal. Information provided in response to this section should be sufficient to demonstrate that adequate measures have been taken to ensure that in these areas, either the likelihood of a load drop which might prevent safe reactor shutdown or prohibit continued decay heat removal is extremely small, or that damage to such equipment from load drops will be limited in order not to result in the loss of these safety-related functions. Cranes which must be evaluated in this section have been previously identified in your response to Item 2.1-1, and their loads in your response to Item 2.1-3c.

2.3-1 Requested Information Identify any cranes listed in Item 2.1-1 which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop Chapter 09 9C.3-8 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling system (i.e.,

crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1.

Response

See Section 8, Verification of Crane Design.

2.3-2 Requested Information For any cranes identified in Item 2.1-1 not designated as single-failure proof in Item 2.3-1, a comprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided, including the following information:

a. The presentation in a matrix format of all heavy loads and potential impact areas where damage might occur to safety-related equipment. Heavy loads identification should include designation and weight or cross-reference to information provided in Item 2.1-3c. Impact areas should be identified by construction zones and elevations or by some other method such that the impact area can be located on the plant general arrangement drawings.

Response

See hazard elimination tables in Section 4.

b. For each interaction identified, indicate which of the load and impact area combinations can be eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, mechanical stops and/or electrical interlocks, or other site-specific considerations. Elimination on the basis of the aforementioned consideration should be supplemented by the following specific information:

Chapter 09 9C.3-9 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR (1) For load/target combinations eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, discuss the basis for determining that load drops will not affect continued system operation (i.e., the ability of the system to perform its safety-related function).

Response

See comment section of the hazard elimination tables in Section 4.

(2) Where mechanical stops or electrical interlocks are to be provided, present details showing the areas where crane travel will be prohibited.

Additionally, provide a discussion concerning the procedures that are to be used for authorizing the bypassing of interlocks or removable stops, for verifying that interlocks are functional prior to crane use, and for verifying that interlocks are restored to operability after operations which require bypassing have been completed.

Response

See the drawings listed in Section 5 for areas where crane travel is prohibited due to mechanical stops or interlocks.

Bypassing of interlocks or mechanical stops will be covered in the load-handling procedures.

(3) Where load/target combinations are eliminated on the basis of other site-specific considerations (e.g.,

maintenance sequencing), provide present and/or proposed Technical Specifications and discuss administrative procedures or physical constraints invoked to ensure the validity of such considerations.

Chapter 09 9C.3-10 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR

Response

See comment section of the hazard elimination tables in Section 4.

c. For interactions not eliminated by the analysis of Item 2.3-2b, identify any handling systems for specific loads which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features).

For each so evaluated, provide the load-handling system (i.e.,

crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1.

Response

All interactions were eliminated by analysis of Item 2.3-2b.

d. For interactions not eliminated in Items 2.3-2b or 2.3-2c, demonstrate using appropriate analysis that damage would not preclude operation of sufficient equipment to allow the system to perform its safety function following a load drop (NUREG-0612, Section 5.1, Criterion IV).

For each analysis so conducted, the following information should be provided:

(1) An indication of whether or not, for the specific load being investigated, the overhead crane-handling system is designed and constructed such that the hoisting system will retain its load in the event of seismic accelerations equivalent to those of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).

Chapter 09 9C.3-11 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR (2) The basis for any exceptions taken to the analytical guidelines for NUREG-0612, Appendix A.

(3) The information requested in Attachment 4.

Response

All interactions were eliminated by analysis of Item 2.3-2b.

Chapter 09 9C.3-12 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 3-1 OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS WHICH CARRY HEAVY LOADS OVER SAFE SHUTDOWN OR DECAY HEAT REMOVAL EQUIPMENT Mark No. Identification Location Function 2MHR-CRN1 132/25/0.5-Ton Reactor Building Polar Reactor Building at El 387'-4" and Refueling and maintenance Crane Azimuth 0°-359° 2MHR-CRN3,4 34-Ton Recirc Motor Handling Cranes Primary Containment at El 284'-11" Removal and replacement of pump and Azimuth 135° and 315° motors 2MHS-CRN6 10-Ton Stop Log Area Crane Screenwell Building Intake and Removal and replacement of SWP Discharge Shaft Area El 307'-9" MOVs and stop logs 2MHS-CRN7 8-Ton Single Girder Crane Reactor Building at El 261'-0" and Removal and replacement of Azimuth 0° outboard main steam and feedwater valves 2MHR-CRN65(1) 2-Ton Monorail System Primary Containment at El 305'-9" Removal and replacement of safety and Azimuth 240° to 115° relief valves 2MHR-CRN65X(1) 2-Ton Monorail System Primary Containment at El 305'-9" Removal and replacement of safety and Azimuth 240° to 115° relief valves (installed during cold shutdown or refueling mode) 2MHR-CRN66X 2-Ton Transfer Monorail System Primary Containment at El 261'-0" Transfer safety relief valves and and Azimuth 165° to 235° CRD cart 2MHR-CRN67 8-Ton Monorail System Primary Containment at El 261'-0" Removal and replacement of main and Azimuth 315° to 45° steam isolation valves 2MHS-CRN2, 3, 5-Ton Emergency Diesel Generator Cranes Emergency Diesel Generator Building Maintenance of emergency and 4 El 261'-0" generators 2MHW-CRN1 75/40-Ton Screenwell Room Crane Screenwell Building Above Service Maintenance of service water Water Pump Bays pumps, circulating water pumps, feedwater heater tube bundles, and miscellaneous equipment (1) 2MHR-CRN65 and 2MHR-CRN65X cannot be used or installed on the monorail concurrently.

