ML20247H316
| ML20247H316 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200002, 05000470 |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1989 |
| From: | ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247G537 | List:
|
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8904040438 | |
| Download: ML20247H316 (309) | |
Text
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(Sheet 1.of 8)
CESSAR !!!Genia l
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EFFECTIVE PAGE LISTING CHAPTER 9 Table of contents Pace Amendment i E l ii E iii E iv E v E vi E vii E viii E ix E' x E xi E xii E xiii E xiv E xv E b xvi E I
V xvii E E
xviii xix E xx E xi E Text ,
Pace Amendment 9.1-1 E 9.1-2 E 9.1-3 E 9.1-4 E 9.1-5 E l 9.1-6 E 9.1-7 E 9.1-8 E 9.1-9 E l
9.1-10 -E 9.1-11 E 9.1-12 E 9.1-13 E 9.1-14 E 9.1-15 E O' 9.1-16 9.1-17 E
E Amendment E 8904040438 890330 0 December 30, 1988 DR ADOCK 0500
l (Sheet 2 of 8) i CESSAR ninnCAMN l
EFFECTIVE PAGE LISTING (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 9 Text (Cont'd)
Page Amendment 9.1-18 E ,
9.1-19 E 9.1-20 E 9.1-21 E 9.1-22 ,
9.1-23 E 9.1-24 E ;
9.1-25 E 9.1-26 E 9.1-27 9.1-28 9.1-29 E 9.1-30 E 9.1-31 E 9.1-32 E 9.1-33 E 9.1-34 E 9.1-35 E 9.1-36 E 9.1-37 E 9.1-38 E 9.1-39 E i 9.1-40 E 9.1-41 E 9.2-1 E 9.2-2 E '
9.2-3 E i
9.2-4 E 9.2-5 E 9.2-6 E 9.2-7 E 9.2-8 E 9.2-9 E 9.2-10 E 9.2-11 E 9.2-12 E l 9.2-13 E l 9.2-14 E j 9.2-15 E 9.2-16 E 9.2-17 E 9.2-18 E 9.2-19 E Amendment E December 30, 1988
CESSAR !!!Mncunu O EFFECTIVE PAGE LISTING (CM t' d) l CHAPTER 9 j Text (Cont'd) l Pace Amendment l 9.2-20 E l 9.2-21 E 9.2-22 E 9.2-23 E 9.2-24 E 9.2-25 E 9.2-26 E 9.2-27 E 9.2-28 E 9.2-29 E 9.2-30 E I i 9.2-31 E
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9.2-32 E l 9.2-33 E 9.2-34 E O 9.2-35 9.2-36 9.2-37 E
E E
9.2-38 E 9.3-1 E 9.3-2 E 9.3-3 E 9.3-4 B 9.3-5 E 9.3-6 B 9.3-7 B 9.3-8 B 9.3-9 E 9.3-10 B 9.3-11 B 9.3-12 B 9.3-13 B 9.3-14 B 9.3-15 B 9.3-16 B 9.3-37 B 9.3-18 B 9.3-19 B ,
9.3-20 E 9.3-21 E O 9.3-22 E h 9.2-23 9.3-24 E
B Amendment E December 30, 1988
(Sheet 4 of 8)
CESSAR EHecm2 O
SFFECTIVE PAGE LISTING (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 9 j Text (Cont'd)
Pace Amendment 9.3-25 B 9.3-26 E 9.3-27 B 9.3-28 B 9.3-29 E 9.3-30 B 9.3-31 B 9.3-32 B 9.3-33 B 9.3-34 B 9.3-35 B 9.3-36 B 9.3-37 B 9.3-38 B 9.3-39 B 9.3-40 B l 9.3-41 B j 9.3-42 E 9.3-43 B 9.3-44 B 9.3-45 9.3-46 B 9.3-47 E 9.3-48 B 9 3-49 B 9.3-50 B 9.3-51 B 9.3-52 B 9.3-53 9.3-54 B 9.3-55 B 9.2-56 B 9.3-57 B i 9.3-58 B l 9.3-59 B ,
9.4-1 E 9.4-2 E 9.4-3 E E I 9.4-4 9.4-5 E 9.4-6 E 9.4-7 E l 9.4-8 E i
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Amendment E
December 30, 1988
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(Shoot 5 of 8)
CESSAR !!!Mncama 1
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b EFFECTIVE PAGE LISTING (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 9 Text (Cont'd)
Pace Amendment 9.4-9 E 9.4-10 E 9.4-11 E 9.4-12 E 9.4-13 E 9.4-14 E 9.4-15 E 9.4-16 E l 9.4-17 E 9.4-18 E 9.4-19 E 9.4-20 E 9.4-21 E 9.4-22 E 9.4-23 E l
- 9.4-24 E Os 9.4-25 9.4-26 E
E 9.4-27 E l 9.4-28 E 9.4-29 E 9.4-30 E 9.4-31 E 9.4-32 E 9.5-1 E 9.5-2 E 9.5-3 E 9.5-4 E 9.5-6 E 9.5-7 E .
9.5-8 E 9.5-9 E 9.5-10 E 9.5-11 E 9.5-12 E 9.5-13 E 9.5-14 E 9.5-16 E 9.5-17 E 9.5-18 E
[ 9.5-19 E
\ 9.5-20 E 9.5-21 E Amendment E December 30, 1988
(Sheet 6 of 8) .
CESSAR EHEncamw !
O EFFECTIVE PAGE LISTING (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 9 j I
Text (Cont'd) l Page Amendment 9.5-22 E 9.5-23 E 9.5-24 E 9.5-25 E 9.5-26 E l 9.5-27 E 9.5-28 E l 9.5-29 E !
9.5-30 E 9.5-31 E 9.5-32 E 9.5-33 E 9.5-34 E 9.5-35 E 9.5-36 E 9.5-37 E 9.5-38 E 9.5-39 E Tables Amendment 9.1-1 E 9.1-2 (Sheet 1) E j 9.1-2 (Sheet 2) E 9.2.1-1 E 9.2.2-1 E 9.2.2-2 (Sheet 1) E 9.2.2-2 (Sheet 2) E 9.2.3-1 B !
9.2.3-2 B l 9.3.2-1 (Sheet 1) B !
9.3.2-1 (Sheet 2) B l
9.3.2-1 (Sheet 3) B 9.3.2-1 (Sheet 4) B 9.3.2-1 (Sheet 5) B 9.3.4-1 (Sheet 1) B 1 9.3.4-1 (Sheet 2) B 9.3.4-2 (Sheet 1) B 9.3.4-2 (Sheet 2) B 9.3.4-3 E 9.3.4-4 (Sheet 1) B 9.3.4-4 (Sheet 2) B i Amendment E December 30, 1988 l
(Sheet 7 of 8)
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EFFECTIVE PAGE LISTING (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 9 Tables (Cont'd) Amendment 9.3.4-4 (Sheet 3) B 9.3.4-4 (Sheet 4) B 9.3.4-4 (Sheet 5) B 9.3.4-4 (Sheet 6) B 9.3.4-4 (Sheet 7) B l
9.3.4-4 (Sheet 8) B 9.3.4-4 (Sheet 9) B l 9.3.4-4 (Sheet 10) B !
9.3.4-4 (Sheet 11) )
9.3.4-5 B l 9.3.4-6 (Sheet 1) E J 9.3.4-6 (Sheet 2) E 9.3.4-6 (Sheet 3) E 9.3.4-6 (Sheet 4) E 9.3.4-6 (Sheet 5) E p 9.3.4-6 (Sheet 6) E r j 9.3.4-6 (Sheet 7) E 9.3.4-6 (Sheet 8) E 9.3.4-7 (Sheet 1) B 9.3.4-7 (Sheet 2) B l
9.3.4-8 (Sheet 1) B 9.3.4-8 (Sheet 2) B 9.3.4-8 (Sheet 3) B l 9.3.4-9 B 9.5.3-1 (Sheet 1) E 9.5.3-1 (Sheet 2) E i
Ficures Amendment 9.1-1 E 9.1-2 E 9.1-3 E 9.1-4 E 9.1-5 E 9.1-6a E 9.1-6b E 9.1-7 E 9.1-8 E 9.1-9 E i 9.1-10 E
, 9.1-11 E 9.1-12 E 9.1-13 E Amendment E December 30, 1988
(Sheet 8 of 8)
CESSAR Eniinc Ii:n O
EF7ECTIVE PAGE LISTING (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 9 l l
Ficures (Cont'd) Amendment 9.1-14 E 9.1-15 E 9.1-16 E 9.1-17 E l 9.2.1-1 E 9.2.2-1 E 9.2.8-1 E 9.2.9-1 E 9.2.10-1 E 9.3.4-1 (Sheet 1) E 9.3.4-1 (Sheet 2) E 9.3.4-1 (Sheet 3) E 9.3.4-1 (Sheet 4) E O
O Amendment E j December 30, 1988
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(
. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER.9 Section Subiect Pace No.
J 9.0 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.1-l' 9.1 FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING 9.1-1 9.1.1 NEW FUEL STORAGE 9.1-1 9.1.1.1 Desian Bases 9.1-1 9.1.1.2 Facilities Description 9.1-1 9.1.1.3 Safety Evaluation 9.1-1 9.1.1.3.1 Criticality Safety 9.1 9.1.1.3.1.1 Postulated Accidents 9.1-2 9.1.1.3.1.2 Criticality Safety 9.1-3 Assumptions 5O 9.1.1.3.1.3 Criticality Safety Margins 9.1-3 9.1.1.3.2 Compliance with Regulatory 9.1-4 Guide 1.13 9.1.1.3.3 Seismic Classification 9.1-4 9.1.1.3.4 Storage Capacity 9.1-4 9.1.2 SPENT FUEL STORAGE 9.1-5 9.1.2.1 Desian Bases 9.1-5 9.1.2.2 Facility Description 9.1-5 9.1.2.2.1 Spent Fuel Pool 9.1-5 '
9.1.2.2.2 Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks 9.1-5:
9.1.2.3 . Safety Evaluation .9.1-6 9.1.2.3.1 Criticality Safety 9.1-6 9.1.2.3.1.1 Posutlated Accidents 9.1-6 9.1.2.3.1.2 Criticality *Afety 9.1-7 Assumptions-9.1.2.3.1.3 Criticality Safety Margins' 9.1-7 s_/ . 9.1.2.3.2 Compliance with Regulatory 9.1-8 Guide 1.13 Amendment E i December 30, 1988
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ __a
CESSAR E!airicari:n 011 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 9 Section Subiect Pace No.
9.1.2.3.3 Seismic Classification 9.1-8 9.1.2.3.4 Storage Capacity 9.1-8 9.1.2.3.5 Fuel Assembly Cooling 9.1-8 9.1.2.3.6 Shielding 9.1-8 9.1.3 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING AND CLEANUP 9.1-9 SYSTEM 9.1.3.1 Desian Bases 9.1-9 9.1.3.1.1 Spenc Fuel Pool Cooling 9.1-9 9.3.3.1.2 Spent Fuel Pool Dewatering 9.1-9 Protection 9.1.3.1.3 Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup 9.1-9 9.1.3.1.4 System Capacity Bases 9.1-10 9.1.3.2 System Description 9.1-10 9.1.3.2.1 General Description 9.1-10 9.1.3.2.2 Component Description 9.1-12 9.1.3.2.2.1 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 9.1-12 Pumps 9.1.3.2.2.2 Skimmer 9.1-12 9.1.3.2.2.3 Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup 9.1-12 i Pumps /
9.1.3.2.2.4 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 9.1-12 l Heat Exchangers 9.1.3.2.2.5 Spent Fuel Pool 9.1-12 !
Deinineralizers 9.1.3.2.2.6 Spent Fuel Pool Filters 9.1-13 9.1.3.2.2.7 Spent Fuel Pool Strainers 9.1-13 9.1.3.2.2.8 Valves 9.1-13 9.1.3.2.2.9 Piping 9.1-13 9.1.3.2.3 System Operation 9.1-13 9.1.3.3 Safety Evaluation 9.1-14 9.1.3.3.1 Availability and Reliability 9.1-14 9.1.3.3.2 Spent Fuel Pool Dewatering 9.1-14 9.1.3.3.3 Water Quality 9.1-14 Amendment E 11 December 30, 1988
CESSAR 9!Sincy,2 O
V TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 9 Section Bubiect Pace No.
9.1.3.4 Tests and Inspections 9.1-15 9.1.3.5 Instrumentation Application 9.1-15 E
9.1.3.5.1 Temperature 9.1 9.1.3.5.2 Pressure 9.1-16 9.1.3.5.3 Flow 9.1-16 ,
9.1.3.5.4 Level 9.1-16 1 9.1.3.5.5 Radiation 9.1-16 )
i '
9.1.4 FUEL HANDLING SYSTEM 9.1-17 9.1.4.1 Desian Bases 9.1-17 9.1.4.1.1 System 9.1-17
("Sg 9.1.4.1.2 Fuel Handling Equipment 9.1-17
( ) 9.1.4.1.3 Fuel Building Overhead Cranes 9.1-18 U and Containment Polar Crane 1
9.1.4.2 System Description 9.1-19 j l
9.1.4.2.1 System and Interlocks 9.1-19 9.1.4.2.1.1 Refueling Machine 9.1-20 9.1.4.2.1.2 Transfer System 9.1-22 9.1.4.2.1.3 Spent Fuel Handling 9.1-24 Machine 9.1.4.2.1.4 New Fuel Elevator 9.1-24 9.1.4.2.1.5 CEA Elevator 9.1-24 9.1.4.2.1.6 CEA Change Platform 9.1-25 9.1.4.2.1.7 Fuel Building Overhead Cranes 9.1-25 9.1.4.2.1.8 Containment Polar Crane 9.1-26 9.1.4.2.2 Components 9.1 9.1.4.2.2.1 Refueling Machine 9.1-26 9.1.4.2.2.2 Transfer System 9.1-27 9.1.4.2.2.3 Fuel Transfer. Tube Assembly 9.1-29 9.1.4.2.2.4 CEA Change Platform 9.1-29 9.1.4.2.2.5 Fuel Handling Tools 9.1-29 9.1.4.2.2.6 Reactor Vessel Head 9.1-30
[ Lift Rig N.
Amendment E iii December 30, 1988.
CESSARE! h w O
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 9 Section Subiect Pace No.
9.1.4.2.2.7 Reactor Internals 9.1-30 Handling Equipment 9.1.4.2.2.8 Spent Fuel Handling 9.1-31 i
Machine 9.1.4.2.2.9 New Fuel Elevator 9.1-31 9.1.4.2.2.10 Underwater Television 9.1-31 9.1.4.2.2.11 CEA Elevator 9.1-31 E 9.1.4.2.2.12 Transport Container 9.1-31 !
9.1.4.2.2.13 Refueling Pool Seal 9.1-32 l 9.1.4.2.2.14 In-Core Instrumentation 9.1-32 l and CEA Cutters 9.1.4.2.2.15 Gripper Operating Tool 9.1-32 Cask Handling Crane 9.1-32 E 9.1.4.2.2.16 9.1.4.2.2.17 Fuel Handling Crane 9.1-32 l 9.1.4.2.2.18 Containment Polar Crane 9.1-33 1 9.1.4.2.3 System Operation 9.1-33 9.1.4.2.3.1 New Fuel Transfer 9.1-33 9.1.4.2.3.2 Spent Fuel Transfer 9.1-33 '
9.1.4.2.3.3 Refueling Procedure 9.1-34 9.1.4.3 Safety Evaluation 9.1-36 E
9.1.4.3.1 Fuel Building Overhead Cranes 9.1-36 and Containment Polar Crane 9.1.4.3.2 Fuel Handling 9.1-37 9.1.4.3.3 Reactor Vessel Closure Head 9.1-38 Handling 9.1.4.4 Testina and Inspection 9.1-39 Requirements 9.'1.4.5 Instrumentation Requirements 9.1-40 9.2 WATER SYSTEM 9.2-1 l
9.2.1 STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 9.2-1 1 9.2.1.1 Desian Bases 9.2-1 1 E 9.2.1.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.2-1 9.2.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Basis 9.2-2 9.2.1.1.3 Codes and Standards 9.2-2 Amendment E iv December 30, 1988
CESSAREHLbmw O TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 9 i Section Bubiect Pace No 1
)
9.2.1.2 System Description 9.2-2 ]
9.2.1.2.1 Components Description 9.2-2 9.2.1.2.1.1 SSWS Pumps 9.2-2 9.2.1.2.1.2 SSWS Pump Structure 9.2-3 9.2.1.2.1.3 Piping, Valves, and Fittings 9.2-3 l
9.2.1.2.2 System Operation 9.2-3 9.2.1.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-4 9.2.1.4 Inspection and Testina 9.2-5 Requirements l 9.2.1.5 Instrumentation Requirements 9.2-5 fs s 9.2.2 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM 9.2-7 E 9.2.2.1 Desian Bases 9.2-7 9.2.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.2-7 9.2.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Basis 9.2-8 9.2.2.1.3 Codes and Standards 9.2-8 1
9.2.2.2 System Description 9.2-8 I 9.2.2.2.1 Components Description 9.2-9 )
9.2.2.2.1.1 CCWS Heat Exchangers 9.2-9 9.2.2.2.1.2 CCWS Pumps 9.2-10 9.2.2.2.1.3 CCWS Surge Tanks, 9.2-10 9.2.2.2.1.4 Piping, Valves, and Fittings 9.2-10 9.2.2.2.1.5 Instrumentation and Controls 9.2-11 9.2.2.2.2 System Operation 9.2-11 9.2.2.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-13 9.2.2.4 Inspection and Testina 9.2-14 Requirements V
Amendment E v December 30, 1988
CESSARE!Lbmu O
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) l CHAPTER 9 i
i Section Sp.biect Pace No E
9.2.2.5 Instrumentation neauirements 9.2-14 9.2.3 DEMINERALIZED WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM 9.2-17 l
9.2.3.1 Desian Bases 9.2-17 B
9.2.3.2 System Description 9.2-17 9.2.3.2.1 System Performance 9.2-18 9.2.3.2.2 Components Description 9.2-19 9.2.3.2.2.1 Demineralized 9.2-19 9.2.3.2.2.2 Vacuum Degasifier 9.2-20 9.2.3.2.2.3 Demineralized Water Storage 9.2-20 Tank l 9.2.3.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-20 9.2.3.4 Inspection and Testina 9.2-20 Requirements 9.2.3.5 Instrumentation Requirements 9.2-20 9.2.4 POTABLE AND SANITARY WATER SYSTEMS 9.2-23 9.2.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK 9.2-23 9.2.5.1 Desian Bases 9.2-23 9.2.5.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.2-23 9.2.5.1.2 Codes and Standards 9.2-23 E 9.2.5.2 System Description 9.2-23 9.2.5.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-24 l
9.2.5.4 Instrumentation Recuireaents 9.2-24 l
9.2.6 CONDENSATE STORAGE SYSTEM 9.2-24 9.2.6.1 Desian Bases 9.2-24 B O
Amendment E vi December 30, 1988
hhk b'ICATl!N
.k N
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 9 l Section Subiect Pace No System Description 9.2-25 I 9.2.6.2 9.2.6.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-26 l l
l B
9.2.6.4 Inspections and Testina 9.2-26 I Requirements I l
9.2.6.5 Instrumentation Requirements 9.2-26 I 9.2.7 REFUELING WATER SYSTEM 9.2-26 9.2.7.1 Desian Bases 9.2-27 9.2.7.2 System Description 9.2-27 l
l
- p. 9.2.7.2.1 Refueling Cavity Filling and 9.2-27 r Draining E
,\ 9.2.7.2.2 Refueling Water Purification 9.2-28 9.2.7.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-28 9.2.7.4 Inspection and Testina 9.2-28 Requirements 9.2.7.5 Instrumentation Requirements 9.2-28 9.2.8 TURBINE BUILDING COOLING WATER SYSTEM 9.2-28 9.2.8.1 Desian Bases 9.2-29 Power Generation Design Basis I 9.2.8.1.1 9.2-29 9.2.8.1.2 Codes and Sthndards 9.2-29 9.2.8.2 System Description 9.2-29 l 9.2.8.2.1 System Operation 9.2-30 9.2.8.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-30 9.2.8.4 Inspection and Testina 9.2-30 Requirements 9.2.8.5 Instrumentation Requirements 9.2-30 I
Amendment E vii December 30, 1988
v-I q
. ICAT12 N l
l TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 9 l
Section Subiect Pace No 9.2.9 CHILLED WATER SYSTEM 9.2-31 9.2.9.1 Desian Basis 9.2-31 i i
9.2.9.2 System Description 9.2-32 9.2.9.2.1 ECWS 9.2-32
. 9.2.9.2.2 NCWS 9.2-33 j
l 9.2.9.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-34 9.2.9.3.1 ECWS 9.2-34 9.2.9.3.2 NCWS 9.2-34 i
9.2.9.4 Inspection and Testina 9.2-34 Requirements 9.2.9.5 Instrumentation Requirements 9.2-35 9.2.10 TURBINE BUILDINC SERVICE WATER S' TEM 9.2-37 9.2.10.1 Desian Bases 9.2-37 E
9.2.10.1.1 Power Generation Design Bases 9.2-37 9.2.10.1.2 Codes and Standards 9.2-37 9.2.10.2 System Description 9.2-37 9.2.10.2.1 General Description. 9.2-38 9.2.10.2.2 Components Description 9.2-38 9.2.10.2.3 System Operation 9.2-38 9.2.10.3 Safety Evaluation 9.2-38 9.2.10.4 Inspection and Testina 9.2-38 Requirements 9.2.10.5 Instrumentation Requirements 9.2-38 9.3 PROCESS AUXILIARIES 9.3-1 9.3.1 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEMS 9.3-1 Amendment E viii December 30, 1988
CESSAR !!Nncm2 I
u>
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 9 l
Section Subiect Pace No 9.3.1.1 Desian Bases 9.3-1 9.3.1.1.1 Codes and Standards 9.3-1 9.3.1.2 System Description 9.3-1 9.3.1.2.1 Instrument Air System 9.3-1 9.3.1.2.2 Station Air System 9.3-2 E 9.3.1.2.3 Breathing Air System 9.3-2 9.3.1.3 Safety Evaluation 9.3-2 9.3.1.4 Inspection.*nd Testina 9.3-3 Reauiremer.1 i
-- 9.3.1.5 Instrumentation Requirements 9.3-3 i
k-s 9.3.2 PROCESS SAMPLING SYSTEM 9.3-3 9.3.2.1 Desian Bases 9.3-3 l 9.3.2.1.1 Performance Design Criteria 9.3-3 9.3.2.2 System Description 9.3-6 9.3.2.2.1 General System Description 9.3-6 9.3.2.2.2 Detailed System Description 9.3-9 9.3.2.3 Desian Evaluation 9.3-17 B 9.3.2.4 Inspection and Testina 9.3-18 Requirements 9.3.2.5 Instrumentation 7cluirements 9.3-18 9.2.3 EQUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEM 9.3-21 4 9.3.3.1 Desian Bases 9.3-21 9.3.3.2 System Description E 9.3-21
( h V
Amendment E ix December 30, 1988
CESSAR 8HOICATl*N TABLE CE;;ONTENT8 (Cont'd)
O CHAPTER 9 Section Bubiect Pace No 9.3.3.2.1 Equipment Drain Tank 9.3-22 9.3.3.2.2 Reactor Drain Tank 9.3-22 9.3.3.2.3 Waste Tanks 9.3-22 i 9.3.3.2.4 Laundary Tanks 9.3-22 E 9.3.3.3 Safety Evaluatica 9.3-22 9.3.3.4 Inspection and Testina 9.3-23 Requirements 9.3.3.5 Instrumentation Reactrements 9.3-23 9.3.4 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM 9.3-23 s.3.4.1 Desian Bases 9.3-23 1
9.3.4.1.1 Functional Requirements 9.3-23 l 9.3.4.1.2 Design Criteria 9.3-25 l l
9.3.4.1.3 System Functions 9.3-27 9.3.4.1.3.1 Reactor Coolant 9.3-27 Inventory 9.3.4.1.3.2 Corrosion Control 9.3-28 By Reactor Coolant System Chemistry 9.3.4.1.3.3 Reactivity Control 9.3-29 9.3.4.2 System Description 9.3-29 9.3.4.2.1 System 9.3-29 9.3.4.2.2 Component Description 9.3-33 9.3.4.2.3 System Operation 9.3-38 9.3.4.3 Desian Evaluation 9.3-40 9.3.4.3.1 Availability and Reliability 9.3-40 9.3.4.3.2 Accident Response 9.3-41 9.3.4.3.3 Overpressure Protection 9.3-42 9.3.4.3.4 Chemistry and Purity Control 9.3-44 9.3.4.3.5 System Isolation 9.3-46 Amendment E x December 30, 1988
W hhk R ICAT13N 1
/"'N m- j TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) f CHAPTER 9 Section Bubiect Pace No 9.3.4.3.5.1 Containment Isolation 9.3-46 B 9.3.4.3.5.2 Safety Class Transition 9.3-47 Boundaries 9.3.4.3.6 Leakage Detection and Control 9.3-48 9.3.4.3.7 Failure Mode and Effects 9.3-48 Analysis 9.3.4.3.8 Radiological Evaluation 9.3-48 9.3.4.4 Testina and Inspection 9.3-48 Rgpuirements 9.3.4.5 Instrumentation 9.3-49 9.3.4.5.1 Temperature Instrumentation 9.3-49 9.3.4.5.2 Pressure Instrumentation 9.3-51
/s 9.3.4.5.3 Level Instrumentation 9.3-54 k ,)\
m 9.3.4.5.4 Flow Instrumentation 9.3-55 9.3.4.5.5 Boron Measurement 9.3-57 l
Instrumentation 9.3.4.5.6 Radiation Monitoring 9.3-57 Instrumentation 9.3.4.5.6.1 Process Radiation 9.3-57 Monitor 9.3.4.5.6.2 Gas Stripper Effluent 9.3-57 Monitor 9.3.4.6 Interface Requirements 9.3 9.4 AIR CONDITIONING, HEATING, COOLING, AND VENTILATION SYSTEMS 9.4-1 9.4.1 CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM 9.4-1 9.4.1.1 Desian Bases 9.4-1 E i 9.4.1.1.1 Codes and Standards 9.4-2 )i 9.4.1.2 System Description 9.4-3
[ 9.4.1.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-4 N~-
Amendment E xi December 30, 1988
(#! h h k R ICATCN 1
O TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 9 Section Subiect Pace No
)
9.4.1.4 Inspections and Testina 9.4-6 Requirements 9.4.1.5 .strumentation Applications 9.4-6 9.4-7 ;
9.4.2 FUEL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM 9.4.2.1 Desian Bases 9.4-7 f l
9.4.2.1.1 Codes and Standards 9.4-8 i 9.4.2.2 System Description 9.4-9 1
9.4.2.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-10 l 9.4.2.4 Inspection and Testina 9.4-10 Requirements 9.4.2.5 Instrumentation Acolication 9.4-10 ;
9.4.3 AUXILIARY AND RADWASTE BUILDING 9.4-11 k VENTILATION SYSTEM i 1
9.4.3.1 Desian ' Bases 9.4-11 )
i 9.4.3.1.1 Codes and Standards 9.4-12 9.4.3.2 System Description 9.4-12 9.4.3.2.1 Component Description 9.4-13 )
9.4.3.2.2 System Operation 9.4-14 ]
9.4.3.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-14 9.4.3.4 Insuection and Testina 9.4-15 ;
Requirements '
l 9.4.3.5 Instrumentation Applications 9.4-16 l
9.4.4 DIESEL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM 9.4-17 !
9.4.4.1 Desian Bases 9.4-17
)
I Amendment E i xii December 30, 1988 i
- h R ICATl!N 1
V TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 9 Section Subiect Pace No 9.4.4.1.1 Codes and Standards 9.4-17 9.4.4.2 System Description 9.4-18 9.4.4.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-19 i 9.4.4.4 Inspection and Testina 9.4-19 i Requirements 9.4.4.5 Instrumentation Aeolication 9.4-20 9.4.5 CONTAINMENT PURGE VENTILATION SYSTEM 9.4-20 I
9.4.5.1 Desian Bases 9.4-20 N 9.4.5.1.1 Codes and Standards 9.4-21 C-l 9.4.5.2 System Description 9.4-21 9.4.5.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-22 9.4.5.4 Inspection and Testina 9.4-23 E
Requirements 9.4.5.5 Instrumentation Acolication 9.4-23 9.4.6 CONTAINMENT COOLING AND VENTILATION 9.4-24 SYSTEM 9.4.6.1 Desian Bases 9.4-24 9.4.6.1.1 Codes and Standards 9.4-25 9.4.6.2 System Description 9.4 9.4.6.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-27 9.4.6.4 Inspection and Testina 9.4-27 Requirements
-s 9.4.6.5 Instrumentation Aeolication 9.4-28 U
Amendment E xiii December 30,_1988
l CESSAR EEncariIn TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) e CHAPTER 9 Section Subiect Pace No 9.4.7 TURBINE BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM 9.4-29 9.4.7.1 Desian Bases 9.4-29 I
9.4.7.1.1 Codes and Standards 9.4-29 l
9.4.7.2 System Description 9.4-30 9.4.7.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-30 9.4.7.4 Inspection and Testina 9.4-30 Requirements 9.4.7.5 Instrumentation Application 9.4-30 9.4.8 STATION SERVICE WATER PUMP STRUCTURE 9.4-30 VENTILATION SYSTEM ,
9.4.8.1 Desian Bases 9.4-30 9.4.8.1.1 Codes and Standards 9.4-31 9.4.8.2 System Description 9.4-32 E 9.4.8.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4-32 ,
1 9.4.8.4 Inspection and Testina 9.4-32 Requirements 9.4.8.5 Instrumentation Application 9.4-32 9.5 OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.5-1 9.5.1 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 9.5-1 9.5.1.1 Desian Bases 9.5-1 9.5.1.1.1 Fire Protection - Water Supply 9.5-1 and Pumps 9.5.1.1.2 Fire Protection During 9.5-1 l Construction 9.5.1.1.3 Codes and Standards 9.5-2 Amendment E xiv December 30, 1988 I
_ _ _ _________.____w
)! hhkk E ICAT13N (v
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 9 Section Subiect Pace No 9.5.1.2 System Description 9.5-2 9.5.1.2.1 General 9.5-2 9.5.1.2.2 Fire Protection - Category I 9.5-3 Related 9.5.1.2.3 Detection and Alarms 9.5-4 9.5.1.2.4 Fire Protection System 9.5-5 Relationship to Power Sources 9.5.1.2.5 Smoke, Heat, and Flame Control 9.5-5 I Features 9.5.1.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5-6 9.5.1.3.1 Category I Related Evaluations 9.5-6 9.5.1.3.2 Other Related Evaluation 9.5-6
' ( 9.5.1.4 Inspection and Testina 9.5-7 Requirements l 9.5.2 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS 9.5-7 9.5.2.1 Desic1 Bases 9.5-7 9.5.2.2 System Description 9.5-8 l
9.5.2.2.1 Intraplant (PABX) Telephone 9.5-8 E System i 9.5.2.2.2 Intraplant Public Address (PA) 9.5-8 System l 9.5.2.2.3 Intraplant Sound-Powered 9.5-8 l Telephone Systems 9.5.2.2.4 Offsite Communications 9.5-9 9.5.2.2.5 System Operation 9.5-10 9.5.2.3 Insnection and Testina 9.5-10 Requirements 9.5.3 LIGHTING SYSTEMS 9.5-10 j 9.5.3.1 Desian Bases 9.5-10
%J Amendment E xv December 30, 1988
CESSAR Kncmu O
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 9 q Subiect Pace No I Section l
9.5.3.2 System Description 9.5-11 9.5.3.2.1 Normal Lighting System 9.5-11 9.5.3.2.2 Security Lighting System 9.5-12 9.5.3.3.3 Emergency Lighting 9.5-12 9.5.3.3 Inspection and Testina 9.5-13 Requirements .
il 9.5.4 DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE FUEL OIL 9.5-15 SYSTEM 9.5.4.1 Desian Bases 9.5-15 9.5.4.2 System Description 9.5-15 9.5.4.2.1 General 9.5-15 9.5.4.2.2 Component Description 9.5-17 {
9.5.4.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5-17 9.5.4.4 Inspection and Testina 9.5-19 Requirements E
9.5.4.5 Instrumentation Application 9.5-19 9.5.5 DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE COOLING 9.5-20 WATER SYSTEM 9.5.5.1 Desian Bases 9.5-20 9.5.5.2 System Description 9.5-21 9.5.5.2.1 General 9.5-21 9.5.5.2.2 Component Description 9.5-22 9.5.5.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5-23 9.5.5.4 Inspection and Testina 9.5-23 Requirements l 9.5.5.5 Instrumentation Acolication 9.5-23 Amendment E xvi December 30, 1988
CESSAR Ennneum 1
/N l t
N~-li TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 9 l
l Section Subiect Pace No I 9.5.6 DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE STARTING 9.5-24 AIR SYSTEM 9.5.6.1 Desian Bases 9.5-24 9.5.6.2 System Description 9.5-24
)
9.5.6.2.1 General 9.5-24 9.5.6.2.2 Component Description 9.5-26 9.5.6.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5-26 9.5.6.4 Inspection and Testina 9.5-27 Requirements
- . 9.5.6.5 Instrumentation Anolication 9.5-27 9.5.7 DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE LUBE OIL 9.5-27 l SYSTEM 9.5.7.1 Desian Bases 9.5-27 9.5.7.2 System Description 9.5-28 E
9.5.7.2.1 General 9.5-28 9.5.7.2.2 Component Description 9.5-30 9.5.7.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5-30 9.p.7.4 Inspection and Testina 9.5-31 Requirements 9.5.7.5 Instrumentation Application 9.5-31 9.5.8 DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE AIR INTAKE 9.5-32 AND EXHAUST SYSTEM 9.5.8.1 Desian Bases 9.5-32 9.5.8.2 System Description 9.5-32 v
Amendment E xvii December 30, 1988
CESSARn!Lbmu O
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 9 Bection Bubiect Pace No 9.5.8.2.1 General 9.5-32 9.5.8.2.2 Component Description 9.5-33 9.5.8.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5-33 9.5.8.4 Inspection and Testina 9.5-34 Requirements 9.5.8.5 Instrumentation Aeolication 9.5-34 I
9.5.9 DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING SUMP 9.5-34 PUMP SYSTEM 9.5.9.1 Desian Bases 9.5-34 9.5.9.2 System Description 9.5-34 l 9.5.9.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5-34 9.5.9.4 Inspection and Testina 9.5-35 Requirements 9.5.10 COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM 9.5-35 E
9.5.10.1 Desian Bases 9.5-35 9.5.10.2 System Description 9.5-35 9.5.10.2.1 Valves 9.5-36 9.5.10.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5-36 9.5.10.4 Inspection and Testina 9.5-38 Beauirements 9.5.10.5 Instrumentation Aeolication 9.5-38 l
O Amendment E xviii December 30, 1988
CESSAR inacue,.
D U
LIST OF TABLES CHAPTER 9 i
l Table subiect f 1
9.1-1 Major Tools and Servicing Equipment for Refueling Functions !
9.1-2 Failure Mode Analysis of Fuel Handling Equipment l 9.2.1-1 Station Service Water System Single Failure l Analysis !
E 9.2.2-1 CCWS Water Quality Specifications 9.2.2-2 Component Cooling System Single Failure Analysis 9.2.3-1 Primary and Secondary Makeup Water Limits '
9.2.3-2 Process Monitoring Parameters A U 9.3.2-1 Process Sampling Requirements / Normal Operation 9.3.4-1 Operating Limits 9.3.4-2 Design Transients 9.3.4-3 Excess Reactor Coolant Generated During Typical Plant Operations 9.3.4-4 Principal Component Data Summary 9.3.4-5 Chemical and Volume Control System Parameters 9.3.4-6 Chemical and Volume Control System Process Flow Data 'i 1
9.3.4-7 Chemical and Volume Control System List of Active Valves 9.3.4-8 Classification of CVCS Structures, Systems, and Components 9.3.4-9 Relationship of Safety Class to code Class 9.5.3-1 Typical Illuminance Ranges for Normal Lighting E (n)
%J Amendment E xix December 30, 1988
CESSAR !!nincui:,. ;
1 i
LIST OF FIGURES O'
CHAPTER 9 l
Ficure Subiect i 1
9.1-1 New and Spent Fuel Storage Rack l l
9.1-2 Cell Details of "L" Insert Box i 1
9.1-3 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System P&ID j l
E Refueling Machine l
9.1-4 9.1-5 CEA Change Platform 9.1-6a Fuel Transfer System Carriage and Upender ,
(Fuel Building) 9.1-6b Fuel Transfer System Carriage and Upender j (Containment Building) 9.1-7 CEA Elevator 9.1-8 Typical New Fuel Elevator 9.1-9 Typical Hydraulic Power Unit 9.1-10 Typical Fuel Transfer Tube Assembly 9.1-11 Typical Fuel Handling Tools l
9.1-12 Typical Closure Head Lift Rig Assembly 9.1-13 Typical Core Support Barrel Lift Rig Assembly l
9.1-14 Typical Upper Guide Structure Lift Rig Assembly !
9.1-15 Typical Underwater TV System 9.1-16 Typical In-Core Instrumentation and CEA Cutter 9.1-17 Typical Reactor Vessel Head Assembly i
9.2.1-1 Station Service Water System (1 of 2 Divisions)
I 9.2.2-1 Component Cooling Water System (1 of 2 Divisions) ei i I
AmendItent E l xx December 30, 1988 j l
l _ _ _ _ . ____-___-__-_-_A
l 1
CESSAR !!aincuian 1
i LIST OF FIGURES (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 9
)
subiect I Fiqure l 9.2.8-1 Turbine Building Component Cooling Water System 9.2.9-1 Chilled Water System E f 9.2.10-1 Turbine Building Service Water System 9.3.4-1 Chemical and Volume Control System Flow Diagram l
l l
l l
1 Amendment E xxi December 30, 1988
i j
CESSAR Ensncam. !
i v
9.0 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.1 FUEL STORAGE AND HANDLING 9.1.1 NEW FUEL STORAGE 9.1.1.1 Desian Bases The following design bases are imposed on the. storage of new fuel assemblies:
A. Accidental . criticality shall be prevented for the most reactive arrangement of new . fuel stored, with optimum moderation, by assuring that K is less than 0.98. This designbasisismetunderanyn8baloraccidentconditions.
B. The intent of Regulatory Guide 1.13 is met.
C. The storage racks and facilities are qualified as Seismic Category I.
D. Storage is provided for 166 new fuel assemblies.
9.1.1.2 Facilities Description The rack assemblies are made up of individual racks similar to those shown 4.n Figure 9.1-1. A minimum edge-to-edge spacing between fuel assemblies is maintained between assemblies in adjacent rows. These spacings are the minimum values after allowances are made for rack fabrication tolerances and the predicted deflections resulting from postulated accident E conditions.
The stainless steel construction of the storage racks is compatible with water and Zircaloy clad fuel.
The outer structure of the racks precludes the inadvertent placement of a fuel assembly against the rack closer than the prescribed edge-to-edge spacing. The racks are bolted to pool embedment plates to preclude excessive tipping.
9.1.1.3 Safety Evaluation The new fuel storage rack design, discussed in Section 9.1.1.2, ensures that the design bases of Section 9.1.1.1 are met. The capability of new fuel storage is described below.
Amendment E 9.1-1 December.30, 1988
CESSARaninc- !
I l
)
9.1.1.3.1 Criticality Safety l 9.1.1.3.1.1 Postulated Accidents i
The following postulated accidents are considered in the design l of the new fuel storage racks l
A. Flooding; complete immersion of the entire storage array in pure, unborated, room-temperature water.
B. Envelopment of the entire array in a uniform density aqueous foam or nist of optimum density that maximizes the reactivity of the finite array as described in Section 9.1.1. 3.1. 2.D of the criticality safety assumptions. It is .
postulated that these conditions could be present as a l result of fire fighting. l l
C. A fuel assembly and its handling tool dropped from a height l of 2 feet onto the rack which then falls horizontally across the top of the rack. j D. Tensile load on the rack of 5000 pounds (limited by adjustment of the motor stall torque or load-limiting device of the crane used to remove fuel from the racks). E Although the above accident conditions have been postulated, the fuel handling equipment, new fuel racks, and the building arrangement are designed to minimize the possibility of these accidents or the effects resulting from these accidents by:
A. Providing positive hoist travel limits and interlocks to ensure proper equipment operation and sequencing.
B. Limiting the handling loads when installing fuel into or removing fuel from the fuel rack.
C. Designing the new fuel racks for Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) conditions and dropped fuel assembly conditions, considered separately.
D. Maintaining K less than 0.95 in the event the fuel area becomes flood 8d E. Designing the new fuel handling crane to preclude the crane, or any part thereof, from falling into the new fuel handling area.
O Amendment E 9.1-2 December 30, 1988
CESSAREna m.
O 9.1.1.3.1.2 Criticality Safety Assumptions The following assumptions are made in evaluating criticality safety:
A. Under postulated conditions of complete flooding by unborated- room-temperature water, the storage array is treated as an infinite array of assemblies having an infinite fuel length.
B. Under postulated conditions of envelopment by aqueous foam j or mist, a ~ range of foam or mist densities is examined to !
ensure that the maximum reactivity of the array is established. The foam or mist is assumed to be pure water.
C. The poisoning effects of rack structure are neglected.
Prior calculations have shown this to be a conservative assumption, where the degree of conservatism depends on the exact rack structure design. It is also assumed that no supplemental fixed poisons are utilized in the storage array.
D. A concrete storage cavity is utilized for_new fuel storage.
p\ Three 10x11 new fuel storage racks are installed in the t(,,/ cavity. E The array is assumed to be surrounded on all six faces by a 2-foot thick, close-fitting reflector of concrete. The a concrete walls are several inches away from the outer rows of fuel assemblies, the floor is several inches below the ,
bottom of the active fuel, and the materials above the active fuel provide a substantially poorer reflector than a thick concrete reflector.
E. The rack is assumed to be filled to design capacity with fuel assemblies.
F. No burnable poison shims or other supplemental neutron poisons (e.g., CEAs) are assumed to be present in the fuel assemblies.
9.1.1.3.1.3 Criticality Safety Margins Criticality safety margins are maintained by:
A. Limiting the capacity to 166 fuel assemblies.
B. Defining an overall array configuration.
C. Providing adequate mechanical separation of fuel assemblies in the array, even under postulated accident conditions.
Amendment E 9.1-3 December 30, 1988
CESSAR EE"lCAT15N The mechanical separation provided is discussed in Section O
9.1.1.2. In evaluating criticality safety, spatial calculations are performed using the two-dimensional transport code, DOT-4 (Reference 1) , for a typical repeating lattice unit of the fuel rack for a selection of uniform water densities covering the ranges in which reactivity peaks occur. Geometries requiring j three-dimensional models are analyzed using KENO IV (Reference 2), Maximum K enrichments uffvaluesarecalculatedforthisstoragearrayand to 5 wt.%, which is higher than U-235 expected I'
loadings.
l The rack structure provides at least 10 inches between the top of the active fuel and the top of the rack to preclude criticality in the event a fuel assembly is dropped into a horizontal position on the top of the rack.
The new fuel storage area is protected from the effects of missiles or natural phenomena as discussed in Section 3.5.
9.1.1.3.2 Compliance with Regulatory Guitte 1.13 New fuel storage complies with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.13.
9.1.1.3.3 Seismic Classification
)
New fuel storage racks and facilities are qualified as Seismic Category I.
9.1.1.3.4 Storage Capacity Storage is provided for at least 166 new fuel assemblies in three l 50% density 10x11 racks.
O I
Amendment E 9.1-4 December 30, 1988 I i
CESSAREE%nc==
C 9.1.2 SPENT FUEL STORAGE 9.1.2.1 Desian Bases The following design bases are imposed on the storage of fuel within the spent fuel pool:
A. Accidental criticality shall be prevented for the most reactive arrangement of fuel stored with optimum moderation by avoiding a K greater than 0.95. This design basis shall be met und8[fany normal or accident conditions.
B. The requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.13 shall be met.
C. .The storage racks and facilities shall be Seismic Category I.
D. Storage shall be provided for up to 1075 spent fuel assemblies.
9.1.2.2 Facility Description 9.1.2.2.1 Spent Fuel Pool The spent fuel pool is a stainless steel lined, concrete walled I pool that is an integral part of the fuel building.
9.1.2.2.2 Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks E
The spent fuel pool storage racks are made up of fifteen 10x11~
individual modules containing 110 storage cells each. A module is an array of fuel storage cells similar to that shown in Figure 9.1-1. The storage racks are stainless steel honeycomb structures with rectangular fuel storage cells. The stainless steel construction of the racks is compatible with fuel assembly materials and the spent fuel borated water environment.
A single pitch of 9.780 inches is provided for all of the racks in the pool. The spent fuel is stored in two regions of the pool. Region I provides core off-load capability for 333 spent fuel assemblies (equivalent to one and one-third cores). This is achieved with 50% density storage in a checkerboard array using "L" inserts in the usable cells (Figure 9.1-2). The "L" insert is a non-poisoned stainless steel insert which provides the needed flux trap water gap. Region . II provides 75% density storage for 742 spent fuel assemblies. "L" inserts are not re-quired to provide a flux trap water gap in Region II. The cells that are not used are blocked to prevent improper storage.
A A total of 1075 ustale spaces for spent fuel storage is thus
( provided. ;
Amendment E 9.1-5 December 30, 1988
CESSAR n!L"icnicu The structural design of the spent fuel rack and pool includes O
provisions for accepting loads associated with 100% storage with neutron poison inserts in order to meet future expansion potential. i 9.1.2.3 Safety Evaluation l The spent fuel pool storage rack design and location, discussed in Section 9.1.2.2, provides assurance that design bases of Section 9.1.2.1 are met as noted in the following sections.
9.1.2.3.1 Criticality Safety 9.1.2.3.1.1 Postulated Accidents l The following postulated accidents are considered in the design of the spent fuel pool storage racks:
A. A fuel assembly and its handling tool dropped from a height of 2 feet above the rack onto the rack with the assembly then falling horizontally across the top of the rack or falling between the rack and surrounding spent fuel pool walls or falling into a blocked-off fuel storage cavity.
B. Tensile load on the rack of 5000 pounds (limited by adjustment of the motor stall torque or load-limiting device of the crane used to load fuel into the racks).
Although the above accident conditions have been postulated, the E fuel handling equipment, fuel racks, and the building arrangement ,
are designed to minimize the possibility of these accidents or '
the effects resulting from these accidents by:
A. Providing positive mechanical travel hoist limits and l interlocks to ensure proper equipment operation and sequence.
B. Limiting the handling loads when installing fuel into or removing fuel from the fuel rack.
C. Designing the fuel racks for SSE conditions and dropped fuel assembly (and handling tool) conditions, considered separately.
D. Designing the fuel handling machine as a Seismic Category I to preclude the fuel handling machine, or any part thereof, from falling into the spent fuel pool.
O Amendment E 9.1-6 December 30, 1988
CESSARinacana
{
i t.>
9.1.2.3.1.2 Criticality Safety Assumptions The following assumptions are made in evaluating criticality safety:
A. No control element assemblies (CEAs) are assumed to be present in the fuel assemblies.
B. The rack is assumed .to be filled to capacit'; with fuel assemblies of the type whose criticality safety is evaluated with the spent fuel pool filled with water.
C. For normM operation, no credit is assumed for the boron normally found in the spent fuel pool water. For the flooded spent fuel pool criticality analysis, an optimum temperature is assumed for the water moderator. In evaluating the criticality limits of a dropped fuel assembly accident, it is assumed that boron concentration in the I
spent fuel pool water is at least 2000 ppm.
D. An infinite fuel assembly array is assumed for the flooded spent fuel pool analysis.
A
( ) E. Only one fuel assembly is assumed to be dropped in a fuel V handling accident.
E 9.1.2.3.1.3 Criticality Safety Margins )
Criticality safety margins are assured by:
A. Neglecting the neutron absorption effects associated with the boron normally in the spent fuel pool water during normal operations and assuming that spent fuel pool boron concentration is less than one-half of normal during a fuel assembly drop accident.
B. When fuel is stored in the borated or mixed modes (freshly burned fuel assembly is advertently placed in Region II),
credit is taken for the neutron absorption effects.
C. No credit is taken for the lesser reactive nature of spent fuel.
In evaluating criticality safety, spatial calculations are ,
performed using the two-dimensional transport coJs DOT-4 (Reference 1), and the three-dimensional Monte Carlo code, KENO IV (Reference 2), for typical repeating lattice units of the fuel rack for a selection of uniform water densities covering the ranges in which reactivity peaks occur.
Amendment E 9.1-7 December 30, 1988
CESSARM h 2 Maximum K eff values are calculated for enrichments up to 5 wt.%
O U-235.
For all conditions, i.e., normal and accident K is shown to be less than 0.95. The K values are substa8d[ ally below the limiting values allowe8 fby ANS/ ANSI 51.1-1983 and provide adequate margin for calculation uncertainty, The spent fuel storage area' is protected from the effects of missiles or natural phenomena as discussed in Section 3.5.
9.1.2.3.2 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.13 The spent fuel storage facility complies with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.13.
1 9.1.2.3.3 Seismic Classification The spent fuel pool storage racks and facilities are Seismic j Category I. l l
9.1.2.3.4 Storage Capacity l l
Storage is provided for up to 1075 spent fuel assemblies.
9.1.2.3.5 Fuel Assembly Cooling The spent fuel pool storage racks are designed to prevent extensive bulk boiling in the racks as well as maintain fuel cladding temperatures well below 650*F for the following collective cor,ditions:
A. Natural convection water circulation within the spent fuel pool, B. Maximum pool water temperature of 150*F at the fuel rack inlet flow passages, and C. Maximum fuel pool heat load as described in Section 9.1.3.
9..i.2.3.6 Shielding Concrete and water shielding are provided that attenuates radiation from the maximum design loading of stored fuel assemblies such that radiation zone criteria are met.
O Amendment E 9.1-8 December 30, 1988
CESSARMEnc-l O
)
9.1.3 SPENT FtlEJ: POOL COOLING AND CLEANUP SYSTEM The spent fue- pool cooling and cleanup system (SFPCCS) consists of the spent fuel pool cooling systems and the spent fuel pool cleanup system. The spent fuel pool cooling system is designed to remove the decay heat generated by the stored spent fuel assemblies from the spent fuel pool water.
This cooling is accomplished by taking high-temperature water from the pool, pumping it through a heat exchanger, and returning the cooled water to the pool. The spent fuel pool cleanup system is also used to clarify and purify spent fuel pool, transfer canal, and refueling cavity water. A portion of the spent fuel pool water is pumped through this cleanup system and returned to the pool. Piping does not interfere with the racks.
The SFPCCs is capable of maintaining the pool water at a low enough temperature to prevent excessive vapor formation or evaporation from the water surface, or cause excessive discomfort to personnel during fuel handling operations.
9.1.3.1 Desian Bases 9.1.3.1.1 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling The spent fuel pool cooling system is designed to remove the E I
amount of decay heat that is produced by the number of spent fuel i assemblies that are stored in the pool following a unit refueling l and the accumulated assemblies resulting from previous j refuelings. Two cooling trains are capable of maintaining the !
spent fuel pool bulk water temperature at or below 120*F when the heat exchangers are supplied with component cooling water at the design flow. The flow through the spent fuel pool provides sufficient mixing to maintain uniform pool water condi+ ions.
9.1.3.1.2 Spent Fuel Pool Dewatering Protection System piping is arranged so that failure of any one pipeline cannot drain the spent fuel pool below the water level required for radiation shielding.
l 9.1.3.1.3 Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup ;
l The system's domineralizers and filters are designed to provide adequate purification to permit unrestricted access for plant personnel, to maintain spent fuel pool surface dose rate below 2.5 mrem /hr during fuel handling operation in the spent fuel storage area, and to maintain optical clarity of the spent fuel
[ i pool water. The optical clarjty of the spent fuel pool water U
Amendment E 9.1-9 December 30, 1988 j l
CESSAR Ennnema 1 O i surface is maintained by use of the system's skimmers. The j cleanup system is designed for a flow rate sufficient to ensure adequate circulation of the entire spent fuel pool water volume, and to maintain the specified water chemistry. i The boron concentration in the spent fuel pool water is maintained at approximately the same concentration as in the q refueling water. Provisions are made to make up water to the s spent fuel puol. The makeup water meets specified water ,
chemistry. l l
9.1.3.1.4 System Capacity Bases '
For all normal plant operations and normal spent fuel pool heat load conditions, the maximum spent fuel pool bulk water ;
temperature is 120*F. Under heat load conditions of a full core j offload with 10 years of irradiated fuel in the pool, the maximum bulk water temperature is 140*F. Given a single active failure, t the maximum temperatures for normal conditions or a full core l offload are 140*F or 180*F respectively. The normal heat load is '
the decay heat which occurs when an accumulation of spent fuel equal to 10 full power years is in the spent fuel pool, with the ;
newest spent fuel batch having just been placed in the pool j during refueling at 120 hoi .rs after shutdown. The full core offload heat load is equal to the normal heat load plus the f addition of the decay heat from a full core offload 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> !
after shutdown. Design heat loads are evaluated utilizing l ANSI /ANS 5.1 correlations.
