ML21105A482

Response to Request for Additional Information for Proposed License Amendment Request to Revise the Millstone, Unit 2 Technical Specification for Steam Generator Inspection Frequency

ML21105A482
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	04/15/2021
From:	Mark D. Sartain Dominion Energy Nuclear Connecticut
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
20-328D
Download: ML21105A482 (20)

Text

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Dominion 5000 Energy Dominion Nuclear Boulevard, Glen Inc.

Connecticut, VA23060 Allen, Qg g" "

DominionEnergy.com

@QQf April15,2021 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial No. 20-328D Attention: Document Control Desk NRA/SS RO Washington, DC20555 Docket No. 50-336 License No. DPR-65 MILLSTONE POWERSTATION UNIT 2  !

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FORPROPOSED i LICENSEAMENDMENTREQUEST TO REVISETHE MILLSTONEUNIT 2 TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS FOR STEAM GENERATORINSPECTION FREQUENCY I

By letter dated October 8,2020(Agencywide Documents Access andManagement System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML20282A594), and as supplemented byletter dated December 8,2020(ADAMS Accession No.ML20343A259), DominionEnergy Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DENC), submitted a license amendment request for Millstone Power Station, Unit No.2 (MPS2). Theproposed amendment would reviseMPS2Technical Specification (TS) 6.26, "Steam Generator (SG) Program," Itemd.2, toreflect a proposed change totherequired SGtube inspection frequency from every 72effective >

full power months (EFPM), oratleast every thirdrefueling outage, to every 96EFPM.

Inan email dated February 26,2021, theNRCissued a draft request foradditional information (RAl) related to the proposed LAR. On March 9 , 2021, the NRC staff conducted a conference callwith DENCstaff toclarify therequest. Inan ,email dated March 18,2021, theNRCtransmitted thefinal version oftheRAl(ADAMS Accession No.ML21078A033). DENCagreed torespond totheRAlwithin 30daysofissuance, or g nolater than April 19,2021. I Attachment mark-up ofthe 1provides TS.

DENC's response totheRAl.Attachment 2 provides a revised l I

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I

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Page2 of3 Ifyou have anyquestions orrequire additional information, pleasecontact Shayan Sinhaat (804) 273-4687.

Sincerely, l

MarkD.Sartain Vice President-Nuclear Engineering & FleetSupport ,

I COMMONWEALTH OFVIRGINIA ) j

) j COUNTY OFHENRICO )

The foregoing document was acknowledged before me, in and fortheCountyand Commonwealth today aforesaid, by Mr.Mark D. Sartain, who isVice President Nuclear EngineeringandFleet Support ofDominion Energy Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.Hehasaffirmed beforemethat heisduly authorized toexecuteandfile the foregoing document inbehalfofthat company, andthat thestatements inthedocument are true tothebest ofhisknowledge and belief.

Acknowledged beforemethis /d dayof , 2021.

MyCommission Expires: ,

GARYDONMI,LLER Not

, i NotaryPublic Public Commonwealth ofVirginia Reg.# 7629412 MyCommission Expires August 20@

31, Attachments:

1. Response toRequest forAdditional Information for theProposed LARtoRevise TSsfor Steam Generator Inspection Frequency

2. Revised Technical Specification Mark-up Commitments madeinthis letter: None I

i l

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Page3 of3 cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 2100 Renaissance BIvd, Suite 100 Kingof Prussia, PA19406-2713 R.V.Guzman Senior Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OneWhite Flint North, Mail Stop 08-C 2

11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD20852-2738 NRCSenior Resident Inspector I Millstone Power Station Director, Radiation Division Department ofEnergy andEnvironmental Protection 79ElmStreet Hartford, CT 06106-5127 I

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 ATTACHMENT1 MILLSTONE POWERSTATION UNIT2 DOMINION ENERGYNUCLEAR INC.

CONNECTICUT,

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 1,Page1of10 By letter dated October 8,2020(Agencywide Documents Access andManagement System(ADAMS) Accession No.ML20282A594), andassupplemented byletter dated December 8, 2020 (ADAMS Accession No.ML20343A259), Dominion Energy Nuclear Connecticut,Inc. (DENC), submitted a license amendment request for Millstone Power Station, Unit No. 2 (MPS2). Theproposed amendment would revise MPS2Technical Specification (TS) 6.26, "Steam Generator (SG) Program," Itemd.2,toreflect a proposed change tothe required SGtube inspection frequency from every 72effective power full months (EFPM), oratleast every third refueling outage, toevery 96EFPM.

