ML21105A482

Response to Request for Additional Information for Proposed License Amendment Request to Revise the Millstone, Unit 2 Technical Specification for Steam Generator Inspection Frequency

ML21105A482
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	04/15/2021
From:	Mark D. Sartain Dominion Energy Nuclear Connecticut
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
20-328D
Download: ML21105A482 (20)

Text

,

5000 Dominion Boulevard, GlenAllen, VA23060 Qg g" Dominion EnergyNuclear Connecticut, Inc.

DominionEnergy.com

@QQf April 15,2021 U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No.

20-328D Attention:

Document Control Desk NRA/SS RO Washington, DC20555 Docket No.

50-336 License No.

DPR-65 MILLSTONE POWERSTATION UNIT 2 RESPONSETO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONFORPROPOSED i

LICENSEAMENDMENTREQUEST TO REVISETHE MILLSTONEUNIT 2 TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONSFOR STEAM GENERATORINSPECTION FREQUENCY I

Byletter datedOctober 8,2020(Agencywide Documents AccessandManagement System(ADAMS)

Accession No.ML20282A594),

and assupplemented byletter dated December 8,2020(ADAMS Accession No.ML20343A259),

DominionEnergy Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.

(DENC),

submitted alicense amendment request forMillstone Power

Station, Unit No.2 (MPS2).

Theproposed amendment would reviseMPS2Technical Specification (TS) 6.26,"SteamGenerator (SG)

Program,"

Itemd.2,toreflect a

proposed change totherequired SGtubeinspection frequency from every72effective full powermonths (EFPM),

oratleast every third refueling

outage, to every 96EFPM.

Inanemail datedFebruary 26,2021,theNRCissued a draft request foradditional information (RAl) related totheproposed LAR.On March9,2021, the NRC staff conducted aconference call withDENCstaff toclarify therequest.

Inan,email dated March18,2021,theNRCtransmitted thefinal version oftheRAl(ADAMSAccession No.ML21078A033).

DENCagreed torespond totheRAlwithin 30daysofissuance, or g

nolater thanApril 19,2021.

I Attachment 1provides DENC'sresponse totheRAl.Attachment 2provides a revised mark-up oftheTS.

Ii I

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Page2of3 Ifyou have anyquestions orrequire additional information, please contact Shayan Sinhaat (804) 273-4687.

Sincerely, MarkD.Sartain VicePresident

- Nuclear Engineering

& Fleet Support COMMONWEALTH OFVIRGINIA ))

COUNTYOFHENRICO

)

The foregoing documentwas acknowledged before me, inandfortheCountyand Commonwealth aforesaid, todaybyMr.Mark D.

Sartain, whoisVicePresident Nuclear Engineering andFleet Support ofDominion Energy Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.Hehasaffirmed before methat heisduly authorized toexecute andfile the foregoing document inbehalf ofthat

company, andthat thestatements inthedocument are true tothebestofhisknowledge and belief.

Acknowledged before methis/d dayof

, 2021.

MyCommission Expires:

GARYDONMI,LLER Not Public Notary Public Commonwealth ofVirginia Reg.#7629412 MyCommission Expires August 31,20@

Attachments:

1. Response toRequest forAdditional Information fortheProposed LARtoRevise TSsforSteamGenerator Inspection Frequency

2. Revised Technical Specification Mark-up Commitments madeinthis letter:

None i

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Page3of3 cc:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I

2100 Renaissance

BIvd, Suite 100 Kingof Prussia, PA19406-2713 R.V.Guzman Senior Project Manager U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission OneWhite Flint

North, Mail Stop08-C2 11555Rockville Pike Rockville, MD20852-2738 NRCSenior Resident Inspector Millstone PowerStation

Director, Radiation Division Department ofEnergy andEnvironmental Protection 79ElmStreet

Hartford, CT 06106-5127

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 ATTACHMENT1 MILLSTONE POWERSTATIONUNIT2 DOMINION ENERGYNUCLEARCONNECTICUT, INC.

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 1,Page1of10 By letter dated October8,2020(Agencywide Documents AccessandManagement System(ADAMS) Accession No.ML20282A594),

andassupplemented byletter dated December 8, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No.ML20343A259),

Dominion Energy Nuclear Connecticut,Inc.