E s A Seismic Category I, Quality Group C borated makeup and its l backup water source will be provided to the spent fuel pool. The j Seismic Category I makeup supply system need not be designed to j withstand single active failure since the spent fuel pool cooling i system is designed to Seismic Category I and Quality Group C requirements. The backup source for makeup need not be a permanently installed Seismic Category I system. Nonborated water from a non-Seir.mic Category I source may be used to make up the evaporation losses from the spent fuel pool during normal operation.
J 9.1.3.2 System Description 4
1 9.1.3.2.1 General Description l The safety-related spent fuel pool cooling system consists of two ;
independent cooling trains. The system is located in a Seismic j Category I building which provides protection from effects of ;
natural phenomena and missiles. The spent fuel pool cooling j system (piping, pumps, valves, and heat exchangers) is j safety-related, Quality Group C. The spent fuel pool receives i I l I
Amendment E k.1-10 December 30, 1988 j a
I l
CESSARHnLum I
/G normal borated water makeup from a water source which is Seismic Category I, Quality Group C. In addition, the backup to the normal makeup system consists of piping and/or hoses from an alternate water source. Non-safety-related, Seismic Category I sources provide normal nonborated demineralized water backup and boric acid backup to the spent fuel pool.
.)
Each cooling train incorporates one heat exchanger and pump and i associated piping, valving, and instrumentation. Each cooling l train is designed to service the spent fuel pool, with designed ]
spent fuel assembly loading, and to maintain the bulk fluid temperature of the spent fuel pool below 140*F during normal operation.
l Tne spent fuel pool cooling system removes decay heat from fuel stored in the spent fuel pool. Spent fuel is placed in the pool 1 during the refueling sequence and stored there until it is I shipped off site. Heat is transferred from the spent fuel pool {
cooling system, thr%gh the heat exchanger to the component !
cooling water system.
When either cooling train is in operation, water flows from the p) i spent fuel pool to the spent fuel pool cooling pump suction, is t pumped through the tube side of the heat exchanger, and is D returned to the pool. The suction line is provided with a strainer and is located at an elevation well above the normal fuel level, while the return line contains an antisiphon device to prevent gravity drainaga of the pool.
E Each of the two spent fuel pool cleanup trains consists of a pump, a strainer, a demineralized and a filter to maintain spent fuel pool water clarity and purity. Transfer canal water may also be circulated through the same demineralized and filter.
This purification loop is sufficient for removing fission prociacts and other contaminants which may be introduced if a i leaking fuel assembly is transferred to the spent fuel pool. j l
The demineralized and filter of s4 -her cleanup train may be used j to clean and purify the refuell. water while spent fuel pool heat removal operations proceed. Refueling water can be pumped from either the in-containment rafueling water storage tank or j the RCS through a filter and demineralized, and discharged to the l reactor vessel or refueling water tank. To assist in maintaining spent fuel pool water clarity, the SFP surface is cleaned by a skimmer.
The pool water may be separated from the water in the transfer canal by a gate. The gate is installed so that the transfer
>p1 canal may be drained to allow maintenance of the fuel transfer i
V equipment.
I Amendment E 9.1-11 December 30, 1988
CESSARsEnce I l
O !
9.1.3.2.2 Component Description j
}
Spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system cooling pumps and heat i exchangers are safety class 3 &nd are designed to ASME B&PV Code, l Section III, Subsection ND rules.
9.1.3.2.2.1 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps i
Two identical pumps are installed in parallel in the spent fuel j pool cooling system. Each pump is sized to deliver sufficient l coolant flow through a spent fuel pool heat exchanger to meet the j system cooling requirements. The pumps are horizontal, i centrifugal units, with all wetted surfaces being stainless steel ,
or an equivalent corrosien -resistant material. The pumps are controlled manually from a local station. l l l 9.1.3.2.2.2 Skimmer )
i The skimmers are designed to circulate surface water through the !
spent fuel pool cleanup system and return it to the pool via the l spent fuel pool cleanup pumps.
l 9.1.3.2.2.3 Spent Fuel Pool Cleanup Pumps '
Two refueling water cleanup pumps are used to circulate water from the spent fuel pool through the spent fuel pool demineralized and filter. l E
9.1.3.2.2.4 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchangers The heat exchangers are shell-and-tube type. Spent fuel pool water circulates through the tubes while component cooling water circulates through the shell. The use of two independent heat exchangers provides redundancy so that safety functions can be performed, assuming single active failure of components. The tubes and other surfaces in contact with the pool water are austenitic stainless steel and the shell is carbon eteel. The tubes are welded to the tubesheet to prevent leakage of pool water.
9.1.3.2.2.5 Spent Fuel Pool Demineralizers Each demineralized is designed to provide adequate spent fuel pool water purity for unrestricted access tc the pool working area while maintaining visual clarity.
Overtemperature protection will be provided for the spent fuel pool demineralizers, if the temperature of the spent fuel cooling water could exceed the temperature at which the ion removal capability of the resin would be adversely affected.
Amendment E 9.1-12 December 30, 1988
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9.1.3.2.2.6 Spent Fuel Pool Filters The spent fuel pool filters contain filter cartridges which are used to improve the pool water clarity by removing insoluble particles which obscure visibility.
9.1.3.2.2.7 Spent Fuel Pool Strainers The strainers are located in each spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup pump suction line for removal of relatively large particles which might otherwise clog the spent fuel pool demineralizers or damage the spent fuel pool pumps. /
9.1.3.2.2.8 Valves Manual stop valves are used to isolate equipment. Manual throttle valves provide flow control. Valves in contact with spent fuel pool water are austenitic stainless steel or equivalent corrosion-resistant material.
9.1.3.2.2.9 Piping fs All piping in contact with spent fuel pool water is austenitic
( ) stainless steel. The piping is welded except where flanged
\u/ connections are used to facilitate maintenance.
9.1.3.2.3 System Operation The spent fuel pool cooling ano cleanup system is not directly E associated with plant startup, normal operation, or shutdown, but is operated when there is a need to cool, clarify, or purify the pool water. All situations are dependent upon the fuel loading and upon the elapsed time that the spent fuel has been discharged. Components for each cooling and cleanup train can be interchanged while in service using bypass lines.
Spent fuel pool cooling pumps are started manually. A high SFP temperature alarm assures that cooling water is being provided to the spent fuel pool heat exchangers.
The spent fuel pool water chemistry can be checked at local sample points. If purification is required, the spent fuel pool cleanup system demineralized and filters the water and returns it to the pool. However, if only undissolved solids are to be removed, this flow may be circulated directly through the filter.
A local sample connection is provided in the purification return line so that the effectiveness of the filter and/or the
~s demineralized may be checked as well as the boron concentration.
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Amendment E 9.1-13 December 30, 1988
CESSAR 8HOicari:n !
i The spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system has its maximum Ol !
duty during refueling operations when the decay heat from the spent fuel is the highest. The system is normally placed in operation prior to the transfer of any fuel and is continued in /
operation as long as required to maintain temperature and water purity.
9.1.3.3 Bafety Evaluation 9.1.3.3.1 Availability and Reliability The spent fuel pool cooling system has no emergency function during an accident. A cooling train may be shut down for limited periods of time for maintenance or replacement of ma] functioning l
components. In the event of the failure of a spent fuel pool
, cooling pump or loss of cooling to a spent fuel pool cooling heat I exchanger, the second cooling train provides backup capability, thus assuring continued cooling of the spent fuel pool.
9.1.3.3.2 Spent Fuel Pool Dewatering The most serious failure of this system would be complete loss of water in the spent fuel pool. To protect against this possibility, the spent fuel pool cooling pump suction connections enter near the normal water level so that the pool cannot be gravity drained. The return lines contain an antisiphon hole to prevent the possibility of gravity draining of the pool via these lines.
E The SFPCCS shall provide a manual makeup capability of demineralized water to the refueling pool and spent fuel pool sufficient to make up for a 100 gpm leakage rate out of the spent fuel pool.
The accidental opening of the gate between the spent fuel pool and the transfer canal, if the canal were dry, would lower the spent fuel pool water level. However, it would leave adequate water over the top of the spent fuel assemblies.
9.1.3.3.3 Water Quality Only a very small amount of water is interchanged between the refueling canal and the spent fuel pool as fuel assemblies are transferred in the refueling process. Whenever a fuel assembly with defective cladding is transferred from the fuel transfer canal to the spent fuel pool, a small quantity of fission products may enter the spent fuel pool water. The cleanup loops remove fission products and other contaminants from the water.
O l
Amendment E 9.1-14 December 30, 1988
CESSAR nnine-O Radioactivity concentrations will be maintained such that the dose at the surface of the spent fuel pool will be 2.5 Mrem /hr or less.
The design flow rate and filtering capability of the SFPCCS shall be such that the refueling pool water chemistry and clarity are ;
sufficient for an operator to read fuel. assembly identification j numbers that are 3/8 inches high, 3/16 inches wide and 1/16 inches thick from the refueling machine at the time the operators and refueling equipment are ready to move fuel (i.e., designed such that water clarity problems do not cause refueling delays).
The design flow rate of the SFPCCS shall provide at least two !
complete water changes per day for the entire volume of the spent fuel pool.
The SFPCCS shall maintain the refueling pool, spent fuel pool, and IRWST (PWR) water chemistry and clarity within the limi.ts apecified below:
o Conductivity less than 3 pslemens/cm @ 25'C; o pH between 4.5 and 10 @ 25*C;
\ o Chlorides less than 0.15 ppm; and !
o optical clarity less than 1.0 ppm turbidity.
9.1.3.4 Tests and Inspections E
Components of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system are in either continuous or intermittent use during normal system operation. Periodic visual inspection and preventive maintenance are conducted using normal industry practice. The Seismic Category I portions will be inspected in accordance with the ASME B&PV Code,Section XI.
No special equipment tests are required since system components are normally in operation when spent fuel is stored in the fuel pool.
Sampling of the feal pool water is performed for gross activity and particulate matter concentration. The layout of the components of the SFPCCs is such that periodic testing and inservice inspection of this system are possible.
9.1.3.5 Instrumentation Application
{N The instrumentation provided for the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system is discussed in the following paragraphs. Alarms and indications are provided as noted. ,
Amendment E 9.1-15 December 30, 1988
CESSARn % mu ,
9.1.3.5.1 Temperature O\,
)
Instrumentation is provided to measure the temperature of the water in the spent fuel pool and to give local indication as well as annunciation in the control room when normal temperatures are i exceeded. !
Instrumentation is also provided to give local indication of the ;
temperature of the spent fuel pool water as it leaves either heat !
exchanger. !
9.1.3.5.2 Pressure
)
1 Instrumentation is provided to measure and give local indication !
of the pressures in the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup pump suction and discharge lines. Instrumentation is also provided at locations upstream and downstream from each spent fuel pool filter so that the pressure differential across these filters can l be determined.
l 9.1.3.5.3 Flow Instrumentation is provided to measure and give local indication of the flow in each cooling train and in the outlet line of each i, spent fuel pool filter.
l 9.1.3.5.4 Level Instrumentation is provided to give an alarm in the control room when the water level in the spent fuel pool reaches either the high- or low-level setpoint.
E 9.1.3.5.5 Radiation Gamma-radiation is continuously monitored in the fuel building.
A high-level signal is alarmed locally and annunciated in the control room.
O Amendment E 9.1-16 December 30, 1988
1 CESSAR1!nificari u jR 1
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9.1.4 FUEL HANDLING SYSTEM 9.1.4.1 Desian Bases 9.1.4.1.1 System The fuel handling system is designed for the handling and storage of fuel assembJies and control element assemblies (CEAs). ,
Associated with the fuel handling system is the equipment . used for assembly, disassembly, and storage of the reactor closure ;
head and internals. As appropriate, the fuel handling equipment includes interlocks, travel-limiting features, and other protective devices to minimize the possibility of mishandling or equipment malfunction that could result in inadvertent damage to a fuel assembly and potential fission product release. ,
.The refueling water provides the coolant medium during spent fuel I transfer. The spent fuel pool is provided with a cooling and j cleanup system. !
All spent fuel transfer and storage operations are designed to be J conducted underwater to ensure adequate shielding during Q refueling and to permit visual control of the operation at all times.
E 9.1.4.1.2 Fuel Handling Equipment The principal design criteria for the fuel and CEA handling equipment (refueling machine, fuel transfer equipment, spent fuel i handling machine, CEA change platform, new fuel elevator, and CEA !
elevator) are as follows: .
A. For non-seismic operating conditions, the bridges, trolleys, hoist units, hoisting cable, grapples, and hooks conform to the requirements of Crane Manufacturing Association of America Specification #70.
B. For seismic design, the combined dead loads, live loads, and seismic loads do not cause any portion of the equipment to
. disengage from its supports and fall into the pool.
C. Grapples and mechanical latches which carry fuel assemblies or CEAs are mechanically interlocked against inadvertent opening.
D. Equipment is provided Uith locking devices or restraints to prevent parts, fasteners, or limit switch actuators from p cecoming loose. In those cases where loosened parts or fasteners can drcp into, or are not separated by a barrier Amendment E 9.1-17 December 30, 1988
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CESSARnnL a O
from, or whose rotary motion will propel it into the water of the refueling pool or spent fuel pool, these parts and fasteners are lock-wired or, otherwise, positively captured.
E. A positive mechanical stop is provided to prevent the fuel from being lifted above the minimum safe water cover depth and it will not cause damage or distortion to the fuel or l
the refueling machine when engaged at full operating hoist speed.
l F. The fuel hoists are provided with load-measuring devices and interlocks to interrupt hoisting if the load increases above the overload setpoint and to interrupt lowering if the load decreases below the underload setpoint.
G. In the event of loss of power, the equipment and its load remain in a safe condition. .
l H. Equipment located within the containment building during plant operation is capable of withstanding, without damage, the internal building test pressure.
I I. Electrical interlocks are provided to ensure the reliability of system components, to simplify the performance of sequential operations, and to limit travel and loads such that design conditions will not be exceeded. In no case will they be utilized to prevent inadvertent criticality or the reduction of the minimum water coverage for personnel protection. No single interlock f aile ne will result in a cendition which will allow equipment nifunction, damage to the fuel, or the reduction of shieM.tng water coverage.
Where these results are considered possible, redundant switches, mechanical restraints, and physical barriers are employed as well as limiting the hoist stall torque and loading capability to values below those which would result in damage to the fuel.
9.1.4.1.3 Fuel Building Overhead Cranes and Containment Polar Crane The fuel building cranes, i.e., the cask handling crane and the E new fuel handling crane, will be used to handle equipment, tools, and fuel assemblies from the receipt of the new fuel containers to the shipment of the spent fuel cask. A description of these cranes is contained in Section 9.1.4.2.1.7. The containment polar crane will be used to handle the reactor vessel head, reactor vessel internals, and other equipment located within the containment building. A description of the containment polar crane is contained in Section 9.1.4.2.1.8.
Amendment E 9.1-18 December 30, 1988
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CESSAR E"icuiu O
Y Provisions will be incorporated to prevent heavy lesi drops which I would result in damaging safety-related systems, components, j structures, and/or equipment.- These provisions will include '
mechanical stops, electrical interlocks, and procedural and i administrative controls. The design of the cranes ill conform l to the requirements of ANSI /ASME NOG-1.
9.1.4.2 System Description E
9.1.4.2.1 System and Interlocks The fuel handling system is an integrated system of equipment, ,
tools, and procedures for refueling, handling and storage of fuel assemblies from receipt of a new fuel container to shipment of a spent fuel cask. The equipment is designed to handle the fuel assemblies from the time they arrive at the. site until they are placed in a cask for shipment from the site. Underwater transfer of fuel assemblies provides a transparent radiation shield, as well as a cooling medium for removal of decay heat. Boric acid i is added to the spent fuel pool (SFP) water in the quantity required to assure subcritical conditions.
p The major components of the system are the refueling machine
- (Figure 9.1-4), the CEA change platform (Figure 9.1-5), the fuel transfer system (Figures 9.1-6a and 9.1-6b), the spent fuel handling machine, the CEA clevator (Figure 9 .1-7 ) ', the new fuel elevator (Figure 9.1-8), fuel building overhead cranes and the containment polar crane. The refueling machine moves fuel assemblies into and out of the core and between the core and the transfer system. The CEA change platform is used to move the CEAs within the upper guide structure (UGS) or between the UGS I and the CEA elevator. The CEA elevator is used to assemble and introduce new CEAs into the refueling pool and to hold the spent .
CEAs while they are being disassembled for disposal. The fuel transfer system moves the fuel between the containment building and the fuel building through the transfer tune. The spent fuel handling machine transports fuel among the transfer system, the l spent fuel storage racks, the new fuel elevator, and the spent i fuel shipping cask. The new fuel elevator is used to introduce )
new fuel into the spent fuel pool so that it can be moved to the spent fuel storage racks or the transfer system by the spent fuel handling machine. The cask handling crane is used to transfer the spent fuel shipping cask between the cask loading pit, cask decontamination pit, and the fuel building loading bay. The fuel handling crane is used for new fuel container handling and new .,
fuel inspection; the fuel handling crane handles new fuel assemblies during fuel transfer from the shipping container to new fuel elevator or to the new fuel storage racks, including fuel inspection. j O\ l Amendment E 9.1-10 December 30, 1988 !
CESSAR 8!EnCAT13N l
Special tools and lift rigs are also used for disassembly of reactor components.
Major tools and servicing equipment utilized for refueling are listed in Table 9.1-1.
The major components of the fuel handling system are described E below.
l In the design of this equipment, mechanical stops and positive locks have been provided to prevent damage to or dropping of the fuel assemblies. In the design of the refueling machine, positive locking between the grapple and the fuel assemblies is provided by the engagement of the actuator arm in vertical ;
channels in the hoist assembly so that relative rotational movement and uncoupling is nct possible, even with inadvertent initiation of an uncoupling signal to the actuator assembly.
i Therefore, failure of an electrical interlock will not result in l the dropping of a fuel assembly.
Sections 9.1.4.2.1.1 through 9.1.4.2.1.6 identify and define the functions of the interlocks contained in the fuel handling equipment. In no case has a method been provided to directly inform the operator that an interlock is inorcrative. However, in most cases a redundant device has been provided to perform the same function as the interlock or to provide information to allow the operator to deduce that an interlock has malfunctioned.
The fuel and CEA handling machines do not fully fall within the ,
framework of an overhead or gantry crane as described in OSHA i Subpart N, Materials Handling and Storage, of 29 CFR 1910, Section 1910.179. However, this document has been used for guidance. More than 95% of the fuel handling machine does conform to the OSHA reg"lations. Both machines have additional features to protect the safety of the operator and facility, and the features are a part of appropriate operational procedures.
9.1.4.2.1.1 Refueling Machine The following identifies and describes the functions of the interlocks which will be contained in the refueling machine.
A. Refueling Machine Hoist Overload Interlock Interrupts hoisting of a fuel assembly if the load increases above the overload setpoint. The hoisting load is visually O
Amendment E 9.1-20 December 30, 1988
y a l
.CESSAR E!!Lmu .
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displayed so that the operator can manually terminate the withdrawal operation if an overload occurs and the hoist continues to operate. The hoist motor stall torque is limited such that the cable load-is less than the allowable fuel. assembly tensile load.
B. Refueling Machine Hoist Up-Stop Interlock Interrupts hoisting of a fuel as.9embly when the ' correct (full up) vertical elevation is reached. A mechanical up-stop has also been provided to physically restrain -the hoisting of a fuel assembly above the elevation wnich would result in less than the minimum shielding water. coverage.
C.- Refueling Machine Hoist Underload Interlock Interrupts insertion of a fuel assembly if the load decreases below 'the underload setpoint. The load is visually displayed so that the operator can' manually terminate the insertion operation if an underload occurs and the hoist continues to operate.
D. Refueling Machine Holst Cable-Slack Interlock
)
Interrupts lowering of the hoist under a no-load condition.
The weighing system interlock is backed up by an independent slack cable switch which also terminates lowering under a E no-load condition.
E. Refueling Machine Hoist Lock-Out Interlock Hoisting is denied during translation of the bridge and/or trolley. No backup or additional circuitry is provided for ;
this interlock. )
l F. Refueling Machine Translation Interlock Denies translation of the bridge and/or trolley with the spreader or grapple extended or when the grappled fuel assembly is still in the core. An additional circuit is provided which, after initiation of a hoisting operation' E requires that a separate switch be actuated -before normal operation of the translation drives is possible. The 3 underwater TV system can be used by the operator' to 1 determine whether the spreader or grapple has been raised, i and lights on the control console indicate whether they are withdrawn or extended.
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l Amendment E j 9.1-21 December 30, 1980 l
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CESSAR Ens"icari;u O
G. Refueling Machine Mast Anti-collision Interlock Stops translation of the bridge and/or trolley when the ;
collision ring on the mast is contacted and deflected. l Redundant switches are provided to minimize the possibility l of this interlock becoming inoperative. Slow bridge speeds are provided for movement of the refueling machine in areas other than its normal travel route which might contain l cbstructicTs . Travel limits are also provided to prevent l machine contact with obstructions within the pool area. l H. Refueling Machine Holst Speed Interlock Provides restriction on maximum hoisting speed when the fuel l is within the core. During insertion and withdrawal the l change in hoist speed can be monitored by observation of the I I
hoist vertical position indicator. A change in the sound of the hoist will accompany the change in hoist speed.
9.1.4.2.1.2 Transfer System The following identifies and describes the functions of the interlocks which will be contained in the transfer system.
A. Transfer System Winch Overload Interlock Terminates movement of the fuel carriage through the transfer tube if the load increases above the overload setpoint.
The winching load is visually displayed so that the operator can manually terminate the transfer operation if an overload occurs and the interlock fails. The motor stall torque is also controlled to preclude equipment damage during normal transfer operations should the overload setpoint fail. An overload is indicated by a light on the control panel and by an audible alarm.
B. Transfer System Fuel Carrier Interlock Prevents the winch from attempting to pull the fuel carriage through the transfer tube with an upender in a vertical position. If this interlock fails and a transfer signal is initiated, winching will be terminated when the load increases above the overload setpoint.
O 9.1-22 l
l
i CESSAR EEncm:,.
O V
C. Transfer System Upender Rotation Interlock Rotation of the upender is denied while the refueling machine and spent fuel handling machine (SFHM) are at their upender stations.
Failure of this interlock while the machines are at the upending station will allow the transfer equipment operator to initiate rotation of the fuel carrier. In the event that this signal is erroneously initiated while the fuel assembly is being lowered from or raised into the refueling machine, a bending load would be applied to the fuel bundle.
D. Transfer System Upender Interlock Rotation of the upender is denied unless the fuel carrier is "
correctly located for upending.
Failure of this interlock will:
1
- 1. With the fuel carrier in the transfer tube allow. the ,
l upender to rotate with no effect on the carrier or fuel bundle.
iO 2. With the fuel carrier partially in the upender, attempt to but not be successful in, rotating the' carrier since a mechanical lock prevents premature carrier rotation.
E. Transfer Tube Valve Interlock Contacts will be provided in the control system of the transfer system which, when connected to a limit switch on the transfer tube valve, will prevent movement of fuel carrier unless the valve is fully opened.
If this switch is provided, or if this interlock fails with the valve partially closed, the fuel carrier will contact the valve and winching will be terminated by an overload signal. No damage to the fuel assembly will result since the fuel assembly is enclosed in the carrier.
F. Fuel Carrier Rotational Interlock E
Rotation of the fuel carrier is prevented unless the fuel carrier is correctly located in the upender.
Failure of this interlock may cause contact between the fuel carrier and the transfer tube assembly which will result in
(
s Amendment E 9.1-23 December 30, 1988
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CESSAREHL - t l
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O an overload signal and termination of motion of the transfer carriage. No damage to the fuel assembly will result since !
the fuel assembly is enclosed in the carrier.
l 9.1.4.2.1.3 Spent Fuel Handling Machine l
l The spent fuel handling machine will be a refueling machine E
j adapted for use in the spent fuel pool area. It will contain the i same interlock features as described in Section 9.1.4.2.1.1, i except as noted below for the Spent Fuel Handling Machine Translation Zone Interlock:
A. Zone switches protect against running the load into walls or i the gate of the storage area. I B. No backup or additional circuitry is provided for this interlock. However, the operator has direct vision of the tool and the attached load so that translation can be terminated if an interlock fails to operate. l l
9.1.4.2.1.4 New Fuel Elevator The following identifies and describes the functions of the interlocks that are part of the new fuel elevator.
A. New Fuel Elevator Hoist Cable-Slack Interlock Stops the elevator motor should the cable become slack.
If this interlock fails, the operator can stop the elevator motion from the spent fuel handling machine console.
B. New Fuel Elevator Hoist Lock-Out Interlock Prevents raising of the elevator with a fuel assembly in the elevator box. This interlock is a backup for the administrative control, which prohibits the placement of a spent fuel assembly in the new fuel elevator.
C.. New Fuel Elevator Hoist Limit Interlock Interrupts hoisting when "up" or "down" limits are' reached.
9.1.4.2.1.5 CEA Elevator The following identifies and describes the functions of the E interlocks that are part of the CEA elevator.
O Amendment E 9.1-24 December 30, 1988
CESSAR nnine-(U A. CEA Elevator Hoist Cable-Slack Interlock Stops the elevator motor should the cable become slack. j l
B. CEA Elevator Holst Lock-Out Interlock l Prevents raising of the CEA elevator with a fuel assembly in the elevator support rack above the minimum safe water level for shielding water coverage. This interlock is a backup for the administrative control, which prohibits the placement of a spent fuel assembly in the CEA elevator. )
9.1.4.2.1.6 CEA Change Platform The following identifies and describes the function of the interlocks that are part of the CEA change platform.
A. CEA Change Platform Hoist Up-Stop Interlock Interrupts hoisting of a CEA assembly when the correct (full-up) vertical elevation is reached. A mechanical E up-stop has also been provided to physically restrain the p hoisting of a CEA assembly above the elevation which would i result in less than the minimum shielding water coverage.
(
B. CEA Change Platform Hoist overload Interlock Interrupts hoisting of a CEA if the load increases above the overload setpoint. The hoisting load is visually displayed so that the operator can manually terminate the withdrawal operation if an overload occurs and the hoist continues to operate.
1 C. CEA Change Platform Hoist Underload Interlock
(
i Interrupts insertion of a CEA assembly if the load decreases l below the underload setpoint. The insertion load is ,
visually displayed so that the operator can manually !
terminate the insertion operation if an underload occurs and the hoist continues to operate.
l 9.1.4.2.1.7 Fuel Building Overhead Cranes l A. Cask Handling Crane The cask handling crane will be used to unload new fuel shipping containers from the receiving bay area and transport them to the new fuel shipping container laydown (h) area. It will also be used for movement of the empty spent fuel cask from the receiving bay area to the cask storage pit and for the return of the loaded cask. The receiving 3 Amendment E 9.1-25 December 30, 1988
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CESSAR EH'rinem l c O
bay area will have sufficient room to permit cask transporter locked in place. The crane will be equipped with a continuously variable speed hoist controller.
l The crane will access the spent fuel pool area to facilitate building construction and spent fuel rack installation.
Mechanical stops will be installed on the bridge rails to
- prohibit the crane from travelling over the spent fuel pool after fuel assemblies have been placed in the fuel racks.
The crane will also be provided with electrical interlocks to control bridge / trolley travel and to minimize possible damage to the new fuel shipping containers, the spent fuel shipping cask, and the spent fuel pool during equipment handling.
1 B. New Fuel Handling Crane The new fuel handling crane will be used to remove new fuel l from the shipping containers and to place them in the new ;
fuel ctorage racks, the new fuel inspection stand, and the l l new fuel elevator. The crane will be provided with l electrical interlocks to control the transfer path of the new fuel assemblies and to restrict fuel handling loads.
The crane will be restricted mechanically from allowing movement of new fuel over the spent fuel racks.
9.1.4.2.1.8 Containment Polar Crane E The polar crane will be mounted on a circular crane wall and will travel 360 degrees. The containment polar crane will have a main hoist and an auxiliary hoist to handle the varicas loads during an outage. Provisions will be made to ensure safe load handling.
These provisions will include automatic upper and lower hoist limits, overload limits, slow speed hoist operation, and a load handling path to prevent any safety-related equipment damage from a heavy load drop. The polar crane will be used to handle the reactor vessel head and reactor vessel 11. 9rnals within the reactor vessel and at various storage areas luring outages, as described in Section 9.1.4.2.3.3. The pola. nrane hoist will also be able to operate at faFt speed with an empty book.
9.1.4.2.2 Components 9.1.4.2.2.1 Refueling Machine The refueling machine is shown in Figure 9.1-4. The refueling machine is a traveling bridge and trolley which is located above the refueling pool and rides on rails set in the concrete on each side of the refueling pool. Motors on the bridge and trolley position the machine over each fuel assembly location within the Amendment E 9.1-26 December 30, 1988
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reactor core or fuel transfer carrier. The controls for the refueling machine are mounted on a console which is located on I the refueling machine trolley. Coordinate location of the bridge and trolley is indicated at the console by digital readout devices which are driven by encoders coupled to the guide rails through rack and pinion gears.
During withdrawal or insertion of a fuel assembly, the load on {
the hoist cable is monitored at the console to assure that movement is not being restricted. Limits are.such that damage to the assembly is prevented.
Locking between the grapple and the fuel assembly is provided by the engagement of the grapple ac_tuator arm in axial channels 4 running the length of the fuel hoist assembly. Therefore, it is l not possible to uncouple even with inadvertent initiation of an '
uncoupling signal to the actuator assembly. The drives for both the bridge and the trolley provide close control for accurate positioning, and brakes are provided to maintain the position i once achieved. In addition, interlocks are installed so that movement of the refueling machine is not possible when the hoist is withdrawing or inserting an assembly. After operation of the ;
n hoist a console-mounted interlock button must be actuated to allow movement of the bridge or trolley.
For operations above the core, the bottom of the hoist assembly is equipped with a spreading device to align the surrounding fuel "
assemblies to their normal core spacing to assure clearance for fuel assemblies being installed' or removed. An anticollision device at the bottom of the mast assembly prevents damage should the mast be inadvertently driven into an obstruction, and a positive mechanical up-stop is provided to prevent the fuel from being lifted above the minimum safe water cover depth. A system of pointers and scales serves as a backup for the remote positioning readout equipment.
Manually operated handwheels are provided for bridge, trolley and winch motions in th'e event of a power loss. Manual operation of the grappling device is also possible in the event that air pressure is lost.
9.1.4.2.2.2 Transfer Oystem The major components of the transfer system are one carriage with ;
ca ri-ie r , two upenders, two hydraulic power packages, and a winch as described below.
3 A. Transfer Carriage
\
\ ,/ A transfer carriage as shown on Figure 9.1-6 conveys the fuel assemblies through the transfer tube. Two fuel r 9.1-27
CESSAR snacarcu O
assembly cavities are provided in the fuel carriage to !
reduce overall fuel handling time. After the refueling l machine deposits a spent fuel bundle in the open cavity, it I I
only has to move approximately 1 foot to pick-up the new fuel assembly which was brought from the fuel building in the other cavity. The handling operation in the fuel building is similar. The dual cavity arrangement permits I both fuel handling machines to travel fully loaded at all l times. Fuel assemblies are placed in the transfer carriage l in a vertical position, lowered to the horizontal position, j moved through the fuel transfer tube on the transfer j carriage, and then restored to the vertical position.
Wheels support the carriage and allow it to ride on tracks j within the transfer tube. The track sections at both ends >
of the transfer tube are mounted on the upending machines to permit the carriage to be properly positioned at the limits of its travel. The carriage is driven by steel cables connected to the carriage and through sheaves to its driving winch mounted on the operating floor. The design of the !
carriage is such that the drive cables do not enter the j transfer tube.
The load in the transfer cables is displayed at the control console. A cable overload condition will interrupt the transfer operation. Manual override of the overload cutout allows completion of the transfer. The supports for the l replaceable rails on which the transfer carriage rides are welded to the 36-inch diameter transfer tube. The rail assemblies are fabricated to a length which will allow them to be lowered for installation in the transfer tube. No rails need be installed in the valve on the spent fuel pool side of the transfer tube. j B. Upending Machine An upending machine as shown on Figure 9.1-6 is provided at i each and of the transfer tube. Each machine consists of a I structural support base from which is pivoted an upending straddle frame which engages the two-pocket fuel carrier.
When the carriage with its fuel carrier is in position within the upending frame, the pivots for the fuel carrier and the upending frame are coincident. Hydraulic cylinders, l attached to both the upending frame and the support base, rotate the fuel carrier between the vertical and horizontal position as required by the fuel transfer procedure. Each hydraulic cylinder can perform the upending operation alone and can be isolated in the event of its failure. A long tool is also provided to allow manual rotation of the fuel 3 l carrier in the event that both cylinders fail or hydraulic power is lost.
9.1-28 1
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C. Hydraulic Power Unit The hydraulic power unit as shown on Figure 9.1-9 provides the motive force for raising and lowering'the upender with the fuel carrier. It consists of a stand containing a motor coupled to a hydraulic pump, .a pump reservoir, valves and the necessary hoses to connect the power package to the hydraulic cylinders on the upender. The valves 'can be aligned to actuate either or both upender cylinders. The hydraulic fluid is distilled water.
9.1.4.2.2.3 Fuel Transfer Tube Assembly A fuel transfer tube extends through the containment wall. !
During reactor operation, the transfer tube is sealed by means of I a blind flange and closure tube located inside the containment building. Prior to filling the refueling pool, the blind flange {
is removed. After a common water level is reached between the !
refueling pool and the spent fuel pool, the transfer tube valve is opened.
The procedure is reversed after refueling is completed.
O The transfer tube arrangement as shown on Figure 9.1-10 consists b of a 36-inch diameter transfer tube contained within penetration which is sealed to the containment building. The a
transfer tube and penetration sleeves are sealed to each other by E
bellows-type expansion joints to allow for relative movement between the tube and penetration sleeve. The blind flange is bolted to the containment closure' tube and sealing is g accomplished through two 0-rings which can be tested for adequacy by pressurizing the annulus between the seals. In this arrangement, the transfer tube does not see containment pressure during reactor operation. E 9.1.4.2.2.4 CEA Change Platform The CEA change platform is shown in Figure 9.1-5. This platform operates above the upper guide structure (UGS) after the UGS has been placed in.the storage area and the UGS lifting rig removed. ,
The platform travels on the same rails as does the refueling I machine.
The platform locates the operator over the CEA to be moved. The CEA handling tool, attached to an overhead crane, is then I lowered, grappled to the CEA and the CEA relocated, as required.
9.1.4.2.2.5 Fuel Handling Tools ,
!Q Two fuel handling tools as shown on Figure 9.1-11 are used to l
move fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool area. A new fuel I 1
Amendment E 1 9.1-29 December 30, 1988
1 CESSARE5 ace 1
handling tool is provided for dry transfer of new fuel, and a O
spent fuel handling tool is provided for underwater movement of both spent and new fuel handling in the spent fuel pool. The spent fuel handling tool is operated manually from the trolley on E
the spent fuel handling machine. The new fuel handling tool is attached to the fuel handling crane and is manually controlled.
l 9.1.4.2.2.6 Reactor Vessel Head Lift Rig The reactor vessel head lift rig is shown in Figure 9.1-12. This lift rig is composed of a removable lifting frame and a column and skirt assembly which is attached to the reactor vessel head assembly. It also incorporates a manifold system for drawing E cooling air to the CEDMs to maintain them within their proper operating temperature range.
(
9.1.4.2.2.7 Reactor Internals Handling Equipment The reactor internals lift rig is a structure used to remove either the upper guide structure assembly or the core support barrel from the reactor vessel. ,
Figure 9.1-13 shows the lift rig in the configuration provided l for withdrawal of the core support barrel from the vessel for l inspection purposes. l l
The upper clevis assembly is a tripod-shaped structure connecting the lift rig to the containment crana lifting hook.
The lift rig includes a spreader beam providing three attachment points that are bolted to the core support barrel flange. This is accomplished manually from the refueling machine bridge.
Correct positioning of the lift rig is assured by attached guide bushings that mate to the reactor vessel guide pins.
Figure 9.1-14 shows the lift rig in the configuration provided for removal of the upper guide structure assembly. In this configuration, the spreader beam supports three columns providing attachment points to the upper guide structure assembly.
Attachment to the upper guide structure assembly is accomplished manually from the working platform. Correct positioning is assured by attached bushings that mate to the reactor vessel guide pins.
The clevis assembly, tie rod assembly, and spreader beam assembly which are common to this and the core support structure lifting rig, are installed prior to lifting of the structure by the crane hook. The working platform also incorporates the holding fixtures for the extension shafts and CEAs.
'O Amendment E 9.1-30 December 30, 1988
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v 9.1.4.2.2.8 Spent Fuel Handling Machine l E l The spent fuel handling machine is a refueling machine modified l for use in the fuel building.
9.1.4.2.2.9 New Fuel Elevator i A fuel elevator as shown on Figure 9.1-8 is utilized to lower new fuel from the operating floor to the bottom of the pool where it is grappled by the spent fuel handling is tool. The elevator is contained in a simple powered by a cable winch and fuel support structure whose wheels are captured in two rails. New fuel is loaded into the elevator by means of the new fuel ,
overhead crane and new fuel handling tool.
A manually operated handwheel is provided for elevator operation in the event of a power loss.
9.1.4.2.2.10 Underwater Television A closed circuit television system as shown on Figure 9.1-15 monitors the fuel handling operations within the refueling pool, e
The camera is mounted on the refueling machine fuel hoist box lmi (see Figure 9.1-4) so that the fuel r.ssembly can be sighted prior
\ m- / to and during grappling and removal from the core. The system may also be used to initially align the refueling machine position indication system with the actual core location of the fuel assemblies. A monitor is provided at the refueling machine control console. The camera, if required for remote surveillance, or inspection, can be removed from its mount on the fuel hoist and handled separately. It is also be used for core mapping after core loading before upper guide structure installation to confirm and record loaded core.
9.1.4.2.2.11 CEA Elevator E A CEA elevator as shown on Figure 9.1-7 is utilized to assemble new CEAs and to disassemble irradiateo CEAs. The elevator is powered by a cable winch and the CEAs are contained in a simple support structure whose wheels are captured at the two rails.
Tooling used to handle CEAs within the elevator is supported from the CEA change platform.
9.1.4.2.2.12 Transport Container The transport container is used to store and move cut up pieces of spent CEAs and in-core instruments (ICIs). The container has the same outside dimensions as a fuel assembly and is provided
/n; with a top fitting to mate with the fuel grapple enabling it to l () be moved by the fuel handling equipment.
Amendment E 9.1-31 December 30, 1988 i
CESSAR naincmou 9.1.4.2.2.13 Refueling Pool Seal O
A watertight coal is installed between the reactor vessel flange and the floor of ihe refueling pool during the refueling operation. The seal is removed prior to reactor operation.
Provisions are made to test the seal after installation and before flooding the refueling pool.
9.1.4.2.2.14 In-core Instrumentation and CEA Cutters Is portable underwater hydraulic cutter similar to that shown on Figure 9.1-36 is provided to cut the expended CEAs into lengths necessary to permit transfer to the spent fuel building in the transport container. A second cutter is used for disposal of the incore instrumentation leads.
9.1.4.2.2.15 Gripper Operating Tool This tool is approximately seventeen feet long and consists of a two concentric tubes with a funnel at the end to facilitate engagement with the CEA extension shafts. When installed, pins attached to the outer tube are engaged with the extension shaft.
The inner tube of the tool is then lifted and rotated relative to the outer tube which compresses a spring allowing the gripper to releese, thus separating the extension shaft from the control element assembly.
9.1.4.2.2.10 Cask Handling Crane The cask handling crane will be capable of servicing the receiving bay area, new fuel shipping container laydown area, the cask decontamination pit, the cask storage pit and the spent fuel pool. After fuel assemblies have been placed in the spent fuel racks, mechanical stops will be installed on the crane bridge rails to prevent passage of the crane over the spent fue] pool.
The crane will have a minimum capacity of 150 tons and will incorporate a variable speed hoist and electrical interlocks to control bridge and trolley travel.
941.4.2.2.17 Fuel Handling Crane E
The fuel handling crane will be capable of servicing the new fuel shipping container laydown area, the new fuel storage area, and the new fuel elevator. The crane will have a minimum capacity of 10 tons and will incorporate electrical interlocks to control the cransfer path of the new fuel assemblics and to restrict fuel handling loads. The crane wi? 1 be mechanically restricted from passing over the spent fuel racks.
O Amendment E 9.1-32 December 30, 1988
CESSAR nsincam.
9.1.4.2.2.18 Containment Polar Crane The containment polar crane will be capable of servicing all major components requiring movement during a refueling outage. E It will incorporate, as a minimum, a 225 ton main hoist for handling the reactor vessel head and a 25 ton auxiliary hoist for lighter load handling. The hoist will also incorporate automatic upper and lower travel limits, overload limits and low speed operation to insure safe load handling. Crane control shall be from a trolley-mounted cab.
9.1.4.2.3 System Operation 9.1.4.2.3.1 New Fuel Transfer After arrival of the new fuel shipping containers, the container covers are removed and the fuel assembly strongback raised to the vertical position and locked. The new fuel handling tool, attached to the fuel building overhead crane, is then locked to the fuel assembly, the fuel assembly clamping fixtures removed and fuel assembly removed from the shipping container. Next, the protective wrapping is removed and the fuel assembly is moved over to the new fuel storage racks where it is placed into its O designated cavity. New fuel may be inspected by a new fuel inspection device before placement into the new fuel racks. The tool is unlocked from the assembly and the operation repeated E
until all assemblies have been placed in t he racks.
Prior to reactor refueling operations, the new fuel is removed from the new fuel storage racks and transferred to the new fuel l elevator by using the fuel handling crane and the short fuel ;
E i handling teol.
The new fuel elevator Inwers the fuel assembly into the spent fuel pool to allow the spent #uel handling machine to transfer the fuel assembly to the sper.& inal rack.
During reactor refueling opcrd as, the new fuel assembly is placed in the upending mechanism, a spent fuel assembly is removed from the other position of the fuel carrier and transferred to a designated position in the spent fuel storage racks using the spent fuel handling machine and the spent fuel handling tool. The new fuel is then transferred to the E
containment building.
9.1.4.2.3.2 Spent Fuel Transfer i
Spent fuel transfer during refueling is discussed in Section 9.1.4.2.3.3. E Amendment E 9.1-33 December 30, 1988
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The spent fuel handling machine transfers the spent fuel assemblics from the storage racks to the spent fuel shipping cask. This operation will be implemented when the spent fuel l shipping cask loading pit is filled with spent fuel pool water '
and the gate between the spent fuel pool and the spent fuel shipping cask loading pit is opened. When the spent fuel assemblies are loaded into the cask, the cask will be sealed and transferred to the cask decontamination pit with the cask I handling crane. In the decontamination pit, the cask surface l will be washed off with an applicable-grade demineralized-water hydro-jet. Then it will be transferred to the fuel building loading bay with the cask handling crane through the fuel E
building transfer hatch for intermediate and/or ultimate storage.
Filling and draining of the cask loading pit will be implemented I by the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system. Cleaning and purification of this pit will be carried out by the same system.
I 9.1.4.2.3.3 Refueling Procedure l During reactor cooldown, preparations are begun for the refueling operation. Refueling operations are initiated with the removal of the missile shield from over the reactor. The control element drive mechanisms (CEDMs) are disengaged from their drive shaft extensions by deenergizing the electromagnets, and the CEDM cabling is disconnected in preparation for reactor vessel head removal. The reactor vessel flange is sealed to the bottom of the refueling pool by means of the refueling pool seal and leak tested to preclude water from entering the lower portion of the reactor vessel cavity. The stud tensioners are employed to remove the preload on the reactor vessel head studs. The nuts and studs are removed and plugs are installed to prevent refueling water from filling the empty stud holes. Two head alignment pins are inserted to assist in subsequent operations.
The CEDM cooling shroud is disconnected from its ductwork and the vessel vent line removed. The ICIs are then disconnected and withdrawn from the core region to allow the fuel bundles to be moved. Next the transfer tube blind flange is removed. The reactor head lifting rig is then installed on the reactor vessel head assembly, and by means of the polar crane, the reactor l vessel head is removed to its storage location, while the !
refueling pool is filled. After a common water level is reached, the transfer tube valve is opened preparatory to refueling.
The reactor vessel head assembly is shown in Figure 9.1-17.
The to theupper upperguide guide structure lif ting structure. The rig is installed extension on and shafts andCEAs locked are lE withdrawn into the lift rig and the extension shafts latched to Amendment E 9.1-34 December 30, 1988
CESSARn h uu k
the work platform. The upper guide structure is renered from the reactor vessel and placed on its storage stand. D m ng transfer ,
of the CSB or UGS internals and their lift rigs over the reactor vessel pool seal, the spent fuel pool will be isolated from the refueling pool. Also, components will not be lifted over the E 1 refueling pool seal when the refueling machine contains a fuel !
assembly.
The refueling machine hoist mechanism is then positioned at the desired location over the core. Alignment of the hoist to the top of the fuel assembly is accomplished through the use of a !
digital readout system and is monitored by closed circuit l television. After the fuel hoist is lowered, minor adjustments can be made to properly position the hoist if misalignment is indicated on the monitor. The operator then energizes the actuator assembly which rotates the grapple at the bottom of the hoist and locks the fuel assembly to the hoist. The hoist motor is started and the fuel' assembly is withdrawn into the fuel hoist box assembly which protects the fuel during transportation to the upanding machine. After removal from the core, the spent fuel assembly is roved underwater to the transfer area of the refueling pool. The spent fuel assembly is lowered into the empty cavity of the transfer carriage in the refueling pool. The E l
upending machine then lowers the spent fuel assembly to the j horizontal position after which a cable drive transports the 1' transfer carriage on tracks through the transfer tube.
After the fuel has passed through the transfer tube, another upending machine returns the transfer carrier to the vertical position. The spent fuel handling machine then removes the spent fuel assembly from the transfer carriage and transports it to the spent fuel storage rack.
1 During and after spent fuel discharge from the reactor core t E the spent fuel pit, spent fuel assemblies will be examined by visual inspection and ultrasonic (or sipping) test. After i completion of fuel examination, the new fuel assemblies and acceptable spent fuel assemblies are reloaded into the transfer carriage and carried through the transfer tube to the refueling pool where they are upended to allow the refueling machine to i pick them up and place them in their proper core position. The refueling machine can also be used to shuffle fuel within the core in accordance with the fuel management scheme. In parallel with the refueling operation, the ICI changeout operation can be carried out. This operation may not be performed each refueling.
Also in parallel, and at a location separate from the fuel handling operations, the CEAs are relocated, as required, within i the upper guide structure utilizing long handling tools and the CEA change platform. This operation may not be performed at each Amendment E 9.1-35 December 30, 1988 i
+__ .__ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ ._ . .
CESSAR nainemou refueling. If new CEAs are required, they may be introduced into O
the upper guide structure at this time. The expended CEAs are moved to the CEA elevator, adjacent to the upper guide structure storage area, where the upper CEA casting is removed from the CEA rods utilizing special tooling. Each rod is picked up individually and placed into the transport container where the lower 15-foot section is cut off utilizing the portable underwater hydraulic CEA cutter. The upper 5-foot section of the CEA rod is then placed into the transport container and the operation is repeated until all rods have been cut. The transport container is then moved to the transfer carriage where it is transported to the spent fuel building for CEA rod disposal.
At the completion of the refueling operation, the fuel transfer tube valve is closed. The upper guide structure is reinserted in the reactor vessel, the CEDM drive shaft extensions and CEAs are lowered into position, and the lift rig is removed. The water in the refueling pool is lowered to the reactor vessel flange. The remainder of the refueling pool fluid is then removed. The reactor vessel head is then lowered until the CEDM drive shaft extensions are engaged by the control element drive mechanism nozzle funnels. Lowering of the head is continued until it is seated. Then tha studs are installed, the head is bolted down, and the transfer tube blind flange installed. The refueling pool seal between the reactor vessel flange and the refueling pool is removed. The ICIs are reinserted into the core region and reconnected to their cabling.
E CEDM cabling and cooling ducts are reconnected to the shroud, the CEDM cable tray replaced, and the vessel vent piping installed.
9.1.4.3 Bafety Evaluation 9.1.4.3.1 Fuel Building overhead Cranes and Containment Polar Crane
( Both the containment polar crane and the fuel building overhead cranes will be designed to prevent a fuel handling equipment or fuel cask drop.
Improper operation of the fuel transfer system will be prevented by the location of special limit switches and interlocks which will not allow the movement of fuel handling equipment or fuel casks unless they are properly oriented, thus avoiding a fuel handling accident.
Limit switches and interlocks located on the fuel handling cranes will prevent improper operations which may result in a fuel handling accident. This is discussed in Section 9.1.4.2.1.7.
Amendment E 9.1-36 December 30, 1988
CESSAR ns!Picarie.
O The fuel building overhead cranes will be restricted from moving the load over the spent fuel pool, the new fuel storage racks, the spent fuel pool cooling system or ESF systems which could be damaged by dropping the load, and will be limited to moving in such a manner as to avoid the possibility of falling or tipping ,
into the spent fuel pool, in accordance with the regulatory l position of Regulatory Guide 1.13 and General Design Criteria 61 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.
Operations which could endanger the operator or damage the fuel shall be prohibited by interlocks. All other interlocks are intended to provide equipment protection and may be implemented either mechanically or by electrical interlock.
9.1.4.3.2 Fuel Handling A failure mode is described in Table 9.1-2.
Direct voice communication between the control room and the refueling machine console is available whenever changes in core geometry are taking place. This provision allows the control room operator to inform the refueling machine operator of any impending unsafe condition detected from the main control board I indicators during fuel movement.
Operability of the fuel handling equipment including the bridge )
and trolley, the lifting mechanisms, the upending machines, the transfer carriage, and the associated instrumentation and controls is assured through the implementation of preoperational E tests and routines. Prior to the first actual fuel loading, the equipment is cycled through its operations using a dummy fuel assembly. In addition to the interlocks described in Section 9.1.4.2.1, the equipment has the following special features:
A. The major systems of the fuel handling system are electrically interlocked with each other to assist the operator in properly conducting the fuel handling operation.
Failure of any of these interlocks in the event of operator error will not result in damage to more than one fuel assembly.
B. Miscellaneous special design features which facilitate handling operations include:
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Amendment E 9.1-37 December 30, 1988
i CESSAR san"icari:n O
- 1. Backup hand operation of the refueling machine hoist and drives and CEA change platform traverse drives in the event of power failure.
- 2. Dual wound transfer system motor to permit applying an increased pull on the transfer carriage in the event it becomes stuck.
- 3. Viewing port in the refueling machine trolley deck to provide visual access to the reactor for the operator.
- 4. Electronic and visual indication of the refueling l machine position over the core.
1
- 5. Protective shroud into which the fuel assembly is drawn by the refueling machine.
- 6. Manual operation of transfer system upenders by a special tool in the event that the hydraulic system lE becomes inoperative.
- 7. Removal of the transfer system components from the j refueling pool for servicing without draining the water !
from the pool. j i
C. The fuel transfer tube is sufficiently large to provide ]
natural circulation cooling of a fuel assembly in the l unlikely event that the transfer carriage should be stopped i in the tube. The manual operator for the fuel transfer tube valve extends from the valve to the operating deck. Also, the valve operator has enough flexibility to allow for operation of the valve even with thermal expansion of the fuel transfer tube.
D. Mechanical stops in both the refueling and spent fuel handling machines restrict withdrawal of the spent fuel assemblies. This results in the maintenance of a minimum water cover of 9 feet over the active portion of the fuel assembly. The resulting radiation level from the spent fuel is 2.5 mrem /hr or less in the work area when the shielding of the fuel handling machine is taken into account.