Inanemail dated February 26, 2021, theNRCissued a draft request for additional information (RAI) related to the proposed LAR. On March 9 ,2021, t he NRC staff conducted a conference callwithDENC staff toclarify therequest. Inanemail dated March18,2021, theNRCtransmitted the finalversion oftheRAl(ADAMS Accession No.ML21078A033). DENCagreed torespond totheRAlwithin 30days ofissuance, or nolater than April 19,2021.

This attachment provides DENC's response tothe RAI.

B.aclig.ro3ud InAppendix A of10CFRPart 50,General Design Criteria 14, 15, 30,31,and32define requirements forthestructural andleakage integrity ofthe reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). As part of the RCPB, the SG tubes must also meet the r equirements of10CFR50.55a with respect toinspection andrepair requirements ofthe American Society ofMechanical Engineers Boiler andPressure Vessel Code. Allpressurized water reactors haveTS according to10CFR50.36 that include a SG Program with specific criteria for thestructural andleakage integrity, repair, andinspection ofSG tubes. ForMillstone Unit 2,therequirements for performing SG tube inspections and repair areinTS Section 6.26, while therequirements forreporting the SG tube inspections andrepair areinTSSection 6.9.1.9.

RAl1 There areseveral apparent inconsistencies between theproposed Insert A toTS Se'ction 6.9.1.9 inAttachment 2, "Marked-up Technical Specification Pages," of Reference 1 andtheproposed changes inTSTF-577 (Reference 3) from w hich t he licerisee states itisproposing tomodel (for example, c.3, c.4. e. and f. of TS 6.9.1.9).

The staff alsonotedthattheeditorial changes fromSection 2.4.4, "Editorial Improvements," ofReference 3,which iscurrently under review, werenotincorporated intheproposed mark-up TSpages. Please provide thecorrect proposed changes and new proposed mark-up TS pages. Ifnot, provide an explanation fortheapparent inconsistencies.

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 1,Page2 of10 DENChas revised the proposed TS markup forMPS2TS6.26, "Steam Generator (SG)

Program," to incorporate the editorial changes fromSection 2.4.4, "Editorial improvements," of TSTF-577 thatusetheacronym "SG" rather than theterm"Steam Generator." DENC has alsorevised theproposed TS markup forMPS2TS 6.9.1.9, "Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report," tomodify thepunctuation andgrammar to alignwith theconventions used intheTS markup fromTSTF-577. Attachment 2 providestherevised TS mark-up pages,with additionsfrom theprevious TS markup showninitalicized, bold font, and deletions fromtheprevious TS markup shownin struck-through, bold font.

RAl2 TheMillstone Unit 2 spring 2017SG tube inspection report (Reference 4)states, "Steam drumvisual inspections toevaluate thematerial condition andcleanliness ofkey components suchasmoisture separators, drainsystems, andinterior surfaces," were performedinboth SGsduring refuelingoutage 24(2R24). Reference 4 goes ontostate, "Theresults ofallsecondary-side visual examinationsperformed weresatisfactory, with nodegradation detected." However, Section 4.3.1,"Steam Drum," of the Attachment to Reference 2 states, "Evidence ofearly stage flow assisted corrosion ofthe secondary moisture separators was noted." Figure 4-3,"Steam Drum Components," inthe AttachmenttoReference 2 includes a picture ofearly stage flowassisted corrosion ina separatorbaseplate. Section 4.3.1 goeson tostate, inpart,"...based on limited operational wearobserved through 2R24,significant structural degradation isnot expected tooccur over thenext cycles f ive ofoperation." Thestaff has the following requestsregarding theflow assisted corrosion ofthesecondary moisture separators:

a.Please discuss the discrepancy between Reference 2 andReference 4related to theresultsofthe secondary-side visual examinations.

b.Please describe eachlocation where flow assisted corrosion wasobserved inall SGs.

c.Please discuss howtheflow assisted corrosion wasevaluated todetermine that "significant structural degradation isnotexpected tooccur overthenext five cycles ofoperation." Inaddition, please discuss how thecondition will be monitored during future outages, forexample, visual inspections, thickness measurements.

