Text

Certified Design Matl
	ML20062L863
Person / Time
Site:	05200002
Issue date:	12/31/1993
From:	; ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY, ASEA BROWN BOVERI, INC.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20062L858	List: LD-93-178, Responds to Comments on ABB-CE Design Descriptions & Associated Insps,Tests,Analyses & Acceptance Criteria & on Changes to CESSAR-DC.Rept Entitled, Certified Design Matl Encl; ML20062L863;
References
	NUDOCS 9401050326
	Download: ML20062L863 (700)
	v • d • e

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SYSTEM 80+"

I TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 Introduction 1.1 Definitions 1.2 General Provisions 13 Figure legend and Abbreviation List 2.0 System and Structure Based Design Descriptions and ITAAC 2.1 Design of Structures, Components, Equipment, and Systems 2.1.1 Nuclear Island Structures 2.1.2 Turbine Building 2.13 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Structures 2.1.4 Diesel Fuel Storage Structure 2.1.5 Radwaste Building 2.1.6 Reactor Vessel Internals 2.1.7 In-Core Instrument Guide Tube System 2.2 Reactor 2.2.1 Nuclear Fuel System 2.2.2 Control Element Drive Mechanism 23 Reactor Coolant System and Connecting Systems 23.1 Reactor Coolant System 23.2 Shutdown Cooling System 233 Reactor Coolant System Component Supports 23.4 NSSS Integrity Monitoring System O

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SYSTEM 80+"

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 2.4 Engineered Safety Featums 2.4.1 Safety Depressurization System 2.4.2 Annulus Ventilation System 2.43 Combustible Gas Control System 2.4.4 Safety Injection System 2.4.5 Containment Isolation System 2.4.6 Containment Spray System 2.4.7 In-Containment Water Storage System 2.5 Instrumentation and Control 2.5.1 Plant Protection System 2.5.2 Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System 2.53 Discrete Indication and Alarm System and Data Processing System 2.5.4 Power Control System / Process-Component Control System 2.6 Electric Power 2.6.1 AC Electrical Power Distribution System 2.6.2 Emergency Diesel Generator System 2.63 AC Instrumentation and Control Power System and DC Power System 2.6.4 Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies 2.6.5 Alternate AC Source O

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SYSTEM 80+"

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continuedl 2.7 Auxiliary Systems 2.7.1 New Fuel Storage Racks 2.7.2 Spent Fuel Storage Racks 2.7.3 Pool Cooling and Purification System 2.7.4 Fuel Handling System 2.7.5 Station Service Water System 2.7.6 Component Cooling Water System 2.7.7 Demineralized Water Makeup System 2.7.8 Condensate Storage System 2.7.9 Process Sampling System 2.7.10 Compressed Air Systems 2.7.11 Turbine Building Cooling Water System 2.7.12 Essential Chilled Water System 2.7.13 Normal Chilled Water System 2.7.14 Turbine Building Service Water System 2.7.15 Equipment and Floor Drainage System 2.7.16 Chemical and Volume Control System 2.7.17 Control Complex Ventilation System 2.7.18 Fuel Building Ventilation System 2.7.19 Diesel Building Ventilation System 2.7.20 Subsphere Building Ventilation System O

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SYSTEM 80+"

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 2.7.21 Containment Purge Ventilation System 2.7.22 Containment Cooling and Ventilation System 2.7.23 Nuclear Annex Ventilation System 2.7.24 Fire Protection System 2.7.25 Communications Systems 2.7.26 Lighting System 2.7.27 Compressed Gas Systems 2.7.28 Potable and Sanitary Water Systems 2.7.29 Radwaste Building Ventilation System 2.730 Turbine Building Ventilation System 2.731 CCW Heat Exchanger Structure Ventilation System - .

2.8 Steam and Power Conversion System 2.8.1 Turbine Generator 2.8.2 Main Steam Supply System 2.83 Main Condenser 2.8.4 Main Condenser Evacuation System 2.8.5 Turbine Bypass System 2.8.6 Condensate and Feedwater Systems 2.8.7 Steam Generator Blowdown System 2.8.8 Emergency Feedwater System 2.8.9 Condenser Circulating Water System O

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SYSTEM 80+"

TABLE OF CONTENTS iContinued)'

2.9 Radioactive Waste Management :

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2.9.1 Liquid Waste Management System I

2.9.2 Gaseous Waste Management System 2.9.3 Solid V ste Management System 1

l 2.9.4 Process and EfDuent Radiological Monitoring and Sampling Systems l 2.10 Technical Support Center 1

2.11 Initial Test Program 2.12 Human Factors 2.12.1 Main Control Room 2.12.2 Remote Shutdown Room 3.0 Non-System Based Design Descriptions and ITAAC ,

i 3.1 Piping Design 3.2 Radiation Protection 4.0 Interface Requirements 4.1 Offsite Power System 4.2 Ultimate Heat Sink i

4.3 Station Service Water Pump Structure l l

4.4 Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System I 5.0 Site Parameters O

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SYS1EM 80+"

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This document contains the Certified. Design Material- for the Combustion Engineering, Inc., System 80+= Pressurized Water Reactor. It consists, by sections, of:

1) Introductory material (Definitions, General Provisions, and the Figure legend

& Abbreviation Ilst);

2) Certified Design Material for System 80+= systems and structures;

3) Certified Design Material for non-system-based aspects of the System 80+"

Certified design;

4) Interface Requirements; and

5) Site Parameters.

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p SYS'IEM 80+" l V l 1.1 DEFINITIONS The following definitions apply to terms used in the Design Descriptions and associated '

ITAAC:

Acceptance Criteria means the performance, physical condition, or analysis result for a 4 structure, system, or component that demonstrates the Design Commitment is met. . !

I j j Analysis means a calculation, mathematical computation, or engmeenng or technical !

l evaluation. Engineering or technical evaluations could include, but are not limited to, ;

comparisons with operating experience or design of similar structures, systems, or components. !

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As-built means the physical properties of a structure, system, or component following the j completion of its installation or construction activities at its final location at the plant site. ]

1 Basic Configuration (for a Building) means the arrangement of building features (e.g . l floors, ceilings, walls, basemat, and doorways) and of the structures, systems or components -

l within, as specified in the building Design Description.

Basic Configuration (for a System) means the functional arrangement of structures,. .

A systems, or components specified in the Design Description and the verifications for that

,V l system specified in Section 1.2.

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Design Commitment means that portion of the Design Description that is verified by l

ITAAC.

l Design Description means that portion of the design that is certified. ' j I

Division (for electrical systems or equipment)is the designation applied to a given safety-related system or set of components which are physically, electrically, and functionally independent from other redundant sets of components. ;

Division (for mechanical systems or equipment)is the designation applied to a specific set of safety.related components within a system. !

Inspect or Inspection mean visual observations, physical examinations, or reviews of records based on visual observation or physical examination that compare the structure, system, or - ;

component condition to one or more Design Commitments. Examples include walkdowns, configuration checks, measurements of dimensions, or non-destructive examinations.

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I SYS1EM 80+"

O Test means the actuation, operation, or establishment of specified conditions to evaluate the performance or integrity of as-built structures, systems, or components, unless explicitly stated ;

otherwise.

Type Test means a test on one or more sample components' of the same type and }

4 manufacturer to qualify other components of that same type and manufacturer. A T3 pe Test :'

is not necessarily a test of the as-built structures, systems, or components.-

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L2 GENERAL PROVISIONS he following general provisions are applicable to the Design Descriptions and associated ITAAC:

Verifications For Basic Configuration For Systems Verifications for Basic Configuration of systems include and are limited to inspection of the 4 system functional arrangement and the following inspections, tests, and analyses:

(1) Inspections, including non-destructive examination (NDE), of the as-built, pressure boundary welds for ASME Code Cass 1,2, or 3 components identified in the Design Description to demonstrate that the requirements of ASME Code Section III for the quality of pressure boundary weMs are met.

(2) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses, of the Seismic Category I mechanical and electrical equipment (including connected instrumentation and controls) identified in the Design Description, to demonstrate that the as-built equipment including associated anchorage, is qualified to withstand design basis dynamic loads without loss of its safety function.

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i" (3) Type tests, or type tests and analyses, of the Cass 1E electrical equipment identified in the Design Description (or on accompanying Figures) to demonstrate that it is qualified to withstand the environmental conditions that would exist during and following a design basis accident without loss of its safety function for the time needed to be functional. These environmental conditions, as applicable to the bounding design basis accident (s), are as follows: expected time-dependent temperature and pressure profiles, humidity, chemical effects, radiation, aging, submergence, and their synergistic effects which have a significant effect on equipment performance. As used in this paragraph, the term "Qass 1E electrical

. equipment" constitutes the equipment itself, connected instrumentation and controls, connected electrical components (such as cabling, wiring, and terminations), and the lubricants necessary to support performance of the safety functions of the Cass 1E electrical components identified in the Design Description, to the extent such equipment is not located in a mild environment during or following a design basis accident.

Electrical equipment environmental qualification shall be demonstrated through analysis of the environmental conditions that would exist in the location of the equipment during and following a design basis accident and through a determination that the equipment is qualified to withstand those conditions for the time needed to be functional. This determination may be demonstrated by:

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(a) type testing of an identical item of equipn .at under identical or similar conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment is qualified; or (b) type testing of a similar item of equipment under identical or similar !

conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment is qualified; or (c) experience with identical or similar equipment under identical or similar l conditions with supporting analysis to show that the equipment is qualified; or (d) analysis in combination with partial type test data that supports the analytical assumptions and conclusions to show that the equipment is quali5ed.

(4) Tests or type tests of active safety-related motor-Operated Valves (MOVs) identified in the Design Description to demonstrate that the MOVs are qualified to perform their safety functions under design basis differential pressure, system pressure, fluid temperature, ambient temperature, minimum voltage, and minimum and/or maximum ;

stroke times.

Treatment of Individual Items The absence of any discussion or depiction of an item in the Design Description or accompanying Figures shall not be construed as prohibiting a licensee from utilizing such an item, unless it would prevent an item from performing its safety functions as discussed or depicted in the Design Description or accompanying Figures.

When the term " operate," " operates," or " operation" is used with respect to an item discussed in the Acceptance Criteria,it refers to the actuation and running of the item. When the term

" exist,"

exists," or " existence" is used with respect to an item discussed in the Acceptance l Criteria, it means that the item is present and meets the Design Description. j l

Implementation of ITAAC The ITAAC are provided in tables with the following three-column format:

Inspections Desien Commitment Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria Each Design Commitment in the left-hand column of the ITAAC tables has an associated Inspections, Tests, or Analyses (ITA) requirement specified in the middle column of the tables.

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The identification of a separate ITA entry for each Dcsign Commitment shall not be construed to require that separate inspections, tests, or analyses must be performed for each Design Commitment. Instead, the activides associated with more than one ITA entry may be combined, and a single inspection, test, or analysis may be sufficient to implement more than one ITA entry.

An ITA may be performed by the licensee of the plant, or by its authorized vendors, contractors, or consultants. Furthermore, an ITA may be performed by more than a single individual or group, may be implemented through discrete activities separated by time, and ;

may be performed at any time prior to fuel load (including before issuance of the Combined l Operating License for those ITAAC that do not necessarily pertain to as-installed j equipment). Additionally, an ITA may be performed as part of the activities that are required to be performed under 10 CFR Part 50 (including, for example, the Quality Assurance (OA) !

program required under Appendix B to Part 50); therefore, an ITA need not be performed j as a separate or discrete activity.

I Discussion of Matters Related to Operations ;

In some cases, the Design Descriptions in this document refer to matters that relate to j operation, such as normal valve or breaker alignment during normal operation modes. Such discussions are provided solely to place the Design Description provisions in context (e.g., to ;

explain automatic features for opening or closing valves or breakers upoe off-normal (V) conditions). Such discussions shall not be construed as requiring operators during operation to take any particular action (e.g., to maintain valves or breakers in a particular position ,

during normal operation). I Interpretation of Figures i l

In many but not all cases, the Design Descriptions in Section 2 include one or more Figures.

The Figures may represent a functional diagram, general structural representation, or other i general illustration. For I&C systems, Figures also represent aspects of the relevant logic of the system or part of the system. Unless specified explicitly, the Figures are not indicative of the scale, location, dimensions, shape, or spatial relationships of as-built structures, systems, and components. In particular, the as-built attributes of structures, systems, and components may vary from the attributes depicted on the Figures, provided that those safety functions discussed in the Design Description pertaining to the Figure are not adversely affected.

Maximum Reactor Core Thermal Power The initial rated reactor core thermal power for the System 80+" Certified Design is 3914 MWt.

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i O- 13 FIGURE LEGEND and ABBREVIATION LIST 1

]

4 The conventions presented in this Section are employed for Figures used in the

Design Descriptions. He abbreviations presented in this Section are used in the l Certified Design Material. The figure legend and abbreviation list are provided for (

information only and are not part of the Certified Design Material l i

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Q FIGURE LEGEND instrumentation l i

Flow Instrument b Temperature Instrument b Radiation Instrument b l 1

Differential Pressure Instrument Q Pressure Instrument g j i

Level Instrument g Current instrument @

Humidity Detector g )

Ultrasonic Instrument g Smoke Detector g Sensor g- i Ai;nunciator (Alarm) p Annunciator Symbols For:

High High HH High H b* L I Low Low LL O

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FIGURE LEGEND (continued)

Valves Gate Valve DulQ Globe Valve Cllmd Check Valve l Butterfly Valve l%l Ball Valve @

Relief Valve Three Way Valve k Post Indicator Valve Valve Type Not Specified Cd Valve Ooerators Operator Of Unspecified Type Fluid Powered Operator Motor Operator Solenoid Operator Diaphragm Operator A I

Hydraulic Operator Pneumatic Operator Position Indications For Hydraulic And Pneumatic Ooerators

-Fails As is FAI

-Fails Closed FC

-Fails Open FO O Mechanical Eauioment Positive Displacement Pump _ k_

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FIGURE LEGEND (continued)

Centrifugal Pump =0" 0 Pump Type Not Specified _

=

]-

Header [

O Tank V

Filter F OR FILTER s

Strainer Flexible Connection @

Delay Coil M ;

Orifice 8!l l

O Ventun.

n Compressor Or Fan Air Distribution Device iiiiii Air Distribution Header lill Vaneaxial Fan M Heat Exchanger d +

Uh Vacuum Breaker O Vent Gv 1.3 3 12-31-93

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i l FIGURE LEGEND (continued) "

Damners l

Manually Operated Damper OR Remotely Operated Damper ;

2 Louver Fire Damper y

Smoke Damper kl Back Draft Damper o Pumo Drivers b

Turbine Drive Motor Drive Electrical Eauioment Battery g Circuit Breaker A Q Disconnect Switch /

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e FIGURE LEGEND (continued) i i

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! Voltage Regulator M i

Multiplexer i l l 1 solation I l

Transformer i

N N j Miscellaneous l i 1 A System Or Component l ~ ~ ~ "" ~ ~ l l That is not Part Of The l l

. Defined System ,_____i Containment l'

Containment with Penetration .

Building Separation tvrrrrrrnvrrrrrrrs

ASME Code Class Break i l i

An ASME Code class break is identified by a single horizontal or i a

vertical line perpendicular to the designated location for the class break,

as shown in the example below.

I ASME CODE SEl"T ON lli CLASS I (NOTE 1)

- 3. til X

N Notes:

1. The header, "ASME Code Section lll Class", must appear at least once

, Qn each figure on which ASME class breaks are shown, but need not Cappear at every class break shown on a figure.

E Indicates Non-ASME Code Section til 1.3 12-31-93 I

i o SYSTEM 80+"

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1 V ABBREVIA'ITON LIST Abbreviation Meaning i

AAC Alternate AC Source A/C Air Conditioning ADV Atmospheric Dump Valve AFAS Alternate Feedwater Actuation Signal ALMS Acoustic Leak Monitoring System APC Auxiliary Process Cabinet i APS Alternate Protection System ATM Atmosphere AVS Annulus Ventilation Syster2 l BAC Boric Acid Concentrator l CCCT Containment Cooler Condensate Tank I

()

l ,- m CCS Component Control System CCVS Control Complex Ventilation System i CCW Component Cooling Water ]

CCWHXSVS CCW Heat Exchanger Stmeture Ventilation System CCWLLSTAS Component Cooling Water Low Level Surge Tank Actuation CCWS Component Cooling Water System CEA Control Element Assembly l CEACP CEA Change Platform CEAE CEA Elevator CEDM Control Element Drive Mechanism CEDMCS Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System CET Core Exit Thermocouple 1

1 CFM Cubic Feet Per Minute CFR Code of Federal Regulations i p., CFS Cavity Flooding System C CGCS Combustible Gas Control System 1.3 u-n.n

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ABBREVIATION LIST (Continued)

Abbreviation Meaning CGS Compressed Gas Systems ]

CH Channel i

CIAS Containment Isolation Actuation Signal l CIS Containment Isolation System CIV Containment Isolati on Valve COL Combined Operating Ucense CONT Containment 1 CPC Core Protection Calculator CPVS Containment Purge Ventilation System l CRS Control Room Supervisor l CSAS Containment Spray Actuation Signal I (g\ CSB Core Support Barrel CSS Containment Spray System CST Chemical Sample Tank ;

CT Combustion Turbine / Generator CVAP Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program i CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System CWT Chemical Waste Tank DBVS Diesel Building Ventilation System DEMIN Demineralized DFSS Diesel Fuel Storage Structure DIAS Discrete Indication and Alarm System DIAS-N Discrete Indication and Alarm System - Channel N DIAS-P Discrete Indication and Alarm System - Channel P DNBR Departure From Nucleate Boiling Ratio

,~ DPS Data Processing System

' D-RAP Design-Reliability Assurance Program 1.3 nam

SYSTEM 80+"

ABBREVIATION LIST (Continued)

Abbreviation Meaning ;

DSW Dry Solid Waste DVI Direct Vessel Injection ,

DWMS Demineralized Water Makeup System ECWS Essential Chilled Water System EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EDT Equipment Drain Tank l EFAS Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal EFDS Equipment and Floor Drainage System EFW Emergency Feedwater EFWS Emergency Feedwater System EFWST Emergency Feedwater Storage Tank ENS Emergency Notification System EPDS Electrical Power Distribution System ESF Engineered Safety Features ESFAS Engineered Safety Features Actuation System ESF-CCS Engineered Safety Features - Component Control System EWT Equipment Waste Tank FBOC Fuel Building Overhead Crane l FBVS Fuel Building Ventilation System FDT Floor Drain Tank FHS Fuel Handling System FPS Fire Protection System FTC Fuel Temperature Coefficient FTS Fuel Transfer System GCB Generator Circuit Breaker GWMS Gaseous Waste Management System O HA High Activity 1.3 um-e

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SYSTEM 80+"

O ABBREVIATION LIST (Continued)

Abbreviation Meaning HDR Header .

HFE Human Factors Engineering .[

HJTC Heated Junction Thermocouple ,

HPN Health Physics Network HSI ' Human-System / Interface HVAC Heating, Ventilating, Air Conditioning l HVT Holdup Volume Tank HX Heat Exchanger HZ Hertz -

IAS Instrument Air System ICI In-Core Instrument ILRT Integrated Leak Rate Test l INIT Initiation '

j INJ Injection l

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INST Instrumentation IPSO Integrated Process Status Overview i IRWST - In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank . -!

ITAAC Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria ITP Initial Test Program

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IVMS Internals Vibration Monitoring System -

IWSS In-containment Water Storage System IX Ion Exchanger LA Iow Activity LBB Leak-Before-Break LHST Laundry & Hot Shower Tank l 1

LOCA less-of-coolant Accident !

O LOOP Imss-of-Offsite-Power 1.3 mim-4

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ABBREVIATION LIST (Continued) i Abbreviation Meaning LPMS Loose Parts Monitoring System i LS Liquid Sample LTOP Low Temperature Overrpressure Protection LWMS Liquid Waste Management System MCC Motor Control Center MCR Main Control Room MCRACS Main Control Room Air Conditioning System MDNBR Minimum Departure From Nucleate Boiling Ratio MFIV Main Feedwater Isolation Valve ;

MG Main Generator MOV Motor Operated Valve MPC Moderator Pressure Coefficient-MSIS Main Steam Isolation Signal MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve MSLB Main Steam Line Break l MSSS Main Steam Supply System l MSSV Main Steam Safety Valve MSVH Main Steam Valve House MTC Moderator Temperature Coefficient MVC Moderator Void Coefficient NA Nuclear Annex NAVS Nuclear Annex Ventilation System NCW Normal Chilled Water NCWS Normal Chilled Water System NDE Non-destructive Examination NFE New Fuel Elevator

- NFS Nuclear Fuel System !

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V ABBREVIATION LIST (Continued)

Abbreviation Meaning r

NI Nuclear Instrumentation NI Structures Nuclear Island Structures NIMS NSSS Integrity Monitoring System NNS Non-Nuclear Safety NPSH Net Positive Suction Head ;

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PA Public Address PABX Private Automatic Business Exchange PAMI Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation P-CCS Process-Component Control System' ;

PCPS Pool Cooling and Purification System PCS Power Control System l Power Control System / Process-Comporient Control System PCS/P-CCS PERMSS Processing and Effluent Radiological Monitoring and j Sampling System ;

PPC Plant Protection Calculator-PPS Plant Protection System PRA Probability Risk Assessment PSS Process Sampling System PSWS Potable and Sanitary Water Systems PZR Pressurizer RAT Reserve Auxilliary Transformer I RB Reactor Building ;

RCGVS Reactor Coolant Gas Vent System RCP Reactor Coolant Pump l

RCPB Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary O

Q RCS Reactor Coolant System .

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ABBREVIATION LIST (Continued) :

Abbreviation Meanine i RDS Rapid Depressurization' System RDT Reactor Drain Tank .!

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RM Refueling Machine l RPS Reactor Protective System- .!

RSP Remote Shutdown Panel !

RSR Remote Shutdown Room . !

RSSH Resin Sluce Slurry Header j RT .. Reactor Trip .l RTSG Reactor Trip Switchgear j RV Reactor Vessel: l RVUH Reactor Vessel Upper Head. j O awevs SAFDL a a- ste iiai 8 ve tii tie sv te-Specified Acceptable Fuel Design Limit SB Shield Building ;

SBVS Subsphere Building Ventilation System !

SCS Shutdown Cooling System l 1

SDS Safety Depressurization System SFHM Spent Fuel Handling Machine !

SFP Spent Fuel Pool i

SFPCS Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System SG Steam Generator SGBS Steam Generator Blowdown System Steam Generator Drain Tank '!

SGDT Safety Injection .

SI .

SIAS Safety Injection Actuation Signal SIS Safety Injection System i O- SIT Safety Injection Tank l 1.3 x2si-se .

SYSTEM 80+"

ABBREVIATION LIST (Continued)

Abbreviation Meaning SSCs Systems, Structures, and Components SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake SSW Station Service Water SSWS Station Service Water System SWMS Solid Waste Management System TB Turbine Building TBCWS Turbine Building Cooling Water System TBSWS Turbine Building Service Water System .

TBV Turbine Bypass Valve TBVS Turbine Building Ventilation System-TC Thermocouple TGSS Turbine Gland Scaling System -

TLOF Total Loss of Feedwater TSC Technical Support Center

'IECACS Technical Support Center Air Conditioning System UGS Upper Guide Structure UHS Ultimate Heat Sink UAT Unit Auxillary Transformer UMT Unit Main Transformer VCT Volume Control Tank VDU Video Display Unit WMT Waste Monitor Tank WSW Wet Solid Waste O

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( 2.1.1 NUCLEAR ISLAND STRUCTURES Design Description The Nuclear Islanu (NI) Structures house, protect, and support plant equipment and provide personnel and equipment access, support for systems and components under I operating loads, radiation shielding, structural components to withstand loads due to design basis external and internal events, physical separation between Disisions of safety-related equipment, and barriers to minimir or prevent the release of radioactive materials.

The F aic Configuration of the NI Structures is as shown on Figures. 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12.i.2 The NI Structures are safety-related.

He NI Structures consist of the Reactor Building (RB) and the Nuclear Annex (NA).

I De RB and NA are further sub-divided into structures, buildings and areas. The RB and NA are structurally integrated on a common basemat which is embedded below the finished plant grade level. The top of the nuclear island basemat is located 40.75 ft. i 1.0 ft. below the finished grade elevation.

The RB is a reinforced concrete and structural steel structure, which consists of the N Shield Building (SB), the RB Subsphere, the Containment, and the Containment j Internal Structures. He SB is composed of a reinforced concrete right r,iinder with a hemispherical dome which encloses the Containment and is structurally connected to the NA. He area between the SB and the Containment is the RB Annulus. The l RB Subsphere is located below the RB Annulus area and the Containment and is divided by a Divisional wall. Within the RB Subsphere, each Division is further divided, such that the RB Subsphere is separated into quadrants. The structural components of the RB Subsphere are structurally connected to the SB and support the Containment and Containment Internal Structures. ,

The Containment is a spherical welded steel structure supported by embeddmg a ;

lower segment between the Containment Internal Structures concrete and the

! Reactor Building Subsphere concrete. There is no structural connection between the j free-standing portion of the containment and adjacent structures other than j penetrations and their supports. Shear bars are welded to the containment vesselin 1 the embedded region to provide restraint against sliding. %e Containment retains its integrity at the pressure and temperature conditions associated with the most limiting Design Basis Accident without exceeding the design leakage rate to the SB. !

Access to the Containment is provided through personnel air locks and an equipment l hatch. Penetrations are also provided for electrical and mechanical components and for the transport of nuclear fuel.

The Containment Internal Structures are reinforced concrete and structural steel structures that support the reactor vessel and reactor coolant system. The primary !

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J shield wall supports and lateral'y surrounds the reactor vessel. The reactor vessel and reactor coolant system can be supported without the reacter cavity wall directly below the reactor vessel support corbels. The reactor vessel support corbels are constructed of reinforced concrete and tre at least 10 feet thick. He secondary shield wall (crane wall) laterally surrounds the primary shield wall and is structurally connected to the primary shield wall by reinforced concrete slabs and walls. He secondary shield wall also provides support for the polar crane. He Containment Internal Structures provide a reactor cavity area below the reactor vessel which can be flooded with water. An indirect gas vent path is provided between the reactor casity and the free volume of the Containment.

He reacwr cavity has a corium debris chamber.

The reactor cavity floor is constructed with a limestone aggregate concrete with a minimum CACO3 content of 17 percent. The minimum floor thickness in the flat region of the cavity floor is 3.0 ft.

He flat floor area is free from obstructions to corium debris spreading. The minimum flat floor area for the reactor cavity is 693 ft.2 He reactor cavity sump is constructed with a limestone aggregate concrete having a minimum thickness of 3.2 feet.

G The Containment and its penetrations, shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12, are i l

designed and constructed to ASME Code Section III, Class MC.'

The Containment and its penetrations, shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12, retain their pressure boundary integrity associated with the design pressure of at least 53 psig. He Containment pressure boundary is evaluated to assure that the ASME Code Section III Senice level C stress limits are not exceeded for a Containment internal pressure of 120 psig.

The Centainment and its penetrations, shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12, maintain the Containment leakage rate less than the maximum allowable leakage rate associated with the peak containment pressure for the design breis accident.

He NA consists of the Control Complex, the Diesel Generator Areas, the Fuel Handling Area, the Spent Fuel Storage Area, the Chemical and Volume Control System and Maintenance Area, and the Main Steam Valve Houses. He NA is a reinforced concrete and structural steel structure which is structurally connected to the SB. The NA laterally surrounds the RB and is divided by a Disisional wall.

The Seismic Category I NI Structures provide the features which accommodate the static and dynamic loads and load combinations which define the structural design basis. The design basis loads are those loads associated with:

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l Normal plant operation (including dead loads, live loads, lateral earth pressure .

loads,' and equipment loads, including the effects of temperature and equipment vibration);

External events (including rain, snow, wind, flood, tornado, tornado generated - ;

' missiles, and earthquake); and j Internal events -(including flood, pipe rupture, equipment failure, and i equipment failure generated missiles).

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%e NI Structures, shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12, are Seismic Category i I, except as noted on Figure 2.1.1-12.

Flood doors, shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12, have sensors with open and ;

closed status displays provided at a central fire alarm station. !

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria I s

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Table 2.1.11 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance !

criteria for the Nuclear Island Structures. i O ,

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' He location of the NI Structures relative to the Turbine Building, the Component Cooling Water System Heat Exchanger Structure, the Diesel Fuel Storage Structures, and the Radwaste Building'~ !

is described in Sections 2.1.2,2.13,2.1.4, and 2.1.5, respectively.

l 2 The building dimensions and elevations provided in Figures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12 are provided for information only and are not part of the certified design information. 1 8 Containment isolation devices are addressed in Section 2.4.5, Containruent Isolation System.

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O O O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.L1-1 NUCLEAR ISLAND STRUCTURES Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desien Cosimitment Inspectis.:.s. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Critesia 1.a) ne Basic Configuration of the Nuclear 1.a) Inspection of the Basic Configuration of 1.a) For the structures shown on Figures Island Structures is as shown on Figures the as-built Nuclear Island Structures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12, the Nuclear 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12. will be conducted. Island Structures conform with the Basic Configuration.

1.b) The top of the nuclear island basemat is 1.b) Inspection of the as-build nuclear island 1.b) The top of the nuclear island basemat is located 40.75 ft i 1.0 ft. below the basemat structure will be conducted. located 40.75 ft. i 1.0 ft. below the finished grade elevation. finished grade elevation.

2.a) The Containment and its penetrations 2.a) Inspection for the existence of ASME 2.a) An ASME Code Design Report and shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through Code required documents will be Certified Material Test Report exists for 2.1.1-12 are designed and constructed to conducted. the Containment and its penetrations.

ASME Code Section III, Class MC.

2.b) The Containment and its penetrations 2.b) A pneumatic pressure test will be 2.b) The resuits of the pneumatic pressure shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through conducted on the Containment and its test on .the Containment and its 2.1.1-12 retain their pressure boundary penetrations required to be pressure penetrations conform with the pressure integrity associated with the design . tested by ASME Code Section Ill. testing acceptance criteria in ASME pressure. Code Section 111.

2.c) The Containment and its penetrations 2.c) Inspection and leak rate testing on the 2.c) He results of the inspection and leak shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through Containment and its penetrations will be rate testing demonstrate that the 2.1.1-12 maintain the Containment conducted. Cont .inment leakage rate is less than or leakage rate less than the maximum equal to 0.50 percent by volume of the allowable leakage rate associated with original content of Containment air at the peak containment pressure for the the peak containment pressure for the design basis accident. design basis accident during a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months test period.

2.1.1 i2 sim

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(J F v s SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.1.1-1 (Continued)

NUCLEAR ISLAND STRUCTURES Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

3. The Nuclear Island Structures are 3. A structural analysis will be performed 3. A structural analysis report exists which Seismic Category I, except as noted on which reconciles the as-built data with concludes that the as-built Nuclear Figure 2.1.1-12, and will withstand the the structural design basis loads Island Structures will withstand the structural design basis loads specified in specified in the Design Description structural design basis loads specified in the Design Description (Section 2.1.1). (Section 2.1.1). the Design Description (Section 2.1.1).

4. Flood doors, shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 4. Inspection for existence of flood door 4. The flood door sensors and open and through 2.1.1-12, have sensors with sensors and open and close status close status displays exist.

Open and close status displays provided displays will be conducted.

at a central fire alarm station.

5. 'Ihe reactor cavity sump has a minimum 5. Inspection of the reactor cavity sump 5. The reactor cavity sump has a thickness of 3.2 feet. and/or inspection of reactor cavity sump minimum thickness of 3.2 feet.

construction records will be performed.

The thickness of the reactor cavity sump from the bottom of the sump to the top surface of the lower portion of the embedded containment shell will be

' determined.

2.1.1 u.st-s3

SYS'IEM 80+"

2.1.2 TURBINE BUILDING Design Description The Turbine Building is a non-safety-related structure which houses the main turbine generator and provides housing and support for power conversion cycle equipment and auxiliaries. There is no safety-related equipment in the Turbine Building. The Turbine Building is located on a separate foundation adjacent to the Nuclear Island (NI) Structures.

He Basic Configuration of the Turbine Building is as shown on Figure 2.1.2-1.

The Turbine Building contains a reinforced concrete turbine generator pedestal, and a structural steel frame supporting bridge cranes, an operating floor, and a mezzanine.

The structural components of the Turbine Building accommodate safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) loads to the extent that the Turbine Building response to these loads cannot result in a loss of safety function of the NI Structures or other safety-related structures, systems, or components adjoining the turbine building.

He turbine generator orientation and projected low trajectory turbine missile path are as shown on Figure 2.1.2-1.

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.1.2-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Turbine Building. ,

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O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.1.2-1 TURBINE BUILDING Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the Turbine 1. Inspection of the as-built Turbine 1. For the structure shown on Figure Building is as shown on Figure 2.1.2-1. Building configuration will be 2.1.2-1, the as-built Turbine Building conducted. conforms with the Basic Configuration.

2. The structural components of the 2. A structural analysis of the Turbine 2. A structural analysis report for the Turbine Building accommodate safe Building will be performed. Turbine Building exists which concludu, shutdown earthquake loads to the extent that structural components of the that the Turbine Building response to Turbine Building accommodate safe those loads cannot result in a loss of shutdown earthquake loads to the extent safety function of the NI Structures, or that the Turbine Building response to other safety-related structures, systems, these loads cannot result in a loss of or components adjoining the turbine safety function of the NI Structures or building. other safety-related structures, systems, or components adjoining .the turbine building.

2.1.2 - n 3 -,3

t i SYSTEM 80 +=

2.1.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER

STRUCTURES a j

i Design Description ,

Each of two Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchanger Structures houses

. and provides protection and support for component cooling water heat exchangers j and supporting equipment. The CCW Heat Exchanger Structures are located outside j

{ :

, the projected low trajectory turbine missile path.

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1 2.13-1. The CCW Heat Exchanger Structure are safety-related.

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! 'Ibe two CCW Heat Exchanger Structures provide personnel and equipment access, I l support for systems and components under operating loads, structural components to {

withstand loads due to design basis external and internal events, and physical i separation between Divisions of safety-related equipment.

Each CCW Heat Exchanger Structure is a separate reinforced concrete structure constructed of slabs and shear walls, and contains a Division of CCW Heat

Exchangers and CCW components.

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., C Each CCW Heat Exchanger Structure provides features which accommodate the static and dynamic loads and load combinations which define the structural design basis.

The design basis loads are those associated with:

Normal plant operation (including dead loads, live loads, and equipment loads, including the effects of temperature and vibration);

External events (including flood, wind, tornado, tornado generated missiles, earthquake, rain, and snow); and 1

i Internal events (including flood, pipe rupture, equipment failure, and equipment failure generated missiles). l i :

} CCW piping enters and exits a CCW Heat Exchanger Structure through underground .

vaults. The CCW pipe vaults are routed underground from the CCW Heat

Exchanger Structure to the CCW pipe chases located on either side of the Nuclear

i. Island (NI) Structures.

Each CCW Heat Exchanger Structure is Seismic Category L 2.1.3 124 e e

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f SYSTEM 80t" N]J .:pections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.13-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for CCW Heat Exchanger Structures.

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1. The Basic Configuration of each 1. Inspection of each as-built CCW Heat 1. For the structu-e shown on Figure Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchanger Structure will be conducted. 2.1.3-1, each CCW Heat Exchanger Exchanger Structure is as shown on Structure conforms with the Basic Figure 2.1.3-1. Configuration.

2. Each CCW Heat Exchanger Structure is 2. Inspection of the location of each CCW 2. Each CCW Heat Exchanger Structure is located outside the projected low Heat Exchanger Structure will be located outside the projectal low trajectory turbine missile path. performed, trajectory turbine missile path.

3. Each CCW Heat Exchanger Structure is 3. A structural analysis will be performed 3. A structural analysis report exists which Seismic Category I and withstands the which reconciles the as-built data with concludes that each as-built CCW lient structural design basis loads specified in the structural design basis specified in Exchanger Structure withstands the the Design Description (Section 2.1.3). the Design Description (Section 2.1.3). structural design basis loads specified in the Design Description (Section 2.1.3).

2.1.3 - 2-3 m

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O 2.1A DIESEL FUEL STORAGE STRUCTURE -

Design Description Two separate Diesel Fuel Storage Structures (DFSSs) house and provide protection and support for the diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks and associated piping and equipment. He DFSSs are not connected to the Nuclear Island (NI) Structures except by underground diesel fuel transfer piping.

De Basic Configuration of each DFSS is as shown on Figure 2.1.4-1.2 The DFSSs .

are safety-related.'

The DFSSs are located outside the projected low trajectory turbine missile path.

Each Diesel Fuel Storage Structure provides personnel and equipment access, support for systems and components under operating loads, and structural components to withstand loads due to design basis external and internal events.

Each DFSS is a reinforced concrete vault containing two Fuel Storage Tank Areas )

and an attached equipment room and is constructed of slabs and shear walls. Each Fuel Storage Tank Area provides space for a' diesel fuel oil storage tank and.

associated piping and pumps.' I Each DFSS provides features which accommodate the static and dynamic loads and .

load combinations which define the structural design basis. The design basis loads are ;

those associated with: ,

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Normal plant operation (including dead loads, live loads, lateral earth pressure 'l loads and equipment loads, including the effects of temperature and vibration);

External events (including flood, wind, tornado, tornado generated missiles, earthquake, rain, and snow); and Internal events (including . flood,. pipe rupture, equipment failure, and equipment failure generated missiles).-

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-1 The DFSSs are Seismic Category L ~

He two DFSSs are physically . separated by their placement on opposite sides of the .

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4 SYS'IEM 80+=

j Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.1.4-1 specifies the inspections, tests,' analyses,' and associated acceptance criteria for the Diesel Fuel Storage Structures.

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1. The Basic Configuration of each Diesel 1. Inspection of each as-built Diesel Fuel 1. For the structure shown on Figure Fuel Storage Structure is as shown on Storage Structure's configuration will be 2.1.4-1 each as-built Diesel Fuel Storage Figure 2.1.4-1. conducted. Structure conforms with the Basic Configuration.

2. The DFSSs are located outside the 2. Inspection of the location of the DFSSs 2. He DFSSs are loca-ted outside the projected low trajectory turbine missile will be performed. projected low trajectory turbine missile path, path.

3. Each Diesel Fuel Storage Structure is 3. A structural analysis will be performed 3. A structural analysis report exists which Seismic Category I and will withstand which reconciles the as-built data with concludes that each as-built Diesel Fuel the structural design basis loads as the structural design basis as specified in Storage Structure wili vithstand the specified in the Design Description the Design Description (Section 2.1.4). design basis loads as specified in the (Section 2.1.4). Design Description (Section 2.1.4).

4. He two DFSSs are physically separated 4. Inspection of the DFSSs will be 4. He two DFSSs are separated by the by their placement on opposite sides of performed. Nuclear Island Structures.

the NI Structures.

2.1.4 i2,si.n

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SYSTEM 80+"

2.1.5 RADWASTE BUILDING Design Description De Radwaste Building is a non. safety-related structure that houses liquid and solid radioactive waste management structures, systems, and components and provides containment for liquid and solid radioactive waste materials. The Radwaste Building is located on a separate basemat adjacent to the Nuclear Annex. A minimum gap of !

6" between the structures will be prosided.

The Basic Configuration of the Radwaste Building is as shown on Figure 2.1.5-1.

He Radwaste Building consists of a reinforced concrete and structural steel structure.

He structural components of the Radwaste Building accommodate safety shutdown earthquake (SSE) loads such that the Radwaste Building response to these loads cannot result in a loss of _ safety function of the adjoining NI Structures. ' The Radwaste Building foundations and walls accommoaate safe shutdown earthquake loads such that the maximum liquid inventory in the bi lding is contained. -

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.1.5-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance l criteria for the Radwaste Building. -!

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1. He Basic Configuration of the 1. Inspection of the as-built Radwaste 1. For the structure shown en Figure Radwaste Building is as shown on Building configuration will be 2.1.5-1, the as-built Radwaste Building Figure 2.1.5-1. conducted. conforms with the Basic Configuration.

2. The structural components of the 2. A structural analysis of the Radwaste 2. A structural analysis report for the Radwaste Building accommodate safe Building will be performed. Radwaste Building exists which shutdown earthquake loads such that the concludes that structural components of Radwaste Building response to these the Radweste Building accommodate loads cannot result in a loss of safety safe shutdown earthquake loads such function of the adjoining NI Structures. that the Radweste Building response to these loads cannot result in a loss of safety function of the adjacent NI Structures.

3. He Radwaste Building foundations and 3. A capacity analysis of the Radwaste 3. A capacity analysis report for the walls . accommodate safe shutdown Building will be performed using as- Radwaste Building exists which earthquake loads such that the maximum built liquid inventory data. concludes that foundations and walls liquid inventory in the building is contain the maximum liquid inventory in contained. the building.

2.1.5 swim

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't SYSTEM 80+=

2.1.6 REACTOR VESSEL INTERNALS Design Description The Reactor Vessel Internals consist of a Core Support Barrel Assembly and an i Upper Guide Structure Assembly.

The Basic Configurations of the CSB and the UGS are as shown on Figures'2.1.6-1 l and 2.1.6-2, respectively. The Reactor Vessel Internals are safety-related.

Dimensions of the core support barrel and the upper guide structure assembly are listed in Table 2.1.6-1.

i The Core Support Barrel (CSB) assembly is suspended from the reactor vessel Gange.

The CSB assembly provides support and location positioning for the fuel assembly , ;

lower end fittings. The CSB assembly contains structural elements that provide an instrumentation guide path from the lower vessel, and hydraulic flow paths through !

the vessel from the inlet nozzles to the upper end of the fuel assemblies. l l

1 The core barrel assembly contains a grid structure which supports the core and- ;

provides Dow distribution from the lower plenum region to the bottom of the fuel assemblies. The core shroud is part of the CSB assembly and provides an envelope j O to direct the primary coolant Dow through the core. Instrument nozzles in the grid structure provide a guije path for in-core instruments from the reactor vessel lower head to the fuel assemblies.

He Upper Guide Structure (UG l assembly is supported by the CSB upper flange -

and extends into the CSB assen c to engage the top of the fuel assemblies. The UGS assembly provides an insernon path for the control element assemblies (CEA). l The UGS assembly contains structural elements which provide both a guide path and lateral support for the upper portion of the control element assemblies and extension shafts in the reactor vessel upper plenum region. The UGS assembly also prosides guide paths for heated junction thermocouple (IUTC) assemblies.

The CSB and UGS assemblies are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III Subsection NG requirements and are classified Seismic Category L The reactor vessel internals maintain their integrity during normal operation, transients, and during SSE and design basis accident conditions not eliminated by leak-before-breal evaluations. He material of construction for the CSB and UGS components is aastenitic stainless steel with the exception of the Holdown Ring, which is made of nartensitic stainless steel. Cobalt base material,if used, is used only for hardsurfacing of wear parts.

The Reactor Vessel Internals withstand the effects of flow induced. vibration caused by the operation of the reactor coolant pumps.

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Table 2.1.6-1 specifies the inspections, tests,' analyses and associated acceptance criteria for the Reactor Vessel Internals. ;

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0 FIGURE 2.1.6-2 UPPER GUIDE STRUCTURE ASSEMBLY ,,.3,

l l SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.1.61 i

NOMINAL DESIGN DIMENSION REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL INTERNALS 4

2 COMPONENT NOMINAL DIMENSION CORE SUPPORT BARREL:

. Length in. 383 Inside diameter in. 157 Upper thickness in. 3 Outlet nozzle inside diameter in. 46-5/8 O UPPER GUIDE STRUCTURE ASSEMBLY:

Outside barrel diameter in. 156 Barrel thickness in. 3 Fuel alignment plate diameter in. 156 Note: These nominal dimensions are provided for information only and are not part of the Certified Design information.

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O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.L6-2 REACTOR VESSEL INTERNALS InsDections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspect!ons. Tests. Analyses _ Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the Reactor 1. Inspection of the as-built Reactor Vessel 1. For the components and equipment Vessel Internals is as shown on Figures Internals will be conducted. shown on Figures 2.1.6-1 and 2.1.6-2, 2.1.6-1 and 2.1.6-2. the as-built Reactor Vessel Intemals conform with the Basic Configuration.

2. The Core Support Barrel and Upper 2. Inspection will be performed of the 2. He completed ASME Code Section III Guide Structure are designed and ASME Code Section III required required Owner's Review of the ASME constructed in accordance with ASME Owner's Review of the ASME Design Design Report Document exists.

Code Section III Subsection NG Report Document.

dequirements and are qualified Seismic Category I.

3. The Reactor Vessel Intemals withstand 3.a) Testing will be performed to subject the 3.a) Testing and inspection results the effects of flow induced vibration Reactor Vessel Internals to flow induced demonstrate that the Reactor Vessel caused by operation of the reactor vibration. Pre- and post-test visual Internals retain their integrity.

coolant pumps. inspection will be performed on the Reactor Vessel Internals.

3.b) A vibration type test will be conducted 3.b) A vibration type test report exists and on the prototype reactor vessel internals. concludes that the prototype reactor vessel internals retain their integrity and -

have no loose parts as a result of the test.

2.1.6 2 3 -n

SYSTEM 80+"

2.1.7 IN-CORE INSTRUMENT GUIDE TUBE SYSTEM i

Design Description ,

The In-Core Instrument (ICI) Guide Tube System having guide tubes, supports, seal housings and a seal table is safety related in that the guide tubes and seal housing are pressure retaining components of the reactor coolant system.

The Basic Configuration of the IG guide tubes, seal housings, supports and seal table '

is as shown on Figure 2.1.7-1.

he ICI guide tubes serve as a guide path and provide support for the in-core detector assemblies. 'Ibe ICI guide tubes connect to the bottom of the reactor vessel and terminate in a seal housing assembly located at the seal table. The ICI guide ;

tubes and seal housings provide the reactor coolant pressure boundary for the ICI guide path outside the reactor vessel. Pressure retaining seals are installed between

.he seal housing and the in-core instrument, at the seal housing.

He ICI supports and seal table support the ICI guide tubes and provide tube to tube i spacing. The seal table also seals the ICI chase from water ingress during refueling. ;

He ASME Code Section III classification for the ICI guide tube pressure retaining I Q

G components is shown on Figure 2.1.7-1 and the tubes will be designed in accordance with Section 3.1, Piping Design.

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The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.1.7-1 is classified Seismic _ Category .

I-Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.1.71 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance ;

criteria for the ICI Guide Tubes System. l i

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ICI GUIDE TUBE SUPPORTS NOTES:

1. ICI GUIDE TUBES, SUPPORTS, SEAL HOUSING AND SEAL TABLE ARE ASME CODE CLASS 1 COMPONENTS.

2. ICI GUIDE TUBES AND SEAL HOUSINGS ARE PRESSURE RETAINING COMPONENTS.

3. THE SEAL TABLE ELEVATION IS AT THE SAME ELEVATION OR HIGHER THAN THE REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL CLOSURE HEAD, MATING SURFACE ELEVATION.

O FIGURE 2.1.7-1 IN-CORE INSTRUMENTATION GUIDE TUBE SYSTEM 12.st-93

O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.1.7-1 IN-CORE INSTRUMENT GUIDE TUBE SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration for the ICI 1. Inspection of the as. built ICI Guide 1. For the components and equipment Guide Tube System is as shown on Tube System configuration will be shown on Figure 2.1.7-1, the as-built Figure 2.1.7-1. conducted. ICI Guide Tube System conforms with the Basic Configuration.

2. The ICI guide tubes and seal housings 2. A pressure test will be conducted on 2. The results of the pressure test of retain their pressure boundary integrity those portions of the ICI Guide Tube ASME Code Section III components of under internal pressures that will be System required to be pressure tested by the ICI guide tubes and seal housings experienced during service. the ASME Code Section III. conform with the pressure testing acceptance criteria in ASME Code Section III Subsection NB.

2.1.7 n-si-n

' l i i l im i gygrEM 80-P" , 4 ( u/ 1 2.2.1 NUCLEAR FUEL SYSTEM , i Design Description i The Nuclear Fuel System (NFS) generates heat by a controlled nuclear reaction and transfers the heat generated to the reactor coolant. The NFS consists of an arrangement in the reactor vessel of fuel assemblies and control element assemblies ! (CEAs). He NFS has the safety-related functions of providing a barrier against the ! release of radioactive material generated by nuclear reactions in the nuclear fuel and providing a means to make the reactor core suberitical. De Basic Configuration of the fuel assembly, the CEAs and their arrangement in the ; reactor core is as shown on Figures 2.2.1-12.2.1-2, and 2.2.1-3. The reactor core has a maximum of 241 fuel assemblies and a minimum of 93 CEAs. 1 l Each fuel assembly has fuel rods, spacer grids, guide tubes, and upper and lower end ! fittings. In each fuel assembly, a minimum of 236 locations are occupied by fuel rods ) or rods containing burnable neutron absorber material or other non-fuel material.ne ; remaining locations are subdivided into symmetric regions, each of which contains one j or more guide tubes. Each guide tube provides a channel for insertion of a CEA l finger or an in. core instrument. Each guide tube is attached to fuel assembly spacer l

EcTioN ,,g, __. i-g- =r i - t ,f s .Cs t-Pss i ar_ .i 113 T T Sie I LINE (CVCs) m 7 \ *I p Q 4 CONTROLLED CONTROLLED =sd4 A 'l SLEEDOFF (CVCS) SLEEDOFF (CvCS) ll e s RCP EDE EU RCP (4) ,,,,E,. c________.,.________,,_., ,,, ,. s.so Tusts ARE AsesE Coof sECTION M CLAs3 t. 'FROM y,y, g 3 a.Tust stoE #s class i ANO sNELL sioE es NOswL9ME sECTiON m. s

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4. FOR INSTRUMENTS, THE NUW9ER OF BIEDUNOANT DETECTORS AND CHApeNELS IS LISTED IN PARENT,NESES.

s.THE eNSTRUMENTATION (ENCEPT THE LEVEL INSTRUMENTS) AND A9ME CODE sECTION N CLASS i A 0 2 I Jf I PRESSURE RETA84480 COMPONENTS SNOWN ARE SAFETv RELATED. THE SAFETv RELATED fM87RUME8fTATION l A g sets or PREssuRirER ELECTRICAL HEATERS ARE POWEREo r!=0W THEiR riEsrECrivE class iE L,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, i SEAL INJECTION DETAILS FIGURE 2.3.1-1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 1241-03 O SYSTEM 80 +* O O - i' Rataap CODF SFnTIOtt 111 CI Ace I u. f = = = = +SAFETYVALVE DISCHARGE (SDS) RCGVS (SDS)4- - - - AL E s5 A E - - - - - + SAFETY VALVE DISCHARGE (SDS) RCGvs (SDS)* - - - - - - - ; f g - - - - - - > SAFETY VALVE DISCHARGE (SDS) RCOVS (SDS)4 - - - - - - - - - EE RCGVS (SDS)4 - - - - - s{5 - - WSAFETY VALVE DISCHARGE (SDS) , - - -> RDS (SDS) I I t - - - - - - - > RDS (SDS) II gg C SPRAY LINE e* e* e* 'P /"I) in e* e*' e* @* @* @* lr I -il I E fw -

% VENT-RCGVS 1 h CLOSURE I } SEAL LEAK MONITOR 1 VENT-RCGVS ! DIRECT VESSEL INJ. 4 , MATING SURFACE SEAL LEAK - l M.ONITOR I J HEATED A F] ' JUNCTION THERMOCOUPLE DVINOZZLE n %1 . PROBES 4 INLET OZRE l-l (2 OF 4 SHOWN) i C OUTLET / t NOZZLE CORE EXIT THERMOCOUPLE % , BASE METAL 1 THICKNESS IN CORE REGION ~ +-D LETTER DIMENSIONS (INCHES)[ NOTE 2] A 196.32 B 30.00 C 42.00 D 9.06 E 182.25 F 8.5 G 469.35 NOTES:

1. The Reactor Vessel Pressure Retaining Components are ASME Code Section ill y Class 1 and are Safety-Related

2. The dimensions in this Figure are, N N TR ENTATION provided for information only and are not NOZZLES part of the Certified Design Material FIGURE 2.3.1-3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 12-si-os (REACTOR VESSEL)

SYSTE 80 +TM .333 AA STEAM e* GENERATOR P FEEDWATER ._ p L L SYSTEM J( EMERGENCY I FEEDWATER - - - SYSTEM g L L 3 FEEDWATER ' " = > $ SYSTEM --> - o SG BLOWDOWN g - SYSTEM $ p 0 (ONE OF TWO CONNECTIONS E SHOWN) 8 RCS SUCTION LEG RCS HOT LEG g .1L NOTES: 1.TWO OF FOUR INSTRUMENT CHANNELS ARE SHOWN. OTHER TWO CHANNELS ARE ARRANGED SIMILARLY.

