ML20248F704

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Summary of 960409 Meeting W/P Blanch Re Forthcoming Policy Statement on Freedom of Employees in Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety Concerns W/O Fear of Retaliation
ML20248F704
Person / Time
Site: Millstone Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 04/24/1996
From: Brian Holian
NRC
To:
NRC
Shared Package
ML20248F498 List:
References
FOIA-COR98-114 NUDOCS 9806040390
Download: ML20248F704 (2)
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April 24. 1996 N Note To: File From: Brian Holian Coordinated With: Kathryn. Annette. Marylee .

Subject:

Meeting with Paul Blanch (4/9/96) /

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Following his request the Ch' airman met witii, Paul Blanch on April 9,1996.

The meeting lasted for approximately 45 minutes: attendees included niembec of l the Chairman's staff and John Zwolinski NRR (the staff's primary point of I contact for Mr. Blanch). Mr. Blanch had three key points that he discussed:

1) Forthcoming Policy Statement on " Freedom of Employees in the Nuclear.

l Indus+ry to Raise Safety Concerns Without Fear of Retaliation": 2) Timeliness in addressing and resolving generic issues; and. 3) Spent Fuel Pool drainage and Part 100 consequences. Recent Millstone-specific issues were not discussed.

Mr. Blanch stated that the major problem with the draft Policy statement is that it places the responsibility for ensuring fair treatment of l whistleblowers on licensees l

within the framework of TAM. Each specific employee therefore company (and/orhas thethe burden Deat. of Labor). to work The bottom-line is that NRC has abdicated its responsibility )y not aggressively supporting whistleblowers, where appropriate. Mr. Blanch states that NRC rules are adequate (e.g. 50.7) and the Agency can take severe l actions, if it chooses. Simply stated the agency doesn't have the willingness l to enforce its regulations uniformly. And when the process works, it takes t

several years, thereby creating a " chilling effect" (nuclear workers will not take on the associated expense to get through the arduous path that exists).

Additionally Mr. Blanch stated that of the over 600 H&I cases reported, only 49 were investigated.

Mr. Blanch also discussed issues that he has taken-to OIG. In particular, he

focused on generic issues and related operability determinations. He l ,_ _ commented that often when the NRC becomes aware of an o)erability concern, the staff refuses to demand that other utilities perform lice operability determinations. Mr. Blanch stated that when the staff identifies a Generic issue, licensees await-the results of the staff's activities (in effect.

Also the time it

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a. has taken the staff to ownership"oftheproblemtotheNRC) bring closure to generic issues (such as GL 89-10 on 1

o Motor Operated Valves) is a real concern. He stated that he agrees that j g )lants should not necessarily have been shut down; but. that schedules should

  • 1 ave been negotiated to assure quicker conformance with the Generic letter.

He mentioned the February 1995 concern at Millstone Unit 2 (that the conta EEopen)inmentisolationvalvesmightexperiencepressurelockingandfailto as an example of an event which could have catastrophic results. Mr.

" Blanch again stated that licensees don't adhere to all regulations as some "are ignored."

Regarding spent fuel pools, Mr. Blanch suggested that fuel in a reactor vessel is extremely safe (i.e. only one core present. . sturdy containment. available safety systems etc. ). However, spent fuel pools often have as much as ten Inkrms in in 'ard wu dwd in acdna w e freedom et Information s

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" cores" worth of fuel, and the safety equipment does not compare with the i

. equi] ment available to maintain the fuel in the reactor vessel.

quiccer adoption of dry cask storage and supplementing existing spent fuelHe supports pool cooling systems with more robust cooling systems.

He elaborated that a drain down event (similar to what he terms a precursor event at Haddam Neck in 1984) could lead to a radioactive release far in excess of Part 100.

Additionally he stated that the industry does a poor job in assuring that Part 100 is met when design changes are implemented.

I The meeting was cordial and Chairman Jackson invited Mr. Blanch to visit again, possibly in a year's time.

Mr. Blanch did mention that he felt a lot enforcement at the time.of the problems at Millstone could have been avoided had He also volunteered that he believed the strong

< staff reaction to the Millstone affairs could be an over reaction by the staff.

Follow-up I

None of the issues discussed included new information or allegations.

Summaries of follow-up items are listed below:

i 1

1) A re-review of the draft policy statement. " Freedom of Employees in the Nuclear Industry to Raise Safety Concerns Without Fear of Retaliation". was performed by the Chairman's staf f.  !

It was determined that the policy '

statement 1ssue. is necessary since it reiterates the importance of the subject However, the Commission. In an SRM to the staff. stated the NRC should exercise its authority by independently investigating high priority cases to l determine action in a whether retaliation occurred, and take the appropriate enforcement timely manner.

The staff was directed to devote the necessary resources to address high priority cases of alleged retaliation. In addition, to better identify that the policy statement is only one piece of improvements being made. a press release was drafted highlighting other actions which have been undertaken.

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2) The NRC staff issued GL 89-10 in response to concerns regarding poor performance of some MOVs at nuclear power plants.

When the staff issued GL 89-10 in 1989. the staff considered the proposed schedule of 5 years or i 3 refueling outages to be reasonable to verify MOV design-basis capability )

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' considering the available information on specific V problems at that time.

Licensees have identified more oblems with MOVs

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licensees were expected to address the opera ility o OVs W n a concern regarding their capability was identified. In Supplement 1 to GL 89-10 (dated June 13. 1990), the staf f stated on page 40 of the enclosure that, if a licensee found that an MOV within the GL 89-10 program would not operate under design-basis conditions. the licensee must declare that MOV inoperable. The NRC staff monitored the licensees' actions regarding operability decisions during GL 89-10 inspections.

Further, the staff has taken regulatory action on a generic basis (such as issuance of supplements to GL 89-10 or information notices) and on a plant-specific basis (such as enforcement) as appropriate when MOV problems have been identified.

With almost 90 reactor units having completed their GL 89-10 programs to verify MOV design-basis capability and with the staff completing the GL 89-10 close-out inspections for nearly

40' reactor units, the staff considers that licensees have substantially

, reduced concerns regarding MOV performance.

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3) Mr. Blanch also stated that he wasn't certain that the guidance recently given to Project Managers for reviewing spent fuel pool plant specifics included ensuring compliance with the licensing basis. During the meeting, the Chairman's staff stated that the guidance was intended for that purpose, and that they believed it was explicitly stated. The guidance was reviewed and it indeed does cover three aspects: A. System Design: B. Summary of Current Licensing Basis (CLB) Requirements: and C. Summary of Compliance with Ci_B Requirements and Commitments.
4) Relatino to Part 100 '

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