(DENC),

submitted alicense amendment request forMillstone Power

Station, Unit No. 2 (MPS2). Theproposed amendment wouldrevise MPS2Technical Specification (TS) 6.26, "Steam Generator (SG)

Program,"

Itemd.2,toreflect a

proposed changetothe required SGtubeinspection frequency fromevery72effective full powermonths (EFPM),

oratleast every third refueling

outage, toevery 96EFPM.

Inanemaildated February26, 2021, theNRCissued a draft request foradditional information (RAI) related tothe proposed LAR.On March9,2021,theNRCstaff conducted aconference call withDENC stafftoclarify therequest.

Inanemail dated March18,2021,theNRCtransmitted the finalversion oftheRAl(ADAMS Accession No.ML21078A033).

DENCagreed torespond totheRAlwithin 30daysofissuance, or nolater than April 19,2021.

Thisattachment provides DENC's response tothe RAI.

B.aclig.ro3ud InAppendix Aof10CFRPart 50,General Design Criteria 14, 15,30,31,and32define requirements forthestructural andleakage integrity ofthe reactor coolantpressure boundary (RCPB).

AspartoftheRCPB,theSGtubes must also meet therequirements of10CFR50.55a withrespect toinspection andrepair requirements oftheAmerican Society ofMechanical Engineers Boiler andPressure Vessel Code.

Allpressurized water reactors haveTSaccording to10CFR50.36that include a SG Program with specific criteria forthestructural andleakage integrity,

repair, andinspection ofSG tubes.

ForMillstone Unit 2,therequirements forperforming SGtube inspections and repair areinTS Section 6.26,whiletherequirements forreporting the SG tube inspections andrepair areinTSSection 6.9.1.9.

RAl1 Thereareseveral apparent inconsistencies betweentheproposed Insert A toTS Se'ction 6.9.1.9 inAttachment 2,"Marked-up Technical Specification Pages,"

of Reference 1andtheproposed changes inTSTF-577 (Reference 3)fromwhichthe licerisee states itisproposing tomodel(for

example, c.3,c.4.

e.andf.ofTS6.9.1.9).

Thestaff alsonotedthattheeditorial changesfromSection 2.4.4, "Editorial Improvements,"

ofReference 3,which iscurrently under

review, werenotincorporated intheproposed mark-up TSpages.

Please provide thecorrect proposed changes and newproposed mark-up TSpages.Ifnot,provide anexplanation fortheapparent inconsistencies.

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 1,Page2of10 DENChas revised theproposed TSmarkup forMPS2TS6.26,"Steam Generator (SG)

Program,"

to incorporate theeditorial changesfromSection 2.4.4,"Editorial improvements," of TSTF-577 that usetheacronym "SG"rather thantheterm"Steam Generator."

DENC has alsorevised theproposed TSmarkupforMPS2TS 6.9.1.9, "Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report,"

tomodify thepunctuation andgrammar to align withtheconventions used intheTS markupfromTSTF-577.

Attachment 2

provides therevised TS mark-up pages,withadditions fromtheprevious TSmarkup showninitalicized, bold

font, and deletions fromtheprevious TS markup shownin struck-through, boldfont.

RAl2 TheMillstone Unit2 spring 2017SG tube inspection report (Reference 4)states, "Steam drumvisual inspections toevaluate thematerial condition andcleanliness ofkey components suchasmoisture separators, drainsystems, andinterior surfaces,"

were performed inbothSGsduring refueling outage 24(2R24). Reference 4goesontostate, "Theresults ofallsecondary-side visual examinationsperformed weresatisfactory, with nodegradation detected."

However, Section 4.3.1, "Steam Drum,"

oftheAttachment to Reference

2states, "Evidence ofearly stageflow assistedcorrosion ofthesecondary moisture separators was noted."

Figure 4-3,"Steam Drum Components,"

inthe Attachment toReference 2includes apicture ofearly stage flowassisted corrosion ina separator baseplate.

Section 4.3.1 goeson tostate, inpart,"...based onlimited operational wearobserved through 2R24,significant structural degradation isnot expected tooccur overthenextfivecycles ofoperation."

Thestaff has the following requests regarding theflowassisted corrosion ofthesecondary moisture separators:

a.Please discuss thediscrepancy between Reference 2andReference 4related to theresults ofthesecondary-side visual examinations.

b.Please describe eachlocation whereflowassisted corrosion wasobserved inall SGs.

c.Please discuss howtheflowassisted corrosion wasevaluated todetermine that "significant structural degradation isnotexpected tooccuroverthenextfive cycles ofoperation."