2. g : EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH PARAGRAPH NUMBER 3 OF THE ' VERIFICATION FOR BASIC CONFIGURATION FOR SYSTEMS

SECTION OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS (SECTION 1.2) APPLIES.

3. THE INSTRUMENTATION AND ASME CO9E SECTION 111 CLASS 1 AND 2 PRESSURE RETAINING COMPONENTS SHOWN ARE SAFETY-RELATED. THE SAFETY-RELATED INSTRUMENTATION IS POWERED FROM ITS RESPECTIVE FIGURE 2.3.1-4 " '

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (STEAM GENERATOR ) A A O V V V SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.3.1-1 REACTOR COOIANT SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. He Basic Configuration of the RCS is 1. Inspection of the as-built RCS 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through configuration will be conducted. shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4. 2.3.1-4, the as-built RCS conforms with the Basic Configuration.

2. The pressurizer safety valves provide 2.a) Testing as analysis in accordance with 2.a) Pressurizer Safety Valve set pressure overpressure protection for reactor ASME Code Section Ill will be equals 2500 psia 25 psi.

coolant pressure boundary components performed to determine set pressure in the RCS. b) Type tests of flow capacity of the b) ne minimum valve capacity is 525,000 pressurizer safety valves will be Ib/hr steam. performed, in accordance with ASME Code Section III. c) Type tests of the pressurizer safety c) Tha pressurizer safety valves have bem valves at full flove and full pressure will tyy: tested at inlet pressures of at least be pe-formed. 2575 psia and the measured valve steam lift is greater than or equal to full flow lift.

3. RV beltline materials have Charpy 3. Charpy V-notch specimens of RCS 3. The initial RV beltline Charpy upper upper-shelf energy of no less than 75 ft- beltline materials will be tested. shelf energy is no less than 75 ft-lb.

Ib initially. 2.3.1 2 3:m O O O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 23.1-1 (Continued) REAuOR COOLANT SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acccotance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 4.a) The RV beltline materials are SA-508 4.a) Inspection of the RV beltline material 4.a) The RV beltline materials are SA-508 Class 2 or 3 for forgings and austenitic test reports will be conducted. Class 2 or 3 for forgings and austenitic stainless steel or Ni-Cr-Fe alloy stainless steel or Ni-Cr-Fe alloy equivalent to SB-166 for cladding, equivalent to SB-166 for cladding. 4.b) The reactor vessel base metal in the 4.b) Inspection of the as-built RV will be 4.b) The RV base metal in the active core active core region has a minimum performed. region is at 1:sst 9.06 inches thick. thickness.

5. The RV is equipped with holders for at 5. Inspection of the RV for presence of 5. At least six capsules are in the reactor least six capsules for accommodating capsules will be performed. vessel, material surveillance specimens.

6. RV material specimens taken from the 6. Inspection of RV material specimens 6. RV material specimens are made from actual material from which the vessel will be performed. material used in RV fabrication, and was fabricated are inserted in the include Charpy V-notch specimens of capsules, and include Charpy V-notch base metal, weld metal, and heat-specimens of base metal, weld metal, affected zone material, and tensile and heat-affected zone material, and specimens from base metal and weld tensile specimens from base metal and metal.

weld metal. 7.a) The RCPs circulate coolant at a rate 7.a) Testing to measure RCS flow with four 7.a) Calculated post-core RCS flow rate is at which removes heat generated in the RCPs operating at normal zero power least 95 percent of 445,600 gallons per reactor core. pressure and temperature will ' be minute (423,320 gpm). performed. Analyses tu convert the measured pre-core flow rate to an expected post-core flow rate will be performed. 2.3.1 - um-ss ('/'\ t (V 3 Q J SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.3.1-1 (Continued) REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Insocctions. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analvses Acceptance Criteria 7.b) Each RCP motor has a flywheel which 7.b) Shop testing of each RCP flywheel will 7. Each RCP flywheel has passed an retains its integrity at 125 % of operating be performed at the vendor facility at overspeed test of no less than 125% of speed. overspeed conditions. oper. ting speed. 7.c) Each RCP has rotating inertia to slow 7.c) Inspection of as-built RCP vendor data 7.c) He rotating inertia of each RCP and the pump flow coastdown when will be performed. motor assembly is no less than 147,401 electrical power is disconnected. pounds-foot squared.

8. Each stea m generator steam outlet 8. He as-built SG steam outlet nozzles 8. Each SG steam outlet nozzle has an nozzle has an integral flow-limiting will be inspected. integral venturi with a throat area no venturi. greater than 1.283 square feet.

9. Each direct vessel injection nozzle cross 9. The as-built direct vessel injection . 9. Each direct vessel nozzle has a cross sectional flow area is limited, nozzles will be inspected. sectional flow area no greater than 56.75 square inches.

10.a) The ASME Code Section III RCS 10.a) A pressure test will be conducted on 10.a) The results of the pressure test of the components shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 those components of the RCS required ASME Code Section III components of through 2.3.1-4 retain their pressure ' to be pressure tested by ASME Code the RCS conform with the pressure boundary integrity under internal Section III. testing acceptance criteria in the ASME pressures that will be experienced Code Section III. during service. 10.b) Components shown as ASME Code 10.b) Inspection of the ASME design reports 10.b) The ASME Code Section III design Class I on Figures 2.3.1-1 through will be conducted. reports exist . for the RCS Class 1 2.3.1-4 are designed and constructed in components. accordance with ASME Code Class I requirements. u,n n 2.3.1 C O O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.3.1-1 (Continued _1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desima Cosemitonent Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptang: Criteria ll.a) Displays of the RCS instrumentation ll.a) Inspection for the existence or ll.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through retrievability in the MCh of on Figures 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4 exist 2.3.1-4 exist in the MCR or can be instrumentation displays will be in the MCR or can be retrieved there, retrieved there. performed. II.b) Controls exist in the MCR to start and 11.b) Testing will be performed using the ll.b) RCS controls in the MCR operate to stop the RCPs, to open and close those RCS controls in the MCR. start and stop the RCPs, to open and power operated valves shown on Figures close those power operated valves 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4, and to energize shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through or de-energize the pressurizer heaters. 2.3.1-4, and to energize or de-energize the pressurizer heaters. 12.a) Two pressurizer backup heater banks 12.a) Testing will be performed on the 12.'s) Within the RCS, a test signal exists only are powered from different Class IE pressurizer heaters by providing a test at the equipment powered from the Divisions. signal in only one Class IE Division at Class IE Division or bus under test. a time. 12.b) Instrumentation shown on Figures 12.b) Testing will be performed on the Class - 12.b) Within the RCS, a test signal exists only 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4 is powered from IE instrumentation shown on Figures at the equipment powered from the its respective Class IE bus, except as 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4 by providing a Class IE Division or bus under test. listed in the Design Description. test signal in only one Class IE bus at a time. 12.c) Independence is provided between Class 12.c) Inspection of the as-installed Class 1E 12.c) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions of the RCS will be performed. IE Divisions in the RCS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, separation exists between Class IE in the RCS. . Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the RCS. 2.3.1 n,n-n O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 23.1-1 (Continued) REACFOR COOLANT SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Comniitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

13. Valves with response positions indicated 13. Testing of loss of motive power to these 13. Dese valves change position to the on Figure 2.3.1-1 clutnge position to valves will be performed. position indicated on Figure 2.3.1-1 on that indicated on the figure upon loss of loss of rnotive power.

motive power. 1 2.3.1 n2-as-,3 p SYSTEM 80+" 2.3.2 SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM Design Description The Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) is a safety-related system which removes heat from the reactor coolant and transfers the heat to the component cooling water system (CCWS) during reduced reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure and temperature conditions. The SCS can be aligned to remove heat from the in- ! containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) and transfer the heat to the CCWS. The SCS is actuated manually. The SCS provides low temperature l overpressure protection (LTOP) for the RCS. l The SCS is located in the reactor building subsphere and Containment. ; he Basic Configuration of the SCS is as shown on Figure 23.2-1. 1 The SCS consists of two Divisions. Each SCS Division has a SCS pump, a SCS heat i exchanger, valves, piping, controls and instrumentation. ) l Each SCS Division has the heat removal capacity to cool the reactor coolant from SCS entry conditions to cold shutdown conditions, within 36 hours after reactor j p shutdown, assuming SCS operation commences no later than 14 hours after reactor () i shutdown. l Each SCS Division has the heat removal capacity to cool the IRWST after design I bases events or feed and bleed operation using the SIS and SDS. i Each SCS Division contains a relief valve that provides LTOP for the RCS when the l RCS is connected to the SCS. l l The SCS pump and the containment spray system (CSS) pump in the same DMsion are connected by piping and valves such that the CSS pump in a Division can perform the pumping function of the SCS pump in that Division. He piping and valves in the cross-connect line between the SCS pump suction and the CSS pump suction permit flow in either direction. In each Division, a Dow-limiting device is installed downstream from the SCS pump discharge between the cross-connect line from the CSS pump discharge and the Containment isolation valves in the SCS pump discharge line to limit runout flow. The piping from the RCS to the SCS pump suction is self venting and contains no loop seals. The SCS pumps can be tested at design flow during plant operation. 2.3.2 u.sim 1 ) n syl5 Map += j U De ASNE Code Section III Oass for the SCS pressure retaining components shown 1 i on Figure 23.2-1 is as depicted on the figure. Safety telated equipment shown on Figure 23.2-1 is classi5ed Seismic Category I. SCS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 23.2-1, except the shell sides'of ' heat exchangers, have a design pressure of at least 900 psig. Displays of the SCS instrumentation shown on Figure 23.21 exist in the main control i -I room (MCR) or can be retrieved there.- Controls exist in the MCR' to start and stop the SCS pumps, and to open and close those power operated valves shown on Figure 23.2-1. SCS alarms shown on Figure' - 23.2-1 are provided in the MCR. Water is supplied to each SCS pump at a pressure greater than the pump's required net positive suction head (NPSH) during expected operations.' The Class 1E loads shown on Figure 23.2-1 are powered from their respective Oass : IE Division. The SCS pump motor and the CSS pump motor in each Division are : ! powered from different Cass 1E buses in that Division. '! . i l Independence is provided between Cass 1E Divisions, and between Oass 1E l Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, in the SCS. He two mechanical Divisions of the SCS are physically separated. 1 A containment spray actuation signal (CSAS) can be aligned to start an SCS pump . ! when the CSS pump in the same Division is not operable. If the CSAS is aligned to ': start the SCS pump in a Division, the CSS pump in the same Division will not start ' on a CSAS. SCS suction line isolation valves have independent interlocks to prevent opening the isolation valves if reactor coolant pressure would cause the SCS LTOP relief valve to lift. Motor operated valves (MOVs) having an active safety function will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under differential pressure ~or fluid flow conditions and under temperature conditions. l l-i O 23.2 2ai.e i i 1 SYSTEM 80+= 4

Check valves shown on Figure 23.2-1 will open, or will close, or will open and also -

close, under system pressure, fluid Gow conditions, or temperature conditions. Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 23.2-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance criteria for the Shutdown Cooling System. i l l 1 1 J A i t 1 23.2 3- noi.es l

. - , . , , . . . . . . . , , w , , , . . , , . - , ,

SYSTE 0+m a CN SIS (TO DVI) 4-4- l ASME CODE SECTUN N1 CLASS l E!! HOLDUP 4 A VE I I VOLUME j TANK L (IWSS) l (NOTE S)" " P ' SUCTION = M 'YAE"E3 N H ,c, l HOT - v -- SCSHx NOTE 1 +< , I , CCW N CN jk , MMIFLOW HX h( SIS l NOTE 1 h MSIOE CONTAINMENT I OUTSIDE CONTAMMENT ee STS (TO tRWST) 4==$ N I nom c$$ 1.11JBESIDE IS ASME CODE SECTMN IN CLASS 2 ANO SHELLSIDE IS ASME CODE SECTION pl CLASS 3,

2. SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND EQUIPtIENT SHOWN ON 4 THIS FIGURE ARE CLASS 1E. ALAftIBS AND PRESSURE AND CURRENT MSTRUSSENTS ARE NOT SAFETY-f4 ELATED AND NOT CLASS SE.

3. NEOUiPMENT FOft WHICH PARAGRAPH NUA89ER S OF THE

VERIFICATION FOR aASm CONriouRATiON rOR Sv8TEMS SECTmM OP THE aENERAL PftOVISONS (SECTION 1.2) APPUES.

C. THE ASME CODE SECTION M CLASS 1 ANO 2 PRESSUfqE RETASH900 COMPONENTS SHOWN ARE SAFETY-f4 ELATED. S. ONLY WHEN THE CSAS IS AUGNED TO THE SCS PUMP. FIGURE 2.3.2-1 SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM. 12-31-93 (ONE OF TWO DIVISIONS) J ( 0 v SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 23.2-1 SIIUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Desima Comunitinent Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the SCS is 1. Inspection of the as-built SCS 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.3.2-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.3.2-1, the as-built SCS conforms with the Basic Configuration.

2.a) Each SCS Division has the heat removal 2.a) Testing and analysis of the SCS to 2.a) Flow through the SCS heat exchanger capacity to cool the reactor coolant from measure pump head and the shutdown and heat exchanger bypass line can be SCS entry conditions to cold shutdown cooling flow at the combined discharge adjusted while maintaining a flow of no conditions. of the SCS heat exchanger and heat less than 5000 gpm per Division. Each exchanger bypass line will be per- SCS pump provides at least 400 feet of formed. Testing, inspection, and head at a flow rate no less than 5000 analyses will be performed to determine gpm. The heat removal capability of the heat removal capability of the SCS one SCS Division, as ineasured by the heat exchanger. product of the service heat transfer coefficient and the effective heat transfer area of the SCS heat exchanger is no less than 1.38 x 108 BTU /hr. -2.b) Each SCS Division has the heat removal 2.b) Testing and analyses of the SCS to 2.b) Each SCS pump develops at least 400 capacity to cool the IRWST after design measure pump head and flow at the feet of head at a flow rate no less tium bases events or feed and bleed operation ' combined discharge of the SCS heat 5000 gpm. using the SIS and SDS. exchanger, with suction and return lines aligned to the IRWSTs will be performed. 2.3.2 i2-st-93 O r pJ V \ SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.3.2-1 (Continued) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Comniitment Inspections. Tests. Anakses Acceptance Criteria

3. Each SCS Division contains a relief 3. Shop testing of the LTOP relief valve 3. LTOP relief valve set pressure is not valve that provides LTOP for the RCS set pressure will be performed. Shop greater than 545 psia and each valve has when the RCS is connected to the SCS. testing and analyses of the LTOP relief a capacity of no less than 5000 gpm.

valves capacity will be conducted in accordance with ASME Code Section Ill.

4. The CSS pump in a Division can 4. Testing to measure the flowrate 4. The CSS pump in a Division develops at perform the function of the SCS pump produced by the CSS pump, when its least 400 ft of head at a flow of at least in the Division. suction is cross-connected to the SCS 5000 gpm through the SCS heat .

pump suction and its discharge to the exchanger in the Division. SCS pump discharge, . will be performed.

5. In each Division, a flow limiting device 5. Functional tests will be performed with 5. In each Division, a flow limiting device is installed downstream from the SCS flow aligned to the RCS (suction from is installed downstream from the SCS pump discharge between the cross- the hot leg and discharge to the direct pump discharge betwten the cross-connect line from the CSS pump vessel injection nozzle.) . connect line from the CSS pump discharge and the Containment isolation discharge and the containment isolation valves to limit runout flow. valves. The SCS maximum flow is less than or equal to 6500 gpm in each Division.

~ 6. The piping from the RCS to the SCS 6. Inspection of the as-built piping will be 6. The piping from the RCS to the SCS pump suction is self-venting and conducted. pump suction has no loop seals and is contains no loop seals, oriented downward or horizontal except for an upward section connecting to the pump suction flange. 2.3.2 i2 si.93 O O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.3.2-1 (Continued) SIIITrDOWN COOLING SYSTEM Insucctions. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Cdteria

7. The SCS pumps can be tested at design 7. Testing and analysis of the SCS will be 7. Each SCS pump develops at least 400 ft flow during plant operation. performed by manually aligning suction of head at a flow of at least 5000 gpm and discharge valves to the IRWST and through the test loop.

a'arting the SCS pumps manually.

8. He ASME Code Section 111 SCS 8. A pressure test will be conducted on 8. The results of the pressure test of components shown on Figure 2.3.2-1 those components of the SCS required to ASME Code Section III components of retain their pressure boundary integrity be pressure tested by ASME Code the SCS conform with the pressure under intemal pressures that will be Section III. testing acceptance criteria in ASME experienced during service. Code Section Ill.

9.a) Displays of the SCS instrumentation 9.a) Inspection for the existence or 9.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.3.2-1 exist in the retrieveability in the MCR of on Figure 2.3.2-1 exist in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there. performed. 9.b) Controls exist in the MCR to start and 9.b) Testing will be performed using the SCS 9.b) SCS controls in the MCR operate to stop the SCS pumps, and to open and controls in the MCR. start and stop the SCS pumps, and to close those power operated valves open and close those power operated shown on Figure 2.3.2-1. valves shown in Figure 2.3.2-1. 9.c) SCS alarms shown on Figure 2.3.2-1' 9.c) Testing of the SCS alarms shown on 9.c) The SCS alarms shown on Figure 2.3.2-are provided in the MCR. Figure 2.3.2-1 will be perfortned using I actuate in the MCR in response to a signals simulating alarm conditions. signal simulating alarm conditions.

10. Water is supplied to each SCS pump at 10. Testing to measure SCS pump suction 10. The calculated available NPSH exceeds a pressure greater than the pump's - pressurewillbeperformed. Inspections each SCS pump's required NPSH.

required net positive suction head ~ and analyses - to determine NPSil (NPSH). available to each pump will be prepared based on test data and as-built data. 23.2 23-s3 O O O Sjr STEM 80+ TABLE 2.3.2-1 (Continued) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM InSDections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 11.a) Clas- IE loads shown on Figure 2.3.2-1 11.a) Testing will be performed on the SCS 11.a) Within the SCS, a test signal exists only are powered from their respective Class by providing a test signal in only one at the equipment powered from the IE Division. Class IE Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. II.b) The SCS pump motor and the CSS t l.b) Testing on the SCS and the CSS will be 11.b) A test signal exists only at the SCS pump motor in each Division are conducted with a test signal applied to pump motor or CSS pump motor powered from different Class IE buses one class IE bus at a time. powered from the Class IE bus under in that Division. test. I1.c) Independence is provided between Class 11.c) Inspection of the as-installed Class IE II.c) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions of the SCS willbe performed. IE Divisions in the SCS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, separation exists between Class IE in the SCS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the SCS.

12. The two mechanical Divisions of the 12. Inspection of the as-built SCS 12. The two mechanical Divisions of SCS are physically separated. mechanical Divisions will ' be the SCS are separated by a Divi-performed. sional wall or a fire barrier except for components of the system within Containment which are sep-arated by spatial arrangement or barriers.

13. SCS suction line isolation valves 13. Testing using a RCS pressure 13. The SCS suction isolation valves do have independent interlocks to . simulated signal greater than the not open, prevent. opening the isolation SCS suction line valves interlock valves if RCS pressure would cause pressure will be performed by the SCS LTOP relief valve to lift. attempting to open the valves from the MCR. Each valve will be tested independently.

23.2 n-si-s3 O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 23.2-1 (Continued) SIIUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM Inspections. Tes3. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desima Comunitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

14. Motor operated valves (MOVs) 14. Testing will be performed to open, 14. Each MOV having an active safety having an active safety function or dose, or open and also close, function opens, or closes, or opens will open, or will dose, or will MOVs having an active safety and also closes.

open and also - close,, under function under preoperational differential pressure or fluid flow differential pressure or fluid flow conditions and under temperature conditions and under temperatere conditions. conditions.

15. Check valves shown on Figure 15. Testing will be performed to open, 15. Each check valve shown on Figure 23.2-1 will open, or will close, or or dose, or open and also close 23.2-1 opens, or doses, or opens will open and also dose under check valves shown on Iigure and also doses.

system pressure, fluid flow 2.3.2-1 under system conditions, or temperature preoperational pressure, fluid flow conditions. conditions or. temperature conditions.

16. A containment spray actuation 16. Testing will be performed with the 16. A signal simulating a CSAS starts signal (CSAS) can be aligned to CSAS aligned to start . the - SCS the SCS pump in a Division and start an SCS pump when the CSS pump using a signal simulating a does not start the CSS pump in the pump in the same Division is not CSAS. same Division, when the CSAS is operable. If the CSAS is aligned to aligned to start the SCS pump.

start the SCS pump in a Division, the CSS pump in the same Division will not start on a CSAS. 23.2 ir.3i.,3 O SYSTEM 80+" 233 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM COMPONENT SUPPORTS Design Description , The reactor vessel, the steam generators, the reactor coolant pumps and the pressurizer are supported by the reactor coolant system (RCS) component supports. The RCS component supports permit movement of the RCS components due to expansion and contraction of the RCS. The component supports are safety related. The RCS component supports are located within the containment. He four reactor vessel support columns vertically support the reactor vessel and accommodate horizontal thermal expansion. Each reactor vessel nozzle cold leg forging mates with a reactor vessel support column and serves as a key which mates with a Ir 3way. Lower keys protruding from the reactor vessel mate with a slot in each support column base plate. The slot in the support column base plate serves as a keyway. These horizontal keys and keyways guide the vessel during expansion and contraction of the RCS, maintain the vessel centerline position, and laterally support the vessel. The Basic Configuration of the Reactor Vessel Supports is as shown in Figure 233-1. Each steam generator (SG) is supported at the bottom by an integral skirt attached to a sliding base plate resting on bearings. The bearings allow the SG to move as the RCS expands and contracts. Keys and keyways within the sliding base guide the movement of the SG during expansion and contraction of the RCS and limit movement of the SG bottom in the direction at right angles to the direction of motion during RCS expansion and contraction. He upper portion of the SG is supported by a system of keys, keyways and snubbers. The upper SG support system guides the top of the steam generator during expansion and contraction of the RCS and laterally supports the SG. The Basic Configuration of the SG Supports is as shown in Figure 233-2. Each reactor coolant pump (RCP) is supported by vertical columns, lower and upper horizontal columns, and snubbers. The columns provide vertical and horizontal support of the RCP, while allowing movement of the RCP during expansion and contraction of the RCS. The Basic Configuration of the RCP Supports is as shown in Figure 233-3. The pressurizer is supported at the bottom by an integral skirt. Keys and ke3 ways provide lateral support of the upper portion of the pressurizer. The Basic Configuration of the Pressurizer Supports is as shown in Figure 233-4. The RCS Supports are designed for loads due to normal operation, testing, seismic and accident conditions. O U 233 nam l i l 1 SYSTEM 80+" O, Ibe Reactor Coolant System Component Supports are designed and constructed in accordance with the ASME Code, Section III requirements and are classified Seismic Category L i Inspection, Test, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 233-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Reactor Coolant System Component Supports. i 1 l 1 O l I 'f t f ) l 2.3.3 mim . -y + +- - l l SYSTEM 80+" O : l COLD LEG w ., COLD LEG A4- ~ t N , D W' s .. ' c ' V ;@ s: - g % - ./ fu f. 43, , # ~ -i' A+} s' id v. : 1 A:; g TOP PLATE VIEW A- A O + J , COLUMN / l\ A N I n - l BASE PLATE i l l FIGURE 2.3.3-1 REACTOR VESSEL SUPPORTS 12-31-93 SYSTEM 80+" O I ' HOT LEG AXIS , _,,c,_,j - ( HOT LEG 't

h. 4 . 1-j [lq =,

COLD LEG - + 1' Su=G yat BASE (} --,. 'j T hp SUPPORT KEY (TYP) l \ LOWER SUPPORTS

m gmy (TYP)

UPPER O SUPPORT KEY (TYP) b l f / - b \d : yS - - -Y UPPER SUPPORTS FIGURE 2.3.3-2 STEAM GENERATOR SUPPORTS 12-31-93 SYSTEM B0+" f i O l f+A , I 8 i i f f MOTOR MOTOR) , e " i i Ir= > . l r-- ' 1 l 9T I h UPPER HORIZONTAL 5NUBBERS- ; ;q. ' .7SUPPORTS I I

0; DISCHARGE blSCHARGE LINE LINE g

- _ '_ a -j ?- ____,.____ - 8 , e r -- 315h LOWER - - - ' % HORIZONTAL - - 8 SUPPORTS 8 LOWER VERTICAL SUPPORTS \ VERTICAL S P ORTS i f I.-l,IL l SUPPORTS - - Nah 9 'uf \ ..'( VIEW A-A -+A J i I FIGURE 2.3.3-3 j REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SUPPORTS 1241 93 l l l ! I SYSTEM 80+ c i O l 1 l 1 KEYS O . N ], SKIRT l l l FIGURE 2.3.3 PRESSURIZER SUPPORTS 12-31-93 O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 233-1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM COMPONENT SUPPORTS Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. He RCS component supports permit 1. A test of the RCS will be performed to 1. Required gaps exist for the RCS movement of the RCS components due monitor thermal motion during heatup component supports.

to expansion and contraction of the and cooldown of the RCS. RCS.

2. The Peactor Coolant System Component 2. Inspection will be performed for the 2. ' ASME Code Section III Design Reports Supports are designed and constructed in existence of the ASME Code Section 111 exist for the Reactor Coolant System accordance with the ASME Code, Design Reports for the Reactor Coolant Component Supports.

Section III. System Component Supports.

3. He Basic Configuration of the RCS 3. Inspection of the as-built RCS 3. For the RCS Component Supports '

Component Supports is as shown in Component Supports configuration will shown on Figures 2.3.3-1 through Figures 2.3.3-1 through 2.3.3-4. be conducted. 2.3.3-4, the as-built RCS Component Supports conform with the Basic Configuration.

4. He as-built RCS Component Supports 4. Inspection of the RCS Component 4. He as-built RCS Component Supports are reconciled with the as-designed Supports will be performed to conarm are reconciled with the as-designed configuration. their designed conditions. support system.

2.3.3 n,n m i l l SYSTEM 80+" 23A NSSS INTEGRITY MONITORING SYSTEM ) Design Description The NSSS Integrity Monitoring System - (NIMS) is a non-safety-related instrumentation and control system which consists of the Internals Vibration j Monitoring System (IVMS), the Acoustic Irak Monitoring System (ALMS), and the l Imose Parts Monitoring System (LPMS). The NIMS provides data to the data l processing system (DPS). The IVMS provides data from which changes in the motion of the reactor internals can be detected. The ALMS provides data and alarms in j response to high acoustic levels originating from a reactor coolant pressure boundary. (RCPB) leak. The LPMS provides data and alarms in response to vibration of the RCPB associated with loose parts within the RCPB. The NIMS is located in the nuclear island structures. Displays of the NIMS instrumentation exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 23.4-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance O criteria for the NSSS Integrity Monitoring System. h i t ) O 2.3.4 12.n-m O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.3A-1 NSSS INTEGRITY MONITORING SYSTEM Insocctions. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The IVMS provides data from which 1. Testing will be performed on the IVMS 1. He IVMS provides data to the DPS in changes in the motion of the reactor by providing a test signal simulating a response to the test signal.

intemals can be detected. time-va ;-;og signal from the ex-core neutron detector channels.

2. The ALMS provides data and alarms in 2.a) Inspection of the as-built ALMS 2.a) ALMS sensors are provided in locations response to high scoustic levels configuration will be performed. specified in Table 2.3.4-2.

originating from a RCPB leak. 2.b) Testing willbe performed on the ALMS 2.b) He ALMS provides data and alanus to by providing a test signal simulating the DPS in response to the test signal. high acoustic levels.

3. De LPMS provides data and alarms in 3.a) Inspection of the as-built LPMS 3.a) LPMS sensors are provided in locations response to vibration of the RCPB configuration will be performed. specified in Table 2.3.4-3.

associated with loose parts within the RCPB. 3.b) Testing will be performed on the LPMS 3.b) He LPMS provides data and alarms to by providing a test signal simulating the DPS in response to the test signal, motion of the RCPB locations.

4. Displays of the NIMS instrumentation 4. Inspection for the existence or 4. _ Displays of the NIMS instrumentation exist in the MCR or can be retrieved retrievability in - the MCR of exist in the MCR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be there.

performed 2.3.4 . n,sim - l ! l l l SYSTEM 80+" ; i i TABLE 23.4-2 l l SENSOR LOCATIONS FOR ACOUSTIC LEAK MONITORING SYSTEM 1 COMPONENT NUMBER OF LOCATION SENSORS i i Reactor Coolant Pump 4 (1 per pump) Seal - l Steam Generators 2 (1 per SG) Pnmary side, manway { ' i ! Hot Legs 2 (1 per Leg) Reactor vessel outlet nozzle I Cold legs 4 (1 per Leg) Reactor vessel inlet nozzle l Reactor Vessel 3 Upper head, CEDM nozzles Reactor Vessel 1 Lower head, instrument nozzle Pressurizer Safety Valves 4 (1 per valve) Discharge line Pressurizer 1 Heater region l 1 l O ; 2.3.4 22m.n l i ) i a i ~ SYSTEM 80+" j . _ TABLE 23.4-3 SENSOR LOCATIONS FOR LOOSE PARTS MONITORING SYSTEM i COMPONENT NUMBER OF SENSORS LOCATION Reactor Vessel 3 Lower Head 3 Upper Head Steam Generator 1 4 Primary (inlet plenum) Primary (outlet plenum) Secondary (economizer region) Secondary (can deck region) O Steam Generator 2 4 Primary (inlet plenum) Primary (outlet plenum) Secondary (economizer region) Secondary (can deck region) O 2.3.4 12 3i.,3 l l SYSTEM 80+" O 2.4.1 SAFETY DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM Design Description l l The Safety Depressurization System (SDS) is a safety-related system composed of two ! l subsystems. The reactor coolant gas vent subsystem (RCGVS) provides a means to vent steam and non-condensible gases from the pressurizer (PZR) and the reactor vessel upper head (RVUH). The rapid depressurization subsystem (RDS) provides f a means to rapidly depressurize the RCS by venting the PZR. The SDS is manually actuated. l The SDS is located inside Containment. The Basic Configuration of the SDS is as shown on Figure 2.4.1-1. l ! I l 'Ihe SDS wasists of two redundant RDS piping trains from the pressurizer to the 1 spargers in the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST), and two i RCGVS piping trains, one from the pressurizer and one from the RVUH, which ! discharge to either the reactor drain tank (RDT) or the IRWST spargers. The RCGVS venting capacity will depressurize the RCS following design basis events. T s'y The RDS depressurization capacity, in conjunction with safety injection system (SIS) operation, will prevent uncovering the core during a total loss of feedwater (TLOFW). The ASME Code Section III Class for the SDS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.4.1-1 is as depicted on the figure. The safety-related equipinent and the ultrasonic instruments on the PZR safety valve discharge lines shown on Figure 2.4.1-1 are classified Seismic Category I. Displays of the SDS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.4.1-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to open and close thoc,e power-operated valves shown on Figure 2.4.1-1. SDS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.1-1 are provided in the MCR. Within the RDS, in one mechanical train, each isolation valve is powered from a different Class 1E bus within its Class 1E Division, and in the other mechanical train, each isolation valve is powered from a different Class 1E bus in the other Gass 1E Division. Within the RCGVS, in the pressurizer vent train and in the RVUH vent train, each isolation valve in one branch line is powered from a different Class IE bus within its Class 1E Division, and each isolation valve in the other branch line is powered from a different Class 1E bus in the other Class 1E Division. The isolation (~h 2.4.1 t2 3 93 i i i j .- i SYSTEM 80+" ' l valve to the RDT and the cross-connect valve between discharge lines to the RDT and the IRWST are powered from different Class 1E Divisions. Independence is provided between Class 1E Divisions, and between Class 1E Divisions and non-Class 1E equipment, in the SDS. ; Within the RCGVS in the pressurizer vent train and in the RVUH vent train, the two branch lines with isolation valves are physically separated. Motor operated valves (MOVs) having an active safety function will open, or will { close, or will open and also close, under differential pressure or fluid how conditions , and under temperature conditions. I Valves with response positions indicated on Figure 2.4.11 change position to that l indicated on the Figure upon loss of motive power. J l l Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria ) l Table 2.4.1-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Safety Depressurization System. ,O , l O 2.4.1 u-n-e 1 I SYSTEK80+* - 2 ! " EZ ; 5 ]s ( *@ * ! A _ [ e b t REACTOR I 2 h [Z g) COOLANT GAS .~ 1 w i *E VENT UNE 3 *U

M

% C> < = I TArm i FC JL 11 , *D ** l-(CvesJ jg / 'j % RAN .- - y

FC FC FC . -

i l (RCS) PZR I DEPRESSURIZATION J 2 i s/ UNES , ,y N ! JLJLJ L iLj ih FC FC I ,a i . t eq I I sArmvAtw I sh I -lmterMozans mes) lI p-; y ; g. ~ ' *vu.w ' " l avtant i - msTnumeur ITwLt m m umeur 1 aeAcron

p *g *-inC7s --

l ORINCE l l ORIMcE l COOLANT qy g s . _ (n_C,,> _ ,,,, pgp) ,,,, gvENTj p( 7{I .g----y H I IREACT R ESSELI I I I ' . NOTES: g*j i ~~~

1. ALL COMPONENTS SHOWN ARE INSIDE CONTAINMENT.

2. THE ASME CODE SECTION M CLASS 1 AND 2 PRESSURE

~~ IPzn s T i RETAINING COMPONENTS SHOWN ARE GAFETY-RELATED. ALL VAtw @, loisCHARGE I VALVES SHOWN ARE POWERED FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE CLASS w (n_Cg _, T 1E BUS, AS NOTED IN THE DESIGN DESCRIPTION.

3. * : EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH PARAGRAPH NUMBER 3 OF THE

" VERIFICATION FOR BASIC CONFIGURATION FOR SYSTEMS" ' SECTION OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS (SECTION 1.2) APPLIES. ; FIGURE ' 2.4.1-1 ' * * " ' SAFETY DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM. p ( 8 i V (d 1 SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2A.1-1 SAFETY DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM Insputions. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. He Basic Configuration of the SDS is 1. Inspection of the as-built SDS 1. For the components and equipment as shov .on Figure 2.4.1-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.4.1-1, the as-built SDS conforms with the Basic Configuration.

2. He RCGVS venting capacity will 2. Testing to determine RCS 2. Le RCGVS depressurizes the RCS at a depressurize the RCS following design depressurization rate will be performed. rate of at least 0.9 psi per second at an basis events. Analyses wW <e performed to convert initial pressurizer pressure of 2250 pds.

the test resus's to a depressurization rate at an RCS starting pressure.

3. The RDS depressurization capacity, in 3. Type tests of the RDS valve flow 3. A single RDS train in conjunction with conjunction with SIS operation, will capacity will be performed. Analysis of two of four safety injection (SI) pumps, prevent uncovering the core during a total loss of feedwater will be prevents core uncovery following a totalloss of feedwater. performed, using the as-built system TLOFW if feed and bleed is initiated characteristics. immediately following the opemng of pressurizer safety valves.

He two RDS trains have sufficient total flow capacity with all SI pumps operating to prevent core uncovery following a TLOFW if feed and bleed is delayed up to 30 minuM from the time pressurizer safety valves lift. 2.4.1 2,3i.n ._. _ _ _ _ . . _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ . . _ _ _ . ._ .-. . .. ~ O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.4.1-1 (Continued) SAFFIY DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analvscs. and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

4. He ASME Code Section III SDS 4. A pressure test will be conducted on 4. He results of the pressure test of components shown on Figure 2.4.1-1 those components of the SDS required ASME Code Section 111 portions of the retain their pressure boundary integrity to be pressure tested by ASME Code SDS conform with the pressure testing under internal pressures that will be Section III. acceptance criteria in ASME Code experienced during service. Section Hl.

5.a) Displays of the SDS instrumentation 5.a) Inspection for the existence or 5.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.4.1-1 exist in the retrievability in the MCR of on Figure 2.4.1-1 exist in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there. performed. 5.b) Controls exist in the MCR to open and 5.b) Testing will be performed using the SDS 5.b) SDS controls in the MCR operate to close those power operated valves controls in the MCR. open and close those power operated shown on Figure 2.4.1-1. valves shown on Figure 2.4.1-1. 5.c) SDS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.1-1 5.c) Testing of the SDS alarms shown on 5.c) He SDS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.1-are provided in the MCR. Figure 2.4.1-1 will be performed using i actuate in response to signals signals simulating alarm conditions. simulating alarm conditions. 6.a) Within the RDS, in one mechanical 6.a) Testing will be performed on the RDS 6.a) A test signal exists only at the RDS train, each isolation valve is powered valves by providing a test signal in only valves powered from the Class IE bus from a different Class IE bus within its one Class IE bus at a time. under test. Class IB Division, and in the other mechanical train, each isolation valve is powered from a different Class IE bus in the other Class IE Division. 2.4.1 nan - - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . .. - -- .. _ _- . .. ._ ~ -. O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2A.1-1 (Continued) SAFETY DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM InsDections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 6.b) Within the RCGVS, in the pressurizer 6.b) Testing will be perfbrmed on the 6.b) A test signal exists only at the RCGVS vent train and in the RVUll vent train, RCGVS valves by providing a test valves powered from the Class IE bus each isolation valve in one branch line is signal in only one Class IE bus at a under test. powered from a different Class IE bus time. within its Cass IE Division, and each isolation valve in the other branch line is powered from a different Class IE bus in the other Class IE Division. 6.c) ne isolation valve to the RDT and the 6.c) Testing will be performed on the 6.c) A test signal exists only at the RCGVS cross-connect valve between discharge RCGVS valves by providing a test valves powered from the Class IE lines to the RDT and IRWST are signal in only one Class IE Division at Division under test. powered from different Class IE a time. Divisions. 6.d) Independence is provided between Class 6.d) Inspection of the as-installed Class IE 6.d) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class 1E Divisions of the SDS will be performed. IE Divisions in th3 SDS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, separation exists between Class IE in the SDS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the SDS.

7. Within the RCGVS, in the pressurizer 7. Inspection of as-built mechanical trains 7. Within the RCGVS, in the pressurizer vent train, and in the RVUH vent train, . will be performed. vent train,'and in the RVUH vent train, the two branch lines with isolation the two branch lines are separated valves are physically separated. within Containment by spatial arrangement or barriers.

2.4.1 iz um O O O SYSTEM 80+" _ TABLE 2.4.1-1 (Continued) SAFETY DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM _ Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

8. Motor operated valves (MOVs) having 8. Testing will be performed to open, or 8. Each MOV having an active safety an active safety function v ".' open or close, or open and also close, MOVs function opens, or closes, or opens and will close, or will open e , . a close, having an active safety function under also closes.

under differential pressure or fluid flow preoperational differential pressure or conditions and under temperature fluid flow conditions and under conditions, temperature conditions.

9. Valves with response positions indicated 9. Testing of loss of motive power to these 9. These valves change position to the on Figure 2.4.1-1 change position to valves will be performed. position indicated on Figure 2.4.1-1 that indicated on the Figure upon loss of upon loss of motive power.

motive per. 2.4.1 nnn SYSTEM 80+" ( 2.4.2 ANNULUS VENTILATION SYSTEM Design Description The Annulus Ventilation System (AVS) reduces the concentration of radioacthity in the annulus air by filtration, holdup (decay), and recirculation before annulus air is released to the atmosphere. The Basic Configuration of the AVS is as shown on Figure 2.4.2-1. The AVS components shown on Figure 2.4.2-1 are safety-related. Components of the AVS are located in the nuclear annex and annulus portion of the reactor building. The AVS takes air from the upper annulus above the primary containment dome, filters it, and discharges part of the air through openings to the lower annulus near the annulus floor and the remainder of the air through the unit vent to the atmosphere. The AVS has two Divisions. Each Division of the AVS has a filtration unit, a fan, (pj dampers, ductwork, instrumentation, and controls. Each AVS filtration unit removes particulate matter. Each Division has dampers to modulate exhaust air to maintain a negative pressure l within the annulus relative to atmosphere when the AVS is in operation. The safety-related components of the AVS are classified Seismic Category I. Safety-related components of the AVS are powered from their respective Class 1E , Division. l 1 Independence is provided between Class 1E Divisions, and between Class IE l Divisions and non-Class 1E equipment, in the AVS. Active components of the two Dhisions of the AVS are physically separated. Displays of the AVS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.4.2-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. 2.4.2 12-sm ! I I , i I l SYS'IEM 80+" ; l Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the AVS fans, and to open and close- . those power operated dampen shown on Figure 2.4.2-1. .! i i Each AVS Division is activated by a Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS). Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria .j 1 ' Table 2.4.2-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance ! criteria for the Annulus Ventilation System. l t l f l t l % 1 l 1 l -l l ) 1 i I I i i l 2.4.2 mi.n l l O O O SYSTEM 80+ , INSIDE E ' T CONTAINMENT ANNULUS s NUCLEAR ANNEX FAN n 3 g STATUS ......CSAS q N e e :' g i- N+ , q ; FILTRATION l Q l N g g UNIT 81 } UPPER $ aANNULUS l s ! T A FAN Iiiiii h ]I g STATUS - CSAS T $ s Uy3NT 3 f N, .I

a ; tA: -- s j 5 FILTRATION ,

xx <x ) - \ - UNIT # 2 - - PK T E1 " lI **. a I l PD s s Dm PRESSURE e A N gT,V,E, NT ,s I L-- s e 3 ; 'y -l im l s f .. .DIPPERE N 1 ' s l 4,o 1 l s l 8 s y IF e F-F l F ! U , F ! - GLOWER' l gANNULUS j NOTE: l

1. THE DUCT WORK FROM THE BUILDING ENT UP TO AND MCLUDMG THE ISOLATION DAMPER 18 FIGURE 2.4.2-1 32.ai-Sa

"""F'"""^" """'"mt PRESSu"'- ANNULUS VENTILATION SYSTEM r) n J / O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.4.2-1 ANNULUS VENTILATION SYSTEM InsDections. Tests. Analvscs. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acaptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the AVS is 1. Inspection of the as-built AVS 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.4.2-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.4.2-1, the as-built AVS conforms with the Basic Configuration.

2. Each AVS filtration unit removes 2. Testing and analysis will be performed 2. The AVS filter efficiency is greater than particulate matter. on each AVS filtration unit to determine or equal to 2:99% for particulate matter filter efficiency. greater than 0.3 microns.

3. Each Division has dampers to modulate 3. Testing will be performed on each 3. The AVS achieves a negative pressure exhaust air to maintain negative pressure Division to measure annulus pressure in the annulus greater than or equal to within the annulus relative to during AVS operation. 0.25 inches water gauge relative to atmosphere when the AVS is in atmosphere within 110 seconds.

operation. 4.a) Safety-related AVS components are 4.a) Testing will be performed on the AVS 4.a) Within the AVS, a test signal exists only powered from their respective Class IE system by providing a test signal in only at the equipment powered from the Division. one Class IE Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. 4.b) Independence is provided between Class 4.b) Inspection of the as-installed Class 1E 4.b) Physical separation exists between Class 1E Divisions, and between Clast iE Divisionsin the AVS willbeperformed. 1E Divisions in the AVS. Separation Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, exists between Class IE Divisions and in the AVS. non-Class IE equipment in the AVS.

5. Active components of the two Divisions 5. Inspection of the as-built mechanical 5. The active components _of the two of the AVS are physically separated. Divisions will be performed. mechanical Divisions of the AVS are separated by a Divisional wall or a fire barrier.

2.4.2 na-n f3 (,~ t Q)s. v l l l SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2A.2-1 (Continued) . I ANNULUS VENTILATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criten3 Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 6.a) Displays of the AVS instrumentation 6.a) Inspection for the existence or 6.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.4.2-1 exist in the retrieveability in the MCR of on Figure 2.4.2-1 exist in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there. performed. 6.b) Controls exist in the MCR to start and 6.b) Tests will be performed using the AVS 6.b) AVS controls in the MCR operate to stop the AVS fans, and to open and controls in the MCR. start and stop the AVS filtration units, close the isolation dampers shown on and to open and close those isolation Figure 2.4.2-1. dampers shown on Figure 2.4.2-1.

7. Each AVS Division is activated by a 7. A test will be performed using a 7. Each AVS Division is activated by a Containment Spray Actuation Signal. simulated Containment Spray Actuation simulated Containment Spray Actuation Signal. Signal.

2.4.2 n,u-n q SYS1EM 80+" NJ 2.4.3 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL SYSTEM Design Description De Combustible Gas Control System (CGCS) is used to maintain hydrogen gas concentration in Containment at a level which precludes an uncontrolled hydrogen and oxygen recombination within Containment following design basis and beyond design basis accidents. He CGCS consists of the Containment Hydrogen Recombiner System (CHRS) and the Hydrogen Mitigation System (HMS). The Basic Configuration of the CHRS is as shown on Figure 2.43-1. The HMS consists of hydrogen igniters located inside Containment. The CHRS hydrogen analyzers are located in the Nuclear Annex and locations are provided in the Nuclear Annex for installation of hydrogen recombiner units post-accident. The ASME Code Section HI Gass 2 components shown on Figure 2.43-1 are safety-related. ne safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.43-1 is classified Seismic Category O L ' i The Cass IE loads shown on Figure 2.43-1 are powered from their respective Gass 1E Division. l Independence is provided between Cass 1E Divisions, and between Cass IE i Divisions and non-Gass 1E equipment in the CGCS. I At least 80 hydrogen igniters are prov' Jed. Forty hydrogen igniters are powered by one Division of Gass 1E power sources, of which at least 17 can be powered by the Oass 1E batteries. Forty hydrogen igniters are powered by the other Division of Class 1E power sources, of which at least 17 can be powered by the Gass 1E batteries. The hydrogen igniters are non-safety related and classified Seismic Category L Displays of the CGCS hydrogen analyzer instrumentation exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. i 4 i O' 2.43 zum I l I (. . , 1 e. L SYSTEM 80+" Controls exist in the MCR to energize and de-energize the hydrogen analyzers and .; the hydrogen igniters. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria l i Table 2.43-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance . i criteria for the Combustible Gas Control System. . l- i i l r + .i i 6

i i

f i I i 2.43 -2 .u,n-n e E SYSTEM 80 +,, INSIDE a OUTSIDE O O CONTAINMENT E CONTAINMENT a I M n ' Civ Cw l p s s HYDROGEN RECOM3lNER ANALYZER M CONNECTION l = l CIV CIV

a a

a e i e a g ' = LCiv Civ h f a HYDROGEN ANALYZER RECOMBINER j ~ M CONNECTION u a _ , l I CIV CIV

a I

! NOTES: ' A. ALL PIPING AND COMPONENTS SHOWN ARE ' ASME CODE SECTION lli CLASS 2. O. SAFETY-RELATED COMPONENTS AND EQUIPMENT . SHOWN ON THE FIGURE ARE POWERED FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE CLASS 1E DIVISION. C.

EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH PARAGAPH NUMBER (3)

OF THE " VERIFICATIONS FOR BASIC CONFIGURATION FOR SYSTEMS" OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS (SECTION 1.2) APPLIES. FIGURE 2.4.3-1 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINER SYSTEM 12-si-os w 3 9-v ~/bk. 1 3-2 1 O _ X % ~ Y - T I V . / - N A C R _ \x - / ' O T C A. - E R - F O W E _ / / ' \ I V N A L P - S V \ N O O / I T A C -_ R \ O E L _ T R I / N E G I T I R . N E i D G A i N Y H y I N G r I t e E _ O t a G O Nb Y H* E R D M - 1 s Y H s a s" iP l C 2-MU "S M a y 3 4 \ / b 2 d E e r R e U w G \ / o p I F e b n O ' s C a / \ \N' % p /// \ F '[ 8 5 5 : l 5 $ C(' v - d 5 - 0 d E : - i d E' ! g 1 ) l1 i. j c 6 f. C Z /. ~ 4 , 7, ; g k\ 5 m ( ' Z 4 i .J , - i ~ ), pop 1 ( , . e e a\ \ N / / / l ' k U O Z g ~ - Z : ! 4 E o - O l e ' x ; 5 o '

o. - >

Z E N 5 % ~ N.t e 3 t. g ts e 4 E = - I 5 25 em W m T- 1 .. o 9, 1 z 9 z AE E c_ US l h '%/ HYD. IGNTTER . HYO. IGNITER I I HYD. IGNITER N~ C ] O O / HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER * ~ HYD. IGNITER H D. IGWR HYD. IGNITER / [h . HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER

O ) HyD. IGNIIER 1(

__r . __ _ _ __ . __. . _ . aan -- . _ ._ . =~ IGNITER HYD. IGNITEFi ' l , p *YD.H f % ttYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER # g \(j HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER ' HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER l l HYD. IGNITER Can be powered by a Class 1E battery . , HYD. IGNITER FIGURE 2.4.3-4: HYDROGEN IGNITER LOCATIONS: PLAN VIEW ABOVE ELEVATION 91+9 AND BELOW 115+6 12-31-93 N 2 O o, HYD. IGNITER 5 o o NYD. IGNITER . --T , . + ,YD. IGNI HYD. IGNITER D HYD. IGNITElt HYD. IGNIT R I HYD. IGNITER I I 0 l ' I \ a ~ O O ' HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITEp '- HYD. I NITER ,, ~ O O * \ HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER V HYD. IGNIT q o + 'HYD. IGNITER Can be powered by a Class 1E battery + , O O e HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER 20 0 5 FIGURE 2.4.3-5: HYDROGEN IGNITER LOCATIONS: PLAN VIEW ABOVE ELEVATION 115+6 AND BELOW ELEVATION 146+0 '*# ~ _ ._ _ - _ __ . _=_ - -_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ - _ _ . . . - _ _ . . - - _ .. _ _ . _ _ _ - _ - . - _ . - _ - _ - . . _ _ - _ _ _ - HYD. IGNITER iYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER ' ' HYD. IGNITER 0L HYD. IGNITER i HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER j -HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER % OPERRTING FLOOR /R u u 7 HYD. IGNITER fREFUELCANALARER I R \ HYD. IGNITER y5 * $i$i$:. N , . HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER **: , :- HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER h n _n l i HYD. IGNITER -- H . IMITER Can be powered by a Class 1E Hyo, 1surrg, battery (OO . HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER

HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER f ITER

.I HYD. IGNITER FIGURE 2.4.3-6: HYDROGEN IGNITER LOCATIONS: PLAN VIEW ABOVE ELEVATION 146+0 TO TOP OF DOME 12-31-93 . _ _ _ __ _ __ _. _ ._ .- ~ . _ _ . _ . _ . _ __ _ .___. _ _. __. _ _ _ _ O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.43-1 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Ar:alyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analnes Acceptance Criteria

1. He Basic Configuration of the CllRS is 1. Inspection of the as-built CHRS 1. For the camponents and equipment as shown on Figure 2.4.3-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.4.3-1, the as-built CHRS conforms with the Basic Configuration.