Chapter 09 9C.3-13 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 3-2 OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS WHICH ARE EXCLUDED FROM FURTHER CONSIDERATION Mark No. Identification and Justification 2MHN-CRN1 30-Ton Radwaste Building Crane - This crane is located inside the radwaste building, which does not contain any safety-related equipment. A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHN-CRN56 Radwaste Building Monorail (10-Ton Capacity) - This crane is located inside the radwaste building, which does not contain any safety-related equipment. A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHN-CRN70 Grating and Miscellaneous Equipment Hoist (2-Ton Capacity) - This crane is located inside the radwaste building, which does not contain any safety-related equipment. A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHN-CRN71 Concrete Slab Hoist (3-Ton Capacity) - This crane is located inside the radwaste building, which does not contain any safety-related equipment. A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHN-CRN72 Heat Exchanger Hoist (2-Ton Capacity) - This crane is located inside the radwaste building, which does not contain any safety-related equipment. A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHN-CRN73 Concrete Slab Hoist (4-Ton Capacity) - This crane is located inside the radwaste building, which does not contain any safety-related equipment. A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHN-CRN74 Concrete Slab Hoist (4-Ton Capacity) - This crane is located inside the radwaste building, which does not contain any safety-related equipment. A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHN-CRN75 Concrete Slab Hoist (4-Ton Capacity) - This crane is located inside the radwaste building, which does not contain any safety-related equipment. A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHN-CRN76 (LLW) Storage container/SRV test and storage facility hoist (4-ton capacity). This crane is located inside radwaste at el 265-0 which does not contain any safety-related equipment. A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHF-CRN1 and -CRN2 Refueling Area Jib Cranes - The capacities of these cranes are all 1/2 ton. Therefore, these cranes are excluded from the Heavy Loads study.

2MHF-CRN3 Channel Handling Boom with Counterbalance - The capacity is 200 lb; therefore, this crane is excluded from the Heavy Loads study.

2MHT-CRN1 250/40-Ton Turbine Room Crane - This crane is located inside the turbine building, which does not contain any safety-related mechanical equipment. A load drop from this crane will not preclude plant shutdown.

Chapter 09 9C.3-14 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 3-2 (Cont'd.)

Mark No. Identification and Justification 2MHS-CRN1 RDS Cart Crane (1.5-Ton Capacity) - This crane is located in that area of the reactor building at el 289'-0" and azimuth 221°F which does not contain safety-related equipment. A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHS-CRN5 Workshop Crane (10-Ton Capacity) - This crane is located in the turbine building dirty workshop and large tool area at el 261'-0". A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHS-CRN9 Discharge Flume and Screenhouse Crane (10-Ton Capacity) - This crane is located in the screenhouse. A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHS-CRN20 Lube Oil Tank Equipment Crane (1.5-Ton Capacity) - This jib crane is located over the turbine oil reservoir at el 277'-6". A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHK-CRN31 3-Ton Monorail Hoist System - This is located inside the control building at el 261'-0" and is used for the removal of the hatch cover slabs and equipment. A load drop from this hoist would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHK-CRN32 3-Ton Monorail Hoist System - This hoist is located inside the auxiliary boiler room at el 261'-0". A load drop from this hoist would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHK-CRN33 and -CRN34 10-Ton Monorail Hoist Systems - These hoists are located in the turbine building for the handling of the condenser waterboxes during a plant shutdown. A load drop from these hoists would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHK-CRN45 and -CRN46 5-Ton Monorail Hoist Systems - These hoists are located inside the normal switchgear building at el 293'-0" and 261'-0", respectively, and are used for the handling of hatch cover slabs and equipment. Load drops from these hoists would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHK-CRN48 10-Ton Monorail Hoist System - This system is located in the decontamination area at el 261'-0". A load drop from this hoist system would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHK-CRN55 4-Ton Monorail Hoist System - This hoist is located in the control building above floor el 306'-0". A load drop from this hoist would not result in damage to any system required for shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHR-CRN50 Pipe Chase Hatch Cover Hoist (5-Ton Capacity) - This hoist is located in the reactor building at el 353'-0" and azimuth 50°. A load drop from this hoist would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown.

2MHR-CRN51 Pipe Chase Hatch Cover Hoist (10-Ton Capacity) - This hoist is located in the reactor building at el 328'-10" and azimuth 320°. A load drop from this hoist would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown.

Chapter 09 9C.3-15 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 3-2 (Cont'd.)

Mark No. Identification and Justification 2MHR-CRN52 8-Ton Monorail Hoist System - This hoist is located in the reactor building at el 328'-10" and azimuth 125°. It is used for removing a hatch cover. A load drop from this hoist will not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown.

2MHR-CRN61 8-Ton Monorail Hoist System - This hoist is used for the removal and replacement of the equipment hatch cover at el 261'-0" and azimuth 315°. A load drop from this hoist would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown.