9.1.4.3.3 Reactor Vessel Closure Head Handling E The reactor vessel closure head lift rig is designed, tested, and inspected to meet the intent of NUREG-0612 and the design criteria of ANSI N14.6. Analyses for the postulated head drops is performed to assure that the reactor vessel support system and O
Amendment E I 9.1-38 December 30, 1988
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U shutdown cooling supply flow paths remain functional, that the core will remain in a coolable configuration, and that the k eff E of the core will remain below 0.95.
9.1.4.4 Testina and Inspection Requirements During manufacture of the fuel and CEA Handling Equipment at the vendor's p'lant, various in-process inspections and checks are required including certification of materials and heat treating, and liquid-penetrant or magnetic-particle inspection of critical compliance with l
I welds. Following completion of manufacture, I
design and specification requirements is determined by assembling and testing the equipment in the vendor's shop. Utilizing a !
dummy fuel assembly having the same weight, center of gravity, exterior size and end geometry as an actual assembly, all equipment is run through several complete operational cycles. In addition, the equipment is checked for its ability to perform under the maximum limits of load, fuel dislocation and misalignment. All traversing mechanisms are tested for speed and positioning accuracy. All hoisting equipment is tested for vertical functions and controls, rotation, and load misalignment.
Hoisting equipment is also tested to 125% of specified hoist capacity. Setpoints are determined and adjusted and the N adjustment limits are verified. Equipment interlock function, and backup systems operations are checked. Those functions having manual operation capability are exercised manually.
During these tests, the various operating parameters such as motor speed, voltage, and current, hydraulic system pressures and l load measuring accuracy and setpoints are recorded. At the completion of these tests the equipment is checked for cleanliness, and the locking of fasteners by lockwire or other means is verified.
Equipment installation and testing at the plant site are controlled by approved installation procedures and preoperational test procedures designed to verify conformance with procurement specifications. Each component is inspected and cleaned prior to installation into the system. Recommended maintenance, including any necessary adjustments and calibration, is performed prior to equipment operation. Preoperational tests also include checks of all control circuits including interlocks and alarm functions.
The following testing and inspections will be used for both the containment polar crane and fuel building overhead crane.
A .. Hoists and cable will be load tested at 125% of the rated E load.
O Amendment E 9.1-39 December 30, 1988 r
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B. The equipment will be assembled and checked for proper functional and running operation at the shop and prior to ;
using the equipment.
E C. Inspection and maintenance will be performed in accordance with plant maintenance procedures.
9.1.4.5 Instrumentation Recruirements The refueling system instrumentation and controls are described in Section 9.1.4.2. No credit is taken for instrumentation or interlocks on components of the fuel handling equipment to either prevent or mitigate the consequences of the postulated accident.
Thus, safety-related interlocks are not provided. 1 l
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l Oli Amendment E 9.1-40 December 30, 1988
4 C E S S A R Ennne. m . l O REFERENCES FOR SECTION 9.1
- 1. " DOT-4--Two Dimensional Discrete Ordinates Radiation Transport Code System," W. A. Rhoades, D. B. Simpson, R. L. Childs, and W. W. Engle, ORNL-TM-6529, August 1978.
E
- 2. " KENO IV--An Improved Monte Carlo Criticality Program,"
L. M. Petrie and N. F. Cross Program, ORNL-4938, November 1975.
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Amendment E 9.1-41 December 30, 1988 i
CESSAR n!Encuia O TABLE 9.1-1 MAJOR TOOLS AND SERVICING EOUIPMENT 1 FOR REFUELING FUNCTIONS 1 Item No. Item Ouantity 1 4-Finger CEA Handling Tool 1 2 12-Finger CEA Handling Tool 1 3 CEA Cutting Tool 1 4 t'ransport Container Handling Tool 1 5 Spent-Fuel Handling Tool 1 6 Surveillance Capsule Retrieval Tool 1 7 Neutron Source Handling Tool 1 8 CEA/ICI Transport Container 1 )
9 Gripper Operating Tool 1 {
-10 CEA Assembly / Disassembly Tool Set 1 )
11 New Fuel Handling Tool 1 E
12 Dummy Fuel Assembly 1 Amendment E December 30, 1988
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9.2 WATER SYSTEM 9.2.1 STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM The Station Service Water System (SSWS) is an open system that takes suction from the ultimate heat sink and provides cooling water flow to remove heat released from plant systems, structures and components. The SSWS then returns the heated water to the ultimate heat sink. The SSWS cools the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) which in turn cools safety-related and non-safety-The SSWS is shown on Figure related reactor auxiliary loads.
9.2.1-1.
9.2.1.1 Desian Bases 9.2.1.1.1 Safety Design Bases Safety design bases applicable to the SSWS are as follows:
A. The SSWS, in conjunction with the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) and ultimate heat sink, is capable of removing l sufficient heat to ensure a safe reactor shutdown coincident with a loss of offsite power.
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j B. The SSWS is capable of maintaining the CCWS supply temperature of 120*F or less following the design basis accident U.nder the most adverse historical meteorological conditio*.s consistent with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.27.
C. A single failure of any cc- nent in the SSWS will not impair the ability of the SSWS to meet its functional requirements, because two 100% divisions are provided to meet safety-grade shutdown and post-LOCA requirenients.
D. Adverse environmental occurrences will not impair the ability of the SSWS to meet its functional requirements.
E. The SSWS is designed to detect leakage of water from SSWS.
F. The SSWS is designed to minimize the effects of long-term corrosion, silt, mud and organic buildup.
G. The SSWS is designed to withstand the effects of a safe i shutdown earthquake (SSE). {
H. Components of the SSWS are capable of being fully tested during normal plant operation. In addition, parts and ,
. components shall be accessible for inspection at any time. !
Amendment E 9.2-1 December 30, 1988
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CESSAR8! h w O
I. The design and arrangement of the SSWS is such that its functional operation is unaffected by any missiles.
9.2.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Basis Power generation design bases pertinent to the SSWS are as follows:
A. The SSWS, in conjunction with the CCWS, is designed to cool the reactor coolant from 350*F to 140*F within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> during normal shutdown. The cooling rate of the reactor coolant does not exceed 75"F/hr.
B. The SSWS, in conjunction with the CCWS, is designed to provide a maximum cooling water temperature of 120*F to the shutdown cooling system heat exchanger during a normal shutdown.
9.2.1.1.3 Codes And Standards The SSWS and associated components are designed in accordance with applicable codes and standards. The design conforms with General Design Cr.iteria 2, 4, 5, 44, 45 and 46 and the intent of the Standard Review Plan.
9.2.1.2 System Description The SSWS consists of two separate, redundant, open loop, safety related divisions. Each division cools one of two divisions of the CCWS, which in turn cools 100% of the safety-related loads.
The SSWS operates at a lower pressure than the CCWS to prevent contamination of the CCWS with raw water.
Each division of the SSWS consists of two pumps, piping, valves, controls and instrumentation. Each SSWS division pumps water from a separate SSWS pump structure located at the ultimate heat l sink, through the CCWS heat exchanger and back to the ultimate heat sink. Provisions are made to ensure a continuous flow of cooling water under normal and accident conditions.
9.2.1.2.1 Components Description 9.2.1.2.1.1 SSWS Pumps i
Two SSWS pumps are provided for each of two SSWS divisions. l i
The SSWS contains 2 pumps per division, or 4 total. The sizing i is based on the following operating mode requirements:
O Amendment E l 9.2-2 December 30, 1988 l
1 l
CESSAR nainema m
s Normal power operation - 1 pump per division operating E Normal shutdown - 4 pumps operating Safety-grade shutdown - 2 pumps required, 1 per (36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />) division or 2 in one division Post-LOCA - 1 pump required, all 4 pumps receive automatic start signal !
The pumps are of the vertical centrifugal type and are installed J j
at the SSWS pump structure located at the ultimate heat sink. In Pump motors are connected to their associated Class 1E buses.
the event offsito power is lost, the pumps are stopped and the diesel generator load i restarted in accordance with j
sequencing.
9.2.1.2.1.2 SSWS Pump Structure The cooling pond serves as the ultimate heat sink for the SSWS. {
A separate pump structure is provided for each of the two l l
divisions. Each pump structure is a Seismic Category I design.
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9.2.1.2.1.3 Piping, Valves, And Fittings Piping from and to the CCWS heat exchangers is corrosion Piping, valves., and fitting are supplied in resistant.
=.cccrdance with ASME Code Section III, Class 3.
The supply and return piping to e.nd from system components in a division is physically separated from the supply and return lines in the redundant train.
9.2.1.2.2 System Operation The SSWS has two redundant and separate divisions. Each divisicn supplies cooling to its corresponding CCWS train through the CCWS heat exchanger.
Although either division has a 100% heat dissipation capacity to obtain safe cold shutdown, a normal reactor shutdown is accomplished by initial operation of both trains of the SSWS and CCWS, in order to reach a reactor coolant system temperature of 140*F in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
J l Amendment E l 9.2-3 December 30, 1988 I
CESSARMna -
During emergency operations, the SSWS provides cooling to safety E O
equipment and components indirectly through the CCWS heat exchangers. Cooling water for the SSWS is supplied from the ultimate heat sink as described in Section 9.2.5. Return flow from CCWS heat exchangers serviced by the SSWS is returned to the ultimate heat sink (from non-open heat sinks such as a cooling pond) for heat rejection. The SSWS will operate for the required nominal 30 days following a postulated LOCA without requiring any makeup water to the ultimate heat sink and without requiring any blowdown (from non-open heat sinks such as a cooling pond) for salinity control. Provisions for non-essential makeup water and blowdown are discussed in Section 9.2.5.
The SSWS has two redundant and separate divisions. Each division has 100% heat dissipation capacity for a safe shutdown. Although a normal reactor shutdown is accomplished by operation of both SSWS divisions, shutdown and cool down over 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> is possible with use of a single division.
l 9.2.1.3 Safety Evaluation Safety evaluations, numbered to conform to the safety desigr. j bases, are as follows: i A. The SSWS has the capability to dissipate the heat loads for safe reactor shutdown.
Loss of offsite power results in the shutdown and restarting of the SSWS in accordance with the diesel generator load sequencing. The diesel generator load capacity and sequencing times are commensurate with SSWS requirements.
Thus, safe reactor shutdown is supported by the SSWS.
B. The SSWS maintains the CCWS heat exchanger outlet temperature at or below 120*F for the design basis accident.
C. The SSWS is comprised of two physically separate, independent, full capacity divisions, each of which is powered from a separate ESF bus and a separate diesel 4 generator. This ensures that a single failure does not impair system effectiveness. Refer to Table 9.2.1-1 for the single failure analysis, i
D. The SSWS pumps are located in Seismic Category I pump j structures to protect the pumps against the adverse l environmental occurrences. Other required portions of the !
SSWS are either installed underground or are located in buildings that also protect against adverse environmental conditions. ,
l Amendment E 9.2-4 December 30, 1988 I I
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o E. Flow differential is monitored between SSWS pump discharges E and the n turn lines to the essential pond. Since the SSWS operates at a lower pressure than the CCWS, leakage of raw water from the SSWS into the CCWS is precluded.
F. Wetted surfaces in the SSWS are of materials compatible with the cooling water chemistry. Organic fouling and inorganic buildups are controlled by proper water treatment. (Refer to Section 9.2.5.)
G. The SSWS is Seismic Category I.
H. During normal plant operation, the SSWS is operating. The i
l redundant features of the SSWS allow testing without violation of technical specifications.
I. Components of the SSWS outside of buildings or structures are located such that missiles from any source would not prevent the system performing its design function.
9.2.1.4 Inspection and Testina Requirements g Prooperat.ional testing is performed in accordance with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.68, " Initial Test Program fL Nter Cooled n
i (h Reactor Power Plants. " Periodic testing is per ormed to assure the design basis performance of the system.
9.2.1.5 Instrumentation Requirements The SEWS instrumentation facilitates automatic operation, remote control, and continuous indication of system parameters (UHS pond water temperature, SSWS pump flow, UHS inlet flow, pH, UHS bater level) both locally and in the control room. Controls and instrumentation necessary for operation of the SSWS pumps are located in the control room. Local instrumentation and controls also are provided at SSWS pumps and CCWS heat exchangers for maintenance, testing, and performance evaluation.
Specifically, control room process indication and alarm is provided to enable the operator to evaluate the SSWS performance and to detect malfunctions. SSWS pump discharge pressure is monitored and alarmed to detect an abnormally low pressure (pump failure, piping break) or abnormally high pressure (piping blockage, closed valves) . UHS water levels and temperatures are monitored to detect a low or high level condi. tion or a high temperature condition in the UHS (see Section 9. 2.5) . Control conditions of level and temperatures are also alarmed in the control room. The SSWS water discharge temperatures from the CCWS heat exchangers are indicated in the control room. A high d
Amendment E 9.2-5 December 30, 1988
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CESSARinL a i
temperature condition is alarmed to indicate either a reduced e
l water flow to the exchanger or an abnormal heat input to the E exchanger from the CCWS. j Differential flow between the SSWS circulating water pump discharge and return header is indicated in the control room for i piping leak detection. In addition, a high differential flow is I alarmed to indicate a significant line break. Local pressure and temperature indicators are provided on the cooling water discharge lines of the CCWS heat exchangers.
The SSWS operational logic and the associated initiation and actuation controls and instrumentation are summarized as follows:
A. Both divisions and all four pumps of the SSWS and the CCWS (see Section 9.2.2.1) are operationally actuated by any I single or any combination of the following signals or ;
operations: J l
- 1. Safety injection actuation signal (SIAS).
- 2. Manual start by control room operator.
- 3. Low pump discharge pressure.
B. Manual start and stop actuation from the control room overrides the automatic mode. Manual start and stop controls are also provided for each of the two SSWS permits the removal of a division from operation after the automatic operation actuation if it is not required. ,
)
C. The only components that are actuated in any of the divisions, either automatically or by manual control room operator initiation in lieu of automatic actuation are the SSWS pumps. Valves in the supply lines from the pumps and in the return lines to the UHS spray ponds or to the CCWS heat exchangers are locked open.
1 1
O Amendment E 9.2-6 December 30, 1988
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E 9.2.2 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM The CCWS is shown on Figure 9.2.2-1. Section 9.2.2.6 lists the safety-related nuclear component heat loads for the CCWS and similar data for the non-safety related components. f i
9.2.2.1 Desian Bases 9.2.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases safety design bases applicable to the CCWS are as follows:
The CCWS, in conjunction with the SSWS (including the A.
ultimate heat sink), is capable of removing sufficient heat to ensure a safe reactor shutdown coincident with a loss of offsite power.
B. The CCWS, in conjunction with the SSWS, is capable of maintaining the outlet temperature of the CCWS heat exchanger within the limits of 65*F and 120*F during a design basis accident with loss of offsite power.
C. A single failure of any component in the CCWS will not
{sI impair the ability of the CCWS to meet its functional ib requirements. 3 I
D. Adverse environmental occurrences will not impair the 1 ability of the CCWS to meet its functional requirements. I E. The CCWS is designed to detect leakage of radioactive water into the CCWS and to detect leakage from the CCWS.
The CCWS is designed to minimize the effects of long-term corrosion.
G. The CCWS is designed to withstand the effects of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).
11 . Components of the CCWS are capable of being fully' tested during normal plant operation. In addition, parts and components shall be accessible for inspection at any time.
I. There will be no flow degradation to safety components if the non-safety and fuel pool headers fail to isolate when component cooling is required.
J. The design and arrangement of the CCWS is such that its functional operation is unaffected by any missiles.
U Amendment E 9.2-7 December 30, 1988
1 I
CESSAREEncm2 E
O The CCWS is a closed loop cooling water system which cools components and heat exchangers located in the Auxiliary, Fuel, Radwaste and Containment Buildings. Heat transferred by these components to the CCWS is rejected by the SSWS via the CCWS heat exchangers.
9.2.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Basis Power generation design bases pertinent to the CCWS are as follows:
1 A. The CCWS, in conjunction with the SSWS, is designed to cool !
the reactor coolant from 350*F to 140*F within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> from l hot standby during normal shutdown. The cooling rate of the
]
reactor coolant does not exceed 75'F/hr.
B. The CCWS, in conjunction with the SSWS, is designed to i provide a maximum cooling water temperature of 120*F to the shutdown heat exchanger during a normal shutdown.
C. The CCWS, in conjunction with the SSWS, is designed to provide cooling water to the reactor coolant pumps, letdown heat exchanger nuclear sample coolers, normal chillers, and other non-safety reactor auxiliary cooling loads.
9.2.2.1.3 Codes and Standards The CCWS and associated components are designed in accordance with applicable codes and standards. The design conforms with General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5, 44, 45 and 46 and the intent of the Standard Review Plan.
9.2.2.2 System Description The CCWS consists of two separate, independent, redundant, closed loop, safety-related divisions. Either division of the CCWS or a single pump in each division is capable of supporting 100% of the cooling functions required for a safe reactor shutdown.
Post-LOCA, all four pumps in both divisions automatically start, however, only one of the four pumps is required to operate to support the cooling function after cooling supply to the non-safety loads and fuel pool cooling heat exchangers are i:iolated.
The CCWS operates at a higher pressure than the SSWS as protection against leakage into the CCWS from the SSWS in case of tube leakage in the CCWS heat exchanger.
O Amendment E 9.2-8 December 30, 1988 a____- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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V E Each division of the CCWS includes two heat exchangers, a surge tank, two pumps, a chemical addition tank, piping, valves, controls, and instrumentation.
The CCWS provides cooling water to the safety-related components listed in Section 9.2.2.6.
Makeup water to the CCWS is supplied by the demineralized water system, described in Section 9.2.3. A backup makeup water line of Seismic Category I construction is provided from an assured source. Normally, makeup j;s supplied from the demineralized water system. Should thi demineralized water system be unavailable, during an accident, makeup can be supplied from the assured makeup source.
In case of a major leak in one of the CCWS trains, that train is removed from service and the other train is used.
Water quality design parameters applicable to the CCWS are given in Table 9.2.2-1.
9.2.2.2.1 Components Description 9.2.2.2.1.1 CCWS Heat Exchangers Two CCWS heat exchangers are provided in each division. Heat exchanger sizing is based on the following:
Normal power operation - 1 HX in each division Normal shutdown (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) - all 4 HXs operating Safety-grade shutdown - 2 HXs required (36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />) 1 per division or 2 in single division Post-LOCA - 1 HX of either division This provides an installed spare for all operating modes, except nprmal shutdown cooling.
The heat exchangers are of the shell and tube or plate and frame type. The tube side is furnished with cooling water from the SSWS at a lower operating pressure than the shell side as noted ;
in Section 9.2.2.4. ,, )
The shell side carries the CCWS cooling water. This closed loop shell-side water is initially supplied with demineralized water from the demineralized water system as discussed in Section s 9.2.3.
l Amendment E ;
9.2-9 December 30, 1988 j
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9.2.2.2.1.2 CCWS Pumps E Oi Two CCWS pumps are provided for each CCWS division. Pump sizing {
is based on the following: i Normal power operation - 1 pump in each division j operating j Normal shutdown - 4 pumps operating Safety-grade shutdown - 2 pumps required 4 (36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />) 1 per division or 2 in single division i l
(matched with operating heat exchangers) l Post-LOCA - all 4 pumps automatically start, only 1 required Thir provides an installed spare for all operating modes except normal shutdown cooling. l 1
The pumps are of the horizontal centrifugal type and are at an l installed at an elevation below the CCWS surge tank to ensure !
flooded suction and maintain a constant pressure at the suction j side of the pump. Pump motors are connected to separate Class 1E buses. In the event offsite power is lost, the pumps are stopped and restarted in accordance with the diesel generator load l sequencing.
9.2.2.2.1.3 CCWS Surge Tanks I
One surge tank is provided in each CCWS division to accommodate i the closed loop water expansion and contraction due to thermal I changes in the system. Level controls in each tank signal a I demineralized water makeup line control valve that then actuates l to maintain the water required in the CCWS. An adequately sized overflow line protects the tank from over pressurization due to excessive inleakage.
The surge tanks are installed on the suction side of the CCWS pumps.
9.2.2.2.1.4 Piping, Valves, and Fittings Piping from and to the CCWS heat exchangers is of carbon steel.
Piping, valves, and fittings are supplied in accordance with ASME Code Section III, Class 3.
O Amendment E 9.2-10 December 30, 1988
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Piping is corrosion protected by chemical addition of corrosion E inhibitors. The supply and return piping to and from system components in a train is physically separated from the supply and return lines in the other division.
9.2.2.2.1.5 Instrumentation and Controls The general discussion of the operational logic and the associated initiation and actuation controls and instrumentation of the CCWS and the SSWS is covered jointly in Section 9.2.1.5.
Specifically, the non-sarety CCWS headers are automatically isolated on a safety injection signal or on low-low CCWS surge tank level. Cooling to the fuel pool cooling heat exchangers is automatically isolated on a safety injection signal, with means y to reestablish flow by operator action. The CCWS supply valve to the containment spray heat exchanger automatically opens on high containment spray temperature. Cooling flow to the shutdown cooling heat exchangers is manually aligned from the control room for normal or safety grade cooldown and is not utilized for post-LOCA mode.
Refer to Section 9.2.1.5 for instrumentation and control h applications to the CCWS.
d System Operation 9.2.2.2.2 The CCWS has two 100% capacity divisions, each with 100% l redundancy. Each division is connected to its corresponding SSWS train through the CCWS heat exchanger that serves as a pressure-thermal barrier between the SSWS and the CCWS.
Although either train has a 100% heat dissipation capacity to obtain safe cold shutdown (through heat transfer from the shell side to the tube side of the CCWS heat exchanger and the dissipation of the transferred heat load by the SSWS to the ultimate heat sink, a normal reactor shutdown is accomplished by initial operation of 2 pumps and 2 heat exchangers in each division. During post-LOCA operation all four pumps automatically start, however to support the cooldown function, only 1 pump and 1 heat exchanger in a single division are required.
Normal shutdown and cooldown in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> requires all 4 pumps and heat exchangers.
I Each division of the CCWS provides cooling for redundant safety-related components. These include:
)
l Amendment E 9.2-11 December 30, 1988
CESSAR EnEr...~..
A. Shutdown cooling heat exchangers (2 total, 1 per division).
O?
E i B. Safety injection pump motor coolers (4 total, 2 per division).
C. Containment spray heat exchangers (2 total, 1 per division).
D. Shutdown cooling pump motor coolers (2 total, 1 per division).
E. Containment spray pump motor coolers (2 total, 1 per division). ,
F. Component cooling pump motor coolers (4 total, 2 per division).
G. Motor driven emergency feedwater pump motor coolers (2 l l total, 1 per division).
l H. Diesel generator cooling water heat exchangers (2 total, 1 ,
per division). J I. Essential chillers (2 total, 1 per division).
Each division can also provide cooling for the following non-safety-related components:
A. Reactor coolant pump (RCP) motor air coolers (4 total).
1 B. RCP motor upper bearing oiler coolers (4 total).
C. RCP motor lower bearing coolers (4 total). I D. RCP oil coolers (4 total).
E. RCP seal coolers (4 total).
F. RCP high pressure cooler '4 total).
G. Letdown heat exchanger (1 total).
H. Fuel pool heat exchanger (2 total).
I. Sample heat exchangers.
J. Gas stripper (1 total).
K. Boric acid concentrator (1 total).
O Amendment E 9.2-12 December 30, 1988 f
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CESSAR asibm,.
O V E L. Normal chillers.
M. CEDM air coolers.
N. Containment spray pump mini-flow heat exchangers (2 total, 1 per division);
O. Shutdown cooling pump mini-flow exchangers (2 total, 1 per division).
P. Charging pumps (2 total).
Q. Instrument air compressors.
R. Other miscellaneous components.
Cross-connections are provided with locked, closed valves to be utilized during shutdown if one division is out for maintenance.
9.2.2.3 Bafety Evaluation Safety evaluations are numbered to conform to the safety design r bases and are as folloc.s:
I k A. The CCWS has the capability to dissipate within the safe reactor shutdown time frame the imposed heat loads.
Loss of offsite power results in the shutdown and restarting of the CCWS in accordance with the diesel generator load sequencing. The diesel generator load capacity and sequencing times, are commensurate with CCWS requirements. i Thus, safe reactor shutdown is supported by the CCWS.
B. This CCWS flow and associated heat transfer capability are compatible with providing the . required CCWS system cooling water within the limits of 65'F and 120*F during a design basis accident.
C. The CCWS is comprised of two pysically separate, independent, full-capacity divisions each of which is powered from a separate ESF bus and a separate diesel generator. This ensures that a single failure does not impair system effectiveness. Refer to Table 9.2.2-2 for the )
single failure analysis. I i
in buildings that ;
D. Components of the CCWS are installed '
protect against adverse environmental conditions.
bi Amendment E )
9.2-13 December 30, 1988 j
l CESSARanecmo.
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E. To detect leakage into or out of the CCWS, high and low-level signals at the surge tank will alarm in the control room. Radiation monitors indicate leakage of radioactive fluids into the CCWS.
F. Wetted surfaces in the CCWS are of materials compatible with the cooling water chemistry. Organic fouling and inorganic buildups are controlled by proper water treatment. The use of demineralized water and corrosion inhibitors for this i system minimizes this problem.
The water in the loop is sampled for quality on a scheduled i basis and the pil is adjusted if required by the addition of chemicals.
G. The essentia] portions of the CCWS are Seismic Category I.
H. The redundant features of the CCWS allow testing of one .
l l division without violation of technical specifications.
I. Components of the CCWS are located such that missiles from any source would not impair the system's functional requirements. The two trains of the CCWS are physically separated and are routed such as to be protected from ,
missiles that could be potentially generated from other l sources.
9.2.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements Preoperational testing is performed in accordance with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.68. " Initial Test Program for Water Cooled Reactor Plants." Periodic testing is performed to assure the design basis performance of the system.
9.2.2.5 Instrumentation Requirements Refer to Section 9.2.1.9 for a presentation of the CCWS interfaces to the SSWS.
The CCWS instrumentation facilitates automatic operation, remote control, and continuous indication of system parameters locally and in the control room. Controls and instrumentation necessary for operation of the CCWS pumps are located in the control room.
Local instrumentation and controls also are provided at the CCWS pumps and at the various safety-related nuclear component heat exchangers for maintenance, testing, and performance evaluation.
Specifically, control room process indication and alarm is provided to enable the operator to evaluate the CCWS performance Amendment E 9.2-14 December 30, 1988 l
l l
CESSAR Eniincam.
O V
and to detect mal f 6nc:tionn. CCWS pump discharge pressures and E temperatures at the inlets and outlets of the CCWS heat exchangers are locally disp?ayed. CCWS pump discharge pressures are alarmed to detect a pump failure, return piping blockage, or pipe breaks. CCWS pump discharge te:aperature is indicated and alarmed in the control room for detection of ECWS heat exchanger malfunction.
The surge tank is provided with level instrumentation to show low or high level condition in the closed loop. Critical conditions of tank level and pressure are alarmed in the control room for detection of ECWS heat exchanger malfunction.
As discussed in Section 9.2.1.9, the SSWS water discharge temperature from the CCWS heat exchangers is indicated in the control room. A high temperature condition of SSWS water discharge is alarmed to indicate either a reduced SSWS flow toa the exchanger or an abnormal heat input to the exchanger from component in the CCWS closed loop.
Relief valves are provided, as required, for personnel and equipment protection.
1
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Amendment E 9.2-15 December 30, 1988
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Amendment E 9.2-16 December 30, 1988
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)
- hk E IC ATl*N O TABLE 9.2.2-1 E CCWS WATER OUALITY SPECIFI. CATIONS l
Parameter value pH at 77'F 8.3 to 10.5 f ")
Resistivity (minimum, before additives), 0.5 Megohm /cm Total dissolvad solids, ppm 0.5 (max)
Halogens, ppm 1.0 (ma):)
Corrosion inhibitors:
l Note: (a) pH is adjusted to this range by addition of chemicals if necessary.
l
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9.2.3 DEMINERALIZED WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM 9.2.3.1 Design Bases 3 The Demineralized Water Makeup System supplies filtered ;
1 demineralized water to the Condensate Storage System for makeup and to other systems throughout the plant that require high quality, non-safety-related, makeup water. This system, E therefore, serves no safe shutdown or accident mitigation function, and has no safety design bases.
9.2.3.2 System Description B The n.akeup demineralized supply pumps take suction from the filtered water storage tanks and pump this water through a series of domineralizers to a vacuum degasifier for furtner purification. The resulting demineralized water provides condensato quality water to the following:
A. Condensate Storage System makeup 1 B. Chemical addition tank makeup A
C. Generator stator cooling water makeup
[
D. Recirculated cooling water storage tank makeup E. Demineralized water storage tank makeup l
l l
F. Reactor water storage tank makeup l l
G. Wet layup to the steam generators H. Auxiliary boiler feedwater I. Chilled water system J. Radwaste system K. Diesel generator cooling water system L. Fuel Pool makeup M. Miscellaneous other systems O
! /
'O Amendment E 9.2-17 December 30, 1988
CESSAR HL%=u System Performance O
9.2.3.2.1 The following functional requirements ensure reliable performance of the system.
A. The system provides demineralized makeup water of a quality ,
and quantity which is suitable for long-term plant 6 operation. This applies to all plant conditions including power operation, startup, shutdown, extended outages, and off-chemistry conditions.
B. The makeup water produced meets the chemistry requirements of Table 9.2.3-1.
C. The startup and off-chemistry conditions are evaluated together with storage capacity and operating procedures to ensure that makeup water capacity is not limited and does not have to be supplied from off-site sources.
D. Raw water quality is reviewed for any additional pre-treatment prior to entering the demineralized water makeup system.
E. The demineralized water storage tank provides for holdup and sampling of stater from the domineralizers prior to discharge. It is designed to maintain water purity and exclude oxygen.
F. The following demineralized system features are included:
- 1. Strainers in waste lines to eliminate resin carryover during backwash.
- 2. Use of inert resin in mixed bed vessels.
- 3. Full-flow recirculation.
- 4. Resin regeneration.
- 5. Sight glasses for viewing resin levels in mixed bed vessels.
- 6. Resin traps downstream of each demineralized vessel.
G. The system utilizes two 100% capacity trains.
H. The demineralized water makeup system is designed to prevent radioactive material from entering the system. E O
Amendment E 9.2-18 December 30, 1988
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i k)lb!hbhfkhI b!kT)flCATl!N 1
,~ 1 I. Regenerative waste is routed to demineralized waste tanks E for reclamation. Chemical addition connections are provided for addition of neutralizing chemicals if discharge to the environt.ient is required.
J. The waste tank exit piping is routed so that leaks can be !
detected.
K. The waste tank exit piping includes a valve (or valves) for isolation of the waste tank in the event of a leak.
9.2.3.2.2 Components Description 9.2.3.2.2.1 Demineralized B A. The demineralized includes cation, anion, and mixed bed units. Depending on site-specific raw water quality, different arrangements, including decarbonators, may be necessary.
B. The design of the demineralized may be based on either concurrent or countercurrent regeneration.
O Recirculation capability around the mixed bed domineralizer
{ C.
\~-} is provided.
D. The following materials are used:
Item Material i Demineralized vessels Lined carbon steel. ,
1 Demineralized skid piping Polypropylene lined carbon steel Dilute acid piping Alloy 20 Demineralized waste piping Alloy 20 (or other corrosion resistant material)
In addition, the demineralized waste tank liner is able to withstand the corrosive effects of the regenerate waste over the complete range of expected pH values and chemical concentrations. The tank also includes provisions for chemical neutralization.
l 0
\
l Amendment E 9.2-19 December 30, 1988
CESSARE!Encum 9.2.3.2.2.2 Vacuum Degasifier B A. The degasifier is a packed spray tower type with the makeup l' water injected at the top of the bed through a distributor system. Two vacuum pumps are provided to maintain system vacuum.
B. Two pumps are provided for transferring the degasified water to the demineralized water storage tank.
l C. The degasifier vessel is constructed of rubber lined carbon steel. All piping and fittings are Type 304 SS.
l 9.2.3.2.2.3 Demineralized Water Storage Tank A. The capacity of the Demineralized Water Storage Tank is based on the design flow rate of the domineralizer and the makeup requirements of the plant systems.
B. Two recirculation pumps are provided downstream of the DWST for recycling water back to the degasifier.
C. The DWST is constructed out of stainless steel. A stainless steel floating cover is provided to minimize air ingress.
9.2.3.3 Safety Evaluation The Makeup Demineralized Water System does not perform any safety functions. Failure of this system will not have any adverse effects on the safety analysis.
9.2.3.4 Inspection and Testina Requirements Prior to startup, all piping is hydrostatically tested and flushed to applicable codes and standards. System operability is verified by placing the system into operation prior to fuel loading. After startup, routine visual inspection of the system components and instrumentation is adequate to verify system operability.
9.2.3.5 Instrumentation Requirements A. Instruments and controls are selected to provide the minimum monitoring and control of the systems used to purify makeup water. The system is controlled and monitored from local control panels; the number of panels is related to the location of equipment. Every attempt is make to integrate the controls and indication into two or three panels, at most, to maximize operator control of each subsystem. Each Amendment B 9.2-20 March 31, 1988
i CESSAR E!Enceu (O a sr.migraphic display of the system or panel contains B subsystem controlled from that panel in simplified piping j and equipment format. The controls and indications are !
j grouped together near their respective sections of the semigraphic display.
B. Manual controls for all steps of sequence control arq provided as backup to the automatic / semi-automatic control.
C. The domineralizer is designed for automatic regeneration following manual pushbutton initiation.
D. The parameters which are monitored throughout the ,
domineralizer system are tabulated in Table 9.2.3-2. Where possible, sequential sampling is utilized to minimize the number of process analyzers.
E. The vacuum degasifier controls and instrumentation include dissolved oxygen analyzers, level controllers, system vacuum gages and flow instrumentation.
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Amendment B 9.2-21 March 31, 1988 I
"" ' a "
CESSAR CERTIFICATION O
1 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK I
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O Amendment E 9,2-22 December 30, 1988
CESSAR Enlincan.
TABLE 9.2.3-1 PRIMARY AND SECONDARY MAKEUP WATER LIMITS l
B pH 6.0 to 8.0 Conductivity Less than 0.2 mhos j Chloride Less than 0.15 ppm Cl Fluoride Less than 0.10 ppm F Suspended Solids Less than 0.35 ppm Silica (SiO2 ) Less than 0.01 ppm Amendment B March 31, 1988
CESSAR Ein%m:u O TABLE 9.2.3-2 PROCESS MONITORING PARAMETERS 3 Demin. Cation Decarbon. Anion Mixed Bed Degasi.
Parameter Inlet E f fl u. Ef fl u. Ef fl u. Efflu. Efflu.
Sodium C C W C
Chloride C Sulfate U W Silica C C pH C C Conductivity C C W Pressure C C flow C i
~
RT)TES':
- 1. All parameters listed above are either continuously monitored (C) or grab sampled on a weekly basis (W).
- 2. Recorders are provided for all continuous parameters except pressure. A. l flow totalizer is also provided.
- 3. Alarms are provided for mixed bed effluent chemistry parameters, low demineralized flow and degasifier effluent dissolved oxygen.
- 4. H decarbonators are utilized.
O Amendment B March 31, 1988
CESSAR !!aincu,.
O 9.2.4 POTABLE AND SANITARY WATER SYSTEMS j The potable and sanitary water systems process water for general E plant use. These systems serve no safety functions and any malfunction has no adverse effect on any safety-related system. j The requirements of General Design Criterion 60 are met as related to design provisions provided to control the release of liquid effluents containing radioactive material from t
contaminating the PSWS, as follows:
A. There are no interconnections between the potable and sanitary water systems and systems having the potential for containing radioactive material.
B. The potable water system is projected by an air gap, where necessary.
9.2.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK 9.2.5.1 Design Bases 9.2.5.1.1 Safety Design Bases The ultimate heat sink provides the source of cooling water for safety-related plant systems and components during all modes of plant operation.
9.2.5.1.2 Codes and Standards The ultimate heat sink is desigrad in accordance with General Design Criteria 2, 5, 44, 45 und 46 and the intent of the Standard Review Plan.
9.2.5.2 System Description The ultimate heat sink described here consists of single passive independent cooling water pond. However, it is recognized that site-specific conditions may require the use of two ponds to meet Regulatory Guide 1.27. The design brackets alternative ultimate heat- sinks which may be specified for a particular site if :
environmental restrictions limit the use of a cooling pond or if an alternative water supply is more reliable. Acceptable alternate ultimate heat sinks are an ocean, a large lake, a large river, a lake and a cooling pond, a river and a cooling pond, or a cooling tower and cooling pond.
l Amendment E 9.2-23 December 30, 1988
CESSAREnha m I
i ei The cooling water pond is provided with redundant makeup water E pump to maintain level. Water chemistry is maintained by a site-specific water treatment system (i.e., chemical injection).
Salinity buildup in a pond is limited by blowdown.
The ultimate heat sink will operate for the required nominal 30 days following a postulated LOCA without requiring any makeup j water to the source, and without requiring any blowdown from the l pond for salinity control. i 9.2.5.3 Safety Evaluation The ultimate heat sink meets the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.27.
The cooling water pond is Seismic Category I and of sufficient I
volume to provide the required nominal 30-day cooling capacity without makeup and under worst case meteorological conditions.
Ultimate heat sink temperature will not exceed 100*F with maximum pre-accident temperature of 95*F. This is less than the maximum allowable temperature required for cooling any safety-grade component during a design basis accident.
The function of the ultimate heat sink is not lost during or af?cr any of the following events:
A. Natural phenomena, including SSE, tornado, flood, and ,
drought. {
l B. Non-concurrent site-related events, including transportation accidents, oil spills, and fires. l C. Credible single failures of man-made structures.
D. Sabotage. i 9.2.5.4 Instrumentation Requirements The level o: each cooling water pond is monitored and controlled.
Safety grade alarms warn if the level of the pond approaches minimum allowable value, or temperature approaches the maximum allowable value.
9.2.6 CONDENSATE STORAGE SYSTEM 9.2.6.1 Design Bases A. The Condensate Storage System provides demineralized water 3 for initial fill of the condensate and feedwater systems.
As dictated by the Hotwall Level Control System, the Condensate Storage System provides makeup or receives excess condensato as necessary.
Amendment E 9.2-24 December 30, 1988
CESSAREnamu o
U B. The Condensate Storage System, along with other conderlate E volumes such as the condensate hotwell or the deaerator storage tank, is designed to enable the RCS to be maintained at hot standby for four hours and then to be cooled down and depressurized to shutdown cooling system entry conditions in the next twentp hours.
C. The Condensate "torage System is designed to maintain water purity and exc] de oxygen.
9.2.6.2 System Description The Condensate Storage System provides a readily available source of deaerrted condensate for makeup to the condenser and is one of the condensate sources of startup feedwater for makeup to the steam generators. It also serves to collect and store miscellaneous system drains. The condensate Storage System provides condensate to or receives drains from, the following E equipment:
A. Condenser Hotwell p B. Startup Feedwater Pump Suction i
\
C. Emergency Feedwater Storage Tank D. Emergency Feedwater Pt"up Turbine Steam Supply and Exhaust Drains E. Steam Jet Air Ejector Drains F. Gland Steam Condenser Drains G. Vacuum Deacrator Condensate Return H. Auxiliary Steam Drains
- 1. Evaporator Condensate Return Units J. Other Miscellaneous Condensa'e Quality Drains The following functional requirements are met to provide a reliabic systeu:
A. The minimum capacity of the condensate storagc tanks is based on the maximum condensate usage during startup (e.g., B maximum steam generator blowdown level x startup duration) plus a 100% margin.
B. A minimum of two condensate storage tanks are provided.
Amendment E l 9.2-25 December 30, 1988 y
l 1
l CESSAREHLuw l
C. Two pumps are provided for recycling back to the degasifier l located in the demineralized water makeup system. 3 D. The condensate storage tanks are to be coristructed of l stainless steel.
1 E. Stainless steel floating covers are recommended to minimize l air ingress. i F. A failure of a Condensate Storage System component connected E j to a safety-related system does not affect the safe shutdown '
or accident mitigation function of the safety-related system.
G. System leakage or storage tank failure will not result in unacceptable environmental effects, 11 . Condensate Storage Tanks are provided with overflow lines which are large enough to handle any storage tank overflow and route that overflow to the Turbine Building sump.
9.2.6.3 Safety Evajuation B
The Condensate Storage Systr . is not safety related because the assured source of water fo the emergency feedwater system is .
j provide? by the Emergency sedwater Storage Tanks. The safety analysis is, therefore, nt t affected by thc design of the ,
Condensate Storage System.
9.2.6.4 l!1spection and Testing Requirements Prior to startup, all piping is hydrostatically tested and flushed to applicable codes and standards. System operability is verified by placing the system into operation prior to fuel loading. After startup, routine visual inspection of the system compoacnts and instrumentation is adequate to verify system ope rability .
9.2.6.5 I_nstrurnentation Requirements Sufficient instrumentation is provided to monitor system performance.
9.2.7 REFUELING WATER SYSTEM l E
There is no unique system designated the Retuoling Water System.
The functions of filling, draining, and purifying the borated water used to flood the refueling pool are performed using components of other systums. These systems are:
A. Containment Spray System Amendment E 9.2-26 December 30, 1988 l
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CESSARnn% - I O)
E B. Chemical and Volume Control System C. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Purification System I D. Shutdown Cooling System 9.2.7.1 Desi_qn Bases Means are provided to flood and drain the refueling pool and purify the water used for this purpose prior _ to, during, and after the refueling operation.
9.2.7.2 System Description The procedures for filling, draining, and purifying the contents of the refueling pool are described below.
9.2.7.2.1 Refueling Cavity Filling and Draining The refueling cavity is filled by operating the containment spray pumps for transferring the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) to the refueling cavity. If the cavity is being flooded for refueling, the blind flange on the containment end of (p) the fuel transfer tube is removed prior to starting the flooding
\~ d operation. In this way, the transfer canal may be flooded simultaneously with the refueling cavity by opening the transfer tube valve.
When the necessary prerequisites have been accomplished, flow is initiated from the IRWST, via the containment spray pumps, to the refueling pool. The filling operation continues until the proper j level in the cavity has been reached, matching the spent fuel pool level. This level, which requires most of the contents of the IRSWT, is a mininum nine feet above the active portion of a raised fuel element.
To drain the refueling cavity, the shutdown cooling pumps are used. These pumps will take suction on the cavity via the 1 shutdown cooling lines and return the contents to the IRWST. l This operation is terminated when the level in the refueling l cavity reaches the reactor vessel flange elevation. Because of !
the geometry of tha pool, some of the water will not be drained '
back through the reactor vessel. An alternate draining path is provided to renove this trapped water. By leaving the fuel transfer valve open, most of the water in the transfer canal will j also be drained. Final draining of the transfer canal is 1 accomplished with an air dewatering pump which returns the remaining water to the IRWST. After both the refueling pool and (n canal have been drained, the blind flange is put back on the transfer tube.
I Amendment E l 9.2-27 December 30, 1988 l
CESSARCEbum )
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9.2.7.2.2 Refueling Water Purification E
O The water flooded into the refueling cavity can be filtered, prior to, during and after the refuelir.g using the refueling cavity filtration system. The filtration system is relatively small (approximately 500 gpm) skid mounted system consisting of a submersible pump, cartridge type filte'es, hoses, and associated l l
instrumentation.
Prior to flooding the refueling cavity, the borated water in the IRWST may be recirculated through the ion exchangers and filters in the CVCS. This is accomplished by recirculating the contents of the IRWST with the shutdown cooling pumps and using the differential pressure supplied by the SCS pumps to drive a portion of the recirculation flow through the CVCS ion exchangers.
When the refr ling pool has beien flooded, its contents may be purified by r.' sing the refueling water through the purification filters and ion exchangers in the CVCS. This is accomplished by diverting a portion of the shutdown cooling flow, using differential pressure supplied by the operating SCS pump, through the CVCS ion exchangers.
9.2.7.3 Safety Evaluation The safety evaluation of the components used to fill, drain, and purify the contents of the refueling pool are discussed in sections which describe those components.
9.2.7.4 Inspection and Testina Requirements j i
The tests and inspections of the components used to fill, drain, and purify the contents of the refueling cavity are discussed in sections which describe those components.
9.2.7.5 Instrumentation Requirements The instrumentation used to monitor the filling, draining, and ,
purification of the contents of the refueling cavity is described l in the various system sections. No instrumentation is specifically installed for the refueling water handling l operation.
9.2.8 TURDINE BUI'LDING COOLING WATER SYSTEM The Turbine Building Cooling Water System (TBCWS) provides cooling for the non-safety-related components in the various l turbine plant auxiliary systems. Cooling is effected through i heat exchangers with heat rejected to the Turbine Building Amendment E 9.2-28 December 30, 1988
CESSARUn%um i
f
\,
E Service Ww H System ' (TBSWS) . This closed cooling water system l i
is used m lieu of direct cooling by the TBSWS because the quality of Qe water being circulated in the TBSWS could result in a greater tendency for equipment fouling and corrosion.
9.2.8.1 Desian Dases 9.2.8.1.1 Power Generation Design Basis The TBCWS is designed to cool the non-safety-related auxiliary I components of the steam and power conversion system over the full l I
range of normal plant operation.
9.2.8.1.2 Codes and Standards The TBCWS is designed in accordance with applicable codes and standards.
9.2.8.2 _ System Description The TBCWS is a single closed loop cooling water system. The TBCWS includes two 100% heat exchangers, two 100% pumps, one surge tank, one chemical addition tank, piping, valves,
[3 t instrumentation and controls.
b The following components are cooled by the TBCWS:
l A. Main turbine lube oil coolers B. Circulating water pump motor lube oil coolers C. IIcater drain pump lube oil coolers D. Electro-hydraulic control fluid coolers E. Air compressor aftercoolers and jacket coolers F. Feedwater pump turbine lube oil coolers G. Condensate pump motor lube oil coolers
!! . Gland steam packing exhauster l
I. Isolated phase bus cooling coils J. Main generator hydrogen coolers K. Main generator stator coolers v
Amendment E 9.2-29 December 30, 1988 l
CESSAR Enfi?ICATl N O
L. Various non-safety-related sample coolers The TBCWS utilizes demineralized water to remove waste heat from the various non-safety-related components in the turbine i building. Refer to Section 9.2.3 for the discussion of the demineralized water system. Discharge from the TBCWS pumps i supplies cooling water to the system's component coolers and returns to the TBCWS heat exchangers where heat is rejected to the TBSWS. A schematic diagram of the TBCWS is provided in Figure 9.2.8-1.
9.2.8.2.1 System Operation The TBCWS is required for power generation operations and during shutdown. Normally, one TBCWS pump and heat exchanger are operating with a second pump and heat exchanger on standby. The standby pump is automatically brought on line whenever the pump discharge header pressure falls below a preselected value. The redundant TBCWS heat exchenger is placed in service manually.
The surge tank is provided with a level control that signals a demineralized water makeup line control valve, which then actuates to maintain the required water level. Instrumentation is provided for automatic temperature control of some components and manual control is provided for the other components.
9.2.8.3 Safety Evaluation The TBCWS has no safe shutdown or accident mitigation function.
9.2.8.4 Inspection and Testing Requiremen_t.s Acceptance testing of this system is performed to demonstrate proper system and equipment function.
9.2.8.5 Instrumentation Requirements Local temperature gauges and pressure / test points tre provided for temperature and pressure determination. Indication of the surge tank level is provided locally. An alarm also is provided in the control room for high and ..ow TBCWS pump discharge pressure and high and low surge tank water level and pressure.
Makeup water flow to the surge tank is initiated automatically by low surge tank water level and is continued until the normal level is reestablished. Chlori.ie detection instruments are provided to detect inleakage froni TBSWS to TBCWS.
O Amendment E 9.2-30 December 30, 1988
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9.2.9 CHILLED WATER SYSTEM 1 The Chilled Water Systems (CWS) are designed to provide and distribute a sufficient quantity of chilled water, through a group of dedicated piping systems, to air handling unitsinto (AHUs)two I in specific plant areas. The CDWS is divided subsystems, an Essential Chilled Water System (ECWS) that serves primarily safety-related HVAC cooling loads, and a Normal Chilled Water System (NCWS) that serves non-safety-related HVAC cooling loads.
9.2.9.1 Desicn Bases i
The ECWS system is designed as follows: i A. The essential chilled water system is a Safety Class 3 system. The components of the system are designed .in accordance with applicable ASME Codes and IEEE Standards. ,
I B. Safety related portions of this system are protected from 1 tornadoes, missiles, pipe whip, and flooding.
p)
(d' C. The condensers of the refrigeration units are cooled by the component cooling water system (CCWS) during all plant operating modes, including design basis events.
D. Two 100 percent capacity equipment trains are provided to meet the single failure criteria.
E. The electrical equipment in each train is powered from independent Class lE electrical buses.
F. This system is designed to withstand ti. . Safe Shutdown Earthquake.
The NCDWS system is designed as follows:
A. The NCPS system is not a safety-related system. However, the containment cooling systems serviced by this system are designed to operate during loss of offsite power. The power supply to these pumps and chiller units are transferred automatically (except during accident conditions) to standby AC power when normal electric power is not available.
B. The chilled water piping components within the containment and other Seismic Category II/I buildings are supported in accordance with Seismic Category I criteria to preclude p damage to safety-related systems during the safe Shutdown
! Earthquake.
Amendment E 9.2-31 December 30, 1988
CESSAR EnnN-O 9.2.9.2 System Description E
The CWS are closed loop, refrigeration systems, divided into two subsystems: the safety-related Essential Chilled Water System (ECWS) and the non-safety-related Normal Chilled Water System (NCWS) loads. The ECDWS subsystem is made up of two equally sized divisions. Each division is totally independent and q separated both mechanically and electrically except for areas l where it is physically impractical or unsafe. The NCWS subsystem is comprised of two 100% capacity divisions that produce the chilled water flow requirements. Figure 9.2.9-1 illustrates the chilled water system configuration.
l l
9.2.9.2.1 ECWS Each 100% capacity division is comprised of a chilled water refrigeration unit, a circulating chilled water pump, control valves, instrumentation, and piping. A makeup water line to the ECWS is connected to the demineralized water system, the normal source of makeup. In case of a loss of offsite power, makeup is supplied from t..a condensate storage tank, via a Seismic Category I backup makeup water line.
The ECWS equipment design requirements are as follows: ,
A. The system is designed to provide a sufficient quantity of chilled water to the associated HVAC system and the HVAC equipment room chilled water coils at a normal 45*F water i temperature from the refrigeration unit and a maximum of I l 10*F AT across the refrigeration unit.
B. The evaporator tubes and the condenser tubes of the refrigeration unit are designed to inplude an allowance for tub f uling f 0.0005 hr-ft *F/ Btu and 0.002 2
hr-f t
- F/ Btu , respectively.
C. Components of the system are designed in accordance with the Seismic Category I and Class lE requirements.
D. Each refrigeration unit is housed along with its corresponding air-handling equipment and physically separated from the ccher refrigeration unit (s) and air-handling equipment by a concrete missile wall.
E. The control room chilled water system is controlled to maintain a constant supply water temperature and work in conjunction with the associated HVAC system to meet the cooling requirements during all modes of operation.
O l Amendment E 9.2-32 December 30, 1988
CESSAR1HMema r
9.2.9.2.2 NCWS. E
'This- system consists oo f _ chilled water refrigeration units, chilled water circulation' pumps, expansion tanks, control valves, instrumentation, and piping. It operates during ' normal plant operation, hot standby, refueling or maintenance shutdown periods.
The NCDWS equipment design requirements are as follows:
A. Containment areas:
'1. .The containment chilled water system consists' of two
-100% capacitv- chilled water ' circuits each comprising one chilled water pump, one chiller, one air separator, one compression tank, and associated air-handling units.
- 2. Plant CCWS water is used for condensors of the refrigerating units during all' operation modes.
- 3. The two 100% capacity containment chilled water systems are interconnected through normally closed and manually operated valves. This assures that. proper cooling will V be maintained, should one chilled water system fail.
- 4. Redundant isolation valves are provided in each supply and return line from the air-handling units at the point of containment penetrations. These valves are powered from the Class 1E buses and'have hand-switches on the main control board. The valves e.re automatically activated to close by the containment isolation signal.
- 5. The system is designed to provide an adequate quantity of chilled water to the air-handling units at a maximum of 45*F leaving water temperature from the chiller, and a maximum of 10*F AT across the chiller.,
B. Other Buildings using NCDWS:
- 1. The NCWS consists of two.100% capacity circuits 'cach' comprising one chilled water pump, one chiller, one' air.
separator, one compression tank and associated air handling units.