2.a) The Class IE loads shown on Figure 2.a) Testing will be performed on the CHRS 2.a) Within the CIIRS, a test signal exists 2.4.3-1 are powered from their by providing a test signal in only one only at the equipment powered from the respective Class IE Division. Class IE Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. 2.b) Independence is provided between Class 2.b) Inspection of the as-installed Class IE 2.b) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions in the CGCS will be IE Divisions in the CGCS. Separation Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, performed. exists between Class IE Divisions and in the CGCS. non-Class IE equipment in the CGCS.

3. ' The ASME Code Section III CHRS 3. A pressure test will be conducted on 3. The results of the pressure test of components shown on Figure 2.4.3-1 those components of the CHRS required ASME Code Section III components of retain their pressure boundary integrity to be pressure tested by ASME Code the CHRS conform with the pressure ur. der internal pressures that will be Section Ill. testing acceptance criteria in ASME experienced during service. Code Section III.

4.a) Displays of the CGCS hydrogen 4.a) Inspection for the existence or re- 4.a) Displays of the CGCS hydrogen concentration instrumentation exist in trieveability in the MCR of instru- concentration instrumentation exist in the MCR or can be retrieved there. mentation displays will be performed. the MCR or can be retrieved there. 4.b) Controls exist in the MCR to energize 4.b) Testing will be performed using the 4.b) CGCS controls in the MCR operate to and de-energize the hydrogen analyzers CGCS controls in the MCR. energize and de-energize the hydrogen and the hydrogen igniters. analyzers and the hydrogen igniters. 2.4.3 i2.ai.n A ' V SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.43-1(Continned) COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL SYSTEM Insucctions. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

5. Hydrogen recombiner units can be 5. Testing to connect hydrogen recombiner 5. Ilydrogen recombiner units can be connected to the CHRS. units will be performed. connected.

6. At least 80 hydrogen igniters are 6. Inspection for the number and location 6. At least 80 hydrogen igniters are provided. of igniten will be performed. provided. The igniters are generally located as shown in Figures 2.4.3-2 through 2.4.3-6.

7. Forty hydrogen igniters are powered by 7. Testing will be performed to determine 7. At least 40 . hydrogen igniters are one Division of Class IE power sources, number ofigniters that can be energized powered from each Division of Class IE of which at least 17 can be powered by from each Division of Class IE power power sources. At least 17 igniters can the Class 1E batteries. Forty hydrogen sources, including the number that can be powered from each Division of Class igniters are powered by the - other be energized ' from each Division of IE batteries.

Division of Class IE power sources, of Class IE batteries. which at least 17 can be powered by the Class IE batteries. 2.4.3 2mm p) i SYSTEM 80+" 2.4.4 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Design Description The Safety Injection System (SIS) is a safety-related system which injects borated water into the reactor vessel to provide core cooling and reactivity control in response to design basis accidents. The SIS provides core cooling during feed and bleed operation, in conjunction with the safety depressurization system. He SIS is located in the reactor building subsphere and Containment. The Basic Configuration of the SIS is as shown on Figure 2.4.4-1. The SIS consists of two Divisions. Each SIS Division has two SIS pumps, two safety injection tanks (SITS), valves, piping, controls and instrumentation. Two SIS pumps, in conjunction with the SITS, have the capacity to cool the core during design basis events. One SIS pump, in conjunction with the SITS, has the capacity to cool the core during a direct vessel injection line break. The SITS contain borated water pressurized by a nitrogen cover gas. When RCS pressure falls below SIT pressure and the associated SIT isolation valve is open, water ,e flows from the SIT into the reactor vessel. The SITS can be depressurized by venting (3 ! for entry into shutdown cooling. A flow recirculation line from each SIS pump discharge to the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) provides a minimum flow recirculation path. j l The SIS pumps can be tested at full flow during plant operation. The ASME Code Section III Class for the SIS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 is as depicted on the Figure. The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 is classified Sdsmic Category I. SIS Pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 outside Containment have a design pressure of at least 900 psig. Displays of the SIS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the SIS pumps, and to open and close those power operated valves shown on Figure 2.4.4-1. SIS alarms shov 1 on Figure 2.4.4-1 are provided in the MCR. n) ( C 2.4.4 2.:nm l ! n SYSTEM 80+" (~) Water is supplied to each SIS pump at a pressure greater than the pump's required net positive suction head (NPSH). The Cass 1E loads shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E Division. Within a Division, one SIS pump and associated valves and controls are powered from a ditTerent Oass 1E bus in the same Oass 1E Division than the other SIS pump and associated valves and controls. l l Within a Didsion, the two hot leg injection isolation vahes are powered from different Cass IE buses in the same Cass 1E Division. Independence is provided between Gass 1E Divisions, and between Gass IE Divisions and non-Class 1E equipment, in the SIS. The two mechanical Divisions of the SIS are physically separated. Valves with response positions indicated on Figure 2.4.4-1 change position to that l. indicated on the Figure upon loss of motive power. The SIS is automatically initiated by a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS). en An interlock automatically opens the SIT motor-operated isolation valves when RCS pressure increases above the SIT normal operating pressure. The interlock prevents closing the SIT motor-operated isolated valves until RCS pressure decreases below the interlock reset point. The SIS can be manually realigned for simultaneous hot leg injection and direct vessel injection (DVI). Hot leg injection is used in long term post-LOCA cooling. Motor operated valves (MOVs) having an active safety function will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under differential pressure or fluid flow conditions and under temperature conditions. Check valves shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under system pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.4.4-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance criteria for the Safety Injection System. i C\ \V l 2.4.4 x2m-n eve L .- 0 0 l ASME CODE SECTION 111 CLASS I LLil SCS(TO RCS HOT LEG)' < ' *M. civ i i af civ h rc ATM SIAS i g SIT pc IE a SlAS

O TD 5 y i

_-.n d,,,,, i - g MMl'l civ M SIAS - 3} c [ REACTOR RCS * "giL" +'"v*i."Jo,, w " n

ATM

= 5ve SIAS ->- \ VESSEL - Ns $ gg E.ta 8 SlAS -a -l*i Y EE scs i b ! CSS gh "* g SIAS - lO l 4 f , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . , , c,y 3 ' av IN-CONTAINMENT Q- CSS /SCS V l REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK ', (IWSS) e av I ' INSIDE CONTAINMENT l OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT - NOTES:

1. SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND EQulPMENT SHOWN ON THIS FIGURE ARE CLASS 1E. ALARMS ARE NOT SAFETY-RELATED AND NOT CLASS 1E.'-

2.

EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH PARAGRAPH NUMBER 3 OF THE " VERIFICATION FOR BASIC ~

CONFIGURATION FOR SYSTEMS" SECTION OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS (SECTION 1.2) APPLIES.

3. THE ASME CODE SECTION lli CLASS 1 AND 2 PRESSURE RETA.. COM,0NENTS SNOWa ARE SAFETY-RELATED FIGURE 2.4.4-1 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM '"

(ONE OF TWO DIVISIONS) n Q (~) V V V SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.4.4-1 SAFFlY INJFCTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. "The Basic Configuration of the safety 1. Inspection of the as-built SIS 1. For the components and equipment injection system (SIS) is as shown on configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.4.4-1, the as-built Figure 2.4.4-1. SIS conforms with the Basic Configuration.

2. Two SIS pumps, in conjunction with the 2.a) Testing to determine SIS flow will be 2.a) Each SIS pump has a pump-developed SITS, have the capacity to deliver performed. Analysis will be performed . pressure differential of no less than 1600 coolant to the reactor vessel to cool the to convert the test results from the test psid and no more than 2040 psid at the core during design basis events. conditions to the design conditions. vendor's specified minimum flow rate, and injects no less than 980 gpm and no more than 1232 gpm of borated water into the reactor vessel at atmospheric pressure.

2.b) Testing will be performed using signals 2.b) The SIS initiates and begins to deliver simulating a safety injection actuation flow to the reactor vessel within 40 signal (SIAS). seconds following receipt of a signal simulating SIAS, including emergency diesel generator start time and load time. 2.c) Testing will be performed to open the 2.c) The pressurized SITS discharge water to SIT isolation valves with the SITS the depressurized RCS. pressurized and the RCS depressurized. Analysis will be performed to convert Resistance coefficient K of the discharge the test results from the test conditions line from the SIT to the reactor vessel is to the design conditions. equal to or between 4.5 to 30 (Insed on a cross-sectional area of 0.6827 ft2). 2.4.4 nm-n DO nv n %J SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2AA-1 (Continued) SAFETY INJECI' ION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses _seceptance Criteria

2. (Continued) 2.d) Inspection of construction records for 2.d) He volume in each direct vessel SIS piping will be conducted. injection line, from the connection for the SIT return header to the piping-to-DVI nozzle weld, is no greater than 27.8 cubic feet.

3. The safety injection tanks can be 3. Testing will be performed with the SITS 3. The SIT vont valves can be opened from depressurized by venting for entry into pressurized and the associated SIT the MCR and the SIT pressure decreases shutdown cooling. isolation valve shut. Each SIT vent while the SIT is being vented.

valve will be opened from the MCR.

4. A flow recirculation line from each SIS 4. Testing of SIS will be performed by 4. Minimum flow recirculation rate meets pump discharge to the IRWST provides manually aligning SI flow to the IRWST or exceeds the pump vendor's minimum a minimum flow recirculation path. through the minimum flow recirculation flow requirements.

line and manually starting each SIS pump.

5. The SIS pumps can be tested at full flow 5. Testing of the SIS will be performed by 5. Each SIS pump has a flow capacity of at during plant operation. manually aligning SIS flow to the least 980 gpm to the IRWST through the IRWST and manually starting each SIS test line.

pump.

6. The ASME Code Section ill SIS 6. A pressure test will be conducted on 6. He results of the pressure test of components shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 those components of the SIS required to ASME Code Section ill components of retain their pressure boundary integrity be pressure tested by ASME Code the SIS conform with the pressure under internal pressures that will be Section Ill. testing. acceptance criteria in ASME experienced under service. Code Section Ill.

2.4.4 umm O O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2AA-1 (Continued) SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and AcceDiante Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Cdteria 7.a) Displays of the SIS instrumentation 7.a) Inspection for the existence or 7.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 exist in the retrievability in the MCR of on Figure 2.4.4-1 exist in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation . displays will be - can be retrieved there. performed. 7.b) Controls exist in the MCR to start and 7.b) Testing will be performed using the SIS 7.b) SIS controls in the MCR operate to start stop the SIS pumps, and to open and controls in the MCR. and stop the SIS pumps and to open and close those power operated valves close those power operated valves shown on Figure 2.4.4-1. shown on Figure 2.4.4-1. ?.,;} sis alarms shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 are 7.c) Testing of the SIS alarms shown on 7.c) He SIS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.4-provideo in the MCR. Figure 2.4.4-1 will be performed using i actuate in the MCR in response to signals simulating SIS alarm conditions. signals simulating SIS alarm conditions.

8. Water is supplied to each SIS pump at a 8. Testing to measure SIS pump suction 8. He calculated available NPSH exceeds pressure greater than the pump's pressure will be performed. Inspections each SIS pump's required NPSH.

required NPSH. and analyses to determine NPSH available to each SIS pump will be performed based on test data and as-built data. 9.a) The Class IE loads shown on Figure 9.a) Testing on the SIS will be conducted by 9.a) Within the SIS, a test signal exists only 2.4.4-1 are powered - from their providing a test signal in only one Class at the equipment powered from the respective Class IE Division. IE Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. 9.b) Within a Division, one SIS pump and 9.b) Testing on the SIS will be conducted by 9.b) Within the SIS, a test signal exists only associated valves and controls are providing a test signalin only one Class at the equipment powered from ' the powered from a different Class IE bus - IB bus at a time. Class IE bus under test. in the same Class IE Division than the other SIS pump and associated valves and controls. 2.4.4 n-u-n O O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2AA-1 (Continued) SAFETY IN.IFLTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 9.c) Within a Division, the two hot leg 9.c) Testing on the SIS will be conducted by 9.c) Within the SIS, a test signal exists only injection isolation valves are powered providing a test signalin only one Class at the equipment powered from the from different Class IE buses in the IE bus at a time. Class IE bus under test. same Class IE Division. 9.d) Independence is provided between Class 9.d) Inspection of the as-installed Clast, IE 9.d) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions of the SIS will be perfonned. IE Divisions in the SIS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, separation exists between Class IE in the SIS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the SIS.

10. The two mechanical Divisions of the SIS 10. Inspection of as-built mechanical 10. The two mechanical Divisions of the SIS are physically separated. Divisions will be performa!. are separated by a Divisional wall or a fire t>arrier except for components of the system within containment which are separated by spatial arrangement or barriers.

I1. Valves with response positions indicated 11. Testing ofloss of motive power to these 11. Dese valves' change position to the on Figure 2.4.4-1 change position to valves will be performed. position indicated on Figure 2.4.4-1 that indicated on the Figure upon loss of upon loss of motive power. motive power.

12. He SIS is automatically initiated by a 12. Testing will be performed by generating 12. A signal simulating SIAS starts the Si safety injection actuation signal (SIAS), a signal simulating SIAS. pumps and opens the SI header isolation valves and safety injection tank (SIT) isolation valves. He SIT isolation valves, when open, receive a confirmatory open signal.

2.4.4 u,si ,3 s SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2A.4-1 (Continued) SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

13. The SIS can be manually realigned for 13. Testing will be performed with the 13. The SIS injects no less than 980 and no simultaneous hot leg injection and direct system manually aligned for more than 1232 gpm through each hot vessel injection (DVI). simultaneous DVI and hot leg injection. leg injection line with the RCS at atmospheric pressure.

14. Motor operated valves (MOVs) having 14. Testing will be performed to open, or 14. Each MOV having an active safety an active safety function will open, or close, or open and also close MOVs function opens, or closes, or opens and will close, or will open and also close, having an active safety function under also closes.

under differential pressure or fluid flow preoperational differential pressure or conditions and under temperature fluid flow conditions and under conditions. temperature conditions.

15. Check valves shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 15. Testing will be performed to open, or 15. Each check valve shown on Figure will open, or will close, or will open close, or open and also close check 2.4.4-1 opens, or closes, or opens and and also close under system pressure, valves shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 under also closes.

fluid flow conditions, or temperature system preoperational pressure, . fluid conditions. flow conditions, or temperature conditions. 16.a) An interlock automatically opens the 16.a) Testing will be performed using a signal 16.a) The SIT motor operated isolation valves SIT motor-operated isolation valves simulating increasing RCS pressure, . ' open i ceyonse to a signal simulating when RCS pressure increases above the with the SIT isolation valves closed. RCS pressure increasing above the SIT SIT normal operating pressure. normal operating pressure. 16.b) The interlock prevents closing the SIT 16.b) Testing willbe performed using a signal 16.b) *ne SIT motor-operated isolation valves motor-operated . isolation valves until simulating decreasing RCS pressure with do not close when RCS pressure is RCS pressure decreases below the the SIT isolation valves open .and above the interlock reset point. interlock reset point. attempting to close the valves from the main control room. 2.4.4 i2.n.n l '<^ SYSTEM 80+" 2.4.5 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM i Design Description l The Containment Isolation System (CIS) provides a safety-related means to close ! 2 4 valves in fluid system piping that passes through Containment penetrations . The CIS l provides a pressure barrier at each of these Containment penetrations. The Basic Configuration of the Containment isolation valves for piping which l penetrates containment is as shown on Figure 2.4.5-1; each Containment isolation i valve arrangement is as shown in one of the configurations on the figure. The AShE Code Section III Cass for the CIS pressure retaining components is as l shown on Figure 2.4.5-1.2 The Containment isolation valves and connecting AShE Code Section III Cass 2 ) piping shown on Figure 2.4.5-1 are classified Seismic Category L i 1 i Electrically-powered Containment isolation valves are Class 1E. These Class 1E loads are powered from their respective Class IE Divisions. p The Containment equipment hatch trolley receives Class 1E power. I 1\ l Redundant Containment isolation valves which require electrical power are powered I from different Class 1E Divisions.' Independence is provided between Class 1E Divisions, and between Class 1E Divisions and non-Class 1E equipment in the CIS. i Displays of CIS valve positions for remotely operated and automatic Containment isolation valves exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to open and close CIS power operated valves. Only those valves required to close automatically for Containment isolation are closed by a Containment isolation actuation signal (CIAS). Containment isolation valves that 4 receive a CIAS close within the time allocated to the function performed. Containment isolation valves that receive a CIAS, upon closure, do not reopen as a direct result of reset of the CIAS. Pneumatic Containment isolation valves close upon loss of motive or control power to the valve. f ( ' 2.4.5 12-sim l l SYSMM 80+" Motoroperated valves (MOVs) that receive a CIAS will close under differential pressure or fluid Dow conditions, and under temperature conditions. ; Containment isolation check valves having an active safety function will close under - l' system pressure, fluid Dow conditions, or temperature conditions. Containment isolation valves required to close automatically against containment atmosphere systems are designed to close against at least containment design pressure. Containment Isolation valves and piping between CIVs are designed for pressures at . least equal to the containment design pressure. The induced stresses in the pressure retaining components of the CIVs due to an internal containment pressure ofless than or equal to 120 psig are within the ASME Code Section III service Level C stress limits. Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria i Table 2.4.5-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance _ l criteria for the Containment Isolation System. 'I NOTES: ' Containment isolation valves are assigned as components of their respective systems. 2 Containment penetration leak rate testing is addressed in Section 2.1.1, Nuclear Island l Structures. ; ' i Electrical penetrations are addressed in Section 2.6.4, Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies. O- 2.4.5 n-si-o . ) CONTAINMENT SYSTEM 80+TM I INSIDt! l OUTSIDE 12.3 OR N 2I NOTei,_ v . ,E l > M= E I l AUTOMATIC I AUTOMATIC OR REMOTELY < l OPERATEDOR REMOTELY l B OPERATED l l l Si NOTE 2 l' NOTE 2 12.3 OR N 21 - *** ""' l ASME CODE SECTION fu CLASS g l5 l I E E AUTOMATIC OR REMOTELY E OPERATED E 2* / NOTE 2 i tJdD 12,3 OR N 2] E NOTE 3 I2 2,3 OR N j O . E 3. I 2.3 OR N 21 E E i i g n NOTE 3 11.2 OR 3 21 g 12 2,3 M N l E E BUND FLANGE E Locan 5. I s i az ! O FIGURE 2.4.5-1 (PAGE 1 OF 4) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE CONFIGURATION 12-31-93 l SYSTEM 80+* O co"raiwaear INSIDE OUTSIDE 6. I. A E --- W IRWST - 1 I $b I AIJTOMATC AUTOMATIC O' r,.] g . d_ , an : an A uto M A1,e - 1,c

s. i, SG: d. +.

gg i mm iEr ST#1 + l [m i

t= a - ec

9. I so I I nn EE -

I J NOTE 2 l a E!s ^uroua m ab " - l FIGURE 2.4.5-1 (PAGE 2 OF 4) l CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE CONFIGURATION l 12-31-93 i ! SYSTEM 80+ CONTAINMENT INSIDE OUTSIDE 12.3 OR N 2l l 3 o* & NOTE 2 I l AUTOMAM OR REMOTELY OPERATED

E 1 AUTOMATIC OR I REMOTELY OPERATED j j T ;

I' 2 0" " I } E I

& NOTE 2 I

E l I2.3 OR N 21 EE E3] : l l REMOTELY REMOTELY

OPERATED

~ k , OPERATED i 11. = { = T . i ax : E i B ! l ! ! 1 { j REMOTELY ED 3 OPER NOTE 2 1 g""IRWCT"" ""g l j i i I + { g g JL REMOTELY ~ OPERATED } EE E wem I GD ;O FiauaE 2.4.5-4 <e oe s og 4> ! ; CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE CONFIGURATION 12-31-93 1 1 I CONTAINMENT INSIDE OUTSIDE E

I i

zm l l AuToe4ATC l

13. $ l l _

! NOTE 2 ~5g i T \ an : an i, I 8 l i GD e b TED l NOTE 4 l No E2 ,1, NOTES ' 14. lL REa00TELY l

g OPERATED

! [] I REleOTELY OPERATED g I NOTES: ,' 1. UQUID REUEF VALVE CAN BE INCLUDED IN CONFIGURATION

2. VALVE CAN BE OPEN OR CLOSED IN NORMAL POSITION

3. FLOW ELEMENT / ROOT VALVES OMITTED FOR CLARITY, WHERE APPUCABLE.

4. CHECK VALVE IS NOT A CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VAL'/E O

4 FIGURE 2.4.5-1 (PAGE 4 OF 4) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE CONFIGURATION 12-31-93 p ,- C ( SYSTEM 83+" TABLE 2.4.5-1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desist Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configutation of the Contain- 1. Inspection of the as-built CIS con- 1. For the components and equipment ment isolation valves for piping which figu stion will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.4.5-1 and specified penetrates Containment is as shown on in Table 2.4.5-2, the as-built CIS Figure 2.4.5-1; each Containment conforms with the specified Basic isolation valve arrangement is as shown Configuration shown on Figure 2.4.5-1.

in one of the configurations on the figure.

2. The ASME Code Section lli valves 2. A pressure test will be performed on 2. The results of the pressure test of shown on Figure 2.4.5-1 retain their those components of the CIS required to ASME Code Section III components of pressure boundary integrity under be pressure tested by ASME Code the CIS specified in Table 2.4.5-2 internal pressures ' hat will be

. Section III. conform with the pressure testing experienced during service. acceptance criteria in ASME Code Section III. 3.a) Electrically-powered Containment 3.a) Testing will be performed on the 3.a) Within the CIS, a test signal exists only isolation valves are Class IE. R ese Contain-ment isolation valves by at the equipment powered from the Class IE loads are powered from their providing a test signal in only one Class Class IE Division under test. respective Class IE Divisions. IE Division at a time. 3.b) The Containment equipment hatch 3.b) Inspection of the as-built Containment 3.b) The Containment equipment hatch trolley receives Class IE power. equipment batch trolley will be trolley receives Class IE power. performed. 3.c) Independence is provided between Class 3.c) Inspection of the as-installed Class IE 3.c) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions and between Class IE Divisions in the CIS will be performed. IE Divisions in the CIS. Separation Divisions and non-Class IE equipment exists between Class IE Divisions and in the CIS. non-Class IE equipment in the CIS. 2.4.5 .3i.,3 0 v ? [ w SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2A.5-1 (Continued) CONTA1NMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Cownitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

4. Redundant Contamment isolation valves 4. Testing will be performed on the 4. Within the CIS, a test signal exists only which require electrical power are Containment isolation valves by at the equipment powered from the powered from different Class IE providing a test signal in only one Class Class IE Division under test.

Divisions. lE Division at a time. 5.a) Displays of CIS valve positions for 5.a) Inspection for the existence or retriev- 5.a) Displays of CIS valve positions for remotely operated and automatic ability in the MCR of displays of remotely operated and automatic Containment isolation valves exist in the Containment isolation valve positions Containment isolation valves exist in the MCR or can be retrieved there, will be performed. MCR or can be retrieved there. 5.b) Controls exist in the MCR to open and 5.b) Testing will be performed using the 5.b) Controls in the MCR operate to open close CIS power operated valves. Containment isolation valve controls in and close power operated Containment the MCR. isolation valves. 6.a) Only those valves required to close 6.a) Testing of the isolation function will be 6.a) ' Containment isolation valves respond to automatically for Containment isolation performed using a signal simulating a signal simulating CIAS as specified in are closed by a CIAS, CIAS. Table 2.4.5-2. 6.b) Cantainment isolation valves that receive 6.b) Testing of the closure times of 6b) Containment isolation valves close upon a CIAS close within the time allocated automatically actuated Containment receipt of a signal that simulates a CI AS to the function performed. isolation valves will be performed using in less than or equal to the time - a signal that simulates a CIAS. specified in Table 2.4.5-2, if specified. 6.c) Containmentisolationvalvesthatreceive ' 6.c) Following closure of Containment 6.c) Containment ~ isolation valves, once a CIAS, upon closure, do not reopen as isolation valves on a signal that closed by a signal that simulates a a direct result of reset of the CIAS. simulates a CIAS, tests will be CIAS, do not reopen as a direct result performed to verify that the valves do of a signal that simulates resetting the not reopen when a signal that simulates CIAS. the CIAS reset is applied. 2.4.5 nan O O V Qd V SYSTEM 80+" TAHLE 2.4.5-1 (Continued) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Comunitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

7. Pneumatic Containment isolation valves 7. Testing will be performed on each 7. Pneumatic Containment isolation valves close upon loss of motive or control pneumatic Containment isolation valve close.

power to the valve. to simulate a loss of motive power and a loss of control power.

8. Motor-operated valves (MOVs) that 8. Testing to close MOVs that receive a 8. Each MOV that receives a CIAS closes, receive a CIAS will close under CIAS will be conducted under differential pressure or fluid flow preoperational differential pressure or conditions, and under temperature fluid flow conditions, and under conditions, temperature conditions.

9. Containment isolation check valves 9. Testing of Containment isolation check 9. Each Containment isolation check valve having an active safety function will valves will be conducted under system specified in Table 2.4.5-2 closes.

close under system pressure, fluid flow preoperational pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. conditions, or temperature conditions. 10.a) Containment isolation valves required to 10.a) Inspection and analysis will be 10.a) Reports exist which conclude that close against containment atmosphere performed on Containment isolation containment isolation valves required to are designed to close against at least valves required to close against close against containment atmosphere containment design pressure, containment atmosphere. are designed to close against at least containment design pressure. 10.b) Containment isolation valves and piping 10.b) Inspection and analysis of containment 10.b) Reports exist which conclude that between CIVs are designed for pressures isolation valves and piping between containment isolation valves and piping at least equal to the containment design CIVS will be performed. between CIVs are designed for pressures pressure. at least equal to the containment design pressure. 2.4.5 n.n m S M 80 +" TABL 4.5-2 (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 31 Maximum Closee On Valve item Service Valve CIAS Closure No. Arrangement (Yes, Not Time on CIAS 1 Main Steam Une #1 from Steam Generator #1 9 No l Remotely Operated Safety Valve + Safety Valve Safety Valve Safety Valve Safety Valve Remotely Operated Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated Manual Valve Manual Valve - 2 Main Steam Une #2 from Steam Generator #1 9 No Remotely Operated - Safety Valve Safety Valve Safety Valve - + Safety Valve - Safety Valve Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Manual Valve - 3 Main Steam Une #1 from Steam Generator #2 9 No Remotely Operated - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Safety Ve've -- Safety Varve Safety Valve . - Remotely Operated - Remo*ely Operated - Remotely Operated - d g Manual VaNo - 2.4.5 n on-,3 C L s SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.4.5- (Cenii ued) (Note il (Note 2) (Note 31 Maximum Closee On Valve item Service Valve CIAS Closure No. Arrangement (Yes, Nol Time on CIAS 4 Main Steam Une #2 from Steam Generator #2 9 No Remotely Operated Safety Valve Safety Valve Safety Valve Safety Valve Safety Valve Remotely Operated Remotely Operated Remotely Operated Manual Valve Manual Valve 5 Main Feedwater to Downcomer Nozzle Steam Generator #1 8 No Remotely Operated Remotely Operated Check Valve Check Valve 6 Main Feedwater to Downcomer Nozzie Steam Generator #2 8 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Check Valve Check Valve 7 Main Feedwater to Economizer Nozzles for Steam Generator #1 7 No. Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Check Valve 8 Main Feedwater to Economizer Nozzles for Steam Generator #2 7 No P.ernotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Check Valve 2.4.5 - nam l 3 9- . pd . t - 3-1 m e S 3 uer eA n mtv u e t o ie x smC oi I N avlC Tn o ( M _ _ ) n t o _ 2 O _ o o sAS N,s e e o o o o o t N N N N N N N _ o eCe I N l o _ ( C Y( t n . ) e . 1 em ve 4 e t leg 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 o n N( Var r . A ) _ d e u i n _ d C 7- ) (2 - 3 5 _ _ A 2 E L B _ A T e c iv r e S e _ e e e g g g g r r r a r a h a h a e g e g e g _ h h c c r r r - c s cs s is a a a _ i D D h h h i D D c c s c s 2 1 2 is i i 1 # # # # D D D p p p p 4 2 3 m m # # # m m u u p p p u u P P ) 4 ) 4 ) 4 P P m m dd m d W d e W d e W d e W d e P u d ee t P u ee e de t P u tet e F t a F t a F E t a F E t a t ao aaoa t t t n a o n n r rNr e(N r r r r rN r E e E e e e o e( o ee( e o n p n p n p n p p it pp p it p Ove OOeO it e v l e v Oe lv i e v Oelv ya e v Oe v ya l c e Oe ya lv c e yyay lv c e Oe ya lv ya i ya r ir j j j i r l eV r l eV D- lev D- l eV n l eV n l eeVl e l n l eV D- D- i i i r t okc r t okc m t okc m t okc y t okc y t t ook co t y t okc . t o me t o me a me a me t e me t e mmem e me _ o eh o eh e eh e eh f a eh f a eeh e f a eh t t M RC M RC S RC S RC S RC S RRCR S RC + _ 0 __ 8 M m. e o 9 o 1 2 3 4 1 5 1 E t 1 1 1 ) r I N t 5 ebsYS 4 2 SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2 4-5-2 (Cintinued) (Note il (Note 2) (Note 3) Maximum Closee On Velve item Service Velve CIAS Cloeure No. Arrangement (Yes, No) Time on CIAS 16 Safety injection Pump #1 Discharge 14 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Check Valve (Note 4) Remotely Operated - 17 SCS Pump #2 Suction 11 No Remotely Operated - Rollef Valve - Remotely Operated - 18 SCS Pump #1 Suction 11 No Remotely Operated - Relief Valve - Remotely Operated - 19 Hot Leg inject!on Loop #2 2 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 20 Hot Log injection Loop #1 2 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 21 Containment Sprey Pump #2 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve 2 22 Containment Spray Pump #1 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 2.4.5 2-si.,3 ~ C ( SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.4.5 (Ocntinued) (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 31 Maximum Closes On Velve Item Service Velve CIA 8 Closure N o. Arrangement (Yes, Nol Time on CIAS 23 Safety injection Pump #1 and Containment Spray Pump #1 Suction une 6 No Remotely Operated - 24 Safety injection Pump #2 and Contalement Spray Pump #2 Suction Une 6 No Remotely Operated - 25 Safety injection Pump #3 Suction 6 No Remotely Operated - 26 Safety injection Pump #4 Suction 6 No Remotely Operated - 27 StS Division 1 Miniflow Retum to IRWST 12 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve - Remotely Operated - 28 SIS DMalon 2 Miniflow Retum to IRWST 12 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve - Remotely Operated - 29 Return Header from $1 Tanks 13 No Remotefy Operated - Manual Valve - Relief Valve ' - 4 30 - CCW Supply to Letdown Heat Exchanger 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60see Remotely Operated 60 sec Check Valve - 2.4.5 noim SY TEM 80+= TABLE 2 4.5 (C ntinued) (Note II (Note 2) (Note 31 Maximum Closes On Valve item service Velve CtAS Closure No. Arrangement lyes, Nol Time on CIAS 31 CCW Return from Letdown Heat Exchanger 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve 32 CCW Suppfy to RCP Heat Exchangers 1 A and 1B 1 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 33 CCW Retum from RCP Heat Exchangers 1 A and 18 1 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 34 CCW Supply to RCP Heat Exchangers 2A and 2B 1 No Remotely Operated - Remote!y Operated - Check Valve - 35 CCW Return from RCP Heat Exchangers 2A and 28 1 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 36 Shutdown Purification Une to Letdown Heat Exchanger 4 No Manual Valve - Check Valve - 37 Letdown to Purification Systsm 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 2.4.5 um.c 1 l j O SYSTEM 80+= O TABLE 2.4.5-2 (Certi~uedl O (Note II (Note 2) (Note 3) Maximum Cioces On Velve item Service Velve CIA 8 Cloeure No. Arrangement (Yee, Not Time on CIAS 38 CVCS Charging Une 2 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 39 RCP Seal Injection 2 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 40 RCP Seal Retum Flow 1 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - 41 RDT Flow to RDPs 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sac Remotely Operated 60 sec 42 Resin Sluice Supply to Reactor Drain Tank 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60see Check Valve - 43 Breathing Mr Supply 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec Check Valve - 44 Station Nr Supply 2 Yes I i Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve - 45 Instrument Mr Supply 2 Yes Remote!y Operated 60 see Check Valve - ~ 2.4.5 uan-n li > m , ) m e S oc ec ec eec m , e u 3 e uer mlvuseA e oe ss ee ss ee ss eee sss . t ie mIC s - - - - - - - , o x 00 00 000 . N avl coi Tn o 0 6 00 66 66 66 666 , ( M ) n ) o 2 J s s e sAs N, s o o s s e e o e e N e e N t o s I s Y N Y Y Y Y N( loCe C Y ( t n ) e 1 em ve 0 e 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 , t le g 1 o N( Varn r A , ) d e u i n t n . e C ( - 8 . 5 A . c 2 E L B _ A T e ic v r e S r e e e d n lp e n a e U e U H e n T~. n o n e lp u it c t r u u n m a e lp t i u k S S F e e m d p p lp c a lo a S C y u u m p e k n n a n 1 lp d a a S dd S dd n dd ddd # dd p e e ee ee u ee a eee ee u e d m T t t t r t t S t a O O iu t t aa a t t aa r r e t t aa r r e aaa r r r o aa r r r r e l o l o q r r ee e ee lp ee m eee t a ee ee ee U pp t pp pp ppp r pp A p o o v lv S m u OOO e OO t n Oev l P vv laa l P laa r e OO r e OO S a OO lo yyy n e e ya g VV g VV iz lyy z lyy lyy V l l G - ly lev n in l r ee l i r ee l g ee l p leee lee m t okc i le laal le laa u t t oo u t t oo o t t oo u t t t ooo m t t oo u uu uu s s L . t r s me eh f u e nn aa f u e nn aa s e r mm ee s e r mm ee t o mm ee d lo mmm eee t a e mm ee = I n RC R MM R MM P RR P RR H RR H RRR S RR u + _ 0 8 _ M m. e o 6 7 8 4 9 4 0 5 1 5 2 5 3 5 E i N t 4 4 _ T 5 ,~US 4 Y S 2 . a I, SYSTEM 80+= ( & TABLE 2.4.5-2 (Co-ti ved) ( (Note II (Note 21 (Note 31 Maximum ' Closes On Velve item Service Valve CIAS Closure No. Artangement (Yes. Nol Time on CIAS 54 Steam Generator #1 Hot Leg Sample 1 No Remotely Operated Remotely Operated 55 Steam Generator #1 Downoomer Sample 1 No Remotely Operated Remotely Operated 56 Steam Generator #2 Cold Leg Sample 1 No Remotely Operated Remotely Operated 57 Steam Generator #2 Hot Leg Sample 1 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - 58 Steam Generator #2 Downcomer Sample 1 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - 59 High Volume Containment Purge System Supply #1 1 No Remotely Operated 60 seo Remotely Operated 60seo 60 H!gh Volume Containment Purge System Supply #2 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60eeo Remotely Operated - 60 seo 61 High Volume Containment Purge System Exhaust #1 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 seo Remotely Operated 60 soo 2.4.5 i2 aim O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 24.5Q- (Continued) (Note 11 (Note 21 (Note 31 Maximum Closes On Velve item Service Valve CIAS Closure No. Arrangement (Yes, Not Time on CIAS 62 High Volume Containment Purge System Exhaust #2 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 63 Low Volume Containment Purge System Supply 2 Yes Remotely Operated 30 see Check Valve - 64 Low Volume Containment Purge System Exhaust 1 Yes Remotely Operated 30 see Remotely Operated 30 sec 65 Steam Generator #1 Combined Blowdown 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60see Remotely Operated 60 sec Check Valve 66 Steam Generator #2 Combined Blowdown 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve 67 Fire Protection Water Supply to Containment (une Number 1) 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60sec Check Valve - 68 Fire Protection Water Supply to Containment (Une Number 2) 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec Check Valve 69 Division 1 NCWS Supply to Containment Ventilation Units and CEDM Units 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60seo Remotely Operated 60 see 2.4.5 n,n-n s O) TABLE 2.4.5 (0 nti'ned) SYSTEM 80+" (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 3) Maximum Closes On Velve item Service Velve CIAS Closure No. Arrangement (Yes, Nel Time on CIAs 70 Division 2 NCWS Supply to Containment Ventitation Units and CEDM Units 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 7t Division 1 NCWS Retum From Containment ventilation Units and CEDM Units 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 soo Remotely Operated 60 sec 72 Division 2 NCWS Retum From Containment Ventilation Units and CEDM Units t Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 73 Containment Radiation Monitor (Inlet) 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sec 74 Contelnment Radiation Monitor (Outlet) 1 Yes Remotely Operated tso see Remotely Operated ' 60seo 75 ILRT Pressure Sensing Une 3 No Manual Vaive Manual Valve 76 Domineralized Water 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve 77 Nitrogen Supply to Safety injection Tanks and ROT 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec check Valve 2.4.5 ' 24i-n ~ SYSTEM 80+" g TABLE 2 4 5-2 (0 niinued) h (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 3) Menimum Closee On Velve item Service Velve CIAS Closure No. Artangement (Yes. No) Time on CIAS 78 ILRT Pressurization Une 5 No Manual Valve - Flange - 7g RCP Oil Fill Une 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated - 80 Containment Sump Pump Discharge Une 1 Yes nemotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve 81 Containment Ventilation Units' Condensate Drain Header 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve 82 Reactor Drain Tank Gas Space to GWMS 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60sec 83 Decontamination Une 3 No Manual Valve - Manuel Valve - 84 Divisien 1 Hydrogen Recombiner Suction from Containment 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated ' . 60 sec 85 Division 2 Hydrogen Recombiner Suction from Containment 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60sec Remotely Operated 60sec 2.4.5 non-n O O p) () LJ SYSTFM 80+" TA"LE 2A.5-2 (Conti~ued) (Note 1) (Note 21 (Note 3) Maximum Closee On ve!ve item service volve CIAS Closure No. Artengement (Yes. Not Time on CtAS 86 Division 1 Hydrogen Recombiner Discharge to Containment 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec Check Valve - 87 Division 2 Hydrogen Recombiner Discharge to Containment 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve - 88 Steam Generator Wet Layup Recirculation Return to Steam Generator #1 4 No Manual Valve - Check Vafve - 89 Steam Generator Wet layup Recirculation Retum to Steam Generator #2 4 No Manual Valve - Check Valve - 90 St IRWST Boron Recovery Supply to CVCs 1 Yes Remotely OperatM 00 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 91 CVCS IRWST Boron Recovery Retum 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve - NOTES:

1. Valve arrangements are in accordance with the Containment isolation valve configurations shown on Figure 2.4.5-1.

2. Paragraph Number 3 of the General Provisions (Section 1.2) applies to Containment isolation valves which receive a CIAS.

3. A dash (-) denotes NOT APPLICABLE

4. Not a containment isolation valve; shown only to establish ASME Code Section 111 class break location.

2A.5 imm w -) SYSTEM 80+" s , 2.4.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM Design Description The Containment Spray System (CSS) 1.s a safety-related system which removes heat and reduces the concentration of radionuclides released from the fuel from the Containment atmosphere and transfers the heat to the component cooling water system following events which increase Containment temperature and pressure. The CSS can also remove heat from the in-contaimnent refueling water storage tank (IRWST). He CSS is located in the reactor building subsphere and Containment. The Basic Configuration of the CSS is as shown on Figure 2.4.6-1. The CSS consists of two Divisions. Each CSS Division has a CSS pump, a CSS beat exchanger, valves, piping, controls and instrumentation. Each CSS Division has the heat removal capacity to cool and depressurize the containment atmosphere, such that containment design temperature and pressure are not exceeded following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or a main steam line break q (MSLB). O Re CSS limits the maximum flow in each Division. The CSS pump and the Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) pump in the same Division are connected by piping and vahes such that the SCS pump in a Division can perform the pumping function of the CSS pump in that Division. He piping and valves in the cross-connect line between the SCS pump suction and the CSS pump suction permit , Dow in either direction. 1 A Dow recirculation line around each CSS pump provides a minimum Dow ] recirculation path. . 1 The CSS pumps can be Dow tested during plant operation. ] The AShE Code Section III Class for the CSS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 is as depicted on the Figure. He safety related equipment shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 is classified Seismic Category L CSS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.4.6-1, except the shell side of the heat exchangers, have a design pressure outside Containment of at least 900 psig. A

V t 2.4.6 mm

SYSTEM 80+" C Displays of the CSS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the CSS pumps, and to open and close those remote-operated valves shown on Figure 2.4.6-1. CSS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 are provided in the MCR. Water is supplied to each CSS pump at a pressure greater than the pump's required net positive suction head (NPSH). The Oass 1E loads shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 are powered from their respective Cass IE Division. The CSS pump motor and the SCS pump motor in each Division are powered from different Cass 1E buses in that same Division. Independence is provided between Gass 1E Divisions and between Gass 1E Divisions and non-Gass 1E equipment in the CSS. 'Ibe two mechanical Divisions of the CSS are physically separated. The CSS pumps are started upon receipt of a containment spray actuation signal (CSAS), except when the CSAS is aligned to the SCS pump in the same Division. The isolation valves to the CSS spray headers and nozzles are opened upon receipt of a containment spray actuation signal (CSAS). 7 Motor operated valves (MOVs) having an active safety function will open, or will (V close, or will open and also close under differential pressure or fluid Gow conditions, ! I and under temperature conditions. l Check valves shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 will open, or will close, or will open and also close under system pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. l Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria j Table 2.4.6-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance criteria for the Containment Spray System. q ] 2.4.6 u.si-e evmLM o o Nctes:

1. TUBE SIDES ARE ASME CODE SECTION lil CLASS 2 AND SHELL (CCW) SIDES ARE ASME CODE SECTION 111 CLASS 3.

t 2. SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND EQUIPMENT INSIDE g OUTSIDE ' CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT SHOWN ON THIS FIGURE ARE CLASS 1E. ALARMS AND PRESSURE AND CURRENT INSTRUMENTS ARE NOT SAFETY-RELATED AND NOT CLASS 1E. CSS HEADER

3. THE ASME CODE SECTION lli CLASS 2 AND 3 PRESSURE RETAINING COMPONENTS SHOWN ARE SAFETY-RELATED Sg SQS y ,,j y g +CIV I ,J . SPRAY NOZZLES CSAS- - IV

s. s,

\t -n i S [M] 'I A 4s JL I k CSAS 1f ; 1r . -@ O ! N CSS Hx g + NOTE 1 SIS (FROM 1RWST) + - - y :pF C W+ l _ , A y s - u ar-A MINIFLOW Hx CCW INSIDE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT - NOTE 1 g IASME CODE SEi7'lON lli CLASS a j tCCWj M y PCPS+ --l l--- X = INSIDE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT SIStrO IRWST) *--- - 4 - SCS EMERGENCY I FIGURE 2.4.6-1 SIS SS"^CKUP CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM g , ,.3, .,3 ; (ONE OF TWO DMSIONS) (v3 O v SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2A.6-1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitinent Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. 'Ihe Basic Configuration of the CSS is 1. Inspection of the as-built CSS 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.4.6-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.4.6-1, the as-built CSS conforms with the Basic Configuration.

2. Each CSS Division has the heat re- 2.a) Testing of the CSS to measure the 2.a) Each CSS pump develops at least 400 moval capacity to cool and depressurize containment spray flow at the discharge feet of head at a flow rate no less than the containment atmosphere such that of the CSS pump will be performed. 5000 gpm.

containment design temperature and Testing and analysis will be performed pressure are not exceeded following a to determine the pump head. LOCA or MSLB. 2.b) Testing of the CSS will be performed 2.b) Flow to the spray nozzles begins within using signals simulating a CSAS. The 68 seconds after receipt of a CSAS. test results will be converted by analysis to a delay time for spray initiation. 2.c) Testing and analyses will be performed 2.c) One CSS heat exchanger cools CSS flow to determine the heat removal capability to a maximum temperature of 175'F of the CSS heat exchanger. with an inlet teos..hus of 218'F when supplied with 8000 gpm from the CCWS at 120*F. 2.4.6 2mm p m p b ) d SYSTEM 83+ TABLE 2.4.6-1 (Continued) CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desist Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

3. The CSS limits the maximum flow in 3. Testing of the CSS will be performed 3. The CSS maximum expected flowis less each Division. with flow aligned to the IRWST. than or equal to 6500 rpm in each Inspection of the as-built spray header Division.

will be performed. Analyses will convert the test flow rates to the maximum expected flow rate.

4. The SCS pump in a Division can 4. Testing to measure the flowrate 4. The SCS pump in a Division pumps at perform the pumping function of the produced by the SCS pump when its least 5000 gpm through the CSS heat CSS pump in the Division. suction is connected to the CSS pump exchanger in the Division.

suction and its discharge to the CSS pump discharge will be performed.

5. A flow recirculation line around each 5. The as-built system configuration will be 5. Minimum flow recirculation rate meets CSS purnp provides a minimum flow inspected and minimum flow or exceeds the pump vendor's recirculation path, recirculation rate verified by a minimum requirements.

flow measurement test.

6. He CSS pumps can be flow tested 6. Testing of the CSS will be performed by 6. He CSS pump has a flow capacity of at during plant operation, manually aligning suction and discharge least 5000 gpm each through the test valves to the IRWST and starting the loop.

CSS pumps manually. 2.4.6 n-n-n O O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.4.6-1 (Continued) CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

7. He ASME Code Section III CSS 7. A pressure test will be conducted on 7. The results of the pressure test of cot ponents shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 those components of the CSS required to ASME Code Section ill components of retain their pressure boundary integrity be pressure tested by ASME Code the CSS conform with the pressure under internal pressures that will be Section Ill. ~ testing acceptance criteria in ASME experienced during service. Code Section III.

8.a) Displays of the CSS instrumentation 8.s) Inspection for the existence or 8.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 exist in the retrievability in the MCR of on Figure 2.4.6-1 exist in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there. performed. 8.b) Controls exist in the MCR to start and 8.b) Testing will be performed using the CSS 8.b) CSS controls in the MCR operate to stop the CSS pumps, and to open and controls in the MCR. start and stop the CSS pumps and to close those power operated valves open and close those power operated shown on Figure 2.4.6-1. valves shown on Figure 2.4.6-1. 8.c) CSS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 8.c) Testing of the CSS alarms shown on 8.c) He CSS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.6-are provided in the MCR. Figure 2.4.6-1 will be performed using 1 actuate in response to signals signals simulating alarm conditions. simulating alarm conditions. 2.4.6 e-3im N Ps T V SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.4.6-1 (Continued) CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM InsDections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

9. Water is supplied to each CSS pump at 9. Testing to measure CSS pump suction 9. The calculated available NPSil exceeds a pressure greater than the pump's pressure will be performed. Inspections each CSS pump's required NPSll.

required net positive suction head and analysis to determine NPSH (NPSH). available to each pump will be performed based on test data and as-built data. 10.a) The Class IE loads shown on Figure 10.a) Testing will be performed on the CSS 10.a) Within the CSS, a test signal exists only 2.4.6-1 are powered from their by providing a test signal in only one at the equipment powered from the respective Class IE Division. Class IE Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. 10.b) The CSS pump motor and the SCS 10.b) Testing on the CSS and the SCS will be 10.b) A test signal exists only at the CSS pump motor in each Division are conducted with a test signal applied to pump motor or SCS pump motor powered from different Class IE buses one Class IE bus at a time. powered from the Class IE bus under in that same Division. test. 10.c) Indqsdowe is provided between Class 10.c) Inspection of the as-installed Class 1E 10.c) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions and between Class IE Divisions in the CSS will be performed. IE Divisions in the CSS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment separation exists between Class IE in the CSS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the CSS.

11. The two mechanical Divisions of the - 11. Inspection of as-built mechanical 11. The two mechanical Divisions of the CSS are physically separated. Divisions will be performed. CSS are separated by a Divisional wall or a fire barrier except for components of the system within Containment svhich are separated 1y spatial arrangement or barriers.

2.4.6 iz-si.n . _ _ - - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ . - . _ --_ _ -_ __ _- _-_--_ _ -_ __ -_= -_______ - _ - _ C O O \ V V l l SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2A.6-1 (Continned) CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desima Comunitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Cdtesia

12. The CSS pumps are started upon receipt 12. Testing will be performed on the CSS 12. The CSS pumps start upon receiving a of a CSAS, except when the CSAS is pumps using a signal simulating a signal simulating a CSAS, except when aligned to the SCS pump in the same CSAS. the CSAS is aligned to the SCS pump in Division.- the same Division.

13. In each Division, the CSS isolation 13. Testing will be performed using a signal 13. The CSS isolation valve to the CSS valve to the CSS spray header and simulating a CSAS. spray header and noules opens upon-nonles opens upon receipt of a CSAS. receipt of a signal simulating a CSAS.

14. Motor operated valves (MOVs) having 14. Testing will be performed to open, or 14. Each MOV h.ving an active safety I

an active safety function will open, or close, or open and also close MOVa function opens or closes, or opens and will close, or will opcc and also close having as active safety function under also closes. under differential pressure or fluid flow preoperational differential pressure or conditions, and under temperature fluid flow conditions and under conditions. temperature conditions.