2MHK-CRN78 2-Ton Hatch and Equipment Hoist - This crane is located inside the radwaste building, which does not contain any safety-related equipment. A load drop from this crane would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.

2MHR-CRN100 4-Ton Hatch and Equipment Hoist - This crane is located in the reactor building at el 261'-0" and azimuth 193°. A load drop from this hoist would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown.

2MHR-CRN200 4-Ton Monorail Hoist System - This hoist is located inside the secondary containment at el 261'-0" and extends from azimuth 135° to 35 line. A load drop from this hoist would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown. (Interchangeable with hoists 2MHR-CRN200A and 2MHR-CRN200B.)

2MHR-CRN200A One of the 2-Ton Hoists - This hoist is interchangeable with 2MHR-CRN200 for the removal and replacement of SRVs and is located inside the secondary containment at el 261'-0" and extends from azimuth 135° to 35 line. A load drop from this hoist would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown.

(Work in conjunction with 2MHR-CRN200B.)

2MHR-CRN200B One of the 2-Ton Hoists - This hoist is interchangeable with 2MHR-CRN200 for the removal and replacement of SRVs and is located inside the secondary containment at el 261'-0" and extends from azimuth 135° to 35 line. A load drop from this hoist would not result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown.

(Work in conjunction with 2MHR-CRN200A.)

Chapter 09 9C.3-16 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 3-3 2MHR-CRN1/POLAR CRANE LOADS Governing Weight Designated Handling Frequency Crane Load (tons) Lifting Device Procedure Handled Fuel Transfer Shielding Bridge 34 Main Strongbacks and Sling Assemblies or Kevlar

• Twice each refueling Sling Assemblies. Preferred Engineering operation Strongbacks may be used in conjunction with Sling Assemblies.

Drywell Shield Plug A 90 Main Strongbacks with Solid Bar Sling Assemblies

• Twice each refueling or Wire Rope Sling Assemblies or Kevlar Sling operation Assemblies Drywell Shield Plug B 102 Main Strongbacks with Solid Bar Sling Assemblies

• Twice each refueling or Wire Rope Sling Assemblies or Kevlar Sling operation Assemblies Drywell Shield Plug C (with rigging) 119 Main Strongbacks with Solid Bar Sling Assemblies

• Twice each refueling or Wire Rope Sling Assemblies or Kevlar Sling operation Assemblies Drywell Shield Plug D 90 Main Strongbacks with Solid Bar Sling Assemblies

• Twice each refueling or Wire Rope Sling Assemblies or Kevlar Sling Assemblies Drywell Shield Plug E 82 Main Strongbacks with Solid Bar Sling Assemblies

• Twice each refueling or Wire Rope Sling Assemblies or Kevlar Sling operation Assemblies Drywell Shield Plug F 93 Main Strongbacks with Solid Bar Sling Assemblies

• Twice each refueling or Wire Rope Sling Assemblies or Kevlar Sling operation Assemblies Drywell Shield Plug G 93 Main Strongbacks with Solid Bar Sling Assemblies

• Twice each refueling or Wire Rope Sling Assemblies or Kevlar Sling operation Assemblies Drywell Shield Plug H 82 Main Strongbacks with Solid Bar Sling Assemblies

• Twice each refueling or Wire Rope Sling Assemblies or Kevlar Sling operation Assemblies Drywell Head 55 Main Strongbacks and Sling Assemblies or Kevlar

• Twice each refueling Sling Assemblies with Redundant Strongback Only operation Reactor Vessel Head 132** Main Strongbacks and Sling Assemblies or Carousel

• Twice each refueling Strongback operation Chapter 09 9C.3-17 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 3-3 (Cont'd.)

Governing Weight Designated Handling Frequency Crane Load (tons) Lifting Device Procedure Handled Steam Dryer 50 Main Strongbacks with Solid Bar Sling Assemblies

• Twice each refueling or Wire Rope Sling Assemblies or Kevlar Sling operation Assemblies Steam Separator 80 Main Strongbacks with Solid Bar Sling Assemblies

• Twice each refueling or Wire Rope Sling Assemblies or Kevlar Sling operation Assemblies Reactor Vessel Head Insulation and Support 40 Main Strongbacks and Sling Assemblies or Kevlar

• Twice each refueling Frame Sling with Redundant Strongback Only operation Spent Fuel Shipping Cask 100 Cask Lifting Yoke

• As needed over the life of plant Reactor Head Stud Rack 2.1 Sling Assemblies

• Twice each refueling operation Reactor Stud Tensioner 5 Sling Assemblies

• Twice each refueling operation Refueling Canal Plugs 16 Main Strongbacks and Sling Assemblies or Kevlar

• Twice each refueling (max) Sling Assemblies operation WCS Filter Demineralizer Removal Plugs 15 Main Strongbacks and Sling Assemblies or Kevlar

• As needed over the life Sling Assemblies of plant SFC Filter Removal Plugs 10 Main Strongbacks and Sling Assemblies or Sling

• As needed over the life Assemblies Only of plant SFC Filter Demineralizer Removal Plugs 4 Sling Assemblies

• As needed over the life of plant Reactor Service Platform 5 Main Strongbacks and Sling Assemblies or Sling

• Twice each refueling Assemblies Only operation Storage Pool Gate 50 Main Strongbacks and Sling Assemblies or Kevlar

• Twice each refueling Sling Assemblies operation Recirculation Pump Motor 33.5 Main Strongbacks and Sling Assemblies

• As needed over the life of plant Storage Pool Plug 82 Main Strongbacks and Sling Assemblies

• Twice each refueling operation Chapter 09 9C.3-18 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 3-3 (Cont'd.)