- 2. The system is designed to provide an adequate quantity of chilled water to the air-handling units at a maximum of 45'F leaving water temperature from the chiller,-and j a maximum of 10*F AT across the chiller.
Amendment E 9.2-33 December 30, 1988 l
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CESSAR ENncarian
- 3. Each pump suction is connected to a common return O
header while each chiller discharge is connected to a I' common supply header. i
- 4. The condenser of each water chiller is cooled by the plant CCWS system during all normal operating conditions.
- 5. Each chiller / pump combination is independent of other !
combinations and has no interlocks with them.
- 6. The system incorporates features that assure its j reliable operation over a full range of normal plant !
operation. These features include the installation of redundant principal system components. ,
l 9.2.9.3 Safety Evaluation I i
9.2.9.3.1 ECWS l
The ECWS is designed to provide chilled water at the required temperature and flow rate.
1 The ECWS is divided into two trains, each supplied with redundant l power sources and redundant essential cooling water system j trains. No single failure can impair the ability of the system l to function. !
l The ECWS is designed to Seismic Category I criteria.
The ECWS is provided with sufficient access and removable insulation to permit visual inspection of the piping and equipment surfaces.
The ECWS is protected from missiles by means of physical separation of redundant units and by use of adequate building structure where it is located.
9.2.9.3.2 NCWS The NCWS has no safety function.
9.2.9.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The refrigerant suction and discharge pressures, compressor lubricant pressure, and water pressure differential across the l
condensors and chillers of each refrigeration unit are periodically monitored to assure that normally operating equipment is functioning properly.
Amendment E 9.2-34 December 30, 1988
CESSARninne-Equipment shall be factory ' inspected and tested in accordance .
i with applicable equipment specifications and codes. System E piping and erection of equipment are inspected. during various on construction stages. Construction tests are performed i mechanical components and the system shall be balanced for the design water flows and system operating pressures. Controls, interlocks, and safety devices on each system are cold checked, adjusted and tested' to ensure the. proper sequence of operation. with A final integrated acceptance test shall be conducted equipment and controls operational to verify the system performance. A heat balance shall be made on all cooling components to verify specified capacity. Maintenance will be performed on a scheduled W is in accordance with the equipment manufacturer's recommendations and station maintenance procedures.
9.2.9.5 Instrumentation Requirements CWS control and instrumentation design requirements are supplied as follows:
A. Each chiller unit is provided. with built-in protection-against freezing, high refrigerant pressure, low refrigerant pressure, high discharge temperature, motor overload, lubrication oil failure, and motor high temperature.
B. If chilled water flow through. an operating chiller is lost for any reason, the chiller and chilled water pumps are automatically shut down by interlocks to a flow switch in the chilled water line. An alarm also is annunciated on the local control panel.
C. If the plant CCWS water pressure at the inlet of any operating chiller is lost for any reason, the chiller is automatically shut down by interlocks after a time delay.
D. Each chiller is interlocked with its respective pump to permit chiller operation only if the pump is running.
E. The chilled water temperature leaving the chillers is controlled to a nominal design value of. 45'F. System capacity modulation is achieved by built-in inlet guide vanes at each compressor suction.
F. Loss of water flow through the chiller is annunciated on the main control board.
G. High chilled water leaving temperature and loss of water .
O flow in each unit is annunciated on the local control panel. I Amendment E 9.2-35 December 30, 1988
CESSAR E!aincunou i
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Amendment E 9.2-36 December 30, 1988
] COMPRESSION 1 TANK DEMINERALIZED WATER CHILLER --
MAKEUP
^
U -
CHILLED 4-- 4-- COMPONENT WATER COOLING PUMP WATER I
1 O v HVAC SYSTEM WM AIR HANDLING UNIT COOLING COILS P.OT E: THIS DR AWING IS TO ILLUSTRATE THE SCOPE AND REQUIREMENTS j OF THE TEST AND IS NOT INTENDED TO SHOW THE FINAL DET All OF THE Amendment E DESIGN December 30, 1988 Figure !
g f CHILLED WATER SYSTEM
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1 CESGAREna m, m
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E 9.2.10 TURBI"" BUILDING SERVICE WATER SYSTEN 1
(
The Turbine Building Service Water System (TBSWS) removes heat from the TBCWS and rejects the heat to the cooling towers. .
1 9.2.10.1 pesian Bases 9.2.10.1.1 Power Generation Design Bases The power generation design basis applicable to this system is as follows:
The TBSWS is designed to remove heat from the non-safety-related normally operating closed cooling water systems over the full range of normal plant operation.
9.2.10.1.2 Codes and Standards The TBSWS is designed in accordance with applicable codes and standards.
9.2.10.2 System Description 9.2.10.2.1 General Description v
The TBSWS uses pumps to circulate from the plant cooling towers to remove heat from the TBCWS. Condenser circulating water from 4 the cooling towers, is pumped through the TBCWS heat exchangers !
and is discharged back into the Condenser Circulating Water System at a point between the main condenser cooling water outlet and the cooling tower inlet. Circulating water quality is maintained as discussed in Section 10.4.5.
Because of possible contamination of the TBCWS through leaks in various components in the system, the design operating pressure of the TBSWS is lower than the design operating or transient pressures of the TBCWS. This pressure differential ensures against contamination of the TBCWS.
Piping and valves in the TBSWS are carbon steel and are coated with a suitable corrosion resistant material. The TBCWS heat l exchangers are constructed of corrosion resistant materials to ;
minimize corrosion. l A schematic diagram of the TBSWS system is provided in Figure 9.2.10-1.
p (v)
Amendment E 9.2-37 December 30, 1988 j l
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1 CESSARnMacus )
i 1
9.2.10.2.2 Components Description E O
The TBSWS consists of two, 100% capacity, vertical, wet pit pumps, (one on standby) which are located at the TBSWS intake structure.
9.2.10.2.3 System Operation Normally, one TBSWS pump is started manually from the main f' control room and is operated continuously during normal plant operating conditions.
I The standby TBSWS pump is started automatically in the event the )
normally operating pump is tripped or the discharge header i pressure drops below a preset limit. j l
The flow through and pressure in the tube side of the TBCWS heat i exchanger is regulated manually so that the TBSWS operates at a j continuous, steady state during plant operating conditions. The redundant heat exchangers are placed in service manually as required. ,
9.2.10.3 Safety Evaluation The TBSWS has no safe shutdown or accident mitic'ation function.
9.2.10.4 Ipspection_and Testing Requirements Acceptance testing of this system is performed to demonstrate proper system and equipment function.
9.2.10.5 Instrumentation Requirements Local pressure and temperature indicators are provided at selected points in the system. TBSWS pump discharge pressure indication is provided locally and in the main control room. j l
Pressure switches are provided at the TBSWS pump discharge for standby pump auto start and for low pressure alarm in the main control room.
I O
Amendment E 9.2-38 December 30, 1988 l
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CESSARE!h mu b
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9.3 PROCESS AUXILIARIES E
9.3.1 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEMS 9.3.1.1 pesign s Bases The Compressed Air System consists of the Instrument Air, Station Air, and Breathing Air Systems. The Instrument Air System supplies clean, oil free, dried air to all air operated instrumentation and valves. The Station Air System supplies compressed air for air operated tools, miscellaneous equipment, and various maintenance purposes. The Breathing Air System supplies clean, oil free, low pressure air to various locations in the plant, as required for breathing protection v.;ainst airborne contamination while performing certain maintenance and cleaning operations.
9.3.1.1.1 Codes and Standards I 3
1 The compressed air systems and associated components are designed in accordance with applicable codes and standards. The design conforms to General Design Criteria 1, 2 and 5 and meets the intent of the Standard Review plan. ]
9.3.1.2 System Description 9.3.1.2.1 Instrument Air System l Instrument air is supplied by two, 100% capacity instrument air compressors. The compressor intakes are in an area free of I corrosive contaminants and hazardous gases. Downstream of each air compressor, the hot compressed air flows through an aftercooler and water separator before discharging into an instrument air receiver. The aftercooler cools the hot compressed air to within 10*F of the Turbine Building Cooling Water System (TBCWS) temperature, and the water separator removing any water condensed in the cooling process. The air receivers smooth out any pressure surges. Downstream of the air receivers, the instrument air is dried to a dew point of 35'F to 39'F by four refrigerated air dryers. In addition, desiccant air dryers are provided on the lines going outside the building to dry the air to a design dew point of -40*F. After the refrigerated air dryers, the air is passed through filters which filter our particles larger than 3 microns. Downstream of the filters, the instrument air headers supply instrument air throughout the plant. At each air operated valve or instrument the air is filtered again through a filter-regulator.
I V
Amendment E 9.3-1 December 30, 1988 l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ -
CESSAR E'L"icari:u E
O in the event of low instrument air pressure, the Station Air System will automatically supply air to the Instrument Air System. This air will be supplied through two oil removal filters to the instrument air compressors discharge header.
The bulk air supply to the condensate polishing domineralizers will come off the instrument air compressors discharge headdr upstream of the instrument air dryers. Tto check valves with a trap between them will be provided in this supply line to prevent the backflow of water into the Instrument Air System.
9.3.1.2.2 Station Air System Station air is supplied by two, 100% capacity station air compressors. Downstream of each air compressor, the hot compressed air flows through an aftercooler and water separator before discharging into a station air receiver. The aftercooler cools the hot compressed air to within 10*F of the conventional TBCWS temperature, and the water separator removes any water condensed in the cooling process. The air receivers smooth out any pressure surges. Downstream of the air roccivers, the station air headers carry station air throughout the plant.
9.3.1.2.3 Breathing Air System Breathing air is supplied by two, 100% capacity breathing air compressors. Downstream of each compressor, the compressed air flows through three filters, an aftercooler, and dryer before discharging into a breathing air receiver which serves to smooth out the air flow. The receiver discharge lines join and supply breathing air to various locations in the Auxiliary Building and inside the Containment.
9.3.1.3 Safety Evaluatiotl The Compressed Air System is designed to provide dependable sources of compressed air for all plant uses. Sufficient redundancy is provided to give a high degree of reliability to the air supply at all times. Sufficient air receiver capacity is provided to meet system high air demand transients.
Failure of the Compressed Air System will not render any safety system equipment or its function inoperable. A loss of instrument air during an accident or plant blackout would cause ;
all pneumatically operated valves in the station which are essential for safe shutdown to fail in the safe position.
Therefore, the Compressed Air System is not relied upon for any l safe shutdown or accident mitigation function. !
)
Amendment E 9.3-2 December 30, 1988 )
1 l
CESSAR EniinCATICN O-The instrument air compressors and air dryers can be manually powered by the Class 1E diesel generators during a loss of offsite power. This provision is made to facilitate shutdown, especially during a Control Room evacuation coincidentfor withthe a
loss of offsite power. The reliable power source ;
compressors in this case is the Class 1E diesel generators, and aftercoolers, the reliable cooling water source for the intercoolers, and oil coolers is the Component Cooling Water System.
9.3.1.4 Inspection and Testina Requirements The instrument air system preoperational testing and inspection is in accordance with intent of Regulatory Guide 1.80 prior to initial operation. The air at the discharge of the air dryers is checked and verified to have an acceptable dew point.
Periodically, the air at the filter discharge is tested for dew point and particulate contamination. Air samples are taken at selected remote locations on the instrument air system and checked for oil and particulate matter as recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.80 and in accordance with MC11.1-1976 (ISA-S7.3). Adequate operating performance monitoring by the s operator assures system integrity.
9.3.1.5 Instrumentation Requirements Sufficient instrumentation is provided to monitor system performance and to control the system automatically or manually under all operating conditions. f l
9.3.2 PROCESS SAMPLING SYSTEM 9.3.2.1 Design Bases B
The sampling system is designed to collect and deliver reprocentative samples of liquids and gases in various process systems to sample stations for chemical and radiological analysis. The system permits sampling during reactor operation, cooldown and post-accident modes without requiring access to the containment. Remote samples can be taken of fluids in high radiation areas without requiring access to these areas. The .
sample system performs no safety function. l 9.3.2.1.1 Performance Design Criteria A. Collection Environment A The system permits sampling without requiring access to the ;
containment or entry into high radiation areas.
l Amendment E ;
December 30, 1988 i 9.3-3
"'t" CESSAR CERTIFICATE *N O
B B. Flow to Continuous Monitors The system provides a constant and continuous sample flow to the on-line monitors or analyzers. In the event that a system is removed from service, an alternative source of water is provided to the monitors.
C. Grab Samples l
Unless sampling is done for total dissolved gases, grab i sample (s) are provided at atmospheric pressure. For grab camples of pure water systems for which pH and conductivity measurements are made, a sample sink is provided to allow for sample flow past portable measuring equipment.
D. Pressure / Temperature Reduction Samples are reduced to a pressure that is compatible with on-1ine monitors or analyzers and to atmospheric pressure for grab samples not being analyzed for dissolved gases. ]
j Samples are cooled to 77'F for on-line monitors and j analyzers and to a maximum temperature of 120*F for grab j samples.
E. Representative Samples Samples are representative of the sampled stream. The campling system provides isokinetic samples if a vapor or gaseous phase may exist in the process fluid being sampled (e.g., wet steam or fluid streams sampled for particulate).
For tanks, provisions are made to sample the recirculation loop of the tank contents and to avoid sampling from low points for from potential sediment traps. For process stream samples, sample points are located in turbulent flow zones. Stagnant areas are avoided since these areas do not have mixing. Gaseous samples of process streams and tanks are in accordance with ANSI N13.1-1969.
F. Sample Segregation Samples a ri . segregated so that low conductivity equipment drains and high conductivity, or high solid, samples are not mixed for discharge to radwaste or return to downstream of the point of origin. In addition, the effluent from analyzers which add chemicals to the sample (e.g., sodium and silica analyzers) are routed to a high conductivity waste tank. Samples that are radioactive or potentially radioactive are segregated from non-radioactive samples.
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Amendment B 9.3-4 March 31, 1988 L_._________________________.__.______ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
CESSAR nairicain v
G. Sample Flow Rate The sample flow rate assures turbulent flow (e.g., Re >
or 4000) in the sample line up-stream of the sampling are monitoring location. Sample flow rate capabilities selected based on sample line size, fluid temperature and sample station location to assure that the turbulent flow requirement is met.
II . Post-Accident Sampling
- 1. The design meets the requirements of Section II.B.3 of NUREG-0737 and applicable sections of Regulatory Guide 1.97.
- 2. The design appropriately integrates the normal and post-accident functions so as to maximize the i J familiarity of plant operators with the operation of l systems that may be required after an accident.
However, long sample delay times for normal samples are avoided.
Any function which is not performed during normal p; 3.
sampling operations has testing capability to enable periodic verification of operability and familiarization with system operation.
- 4. Provision is made fer diluting liquid and gas samples for subsequent radiological analysis.
- 5. Collection and dilution of the post-accident sample is performed remotely to the maximum extent feasible.
- 6. Grab samples are utilized for specific laboratory l
analyses, and on-line monitors are utilized for trends.
l Utilizing grab samples for radioisotopic analysis is preferred over on-line monitors. Gas chromatography E equipment is not utilized for on-line analysis.
- 7. All remotely operated valves required for post-accident g sampling have assured power supplies and system level reset features which allow reopening of the valves after containment isolation without clearing the isolation signal for other containment isolation ,
valves. Individual valve reset features are provided ]
to allow opening of individual sampling valves after ;
system reset. Valves and operators which are p inaccessible during an accident are environmentally qualified to ensure operability under accident-l (s conditions.
1 Amendment E 9.3-5 December 30, 1988
CESSAR 8Binema O
- 8. Two independent non-1E sources are available to provide B electrical power for post-accident sampling. After loss of normal onsite power, power is automatically supplied from offsite. During loss of offsite power, an alternate backup power cource, not necessarily the vital 1E bus, is available that can be energized in sufficient time to meet the three-hour sampling and analysis time limit of NUREG-0737.
- 9. Fire Protection In the event of a fire, reactor coolant boron sampling is available to verify shutdown margin.
9.3.2.2 System Description 9.3.2.2.1 General System Description The process sampling system includes sampling lines, heat exchangers, sample vessels, sample sinks or racks, analysis equipment, and instrumentation. The sampling points have been selected to provide the required chemical and radiological information while keeping the system simple for reliability and case of maintenance. Table 9.3.2-1 shows the sample locations, types of samples and monitors required for normal and post-accident sampling, respectively. Other sample points may be provided and are listed in the site-specific SAR.
Chemical and radiochemical analyses are performed to determine boron concentration, fission and corrosion product activity, crud concentration, dissolved gas and corrosion product concentrations, chloride concentration, coolant pH, conductivity of the reactor coolant, and noncondensible gas concentration in the pressurizer. The results of the analyses are used to regulate the boron concentration. monitor the fuel cladding integrity, evaluate ion exchanger ai.d filter performance, specify chemical additions to the various systems, and maintain the proper hydrogen concentration in the reactor coolant systems.
A data management and surveillance system gives daily evaluation of plant chemiutry, and tracks and plots chemistry trends.
The seismic design classification and quality group classification of sample lines and components conform to the classification of the system to which each sampling line and l component is connected, out to such a point where classification l to lower seismic and quality group classification is justified on l the basis that adequate isolation valving or flow restriction is ,
provided.
Amendment B 9.3-6 March 31, 1988
CESSAR nin,"icarian
(
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Sample lines penetrating the containment are provided with isolation valves in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, B General Design Criteria 55 and 56.
The sampling system has the following system features:
i A. Configuration The system configuration is such that, under normal operation, samples are transported from a number of different locations to central sample racks, where samples are cooled and depressurized as necessary. For samples containing dissolved gases, sample bombs are located at the exit of each sample cooler to facilitate the collection o 'f samples. In addition, the system configuration is such that, under post-accident conditions, samples of containment atmosphere and containment liquids are transported to an accessible location for grah sampling.
B. Arrangement
- 1. Sample lines have continuous slope either toward or p away from the sample station, depending on the type of t sample (i.e., sloping toward sampling station for liquid samples and sloping away from sampling station for gaseous samples). Traps and pockets in which condensate or sludge may settle, or in which gas pockets form, are avoided.
- 2. A shut-off valve is placed in the sample line immediately after the point from which the sample is withdrawn.
- 3. If sample coolers / condensers are required, a valve, capable of being locked wide open, is placed at the sample coolor/ condenser inlet. Throttling devices are placed downstream of the sample cooler / condenser.
- 4. Sample station locations are selected to consolidate samples within a location or locations consistent with:
- a. Common building areas.
- b. Minimization of sample line lengths consistent with other functional requirements, such as fluid hold-up to allow decay of radioactivity,
- c. Minimization of travel time and distance for sampling personnel.
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Amendment B 9.3-7 March 31, 1988
CESSAREna mu O
B
- d. Accessibility to personnel.
- c. Area radiation as low as practicable to minimize radiation doses to plant personnel.
- f. Proximity of sample stations to the chemical laboratories.
- g. Maintaining sufficient pressure head for turbulent flow.
- 5. Sampling station components that retain potentially radioactive fluids, such as sample coolers, isolation valves, throttle valves, control valves, relief valves and drain lines, are located behind a wall which provides radiation shielding.
C. Overpressurization Protection Relief valves are provided for overpressurization protection. The discharge of the relief valves is routed to an appropriate collection point.
D. Exhaust-Ventilated, Hooded Enclosures Sample points for radioactive samples are located within a vented sampling hood. The hooded enclosure confines any leakage or spillage of radioactive samples. The enclosure allows any liquid leakage to be collected in a sink and drained to an equipment drain header for processing through .
the liquid radioactive waste system.
l l
E. Purging of Sample Lines '
- 2. Sample purge collection headers are routed back to the system of origin or radwaste consistent with process parameters (e.g., reactor coolant grade water samples are purged to the Volume Control Tank). If process parameters do not permit this recycling, the purge flow is directed to a collection tank consistent with the chemistry and activity of the sample.
l O
Amendment B 9.3-8 March 31, 1988 l
J CESSARnEnumu p
B F. Materials Sample system materials are selected so that the system does not contribute to sample contamination via such mechanisms as cobalt or corrosion product release. 1 i
G. Sample Lines Sample line components and fittings are procured for 3000 psig at 600*F. Expansion loops or other means are provided to prevent undue buckling and bending when large temperature changes occur. i lE 11 . Valves
- 1. Remotely-controlled isolation valves fail in the closed B position.
- 2. Sample lines which contain radioactive fluids are provided with packless valves for all applications E other than pressure relieving and flow throttling.
l p I. Sample Coolers
- 1. The sample co aler coil or tube (s) is made of material resistant to corrosion by both the sample fluid on one side and cooling water on the other.
- 2. The tube (s) through which the sample flows is continuous and extends completely through the cooling jacket.
J. Passive Flow Restriction E
Sample lines which are not isolable from the RCS during nornal system cperations (including Shutdown Cooling System 3 operation) are provided with a flow restriction device j' (7/32" ID x 1" orifice) to limit the loss of coolant in the event of a sample line piping break. !
9.3.2.2.2 Detailed System Description 9 The plant-specific layout of the sampling system is described in the site-specific SAR. The following detailed functional requirements are to be met for a reliable system.
A. Reactor Coolant System Sample
- 1. The sampling system provides a means of obtaining V remote liquid samples from the Reactor Coolant System i
Amendment E 9.3-9 December 30, 1988 j
CESSAREna mu for chemical and radiochemical laboratory analysis. B 9
Typical analyses performed include corrosion product activity levels, crud concentration, dissolved gas and-corrosion product concentrations, chloride concentration, coolant pH, conductivity levels and boron concentration. The results of these tests are used to verify the boron concentration, monitor the fuel rod integrity, specify chemical additions and maintain the proper hydrogen concentration in the Reactor Coolant System.
- 2. Reactor Coolant System sample connections are provided from one hot leg and the pressurizer surge line. A sample connection is provided from the pressurizer steam space via the pressurizer safety valve inlet piping. Each of these sample lines contains a 7/32-inch by 1-inch orifice. This orifice functions as the Safety Class 1 to Safety Class 2 boundary in the sample line per ANSI N18.2a - 1975.
- 3. The high-pressure and high-temperature samples from the pressurizer surge line, the pressurizer steam space and the hot leg are individually routed to a sampling station where they are first cooled in a sample heat exchanger tr 120*F or less, and then reduced in pressure by a throttling valve to approximately 25 psig.
- 4. The sample lines in contact with the reactor coolant are austenitic stainless steel or equivalent, cuch that the material is compatible with the fluid chemistry. l S. Provisions are made to allow sampling of the Reactor l j
Coolant System during startup. For this mode of l operation it can be assumed that the Reactor Coolant System pressure is approximately 250 psig.
- 6. Provisions are made to allow Reactor Coolant System sampling during Shutdown Cooling System operation.
- 7. On-line monitoring is provided for boron concentration and radiation level of the reactor coolant sample.
Continuous indication and recording of these parameters is provided in the control room. The sample point (s) for these monitors provides a representative sample for a wide range of plant operating and accident conditions, including low temperature and pressure in the Reactor Coolant System. In addition, the sample point location (s) and sample stream flow rate are Amendment B 9.3-10 March 31, 1988
CESSAR!=%ma Ov designed to have a response time of less than two B i
minutes. Alternate sample points, isolated by manual valving are provided to allow monitoring of reactor coolant boron concentration with an RCS loop drained.
B. Main Steam System and Steam Generator Sample
- 1. Sampling lines are as short as possible and of the smallest practicable bore to facilitate flushing and reduce transport time.
- 2. Sample lines are 3/8-inch 18 BWG tubing or equivalent.
Material is stainless steel or equivalent that is at least as resistant to steem as 18 chromium, 8 nickel stainless. On high temperature lines which may present a personnel hazard, lagging is provided.
- 3. As much as practicable, sample lines are pitched downward at least 10 degrees to provide self drainage so as to prevent settling or separation of solids contained by the water sample. Traps and pockets in which condensate or sludge may settle are avoided since they may be partially emptied with changes in flow conditions and may result in sample contamination.
- 4. Expansion loops or other means are provided to prevent undue buckling and bending when large temperature changes occur.
- 5. Valves and fittings are made from materials similar to those used in the sampling lines. A shutoff valve is provided immediately after the point from which the sample is withdrawn. A valve capable of being locked or wired wide open is placed at the sample cooler /
condenser inlet. Throttling devices (e.g., valves, orifices) are placed downstream of the sample cooler / condenser.
- 6. The sample cooler / condenser is constructed of material compatible with the chemistry of both the sample and cooling media. It is designed to cool a sample at sample flow rates compatible with the sample line size and purge flow rates. The tube through which the sample flows is continuous and extends completely through the cooling jacket to avoid contamination or dilution of the sample with cooling water. The tube diameter is sized so as to minimize lag time through the cooler. For steam samples, tubing is at least as resistant to steam as 18 chromium, 8. nickel stainless
( steel.
Amendment B 9.3-11 March 31, 1988
1 l
I CESSAR HEncuiu 1 1
B
- 7. The steam sample nozzle is of multiport design (ports facing upstream) and designed for: sufficient strength to eliminate the possibility of failure through i vibration or wear, isokinetic sampling, high velocity ,
beyond the inlet port, and of a material which will not 5 contaminate the sample. The nozzle is not located immediately after a pipe bend or valve (unless valve aperture is concentric with the pipe). In order of preference, location is in: l
- a. Vertical pipe, downward flow.
l
- b. Vertical pipe, upward flow.
- c. Horizontal pipe, vertical insertion.
- d. Horizontal pipe, horizontal insertion.
- 8. All probes are 90 degrees to the pipe wall.
- 9. Three sample points are provided for each steam generator:
- a. Hot leg blowdown,
- b. Cold leg blowdown.
- c. Recirculating (downcomer) water.
Samples from the blowdown lines originate as close to the blowdown nozzles as possible. All three samples run outside containment without headering to allow independent simultaneous grab samples to be drawn and to allow the sample to be continuously monitored for pH, conductivity and radiation. Two sample points are continuously monitored for pH and conductivity and one of the samples are continuously monitored for radiation. Alarms are provided for all monitors to l
alert operators of out of specification chemical '
conditions.
- 10. Sufficient process instrumentation (temperature, pressure, flow) are provided at the sampling station to monitor system performance. Relief protection is provided to protect the operator and low pressure / temperature portion of the system from the high temperature /high pressure sample fluid.
O Amendment B 9.3-12 March 31, 1988 L---------------
CESSAR Ennr"icari-u !
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B C. Safety Injection System Sample
- 1. Sample points for the SIS are located at the:
- a. ESF Train 1 safety injection pump miniflow line.
- b. ESF Train 2 safety injection pump miniflow line.
The above samples provide the operator with a remote means of measuring sump pH and boron concentration. In order to allow sampling to be carried out, the operator will be required to open one of the miniflow line isolation valves between the san.ple point and the safety injection discharge. These samples are at a temperature of less than 350*F and a pressure of less than 2050 psig.
- 2. Local sampling lines are provided on the safety injection tanks (four sample points, one per tank) and l on the recirculation line to the refueling water tank.
The samples from the safety injection tank will be at a pressure of less than 700 psig and a temperature of I less than 200'F. The samples from the recirculation .{
(A)
U line will be at a pressure of less than 2050 psig and a temperature of less than 350*F. The valves on the l
sample lines shall be sized to limit flow to an acceptable level at the sample collection point.
- 3. The fluid velocity in the sample lines is selected to obtain representative samples. The purge flow ratc is high enough to remove crud from lines. Based on 3/8 inch 0.D. sample lines, the following nominal values are recommended:
- a. Liquid purge flow rate - 1.0 gpm
- b. Liquid sample flow rate - 0.6 gpm
- 4. Sample taps are located on vertical runs of pipe i whenever possible. Where this cannot be done, it is l permissible to take samples from the top of horizontal pipe runs. The safety injection tanks are provided with sample nozzles.
- 5. The sample lines in contact with the reactor coolant are austenitic stainless steel or equivalent, such that the material is compatible with the fluid chemistry.
O Amendment B 9.3-13 March 31, 1988
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CESSAR 88&bmu 1
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B D. Shutdown Cooling System Sample
- 1. The Sampling System shall provide a means of obtaining remote liquid samples from the Shutdown Cooling System for chemical and radiochemical laboratory analysis.
The four sample points which must be sampled by the Sampling System are:
- a. Train #1 - Safety Injection Pumps miniflow recirculation line, (2050 psig, 350*F).
- b. Train #2 -
Safety Injection Pumps miniflow recirculation line, (2050 psig, 350*F).
- c. Train #1 - Shutdown cooling suction line, (435 psig, 400*F).
- d. Train #2 - Shutdown cooling suction line, (435 J psig, 400*F).
{
- 2. Local sample points shall be provided to obtain local samples from the shutdown cooling heat exchanger outlets (650 psig, 400*F). !
- 3. The sample lines in contact with reactor coolant are austenitic stainless steel, such that the material is compatible with the fluid chemistry.
- 4. The sample lines are sized such that the fluid velocity allows a representative sample and the purge flow rate is high enough to remove crud from the sample lines.
Instrument lines connected to piping within the RCS pressure boundary, and not isolable during normal operations have flow restricting devices (7/32-inch by 1-inch) to limit the flow in the event of an instrument line rupture.
- 5. Sample taps are located on vertical runs of pipe whenever possible. Where this cannot be done, it is permissible to take samples from the top of horizontal runs.
E. Gaseous Waste Management System Sample
- 1. The Gas Analyzer Sampling System is designed to sample the gas spaces of the following plant components and
' discharge the sampled gas to either the mixing header (MH) or the gas collection header (GCH) as indicated:
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Gas Decay Tanks, GWMS, (3), MH B Gas Surge Tank, GWMS, MH !
Containment Vent Header, GWMS, MH l Volume Control Tank, CVCS, MH Gas Stripper, CVCS, MH Equipment Drain Tank, CVCS, MH ,
Holdup Tank, CVCS, GCH l Spent Resin Tank, SWMS, (3), GCH Accumulator Tank, GWMS, MH
- 2. The following system requirements are met:
- a. Influent to the Gas Analyzer Pressure 50 psig maximum Temperature 140*F maximum
- b. Influent to the accumulator tank (Gas Analyzer effluent)
Pressure 7-9 psig maximum Temperature 140*F maximum Flow 1 SCFM maximum
- c. Influent to the Gas Collection Header (Gas Analyzer effluent)
Pressure 5-15 psig Temperature 140*F maximum Flow 1 SCFM maximum
- 3. All components exceeding 50 psig have the gas sample regulated to 50 psig.
- 4. The gas decay tanks, gas surge tank, accumulator tank, and gas stripper have flow restricting orifices in the gas sample lines. The maximum permissible orifice sizes for the 1/2-inch sample lines are:
GDT .0404 inch Diameter Gas Stripper .0486 inch Diameter GST & AT .0577 inch Diameter
- 5. The local sample points are located off the gas surge header and GDT discharge header. Grab samples can be taken from each point for radioactivity analysis. The following gas effluent is expected from. sample points:
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- a. Gas Surge Header B Pressure (design / operating) 130/(1-15 psig)
Temperature (design / operating) 200/120*F Fluid Nitrogen, Hydrogen, and traces of Oxygen gases
- b. Gas Discharge Header Pressure (design / operating) 40/ ( LATER)
Temperature (design / operating) 200/120*F Fluid Same as above
- 6. The maximum available Ps for sample sources at minimum source pressure:
AP Available at Minimum Source Minimum Source Sample Sources Pressure (psia) Pressure (psi)
Gas decay tank 5 8 Accumulator tank, 0 3 gas surge tank Gas stripper 2 5 Remaining samples 0 3 F. Chemical and Volume Control System Sample ,
- 1. The Process Sampling System is capable of individually processing samples from the following points:
- a. Purification filter influent ,
Temperature 120 - 140*F Pressure 60 - 200 psig Activity (LATER)
Chemical Nature Primary water or ,
refueling water
- b. Purification filter effluent Temperature 120 - 140*F Pressure 58 - 200 psig !
Activity (LATFR)
Chemical Nature Primary water or j refueling water i Amendment B 9.3-16 March 31, 1988 j
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- c. Purification /deborating ion exchanger effluent B
Temperature 120 - 140*F Pressure 50 - 200 psig Activity (LATER)
Chemical Nature Primary water or l i
refueling water
- 2. The sample flow rates from each point are:
Sample flow rate 0.50 - 1.00 gpm Purge flow rate 1.00 gpm
- 3. The process flow sample line purge flow enters the CVCS at the following points:
- a. Reactor coolant pump seal bleodoff return Flow 1.5 gpm Temperature 120 - 240*F i Pressure 50 - 70 psig l Activity (LATER) g-~ Chemical Nature Primary water
-- b. Recycle drain header Same flow conditions as above. 1 The sampling system relief valves should relieve into the I equipment drain tank to minimize waste. The interface i conditions for design of the relief valves are:
Pressure 0-3 psig normal 50 psig maximum Activity (LATER)
Chemical Nature Primary water Sample lines and instrumentation lines, which are not isolable from the RCS during normal system operations, have flow restriction devices (7/32-inch I.D. by 1-inch) to limit the flow in the event of a piping break.
9.3.2.3 Safety Evaluation All sample lines have the required indicators, pressure throttling valves, heat exchangers, and other components to ensure plant operator safety when collecting samples. The sampling systems serve no emergency function. All sample lines I h which penetrate the Containment are isolated on receipt of a k/ s- Containment isolation signal. These valves ata normally closed, Amendment B 9.3-17 March 31, 1988
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designed to fail closed, and can only be operated from the main B control room. Also, all samples have the ability to be isolated manually at the sample source or just prior to entering monitors for continuous on-line samples.
The purification filter inlet sample serves as a backup for the RCS hot leg sample.
Connections made to the RCS pressure boundary are fitted with flow restriction devices to satisfy NRC General Design Criterion
- 33. Sample system piping, up to and including the passive flow restrictors, is designed and fabricated in accordance with the same safety class and codes as the system that it is connected to. The piping and components in proximity to the sample sink i l
are of low pressure design and provided with pressure relief for l protection of personnel. l The Sampling System has the following special safety features due to handling primary loop samples:
A. Sample lines from the reactor coolant hot legs contain a delay coil to provide a decay time for N-16.
B. Adequate shielding is provided to protect personnel when taking a sample. i C. Exhaust hoods are provided for each sample sink to ensure that leakage of any gases will be exhausted from the sample room.
D. Sample sinks are provided to collect all spillage. l l
The routing of high pressure and temperature sample lines outside the reactor containment is not considered hazardous because of the limited flow capacity.
9.3.2.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The sampling systems are fully tested and inspected before
! initial operation. Adequate operating performance monitoring assures system integrity. Containment isolation valves are tested as described in Section 6.2.4.
9.3.2.5 Instrumentation Requirements Local pressure, temperature, and flow indicators are provided to facilitato manual operation and to verify sample conditions before samples are drawn.
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Radiation monitors are provided for continuous monitoring of reactor coolant and steam generator blowdown sample. B A boronometer is provided for continuous monitoring of the reactor coolant sample boron conceratration.
Continuous analyzers monicor specific water quality conditions in the secondary plant.
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TABLE 9.3.2-1 (Sheet 1 of 5) !
r PROCESSSAMPLINGREQUIREMENTS[ s NORMAL OPERATION Continuous Pressurized On Line Mode of Sample Analysis Sample Sample Oriain Capability Provided Removal Primary Samplina System Hot leg Loop 1 Yes Yes, Radio- Remote activity & Boron Pressurizer Steam Space Yes tione Remote In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank No None Remote Shutdown Cooling Suction No None Remote O' ' Lines 1 & 2 1
ESF A & B Train Safety No None Remote Injection Pump Mini flow Line ,
Purification Filter Inlet No None Remote Purification Filter Outlet, No None Remote lon Exchanger Inlet Purification lon Exchanger No None Remote Outlet Pressurizer Surge Line Po tione Remote Reactor Drain Pump Discharge .No None Local Before filter Reactor Drain Pump Discharge No None Local After Filter Pre-holdup lon Exchanger No None Local Outlet
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TABLE 9.3.2-1 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 2 of 5)
PROCESS SAMPLING REQUIREMENTS B NORMAL OPERATION Continuous Pressurized On Line Mode of Sample Analysis Sample Sample Oriqin Capability Provided Removal l Primary Samplina System (Cont'd)
Holdup Tank Inlet No None Local Boric Acid Condensate lon No None Local Exchanger inlet Boric Acid Condensate lon No None Local Exchanger Outlet Reactor Makeup Water Pump No None Local l Discharge Reactor Makeup Water Pump No None Local i Recirculation i
Boric Acid Makeup Pump No None Local j Recirculation Boric Acid Makeup Pump No None Local !
Discharge !
Boric Acid Batching Tank No None Local !
l Reactor Makeup Water to No None Local Volume Control Tank l
Volume Control Tank Drain No None Local l l to Recycle Drain Header !
Shutdown Cooling Heat No None Local Exchanger Outlet l
l Safety Injection Tanks No None Local O
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C E S S A R M Minc m a O TABLE 9.3.2-1 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 3 of 5)
PROCESS SAMPLING REQUIREMENTS B
NORMAL OPERATION Continuous Pressurized On Line Mode of Sample - Analysis Sampie Sample Origin Capability Provided Removal Secondary Samole Points l Hotwell No Yes, cation Remote conductivity sodium S/G 1 and 2 Hot Leg Blowdown No Yes, cation and Remote specific conduc-tivity pH, radio-activity sodium, i sul f ate S/G 1 and 2 Cold Leg Blowdown No Yes, cation and Remote specific conduc-tivity pH, radio-activity sodium, sul f ate S/G 1 and 2 Downcomer Blow- No Yes, cation and Remote down specific conduc-tivity pH, radio-activity sodium, sulfate Condensate Pump Discharge No Yes, specific Remote conductivity, cation conduc-tivity, sodium, )
oxygen !
Condensate Polishing No Yes, cation and Remote Demineralizers specific conduc-tivity, sodium Heater Drains No None Local Moisture Separator Orains No None local Amendment B i l March 31, 1988 i
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TABLE 9.3.2-1 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 4 of 5)
PROCESS SAMPLING REQUIREMENTS NORMAL OPERATION a Continuous Pressurized On Line Mode of Sample Analysis Sample Sample Oriain capability Provided Removal Secondary Sample Points (Cont'd)
Evaporator Drains No None Local Secondary Steam S/G 1 & 2 No Yes, cation Remote conductivity feedwater No Yes, pH, oxygen, Remote sodium, cation and specific conductivity Emergency Feedwater Storage Tank No Yes, pH, oxygen, Remote sodium, cation and specific conductivity Makeup Effluent No See site-specific See site-SAR specific SAR Demineralized Water Tank No None Local Condensate Storage Tanks No None Local ,
Aux Boiler No See site-specific See site-SAR specific SAR Circulating Water No See site-specific See site-SAR specific SAR Closed Cooling Water No None Local Systems Emergency Service Water No None Local l Spent fuel Pool No See site-specific See site-SAR specific SAR l
Amendment B March 31, 1988 )
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v TABLE 9.3.2-1 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 5 of 5)
PROCESS SAMPLING REQUIREMENTS NORMAL OPERATION B Continuous Pressurized On Line Mode of Sample Analysis Sample Sample Origin Ca_pability Provided Removal Gas Samplina System (Cont'd)
Gas Surge Tank No H ,0 . Remote 2 2 Gas Decay Tank Yes H ,0 Remote 2 2 Gas Stripper Yes H ,0 Remote 2 2 Volume Control Tank No H ,0 Remote 2 2
[ Equipment Drain Tank No H ,0 2 2 Remote
'y/
Reactor Drain Tank No H ,0 Remote 2 2 Holdup Tank No H ,0 Remote 2 2 Containment Atmosphere No Radioactivity Local Containment Purge Exhaust No Radioactivity Local Plant Vent No Radioactivity local Radioactive and Conventional No See site-specific See site-Waste System SAR specific SAR Post-Accident Samnlina System Hot leg Yes N/A Remote Containment Sump No N/A Remote Containment Air No N/A Remote
- Additional sampling requirements may be necessary. See the site-specific Q SAR.
Amendment B March 31, 1988
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9.3.3 EQUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEM E
9.3.3.1 Design Bases Chapter 11 discusses the different means of processing liquid wastes. The Equipment and Floor Drainage System provides the means by which wastes are appropriately segregated and transported to the Liquid Radioactive Waste Processing System (LRWPS) in order to minimize the liquid and gaseous radioactive releases. This system accomplishes this function in a manner l that is consistent with normal plant operating procedures.
l The drains and sumps in the Turbine Building are not normally I processed by the LRWPS. Sumps in Service Buildings are separated from Turbine Building sumps and are never processed in this system.
9.3.3.2 System Description The Equipment and Floor Drainage System piping is embedded in the floor where possible. The various areas of the Equipment and Floor Drainage System are described below.
Turbine Building pump leakages, seal flows, cooling runoffs, I %,,/ drains and similar valve discharges are piped or channeled to the Turbine Building sump. Miscellaneous leaks from various sources and general water uses, such as flushing or washdown of floors or equipment, also enter the sump by way of channels, floor drains or trenches usually covered by open grating in an embedded network within the Turbine Building floors. Other small sumps, such as in the condenser pit or polishing demineralized area, may also drain to or operate separately as an extension of the main Turbine Building sump.
During normal operating events, these sumps will not collect radioactive wastes. The sump is normally pumped into the Waste Water Treatment Collection Basin for adjustment of pH and solids control.
The Turbine Building sump can become slightly radioactive and require monitoring if there is a steam generator primary-to-secondary leak at the same time that sizeable leaks exist in the condensate-feedwater systems, steam generator blowdown systems, or the polishing domineralizer waste system within the Turbine Building. In order to detect primary coolant in the secondary system the steam jet air ejector discharge and the stean generator blowdown are continuously monitored. Should these monitors indicate that significant primary-to-secondary i $ leakage exists, sampling or monitoring of the sump for U
Amendment E 9.3-21 December 30, 1988
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radioactive effluents will be required for the duration of the leak. If the sump contents are not judged suitable for release E
to the Waste Water Treatment Collection Basin, it is possible to initiate a manual mode of operation to allow the transfer of the sump contents to the LRWPS for further treatment in the same manner as the Auxiliary Building drains.
9.3.3.2.1 Equipment Drain Tank l Recoverable reactor coolant quality water outside the containment structure from colected equipment drains and leakoffs, and reliefs are collected in the equipment drain tank.
9.3.3.2.2 Reactor Drain Tank Reactor coolant quality water from valve and equipment leakoffs, drains, and reliefs within the containment are collected in the reactor drain tank. The tank is part of CVCS system and is described in Section 9.3.4.
9.3.3.2.3 Waste Tanks All Auxiliary Building floor drains feed either directly to one i
of the waste tanks or indirectly to the tanks through the waste j l sumps. This includes the containment sump pump and all equipment '
l that has a low probability of containing tritium or other radioactive elements. The flow from the miscellaneous waste drain header is directed to the appropriate tank by a three-way valve.
9.3.3.2.4 Laundry Tanks The drains from the laundry, showers, and sinks that may contain radioactive wastes are piped to either of the two laundry tanks.
Flow is directed to the appropriate tank by three-way valves.
9.3.3.3 Safety Evaluation l Drains are sized for draining of their corresponding equipment.
l Sumo sizes and sump pump capacities are compatible to eliminate undesirable sump pump cycling operation.
Sump pump capacities are sized large enough to handle the maximum leakage rate or credible rupture into their respective sumps.
Operators will be alerted of abnormal quantities of water being O'
Amendment E i 9.3-22 December 30, 1988 i
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released to the Equipment and Floor Drainage System by comparing pump discharge pressures and flows to the calculated and experimental flows and pressure drops. Leakage detection devices E l will also be used in applicable component areas. The Equipment and Floor Drainage System is not relied upon for any safe shutdown or accident mitigation function. l 4
All piping capable of flooding components needed for safe shutdown and accident prevention will be upgraded to Seismic <
Category I piping regardless of system safety class. This will i minimize the potential for flooding safety-related components.
Good operating practice dictates that system operation will be either terminated or quickly diverted from the excessive leaking component or ruptured line. This will minimize the quantity of water available for flooding safety-related equipment.
9.3.3.4 Inspection and Testina Re_quirements The system will be fully tested and inspected before initial operation. Adequate operating performance monitoring will assure system integrity.
9.3.3.S Instrumentation Requirements
~. Sufficient instrumentation is included in the system to assure satisfactory operation.
9.3.4 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (
9.3.4.1 _D_e sign Da s e s 3 9.3.4.1.1 Functional Requirements The Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) is designed as a non-safety-grade system. As such, the CVCS is not required to perform any accident mitigation or safe shutdown function. In particular, the CVCS is not required to function in order to ensure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, ensure the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, nor ensure the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of plant conditions. It is not required to show acceptable results for safety analysis. Since the CVCS is not required to perform such functions, all portions of the CVCS outside of containment, with the exception of the containment isolation valves and penetrations, are designated as non-nuclear safety or Safety Class 4. ,
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Specific accident mitigation or safe shutdown tunctions performea I
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by the chemical and volume control system in earlier designs .
included the following: RCS pressure control via auxiliary spray [
and RCS reactivity control via boration. For System 80+, these safety functions are performed by dedicated safety systems.
Specifically, the safety injection system is credited for RCS inventory control and boration in Chapter 15 accident analyses, Chapter 6 LOCA events, and safe shutdowns. Pressure control during these events is accomplished via the safety depressurization and vent system.
Although not required to perform any accident mitigation or safe shutdown functions, the chemical and volume control system is I 1
essential for the normal day-to-day operation of the plant. The CVCS has therefore been provided with a high degree of l reliability and redundancy and has been designed in accordance l l
with accepted industry standards and quality assurance I commensurate with its importance to plant operations. j The Chemical and Volume Control System is designed to perform the j following functions:
1 A. Maintain the chemistry and purity of the reactor coolant during normal operation and during shutdowns.
B. Maintain the required volume of water in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), compensating for reactor coolant contraction or expansion resulting from changes in reactor coolant temperature and for other coolant losses or additions.
C. Receive, store and separate borated waste for reuse and/or discharge to the Liquid Waste Management System (LWMS).
D. Control the boron concentration in the RCS to obtain optimum Control Element Assembly (CEA) positioning, to compensate for reactivity changes associated with major changes in reactor coolant temperature, core burnup, and xenon variations, and to provide shutdown margin for maintenance and refueling operations.
E. Provide auxiliary pressurizer spray for operator control of pressurizer pressure during the final stages of shutdown and to allow for pressurizer cooling.
F. Provide a means for functionally testing the check valves which isolate the Safety Injection System (SIS) from the RCS.
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G. Provide injection. water at the. proper temperature,. pressure,-
and purity for the reactor coolant pump seals, and collect the controlled bleedoff from the reactor coolant pump seals.
H. Leak test the RCS.
I. Provide a reactor makeup water supply to various auxiliary equipment.
J. Provide a means for sluicing ion exchanger resin to the Solid Waste Management System (SWMS).
l K. Provide a means for continuous removal of noble gases from the RCS.
l l .L. Provide makeup to the spent fuel pool.
M. Provide purification of shutdown cooling flow.
N. Provide makeup for losses from small leaks in RCS piping.
O. Provide a means to purify contents of IRWST. B P. Provide a means to add makeup and adjust chemistry of IRWST.
9.3.4.1.2 Design Criteria The CVCS is designed in accordance with the following criteria:
l A. The CVCS is designed to accept RCS letdown flow when the i
reactor coolant is heated at the maximum administrative rate I of 75'F/hr and to provide the required makeup using one of B the two charging pumps when the reactor coolant is cooled at the maximum administrative rate of 75'F/hr.
B. The CVCS is designed to supply makeup water or accept letdown due to power decreases or increases:
- 1. .The system is designed for 10% - step power increases between 15% and 90% of full power and 10% step power decreases between 100% and 25% full power, as well as for ramp changes of 15% of full power per minute between 15 and 100% power.
- 2. The Volume Control Tank is sized with sufficient capacity to accommodate the inventory. change resulting from a full to zero power decrease with no makeup system operation, assuming that the Volume Control Tank I level is initially in the normal operating level band.
l l Amendment B i 9.3-25 March 31, 1988
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C. The CVCS provides a means for maintaining activity in the RCS within the appropriate technical specification limit, assuming a one percent f".iled fuel condition and continuous full power operation.
D. The CVCS is designed to maintain the reactor chemistry within the limits specified in Table 9.3.4-1. coolant lB E. Letdown and charging portions of the CVCS are cesigned to withstand the design transients defined in Table 9.3.4-2lB without any adverse effects, as applicable.
1 F. The CVCS has the capacity to receive and process all excess I i
reactor coolant generated during all normal and anticipated 3 modes of operation. Excess coolant generated during typical plant operations is shown in Table 9.3.4-3.
G. The CVCS is designed to provide 40 gpm of filtered flow to the reactor coolant pump seals and to accept a 22 gpm controlled bleedoff flow.
H. Components of the CVCS are designed in accordance with applicable standards or codes as shown in Table 9.3.4-4.
Safety Class and Seismic Class are shown in Table 9.3.4-8.
The relationship between Safety Class and Code Class is B shown in Table 9.3.4-9.
I. The environmental design conditions of the CVCS active valves are given in Table 9.3.4-7 (refer also to Section ,
3.11). l J. The CVCS is designed to operate with no boric acid concentration above the point where precipitation could occur. The boric acid batching tank and the boric acid 1 concentrator concentrate discharge line to the SWMS are the i only portions of the system requiring heat tracing to l preclude boric acid precipitation. These portions of the l
system can contain fluid concentrated to 12 weight percent l boric acid. The remaining portions of the system contain a l lower boric acid concentration solution (less than 2.5 wt%), 3 )
and heat tracing to prevent precipitation is not required. j t
K. Safety Classes of components are shown in Figure 9.3.4-1. lE l Safety Classes can be cross referenced to seismic i classifications using Table 9.3.4-8. B L. One charging pump has a capacity suf ficient to replace the l flow lost to the containment due to leaks in small RCS 1
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Amendment E 9.3-26 December 30, 1988 ,
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I lines, such as instrument and sample lines. These lines I typically .have 7/32-inch I.D. by 1-inch long flow restricting devices, j M. The CVCS is designed to receive discharges from drains and relief valves from the RCS, SIS and SCS.
N. The CVCS provides for boron concentration adjustment in the Reactor Coolant System by feed and bleed. The maximum possible rate of boron dilution is limited, such that the operator has sufficient time to identify and terminate a boron dilution incident prior to reaching criticality during any refueling operations.
O. The CVCS concentrated boric acid reserve is sufficient to make the reactor suberitical in the cold shutdown condition with the most reactive CEA withdrawn.
9.3.4.1.3 System Functions 9.3.4.1.3.1 Reactor Coolant Inventory The volume of water in the RCS is automatically controlled using level instrumentation located on the pressurizer. The pressurizer level setpoint is programmed to vary as a function of RCS temperature in order to minimize the transfer' of fluid between the RCS and CVCS during power changes. This linear lB l relationship is shown in Figure 5.4.10-2. Reactor power is determined for this situation using.the average reactor coolant temperature derived from hot and cold. leg temperature measurements. A level error signal is obtained by comparing the programmed setpoint with the measured pressurizer water level.
Volume control is achieved by automatic control of the charging B
and letdown flow control valves in accordance with the pressurizer level control program shown in Figure 5.4.10-4.
Two parallel charging pump flow control valves, two parallel B
letdown flow control valves, and two parallel charging pumps are provided. During normal operations, one charging pump is running l with one in standby. In addition, one of the letdown and one of the charging pump flow control valves are selected for use. The selected charging pump flow control valve is normally maintained by the pressurizer level control program at a preset position which gives a constant desired flow rate at normal operating pressures. The position of the selected charging pump flow control valve is maintained constant by the pressurizer level control program, except in response to a high or low pressurizer level condition as shown in Figure 5.4.10-4. Fine control of pressurizer level is accomplished via letdown control. The Amendment B 9.3-27 March 31, 1988 1
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CESSARn!Mc- i position of the selected letdown flow control valve is varied by e
the pressurizer level control program in response to the level 3 error in order to compensate for small changes in pressurizer i level and to keep it within the programmed level band. I I
The level in the Volume Control Tank is controlled automatically. l The letdown flow is diverted to the holdup tank via the pre-holdup ion exchanger and gas stripper when the control band high level is reached. The makeup system is normally set up for the automatic mode of operation in which flow at a preset 1 of boric acid from the Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST) blend and lB demineralized water from the Reactor Makeup Water Tank (RMWT) is initiated by the Volume Control Tank low level signal. A low-low l level signal automatically closes the outlet valve on the Volume
! Control Tank, opens the boric acid flow control bypass valve, and B starts the boric acid makeup pumps.