No.20-328D Serial Docket No.50-336 Attachment 1,Page3 of10 M

RA11gart aj.espons.e 4 summarizes theMPS2Steam Reference Generator Integrity Condition Monitoringand Operational Assessment (CMOA) report (Attachment to Reference 2), which documented theresults ofsecondary sideinspections performed duringthe2R24 Theauthor outage. ofthe CMOA wasa contracted TubeIntegrity Engineer (TIE),who developedthematerialdegradation assessment captured inSection 4.3.1 after still reviewing images ofdiscolored secondary separator components andwhoused veryconservative terminology in hisassessment ofthematerial condition. The summarycaptured inReference 4 was developed byDENC's site program owner.

Basedonoversight oftheSG inspections identified inTable 1,DENC's siteprogram ownerconfirmed that theregions ofdiscoloration identified inthesecondary moisture reflected separators anabsence ofmagnetite, which hasnotchanged appreciablyover multiple operating cycles. Based onthis information, thesite program owner wasable toconclude the photographic evidence wasinsufficient todiagnosethediscoloration as anearly stage offlow accelerated corrosion.

h No flow assisted corrosion hasbeenobserved ineither SG. DENC hasperformed visual extensive examinations oftheMPS2 steamdrumcomponents since SG replacementin1992.Table 1 provides a summary ofthemost recent examination history.

Table 1 Recent Steam DrumExaminations Outae Date Steam Generator EOC18 S rin2008 Both SGs EOC20 S rin2011 SG-1 EOC22 S rin2014 SG-2 EOC23 Fall 2015 SG-1 EOC24 S rin2017 Both SGs EOC25 Fall 2018 Both SGs The secondary separators havebeentheprimary focus ofrecent steamdrum examinationsduetooperating experience fromother stations with similarBWXT SG designs secondary andconcerns that degradation ofsteamseparators could adversely impact moisture carryover performance. Based this o n recent operating additional experience, scrutiny wasapplied toanyanomaly associated withtheBWXT secondary separators during the EndofCycle (EOC) 25inspection.

Secondaryseparators inbothSGshavebeeninspected fromthetop(above the deck, secondary looking downinto thesecondary separators)andthebottom (looking

Serial No.20-328D DocketNo.50-336 1,Page4 of10 Attachment upat the baseplate from below thesecondary deck). Someregions oftheseparators exhibita lack ofmagnetite, with no apparent loss ofmaterial thickness. Thisoccurs mostnotably on thelower cylinder sidewalls andskimmer slots andoccurs toa lesser extentonthe baseplates andswirl vanes. Thesearethelocations wheretheformation oforange oxides has beennoted. Thesefindings affect a small populationofthe secondary separators, mostly on the hot-leg side oftheSGs. Figures 1 thru4 below provide examples ofthese locations:

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Video images wereobtained ofall secondary separators from above thesecondary deckduring EOC25.Of the170separators (per SG)inspected, approximately 25 showed a lack Wherediscoloration oftightly adhering was observed magnetiteevidenced on theskimmer (as vanes, by orange discoloration).

lower cylinder assembly sidewalls,swirl vanes, orbaseplates, thevisual inspectors scrutinized the discolored for location evidence ofperforations orvisible material loss. No perforations orvisible material loss wereevident, andtheaffected sidewalls andbaseplates weresmooth.

RAE2Jart.c. Response Thecontracted TIEreached theconclusions documented inReference 4 based on reviewofstill images ofthediscolored secondary separators. Minor material loss is difficult toassess based onphoto images alone, andconcluding that theexistence of orangeoxide represents "evidence ofearly state flow assisted corrosion" isconsidered an overly conservative conclusion byDENC,astheexistence oforange oxide alone doesnotindicate a condition that iseither unsatisfactory ordegraded.

Asdiscussed intheresponse topart "b." above, visual inspectors scrutinized areas of discoloration identified ontheskimmer vanes, lower cylinder assembly sidewalls, swirl vanes, andbaseplates forevidence ofperforations orvisible material loss while performing theEOC25secondary side inspections. No perforations orvisible material losswereevident, andtheaffected sidewalls andbaseplates weresmooth. Based on lackofevidence that flow assisted corrosion isactively degrading secondary side component material after 26 years ofreplacement SG operation, itisreasonable to

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 1,Page7 of10 conclude significant structural degradation ofthesecondary separators isnotexpected tooccurover fivecycles ofoperation between secondary side inspections.