Governing Weight Designated Handling Frequency Crane Load (tons) Lifting Device Procedure Handled Fuel Pool Gate 1.45 Main Strongbacks and Sling Assemblies or Sling

• Twice each refueling Assemblies Only operation Jib Cranes 3.3 Main Strongbacks and Sling Assemblies or Sling As needed over the life Assemblies Only of plant Removal Hoist Plate 0.6 N/A

• As needed over the life of plant Control Blade Storage Frame 6.5 Chain Hoist and Sling Assemblies

• As needed over the life of plant Fuel Inspection Stand 1.5 Sling Assemblies As needed over the life of plant Refuel Bridge Hoist Test Weight 0.5 Refuel Bridge Auxiliary Hoist Once each refueling operation Refuel Bridge Hoist Test Weight 0.74 Refuel Bridge (Round Mast) Main Hoist Once each refueling operation Refuel Bridge Hoist Test Weight 0.2 Refuel Bridge (Round Mast) Main Hoist Once each refueling operation

• Load-handling procedures will be developed to cover load-handling operations for heavy loads that are handled over or in proximity to spent fuel or safe shutdown equipment.

• • Maximum load.

Chapter 09 9C.3-19 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 3-4 REACTOR BUILDING CRANES - LOADS HANDLED Governing Weight Designated Handling Frequency Crane Load Crane Mark No. (tons) Lifting Device Procedure Handled Main Outboard Steam Valve(s) 2MHS-CRN7 7 Sling Assembly *

• 2MSS*AOV7A, B, C, and D MSS Valve Operators 2MHS-CRN7 2.4 Sling Assembly *

• Feedwater Valves 2MHS-CRN7 8 Sling Assembly *

• PSV Valves (PSV-120 to 137) 2MHR-CRN65 1.8 Sling Assembly *

• 2MHR-CRN65X 1.8 Sling Assembly *

• PSV Valves and CRD Cart (PSV-120 2MHR-CRN66X 1.5 Sling Assembly *

• to 137)

Recirculation Pump Motors 2MHR-CRN3&4 33.5 Spreader Beam *

• Cooling Coil Cart 2MHR-CRN3&4 5 Sling Assembly *

• Inboard Steam Valves 2MSS*AOV6A, 2MHR-CRN67 7.0 Sling Assembly *

• B, C, and D

• Load-handling procedures will be developed to cover load-handling operations for heavy loads that are handled over or in proximity to spent fuel or safe shutdown equipment. Frequency will depend on maintenance guidelines.

Chapter 09 9C.3-20 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 3-5 SCREENWELL AREA TRAVELING CRANES - LOADS HANDLED Governing Crane Weight Designated Handling Frequency Crane Load Mark No. (tons) Lifting Device Procedure Handled Service Water Pumps 2MHW-CRN1 4 Sling Assembly *

• Service Water Pump Motors 2MHW-CRN1 2.5 Sling Assembly *

• Circulation Water Pumps 2MHW-CRN1 30 Sling Assembly *

• Circulation Water Pump Motors 2MHW-CRN1 20 Sling Assembly *

• Stop Log No. 6 2MHS-CRN6 1 Sling Assembly *

• Stop Log No. 9 2MHS-CRN6 2.5 Sling Assembly *

• 6th Pt Heater 2MHW-CRN1 56 Sling Assembly *

• 5th Pt Heater 2MHW-CRN1 34 Sling Assembly *

• 4th Pt Heater 2MHW-CRN1 38 Sling Assembly *

• 3rd Pt Heater 2MHW-CRN1 28 Sling Assembly *

• Concrete Floor Plugs 2MHW-CRN1 18 Sling Assembly * *

• Load-handling procedures will be developed to cover load-handling operations for heavy loads that are handled over or in proximity to safe shutdown equipment. Frequency will depend on maintenance guidelines.

Chapter 09 9C.3-21 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 4 HAZARD ELIMINATION TABLE Table 4-1 lists the potential impact where damage might occur to safety-related equipment upon a heavy load drop.

1. Hazard Elimination Categories

a. Crane travel for this area/load combination is prohibited by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops.

b. System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability of system to perform its safety-related function following this load drop in this area.

c. Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to consider load/equipment combination. (See comment at bottom of Table 4-1 for detailed explanation of the use of this category.)

d. Likelihood of handling system failure for this load is extremely small (i.e., Section 5.1.6, NUREG-0612 satisfied).

e. Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and load drop will not damage safety-related equipment.

f. Load is handled only in shutdown condition.

Safety-related components under the load paths are already inoperative due to plant conditions and/or maintenance requirements. Their failure does not prevent safe shutdown conditions from being maintained.