15. Check valves shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 15. Testing will be performed to open, or 15. Each check valve shown on Figure will open, or will close, or will open close, or open and also close check 2.4.6-1 opens, or closes, or opens and and also close under system pressure, valves shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 under also closes.

fluid flow conditions, or temperature system preoperational pressure,' fluid conditions. flow conditions, or' temperature conditions. 2.4.6 irm n i e SYSTEM 80+" i 2.4.7 IN-CONTAINMENT WATER STORAGE SYSTEM ; 1 Design Description The In-containment Water Storage System (IWSS) includes the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST), the holdup volume tank (HVT), and the cavity l flooding system (CFS). The TRWST provides borated water for the safety injection system (SIS) and the containment sprav system (CSS). It is the primary heat sink for discharges from the j reactor coolant r stem (RCS) pressurizer safety valves and the safety depressurization system (SDS) r ai depressurization subsystem. It is the source of water for the CFS. r It is the source or water to fill the refueling pool via the SIS and CSS. He IRWST l and IRWST instrumentation, except alarms, are safety-related. The HVT collects water released in Containment during design basis events and : returns water to the IRWST through spillways. It also collecti component leakage not routed to other drain systems inside Containment and recewes water discharged from the IRWST by the CFS. , I The CFS is used to provide water to flood the reactor cavity in response to beyond design basis events. O CFS valves located in the holdup volume are designed such that they may be actuated , while submerged. The IWSS is located in the Containment. ! The Basic Configuration of the IWSS is as shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 and locations of . IRWST and HVT are shown on Figure 2.1.1-1. The IRWST has a volume above the SIS / CSS pump suction line penetrations to - permit proper SIS and CSS operation following design basis events. The IRWST has a total volume that permits dilution of radionuclides from core and RCS release following design basis loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs). The IRWST can be vented to allow communication between the IRWST and the containment atmosphere. Stainless steel baskets containing trisodium phosphate are located in the HVT. The ASME Code Section III Class for the IWSS pressure retair.i::g components is as shown on Figure 2.4.7-1. De safety related equipment shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 is classified Seismic Category I. 2.4.7 u,sim ,. - - -~ -. -.- -. - - . - - - - .. . - . t t SYS'IEM 80+" j i Displays ofIWSS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 exist in the main control i I room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to open and close those power operated valves shown on - I Figure 2.4.7-1. IWSS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 are provided in the MCR. ' j The power operated valves and IRWST instrumentation, except alarms, shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 are powered from their respective Cass 1E Division.' Within the CFS, each of the four valves in the spillways from the IRWST to the HVTis powered from - j a different Oass IE bus, and each of the two valves in the spillways from the HVT l to the reactor cavity is powered from a different Cass 1E Division. ' t i Independence is provided between Cass 1E Divisions,~ and between' Cass 1E : Divisions and non-Cass 1E equipment, in the IWSS.~ j .q Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria - ! Table 2.4.7-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses,' and associated acceptance ! criteria for the Incontainment Water Storage System.L l .l, l l 2.4.7 : u.n.m l r SYSTE + LL LiLIL .LI SDS SDS p*- y I y I ig;. _;[ $ $ W N ses 7*1 r 1 r -d Jcs 1 , L SlS- - > c SIS- -> IN CONTAINMENT REFUELING - - > PSS CVCS - - - > WATER STORAGE HOLDUP TANK VOLU E - - > PSS = E IJ ! g CvCS * - gl=* Civ s CIV = g g , . , , IREACTOR' l CAVITY l ? I W l CONTAINMENT I I LINSIDE l I . OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT y yyy ,. SIS SIS SIS SIS - - -+ EFDS EFDS-NOTES:

1. THE IRWST AND IRWST INSTRUMENTATION SHOWN, EXCEPT ALARMS AND SUMP LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION, ARE SAFETY-RELATED

2. THE POWER OPERATED VALVES AND IRWST INSTRUMENTATION SHOWN, EXCEPT ALARMS i ARE POWERED FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE CLASS 1E DIVISION 4

3. * : EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH PARAGRAPH NUMBER 3 OF THE ' VERIFICATION FOR BASIC CONFIGURATION FOR SYSTEMS" SECTION OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS - 4 (SECTION 1.2) APPLIES.' ,

FIGURE 2.4.7-1 , 23343 IN-CONTAINMENT WATER STORAGE SYSTEM , ^ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . - _ - - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ .- - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ - _ ~ - - . - - - . - . . - _ - - - - - - - . . . - . - - - . - O O O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2A.7-1 IN-CONTAINMENT WATER STORAGE SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desist Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the IWSS is 1. Inspection of the as-built IWSS con- 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.4.7-1. figuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.4.7-1, the as-built IWSS conforms with the Basic Configuration.

2.a) The IRWST has a volume above the 2.a) Inspection of construction records for 2.a) The IRWST has a useable volume of at SIS / CSS pump suction line penetrations the IRWST will be performed, least 495,000 gallons above the SIS / CSS to permit proper SIS and CSS operation pump suction line penetrations. following design basis events. 2.b) The IRWST has a total volume that 2.b) Inspection of construction records for 2.b) he IRWST has a minimum total permits dilution of radionuclides from the IRWST will be performed. volume of at least 545,800 gallons. core and RCS release following design basis LOCAs.

3. Stainless steel baskets containing 3. Inspection of the as-built HVT will be 3. Stabiless steel baskets containing trisodium phosphate are located in the performed. trisodium phosphate are located in the llVT. IIVT.

4. The ASME Code Section IIIIWSS com- 4. A pressure test will be conducted on 4. He results of the pressure test of ponents shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 renin those components of the IWSS required ASME Code Section III portions of the their pressure boundary integrity under to be pressure tested by ASME Code IWSS conform with the pressure testing internal pressures that will be Section III. acceptance criteria in ASME Code experienced during service. Section III.

2.4.7 2-3i.n O O O i SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2A.7-1 (Continued) IN-CONTAINMENT WATER S1X) RAGE SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Conimitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 5.a) Displays of the IWSS instrumentation 5.a) Inspection for the existence or re- 5.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 exist in the trievability in the MCR of instru- on Figure 2.4.7-1 exist in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieved there. mentation displays will be performed. can be retrieved there. 5.b) Controls exist in the MCR to open and 5.b) Testing will be performed using the 5.b) IWSS controls in the MCR operate to close those power operated valves IWSS controls in the MCR. open and close those power operated shown on Figure 2.4.7-1. valves shown on Figure 2.4.7-1. 5.c) IWSS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 5.c) Testing of the IWSS alarms shown on 5.c) The IWSS alarms shown on Figure are provided in the MCR. Figure 2.4.7-1 will be performed using 2.4.7-1 actuate in response to signals signals simulating alarm conditions, simulating alarm conditions. 6.a) The power operated valves and IRWST 6.a) Testing will be performed on the IWSS 6.a) A test signal exists only at the IWSS instrumentation, except alarms, shown components by providing a test signal in components powered from the Class IE on Figure 2.4.7-1 are powered from . only one Class IE Division at a time. Division under test. their respective Class IE Division. 6.b) Within the CFS, each of the four valves 6.b) Testing will be performed on the CFS 6.b) A test signal exists only at the CFS in the spillways from the IRWST to the valves by providing a test signalin only - valves powered from the Class IE bus llVT is powered frorn a different Class one Class IE bus at a time. under test. 1E bus. 6.c) Indepe-+nce is provided between Class 6.c) Inspection of the as-installed Class IE 6.c) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions in the IWSS will be IE Divisions in the IWSS. Separation Dit isions and non-Class IE equipment, performed. exists between Class lE Divisions and in th> IWSS. non-Class IE equipment in the IWSS. 2.4.7 2. aim i i ^ SYSTEM 80+" ,h 2.5.1 PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Design Descr ,, tion l The Plant Protection System (PPS) is a safety related instrumentation and control system which initiates reactor trip, and actuation of engineered safety features in response to plant conditions monitored by process instrumentation. Initiation signals l from the PPS logic are sent to the reactor trip switchgear and to the Engineered l Safety Features - Component Control System (ESF-CCS) to actuate protective I functions. He PPS is located in the nuclear island structures. The Basic Configuration of the PPS is as shown on Figure :T 5.1-1. The PPS and the electrical equipment that initiate reactor trip or engineered safety feature actuation are classified Seismic Category I. He PPS uses sensors, transmitters, signal conditioning equipment, and digital l equipment which performs the calculations and logic to generate protective function initiation signals. The PPS features and equipment are software programmable processors, that operate with fixed sequenced program execution, and fixed memory allocation tables. There l are two bistable processors per channel which provide separate trip paths where multiple sensors are available to detect the same transient. There are two coincidence processors per channel each providing a local coincidence logic (LCL) for each assigned bistable trip function. Each coincidence processor has dedicated remote multiplexing from each bistable processor. The Interface and Test Processor (ITP) communicates with the bistable trip l processors, and coincidence processors. Separation is provided between protective (safety critical) PPS processing functions and auxiliary functions of man-machine l interfaces, data communications, and automatic testing. Data communication networks support the transmission of safety critical data on a continuous cyclical basis independent of plant transients. The PPS equipment is classified Class 1E. (% b 2.5.1 -I- 2.u.n l SYSHM 90+" An environmental qualification program assums the PPS equipment is able to perform- , its intended safety function for the time needed to be functional, under its design environmental conditions. De environmental conditions, bounded by applicable ;j design basis events, are: temperature, pressure, humidity, chemical effects, radiation, __ .j aging, seismic events, submergence, power supply voltage & frequency variations,' l electromagnetic compatibility and synergistic effects which may have a significant- j effect on equipment performance. De environmental qualification of PPS equipment - ! is achieved via tests, analyses or a combination of analyses and tests. I i EMI quahfication is applied for equipment with known EMI susceptibility based on ! operating environment and/or inherent design characteristics. He PPS is qualified according to an established plan for' Electromagnetic l Compatibility (EMC). j i ne qualification plan requires the equipment to function properly when subjected I to the expected operational electrical surges, electromagnetic interference (EMI), l' electrostatic discharge (ESD), and radio frequency interference (RFI). He equipment to be tested will be configured for intended service conditions. j l A site survey is performed upon completion of system installation to characterize the j installed F.MI environment. PPS software is designed, tested, installed and maintained using a process which: _!

a. Defines the organization, responsibilities," and software quality j assurance activities for the software engineering _ life _ cycle that ;

provides for: , i e establishment of plans and methodologies . i

specification of functional, system and software requirements and {

standards, identification of safety critical requirements . j + design and development of software e software module, unit and system testing practices e installation and checkout practices e reporting and correction of software defects during _ operation

b. Specifies requirements for:

+ software management, documentation requirements, standards, review requirements, and procedures for problem reporting and corrective - action

software configuration management, historical records of software, and control of software changes O 2.5.1 amis -j l

l i SYSTEM 80+"

verification & validation, and requirements for reviewer independence

c. Incorporates a graded approach according to the software's relative importance to safety.

The use of commercial grade computer hardware and software items in the PPS is accomplished through a process that has:

requirements for supplier design control, configuration management, problem reporting and change contml;
review of product performance;
receipt acceptance of the commercial grade item;
final acceptance, based on equipment qualification and software validation in the integrated system.

Setpoints for initiation of PPS safety-related functions are determined using methodologies which have the following characteristics: a) Requirements that the design basis analytical limits, data, assumptions, and methods used as the bases for selection of trip setpoints are specified and documented. b) Instrumentation accuracies, drift and the- effects of design basis transients are accounted for in the determination of setpoints.- c) The method utilized for combining the various uncertainty values is specified. d) Identifies required pre-operational and surveillance testing. e) Identifies performance requirements for replacement of ~setpoint-related instrumentation. f) The setpoint calculations are consistent with the physical configuration of the instrumentation. Reactor Trio Initiation Function Process instrumentation, the Plant Protection Calculators (PPCs), the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs) and the reactor trip switchgear function to initiate an automatic reactor trip. The process instrumentation provides sensor data input to the PPS which monitors the following plant conditions to provide a reactor trip: Reactor Power - High Reactor Coolant System Pressure - Iow or High Steam Generator Water Level - Iow or High 2.5.1 zum c SYMM 80+" l l (~ Steam Generator Pressure - Iow Containment Pressure - High l

Reactor Coolant Flow - Iow

! Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio - Iow Linear Heat Generation Rate - High l Setpoints for initiation of a reactor trip are installed for each monitored condition to l provide for initiation of a reactor trip prior to exc eding reactor fuel thermal limits I and the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary limits for anticipated operational occurrences. If a monitored condition exceeds its setpoint, the PPS automatically l actuates the reactor trip switchgear. Encineered Safety Features Initiation Function l Process instrumentation, the PPCs, the ESF-CCS, motor starters and other actuated ! devices function to initiate the engineered safety feature systems. The process instrumentation provides sensor data input to the PPCs, which monitor the following plant conditions to initiate the engineered safety features systems. Pressurizer Pressure - Iow Steam Generator Water level - Iow or High l

Steam Generator Pressure - Low Containment Pressure - High l /]

(> If a monitored condition exceeds its setpoint, the PPCs automatically generate one or more of the following Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Signals (ESFAS). l Safety Injection Actuation Signal l Containment Isolation Signal Containment Spray Actuation Signal Main Steam Isolation Signal Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signals l These initiating signals are provided to the ESF-CCS, which responds by actuating the engineered safety feature systems. Elements Of The PPS j l The PPS is divided into four redundant channels. The following elements, depicted in Figures 2.5.1-2 and 2.5.1-3, are included in each channel of the PPS: Process Instrumentation Signal Conditioning Equipment Limit logic (PPC Bistables and CPCs) local Coincidence logic n' ' 2.5.1 ts-31-e (- SYSTEM 80+" ( Initiation Irgic Reactor Trip Switchgear Interface and Test Processor Operator's Modules Switches for Manual Activation of Reactor Trip Signals Switches for Manual Activation of ESF Initiating Signals Figure 2.5.1-2 shows the plant systems in which process instrumentation is implemented for generation of the sensor signal input to the PPS. Ilmit logic for process-value to setpoint comparison is implemented in bistable processors in each channel. De bistable processors generate trip signals based on the channel digitized value exceeding a digital setpoint. The PPS maintenance and test panels provide the capability for trip limit setpoint changes. Limit logic for calculated departure from nucleate boiling ratio and high linear heat generation rate are implemented in each channelin a section of the PPS referred to as the Core Protection Calculator (CPC). He trip output signals of the bistable processors and the CPC in each channel are sent to the local coincidence logic processors in all four PPS channels. Therefore, for each trip condition, the local comcidence logic processor in each channel receives four trip signals, one from its associated bistable processors or CPC from within the channel, and one from the equivalent bistable processors or CPC located in each of the other three redundant channels. The coincidence processors evaluate the local Q (j coincidence logic based on the state of the four like trip signals and their respective bypasses. A coincidence of any two like trip signals is required to generate a reactor trip or ESF initiation signal. Operating bypasses are implemented in the PPS to provide for the bypass of trip functions which are plant mode specific. These bypasses are manually activated. The PPS automatically removes an operating bypass if the plant approaches conditions for which the associated trip function is designed to provide protection. Bistable trip channel bypasses allow one channel of the bistable inputs to the coincidence processors to be bypassed for each trip function. This converts the local coincidence logic to two-out-of-three coincidence for each trip function for which a bistable trip channel bypass is initiated. For each trip function. the PPS allows only one bistable trip channel to be bypassed at a time. Upon coincidence of two like signals indicating one of the conditions for reactor trip, the PPS logic initiates actuation of a channel of the reactor trip switchgear. As shown on Figure 2.5.1-2, actuation of a selective two single channels of the reactor trip switchgear is required to cause a reactor trip. The reactor trip switchgear breakers interrupt power to the Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM) coils, allowing all Control Element Assemblies to drop into the core by grasity. ,f ~3 2.5.1 12.:n-e p SYSTEM 80+" N'] The reactor trip switchgear can be tripped manually from the Main Control Room or the Remote Shutdown Room. The manual reactor trip uses hardwired circuits which are independent of the PPS bistable and coincidence processors. Once a reactor trip has been initiated, the breakers in the reactor trip switchgear latch open. Upon coincidence of two like signals indicating a condition for generating an ESFAS, the ESF initiation logic transmits the respective initiation signal to the ESF-CCS. The PPS interfaces in the Main Control Room allow for manual activation of each of the ESF initiating signals input to the ESF-CCS. The PPS interfaces in the Remote Shutdown Room allow for manual activation of the initiating signals for Main Steam Isolation. Manual activation of these initiating signals is independent of the PPS bistable and coincidence processors. The PPS operator's modules at the Main Control Room, the Remote Shutdown Room and at the maintenance and test panel allow operators to enter tdp channel bypasses, operating bypasses, and variable setpoint resets. These modules provide indication of bypass status and bistable trip and pre-trip status. Manual control capability for the PPS is transferred from the Main Control Room to the Remote Shutdown Room upon actuation of the Master Transfer Switches via signals from the ESF-CCS for all control functions except reactor trip. The manual reactor trip switches are active in both locations at all times. Provision for (] G transferring PPS control capability back to the Main Control Room is provided at the maintenance and test panel. Ioss of power to, or disconnection of a reactor trip path component in a PPC or CPC will cause a trip initiating state to be detected in a downstream component in that channel. Periodic testing to verify operability of the PPS can be performed with the reactor at power or when shutdown without interfering with the protective function of the system. Overlap in individual tests assures that all functions are tested from sensor input through to the actuation of a reactor trip circuit breaker and to the generation of protection function initiation signals provided to the ESF-CCS. The ITP monitors the on-line continuous automatic PPC and CPC hardware testing and performs on-line periodic automatic software logic functional testing of PPS logic. Where automatic testing is implemented in the PPS, it does not degrade the capability of the PPS to perform its protective function. Indication of the automatic test system status and test results are provided to the operator via the Interface and Test Processor interface to the DIAS and DPS. (~N 2.5.1 2ai-c SYS'mM 80+" (q> Manual testing of PPS functions and hardware can be performed at the maintenance and test panel. PPS Channel Separation and Isolation Figure 2.5.1-3 shows the PPS channels and tho signal flow from the process instrumentation to the individual channels for initiation of protection system functions. Four measurement channels with electrical independence are provided for each parameter used in the direct generation of these initiation signals, with the exception of the Control Element Assembly position which is a two channel measurement. The four PPS channels are physically separated and electrically isolated. Each PPS channel is powered from its respective Class 1E bus. System Characteristics: Number of independent channels of equipment 4 Minimum number of sensors per trip variable 4 (at least one per channel except as identified above , for the Control Element Assembly position)) l {O] i Coincidence logic used for plant sensor inputs local 2-out-of-4 Reactor Manual / Automatic actuation trip logic Selective 2-out-of-4 ! ESF Manual / Automatic Actuation Iegic Selective 2-out-of-4 Electrical isolation and physical separation are provided between the PPS and the l process control system. Where the PPS and the process control system interface with the same component (e.g., with sensors, signal conditioners, or actuated devices), electrical isolation devices are provided between the process control system and the , shared component. Electrical isolation devices are provided at PPS interfaces with the Power Control System, the Discrete Indication and Alarm System - Channel N l and the Data Processing System as shown on Figure 2.5.1-2. Electrical isolation devices are provided between the signal conditioning equipment and the Discrete Indication and Alarm System - Channel P. Physical separation is provided between PPS channels for the hardwired circuits used for manual initiation of reactor trip signals. A kJ 2.5.1 u.u.n i i

l SYS'IEM 80+" .

i Other operator interfaces from the main control panel and the remote shutdown panel to the PPS have electrical isolation devices. ; Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Cdteria i Table 2.5.1-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance - criteria for the Plant Protection System. e t i t 5 h i t i ) l 2.5.1 -8 mi.. i SYSTEM 80+ O S ' I _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - . r- - i e- -- ESF-CCS l L. - - .I g y ------. I -* i~ - (PROCESS-CCS , ' % . _ .s : PPS i i SIGNAL ' - - - -90WER CONTROL' 3. CONDITIONING r- '_ _ SYST_EM 8 ! 8 ' i 1 i r ! : ' SAFETY RELATED 8 i ' ' DISPLAY ' ' '. ' INSTRUMENTATION 3 PPCs 8 l s OPERATORS g ,_ _ _, , l MODULE CPCs ~~~~~~~~' ' I 8 i L ' p-,J RTSG I l I l I i I J -=- I '_E_SF_-CC_ - S_ : I____________ . . . -_' 4 l ,...l..., , '.CEDMCS ' J l NOTES:

1. PPS EQUIPMENT SHOWN ON THE FIGURE IS CLASS 1E. )

2. PPS EQUIPMENT IS POWERED FROM CLASS 1E SUPPLIES.

3. EACH PPS CHANNEL (4 IN NUMBER) IS POWERED FROM A SEPARATE CLASS 1E BUS.

O FIGURE 2.5.1-1 PPS CONFIGURATION 12-31-93 SYSTEMA CHL 2L_A, , , , _ _ _ ' REACTOR COOLANT SY4TEJ , - _ _ _ _ _ . , i . HOT & COLD LEG TEMP. g NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION . PRESSURIZER PRESSURE e . NUCLEAR POWER e I.RCPPLOW ' ,_CE_A P_OSI_ TION _ . . _. 8 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , e RC_P_ _SPEE_D _ _._.._._.,, MAIN STEAM AND PEED , _CONTAIMMENT SYSTEM t.SGPRESSURE ( "a .CONTAINARENT PRESSURE I 3 g - Sa_LEyEL, _ _ _ _ _ n DISCRETE INDICATION & - 8,,,A LARM,SYS, TEM .C,HANNEL P,) ' itir1r1r REDUNDANT CHANNELS B, C & D ,_ ESP CCS , - g CHANNEL A SIONALCONDITIONING t_DfV_ISIO_N A_ _ ____ ,. " _l I n , I I % mRED MAMTENANCE g g AND TEST PANEL

g S j -

PROCESS COMPONENT 4, ,, 3 s . 9=.cata unit on II e_ CO_NT_ROl. _ SY_STE_M _ _ _e g cesemETE S GotAL (E.e Pteam opric) *- - - - 46 - - - - - d' - --- W - >TO/PROe4 m OTHeR ITP'S I-POWER CONTROL SYSTEM 74_.aug. _ _8 s CHANNELS I . _g s s M e4ULTIPLEXER R , ; wTERPACE ourio s AND I , . . TEST g PROCESSOR - ,,,,,,y,o,, M 1 rir 1r1r BETWEEN CHANNELS OfSCRETE fMDICAT104 * " " qll StSTABLE CORE 8_& A_LAR_e4 S_YST_EM C_HA_NNE_L M_g " " " " " ~" TR,, PROTECTION I" "I , PROCESSORS CALCULATOR DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM a #~ ~ " l" " - - e m"El- 1 I >B ID NC 44 o a g _, _ ,, T,,O COWC,0,E,S ,,,E ROCES OmER CnA-ELS MAM CONTROL PANEL , , , w,, _ i _m 1P y 8 8 '8 =aG- - - - -B PROM SISTABLES =3 COMCIDENCE PftOCESSORS =sG= = = = = =C I OPEftATORS MODULE ll- J I - - - 1 i l- - D AND CPCS IN OTHER CHANNELS I I I 1 f 1r 1f MANUAL MfTIATIONS l ' '_ _ _ __ _ _ _ : 'i---- SNmTiO wG.e9 i ---* , g REMOTE SMUTDOWN PANEL g l I l pEM P E OMER = +C l OPERATOR'S A80DULE l.aeyl _== 1t , ! --gns. D SP4lCS - - 3 CH4 A .E CH49 : M3 g l MANUALINITIATIO80S l: # - _ _ _ mSO 9 , i ,,, i e rROM ,,5CRA OTweR,. E g CHo s ; y+ 0 ._ _ _ __ _ _ _ .. ~ ,_ _ . _ . _g 1 r 94AHt COfffROL ROOM _ ______g I 1" ' I TRANSPER SWITCH e I'. CN. ~I _ g= g- g - - - -- - - '_ _ _ . . - L OrviS40N A e , FIGURE 2.5.1 " " "' " ' 12-31 93 PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM INTERCONNECTIONS i SYSTEM 80+ 7g CH-A CH-D CH-C ' CH-D PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS d IN,ST INST INp INST O I1 ' ,r cpc 11I ,r cPc I ,r CPC ~l l ' y CPC CH-A CH-B CH-C CH-D - BISTABLE BISTABLE BISTABLE BISTABW TRIP Trip . TRIP TRIP PROCESSORS PROCESSORS PROCESSORS- PROCESSORS l Il fl fl fl rl Il Il f l fl fl fl N Il fl fl f l fl fl fl fl I l fl f SIGNALISOLATION I 1 . IC ID II D IC ED I A L I ID E A IB ICI m * '1 ) Cl i nt i fl f l f1 f CH-A CH-B CH-C CH-D COINCIDENCE COINCIDENCE COINCIDENCE COINCIDENCE PROCESSORS PROCESSORS PROCESSORS PROCESSORS O INrTATION LOGIC lI lI RTlESF RT ESF RT ESF RT ESF CH-A CH-B CH-C CH-D INIT l INIT INIT l INIT INIT l l NIT INTT l INIT if if I f 1r "'^$HG W1T l RT-A l l RT-B l l RT-C l l RT-D l t t 1r 1f 1r 1r if 1r 1r if 1 i 1r if -c ) 1r SF FUNCTIONS 1f 1f -B 1f 1I l ESF-CCS-A l_ 1 FIGURE 2.5.1-3 PPS BASIC BLOCK DIAGRAM u-u-o L O O O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.1-1 PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Accentance Criteric Desist Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1.a) The Basic Configuration of the PPS is 1.a) Inspections of the as-built PPS con- 1.a) For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.5.1-1. figuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.5.1-1, the as-built PPS conforms with the Basic Configuration. 1.b) Separation is provided between safety 1.b) Inspection of the as-built PPS hardware 1.b) 'Ihe as-built PPS hardware and software critical PPS processing functions and and software will be conducted. has: auxiliary functions of man-machine interfaces, data ecmmunications and

Processors that provide fixed sequenced automatic testing. program execution with fixed memory allocation Data communication networks support the transmission of safety critical data
Separation provided between safety on a continuous cyclical basis critical PPS processing fanctions and independent of plant transients. auxiliary functions of man-machine interfaces, data communications and automatic testing.
Data communication networks that support the transmission of safety critical data on a continuous cyclical basis independent of plant transients.

2. The four PPS channels are physically 2. Inspection for separation and isolation of 2. Physical separation exists between the 4 separated and electrically isolated. the four.as-built PPS channels will be PPS channels. Electrical isolation conducted. devices are provided at interfaces between the 4 PPS channels.

2.5.1 n,si-n - _ _ . _ _- - - - - - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _. _________.__ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __. - __ _ __ a O (3 pJ G N l SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.1-1 (Continued) PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment ' Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

3. Each PPS channel is powered from its 3. Testing will be performed on the PPS 3. Within the PPS, a test signal exists only respective Class 15 bus, by providing a test signal in only one of at the equipment powered from the the Class IE bus at a time. Class IE bus under test.

4 When the PPS and the process control 4. Inspection of the as-built PPS con- 4. Electrical isolation devices are provided system interface to the same component, figuration will be conducted. between the process control system and isolation devices are provided between sensors, signal conditioners and actuated the process control system and the devices which interface to the PPS. shared component.

5. Electrical isolation devices are provided 5. Inspection of the as-built configuration 5. Electrical isolation devices are provided et PPS interfaces with the Power will be conducted. at PPS interfaces with the Power Control System, the Discrete Indication Control System, the Discrete Indication and Alarm System - Channel N and the and Alarm System - Channel N and the Data Processing System and between the Data Processing System and between the signal conditioning equipment and the signal conditioning equipment and the Discrete Indication and Alarm System - Discrete Indication and Alarm System -

Channel P. Channel P.

6. Loss of power to, or disconnection of 6. less of power and component 6. Loss of power to, or disconnection of a any reactor trip path active component disconnect type testing will be conducted reactor trip path active component (i.e.,

(i.e., circuit boards and power supply at the factory or on the as-installed circuit boards - and power ~ supply modules) in a PPC or CPC will cause a equipment. modules)in a PPC or CPC causes a trip trip initiating state to be detected in a initiating state to be detected in a downstream component in that channel. downstream component in that channel. 2.5.1 n,n.n O O O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.1-1 (Continued) PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desis Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteda 7.a) When a process valve input signal 7.a) Testing will be performed using 7.a) Bistable processor generates s trip signal crosses the setpoint threshold, the trip simulated initiating input signals to the when an input signal crosses i limit limit bistable processor will generate a PPS. logic setpoint threshold. trip signal. 7.b) The PPS maintenance and test panels 7.b) Testing will be performed using the 7.b) Setpoint changes affect only the intended provide the capability for trip limit built-in trip limit setpoint change trip limit functions. setpoint changes, feature. 7.c) Upon coincidence of two like signals 7.c) Testing will be performed using 7.c) The PPS generates reactor trip switch-indicating one of the following simulated initiating signals to the PPS. gear actuation signals. conditions for reactor trip, the PPS logic initiates a reactor trip: 7.d) Tests will be performed using simulated 7.d) Each coincidence processor outputs a Reactor Power -liigh input signals to each coincidence trip signal whenever it receives 2 or Reactor Coolant System Pressure - Iow processor, for combinations of 2,3 and more like signals. or Iligh 4 like signals for a trip condition and for Steam Generator Level - Low or liigh ' combinations of 2 and 3 like signals Steam Generator Pressure - Iow with one bistable trip channel in bypass. Containment Pressure - liigh Reactor Coolant Flow - Low Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio - Low Linear IIeat Generation Rate - liigh 2.5.1 2 aim _ . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ ~ - .._ __ - . ! O O O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.1-1 (Continued) PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment

8. Upon coincidence of two like signals 8.a) Testing will be performed using 8.a) The PPS generates ESFAS signals indicating one of the following simulated initiating signals to the PPS. related to the initiating conditions for conditions for an ESFAS, the ESF each condition listed in the Design initiation logic transmits the respective Commitment as follows:

initiation signal to the ESF-CCS. ESFAS PARAMETER Pressurizer Pressure - Low Steam Generator Water Level - Imw or SIAS and CIAS Low Pressurizer Pressure Iligh liigh Containment Pressure Steam Generator Pressure - Low CSAS High-High Containment Pressure Containment Pressure - liigh MSIS Low Steam Generator Pressure High Containment Pressure High Steam Generator Level ESFAS Imw Steam Generator level and High Steam Generator level 8.b) Testing will be performed using 8.b) Each coincidence processor outputs the simulated input signals to each respective initiation signal whenever it coincidence processor, for combinations receives 2 or more like - signals of 2, 3 and 4 like signals indicating a indicating conditions for generating an condition for generating an ESFAS, and ESFAS. for combinations of 2 and 3 like signals with one bistable trip channel in bypass. 2.5.1 u-u-n M Q O (%.) QJ %/ SYSTEM 80+" TARLE 2.5.1-1 (Continued) PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Insocctions. Tests. Analyses and Acccotance Criteria Desist Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 9.a) A reactor trip initiation signal from a 9.a) Testing of the as-built reactor trip 9.a) The reactor trip initiation signal from PPS channel results in actuation of the switchgear actuation circuits will be each PPS channel actuates the correct correct reactor trip switchgear breaker, conducted, single reactor trip switchgear breaker. 9.b) Each reactor trip switchgear breaker can 9.b) Testing will be performed separately for 9.b) Each reactor trip switchgear breaker be f. ripped by either an under voltage or the under voltage trip and the shunt trip trips for either an under voltage trip or a shunt trip. for each reactor trip switchgear breaker. a shunt trip.

10. The RTSG can be tripped manually 10. Testing of manual reactor trip Imm 10. Actuation of either pair of reactor trip from the Main Control Room or the Main Control Room ar.d Remote switches at the Main Control Room or Remote Shutdown Room. Shutdown Room will be performed. either pair of trip switches at the Remote Shutdown Room interrupts power to the CEDMs.

I1.a) The following ESFAS signals can be 11.a) Testing of manual ESF actuation from i1.a) Actuation of either pair of ESFAS actu-manually actuated at the Main Control Main Control Room will be performed. ation switches for an ESF function at the Room. Main Control Room initiates the assoc-iated ESFAS signal input to the ESF-Safety injection Actuation Signal CCS. Containment Spray Actuation Signal Containment Isolation Signal Main Steam Isolation Signal Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal 11.b) A Main Steam Isolation Signal can be- 11.b) Testing of manual MSIS actuation from i1.b) Following transfer of control from the manually actuated at the Remote Shut- the Remote Shutdown Room will be Main Control Roomto the Remote Shut-down Room. performed. down Room actuation of either pair of MSIS actuation switches at the Remote Shutdown Room initiates a MSIS input to the ESF-CCS. 2.5.1 u. aim m U dp SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.1-1 (Continued) PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and AcceDiance Criteria Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 12.a) A bistable trip channel bypass can be 12.a) Testing of PPS Trip Channel Bypasses 12.a) With one trip channel in bypass, at-activated in only one channel at a time. will be performed. tempts to actuate a second like para-meter bypass in a second channel are rejected. 12.b) He PPS automatically removes an oper- 12.b) Testing will be performed for each 12.b) Each operating bypass becomes desc-ating bypass if the plant approaches operating bypass implemented in the tivated when the input signal for the conditions for which the associated trip PPS. mode dependent parameter monitored function is designed to pmvide for that function reaches the associated protection. setpoint.

13. The PPS initiates reactor trip and ESF 13. Testing and analysis will be performed 13. Measured response times are less than system actuations within allocated to measure PPS equipment response or equal to the response time values response times. times, required for reactor trip and ESF actuations.

14. Setpoints for initiation of PPS safety- 14. Inspection will be performed on the 14. The inspection of the setpoint calculation related functions are determined using setpoint calculations, confirms the use of setpoint method-methodologies which have the following ologies that require:

characteristics: a) Documentationofdata, assumptions, a) Requirements that the design basis and methods used in the bases for analytical limits, data, assumptians, selection of trip setpoints . is and methods used as the bases for performed. selection of trip setpoints are specified and documented. 2.5.1 n-3t . - _ . ~ _ _ _ . . __ - _ __ __ . ._ _ p m n 'd b SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.1-1 (Continued) PLANT PROTECIlON SYSTEM Insocctions. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desist Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acccotance Criteria

14. (Continued) 14. (Continued) 14. (Continued) b) Instrumentation accuracies, drift and _ b) Consideration of instrument cali-the effects of design basis transients bration uncertainties and uncer-are accounted for in the tainties due to environmental con-determination of setpoints. ditions, instrument drift, power supply variation and the effect of c) The method utilized for combining design basis event transients is the various uncertainty values is included in determining the margin specified. between the trip setpoint and the safety limit.

d) Identifies of required preoperational and surveillance testing. c) The methods used for combining uncertainties is consistent with those e) Identifies performance requirements specified in the methodology plan. for replacement of setpoint related instrumentation. d) The use of written procedures for required preoperational and-f) The setpoint calculations are surveillance testing. consistent with the physical configurationof theinstrumentation. e) Evaluation for equivalent or better performance of replacement instrumentation which is not identical to original equipment is documented. f) The configuration of the as-built instrumentation is consistent with the ' attributes used in the setpoint calculations for location of taps and sensing lines. 2.5.1 um-n O V (3 U Q V SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.1-1 (Continued) PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

15. PPS software is designe.1, tested, 15. Inspection will be performed of the 15.a) The process defines the organization, installed and maintained using a process process used to design, test, install, and responsibilities and activities for the which: maintain the PPS safety related following phases of the software software. engineering life cycle:

a. Defines the organization, respon-sibilities, and software quality assurance

Establishment of plans and activities for the software engineering methodologies for all software to be life cycle that provids s br: developed.
establishment of plans and
Specification of functional, system and methodologies software requirements and identification of safety critical requirements.
specification of functional, system and software requirements and standards,
Design of the software architecture, identification of safety critical program structure and definition of the requirements software modules.
design and development of software
Development of the software code and testing of the software modules.
software module, unit and system testing practices
Interpretation of software and hardware and performance of unit and system
installation and checkout practices tests.
reporting and correction of software
Software . installation and checkout defects during operation testing.
Reporting and correction of software defects during operation.

2.5.1 inim o T bm V / SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.1-1 (Continued) PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Cdteria

15. 15. (Continued) 15. (Continued)

(Continued) b) Specifies requirements for: b) The process has requirements for the following software development e software management, documentation functions: requirements, standards, review

Software snanagement, which defines or-requirements, and procedures for problem reporting and corrective action ganization responsibilities, documen-tation requirements, standards for soft-
software configuration management, ware coding and testing, review require-historical records of software, and ments, and procedures for problem control of software changes reporting and corrective actions.
verification & validation, and
Software configuration management, requirements for reviewer independence which establishes mahods for maintain-ing historical records of software as it is c) Incorporates a graded approach developed, controlling software changes according to the software's relative and for recording and reporting software importance to safety, changes.
Verification and validation, which speci-fies the requirements for the verification review process, the validation testing .

process, review and test activity docc-mentation and reviewer independence. 15.c) The process establishes the method for classifying PPS software elements according to their relative importance to safety. The process defines the tasks to be performed for software assigned to each safety classification. '2.5.1 n-aim O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.1-1 (Continued) PLANT PROTFfrION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and AcceDiance Criteria Desinn Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

16. The use of commercial grade computer 16. Inspection will performed of the process 16. A process is defined that has:

hardware and software items in the PPS defined to use commercial grade is accomplished through a process that components in the application.

requirements for supplier's design has: and production control, configuration management, problem reporting and
requirements for supplier design change control; control, configuration management, problem reporting and change
review of product performance; control;
receipt of acceptance of commercial
review of product performance; grade item;
final acceptance, based on equipment
receipt acceptance of the commercial grade item; qualification and software validation in the integrated system.
final acceptance, based on equipment qualification and software validation in the integrated system.

17. He PPS is qualified according to an 17. An inspection of the . PPS EMC 17. For the PPS components and equipment established plan for Electromagnetic qualification reports and the as-built PPS shown on Figure 2.5.1-1, the as-built compatibility (EMC). equipment installation configuration and installation configuration and site survey environment will be conducted. are bounded by those used in the PPS The qualification plan requires the EMC qualification report (s).

equipment to function properly when subjected to the expected operational electrical surges or electromagnetic interference (EMI), electrostatic discharge (ESD), and radio frequency interference (RFI). 2.5.1 n si e o b d d SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.1-1 (Continued) PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desisi Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

17. (Continued)

The qualification plan will require that the equipment to be tested be configured for intended service cenditions.

18. An environmental qualification program 18. An inspection of the PPS qualification 18. For the PPS components and equipment assures the PPS equipment is able to report and the as-built PPS equipment shown on Figure 2.5.1-1, the as-built perform its intended safety function for installation configuration and installation, configuration, and design the time needed to be functional, under environment will be conducted. environmental conditions are bounded its design environmental conditions, by those used in the environmental The environmental conditions, bounded qualification report.

by applicable design basis events, are: temperature, pressure, humidity, chemical effects, radiation, aging, seismic events, submergence, power supply voltage & frequency variations, electromagnetic compatibility and synergistic effects which may have a significant effect on equipment performance. The environmental qualification of PPS equipment is achieved via tests, analysis or a combination of analyses and tests. -2.5.1 2,3 -n SYSTEM 80+" O i 2.5.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES - COMPONENT CONTROL i SYSTEM l i Design Description ne Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System (ESF-CCS) is a safety-related instrumentation and control system which provides automatic actuation of Engineered Safety Features (ESF) systems upon receipt of ESFinitiation signals from the Plant Protection System (PPS). The ESF-CCS also provides the capability for manual actuation of ESF systems, manual control of ESF system components and manual control of other safety-related systems and components identi5ed below. The ESF-CCS is located in the nuclear island structures. i The Basic Configuration of the ESF-CCS is as shown on Figure 2.f.2-1. The ESF-CCS is classified Seismic Category L He ESF-CCS equipment is classified Class 1E. An enviromnental qualification program assures the ESF-CCS equipment is able to { s perform its intended safety function for the time needed to be functional, under its design environmental conditions. He environmental conditions, bounded by applicable design basis events, are: temperature, pressure, humidity, chemical effects, radiation, aging, seismic events, submergence, power supply voltage & frequency ; variations, electromagnetic compatibility and synergistic effects which may have a i significant effect on equipment performance. The environmental qualification of ESF-CCS equipment is i.-hieved via tests, analyses or a combination of analyses and tests. EMI qualification is applied for equipment with known EMI susceptibility based on operating environment and/or inherent design characteristics. He ESF-CCS is qualified according to an established plan for Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC). The qualification plan requires the equipment to function properly when subjected to the expected operational electrical surges or electromagnetic interference (EMI), electrostatic discharge (ESD), and radio frequency interference (RFI). He equipment to be tested will be configured for intended senice conditions. O 2.5.2 u .3 I i p SYSTEM 80+" t A site survey is performed upon completion of system installation to characterize the l installed EMI environment. l He ESF-CCS uses sensors, transmitters, signal conditioning equipment, and digital l equipment which perform the calculations, communications and logic to generate signals to actuate protective system equipment. His equipment is Class 1E. The ESF-CCS design incorporates the following features: software programmable processors arranged in primary and standby processor configurations within each ESF-CCS division. Processors provide fixed sequence program (non-interrupt driven) execution with fixed memory allocation. ESFAS functions are divided into ESF-CCS distributed segments with two separate multiplexers per segment which receive PPS initiation signals. Separation is provided between protection (safety critical) ESFAS processing functions and auxiliary functions of man-machine interfaces, data communication and automatic testing. . Redundant data communication networks support the transmission of protection (safety critical) data on a continuous cyclical basis independent of plant transients. For each defined failure of @e ESF-CCS data communication links, a predetermined , failure mode for the affected system has been defined and determined to have acceptable consequences. b Re ESF-CCS is divided into four divisions. Each division of the ESF-CCS has the I following elements, as depicted on Figure 2.5.2-2: selective 2-out-of-4 logic, component control logic, process instrumentation, signal conditioning equipment, maintenance and test panel, , control and display interface devices, and a ) master transfer switch. j The four ESF-CCS divisions are physically separated and electrically isolated. Each ESF-CCS division is powered from its respective Class 1E bus. _ l Each ESF-CCS division receives 4 channels of initiation signals from the PPS which I are processed using selective 2-out-of-4 logic to generate actuation signals for the ESF systems controlled by that division. Basic block diagrams for the functionallogic used in the ESF-CCS for actuation of ESF systems are shown on Figures 2.5.2-3 and 2.5.2-4. i Y 2.5.2 22 3 m I l ( SYSTEM 80+" "Ibe ESF-CCS provides control capability and, upon receipt of initiation signals from the PPS, automatically generates actuation signals to the following ESF systems within allocated response times: i ! safety injection system, 1 l containment isolation system, I containment spray system, l main steam isolation, and l emergency feedwater system. Once initiation signals are received from the PPS, the ESF-CCS actuation logic signals remain following removal of the initiation signal. The ESF.CCS provides control capability and, upon receipt ofinitiation signals from the PPS, automatically generates actuation signals to the following non-ESF systems: annulus ventilation system, component cooling water system, onsite power system, and diesel generators. fl V The ESF-CCS provides control capability for the following safety-related systems: shutdown cooling system, safety depressurization system, atmospheric dump system, station service water system, heating, ventilating and air conditioning systems, and hydrogen mitigation devices. i Upon receipt of bSF initiation signals for safety injection, containment spray or emergency feedwater, the ESF-CCS initiates an automatic start of the diesel generators and automatic load sequencing of ESF loads. Upon detecting loss of power to Class 1E Division buses through protective devices, the ESF-CCS automatically initiates startup of the diesel generators, shedding of electrical load, transfer of Class IE bus connections to the diesel generator, and , l sequencing of the reloading of safety-related loads to the Class IE bus. In performing ' load sequencing, normally used safety related plant loads are loaded first in a predetermined sequence unless an ESF actuation signal is generated. Upon ESF actuation, the normal load sequence is interrupted and priority is given to loading the actuated ESF systems and associated safety-related systems. The sequence for loading the normally used safety related plant loads is then resumed. 2.5.2 um-n l l l l 1 7 i i G SYSTEM 80+" V The ESF-CCS provides interlock control for isolation valves in the shutdown cooling system (SCS) suction lines, the safety injection tank (SIT) discharge lines and the emergency feedwater (EFW) pump discharge lines. The SCS interlocks prevent the ESF-CCS from generating a signal to open the SCS isolation valves when the RCS pressure is above the entry pressure of the SCS. The SITinterlocks prevent the ESF-CCS from generating a signal to close the SIT isolation valves when the RCS pressure is above the entry pressure of the SCS. The interlock on the EFW isolation valves automatically closes the isolation valves on high SG levels when an Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signalis not present. The control and display interface devices of the ESF-CCS in the MCR provide for automatic and manual control of ESF systems and components. In the remote shutdown room, the contrcl and display interface devices provide for manual control of ESF system components needed to achieve hot standby. Actuation of master transfer switches at either exit of the MCR transfers control capability from the control and display interface devices in the MCR to those in the remote shutdown room. Indication of transfer is provided in the MCR. Each ESF-CCS division's maintenance and test panel provides capability to transfer control from the MCR to the remote shutdown room for its respective ESF-CCS division and to transfer control back to the MCR for its respective ESF-CCS division. Diverse manual actuation switches are provided as an alternate means for manual l \ actuation of ESF components in two divisions of the ESF-CCS as follows: 2 trains of safety injection, l 1 train of containment spray, l 1 train of emergency feedwater to each steam generator, l 1 main steam isolation valve in each main steam line, l 1 isolation valve in each containment air purge line, and l 1 letdown isolation valve. The diverse manual actuation switches provide input signals to the lowest level in the ESF-CCS digital equipment. Conununication of the signals from the switches is 4 diverse from the software used in the higher levels of the ESF-CCS. Actuation of the switches provides a signal which overrides higher level signals, to actuate the associated ESF component or components. Diverse manual actuation status indication is provided in the MCR. Periodic testing to verify operability of the ESF-CCS can be performed with the reactor at power or when shutdown without interfering with the protective function of the system. Capability is provided for testing all functions, from ESF initiating signals received from the PPS through to the actuation of protective system equipment. Testing consists of on-line automatic hardware testing, automated functional testing of PPS/ESFAS initiations and interfaces, and manual testing. The p !j 2.5.2 naim SYSTEM 80i" maintenance and test panel provides capability for manual testing of ESF-CCS functions and hardware. Where the ESF-CCS and the process control system interface with the same component (e.g., with sensors, signal conditioners, or actuated desices), electrical isolation devices are provided between the process control system and the shared component. Electrical isolation devices are provided at ESF-CCS interfaces with the discrete indication and alarm system - channel N (DIAS-N), the data processing system (DPS), the process-component control system (P-CCS), the control and display interface devices, the master transfer switches and between the signal conditioning equipment and the discrete indication and alarm system - channel P (DIAS-P), as shown on Figure 2.5.2-2. ESF-CG software is designed, tested, installed and maintained using a process which:

a. Defines the organization, responsibilities, and software quality assurance activities for the software engineering life cycle that provides for:

establishment of plans and methodologies
spectfication of functional, system and software requirements and ;

p v

standards, identification of safety critical requirements design and development of software

{

software module, unit and system testing practices
installation and checkout practices
reporting and correction of software defects during operation j l

I

b. Specifies requirements for:

software management, documentation requirements, standards, review requirements, and procedures for problem reporting and corrective action
software configuration management, historical records of software, and control of software changes a verification & validation, and requirements for reviewer independence

c. Incorporates a graded approach according to the software's relative importance to safety.

The use of commercial grade computer hardware and software items in the ESF-CCS is accomplished through a dedication process that has:

requirements for supplier design control, configuration management, problem reporting and change control;
review of product performance; b

d 2.5.2 t2ai.n i SYSTEM 80+" e) (V

receipt acceptance of the commercial grade item;
final acceptance, based on equipment qualification and software validation in the integrated system.

Setpoints for interlocks and actuation of ESF-CCS safety-related functions are determined using methodologies which have the following characteristics: a) Requirements that the design basis analytical limits, data, assumptions, and methods used as the bases for selection of trip setpoints are specified and documented. b) Instrumentation accuracies, drift and the effects of design basis transients are accounted for in the determination of setpoints. c) The method utilized for combining the various uncertainty values is specified. d) Identifies required pre-operational and surveillance testing. e) Identifies performance requirements for replacement of setpoint related instrumentation. i f'} () f) The setpoint calculations are consistent with the physical configuration of the instrumentation. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.5.2-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System. j 'l J 2.5.2 6 SYSTEM + l PPS-I .___s I I i ESF-CCS I l l : I l t CONTROL & DISPLAY l INTERFACE DEVICES a i MASTER TRANSFER l ' swerCNEs COMPONENT CONTROL I OivERsE M.NuAt I ACTUATION swiTCNE: i LOGIC . J_________, i i i I_ SAFETY RELATED DISPLAY _______I I i !"'**.*!^*!!! _ . ; ; .' I ~ I l~ ~PROCEsSCTs ! a g m ______. i_ , , i ,_ POWER CONTROL SYSTEM _ _ _ _ _ _ . , , CONDITIONING l n i I m , i_ _ _ _ _ L _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . i ; e i J, i_ SENSORS ,_ J _ _ , ESF . l '( iCOMPONENTSi FIGURE 2.5.2-1 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES-COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 22 33 . SYSTEA + -------l ESF INITIATING SIGNALS O FRO 3 4 CHANNELS OF PPS A B C D I 3 _ .J... I iMA.rce..TRcRO----i === u v v v ** i a C== A SPu-D N ES ..m .... g MAINTENANCE SELECTIVE -" HARDWIRED OR i * & TEST PANEL 2 OUT4F-4 DATA UNK g- a I MASTF.R TRANSFER C'.~4rCH m...y l.eE a LOGIC . . s> NON40NDUCTING g DATA UNKOR lf 1f

i DIVERSE MANUAL E E D8SCRETE SIGNAL ACTUATION SW,TCHES E

%..> (E.G. FIBER OPTIC) , I (NOTE 1) ( , , , ,, g INTION -_ ,_ m PHYSICAL i S AT IREMOTE SYDOb ROOM I , i LynM*o"g,cT! +=*l=======> COMPONENT '-------- CONTROL LOGIC _ - _ i_aAS . Cn e m N ._ _ _ .4. # ......... i TO .E i +4 : ESr.cCS i_om_P,,0CESSI,,O Sm. -- - _ _ _ _ _......... .% . 4 =i_mi O .,r=_ _ _ _ _ _ ',= ,...... y j( NOTE 1: ,, IMP,L,,E,M,,E,N,TED IN TWO ,_" E"*= i = = = . % ...s........... i=,. OWE,, cO,,T,,0,. S, STEM ._ _ _.......... .g* . S,,,,AL CO,,,,,,0,,,,0 i i_NASCHANNEL P '- _ _ _ _ _ _ .! C Ik H _1 L_ # "s ! _ESF SENSORS & (S j-

g. COMPONENTS FIGURE 2.5.2-2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES-COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM *~"

.ONE DIVISION AND INTERCONNECTIONS I SYSTEM 80. O ESFAS ESFAS ESFAS ESFAS INITIATION INITIATION INmATION INmATION - SIGNALS SIGNALS SIGNALS SIGNALS ^ ^ ^ ^ < s < s e s e s 1r1 r1 r1 r 1 r1 r u1 r 1 r1 r1 r1 r 1 r1 r1 r1 r sEuCUvE SEECUVE SELECUVE SELECUVE 2 OUT OF 4 2 OUT OF 4 2 OUT OF 4 2 OUT OF 4 LOGIC I LOG 8C LOGIC LOGIC 1r 1r 1r 1r COMPONENT ColePONENT CotsPONENT COMP)NENT CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL LOGIC LOGIC LOGIC LOGIC 1 r i 1r 1r 1r O TRAIN A COMPONENTS TRAIN B COMPONENTS TRAIN C COMPONENTS TRAIN D COMPONENTS O FIGURE 2.5.2-3 ESFAS BASIC BLOCK DIAGRAM FOR SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION AND EMERGENCY FEEDWATER ACTUATION ,3,3,,,3 i ! SYSTEM 80. i !O ESFAS ESFAS j INmATION INmATION

SIGNALS SIGNALS l A A l # T r T l

l fI Il fl f l II Il II I sEuCnVE SEECTNE 2 OUT OF 4 2 OUT OF 4 LOGC N ; i - h l l f I lI lf l l COMPONENT COMPONENT i ! CONTROL CONTROL 8 LOGC LOGC l i l d + 1r 1r l } TRAIN A TRAIN 5 l l COMPONENTS COMPONENTS 4 i i ^ i ) 1 i i iO ! FIGURE 2.5.2-4 i ESFAS BASIC BLOCK DIAGRAM FOR MAIN STEAM ISOLATION, AND CONTAINMENT ISOLATION 12-31-93 4 N 0 ( O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.2-1 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment In_spections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1.a) The Basic Configuration of the ESF- 1.a) Inspection of the as-built ESF-CCS 1.a) For the components and equipment CCS is as shown on Figures 2.5.2-1 and configuration will be conducted. shown on Figures 2.5.2-1 and 2.5.2-2, 2.5.2-2. the as-built ESF-CCS conforms with the Basic Configuration. 1.b) The ESF-CCS has the following 1.b) Inspection of the as-built ESF-CCS will 1.b) "Ihe ESF-CCS has the following features: be performed. features:

Software programmable processors
Software programmable processors arranged in primary and standby arranged in primary and standby processor configuration within each processor configuration within each ESF-CCS division ESF-CCS division
Processors provide fixed sequence
Processors . provide fixed sequence program (non-interrupt driven execution program (non-interruptdriven) execution with fixed memory allocation with fixed memory allocation e ESFAS functions are divided into ESF-
ESFAS functions are divided into ESF-CCS distributed segments with two CCS distributed segments with two separete multiplexers per segment which separate multiplexers per segment which receive PPS initiation signals. receive PPS initiation signals
Separation is provided between
Separation is provided between safety protective (ssfety critical) ESFAS critical ESFAS processing functions and processing functions and auxiliary auxiliary functions of snan-machine functions of man-machine interfaces, interfaces, data communications and data communications and' automatic automatic testing testing
Redundant data communication networks
Redundant data communication networks support the . transmission of safety support the transmission of safety critical data on a continuous cyclical critical data on a continuous cyclical basis independent of plant transients basis independent of plant transients 2.5.2 12m.n

O V-O V F SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desien Coninnitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

2. Each division of the ESF-CCS has the 2. Inspection of the four as-built ESF-CCS 2. Each ESF-CCS division has equipment following elements, as depicted on divisions will be performed. for the following:

Figure 2.5.2-2: selective 2-out-of-4 logic, selective 2-out-of-4 logic, component control logic, component control logic, process instrumentation, process instrumentation, signal conditioning equipment, signal conditioning equipment, maintenance and test panel, maintenance and test panel, control and display interface devices, control and display interface devices, and a master transfer switch. and a master transfer switch.