9.3.4.1.3.2 Corrosion Control By Reactor Coolant System Chemistry l (^
Preoperational oxygen scavenging is accomplished by addition of hydrazine. During hot functional testing, 30 to 50 ppm of hydrazine is maintained in the reactor coolant whenever the reactor coolant temperature is below 150*F. This prevents halide-induced attack, which could occur if significant quantities of fluorides or chlorides and significant amounts of During heatup, any dissolved dissolved oxygen are present.
oxygen is scavenged by the hydrazine, eliminating the potential for general corrosion. At higher temperatures, the hydrazine decomposes, forming ammonia. The resultant increase in pH aids i in the development of passive oxide films on reactor coolant l oystem surfaces. It has been well established that the corrosion '
rates of Ni-Cr-Fe Alloy-600 and 300 series stainless steels decrease with time when exposed to normal reactor coolant chemistry conditions, approaching low steady state values within approximately 200 days. The high pH condition produced by high ammonia concentration (to 50 ppm) minimizes corrosion product release and assists in the rapid development of the passive oxide film. Most of the film is c 2blisi ed within seven days at hot, high pH conditions.
To aid in maintaining the pH during this passivation period, lithium in the form of lithium hydroxide, is added to the coolant and maintained within a 1-2 ppm lithium-7 range.
At power, oxygen concentration is limited by maintaining excess dissolved hydrogen gas in the coolant. The excess hydrogen forces the water decomposition / synthesis reaction in the reactor O
Amendment B 9.3-28 March 31, 1988
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core toward water synthesis rather than hydrogen and oxygen decomposition, oxygen in the makeup water is removed in the same way.
In order to minimize the effect of crud deposition on the reactor core heat transfer surfaces, lithium-7 hydroxide additions to the reactor coolant are made. The lithium-7 hydroxide produces pH conditions within the reactor coolant at operating temperature that reduce the corrosion product solubility and, hence, the dissolved crud inventory in the circulating reactor coolant. The elevated pH promotes conditions within the coolant for selective ,
deposition of corrosion products on cooler surfaces (SG) rather than hotter surfaces (core). An additional advantage is the formation of a more stable and tenacious passive oxide layer on out-of-core system surfaces. The lithium concentration is maintainedwithina0.2-2.3ppmlithium-7rangeduringoperation.lB 9.3.4.1.3.3 Reactivity Control Boron concentration is normally controlled by feed-and-bleed. To change concentration, the makeup system supplies either reactor makeup water or boric acid to the Volume Control Tank, and the letdown stream is diverted to the holdup tank via the pre-holdup lon exchanger and the gas stripper. Toward the end of a fuel cycle, with low boric acid concentration in the coolant, feed-and-bleed becomes inefficient, and the deborating ion exchanger is used to reduce the RCS boron concentration. The ion exchanger contains an anion resin initially in the hydroxyl form, which is converted to a borate form as boron is removed from the reactor coolant.
9.3.4.2 System Description 9.3.4.2.1 System The normal reactor coolant flow path through the CVCS the Flow Diagrams, islB indicated by the heavy lines on Figure 9.3.4-1. DesignparametersforthemajorcomponentsareshowninlE Table 9.3.4-4. Normal operating parameters for the CVCS are listed in Table 9.3.4-5. Process flow data are shown in Table 3 9.3.4-6. Equipment seismic and safety classifications are given in Table 9.3.4-8.
Letdown flow from the Reactor Coolant System passes through the tube side of the Regenerative Heat Exchanger where an initial temperature reduction takes place via heat transfer to cooler charging fluid on the shell side of the heat exchanger. The regenerative heat exchanger is designed to cool letdown flow to a
' maximum of 450*F for all normal operations and to heat the charging flow by a minimum of 100*F. A final temperature Amendment E 9.3-29 December 30, 1988
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reduction to the purification subsystem operating temperature is ,
made by the letdown heat exchanger. The letdown heat exchanger B is sized to cool inlet water from the maximum regenerative heat l exchanger outlet temperature to 120*F (or lower) for most I operating conditions. Both the letdown and the regenerative heat exchangers are designed for full RCS pressure and both are located inside containment.
Letdown fluid pressure is reduced from full system pressure to the operating pressure of the purification subsystem in two stages. The first pressure reduction occurs at the letdown control valve and the second occurs at a letdown orifice downstream of the control valve. The letdown orifice is sized to pass the maximum letdown flow at full RCS pressure with the control valve full open. The orifice provides the back pressure necessary to minimize erosion of the letdown control valve seating surfaces during normal reactor coolant pressure operations. A bypass valve around the orifice is provided for l
low pressure operations.
1 A Chemical Addition Tank and a Chemical Addition Metering Pump are used to transfer chemical additives to the charging line downstream of the seal injection takeoff connection. An excess hydrogen inventory is provided by keeping a hydrogen overpressure in the Volume Control Tank or by adding hydrogen directly to the RCS via the charging line. Sufficient connections exist between B the CVCS and the In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) to allow for purification, inventory adjustments, and boron adjustments to the contents of that tank.
The boron recovery portion of the CVCS accepts the letdown flow diverted from the Volume Control Tank as a result of feed and bleed operations for shutdowns, startups, and boron dilution over core life. Reactor coolant quality water from valve and equipment leakoffs, drains, and reliefs within the containment is collected in the Reactor Drain Tank and scheduled for batch processing. Recoverable reactor coolant quality water outside the containment from various equipment and valve leakoffs, reliefs, and drains is collected in the Equipment Drain Tank and scheduled for batch processing.
Reactor coolant collected in the Reactor Drain and Equipment Drain Tanks is periodically discharged by the Reactor Drain Pumps through the reactor drain filter and pre-holdup ion exchanger.
The diverted letdown flow, which has been previously passed through a purification filter and ion exchanger, also passes through the pre-holdup ion exchanger. The pre-holdup ion exchanger retains cesium, lithium, and other ionic radionuclides B
with high efficiency. The process flow then passes through the Amendment B 9.3-30 March 31, 1988
~
l CESSARnn% m 7 1 i
gas stripper where hydrogen and fission gases are removed with high efficiency, thus precluding the buildup of explosive gas mixtures in the- holdup tank and minimizing the release of radioactive fission product gases via aerated vents and in any liquid discharge. The degassed liquid is automatically pumped from the gas stripper to the holdup tank. When a sufficient volume accumulates in the holdup tank, it is pumped by the holdup pump to the boric acid concentrator where the bottoms are concentrated to within the range of 4000 to 4400 ppm boron.
The Boric Acid Concentrator bottoms are continuously monitored for proper boron concentration. Normally, the concentrator bottoms are pumped directly to the Boric Acid Storage Tank. In the event that abnormal quantitiesofradionuclidesarepresent,lB the bottoms are concentrated to 12 weight percent boric acid and are discharged to the Solid Waste Management System (SWMS).
The concentrator distillate passes through a boric acid condensate ion exchanger, where boric acid carryover is removed. i The distillate is collected in the Reactor Makeup Water Tank for j rouse in the plant. If recycle is not desired, the condensate is l' diverted to the Liquid Waste Management System (LWMS).
f The charging pumps normally take suction from the Volume Control Tank and discharge to the RCS. During normal operations- one B
charging pump is running and the other is in standby. In i addition, one letdown and one charging pump flow control valve are selected for use. Seal injection water is supplied to the Reactor Coolant Pulaps by diverting a portion of the charging flow at a point in the system just downstream of the charging pumps.
This scal flow is then heated in a steam heater to approximately 125'F before filtering. Once the flow has been filtered the seal injection fluid is distributed to the Reactor Coolant Pumps. The undiverted charging fluid is sent to the regenerative heat exchanger where it is heated before injection into the RCS. B When the Shutdown Cooling System is operational, a flow path through the CVCS can be established for purification. This is accomplished by diverting a portion of the flow from the Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger to the letdown line upstream of -the Letdown Heat Exchanger. The flow then passes through the purification filter, purification ion exchanger, and letdown strainer, and is returned to the suction of the Safety Injection l B Pumps. l A makeup subsystem of the CVCS provides for changes in reactor coolant boron concentration. Boric acid solution is prepared from boric acid powder and reactor makeup' water in a batching l
l l Amendment B 9.3-31 March 31, 1988
CESSARnah .
O tank and is stored in the Boric Acid Storage Tank. Recovered boric acid from the Boric Acid Concentrator (concentrator bottoms) is returned to the Boric Acid Storage Tank. The boric B acid makeup pumps are used to transfer the boric acid from the BAST. The dischar of the Boric Acid Makeup Pumps is mixed with reactor makeup wa, in a predetermined ratio to produce the desired boron concentration. The boric acid solution is then pumped either to the Volume Control Tank or directly into the charging pump suction header via the volume control tank bypass valve.
1 When continuous degasification of the RCS is desired, the letdown fl ow is diverted from the inlet line of the Volume Control Tank B to the Gas Stripper, bypassing the pre-holdup ion exchanger. The i letdown flow is processed in the Gas Stripper and is then i returned to the Volume Control Tank via the normal spray nozzle. f Sufficient hydrogen absorption occurs via the Volume Control Tank i hydrogen overpressure to replace the hydrogen removed during the ,
gas stripping process. The charging pumps take suction from the i Volume Control Tank and return the processed fluid to the RCS. (
Boric acid solution stored in the Boric Acid Storage Tank is supplied via the Boric Acid Makeup Pumps, while the reactor lB makeup water stored in the Reactor Makeup Water Tank is supplied via the Reactor Makeup Water Pumps. Pour operational modes of the makeup portion of the CVCS are provided. In the dilute mode, a preset quantity of reactor makeup water is introduced into the Volume Control Tank or directly into the charging pump suction header via the Volume Control Tank Bypass Valve at a preset rate.
In the borate mode, a preset quantity of boric acid is introduced into the Volume control Tank or directly into the charging pump suction header via the Volume Control Tank bypass valve at a preset rate. In the manual mode, the flow rates of the reactor makeup water and the boric acid can be preset to give any blended boric acid solution between zero and the boric acid I concentration in the BAST (4000-4400 ppm). The manual solution mode is lB primarily used for makeup to the Safety Injection Tanks. In the automatic mode, a preset blended boric acid solution is automatically introduced into the Volume Control Tank upon demand from the volume control tank level controller. The preset i solution concentration is adjusted periodically by the operator j to match the boric acid concentration being maintained in the l RCS. :
Boron is initially added to the CVCS using the boric acid t batching tank. Reactor makeup water is added to the Boric Acid !
Batching Tank via the Reactor Makeup Water Pumps, and the fluid l is heated by immersion heaters. Boric acid powder is added to the heated fluid while the mixer agitates the fluid. A boric l
Amendment B i 9.3-32 March 31, 1988
"*a" CESSAR CERTIFICATION acid concentration as.high as 12 weight percent can be prepared.
Electric immersion heaters maintain the temperature of the a solution in the boric acid batching tank high enough to preclude precipitation. The boric acid is pumped into the BAST and 3 diluted by recirculating the contents of the Boric . Acid . Storage Tank via the Boric Acid Makeup Pumps. The Reactor Makeup Water Pumpscanalsobeusedby'takingsuctionfromtheReactorMakeu Water Tank and discharging to the Boric Acid Storage Tank. i 9.3.4.2.2 Component Description The major components of the CVCS are described in this section.
The principal component data summary including- component design:
code is given in Table 9.3.4-4. Component seismic and safety-classification are discussed in Section 3.2.
A. Regenerative Heat Exchanger 1 1
The regenerative heat exchanger is a vertically mounted, shell and tube (U-tube) heat exchanger The regenerative heat exchanger conserves RCS thermal energy by transferring heat from the letdown flow to the charging flow. Heating the charging flow serves to minimize the charging nozzle therme1 transients. The heat exchanger .is- designed to maintain a letdown outlet temperature below 450'F-under all normal operating conditions.
B. Letdown Heat Exchanger ;
i The letdown heat exchanger is a horizontally mounted, shell ,
and tube heat exchanger. The letdown heat exchanger uses component cooling water to cool the letdown flow from the outlet temperature of the regenerative. heat exchanger to a temperature suitable for long term operation of the purification system. The letdown heat exchanger is sized to l cool the letdown flow from the maximum outlet temperature of the regenerative heat exchanger (450*F) to below the maximum allowable operating temperature of the ion exchange resins.
C. Purification Filters Each of the two purification filters is designed to remove !
insoluble particulate from the letdown flow. Each filter is designed to pass the maximum . letdown flow without exceeding the allowable differential pressure across the filter elements in the maximum fouled condition. Each filter is designed for efficient remote removal of filter cartridges due to the buildup of high activity levels during filter operation.
Amendment B 9.3-33 March 31, 1988
CESSARnnLmu O I D. Purification Ion Exchangers Each of the two purification ion exchangers contains mixed bed resins and is provided with the necessary connections to replace resins by sluicing. J to pass the maximum letdownEachionexchangerisdesignedlB flow and is identical in l mechanical design. The volume of resin contained in one ion exchanger is sufficient to continuously remove impurities and radionuclides from normal letdown flows. The other purification ion exchanger is used intermittently to coatrol the lithium concentration in the reactor coolant. 1 E. Deborating Ion Exchanger The deborating ion exchanger is identical to the purification ion exchangers in mechanical design. The deborating ion exchanger contains anion resin. The deborating ion exchanger is sized to reduce the reactor coolant boron concentration from 30 ppm to O ppm using two charges of anion resin.
P. Volume Control Tank The Volume Control Tank is designed to accumulate letdown water from the RCS, to provide for control of hydrogen concentration in the reactor coolant, and to provide a reservoir of reactor coolant for the charging pumps. The Volume Control Tank has sufficient capacity below the normal operating band to accommodate full charging flow for ten minutes without makeup addition plus a reserve volume for vortex prevention. The Volume Control Tank has sufficient a capacity above the normal operating band to accommodate full makeup flow for five minutes with charging secured plus an additional volume for a gas cushion sized to preclude over or under pressure conditions. The normal operating band is sized to accommodate the maximum allowable RCS leakage for one hour without the need for makeup addition. The tank has hydrogen and nitrogen gas supplies and a vent to the Gaseous Waste Management System (GWMS) to enable venting of hydrogen, nitrogen, helium, and fission gases.
G. Charging Pumps The two charging pumps are multi-stage centrifugal type 3 pumps. Each pump is provided with vent, drain, and flushing connections to minimize radiation levels during maintenance operations.
O Amendment B 9.3-34 March 31, 1988
CESSARnnLm.
H. Charging Pump Mini-flow Heat Exchanger B
The charging pump mini-flow heat exchanger is a horizontally mounted, shell'and' tuba heat exchanger. The mini-flow heat exchanger uses component cooling water to cool tr e recirculation flow from an operating charging pump and the reactor coolant pump controlled bleedoff.
I. Boric Acid Batching Tank The Boric Acid Batching Tank allows the operator to conveniently mix boric acid. The tank is designed to permit handling of up to 12 weight percent boric acid. The tank is insulated and has a reactor makeup water supply. Sampling provisions, mixer, temperature controller, and steam heaters 3 are provided.
J. Boric Acid Batching Pump and Associated Piping The Boric Acid Batching pump is a small centrifugal type pump. It is used to transfer fluid from.the Batching Tank to the Boric Acid Storage Tank recirculation line. A local flow indicator and a strainer are provided in: the discharge piping.
K. Boric' Acid Storage Tank The Boric Acid Storage Tank is sized to permit back-to-back shutdowns to cold shutdown, followed by a shutdown for refueling at the most limiting time in core cycle with the most reactive control rod '1thdrawn.
, The maximum concentration of boric acid in +Gac tank shall be 2.50 weight percent.
L. Holdup Tank The holdup tank is sized to store all recoverable reactor coolant generated by back-to-back cold shutdowns to five percent subcritical with the most reactive CEA withdrawn and subsequent startups at 90% core life.
M. Reactor Makeup Water Tank The Reactor Makeup Water Tank capacity is based on providing dilution to allow total recycle. The tank also provirles dilution for two back-to-back shutdowns 'and subsequent startups at 90 percent core life.
1 Amendment .B 9.3-35 March 31, 1988
CESSARn h o N. Boric Acid Makeup Pumps O
The two Boric Acid Makeup Pumps are single stage, centrifugal pumps. The pump motors are induction, squirrel cage motors. The capacity of each boric acid makeup pump is greater than the maximum charging capacity.
O. Reactor Makeup Water Pumps The two Reactor Makeup Water Pumps are single stage, centrifugal pumps. The pump motors are induction, squirrel cage motors.
P. Holdup Pumps The two Holdup Pumps are single stage, centrifugal pumps.
The pump motors hre induction, squirrel cage motors.
Q. Chemical Addition Package The chemical addition package consists of a Chemical Addition Tank, Chemical Addition Pump, and a strainer. The ,
capacity of the Chemical Addition Tank is based upon the j maximum anticipated amount of lithium to be added in one batch. The Chemical Addition Pump is a positive )
displacement pump with a variable capacity, i l
l R. Boric Acid Filter The beric acid filter is designed to remove particulate from the BAST and makeup flow. insoluble lB S. Reactor Makeup Water Filter The reactor makeup water filter is designed to remove insoluble particulate from the reactor makeup water supply to the resin sluice supply header, makeup header, and makeup system.
T. Reactor Drain Pumps The two Reactor Drain Pumps are single stage, centrifugal pumps. The pump motors are induction, squirrel cage motors.
U. Reactor Drain Filter The reactor drain filter is designed to remove insoluble particulate from the contents of the Reactor Drain Tank, Equipment Drain Tank, and Holdup Tank.
Amendment B 9.3-36 March 31, 1988
CESSARunkm, t
i V. Reactor Drain Tank B
The Reactor Drain Tank is designed to:
- 1. Receive thermal- relief valve discharges from the i Shutdown Cooling / Safety Injection System. 'l
' I
- 2. Receive gravity drains and . leakage of reactor grade quality water-from components located. within contain-ment.
l l' 3. Receive gravity drains from the RCS.
W. Equipment Drain Tank The Equipment Drain Tank receives - gravity drains' from the recycle drain header and the ion exchanger drain header.
The equipment drain tank. is- also sized to accept gas stripper bypas'c for 30 minutes and to accept discharge from miscellaneous relief valves.
X. Preholdup lon Exchanger The preholdup lon exchanger is identical to.the purification j
! lon exchangers .in mechanical design. The preholdup lon l l exchanger contains mixed bed resin and is. designed.to pass j the maximum letdown flow. The volume of resin contained in the proholdup lon exchanger is sufficient to remove impurities and radionuclides from normal letdown flows.
Y. Gas Stripper
.i The Gas Stripper achieves efficient gas stripping by heating the process fluid and passing it down through a packed tower employing steam as a stripping medium. The stripping steam is generated by heating the degassed process fluid with auxiliary steam. The degassed process fluid is then cooled.
The gas stripper package includes pumps which transfer the .j 1
degassed process fluid to the holdup tank or to the VCT during continuous degassing of normal letdown flow.
Noncondensible gases, along with trace quantities of fission gases and water vapor, flow to the Gaseous Waste Management System.
Z. Boric Acid Concentrator Package The Boric Acid Concentrator concentrates the process flow boron concentration by means of evaporation. The process flow enters the concentrator and is heated via recirculation through a steam heater. The vapor leaving the recirculation Amendment B 9.3-37 March 31, 1988
CESSARHMinc-stripped of entrained liquid by demisters, O
flow is condensed, and pumped to the Reactor Makeup Water Tank. The concentrate (bottoms) is cooled and pumped to the Boric Acid B Storage Tank.
AA. Boric Acid Condensate Ion Exchanger The boric acid condensate ion exchange" contains anicn resin of sufficient volume to remove boroo .rryover from the i boric acid concentrator distillate, and is designed to pass {'
the maximum flow when bypassing the boric acid concentrator.
BB. Seal Injection Filters I
These two redundant filters are designed to remove insoluble particles from the seal injection flow to the reactor coolant pumps. Each unit is designed to pass the maximum anticipated flow without exceeding the allowable differential pressure across the element in the defined maximum fouled condition.
CC. Seal Injection Heat Exchanger The seal injection heat exchanger is a vertical heat exchanger which uses steam (shell side) to heat the seal injection flow (tube side). The seal injection heat 3 exchanger functions to maintain a relatively constant fluid temperature to minimize thermal transients to the RCP seals.
9.3.4.2.3 System Operation The Chemical and Volume Control System is designed to be operated as follows:
A. Plant Startup Plant startup is the series of operations which bring the plant froin a cold shutdown condition to a hot standby condition at normal operating pressure and zero power temperature with the reactor critical at a low power level.
The charging pumps and letdown control valves are used during initial phases of reactor coolant system heatup to maintain the RCS pressure until the pressurizer steam bubble is established. Prior to establishing a pressurizer steam bubble, the RCS will be in a water solid condition with one B charging pump, one letdown flow control valve, and one charging pump flow control valve in operation. The charging O
Amendment B 9.3-38 March 31, 1988
-CESSAR n!Mcum O y pump flow control valve will be held in. its minimum l automatic position by the pressurizer level control program. B i The manual bypass around the letdown orifice will be full open. -RCS. pressure will be automatically maintained by the f letdown control valve in a pressure mode.- In this mode, the J pressurizer level control system. senses pressure at a.
pressure controller just up stream of the letdown valve and positions the letdown valve as necessary to maintain a j preset pressure value. Once a pressurizer steam bubble has .j been established, pressurizer level and system pressure are controlled by use of .both.. pressurizer heaters and the letdown control valves. ]
The Volume Control Tank is initially purged out nitrogen and a hydrogen overpressure is established. The' -RCS boron q concentration may be reduced during heatup in accordance. )
with shutdown margin limitations. The makeup controller is {
operated in the dilute mode to inject a predetermined amount of reactor makeup water at a preset rate. Compliance with the shutdown margin limitations is verified- by sample i analysis and Boronometer indication. )
B. Normal Operation
\' Normal operation includes hot standby operation and power generation when the RCS is at normal operating pressure and temperature. A description of' normal operation is continued in Section 9.3.4.2.1.
C. Plant Shutdown Plant shutdown is a series of operations which brings the plant from a hot standby condition at normal operating pressure and zero power temperature to a cold shutdown condition for maintenance or refueling.
Prior to plant cooldown, the gas space of the Volume Control Tank is vented to reduce fission gas activity and hydrogen concentration to less than 10 cc/kg, and the purification rate may be increased to accelerate the degasification, ion exchange, and filtration processes. Degassing -the reactor coolant is accomplished by diverting letdown flow to the gas stripper. and returning the process fluid to the Volume Control Tank. Addition of chemicals is not normally required during a plant shutdown, b
U Amendment B 9.3-39 March 31, 1988
CESSARnah m Boron concentration in the reactor coolant system is O
B normally increased concurrently with cooldown by charging from the Boric Acid Storage Tank as part of the inventory required to make up for coolant contraction. Borating concurrently with cooldown greatly reduces the amount of liquid waste generated during the shutdown process.
Once the required RCS boron concentration has been reached, i I
charging pump suction is switched from the Boric Acid
! Storage Tank to the Volume control Tank. A low level condition in the VCT will cause automatic makeup at the required shutdown boron concentration. Pressurizer level is maintained via positioning of the charging pump and letdown flow control valves. All or part of the charging flow may be used for auxiliary spray to cool the pressurizer and q increase its boron content when RCS pressure is below that ;
required to operate the reactor coolant pumps. I l
If the shutdown is to be for refueling, the boron I concentration in the refueling water tank is first verified ,
to be 2200 ppm. Any borating operations of this tank J required to meet the boron concentration criteria are to be l B completed prior to the scheduled shutdown.
After the reactor vessel head is removed, the Shutdown Cooling System Pumps take the borated water from the 3 In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) and inject the water into the reactor coolant loops via the ,
normal flow paths thereby filling the refueling pool. The resulting concentration of the refueling pool and the RCS is above the lower operating boron concentration operating concentration. Thus, the limitation of l B 2000 ppm but less than the refueling water tank maximum contents of the refueling pool can be returned directly to the IRWST prior j to plant startup without hindering plant operations. l During refueling shutdown, the reactor makeup water supply piping is monitored and alarmed for flow to prevent dilution of the refueling pool.
l 9.3.4.3 Desian Evaluation l 9.3.4.3.1 Availability and Reliability l
l A high degree of functional reliability is assured by providing standby components and by assuring fail-safe responses to the most probable modes of failure. Redundancy is provided as follows:
Amendment B 9.3-40 March 31, 1988
CESSAR nainema O Redundancy Component Purification and Deborating Three identical components-Ion Exchangers Charging Pumps One operating, one in standby B
Charging Pump Flow Control One parallel, standby valve Valve I Letdown Control Valve One parallel, standby valve Boric Acid Makeup Pump One parallel, standby pump Gas Stripper The gas stripper package !
includes redundant standby ,
pumps. d I
Seal Injection Filter One parallel, standby filter Purification Filter One parallel, ' standby -filter Reactor Makeup Water Pump One parallel,- standby pump Boric Acid Concentrator The concentrator package p Package includes redundant standby pumps.
In addition to the component redundancy, it is possible to operate the CVCS in a manner such ' that some components are bypassed. While the normal charging path is through the l regenerative heat exchanger, it is also possible to charge to the g reactor vessel via the normal safety injection system. It is possible to transfer boric acid to the charging pump suction header by bypassing the Volume Control Tank or.by bypassing the makeup flow controls and the Volume Control Tank. The letdown l filter and purification and deborating ion exchangers can be !
bypassed. Controlled bleedoff. flow can be routed to the Reactor Drain Tank rather than the charging pump suction. B An independent gravity feed line from.the Boric Acid Storage Tank to the charging pump suctions are provided to assure makeup. The charging pumps have an alternate source of borated water from the spent fuel pool which is maintalhed above 2000 ppm concentration. boron l3 9.3.4.3.2 Accident Response The letdown line is isolated on receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS). A Containment Isolation Actuation Signal.(CIAS) isolates the letdown line, the Reactor Coolant Pump controlled bleedoff line, the resin sluice supply header (RSSH) b supplying to the RDT, and the RDT suction line.
Amendment B 9.3-41 March 31, 1988 !
~
l CESSAR Mnir"icari:n i l
l A CIAS (or SIAS) does not isolate the charging line or stop the I charging pumps. Maintaining charging flow following a CIAS prevents the simultaneous loss of component cooling water and seal injection flows to the reactor coolant pump seals. A ,
sufficient volume of fluid exists in the VCT to provide !
timo to manually align the gravity feed lines from the BAST ample to lB the charging pump suction header.
9.3.4.3.3 Overpressure Protection l In order to provide for safe operation of the CVCS, i protection is provided throughout the system by relief overpressure valves. lE I The following is a description of the relief valves that are l
located in the CVCS.
A. Low Pressure Letdown Relief Valve The relief valve downstream ofpurification the letdownorificeprotectslB filters, ion I
j the low pressure piping, exchangers, and letdown strainer from overpressure. The l valve capacity is equal to the capacity of the letdown 3 I
orifice with the control valve full open at normal system l pressure. The set pressure is equal to the design pressure I of the low pressure piping and components.
B. Volume Control Tank Relief Valve l
The relief valve on the Volume Control Tank is sized to pass a liquid flow rate equal to the sum of the following flow rates: the maximum letdown flow rate possible without actuating the high flow alarm on the letdown flow indicator; the design purge flow rate of the Sampling System (SS) ; and, the maximum flow rate that the boric acid makeup system can produce with relief pressure in the Volume Control Tank.
The set pressure is equal to the design pressure of the Volume Control Tank.
C. Volume Control Tank Gas Supply Relief Valve The relief valve is sized to exceed the comb..ned maximum capacity of the nitrogen and hydrogen gas regt lators. The set pressure is lower than the Volume Contro) Tank design pressure.
D. Reactor Coolant Pump Controlled Bleedoff Her. der Relief Valve The relief valve at the reactor ecolant pump controlled bloodoff header allows the controlled bleedoff flow to continue to the Reactor Drain Tank in the event that a valve Amendment E 9.3-42 December 30, 1988
~
i i
CESSARMMema, n
V in the line to the Charging Pump Mini-flow Heat Exchanger is B closed.- It does not serve an overpressure protection function. The valve is sized to pass the flow rate in the event of failure of the seals in one reactor coolant pump plus the normal bleedoff from the other reactor coolant pumps. The maximum relief valve opening pressure is less than the controlled bleedoff high-high pressure alarm setpoint.
E. Heat Traced Piping Relief Valves Relief valves are provided for those portions of the boric acid system that are heat traced and which can be individually isolated. The set pressure is equal to the design pressure of the corresponding portion of the system piping. Each valve is sized to relieve the maximum fluid thermal expansion rate that would occur if maximum duplicate heat tracing power were inadvertently applied to the isolated line.
F. Equipment Drain Tank Relief Valve The Equipment Drain Tank relief valve is sized to pass the O
^
liquid flow rate equal to the flow of the shutdown cooling return relief valve. The set pressure is equal to the design pressure of the Equipment Drain Tank.
G. Reactor Drain Tank Relief Valve A relief valve which vents to the containment sump is provided for the Reactor Drain Tank. The relief valve is B sized to pass the liquid flow rate equal to the total flow of the possible flowing in the Reactor Drain Tank. The set pressure is equal to the design pressure of the Reactor Drain Tank.
H. Charging Pump Mini-flow Relief Valve The relief valve down stream of the charging pump mini-flow orifices protects the portions of the CBO piping outside containment from overpressurization and portions of the charging pump piping due to thermal expansion that might result from operating a charging pump with its discharge isolation valve closed. The valve is sized to pass the flow rate in the event of a failure of the seals in one reactor coolant pump plus the normal bleedoff from the other pumps.
/O d
Amendment B 9.3-43 March 31, 1988
CESSAR58% . l O
I. Seal Injection Heat Exchanger Thermal Relief The tube side of the seal injection heat exchanger is protected by a thermal relief valve. This relief valve is sized to protect the heater from overpressurization due to the thermal expansion of trapped watcr or inadvertent closure of the isolation valves with steam to the shell side.
J. Regenerative Heat Exchanger Thermal Relief l A spring loaded check valve (CH-435) is provided downstream of the regenerative heat exchanger to protect against B overpressure from continued letdown operation with both charging and auxiliary spray isolated. Note that CH-435 is j sized to pass full charging flow should CH-208 fail closed.
9.3.4.3.4 Chemistry And Purity Control The chemistry and purity of the reactor coolant are controlled to provide the following:
A. Minimize the corrosion of the system hardware, which l includes minimizing the fouling of heat transfer surfaces.
B. Adjust the chemical shim properly to control core reactivity ,
throughout the life of the core. 3 C. Identify on a timely basis the occurrence of defective fuel by measuring the fission products in the reactor coolant.
D. Ensure that the quality of the reactor coolant is being maintained by the purification circuit.
Table 9.3.4-1 describes the chemistry of the reactor coolant. lB The oxygen and chlorido limits as presented in Table 9.3.4-1 of 0.10 ppm and 0.15 ppm respectively, were established from thelB relationships between oxygen and chloride concentrations and the susceptibility to stress corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steel. This relationship is presented in References 2 and 3.
These data reveal that no chloride stress corrosion occurs at oxygen concentrations below approximately 0.8 ppm. This oxygen limit was reduced by a factor of 8 to give the conservative concentration of 0.10 ppm oxygen. The maximum amount of oxygen from air dissolved in water at 77'F is approximately 8 ppm. At O
Amendment B 9.3-44 March 31, 1988
CESSAR EnMCATl!N ;
in kv) to,s concentration, a chloride concentration of less than approx-imately 1.50 ppm would preclude the possibility of chloride stress corrosion. This limit was reduced by a factor of 10 to provide a conservative chloride limit of 0.15 ppm.
The fluoride limit of 0.10 ppm for reactor coolant is the result of the fluoride ion being identified as causing intergranular corrosion of sensitized austenitic stainless steels. This is presented in Reference 4. Based on these data, it is essential to minimize fluoride ions in the reactor coolant. Therefore, the concentration chosen as the maximum limit is the lowest concentration which can be readily detected in the bulk water and i which can easily be maintained by the action of the purification l ion exchanger.
Chemistry control of the reactor coolant consists of preoperational removal of oxygen by hydrazine scavenging, degasification via the gas stripper of makeup water if necessary during startup, and control of oxygen concentration by maintaining an excess hydrogen concentration and pH control by maintaining lithium within a specific control band during normal operation. A chemical addition tank and pump is used to transfer l A hydrazine and/or lithium hydroxide to the discharge side of the )
(' i charging pumps for injection into the RCS. The hydrogen concentration in the reactor coolant is controlled by the } '
hydrogen overpressure in the Volume Control Tank or by direct addition of hydrogen in the charging pump discharge line.
l i I Lithium by is generatg(n,n the reaction B a )sigp;ificant Li quantities therefore in the it is the core region logical choice f for a pH control agent. However, there exists a threshold for ;
accelerated attack of Zircaloy at approximately 35 ppm lithium. l Therefore, the lithium concentration limits are specified to provide a wide margin between the upper operating limit and the threshold for accelerated attack in the event any concentrating phenomena exist. Early in core life, periodic removal of lithium by ion exchange is required to control concentration below the upper limit. One purification ion exchanger is used intermittently to control the lithium concentration. Prior to refueling shutdown, when large dilution operations are necessary, lithium additions will be necessary to maintain the lithium concentration within the control band. The lower limit on lithium concentration ensures that sufficient lithium hydroxide is present during operation to provide the benefits noted in Section 9.3.4.1.3.2.
The control of other impurities is accomplished by the continuous operation of the second purification ion exchanger which has been
!o \
9.3-45
converted to the lithium or ammonia , lithium form and does not O
remove lithium. The resin beds remove soluble nuclides by an ion exchange mechanism and insoluble particles by the impingement of these particles on the surface of the resin beads.
The normal method of adjusting boron concentration is by feed and bleed. To change concentration, the mrskeup portion of the CVC$
supplies either reactor makeup water or horic acid to the Volume l Control Tank, and the letdown stream is diverted to the pre-holdup lon exchanger. Toward the end of the core cycle, the quantities of waste produced due to feed-and-bleed operations become excessive and the deborating ion exchanger is used to reduce the reactor coolant system boron concentration. An anion resin, initially in the hydroxyl form, is converted to a borate form as boron is removed.
Various reactions taking place within the reactor during operation result in the production of tritium, which appears in
{ the reactor coolant as tritiated water. See Section 11.1.3 for a discussion of tritium. i Boric acid recovery from the reactor coolant liquid waste is accomplished by the boric acid concentrator package at a processing rate of 20 gpm. Based on the waste estimates identified in Table 9.3.4-3, the concentrator once-through usage lB factor is less than 10 percent, thus resulting in an adequate opportunity for reprocessing of the Reactor Makeup Water Tank contents, the RWT contents, or the BAST contents if necessary.
l3
, 9.3.4.3.5 System Isolation j i
9.3.4.3.5.1 Containment Isolation !
l There are seven penetrations through the containment structure to !
accommodate CVCS piping. Four of these penetrations (charging B l flow to RCS, purification stream from the shutdown cooling heat 1 exchanger to the letdown heat exchanger, seal injection flow to RCPs, and resin sluice supply header flow to the RDT) allow flow in the inward direction, and three of these penetrations (letdown i line flow to purification ion exchangers, RCP controlled l bleed-off flow, and RDT flow to reactor drain pumps) allow flow ,
in the outward direction.
The penetration for the charging piping to the RCS consists of a Safety Class 2 motor-operated valve (CH-524) outside containment and a safety Class 2 check valve (CH-303) inside containment.
CH-524 is operable from the control room with position indication in the control room, and does not receive an automatic close signal. The penetration for the purification stream from the SCS Amendment B 9.3-46 March 31, 1988
CESSARnnh -
G V
heat exchanger to the letdown heat exchanger consists of a safety 3 Class 2 manual isolation valve (CH-307) outside containment and a Safety Class 2 check valve (CH-304) inside containment. CH-307 is a normally closed, locked closed valve that is only opened after the RCS has been shutdown and placed on shutdown cooling.
The penetration for seal injection flow consists of a Safety Class 2 motor-operated valve (CH-255) located outside containment and a Safety Class 2 check valve (CH-835) located inside containment. CH-255 is operable from the control room with position indication in the control room and does not receive an automatic close signal. The penetration for the resin sluice supply header flow to the ' RDT consists of a Safety Class ' 2 pneumatic valve (CH-580) located outside containment and a Safety Class 2 check valve (CH-494) located inside containment. CH-580 is a failed close valve operable from the control room and receives an automatic close signal on CIAS.
l The penetration for the letdown line flow to the purification l system consists of a Safety Class 2 pneumatic valve (CH-570)
I located inside containment and a Safety Class 2 pneumatic valve (CH-523) located outside containment. Both CH-523 and CH-570 are ;
fail-closed valves, operable from the control room with position indication in the control room and both receive an automatic (qd j close signal on CIAS. The penetration for RCP bleed-off flow consists of a safety Class 2 pneumatic valve controlled (CH-505) located outside containment and a Safety Class 2 pneumatic valve (CH-506) located inside containment. Both CH-506 and CH-505 are fail-closed valves, operable from the control room with position indication in the control room and both receive an automatic close signal on CIAS. The penetration for the RDT flow to the reactor drain pumps consists of a Safety Class 2 pneumatic valve (CH-560) located inside containment and a Safety Class 2 i
pneumatic valve (CH-561) located outsido ~ containment. Both I CH-560 and CH-561 are fail-closed valves operable from the control room with position indication in the control room and both receive an automatic close signal'on CIAS.
9.3.4.3.5.2 Safety Class Transition Boundaries As stated in Section 9.3.4.1, the CVCS has been designed as a non-safety grade system and all portions of the CVCS outside of containment are designed as non-nuclear safety. The containment penetrations and valves discussed in the previous section are all designed as Safety Class 2. The boundaries for the transition between various safety classes (e.g., SC1 to SC4) for portions of the CVCS located inside containment are indicated in Figure 9.3.4-1. E 1 t
(
Amendment E 9.3-47 December 30, 1988 E
CESSAR nai"icaricu 9.3.4.3.6 Leakage Detection and Control O
The components in the CVCS are provided with welded connections wherever possible to minimize leakage to the atmosphere.
However, flanged connections are provided on all pump suction and discharge lines, on relief valve inlet and outlet connections and on some flow meters to permit removal for maintenance. All valves larger than 2 inches and all actuator-operated valves are provided with double-packing, lantern rings, and leakoff I connections, unless the valves are diaphragm (packless) valves. l Diaphragm valves are utilized around the Volume control Tank gas space. Thus, activity release due to valve leakage is minimized.
The CVCS can also monitor the total RCS water inventory. If there is no leakage throughout the plant, the level in the Volume Control Tank should remain constant during steady state operation. Therefore, a decreasing level in the Volume Control Tank alerts the operator to a possible leak somewhere in the I system. J During refueling shutdown, the reactor makeup water piping is monitored to detect leakage past isolation valve CH-195 (locked i shut during refuelin shutdown). If leakage occurs, an alarm is annunciated in the c ntrol room.
l 9.3.4.3.7 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Since the CVCS is not a safety grade system, a detailed Failur B
Mode and Effects Analysis is not performed.
9.3.4.3.8 Radiological Evaluation l Frequently used manually operated valves located in high radiation or inaccessible areas are provided with extension stem handwheels terminating in low radiation and accessible control areas. Manually operated valves are provided with locking provisions if unauthorized operation of the v.alve is considered a potential hazard to plant operation or personnel safety. Refer
- to Section 12.2 for further information.
l 9.3.4.4 Testing and Inspection Requirements Each component is inspected and cleaned prior to installation into the CVCS. A high velocity flush using demineralized water will be used to flush particulate material and other potential contamination from all lines in this system.
O Amendment B 9.3-48 March 31, 1988 f
L_ -_
CESSAREnMem f l l G 1 i'
Instruments will be calibrated during preoperational testing.
Automatic controls will be tested for actuation at the proper >
setpoints and alarm functions will be checked for operability and l proper setpoints. The relief valve settings will be checked and adjusted as required. All sections of the CVCS will be operated and tested initially with regard to flow paths, flow capacity and mechanical operability. Pumps will be tested to demonstrate head and capacity.
The CVCS is tested for integrated operation with the RCS during hot functional testing. Heat exchanger performance and proper l control of the letdown flow control valves and the charging pump flow control valves by the pressurizer level control program will l be tested during hot functional testing. The charging line will be checked to assure that the piping is free of excessive vibration. Response of the makeup portion of the CVCS in the automatic, dilute, and borate modes will be verified. Any ,
defects in operation that could affect plant safety are corrected l before fuel loading.
As part of normal plant operation, tests, inspections, data ;
tabulation and instrument calibrations are made to evaluate the rm condition and performance of the CVCS equipment and l instrumentation. Data will be taken periodically during normal (V) plant operation to confirm heat transfer capabilities and purification efficiency. Pump and valve leakage will be monitored.
Appropriate vents, drains, and test connections are provided to permit the site operator to perform inservice testing of valves.
9.3.4.5 Instrumentation Requirements 9.3.4.5.1 Temperature Instrumentation A. Holdup Tank and Reactor Makeup Water Tank Temperature The temperature of the contents of these tanks is indicated in the main control room. A low temperature alarm annunciated in the main control room to warn the operator of low temperature of the tank contents.
B. Boric Acid Storage Tank Temperature Two instruments are installed in the Boric Acid Storage B Tank. One provides temperature indication in the control room, the other provides indication locally. Annunciation 73 in the control room warns the operator of low temperature of I
- the tank contents.
Amendment B 9.3-49 March 31, 1988
CESSAREPema O,
C. Boric Acid Batching Tank Temperature The batching tank temperature measurement channel controls the tank steam supply. Local indication is provided to B facilitate batching operations.
D. Letdown Line Temperature The regenerative heat exchanger letdown outlet temperature is indicated in the control room and local indication is provided outside of containment. An alarm is provided to alert the operator to abnormally high letdown temperature.
l The instrument also provides a signal that positions the B
l 1etdown flow control valve to automatic minimum flow at a setpoint above the high temperature alarme The valve must be manually reset to restore nominal letdown flow.
E. Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature This channel is used to control the Component Cooling System (CCS) flow through the letdown heat exchanger to maintain the proper letdown temperature for purification system l
operation. This temperature is indicated in the control room.
F. Ion Exchanger Inlet Temperature B
This channel indicates locally and actuates isolation valves to bypass flow around the purification and deborating ion exchangers if the letdown temperature exceeds the highest permissible ion exchanger operating temperature. A high temperature alarm is provided in the control room. The instrument also provides a signal that positions the letdown flow control valve to automatic minimum flow on the high temperature alarm, and shuts CH-517 on high-high temperature indication. Flow to the ion exchangers must be manually restored when the temperature decreases below the setpoint. j G. Volume Control Tank Temperature The Volume Control Tank is provided with temperature j indication in the control room. A high temperature alarm is provided to alert the operator to abnormally high water !
temperature in the Volume Control Tank.
l l H. Charging Line Temperature The regenerative heat exchanger charging outlet temperature is indicated in the control room. This indication is used 1
Amendment B 9.3-50 March 31, 1988 ;
i
l 1
CESSAREnMnc- j J f
(
to monitor heat exchanger. performance and verify that auxiliary spray initiation conditions are satisfied.
i I. Pre-holdup Ion Exchanger Inlet Temperature This channel indicates gas stripper influent temperature in i the control room. A high temperature alarm annunciated in .
On high inlet temperature the flow is i the control room.
diverted to bypass the ion exchanger to preclude resin )
damage.
J. Reactor Drain Tank Temperature i The Reactor Drain Tank is provided with temperature indication in the control room. A high temperature alarm is provided to alert the operator of abnormally high water temperature and the need for cooling of the tank contents.
K. Seal Injection Heat Exchanger Inlet and outlet Temperature B
A temperature controller on the inlet and on the outlet of the seal injection heat exchanger provides indication to the j g seal injection temperature controller to maintain fluid t temperature within acceptable limits. The seal injection k temperature controller positions CH-231 to regulate the flow which bypasses the heat exchanger and thus regulate i temperature. Indication and alarms are provided in the control room. l I
L. Equipment Drain Tank Temperature The Equipment Drain Tank is provided with temperature indication in the control room. A high temperature alarm is provided to alert the operator of abnormally high water temperature and the need for cooling of the tank contents.
9.3.4.5.2 Pressure Instrumentation A. Purification Filter, Ion Exchanger and Letdown Strainer Differential Pressures Differential pressure indicators are provided to indicate the pressure loss across the purification filters and across the ion exchangers plus letdown strainer. Both differential )
I pressure indicators have local readouts and control room high differential pressure alarms.
O (d j l
Amendment B 9.3-51 March 31, 1988 l
CESSAR EEDICATION B. Boric Acid Makeup Pump Discharge Pressures B O
Discharge pressure of each pump is indicated in the control room and locally. Low pressure alarms, annunciating in the control room, are provided. If the pump has been manually turned off by the operator, the discharge pressure alarm is suppressed.
C. Charging Line Pressure The charging line pressure is indicated in the control room and at a location outside the control room and a low I pressure alarm is provided in the control room. If the pump B has been manually turned off by the operator, the discharge pressure alarm is suppressed.
D. Reactor Coolant Pump Controlled Bleedoff Header Pressure A pressure measurement channel is provided to measure the pressure at the reactor coolant pump controlled bleedoff header. Indication is provided in the control room, and the measuring device has overpressure protection for RCS design i
pressure. A high alarm and a high-high alarm are annunciated in the control room. The high alarm indicates that a valve in the line to the Charging Pump Mini-flow Heat B Exchanger has been closed. The high-high alarm indicates that the controlled bleedoff flow has stopped. l E. Charging Pump Suction Line Pressure Switches .
l A pressure switch on each charging pump suction manifold 1 stops the associated charging pump on low suction line J pressure thus preventing damage due to cavitation.
F. Letdown Line Pressure B The letdown line pressure measurement channel upstream of the letdown control valves controls letdown flow to maintain constant RCS pressure during low system pressure operations.
Indication and alarms are provided in the control room.
l G. Ion Exchanger Drain Header Strainer Differential Pressure l A local differential pressure indicator is provided with a local alarm. These instruments will indicate any progressive loading of the strainer.
O Amendment B 9.3-52 March 31, 1988
C E S S A R En nnca m . i l
'l H. Equipment Drain. Tank Pressure The Equipment Drain Tank pressure is indicated in the control room and is provided with a high-pressure alarm in the control room. This channel also actuates valves to automatically. isolate the equipment drain tank from the gas analyzer, gaseous waste management system, the. recycle drain header, and the reactor drain pumps when the tank pressure exceeds the high-pressure alarm setpoint.
I. Reactor Drain Pump Discharge Pressure The pump discharge pressures are indicated locally and in the control room.
J. Reactor Drain Filter, Pre-holdup Ion Exchanger and Strainer l Differential Pressures Differential pressure indicators are provided to indicate the pressure loss across the components. Both differential pressures are indicated locally. High-pressure alarms are annunciated in the control room. {
K. Reactor Drain Tank Pressure G This measurement channel provides a pressure indication in the control room and actuates a high-pressure alarm. This channel closes the isolation valve to the GWMS and the containment isolation valve (inside).
I L. Holdup Pumps Discharge Pressure l
The pump ctischarge pressures are indicated locally.
l l
Exchanger and Strainer M. Boric Acid Condensate Ion l Differential Pressure A local differential pressure indicator with a high alarm is provided. Periodic reading of this instrument will indicate any progressive loading.
N. Seal Injection Filter Differential Pressure !
1 A differential pressure indicator with local indication and j high differential pressure annunciation in the control room is provided to determine pressure loss across the seal injection filters. Periodic readings of this instrument will indicate any progressive loading of the unit.
l 9.3-53
CESSARE h ia
- 0. Reactor Makeup Water Pump Discharge Pressure 0
The reactor makeup water pump discharge pressure is indicated locally and in the control room. The low pressure alarm annunciated in the control room. Low pressure on one B pump stops that pump and starts the standby pump. If the pump has been manually turned off by the operator, the discharge pressure alarm is suppressed.
l P. Volume Control Tank Pressure This channel indicates Volume control Tank pressure in the control room. High and low pressures are annunciated in the control room.
Q. Boric Acid Filter Differential Pressure A differential pressure indicator with local readout is provided to indicate the pressure loss across the boric acid filter. The high pressure alarm is provided in the control room.
R. Reactor Makeup Water Filter Differential Pressure A differential pressure indicator with local readout and a high differential pressure alarm in the control room is provided to indicate excessive loading causing high pressure loss across the reactor makeup water filter.
9.3.4.5.3 Level Instrumentation A. Holdup Tank and Reactor Makeup Water Tank Level Level indication and alcms for these tanks are indicated in I the control room. On low level in the Holdup Tank and low-low level in the Reactor Makeup Water Tank, the holdup j pumps and reactor makeup water pumps are automatically i stopped. The low level alarm for the Reactor Makeup Water Tank warns the operator of entering the volume required for back to back cold shutdowns at 90% core life. A high level alarm in the Holdup Tank indicates that processing should be commenced. The high level alarm in the Reactor Makeup Water Tank and the high-high level alarm in the Holdup Tank indicates that filling of the tanks should be secured.
D. Volume Control Tank Level i A differential pressure type level instrument provides l Volume Control Tank level indication in the control room and l l
l i
Amendment B l 9.3-54 March 31, 1988 i
CESSAR naincuiu O controls the starting and stopping of the automatic makeup system. This channel also automatically diverts letdown flow on high level to the gas stripper via the pre-holdup B~
ion exchanger. High, low and low-low level alarms are provided in the control room.
C. Volume Control Tar.k Level A differential pressure type level instrument on the Volume Control Tank automatically switches charging pump suction 0 from the Volume Control' Tank to the Boric Acid Storage Tank via the boric acid enkeup pumps upon actuation of a low-low level alarm. High, low, and low-low level alarms are provided in the control room.
D. Equipment Drnin Tank and Reactor Drain-Tank Level A differential pressure type level instrument indicates level in the control room. The transmitter also activates high and low level alarms in the control room and automatically stops the reactor drain pumps on low level.
3 E. Boric Acid Storage Tank Level s Two high level band instruments are provided with indication and alarms in the control room. One transmitter also stops the boric acid makeup pumps on low-low level.
9.3.4.5.4 Flow Instrumentation A. Letdown Flow An orifice-type flow meter indicates letdown flow locally and in the control room. This channel actuates a high flow alarm in the control room.
B. Reactor Makeup Water Flow Switch A flow switch -located downstream of the makeup controller flow indicator F-210X is used to indicate and alarm in the control room if demineralized water flow occurs during refueling operations. During normal operations, the flow switch is not operational.
C. Volume Control Tank Hydrogen and Nitrogen Gas Flow Local indications of nitrogen and hydrogen gas flow to the Volume Control Tank are provided. The nitrogen flow meter Amendment B 9.3-55 March 31, 1988
CESSAREinam.
is used during VCT purging operations. The hydrogen flow O
meter is used during operations where a hydrogen over-pressure is desired in the VCT.
D. Concentrated Boric Acid Flow An ultrasonic flow meter is provided to measure the concentrated boric acid flow rate to the blending tee. This i channel controls the boric acid control valve to obtain a preset flow rate. High and low flow alarms are delayed after initiation of the makeup signal to allow the set flow 1 rate to become established. A high-high alarm is provided to avoid exceeding design flow of the boric acid filter.
The flow is recorded and the total quantity is indicated in the control room.
E. Reactor Makeup Water Flow An orifice-type flow meter is provided to measure the reactor makeup water flow rate to the blending tee. This channel controls the reactor makeup water control valve to obtain a preset flow rate. High and low flow alarms are delayed to allow the set flow rate to become established. A high-high alarm is provided to avoid exceeding design flow of the reactor makeup water filter. The flow is recorded j and the total quantity is indicated in the control room.
F. Charging Flow )
Charging flow rate indication and low flow annunciation are l provided in the control room and at a location outside the control room. If the pump is manually turned off by the B operator, the low flow alarm is suppressed. l G. Ion Exchanger Drain Header Flow Switch 3 1
A flow switch is provided with a local indicator of flow, i The indicator light is on whenever draining is in progress. l The light goes off when an ion exchanger draining operation '
l is complete. When refilling an ion exchanger after charging new resin, the light indicates overflow from the vent line drain and therefore completion of the filling operation. ;
I H. Seal Injection Flow Rate ;
1 Orifice-type flow meters indicate seal injection supply i flows to each reactor coolant pump. This channel controls the seal injection flow control valves to maintain the desired flow. Control room indication of high, high-high, ,
and low flow annunciation is provided. i l
l l Amendment B ;
9.3-56 March 31, 1988 l l <
l i
CESSAR Ennnewcu (v !