Chapter 09 9C.4-1 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 4-1 HAZARD ELIMINATION Safety-Related Hazard Elimination Load Elevation Equipment Category MARK NO. 2MHR-CRN1 (25-Ton Auxiliary Hoist)

When handling loads with the 25-ton auxiliary hoist, slings specified for use on safety-related equipment must be used. Loads greater than 12.5 tons shall not be permitted over safety-related equipment. When handling loads greater than 1/2 ton, lifts must be done in accordance with NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants.

MARK NO. 2MHR-CRN3 (Recirc Motor Handling)

Impact Area: Reactor Building - Drywell Location: At El 284 ft 11 in, Azimuth 135° Recirculation Pump 261 ft, 0 in The recirculation pump and C(1)

(2RC-P1A) Motor associated piping and electrical conduit not removed for the lift operation MARK NO. 2MHR-CRN4 (Recirc Motor Handling)

Impact Area: Reactor Building - Drywell Location: At El 284 ft 11 in, Azimuth 315° Recirculation Pump 261 ft, 0 in The recirculation pump and C(2)

(2RC-P1B) Motor associated piping and electrical conduit not removed for the lift operation (1) This crane's sole purpose is for maintenance/removal of the pump motor and motor cooling coils. This crane will be utilized only during cold shutdown conditions; however, failure of these components does not result in a loss of safe shutdown capability. The potential exists for damage to the pump or its associated piping.

(2) This crane's sole purpose is for maintenance/removal of the pump motor and motor cooling coils. When this motor is replaced, it will be hoisted up the equipment hatch at Azimuth 315° and carried over the reactor operating floor with the main hook of the RBPC (single-failure proof). This crane will be utilized only during cold shutdown conditions. The potential exists for damage to the pump or its associated piping; however, failure of these components does not result in a loss of safe shutdown capability.

Chapter 09 9C.4-2 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 4-1 (Cont'd.)

Safety-Related Hazard Elimination Load Elevation Equipment Category MARK NO. 2MHS-CRN7 (Outboard MSS and FWS Valves)

Impact Area: Reactor Building - Main Steam Tunnel Location: At El 261 ft 0 in, Azimuth 0° 2MSS*HYV7A, 7B, 7C and 7D 261 ft, 0 in 2 1/2-in Ø electrical conduit F MSS-750-170-2 2FWS*AOV23A and 23B 261 ft, 0 in MSS lines for valves F 2FWS*MOV21A and 21B 261 ft, 0 in WCS-008-89-1 F MARK NO. 2MHR-CRN65 AND 65X (Main Steam Safety Relief Valve Removal)

Impact Area: Reactor Building - Primary Containment Location: At El 305 ft 9 in, Azimuth 240° to 115° PSV Valves 296 ft, 6 in 2-ISC-750-107-2 F (PSV-120 to PSV-137) 2-IAS-150-727-3 F 2RHS-012-125-1 B 2-MSS-026-43-1 F 2-MSS-026-44-1 F 2-MSS-026-45-1 F 2-MSS-026-46-1 F MARK NO. 2MHR-CRN66X (PSV Valves and CRD Cart Removal)

Impact Area: Reactor Building - Primary Containment Location: At El 261 ft 9 in, Azimuth 135° to 231° PSV Valves and CRD Cart 261 ft, 0 in 2-ICS-010-70-1 F 2ICS*MOV128 F 2-CCP-003-343-3 B 2-CCP-003-344-3 F 2MSS-026-43-1 F 2MSS-026-44-1 F 2CX999GF1-1 1/2" F 2CK993NA-3" Chapter 09 9C.4-3 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 4-1 (Cont'd.)

Safety-Related Hazard Elimination Load Elevation Equipment Category MARK NO. 2MHR-CRN67 (MSS Isolation Valves)

Impact Area: Reactor Building - Primary Containment Location: At El 261 ft 0 in, Azimuth 315° 2MSS*AOV6A, 6B, 6C and 6D 261 ft, 0 in 2-FWS-024-031-1 F 2-FWS-024-032-2 F 2MSS-026-43-1 F 2MSS-026-44-1 F 2MSS-026-45-1 F 2MSS-026-46-1 F 2RMS*RE1C and D F 2SVV-025-128-3 F 2SVV-025-129-3 F 2SVV-025-132-3 F 2SVV-025-133-3 F 2MSS-750-260-2 F 2MSS-750-263-2 F 2MSS-750-264-2 F 2MSS-750-267-2 F 2MSS-750-268-2 F 2MSS-750-271-2 F 2MSS-750-272-2 F 2MSS-750-275-2 F 2CMS*TE105 F 2CX995YF F 2CC995YU3 F 2CC999DA F 2CC985YZ F 2CC985YZ1 F 2CC9970X F 2CX995YT F 2CC991 F 2CC995 F 2CC9980M F Chapter 09 9C.4-4 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR TABLE 4-1 (Cont'd.)