Inaddition, pleasediscuss howthecondition will be monitored during future

outages, forexample, visual inspections, thickness measurements.

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 1,Page3of10 M

RA11gart aj.espons.e Reference 4summarizes theMPS2SteamGenerator Integrity Condition Monitoring and Operational Assessment (CMOA) report(Attachment to Reference 2),which documented theresults ofsecondary sideinspections performed during the2R24 outage.

Theauthor ofthe CMOA wasacontracted TubeIntegrity Engineer (TIE),

who developed thematerialdegradation assessment captured inSection 4.3.1after reviewing still images ofdiscolored secondary separator components andwhoused veryconservative terminology in hisassessment ofthematerial condition.

The summarycaptured inReference 4 was developed byDENC'ssiteprogram owner.

Basedonoversight oftheSGinspections identified inTable1,DENC'ssite program ownerconfirmed that theregions ofdiscoloration identifiedinthesecondary moisture separators reflected anabsence ofmagnetite, which hasnotchanged appreciably over multiple operating cycles.

Basedonthis information, thesite program ownerwasable toconclude thephotographic evidence wasinsufficient todiagnosethediscoloration as anearly stage offlow accelerated corrosion.

h Noflowassisted corrosion hasbeenobserved ineither SG.

DENC hasperformed extensive visual examinations oftheMPS2steamdrumcomponents sinceSG replacement in1992.Table1 provides a summaryofthemost recent examination history.

Table 1

- Recent SteamDrumExaminations Outae Date SteamGenerator EOC18 S rin2008 BothSGs EOC20 S rin2011 SG-1 EOC22 S rin2014 SG-2 EOC23 Fall 2015 SG-1 EOC24 S rin2017 BothSGs EOC25 Fall 2018 BothSGs Thesecondary separators havebeentheprimary focusofrecent steamdrum examinations duetooperating experience fromotherstations withsimilar BWXT secondary SGdesigns andconcerns thatdegradation ofsteamseparators could adversely impactmoisture carryover performance.

Basedonthisrecent operating experience, additional scrutiny wasapplied toanyanomaly associated withtheBWXT secondary separators during theEndofCycle(EOC) 25inspection.

Secondary separators inbothSGshavebeeninspected fromthetop(above the secondary deck,looking downinto thesecondary separators) andthebottom (looking

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 1,Page4of10 upatthe baseplate frombelowthesecondary deck).

Someregions oftheseparators exhibita lack ofmagnetite, withnoapparent lossofmaterial thickness.

Thisoccurs mostnotably on thelower cylinder sidewalls andskimmer slots andoccurs toa lesser extent onthe baseplates andswirl vanes.Thesearethelocations wheretheformation oforange oxides has beennoted.Thesefindings affect a smallpopulation ofthe secondary separators, mostly onthehot-leg sideoftheSGs.Figures 1thru4 below provide examples ofthese locations:

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Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 1,Page6of10 Figure 4

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Videoimages wereobtained ofallsecondary separators from above thesecondary deckduring EOC25.Ofthe170separators (per SG) inspected, approximately 25 showeda lackoftightly adhering magnetite (as evidenced by orange discoloration).

Wherediscoloration wasobserved ontheskimmer

vanes, lower cylinder assembly sidewalls, swirl vanes,orbaseplates, thevisual inspectors scrutinized the discolored location forevidence ofperforations orvisible material loss.

Noperforations orvisible material loss wereevident, andtheaffected sidewalls andbaseplates weresmooth.

RAE2Jart.c.

Response

Thecontracted TIEreached theconclusions documented inReference 4 basedon review ofstill imagesofthediscolored secondary separators.

Minormaterial lossis difficult toassess basedonphotoimages

alone, andconcluding that theexistence of orange oxide represents "evidence ofearly state flowassisted corrosion" isconsidered anoverly conservative conclusion byDENC,astheexistence oforangeoxidealone doesnotindicate acondition that iseither unsatisfactory ordegraded.

Asdiscussed intheresponse topart"b."

above,visual inspectors scrutinized areasof discoloration identified ontheskimmer vanes,lower cylinder assembly sidewalls, swirl vanes,andbaseplates forevidence ofperforations orvisible material losswhile performing theEOC25secondary sideinspections.

Noperforations orvisible material losswereevident, andtheaffected sidewalls andbaseplates weresmooth.