According to the SG manufacturer (BWXT), therobust design ofMPS2secondary separators makes them lesssusceptible to perforation resulting frombaseplate degradation when compared toother secondary separator designs. Figure 5 and Figure 6 below showthe robustness ofthe MPS2secondary separator baseplates.

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Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 1,Page8 of10 Inthe unlikely event that perforations develop inthefuture, they arenotexpected to significantly affect moisture carryover andwill notaffect thestructural integrity ofthe secondary separators duetotherobust design aspects oftheMPS2SGs. DENC intends tocontinue tomonitor thecondition oftheMPS2secondary separators each inspection interval through visual inspection and implement more quantitative methods tomonitor material degradation aswarranted byvisual inspection results.

RAl-3 Table 4-2,"DMTDeposit Removal Quantities," oftheAttachment toReference 2 indicates identical amounts ofmagnetite andcopper (e.g., 1,963 lbs. ofmagnetite and 16.2 Ibs. ofcopper) wereremovedfrom SG25(2,608 lbs. oftotal deposit) andSG 26 (2,584 lbs. oftotal deposit). Thisappears to bein asthe error staff would notexpect the deposit removal quantitiestobeidentical for thetwoSGs.Please provide thecorrect values for both SGsinTable 4.2,orprovidean explanation for the apparent error.

M Soft chemical cleaning wasperformed on both SGs simultaneously during the2R24 outage, andthetotal deposition wasremoved andfilteredcollectively. Forpurposes of estimating thetotal inventory removed through deposit minimization treatment (DMT) andwater lancing, thetotal deposition removed fromthetwoSGs was divided evenly between SG1andSG2.Thedata presented inReference 2,Attachment 1,Table 4-2 have beenverified tobecorrect for both SGs.

AtMPS2,nooperational difficulties have beenreported which would potentially relate to support blockage. Also, nosystematic change inthegrowth ordistributionof support structure wearindications havebeenidentified which would suggest secondary side flow redistribution resultingfrom deposit accumulation. DMTwasperformed expressly for thepurpose ofincreasing SGthermal performance.

RAl4 Reference Identification 2610inthetable entitled, "SG26[SG 2)PLP[possible loose parts) /Foreign Objects Detected in2R24," ofthe Attachme'nt toReference 2 states that thehistorical foreign object (nut)appears to have moved closer to the periphery. The table further states thatnowearwasidentified inthevicinity andthat thepart wasnot visually monitored bysecondary side inspection. Please discuss thedecision notto visually monitor theforeign object andattempt toremove theforeign object during 2R24..

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 1,Page9 of10 TheDegradation Assessment prepared priortothe2R24outage contained a detailed primaryside examination scope(eddy current andvisual), anda detailed secondary sideexamination scope (visual andforeign object search andretrieval). Foreign object 2610,which hadbeen first detected inEOC13(2000), andcontinuously monitored since time, that wasincluded inthepreplanned secondary side examination scope. However, thesecondary side inspection crewreported that nopart wasvisible atthat location, andthus could notbe removed orfurther visually monitored. A subsequent eddy currentexamination identified that therewasa possible loose part (PLP), ina nearby which location, prompted theTIE to assume that thepart hadmovedduring thewater lancingactivities.Since nowearhas ever beendetected inanytube adjacent tothis PLP in17years, there isreasonable confidence that no parts capable ofcausing significant tube degradation remain inthe tube bundle.

RAl-5 The staff identified thefollowing apparent discrepancies. Confirm thecorrect information.

a. Table 3-2,"Summary ofSGInspection Sampling Through the 2R24Outage (TS 6.26),"inthe Attachment toReference 2 refers tofanbar and foreign object wear as potential degradation mechanisms rather than existing degradation mechanisms.

b.Section 5,Condition Monitoring Assessment," oftheAttachmentto Reference 2 states, "Figures 5-1through 5-4provide theCM [condition monitoring) limit curves forflaws sized with ETSSs[examination technique specification sheets) 96004.3, 27901.1, 27902.1, and27903.1[,) respectively." However, Figure 5-1, "Acceptance Limits for FanBarWear," references ETSS96041.3. Thestaffalso notes that ETSS96004.3 isnotreferenced inanyother section inReference 2.