Safety-Related Hazard Elimination Load Elevation Equipment Category MARK NO. 2MHS-CRN2, 3 AND 4 (Emergency Diesel Generator)

Impact Area: Emergency Diesel Generator Building Location: El 261 ft 0 in Any Diesel Component, Maintenance 261 ft, 0 in 2EGS*EG1 F(3)

Tool, or Auxiliary Equipment 2EGS*EG2 F(3) 2EGS*EG3 F(3)

MARK NO. 2MHW-CRN1 Impact Area: Screenwell Building Location: Above Service Water Pump Bays Service Water Pump Motors 224 ft, 0 in Service water pumps and piping B Circulation Water Pumps 231 ft, 9 in Service water pumps and piping C(4)

Circulation Water Pump Motors 239 ft, 4 in Service water pumps and piping C(4)

Feedwater Heater Tube Bundles 280 ft, 0 in Service water pumps and piping C(4)

Stop Logs 261 ft, 0 in Service water pumps and piping C(4)

Concrete Floor Plugs 280 ft, 0 in Service water pumps and piping B MARK NO. 2MHS-CRN6 Impact Area: Screenwell Building Location: Intake and Discharge Shaft Area Stop Log(s) 261 ft, 0 in and 2SWP*MOV30A C(5) 285 ft, 0 in 2SWP*MOV30B C(5) 2SWP*MOV77A 2SWP*MOV77B C(5)

SWP Piping (3) The only time when the load will be over safety-related equipment would be when the diesel generator is down and being serviced.

The overhead crane structure is seismically qualified only when the crane is in the stored position. Procedure controls will be utilized to assure the crane is not moved over safety-related equipment when diesel generators are operable.

(4) Administrative procedures will prevent crane travel over safety-related equipment. See Safe Load Path Drawing (Figure 5-3).

(5) Operating procedures will restrict crane travel over safety-related equipment. See Safe Load Path Drawing (Figure 5-3).

Chapter 09 9C.4-5 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 5 LIST OF FIGURES The following figures are included as part of this report:

Figure No. Title 5-1 Safe Load Paths for Heavy Loads 5-2 Safe Load Paths for Heavy Loads, Refueling Floor 5-3 Safe Load Paths, Screenwell Building 5-4 Crane Restricted Area Diagram Chapter 09 9C.5-1 Rev. 25 October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 6 LIFTING DEVICES The following specially-designed lifting devices consist of primary and redundant strongbacks or spreader seams and sling assemblies or specially-designed sling assemblies. They are single-failure proof in accordance with NUREG-0554. The design approach for these devices is consistent with the design criteria contained in ANSI N14.6. Quality Assurance (QA)

Program requirements in compliance with the provisions of 10CFR50 Appendix B and supplementary QA requirements were mandatory in the purchase specification. Critical items are identified as QA Category I components.

1. Lifting Rig Arrangements for Drywell and Vessel Heads

2. Lifting Rig Arrangements for Insulation Support Frame

3. Lifting Rig Arrangements for Steam Dryer

4. Lifting Rig Arrangements for Steam Separator

5. Lifting Rig Arrangements for Transfer Bridge

6. Lifting Rig Arrangements for Service Platform

7. Lifting Rig Arrangements for Shield Plugs

8. Lifting Rig Arrangement for Recirc Motor

8. Lifting Rig Arrangements for the Transfer Cask used during Dry Cask Storage Operations Other lifting arrangements, not listed above, consisting of sling assemblies are supplied in accordance with design criteria contained in Section 3.2.5 of ANSI N14.6. ASME B30.9-2010 is used for the selection, use and maintenance of synthetic round slings.

Chapter 09 9C.6-1 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 7 VERIFICATION OF TESTING, INSPECTION, AND MAINTENANCE Procedures will be written and approved for inspection, testing, and maintenance of the RBPC and those cranes, monorails, and hoists identified in Item 2.1-1. Cranes will be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, and monorails and hoists will be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with Chapter 16-2 of ANSI B30.16-1981, which is technically equivalent to Chapter 2-2 of ANSI B30.2-1976, with the exception that tests and inspection will be performed prior to use where it is not practical to meet the frequency of ANSI B30.2 or ANSI B30.16, or where frequency of crane, monorail, or hoist use is less than the specified inspection and test frequency.

Chapter 09 9C.7-1 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 8 VERIFICATION OF CRANE DESIGN

8.1 INTRODUCTION

The RBPC has been designed for Class A1 standby service in accordance with Crane Manufacturers' Association of America (CMAA) Specification No. 70 and the mandatory requirements of ANSI B30.20, in addition to the technical requirements of Stone

& Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC) Specification No.

NMP2-251P. The RBPC is seismic Category I. The crane is designed for the following rated loads:

• No. 1 Auxiliary Hoist 1/2-ton

• No. 2 Auxiliary Hoist 25-ton

• No. 3 Main Hoist 132-ton

• Crane Trolley 132-ton

• Crane Bridge 132-ton The main hoist is designed to provide a dual loading path so that the single failure of any component shall not result in loss of the lifted load. The single-failure system criteria also applies to the hoist electrical system. The Hoist Motor is an inverter duty AC motor that is controlled by a VFD. The main hoist controls include phase loss and phase reversal protection.

The redundant main hoist system consists of a dual path through the hoist gear train, the reeving system, and the hoist load block, along with restraints at critical points to provide load retention and to minimize uncontrolled motions of the load upon failure of any single hoist component. The system includes the complete gear trains connecting the hoist motor to the hoist drum, while the main hook is used for handling the spent fuel cask; positive interlocks are provided which prevent the transfer path of the cask to be over the spent fuel storage pool but still allow the hook to lower the cask into its proper position in the spent fuel loading pool. Bypass keylock switch is provided to override these interlocks. This allows the use of RBPC main hoist over the spent fuel pool to support refueling operations. Operation is accomplished by following written load handling procedures in accordance with NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants. Specific criteria regarding heavy load handling over fuel assemblies in the storage pool are described in TRM Section 3.9.5.