I. Charging Hydrogen Injection Flow This instrument provides local indication of hydrogen flow i into the charging system. High and low flow alarms' are B annunciated 'in the control room. If the charging pump is ;
manually turned off by the operator, the low flow alarm is {
suppressed. )
l J. Boric Acid Batching Flow i i
This instrument indicates locally the flow of boric acid {
from the boric acid batching tank to the boric acid storage !
B tank recirculation line. I i
K, Resin Sluice Supply Header Air Flow l l
This instrument provides local indication of air flow to the resin sluice supply header.
L. Reactor Makeup Water Flow to Resin Sluice Supply Header This instrument provides local indication of reactor makeup p water flow to the resin sluice supply header.
9.3.4.5.5 Boron Measurement Instrumentation 8 Continuous boron concentration measurements on the RCS are made by a boronometer located in the process sample system (PSS -
Section 9.3.2).
9.3.4.5.6 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation 9.3.4.5.6.1 Process Radiation Monitor The process radiation monitor (PRM) provides a continuous recording in the control room of reactor coolant gross gamma radiation and specific fission product gamma activity thus providing a measure of fuel cladding integrity. The instrument B is located in the process sample system (PSS - Section 9.3.2).
9.3.4.5.6.2 Gas Stripper Effluent Radiation Monitor This monitor provides a continuous recording in the control room of the gross gamma activity leaving the gas stripper and entering the holdup tank. A high alarm indicates improper operation of upstream purification equipment. Normally, however, an
, increasing activity trend will allow operators to take corrective <
l measures (replace ion exchanger resin or filter cartridge) before b
v Amendment B 9.3-57 March 31, 1988
CESSAR HiMem:u O
significant activity increase occurs in the holdup tank. The radiation monitor consists of a logarithmic ratemeter which processes the pulses from the shielded scintillation detector. i 9.3.4.6 Interface Requirements A. Power
- 1. Normal Power Requirements
- a. Tuo independent power sources shall be available i to provide electric power to the Chemical and Volume Control System equipment. Power shall be capable of being supplied from the main generator.
During startup or shutdown, power shall be I available from offsite,
- b. Within the plant distribution system, redundant chemical and Volume Control System equipment loads shall be supplied by separate buses or notor control centers to minimize the effect of oubages.
- c. In the event of a failure of a bus, standby equipment connected to other buses shall be '
capable of being placed into operation.
- 2. Emergency Power Requirements
- a. Charging Pumps - Each emergency power bus shall supply one pump. The charging pumps shall not be automatically sequenced on the emergency power buses.
- b. The following are emergency power supply requirements for CVCS instrumentation:
Contro Instrument Location {g Emercency Bus j l
A B L-200 (BAST level) A/C L-201 (BAST level) A/C B F-212 (Charging flow) A/C B P-212 (Charging pressure) A/C A L-226 (VCT level) A N1(2) B L-227 (VCT level) A N2(2)
O Amendment B 9.3-58 March 31, 1988
CESSAR!annc-o
- c. The following are emergency power supply requirements for CVCS valves:
Emergency Contro Valve Bus Location CH-501 A A B CH-515 (receives SIAS) B A/C CH-516 (receives CIAS & SIAS) A A/C CH-517 B A/C CH-523 (receives CIAS) A A CH-524 B A CH-570 (receives CIAS) B A CH-255 B A CH-208 A A/C CH-205 A A/C CH-505 (receives CIAS) A A/C '
CH-506 (receives CIAS) B A/C Cll-580 (receives CIAS) A A CH-560 (receives CIAS) B A CH-561 (receives CIAS) A A
/g Notes: Location code is as follows; A-Control Room, (V ) [1)
B-Local, C-Remote Shutdown Panel, D-Location outside Control Room.
(2) A Class 11 Uninterruptable Power Supply (Bus N1 and N2) will be used to provide power to non-lE CVCS instrumentation.
Amendment B 9.3-59 March 31, 1988
CESSARHHincum
(
V TABLE 9.3.4-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)
OPERATING LIMITS 1.0 REACTOR COOLANT MAKEVP WATER Analysis Normal
< 0.15 ppm chloride (Cl) pH 6.0 - 8.0 B
< 0.1 ppm Fluoride (F) 1 Suspended Solids < 0.35 ppm B 2.0 PRIMARY WATER Pre Core Hot Initial Core Load Power Analysis Functionals (1) and Criticality Operation B
, c pH (77'F) 3.8 - 10.4 4.5 - 10.2 4.5 - 10.2 Conductivity (2) (2) (2) l Hydrazine 30-50 ppm O) 30-50 ppm (3) 1.5 x 0xygen ppm (4) I (max. 20 ppm)
Ammonia <50 ppm <50 ppm 0-2 ppm Dissolved Gas (5)
Lithium 1-2 ppm 0.2-2.3 ppm 0.2-2.3 ppm Hydrogen (0) 25-50 cc (STP)/kg (H2 0) (7) 0xygen 10.1 ppm 10.1 ppm I9) 10.1 ppm Suspended Solids <0.35 ppm,(8) <0.35 ppm,(g) 2 ppm max. <0.35 ppm'.(8) 2 ppm max 2 ppm max.
i Chloride 50.15 ppm 10.15 ppm 10.15 ppm Fluoride 10.1 ppm 10.1 ppm 10.1 ppm Boron s Refueling 1 Refueling Concentration Concentration Amendment B March 31, 1988
~
CESSAREnace i I
I TABLE 9.3.4-1 (Cont'd)
O (Sheet 2 of 2)
OPERATING LIMITS I
Notes: (1) Special hot conditioning limits: j Temperature >350*F for 7-10 days (2) Consistent with pH additive concentration.
(3) Hydrazine is maintained at 30-50 ppm any time the RCS is less j than 150*F. l l
(4) Prior to exceeding 150*F during heatup or below 400*F during !
cooldown. !
1 (5) Prior to a depressurization shutdown, reduce total gas to I
<10cc(STP)/kg 2(H 0) to limit the possibility for explosive mixtures. ;
l (6) During the transition from post-core to operating, hydrogen )
should be maintained in the 15 to 25cc(STP)/kg (H7 0) range to minimize degassing requiremer.ts in case the reactor plant must be shutdown and depressurized.
(7) Hydrogen should be <5cc(STP)/kg (H 2
- 0) before securing the reactor coolant pumps.
(8) The abnormal condition of 0.35 to 2.0 ppm is permitted for up B to 14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> to allow for crud burst conditions.
(9) Not applicable during core load.
O Amendment B March 31, 1988
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ l
CESSAR EnHr"lCATION rh TABLE 9.3.4-2 (Sheet 1 of 2)
DESIGN TRANSIENTS CVCS Code Class 2* Components Which Are Part Of The Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Assumed number of occurrences during (1) the 60-year design Affected 3 Event life of the plant Component
- 1. Plant Startup 750 L,C i
- 2. Step Power Change 3,000 L,C (90 Percent to 100 Percent)
- 3. Step Power Change 3,000 L,C (100 Percent to 90 Percent)
- 4. Ramp Power Change 22,500 i o (15 Percent to 100 Percent)
- 5. Ramp Power Change 22,500 L,C (100 Percent to 15 Percent at -5 Percent / Minute)
- 6. Turbine Trip 180 L,C
- 7. Loss of Flow to the Core 60 L
- 8. Loss of Secondary Pressure 1 L,C
- 9. Switch from Normal Purifica- 1,500 L,C B
tion to Maximum Purification
- 10. Low-Low Volume Control Tank 120 L,C,S
Response
- 11. Loss of Letdown Flow and 1,275 L,C Recovery
- 12. Loss of Charging Flow 150 L,C
- 13. Plant Cooldown 750 L,C
- 14. Reactor-Turbine Trip 350 L,C Amendment B March 31, 1988
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . - . -- ]
l CESSAR 8Encuieu TABLE 9.3.4-2 (Cont'd)
O j (Sheet 2 of 2)
DESIGN TRANSIENTS l CVCS Code Class 2* Components Which Are Part Of The Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Assumed number of :
occurrences during (1) 3 l the 60-year design Affected 1 Event life of the plant Component )
- 15. Inadvertent Actuation of 15 L,C Pressurizer Heaters
- 16. Inadvertent Initiation of 8 C j Auxiliary Spray at Full Power
- 17. Depressurization due to 8 L,C Inadvertent Actuation of One l Pressurizer Safety Valve
- 18. Opening One Steam Bypass 60 L,C Valve at Full Power
- 19. Excess Feedwater Flow Due to 60 L,C Control System Malfunction at Full Power
- 20. Loss of Feedwater Flow to 130 L,C the Steam Generators
- 21. Pressurizer Level Control 150 L Failure to Full Letdown
- Design transients for Code Class 1 components are listed in 3.9.1.1.
l Amendment B March 31, 1988
CESSAR 8mincma Q
v TABLE 9.3.4-3 EXCESS REACTOR COOLANT GENERATED i
DURING TYPICAL PLANT OPERATIONS PLANT OPERATION VOLUME GENERATED Plant shutdown to refueling at 90% core 155,250 gallons cycle.
Plant startup from refueling at 293,603 gallons E l beginning of core cycle.
Plant shutdown to cold shutdown and 79,538 gallons startup at 50% core cycle. .
1 Anticipated daily leakage to reactor 250 gallons / day !
drain tank and equipment drain tank.
I
(
Amendment E December 30,.1988
CESSAR Eniincma I
O TABLE 9.3.4-4 1
(Sheet 1 of 11)
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT DATA
SUMMARY
l Regenerative Heat Exchanaer l Quantity 1 Type Shell and tube, vertical B
Code (tube and shell side) ASME VIII l
Tube Side (Letdown)
Fluid Reactor coolant, 3.6 wt % boric acid, maximum Design' pressure 2485 psig !
Design temperature 650'F ]
Materials Austenitic stainless steel I Normal flow 80 gpm B
Design flow 200 gpm-Shell Side (Charging) s Fluid Reactor coolant, 3.6 wt % boric acid, maximum Design pressure 3025 psig 550*F l3 Design temperature Austenitic stainless steel l
Materials Normal flow 65 gpm !
Design flow 250 gpm 3 l Letdown Heat Exchanaer Quantity 1 Type Shell and tube, vertical B-Code (tube and shell side) ASME VIII Tube Side (Letdown)
Fluid Reactor coolant, 3.6 wt % boric acid, maximum Design pressure 2485 psig lB Design temperature 550*F Materials Austenitic stainless steel Normal flow 80 gpm B
Design flow 200 gpm Amendment B March 31, 1988 l
__.__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____________m___________ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _
CESSARiiminc-TABLE 9,3.4-4 (Cont'd)
O' (Sheet 2 of 11) l l
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT DATA
SUMMARY
Shell Side (Cooling Water) i fluid Component cooling water Design pressure 150 psig Design temperature 250*F Materials Carbon steel l Normal flow 950 gpm n Design flow 2400 gpm Pressure loss 15 paid 0 1500 gpm & 105'F Seal Injection Heat Exchanaer Quantity 1 Type Shell and tube (steam heater)
Tube Side (Seal Injection) l Fluid Reactor coolant, 3.6 wt % boric acid maximum Design pressure 3025 psig lB Design temperature 200*F l Materials Austenitic stainless steel Pressure loss 10 psi 0 30 gpm & 120*F Normal flow 30 gpm B
Design flow 50 gpm Code ASME VIII Shell Side (Steam)
Fluid Steam-saturated Design pressure 110 psig Design temperature 360*F q Materials Carbon steel I I
Design flow 1740 lbm./hr. B Code ASME VIII l Charaina Pumps Quantity 2 3 Type Centrifugal Design pressure 3025 psig Design temperature 200*F Design flow 200 gpm lr Amendment B March 31, 1988 1
.I CESSAR EnWicarieu
/O '
TABLE 9.3.4-4 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 3 of 11)
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT DATA
SUMMARY
Design head 6,228 ft. 3 Normal suction pressure 38 psig Normal temperature of pumped fluid 120*F ;
NPSH required 50 ft. lB Materials in contact with pumped fluid Austenitic stainless steel i Fluid 3.6 wt % boric acid, maximum l3 l Code for fluid end None .
l
' Charaina Pump Mini-flow Heat Exchanger B
Quantity 1 l Type Shell and tube, horizontal Tube Side (Charging) l Fluid Reactor coolant, 3.6 wt % boric acid, maximum Design Pressure 200 psig (u Design temperature 200*F Materials Austenitic stainless steel Normal flow 35 gpm Design Flow 100 gpm Code ASME VIII Shell Side (Cooling Water)
Fluid Component Cooling Water Design Pressure 150 psig Design 200*F Materials Carbon Steel Normal flow 2 gpm Design Flow 200 gpm Code ASME Vlli Boric Acid Makeup Pumps Quantity 2 l
Type Centrifugal Design pressure 200 psig i
Design temperature 200*F B
Der:gn head 300 ft Des tgr. flow 240 gpm
/n \ Normal operating temperature 120*F Q ,/ NPSH requirea 30 ft Amendment B March 31,.1988
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~
CESSAR Enfincmu O
TABLE 9.3.4-4 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 4 of 11)
PRINCIPAL COMP 0NENT DATA
SUMMARY
Fluid 3 6 wt % boric acid, maximum i Material in contact with liquid Austenitic stainless steel N]ne Code lB Reactor Makeup Water Pumps Quantity 2 Type Centrifugal Design pressure 200 psig Design temperature 200*F Normal operating temperature 40-120*F Normal design flow 200 gpm 3 i Design Head 300 ft.
NPSH required 30 ft Material in contact with pumped fluid Austenitic stainless steel Fluid Demineralized water Code None Holdup Pumps Quantity 2 Type Centrifugal Design pressure 100 psig Design temperature 200*F Normal operating temperature 40-120*F Design flow 50 gpm Design head 145 ft 3 NPSH required 17 ft Materials in contact with pumped fluid Austenitic stainless steel Fluid 3.6 wt % boric acid, maximum Code None 3
' Reactor Drain Pumps Quantity 2 Type Centrifugal l
Design pressure 200 psig Design temperature 200*F Normal operating temperature 120*F Design flow 50 gpm Design head 145 ft 3 NPSH required 20 ft l
Amendment B March 31, 1988
CESSAR EMUricari:.
r'\
\v)
TABLE 9.3.4-4 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 5 of 11)
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT DATA
SUMMARY
Materials in contact with pumped fluid Austenitic stainless steel Fluid 3.6 wt % boric acid, maximum l Code for fluid end None lB Boric Acid Batchina Pump B
Quantity 1 .
Type Centrifugal i Design pressure 200 psig Design temperature 200*F Normal operating temperature 155'F Design flow 50 gpm Design head 145 ft.
NPSH required 20 ft.
Materials in contact with pumped fluid Austenitic stab less steel I (N) s Fluid 3.6 wt % boric acid, maximum I V Code for fluid end None l Volume Control Tank L
Quantity 1 Type Vertical, cylindrical l3 Internal volume 5,800 gallons Design pressure, internal 75 psig Design pressure, external 15 psig Normal operating temperature 120*F Normal operating pressure 20 psig Blanket gas (during plant operation) Hydrogen Code ASME Vill 3 l Fluid 3.6 wt % boric acid, maximum Material Austenitic stainless steel l Boric Acid Batchina Tank Quantity 1 Internal volume 630 gallons (minimum) j Design pressure Atmospheric I Design temperature 200'F Normal operating temperature 155'F 4 Type heater Steam-saturated (298'F) 3 l (n) v Heater capacity, minimum Fluid 600 lbm./hr.
12 wt % boric acid, maximum l
Material Austenitic stainless steel !
Amendment B March 31, 1988 l
CESSAREnacm2 1
I TABLE 9.3.4-4 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 6 of 11)
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT DATA
SUMMARY
l l
Normal operating pressure Atmospheric Code None
_E_quAment Drain Tank Quantity 1 I Type Horizontal, cylindrical j Internal volume 10,500 gallons (minimum) l Design pressure 60 psig internal,15 psig external l Design temperature 300*F ;
Normal operating pressure 3 psig l Normal operating temperature 120*F g Code ASME VIII l Fluid 3.6 wt % boric acid, maximum 1 Material Austenitic stainless steel Reactor Drain Tank Type Horizontal, cylindrical Quantity 1 Design pressure (internal) 130 psig 3 Design pressure (external) 60 psig Design temperature 350*F psig Nc. mal operating pressure 3 psig Noimal operating temperature 120*F Internal volume 2000 gallons lB Blanket gas Nitrogen Material Austenitic stainless steel Code ASME VIII Fluid 3.6 wt % boric acid, maximum Holdup Tank Quantity 1 Type Field Fabricated (vertical)
Internal volume 435,000 gallons Design pressure 1.5 psig Design temperature 200*F Operating pressure Atmospheric Operating temperature 40-120*F Material (wetted) Austenitic stainless steel Code API-650 Fluid 3.6 wt % boric acid, maximum Amendment B March 31, 1988
CESSAR Ennncarien I I
'N TABLE 9.3.4-4 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 7 of 11) l PRINCIPAL COMPONENT DATA
SUMMARY
I Quantity 1 Reactor Makeup Water Tank i Type Field Fabricated (vertical)
Internal volume 420,000 gallons ('
Design pressure 1.5 psig Design temperature 200*F Operating pressure Atmospheric l Operating temperature 40-120*F Material (wetted) Austenitic stainless steel i l
Code API-650 Fluid Demineralized water Boric Acid Storace Tank B
(9 (j
Quantity Type 1
Field fabricated (vertical)
Internal volume 180,000 gallons Design pressure 1.5 psig Design temperature 200*F Operating pressure Atmospheric Operating temperature 60-120*F Material (wetted) Austenitic stainless steel Code API-650 Fluid 3.6 wt % boric acid, maximum Purification and Deboratina Ion Exchanaers Quantity 3 Type Flushable Design pressure 200 psig Design temperature 200*F Normal operating temperature 120*F Resin volume, each (useful) 38.0 ft3 (minimum required)
B Normal flow 80 gpm ,
Maximum flow 200 gpm Code for vessel ASME VIII Retention screen size 80 U.S. mesh Material Austenitic stainless steel Q Resin Cation / anion Q mixed bed for purification; anion bed for deborating Amendment B March 31, 1988
CESSAR El%"icmu TABLE 9.3.4-4 (Cont'd)
O (Sheet 8 of 11)
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT DATA
SUMMARY
Fluid 3.6 wt % boric acid, maximum Pre-holdup lon Exchanger Quantity 1 Type Flushable l I
Design pressure 200 psig Design temperature 200*F tiormal operating temperature 120*F l Resin volume, each (useful) 38.0 ft3 (minimum required) B tlormal flow 80 gpm l Maximum flow 200 gpm Code for vessel ASME Vill Retention screen size 80 U.S. mesh Material Austenitic stainless steel .
l Fluid 3.6 wt % boric acid, maximum Resin Cation / anion mixed bed Boric Acid Condensate Ion Exchanger Quantity 1 Type Flushable Design pressure 200 psig Design temperature 200*F Normal operating temperature 120*F Resin volume, (useful) 32 ft3 (minimum required)
Normal flow 20 gpm Maximum flow 100 gpm Code for vessel ASME VIII Retention screen size 80 U.S. mesh l Material Austenitic stainless steel Fluid 10 ppm Boron, maximum Resin anion Purification Filter Quantity 2 Type elements Replaceable cartridge Retention for 2 micron and 98%
larger particles, % by wt flormal operating temperature 120*F Design pressure 200 psig Amendment B March 31, 1988 l
I CESSAREnac- i
)
I 1 o i TABLE 9.3.4-4(Cont'd)
(Sheet 9 of 11)
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT DATA
SUMMARY
l Purification Filter (Cont'd) ]
1 Design temperature 200*F q Design flow 200 gpm ;
B 80 gpm Normal flow Code for vessel ASME VIII l Material Austenitic stainless steel I Fluid 3.6 wt % boric acid, maximum ]
Boric Acid Filter Quantity 1 Type elements Replaceable cartridge f Retention for 2 micron and 98% )
larger particles, % by wt g Normal operating temperature 60-120*F [3
! /9 Design temperature 200*F h Design pressure Design flow 200 psig 240 gpm B
Code for vessel ASME VIII
! Materials, wetted Austenitic stainless steel Fluid 3.6 wt % boric acid, maximum Reactor Makeup Water Filter i Quantity 1 Type elements Replaceable cartridge Retention for 2 micron and 98%
larger particles, % by wt Normal operating temperature 40-120*F Design pressure 200 psig Design flow 200 gpm Code for vessel ASME VIII Materials, wetted Austenitic stainless steel Fluid Demineralized water Reactor Drain Filter Quantity 1 Retention for 2 micron and 98%
larger particles, % by wt
[ Type elements Replaceable cartridge i
(]) Normal operating temperature 120*F Amendment B March 31, 1988
CESSAR E!Nincari:n i
l l
TABl.E 9.3.4-4 (Cont'd)
O!
(Sheet 10 of 11)
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT DATA
SUMMARY
i 1
Design temperature 200*F 1 Design pressure 200 psig Design flow 100 gpm l3 Code for vessel ASME VIII l ,
Materials, wetted Austenitic stainless steel l Fluid 3.6 wt % boric acid, maximum !
l Seal Iniection Filter l 1
Quantity 2 i Type elements Replaceable cartridge Retention for 5 micron and 95%
larger particles, % by wt Normal operating temperature 125'F Design pressure 2735 psig Design temperature 200'F Code for vessel ASME VIII :B l
Materials, wetted Austenitic stainless steel n 1 flow bg 3 Boric Acid Concentrator Quantity 1 4
Design DF (Bottoms to Distillate) 10 Maximum distillate effluent concentration 10 ppm boron Design flow 20 gpm Cooling water flow 700 gpm (maximum)
Steam required at 50 psig 13,500 lb/hr per unit B
Code ASME VIII/ ANSI B.31.1 Gas Stripper _
Quantity 1 3
Design DF 10 Design flow (process) 200 gpm Cooling water flow 700 gpm (maximum)
B Steam required at 50 psig 20,000 lb/hr per unit (maximum)
Code ASME VIII O
Amendment B March 31, 1988
_ _ _ _ = _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _
C E S S A R !a nne. m . l O TABLE 9.3.4-4 (Cont'd) <
(Sheet 11 of 11)
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT DATA
SUMMARY
Chemical Addition Package Chemical Addition Tank: l Quantity 1 Internal volume 8 gallons (minimum)
Design pressure Atmospheric Design temperature 150*F Normal operating temperature 40-90*F 7 Fluid NH or Li OH solution Code N$n8 Chemical Addition Pump: ,
j Quantity 1 Type Positive displacement, variable i O Design pressure Design temperature capacity 2735 psig 150*F Normal operating temperature 40-90*F Capacity 0-25 GPH Design head 2735 psig 7 Fluid NH or Li OH solution Material in contact with fluid Abskenitic stainless steel Code None 1
?
I
f CESSAR EnWicarien O TABLE 9.3.4-5 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PARAMETERS 8
Normal letdown and purification flow 100 gpm Normal charging flow 130 gpm i Normal charging mini-recirculation flow 35 gpm Normal seal injection flow 30 gpm Reactor coolant pump controlled bleedoff (4 pumps) 15 gpm Normal letdown temperature at loop 565'F Normal charging temperature at loop 445'F lB Ion exchanger operating temperature 120*F l
1 l
I O
Amendment B -
March 31, 1988
CESSARnainceu g
V TABLE 9.3.4-6 (Sheet 1 of 8)
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PROCESS FLOW DATA #
I. CVCS MINIMUM PURIFICATION OPERATION (Minimum Charging and Letdown Flow)
E CVCS LOCATION: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Flow (gpm) 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 Press. (psig) 2235 2235 2235 460 60 60 60 60 Temp. (*F) 565 300 120 120 120 120 120 120 CVCS LOCATION: 8b 8c 8d 9 10 11 11b 11c 12 i
Flow (gpm) 30 30 35 25 70 50 50 20 50 l
O Press. (psig) 60 40 40 40 40 3285 3060 100 3060 Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 380 12d, 12h, 13a l CVCS LOCATION: 12b 12e e.f.a 3.k 121 12m b,c.d 13e 13f Flow (gpm) 50 0 0 0 50 0 4 0 15 Press. (psig) 3030 2975 2975 2975 3060 2975 100 100 100 i Temp. (*F) 380 120 120 120 120 120 180 180 180 1
CVCS LOCATION: 13a 14 Flow (gpm) 15 35 Press. (psig) 100 100 l
Temp. (*F) 180 120
(
V Amendment E December 30, 1988
CESSAR !!ninema O
TABLE 9.3.4-6 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 2 of 8)
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PROCESS FLOW DATA # .
l II. CVCS NORMAL PURIFICATION OPERATION (Normal Charging and Letdown Flow)
CVCS LOCATION: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Flow (gpm) 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 E 1
Press. (psig) 2235 2235 2235 460 60 60 60 60 l Temp. (*F) 565 300 120 120 120 120 120 120 CVCS LOCATION: 8b 8c 8d 9 10 11 11b lle 12 Flow (gpm) 110 110 110 110 140 126 126 20 100 i Press. (psig) 60 40 40 40 40 3050 2840 100 2840 Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 445
\
12d, 12h, 13a i CVCS LOCATION: 12b 12e e f.a .i k 121 12m b,c.d 13e 13f I l
Flow (gpm) 100 26 7 7 100 26 4 0 15 I
Press. (psig) 2810 2755 2755 2755 2840 2755 100 100 100 Temp. (*F) 445 120 125 125 120 125 180 180 180 CVCS LOCATION: 13a 14 Flow (gpm) 15 36 Press. (psig) 100 100 Temp. (*F) 180 120 0
Amendment E December 30, 1988
CESSAR EEnflCATIEN O TABLE 9.3.4-6 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 3 of 8)
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM.
PROCESS FLOW DATA #
III. CVCS MAXIMUM PURIFICATION OPERATION (Maximum Charging and Letdown Flow)
CVCS LOCATION: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Flow (gpm) 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 l
Press. (psig) 2235 2235 2235 460 60 60 60 60 !
Temp. (*F) 565 400 120 120 120 120 120 120 CVCS LOCATION: 8b 8c 8d 9 10 11 11b 11c 12 Flow (gpm) 170 170 175 175 200 190 190 10 154 Press. (psig) 60 40 40 40 40 2700 2660 100 2660 Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 270 12d, 12h, 13a CVCS LOCATION: 12b 12e e f.a 3.k 121 12m b,c.d 13e 13f Flow (gpm) 154 26 7 7 154 27' 4 0 15 Press. (psig) 2630 2580 2580 2580 2660 2580 100 100 100 Temp. (*F) 265 120 125 125 120 125 180 180 180 CVCS LOCATION: 13a 14 Flow (gpm) 15 26 Press. (psig) 100 100 Temp. (*F) 180 120
- )
i 'V Amendment E December 30, 1988
CESSAR Einnenia O
TABLE 9.3.4-6 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 4 of 8)
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PROCESS FLOW DATA #
IV. CVCS MAKEUP SYSTEM OPERATION E l
- 1) Automatic Mode (Blended Boric Acid Concentration = 900 ppm)
CVCS LOCATION: 15 16 17 18 18b 18d 19
)
Flow (gpm) 73 43 43 43 43 30 43 Press. (psig) 41 130 130 130 130 0 130 ;
i Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 l CVCS LOCATION: 20 21 22 23 23b 24 25 Flow (gpm) 207 0 194 194 30 164 164 Press. (psig) 130 18 130 130 0 130 130 l l
Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 l
l l
O I Amendment E l December 30, 1988
CESSAR En@icui:,.
o TABLE 9.3.4-6 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 5 of 8)
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PROCESS FLOW DATA #
E IV. CVCS MAKEUP SYSTEM OPERATION (Cont'd)
- 2) Dilute Mode CVCS LOCATION: 15 16 17 18 16b 18d 19 Flow (gpm) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Press. (psig) 41 41 41 41 41 0 41 Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 CVCS LOCATION: 20 21 22 23 23b 24 25 Flow (gpm) 207 0 2.07 207 0 207 237 Press. (psig) 130 0 130 130 0 130 130 Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
- 3) Shutdown Boration CVCS LOCATION: 15 16 17 18 18b 18c 18d Flow (gpm) 237 207 207 207 207 207 30 Press. (psig) 41 130 130 130 130 130 0 Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
/%
V 1 Amendment E December 30, 1988 l
CESSAR E!!Gncuen 1
Oll TABLE 9.3.4-6 (Cont'd) l d
(Sheet 6 of 8)
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM I PROCESS FLOW DATA # j 1
IV. CVCS MAKEUP SYSTEM OPERATION (Cont'd) E
- 4) BAST Boration (Boric Acid Batching Operations)
CVCS LOCATION: 15 16 17 18 18b 18d 18e 18f Flow (gpm) 237 207 207 207 207 267 30 30 Press. (psig) 41 130 130 130 130 130 20 130 Temp. ('F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 155 155
- 5) Resin Sluicing CVCS LOCATION: 21 22 23 23b 40 41 42 43 Flow (gpm) 0 40 40 30 40 50scfm 40 40 Press. (psig) 18 195 195 0 130 90 130 130 Temp. ('F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
- 6) Borate Mode CVCS LOCATION: 15 16 17 18 18b 18d 19 20 l Flow (gpm) 155 125 125 125 125 30 125 12S Press. (psig) 41 130 130 130 130 0 130 130 1
Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 l
O Amendment E December 30, 1908
CESSAR nainemou O
TABLE 9.3.4-6 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 7 of 8)
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM PROCESS FLOW DATA #
2) 32 33 34 Flow (gpm) 170 170 170 Press. (psig) 65 65 65 Temp. (*F) 120 120 120
- 3) Reactor Drain Tank Processing CVCS LOCATION: 26 27 30 31 32 33 34 Flow (gpm) 200 gpd 50 50 50 50 50 50 Press. (psig) 4 4 83 83 80 80 30 Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 i
O Amendment E December 30, 1988
CESSAR ELis"lCATION O
TABLE 9.3.4-6 (Cont'd) i (Sheet 8 of 8)
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM .
PROCESS FLOW DATA # I E
l V. BORON REC 0VERY SYSTEM (Cont'd)
- 4) Equipment Drain Tank Proce sing CVCS LOCATION: 28 28b 29 30 31 32 33 34 Flow (gpm) 150 100 50 50 50 50 50 50 Press. (psig) 3 5 4 83 83 80 80 30 Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 i
- 5) Holdup Tank Processing CVCS LOCATION: 35 36 37 38 39 Flow (gpm) 50 50 20 2-20 20 Press. (psig) 20 83 60 40 60 l Temp. (*F) 120 120 120 120 120 l ii6ft: # Locations correspond to numbers in ellipses on Figure 9.3.4-1 (Sheets I through 4)
O Amendment E December 30, 1988
CESSAR !!aincer C TABLE 9.3.4-7 (Sheet 1 of 2)
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM LIST OF ACTIVE VALVES
Reference:
Fiqure 9.3-1. Flow Diaaram Valve Flow Diagram Valve Line Actuator Environmental Number Coordinates Type __
Size (in.) _TvDe DeSian Criteri$
CH-505 G-7 Globe 1.00 Pneumatic C (1)
B l Diaphragm G-7 Globe 1.00 Pneumatic A-1, A-2, B CH-506 Diaphragm
Reference:
Fiaure 9.3-2. Flow Diaaram CH-494 H-7 Check 1.50 None A-1, A-2, B CH-560 D-7 Globe 3.00 Pneumatic A-1, A-2, B Diaphragm CH-561 D-7 Globe 3.00 Pneumatic C (1)
Diaphragm CH-580 H-6 Globe 1.50 Pneumatic C (1)
}
w/ Diaphragm
Reference:
Fiqure 9 3-4. Flow Diaaram CH-205 H-7 Globe 2.00 Solenoid A-1, A-2, B CH-208 G-7 Globe 2.50 Solenoid A-1, A-E, B CH-241 H-1 Globe 1.00 Pneumatic A-1, A-2, B Diaphragm CH-242 G-1 Globe 1.00 Pneumatic A-1, A-2, B Diaphragm CH-243 F-1 Globe 1.00 Pneumatic A-1, A-2, B Diaphragm CH-244 E-1 Globe 1.00 Pneumatic A-1, A-2, B l Diaphragm CH-255 F-3 Globe 1.50 Motor C (1)
CH-303 F-8 Check 2.50 None A-1, A-2, B CH-304 F-8 Check 3.00 None A-1, A-2, B CH-431 H-6 Check 2.00 None A-1, A-2, B CH-433 G-6 Check 2.50 None A-1, A-2, B CH-447 H-6 Check 2.00 None A-1, A-2, B CH-448 G-6 Check 2.50 None A-1, A-2, B l CH-515 H-8 Globe 2.00 Pneumatic A-1, A-2, 8 Diaphragm CH-516 H-8 Globe 2.00 Pneumatic A-1, A-2, B O Diaphragm
(
Amendment B March 31, 1988
CESSARM5Encm2 TABLE 9.3.4-7 (Cont'd)
O !
l (Sheet 2 of 2) i i
CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM LIST OF ACTIVE VALVES
Reference:
Fiaure 9.3-4. Flow Diaaram (Cont'd) I Valve Flow Diagram Valve Line Actuator Environmental i Number Coordinates Type Size (in._1 _ Type Desian Criteria l CH-517 H-7 Globe 2.00 Pneumatic A-1, A-2, B B Diaphragm CH-523 E-7 Globe 2.00 Pneumatic C (1)
Diaphragm CH-524 D-8 Globe 2.50 Motor C (1)
CH-570 F-7 Globe 2.00 Pneumatic A-1, A-2, B Diaphragm l
CH-787 H-1 Check 1.00 None A-1, A-2, B CH-802 G-1 Check 1.00 None A-1, A-2, B CH-807 F-1 Check 1.00 None A-1, A-2, B CH-812 E-1 Check 1.00 None A-1, A-2, B CH-835 F-2 Check 1.50 None A-1, A-2, B CH-866 H-1 Check 1.00 None A-1, A-2, B CH-867 G-1 Check 1.00 None A-1, A-2, B CH-868 F-1 Check 1.00 None A-1, A-2, B '
CH-869 E-1 Check 1.00 None A-1, A-2, B l
Note: (1) C, F, G required if valve in annulus building Environmental Design Criteria Legend:
Category "A-1" Environmental Conditions (LOCA: In-Containment)
Category "A-2" Environmental Conditions (MSLB: In-Containment)
Category "B" Environmental Conditions (Normal In-Containment)
Category "C" Environmental Conditions Category "D" Environmental Conditions Category "E" Environmental Conditions Category "F" Environmental Conditions Category "G" Environmental Conditions O
Amendment B March 31, 1988
CESSAR Eininemon G TABLE 9.3.4-8 (Sheet 1 of 3)
CLASSIFICATION 0F CVCS B
STRUCTURES. SYSTEMS. AND COMPONENTS Safety Seismic Quality Component Name (# of components) Class Category Class Regenerative heat exchanger 4/4{ N/A 2
- Letdown heat exchanger 4/4, N/A 2
- Mini-flow heat exchanger 4/4, N/A 2
- Seal injection heat exchanger A/4 N/A 2
- Purification ion exchangers (2) 4 N/A 2 Deborating ion exchanger 4 N/A 2
- Pre-holdup ion exchanger 4 N/A 2
- Boric acid condensate ion exchanger 4 N/A 2 Volume control tank 4 N/A 2
- Boric acid batching tank 4 N/A 2 Reactor drain tank 4 N/A 2
- Holdup tank 4 N/A 2 9
- Equipment drain tank Boric acid storage tank Reactor makeup water tank 4
4 4
N/A N/A N/A 2
2 2
- Chemical addition package 4 N/A 2 Boric acid concentrator 4 N/A 2
- Gas stripper 4 N/A 2
- Charging pumps (2) 4 N/A 2
- Boric acid makeup pumps (2) 4 N/A 2
- Reactor makeup water pumps (2) 4 N/A 2 Reactor drain pumps (2) 4 N/A 2
- Holdup pumps (2) 4 N/A 2
- Boric Acid Batching Pump 4 N/A 2 Purification filters 4 N/A 2 Reactor drain filter 4 N/A 2
- Seal injection filters 4 N/A 2
- Reactor makeup filter 4 N/A 2 Boric acid filter 4 N/A 2 Letdown strainer 4 N/A 2 Pre-holdup strainer 4 N/A 2 Boric acid condensate ion exchanger strainer 4 N/A 2 Ion exchanger drain header strainer 4 N/A 2
- Boric acid batching strainer 4 N/A 2 Chemical addition strainer 4 N/A 2 O
Amendment B March 31, 1988
i l
i CESSAREmincma l l l
1 TABLE 9.3.4-8 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 2 of 3) 4 l
CLASSIFICATION OF CVCS a STRUCTURES. SYSTEMS. AND COMPONENTS Chemical Volume and Control System (CVCS@ I Safety Class 1. 2 and 3 Valves:
Component Safety Seismic Quality Identification Location / Description Class Category Class CH-205 Auxiliary spray 1 I 1 CH-208 Charging line backpressure 1 I 1 CH-209 Charging bypass line 1 I 1 CH-241 Seal injection flow control (RCP 1A) 2 I 1 CH-242 Seal injection flow control (RCP 1B) 2 I 1 CH-243 Seal injection flow control (RCP 2A) 2 I 1 CH-244 Seal injection flow control (RCP 28) 2 I 2 CH-255 Seal injection contain, isol. 2 I 1 CH-303 Charging line isolation check 2 I 1 CH-304 SDC Purification isol. check 2 I 1 CH-307 SDC Purification contain. isol. 2 I 1 CH-431 Auxiliary spray check 1 I 1 CH-433 Charging line check 1 I 1 CH-447 Auxiliary spray check 1 I 1 CH-448 Charging line check 1 I 1 CH-494 RSSH and RDP to RDH Check 2 I 1 CH-505 RCP CB0 contain. isol. 2 I 1 CH-506 RCP CB0 contain. isol. 2 1 1 ,
CH-515 Letdown isolation 1 1 1 CH-516 Letdown backup isolation 1 1 1 CH-517 RHX isolation 2 I 1 CH-523 Letdown contain, isol. 2 I 1 CH-524 Charging line contain, isol. 2 I 1 CH-560 RDT suction isolation '2 1 1 CH-561 RDT isolation 2 1 1 CH-570 Letdown contain. isol. 2 I 1 CH-580 RMWS to RDT isolation 2 I 1 CH-787 Seal injection check (RCP 1A) 1 1 1 CH-802 Seal injection check (RCP 18) 1 1 1 CH-807 Seal injection check (RCP 2A) 1 I 1 CH-812 Seal injection check (RCP 28) 1 1 1 CH-835 Seal injection check contain, isol. 2 I 1 O
Amendment B March 31, 1988
CESSAR Eininema f3 iv!
TABLE 9.3.4-8 (Cont'd) !
(Sheet 3 of 3) f CLASSIFICATION OF CVCS STRUCTURES. SYSTEMS. AND COMPONENTS Chemical Volume and Control System (CVCS)++
Safety Class 1. 2 and 3 Valves:
Component Safety Seismic Quality Identification Locati.on/ Description Class CateQorY Class CH-866 Seal injection check (RCP 1A) 1 I 1 CH-867 Seal injection check (RCP IB) 1 I 1 CH-868 Seal injection check (RCP 2A) 1 I 1 CH-869 Seal injection check (RCP 2B) 1 1 1 NOTES: (+) Tube and shell sides safety classifications.
(++) All containment isolation valves (and their d operators) within C-E's scope of supply -
including manual valves, check valves, and relief valves which also serve as isolation valves will be subject to the pertinent requirements of the Quality Assurance Program.
- including component supports down to (but not including) embedments.
N/A = Not Applicable 1
l D I
k.
Amendment B l March 31, 1988
CESSAR !!nificanon TABLE 9.3.4-9 B
RELATIONSHIP OF SAFETY CLASS TO CODE CLASS Code Class Safety Class (ASME Section III)
SC-1 1
. SC-2 for fluid system I
components 2 SC-3 3 Nils Industry Standards O
. l l
l l
Amendment B i March 31, 1988 L _- _________ - __________ __
ve OVERSIZE DOCUMENT PAGE PULLED 1 SEE APERTURE CARDS !
NUMBER OF OVERSIZE PAGES FILMED ON APERTURE CARDS APERTURE CARD /HARD COPY AVAILABLE FROM l GECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH 4
i CESSAR Heincama-( !
9.4 AIR CONDITIONING, HEATING, COOLING, AND VENTILATION l BYSTEMB )
9.4.1 CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM 9.4.1.1 Design Bases The Control Building Ventilation and Air Conditioning Systems are designed to maintain the environment in the control room envelope and balance of control building within acceptable limits for the operation of unit controls, for maintenance and testing of the controls as required, and for uninterrupted safe occupancy of the control building area during post-accident shutdown. These systems are designed in accordance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5, 19, and 60. Refer to Section 6.4 for further information regarding control room habitability.
The control building consists of the main control room, the technical support center, the auxiliary control rooms, relay rooms, offices, and mechanical support equipment areas.
The control room, and other support areas are designed to maintain approximately 73*F to 78'F and 20% to 60% maximum relative humidity. The battery room is designed to maintain i approximately 77*F. The mechanical equipment room is designed to
- h maintain a maximum temperature of 104*F. All other areas E are designed to maintain a maximum temperature of 85'F. These conditions are maintained continuously duri.ig all modes of operation for the protection of instrumentation and controls, and for the comfort of the operators. Outdoor design temperatures meet or exceed those given in the ASHRAE Fundamentals Handbook.
Continuous pressurization of the control room and the control room area is provided to prevent entry of dust, dirt, smoke, and radioactivity originating outside the pressurized zones in accordance with the intent of NUREG-0700 requirements.
Pressurization is maintained slightly positive relative to the pressure outdoors and in surrounding buildings.
Outdoor air for pressurization is taken from either of two locations such that a source of uncontaminated air is available regardless of wind direction. Each air intake is located as far away from the diesel generator exhaust as practical. All outside air is filtered.
Each outside air intake location is monitored for the presence of radioactivity, toxic gases, e.g., chlorine, and products of combustion. Isolation of the outside air intake occurs automatically upon indication of high radiation level, high b chlorine concentration or smoke concentration in the intake.
( Should both intakes close, the operator can override the intake Amendment E 9.4-1 December 30, 1988
~
l 1
l CESSAR na%=u l
monitors and by inspection of the control room readouts select 9
the least contaminated intake. This will ensure pressurization of the control room at all times.
Each outside air intake is provided with a tornado isolation damper to prevent depressurization of the control room and the control room area during a tornado. ,
1 l
All essential air conditioning and ventilation equipment is able l to perform required safety functions assuming the worst single !
failure of an active component concurrent with a loss of offsite )
power. 1 All essential air conditioning and ventilating equipment, ductwork and supports are designed to withstand the safe shutdown earthquake. In addition, this equipment is protected from the l effects of internally generated missiles, pipe breaks and water l spray. Essential electrical components required for the heating, cooling, and pressurization of the control room during accident conditions are connected to emergency Class 1E standby power. 1 l Instrumentation is provided for the air conditioning systems t E
control and indicate the temperature, and to indicate radioactivity levels. Early warning ionization-type smoke detectors are located in the supply, return and outside air ductwork serving the Control Room Area Ventilation System.
9.4.1.1.1 Codes and Standards Equipment, work, and materials utilized conform to the requirements and recommendations of the codes and standards listed below:
A. Fan ratings conform to the Air Moving and Conditioning ,
Association (AMCA) Standards.
B. Fan motors conform to applicable standards of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE).
C. Essential equipment, fans, coils, dampers, and ductwork will be manufactured in accordance with ASME/ ANSI AC-1-1988.
D. Ventilation ductwork conforms to applicable standards of the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association (SMACNA).
E. Water-cooling and heating coil ratings conform to standards of the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI).
l Cooling coils in the essential cooling units are designed in l accordance with the ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Class 3.
i Amendment E 9,4-2 December 30, 1988
CESSARnab a l
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U F. High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters conform to ORNL-NSIC-65,. " Design, Construction, and Testing of High-Efficiency Air Filtration Systems for Nuclear Application."
G. Applicable components and controls conform to the requirements of IEEE, Underwriter's Laboratories (UL) and NEMA.
9.4.1.2 System Description The main control room air-handling system consists of two redundant air-handling units, each with filters, essential chilled water cooling coils for heat removal, and fans for air j circulation. The emergency circulation system consists of filter trains with particulate filters, carbon filters, and fans for emergency air circulation. Chilled water is supplied from the essential chil]ed water system.
During normal operation, return air from the control room is mixed with a small quantity of outside air for ventilation, is filtered and conditioried in the control room air-handling unit, and is delivered to the control room through supply ductwork. E
[g % Duct-mounted heating coils and humidification equipment provide
(,/ final adjustments to the control room temperature and humidity for maintaining normal comfort conditions.
In the event of a loss-of-coolant-accident or a release of toxic gases, the habitability zone is isolated from the outside environment, and the emergency circulation system is actuated to pressurize the control room. The main control room air-handling equipment is automatically actuated (or continues to operate, as applicable) to remove heat and provide mixing and circula+ in of the control room air. The emergency circulation system - iters particulate and potential radioactive iodines from a portion of the return air, and delivers the filtered air to the inlet of the main air-handling unit.
The Technical Support Center air-handling system consists of an air-handling unit, return air and smoke purge fans, and an emergency filter unit. The computer room air-handling system consists of two 100% air-handling units and associated fans.
Both the Technical Support Center and computer room air-handling systems are non-safety and non-seismic. ;
The balance of control building air-handling systems consists of two redundant air-handling units, each with roughing filters, m
)
Amendment E 9.4-3 December 30, 1988
CESSARESJL =
essential chilled water cooling coils, and redundant fans. Train 0
A cooling equipment serves train A electrical rooms, and Train B cooling equipment serves Train B electrical rooms. Each train will operate with one of the redundant fans delivering filtered, conditioned air to the various electrical equipment rooms. In the event of a loss-of-coolant-accident, only one of the redundant trains is required to achieve cold shutdown conditions since the cooling systems are channeled with the electrical equipment areas. Chilled water is supplied from the essential j chilled water system.
1 Return air from the various essential electrical equipment areas is mixed with a portion of outside air for ventilation, is filtered and conditioned in the air-handling unit, and is I delivered to the rooms through supply ductwork. Duct-mounted j heating coils provide final adjustments to temperature in selected equipment rooms. I l
l Each redundant train of the control room area air-handling system also contains redundant battery room exhaust fans to prevent hydrogen buildup and accumulation of fumes. One of the fans in each train will operate normally to perform the desired function. )
E
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9.4.1.3 Safety Evaluation i l
The control room air-handling system consists of two completely I redundant, independent, full-capacity cooling systems. Each system is powered from independent, Class 1E power sources and l headered on separate essential chilled water systems. Equipment I capacities are selected based on conservative evaluations of heat-producing equipment and conservative assumptions of adjacent area temperatures. Normally, the control room temperature will be maintained at approximately 74*F. The design basis upper limit of 85'F is based on reliable operation of the electronic protection equipment.
Both, the Technical Support Center and computer room air-handling systems are non-safety and non-seismic. Failure of either does not compromise other safety-related air-handling systems or prevent safe shutdown.
The balance of control building air-handling system consists of two independent, full capacity systems. Each system serves the associated train of essential electrical equipment areas, Each system is powered from independent Class lE power sources and served from separate essential chilled water systems. Equipment capacities are based on conservative evaluations of heat-producing equipment and conservative assumptions of O
Amendment E 9.4-4 December 30, 1988
CESSARin h a r
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surrounding area temperatures. Normally, the electrical equipment areas will be maintained at approximately 85'F. The design basis upper limit of 104*F is based on standard ratings for electrical equipment.
The control room emergency recirculation system consists of two completely redundant, independent, full-capacity filtration systems. Each system is powered from separate Class lE power sources, and is capable of providing the required cleanup effect.
The dose assessment assumes the failure of one complete train of the emergency circulation system.
All essential components of the control equipment area ventilation systems are designed as Seismic Category I equipment, l and will remain functional following a safe shutdown earthquake. 1 Intake and exhaust structures are protected from tornado- 1 generated or wind-generated missiles. Isolation valves in the I main control room intake, relief and exhaust points are designed I to withstand pressure differentials of a postulated tornado. No components are subjected to flooding by virtue of the location .
within the control building. I Redundant components are physically separated, and none are h
Q subjected to pipe break effects such as pipe whip or jet impingement. Components are designed and constructed so that e
exposure to a water-spray environment will not prevent performing the required safety function.
l All essential components of the control equipment area ventilation systems are powered from Class lE, diesel-backed power sources. Capacity of the control room air-handling system is based on complete failure of one train. Capacity and evaluation of the control room emergency circulation system is also based on complete failure of one train. The control room area air-handling systems are tied to the trains of equipment that are served. Failure of one train of the control room area air-handling system may cause subsequent loss of components in the associated rooms. The consequences of this are acceptable since full redundancy of electrical components and electrical equipment areas is provided. System capacity is selected on the basis of a normal operating temperature of 85*F, or on a post-accident temperature of 104*F, whichever requires greater capacity.
Ducts that pass through walls, floors, and ceilings of the control room are bullet resisting. In addition, security barriers (i.e., rebar or segmented ducts) are provided within ducts that pass through vital boundaries.
(
Amendment E 9.4-5 December 30, 1988
CESSAREne mu
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9.4.1.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The Control Building Ventilation System is in continuous operation and is accessible for periodic inspection. Essential electrical components, switchovers, and starting controls are tested during preoperational tests and periodically thereafter to demonstrate system readiness and operability.
Performance characteristics of the control equipment area {
ventilation system will be verified through qualification testing ;
of essential components as follows:
A. Air-handling fans are tested in accordance with AMCA ;
standards to assure fan characteristics and performance '
curves. Remaining fans are qualified by similarity.
B. Heating and cooling coils are leak-tested with air, or hydrostatically, to assure integrity.
C. HEPA filters are manufactured and tested prior to l installation in accordance with MIL-F-51068. HEPA filters will be tested in place after initial installation and periodically thereafter. Carbon absorbers are leak-tested l initially and periodically thereafter to ensure bypass E leakage through the absorber section less than that assumed in the dose assessment.
D. Ductwork is fabricated, installed, leak-tested, and balanced in accordance with SMACNA. Where applicable, duct and housing leak tests are performed in accordance with the provisions of ANSI N510.
Functional testing is performed pricr to initial startup to l verify proper operation of the controls and interlocks. Response times of applicable components are verified.
l 9.4.1.5 Instrumentation Application i
Instrumentation is provided to provide automatic or manual operation of the system, both from local and/or remote locations and permit verification that the system is operating !
satisfactorily.
l Indication of the fan operating status is provided in the control l room. Failure of a running fan is alarred in the control room. j I
Indication of damper positions / damper alignment is provided in the control room. f Oi !
Amendment E ]
9.4-6 December 30, 1988 !
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CESSAR ninnema p
b Indication of pressure drop across filters (supply filters and pressurization filter trains) is provided in the control room.
High room temperature alarm for the remote or unmanned control room area (electrical equipment rooms, battery rooms, switchgear rooms, etc.) is provided in the control room. l The following data shall be available to determine system performance:
A. Entering and leaving air temperature for air handling units.
B. Entering and leaving chilled water temperature at air handling units.
C. Air flow rate for fans.
D. Chilled water flow rate to air handling units.
Indication of high radioactivity and chlorine at outside air intakes is provided in control room.
9.4.2 FUEL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM
('N 1
E 9.4.2.1 Desian Bases The Fuel Building Ventilation System is designed to:
A. Maintain a suitable environment for the operation, maintenance, and testing of equipment.
B. Maintain a suitable access and working environment for personnel.
C. Maintain the fuel handling and storage building at a negative pressure relative to the atmosphere to mininize outleakage.
The fuel-handling building exhaust system is designed to mitigate i the consequences of a postulated fuel-handling accident. Dose at the site boundary shall be less than the values of 10 CFR Part 100, consistent with the Standard Review Plan 15.7.4.
The exhaust side of the Fuel Handling Area Ventilation System consists of two 100 percent exhaust systems. Each exhaust system consists of two 50 percent capacity filter trains and fans. This meets the single failure criterion. Switchover between sets of filter trains is accomplished manually by the operator.
[s^ Electrical and control component separation is maintained between
\ trains.
Amendment E 9.4-7 December 30, 1988
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CESSAR8 Hec-l l
All essential fans, filters, dampers, ductwork and supports are O
designed to withstand the safe shutdown earthquake.