M RA15.Jart aj3esponse Fanbarwearandforeign object wearareexisting degradation mechanisms identified theMPS2 for SGs, but this wearhasonly beenobserved ina limited subset oftheSG tubes. InTable 3-1oftheReference 2 Attachment, theterm"potential" isusedto thenumber indicate oftubes susceptible toeachdegradation mechanism andthe number oftubes thatwereexamined for thatdegradation mechanism.

No.20-328D Serial Docket No.50-336 Attachment 1,Page10of10 W

Thereference toETSS96004.3 wasanerror. Thecorrect document tobereferenced throughout Section 5oftheReference 2 Attachment is ETSS 96041.3.

REFERENCES 1.Proposed License Amendment Request toRevise theMillstone Unit2 Technical Specifications forSteam Generator Inspection Frequency, datedOctober8,2020 (Agencywide Documents Access andManagementSystem (ADAMS) Accession No.ML20282A594).

2.Supplement toProposed License Amendment Request toRevise theMillstone Unit 2Technical Specifications for Steam Generator Frequency, dated December 8,2020 (ADAMS Accession No. ML20343A259).

3.TSTF-577, "Revised Frequencies forSteam Generator TubeInspections,"

Revision 0,dated June 8,2020 (ADAMS Accession No.ML20160A359).

4.Millstone, Unit2,EndofCycle 24 SteamGenerator TubeInspectionReport, dated September 18, 2017(ADAMS Accession No.ML17269A030).

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 ATTACHMENT2 MILLSTONE POWERSTATION UNIT2 DOMINION ENERGYNUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.

SerialNo.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 2,Page1of5 MM ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS STEAMGENERATOR TUBEINSPECTION REPORT 6.9.1.9 A report shall besubmittedwithin 180days initial after entry MODE4following into completion of aninspection performed inaccordance withTS6.26, Steam Generator (SG)

Program. The report shall include:

a. Thescope of inspections oneach perfonned SGy b W 4-m4tteed-mdtea4teney A

Insert meehamemy E

h 8-tessag-SPECIAL REPORTS 6.9.2Special reports shall besubmitted totheU.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C.

20555, tothe onecopy Regional Administrator, Region I,andonecopy tothe NRCResident within Inspector thetime period specified for each repo1t These reports shall besubmittedcovering the activities identified below pursuant tothe requirements ofthe applicable specification:

reference

a. Deleted

b. Deleted

c. Deleted

d. ECCSActuation, Specifications and3.5.3.

3.5.2

e. Deleted

f. Deleted

g. RCSOverpressure Specification Mitigation, 3.4.9.3. i MILLSTONEUNIT2 6-20 Amendment No.9,36,404, 414, 448, 462,46A+94,239, 240, 266, M, m, 294, 299, 3-14,-320

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 2,Page2 of5 insert A:

b.Thenondestructive examination techniques utilizedfor tubes withincreased degradation susceptibility; c.Foreachdegradation mechanism found:

1,Thenondestructiveexamination techniquesutilized; 2.Thelocation, orientation(if linear), measured size (ifavailable), andvoltage response for eachindication. For tubewearatsupport structuresless than20 percent through-wall, only thetotal number ofindications needstobereported; 3.A description ofthecondition monitoring assessment andresults, includingthe margin tothe tube integrity performance criteria andcomparisonwith themargin predicted toexist attheinspection bytheprevious forward-looking tubeintegrity assessment; and 4.Thenumber oftubes plugged during theinspection outage;.

d.Ananalysis summary ofthetube integrity conditions predicted toexistatthenext scheduled inspection (the forward-looking tube integrity assessment) relativetothe applicable performance criteria, including theanalysis methodology, inputs, and results; e.Thenumber andpercentage oftubes plugged todate, andtheeffectiveplugging percentage ineachSG;and f.Theresults ofanySGsecondary side inspectionsf.

Serial No.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 2,Page3of5 January 4,2013 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS An SG 6.26m SG ASteam4enerates Program shall beestabliandimplemented toensure that SGtube integrity ismaintained. Inaddition, the Program shall include the following: l

a. Provisions for condition monitoring assessments: Condition monitoring assessment means anevaluation ofthe "as found" condition ofthe tubing with respect tothe performance criteria forstructuralintegrity andaccident induced leakage. The"as found" condition referstothe condition ofthe tubing during aSGinspection outage, asdetennined from the inservice inspection resultsor by other means, prior tothe plugging oftubes. Condition monitoring assessments shallbe conducted during each outage during which the SGtubes areinspected orplugged toconfirm that the performance criteria are being met.

b. Provisions for performance forSG tube integrity: SGtube criteria integrity shall be maintained bymeeting the performance criteria for tube structural integrity, accident induced leakage, andoperational LEAKAGE.