3. 'Ihe four ESF-CCS divisions are 3. Inspection for separation and isolation of 3. Physical separation exists between the 4 physically separated and electrically the four as-built ESF-CCS divisions will ESF-CCS divisiors. Electricalisolation isolated. be conducted. devices are provided at interfaces between the four ESF-CCS divisions.

4. Each ESF-CCS division is powered 4. Tests will be performed on the ESF- 4. Within the ESF-CCS, a test signal exists from its respective Class IE bus. CCS by providing a test signalin only only at the equipment powered from the one Class IE bus at a time. Class IE bus under test.

5. Each ESF-CCS division receives 4 5. Tests will be performed using simulated 5.a) Each ESF-CCS division receives four channels of initiation signals from the . PPS signals for ESF initiation input to channels of PPS initiation signals for PPS which are processed using selective each division of the ESF-CCS. each ESP actuation function performed 2-out of-4 logic to generate actuation by that ESF-CCS division.

signals for the ESF systems controlled by that division. Basic block diagrams for the function logic used in the ESF- - CCS for actuation of ESF systems are shown on Figures 2.5.2-3 and 2.5.2-4. 2.5.2 inim ( ~ J O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desis Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

5. (Continued) 5.b) For each ESF actuation function performed by an ESF-CCS division, receipt of an ESF initiation signal from only one PPS channel does not result in generation of an ESF actuation signal The receipt of like PPS initiation signals which do not satisfy the selective 2-out-of-4 logic does not result in actuation signals for that ESF function.

The receipt of like PPS ESF initiation signals which satisfy the selective 2-out-of-4 logic does result in actuation signals for that ESF function. - 6. The ESF-CCS provides control 6.a) Tests will be performed on the 6.a) The control and display interface capability and, upon receipt of initiation as-built ESF-CCS control and display - equipment provide control capability for signals from the PPS, automatically interface equipment. the following systems: generates actuation signals . to the following ESF systems within allocated safety injection system, response times: containment isolation system,- containment spray system safety injecilon system, main steam isolation, and containment isolation system, emergency feedwater system. containment spray system main steam isolation, and emergency feedwater system. 2.5.2 224:m . _ - - . _ _ - . _ - - - . _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . ~. - O O O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) XNGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and AcceDiance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Anahrses Acceptance Criteria

6. (Continued) 6.b) Tests will be performed using signals 6.b) ESF initiation signals which satisfy the simulating ESF initiation to the ESF- selective 2 out of 4 criteria result in Once initiation signals are received from CCS. actuation signals for related system the PPS, the ESF-CCS actuation logic components for the following systems:

signals remain following removal of tae initiation signal. safety injection system, cont:3nment isolation system, containment spray system main steam isolation, and emergency feedwater system. 6.c) Tests will be performed using signals 6.c) Measured response times are less than simulating ESF initiation to the ESF- or equal to the response time values CCS. required for each ESF actuation signal. 6.d) Testing will be performed using signals 6.d) Once initiated, ESF-CCS actuation logic simulating ESF initiation to the ESF- signals remain following removal of the CCS. initiation signal.

7. The ESF-CCS provides control 7.a) Tests will be performed on the as-built 7.a) The- control and display interface capability and, upon receipt of initiation ESF-CCS control and display interface equipment provide control capability for signals from the PPS, automatically equipment. the following systems:

generates actuation signals to the following non-ESF systems: annulus ventilation system, component cooling water system, annulus ventilation system, onsite power system, . component cooling water system, diesel generators, and onsite power system, control complex ventilation system. diesel generators, and control complex ventilation system. 2.5.2 in.n O O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Inspections. Tests. Analyses - Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment 7.b) Tests will be performed using signals 7.b) ESF initiation signals which satisfy the

7. (Continued) simulating ESF initiation to the ESF- selective 2 out of 4 criteria results in CCS. actuation signals for related system components for the following systems:

annulus ventilation system, component cooling water system, onsite power system, diesel generators, and control complex ventilation system.

8. The ESF-CCS provides control 8. Tests will be performed on the as-built ' 8. 'Ibe control and display interface capability for. the following safety- ESF-CCS control and display interface equipment provide component status and related systems: equipment. control capability for the following systems:

shutdown cooling system, safety depressurization system, shutdown cooling system, atmospheric dump system, safety depressurization system, station service water system, atmospheric dump system, heating, ventilating and sir conditioning station service water system, systems, and heating, ventilating and air conditioning hydrogen mitigation devices. systems, and hydrogen mitigation devices. 2.5.2 irai.n O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

9. Upon receipt of ESF initiation signals 9. Tests will be performed using signals 9. Upon receipt of signals simulating for safety injection, containment spray, simulating ESF initiation signals. initiation of safety injection. containment or emergency feedwater, the ESF-CCS spray, or emergency feedwater which initiates an automatic start of the diesel satisfy the selective 2-out-of-4 criteria, generators and automatic load the ESF-CCS willinitiate an automatic sequencing of ESF loads, start of the diesel generators and automatic load sequencing of ESF loads.

The loads are sequenced in the assigned order for each of the accident sequencing scenarios. 10.a) Upon detecting loss of power to Class 10.a) Tests will be performed using simulated 10.a) Upon loss of power at a Class IE bus, IE division buses through protective loss of power to the Class IE buses. signals are generated automatically by devices, the ESF-CCS automatically each of two ESF-CCS divisions which initiates startup of the respective diesel will: generators, shedding of electrical load, transfer of Class IE bus connections to 1) initiate an automatic start of the the diesel generators, and sequencing to emergency diesel generator the reloading of safety-related loads to associated with that division, the Class IE bus.

2) cause each medium voltage switchgear circuit breaker to open,

3) cause transfer of the Class IE bus connections to the diesel generator, and

4) sequentially reclose each medium voltage switchgear' circuit breaker aller the diesel generator has started.

2.5.2 n,mn O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Cdteda 10.b) Upon ESF actuation, the normal load 10.b) A test will be performed using a 10.b) Upon receipt of the ESF initiation sequence is intenupted and priority is simulated loss of power to the Class IE signal, the ESF-CCS automatically given to loading the actuated ESF busca and simulated ESF initiation intermpts the loading sequence to load systems and associated safety-related signals input to the ESF-CCS during the the equipment associated with the ESF systems. reloading sequence for each of the equipment associated with the ESF following ESF initiation signals: initiation signal and then resumes the reloading sequence. safety injection actuation signal, containment spray actuation signal, emergency feedwater actuation signal to steam generator 1, and emergency feedwater actuation signal to steam generator 2. 10.c) Loss of power in an ESF-CCS Division 10.c) Testing will be performed simulating 10.c) less of power in an ESF-CCS Division results in ESF-CCS outputs assuming loss of power in the ESF-CCS Division. results in ESF-CCS outputs assuming fail-safe output operation. fail-safe output operation. 10.d) Protective devices are designed to detect 10.d) Inspection of the as-built protective 10.d) Protective devices are installed to detect loss of power if a setpoint is exceeded. devices will be performed. loss of power, if a setpoint is exceeded. 2.5.2 12 3i.,3 . -- - . - - - - ._ .. - . - - . . - - . - - - - . .-- . ~ - - O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 11.a) The ESF-CCS provides an interlock 11.a) Tests will be performed using signals 11.a) Manual control signals input to the ESF-which prevents the ESF-CCS from simulating RCS pressure input to the CCS to open the shutdown cooling generating a signal to open the shutdown ESF-CCS. system isolation valves do not result in cooling system isolation valves when the generation of signals to open the valves RCS pressure is above the entry when the ESF-CCS receives signals

p. essure of the shutdown cooling simulating RCS pressure that is greater system. than the shutdown cooling system entry pressure.

I1.b) The ESF-CCS provides an interleck i1.b) Tests will be performed using signals 11.b) Manual control signals input to the ESF-which prevents the ESF-CCS fron. simulating RCS pressure input signals to CCS to close the SIT isolation valves do generating signals to close the SIT the ESF-CCS. - not result in generation of signals to isolation valves when the RCS pressure close the valves when the ESF-CCS is above the entry pressure of the SCS. receives signals simulating RCS pressure that is greater than the SCS entry pressure. I1.c) The interlock on the EFW isolation 11.c) Tests will be performed using signals 11.c) Input of signals indicating high SG level valves automatically closes the isolation simulating SG level and Emergency results in generation of a signal to close valves on high SG levels when an Feedwater Actuation input signals to the the EFW isolation valves unless signals Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal ESF-CCS. for Emergency Feedwater Actuation are is not present, also input to the ESF-CCS. 2.5.2 u.n m O O v V SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

12. 'the operator interface devices of the 12. Addressed in 6.a),7.a) and 8. 12. Addressed in 6.a),7.a) and 8.

ESF-CCS in the MCR provide for automatic and manual control of ESF systems and components.

13. In the remote shutdown room, operator 13. Tests will be performed on the as-built 13. Control capability is provided at the interface devices provide for manual ESF-CCS control and display interface ESF-CCS control and display interface control of ESF system components devices in the remote shutdown room devices in the remote shutdown room needed to achieve hot standby. following a transfer of control capability for the following systems:

to the remote shutdown room. safety injection system, emergency feedwater system, component cooling water system, onsite power system, diesel generators, shutdown cooling system, safety depressurization system, atmospheric dump system, station service water system, and heating, ventilating and air conditioning systems. 2.5.2 nan O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitinent Inspections. Tests. Anakses Acceptance Criteria 14.a) Actuation of master transfer switches at 14.a)' Tests will be performed using master 14.a) Upon actuation of the naster transfer either exit of the MCR transfers control transfer switches at each exit of the switches at either MCR exit: capability from the ESF-CCS control MCR and each of the ESF-CCS control and display interface devices depicted in and display interface devices in the 1) control actions at the ESF-CCS the MCR to those in the remote MCR and the remote shutdown room. control and display interface devices shutdown room. do not cause the ESF-CCS to generate the associated control Indication of transfer status is provided signals, and in the MCR.

2) control actions at the ESF-CCS control and display interface devices in the remote shutdown room cause the ESF-CCS to generate the associated control signals.

3) indication of transfer status is provided in the MCR.

14.b) Each ESF-CCS division's maintenance 14.b) Testing will be performed using each 14.b) Upon actuation of the master transfer and test panel provides capability to ESF-CCS division's maintenance and switching function from each ESF-CCS transfer control from the MCR to the test panel a-d control ' and display division's maintenance and test panel: remote shutdown panel for its respective interface devices in the MCR and the ESF-CCS division and to transfer remote shutdown room. 1) control actions at the ESF-CCS control back to the MCR for its control and display interface devices respective ESF-CCS division. in the MCR for that ESF-CCS division do not cause the ESF-CCS to generate the associated control - signals, and 2.5.2 izam O O O SYSTEM 80+"' TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 14.b) (Continued)

2) control actions at the ESF-CCS control and display interface devices in the remote shutdown room for that ESF-CCS division cause the ESF-CCS to generate the associated control signals.

Upon de-actuation of the master transfer switching function from each ESF-CCS division's maintenance and test panel:

3) control actions at the ESF-CCS control and display interface devices in the remote shutdown room for that ESF-CCS division do not cause the ESF-CCS to generate the associated control signals, and

4) control actions at the ESF-CCS control and display interface devices in the MCR for that ESF-CCS division cause the ESF-CCS to generate the associated control signals.

2.5.2 non n m (3 p U b d SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 14.c) Prior to transfer of control to the remote 14.c) Testing will be performed on the as- 14.c) Prior to transfer of control to the remote shutdown room, control actions in the built ESF-CCS control and display shutdown room, control actions in the remote shutdown room do not cause the devices in the remote shutdown room remote shutdown room do not cause the ESF-CCS to generate the associated prior to transfer of control capability to ESF-CCS to generate the associated control signals. the remote shutdown room. control signals. 15.a) Diverse manual actuation switches are 15.a) Tests will be performed using the 15.a) Actuation of the switches provides provided as. an alternate means for diverse manual actuation switches. signals to achieve actuation of ESF manual actuation of ESF components in components for the following: two divisions of the ESF-CCS as follows: 2 trains of safety injection, 2 trains of safety injection, I train of containment spray, I train of containment spray, I train of emergency feedwater to each I train of emergency feedwater to each steam generator steam generator i main steam isolation valve in each I main steam isolation valve in each main steam line, main steam line, I isolation valve in each containment air 1 isolation valve in each containment air purge line, and purge line, and I letdown isolation valve. I letdown isolation valve. 15.b) The diverse manual actuation switches 15.b) Inspection of ' the as-built ESF-CCS 15.b) Communication of the signals from the provide signals to the lowest level in the equipment will be performed. diverse manual actuation switches ESF-CCS digitalequipment. Communi- implements hardwired signal cation of the signals from the switches is communication to the lowest level in the diverse from the software used in the - ESF-CCS digital equipment. higher levels of the ESF-CCS. 2.5.2 u n-m O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desian Comunitinent Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 15.c) Actuation of the switches provides a 15.c) Testing will be performed for each 15.c) Each diverse manual actuation switch is signal which overrides the higher level diverse manual actuation switch with able to generate a signal which overrides signals, to actuate the associated ESF concurrent and opposing control the manual signals input via the control component or components. commands initiated from the control and and display interface devices, such that display interface devices depicted on signals are provided to the associated Figure 2.5.2-2. motor control centers to actuate the ESF equipment. 15.d) Diverse manual actuation status 15.d) Testing will be performed for each 15.d) Diverse manual actuations are indicated indication is provided in the MCR. diverse manual actuation switch. in the MCR. 16.a) Periodic testing to verify operability of 16.a) Inspection of design documentation will 16.a) The design documentation specifies tests the ESF-CCS can be performed with the be performed to verify the cepability to that can be performed while the plant is reactor at power or when shutdown perform surveillance tests while the operating without disabling the protec-without interfering with the protective plant is operating. tion functions to verify operability of the function of the system. selective 2-out-of-4 logic and the res-Manual surveillance tests will be ponse of ESF systems to ESF actuation conducted while simulating ESP signals and interlocks. initiation signals. He manual test does not interfere with the actuation of the ESF-CCS. 16.b) Capability is provided for testing all 16.b) Inspection . of the as-built ESF-CCS 16.b) Testing capability provides overlap in functions from ESF initiating signals equipment will be performed to verify individual tests such that all functions received from the PPS through to the the capability for functional testing. from ESF initiating signals received actuation of protective system from the PPS through to the actuation of equipment. Testing consists of on-line protective system equipment are tested. automatic hardware testing, automated testing of PPS/ESFAS initiations and Testing consists of on-line - automatic interfaces, and manual testing. hardware testing, automated functional testing of PPS/ESFAS initiations and interfaces, and manual testing. 2.5.2 -u m O O O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desian Coniniitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 16.c) The maintenance and test panel provides 16.c) Inspection of the as-built ESF-CCS 16.c) The maintenance and test panel includes capability for manual testing of ESF- equipment will be performed. the capability to perform manual testing CCS functions and hardware. of ESF-CCS functions and hardware. 17.a) Where the ESF-CCS and the process 17.a) Inspection of the as-built ESF-CCS 17.a) Electrical isolation devices are provided control system interface to the same configuration will be conducted. between the process control system and component, electrical isolation devices sensors, signal conditioners and actuated are provided between the process devices which interface to the ESF-control system and the shared CCS. component. 17.b) For each defined failure of the ESF- 17.b) Testing of the ESF-CCS and a failure 17.b) For each defined failure of the ESF-CCS data communication links, a mode and affects analysis will be CCS data communication links, a predetermined failure mode for the performed. predetermined failure mode for the affected system has been defined and affected system has been defined and determined to have acceptable determined to have acceptable consequences. consequences.

18. Electrical isolation devices are provided 18. Inspection of the as-built ESF-CCS 18. Electrical isolation devices are provided at ESF-CCS interfaces with the DIAS- ' equipment will be conducted. at ESF-CCS interfaces with the DIAS-N, the DPS, the P-CCS, the control and N, the DPS, the P-CCS, the control and display interface devices, the master display interface devices, the master transfer switches, and between the signal transfer switches, and between the signal conditioning equipment and the DIAS-P. ' conditioning equipment and the DIAS-P, as shown on Figure 2.5.2 2. as shown on Figure 2.5.2-2.

2.5.2 2-um f ') SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

19. Setpoints for interlocks and actuation of 19. Inspection will be performed on the 19. The inspection of the setpoint calculation ESF-CCS safety-related functions are setpoint calculations. confirms the use of setpoint method-determined using methodologies which ologies that require:

have the following characteristics: a) Documentationofdata, assumptions, a) Requirements that the design basis and methods used in the bases for analytical limits, data, assumptions, . selection of trip setpoints is and methods used as the bases for performed. selection . of trip setpoints are b) Consideration of instrument calibra-specified and documented. tion uncertainties and uncertainties b) Instrumentat'on accuracies, drift and due to environmental conditions, in-the effects of design basis transients strument drift, power supply varia-are accounted for in the tion and the effect of design basis determination of setpoints. event transients is included in deter-c) He method utilized for combining mining the margin between the trip the various uncertainty values is setpoint and the safety limit. specified. . c) The methods used for combining un-d) Identifies of required preoperational certainties is consistent with those and surveillance testing. - specified in the methodology plan. e) Identifies performance requirements d) . He use of written procedures for re-for replacement of setpoint related quired preoperational and sur-instrumentation. veillance testing. f) The setpoint calculations are e) Evaluation for equivalent or better consistent with the physical performance of replacement instru-configuration of the instrumentation. mentation which is not identical to original equipment is documented. f) The configuration of the as-built in-strumentation is consistent with the attributes used in the setpoint cal-culations for location of taps and sensing lines. 2.5.2 troim O C) % %) (") SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desima Conomitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteda

19. (Continued) 19.b) Testing will be performed to verify 19.b) 1) ne correct ESF-CCS response interlock and actuation responses to occurs when an input signal crosses simulated input signals. the setpoint threshold.

2) Changing of a setpoint does not also change the setpoints of other trips or interlocks.

20. ESF-CCS software is designed, tested, 20. Inspection will be performed of the 20.a) He process defines the organization, insta!!ed and maintained using a process process used to design, test, install, and responsibilities and activities for the which: maintain the ESF-CCS software. following phases of the software engineering life cycle:

a. Dermes the organization, responsi-bilities, and software quality assurance

Establishment of plans and method-activities for the software engineering ologies for all software to be developed; life cycle that provides for:
Specification of functional, system and
establishment of plans and method- software requirements and identification ologies of safety critical requirements; e specification of functional, system
Design of the software architecture, pro-and software requirements and . gram structure and dermition of the soft-standards, identification of safety ware modules; critical requirements
Development of the software code and e design and development of software testing of the software modules;
software module, unit and system
Interpretation of software and hardware testing practices and performance of unit and system tests; 2.5.2 n.sim

O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitasent Inspections. Tests. Anakses Acceptance Criteria

20. (Continued) 20.a) (Continued) e installation and checkout practices

Software installation and checkout testing; and
reporting and correction of software defects during operation
Reporting and correction of software defects during operation.

b. Specifies requirements for:

20.b) The process has requirements for the e software management, documen- following software development tation requirements, standards, functions: review requirements, and procedures for problem reporting and corrective

Software management, which defines action organization responsibilities, docu-mentation requirements, standards for e software configuration management, software coding and testing, review historical records of software, and requirements, and procedures for control of software changes problem reporting and corrective actions;
verification & validation, and re-quirements for reviewer inde-
Software configuration management, pendence which establishes methods for main-taining historical records of software as

c. Incorporates a graded approach accord- ~ it is developed, controlling software ing to the software's relative importance ' changes and for recording and reporting to safety. software changes; and

Verification and validation, which specifies the requirements for the veri-fication review process, review and test activity documentation and reviewer independence.

2.5.2 um.n O v O v Ov SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 20.c) The process establishes the method for classifying ESF-CCS software elements according to their relative importance to safety. The process defines the tasks to be performed for software assigned to each safety classification.

21. An environmental qualification program 21. An inspection of the ESF-CCS 21. For the ESF-CCS components and assures the ESF-CCS equipment is able qualification report ar.d the as-built ESF- equipment shown on Figure 2.5.2-1, the to perform its intended safety function CCS equipment installation as-built installation, configuration, and for the time needed to be functional, configuration and environment will be design environmental conditions are under its design environmental conducted, bounded by those used in the conditions.' The environmental environmental qualification report.

conditions, bounded by applicable design basis events, are: temperature, pressure, humidity, chemical effects, radiation, aging, seismic events, submergence, power supply vo~tage & frequency variations, electromagnetic compatibility and synergistic effects which may have a significant effect on equipment performance. The environmental qualification of ESF-CCS equipment is achieved via tests, analysis or a combination of analyses and tests. 2.5.2 umm g S q V V SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continuedl ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

22. The use of commercial grade computer 22. Inspection will be performed of the 22. A process is defined that has:

hardware and software items in the process defined to use commercial grade ESF-CCS is accomplished through a componeats in the application.

requnanents for supplier's design dedication process that has: and production control, configuration management, problem reporting and

.

requirements for supplier design change control; .

control, configuration management,

review of product performance; problem reporting and change
receipt of acceptance of commercial control; grade item;
review of product performance;
final acceptance, based on equipment
receipt acceptance of the commercial qualification and software validation grade item; in the integrated system.
final acceptance, based on equipment qualification and software validation in the integrated system.

23. The ESF-CCS is qualified according to 23. An inspection of the ESF-CCS EMC 23. For the ESF-CCS components and an established plan for Electromagnetic qualification reports and the as-built equipment shown on Figure 2.5.2-1, the compatibility (EMC). ESF-CCS equipment installation as-built installation configuration and configuration and environment will be site survey are bounded by those used in The qualification plan requires the conducted. the ESF-CCS EMC qualification equipment to function properly when report (s).

subjected to the expected operational electrical surges or electromagnetic interference (EMI), electrostatic discharge (ESD), and radio frequency interference (RFI). The qualification plan will require that the equipment to be tested be configured for intended service conditions. 2.5.2 n,n.n 7 SYSTEM 80+" 2.5.3 DISCRETE INDICATION AND ALARM SYSTEM AND DATA - ' PROCESSING SYSTEM Design Description The Discrete Indication and Alarm System (DIAS) and the Data Processing System (DPS) are non-safety related instrumentation and display systems which display information for monitoring conditions in the reactor, the reactor coolant system, Containment and safety-related process systems during and following design basis events. He DIAS and DPS are non-Class 1E systeias used to display safety-related information. The Basic Configuration for the DIAS and DPS is as shown on Figure 2.53-1. The DIAS and the DPS are located in the nuclear island structures. . De DIAS and the DPS use sensors, transmitters, signal conditioning equipment, information display equipment and digital equipment which perform the data processing, data communication, calculations, and logic to display safety-related O information. Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation (PAMI) Category I instruments and computers up to and including the channel isolation devices are Class IE environmentally qualified. He DIAS power supplies, displays and processors are seismically qualified for physical and functional integrity. The main control room (MCR) and remote shutdown room (RSR) DPS display devices are seismically qualified for physical integrity. The DIAS is divided into two segments: DIAS - Channel P (DIAS-P) ' DIAS - Channel N (DIAS-N) The DIAS hardware components have the following attributes: e software programmable processors; e software execution without process dependent interrupts; e segmented design such that the impact of a single electrical failure is limited i I to the display devices of the segment. O 2.53 num 1 ) r SYSTEM 80+" , O] l Physical separation and electrical isolation are provided between the DIAS-P, the DIAS-N and the DPS as shown on Figure 2.5.3-2. The DIAS displays and processors are non-class 1E which are designed for room ambient temperature and humidity environmental conditions. Temperature sensors mounted in the DIAS cabinets provide high temperature status indication in the MCR. The hardware and software used in the DPS for information processing nnd display is diverse from that used in the DIAS-N and the DIAS-P. He DIAS-P provides a continuous display in the main control room (MCR) of key parameters for indication of critical function status during and following design basis events. These parameters are provided to the DIAS-P displays via two channels of instrumentation which include protection system signal conditioning equipment and post accident monitoring instrumentation (PAMI) equipment, as shown on Figure 2.5.3-2. The PAMI comnuters calculate values for the reactor coolant subcooled margin, the coolant temperature at the core exit, and the coolant level in the reactor vessel which are displayed by the DIAS-P. He information provided to the DIAS-P displays are communicated via means which are diverse from the communication software used in the plant protection system (PPS) and the engineered safety f3, features-component control system (ESF-CCS). D The DIAS-N provides for display of the key parameters for indication of critical function status during and following design basis events, and the operating status of success path systems using dedicated display devices. 'Ibe DIAS-N provides multi-parameter displays with access to backup information for the key indicators, and access to diagnostic information. The DIAS-N provides displays for specified alarm conditions. The DIAS-N also provides displap with access to information from non-safety-related systems. The DPS displays provide access to information from safety related systems, as identified above for DIAS-N, and to non-safety related information. The DIAS-N and the LPS provide for monitoring of the following: a) Specified process conditions in the reactor and related systems for startup, aperation, and shutdown from the MCR and for shutdown to hot standby l from the remote shutdown room. b) Reactor trip system status to confirm that a reactor trip has taken place and whether or not a setpoint for initiation of a reactor trip response has beca reached. n 1 ('") 2.5.3 2 ann l l 1 p SYSTEM 80+" c) The status and operation of each engineered safety features system and for specified related systems in the post accident period. d) The position of the control element assemblies. e) Specified parameters that provide information to indicate whether plant safety functions are being accomplished during and following design basis accident events. f) Indication of bypassed and inoperable status of plant safety systems, as follows:

i. Status of plant operating mode related bypasses of the PPS.

ii. Bypass status of each channel of the PPS. iii. Bypass and inoperable status of engineered safety feature systems. g) The status of core cooling prior to and following an accident, as follows:

i. Subcooling.

(VD ii. Liquid inventory in the reactor vessel above the fuel alignment plate. iii. Coolant temperature at the core exit. b) Four channels of PPS status information. i) Four channels of status and parameter information from the ESF-CCS. j) The following information fmm the power control system and the process component control system (PCS/P-CCS): alternate reactor trip status, alternate feedwater actuation signal status, pressurizer pressure, and steam generator 1 and 2 levels. The DIAS-N and DPS provide alarm indication consisting of alarm tiles (DIAS-N only) and display messages, provision for alarm acknowledgement, and priority distinction in alarm display. The DIAS-N and the DPS perform automatic signal validation using cross channel data comparison prior to data presentation and alarm generation. A kvI 2.5.3 n-n m

i

! ~ -l -l SYSTEM 80+= 1 O . . .) 1 Electrical isolation devices are provided at DIAS-N and DPS interfaces to the PPS, l ESF-CCS, PCS/P-CCS and at interfaces to display devices in the MCR and remote- l shutdown room. l Electrical isolation is provided between the DIAS-P display devices and protection-l system signal conditioning equipment, as shown on Figure 2.53-2. DIAS uses redundant networks for communications. De networks utilize isolatbn ' j technology (e.g., fiber optics) to ensure electrical i@ndence of the redundant i safety channels and electricalindependence of the MCR and the RSR.- De DIAS j l communications network provide communication paths to allow display ofinformation j l from safety-related I&C systems. Data communications is on a cyclical basis, . j independent of plant transients. - A loss of electrical power to DIAS or DPS equipment will. result in a blank screen,- inactive running indicator, or bad ' data symbol EMI qualification is applied for equipment with known EMI susceptibility based on operating environment and/or inherent design characteristics. De DIAS /DPS is quahfied according to an' established plan for Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC). ~ De qualification plan requires the equipment to function properly when subjected to the expected operational electrical surges, electromagnetic interference (EMI), electrostatic discharge (ESD), and radio frequency interference (RFI). He equipment to be tested will be configured for intended service conditions. A site survey is performed upon completion of system installation to characterize the installed EMI environment.- ne use of commercial grade computer hardware and software items in the DIAS /DPS is accomplished through a process that has:

requirements for supplier design control, configuration management, problem reporting and change control, i e review of product performance; . i e receipt acceptance of the commercial grade item- _

i e final acceptance, based on- equipment. qualification and software - ) validation in the integrated system. DIAS /DPS software is designed, tested, installed and maintained using a process which: ! l O 2.53 um.m i i i l l i l 1 SYS1EM 80+" , I

a. Defines the organization, responsibilities, and software quality- >

assurance activities for the software engineering life cycle that provides for: o establishment of plans and methodohgies e specification of functional, system and software requirements and f standards, identification of safety critical requirements j e design and development of software e software module, unit and system testing practices )' e installation and checkout practices e reporting and correction of software defects during operation

b. Specifies requirements for:

] e software management, documentation requirements, standards, review requirements, and procedures for problem reporting and corrective action e software configuration management, historical records of software, and ) control of software changes ; e verification & validation, and requirements for reviewer independence j

c. Incorporates a graded approach according to the software's relative )

importance to safety. l i \ - Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria j i Table 2.53-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for the Discrete Indication and Alarm System and Data Processing System.- i l l l ; i , \ i2.si.n 2.5.3 l \ l SYST 80+ 0 O I I I I I I DIAS CHANNEL P DIAS CHANNEL N DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM I I I I I I I I I PAMI I I I I I I I llll ll f ~ l i Illi Illi i ! lill 1111 PROTECTION i i-g PPS- u_lll________ llll I l SYSTEM SIGNAL I I ll 3 I Il lll II CONDITIONING i"~ SF-CCS~ ~ ~ I- - , _ , , _ _ , _ , _ _ , , _ , _ _ _ _ _ ,_,, a g , g g g _,E EQUIPMENT , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . i, _ _~ _ i _ _ _. , ,i . - - - l - - - - - - - - - ,,,j i I_ PCS ___. . i- - i_. __ .) l P-CC S ,___________ _J y FIGURE 2.5.3-1 DIAS AND DPS CONFIGURATION um = O O - DPS O SYSTEM 80 +TM DISPLAY DEVICES DIAS CHANNEL N PRINTERS & INFORMATION DISPLAYS DEVICES STCRAGE DEVICES A A - I E DIAS CHANNEL P DIAS CHANNEL N DPS DISPLAYS PROCESSORS PROCESSORS r-i A 4A i 4 DPS NETWORK I IAS CHANNEL N NETWORK g I mmiirrri i'emme emme m 44meem iiii iiii meem e i i I I I ' AlhCDl 9 9 g g I g i II Al C ll~CS P ~~ ~ ~l P-CCS El AlhC l Al C ll PCS~l l~P-CCS~ ~l ._ _ _ _ _g I II ESF I~ ~~ II I PPS II ESF I '~ ~ ~ ~~ s s J ,__ _PPS ___ _ _-CCS __ _ _ _ _ _ _-CCS __ I E I EI E. I g PAMI l PAMI COMPUTER COMPUTER KEY: I CHANNEL A I CHANNEL B j( j( [ j( jg ? HARDWIRED OR 1 DATA UNK ~ " C NG OTEET16NI PAMIlP OTE ONI PAMI $A A 0 SYSTEM i l i DISCRETE SIGNAL l ~ SC-A SC-B l l SC-A I 1 @ ISMON ji JL JL JL SC-A SIGNAL CONDITIONING ,s ,s ,* s #*** CHANNEL A 1 I I I r,S,1 1 I r,S, '1 I r,Sj \,SJ FIGURE 2.5.3-2 m.3, .,3 DIAS-P, DIAS-N, DPS, AND INTERCONNECTIONS ~ SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.53-1 DISCRETE INDICATION AND AIARM SYSTEM AND DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acccotance Criteria Desima Conimitment Insocctions. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the DIAS 1. Inspection of the as-built configuration 1. For the components and equipment and DPS is as shown on Figure 2.5.3-1. of the DIAS and the DPS will be shown on Figure 2.5.3-1, the as-built conducted. DIAS and DPS conforms with the Basic Ccnfiguration.

2. Physical separation and electrical 2. Inspection of the as-built DIAS-P, 2. Physical separation exists between the isolation are provided between the DIAS-N and DPS equipment will be DIAS-P, the DIAS-N and the DPS.

DIAS-P, the DIAS-N and the DPS as conducted. Electrical isolation devices are provided shown on Figure 2.5.3-2. at interfaces between the DIAS-P, DIAS-N and DPS, consistent with Figure 2.5.3-2.

3. The hardware and software used in the 3.a) Inspection of the as-built DIAS-P, 3.a) Digital equipment used for data DPS for information processing and DIAS-N and DPS equipment will be processing, data communication and display are diverse from that used in the performed. display in the DPS uses microprocessors DIAS-N and the DIAS-P. which are diverse from the microprocessors used in corresponding equipment in the DIAS-N and the DIAS-P.

3.b) Inspection of the DPS, DIAS-N and 3.b) 'Ibe design documentation' confirms that DIAS-P design documentation will be the design group (s) which developed the performed to confirm that the software DPS software is different from the was developed by different design design group (s) which developed the groups. DIAS-N and DIAS-P software. 2.5.3 n-n m f O - \ V s SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION' FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM _S Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment laspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 4.a) The DIAS-P provides a continuous dis- 4.a) Inspection of as-built DI AS-P equipment 4.a) He DIAS-P displays in the MCR pro-play in the MCR of the key parameters will be performed. vide the key parameters for indication of for indication of critical function status critical function status during and fol-during and following design basis lowing design basis events, and two events. Rese parameters are provided channels of instrumentation which in-to the DIAS-P displays via two channels clude protection system signal condi-of instrumentation which ine'ade pro- tioning equipment and PAMI equipment tection system signal conditioning equip- are used to provide the information to ment and PAMI equipment, as shown the DIAS-P displays consistent with on Figure 2.5.3-2. Figure 2.5.3-2. 4.b) The information provided the DIAS-P 4.b) Inspection of the as-built DIAS-P 4.b) Communication of the signals from the displays are communicated via means equipment will be performed. Where signal conditioning equipment to the which are diverse from the digital equipment is used for DIAS-P display devices is consistent communication software used in the communication of signals to DIAS-P, with Figure 2.5.3-2 and implements plant protection system (PPS) and the then inspection of the documentation either of the following: engineered safety features ESF-CCS. will be performed to confirm that the signal communication software is i. hardwired signal communication diverse from the signal communication for displays derived directly from software for the PPS and ESF-CCS. the signal conditioning equipment, ii. digital signal communication equipment that uses software that - is diverse from the signal communication for-the PPS and ESF-CCS. 2.5.3 it.3 m ,-~ ,l O' (v) SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS InsDections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Crite& Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteda

5. The DIAS-N provides for display of the 5. Inspection of the as-built DIAS-N 5. The DIAS-N provides dedicated display key parametem for indication of critical equipment will be performed. devices in the MCR for the display of function status during and following the key parameters for indication of design basis events and the operating critical function status during and status of success path systems using following design basis events and the dedicated display devices. The DIAS-N operating status of success path systems.

provides multi-parameter displays with The DIAS-N provides multi-parameter access to backup information for the key displays in the MCR with access to indicators and access to diagnostic backup information for the key information. The DIAS-N provides indicators and access to diagnostic displays for specified alarm conditions. infermation. The DIAS-N provides displays in the MCR for specified alarm conditions.

6. He DPS provides for display of the key 6. Inspection of the as-built DPS equipment 6. He DPS displays in the MCR provide parameters for indication of critical will be performed. for display of the key parameters for function status during and following indication of critical function status design basis events, the operating status during and following design basis of success path systems, backup events, the operating status of success information for the key indicators, path systems, backup information for the access to diagnostic information, and for . key indicators, access to diagnostic specified alarm conditions. information, and for specified alarm conditions, 2.5.3 - n2-st.n

O O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Insocctions. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Critert

7. The DIAS-N and the DPS provide for 7. Inspection of the as-built DIAS-N and 7. The DIAS-N and DPS display equip-monitoring the following: DPS displays in the MCR and remote ment provide monitoring capability for shutdown room will be performed. the following:

Tesdng will be performed using actual a) Specified process conditions in the or simulated input signals. a) Specified process conditions in the reactor and related systems for startup, reactor and related systems for startup, operation, and shutdown from the MCR operation, and shutdown from the MCR and for shutdown to hot standby from and for shutdown to hot standby from the remote shutdown room (NOTE 1). the remote shutdown room (NOTE 1). b) - Reactor trip system status to confirm b) Reactor trip system status to confirm that a reactor trip has taken place and that a reactor trip has taken place and whether or not a setpoint for initiation whether or not a setpoint for initiation of a reactor trip response has been of a reactor trip response has been ~ reached. reached. c) The status and operation of each c) The status and operation' of each engineered safety feature system and for engineered safety feature system and for specified related systems in the post specified related systems in the post accident period, accident period. d) The position of the control element d) The position of the control element assemblies. assemblies. e) Specified parameters that provide e) Specified parameters that provide information to indicate whether plant information to indicate whether plant safety functions are being accomplished safety functions are being accomplished during and following design basis during and following design basis accident events, accident events. NOTEI Refer to Section 2.12.1, MCR and 2.12.2, RSR for identification of MCR and RSR indications and control provided by DIAS-N and DPS 2.53 n-n-n . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _- _ = 0 O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued) DISPLAY 1NSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Conninitinent inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

7. (Continued) 7. (Continued) f) Indication of bypassed and inoperable f) Indication of bypassed and inoperable status of plant safety systems, as status of plant safety systems, as follows: follows:

i. Status of plant operating mode i. Status of plant operating mode related bypasses of the PPS. related bypasses of the PPS.

ii. Bypass status of each channel of ii. Bypass status of each channel of the PPS. the PPS. iii. Bypass and inoperable status of iii. Bypass and inoperable status of engineered safety feature systems. engineered safety feature systems. g) The status of core cooling prior to and g) The status of core cooling prior to and following an accident, as follows: following an accident, as follows:

i. Subcooling. i. Subcooling.

ii. Liquid inventory in the reactor ii. Liquid inventory in the reactor vessel above the fuel alignment vessel above the fuel alignment plate. plate. iii. Coolant temperature at the core iii. Coolant temperature at the core uit. exit. 2.5.3 2 3:e Q V C s O V SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desima Comniitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Cdteria

7. (Continued) 7. (Continued) h) Four channels of PPS status h) Four channels of PPS status information. information.

i) Four channels of status and parameter i) Four channels of status and parameter information from the ESF-CCS. information from the ESF-CCS. j) The following information from the j) The following iaformation from the PCS/P-CCS: PCS/P-CCS: alternate reactor trip status, alternate reactor trip status, ahernate feedwater actuation signal alternate feedwater actuation signal status, status, pressurizer pressure, and pressurizer pressure, and steam generator 1 and 2 levels. steam generator 1 and 2 levels.

8. The DIAS-N and the DPS perform 8. Testing will be performed simulating the automatic signal validation using cross multiple channel input signals to the channel data comparison prior to data DIAS-N and DPS for each parameter presentation and alarm generation. selected as a key indicator of critical function status, as follows:

8.a) The input signals will simulate a failure 8.a) He DIAS-N and the DPS display a of one of the multiple channels ofinput value for the parameter under test which signals for the parameter under test. is consistent with the signals which were simulated not to fail, and the DIAS-N and DPS indicate that the displayed value is velidated. 2.5.3 n-n-n G 3 V SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections,. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 8.b) ne input signals will simulate a failure 8.b) The DIAS-N and DPS indicate that the of all but one of the multiple channels of displayed value for the parameter under input signals for the parameter under test is not validated. test. 8.c) The input signals will simulate failure of 8.c) The DIAS-N and DPS display a valve - one channel with ' the other channel for the parameter under test which is previously removed from service. consistent with the signals which were simulated not to be r-moved from service or failed, and the DIAS-N and DPS indicate that the valve is validated. 8.d) The DIAS-N and DPS display capability 8.d) He DIAS-N and DPS indicate will be verified. operability by verifying that the status signal is present and functional. He display used to verify 8.a) through 8.c) display these signals upon request, which make up the validated signal. - 9.a) Electrical isolation devices are provided 9.a) Inspection of the as-built DIAS-N and 9.a) Electrical isolation devices are provided at DIAS-N and DPS interfaces to the DPS equipment will be conducted. at DIAS-N and DPS interfaces to the PPS, ESF-CCS, PCS/P-CCS and at PPS, ESF-CCS, PCS/P-CCS . and at interfaces to display devices in the MCR interfaces to display devices in the MCR and remote shutdown room. and remote shutdown room, consistent with Figurc 2.5.3-2. 9.b) Electrical isolation is provided between 9.b) . Inspection of the as-built DIAS-P 9.b) Electrical isolation' devices are provided the DIAS-P display devices and one of equipment will be conducted. between the DI AS-P display devices and the two channels of protection system one of the *.wo channels of protection signal conditioning equipment, as shown system signal conditioning equipment, on Figure 2.5.3-2. consistent with Figure 2.5.3-2. 2.5.3 124:e o pd O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

10. DIAS /DPS software is designed, tested, 10. Inspection will be performed of the 10.a) The process defines the organization, installed and maintained using a process process used to design, test, install, and responsibilities and activities for the which: maintain the DIAS and DPS software. following phases of the software engineering life cycle:

a. Defines the organization, respon-sibilities, and software quality

Establishment of plans and assurance activities for the soft- methodologies for all software to be ware engineering life cycle that developed.

provides for:

Specification of functional, system and
establishment of plans and method- software requirements and identification ologies of safety critical requirements.
specification of functional, system and software - requirements and
Design of the software architecture, standards, identification of safety program structure and definition of the critical requirements software modules.
design and development of soft-ware
Development of the software code and
software module, unit and system testing of the software modules.

testing practices * - installation and checkout practices

Interpretation of software and hardware
reporting and correction of soft- and performance of unit and system ware defects during operation tests.

b. Specifies requirements for:

Software installation and checkout testing.
software management, documen-tation requirements, standards, re-
Reporting and correction of software view requirements, and procedures defects during operation.

for problem reporting and cor-rective action 2.5.3 umm O O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continned) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitment InSDections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

10. (Continued) 10.b) The process has requirements for the following software development e software c o n fig u ra tio n functions:

management, historical records of software, and control of software

Software management, which defines or-changes ganization responsibilities, documen-e verification & validation, and tation requirements, standards for soft-requirements for reviewer were coding and testing, review require-independence ments, and procedures for problem re-porting and corrective actions,

c. Incorporates a graded approach according to the software's relative

Software configuration management, importance to safety. which establishes methods for main-taining historical records of software as it is developed, controlling software changes and for recording and reporting software changes.

*. Verification and validation, .which specifies the requirements for the veri-fication review process, the validation testing process, review and test activity documentation and reviewer inde-pendence. 10.c) The process establishes the method for classifying DIAS and DPS software ele-ments according to their relative impor-tance to safety. The process defines the tasks to be performed for software as-signed to each safety classification. 2.5.3 um C) s.s Q v fD u) SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

11. The DIAS /DPS is qualified according to 11. An inspection of the DIAS /DPS EMC 11. For the DIAS /DPS components and an established plan for Electromagnetic qualification reports and the as-built equipment shown on Figure 2.5.3-1, the compatibility (EMC). DIAS /DPS equipment installation as-built installation configuration and configuration and environment will be site survey are bounded by those used in The qualification plan requires the conducted. the DIAS /DPS EMC qualification equipment to function properly when report (s).

subjected to the expected operational electrical surges or electromagnetic interference (EMI), electrostatic discharge (ESD), and radio frequency interference (RFI). He qualification plan will require that . the equipment to be tested be configured for intended service conditions.

12. DIAS and DPS are non-Class IE 12. Inspection of the DIAS and DPS 12. DIAS and DPS display safety-related systems used to display safety-related equipment will be performed. information (NOTE 2).

information.

13. The DIAS-N and DPS provide alarm 13. Testing will be performed to verify 13. He DIAS-N and DPS provide alarm indication consisting of alarm tiles DIAS-N and DPS alarm indication. indication consisting of alarm tiles (DIAS-N only) and display messages, . (DIAS-N only) and display messages, provisions for alarm acknowledgement, provisions for alarm acknowledgement, and priority distinction in alarm display. and priority distinction in alarm display.

NOTE 2 Refer to Section 2.12.1, MCR for identification of information displayed. 2.5.3 n-ai-s3 p A ( d V SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections.TMa Analyses Acceptance Criteria

14. DIAS communications has the following 14. Inspectir ;. of the as-built DIAS will be 14. The equipment used for DIAS has the safety critical attributes: perfo med. following attributes:

cyclical data communications
cyclical data communications independent of plant transients independent of plant transients e redundant networks for
redundant networks for communication communication
networks utilize isolation
networks utilize isolation technology to ensure electrical technology to ensure electrical independence of redundant safety independence of redundant safety channels and electrical channels and electrical independence of the Main Control independence of the Main Control Room and Remote Shutdown Room and Remote Shutdown Room, Room, e and networks provide
and networks provide communication paths to allow communication paths to allow display ofinformation from safety- display ofinformation from safety-related I&C systems. related I&C systems.

15.a) PAM Category I instruments and 15.a) Inspection of the - PAMI Category I 15.a) The qualification report concludes that computers up to and including the equipment qualification report and the the PAMI Category I instruments and channel isolation devices are Class IE as-built equipment installation, computers are Class IE environmental environmentally and seismically configuration and environment will be and seismically qualified, qualified. conducted. 15.b) 'the DIAS displays and processors are 15.b) Inspection of non-Class IE equipment 15.b) The non-Class IE DIAS equipment non-Class IE which are designed for documentation will be conducted. environmental specifications envelope room ambient temperature and humidity the room's design ambient temperature environmental conditions, and humidity environmental conditions. 2.5.3 iz-ai n rs . J SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Anakses Acceptance Criteria 15.c) Temperature sensors mounted in the 15.c) Tests will be performed to simulate high 15.c) Temperature sensors mounted in the DIAS cabinets provide status indication temperature in the DIAS cabinets. DIAS cabinets provide status indication in the MCR. in the MCR. 15.d) 'Ihe DIAS power supplies, displays and 15.d) Inspection of the DIAS equipment 15.d) The qualification report concludes the processors are seismically qualified for qualification report and an inspection of DIAS equipment is seismically qualified physical and functional integrity. the as-built equipment installation, for physical and functional integrity. configuration and location will be conducted. 15.e) The MCR and RSR DPS display devices 15.e) An inspection of the DPS display device 15.e) The' seismic qualification report are seismically qualified for physical seismic qualification report and an concludes the DPS display device is Writy. inspection of the as-built equipment seismically qualified for physical installation, configuration and location - integrity. will be conducted.

16. The DIAS hardware components have 16. Inspection of the design documentation 16. The design documentation concludes that .

the following attributes: for the as-built DIAS equipment will be the DIAS equipment has the following performed. features:

softwareprogrammableprocessors:

e software execution without process e softwareprogrammableprocessors; dependent interrupts;

software execution without process e segmented design such that the dependent interrupts; impact of a single electrical failure e segmented design such that the is limited to the display devices of impact of a single electrical failure the segment, is limited to the display devices of the segment.

2.5.3 nam ( O ) % %J SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

17. loss of electrical power will result in 17, inspection of the DIAS and DPS during 17. Loss of power to a display device either a blank display, inactive status loss of power will be performed. results in a blank screen. Loss of indicator, or bad data status symbol. power to a DIAS segment results in an inactive running indicator. Loss of power to a DPS application processor results in a bad data symbol on the display device.

18. The use of commercial grade computer 18. Inspection will be performed of the 18. A process is defined that has:

hardware and software items in the process defined to use commercial grade DIAS /DPS is accomplished through a components in the application.

requirements for supplier's design process that has: and production control, configuration management, e requirements for supplier design problem reporting and change control.configurationmanagement, control; problem reporting and change
review of product performance; control;
receipt of acceptance of
review of product performance; commercial grade item;
receipt acceptance of the
final acceptance,- based on commercial grade item; equipment qualification and
final acceptance, based on software validation in the equipment qualification and integrated system.

software validation. 2.5.3 n-n-n i i l l l l SYSTEM 80+" O 2.5.4 POWER CONTROL SYSTEM / PROCESS-COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Design Description l The Power Control System and the Process-Component Control System (PCS/P-CCS) are non-safety-related instrumentation and control systems which provide control of functions to maintain the plant within its normal operating range for all normal modes i of plant operation. The PCS/P-CCS are located in the nuclear island structures. The Basic Configuration of the PCS/P-CCS is as shown on Figure 2.5.4-1. The PCS/P-CCS use sensors, transmitters, signal conditioning equipment, control and display interface devices and digital processing equipment which perform the ! calculations, data communications, and logic to support the control functions. The digital equipment and software used in the PCS/P-CCS are diverse from that used in I the plant protection system (PPS) and the engineered safety features - component control system (ESF-CCS). The PCS/P-CCS provide control interfaces for the following control functions: PCS-reactivity control using control element assemblies, PCS-reactor power cutback, PCS-power change limiter (Megawatt Demand Setter), P-CCS-pressurizer pressure and level, P-CCS-main feedwater flow, P-CCS-main steam bypass flow, P-CCS-boron concentration, P-CCS-alternate reactor trip actuation, and ! P-CCS-alternate emergency feedwater actuation. l l The circuits used for alternate actuation of reactor trip, turbine trip, and emergency ! feedwater are independent and diverse from the protection system actuation circuits. The PCS/P-CCS provide the following information to the Discrete Indication and Alarm System (DIAS): alternate reactor trip status, alternate feedwater actuation signal status, pressurizer pressure, and steam generator 1 and 2 levels. O 2.5.4 . mi-n ; SYS'mM 80+" O) r V , For parameters used in PCS/P-CCS control functions which are provided from the redundant Class 1E sensors that are used independently by each channel of the protective system, the PCS/P-CCS monitor the four redundant instrument channels. 'Ibe PCS/P-CCS apply signal validation logic to the signals received from the four redundant channels to detect bypassed or failed sensors and to determine the sensed value to be used in the control system. I Control and display interface devices for the PCS/P-CCS are provided in the main control room (MCR) and in the remote shutdown room for control and monitoring of PCS/P-CCS controlled equipment. Actuation of master transfer switches at either exit of the MCR transfers control capability from the PCS/P-CCS control and display interface devices in the MCR to those in the remote shutdown room. The transfer can also be performed at the PCS/P-CCS equipment cabinets, which also provide capability for transferring control back to the MCR. Indication of transfer status is provided in the MCR. l Electrical isolation devices are implemented between the PCS/P-CCS and the i protection system signal conditioning equipment for each protection signal provided ! to them, as shown on Figure 2.5.4-2. Electrical isolation devices are provided for the PCS/P-CCS interfaces with the MCR equipment, the remote shutdown room fl V equipment, the DIAS and the Data Processing System (DPS), the protection system, ! and with protection system components as shown on Figure 2.5.4-2. ! 1 [ system] software is designed, tested, installed and maintained using a process which: '

a. Defines the organization, responsibilities, and software quality assurance activities for the software engineering life cycle that provides for: ,

e establishment of plans and methodologies e specification of functional, system and software requirements and ! standards, identification of safety critical requirements e design and development of software e software module, unit and system testing practices e installation and checkout practices e reporting and correction of software defects during operation

b. Specifies requirements for:

software management, documentation requirements, standards, review requirements, and procedures for problem reporting and corrective action (O

2.5.4 umm SYS'IEM 80+"

software configuration management, historical records of software, and -

control of software changes a verification & validation, and requirements for reviewer independence

c. Incorporates a graded approach according to the software's relative importance to safety.