Basedon lackofevidence thatflowassisted corrosion isactively degrading secondary side component material after 26yearsofreplacement SG operation, itisreasonable to

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 1,Page7of10 conclude significant structural degradation ofthesecondary separators isnotexpected tooccurover fivecyclesofoperation between secondary sideinspections.

According to the SG manufacturer (BWXT),therobust design ofMPS2secondary separators makes them lesssusceptible toperforation resulting frombaseplate degradation when compared toother secondary separator designs.

Figure 5 and Figure 6below showthe robustness oftheMPS2secondary separator baseplates.

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Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 1,Page8of10 Inthe unlikely eventthatperforations develop inthefuture, theyarenotexpected to significantly affect moisturecarryover andwill notaffect thestructural integrity ofthe secondary separators duetotherobust design aspects oftheMPS2SGs.DENC intends tocontinue tomonitorthecondition oftheMPS2secondary separators each inspection interval through visual inspection andimplement morequantitative methods tomonitor material degradation aswarranted byvisual inspection results.

RAl-3 Table4-2,"DMTDeposit Removal Quantities,"

oftheAttachment toReference 2

indicates identical amounts ofmagnetite andcopper (e.g.,

1,963lbs.

ofmagnetite and 16.2Ibs.

ofcopper) wereremovedfrom SG25(2,608 lbs.

oftotal deposit) andSG26 (2,584 lbs.

oftotal deposit).

This appears tobeinerror asthestaff wouldnotexpect the deposit removal quantities tobeidentical for thetwoSGs.Please provide thecorrect values forbothSGsinTable 4.2,orprovidean explanation fortheapparent error.

M Softchemical cleaning wasperformed onbothSGssimultaneously during the2R24

outage, andthetotal deposition wasremoved andfiltered collectively.

Forpurposes of estimating thetotal inventory removed through deposit minimization treatment (DMT) andwaterlancing, thetotal deposition removed fromthetwoSGs was dividedevenly between SG1andSG2.Thedatapresented inReference 2,Attachment 1,Table 4-2 havebeenverified tobecorrect forbothSGs.

AtMPS2,nooperational difficulties havebeenreported whichwould potentially relate to support blockage.

Also, nosystematic changeinthegrowth ordistributionof support structure wearindications havebeenidentified whichwouldsuggest secondary side flowredistribution resulting fromdeposit accumulation.

DMTwasperformed expressly forthepurpose ofincreasing SGthermal performance.

RAl4 Reference Identification 2610inthetable

entitled, "SG26[SG2)PLP[possible loose parts)

/Foreign Objects Detected in2R24,"

oftheAttachme'nt toReference 2states that thehistorical foreign object (nut) appears tohavemovedcloser totheperiphery.

The table further states that nowearwasidentified inthevicinity andthat thepartwasnot visually monitored bysecondary sideinspection.

Pleasediscuss thedecision notto visually monitor theforeign object andattempt toremovetheforeign object during 2R24..

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 1,Page9of10 TheDegradation Assessment prepared prior tothe2R24outage contained adetailed primary side examination scope(eddy current andvisual),

andadetailed secondary side examination scope (visualandforeign object search andretrieval).

Foreign object 2610,which hadbeen firstdetected inEOC13(2000),

andcontinuously monitored since that

time, wasincluded inthepreplanned secondary sideexamination scope.

However, thesecondary side inspection crewreported thatnopartwasvisible atthat

location, andthuscouldnotberemoved orfurther visually monitored.

A subsequent eddy current examination identified that therewasa possible loose part(PLP),

ina nearby

location, whichprompted theTIE toassume thattheparthadmovedduring thewater lancing activities.

Sincenowearhas ever beendetected inanytubeadjacent tothis PLPin17years, thereisreasonable confidence thatnoparts capable ofcausing significant tubedegradation remain inthe tube bundle.

RAl-5 Thestaff identified thefollowing apparent discrepancies.

Confirm thecorrect information.

a.Table 3-2,"Summary ofSGInspection Sampling Through the2R24Outage(TS 6.26),"

intheAttachment toReference 2refers tofanbar and foreign object wear as potential degradation mechanisms rather than existing degradation mechanisms.

b.Section 5,Condition Monitoring Assessment,"

oftheAttachmentto Reference 2

states, "Figures 5-1through 5-4provide theCM [condition monitoring) limit curves forflaws sized withETSSs[examination technique specification sheets) 96004.3, 27901.1, 27902.1, and27903.1[,)

respectively."

However, Figure 5-1, "Acceptance Limits forFanBarWear,"

references ETSS96041.3.