1. Structural integrity perfonnance criterion: All inservice steamgenerater tubes shallretain structural integrityover the fullrange of nonnal operating conditions (including STARTUP, operation inthe power range, HOT STANDBY, andcool down), allanticipated transients included inthe design specification, anddesign l basisaccidents. 'Ihis includes retaining asafety factor of 3.0 against burst under nonnal steady state fullpower operation primary-to-secondary pressure differential anda safety factor of1.4 against burst applied tothe design basis accident primary-to-secondary pressure differentials. Apart from the above requirements, additional loading conditions associated with the design basis accidents, orcombination ofaccidents inaccordance with the design and licensing basis,shall also beevaluated todetennine if theassociated loads contribute significantly toburst orcollapse. Inthe assessment oftube integrity, those loads thatdosignificantly affect burst orcollapse shall bedetennined andassessed in combination with the loads duetopressure with a safety factor of1.2 onthe combined primary loads and1.0 onaxial secondary loads.

2. Accident induced leakage perfonnance criterion: Theprimary tosecondary accident induced leakage ratefor anydesign basis accident, other than a SGtube rupture, shall notexceed theleakage rate assumed inthe accident analysis intenns oftotal leakage rate for allSGsandleakage rate for anindividual SG.Leakage is nottoexceed 150gpdper SG.

3. Theoperational LEAKAGEperfonnance criterion isspecified inLCO3.4.6.2, "Reactor Coolant System Operational LEAKAGE."

MILLSTONEUNIT2 -

6-30 Amendment No.299, 312

SerialNo.20-328D DocketNo.50-336 Attachment 2,Page4 of5 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS W

c. Provisions flaws forSGtube with a depth equal plugging criteria:

toorexceeding Tubes 40%ofthe found byinservice nominal tube wall tocontain inspection thickness shallbe plugged.

d. Provisions forSGtube inspections: Periodic SGtube inspections beperformed.

shall The number and portionsof the tubes inspected andmethods ofinspection shallbeperformed with theobjective ofdetecting flawsofanytype (e.g.,volumetric axial flaws, and circumferential cracks) that may bepresentalong the length ofthe tube, from thetube-to-tubesheet weld atthetube inlet to the tube-to-tubesheet weld atthe tube and outlet, that maysatisfy theapplicable tube plugging criteria. The tube-to-tubesheet weld is of %

notpart the tube. Inadditiontomeeting the requirements of d.1., d.2, and d.3 the below, inspection scope, inspection methods, andinspection intervals shall besuch astoensure SGtube that integrity ismaintained until the next SGinspection. A degradation assessment shall be i perfonned todetermine the type andlocation of flaws towhich the tubes maybe susceptible and, based onthis assessment, todetennine whichinspection methods needto beemployed andatwhat locations.

1. Inspect100%ofthe tubes ineach SGduring thefirst refueling outage following

" "' ' which defines theinspectionperiod. 100%ofthetubesin 96

2. e the refueling first outage folloT g SGinstallation,inspect each SGatleast ever ffective full power months W peekewategeeeehedt+leh W

WW e4eteam*ataea4hat-a Pened-Eaelusereehen-pened4ermed-belemnay-bwxtended-up-te+effeet+ve megeet+en-eutage-MILLSTONEUNIT2 6-31 Amendment No.299-349

SerialNo.20-328D Docket No.50-336 Attachment 2,Page5 of5 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS W

a) f-the W

e)

W 3 Ifcrackindications arefoundinanySGtube, thenthe nextinspection foreach andpotentially affected SGfor affected thedegradation mechanismthat causedthe i crackindication shall refueling outag suchasfromexamination tube, ofapulled Ifdefinitive onnation, diagnostic non-destructi etesting, or i

evaluation engineering indicates that acrack-like indication isno associatedwith then acrack(s), the indication neednotbetreated asacrack.

e. Provisions for operational monitoring primarytosecondary LEAK GE.

beatthenext MILLSTONEUNIT2-6-31a Amendment No.444