He use of commercial grade computer hardware and software items in the PCS/P-CCS is accomplished through a process that has:

requirements for supplier design control, configuration management, problem reporting and change control;
review of product performance; a receipt acceptance of the commercial grade item;
final acceptance, based on equipment qualification and software validation.

Inspection, Test, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.5.4-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance - criteria for the Power Control System / Process-Component Control System. O

l l

l I i i O 2.5.4 n.si.e . a SYST M 80 + 0 O I I I I PROCESS CONTROL EQUIPMENT I I CONTROL & DISPLAY I I INTERFACE DEVICES I I I I y MASTER TRANSFER I SWITCHES COMPONENT CONTROL I I___--__I . LOGIC g l- I ; I SAFETY RELATED 3 DISPLAY g 3 , _______. INSTRUMENTATION , ________ y I PROTECTION I ] I SYSTEM I g SIGNAL I 1 l VALIDATION I -- 1 y ; I I I SIGNAL I-3 I _ _CO_ND_ITI_ON_ING_ _ s y I I a_ . . _ _ _ . I __.I___ em I PROTECTION I , a. s .a. -__ (Sj SYSTEM i l . COMPON,EN,TS_, f SjII COMPONENTS PROCESS I I FIGURE 2.5.4-1 PROCESS CONTROL EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION =-=i- a SYSTE + PROCESS CONTROL EQUIPMENT lMAINlON3RO5RolM l KEY: i CONTROL & DISPLAY +-E---> > HARD WIRED OR INTERFACE DEVICES DATA UNK g - + NON-CONDUCTING l MASTER TRANSFER - - - g - .-.y DATA UNK OR SWITCH DISCRETE SIGNAL I= - " " - - - " (E.G. FIBER OPTIC) l REMOTE SHUTDOWN ROOM -l COMPONENT = POWER SuPPtY CONTROL I "*' [D iSota m N fN E"'"N'DEJCs + - {l - - - > LOGIC 1- - ---- DIAS DISCRETE INDICATION & ! DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM----- ! 4_g_,_ ALARM SYSTEM ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' MCC MOTOR CONTROL DIAS - CHANNELN -S---- RTSG REACTOR TRIP t- ------ I SWITCHGEAR ! PROTECTION SYSTEMS CEDMCS CONTROL ELEMENT DRIVE g MECHANISM I -- l l SIGNAL l- @ = - + VAUDA ON y l CONDITIONING I y gCONDTTIONING L- - - - - I CEDMCS POWER l I k l~ ~' "" l J l MCC ,..g SUPPLY l l l U (s) ~ g ; ,s !_RTSO_ ! _[ q-1 (sj I t f _ _ ia _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _l l_ WIRED I l"- ._o'E. . l \~MCC f_. l 1 f y p- ~ !CEDM ll TURBINE l5ERGENIY UM.P,S FIEDWATER l A A,V,,, L38, *= *eS.ONT_ rot.I., r , FIGURE 2.5.4-2 ' 2-ai-as PROCESS CONTROL EQUIPMENT AND INTERCONNECTIONS O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5:4-1 O O POWER CONTROL SYSTEM / PROCESS-COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. He Basic Configuration of the PCS/P- 1. Inspection of the as-built configuration 1. For the components and equipment CCS is as shown on Figure 2.5.4-1. of the PCS/P-CCS will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.5.4-1, the as-built PCS/P-CCS conforms with the Basic Configuration.

2. He digital equipment and software used 2.a) Inspection of the as-built PCS/P-CCS, 2.a) The digital equipment used in the in the PCS/P-CCS are diverse from that PPS and ESF-CCS equipment will be PCS/P-CCS uses microprocessors which used in the PPS and ESF-CCS. performed. are diverse from the microprocessors used in the PPS and ESF-CCS equipment.

2.b) Inspection of the design documentation 2.b) he software documentation confirms will be performed to confirm that the that the desiga group (s) which developed software was developed by different the PCS/P-CCS software is different design groups. from the design group (s) which devel-oped the PPS and ESF-CCS software.

3. He PCS/P-CCS provide control inter- 3. Inspection will be performed on the as- 3. PCS/P-CCS control interfaces are pro-faces for the following control functions: built PCS/P-CCS control interface vided for the following functions:

equipment. PCS-reactivity control using control PCS-reactivity control using control - element assemblies, element assemblies, PCS-reactor power cutback, PCS-reactor power cutback, PCS-power change limiter (Mega. watt PCS-power change limiter (Megawatt Demand Setter), Demand Setter), P-CCS-pressurizer pressure and level, P-CCS-pressurizer pressure and level, P-CCS-main feedwater flow. P-CCS-main feedwater flow, P-CCS-steam bypass flow. P-CCS-steam bypass flow, P-CCS-boron concentration, P-CCS-boron concentration, P-CCS-alternate reactor trip actuation, P-CCS-alternate reactor trip actuation, and and P-CCS-alternate emergency feedwater P-CCS-alternate emergency feedwater actuation. actuation. 2.5.4 24 -n O O O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5A-1 (Continued) POWER CONTROL SYSTEM / PROCESS-COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Comunitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses ' Acceptance Criteria

4. He circuits used for attemate actuation 4. Inspection of the design documentation 4. The documentation confirms that eircuits of reactor trip, turbine trip and emer- will be performed to confirm that the are implemented in the PCS/P-CCS to gency feedwater are independent and specified alternate actuation circuits are perform actuation of reactor trip, turbine diverse from the protection sys*2m independent and diverse from the trip and emergency feedwater which do actuation circuits, protection system actuation circuits, not utilize signals from the PPS or ESF-CCS and that the PPS and ESF-CCS digital equipment is not used to com-municate the actuation signals from the PCS/P-CCS to the actuated components.

5. He PCS/P-CCS provide the following 5. Inspection will be performed of the as- 5. The following information is available at .

information to the DIAS: built DIAS equipment. a DIAS-N display device: alternate reactor trip status, alternate reactor trip status, alternate feedwater actuation signal attemate feedwater actuation signal status, status, pressurizer pressure, and pressurizer pressure, and steam generator 1 and 2 levels. steam generator I and 2 levels.

6. For parameters used in PCS/P-CCS con- 6. A test will be performed using signals 6. For each parameter, the representative trol functions which are provided from simulating each parameter provided to parameter value determined by the the redundant Class IE sensors that are the PCS/P-CCS via the redundant Class PCS/P-CCS from the Class IE sensor used independently by each channel of IE sensors that are used independently inputs is bounded by the three signals the protective system, the PCS/P-CCS by each channel of the protective which are simulated to be unaffected by monitor the four redundant instrument system. He signals will simulate a the failure.

channels. The PCS/P-CCS apply signal failure of one of the four sensor inputs validation logic to the signals received for each parameter. from the four redundant channels to de- - tect bypassed or failed sensors and to determine the sensed value to be used in the control system. 2.5.4 2.n-n O V O O V U SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5A-1 (Continuedl POWER CONTROL SYSTEM / PROCESS-COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitment InspectionCfests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

7. Control and display interface devices for 7. Inspection will be performed of the as- 7. Control and display interface devices for the PCS/P-CCS are provided in the built PCS/P-CCS control and display the PCS/P-CCS are provided in the MCR and in the remote shutdown room. interface devices in the MCR and MCR and in the remote shutdown room.

remote shutdown room. 8.a) Actuation of master transfer switches at 8.a) Testing will be performed using the 8.a) Upon actuation of the master transfer either exit of the MCR transfers control master transfer switches at each exit of switches at either MCR exit: capability from the PCS/P-CCS control the MCR and each of the PCS/P-CCS and display interface devices in the control and display interface devices in 1) control actions at the PCS/P-CCS MCR to those in the rs ete shutdown the MCR and the remote shutdown control and display interface devices room. Indication of transfer status is panel. in the MCR do not cause the process provided in the MCR. control systems to generate the associated control signals; and

2) control actions at the PCS/P-CCS control and display interface devices in the remote shutdown room cause the process control systems to generate the associated control signals.

3) Indication of transfer status is provided in the MCR.

I l 8.b) . The transfer of control capability can 8.b) Testing will be performed at the 8.b) Upon actuation of the master transfer also be performed at the PCS/P-CCS equipment cabinets for the PCS/P-CCS switching function from the equipment equipment cabinets, which also provide and using the PCS/P-CCS control and cabinets for the PCS/P-CCS: capability for transferring control back display interface devices in the MCR to the MCR. Indication of transfer and the remote shutdown room. wtatus is provided in the MCR. 2.5.4 324 n O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.4-1 (Continued) POWER CONTROL SYSTEM / PROCESS-COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. AnaPyses. and Accentance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 8.b) (Continued) 8.b) (Continued)

1) control actions at the PCS/P-CCS control and display interface devices in the MCR do not cause the process control systems to generate the associated control signals; and

2) control actions at the PCS/P-CCS control and display interface devices in the remote shutdown room cause the process control systems to generate the associated control signals.

3) Indication of transfer status is provided in the MCR.

Upon de-actuation of the master transfer switching function from the equipment cabinets for the PCS/P-CCS:

1) control actions at the PCS/P-CCS control and display interface devices in the remote shutdown room do not cause the process control systems to generate the associated control signals; and

~.2.5.4 2-si-n O O O V V U SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.4-1 (Continued) POWER CONTROL SYSTEM / PROCESS-COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTF41 Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 8.b) (Continued) 8.b) (Continued)

2) control actions at the PCS/P-CCS control and display interface devices in the MCR cause the process con-trol systems to generate the associated control signals.

3) Indication of transfer status is provided in the MCR.

9.a) Electrical isolation devices are provided 9.a) Inspection of the as-built PCS/P-CCS 9.a) ' Electrical isolation devices are provided between the PCS/P-CCS and the pro- configuration will be conducted. between the PCS/P-CCS and the pro-tection system signal conditioning equip- . tection system signal conditioning equip-ment for each protection signal provided ment, consistent with Figure 2.5.4-2 for to them, as shown on Figure 2.5.4-2. each protection signal provided to them. 9 b) Electrical isolation devices are provided 9.b) Inspection of the as-built PCS/P-CCS 9.b) Electrical isolation devices are provided for the PCS/P-CCS interfaces with the configuration will be conducted. for the PCS/P-CCS interfaces with the MCR, the remote shutdown room, the MCR, the remote shutdown room, the safety related display instrumentation, safety related display instrumentation, the protection systems and with pro- the protection systems and with pro-tection system components, as shown on tection system components, conforming Figure 2.5.4-2. to Figure 2.5.4-2. 2.5.4 iwim i O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5A-1 (Continued) POWER CONTROL SYSTEM /PROCESSCOMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. an' Acceptance Criteria Desian Comunitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

10. PCS/P-CCS software is designed, 10. Inspection will be perfornux! of the 10.a) The process defines the organization, tested, installed and maintained using a process used to design, test, install, and responsibilities and activities for the process which: maintain the PCS/P-CCS software. following phases of the software engineering life cycle:

a. Defines the organization, responsibilities, and software quality

Establishment of plans and assurance activities for the software methodologies for all software to be engineering life cycle that provides for: developed;
establishment of plans and
SpecificatSn of functional, system and methodologies software requirements and identification of safety critical requirements; e specification of functional, system and software requirements and standards,
Design of the software architecture, pro-identification of safety critical gram structure and definition of the soft-requirements ware modules:
design and development of software
Development of the software code and testing of the software modules; e software module, unit and system testing practices
Interpretation of software and hardware and perfonnance of unit and system

+ installation and checkout practices tests;

reporting and correction of software
Software installation and checkout defects during operation testing; and
Reporting and correction of software de-fects during operation.

2.5.4 2 si.m 3 \ (G SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.4-1 (Continued) POWER CONTROL SYSTEM /PROCEFS-COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 10.b) (Continued) 10.b) The process has requirements for the following software development

b. Specifies reqWerwh fou functions:

software mangement - w= mentation
Softwars management, which defines requiren.ents. eu6 5s, review organization responsibilities, require.nents, and procedures for documentation requirements, standards problem r> porting and corrective action for software coding and testing, review requirements, and procedures for
mftware configuration management, problem reporting and corrective historical receeds of software, and actions; control of sedware changes
Software configuration management, a verificatu & validation, and which establishes methods for requirements for reviewer independence maintaining historical records of software as it is developed, controlling

c. Incorporates a graded . approach software changes and for recording and according to the software's relative reporting software changes; and importance to safety.

Verification and validation, which specifies the requirements for the verification review process, the validation testing process, review and test activity documentation and reviewer independence.

2.5.4 naim O O O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.4-1 (Continued) POWER CONTROL SYSTEM / PROCESS-COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitinent Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 10.c) The process establishes the method for classifying PCS/P-CCS software elements according to their relative importance to safety. The process defines the tasiv to be performed for software assigned to each safety classification.

11. The use of commercial grade computer 11. Inspection will be performed of the 11. A process is defined that has:

hardware and software items in the process defined to use commercial grade PCS/P-CCS is accomplished through a components in the application.

requirements for configuration manage-process that has: ment;
requirements for configuration
review of product performance; management;
receipt acceptance of the commercial
review of product performance; grade item; and
receipt acceptance of the commercial
final acceptance based on equipment grade item; and qualification and software validation in the integrated system.
final acceptance based on equipment qualification and software validation.

2.5.4 um.n i i l l p V SYSTEM 80+= 2.6.1 AC ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM DESIGN DESCRIPTION l De AC Electrical Power Distribution System (EPDS) consists of the transmissien l system, the plant switching stations, the Unit Main Transformer (UMT), two Unit l Auxiliary Transformers (UATs), two Reserve Auxiliary Transformers (RATS), a Main l Generator (MG), Generator Circuit Breaker (GCB), buses, switchgear, load centers, motor control centers (MCCs), breakers and cabling. He EPDS includes the powm, instrumentation and control cables and buses to the distribution system loads, and electrical protection devices (circuit breakers and fuses) for the power, instrumentation and control cables and buses. The portion of the EPDS from the high sides of the UMT and RATS to the distribution system loads constitutes the EPDS Certified Design scope. Interface requirements for the transmission system, plant switching stations, UMT and RATS are specified below under the heading, " Interface Requirements." t l Two Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) provide Class 1E power to the two independent Class 1E Divisions, as described in Section 2.6.2. A non-safety-related Alternate AC Source (AAC) (i.e., combustion turbine) supplies non-Class 1E power to the EPDS, as described in Section 2.6.5. ) l (~ '( The Basic Configuration of the Class 1E portion of the EPDS is as shown on Figure 2.6.1-1. i f l During plant power operation, the MG supplies power through the GCB through the UMT to the transmission system, and to the UATs. When the GCB is open, power is backfed from the transmission system through the UMT to the UATs. l The UATs are sized to supply the design operating requirements of their respective ! Class 1E buses and non-Class 1E medium voltage non-safety and permanent non-l safety buses. The UMT and UATs are separated from the RATS. UMT, UATs, and RATS are provided with their own oil pit, drain, fire deluge system, grounding, and lightning protection systems. l The MG and GCB are separated from the RAT power feeders. The MG and GCB ( instrumentation and control circuits are separated from the RAT's instrumentation and control circuits. Each RAT is sized to supply the design operating power requirements of at least its > respective Class 1E buses and permanent non-safety bus, and one reactor coolant p t t.') 12-um 2.6.1 L- -- _ - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ o SYSTEM 80+" \ pump and its reactor coolant pump support loads. Each RAT has the capability of supplying power directly (i.e., not through any bus supplying non-Class 1E loads) to its respective Oass IE buses. UAT power feeders, and instrumentation and control circuits are separated from the ' RAT's power feeders, and instrumentation and control circuits Power feeders, and instrumentation and control circuits for the UMT and its switching station are separated from power feeders, and instrumentation and control circuits for the RATS and their switching station. EPDS medium voltage switchgear, low voltage switchgear and their respective transformers, MCCs, and MCC feeder and load circuit breakers are sized to supply their load requirements. EPDS medium voltage switchgear, low voltage switchgear and their respective transformers, and MCCs are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source. The GCB, medium voltage switchgear, low voltage switchgear, and MCC feeder and load circuit breakers are rated to interrupt fault currents. EPDS interrupting devices (circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupter closest to the fault is designed to open before other desices. d Instrumentation and control power for Gass 1E Divisional medium voltage switchgear . and low voltage switchgear is supplied from the Oass 1E DC Power System in the same Division. The GCB is equipped with redundant trip coils supplied from separate non-Gass IE DC power systems. EPDS cables and buses are sized to supply their load requirements. EPDS cables and buses are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source. For the EPDS, Oass 1E power is supplied by two independent Gass 1E Dhisions. Independence is maintained between Gass 1E Didsions, and between Gass 1E Divisions and non-Gass 1E equipment. Gass 1E medium voltage switchgear, low voltage switchgear, and MCCs are identified according to their Cass 1E Division / Channel. Gass 1E medium volti,ge switchgear, low voltage switchgear, and MCCs are located in Seismic Category I structures and in their respective Division areas. T 2 2.6.1 12mm 1 l SYS'IEM 80+" i l. l Cass 1E EPDS cables and raceways are identified according to their Class 1E Division. Class 1E EPDS cables are routed in Seismic Category I structures and in. their respective raceways. Cass 1E equipment is not prevented from performing its safety functions by harmonic distortion waveforms. ; i The EPDS supplies an operating voltage at the terminals of the Cass 1E equipment ; which is within the equipment's voltage tolerance limits. : i Qass 1E equipment i:. protected from degraded voltage conditions.. j I An electrical grounding system is provided for '(1) instrumentation, control, and computer systems, (2) electrical equipment (switchgear, motors, distribution panels), and (3) mechanical equipment (fuel and chemical tanks). Lightning protection ; systems are provided for buildings and for structures located outside of the buildings. j Each grounding system and lightning protection system is separately grounded to the plant ground grid. l Qass 1E equipment is classified as Seismic Category L Rere are no automatic connections between Gass 1E Divisions. ~ ! C Interface Requirements l De offsite system shall consist of a minimum of two independent offsite transmission circuits from the transmission system. He offsite transmission circuits shall be sized to supply their load requirements, ! during all design operating modes, of their respective Gass 1E divisions and non-Qass j j 1E loads. He UMT and RATS shall be connected to independent switching stations. Switching stations and their circuit breakers shall be sized to supply their load requirements and be rated to interrupt fault currents. i Voltage variations of the transmission system shall not cause voltage variations at the loads of more than plus or minus 10% of the loads' nominal voltage rating. l Re normal steady-state frequency of the offsite system shall be within plus or minus ' j 2 Hertz of 60 H.:rtz during recoverable periods of system instability. The transmission system does not subject the reactor coolant pumps to sustained frequency decays of greater than 3 Hertz per second.' O 2.6.1 ' n.n-n ll O Each switchyard shall have two redundant and independent 125V DC power systems to provide 125V DC power for all relaying, controls, and monitoring equipment in the switchyards. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.6.1-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analysis, and associated acceptance . criteria for the AC Electrical Power Distribution System. O O 2.6.1 mi-m l 1 i . _ __. . _ _ _ . - . 4 ! ~ ; E 6 e8U l Omg ^g i - 3Ov170A O O u, f 4 nnlO3W 3 R S d!" B30333 Ovv/1vn A n _ m 8, 2 n_,,_ 3 o [o* ggh o SE l 2 2 Do no Mm i i Hn u s5 l <D l 8a ^ I l / l ES!$ D I e _ l A ~d ~ Q ' o l SE 6 m 5 A 5 I DO 5 l M" l 1y d - 30v1'10A @ nnien q, f 9 , I " R " e W B30333 Ovv/1vn ] n , n m 8 s n_ 3a g o m o o I 2 Z j q HO O A I 0 j 9 I / - O d b b I l i js l Q M3033J lm n Ov07 g \ N y: I lyg 30v170A < D o l nnlC3M o, f 3 y Q. 830333 lm n (( // n R 8 *n-e S d O ) s i g $ E i Ovv/lvn ~l o m r i i H w l ss A I O l / < l _m - n ed w 1 l l O E ' l l *4 O I D, j a3a333 n V'

Ovo, n - 30V170A g N I ava g <

nniaan g g._.m S l ^ ^ ^ 37vy[v'ni $<#- h. ' R # v i eI im ,I w s,w 8 z Io1 e 2>omisome bec Oa Oa > \ SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.6.1-1 AC ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteris ' Desian Comniitinent Inspections. Tests. Annivses Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the EPDS is 1. Inspection of the as-built EPDS will be 1. 'the as-built EPDS conforms with the as described in the Design Description conducted. Basic Configuration as described in the (Section 2.6.1). Design Description (Section 2.6.1).

2. UATs are sized to supply the design 2. Analysis for the as-built UATs to deter- 2. Analysis for as-built UATs exists and operating power requirements of their mine their load requirements will be concludes that the capacity of each respective Class 1E buses and non-Class performed. UAT, as determined by its nameplate IE medium voltage non-safety and rating, exceeds the analyzed design permanent non-safety buses. operating load requirements of its respective Class IE buses and non-Class IE medium voltage non-safety and per-manent non-safety buses.

3. UMT and UATs are separated from the 3. Inspection of the as-built UMT and 3. As-built UMT and UATs are separated RATS. UATs will be conducted. from the RATS by a minimum of 50 feet.

4. UMT, UATs, and RATS are provided 4. Inspection of the as-built UMT and 4. As-built UMT, UATs, and RATS are widi their own oil pit, drain, fire deluge UATs will be conducted. protided with their own oil pit, drain, system, grcunding, and lightning pro- fira deluge system, groundings, and tection systems. lightning protection systems.

2.6.1 n-3-n b ~ O O V (d' U SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.6.1-1 (Continued) AC ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitment Tasocctions. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

5. The MG and the GCB are separated 5. Inspection for the as-built MG, the 5. As-built MG and GCB are separated from the RAT power fealers. The MG GCB, the RATS and their respective from the RATS power feeders by a min-and GCB instrumentation and control instrumentation and control circuits will imum of 50 feet, or by fire-rated walls circuits are separated from the RAT's be conducted. or fire-rated floors. Outside the MCR, instrumentation and control circuits. the MG and GCB instrumentation and control circuits are separated from the RAT's instrumentation and control circuits by a minimum of 50 feet, or by fire-rated walls or fire-rated floors.

Within the MCR, the MG and GCB instrumentation and control circuits are separated from the RAT's instru-mentation and control circuits by routirg the circuits in separate race-ways.

6. Each RAT is sized to supply the design 6. Analysis for the as-built RATS to deter- 6. Analysis for as-built RATS exists and operating power requirements of at least mine their load requirements will be concludes that the capacity of each its restm:tive Class IE buses and per- - performed. RAT, as determined by its nameplate manent non-Safety bus, and one reactor. rating, exceeds the analyzed design coolant pump and its reactor coolant operating load requirements of at least pump support loads. its respective Class 1E buses and imm ecst non-safety bus, and one reactor coolant pump and its reactor coolant pump support loads.

2.6.1. n aim t l A A pd V V SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.6.1-1 (Continued) AC ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acccotance Criteria Desian Comniitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

7. UAT power feeders, and instrumen- 7. Inspection of the as-built UATs' and 7. As-built UAT power feeders are tation and control circuits are separated RATS' power feeders, and instrumen- separated from the RATS' power feeders from the RAT's power feeders, and tation and control circuits will be by a minimum of 50 feet, or by fire-instrumentation and control circuits. conducted. rated walls or fire-rated floors, except at the switchgear, where they are routed to opposite ends of the medium voltage switchgear. As-built UAT instrumen-tation and control circuits, are separated from the RATS' instrumentation and control circuits by a minimum of 50 feet, or by fire-rated walls or fire-rated floors, except as follows: a) inside the MCR, where they are separated by rout-ing the circuits in separate raceways, and b) at the switchgear, where they are routed to opposite ends of the medium voltage switchgear.

8. Power feeders, and instrumentation and 8. Inspection for the as-built power 8. Outside the MCR, power feeders instru-control circuits for the UMT and its feeders, instrumentation and control mentation and control circuits for the switching station are separated from circuits for the UMT, RATS, and their UMT and its switching station are sep-power feeders, and instrumentation and respective switching stations will be arated from the instrumentation and con-control circuits for the RATS and their conducted. trol circuits for the RATS and their switching station. switching station by a minimum of 50 feet, or by fire-rated walls or fire-rated floors. Within the MCR, instrumen-tation and control circuits for the UMT and its switching station are separated from the instrumentation and control cir-cuits for the RATS and their switching station by routing in separate raceways.

2.6.1 2,sim O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.6.1-1 (Continued) AC ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

9. EPDS medium voltage switchgear, low 9.a) Analysis for the as-built EPDS to 9.a) Analysis for the as-built EPDS exists voltage switchgear and their respective determine load requirements will be and concludes that the capacities of the transformers, MCCs, and MCC feeder performed. Class IE medium voltage switchgear, and load circuit breakers are sized to low voltage switchgear and their supply their load requirements. respective transformers, MCCs, and MCC feeder and load circuit breakers, as determined by their nameplate ratings, exceed their analyzed load requirements.

9.b) Testing of the as-built Class 1E medium 9.b) Connected Class 1E loads operate in the voltage and low voltage switchgear and ranges of 9% to 10% above and 9% to MCCs and their respective load circuit 10% below design voltage, breakers will be performed by operating connected Class IE loads in the ranges of 9% to 10% above and 9% to 10% below design voltage. 10.a) EPDS medium voltage switchgear, low 10.a) Analysis for the as-built EPDS to '10.a) Analysis for the as-built EPDS exists voltage switchgear and their respective determine fault. currents will be and concludes that the current capacities transformers, and MCCs are rated to performed. of the Class 1E medium voltage switch-withstand fault currents for the time gear, low voltage switchgear and their required to clear the fault from its respective transformers, and MCCs ex-power source. ceed their analyzed fault currents for the time required, as determined by the cir-cuit interrupting device coordination analyses, to clear the fault from its power source. 2.6.1 n-n n f\ O (J3 G SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.6.1-1 (Continued) AC ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desist Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 10.b) The GCB, medium voltage switchgear, 10.b) Analysis for the as-built EPDS to 10.b) Analysis for the as-built EPDS exists low voltage switchgear, and MCC determine fault currents will be and concludes that the analyzed fault feeder and load circuit breakers are performed. currents do not exceed the GCB and rated to interrupt fault currents. Class IE medium voltage switchgear, low voltage switchgear, and MCC feeder and load circuit breakers internipt capacities, as determined by their nameplate ratings. I 1. EPDS interrupting devices (circuit i1. Analysis for the as-built EPDS to deter- 11. Analysis for the as-built EPDS exists breakers and fuses) are coordinated so mine circuit interrupting device co- and concludes that the analyzed Class that the circuit interrupter closest to the ordination will be performed. IE circuit interrupter closest to the fault is designed to open before other analyzed fault will open before other devices. devices.

12. Instrumentation and control power for 12. Testing of the as-built Class IE medium 12. A test signal exists in only the circuit

' Class IE Divisional medium voltage and low voltage switchgear will be con- under test. switchgear and low voltage switchgear ducted by providing a test signal in only is supplied from the Class IE DC power one Class IE Division at a time. system in the same Division.

13. The GCB is equipped with redundant 13. Testing of the as-built GCB will be con- 13. A test signal exists in only the circuit trip devices which are supplied from ducted by providing a test signalin only under test.

separate non-Class IE DC power .one trip circuit at a time. systems.

14. EPDS cables and buses are sized to 14. Analysis for the as-built EPDS cables 14. Analysis for the as-built EPDS exists supply their load requirements. and buses will be performed. and concludes that Class 1E cables and bus capacities, as determined by cable and bus ratings, exceed their analyzed load requirements.

2.6.1 n-u m /l V O V p V SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.6.1-1 (Continuedl AC ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitinent Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

15. EPDS cables and buses are rated to 15. Analysis for the as-built EPDS to 15. Analysis for the as-built EPDS exists withstand fault currents for the time determine fault currents will be and concludes that Class IE cables and required to clear the fault from its performed. buses will widistand the analyzed fault power source. currents for the time required, as deter-mined by the circuit interrupting device coordination analyses, to clear the analyzed faults from their power sources.

16. For the EPDS, Class IE power is 16.a) Testing on the as-built EPDS will be 16.a) A test signal exists in only the Cass IE supplied by two independent Class IE performed by providing a test signal in Division / Channel under test in the Divisions. Independence is maintained only one Class IE Division / Channel at EPDS.

between Class IE Divisions / Channel, a time. and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment. 16.b) Inspection of the as-built EPDS Class 16.b) In the EPDS, physical separation or IE Divisions / Channels will be con- electrical isolation exists between Class ducted. IE Divisions. Physical separation or electrical isolation exists betwwn Class IE Channels. Physical separation or electrical isolation exists between these Class IE Divisions / Channels and non-Class IE equipment. Raceways containing Cass IE cables do not contain non-Class IE cables.

17. Class IE medium voltage switchgear, 17. Inspection of the as-built EPDS Class 17. As-built Cass IE medium voltage low voltage switchgear, and MCCs are IE medium voltage switchgear, low vol- ' switchgear, low voltage switchgear, and identified according to their Class IE tage switchgear, and MCCs will be con- MCCs are identified according to their Division. ducted. Cass IE Division.

2.6.1 iz-ai-,3 c o o SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.6.1-1 (Continued) AC ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

18. Class IE medium voltage switchgear, 18. Inspections of the as-built Class IE 18. As-built Class IE medium voltage low voltage switchgear, and MCCs are medium voltage switchgear, low voltage switchgear, low voltage switchgear, and located in Seismic Category I structures switchgear, and MCCs will be MCCs are located in Seismic Category and in their respective Divisional areas. conducted. I structures and in their respective Divisional areas.

19. Class IE EPDS cables and raceways are 19. Inspection of the as-built Class IE 19. As-built EPDS cables and raceways are identified according to their Class IE EPDS Divisional cables and raceways identified according to their Class IE Division. will be conducted. Division.

20. Class IE Division / Channel cables are 20. Inspection of the as-built EPDS Divi- 20. As-built Class IE Division / Channel muted in Seismic Category I structures sion/ Channel cables and raceways will cables are routed in Seismic Category I and in their respective raceways. be conducted. structures and in their respective Divi-sion/ Channel raceways.

21. Class IE equipment is not prevented 21. Analysis for the as-built EPDS to deter- 21. Analysis for the as-built EPDS exists from performing its safety functions by. mine harmonic distortions will be per- and concludes that harmonic distortion harmonic distortion waveforms. formed. waveforms do not exceed 5 percent voltage distortion on the Class IE EPDS.

22. The EPDS supplies an operating voltage 22. Analysis for the as-built EPDS to deter- 22. Analysis for the as-built EPDS exists at the terminals of the Class IB mine voltage drops will be performed. and concludes that the analyzed equipment which is within the operating voltage supplied at the equipment's voltage tolerance limits, terminals of the Class IE equipment is within the equipment's voltsge tolerance limits, as determined by their nameplate ratings.

2.6.1 um n n n u U U SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.6.1-1 (Continued) AC ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desism Commitment Insocctions. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

23. Class IE equipment is protected from 23.a) Analysis for the as-built EPDS to 23.a) Analysis for the as-built EPDS exists degraded voltage conditions, determine the trip conditions for de- and concludes that the Class IE pre-graded voltage conditions will be per- ferred offsite power feeder breakers to formed. the Class 1E medium voltage switchgear will trip before Class IE loads exper-ience degraded voltage conditions ex-ceeding those voltage conditions for which the , Class IE equipment is qualified.

23.b) Testing for each as-built Class IE 23.b) As-built Class IE feeder breakers from medium voltage switchgear will be preferred offsite power to the Class IE conducted by providing a simulated medium voltage switchgear trip when a degraded voltage signal. degraded voltage conditions exists.

24. An electrical grounding system is pro- 24. Inspection of the plant grounding and 24. The as-built EPDS instrumentation, con-vided for (1) instrumentation, control, lightning protection systems will be trol, and computer grounding systesn, and computer systems, (2) electrical performed. electrical equipment and mechanical equipment (switchgear, motors, distri- equipment grounding system, and light-bution panels, and motors), and (3) ning protection systems provided for mechanical equipment (fuel and chem- buildings and for structures and trans-ical tanks). Lightning protection sys- formers located outside of the buildings, tems are provided for major plant struc- are separately grounded to the plant tures, transformers and equipment ground grid.

located outside buildings. Each ground-ing system and lightning protection sys-tem is separately grounded to the plant ground grid.

25. There are no automatic connections 25. Inspections of the as-built Class IE 25. There are no automatic connections between Class IE Divisions. Divisions will be conducted. between Class IE Divisions.

2.6.1 nam SYSTEM 80+= %) 2.6.2 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SYSTEM DESIGN DESCRIPTION The Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) System is a safety-related system which has two diesel generators and their respective fuel oil, lube oil, engine cooling, starting air, and air intake and exhaust support systems. One EDG is connectable to the two Cass 1E buses of an Electrical Power Distribution System (EPDS) Cass 1E Division and the other EDG is connectable to the two Cass 1E buses of the other EPDS Gass 1E Division. Each EDG and its support systems are physically separated from the other EDG and its support systems, and are located in physically separate areas of the Nuclear Island Structures. Portions of the EDG support systems which perform the safety function of starting and operating the EDG are classified ASME Code Qass 3. He EDG generators are classified Qass 1E. Cass 1E equipment is classified Seismic Category I. The EDG engine and ASME Code Cass 3 portions of its respective support systems are classified Seismic Category I. He diesel fuel storage tanks for each of the two EDGs are located in physically . separate diesel fuel storage structures. The underground fuel oil piping from each diesel fuel storage structure to its respective EDG day tank is classified Seismic O Category I. Divisional separation is established by pipe routing and use of the Divisional wall. He EDGs are sized to supply their load demands following a design basis' accident which requires use of emergency power. Each EDG has fuel storage capacity to provide fuel to its EDG for a period of no less than 7 days with the EDG supplying the power requirements for the most limiting design basis accident. He starting air system receiver tanks of each EDG have a combined air capacity for 5 starts of the EDG without replenishing air to the receiver tanks. He EDG combustion air intakes are separated from the EDG exhaust ducts. Electrical independence is provided between Cass 1E Divisions and between the Cass 1E Divisions and non-Cass 1E equ'pment. A loss of power to a Cass 1E bus initiates an automatic start of the respective EDG and automatic connection to the Cass 1E buses in the affected Division. Following . attainment of rated voltage and frequency, the EDG automatically connects to its respective Divisional buses. After the EDG connects to its respective buses, the non-accident loads are automatically sequenced onto the buses. O 2.6.2 u n-n i : 9 .1 i '! 1 i } SYS'mM 80+= 3 4 Each EDG receives an automatic start signal.in response' to a safety' injection , actuation signal (SIAS), a containment spray actuation signal (CSAS), or an i ! emergency feedwater actuation signal (EFAS). An EDG does not automatically ~ j connect to its Divisional Class IE buses, if the Divisional Class 1E buses are- l } energized. - j l I I For a loss-of-power to a Class 1E medium voltage safety bus condition concurrent - l with a Design Basis Accident condition (SIAS/CSAS/EFAS), each EDG automatically :; l i starts. Following attainment of rated voltage and frequency, the EDG automatically _ , connects to its respective buses, and loads are sequenced onto the buses. i f When operating in a test mode, an EDG is capable of responding to an automatic' f start signal. Displays of EDG voltage, amperage, frequency, watts, and vars instrumentation exist . i in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. . Controls exist in the MCR to manually start and stop each EDG. Controls exist at ~ d each EDG local control panel to manually start and stop its respective EDG. l f . Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria ' { i Table 2.6.2-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance -! criteria for the Emergency Diesel Generator System. ! I l -l

l l

2.6.2 -2 n2 si.e i ) .. . .. . - - - -. ,, .I O (} (v3- V v SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.6.2-1 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SYSTEM InsDections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Deslan Commitment Inspections. Tests. Anakses Acceptance Criteria

1. He Basic Configuration of the EDO 1. Inspection of the as-built EDG System 1. He as-built EDG System conforms with System is as described in the Design will be conducted. the Basic Configuration as described in Description (Section 2.6.2). the Design Description (Section 2.6.2).

2. Each EDG and its support systems are 2. Inspection of the as-built EDGs and 2. The two EDGs and their reqative physically separated from the other EDO support systems will be support systems are located on opposite EDG and its support systems, and are performed. sides of the nuclear island structures and located in physically separate areas of are separated by the Divisional wall.

the nuclear island structures.

3. The diesel fuel storage tanks for each of 3. Inspection of the as-built diesel fuel 3. He diesel fuel storage tanks for one the two EDGs are located in physically storage tank structures will be EDG are located in a different structure separate diesel fuel storage structures. performed. from the diesel fuel storage tanks for the other EDG.

4. The fuel oil piping from each diesel fuel 4. Inspection of the as-built piping from 4. The as-built fuel oil piping from each storage structure to its respective EDO each diesel fuel storage structure to its diesel fuel storage structure to its day tank is classified Seismic Category respective EDG day tank will be respective EDO day tank is classified I. Divisional separation is established performed. Seismic Category I. Divisional separ-by pipe routing and use of the ation is established by pipe routing and Divisional wall. use of the Divisional wall.

5. The EDGs are sized to supply their load 5. Analysis to determine EDG load 5. Analysis for the as-built EDGs exists demands following a design ' basis . demand, based on the as-built EDO load and concludes that the EDGs' capacities accident which requires use of profile, will be performed. exceed, as determined by their name-emergency power. plate ratings, their load demand fol-lowing a design basis accident which requires the use of emergency power.

2.6.2 i2,n-n - Ov O v O) v SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.6.2-1 (Continued) EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desis Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

6. Each EDG has fuel storage capacity to 6. Inspection and analysis will be 6. An analysis exists and concludes that provide fuel to its EDG for a period of perfonned to determine fuel storage each EDG has fuel storage capacity to no less than 7 days with the EDO capacities and EDG fuel consumption. operate the EDG for 7 days with the supplying the power requirements for EDG supplying power during the most the most limiting design basis accident. limiting design basis accident.

7. The starting air system receiver tanks of 7. Testing will be performed with the 7. Each EDG can be started 5 times each EDG have a combined air capacity EDGs and their air start systems. without replenishing air to the receiver for 5 starts of the EDG without tanks.

replenishing air to the receiver tanks.

8. The EDG combustion air intakes are 8. Inspection of the as-built EDG air 8. Each EDG's air intake and air exhaust is separated from the EDG exhaust ducts. intakes and air exhaust will be separated by distance and orientation.

performed. 'Ihe air intakes and exhausts of the two EDGs are separated by the location of the EDGs on opposite sides of the nuclear island structures.

9. Electrical independence is provided 9.a) Testing will be performed on each EDG 9.a) A test signal exists only in the EDG and between Class 1E Divisions and between and support systems by providing a test support systems Division under test.

the Class IE Divisions and non-Class signalin only one Class 1E Division at IE equipment. a time. 9.b) Inspection of the as-installed Class IE 9.b) Physical separation exists between Class Divisions of the EDO System will be IE Divisions of the EDG system. performed. Separation exists - between Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the EDG system. 2.6.2 tui.n o o O d d SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.6.2-1 (Continued) EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERA 1DR SYSTEM InsDections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desist Cornmitenent Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

10. A lossef-power to a Class IE medium 10. Testing for the actuation and connection 10. As-built EDGs automatically start on voltage safety bus automatically starts its of each EDG will be performed using a receiving a loss-of-power signal, attain respective EDG. Following attainment signal that simulates a loss-of-power. rated voltage (i 10%), and rated of rated voltage and frequency, the EDG frequency (i 2%) in s; 20 seconds, automatically connects to its respective automatically connect to their respective Divisional buses. After the EDG Divisional buses, and their non-accident connects to its respective buses, the non- loads are sequenced onto the buses.

accident loads are automatically sequenced onto the buses. I1. Each EDO receives an automatic start 11. Testing for the actuation of each EDG 11. Each EDG receives a start signal in signal in response to a safety injection will, be performed using signals that response to each of the following actuation signal (SIAS), a containment simulate a SIAS, a CSAS, and a EFAS. simulated signals; a SIAS, a CSAS, and spray actuation signal (CSAS), or an a EFAS, but does not automatically emergency feedwater actuation signal connect to its Divisional buses, if the (EFAS). An EDG does net Divisional buses are energized. automatically connect to its Divisional buses, if the Divisional Class IE buses are energized. 2.6.2 24 -n (l O pV v V SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.6.2-1 (Continued) EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteri. Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

12. For a loss-of-power to a Class IE 12. Testing on the as-built EDG Systems 12. In the as-built EDG Systems, when medium voltage safety bus condition will be performed by providing SIAS/CSAS/EFAS and loss-of-power concurrent with a Design Basis Accident simulated SIASICSAS/EFAS and loss- signals exist, the EDG automatically condition (SIAS/CSAS/EFAS), each of-power signals. starts, attains rated voltage and EDO automatically starts. Following frequency and is connected to its attainment of: rated voltage and Divisional buses within 20 seconds, frequency, the EDG automatically Following connection, the automatic connects to its respective buses and load sequence begins. Upon application loads are sequenced onto the buses. of each load, the voltage on these buses does not drop more than 20% measured at the buses. Frequency is restored to within 2% of nominal, and voltage is restored to within 10% of nominal within 60% of each load sequence time interval. The SI, CS, and EFW loads are sequenced onto the buses in d 40 seconds total time from initiating SIAS/CSAS/EFAS.

13. When operating in a test mode, an EDG 13. Testing will be performed with each 13. When operating in a test mode, each D capable of responding to an automatic EDO in a test mode configuration. An EDO resets to its automatic control s6st signal, automstic start signal will be simulated. mode upon receipt of a simulated automatic start signal.

2.6.2 um-m - - O ' O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.6.2-1 (Continued) EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 14.a) Displays of EDG voltage, amperage, 14.a) Inspection for the existence or re- 14.a) Displays of the EDG instrumentation in-frequency, watts, and vars instru- trievability in the MCR of instru- dicating voltage, amperage, frequency, mentation exist in the MCR or can be mentation displays will be performed. watts and vars exist in the MCR or can retrieved there. be retrieved there. 14 b) Controls exist in the MCR to manually 14.b) Testing will be performed using the 14.b) EDG controls exist in the MCR start and stop each EDO. Controls exist EDG controls in the MCR and EDG manually start and stop each EDO. at each EDO local control panel to local control panels. Controls exist at each EDO local control manually start and stop its respective panel to manually start and stop its EDG. respective EDO. 2.6.2 n. aim I i SYS'IEM 80+" 2.6.3 AC INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM AND DC POWER SYSTEM DESIGN DESCRIPTION The AC Instrumentation and Control (I&C) Power System and DC Power System consist of Qass 1E and non-Cass 1E power systems. He non-Gass 1E AC I&C Power System and DC Power System have non-Gass 1E batteries, inverters, electrical distribution panels, and battery chargers. The non-Class 1E AC I&C Power System and DC Power System provide power to non-Gass 1E equipment. The Class IE AC Instrumentation and Control (I&C) Power System (also referred to as the Vital AC I&C Power System) and the Class 1E DC Power System (also referred to as the Vital DC Power System) consist of Oass 1E uninterruptible power supplies, their respective alternating current (AC) and direct current (DC) distribution centers, along with power, instrumentation and control cables to the distribution system loads. The Oass IE AC I&C Power System and the Cass 1E DC Power System include the protection equipment provided to protect the AC and DC distribution equipment. 'Ibe Basic Configuration of the Qass 1E AC Instrumentation and Control Power System and Oass 1E DC Power System is as shown on Figures 2.63-1 and 2.63-2. Class 1E AC Instrumentation and Control Power Svstem The Gass 1E AC I&C Power System consists of two Division (Division I and II) and four Channel (A, B, C, D) uninterruptible power supplies, with their respective distribution panels. Each Gass IE AC I&C power supply is a constant voltage constant frequency inverter power supply unit, which in normal operating mode receives Qass 1E direct current (DC) power from its respective Class 1E DC distribution center. Each Gass 1E inverter power supply unit also has capability to transfer from its respective Cass 1E DC distribution center to an alternate source of alternating current (AC) power to directly supply the Gass 1E AC I&C Power System loads. This alternate power source is a voltage regulating device which is supplied power from the same AC power source as the battery charger associated with the Class 1E DC distnbution center servicing the inverter power supply unit. Each Cass 1E inverter power supply unit is synchronized, in both frequency and phase, with its alternate power supply and maintains continuity of power during transfer from the inverter to the alternate power supply. Each Gass 1E inverter power supply unit is sized to provide power to its respective distribution center loads. 2.6.3 12.si m '^ . l l m SYSTEM 80+" l Gass 1E inverter power supply units and their respective distribution centers are I identified according to their Class 1E Dhision/ Channel and are located in Seismic Category I structures and in their respective Division / Channel areas. Independence is provided between Cass 1E Divisions. Independence is provided between Gass 1E Channels. Independence is provided between Class 1E ; Divisions / Channels and non-Cass 1E equipment. j Class 1E AC I&C Power System distribution panels and their circuit breakers, j disconnect switches and fuses are sized to supply their load requirements. Distribution panels and disconnect switches are rated to withstand fault currents for I the time required to clear the fault from its power source. Circuit breakers and fuses are rated to interrupt fault currents. Cass 1E AC I&C Power System interrupting devices (circuit breakers and fuses) are ! I coordinated so that the circuit interrupter closest to the fault opens before other devices. Cass 1E AC I&C Power System cables are sized to supply their load requirements and are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source. /Q The Qass 1E AC I&C Power System supplies an operating voltage at the terminals () of the Cass 1E equipment which is within the equipment's voltage tolerance limits. Cass 1E AC I&C Power System cables and raceways are identified according to their ! Cass IE Division / Channel. Cass 1E cables are routed in Seismic Category I structures and in their respective Division or Channel raceways. Class 1E equipment is classified as Seismic Category L Class 1E DC Power System The Cass 1E DC Power System consists of two Divisional (Dhision I and II) and four Channel (A, B, C, D) batteries (2 Channel batteries per Division) with their respective DC electrical distribution panels and battery chargers. The Gass 1E DC distribution system provides DC power to Cass 1E DC equipment and instrumentation and control circuits. Each Qass 1E battery is sized to supply its Design Basis Accident (DBA) loads, at the end-of-installed-life, for a minimum of 2 hours without recharging. Each Qass 1E battery charger is sized to supply its respective Class 1E Division / Channel steady-state loads while charging its respective Cass 1E battery. ' 2.63 2 aim I i e SYSTEM t'O+" ! ( Manual interlocked transfer capability exists within a Division between Qass 1E DC distribution centers. i The Gass IE batteries, battery chargers and respective MCCs, DC distribution panels, disconn ci switches, circuit breakers, and fuses are sized to supply their load ; requirements. 'Ibe Oass 1E batteries, battery chargers and respective MCCs, DC l distribution panels, and disconnect switches are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source. Cass 1E DC Power System circuit breakers and fuses are rated to interrupt fault currents. Gass 1E DC Power System electrical distribution system circuit interrupting desices j (circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupter closest to ; the fault is designed to open before other devices. Cass IE DC Power System electrical distrPr* ion system cables are sized to supply j their load requirements and are rated to v n .. ' fault currents for the time required j to clear the fault from its power source. ! l The Qass 1E DC Power System electrical distribution system supplies an operating l I voltage at the termin31s of the Gass 1E equipment which is within the equipment's A voltage tolerance limits. l l Each Cass IE battery is located in a Seismic Category I strrsure and in its respective Division / Channel battery room. j i Cass 1E DC Power System distribution panels and MCCs are identified according to their Gass 1E Division / Channel. Cass 1E cables are routed in Seismic Category I - i structures and in their respective Division / Channel raceways. Independence is provided between Gass 1E Divisions. Independence is provided t.etween Gass IE Channels. Independence is provided between Qass IE ; Divisions / Channels and non-Qass 1E equipment. 1 The Gass 1E DC Power System has the following alarms and displays in the main i control room (MCR):

1) Alarms for battery ground detection.