Thestaffalso notes that ETSS96004.3 isnotreferenced inanyother section inReference 2.

M RA15.Jart aj3esponse Fanbarwearandforeign object wearareexisting degradation mechanisms identified fortheMPS2SGs,butthis wearhasonlybeenobserved inalimited subset oftheSG tubes.InTable3-1oftheReference 2 Attachment, theterm"potential" isusedto indicate thenumberoftubessusceptible toeachdegradation mechanism andthe number oftubes that wereexamined forthat degradation mechanism.

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 1,Page10of10 W

Thereference toETSS96004.3 wasanerror.

Thecorrect document tobereferenced throughout Section 5oftheReference 2Attachment isETSS96041.3.

REFERENCES 1.Proposed License Amendment Request toRevise theMillstone Unit2 Technical Specifications for Steam Generator Inspection Frequency, datedOctober 8,2020 (Agencywide Documents Access andManagementSystem(ADAMS)

Accession No.ML20282A594).

2.Supplement toProposed License Amendment Request toRevise theMillstone Unit 2Technical Specifications for Steam Generator Frequency, dated December 8,2020(ADAMS Accession No.ML20343A259).

3.TSTF-577, "Revised Frequencies forSteam Generator TubeInspections,"

Revision 0,dated June8,2020(ADAMS Accession No.ML20160A359).

4.Millstone, Unit 2,EndofCycle24SteamGenerator TubeInspectionReport, dated September 18,2017(ADAMS Accession No.ML17269A030).

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 ATTACHMENT 2

MILLSTONEPOWERSTATIONUNIT2 DOMINIONENERGYNUCLEARCONNECTICUT, INC.

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 2,Page1of5 MM ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS STEAMGENERATOR TUBEINSPECTIONREPORT 6.9.1.9 A report shall besubmittedwithin 180daysafter initial entry into MODE4following completion of aninspection performed inaccordance with TS6.26, SteamGenerator (SG)

Program.

The report shall include:

a.

Thescope of inspections perfonned oneachSGy b

W 4-m4tteed-mdtea4teney Insert A

meehamemy E

h 8-tessag-SPECIALREPORTS 6.9.2Special reports shall besubmitted totheU.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control

Desk, Washington, D.C.20555, onecopytotheRegional Administrator, Region I,andonecopytotheNRCResident Inspector within thetimeperiod specified for each repo1t These reports shall besubmitted covering theactivities identified below pursuant totherequirements oftheapplicable reference specification:

a.

Deleted b.

Deleted c.

Deleted d.

ECCSActuation, Specifications 3.5.2 and3.5.3.

e.

Deleted f.

Deleted g.

RCSOverpressure Mitigation, Specification 3.4.9.3.

i MILLSTONEUNIT2 6-20 Amendment No.9,36,404,414,448, 462,46A+94,239, 240,266,M, m, 294,299,3-14,-320

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 2,Page2of5 insertA:

b.Thenondestructive examination techniques utilized fortubes with increased degradation susceptibility; c.Foreachdegradation mechanism found:

1,Thenondestructiveexamination techniquesutilized; 2.Thelocation, orientation(if linear),

measured size(if available),

andvoltage response foreachindication. For tubewearatsupport structures less than20 percent through-wall, only thetotal number ofindications needstobereported; 3.Adescription ofthecondition monitoring assessment andresults, including the margin tothetubeintegrity performance criteria andcomparisonwith themargin predicted toexist attheinspection bytheprevious forward-looking tubeintegrity assessment; and 4.Thenumberoftubes plugged during theinspection outage;.

d.Ananalysis summary ofthetubeintegrity conditions predicted toexistatthenext scheduled inspection (the forward-looking tubeintegrity assessment) relativetothe applicable performance

criteria, including theanalysis methodology, inputs, and results; e.Thenumberandpercentage oftubesplugged

todate, andtheeffectiveplugging percentage ineachSG;and f.Theresults ofanySGsecondary sideinspectionsf.

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 2,Page3of5 January 4,2013 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS AnSG 6.26m SG ASteam4enerates Program shall beestabliandimplemented toensure that SGtubeintegrity ismaintained.

Inaddition, the Program shall include thefollowing:

l a.

Provisions for condition monitoring assessments:

Condition monitoring assessment means anevaluation ofthe "as found" conditionofthetubing with respect totheperformance criteria for structuralintegrity andaccident induced leakage.