Essential electrical components required for ventilation of the fuel handling area during accident conditions are connected to emergency Class 1E standby power.
In order to control airborne activity, the ventilation air is j generally supplied directly to the clean areas and exhausted from l the potentially contaminated areas, creating a positive flow of l air from the clean areas to the potentially contaminated areas.
The Fuel Building Ventilation System will be in operation '
whenever irradiated fuel handling operations above or in the fuel pool are in progress.
The Fuel Building Ventilation System is located completely within I a Seismic Category I structure and all essential components l (exhaust filter trains, exhaust fans, exhaust ductwork) are fully j protected from floods and tornado missile damage. The outside l air intake opening for the ventilating air supply unit is protected by missile shields above and in front of the opening.
4 E
This system is designed in accordance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, b, 60, and 61. O'<
9.4.2.1.1 Codes and Standards Equipment, work, and materials utilized conform to the requirements and recommendations of the codes and standards listed below:
A. Fan ratings conform to the Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) Standards.
B. Fan motors conform to anplicable standards of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE).
C. Essential equipment, fans, coils, dampers, and ductwork will be manufactured in accordance with ASME/ ANSI AG-1-1988.
D. Ventilation ductwork conforms to applicable standards of the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association (SMACNA).
1 O
Amendment E 9.4-8 December 30, 1988 l . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
1 CESSAR 88Lmu I i
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b E. Water-cooling and heating coil ratings conform to standards of the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI). 'l Cooling coils in the essential cooling units are designed in j accordance with the ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Class 3. ]
F. High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters conform to ORNL-NSIC-65, " Design, Construction, and Testing of ;
High-Efficiency Air Filtration Systems for Nuclear 1 Application."
G. Applicable components and controls conform to the requirements of IEEE, Underwriter's Laboratories (UL) and NEMA. )l
'i . 4 . 2 . 2 System Description The Fuel Building Ventilating System consists of the following components: i A. One 100% capacity ventilation supply air handling unit and associated dampers and ductwork.
B. Two 100% capacity Exhaust Systems complete with filter h
Q trains and associated fans, dampers, ductwork, supports and control systems.
E Outside air is supplied to the fuel handling area by a supply system consisting of one 100% capacity fan with heating and cooling coils, filter section and associated ductwork. Cooling coils are served by non-essential chilled water system.
The Fuel Building Ventilation Exhaust System consists of four 50%
capacity filter trains. This portion of the Fuel Building Ventilation System is an engineered safety feature. Two 50%
l capacity filter trains are paired to operate as a single 100%
capacity exhaust system with the two sets of filter trains receiving separate emergency power.
Each of the 50% capacity filter trains is equipped with a bypass section. The normal mode of operation for the filter trains is in the bypass position. Radiation detection is provided in the duct system header, upstream of the filter train inlet to monitor radioactivity. Upon indication of high radioactivity in the exhaust duct system, the bypass dampers will automatically close and the filter train inlet dampers will automatically open to direct air flow through the filter trains. Air from the Fuel Building Exhaust System is directed to the unit vent, where it is l monitored before release to the atmosphere.
p 5
Amendment E 9.4-9 December 30, 1988
1 CESSAR EHE"lCAT13N 1 1
The Fuel Building Ventilation Supply and Exhaust Systems are !
designed such that a minimum of ten air changes per hour over the I fuel pool are afforded to continuously purge the area of heat, humidity, and particulate matter. I 9.4.2.3 Safety Evaluatio.n i l
The Fuel Building Exhaust System is an engineered safety feature. !
Each redundant set of filter trains (two 50% capacity), fans, and ]
motor operated dampers is served from separate trains j
of the emergency class 1E standby power. This assures the l integrity and availability of the Exhaust System in the event of any single active failure.
Air exhausted from the fuel handling area is monitored by a radioactive gaseous detector sampling the air in the exhaust duct ,
header between the fuel handling area and the inlet to the filter ]
trains. Indication of radioactivity above allowable limits will j automatically divert the flow of air through the filter trains prior to discharge into the atmosphere through the unit vent.
Additional monitoring of exhaust air is provided in the unit j vent. )
The Fuel Building Ventilation Exhaust system is available 1 l following a loss of offsite power; however, fuel building supply will not be available. E 9.4.2.4 Inspection and Testina Requirements ,
The Fuel Building Ventilation System is in continuous operation and is accessible for periodic inspection. Essential electrical !
components, switchovers, and starting controls are tested during l preoperational tests and periodically thereafter. I 9.4.2.5 Instrumentation Application i Instrumentation is provided to provide automatic or manual !
operation of the system, both from local and/or remote locations f and permit verification that the system is operating i satisfactorily.
Indication of the fan operating status is provided in the control room. Failure of a running fan is alarmed in the control room. j Indication of damper positions / damper alignment is provided in j j the control room. ;
Indication of pressure drop across filters (supply filters and exhaust filter trains) is provided in the control room, i l
Amendment E i
9.4-10 December 30, 1988 ,
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The fol3nwing data shall be available to determine system perforitance.
J A. Entering and leaving air temperature for the ventilation supply unit.
- 3. Entering and leaving chilled water temperatures at thb !
ventilation supply unit.
C. Air flow rate for the supply and exhaust units.
D. -Water flow rate for the supply unit cooling coil.
9.4.3 AUXILIARY A.ID RADWASTE BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM 9.4.3.1 Desian Bases The Auxiliary and Radwaste Building Ventilation Systems consist ]
of a general supply and exhaust ventilation system that performs I heat removal and air exchange functions. The ventilation system l is supplemented by individual cooling units and ventilation fans {
that serve essential mechanical equipment areas. The Auxiliary j l
Building Ventilation System serves all areas of the Auxiliary i
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Building including subsphere areas and penetration rooms.
E 1
x The essential mechanical equipment room cooling systems are i designed to maintain the space temperatures below 100*F at times l when the served equipment must operate. At least one train of l essential mechanical equipment rooms is maintained below 100*F j assuming a single failure of an active component concurrent with q a loss of offsite power. I The essential mechanical equ pment room cooling systems perform I the required safety function following a safe shutdown !
carthquake, and are able to withstand the effects of appropriate j natural phenomena such as tornadoes, floods, and hurricanes )j (GDC 2),
i The essential mechanical equipment room cooling systems are I protected from the effects of internally generated missiles, pipe break effects, and water spray (GDC 4).
The Auxiliary Building Ventilation System is designed to provide l ventilation and heat removal for personnel access to I l non-essential areas of the building. The design temperature l l range for the non-essential building areas is 60*F to 100*F. ,
l The auxiliary building is maintained at a slight negative
[ pressure with respect to the environment to assure that all Q] potentially radioactive releases are monitored prior to l
l Amendment E 9.4-11 December 30, 1988 .
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1 CESS.AR Enfinc- l <
atmospheric discharge. As an ALARA consideration, design air 9'
flow patterns within the building are generally from clean areas to potentially contaminated areas.
The Radwaste Building Ventilation System performs heat removal and air exchange functions. The radwaste building is maintained at a slight negative pressure with respect to the environment to assure that all potentially radioactive releases are monitored ..
prior to discharge. The design temperature range for the l i
radwaste building is 50*F to 100*F.
l 9.4.3.1.1 Codes and Standards l
l Equipment, work, and materials utilized conform to the recommendations the codes and standards requirements and of -j listed below:
A. Fan ratings conform to the Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) Standards.
B. Fan motors conform to applicable standards of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE). .
C. Essential equipment, fans, coils, dampers, and ductwork will E be manufactured in accordance with ASME/ ANSI AG-1-1988.
D. Ventilation ductwork conforms to applicable standards of the l; Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association (SMACNA). I E. Water-cooling and heating coil ratings conform to standards j of the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI).
Cooling coils in the essential cooling units are designed in accordance with the ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Class 3.
F. High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters conform to l ORNL-NSIC-65, " Design, Construction, and Testing of High-Efficiency Air Filtration Systems for Nuclear Application."
J G. Applicable components and controls conform to the requirements of IEEE, Underwriter's Laboratories (UL) and i NEMA.
9.4.3.2 System Description I
The auxiliary building general ventilation system consists of l supply airhandling units, cooling coils as required, particulate i exhaust filter units, fans, ductwork, and accessories to provide i Amendment E 9.4-12 December 30, 1988 l'
CESSAR En#1 CAT 13N l 1
i p)
V normal ventilation and building temperature control. Air is generally supplied to corridors, and is exhausted from the individual equipment compartments. More air is exhausted than supplied to maintain the auxiliary building at a slight negative pressure. The systdm utilizes a once-through cycle for the ;
ventilation air. The general ventilation system is not safety-related and performs no function essential to safe shutdown or post-accident operation.
The essential mechanical equipment room cooling units consist of a cooling coil with recirculation fan and dampers to remove heat generated within the space. A recirculation cooling unit is provided instead of a once-through ventilation system because the served areas are potentially contaminated. Applicable areas are as follows:
A. Safeguard component areas including Safety Injection pump rooms, Shutdown Cooling pump rooms, Containment Spray pump rooms, and associated piping and valve galleries.
B. Component cooling water system equipment areas including CCWS pump rooms, CCWS heat exchanger rooms, and essential chilled water system pump and chiller rooms.
E The essential mechanical equipment room ventilation units consist of a once through ventilation cycle utilizing supply fans and exhaust fans to remove heat and maintain space temperature ccntrol. All rooms are considered clean areas, and exhausted by ventilation system. Applicable areas are as follows:
A. Motor-driven emergency feedwater pump rooms. l l
B. Steam-driven emergency feedwater pump rooms.
C. Main steam and feedwater piping rooms. l 9.4.3.2.1 Component Description 1
The auxiliary building and radwaste building general ventilation l supply systems consist of two 50% capacity supply units and three !
50% capacity supply fans. Supply units contain filters, heating )
coils, and chilled water cooling coils. Cooling coils are served from the non-essential chilled water system. The supply fans are large, direct-drive centrifugal type with inlet isolation dampers.
The auxiliary building and radwaste building general ventilation exhaust systems consist of two 50% capacity particulate filtration exhaust units and three 50% capacity exhaust fans.
%)
Amendment E 9.4-13 December 30, 1988
CESSAREELua The exhaust fans are large direct-drive centrifugal type with O
outlet isolation dampers. Exhaust fans discharge to the unit vent.
The essential mechanical equipment room cooling units consist of chilled water cooling coil, direct-drive vane-axial recirculation fan, and dampers and controls to achieve the desired operation.
The chilled water coils are served from the essential chilled l water system.
The essential mechanical equipment room ventilation units contain intake filters, direct-drive vane-axial supply and exhaust fans, and dampers and controls to achieve the desired operation. There are no cooling coils in this portion of the system.
9.4.3.2.2 System Operation During normal operation of the general ventilation system, 4 outside air is supplied by two 50% capacity supply units and two i of three 50% capacity supply fans. The air is filtered and then conditioned as needed by the heating and cooling coils. The exhaust air is processed through two 50% capacity particulate filter systems and is discharged to the unit vent by two of three 50% capacity exhaust fans. Supply and exhaust fans are E electrically interlocked such that the building will always remain under a slight negative pressure. In the event of a loss-of-coolant-accident, the general ventilation equipment will j continue to operate normally, assuming off-site power is still available. Ducts to areas with essential cooling units will be isolated to enable proper operation of the emergency equipment.
Normal operation of the essential mechanical equipment room cooling and ventilation units is with the equipment operating as j required to maintain space temperatures below the design value. !
The cooling systems will operate based on heat load as indicated by room temperature. In the event of a loss-of-coolant-accident, all units are automatically started and will operate at full capacity throughout the event.
9.4.3.3 Safety Evaluation
, The essential mechanical equipment room cooling systems consist I of two completely redundant, independent full-capacity systems.
Train A cooling system serves Train A essential mechanical equipment rooms, and Train B cooling system serves Train B essential mechanical equipment rooms. Each train is powered from independent, Class 1E power sources. (Units with chilled water cooling coils are headered on separate essential chilled water systems.) Equipment capacities are selected based on l
l l
Amendment E 9.4-14 December 30, 1988
CESSAREnnc- !
(
Q) conservative evaluations of heat-producing equipment and conservative assumptions of adjacent area temperatures. Failure of one train may cause subsequent loss of components in the associated rooms. The consequences of this are acceptable since i full redundancy of essential mechanical components is provided. J All essential components of the mechanical equipment room cooling systems are designed as Seismic Category I equipment, and will ,
remain functional following a design basis earthquake. Intake j '
and exhaust structures are protected from wind-generated or tornado-generated missiles. No components are subjected to flooding by virtue of the location within the auxiliary building.
Redundant components of the essential mechanical equipment room cooling systems are physically separated and protected from l internally generated missiles. When subjected to pipe break !
cffects, the components are not required to operate because the served mechanical equipment is located in the same space as the cooling components. Therefore, a pipe break in the same mechanical safety train is the only possible means of affecting the cooling system.
The Radwaste Building Ventilation System is a non-safety system j and operates only during normal plant conditions, j l 9.4.3.4 Inspection and Testinc Requirements l E ,
Performance characteristics of the Auxiliary and Radwaste l Building Ventilation System will be verified through l
qualification testing of components as follows: j A. Essential equipment, fans, dampers, coils., and ductwork will l be tested in accordance with ASME/ ANSI AG-1-1988. j
)
B. One auxiliary building supply fan and one auxiliary building exhaust fan is tested in accordance with AMCA standards to ,
assure fan characteristic performance curves. One of each type of essential cooling fan will also be tested in accordance with AMCA.
C. Heating and cooling coils are leak-tested with air, or hydrostatically, to assure integrity. Coils are rated in accordance with ARI standards. Coils associated with the essential cooling units are tested in accordance with ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Class 3.
D. HEPA filters are manufactured and tested prior to installation in accordance with MIL-F-51068. HEPA filters
/~ will be tested in place after initial installation and Q] periodically thereafter to verify filter integrity.
Amendment E 9.4-15 December 30, 1988
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CESSAR EnLmu E. Ductwork is fabricated, installed, leak-tested, and balanced O:
in accordance with SMACNA.
Initial functional testing of the auxiliary building ventilation system will verify fan flow rates, cooling water flow distribution, and operation of interlocks and controls.
The safety-related recirculation systems will be tested by initiating the system. Correct damper actuation, fap performance, proper cooling water flow, cooling coil performance, and system response time will be tested initially and periodically during the plant operating life.
1 9.4.3.5 Instrumentation Application 1
Instrumentation is provided to provide automatic or manual 1 operation of the system, both from local and/or remote locations ;
and permit verification that the system is operating j satisfactorily. ;
I Indication of the fan operating status is provided in the control room. Failure of a running fan is alarmed in the control room.
Indication of damper positions / damper alignment is provided in the control room.
l E I Indication of pressure drop across filters (supply filters and exhaust filter trains) is provided in the control room.
Temperature indication is provided for the essential mechanical equipment rooms is provided in the control room.
The following data shall be avail able to determine system performance:
A. Entering and leaving air temperature for the supply J ventilation unit. 4 k
B. Entering and leaving chilled water temperatures at supply ventilation units. ]
l C. Air flow rates for the supply and exhaust units. {
J D. Chilled water flow rates to supply ventilation units.
1 O
Amendment E 9.4-16 December 30, 1988 l .______-__________L
CESSAR naincarieu l i
i k l 9.4.4 DIESEL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM 9.4.4.1 _D_e_s__i_g n B a s e s j The Diesel Building Ventilation System is designed to provide, a suitable environment for the operation of equipment and personnel access for inspection, testing, and maintenance. l The Diesel Building Ventilation System is designed to maintain i the building temperature between 60*F minimum and 110*F maximum when the diesel is not operating, and between 40*F minimum and 120*F maximum when the diesel is operating. Outdoor design temperatures meet or exceed those given in the ASHRAE Fundamentals Handbook.
The diesel generator building ventilation system shall perform its heat removal function assuming a single failure of an active component. Each ventilation train shall be capable of receiving electrical power from its associated diesel generator.
The diesel generator building ventilation system shall remain functional following a safe shutdown earthquake, and shall withstand the effects of appropriate natural phenomena such as
. tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods (GDC 2). E Redundant trains of the diesel generator building ventilation system shall be physically separated and protected from the effects of missiles, pipe whip, and jet forces (GDC 4). !
I Essential electrical components required for ventilation of the diesel building during accident conditions are connected to emergency Class 1E standby power.
This system is designed in accordance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 5, 17 and 60 in addition to GDC 2 and 4 mentioned above.
9.4.4.1.1 Codes and Standards Equipment, work, and materials utilized conform to the requirements and recommendations of the codes and standards listed below:
A. Fan ratings conform to the Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) Standards.
B. Fan motors conform to applicable standards of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE).
Amendment E 9.4-17 December 30, 1988
I i
CESSARnah - '
O C. Essential equipment, fans, coils, dampers, and ductwork will l be manufactured in accordance vith ASME/ ANSI AG-1-1988.
D. Ventilation ductwork conforms to applicable standards of the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association (SMACNA).
E. Water-cooling and heating coil ratings conform to standards of the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI).
Cooling coils in the essential cooling units are designed in accordance with the ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Class 3.
I F. liigh-e f ficiency particulate air (IIEPA) filters conform to ORNL-NSIC-65, " Design, Construction, and Testing of liigh-Ef ficiency Air Filtration Systems for Nuclear Application."
G. Applicable components and controls conform to the
! requirements of IEEE, Underwriter's Laboratories (UL) and NEMA.
9.4.4.2 System. Description The diesel building ventilation system consists of supply and E exhaust fans with associated ductwork, dampers, and controls for cach of the two diesel rooms. licat energy from the diesel engine and other sources is absorbed by the ventilation supply air and discharged to the building exterior by the exhaust fans.
Isolation dampers are provid~ for the supply and exhaust ductwork to protect the diesel aerator and associrted equipment during a tornado or high wini Each system is powered from independent Class 1E power sources.
Each diesel generator room receives ventilation air for cooling from two 50% capacity axial supply fans, each equipped with a weatherproof intake louver, filter, damper, and associated motor driver. Ventilation air is exhausted from each diesel room through two 50% capacity axial exhaust fans and dampers.
The diesel generator building ventilation system fans are automatically activated in response to building temperature.
These automatic controls sequence the fans to meet required cooling demands.
When the diesel generator is shut down, the ventilation system can be manually activated if necessary to provide cooling for maintenance or testing access. A low room temperature setpoint will shut down all fans in order to limit the minimum room temperature to 40*F and prevent freezing.
Amendment E 9.4-18 December 30, 1988
CESSAR Emincamu
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'O A missile barrier is provided over each air intake and exhaust louver to prevent the penetration of a missile into either diesel generator building. Intake and exhaust ducts are protected by appropriate security barriers.
9.4.4.3 Safety Evaluation The Diesel Building Ventilation System automatically maintains a suitable environment in each diesel enclosure under all operating conditions.
The diesel generator building ventilation system has sufficient cooling capacity to maintain the diesel room at 120*F or below with the diesel opes ating at rated load and with ambient outside design air temperature based on ASHRAE Fundamentals Handbook.
Fans are cycled off as necessary to maintain a minimum temperature of 50*F for freeze prevention. Heat losses from equipment are conservatively estimated based on calculations and operating experience.
A single failure will not prevent the diesel generator building ventilation system from performing the intended heat removal function. Each ventilation train is powered by a Class lE electrical system capable of being fed from the associated diesel generator.
l l Essential components of the diesel generator building E ventilation system are designed to Seismic Category I I requirements and will remain functional Co11owing a safe shutdown l carthquake.
Diesel generator ventilation trains are located in separate compartments above the respective diesel generators. Each penetration into the building is provided with protection from external missiles. No high or moderate energy piping is located in the vicinity of the ventilation equipment or controls.
9.4.4.4 I_nspection and Testing Requirements Performance characteristics of the diesel building ventilation system are verified through the following qualification testing of essential components:
, A. One of each set of diesel generator ventilation supply f ans and diesel generator ventilation exhaust fans is tested in
{ accordance with AMCA standards to assure fan characteristic performance curves.
Amendment E 9.4-19 December 30, 1988 >
CESSAREinh a i
B. Ductwork is fabricated, installed, leak tested, and balanced O
in accordance with SMACNA standards.
Essential electrical components, switchovers, and starting l
controls are tested during preoperational tests and periodically thereafter coincident to testing of the diesels.
9.4.4.5 Instrumentation Application Instrumentation is provided to provide automatic or manual operation of the system, both from local and/or remote locations and permit verification that the system is operating satisfactorily.
Indication of the fan operating status is provided in the control room. Failure of a running fan is alarmed in the control room.
1 Indication of damper positions / damper alignment is provided in the control room.
Indication of pressure drop across ,11ters (supply filters and exhaust filter trains) is provided in tLe control room. ;
E I Space temperature indication is prcvided and high and low j temperature alarms are provided in the control room. i 9.4.5 CONTAINMENT PURGE VENTILATION SYSTEM 9.4.5.1 Design Bases The Containment Purgo Ventilation System is designed to maintain the average containment air temperature between 60*F and 90*F during inspection, testing, maintenance and refueling operations; and to limit the release of any contamination to the environment.
The Containment Purgo Ventilation System is dosigned to provide clean, fresh air whenever the containment is ot rill be occupied.
Containment air is exhausted to the environment through the purge filter trains.
Each containment penetration for the Purge Ventilation Supply and Exhaust subsystems is provided with two isolation valves, one one cach side of the containment wall. The Containment Purge Ventilation System meets the single failure criterion.
The containment purge isolation valves maintain primary containment integrity during a postulated loss-of-coolant-accident (GDC 54 and GDC 56) .
O Amendment E 9.4-20 December 30, 1988
I CESSAR EnWicarian F
The containment purge exhaust system mitigates the radiological consequences of a postulated fueling handling accident inside l containment. Dose at the site boundary does not exceed values of l 10 CFR Part 100, consistent with the Standard Review Plan 15.7.4.
9.4.5.1.1 Codes and Standards Equipment, work, and materials utilized conform to the requirements and recommendations of the codes and standards i
listed below:
A. Fan ratings conform to the Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) Standards.
B. Fan motors conform to applicable standards of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE).
1 C. Essential equipment, fans, coils, dampers, and ductwork will j be manufactured in accordance with ASME/ ANSI AG-1-1988. I D. Ventilation ductwork conforms to applicable standards of the ,
Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National I Association (SMACNA).
a
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E. Water-cooling and heating coil ratings conform to standards of the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI).
Cooling coils in the essential cooling units are designed in accordance with the ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Class 3. E F. High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters conform to ORNL-NSIC-65, " Design, Construction, and Testing of High-Efficiency Air Filtration Systems for Nuclear i Application." I i
G. Applicable components and controls conform to the requirements of IEEE, Underwriter's Laboratories (UL) and NEMA.
9.4.5.2 S_ystem Description The containment purge system supplies ventilation air to the containment during extended shutdown conditions or refueling outages. Air is tempered or conditioned, as required, in the supply unit, and is dalivered to the containment through a l penetration assembly and butterfly type isolation valves. This I
ventilation air helps to provide an atmosphere suitable for personnel access by maintaining temperature control and reducing n
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Amendment E 9.4-21 December 30, 1988
l l
CESSAR EnUICAT15N 1
1 airborne radioactivity. Air is exhausted through a similar O
penetration with butterfly type isolation valves. The exhaust air passes through particulate and iodine filters prior to discharge to the unit vent.
The containment purge supply system consists of two 50% supply units, two 50% cooling units, and two 50% purge supply fans. The supply units contain filters and heating coils to temper the outside air as required. The cooling units contain cooling coils served by non-essential chilled water for conditioning the outside air as required. Supply fans are of the direct-drive l
centrifugal type. Dampers are provided to control the rate of i air being admitted to the containment. The containment purge exhaust system consists of two 50% capacity filter trains and two l 50% capacity exhaust fans. The filter trains contain particulate 3 filters and carbon filters for mitigation of a postulated fuel-handling accident inside containment. Exhaust fans are of the direct-drive centrifugal type. Dampers are provided to control the rate of air being exhausted from the containment.
The containment purge system is manually initiated during a l maintenance outage or refueling operation to provide a suitable I environment within containment. Either one or both air-handling trains may be operated depending on the desired purging rate.
Indication of high radioactivity levels in the exhaust duct will automatically isolate the butterfly-type containment isolation !
valves. E l l
An auxiliary purge system is provided to allow limited personnel l entry for inspection and maintenance during normal plant operation.
9.4.5.3 Safety Evaluation Each Containment Purge Ventilation System supply and exhaust penetration through the containment vessel is equipped with two normally closed isolation valves, each connected to separate control trains. A failure in one train will not prevent the remaining isolation valve from providing the required isolation capability. The isolation valves and containment penetrations are the only portions of the containment Purge Ventilation System that are engineered safety features.
Redundant containment isolation valves are designed, constructed, and tested in accordance with ASME Section III, Class 2. The valves are leak-tested periodically to verify acceptability of seat leakage. Valves are designed to fail closed in the event of loss of power or loss of instrument air.
O Amendment E 9.4-22 December 30, 1988
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l CESSARnahnu
[a3 The containment purge exhaust filter train is designed to meet the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.52. Ductwork from the containment penetration to the filter train will be low-leakage design, but not . Seismic Category 1. Fans are powered from a reliabic non _1 power source. E The containment purge exhaust system is isolated- on high radiation or high relative humidity signals. Relative humidity.
'io controlled and monitored upstream of the containment purge exhaust filter trains.
9.4.5.4 Inspection and Testina Requirements The nonessential components are not normally in operation and are accessible for periodic inspection. Essential components and controls are tested during preoperational tests and periodically thereafter.
IIEPA filters are manufactured and tested prior to installation in accordance with MIL-F-51068. HEPA filters in the containment purge exhaust system are periodically tested to verify removal efficiency. Carbon absorbers are periodically tested to verify required removal efficiency based on the dose assessment.
Ductwork is fabricated, installed, leak-tested, and balanced in accordance with SMACNA.
9.4.5.5 Instrumentation Application Instrumentation is provided to provide automatic or manual operation of the system, both from local and/or remote locations and permit verification that the system is operating satisfactorily.
Indication of the fan operating status is provided in the control room. Failure of a running fan is alarmed in the control room. 1 Indication of damper positions / damper alignment is provided in the control room.
Indication of pressure drop across filters (supply filters and <
exhaust filter trains) is provided in the control room.
Indication of containment purge isolation valve positions are provided in the control room. i The following data shall be available to determine system 'i performance:
Amendment E ,
9.4-23 December 30, 1988 l
CESSAR8l h a A. Entering and leaving air temperature ?or the supply O
ventilation units.
B. Entering and leaving chilled water temperatures at supply ventilation units.
C. Air flow rates for the supply and exhaust fans.
D. Chilled water flow rate to air handling unit.
9.4.6 CONTAINMENT COOLING AND VENTILATION SYSTEM 9.4.6.1 Design __ Bases The Containment Cooling anc. Ventilation System is designed to maintain acceptable temperature limits inside containment to ensure proper operation of equipment and controls during normal plant operation and normal shutdown and for personnel access during inspection, testing, and maintenance. It is comprised of the following subsystems:
A. The containment recirculation cooling subsystem functions during normal plant operation to maintain a suitable ambient temperature for equipment located within the containment.
This E system also operates during a loss of offsite power.
B. The control element drive mechanism (CEDM) cooling subsystem functions during normal plant operation to maintain a suitable air temperature around the rod drive mechanisms.
C. The containment air cleanup subsystem operates before and during personnel entries to reduce airborne radioactivity.
D. The cavity cooling subsystem functions to maintain a suitable air temperature in closed ended cavities.
The containment recirculation cooling subsystem is designed to maintain the average containment air temperature between 60*F and 120*F during normal plant operation with three of four cooling units operating and one in standby.
The CEDM cooling system is designed to limit the normal air temperature exiting the CEDM shroud to approximately 170*F during normal operation with one cooling units operating.
l The containment air cleanup unit is designed to rd Se the containment airborne concentrations to approxbately seven maximum permissible concentrations (MPC) to permit personnel access.
Amendment E 9.4-24 December 30, 1988
CESSARMEnmiu
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% 1 The steam generator and pressurizer compartment cooling fans, in conjunction with the containment recirculation cooling system, maintains the average compartment temperatures at or below 130*F.
9.4.6.1.1 Codes and Standards l
Equipment, work, and materials utilized conform to the ,
requirements and recommendations of the codes and standards l listed below:
A. Fan ratings conform to the Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) Standards.
B. Fan motors conform to applicable standards of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE). <
1 C. Essential equipment, fans, coils, dampers, and ductwork will be manufactured in accordance with ASME/ ANSI AG-1-1988. I D. Venti.lation ductwork conforms to applicable standards of the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association (SMACNA).
b I
V E. Water-cooling and heating coil ratings conform to standards of the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI).
Cooling coils in the essential cooling units are designed in accordance with the ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Class 3. l 1
F. liigh-e f ficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters conform to ORNL-NSIC-65, " Design, Construction, and Testing of liigh-Efficiency Air Filtration Systems for Nuclear '
Application."
G. Applica.ile components and controls conform to the requirements of IEEE, Underwriter's Laboratories (UL) and NEMA.
9.4.6.2 System Description The containment recirculation cooling system consists of four large cooling units, each with cooling coils and recirculation fan for heat removal. The system provides continuous air recirculation and cooling for all major areas inside containment.
Ileat energy is transferred to a non-essential leg of the chilled water system through chilled water cooling coils located in the recirculation cooling units. The cooled air is delivered ,
to the lower floors of the containment by the containment I
f i
recirculation fans. Further distribution of air to the various Amendment E 9.4-25 December 30, 1988
~
CESSAR EnWicari:n compartments is accomplished with individual distribution fans.
O The air absorbs heat as it rises through the compartments, and is returned to the cooling units to complete the recirculation l cycle. Distribution fans include the following: l A. Steam generator and pressurizer compartment cooling fans .
l Redundant fans are provided for each steam generator compartment and the pressurizer compartment to maintain compartment temperatures within design limits. The fans draw in cool air discharged from the containment recirculation cooling units, and deliver it to the 4 l individual compartments. As the air picks up heat from the i components and hot surfaces, a natural stack effect is created that assists the circulation provided by the !
i distribution fans.
B. Reactor compartment cooling fans Redundant fans are provided for the reactor compartment to l
maintain the compartment temperature within design limits.
The fans draw in cool air discharged from the containment recirculation units, and deliver it to the compartment beneath the reactor vessel. The air is forced up through E
the annular space between the vessel insulation and the primary shield wall. A portion of the air flows across the reactor vessel supports and continues through the hot and cold leg penetrations in the primary shield wall. The remainder of the air flows out through openings in the seal ring near the reactor vessel flange.
C. Dome supply system l
Redundant distribution fans are provided to deliver air to the containment dome area. Air is drawn from the :
containment recirculating cooling units and discharged l toward the dome to limit heat buildup and stratificatic j The CEDM cooling system consists of two cooling units, each with cooling coils and fan for removal of heat from the rod d rive mechanisme. Ambient containment air is drawn across the drive mechanisms and down into the cooling shroud on the reactor head.
The heated air exits the shroud and is ducted to the inlet of the cooling units. After cooling, the air passes through the fans
- and is returned to the containment atmosphere at or near ambient i
temperature.
The containment air cleanup system consists of two filtration units, each with particulate filters, carbon filters and centrifugal fan. The units circulate a portion of the Amendment E 9.4-26 December 30, 1988
3 l
I CESSAREnnnemu 1
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containment atmosphere for cleanup prior to and during a personal entry into containment. They also serve to reduce airborne activity prior to making a routine atmospheric release of containment air.
The containment recirculation cooling system consists of four 33%
capacity recirculation cooling units, each connected to ad associated recirculation fan.
The CEDM cooling system consists of two 100% capacity cooling units, each with associated 100% capacity fan.
The containment air cleanup system consists of two 50% capacity filter trains and two 50% capacity exhaust fans.
The cavity cooling subsystem consists of two 100% capacity supply fans.
9.4.6.3 Gafety Evaluation The Containment Cooling and Ventilation System provides adequate capacity to assure that proper temperature levels are maintained in the containment Mder operating conditions. Sufficient E i redundancy is included to assure proper operation of the system with one active component out of service. Although not required, this system operates to maintain the containment temperature within acceptable limits during a loss of offsite power.
The Containment Cooling and Ventilation System is not an Engineered Safety Feature and no credit has been taken for the operation of any subsystem or component in analyzing the consequences of design basis accidents. !
l 9.4.6.4 );nspection and _ Testinq Requirements !
Performance characteristics of the containment ventilation system are verified through qualification testing of essential components as follows: 4 l A. One i. ' four containment recirculation fans is tested in l accordance with AMCA standards to assure fan characteristics i performance curves. All other fans are rated in accordance with AMCA standards.
l 13 . lleating and cooling coils are leak-tested with air, or j
hydrostatically, to enenre integrity. Colls are rated in accordance with ARI standards.
C. !! EPA filters are manufactured and tested prior to installation in accordance with MIL-F-51068. HEPA filters in Os the containment purge exhaust system are periodically tested Amendment E 9.4-27 December 30, 1988
CESSAR Ennficari:n i
to verify removal efficiency. Carbon absorbers are 9!
periodically tested to verify required removal efficiency 4 based on the dose assessment. l J
D. Ductwork is fabricated, installed, leak-tested, and balanced )
in accordance with SMACNA. j Major components located outside containment are accessible during normal plant operation for inspection, maintenance, and periodic testing. Components located inside containment are accessible during plant shutdown. Operational testing will be performed prior to initial startup.
9.4.6.5 Instrumentation Applicatio_r1 Instrumentation is provided to allow automatic or manual operation of the system, both from local and/or remote locations and permit verification that the system is operating satisfactorily.
Indication of the fan operating status is provided in the control room. Failure of a running fan is alarmed in the control room.
Indication of damper positions / damper alignment is provided in the control room.
E Indication of pressure drop across all filters is provided in the control room.
High vibration alarms are provided for all fans located inside containment.
Temperature is indicated for various/ representative areas inside containment.
The following data shall be available to determine system ,
performance:
A. Entering and 1 caving air temperature for the containmnt recirculation cooling units and the CEDM cooling units.
B. Entering and leaving chilled water temperature at containment recirculation cooling units and the CEDM cooling units supply units.
C. Air flow rates for containment recirculation cooling units and the CEDM cooling units.
D. Chilled water flow rates to the containment recirculation cooling units and the CEDM cooling units.
Amendment E 9.4-28 December 30, 1988
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9.4.7 TURBINE BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM 9.4.7.1 Desian Bases The Turbine Building Ventilation System is designed to provide a suitable environment for the operation of equipment and personnel access as required for inspection, testing, and maintenance.
Ambient temperature limits within the turbine building are maximum 130*F and minimum 50*F.
Treatment and monitoring of exhaust air is not provided since the I turbine building has no potentially contaminated areas.
This system is designed in accordance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 5, and 60.
9.4.7.1.1 Codes and Standards Equipment, work, and materials utilized conform to the requirements and recommendations of the codes and standards listed below: j O A. Fan ratings conform to the Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) Standards. E B. Fan motors cc:aform to applicable standards of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE).
C. Essential equipment, fans, coils, dampers, and ductwork will i be manufactured in accordance with ASME/ ANSI AG-1-1988.
D. Ventilation ductwork conforms to applicable standards of the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association (SMACNA).
E. Water-cooling and heating coil ratings conform to standards of the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI).
Cooling coils in the essential cooling units are designed in accordance with the ASME'B&PV Code,Section III, Class 3.
F. High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters conform to ORNL-NSIC-65, " Design, Construction, and Testing of High-Efficiency Air Filtration Systems for Nuclear Application."
G. Applicable components and controls conform to the O requirements of IEEE, Underwriter's Laboratories (UL) and V NEMA.
Amendment E 9.4-29 December 30, 1988
CESSAR8Eba l
i 9.4.7.2 System Description O
The Turbine Building Ventilation System is composed of j ventilating fans, intake dampers, and exhausters.
Outside air is drawn into the turbine building through outside I l
air intake louvers located in the turbine building outside wall at individual floors and exhausted through roof mounted exhausters. Roof mounted heat vents which vent directly to the )
atmosphere are provided for protection of the structure in case l of fire. i i
9.4.7.3 Safety Evaluation l l
The Turbine Building Ventilation System maintains a suitable !
l environment in each turbine building during normal plant operation. This system is not an Engineered Safety Feature and no credit is taken for its operation during an accident. )
9.4.7.4 Inspection and Testina Requirements The Turbine Building Ventilation System is in continuous operation during normal plant operation and is accessible for I routine inspection. System components and controls are tested I during preoperational testing and thereafter system equipment i operability is verified periodically. E 9.4.7.5 Instrumentation Application Instrumentation is provided to provide automatic or manual ;
operation of the system from local control panels. l Instrumentation is also provided to permit verification that the system is operating satisfactorily.
Indication of the fan operating status is provided on the local control panel. Failure of a running fan is alarmed locally.
9.4.0 STATION SERVICE WATER PUMP BTRUCTURE VENTILATION SYSTEM 9.4.8.1 Design Bases The Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System is designed to provide a suitable environment for the operation of equipment, and personnel access for inspection, test.ing, and maintenance.
Ambient temperature limits within the nuclear service water pump ;
structure are maximum 104*F and minimum $0*F. Outdoor de:Ign temperatures meet or exceed those given in the ASHRAE Fundamentals Handbook.
1 Amendment E 9.4-30 December 30, 1988 l
CESSAREnnnem )
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V All essential fans, dampers, ductwork and supports, are designed to withstand the safe shutdown earthquake.
Essential electrical components required for ventilation of the building during accident conditions are connected to emergency Class 1E standby power.
The Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System is located completely within a Seismic Category I structure and all j essential components are fully protected from tornado missile damage.
This system is designed in accordance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 4, 5, 17, and 60.
9.4.8.1.1 Codes and Standards Equipment, work, and materials utilized conform to the requirements and recommendations of the codes and standards )
I listed below:
A. Fan ratings conform to the Air Moving and Conditioning Association (AMCA) Standards.
B. Fan motors conform to applicable standards of the National ,
Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) and the )
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE).
E i
C. Essential equipment, fans, coils, dampers, and ductwork will be manufactured in accordance with ASME/ ANSI AG-1-1988.
D. Ventilation ductwork conforms to applicable standards of the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association (SMACNA).
E. Water-cooling and heating coil ratings conform to standards l l of the Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute (ARI).
Cooling coils in the essential cooling units are designed in accordance with the ASME B&PV Code,Section III, Class 3. ]
F. High-efficiency particulate air (IIEPA) filters conform to ORNL-NSIC-65, " Design, Construction, and Testing of fligh-Ef ficiency Air Filtration Systems for Nuclear Application."
G. Applicable components and control s conform to the I requirements of IEEE, Underwriter's Laboratories (UL) and HEMA.
h G l Amendment E 9.4-31 December 30, 1988 l
1 CESSAR Maincari:n .
l l
9.4.8.2 Bystem Description O
The Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System consists of two 100% capacity essential vane-axial supply fans with associated dampers, ductwork, supports and control systems por pump compartment. A non-essential vane-axial fan is provided.
to supply ventilation air to the pool area below the pumps when maintenance or inspection is performed in this area.
Each essential fan ia provided with a check damper on the fan discharge to prevent backflow through the fan on standby.
9.4.8.3 Safety Evaluation l
The Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System is an engineered safety feature. The two 100% capacity fans in each pump compartment are powered from separate trains of the onsite power system. This assures the integrity and availability of the ventilation system in the event of a loss of offsite power or any single active failure.
9.4.8.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements The Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System E operates as required to limit temperature in the pump structure j and is accessible for periodic inspection. Essential electrical l components, switchovers, and starting controls are tested during preoperational tests.
9.4.8.5 Instrumentation Applicatiorl Instrumentation is provided to provide automatic or manual operation of the system, both from local and/or remote locations and permit verification that the system is operating satisfactorily.
Indication of the fan operating status is provided in the control room. Failure of a running fan is alarmed in the control room.
Indication of damper positions / damper alignment is provided in the control room.
Indication of pressure drop across filters is provided in the control room.
Space temperature indication for the pump structure is provided in the control room along with alarm indication of high and low temporutures.
'O Amendment E 9.4-32 December 30, 1988
l CESSAR Einincari:n I
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v 9.5 OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.5.1 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM 9.5.1.1 Desian Basis The Fire Protection System minimizes the risks and consequences of fires. The functions provided by the Fire Protection System j include the following:
A. Prompt detection and alarm of fires. q B. Quick suppression of fire %
C. Prevention of the spread of fires. ]
D. Assurance of the capability to achieve safe shutdown in the event of fires.
E. Minimization of radioactive exposure and the spread of contamination as the result of fires.
1 F. Provision of manual backup to automatic fire suppression systems.
9.5.1.1.1 Fire Protection - Water Supply and Pumps E .
Water supplies are designed to meet the flow demand for l l sprinklers and deluge systems plus hose streams.
The water supply is provided by two 100% capacity Underwriters Laboratory (UL) approved electric motor driven fire pumps. Each are supplied with water from a potable water source. Pump l submergence, installation and the set pressure at which the pumps t l are automatically started or staggered will be in accordance with l NFPA standards. The pumps are shutoff manually. In addition, an I
elevated tank supplied by the same water source is provided to prevent frequent starting of the fire pumps. This tank maintains pressure in the yard mains at approximately 10 psig above the start pressure setting of the fire pumps. This is accomplished by replenishing any water loss from leakage.
9.5.1.1.2 Fire Protection During Construction The exterior portions of tne Fire Protection System including pumps intake structures, and hydrants will be completed prior to any major construction of any of the units and before the installation of any components.
t A
V)
Amendment E 9.5-3 December 30, 1988
1 CESSAREna mu 9.5.1.1.3 Codes and Standards O
i The Fire Protection System is designed to meet existing regulations concerning personnel safety. It is also intended to i meet practices, standards, codes, and manuals developed by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) where practicable. j Since these standards are not developed primarily for nuclear power plants, the suggestions, practices, and standards defined in Nuclear Mutual Limited Property Loss Prevention Standards for Nuclear Generating Stations for investment protection will be followed, provided such standardu are not in conflict with nuclear or personnel safety. In addition to the foregoing i I
standards, the system design considers the occupational Safety and IIcalth Act and the American National Standards Institute.
The design shall be in accordance with the intent of NUREG-0800 Section 9.5.1.
9.5.1.2 S_ystem Description 9.5.1.2.1 General l The Fire Protection System provides:
A. Fire detection in areas selected on the potential and resulting severity (either consequential or intensity) of a fire.
B. Fire control and extinguishment by automatic or manual E systems using water or chemicals.
C. Manual extinguishing equipment, such as hoses and portable extinguishers.
D. Protection against damage to safety class equipment due to failure of any portion of the Fire Protection System.
E. Water to points throughout the plant area, service and administration building and exterior yard area. Pumps i hydrants and headers in water spray systems (deluge and l sprinkler) are connected through isolation valves to a yard l fire main that loops the periphery of the plant in critical i yard areas. Fire pump discharge pipes not underground are l provided with means to preclude freezing. J Automatic sprinkler systems are provided in selected areas of the turbine building, paint storage facilities, warehouse and maintenance shops, condenser pits and administrative building.
Each sprinkler head fuses and discharges water when it is heated to its rated temperature. The water flowing out of the automatic Amendment E i 9.5-2 December 30, 1988 c _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - - _ _ - _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _
CESSAR n!Wicari:n m
i sprinkler reduces the pressure in the Fire Protection System to a degree that a fire pump is activated. Simultaneously, an alarm sounds in tP2 Control Room to alert the personnel that sprinklers and a pump are in operation in the location. In addition, the plant fire brigade will be available to extinguish the fire by use of those stations and portable extinguishers.
Automatic deluge systems which provide fixed spray patterns of water similar to a sprinkler system are provided for:
A. Transformers - main and station oil filled.
B. Transformers unit main step up and unit auxiliary (oil filled).
C. All turbine oil reservoirs, turbine related oil piping, and bearings including:
- 1. Feedwater pump turbine lubrication requirements.
- 2. Hydrogen seal oil units.
- 3. Electro hydraulic (EHC) control fluid.
E Oil purification equipment.
Q 4.
Water spray deluge systems consist of a number of open spray nozzles controlled by a single deluge valve which is activated by any one of a number of heat and/or smoke sensors detecting a fire condition. Upon activation of the deluge valve water discharges from all nozzles in the mulsifyre system.
Small hose station or cabinets are located permanently throughout the interior of the buildings with the exception of the Containment. These stations consist of 50 feet to 100 feet length of 1 1/2" neoprene lined linen or rubber fire hose with appropriate shutoff valves and nozzles. These stations are located at maximum intervals of 100 feet. Exterior fire hydrants are provided on the exterior yard mains at maximum intervals of 250 feet.
9.5.1.2.2 Fire Protection - Category I Related Fire protection of the plant is provided by portable fire extinguishers and hose stations supplied from a seismically designed dry header system. The header system is maintained dry until such time the operator deems it necessary to use the fire hose capability in addition to or in lieu of the portable extinguishers in controlling a fire situation. The charging of Amendment E 9.5-3 December 30, 19E8 l
CESSAREna mu the header system is controlled by the operator in the control O
room or at a local operating panel with remote indicating lights.
The operator must charge the header and persons engaged in fire fighting must open the manual valve at the local hose station. l These requirements permit the confinement of water flow to the l immediate fire area which prevents engineered safety systems from being impaired by accidental discharge from a leak or break in one of the pipes. It is also noted that all safety-related equipment essential for a safe plant shutdown conforms to required separation criteria for redundant channels to preclude fire or water damage to both safety channels in the event one channel is incapacitated by fire damage. A wet sprinkler system is provided for each diesel generator. Fire protection for the constantly attended control room is provided by portable fire ,
extinguishers. Breathing air packs are also provided for use of I personnel in the control room area. The cable, switchgear, and cable tray rooms beneath the control room are provided with UL or FM approved fire detection devices which alarm in the control room. Portable fire extinguishers are provided in these areas.
The probability of fire within the containment is low due to the small number of fire sources and lack of combustible material.
Since the possibility exists for an unsafe condition or damage to Category I equipment from a fire protection system, the only E permanent fire protection provided in the containment is a number of portable fire extinguishers. No automatic sprinklers or j deluge systems are included to prevent inadvertent operation or other failures.
9.5.1.2.3 Detection and Alarms A fire will be detected in normally unoccupied areas or locations requiring rapid detection by automatic UL or Factory Mutual (FM) i approved detection equipment which provides status and '
annunciation for an alarm within the control room. There will also be indicators for the sprinkler systems, the deluge systems, and main fire pumps. The following alarms are provided:
A. Control room alarms to indicate fire pump operation or power failure, or failure to start.
B. An audible water flow alarm on each fixed spray system.
C. Fire and smoke detection systems connected to annunciators in the control room, motor control centers, switchgear rooms, battery rooms, and the containment at strategic cable locations. Instrumentation is provided to monitor the status and availability of the systems which is displayed in a given fire protection par.el ares in the control room along with activation switches. As noted, audio and visual signals are displayed in tne control room for sprinkler, mulsifyre, and Halon systems as well as fire pump and Amendment E 9.5-4 December 30, 1988
CESSAR EMWicue,,
n ;
detector device status. In addition, should a break or leak I occur of large consequence in the normally pressurized system in the turbine building, appropriate high sump level alarms and sump pump operation will alert the operator of the problem and the general location. Further, each automatic sprinkler system has flow indication.
i 9.5.1.2.4 Fire Protection System Relationship to Power Sources i
onsite power sources do not directly rely upon any fire j protection system to provide their safety-related function due to ]
the design of the sources themselves to provide redundancy and j' separation of safety channels criteria. The fire protection systems are not anticipated to prevent the loss of such l equipment, but to control the situation with the least disruption possible. Although the main step up in auxiliary transformers l I
will likely be oil filled and hence will require fire protection, none of these transformers are essential to safe plant shutdown and all are located outside and away from Category I structures.
Other transformers will be gas cooled, dry or non-combustible liquid cooled, such that a fire protection system will not be required. A complete discussion of essential and available power sources is given in Sections 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3.
9.5.1.2.5 Smoke, Heat, and Flame Control Features Fire walls and doors provide the major portion of heat and flame control. As well as the reinforced concrete construction E !
including ceiling and floors and all operating plant areas.
Warehouses and storage facilities not using this type construction are separated from the operating buildings.
Ventilation and exhaust systems are provided. In general, throughout the plant an exhaust system from numerous compartments l containing equipment maintains a slight negative pressure within l the building, to prevent outleakage. This system will serve to i control smoke generated by fire and exhausted to station vent. A l description of this ventilation system is given in Section 9.4.3 l
and Diesel Building system in Section 9.4.4. The control room ventilation systun is compatible with the exclusion of fire generated smoke external to the control room by maintaining it at a slight positiv' ecessure relative to the surroundings. The ventilation and ic t conditioning system for the control, equipment, and cu. ;e rooms is described in Section 9 4.1. Air racks are also provided in all areas which could be hazardous to personnel due to the lack of adequate ventilation under fire
! conditions.
O V
Amendment E l 9.5-5 December 30, 1988
CESSAR 8!ninem:n To minimize fire potential in cabling, fire retardant and O ,
non-propagating cables are used throughout as well as cable j separation. All power control and instrument cables supplied are quality assured, fire retardant cable. Power cable is separated from control and instrument cable by routing it in separate cable trays as well as being separated physically in each power cable tray. Where fire protection systems are provided for safety ,
related equipment, the cable trays are protected locally near the equipment. The safety function of the cable is assured by the separation of redundant safety trays. In addition, heat or smoke !
i detectors with alarms are provided at strategic cable locations I to alert station personnel of a situation endangering essential '
cables. Additional information describing the cable installation and separation as well as routing of safety and non-safety cable is provided in Chapter 8.
9.5.1.3 Safety Evaluation 9.5.1.3.1 Category I Related Evaluation The fire protection system cannot prevent the fire from damaging equipment and materials necessary to nuclear safety, but it is ,
intended to aid in preventing a fire from damaging redundant j safety equipment as well as preventing the spread of fire or flammable materials due to fire. The fire risk determination i utilized in the design and application of the various fire I protection systems involves evaluation of the consequences of a E l
fire to nuclear safety, possible damage of fire safety related equipment by fire protection systems, consequences of a fire to personnel safety, and monetary investment loss by fire. All fire protection system piping and equipment protecting safety equipment are in the vicinity of safety equipment is designed to meet seismic conditions.
9.5.1.3.2 Other Related Evaluation Where automatic sprinklers or deluge systems are installed, floor drains, grating, or trenching is provided to effectively dispose l of or contain discharged water and spillage.
1 A postulated oil filled transformer fire is also dependent on the oil quantity in the transformer. When the deluge system is activated, the water will serve to flush the oil into the retaining and draining base as well as cool the oil below the reignition point. Should the deluge system not function properly, the loss of a transformer will not cause any unsafe conditions. Due to the physical separation of the transformers, fire within one transformer would not be anticipated to damage another. However, heat detectors at one transformer may activate the corresponding deluge system due to fire at a nearby
[
Amendment E l 9.5-6 December 30, 1988
C E S S A R n a scari:n 1 n
V transformer. This would serve to cool the intact transformer and i help avoid damage. This operation would not affect the transformer since normal transformer design anticipates heavy j rains and other adverse conditions in outdoor installations. ;
9.5.1.4 Inspection and Testina Requirements The installation of the fire protection system will be in accordance with approved engineering drawings supplied by the designer or experienced fire protection system manufacturers contracted to supply the engineered equipment components or distribution system. Personnel will be assigned to erect, inspect, and review the installed system to determine that the systems are properly installed in accordance with the drawings.
After erection, all wet systems will be hydrostatically tested. !
This is also true of wet systems normally maintained dry. All deluge systems will receive functional checks including alarms and detectors to ensure their proper functioning. All hose stations, racks, and hydrants will receive inspection and testing "
l to ensure their proper operation prior to required use in unit operation and as they are installed and completed. In addition, the permanent fire extinguishers will be positioned and maintained as early as practical during the construction phase and prior to unit operation.
V' The installation of the systems and construction of the buildings will from time to time be reviewed and inspected by the insurer.
E Their suggestions and requirements will be reviewed, adopted, or ]
resolved in keeping with all requirements of a nuclear generating j I
station.
9.5.2 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS l
9.5.2.1 Desian Bases The communications systems are designed to provide effective communications between all areas of the plant and plant site including all vital areas of the plant. In addition, the i communications nystems are designed to provide an effective means I to communicate to plant personnel and offsite utility and regulatory officials during normal conditions and abnormal /
accident conditions such as fire, accident, and plant testing.