2) Parameter displays for battery voltage and amperes.

i

3) Status indication for battery circuit breaker / disconnect position.

h' v 2.6.3 uma t ? - FYSTEM 80+" Class 1E equipment is classified as Seismic Category I. Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Cdteria i i Table 2.63-1 specifies the inspections,- tests, analyses and associated acceptance ' criteria for the AC Instrumentation and Control Power System and DC Power System. l I i i i 2.6.3 .4. ,y,, i r l l O O O CLASS 1E LOW VOLTAGE CLASS 1E LOW VOLTAGE CLASS 1E LOW VOLTAGE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM DISTRIOUTION SYSTEM DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 0 * ^

DIVISION I CHANNEL C CHAN.TAL A CLASS 1E CLAS3 IE CLASS 1E BATTERY BATTERY BATTERY CHANNEL -

OlANNEL DivlSION l BATTERY BATTERY BATTERY CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER u u v CLASS 1E OC POWER SYSTEM CLASS 1E DC POWER SYSTEM CLASS 1E DC POWER SYSTEM CHANNEL C / CHANNEL A / DIVISION 1 / DISTRIBUTION CENTER DISTRIBUTION CENTER DISTRIBUTION CENTER \ \ \ CLASS 1E LOW VOLTAGE CLASS 1E LOW VOLTAGE CLASS 1E LOW VOLTAGE OtSTRIBUTION SYSTEM DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM BUS C MCC BUS A MCC* BUS A MCC. k CHANNEL CHANNEL Y DIVISION i u C W A W -VOLTAGE & VOLTAGE & VOLTAGE & REGULATOR REGULATOR REGULATOR - CHANNEL C CHANNEL A DIVISION 1 INWRTER INVERTER INVERTER POWER POWER -POWER SUPPLY UNIT SUPPLY UNIT SUPPLY UNIT CLASS 1E AC I&C *0WER SYSTEM CLASS 1E AC I&C POWER SYSTEM CLASS 1E AC latC POWER SYSTEM CHANNEL C CHANNEL A DIVISION I . DISTRl90 TION CENTER. DISTRIBUTION CENTER DIFTRIBUT10N CENTER FIGURE 2.6.3-1

BUS A WCC SERVICING CHANNEL A IS DIFTERENT CLASS 1E AC INSTRUMENTATION FROM THE BUS A MCC AND CONTROL POWER -SYSTEM AND SERVICING DIVISION I . 12-31-93 CLASS 1E DC POWER SYSTEM ,

- ~ - - _ . - - . . . . - . . . .-. - - - . . . - - -. . ..-- -. . - . O O O CLASS 1E LOW YOLTAGE CLASS 1E LOW VOLTAGE CLASS 1E LOW VOLTAGE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM DISTRIOUTION SYSTEM DISTRIDUTION SYSTEM DUS D MCC D EC+ CHANNEL D DIVISION 11 CHANNEL D CLASS 1E CLASS 1E JLASS 1E BATTERY DATTERY BATTERY CHANNEL CHANNEL DIVISION ll DATTERY BATTERY DATTERY CHARGER CHARGER CHARGER 't \ \ CLASS 1E DC POWER SYSTEM CLASS 1E DC POWER SYSTEM CLASS 1E DC POWER SYSTEM CHANNEL D / CHANNEL 0 / DIVISION 11 / DlSTRl0UTlON CENTER DiSTRIBUTlON CENTER DiSTRIBUT10N CENTER \ N N CLASS 1E LOW VOLTAGE CLASS 1E LOW VOLTAGE CLASS 1E LOW VOLTAGE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM BUS D MCC BUS B MCC* BUS B MCC* CHANNEL CHANNEL DIMSION 11 W D W D W VOLTAGE & VOLTAGE & VOLTAOE & REGULATOR REGJLATOR REGULATOR CHANNEL D CHANNEL 0' DIVISION I! INVERTER INVERTER INVERTER POWER POWER POWER SUPPLY UNIT SUPPLY UNIT SUPPLY UNIT ) ) -) - CLASS 1E AC I&C POWER SYSTEM - CLASS 1E AC l&C POWER SYSTEM CLASS 1E AC l&C POWER SYSTEM CHANNEL D CHANNEL B DIVISION !! DISTRIBUTION CENTER DISTRIBUTION CENTER DISTRIBUTION CENTER FIGURE 2.6.3-2~

BUS B MCC SERVICING

. CHANNEL B IS DIFFERENT CLASS 1E AC INSTRUMENTATION FROM THE BUS B MCC AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM AND SERVICING DIVISION li 12-31-93 CLASS IE DC POWER SYSTEM =- __--,- . - . . - . - , - . . - - . . . - . . - . . - .. . . . - . . _ - - . -...-..~ .. - . - . b d O v Ov SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.63-1 AC INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM AND DC POWER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Accentance Criteria Desian Connmitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the AC 1. Inspection of the as-built AC 1. The as-built AC Instrumentation and Instrumentation and Control Power Instrumentation and Control Power Control Power System and the as-built System and the DC Power System is as System and the DC Power System DC Power System conforms with the described in the Design Description configuration will be conducted. Basic Configuration as described in the (Section 2.6.3). Design Description (Section 2.6.3).

2. Each Class IE inverter power supply 2. Inspection of the as-built Class IE 2. Each Class IE inverter power supply unit in normal operating mode receives inverter per supply unit will be unit in normal operating mode receives Class IE direct current (DC) power conducted. Class IE direct current (DC) power from its respective DC distribution from its respective DC distribution center. Each Class IE inverter power center. Each Class IE inverter power supply unit also has capability to supply unit also has capability to transfer from its respective Class lE DC transfer from its respective Class IE DC distribution center normal power source distribution center normal power source to an attemate source of attemating to an alternate source of allemating current (AC) power to directly supply current (AC) power to directly supply the Class IE AC I&C Power System the Class IE AC I&C Power System loads. loads.

3. Automatic transfer between the normal 3. Testing en each as-built Class IE 3. Each Class lE inverter power supply and attemate power supplies for each inverter power supply unit will be unit . automatically and manually Class IE inverter power supply unit is conducted by providing a test signal in transfers between its normal and provided and maintains continuity of one power source at a time. A test of alternate power sources and maintains power during tran;fer from the inverter the manual transfer will also be continuity of power during transfer from power supply unit to the alternate power conducted. the inverter to the alternate supply, supply. Manual transfer between the

. normal and attemate power supplies for each Class IE inverter power supply unit is also provided. 2.6.3 inim O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.63-1 (Cor,tinued) AC INSTRUMENTATION AF CONTROL t POWER SYSTEM AND DC POvVER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitnient Inspections. Tests. Analyses Accentance Criteria

4. Each Class IE inverter power supply 4. Analyses for each as-built Class IE 4. Analyses for each as-built Class IE unit is sized to provide output power to inverter power supply unit to determine inverter power supply unit exist and its respective distribution panel loads, the power requirements ofits loads will conclude that each inverter power be performed. supply unit's capacity, as determined by its nameplate rating, exceeds its analyzed load requirements.

5. Class IE inverter power supply units 5. Inspection of the as-built Class IE 5. The as-built Class IE inverter power and their respective distribution panels inverter power supply units and their supply units and their respective are identified according to their Class respective distribution panels will be distribution panels are identified IE Division / Channel and are located in conducted. according to their Class IE Seismic Category I structures and in Division / Channel and are located in their respective Division / Channel areas. Seismic Category I structures and in their Division / Channel areas.

6. In the Class IE AC I&C Power System, 6.a) Testing on the Class IE AC I&C Power 6.a) A test signal exists only in the Class IE independence is provided between Class . System will be conducted by providing Division / Channel under test in the Class IE Divisions. Independence is provided a test signal in only one Class IE lE AC l&C Power System.

between Class IE Charinels. Indepen . Division / Channel at a time. dence is provided between Class 'IE Divisions / Channels and non-Class IE 6.b) Inspection of the as-built Class IE 6.b) In the Class tE AC l&C Power System, equipment. Divisions / Channels in the Class 1E AC . physical separation or electrical isolation Power System will be conducted. exists between the Class IE Divi-sions/ Channels. Physical separation or electrical isolation exists between these Class IB Divisions / Channels and non-Class IE . equipment. Raceways containing Class IE cables do not contain ncn-Class IE cables. 2.6.3 naim O O O l SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.63-1 (Continued) _AC INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM AND DC POWER SYSTEM Insocctions. Tests. Analyses. and Acccotance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Accepta;: ce Criteria

7. Class IB AC I&C Power System 7. Analysis for the as-built Class IE AC 7. Analysis for the as-built Class IE AC distribution panels, disconnect switches. I&C Power System distribution panels, I&C Power System distribution panels, circuit breakers, and fuses are sized to disconnect switches, circuit breakers, disconnect switches, circuit breakers, supply their load requirements. and fuses to determine their load and fuses exists and concludes that the requirements will be performed. capacities of the distribution panels, disconnect switches, circuit breakers,

, and fuses exceed, as determmed by their nameplate ratings, their analyzed load requirements.

8. Class IE AC I&C Power System 8. Analysis for the as-built Class IE AC 8. Analysis for the as-built Class IE AC distribution panels and disconnect I&C Power System to determine fault I&C Power System exists and concludes switches are rated to withstand fault currents will be performed. that the current capacities of the current- for the time required to clear distribution panels and disconnect the fault from its power source. switches exceed their analyzed fault currents for the time required, as determmed by the circuit interrupting device coordination analyses, to clear the fault from its po ver source.

9. Class IE AC I&C Power System circuit 9. Analysis for the as-built Class IE AC 9. Analysis for the as-built Class IE AC breakers and fuses are rated to interrupt I&C Power System to determine fault I&C Power Systeu exists and concludes fault currents. currents will be performed. that the analyzed fault currents do not exceed the distribution system circuit breakers and fuses interrupt capabilities, as determined by their nameplate ratings.

2.6.3 23 m (O v s / s SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.63-1 (Continued) AC INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM AND DC POWER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

10. Class IE AC I&C Power System 10. Analysis for the as-built Class IE AC 10. Analysis for the as-built Class IE AC interrupting devices are coordinated so I&C Power System to determine circuit I&C Power System circuit interrupting that the circuit interrupter closest to the interrupting device coordination will be device coordination exists and concludes fault is designed to open before other performed. that the analyzed circuit interrupter devices. closest to the fault will open before other devices.

11. Class IE AC I&C Power System cables 11. Analysis for the as-built Class IE AC 11. Analysis for the as-built Class IE AC are sized to supply their load I&C Power System cables to determine I&C Power System exists and concludes requirements. their load requirements will be that the capacities of the distribution performed. system cables exceed, as determined by their cable ratings, their analyzed load requirements.

12. Class IE AC I&C Power System cables 12. Analysis for the as-built Class IE AC 12. Analysis for the as-built Class IE AC are rated to withstand currents for the I&C Power System to determine fault I&C Power System cables exists and time required to clear the fault from its currents will be performed. concludes that the distribution system power source. cable current capacities exceed their analyzed fault currents for the time required, as determined by the circuit interrupting device coordination analysis, to clear the fault from its power source.

2.6.3 n.si-,s O a n v (~) m SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.63-1 (Continued) AC INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM AND DC POWER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

13. The Class IE AC I&C Power System 13. Analysis for the as-built Class IE AC 13. Analysis for the as-built Class IE AC supplies an operating voltage at the i&C Power System to determine voltage 1&C Power System voltage drops exists terminals of the Class IE utilization drops veill be performed. and concludes that the analyzed equipment which is within the utilization operating voltage supplied at the equipment's voltage tolerance limits. terminals of the Class IE equipment is within the equipment's voltage tolerance limits, as determined by their nameplate ratings.

14. Class IE AC 1&C Power System cables 14. Inspection of the as-built Class IE AC 14. As-built Class IE AC Power System and raceways are identified according to Power System cables and raceways will cables and raceways are identified ac-their Class lE Division / Channel. Class be conducted. cording to their Class - IE ' Divi-IE cables are routed in Seismic sion/ Channel. Class IB Division-Category I structures and in their al/ Channel cables are routed in Seismic respective Division or Channel Category I structures and in their raceways. respective Division /Channet raceways.

15. Each Class IE battery is provided with 15. Inspections of the as-built Class IE DC 15. Each Class IE battery is provided with a normal battery charger supplied Power System will be conducted. a normal battery charger supplied alternating current (AC) from a MCC in alternating current (AC) from a MCC in the same Class IE Division as the the same Class IE Division as the battery. battery.

2.6.3 u-me O O O SYS'IEM 80+" TABLE 2.6.3-1 (Continued) AC INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM AND DC POWER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

16. Each Class IE battery is sized to supply 16.a) Analysis for the as-built Class IE 16.a) Analysis for the as-built Class IE its Design Basis Accident (DBA) loads, batteries to determine battery capacities batteries exists and concludes that each at the endef-installed-life, for a will be performed based on the DBA Class IE battery has the capacity, as minimum of 2 hours without recharging. duty cycle for each battery. determined by the as-built battery rating, to supply its analyzed DBA loads, at the end-of-installed-life, for a minimum of 2 hours without recharging.

16.b) Testing of ench as-built Class IE battery 16.b) The capacity of each as-built Class IE will be conducted by simulating loads battery equals or exceeds the analyzed which envelope the analyzed battery battery design duty cycle capacity. DBA duty cycle.

17. Each Class IE battery charger is sired 17. Testing of each Cass IE battery charger 17. Each Class IE battery charger can sup-to supply its respective Class IE will be conducted by supplying its ply its respective . Class IE Divi-Division's steady-state loads - while respective Class IE Division's normal sion's/ Channel's normal steady-state charging its respective Class IE battery. steady-state loads while charging its - loads while charging its respective Class respctive Class IE battery. IE battery.

18. Manual interlocked transfer capability 18. Testing of the as-built Class IE DC 18. The as-built Class IE interlocks prevent exists within a Division between Class distributioncenters willbe performed by . paralleling of the Class. 1E DC IE DC distribution centers. attempting to close interlocked breakers. distribution centers within a Division.

2.6.3 mim . - . ~ . V'O O V Q U SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.63-1 (Continued) AC INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM AND DC POWER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

19. The Class IE DC Power System MCCs, 19.a) Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC 19.a) Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC DC distribution panels, disconnect Power System electrical distribution Power System exists and concludes that switches, circuit breakers, and fuses are system to determine the capacities of the the capacities of MCCs, DC distri-sized to supply their load requirements. battery, battery charger, MCCs, DC bution panels, disconnect switches, distribution panels, disconnect switches, circuit breakers, and fuses, as deter-circuit breakers, and fuses will be mined by their nameplate ratings, ex-performed. ceed their analyzed load requirements.

19.b) Testing of the as-built Class IE battery, 19.b) Connected as-built Class IE loads battery charger, DC distribution panels, operate at less than or equal to the MCCs, and system circuit breakers, minimum allowable battery voltage and disconnect switches, and fuses will be at greater than or equal to the maximum conducted by operating connected Class charging voltage. IE loads at less than or equal to minimum allowable voltage and at greater than or equal to the maximum battery charging voltage. 20.a) The Class IE batteries, battery chargers. 20.a)_ Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC 20.a) Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC DC distribution panels, MCCs, and Power System to determine fault Power System exists and concludes that disconnect switches are rated to currents will be performed. the capacities of the as-built Class IE withstand fault currents for the time batteries, battery chargers, DC dis-required to clear the fault from its tribution panels, MCCs, and disconnect power source. switches current capacities exceed their analyzed fault currents for the time required, as determined by the circuit interrupting device coordination analyses, to clear the fault from its power source. 2.6.3 u-3im O O O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.63-1 (Continued) AC INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM AND DC POWER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Awalyses Acceptance Criteria 20.b) Class IE DC Power System circuit 20.b) Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC 20.b) Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC breakers and fuses are rated to interrupt Power System to determine fault Power System exists and concludes that fault currents. currents will be performed. the analyzed fault currents do not exceed the circuit breaker and fuse intenupt capacities, as determined by their nameplate ratings.

21. Class IE DC Power System circuit 21. Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC 21. Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC interrupting devices are coordinated so Power System to determine circuit Power System circuit interrupting that the circuit interrupter closest to the interrupting device coordination will be devices exists and concludes that the fault is designed to open before other performed. analyzed circuit intenupter closest to the devices. fault is designed to open before other devices.

22. Class IE DC Power System cables are 22. Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC 22. Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC sized to supply their load requirements. Power System cables to determine their Power System cables exists and con-load requirements will be performed. ciudes that the Class IE DC electrical distribution system cable capacities, as determined by cable ratings, exceed their analyzed load requirements.

2.6.3 2-sim O O O SYSTEM 80+= TARLE 2.6.3-1 (Continued) AC INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM AND DC POWER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and AcceDiante Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

23. Class IE DC Power System cables are 23. Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC 23. Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC rated to withstand fault currents for the Power System to determine fault Power System exists and concludes that time required to clear the fault from its currents will be performed the Class IE DC electrical distribution power source. system cables will withstand the analyzed fault currents for the time required, as determined by the circuit interrupting device coordination -

analysis, to clear the fault from its power source.

24. The Class IE DC Power System 24. Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC 24. Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC supplies an operating voltage at the Power System to determine system Power System exists and concludes that terminals of the Class IE equipment voltage drops will be performed. the analyzed operating voltage supplied which is within the equipment's voltage at the terminals of the Class IE tolerance limite. equipment is within the equipment's voltage tolerance limits, as determined by their nameplate ratings.

25. Each Class IE battery is located in a 25. Inspection of the as-built Class IE 25. Each Class IE battery is located in a Seismic Category I structure and in its batteries will be conducted. Seismic Category I structure and in its respective Division / Channel battery respective Division / Channel battery room. room.

26. Class 1E DC Power System distribution 26. Inspection of the as-built Class IE DC 26. Class IE DC Power System distribution panels and MCCs are identified distribution panels and MCCs will be panels and . MCCs are identified according to their Class IE conducted. ' according to their Class IE Division / Channel. Division / Channel.

2.6.3 2nm O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.63-1 (Continued) AC INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM AND DC POWER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitinent Insocctions. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

27. Class IE DC Power System cables are 27. Inspection of the as-built Class IE DC 27. As-built Class IE DC Power System identified according to their Class IE Power System cables will be conducted. cables are identified according to their Division / Channel. Class IE Division / Channel.

28. Class IE Division / Channel cables are 28. Inspection of the as-built Class IE DC 28. Class IE Division / Channel cables are routed in Seismic Category I structures Power System cables and racevvays will routed in Seismic Category I stmetures in their respective Division / Channel be conducted. in their respective Division / Channel raceways. raceways.

29. In the Class 1E DC Power System, 29.a) Testing will be conducted on the as-built 29.a) A test signal exists in only the Class 1E independence is provided between Class Class IE DC Power System by Division /Channelunder test in the Class IE Divisions. Independence is provided nroviding a test signal in only one Class IE DC Power System.

between Class 1E Channels. IE Division / Channel at a time. Independence is provided betnen Class IE Divisions / Channels and non-Class IE equipment. 29.b) Inspection of the as-built Class IE DC 29.b) In the as-built Class IE DC Power Power System will be conducted. System, physical separation or electrical - isolation exists between Class IE Divisions / Channels. Physicalseparation or electrical. isolation exists between these Class IE Divisions / Channels and non-Class IE equipment. Raceways containing Class IE cables do not contain non-Class IE cables. 2.6.3 um.n l 4 SYS'IEM 80+= ; tO i 2.6.4 CONTAINMENT ELECI'RICAL PENETRATION ASSEMBLIES ; DESIGN DESCRIPTION Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies are provided for electrical cables passing through the primary containment. Contamment Electrical Penetration Assemblies are classified as Seismic Category L Oass 1E Division Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies only contain cables of one Cass 1E Division, and Oass 1E Channel Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies only contain cables of one Cass 1E Channet - Independence is provided between Division Containment Electrical Penetrations Assemblies. Independence is provided between Channel Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies. Independence is provided between Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies containing Cass 1E cables and Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies containing non-Gass 1E cables. Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies are protected against overcurrent. s Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies are equipment for which paragraph number (3) of the ' Verification for Basic Configuration for Systems" of the General Os ~ Provisions (Section 1.2) applies. Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.6.4-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance - ; criteria for the Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies. , i I O 2.6.4 4 12.m-n O O O SYSTEM 80+" TAHLE 2.6.4-1 CONTAINMENT ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ASSEMBLIES Insocctions. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Anakses AcceptaDCe crited.

1. The Basic Configuration of the Con- 1. Inspection of the as-built Containment 1. 'Ihe as-built Containment Electrical tainment Electrical Penetration Assem- ElectricalPenetration Assemblieswillbe Penetration Assemblies conforms with blies is as described in the Design conducted. the Basic Configuration described in the Description (Section 2.6.4). Design Daision (Section 2.6.4).

2. Class IB Division Containment Elec- 2. Inspectio1 of the as-built Division and 2. As-built Class IE Divisional Contain-trical Penetration Assemblies only Channel Containment Electrical Pene- ment Electrical Penetration Assemblies contain cables of one Class IE Division, trations Assemblies will be conducted. only contain cables of one Class IE and Class IE Channel Containment Division, and Class IE Channel Con-Electrical Penetation Assemblies only tainment Electrical Penetration contain cables of one Class IE Channel. Assemblies only contain cables of one Class IE Channel.

3. Independence is provided between 3. Inspection of the as-built Containment 3. Physical separation exists between as-Division Containment Electrical ElectricalPenetration Assemblieswillbe built Division Containment Electrical Penetrations Assemblies. Independence conducted. Penetration Assemblies. Physical is provided between Channel separation exists between Channel Containment Electrical Penetration Containment Electrical Peretration Assemblies. Independence is provided Assemblies. Physical separation exists between Containment Electrical between Containment Electrical Penetration AssembliescontainingClass Penetration Assemblies containing Class IE cables and Containment Electrical ' IE cables and Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies containing non- Penetration Assemblies containing noa-Class 1E cables. Class 1E cables.

2.6.4 n ,31-s3 O O O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2,6A-1 (Continued) CONTAINMENT ELECI'RICAL PENETRATION ASSEMBLIES Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

4. Containment Electrical Penetration 4. Analysis for the as-built Containment 4. Analysis exists for the as-built Con-Assemblies are protected against Electrical Penetration Assemblies. tainment Electrical Penetration Assem-overcurrent. blies and concludes either (1) that the maximum overcurrent of the circuits does not exceed the continuous rating of the Containment Electrical Penetration Assembly, or (2) that the circuits have redundant overturrent protection devices in series and that the redundant over-current devices are coordinated with the -

Containment Electrical Penetration Assembly's rated short circuit thermal capacity data and prevent overcurrent from exceeding the continuous current rating of the Containment Electrical Penetration Assembly. 2.6.4 324i-n i SYS1EM 80+" p/ 2.6.5 ALTERNATE AC SOURCE l DESIGN DESCRIPTION r *Ibe Alternate AC Source (AAC) (i.e., combustion turbine) is a self-contained power , generating unit with its own supporting auxiliary systems. The AAC is classified as non-safety-related. The AAC can supply power to the non-Class 1E permanent non-safety buses or to a Class 1E Division through its associated non-Class 1E permanent non-safety bus. The load capacity of the AAC is at least as large as the capacity of an emergency diesel generator (EDG). The AAC is located in its own structure. The AAC has the following displays and controls in the main control room (MCR): i

1) Parameter displays for the AAC output voltage, amperes, watts, and frequency.

2) Controls for manually starting the AAC.

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Cdteria l Table 2.6.5-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance-criteria for the Alternate AC Source. , t r L 2.6.5 ame QJ R v (3 uJ SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.6.5-1 ALTERNATE AC SOURCE InsDecdons. Tests. Analyses. and AcceDtance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the AAC is 1. Inspection of the as-built AAC will be 1. The as-built AAC conforms with the as described in the Design Description conducted. Basic Configuration as described in the (Section 2.6.5). Design Description (Section 2.6.5).

2. The AAC can supply power to: 2. Testing on the as-built AAC will be 2. The as-built AAC can supply power to:

conducted by connecting the AAC to: a) the non-Class lE permanent non-safety a) the non-Class IE permanent non-safety a) the non-Class IE permanent non-safety buses; or buses; and then buses; or b) to a Class IE Division through its b) to a Class IE Division through its b) to a Class IE Division thmugh its associated non-Class IE permanent non- associated non-Class IE permanent non- associated non-Class IE permanent non-safety bus. safety bus. safety bus.

3. ' The load capacity of the AAC is at least 3. Inspection of the as-built AAC and 3. The as-built AAC load capacity is at as large as the capacity of an EDG. EDGs will be conducted. least as large as the capacity of an EDG as determined by the AAC and EDG nameplate ratings.

4. The AAC displays and controls 4. Inspection of the MCR will be 4. AAC displays and controls identified in identified in the Design Description conducted. the Design Description (Section 2.6.5)

(Section 2.6.5) exist in the MCR or can exist or can be retrieved there. be retrieved there. 2.6.5 n-aim I SYS1EM 80+" 2.7.1 NEW FUEL STORAGE RACKS f Design Description , The New Fuel Storage Racks provide an initial on-site storage for at least 121 new fuel assemblies. The New Fuel Storage Racks are safety-related. He New Fuel Storage Racks are located in the nuclear island structures in the new l fuel storage pit. He New Fuel Storage Racks support and protect new fuel assemblies. The New Fuel Storage Racks maintain the effective neutron multiplication factor less than the required criticality limits during normal operation and design postulated accident conditions. The New Fuel Storage Racks are anchored to embedments at the bottom of the ; storage cavity. l The New Fuel Storage Racks are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III, Subsection NF, Class 3 Component Supports requirements. The New Fuel Storage Racks are designed to accommodate design basis loads and ! load combinations including the effects of impact of fuel assemblies on the racks and ; the impact due to postulated fuel handling accidents without losing the structural , capability to maintain the fuel in a non-critical configuration. The New Fuel Storage Racks are classified Seismic Category I. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria ! Table 2.7.1-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance ; criteria for the New Fuel Storage Racks. k 2.7.1 iui.e . __ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . ._. __ -._ _ ._ m _ _ . . - _ . m n U SYSTEM 80+" TARLE 2.7.1-1 NEW FUEL STORAGE RACKS InsDection. Tests. Analysis and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspection. Test. Analysis Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the New 1. Inspection of the as-built New Fuel 1. For the New Fuel Storage Racks Fuel Storage Racks is as described in Storage Racks configuration will be described in the Design Description the Design Description (Section 2.7.1). conducted. (Section 2.7.1), the as-built New Fuel Storage Racks conform with the Basic Configuration.

2. The New Fuel Storage Racks maintain 2. Analysis will be performed to calculate 2. The estculated effective neutron the effective neutron multiplication the effective neutron multiplication multiplication factor for the New Fuel factor less than the required criticality factor. Storage Racks is less than 0.95 during limits during normal operation and normal operation and postulated accident design postulated accident conditions. conditions (less than 0.98 for immersion in a uniform density aqueous foam or mist of optimum moderation density).

3. The New Fuel Storage Racks are 3. Inspection will be performed of the 3. The Fabrication Data Package, designed and constructed in accordance Fabrication Data Package, Certificate of Certificate of Conformance and the with ASME Code Section III Subsection Conformance and the Design Report Design Report Document exist, and NF, Class 3 Component Supports Document. conclude that the design requirements requirements and are classified Seismic are met.

Category I. 2.7.1 n.m.n SYSTEM 80+" I

O l 2.7.2 SPENT FUEL STORAGE RACKS i

Design Description The Spent i uct Storage Racks provide an initial on-site storage for at least 907 spent fuel assemblies. He Spent Fuel Storage Racks are safety-related. l Re Spent Fuel Storage Racks are located in the nuclear island structures in the ! spent fuel pool. The Spent Fuel Storage Racks are free standing structures that support and protect l spent fuel assemblies. He Spent Fuel Storage Racks maintain the effective neutron l multiplication factor less than the required criticality limits during normal operation ; and postulated accident conditions. The Spent Fuel Storage Racks are designed and fabricated in accordance with ASME l

Code Section III, Subsection NF, Class 3 Component Supports requirements.

The Spent Fuel Storage Racks are designed to accommodate design basis loads and load combinations including the effects ofimpact of fuel assemblies on the racks and the impact due to postulated fuel handling accidents without losing the structural capability to maintain the fuel in a non-critical configuration. O Re Spent Fuel Racks are classified Seismic Category L Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.2-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associatec icceptance criteria for the Spent Fuel Storage Racks. 1 l 2.7.2 .1. u-n-m 1 . O O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.7.2-1 SPENT FUEL STORAGE RACKS Insucction. Tests. Analysis and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspection. Test. Analysis Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the Spent 1. Inspection of the as-built Spent Fuel 1. For the Spent Fuel Storage Racks Fuel Storage Racks is as described in Storage Racks configuration will be described in the Design Description the Design Description (Section 2.7.2). conducted. (Section 2.7.2) the as-built Spent Fuel Storage Racks conform with the Basic Configuration.

2. The Spent Fuel Storage Racks maintain 2. Analysis will be performed to calculate 2. The calculated effective neutron the effective neutron multiplication the effective neutron multiplication multiplication factor is less than 0.95 factor less than the required criticality factor, during normal operation and postulated limits during normal operation and accident conditions.

postulated accident conditions.

3. The Spent Fuel Storage Racks are de- '3. Inspection will be performed of the - 3. The Fabrication Data Package, signed and fabricated in accordance with Fabrication Data Package, Certificate of Certificate of Conformance and the the ASMII Code Section 111, Subsection Conformance and Design Report approved Design Report Document exist NF, Class 3 Component Supports Document. and conclude that the design requirements and are classified Seismic requirements are met.

Category 1. 2.7.2 iui.n SYSTEM 80+" 2.7.3 POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM Design Description The Pool Cooling and Purification System (PCPS) consists of a spent fuel pool cooling system (SFPCS) and a pool purification system. The SFPCS removes heat generated by the stored spent fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool water. The pool - purification system pumps spent fuel pool water, refueling pool water, and fuel transfer canal water through filters and ion exchangers. The Basic Configuration of the PCPS is as shown on Figure 2.73-1. The SFPCS is , safety-related and the pool purification system is non-safety-related. The PCPS is located in the reactor building and nuclear annex. The SFPCS has two Divisions, each with a spent fuel pool (SFP) pump, a SFP heat exchanger, and associated valves, piping, controls, and instrumentation. A cross-connect line with isolation valves between the SFP pump discharge lines is provided to allow either pump to be used with either heat exchanger. Each SFPCS Division has the heat removal capacity to prevent boiling in the spent fuel pool with a full core ofDoad of fuel assemblies and a ten year inventory of stored O irradiated fuel. Heat from the spent fuel pool is transferred to the component cooling water system (CCWS) in the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers. The PCPS includes provisions to prevent gravity draining of the spent fuel pool and refueling pool. The ASME Code Section III Class for the PCPS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.73-1 is as depicted on the figure. Safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.73-1 is classified Seismic Category I. Displays of the PCPS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.73-1 are available as noted on the Figure. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to start and stop the spent fuel pool cooling pumps. PCPS alarms shown on Figure 2.73-1 are provided as shown on the Figure. > Water is supplied to each SFPCS pump at a pressure greater than the pump's required net positive suction head (NPSH). 2.7.3 nwn i i i j .! SYS'mM 80+" l i The Cass 1E loads shown on Figure 2.73-1 are powered from their respective Qass ; 1E Division. l Independence is provided between Gass 1E Divisions, and between Cass 1E- l Divisions and non-Qass 1E equipment, in the PCPS. l The two mechanical Divisions of the SFPCS are physically separated except for the cross-connect line between SFPCS pump discharge lines. i i Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria ] Table 2.73-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Pool Cooling and Purification System. l t l l l i O 1! l l i l 2.7.3 noi.e P+ Ee> w emL>M o o CONTAINMENT INSIDE OUTSIDE ,_ ___q NOTE 1 l ASME CODE SECTION 111 CLASS l FUEL TRANSFER I CANAL I gg g gg , n -__ _ _ _ . r--------- -i r---- , iE Bi, i RE O EL NG g g l l [@ PURIF ATION SYSTEM MAKE-UP 3 l 1 1 Civ Civ FRoM CvCS' - p ' '------ - I SPENT FUEL I Si

1 POOL

' I N _ I [ .? I{ lz i El I _L_I I_ SPOOL PIECE _L_l !_ SPOOL PIECE NOTE 2 I_ (css) g g_ yss) _ g @ g 1 , y CCwS M NOTES: hE2 l

1. LOCAL INDICATION ONLY, NOT IN CONTROL ROOM; ALARM IN CONTROL ROOM

2. PRESSURE SWITCH WITH ALARM IN CONTROL ROOM; NO CONTROL ROOM INDICATION

3. THEINSTRUMENTATION, EXCEPT ALARMS, AND ASME CODE SECTION 111 CLASS 2 AND 3 COMPONENTS SHOWN ARE SAFETY CCWS RELATED. THE PUMPS ANDINSTRUMENTATION SHOWN, EXCEPT ALARMS, ARE POWERED FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE CLASS 1E DIVISION.

FIGURE .2.7.3 -1 POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM 42-a1- a O V A U O v SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.7.3-1 POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Cosninitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the PCPS is 1. Inspection of the as-built PCPS 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.7.31. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.3-1, the as-built PCPS conforms with the Basic Configuration.

2. Each SFPCS Division has the heat 2. Testing to measure SFPCS pump flow 2. Each SFPCS Division will remove at removal capacity to prevent boiling in in each Division will be performed. least 67.25 million btu /hr from the spent the spent fuel pool with a full core inspection and analysis to determine the fuel pool, with the spent fuel pool at offload of fuel assemblies and a ten year heat removal capability of each SFPCS 180'F and component cooling water inventory of stored irradiated fuel. Division will be performed based oc test supplied at 5000 gpm and 105'F.

data and as-built data.

3. The PCPS includes provisions to prevent 3. Inspection of the PCPS suction and 3. Spent fuel pool cooling suction gravity draining of the spent fuel pool return line connections to the refueling connections are located at least 10 feet and the refueling pool. pool and spent fuel pool will be above the *.,p of the spent fuel. Anti-performed. e-M devices are provided in the lines for spent fuel pool cooling return, spent fuel pool purification suction and return, and refueling pool suction and return.

4. The ASME Code Section Ill PCPS 4. A pressure test will be conducted on 4. The results of the pressure test of components shown on Figure 2.7.3-1 ' those components of the PCPS required ASME Code Section III components of retain their pressure boundary integrity to be pressure tested by the ASME Code the PCPS conform with the pressure under internal pressures that will be Section III. testing acceptance criteria in ASME experienced during service. Code Section Ill.

2.7.3 n-aim O O - SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.73-1 (Continued) POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desien Counniitment Inspections. Tests. Anakses Acceptance Criteria 5.m) Displays of the PCPS instrumentation 5.a) Inspection for the existence or 5.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.7.3-1 are available retrieveability of instrumentation on Figure 2.7.3-1 are available as noted as noted on the figure. displays will be perforrned. on the figure. 5.b) Controls exist in the MCR to start and 5.b) Testing will be performed using the 5.b) PCPS controls in the MCR operate to stop the spent fuel pool cooling SFP PCPS controls in the MCR. start and stop the SFP pumps. pumps. 5.c) PCPS alarms shown on Figure 2.7.3-1 5.c) Testing of the PCPS alarms shown on 5.c) He PCPS alarms shown on Figure are provided as shown on the figure. Figure 2.7.3-1 will be performed using 2.7.3-1 actuate in response to signals signals simulating alarm conditions. simulating alarm conditions.

6. Water is supplied to each SFP cooling 6. Testing to measure SFP pump suction 6. He available NPSH exceeds each SFP pump at a pressure greater than the pressure will be performed. Inspection pump's required NPSH.

pump's required net positive suction and analysis to determine NPSH head (NPSII), available to each SFP pump will be performed based on test data and as-built data. 7.a) The Class 1E loads shown on Figure 7a) Testing will be performed on the SFPCS 7.a) Within the SFPCS, a test signal exists 2.7.3-1 are powered from their system by providing a test signal in only only at the equipment powered from the respective Class IE Division. one Class IE Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. 7.b) Independence is provided between 7.b) Inspection of the as-installed Class IE 7.b) Physical separation exists between Class Class IE Divisions, and between Divisions in the . PCPS will be IE Divisions in the PCPS. Physical Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE performed. separation exists between Class IE equipment, in the PCPS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the PCPS. 1 2.7.3 n-sim O O O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.73-1 (Continued) POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desimi Commitment Inc,cctions._ Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

8. He two mechanical Divisions of the 8. Inspections of as-built mechanical 8. The two mechanical Divisions of the SFPCS are physically separated except Divisions will be performed. SFPCS are separated by a wall, or by a for the cross-connect line between SFP fire barrier, or by spatial separation in pump discharp lines. the spent fuel pool, except for the cross-connect line between SFP pump dis-charge lines.

2.7.3 iui.n i SYSTEM 80+" ! 2.7.4 FUEL HANDLING SYSTEM , Design Description The Fuel Handling System (FHS) is a non-safety system of equipment and tools that haadles and moves fuel assemblies and control element assemblies (CEAs), and also provides storage for them during fuel transfer operations. The FHS load handling ! devices are designed to reduce the potential for damage to a fuel assembly. He FHS has a refueling machine (RM), a spent fuel handling machine (SFHM), a CEA change platform (CEACP), a fuel transfer system (FIS), a CEA elevator , (CEAE), a new fuel elevator (NFE) and a fuel building overhead crane (FBOC). l The reactor building polar crane is used to remove and replace the reactor vessel . l head and reactor vessel internals during refueling. He RM, CEACP, CEAE and reactor building polar crane are located in the reactor building. He SFHM, NFE and FBOC are located in the nuclear annex. The fuel transfer tube is located in both the reactor building and the nuclear annex. t The RM, SFHM, and CEACP hoists are each provided with load-measuring devices ! and are interlocked to interrupt hoisting if their individual loads exceed an overload ! limit and to interrupt lowering if their individual loads decrease below an underland limit. , He RM, SFHM, CEACP hoists, and reactor building polar crane are interlocked to limit upward hoist travel Rey are also provided with positive mechanical stops to : limit upward movement of the hoists. In the event of a safe shutdown earthquake or ofloss of electrical power to the RM or SFHM, the RM or SFHM will not drop a fuel assembly held by its hoist. The RM : and SFHM each have manual drive mechanisms to allow hoist operation and machine ! translation without electrical power. The new fuel handling hoist is interlocked to prevent moving new fuel over the spent fuel racks. The cask handling hoist is interlocked and equipped with mechanical stops to prevent moving a cask over either the new or spent fuel racks. , i Inspections, Tests, Analyses v.ad Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.4-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Fuel Handling System. i /* b) 2.7.4 me SYS*IEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.4-1 FUEL HANDLING SYSTEM ' . Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Accentance Criteria Desima Counmitament la . :T n Tests. Analyses Accestance Criteda -

1. The Basic Configuration of the RM, 1. Inspection of the as-built system will be 1. For the RM, SFHM, CEACP, FTS, SFHM, CEACP, FTS, CEAE, NFE and conducted. . CEAE, NFE and FBOC described in the FBOC is as described in the Design Design Description (Section 2.7.1), the Description (Section 2.7.4). as-built equipment conforms with the basic configuration.

l 2.a) The RM, SFHM and CEACP hoists are 2.a) Testing of the RM, SFHM and CEACP 2.a) The KM, SFHM and CEACP hoist load provided with load-measuring devices hoists will be performed to evaluate ' measuring devices and- interlocks and are interlocked to interrupt hoisting equipment response to simulated loads. interrupt hoisting when simulated load - ifload limits are reached. limits are reached. 2.b) %e RM, SFHM and CEACP hoists are 2.b) Testing of the RM, SFHM and CEACP 2.a) He RM, SFHM auf CEACP hoist load provided with load-measuring devices hoNs will be performed to evaluate - measuring devices and : interlocks and interlocks to interrupt lowering if equipment response to simulated loads. - interrupt lowering when simulated load load limits are reached. limits are reached.

3. De RM, SFHM, CEACP and. reactor- 3. Testing of the RM, SFHM, CEACP and 3. The RM, SFHM, CEACP hoist and building polar crane hoists, are each reactor bailding polar crane hoists will reactor ' . building polar crane are

interlocked to limit upward hoist travel.

be i Jm l to confirm interlock - interlocked to limit upward hoist travel. function to limit upward hoist travel.-

4. De RM, SFHM and CEACP hoists are 4.' TeAing of the RM, SFHM and CEACP 4. The RM, SFHM and CEACP hoist each provided with mechanical stops to hoists will be performed to confirm the anechanical stops limit upward hoist >

,- limit upward hoist travel, functioning of mechanical stops to limit travel. ~ upward hoist travel. 2.7.4 - l'- n.n.n l O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7A-1 (Continued) FUEL IIANDLING SYSTEM InSDeClions. Tests. Analyses. and Accentance Criteria Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

5. In the event of loss of electrical power 5. Testing of the RM and SFilM will be 5. He grapple does not open upon loss of to the RM or SFIIM, the RM or SFIIM performed by removing electricat power electrical power.

will not drop a full assembly held by its from the loaded equipment. hoist.

6. He RM and SFHM each have manual 6. Testing of the RM and SFIIM hoists 6. The hoists operate and the machines drive mechanisms to allow hoist will be performed manually without move manually, operation and machine translation electrical power.

without electrical power.

7. The new fuel handling hoist is 7. Testing of the new fuel handling hoist 7. The new fuel handling hoist is interlocked to prevent moving new fuel will be performed to confirm interlock interlocked to prevent moving new fuel over the spent fuel racks. functioning. over spent fuel racks.

8. Le cask handling hoist is interlocked to 8. ' Testing of the cask handling hoist will 8. The cask handling hoist is interlocked to prevent moving a cask over either the be performed to confirm interlock prevent moving a cask over either the new or spent fuel racks. functioning. new or spent fuel racks.

2.7.4 2-n n SYSTEM 80+" J 2.7.5 STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM Design Description The Station Service Water System (SSWS), in conjunction with the ultimate heat sink (UHS), provides cooling water to remove heat from the component cooling water system (CCWS). The Basic Configuration of the SSWS is as shown on Figure 2.7.5-1. The SSWS is a safety.related system as noted on the Figure. He SSWS consists of two Divisions. Each SSWS Division receives heat from its corresponding CCWS Division through the component cooling water heat exchangers. Each Division of the SSWS has two station service water pumps, two station service water strainers, piping, valves, controls, and instrumentation. He SSWS pumps and strainers are located in the SSWS pump structure (s). Interconnecting piping runs between the SSWS pump structure (s) and the component cooling water heat exchanger structure. ne SSWS has the capacity to remove heat from the CCWS during operation, O shutdown, refueling, and design basis accident conditions. Each Division has the heat dissipation capacity to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. The ASME Code Section III Qass for the SSWS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 is as depicted on the Figure. He safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 is classified Seismic Category I. He Gass 1E loads shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E Division. Independence is provided between Class 1E Divisions, and between Qass 1E Divisions and non-Qass 1E equipment, in the SSWS. The two mechanical Divisions of the SSWS are physically separated. Displays of the SSWS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the station service water pumps, and to open and close those power operated valves shown on Figure 2.7.5-1. c) ' 2.7.5 12,u.e ~ SYSTEM 80+= Motor operated valves (MOVs) having an active safety function will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under differential pressure or Duid Dow conditions and under temperature conditions. Check valves shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under system pressure, Duid Dow conditions, or temperature conditions. Interface Requirements The Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) transfers heat from the SSWS to the environment during operation, shutdown, refueling, and design basis accident conditions. The Ultimate IIcat Sink is capable of dissipating a heat load of at least 143.0 million BTU /hr during the initial phase of a design basis accident. The UHS is sized so that makeup water is not required for at least 30 days following a design basis accident. During this period of 30 days, the design basis temperatures of safety-related equipment are not exceeded. Water is supplied to each SSWS pump at a net positive suction head (NPSH) greater than the pump's required NPSH. The Station Service Water Pump Structure is classi5ed Seismic Category I and provides physical barriers to maintain separation of SSWS mechanical Divisions. (v) The SSWS pump structure ventilation system is classified Seismic Category I, and its mechanical Divisions are separated by physical barriers. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.5-1 speci5es the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance criteria for the Station Servic Water System.- I l 4 b) ~ ' 2.7.5 12.si n l exst.- o o . i CCWS CCWS 4 3 4 STATION : FROM SERVICE WATER PUMP ,s'---- N ULTIMATE ,N 7 * *CCW HX ' ' HEAT SINK - - - - - + h sTRAMER TO - - > ULTIMATE HEAT SINK STATION SERVICE WATER FicOM PUMP " U , ....,, T H K---- HXl ; sTRAMER I ee i NOTES: f CCWS CCWS g A. SSWS COMPONENTS AND EQUIPMENT SHOWN ON THE FIGURE ARE ASME CODE SECTION M CLASS 3 AND ARE SAFETY-RELATED.

3. SAFETY-REl.ATED COMPONENTS AND EQUIPMENT SHOWN ON THE FIGURE ARE POWERED FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE CLASS 1E DIVISION.

FIGURE 2.7.5-1 STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (ONE OF TWO DMSIONS)- 12-31-93 4 . . /] V QU 'T fiYSTEM 80+= TAHLE 2.7.5-1 STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configurationof the SSWS is 1. Inspection of the as-built SSWS con- 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.7.5-1. figuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.5-1, the as-built SSWS conforms with the Basic Configuration.

2. The SSWS has the capacity to remove 2. Testing will be performed to measure 2. The SSWS has the capacity to remove heat from the CCWS during operation, SSWS flow rates, inspections will be heat from the CCWS during operation, shutdown, refueling, and design basis conducted of the as-built SSWS, and shutdown, refueling, and design basis accident conditions. analyses will be performed to determine accident conditions.

the heat removal capacities of the as-built SSWS.

3. The ASME Code Section III SSWS 3. A pressure test will be conducted on 3. The results of the pressure test of components shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 those components of the SSWS required ASME Code Section til components of retain their pressure boundary integrity to be pressure tested by ASME Code the SSWS conform with the pressure under internal pressures that will be Sxtion III. testing acceptance criteria in ASME experienced during service. Code Section III.

4.a) The Class IE loads shown on Figure 4.a) Testing will be performed on the SSWS 4.a) Within the SSWS, a test signal exists 2.7.5-1 are powered from their by providing a test signal in only one only at the equipment powered from the respective Class IE Division. Class IE Division at a time. Class 1E Division under test. 4.b) Independence is provided between Class '4.b) Inspection of the as-installed Class 1E 4.b) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class lE Divisions in the SSWS. will be IE Divisions in the SSWS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, performed. separation exists between Class 1E . in the SSWS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the SSWS. 2.7.5 i2-si-s3 l O O O i SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.7.5-1 (Continued) STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Counmitment Insocctions. Tests. Annivses Acceptance Criteria

5. The two mechanical Divisions of the $. Inspection of the as-built mechanical 5. The two mechanical Divisions of the SSWS are physically separated. Divisions will be performed. SSWS are separated by a Divisional wall or a fire barrier.

6.a) Displays of the SSWS instrumentation 6.a) Inspection for- the existence or 6.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 exist in the retrieveability in the MCR of on Figure 2.7.5-1 exist in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there. performed. 6.b) Controls exist in the MCR to start and 6.b) Testing will be performed using the 6.b) SSWS controls in the MCR operate to stop the station service water pumps, SSWS controls in the MCR. start and stop station service water and to open and close those power pumps, and to open and close those operated valves shown on Figure power operated valves shown on Figure 2.7.5-1. 2.7.5-1.

7. Motor operated valves (MOVs) having 7. Testing will be conducted to open, or 7. ' Each MOV havine, an active safety an active safety function will open, or close, or open and also close, MOVs~ function opens, or closes, or opens and will close, or will open and also close, having an active safety function under also closes.

under differential pressure or fluid flow preoperational differential pressure or conditions and under temperature fluid flow conditions and under conditions. temperature conditions.

8. Check valves shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 8. Testing will' be conducted to open, or 8. Each check valve shown on Figure will open,' or will close, or will open close, or open and also close, check 2.7.5-1 opens, or closes, or opens and and also close under system pressure, valves shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 under also closes, fluid flow conditions, or temperature system preoperational pressure, fluid conditions. flow conditions, vr temperature corditiens.

2.7.5 mim. l l l l SYSTEM 80+= l 2.7.6 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Design Description The Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) is a closed loop cooling water system that, in conjunction with the station senice water system (SSWS) and the ultimate heat sink (UHS), removes heat generated from the plant's safety-related and non-safety-related components connected to the CCWS. Equipment listed in Table 2.7.6-1 can receive cooling water flow during the plant modes indicated. The AShE Code Section III Class 2 and 3 components and the instrumentation (except the radiation instrument) shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 are safety-related. He Basic Configuration of the CCWS is as shown on Figure 2.7.6-1. The CCWS consists of two Divisions. Each CCWS Division transfers heat to its corresponding SSWS Division through the component cooling water heat exchangers. Each Division of the CCWS has two component cooling water heat exchangers, a component cooling water surge tank, two component cooling water pumps, piping, valves, controls, and instrumentation. b The CCWS heat exchangers are located in the CCWS heat exchanger structure. The l remainder of the CCWS components and equipment is located within the nuclear island structures except for piping that connects the CCWS beat exchangers to the components and equipment in the nuclear island structures. He CCWS, in conjunction with the SSWS and UHS, has the capacity to dissipate the heat loads of connected components during operation, shutdown, refueling, and design basis accident conditions. Each Division has the heat dissipation capacity to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. The ASME Code Section III Class for the CCWS pressure retaining components shown l on Figure 2.7.6-1 is as depicted on the Figure. He safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 is classified Seismic Category I. The Class 1E loads shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 are powered from their respective Class IE Division. Independence is provided between Class 1E Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, in the CCWS. The two mechanical Divisions of the CCWS are physically separated. 2.7.6 um-n l l p SYSTEM 80+" ' Displays of the CCWS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the component cooling water pumps, and to open and close those power operated valves shown on Figure 2.7.6-1. Upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS), the system response is as follows: 1

1) The ASME Code Section III Class 3 valves that separate ASME Code Section - j III Class 3 component cooling water piping and non-ASME Code Section III ;

component cooling water piping close automatically.

2) 'Ibe spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger isolation valve closes automatically. j i

3) *Ihe component cooling water heat exchanger bypass valves close automatically.

Upon receipt of a Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS), the containment spray j heat exchanger isolation valyc. opens automatically. Upon receipt of a component cooling water low-low surge tank level signal, isolation valves for cooling loops composed of non-ASME Code Section III piping close _ automatically. C Motor +perated valvs (MOVs) having an active safety function will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under differential pressure er fluid flow conditions and vader temperature conditions. Check valves shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under system pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. l 1 Valves with response positions indicated on Figure 2.7.6-1 change position to that indicated on the Figure upon loss of motive power. Makeup water to the CCWS is supplied by the demineralized water makeup system (DWMS). A safety-related Seismic Category I makeup line is provided to each Division from the SSWS via a spool piece which can be connected. Pressure relief and flow isol:tian valves are provided for each reactor coolant pump as l shown on Figure 2.7.6-1. Pressure relief capacity is sized to accept the maximum expected in-leakage from a reactor coolant pump seal cooler tube rupture. k 2.7.6 u.n m SYSTEM 80+" The CCWS pipe channels from the nuclear island structures to the component cooling . water heat exchanger structure are classified Seismic Category I and provide physical barriers between CCWS mechanical Divisions. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.6-2 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance

criteria for the Component Cooling Water System.

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FIGURE 2.7.61 COMPONENT COOUNG WATER SYSTEM ID"N MO N 12-31-93 ._ .. . , . _ _ , _ . , . . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ , - . _ _ , , ,_ _ , . . ~ O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.6-1 Plant Mode / Normal Operation Shutdown Cooling - Refueling Design Basis Components Accident SAFETY REIATED (Note a) Shutdown cooling - X X - heat exchanger Containment spray - - - X heat exchanger Spent fuel pool X X X X (Note b) cooling heat exchanger Diesel Generator X X X X Pump Motor Cool- X X X X-ers, Miniflow Heat Exchangers, - and Essential Chilled Water Condensers 4 2.7.6 imm - O O O SYSTEM 80+" i TABLE 2.7.6-1 (Continued) Plant Mode / Normal Operation Shutdown Cooling Refueling Design Basis Components Accident NON-SAFETY RELATED (Note a) Reactor coolant X X X X pumps and pump motors Charging ' pump X X X X motor coolers Charging pump X- X X X miniflow heat exchanger Instrument Air X X X X Compressors Normal Chilled X X X - Water Condensers (Note c) Letdown Heat X X X - Exchanger, Sample Heat Exchangers, Gas Stripper, and Boric Acid Con-centrator (Note c) 2.7.6 . n a -,3 .m_.._ m _m .________..-.__.-____________-.__...__.__mm___- __ __.. m-___u.-m_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ----4 . -. ---4 i SYS'IEM 80+" NOTES FOR TABLES 2.7.6-1

a. (X) = Equipment can receive component cooling water flow in this mode.

(-) = Equipment does not receive component cooling water flow in this mode.

b. Wi!I require operator action to restore. ,

i l

c. Assignment of the non-safety-related CCWS heat removal loads to the ;

respective CCWS Division is dependent upon the location of the components l associated with those loads. l I l O . t i l . i i 1 l O 2.7.6 12-22-93 i d V O O U SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.7.6-2 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Cammitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the CCWS 1. Inspection of the as-built CCWS 1. For the components and equipment is as shown on Figure 2.7.6-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.6-1, the as-built CCWS conforms with the Basic Configuention.