Chapter 09 9C.8-1 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR The auxiliary hoists also have positive interlocks which prevent their transfer paths to be over the spent fuel storage pool.

Overrides of these interlocks will be covered by special administrative procedures. The auxiliary hoists can also be placed in operable modes by use of key-operated selector positions. The operating modes of these hoists will also be controlled by administrative procedures.

8.2 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNIT 2 DESIGN AND NUREG-0554 A thorough evaluation was made between the RBPC design features and those recommended in NUREG-0554. The RBPC main hoist as designed contains all the major safety features recommended by NUREG-0554 to quality as single-failure proof. The following section provides a detailed summary of the differences between the RBPC design and NUREG-0554 recommendations.

The significant differences between the Unit 2 design and NUREG-0554 are as follows:

a. NUREG Section 2.4 specifies impact tests for materials over 1/2 in. The specification requires impact tests for materials over 5/8-in thick.

Evaluation ASME Section III, NC-2300, requires impact tests for materials greater than 5/8-in thick; the Unit 2 specification is consistent with this requirement.

b. NUREG Section 4.1 specifies a cable safety factor of 10 to 1 dynamic. The specification requires a cable safety factor of 10 to 1 static.

Evaluation The dynamic safety factor of the crane when considering the MCL to be 132 tons is slightly under 11.0 to 1. This conservative design more than surpasses requirements to sustain the dynamic effects of load transfer due to the loss of one of the two independent rope systems. An ample design margin will still exist in the remaining rope system of eight parts supporting the load.

c. NUREG Section 4.3 specifies load attachment points to be designed for three times the load to be handled, static plus dynamic. The specification requires the load Chapter 09 9C.8-2 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR attachment points to be designed for three times the static load to be handled.

Evaluation A design factor margin study and a main hoist load block design study were made to verify the safety of the RBPC design. For the main hoist load blocks study the structural components were reviewed for a 152-ton load (MCL plus 15 percent). The resulting stresses were less than 1/3 the minimum yield strength of the respective materials.

d. NUREG Section 4.6 specifies that lift beams and lifting devices be designed for three times the load, static plus dynamic. The specification requires three times the static load.

Evaluation The lifting rigs and sling assemblies were designed for three times the static load times 1.05. The calculated stresses were less than the minimum yield strength of the respective materials. See Section 6 for further details on the design of these devices.

e. NUREG Section 5.1 specifies the bridge speed not to exceed the slow recommendation of CMAA, which is 50 ft/min. The Unit 2 crane's bridge span is designed to be 75 ft/min.

Evaluation The RBPC design includes a VFD that provides up to 2ft/min stepless inch speeds. The 75 ft/min normal operating speed satisfies the moderate speed recommendation of CMAA-70.

With these features the intent of NUREG-0554 is met.

f. NUREG Section 8.5 specifies that the MCL be marked on the crane. The specification uses maximum working load (MWL).

Evaluation The MCL will be identified on the RBPC.

g. NUREG Section 9.0 specifies that the operating manual give the margin for degradation of wear-susceptible components.

Evaluation Chapter 09 9C.8-3 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR This is an administrative requirement which will be covered in the Inspection Procedures detailed in Section 7. These procedures will be in compliance with ANSI B30.2.0.

h. NUREG Section 10.0 specifies that Crane Operator qualification be addressed.

Evaluation Section 9 covers Crane Operator qualifications.

8.3 RBPC LOSS OF POWER AND FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS With regard to the NRC's December 19, 1983, Clarification to Generic Letter 81-07, concerning electrical circuitry and phase loss of a single-failure proof crane, the dc hoist controls of the Unit 2 RBPC, Mark No. 2MHR-CRN1, are specifically provided with phase loss protection as well as phase reversal protection.

Inherently, the crane's dc hoist controls are provided with a fail-safe design such that power is removed from the hoist motor and the holding brakes applied upon any of the following contingencies:

• Opening of an ac phase

• Loss of ac fuses

• Loss of voltage

• Loss of regenerative power capability

• Loss of motor field

• Loss of dc fuse Additionally, the crane's dc hoist controls are provided with a torque check, which prevents the hoist holding brakes from being released until the motor field is energized and armature current is flowing.

8.4 CRANES OTHER THAN RBPC

a. Cranes 2MHR-CRN3, 2MHR-CRN4, and 2MHS-CRN7 were designed so that the trolleys and crane bridges cannot be dislodged during an earthquake, in combination with SRV and LOCA phenomena. The design of the single-girder, underhung motor-operated bridge crane includes the requirements of CMAA Specification No. 74 and all the mandatory requirements of ANSI B30.11. The design of the wire rope hoists and trolleys includes the requirements of HMI-100 Chapter 09 9C.8-4 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR and the mandatory requirements of ANSI B30.16, in addition to the technical requirements of SWEC Specification No.