The Private Automatic Business Exchange (PABX) telephone system and the Public Address (PA) system are designed to provide diverse means of communications to all critical areas of the plant during normal and abnormal / accident conditions.
Additionally, sound-powered telephone systems are provided O between selected critical areas of the plant for auxiliary Q shutdown and other required functional purposes. Finally, Amendment E 9.5-7 December 30, 1988 l
i
CESSAR HEncm:,. l multiple offsite communications lines, both direct and through 9 '
the PABX are provided for effective communications during normal and abnormal / accident conditions. All of these diverse communications systems are independent of each other to assure effective communications assuming a single failure.
9.5.2.2 System Description 9.5.2.2.1 Intraplant (PABX) Telephone System l The PABX telephone system provides independent communications j throughout the plant and plant site. To assure its functional operability, the PABX telephone switch is provided with redundant 1 critical electronics, controls, and power supplies. Normal power is provided from the Normal Auxiliary Power System via an AC-DC ,
rectifier / battery combination. For multi-unit plants, normal !
power is provided from each of the units. Emergency power is I provided via a standby diesel generator which will automatically start and accept load should normal power be lost.
I The PABX telephone system is also connected to the commercial l telephone system and the utility private network which allows {
offsita communications for normal and abnormal / accident j conditions. I 9.5.2.2.2 Intraplant Public Address (PA) System E The intraplant PA system provides two independent channels of communications throughout the plant and plant site. These independent channels are page and party-line.
The page channel provides communications over loud speakers with integ ra.1 amplifiers. Page channel speaker-amplifiers are ring-wired to preclude loss of system function in the event of a singic cable failure. Paging is accomplished via the use of either dedicated PA party-line handsets as described below, or via the use of the PABX telephone handsets. The connection between the PABX system and the PA system is through an isolation device to preserve the independence of the two systems.
The party-line channel of the PA system consists of the dedicated PA handsets as noted above. Each party-line handset is provided with the capability of selecting either the paging channel or the party-line channel.
9.5.2.2.3 Intraplant Sound-Powered Telephone Systems Intraplant sound-powered telephone systems, independent of the PABX and PA systems, are provided for normal and abnormal / accident conditions. These sound-powered systems include, but are not limited to, the following:
Amendment E 9.5-8 December 30, 1988
CESSAR anWNmou O A. Maintenance Circuit consists of phone jacks located throughout the plant which can be patched together to establish communications between areas as necessary.
B. Refueling Circuit consists of phone jacks-located in areas required for refueling operations.
C. Emergency Circuit consists of phone jacks connecting specific areas of the plant for the purpose of communication during auxiliary shutdown operations.
As a minimum, the emergency sound-powered telephone system is powered from diesel-backed power sources.
9.5.2.2.4 Offsite Communications Normal offsite communications is provided by public telephone lines and the utility private network which is connected to the PABX telephone switch.
Emergency offsite communications, independent of the PABX telephone switch, is provided by public telephone lines and the utility private network lines connected directly to specific 9 telephones located in critical areas of the plant and support facilities. Emergency telephones are color-coded to distinguish them from the intraplant telephone system. The emergency telephones include, but are not limited to, the following: E A. Emergency Notification System (ENS)
Provides a communications link with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
B. Ilealth Physics Network (HPN)
Provides a communications link with the NRC's health physics personnel.
C. Ringdown Phone System Provides communications link with local and state agencies. ,
1 In addition, a security radio system is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 73. 55 ( f) and a crisis management radio system is provided in accordance with the intent of NUREG-0654.
O Amendment E 9.5-9 December 30, 1988
= ._ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._.
l CESSAR EnnnCATl2N 9.5.2.2.5 System Operation O
l All of the communications systems are designed to operate during !
normal and abnormal / accident conditions. In areas of high noise levels, noise-cancelling devices and/or sound isolation booths are utilized.
9.5.2.3 Inspection and Testing Requirements l l
All communications systems are inspected, checked, and tested for I operability after installation to assure proper operation and coverage. Normal and continued use of the systems provides the basis for inspections on the systems.
9.5.3 LIGHTING SYSTEMS 9.5.3.1 Design Bases The lighting systems are designed to provide adequate and effective illumination throughout the plant and plant site including all vital areas of the plant.
The luminaries are of a proven design with long life and low maintenance requirements, such as fluorescent, metal-halide, high pressure sodium lamps. Incandescent luminaries are generally only used in cases of infrequent operation. Fluorescent E luminaries are normally used in the following cases:
A. In plant stairs and stair wells. ,
i 1
B. Around switchgear, motor control centers and instrumentation i racks. l l
C. To supplement high intensity discharge (HID) luminaries in order to provide partial illumination in areas where l starting times (or restarting following a momentary loss of l power) of HID luminaries is objectionable.
The system design is based on the use of standard materials. The !
use of "special" or " custom" made fixtures or materials is restricted to cases where the use of standard materials is demonstrated impractical.
Personnel discomfort from lighting, e.g., glare, is minimized by coordinating the design features of the lighting system with the characteristics of illuminated objects.
The lighting system components are selected to minimize the potential for danger to personnel or damage to equipment. In particular, the potential for and consequences of lamp breakage are evaluated.
Amendment E 9.5-10 December 30, 1988
CESSAR Ea@icarian D
U Each lighting panel is provided with a main circuit breaker with spare switching capability of at least 40% to support the possible expansion of the panel's loads.
The lighting panels are located in areas that are easily accoysibleforinstallation, maintenance, testing, and operation.
Similarly, the lighting fixtures are designed and located so that maintenance and relamping can be accomplished efficiently and safely.
Provisions are made to allow the removal and reinstallation of l lighting equipment in order to support room, space, or area modifications.
l The design of the plant lighting systems is in accordance with l applicable industry standards for illumination fixtures, cables, grounding, penetrations, conduit, controls.
The normal station lighting system is used to provide normal illumination under all plant operation, maintenance and test conditions. Table 9.5.3-1 summarizes typical illuminance ranges for normal lighting.
\ The security lighting system provides the illumination required to monitor isolation zones and all outdoor areas within the plant protected perimeter, under normal conditions as well as upon loss of all AC power. The security lighting system complies with the E Intent of NUREG CR-1327.
The emergency lighting system is used to provide acceptable levels of illumination throughout the station and particularly in areas where emergency operations are performed, such as control rooms, battery rooms, containment, etc., upon loss of the normal i lighting system. j 9.5.3.2 System Description I
9.5.3.2.1 Normal Lighting System The Normal Lighting System provides general illumination throughout the plant in accordance with illumination levels recommended by the Illuminating Engineering Society.
Incandescent lighting is used in the Containment Building while incandescent, fluorescent and high intensity discharge lighting is provided in the remainder of the plant and on the plant site.
Power for the Normal Lighting System is provided independently f rom the Normal Auxiliary Power System via dry-type transformers and lighting panelboards.
[J' .
Amendment E 9.5-11 December 30, 1988
1 l
CESSAR EHLa l Indoor lighting is designed for continuous operation. Switching O
is by individual plant circuit breakers except in office areas.
Outdoor lighting is controlled by photocells. j The normal lighting system is considered part of the plant I permanent non-safety systems. As such, the normal lighting system is energized as long as power from an offsite power source I or a standby non-safety source is available. )
Normal system operation is not affected by the failure or unavailability of a single lighting transformer. !
I The circuits to the individual lighting fixtures are staggered as j much as possible to ensure some lighting is retained in a room in {
the event of a circuit failure.
9.5.3.2.2 Security Lighting System l The security lighting system is considered part of the permanent non-safety systems and is fed from an uninterruptible power j supply connected to a non-safety battery. The security lighting l system, therefore, remains energized as long as power from an offsite power source, a standby non-safety source, or a non-safety battery is available.
The security lighting system is designed to provide a minimum illumination of 0.2 foot-candles when measured horizontally at I I
ground level. E 9.5.3.2.3 Emergency Lighting The emergency lighting system achieves illumination units of at least 10 foot-candles in those areas of the plant where emergency operations are performed which could require reading of printed l or written material or the reading of scales and legends. These areas are typically control rooms or local control stations. In other areas of the plant, the emergency lighting achieves a minimum illumination level of 2 foot-candles.
The emergency lighting is accomplished by two systems:
A. Conventional AC fixtures fed from class 1E AC power sources, and B. DC self contained, battery-operated lighting units.
O Amendment E 9.5-12 December 30, 1988
CESSAR Ennficarian r^
(x Both systems are qualified Class 1E. For all emergency conditions both systems are considered operational except in emergencies involving some loss of Class 1E power, adequate illumination in those areas which could be involved in recovery, e.g., electrical distribution control panels and the emergency .
generators and their contents, depend only on the DC l self-contained battery operated lights.
The DC self contained, battery-operated light units meets the following requirements: j l
A. The battery life is at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> at rated load. l l
B. The loading is not greater than 80% of the rated capacity with additional derating for temperature variations, where {
appropriate. {
l C. A time delay is provided so that the lights turn off on the resumption of power only after there is adequate time for the normal lighting to restart.
D. Provision is made to lock the power supply breakers which supply the units in the " energized" position. E 9.5.3.3 Inspection and Testing Requirements j l All lighting systems are inspected, checked, and tested for operability after installation to assure proper operation and coverage. Continuous use of the Normal Lighting System provides the bases for testing the system.
l l
I l
l 0
Amendment E 9.5-13 December 30, 1988
CESSAR 8lninCADON O
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLA!1K O
O Amendment E 9.5-14 December 30, 1988
CESSAR nahnou TABLE 9.5.3-1 1 (Sheet 1 of 2)
TJPICAL ILLUMINANCE RANGES FOR NORMAL LIGHTING Rormal Inter (or Areas Illuminance Ranges Auxiliary Building, Uncontrolled 10-20 foot-candles Access Areas Controlled Access Areas Count Room 50-100 foot- candles Laboratories 50-100 foot-candles Health Physics Offices 100-200 foot-candles Medical Aid Room 100-200 foot-candles Hot Laundry 20-50 foot-candles Storage Room 10-20 foot-candles Engineered Safety Features Equipment 20-50 foot-candles l
Battery Room 20-50 foot-candles E Diesel Generator Building 20-50 foot-candles Fuel Handling Building Operating Floor 20-50 foot-candles Below Operating Floor 10-20 foot-candles Off Gas Building 10-20 foot-candles Radwaste Building 20-50 foot-candles Reactor Building Operating Flcor 20-50 foot-candles Below Operating Floor 10-20 foot-candles Control Rooms Main Control Boards 20-50 foot-candles Auxiliary Control Panels 20-50 foot-candles Operators Station 50-100 foot-candles Turbine Building Operator Floor 20-50 foot-candles Below Operating Floor 10-20 foot-candles Amendment E December 30, 1988
1 CESSARnaincu.
O1 IABL_E ').5.3-1 (Cont'd) l (Sheet 2 of 2)
TJP_LCAL IL1MiLNANCE RANGES FOR NORMAL LIGHTING I
Norma,l_LnfeM or Areas Illuminance Raqges Switchgear & Motor Control Center 20-50 foot-candles HVAC Equipment Areas 5-10 foot-candles Normal Exterior Areas 2-5 foot-candles O
i O
Amendment E Decembe" 30, 1988 I
CESSARn!Mnc-A U
9.5.4 DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE FUEL OIL SYSTEM 9.5.4.1 Desion Bases The Diesel Generator Engine Fuel Oil System is designed to provide for storage of a seven-day supply of fuel oil . for each diesel generator engine and to supply the fuel oil to the engine, as necessary, to drive the emergency generator. The system is designed to meet the single failure criterion, and to withstand !
l the effects of natural phenomena without the loss of operabil'ity.
9.5.4.2 System Description 9.5.4.2.1 Gep0ral A separate and complete fuel oil storage and transfer system is provided for each diesel generator engine. Two underground ;
storage tanks provide fuel oil for each engine, which- is cufficient to operate at full load for a period of time no less than seven days plus a margin to allow periodic testing.
Fuel oil is transferred by gravity from the storage tanks to the day tank which is located within rataining walls inside the Diesel Generator Building. The day tank has a sufficient E capacity of fuel oil to operate the diesel generator engine in excess of 60 minutes at full load. A set of level switches located within the day tank control the position of the fuel oil transfer valve: opening the valve to allow fuel to flow to the day tank at low level; closing the valve to shut off the supply of fuel at high level. High and low level alarms are also provided both on the storage tanks and on the day tank. In the l event of a transfer valve failure in the closed position, the day tank low level alarm, indicating 60 minutes of fuel reserve at full load, allows the operat ; to take corrective action. In such an event, a bypass line allows for manual filling of the day tank. In the event of a transfer valve in the open position, fuel oil would continue to flow from the storage tanks to the day tanks until the system reached hydrostatic equilibrium. Since .
there is no day tank overflow pipe, fuel oil would rise in the l day tank vent pipe to an elevation equivalent to that of the fuel oil in the storage tank, but well below the top of the vent.
During normal operation, fuel oil is pumped from the day tank to the engine by the engine driven fuel oil pump. The motor-driven fuel oil booster pump is normally isolated both electrically and ,
mechanically, but may be operated if required during maintenance.
The day tank provides sufficient positive suction to both the motor-driven fuel oil booster pump and the engine-driven fuel oil pump.
- O Amendment E 9.5-15 December 30, 1988
CESSARMaibmu O
Each pump is provided with a duplex suction strainer and a discharge pressure relief valve, and an engine-mounted dual element fuel oil filter is provided on the common dis. charge header. Pressure gauges are located on the inlet and outlet sides of both strainers for local indication and an alarm is provided with each strainer to alert the operator of high differential pressure. Differential pressure indication and a high differential pressure alarm are also provided with the fuel oil filter.
Two fuel oil drip headers, one located on each bank of the diesel generator engine, contain unburned fuel leakage within the engine. The unburned fuel is removed from the drip headers through a piloted valve and ejector driven by the pressurized fuel oil return from the bypass headers to the day tank. The main circulation headers are fitted with a relief valve which prevents the engine fuel oil pressure from exceeding a certain maximum and which discharges back to the day tank.
The day tank is surrounded by a fire wall which serves as a containment in the event of leaks or ruptures. The containment drain line is isolated by a normally closed, solenoid-operated valvo. A high level signal from a level transmitter located within the containment opens this valve, allowing the oil to drain to the auction side of the lube oil transfer pump which is simultaneously activated and delivers the oil to a waste oil storage tank. E To prevent settling, stratification and deterioration of the fuel oil during extended periods, a system is provided to recirculate or transfer filtered fuel oil. Four fuel oil tanks (two half capacity storage tanks per redundant diesel) are centrally located and integrally connected with normally closed isolation valves and check valves to prevent backfilling and possible contamination of fuel oil between tanks. A manually operated, positive displacement recirculation pump takes suction from the flush mounted sample connection on the bottom of the storage tank and discharges the fuel oil through a simplex filter with alternate bypass line to the storage tank fill connection. The filtering and recirculation process is performed on a tank by tank basis with the frequency of operation dependent on the results of a fuel oil inspection program. Since two half capacity storage tanks are provided per diesel, one tank will be l aligned to supply fuel oil to its respective diesel while l isolating the second tank through administrative control. The l contents of the isolated storage tank would be filtered and recirculated. Prior to realigning the tank to its respective .
diesel, a period of not less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is required to allow l any stirred sediment to settle. !
i i
Amendment E '
9.5-16 December 30, 1988 j l l.
CESSARn h o i
Should the recirculation system be operating in the event of a LOCA, a redundant, safety related interlock is provided to shutdown the recirculation pump to prevent possible stirring of cediment. A redundant safety-related interlock is also provided to shutdown the recirculation pump should the fuel oil in the storage tanks drop below a level to preclude loss of fuel oil in ,
i the event of a recirculation system pipe rupture.
These two safety-related and redundant interlocks protect the Diesel Concrator Fuel Oil System during operation of the recirculation system. They assure uninterrupted operation of the essential emergency diesels in the event of a Loss of Offsite Power or LOCA.
Fuel oil amenders are added as necessary to extend oil life by preventing oxidation and stratification. A sample is used to inspect the oil for water content or degradation and if degradation is determined, the oil may be pumped out for disposal. Accumulated water in the fuel oil storage tanks will i be removed by the recirculation system through a sample )
connection provided on the recirculation pump discharge.
The day tank vent and fuel oil storage tank vents and fill O connections which are exposed outdoors, are protected from tornado missiles due to the construction of the vents using heavy gauge pipe. Each fill connection is provided with a locking dust cap and each vent line is down turned. The storage tanks can be filled and vented through the manway should the fill or vent lines become impaired. E 9.5.4.2.2 Component Description !
Fuel is recirculated within the storage facility to prevent deterioration by a recirculation pump.
The motor-driven fuel oil booster pump is normally isolated, both electrically and mechanically, but may be operated if required during maintenance to deliver fuel oil to the diesel.
9.5.4.3 Safety Evaluation The Diesel Generator Engine Fuel Oil System is a ANSI Class 3 piping system with the exception of the Fuel Oil Recirculation System and the fuel oil storage tank fill line strainer which are ANSI Class 4 piping systems. The Fuel Oil Recirculation System and the fuel oil storage tank fill line strainer are separated from the essential Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System by normally p closed ANSI Class 3 isolation valves. An ANSI Class 4 flexible
( rubber hose is used to connect the ANSI Class 4 fill line
' strainer to the ANSI Class 3 fuel oil storage tank fill lines.
The diesel engine and engine mounted components are constructed Amendment E 9.5-17 December 30, 1988
CESSARnsLmu I
I O
in accordance with IEEE Standard 387. The fuel oil system is designed and constructed in compliance with ANSI Standard N195, except in regards to an overflow line from the day tank, the flame arresters on the storage tanks, and excluding all q references to fuel oil transfer p!1mps. I Each diesel generator unit is housed separately in a Seismic Category I structure. i l
Diesel fuel oil 2D, as specified by ASTM D975, is normally ]
delivered to the site by private carriers. The fuel oil storage capacity is based on continuous operation of the diesel generator )
engines at rated load for a period of seven days. A 10 percent margin in storage capacity is provided to preclude the necessity of refilling the tanks following routine performance testing.
The exterior of carbon steel tanks and other underground carbon steel componcnts is coated. In addition to being coated, the ;
external surfaces of buried metallic piping and tanks are l protected from corrosion by an impressed current cathodic protection system in accordance with NACE Standard RP-01-69, t
The interior of the fuel oil storage tanks are not coated since 1 the presence of fuel oil will act as a deterrent to internal corrosion. Requirements assure that the fuel oil storage tanks are maintained essentially full to provide a seven day supply.
During surveillance intervals for sampling the fuel oil in the storage tanks, any accumulated water or sediment detected will be removed via the Fuel Oil Recirculation System. The fuel oil E storage tanks are set at a level above the normal ground water ]
table. j During normal operation of the diesel any accumulated sediment in the bottom of the fuel oil storage tanks is prevented from entering the supply line to the day tank since the outlet connection is raised 6 inches above the storage tank floor.
During the addition of new fuel oil, degradation or failure of '
the diesel generator engine due to stirring of sediments is prevented by a two tank system. Two half capacity fuel oil .
storage tanks par redundant diesel provide the ability to operate I I
the diesel off one tank while isolating and filling the adjacent tank. Prior to the addition of new fuel oil either during an accident or when " topping-off" the fuel oil storage tank, the i diesel would be aligned to one tank while the tank to be filled l would be isolated through administrative control. After filling !
the storage tank, a period of not less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> must be allotted to allow sediment to settle prior to realigning the tank O
Amendment E 9.5-18 December 30, 1988 l
)
CESSAR Ennnem:,.
C J
to its respectivo diesel. In the event of an accident (blackout or LOCA), a sufficient reserve of fuel oil will be maintained to allow the diesel to operate off one storage tank while refilling the adjacent fuel oil storage tank, allowing. for a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> i settling period. 1 To minimize the chances of a fire in the fuel oil system, piping is routed such that it is remote from other piping and equipment with potentially hot surfaces and from any source of open flame or sparks. The fuel oil day tank is protected by a fire barrier.
There are no high energy lines within the diesel generator building and all moderate energy lines are properly supported and restrained to prevent damage to safety-related systems, piping and components resulting from line failure.
9.5.4.4 Inspection and Testinc7 Recruirements System components and piping are tested to pressures designated by appropriate codes. Inspection and functional testing are performed prior to initial operation.
E 9.5.4.5 Instrumentation Application t
'v Each diesel generator engine is provided with sufficient instrumentation to monitor the operation of the fuel oil system.
All alarms are separately annunciated on the local diesel engine control panel which also signals a general' diesel trouble alarm in the control room. There are two redundant safety related interlocks provided on the fuel oil recirculation system. One interlock is provided to shutdown the recirculation pump in the even of a LOCA. The s cmd interlock is provided to shutdown the recirculation pump should 'he fuel oil level in the storage tanks drop below a specified level. The fuel oil system is provided with the following instrumentation and alarms:
A. Fuel oil storage tanks
- 1. Low level and high level annunciators.
- 2. Technical specification low-low level alarm.
- 3. Level indication, 0-100%.
- 4. The capability for use of a stick gauge to measure the fuel oil level.
O b
Amendment E 9.5-19 December 30, 1988
CESSAR MnCATION O
B. Fuel oil recirculation filter
- 1. Inlet and outlet pressure indication.
C. Fuel oil day tank
- 1. Fuel oil transfer valve control.
- 2. High level alarm.
- 3. Low level alarm.
- 4. Level indication.
D. Fuel oil strainers (Engine-driven pump and motor-driven booster pump)
- 1. High differential pressure alarm - Alerts the operator to take corrective action by manually switching over to the alternate clean strainer.
- 2. Inlet and outlet pressure indication.
E. Fuel oil filter E
- 1. High differential pressure alarm - Alerts the operator to take corrective action by manually switching over to the alternate clean filter.
- 2. Differential pressure indication. .
l
- 3. Outlet pressure indication.
- 4. Low fuel oil pressure alarm.
F. Day tank retaining wall
- 1. High and low level drain valve and lube oil transfer pump control.
- 2. High-high level alarm.
9.5.5 DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE COOLING WATER SYSTEM 9.5.5.1 Desion Bases The Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System is designed to maintain the temperature of the diesel generator engine within an j optimum operating range during standby and during full-load i Amendment E 9.5-20 December 30, 1988
i CESSAR !!nha !
m operation in order to assure its fast starting and load-accepting capability and to reduce thermal stresses. The system is also designed to supply cooling water to the engine lube oil cooler, the combustion air aftercoolers, and the governor lube oil cooler.
9.5.5.2 System Descripilom A separate and complete closed-loop cooling water system i,s provided for each diesel generator engine, receiving makeup water from the Demineralized Water Syutem and uses as it's sink the Component Cooling Water System. A surge tank, the jacket water standpipe located in the diesel generator building, provides positive suction pressure for the circulation pump and for th'e keep warm pump. The keep warm pump, which is electric motor-driven, operates continuously during engine standby to assure that the system is completely filled with water. When the diesel starts, the circulation pump, which is engine mounted and engine-driven, would operate to circulate cooling water through the closed loop system.
From the circulation pump, the cooling water passes through a three-way thermostatic control valve which regulates the flow of (O / water through the shell side of the jacket water cooler by diverting varying amounts through a bypass line. From the jacket water cooler, the cooling water flows through the tube side of either the lube oil cooler or the combustion air aftercoolers and E then through the engine itself, returning to the standpipe. A small fraction of the flow from the discharge side of the combustion air aftercooler is divotted to the engine governor lube oil cooler.
In order to keep the engine warm during standby, water which is circulated by the keep warm pump passes over a set of thermostatically-controlled electric heating elements before leaving the standpipe. From the keep warm pump, the water bypasses the jacket water cooler and thermostatic valve and thereafter follows the same path described above for the circulation pump flow. When the diesel starts and has attained rated speed, power to the heater and keep warm pump is automatically shut off and is automatically staited when the diesel is shut down if the switch is in the auto mode.
Corrosion inhibiting agents will be added to the engine cooling water by means of a chemical pot feeder unit, which can be connected to the system whenever necessary. These additives will be compatible with the materials which makeup the cooling water
(~N) system, and will assure proper system performance by maintaining n a water chemistry in accordance with Manufacturer's recommendations.
Amendment E 9.5-21 December 30, 1988
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9.5.5.2.2 Component Description The diesel generator engine cooling water system removes heat '
from the engine lube oil system via the lube oil cooler, thereby reducing the lube oil temperature. Oil flows on the shell side while cooling water flows through the tube side and cooling water temperature increases.
As combustion air leaves the turbocharger and before it enters the intake manifold, it passes through an aftercooler where its temperature drops. Cooling water flows through the tube side, removing heat, and water temperature increases.
A small portion of the cooling water leaving the aftercooler is diverted the engine governor lube oil cooler.
Total cooling water system flow circulates through the engine water jacket, removing heat.
Cooling water enters the jacket water cooler and begins its flow through the system, again. The component cooling water system provides the heat sink for the cooling water system.
The design margin for each of tha above-mentioned components is approximately 10%.
The jacket water keep warm pump provides standby circulation flow to maintain the engine in a warmed condition. The water is heated by an immersion-type heater in the jacket water standpipe.
The heater is a thermostatically-controlled unit and the source of power for each is the Essential Auxiliary Power Supply.
A standpipe is provided in the cooling water system to accommodate coolant expansion and venting due to temperature j changes and to compensate for system losses due to minor leaks j and evaporation. The standpipe is equipped with a low level j alarm which is set below the normal operating water level. All j the water between the alarm set level down to the minimum water :
level is available for system make-up. The engine-driven l circulation pump receives suction head from the standpipe.
In the event a tube leak should develop in the jacket water !
cooler or the lube oil cooler, the Diesel Generator Cooling Water !
System would continue to maintain jacket water temperature. The Diesel Generator Cooling Water System operates at a lower i pressure than the Component Cooling Water System (sink) and the lube oil system. Leakage from either of these systems into the cooling water system would cause the jacket water standpipe to overflow into the Diesel Generator Building sump. Initiation of Amendment E i 9.5-22 December 30, 1988
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the diesel sump pumps would activate a local alarm on the engine control panel and a common diesel alarm in the control room to alert the operator. The diesel, however, remains operable.
Should a severe leak in the cooling water system develop, the jacket water low level alarm would alert the operator.
9.5.5.3 g_afety Evaluation The Diesel Generator Engine Cooling Water System is a ANSI Class 3 pioing system. The diesel engine and engine mounted components are constructed in accordance with IEEE Standard 387. All essential off engine equipment and components are designed in l accordance with the requirements of the applicable codes. Each diesel generator unit is housed separately in a seismic Category I structure which forms one half of the Diesel Generator Building, and the unit themselves are fully independent and redundant.
In order *o climinate air pockets in the cooling water system, components and piping are vented during initial filling of the system. Once filled, the height of the vented jacket water standpipe ensures that both the keep-warm pump and circulation l pump suction piping and the remaining system is filled with O water. During standby and startup, any air trapped in the system is displaced by the pump discharge.
9.5.5.4 Inspection __and Testina Requirements System components and piping are tested to pressures designated by appropriate codes. Inspection and functional testing are performed prior to initial operation; therefore, the system will l be tested in accordance with the technical specifications.
9.5.5.5 Instrumentation Application Each diesel generator engine is provided with sufficient instrumentation and alarms to monitor the operation of the cooling water system. All a? arms are separately annunciated on the local diesel engine control panel which also signals a general diesel alarm in the control room. The following tempera-ture, pressure, and level sensors will annunciate when they l exceed setpoints.
A. Low-Pressure Jacket Water B. Low-Level Jacket Water Standpipe C. Low-Temperature Jacket Water In i
N Amendment E 9.5-23 December 30, 1988
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D. Low-Temperature Jacket Water Out j E. !!igh-Temperature Jacket Water In F. High-Temperature Jacket Out Trip G. liigh-liigh Temperature Jacket Water Out Trip The high-high temperature alarm will affect a diesel engine trip if the engine is in the test mode. This is to prevent damage to the engine. Ilowever, if such an alarm is received during the emergency mode (e.g., Loss of Offsite Power or LOCA) the trip l signal is locked out and the engine continues to run. The l high-high alarm in the emergency condition alerts the operator to prepare to switchover to the redundant diesel.
The engine jacket water inlet and outlet temperatures are also recorded by a multipoint recorder and may be monitored by a multi-channel pyrometer (in the manual mode). Both the recorder and pyrometer are located on the generator control panel in the i diesel building.
The periodic testing and maintenance of all diesel engine cooting water system instruments is controlled by a preventative maintenance program. This program insures that instruments are periodically calibrated and tested, assuring reliability.
9.5.6 DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE STARTING AIR SYSTEM E 9.5.6.1 Desicr Bases The Diesel Generator Engine Starting Air System is designed to provide fast start capability for the diesel generator engine by using compressed air to rotate the engine until combustion begins and it accelerates under its own power.
9.5.6.2 System Description 9.5.6.2.1 General Each diesel generator engine is provided with two independent starting air systems, each consisting of a compressor and aftercooler, a filter / dryer unit, air receivers, injection lines and valves, and devices to crank the engine.
Ambient air from within the diesel room is compressed, cooled, filtered, dried, filtered again and then stored until needed in receiver tanks. The starting air storage capacity for each redundant diesel engine is sufficient for a minimum of five successful engine starts without the use of the air compressor.
a Amendment E 9.5-24 December 30, 1988 q l
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V Starting air is supplied to the diesel generator engine by four starting air solenoid valves, with each valve supplying starting air to one end of the two cylinder banks on the engine. The starting air enters the left and right bank starting air manifolds which are interconnected withir the engine to allow the capability of one or all the starting air solenoid valves operating to start the engine. From there, starting air is directed to- both the left and right bank starting air distributors which admit the air to the individual cylinders, on their respective banks, in firing order sequence to rotate the i engine. The combined starting air manifold also supplies starting air to the governor oil pressure boost cylinder which acts as an accelerator pump to ensure the diesel attains rated speed after receiving an automatic diesel start signal.
The starting air receiver tanks also supply air at reduced pressure to the engine control panel instrumentation. Air enters the engine control panel where it- is filtered and a self-contained pressure regulator maintains constant pressure for the diesel automatic safety shutdown system. The automatic I safety shutdown system is made up of a network of vent on fault pneumatic devices which monitor the engines parameters, tripping.
the engine when a manufacture's recommended temperature, E pressure, overspeed, or vibration setpoint has been exceeded.
./ There are two types of engine trips. Group "A" trips are active -
only during the periodic testing of the diesel to prevent damage -
to the engine and are locked out during the emergency mode (i.e., .
LOOP or LOCA) allowing the engine to continue to run. Group "A" trips include and are activated upon: low lube oil pressure, low left and right turbocharger oil pressure, high crankcase pressure, excessive engine vibration, high lube oil temperature, ;
high temperature main bearings, and high-high jacket water .
temperature. Group "B" trips remain active during the emergency '
)
mode to shutdown the engine should a setpoint be exceeded. Group "B" trips include and are activated upon; engine overspeed, !
low-low lube oil pressure, and generator differential. The low-low lube oil pressure trip contains redundant (two out of three) logic which must be affected to activate a diesel shutdown. The pneumatic logic for Group "A" and "B" trips consumes negligible volume, operating on pressure rather than flow capacity. Sufficient air pressure remains available for operating the pneumatic logic following five successive start attempts. In addition, the starting air compressors, air dryers, aftercoolers, piping and valves are seismic Category I, seismically qualified to remain operable following a design basis carthquake. The starting air compressors and air dryers receive Class 1E power from their associated diesel.
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Relief valves on the compressor discharge line and on the air l receiver tanke protect the starting air system from l overpressurization.
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9.5.6.2.2 Component Description j The starting air compressors are driven by electric motors which are powered from the Essential Auxiliary Power Supply. Each compressor discharges compressed air and the heat of compression is removed by a water-cooled aftercooler. The component cooling water system provides cooling water on the tube side.
To minimize the accumulation of moisture, the diesel engine l
starting air system is equipped with a multi-stage drying and I filtering unit located in line between the aftercooler and the rocciver tank. The air is first thrown through a cyclone-type moisture separator and is filtered before entering one of two alternating desiccant drying towers (alternating between active and regeneration cycles). The air is then filtered a second time before entering the receiver tank.
To minimize fouling of the starting air valves or filters with contaminants, drip-traps are provided on the cyclone-type moisture separator and the air dryer pre-filter to collect any oil carryover. Drains are also provided on the aftercooler and a l'r receiver tanks. Periodic blowdown of the drip-traps and E drain valves will minimize the buildup of contaminants in the starting air system. Strainers are provided upstream of the starting air solenoid valves to prevent rust carryover to the diesels.
Two starting air receiver tanks for each diesel engine provide storage capacity which is sufficient to allow five successful engine starts without the use of the compressor.
1 9.5.6.3 Safety Evaluation The Diesel Generator Engine Starting Air System is ANSI Class 4 from the starting air compressor through the desiccant drying towers, and ANSI Class 3 from the starting air receiver tank inlet check valve to the engine connections. The diesel engine and engine mounted components are constructed in accordance with IEEE Standard 387. The starting air aftercooler, which uses component cooling water on its tube side and the starting air receiver tank are designed in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Class 3.
The starting air compressor and the starting air dryer are designed in accordance with the requirements of the applicable codes.
Amendment E 9.5-26 December 30, 1988
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O 9.5.6.4 Inspection and Testing Requirements System components and piping are tested to pressures designated {
by appropriate codes. Inspection and functional testing are -
i performed prior to initial operation. Therefore, the system will be tested in accordance with the technical specifications.
Periodic blowdown of the starting air tanks is done to check for moisture. The frequency will be determined based upon operating 2
experience.
Air dryer desiccant is inspected per the manufacturers recommendations (approximately every six months).
9.5.6.5 Instrumentation Application Each starting air receiver is equipped with a set of pressure switches which control the operation of the air compressor on its f associated train; starting the compressor on low pressure and l stopping the compressor on high pressure. Pressure gauges are located on the tanks for local indication with a low pressure alarm. A separate pressure switch on the engine control panel alarms if the air receiver tank pressure falls to a low setpoint.
It the starting air pressure to the starting air manifold drops to a specified value with the engine failing to start, an automatic lockout will present further start attempts and an E alarm alerts the operator to take corrective action. The automatic lockout ensures there will be sufficient reserve for a manual restart.
All starting air system alarms are annunciated separately on the local diesel engine control panel and signals a general diesel trouble alarm in the control room.
The periodic testing and maintenance of all diesel engine cooling water system instruments is controlled by a preventative maintenance program. This program insures that instruments are periodically calibrated and tested, assuring reliability.
9.5.7 DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE LUBE OIL SYSTEM 9.5.7.1 Design Bases The Diesel Generator Engine Lube Oil System is designed to deliver clean lubricating oil to the diesel generator engine, its bearings and crankshaft, and other moving parts. By means of es heaters, the lube oil system is designed to deliver warmed oil to
( the engine during standby to assure its fast-starting and Amendment E 9.5-27 December 30, 1988
"r" CESSAR CERTIFICATION load-accepting capability. The system also provides a means by O '
which used oil may be drained from the engine and its components, and replaced with clean oil. 1 1
9.5.7.2 System Description 1
9.5.7.2.1 General l l
Each diesel generator unit utilizes the " dry sump" lube oil J' system, in which the supply of lubricating oil for the engine is stored in a separate sump tank, independent of, and set at a lower elevation than the engine crankcase. As oil accumulates in the crankcase, it drains by gravity into the sump tank.
Additions of clean oil are made to the sump tank from a storage tank located underground and outside the Diesel Generator Building, and used oil is removed from the sump tank via a transfer pump to a used oil storage tank.
The engine-driven lube oil pump picks up oil from the sump tank through a built-in suction pipe with foot valve and delivers the oil in sequence from the pump discharge first to the oil pressure regulating valves which limit the maximum pressure on the pump discharge, and then in series through the lube oil cooler, the full-flow lube oil filter and finally to the full-flow lube oil strainer. From the strainer, the oil enters the engine internal circulation system. E I
During engine standby, the motor-driven prelube oil pump operates I continuously to ensure complete filling of the lube oil system.
011 which in circulated by the prelube oil pump passes over a set of thermostatically controlled electric heating elements before leaving the cump tank to maintain the engine in a warmed state.
From the prelube oil pump, the oil passes in series through the prelube all filter, the prelube oil strainer and enters the engine internal circulation system. A separate drip lube system provides a continuous, metered flow of oil to the turbocharger bearings during engine standby to ensure adequate bearing lubrication for startup.
The diesel generator engine crankcase is vented to the atmosphere through the roof of the Diesel Generator Building. The lube oil filters and strainers are also vented, but into the room itself.
The lube oil sump tank is vented to the atmosphere through the roof. The crankcase is equippc:d with blowout panels to prevent high pressures from damaging the engine.
The design of the lube oil storage tank is provided with an individual fill and vent line located outdoors. To prevent entrance of water into the storage tanks the vent and fill lines terminate above grade elevation. The fill connection is provided with a locking dust cap and the vent is down turned.
Amendment E 9.5-28 December 30, 1988
CESSAR n!%ma Each diesel is provided with a lube oil sump tank. The sump tank is equipped with a low level alarm which is set below the normal operating level. With an established oil consumption at full load, this volume is sufficient to operate the diesel in excess of seven days without requiring replenishment.
Should it become necessary to make additions of lube oil to the diesel, lube oil is available in a storage tank located underground and outside' - the' Diesel Generator Building. A manually operated, positive displacement clean lube oil pump takes suction from the storage tank and discharges lube oil through a simplex filter to the intended diesel. The pump suction is raised above the storage tank - floor to prevent any accumulated water from entering the diesel lube oil sump tank.
Accumulated water in the bottom of the storage tank is removed through a sample connection flush on the bottom of storage tank.
The lube oil in the cican lube oil storage tank is inspected monthly to determine the purity of the oil. Parameters monitored include viscosity, neutralization number, and percentage of-water. Any accumulated water detected in the bottom of the storage tank will be removed. If degradation of the oil is detected, the oil may be pumped out for disposal.
( Lubricating oil leakage is detected by: E A. Routine surveillance ]
B. Low lube oil sump levels alarm C. Low lube oil pressure and alarm System leakage into the lube oil system through the jacket water is minimized by the normal operating pressure of the lube oil i being higher than the jacket water pressure. Oil leakage from ;
the diesel is collected in a sump in the diesel room.
The truck fill connection for clean lubricating oil is locked and is keyed differently from other fill connections. Administrative i controls govern the issuance of this key.
l Periodic monitoring of the level instrumentation associated with the lube oil sump tank may indicate leakage of oil from the system. Corrections will be made in accordance with applicable operating and maintenance procedures. Makeup to the system is manually initiated from the clean oil storage tank.
Amendment E l 9.5-29 December 30, 1988
CESSAR inn"lCATION 9.5.7.2.2 Component Description O
During operation of the diesel generator engine, heat is removed ,
from the lube oil system via the lube oil cooler. Oil flows on the shell side while cooling water flows through the tube side.
The lube oil temperature drops while the water temperature l increases. A 10% design margin is built into the cooler, !
assuring that the system is maintained in accordance with Manufacturers recommendation.
The lube oil transfer pump moves oil from the lube oil sump tank l to the used oil storage tank. The pump is driven by an electric i motor. !
The prelube oil pump delivers warmed oil to the engine during standby. The pump is driven by an electric motor.
l Two lube oil sump tank heaters are provided to keep the oil warm and fluid during engine standby. The heaters are electric immersion-type heaters.
The above-mentioned motors and heaters are powered from the Essential Auxiliary Power Supply.
The clean lube oil transfer pump delivers oil from the clean lube oil storage tank to the lube oil sump tank. It is driven by an electric motor.
The used lube oil trartsfer pump transfers oil from the used lube oil storage tank to a truck or tanker for disposal. The pump is driven by an electric motor.
The clean and used lube oil transfer pump motors are powered from the Station Normal Auxiliary Power Supply.
9.5.7.3 Safety Evaluation The Diesel Generator Engine Lube Oil System is an ANSI Class 3 piping system with the exception of the Clean and Used Lube Oil Transfer System which is an ANSI Class 4 piping system. The two systems are separated by ANSI Class 3 isolation valves. The diesel engine and engine mounted components are constructed in accordance with IEEE Standard 387. The off engine essential equipment and components and the nonessential (i.e., Clean and Used Lube Oil Transfer System) equipment and components are designed in accordance with the requirements of the applicable codes.
O Amendment E 9.5-30 December 30, 1988
CESSAREEb-The exterior of carbon steel tanks and other underground carbon stcol components is sandblasted to a SSPC-SP10-63, Near White Metal Dlast cleanir.g. A coal tar epoxy coating which meets the requirements of Corps of Engineers Specification C-200 and Government Specification MIL-P-23236 is applied to- exterior surfaces at a dry film thickness of 16 mils. This coal tar epoxy is also applied to the exterior of stainless steel piping.
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In addition to being coated, the external surfaces of buried metallic piping and tanks are protected -from corrosion by an impressed current cathodic protection system in accordance with i NACE Standard RP-01-69 Periodic monitoring, as described by the maintenance procedure, will remove any accumulated moisture from the tanks.
The governor lube oil coolers on the diesel generator engines are located at an elevation below the governor lube oil level, thereby, not affecting the starting reliability of the engines.
The interior of the cl e c.. lube oil storage tank is not coated since the presence of lube oil will act as a deterrent to internal corrosion. During the surveillance intervals for A. sampling the lube oil in the storage tanks, any accumulated water E will be removed.
9.5.7.4 I.nspection and Testina Requirements System components and piping are tested.to pressures designated by appropriate codes. Inspection and functional testing are performed prior to initial operation. l 9.5.7.5 Instrumentation Application I Each diesel generator engine is provided with sufficient instrumentation and alarms to monitor the operation of the lube oil system. All alarms are separately annunciated on the local diesel engine control panel which also signals a general diesel trouble alarm in the control room. The lube oil system is provided with the following instrumentation and alarms:
The lube oil sump tank is equipped with a local level indicator along with a low level annunciator to alert the operator to take corrective action.
The full flow filters are equipped with locally-mounted pressure gauges. A high differential pressure alarm alerts the operator to manually switchover to the alternate clean filter; there is no p bypass.
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s Amendment E 9.5-31 December 30, 1988
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The engine mounted full flow strainers are equipped with a high differential pressure alarm which alerts the operator to manually switchover to the alternate clean strainer; there is no bypass.
The diesel generator engine is equipped with both temperature and preasure monitoring systems with separate alarm and trip switches to a le rt- the operator of abnormal operating conditions. If a shutdown setpoint/ alarm is exceeded while the engine is operating during the test mode, a diesel trip will automatically shutdown the engine to prevent incurring any damage.
However, if such a shutdown / alarm is received during the emergency mode (i.e., LOOP or LOCA) the trip is locked out and the engine continues to run. The alarms alert the operator to j prepare to switch over to the redundant diesel for power. Only a )
low-low engine lube oil pressure shutdown / alarm will trip the engine regardless of the diesel operating mode.
The engine inlet and outlet lube oil temperatures are also recorded by a multipoint recorder and may be monitored by a multi-channel pyrometer (in manual mode). Both the recorder and pyrometer are located on the generator control panel in the diesel generator building.
The periodic testing and maintenance of all diesel engine lube oil system instruments is controlled by a preventative l maintenance program. This program insures that instruments are periodically calibrated and tested, assuring reliability.
9.5.8 DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINE AIR INTAKE AND EXHAUST SYSTEM 9.5.8.1 Des _ign Bases The Diesel Generator Engine Air Intake and Exhaust System is designed to supply clean air for combustion to the diesel generator engine and to dispose of the engines exhaust. The system is housed in a building designed to withstand the ef fects of natural phenomena and credible missiles.
9.5.8.2 System Description !
9.5.8.2.1 General I
Each diesel generator is provided with a two pipe combustion air intake system. Combustion air is drawn in through in line air filters prior to entering the turbocharger.
O Amendment E 9.5-32 December 30, 1988
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Each diesel generator is provided with a two pipe exhaust system.
The waterjacketed exhaust manifold discharges directly into the engine-mounted turbocharger. The exhaust piping then joins to pass through a single exhaust silencer and exits the building.
Outside air intakes are located at one end of the building and exhausts (both Diesel and Ventilation System) at the opposite end of the structure. The intake and exhaust structures are separate for each diesel building and are similar in design. Each intak,e and exhaust structure is served by a 100% capacity floor drain.
In addition a sump, formed by the curb at the bottom of the intake and exhaust structures, provides capacity for preventing accumulation of snow, ice, or freezing rain from interfering with emergency diesel generator system operation.
9.5.8.2.2 Component Description The turbocharger, driven by the hot exhaust gases on one side, compresses the intake air on the other side and forces it through I i
the engine aftercooler.
l The aftercooler removes heat from the compressed intake air, l decreasing the air temperature. Cooling water flows through the tube side and its temperature increases.
9.5.8.3 Safety Evaluation The Diesel Generator Engine Air Intake and Exhaust System is an ANSI Class 3 piping system. The diesel engine and engine mounted components are constructed in accordance with IEEE Standard 387. '
The off engine essential components are designed in accordance with the requirements of the applicable codes. The intake ,
filter, intake silencer, and exhaust silencer are ASME Section I III Class 3 code approved. These components are seismically
- qualified by shaker table tests or analysis perfomed by the l manufacturer. The components are installed in the diesel generator building with Seismic Category I restraints.
The intake air plenum and the exhaust gas plenum for each diesel generator unit are at opposite ends of the diesel generator building. This fact and an analysis of the diesel generator engine exhaust using the normal ventilation flowrate is 5% of the diesel run mode ventilation flowrate. Normal ventilation is filtered to maintain engine room cleanliness. All diesel generator building interior surfaces are painted to minimize concrete dust. Diesel intake air is taken at a height of 10 feet above grade to minimize the intake of dust, e
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Amendment E 9.5-33 December 30, 1988
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O Primary fire protection is provided by an automatic carbon ,
dioxide system. The system is activated by temperature detectors l which alarm and annunciate in the control room.
9.5.8.4 Inspection s _and Testing Requirements ;
System components and piping are tested to pressures designated by appropriate codes. Inspection and functional testing are performed prior to initial operation.
9.5.8.5 Instrumentation _ Application Each diesel generator engine unit is provided with sufficient instrumentation and alarms to monitor the combustion inbake and exhaust system. A multipoint recorder on the local generator control panel records the individual cylinder exhaust temperatures and the inlet and outlet turbocharger exhaust ,
temperatures. A pyrometer, also on the local generator control l panel, automatically monitors each cylinder temperature and j compares it to the average temperature of the other cylinders.
The pyrometer will annunciate a high/ low temperature alarm on the local diesel engine contcol panel and signal a general diesel ,
trouble alarm in the control room if a cylinder temperature exceeds the average temperature differential setpoint, with the E
pyrometer automatic sequencer stopping to display the out-of-tolerance cylinder. A high or low exhaust temperature l will not effect a trip on the engine. A manual advance is also l provided on the pyrometer to allow each individual cylinder to be checked as well as the inlet and outlet turbocharger exhaust temperatures. The turbocharger temperatures do not affect the cylinder temperature averaging circuit.
9.5.9 DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING SUMP PUMP SYSTEM 9.5.9.1 Design Bases The Diesel Generator Building Sump Pump System is designed to i remove leakage and equipment drainage from the Diesel Generator !
Building and to protect the diesel generator units from flooding !
caused by a major pipe rupture.
9.5.9.2 System Description i Two sump pumps are provided in each diesel generator building, ,
The pumps are located in the pit below the lube oil sump tank. !
I 9.5.9.3 Safety Evaluation The Diesel Generator Building Sump Pump System is an ANSI Class 3 piping system and the pumps and system components are designed in Amendment E 9.5-34 December 30, 1988
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I accordance with the requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Class 3.
9.5.9.4 Ingpection and Testina Requirements System components and piping are tested to pressures designated by appropriate codes. Inspection and functional testing are performed prior to initial operation; thereafter, equipment not in continuous use is subject to periodic testing and visual inspection.
9.5.10 COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEMS 9.5.10.1 Design D3p_e_s The compressed gas supply systems are provided to supply various gases for equipment and instrumentation cooling, purging, diluting, inerting, and welding. The major items of equipment are the high pressure gas cylinders and pressure regulators to control the pressure and distribution of the'various gases used l throughout the plant. These compressed gas supply systems are !
non-safety-related and any failure does not jeopardize the l operation of any safety-related components or systems. E fn\
9.5.10.2 System Description The compressed gas systems are arranged into the following separate and isolated subsystems:
A. N System 2
liigh pressure Bulk Storage cylinders and High usage LN2 evaporators.
B. 11 System 2
liigh pressure cylinders. 11 Leak Detection system required.
2 C. O System 2
}{igh pressure cylinders. All distribution hardware shall be oil free with no combustibles and specifically rated for O 2
service.
D. CO System 2
lligh pressure cylinders. CO L ak Detection system 2
required.
b Amendment E 9.5-35 December 30, 1988
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l 9i E. Argon /Methano liigh pressure cylinders for use in radiation detection equipment.
F. Acetylene System i
Ifigh pressure cylinders for use in welding service I applications.
G. Argon System liigh pressure cylinders for use in inert welding service applications.
9.5.10.2.1 Valves All valves specified for compressed gas service are designed and rated specifically for gas service with resilient materials used for scaling surfaces. Valves are packless and utilize either diaphragm or bellows stem seals tc prevent or minimize potential gas leakage.
9.5.10.3 S_a.Lety Evaluatiorl The compressed gas supply systems serve no safety function.
The following System 80+ interface requirements are met:
A. Steam Generator Nitrogen is used to maintain a pressure of 5 psig in the {'
steam generator during shutdown. This nitrogen overpressure precludes oxygen buildup in the steam generator during outage and can also be used to displace steam generator water during outages requiring dry layup condition or draining operations (see Section 10.3.2.2).
B. Chemical and Volume Control System
- a. a minimum of 99.99 volume percent of nitrogen, and
- b. less than 5 ppm of oxygen.
Amendment E 9.5-36 December 30, 1988
I CESSAR HL"ica, s
- 6. A nitrogen supply to the boric acid concentrator of 20 scfm at 100 psig is available. Approximately 2500 scf/ year of nitrogen is required.
- 7. All nitrogen supply piping is non-seismic.
a
- 8. The hydrogen gas is 99.95 percent H2 and contains less than 10 ppm methane.
,n E
The hydrogen supply to the volume control tank is 1.5 to 20 scfm at 50 psig. Approximately 400,000 scf/ year is required. To prevent hydrogen overpressurization of the Volume Control Tank, Relief Valve CH-105 set pressure is 70 psig.
The capability for adding hydrogen directly into the charing line exists. When used, a hydrogen flow rate of 0.5 scfm at 2400 psig is required. Approximately 10,000 scf/ year required. Overpressurization protection is provided to prevent damage to CVCS piping / components in the event the regulating valve fails (set pressure is 2735 psig). All hydrogen supply piping is non-seismic.
C. Safety Injection Tanks Nitrogen gas is supplied to the safety injection tanks.
This supply satisfies the following requirements:
Minimum Required Flow Rate 300 SCFM (at supply pressure) i Maximum Allowable Flow Rate 2490 SCFM (at supply pressure)
Minimum Supply Pressure 630 psig (for normal plant operation)
. Maximum Supply Pressure 700 psig (all conditions) 1 Amendment E 9.5-37 December 30, 1988 l _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ -
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Gas Volume Required for 4 Tank Blowdown 105,000 SCF Design Criteria ANSI B31.1 Maximum Water Content 0.1 percent Minimum Supply Stream Stagnation Temperature 80*F Maximum Supply Free Stream Temperature ll5'F No single failure allows the compressed nitrogen system delivery pressure to exceed 700 psig.
9.5.10.4 Ipspection and Testina Requirements System components and piping are tested to pressures designated by appropriate codes. Inspection and functional testing are performed prior to initial operation and as a result of normal usage. Equipment not in continuous use is subject to periodic testing and visual inspection.
9.5.10.5 1pstrumentation Application An "on-demand" manual selection capability is provided to remotely monitor the various gas systems operation status. This includes a multichannel control room monitor for the following: E A. Manifold pressures B. Manifold temperatures C. Flow rates of flammable or toxic gases ,
A low pressure annunciator is provided to alarm the control room when bottled gas supplies are nearly depleted. A high flowrate ;
annunciator is provided to alarm the control room when flammable j or toxic gas flowrates exceed this normal operating range.
Vaporizers for LN 2 and other areas stored in liquid form have fail-safe controls to prevent cryogenic liquid from reaching the serviced component in case of vaporizer failure or loss of power.
Alarms for vaporizer functions failure are provided.
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Amendment E ;
9.5-38 December 30, 1988 l l