2. The CCWS, in conjunction with the 2. Testing will be performed to measure 2. He CCWS, in conjunction with the SSWS and UHS, has the capacity to CCWS flow rates, inspections will be SSWS and UHS, has the capacity to dissipate the heat loads of connected conducted of the as-built CCWS, and dissipate the heat loads of connected compone.its during operation, shutdown, analyses will be performed to determine components during operation, shutdown, refueling and design basis accident the heat removal capacities of the as- refueling and design basis accident conditions. built component cooling water heat conditions, exchangers.

3. He ASME Code Section III CCWS 3. A pressure test will be conducted on 3. The results of the pressure test of components shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 those components of the CCWS required . ASME Code Section ill components of retain their pressure boundary integrnf to be pressure tested by ASME Code the CCWS conform with the pressure under intemal pressures that will be Section Ill. testing acceptance criteria in ASME experienced during service. Code Section III.

4.a) The Class IE loads shown on Figure 4.a) Testing will be performed on the CCWS 4.a) Within the CCWS, a test signal exists 2.7.6-1 are powered from their by providing a test signal in only one only at the equipment powered from the respective Class IE Division. Class IE Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. 4.b) Independence is provided between Class 4.b) Inspection of the as-installed Class IE 4.b) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions in the CCWS will be IE Divisions in the CCWS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, performed. separation exists between Class IE in the CCWS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the CCWS. 2.7.6 m-n (~')s ~- O G ,A G SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.7.6-2 (Continned) COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

5. The two mechanical Divisions of the 5. Inspection af the as-built mechanical 5. The two mechanical Divisions of the CCWS are physically separated. Divisions will be performed. CCWS are separated by a Divisional wall or a fire barrier except for components of the CCWS within Containment which are separated by spatial arrangement or physical barriers.

6.a) Displays of the CCWS instrumentation 6.a) Inspection for the existence or 6.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 exist in the retrieveability in the MCR of- on Figure 2.7.6-1 exist in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there. performed. 6.b) Controls exist in the Main Control 6.b) Testing will be performed using the 6.b) CCWS controls in the MCR operate to Room to start and stop the component CCWS controls in the MCR. start and stop component cooling water cooling water pumps, and to open and pumps, and to open and close those close those power operated valves power operated valves shovm on Figure shown on Figure 2.7.6-1. 2.7.6-1.

7. Upon receipt of a Safe *.y Injection 7. Testing will be performed using a 7. The system responds as follows:

Actuation Signal (SIAS), the system simulated SIAS. response is as follows: 7.a) The ASME Code Section III Class 3 7.a) Upon receipt of a SIAS, the valves valves that separate the ASME Code close. Section III Class 3 component cooling water piping and non-ASME Code Section III, component cooling water piping close automatically. 2.7.6 noim _ . _ _ _-__ _=__- --__ __ _ _ - - - - - - - .- - _. ._. (~ O 'w ) (O3 SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.6-2 (Continued) COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 7.b) The spent fuel pool cooling heat 7.b) Upon receipt of a SIAS, the valve exchanger isolation valve closes closes. automatically. 7.c) The component cooling water heat 7c) Upon receipt of a SIAS, the valves exchanger bypass valves close close. automatically.

8. Upon the receipt of a component cooling 8. Testing will be performed using a 8. Upon the receipt of a component cooling water low-low surge tank level signal, simulated component cooling water water surge tank low-low level signal, isolation valves for cooling loops surge tank low-low level signal. the valves close, composed of non-ASME Code Section 111 piping close automatically.

9. Upon receipt of a Containment Spray 9. Testing will be performed using a 9. Upon receipt of a CSAS, the valve Actuation Signal (CSAS), the simulated CSAS signal. opens.

containment spray heat exchanger isolation valve opens automatically.

10. Motor +perated valves (MOVs) having 10. Testing will be performed to open, or 10. Each MOV having an active safety an active safety function will open, or ;close, or open and also close, MOVs function opens, or closes, or opens and will close, or will open and also close, having an active safety function under also closes.

under differential pressure or fluid flow preoperational differential pressure or conditions and under . temperature fluid flow conditions and ' under conditjons. temperature conditions. 2.7.6 n.3:43 O V D OV SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.6-2 (Continued) COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Insocctions. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspectians. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

11. Check valves shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 11. Testing will be performed to open, or !!. Each check valve showra on Figure will open, or will close, or will open close, or open and also close, check 2.7.6-1, opens, or closes, or opens and and also close, under system Pressure, valves shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 under also closes.

fluid flow conditions, or temperature system preoperational pressure, fluid conditions. flow conditions or temperature conditions.

12. Valves with response positions indicated 12. Testing of loss of motive power to these 12. These valves change position to the on Figure 2.7.6-1 change position to valves will be performed. position indicated on Figure 2.7.6-1 on that indicated on the figure upon loss of loss of motive power.

motive power.

13. 'he spool piece on the SSWS makeup 13. Testing of the spool piece will be 13. The spool piece on the SSWS makeup line to each Division of the CCWS can performed to confirm that it can be line to each Division of the CCWS can be connected. connected. be connected.

14. Pressure relief capacity provided for 14. An analysis will be performed to 14. Pressure relief capacity provided for each reactor coolant pump is sized to confirm the pressure relief capacity each reactor coolant pump is sized to accept the maximum expected in-leakage provided for each reactor coolant pump. accept the maximum in-leakage from a from a reactor coolant pump seal cooler reactor coolant pump seal cooler tube tube rupture. rupture.

2.7.6 uan i i l I l l SYSTEM 80+= i l 2.7.7 DEMINERALIZED WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM Design Description The Demineralized Water Makeup System (DWMS) supplies filtered water reduced in gases and ions to the condensate storage system, component cooling water system I (CCWS), emergency feedwater system (EFWS), normal and essential chilled water ( systems, and the diesel generator cooling system. l Re Basic Configuration of the DWMS is as shown on Figure 2.7.7-1. He DWMS is non-safety-related with the exception of the containment penetration isolation valves and piping in between covered in Section 2.4.5. He DWMS has pumps, demineralizes, a degasifier, a deminerahzed water storage { tank, piping, instrumentation, and controls. l ' Re DWMS demineralizers, pumps, regeneration, and neutralization equipment, including the regenerant waste neutralization tank are located in the station service building. He demineralized water storage tank is located in the yard. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criterie Table 2.7.7-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance . criteria for the Demineralized Water Makeup System. l O 2.7.7 -1 u u-n 1 - - - ,,m O O O SYSTEM 80+" .J a . l Pa = . i ecow. gag cu.= l '.~55=5.' _ - I d= I _ " " " "

_ '~ ti T i

i o, om- 1 __ ----~ M MAWER ' _=_rl=:= ' l= l SUPPLY LOADS r ---- --. g m w = = g } ===" --bt-- i - ~ E t E N X lJ lg .gl!l: ! Oll! " Og* ed J= m mi hga h !! ==,= sJg; sJlg; l ll- ll FIGURE 2.7.7-1 DEMINERALIZED-WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM == p O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.7-1 DEMINERALIZED WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desira Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the DWMS 1. Inspection of the as-built DWMS 1. For the components and equipment is as shown on Figure 2.7.7-1. configuration will be performed, shown on Figure 2.7.7-1, the as-built DWMS conforms with the Basic Configuration, t

2.7.7 um s ..__-______--_-__-____--__-________-_--_-__9 l dYS'IEM 80+= l O 2.7.8 CONDENSATE STORAGE SYSTEM f Design Description ne Condensate Storage System provides a source of condensate for makeup to the main condenser, is a source of startup feedwater to the steam generators, and provides a non-safety source of condensate to the emergency feedwater storage tanks.- Re Basic Configuration is as shown on Figure 2.7.8-1. The Condensate Storage System is non-safety-related. The Condensate Storage System has a condensate storage tank, a condensate storage 5 tank recycle pump, and associated valves, piping, and controls. The condensate ; storage tank is located in the yard. The Condensate Storage System recycle pump is j located in the station services building. The Condensate Storage System provides makeup or receives excess condensate from the main condenser hotwell. The Condensate Storage System also serves to collect i and store condensate from plant condensate drains. ! Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.8-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Condensate Storage System. I i l l l l % 2.7.8 u-se ! i w

1 Y e -

5 'r t *gu- gg y'ep yyes p O O O SYSTEM 80 + DEMINERALIZED r 3 l WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM I --> I ,_, _ _ ,,, ,,,, ,,,, _ _ _ i l (DEGASIFER) i C --) MAIN CONDENSER l ---------- HOTWELL -M i CONDENSATE _. _ ~~ STORAGE I _ _ I l DEM NERALIZED--l TANK ,_ ,,, p EMERGENCY FEEDWATER I l WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM 1 m STORAGE TANKS l.---------- y , (DEMINERALIZED WATER _ _ syqp@F,_T@lg _ _ g L J - ---_y . l -""-----""""I DEMINERALIZED STARTUP - - M WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM I I FEEDWATER '< [) I (DEGASIFER) 'I l PUMP SUCTION UNE I = ---.------ ' 'gl CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK RECYCLE PUMP F FIGURE 2.7.8-1 " ' ~ " CONDENSATE STORAGE SYSTEM O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.8-1 CONDENSATE STORAGE SYSTEM Insocctions. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desist Commitment Inspections. Tests. Anakses Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the 1. Inspection of the as-built Condensate 1. For the components and equipment Condensate Storage System is as shown Storage System configuration will be shown on Figure 2.7.8-1, the as-built on Figure 2.7.8-1. conducted. Condensate Storage System conforms with the Basic Configuration.

2.7.8 im.n ] ! SYSTEM 80+" i 2.7.9 PROCESS SAMPLING SYSTEM i i Design Description The Process Sampling System (PSS) collects and delivers samples from process systems to sample stations for analyses. Portions of the system which form part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are safety-related. A sub-system of the PSS is the post-accident sampling system (PASS). The PASS is used to collect post-accident samples of containment atmosphere and reactor coolant for analysis. Reactor coolant samples are collected for boron, radiological, and total dissolved gas measurements. Containment atmosphere samples are collected for radiological measurements. He PASS may be remotely operated as necessary to reduce personnel radiation exposure. The PSS is located within the nuclear island structures. The Basic Configuration of the PSS is as shown on Figure 2.7.9-1. The ASME Code Section III Class for the PSS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.7.9-1 is as depicted on the Figure. 4 The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.9-1 is classified Seismic Category I. Displays of the PSS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.9-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to open and close those power operated valves shown on Figure 2.7.9-1. PSS alarms shown on Figure 2.7.9-1 are provided in the MCR. - Valves with response positions indicated on Figure 2.7.9-1 change position to that indicated on the Figure upon loss of motive power. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.9-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Process Sampling System. l l l 2.7.9 naim _ _ . ._. . .._._m._. -._ _ _ _ . - . _ _ . . . _ . _ . _ . . . _ _ _ . . . _ . _ . . _ _ . . . _ . _ . _ , _ _ . _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ SYSTEMLil" n lASME CODE SECilON in CLASS [ O O TO VCT ME PROCESS (CVpS) RADIATION a MONITOR $e PURIFICATION l" FILTER (CVCS) ~"* gg BORONOMETER =---. . -. -.--=. -.= =3 + comussent g commweewr , FC l HOT LEO l FC * { i *^"a O i = CIV --cED-il "x lIr- ASSEMBLY M N ORIFICE CIV g E Q$ RCP CONTROt1ED FC

E-> I ~*~

f ~ ~~ ~ l TO POST l r e FC ACCIDENT ! l CIV SAMKING l t l$10LDUP VOLUME l l TANK -> l (IWSS) l FC

CIV TO POST l 8 ACCIDENT EE g n. ~

l ____ Civ I* S""*'" l I l PRESSURIZER l FC l rc I fl T r SAMPLE SINK ~ *LWM8 SURGE LINE lli ll 4 HX ll l g ,' lSAIPLE NOZZLE I ORIFICE CIV U (RCS) dE g g r*- I g FC

PRESSURIZER REACTOR -

FC g uI fl I I. g HX ly-l COOLANTOAS VENT LINE l Cly CIV lI l g N+ i lSAMPLENOZ2LE ORIFICE l s a EE se-I PRIMARY l SAMPLE pg - e SAMPLE l VESSEL . - - - -- FC

l FC l COOLER RACK ASSEMBLY a

lSAFETYINJECTION! I jg '#"* " T $ l HEA ER l ClV ClV l

Em p 5

NOTES:

1. THE ASME CODE SECTION lit CLASS 2 COMPONENTS SHOWN ARE SAFETY.RELATED

2. e EOU1PMENT FOR WHICH PARAGRAPH NUMBER 3 OF THE

VERIFICATION FOR BASIC CONFIGURATION FOR SYSTEMS
SECTION OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS (SECTION 1.2) APPLIES FIGURE 2.7.9-1 " '

PROCESS SAMPLING SYSTEM O O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.7.9-1 PROCESS SAMPLING SYSTEM inry#NsJests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the PSS is 1. Inspection of the as-built PSS con- 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.7.9-1. figuration will be conducted, shown on Figure 2.7.9-1, the as-built PSS conforms with the Basic ,

Configuration.

2. He ASME Code Section III PSS 2. A pressure test will be conducted on 2. He results of the pressure test of components shown on Figure 2.7.9-1 those components of the PSS required to ASME Code Section Ill components of retain their pressure boundary integrity be pressure tested by ASME Code the PSS conform with ths pressure under internal pressures that will be Section III. testing acceptance criteria in ASME experienced during service. Code Section III.

3.a) Displays of the PSS instrumentation 3.a) Inspection for the existence or 3.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.7.9-1 exist in the retrieveability in the MCR of on Figure 2.7.9-1 exist in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there. performed. 3.b) Controls exist in the MCR to open and 3.b) Testing will be performed using the PSS 3.b) PSS contniis in the MCR operate to close those power operated valves controls ir. the MCR. open and close those power operated shown on Figure 2.7.9-1. valves shown on Figure 2.7.9-1. 3.c) PSS alarms shown on Figure 2.7.9-1 are 3.c) Testing of the PSS alarms shown on 3.c) ' He PSS alarms shown on Figure provided in the MCR. Figure 2.7.9-1 will be performed using 2.7.9-1 actuate in the MCR in response signals simulating alarm conditions. to signals simulating alarm conditions. 2.7.9 iwi.n 10 C i (~ y v SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.7.9-1 (Continued 1 PROCESS SAMPLING SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

4. Check valves shown on Figure 2.7.9-1 4. Testing will be performed to open, er 4. Each check valve shown on Figure will open, or will close, or will open close, or open and also close check 2.7.9-1 opens, or closes, or opens and and also close under system pressure, valves under preopeastional differential also closes.

fluid flow conditions, or temperature pressure, fluid flow conditions, or conditions. temperature conditions.

5. Valves with response positions indicated 5. Testing of loss of motive power to these 5. These valves change position to the on Figure 2.7.9-1 change position to valves will be performed. position indicated on Figure 2.7.9-1 on that indicated on the Figure upon loss of loss of motive power.

motive power.

6. The PASS can collect samples of rem 6. Testing of the PASS capability to obtain 6. Samples of reactor coolant and coolant and containment atmosphert, samples will be performal under containment atmosphere are collected by preoperational conditions. the PASS.

2.7.9 2 si-ss !' i i .I SYSTEM 80+" j E.qp) t

2.7.10 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEMS j t

Design Description %e Compressed Air Systems (CAS) consist of the Instrument Air System (IAS)', Station Air System (SAS), and Breathing Air System (BAS). .{ He IAS supplies compressed air. to air-operated instrumentation, air-operated, ;! controls, and air-operated valves. . j he Basic Configuration of the IAS is as shown on Figure 2.'i.101. , l IAS air compressors, air receivers, and dryer / filters are located in the nuclear annex. De IAS supply lines extend to and end at the controller'of the connected i 1 component. i i Each IAS air compressor shown on Figure 2.7.10-1 is powered from a permanent non- ~ safety bus. j A display of the IAS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.10-1 exists in the main O control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. ~i The SAS supplies compressed air for air-operated tools and for general use in the..-- plant. .] He Basic Configuration of the SAS is as shown on Figure 2.7.10-2. -! The BAS supplies compressed air for breathing protection.- 'j The Basic Configuration of the BAS is as snown on Figure 2.7.10-3.' l The CAS are non-safety-related systems with the exception of the containmenti penetration isolation valves and piping in between which are covered in Section 2.4.5.- Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria . Table 2.7.10-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance ~ ~ criteria for the Compressed Air Systems. 2.7.10 2M8* l t , -- - O O O +'- AIR COesPRE.90R .4YER71LTER g V,,,,,, , Omn..,T mm l, COm E.,T l Asest CODE seCTEDN M CLAes a aj u E H] m : +'~ en g = i, m - NT - tOAo. Am cot 0 PRES.OR ORYERTILTER g 8 v -CE,vER --O I 7 Ipe.TRUe0ENT AIR LOA - Civ y . P=..OR omRam .. 8 V ,,ECE,.E,, A. En l, um OUm.E .. E CONTAMADENT CONTA.H8ENT m ..T +g4 = m ,ftU.t.eEN.T,A,R,, OUT.t.A T U u .O U.PPLY E CONTAmtBENT A.RCO OR om m v AM RECEIVER FIGURE 2.7.10-1 * * " INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM SYS 80 + N AIR COMPRESSOR E M V AIR RECElVER m iN AIR COMPRESSOR DRYERTETER Iase8Ekb4 CLASS SECTKW Mt l A,,, au . ona RECErvER STATM)N AIR SUPPLY SIDE NTANnMMT en eu INSIDE OUTSrDE ' CONTA9NSENT CONTAMMENT u %^a"T ^'l"Us", 2'8 OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT FIGURE 2.7.10-2 STATION AIR SYSTEM SYSTE O+ O m N AIR COMPRESSOR BREA NG AIR V ^" RECimER m ._ -h i AM COMPftESSOR BREATHING AM v . .. _ . .. - ,,, , 1 AM au : Em RECEfVER TO 90NS C INSIDE CONTAf88WENT W CN EETAm=Ewr E E Ee=Enr l

u Io*Pt,Awr"eSA.nY.o oms oE Co .E1 FIGURE 2.7.10-3

$2m3 BREATHING AIR SYSTEM O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.10-1 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desies Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the IAS is as 1. Inspection of the as-built IAS con- 1. For the components and equipment shown on Figure 2.7.10-1. figuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.10-1, the as-built IAS conforms with the Basic Con-figuration.

2. The Basic Configuration of the SAS is 2. Inspection of the as-built SAS 2. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.7.10-2. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.10-2, the as-built SAS conforms with the Basic Configuration.

3. The Basic Configuration of the BAS is 3. Inspection of the as-built BAS 3. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.7.10-3. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.10-3, the as-built BAS conforms with the Basic Configuratia.

4. A display of the IAS instrumentation 4. Inspection for the existence or re- 4. A display of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.7.10-1 exists in the trieveability in the MCR of on Figure 2.7.10-1 exists in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieved there. instiv*nentation ' displays will be can be retrieved there.

performed.

5. The IAS electrical loads shown on 5. Testing will be performed on the IAS by S. Within the IAS, a test signal exists at Figure 2.7.10-1 are powered from a ' providing a test signalin the permanent the equipnient powered by. the permanent non-safety bus. non-safety bus, permanent non-safety bus under test.

2.7.10 u-n-n 1 i SYSTEM 80+" 2.7.11 TURBINE BUILDING COOLING WATER SYSTEM Design Description 1 The Turbine Building Cooling Water System (TBCWS) provides cooling water to the ! non-safety-related turbine plant auxiliary system components. The Basic Configuration of the TBCWS is as shown on Figure 2.7.11-1. The TBCWS is non-safety-related. The TBCWS is a single closed loop cooling water system. He TBCWS has two beat exchangers, two pumps, one surge tank, piping, valves, and controls. The TBCWS is located in the turbine building and yard. He TBCWS transfers heat from turbine building auxiliary system components to the l turbine building service water system (TBSWS). Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.11-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance

criteria for the Turbine Building Cooling Water System.

Q l V

1 i

i O 2.7.11 um ] 1 i I O O O SYSTEM 80 +* n if TBSWS - - W IX WTBSWS TBCWS SURGE TANK r m h TBSWS - - -> HX -- WTBSWS e = 0; 1r II--1I m i I HEAT I lm g y LOADS y y' um____. ' FIGURE 2.7.11-1 12 m 3 TURBINE BUILDING COOLING WATER SYSTEM 1 O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.11-1 TURBINE BUILDING COOLING WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria ;

1. The Basic Configuration of the TBCWS 1. Inspection of the as-built TBCWS 1. For the components and equipment is as shown on Figure 2.7.11-1. configuration will be conducted, shown on Figure 2.7.11-1, the as-built TBCWS conforms with the Basic Configuration.

2.7.11 mi.n .m.a_m _ __ __.___ _ . . _ _ _ _ - _ _ _m_-_,_.m.____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ,_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ ____ _ _ _ . . - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ __m_n- = _ _ _ _ _ .__am v_ __-__m w __._____m - _m____m________________--_____________.2_ _ _ _ _ _ . _ SYS'mM 80+ 0 2.7.12 ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM j l Design Description i i The Essential Chilled Water System (ECWS) is a safety-related closed loop chilled water sptem that serves safety-related HVAC cooling loads. The ECWS provides , chilled water to connected safety-related air handling units. l l he Basic Configuration of the ECWS is as shown on Figure 2.7.12-1. The essential chilled water (ECW) expansion tanks, ECW pumps, essential chillers, . and ECW heat exchangers are located in the nuclear annex. l The ECWS consis+s of two Divisions. Esch Division includes a chiller, a heat l exchanger, two chilled water pumps, an expansion tank, piping, v4.es, controls and. ; instrumentation. ; he ASME Code Section III Qass for the ECWS pressure retaining componene shown on Figure 2.7.12-1 is as depicted on the Figure. The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.12-1 is classified Seismic Category L O The Gass IE loads shown on Figure 2.7.12-1 are powered from their respective Cass IE Division. The two mechanical Divisions of the ECWS are physically separated. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to start and stop the essential chilled water pumps and essential chiller shown on Figure 2.7.12-1. Independence is provided between Cass 1E Divisions, and between Cass 1E Divisions and non-Qass 1E equipment, in the ECWS. The ECWS is automatically actuated to furnish essential chilled water upon a loss of the normal chilled water system (NCWS). C1 2.7.12 2.m-m l' . l l l- : ~! L SYS1EM 80+ -! Makeup water to the ECWS is supplied by the demineralized water makeup system . (DWMS) A safety-related Seismic Category.I makeup line is provided to each - , Division from the station service water system (SSWS) via a spool piece which can be ! connected. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria I Table 2.7.12-1 specifies the inspections,' tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Essential Chilled Water System. -1 O I f O 2.7.12 ~** uss.m I i .. _ , . . ~ - - . SYSTE 80+ I ASME COD E SFCTION ill CLASS I 3 N E VIC WATER Il lI ,,, ,,, DEMINERALIZED WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM (SSWS) 3 SYSTEM (DWMS) MAKEUP I MAKEUP 3" spoo"f NCWS NCWS PIECE ECW EXPANSIONTANK I es t , x + == ECW PUMP ESSENTIAL CHILLER ~ + ECW PUMP SAFETY-RELATED = HVAC COOLING LOADS i 4 FIGURE 2.7.12-1 ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM ' ' * (ONE OF TWO DIVISIONS) O O - SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.7.12-1 ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitinent Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. He Basic Configuration of the ECWS is 1. Inspection of the as-built ECWS 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.7.12-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.12-1, the as-built ECWS conforms with the Basic Configuration.

2. He ASME Code Section III ECWS 2. A pressure test will be conducted on 2. The results of the pressure test of the components shown on Figure 2.7.12-1 those components of the ECWS required ASME Code Section III components of retain their pressure boundary integrity to be pressure tested by ASME Code the ECWS conform with the pressure under internal pressures that will be Section III. testing acceptance criteria in ASME experienced during service. Code Section III.

3.a) He Class IE loads shown on Figure 3.a) Testing will be performed on the ECWS 3.a) Within the ECWS, a test signal exists 2.7.12-1 are powered from their by providing a test signal in only one only at the equipment powered from the respective Class IE Division. Class IE Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. 3.b) Independence is provided between Class 3.b) Inspection of the as-installed Class IE 3.b) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions in the ECWS will be IE Oivisions in the CCWS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, performed. eeparation exists between Class IE in the ECWS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the ECWS. ' 4. The two mechanical Divisions of the 4. Inspection of the as-built mechanical 4. He two mechanical divisions of the ECWS are physically separated. Divisions will be performed. ECWS are separated by a Divisional wall or by a fire barrier. i 2.7.12 32mm O O ( SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.12-1 (Continued) ESSENTIAL CIIILLED WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Coninaitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

5. Controls exist in the MCR to start and 5. Testing will be performed using the 5. ECWS controls in the MCR operate to stop the essential chilled water pumps ECWS controls in the MCR. start and stop the essential chilled water and essential chiller shown on Figure pumps and essential chiller shown on 2.7.12-1. Figure 2.7.12-1.

6. The ECWS is automatically actuated to 6. Testing will be performed using a signal 6. The ECWS is automatically actuated to fumish essential chilled water upon a to simulate loss of the normal chilled furnish essential chilled water upon a' loss of the normal chilled water system water system. loss of the NCWS.

(NCWS).

7. The spool piece on the SSWS makeup 7. Testing of the spool piece will be 7. The spool piece on the SSWS makeup line to each Division of the ECWS can performed to confirm that it can be line to each Division of the ECWS can be connected. connect xl. be connected.

2.7.12 asim l l 1 i i l SYSTEM 80+ O 2.7.13 NORMAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM Design Description . 1 With the exception of the Containment penetration isolation valves and piping in ! between covered in Section 2.4.5, the Normal Chilled Water System (NCWS) is a l non-safety-related closed loop chilled water system that serves non-safety-related { HVAC cooling loads. The NCWS provides chilled water to connected air handling , units and the essential chilled water heat exchanger. j The Basic Configuration of the NCWS is as shown on Figure 2.7.13-1. The normal chilled water (NCW) expansion tanks, NCW pumps, and normal chillers are located in the nuclear annex. t The NCWS consists of two Divisions. Each Division of the NCWS includes two ! chillers, two chilled water pumps, an expansion tank, piping, valves, controls and instrumentation. , Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria [ i Table 2.7.13-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance ; O criteria for the Normal Chilled Water System. i i l 5 l -i i i l l l l O 2.7.13 12.n.c ; l i l O SYSTEM 80+ O O O DEMIMERAUZED WATER MAKEUP * ~

SYSTEM (DWMS) MAKEUP

. NCW EXPANSION TANK k [ + %' NORMAL CHILLER a NCW PUMP NORMAL CHILLER + NCW PUMP i I , ECW I I i I l .# lI NON-SAFETY ! RELATED OUTSIDE MSIDE MS40E OUTSIDE ! RELATED ! HVAC COOUNG ' LOADS

l. Civ Civ CIV' CIV i .

IN 2l E 12 Nl [N 2l E 12 ; NI i N LacMS @E SECTION til O__Att l O EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH PARAGAPH NUMBER (3) OP mE vEmnCanONS FOR a4 sic CONnGURAnON FIGURE 2.7.13-1 "'"""^'P"8'"* '"S*'" , Sip 3 *,u"S. NORMAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM 12-31-93 (ONE OF TWO DIVISIONS) i = O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.13-1 NORMAL CIIILLED WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the NCWS 1. Inspection of the as-built NCWS 1. For the components and equipment is as shown on Figure 2.7.13-1. configuration will be conducted. shown en Figure 2.7.13-1, the as-built NCWS conforms with the Basic Configuration.

2.7.13 n.n.n SYSTEM 80+" 2.7.14 TURBINE BUILDING SERVICE WATER SYSTEM Design Description 'Ibe Turbine Building Service Water System (TBSWS) removes heat from the turbine building cooling water system (TBCWS) and transfers heat to the condenser circulating water system. The Basic Configuration of the TBSWS is as shown on Figure 2.7.14-1. The TBSWS is non-safety-related. The TBSWS has two pumps and associated piping, valves, and controls which provide cooling water to the TBCWS heat exchangers. The TBSWS is located in the yard. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.14-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Turbine Building Service Water System. O 2.7.14 u.m-n O O O SYSTEM 80+" TecWs n I , 8 rr-- Iii I i TBCWS I I HX INORMAL I - i [ i l i LL___JJ l l l-__-- HEAT SINKI p__y CONDENSER I CIRCULATING I Oi WATER I g ' SYSTEM ; I l - - - ~1 ~1 - I I TBCWS I I HX Il NORMAL m [] , II g ~ ~~ ~ 3 g g g

i. HEAT ____ SINKl g U

TBCWs I t FIGURE 2.7.14-1 TURBINE BUILDING SERVICE WATER SYSTEM ] ______.___-__._m.___. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ __ ___m______1_____ _ _ _ _ _ . _ , w O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.14-1 TURilINE RUILDING SERVICE WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses _ Acceptance Criteria

1. The Basic Configuration of the Turbine 1. hispection of the as-built TBSWS 1. For the components and equipment Building Service Water System configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.14-1, the as-built (TBSWS) is as shown on Figure TBSWS conforms with the Basic 2.7.14-1. Configuration.

l 2.7.14 ::oi-n - - - _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ - . _ - - - . . . .,. .-____ . .. - .. - SYSTEM 80+" 2.7.15 EQUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEM Design Description The Equipment and Floor Drainage System (EFDS) segregates and transports liquids containing wastes to the liquid waste management system (LWMS). The EFDS has components in the nuclear island structures, the turbine building and the radwaste - building. The Basic Configuration of the EFDS is as ww on Figure 2.7.15-1. The ASME , Code Section III Qass 2 and 3 components shown on Figure 2.7.15-1 are l safety-related. j The equipment and floor drains are separated into equipment drains, floor drains, chemical waste drains, and detergent waste drains. Liquid wastes are routed to the LWMS subsystem that processes the particular waste type, i Nonradioactive equipment and floor drains are not connected to radioactive or potentially radioactive equipment and floor drains. Floor drains in the nuclear annex (NA) are physically separated into two Divisions and there are no common drain lines between Divisions. Floor drains in the reactor building (RB) subsphere are physically separated into quadrants (two in each-Division) and there are no common Door drain lines between quadrants. Within Containment, the EFDS has no direct downward gravity Dowpaths that will allow the release of radioactive material. The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.15-1 is classified Seismic Category I. The Gass 1E loads shown on Figure 2.7.15-1 are powered from their respective Cass 1E Division. Independence is provided between Cass 1E Divisions, and between Class 1E Divisions and non-Cass 1E equipment, in the EFDS. The turbine building floor drain sump is equipped with a radiation detection instrument. If radioactivity is detected in the turbine building floor drain sump, the sump discharge is automatically terminated and can be routed to the LWMS. I 2.7.15 1. 12-22-93 SYS'IEM 80+" i O The ASME Section III Class for the EFDS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.7.15-1 is as depicted on the Figure. Displays of EFDS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.15-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.15-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance criteria for the Equipment and Floor Drainage System. O l s l j O 2.7.15 12-22-93 l l I l .]. SYSTEM 80+TM i o.comm= win j our.oe co.n==wn ,, wo.1xm Sm L : ,,ocm ,, ,,,,,,, CvCS EouirisENT ; rs.oononam ne,oEn l : +isoNRioiaTmM81.'*L tr o maocac""e t== i oa '" """" j ,r '" """'moEm . - c rt=R-1 e u,=.x_ = ,, ,u UCuA. .,,,,,x .,_ ,, . CvCS--,- ,,En nw,. , L 3 Civ av f0t?RADUACTfYE UQUIDSg 61 F1 i rp -e i. .-.1%l l- rg i k l i!! i IIgI !IJ r;I I I ib i I: _g i,lgi ; il tillJ IIJ l "J -w . go =- '=:_ _7.74 _' I i. ;_8 8 pk 8 8 8 i _,p- 3 l ,i=- i l I Z.473 -Z.4Z.4' !. _73_7) _24_Z4 _Z+73 _Z4_73 _Z4_73 _Zt_73 i - _ur u v -ul 7 , r r c , c , c i i i i I i 1 1 : . 1 1 . , ! ! , , ! ! , , 1 1 , l l l . l' l l l l :l " 'l l l 'l , i l 1 l l . l l _ . F's l l ! I ' o p, i.., u u , , , ,

l. , , ,

CO,,,_E,,7 REAC,0,, ._.. 8 REACTOR BLDG, NUCLEAR ANNEX DIESEL GENERATOR CVCS FLOOR DRAIN CAVTTY CVCS AREA Sump SUuP l, SUBSPHERE NON-AADICACTIVE BUILDtNa E3 rtOoR - m touiPiseNT OUADRANT PLOOR DRAM FLOCR DRAW SUMP pHE DRAW SUMP , rtooR DRAM SUwP SUMP pME SUMP NNEX SUMP PER (ONE SUMP PER PER DIVISION. SunsP PER DMSme (oNE S,UwP . NUCLEAR DMSON.4 PUMPS (ONE SUMP PER RADloACT A,VE DMSON. 4 SUBSPHERE 4 PUMPS TOTAQ 4 PURSPS TOTA 4 floor DRAM SUtsP PUntPS TOTAQ TOTAQ I. QUADRANT.S PURAPS {ONE SUMP PER NOTE ' MA4 DMSON.4 PUMPS ' **"""gg"g"%E,"J8%% o,T,.E

2. THE SAFETY 4 ELATED EMCTR CAL EQUtPMENT IS CLASS 1E.

FIGURE 2.7.15-1 ' 2*' EQUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEM m \ U pd r SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.7.15-1 EOUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Comunitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1.a) He Basic Configuration of the EFDS is 1.a) Inspection of the as-built EFDS 1.a) For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.7.15-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.15-1, the as-built EFDS conforms with the Basic Configuration. , t 1.b) Displays of the EFDS instrumentas.on 1.b) Inspection for the existence or 1.b) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.7.15-1 exist in the retrievability in the MCR of on Figure 2.7.15-1 exist in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieve there. instrumentation displays will be can be retrieve there. ; performed.

2. De ASME Code Section 111 EFDS 2. A pressure test will be conducted on - 2. He results of the pressure test of components shown on Figure 2.7.15-1 those components of the EFDS required ASME Code Section 111 components of retain their pressure boundary integrity to be pressure tested by ASME Code the EFDS conform with the pressure under internal' pressures that will be Section Ill. testing acceptance criteria in ASME experienced during service. Code Section III.

3. %e equipment and - floor drains are 3. Inspection of the EFDS will be 3. Equipment drain liquid waste, floor separated into equiprnent drains, floor - performed. drain liquid waste, chemical liquid ,

drains, chemical waste d ains, and waste, and detergent liquid waste are . detergent waste drains. Liquid wastes transported through separate piping to are routed to the LWMS subsystem that the LWMS subsystem that processes that ' processes the particular waste type. .wsste type.

4. Nonradioactive equipment and floor 4. - Inspection of the EFDS will be 4. Nonradioactive equipment and floor drains are not connected to radioactive performed. drains are not connected to radioactive or potentially radioactive equipment and or potentially radioactive equipment and -

floor drains. : floor drains. , 2.7.15 12-22-93 m w Mr *e e u-- 1--e*-"Pw*ry-1 w my e w eg me sei -4s--t-. ego em m,v v? ? 9--w T- 4+-- w SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.7.15-1 (Continued) EOUIPMEh'T_6ND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment hsoccticas.Tes3s. Ansivses Acceptance Criteria 5.a) Floor drains in the NA are physical;y 5.a) Inspection of the EFDS will be 5.a) The floor drains in ti a NA are separated separated into two Divisions and there prformed. by a Divisional wall and have no are no common drain lines between common drain lines between Divisions. Divisions. 5.b) Floor drsins in the PB subsphere are 5.b) Inspection of the EFDS will be 5.b) The EFDS RB subsphere floor drains in physically separated into quadrants (two performed. each quadrant of the RB subsphere are in each Division) and there are no separated by walls and have no common common floor drain lines between drain lines between quadrants. quadrants.

6. Within Containment, the EFDS has no 6. Inspection of the EFDS will be 6. Within Containment, no direct direct gravity downward flowpath that performed. downward flowpath that would allow the will allow the release of radioactive release of radioactive material exists.

material. 7.a) The Class IE loads shown on Figure 7.a) Testing will be performed on the EFDS 7.a) Within the EFDS, a test signal exists 2.7.15-1 are _ powered from their by providing a test signal in only one only at the equipment powered from the respective Class IE Division. Class IE Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. 7.b) Independence is provided between Class 7.b) Inspection of the as-installed Class 1E 7.b) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and betwen Class IE Divisions of the EFDS will be . IE Divisions in the EFDS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, performed. separation exists between Class IE in the EFDS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the EFDS. 2.7.15 12-22-93 .f$jiyi[,}i.['.yf5[3%jkhj%{fi$[.Q.[;d(..h%[j:j[~[.hj j (s@% M @$f T.jjj[%f%.W$ - ~ f% f% b[% b C SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.7.15-1 (Continued) EOUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 8.a) The turbine building floor drain sump is 8.a) Inspection of the turbine building floor 8.a) A radiation detection instrument is equipped with a radiation detection drain sump will be performed. installed. instrument. 8.b) If radioactivity is detected in the turbine 8.b) Testing of the flow termination from the 8.b) In response to a signa; that simulates building floor drain sump, the sump turbine building floor drain sump will be radioactivity in the turbine building floor discharge is automatice'.ly terminated performed using a signal that simulates drain sump, the sump discharge is and can be routed to the LWMS. radiation in the sump, automatically terminated. 2.7.15 12-22-93 SYSTEM 80+" O 2.7.16 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM Design Description The Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) maintains the required volume of water in the reactor coolant system (RCS) (in conjunction with the pressurizer level control system), removes noble gases from the RCS, and permits addition of chemicals for primary coolant chemistry control. The CVCS removes coolant water from the RCS, passes the coolant water through filters and ion exchangers, adds or removes soluble boron from the coolant, provides backup spray water to the pressurizer, provides cooling water to the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals, collects controlled RCP seal bleedoff, provides wate.r to the spent fuel pool and returns water to the RCS. The CVCS is a non-safety-related system except for portions of the system which form part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, which are safety-related. The Basic Configuration of the CVCS is as shown on Figure 2.7.16-1. Components shown on the Figure are located in the nuclear island structures. The CVCS includes pumps, valves, tanks, heat exchangers, ion exchangers, piping, instrumentation and controls. Flow limiting orifices are provided in the letdown line. The ASME Code Section III Cass for the CVCS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 is as depicted on the Figure. The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 is classified Seismic Category I. Pressure retaining components in the charging pump suction line from the check valve to the pumps have a design pressure of at least 900 psig. Displays of the CVCS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the charging pumps and the dedicated seal injection pump, and to open and close those power operated valves shown on Figure 2.7.16-1. CVCS alarms are provided as shown on Figure 2.7.16-1. The dedicated seal injection pump receives Cass 1E power. Each ASME Code Section III Cass 1 letdown line isolation valve is powered fram a different Cass 1E Dhision. 2.7.16 12 m.o SYSTEM 80+" Motor operated valves (MOVs) having an active safety function will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under differential pressure or Duid flow conditions and under temperature conditions. Check valves shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under system pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. Valves with response positions indicated on Figure 2.7.161 change position to that indicated on the Figure upon loss of motive power. The letdown line is isolated by a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS). The RCP controlled bleedoff line is isolated by a containment spray actuation sig .al (CSAS). An interlock is provided so that no more than one charging pump is operating at a time. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.16-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Chemical and Volume Control System. O i i O 2.7.16 n-n-93 O SYSTEM 80 +,. O mmoe ourssoe O CONTAmaIENT CoNTAmteENT , . . . m. . , , " * " ~ " ' ~ g 'I .2.".c=> . te . h,e rrn l ,Ji',"c., l -l p*"4 h i ,H civ T. *"ga h-n - ,o car a ",WTE 4) I COD. .ECTION W C1.A. I j g l m 'g.h g ......l..., o u cews g ac y' M r-- ..---- ..- ?, 3 ,,, 4 - ~ ="j ga cu .oo",r"lll5,,, a=i= l _ :. a m3 = 4 " e ' n * * 'd . =- __

m. 1 ED ED N W to

!Qh ~ ramMI "lF [i =~*3llL.' r _unes '. I c . ... g g pl. l <=r='m RE. DOFF p,$",. I g M ; i llll=,,o".*, c c., l m lllm- i e-------. EB . E Da> gi ; " "',: " ' * : g cron o,=,. "",,,",",,,...,rl _r= i , g onou n co y f -- -- -- - ' = r , w ^"a,, yor, EE- EB g M,' S = U .,. Acro. "U . i 5~ 'W maxev wArun D 07, : i.1_. ,co_o. er,= .,cua . . - ner != % w-o 9n. t 1,.o car.,--pu or wo. cra cun , e ,,o M, e"_","o". =.^.- l".V.1 *"" "'**"'.a'c"r,ol.'r",.".".,." i 1. & Cou,oM9ff. 7,e.E.u=V.TS af.N CC E CT1o.1 FIGURE 2.7.16-1 . CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM - l e e e SYSTEM 80+~ TABLE 2.7.16-1 CIIEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. TcSts. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

1. He Basic Configuration of the CVCS is 1. Inspection of the as-built CVCS 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.7.16-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.16-1, the as-built CVCS conforms with the Basic Con-figuration.

2. The ASME Code Section Ill CVCS 2. A pressure test will be conducted on 2. The results of the pressure test of components shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 those components of the CVCS required ASME Code Section III components of retain their pressure boundary integrity to be pressure tested by ASME Code the CVCS conform with the pressure under internal pressures that will be Section 111. testing acceptance criteria in ASME experienced during service. Code Section III.

3.a) Displays of CVCS instrumentation 3.a) Inspection for the existence or retriev- 3.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 exist in the ability in the MCR of instrumentation on Figere 2.7.16-1 exist in the MCR or MCR or can be ret-ieved there, displays will be performed. can be retrieved there. 3.b) Controls exist in the MCR to start and 3.b) Testing will be performed using the 3.b) CVCS controls in the MCR operate to stop the charging pumps and the CVCS controls in the MCR. start and stop the charging pumps and dedicated seal injection pump, and to the dedicated seal injection pump, and to open and close those power operated open and close those power-operated valves shown on Figure 2.7.16-1. valves shown on Figure 2.7.16-1. 3.c) CVCS alarms shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 3.c) Testing of the CVCS alarms shown on 3.c) He CVCS slarms shown on Figure are provided as shown on the Figure. Figure 2.7.16-1 will be performed using 2.7.16-1 actuate in response to signals signals simulating alarm conditions. simulating alarm conditions. 2.7.16 uan C 3 x ( (V SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.16-1 (Continued) CIIEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM Insocctions. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses AcceDiance Criteria 4.a) The dedicated seal injection pump 4.a) Testing will be performed on the CVCS 4.a) A test signal exists at the CVCS receives Class lE power. by providing a test signal in the Class component powered from the Class IE lE Division which supplies power to the Division under test. dedicated seal injection pump. 4.b) Each ASME Code Section III Class 1 4.b) Testing will be performed on the CVCS 4.b) A test signal exists only at the CVCS letdown line isolation valve is powered by providing a test signal in only one component powered from the Class IE l from a different Class IE Division. Class IE Division at a time. Division under test. 1

5. Valves with response positions indicated 5. Testing ofloss of motive power to these 5. These valves change position to the i on Figure 2.7.16-1 change position to valves will be performed. position indicated on Figure 2.7.16-1 on l that indicated on the Figure upon loss of loss of motive power.

motive power. 6.a) The letdown line is isolated by a safety 6.a) Testing will be performed using a signal 6.a) The two CVCS letdown isolation valves injection actuation signal (SIAS). simulating an SIAS. inside containment close upon receipt of a signal simulating an SIAS. i l 6.b) The RCP seal controlled bleedoffline is - 6.b) Testing will be performed using a signal 6.b) The RCP seal controlled bleedoff 81ne isolated by a containment spray simulating a CSAS. isolation valves close upon receipt of a actuation signal (CSAS). signal simulating a CSAS.

7. An interlock is provided so that no more 7. Testing will be performed by attempa.g 7. 'Ihe idb charging pump will not start than one charging pump is operating at to start each charging pump from the when the other pump is running.

a time. MCR with the other pump running. 2.7.16 n.3tm 1 O (O V Qa v SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.16-1 (Continued) l CIIEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM l Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria l l Design Conimitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria

8. Motor operated valves (MOVs) having 8. Testing will be performed to open, or 8. Each MOV having an active safety an active safety function will open, or close, or open and also close, MOVs function opens, or closes, or opens and will close, or will open and also close, having an active safety function under alsocloses.

under differential pressure or fluid flow preoperational differential pressure or conditions and under temperature fluid flow conditions and under conditions. temperature conditions.

9. Check valves shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 9. Testing will be performed to open, or 9. Each check valve shown on Figure l will open, or will close, or will open close, or open and also close, check 2.7.16-1, opens, or closes, or opens and and also close, under system pressure, valves shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 under also closes.

fluid flow conditions, or temperature system preoperational pressure, fluid conditions. flow conditions, or temperature , conditions. l l

10. Flow limiting orifices are provided in 10. Inspection of the as-built letdown 10. Each letdown line flow limiting orifice the letdown line. orifices will be performed. has a cross-sectional area not greater than 0.01556 square feet.

2.7.16 i2-3i.n SYSTEM 80+" O 2.7.17 CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM Design Description The Control Complex Ventilation System (CCVS) maintains emironmental conditions - within the control complex areas in the nuclear annex. The CCVS consists of (a) the main control room air conditioning system (MCRACS) and the technical support center air conditioning system (TSCACS), and (b) the balance of the control complex air conditioning systems. a) The Basic Configuration of the MCRACS and the TSCACS is as shown on Figure 2.7.17-1. Tne safety-related components of the MCRACS and the TSCACS are as indicated on the Figure. The MCRACS consists of two Divisions. Each Division has an outside air intake, louver, tornado dampers, dampers, filtration unit, air conditioning with fan, ducting, instrumentation, and controls. The TSCACS receives outside air from the MCRACS air intake ducts and has a filtration unit and an air conditioning unit. Each outside air intake has a minimum of two redundant isolation dampers, at least one detector to detect the products of combustion, two radiation detection monitors, and a tornado damper. The air intake isolation dampers close upon receipt of a signal indicating the detection of smoke. The smoke isolation signals can be manually overridden to open the isolation dampers from the main control room (MCR). Upon detection of radiation in the outside air intakes, the air intake isolation dampers in the air intake having the higher radiation level close automatically. The air intake isolation dampers in the other air intake line remain open. After initial actuation of the air intake isolation dampers, the air intake isolation dampers realign automatically, such that the air intake having the lower radiation level opens before the isolation dampers in the air intake line having a higher radiation level close. The air intake isolation dampers can be manually controlled from the MCR. Each MCR filtration unit and the technical support center (TSC) filtration unit remove particulate matter and iodine. O 2.7.17 .1 12.n.n I p SYSTEM 80+" \'] 'Ibe MCR is maintained M a positive pressure with respect to adjacent areas. The 'ISC can be pressurized with respect to adjacent areas. The designated MCR filtration unit starts automatically and the MCR air conditioning unit starts or continues to operate, if ninning, on receipt c,f a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) or a high radiation signal. In addition, the dampers in the MCR circulation lines and the bypass lines reposition to establish the flow path through the MCR filtration units. b) The Basic Configuration of the balance of the CCVS is as shown on Figures 2.7.17-2 and 2.7.17-3. The safety-related portions of the balance of the CCVS are as shown on the Figures. The CCVS serves the following safety-related areas: essential electrical equipment rooms, vital instrumentation and equipment rooms, battery rooms, and the remote shutdown panel room. The CCVS serves the following non-safety related areas: the operation support center, non-essential electrical rooms, computer rooms, non-p safety battery rooms and other non-essential areas within the control v complex. Each battery room has an exhaust fan taking suction near the battery room ceiling. Hydrogen detection devices are installed in the battery rooms. Smoke removal is accomplished with the smoke purge fans. The CCVS equipment shown on Figures 2.7.17-1,2.7.17-2, and 2.7.17-3 is classified seismic Category I except as noted on the Figures. Safety-related components of the CCVS are Cass 1E. The Oass 1E loads shown on Figures 2.7.17-1,2.7.17-2 and 2.7.17-3 are powered from their respective Class 1E Division. The two MCRACS air intake isolation dampers in a Division are powered from different Class 1E buses. Independence is provided between Class 1E Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Clz.ss IE equipment, in the CCVS. ' 2.7.17 u-si-n I b e SYSTEM 80+" The active components of the two mechanical Divisions of the CCVS are physically ' separated. , Displays of the CCVS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.17-1 exist in the MCR or ' can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the MCR filtration units and air conditioning units, and the TSC filtration unit and air conditioning unit, and to open - and close those power operated isolation dampers shown on Figures 2.7.17-1,2.7.17-2, ' and 2.7.17-3. Components with response positions indicated on Figure 2.7.17-1 change position to that indicated on the Figure upon loss of motive power. He leakage through MCRACS intake ductwork is less than the maximum allowable for the associated design. l He fire dampers in the CCVS HVAC ductwork can close under design air flow i conditions. Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria: f O Table 2.7.17-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Control Complex Ventilation System. 2.7.17 n.n.n SYSTEM 80+ $ DivlSION 2 l l DIVISION 1 () ~~ SUP RTCE ER I I Jk '3 JL N TSC FILTRATION k h UNff AND M N' NOTE 1us UNIT " l j( * *

HM RADIATON StGNAL

.- - *

HeGH RADIATION SIGNAL .

g 2 l . . . . SMOKE DETECTOR SIONAL * *- - SMOKE DETECTOR SIGNAL i M LJ-C H i NOTE 1 !, b" U D-c ! NOTE 1 FC - LOUVER Oa Oa O== 9' g a FC9 . 9; o - na Louver ' ^i oT1g,R 9 5 TTT s

JJ 8 s e s T5 g

P f ouTSioE A>R +-iNTA= h ; s o TORNADO TORNADO D ER DIVISIONALWALL+ DAMP,ER g TE u u 9, 9 9p . 9p . ..: ... .. Stas . .,, ,A ,AT,o,, 8,om jL [ m3 - R=v=N == - -. :. . . .Y .' .T - = H .s . . . . . . ::

. . . . . . . . . g g .:. . . . . . . . . . .: . ,c. . ,c s 3

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u_j_ RLTRADON - ~ NT 1 UTT RLTW U " - -

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ESSENTIAL ESSENTIAL 7, 3 CHILLED WATER SYSTEM, CHILLED WATER SYSTEM, NOTES: ONMRM

1. NON-SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS.

2. SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IS CLASS 1E.

FIGURE 2.7.17-1 CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM ,2-3i.93 (MCRACS AND TSCACS) SAFETY-RELATED AND SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 NON-SAFETY-RELATED AND NON-SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 , - TO ATMOSPHERE l g- - -- --.A LA U IN g AREAS SERVED BY NON- ROOM SMOKE ESSENTIAL RECIRCULATING I OUTSIDE AIR 3 % - I g ? l A/C UNITS, FOR EXAMPLE, W PURGE FAN $ [ d g NON-ESSENTIAL ELECTRICAL I LOUVER NOTE 2 i ROOMS, COMPUTER ROOM, _y g l NON-SAFETY BATTERY ROOM, omm l y CASUALTY AND SECURITY ROOM _? /}}

ML20062L863

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ML20062L863

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