NMP2-P251W.

b. The 75-ton screenwell area crane, 2MHW-CRN1, is designed in accordance with the requirements of CMAA Specification No.

70 and ANSI B30.2.0, in addition to the technical requirements of SWEC Specification No. NMP2-P251C.

c. 2MHR-CRN61, -CRN65, and -CRN67 monorail hoist systems have been designed in accordance with the mandatory requirements of HMI-100 and ANSI B30.16, in addition to the technical and seismic requirements of SWEC Specification No.

NMP2-P251R.

d. 2MHS-CRN2, -CRN3, -CRN4, and -CRN6 have been designed in accordance with the requirements of CMAA Specification No.

74 and ANSI B30.16*, and all the mandatory requirements of SWEC Specification No. NMP2-P251H.

e. The auxiliary electrical chain hoist 2MHR-CRN65X is designed in accordance with mandatory requirements of HMI-400 and ANSI B30.16, in addition to the technical requirements established in Specification No. NMP2-P251K.

• ANSI B30.16 is technically equivalent to ANSI B30.2, and CMAA Specification No. 74 is technically equivalent to CMAA Specification No. 70.

f. Electric chain hoist 2MHR-CRN66X is designed in accordance with mandatory requirements of HMI-400 and ANSI B30.16 in addition to the technical requirements established in specification NMP2-P251K.

Chapter 09 9C.8-5 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 9 OPERATOR TRAINING, QUALIFICATION, AND CONDUCT Unit 2 uses lesson guides to train Crane Operators. These lesson guides ensure proper and safe operation of floor-operated overhead cranes in accordance with ANSI B30.2-1976. The Crane Operator program ensures that the recommendations of ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-3, are adequately included. The current Crane Operator training program includes the requirements for a practical operating examination. This practical examination is given after the Operator undergoes detailed classroom instruction. In addition, the Operator is required to meet certain physical qualifications before qualifying to train as a Crane Operator. These physical qualifications are consistent with ANSI B30.2-1976.

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NMP Unit 2 USAR SECTION 10 NRC REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION NRC Position 1 Information on the selection of lifting devices not specifically designed which provides stress allowance based on maximum static plus dynamic loads, and special identification labeling of any sling committed to a dedicated crane load service.

Response

Table 3-1 in the report (submitted July 10, 1984) represents overhead handling systems which carry heavy loads over safe shutdown equipment. All lifting devices for these cranes will be designed for the static load and additional impact loading as specified in CMAA Specification No. 70. These lifting devices will be tested and properly identified.

NRC Position 2 The application of special lifting device design stresses that provides for the maximum static plus dynamic loading.

Response

The specially-designed lifting devices used for handling heavy loads contain dual-load paths consisting of primary and redundant strongbacks and sling assemblies. Each load path is designed to support three times the weight of the load being handled without exceeding the yield strength of any component.

This provides a 200-percent margin to account for dynamic effects. The design of these devices is consistent with the guidelines of ANSI N14.6.

NRC Position 3 Development of procedures incorporating safe load path identification system used for the facility.

Response

Unit 2 will incorporate the requirement of a signalman in the load handling party. The duties of the signalman and the Crane Chapter 09 9C.10-1 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR Operator will be clearly defined in the load handling procedures.

NRC Position 4 Adapt a system or method of marking safe load paths that is consistent with NUREG-0612.

Response

Unit 2 has reviewed "Synopsis of Issues Associated with NUREG-0612 - Guide Line 1 - Safe Load Paths." Unit 2 will designate a second party member (signalman) to be responsible to ensure that designated safe load paths are followed. Safe load paths will be marked on drawings and included in load handling procedures. These procedures will clearly define the duties and responsibilities of each member of the load handling party.

NRC Question F410.52 As a result of recently identified ACRS concerns, provide a response to the following request for information regarding the handling of heavy loads:

a. Describe the means provided to assure the integrity of the concrete shield plugs lifting eye, and any other heavy loads so that they will not fall apart while being handled during refueling should the lifting eye fail or the plug impact other structures.

b. Alternatively, describe the consequences of failure of the concrete shield plug or other heavy loads during handling. This evaluation should confirm that unacceptable fuel damage or damage to safety-related equipment will not occur.

Response

A dual-load-path hoisting system is used for handling all heavy loads. This system includes primary and redundant crane hooks, strongbacks, slings, and lifting lugs on the load. Each part of the hoisting system has been designed to support a load of at least three times the weight of the item being handled without permanent deformation. In addition, the special lifting device (strongbacks and slings) has been static load-tested to 150 percent of rated load, and the lifting lugs on the concrete Chapter 09 9C.10-2 Rev. 25, October 2022

NMP Unit 2 USAR shield plugs and fuel transfer bridge have been static load-tested to 125 percent of rated load.

The integrity of the concrete shield plugs, lifting lugs, and lifting assemblies is assured by the integral design of the plug liners, lifting structures, rebar, and concrete. The concrete is completely encased in a reinforced carbon steel liner to which the lifting lugs are welded. The concrete rebar are welded to the lifting lugs by cadweld sleeves. This design and the aforementioned design requirements of the plug eliminate any possibility of the plug falling apart should the lifting lug fail or the plug impact other structures.

Chapter 09 9C.10-3 Rev. 25, October 2022