The"as found" condition refers tothe condition ofthe tubing during aSGinspection

outage, asdetennined fromthe inservice inspection resultsor by other means,prior totheplugging oftubes.

Condition monitoring assessments shall be conducted during eachoutage during which theSGtubes areinspected orplugged toconfirm that the performance criteria arebeing met.

b.

Provisions forperformance criteria forSG tube integrity: SGtube integrity shall be maintained bymeeting theperformance criteria fortube structural integrity, accident induced

leakage, andoperational LEAKAGE.

1.

Structural integrity perfonnance criterion:

All inservice steamgenerater tubes shall retain structural integrity overthefull range of nonnal operating conditions (including STARTUP,operation inthepower

range, HOT

STANDBY, andcool down),

all anticipated transients included inthe design specification, anddesign l basis accidents.

'Ihis includes retaining asafety factorof 3.0 against burst under nonnal steady state full poweroperation primary-to-secondary pressure differential andasafety factor of1.4against burst applied tothe design basis accident primary-to-secondary pressure differentials.

Apart fromthe above requirements, additional loading conditions associated withthe design basis accidents, orcombination ofaccidents inaccordance withthedesign and licensing

basis, shall also beevaluated todetennine iftheassociated loads contribute significantly toburst orcollapse.

Intheassessment oftubeintegrity, those loads that dosignificantly affect burst orcollapse shall bedetennined andassessedin combination withtheloads duetopressure with asafety factor of1.2onthe combined primary loads and1.0onaxial secondary loads.

2.

Accident induced leakage perfonnance criterion:

Theprimary tosecondary accident induced leakage rateforanydesign basis

accident, other than aSGtube

rupture, shall notexceed theleakage rateassumed intheaccident analysis intenns oftotal leakage rateforall SGsandleakage rateforanindividual SG.Leakage is nottoexceed 150gpdperSG.

3.

Theoperational LEAKAGEperfonnance criterion isspecified inLCO3.4.6.2, "Reactor Coolant System Operational LEAKAGE."

MILLSTONE

- UNIT2 6-30 Amendment No.299,312

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 2,Page4of5 W

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS c.

Provisions forSGtubeplugging criteria:

Tubes found byinservice inspection tocontain%

flaws with a depth equal toorexceeding 40%ofthe nominal tube wallthickness shall be plugged.

d.

Provisions forSGtube inspections:

Periodic SGtube inspections shall beperformed.

The number andportionsof the tubes inspectedandmethods ofinspection shall beperformed with theobjective ofdetecting flawsofanytype(e.g.,

volumetric

flaws, axial and circumferential cracks) that may bepresentalong thelength ofthetube, fromthetube-to-tubesheet weldatthetube inlet to thetube-to-tubesheet weldatthetube

outlet, andthat maysatisfy theapplicable tube plugging criteria. Thetube-to-tubesheetweldisnotpartof %

thetube.

Inaddition tomeeting therequirements ofd.1.,

d.2, andd.3below, theinspection

scope, inspection

methods, andinspection intervals shall besuch astoensure that SGtube integrity ismaintained until thenextSGinspection.

A degradationassessment shall be i

perfonned todetermine thetypeandlocation of flaws towhich thetubes maybe susceptible and,based onthis assessment, todetennine whichinspection methods need to beemployed andatwhatlocations.

1.

Inspect 100%ofthetubes ineachSGduring thefirst refueling outage following

'whichdefines theinspectionperiod.

100%ofthetubesin 96 2.

e thefirst refueling outage folloT gSGinstallation,inspect eachSGatleast ever ffective full powermonthsW peekewategeeeehedt+leh W

WW e4eteam*ataea4hat-a Pened-Eaelusereehen-pened4ermed-belemnay-bwxtended-up-te+effeet+ve megeet+en-eutage-MILLSTONEUNIT2 6-31 Amendment No.299-349

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 2,Page5of5 W

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS a) f-the W

e)

W 3

Ifcrack indications arefound inanySGtube, thenthenextinspection foreach affected andpotentially affected SGforthedegradation mechanismthat caused the i crack indication shall refueling outag Ifdefinitive onnation,i such asfromexamination ofapulled

tube, diagnostic non-destructi

etesting, or engineering evaluation indicates that acrack-like indication isno associatedwith acrack(s),

then theindication need notbetreated asacrack.

e.

Provisions formonitoring operational primary tosecondary LEAK GE.

beatthenext MILLSTONE

- UNIT2 6-31a Amendment No.444