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Rev 1 to Design Alternatives for Sys 80+ Nuclear Power Plant.
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ATTACHMENT A APPENDIX 19A TO CESSAR-DC DESIGN ALTERNATIVES FOR THE SYSTEM 80+ NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (REV. 1)

JUNE, 1993 i

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9306280250 930618 PDR ADDCK 05200002 i A pop

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l TABLE OF CONTENTS Table Title Page l

1.0 INTRODUCTION

19A - 1 2.0

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSION 19A - 2 l

l 3.0 METHODOLOGY 19A - 6 l

3.1 RISK REDUCTION 19A - 6 3.2 COST ESTIMATES 19A - 7 3.3 COST BENEFIT COMPARISON 19A - 7 4.0 PRA RELEASE CLASSES '19A - 10 5.0 DESIGN ALTERNATIVES 19A - 22 5.1 ALTERNATIVE CONTAINMENT SPRAY 19A - 22 5.2 FILTERED VENT (CONTAINMENT) 19A - 23 5.3 ALTERNATIVE DC BATTERIES AND EFWS 19A - 23

! 5.4 RCP SEAL COOLING 19A - 24 5.5 ALTERNATIVE PRESSURIZER AUXILIARY SPRAY 19A - 25 l 5.6 ALTERNATIVE ATWS PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES 19A - 25 l 5.7 ALTERNATIVE CONCRETE COMPOSITION 19A - 26 '

l 5.8 REACTOR VESSEL EXTERIOR COOLING 19A - 26 5,9 ALTERNATIVE H2 IGNITORS 19A - 27 5.10 ALTERNATIVE HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION 19A - 27 5.11 ALTERNATIVE RCS DEPRESSURIZATION 19A - 27 5.12 100% SG INSPECTION 19A - 28 5.13 MSSV AND ADV SCRUBBING 19A - 28 1 5.14 THIRD DIESEL GENERATOR 19A - 29 5.15 ATWS INJECTION SYSTEM 19A - 29 5.16 DIVERSE PPS 19A - 29 5.17 ALTERNATIVE CONTAINMENT MONITORING SYSTEM 19A - 30 5.18 CAVITY COOLING 19A - 30 5.19 12-HOUR BATTERIES 19A - 30 5.20 TORNADO-PROTECTION FOR COMBUSTION TURBINE 19A - 31 1 5.21 DIESEL SI PUMPS (2) 19A - 31 l 5.22 ALTERNATIVE STARTUP FEEDWATER SYSTEM 19A - 31 I

6.0 REFERENCES

19A - 54 APPENDIX A: FAULT TREE ANALYSIS FOR TOTAL LOSS OF l COMPONENT COOLING WATER l

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LIST OF TABLES I

Table Title Page 2-1

SUMMARY

OF THE RISK REDUCTIONS OF THE DESIGN ALTERNATIVES 19A - 4 3-1 ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS FORLEVELIZED CAPITAL COST RATE 19A - 9 4-1

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM 80+ RELEASE

! CLASSES 19A - 13 1

4-2 MAPPING SEQUENCES INTO RELEASE CLASSES 19A - 15 4-3 RANKING OF RELEASE CLASSES BY OFFSITE RISK 19A - 19 l

! 4-4 RANKING OF SEQUENCES BY CDF 19A - 20 l

5-1 DESIGN ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED 19A - 33 5-2 DESIGN ALTERNATIVES QUANTIFIED 19A - 35 l 5-3 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR ALTERNATIVE CONTAINMENT SPRAY 19A - 36 5-4 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR FILTERED VENT (CONTAINMENT) 19A - 37 5-5 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR ALTERNATIVE DC BATTERIES & EFWS 19A - 38 5-6 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR ALTERNATIVE PRESSURIZER AUXILIARY SPRAY 19A - 39 5-7 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR ALTERNATIVE ATWS PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES 19A - 40 5-8 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR ALTERNATIVE CONCRETE COMPOSITION 19A - 41 5-9 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR REACTOR l VESSEL EXTERIOR COOLING 19A - 42 11

l LIST OF TABLES (cont.'d)

Table Title Pace l

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l 5-10 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR ALTERNATIVE l H2 IGNITERS 19A - 43 i l

l 5-11 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR ALTERNATIVE l HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION 19A - 44 l

5-12 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR ALTERNATIVE RCS DEPRESSURIZATION 19A - 45

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5-13 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR 100% SG INSPECTION 19A - 46 ,

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5-14 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR MSSV AND ADV SCRUBBING 19A - 47 5-15 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR THIRD DIESEL GENERATOR 19A - 48 5-16 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR ALTERNATIVE '

CONTAINMENT MONITORING SYSTEM 19A - 49 l 5-17 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR 12-HOUR BATTERIES 19A - 50 l 5-18 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR TORNANDO-PROTECTION FOR COMBUSTION TURBINE 19A - 51 1

5-19 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR DIESEL SI PUMPS (2) 19A - 52 5-20 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR ALTERNATIVE STARTUP FEEDWATER SYSTEM 19A - 53 l

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t ADV Atmospheric Dump Valves ALWR Advanced Light Water Reactor ATWS Anticipated Transient Without' Scram BWR Boiling Water Reactor CAFTA Computer Assisted Fault Tree Analyzer cal Calories CCW Component Cooling Water CDF Core Damage Frequency

CET Containment Event Tree l CSS Containment Spray System

! DA Design Alternative DC Direct Current DCH Direct Containment Heating l DG Diesel Generator DHR Decay Heat Removal EFWS Emergency Feedwater System EPRI Electric Power Research Institute H2 Hydrogen !'

t HPSI High Pressure Safety Injection Hrs Hours HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning IRWST In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank ,

j KAG Key Assumptions and Groundrules l LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident l LOFW Loss Of FeedWater l M Meters MAAP Modular Accident Analysis Program MACCS MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System MORV Motor Operated Relief Valve MSSV Main Steam Safety Valve NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PDS Plant Damage State PPS Plant Protection System PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment RC Release Class RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System RHR Residual Heat Removal SCS Shutdown Cooling System sec Second l SGTR' Steam Generator Tube Rupture l SI Safety Injection l SIT Safety Injection Tanks y year iv

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's policy related to severe accidents requires, in part, that an application for a design approval comply with the requirements of 10CFR50.34(f). Item (f) (1) (i) requires " performance of a plant site specific [PRA] the aim of which is to seek improvements in the reliability of core and containment heat removal systems as significant and practical and do not impact excessively on the plant." Section 15 to Chapter 19 provides the base PRA of the System 80+ plant.

The NRC also requested the ALWR participants to evaluate design alternatives' that help mitigate the consequences of severe accidents. To address these requirements and requests, a review of potential modifications to the System 80+ design, beyond those included in the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), was conducted to evaluate whether potential severe accident mitigation design features could be justified on the basis of cost per person-rem averted.

This report summarizes the results of C-E's review and evaluation of Design Alternatives that were considered in the system 80+

design. Improvements have been reviewed against conservatively high estimates of risk reductions based on the- PRA and conservatively low estimates of costs, to determine whether potential modifications are cost beneficial.

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t 2.0

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSION The System 80+ design is an evolutionary Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) design with improved design features to reduce the risk of core damage and mitigate the consequences if core damage should occur. The design process was integrated with the PRA to ensure that the risk was very low and distributed over all of the safety related systems (i.e., no single system carries a

, disproportional responsibility for plant safety). The design l ensured that no single accident sequence dominated the plant risk and the lessons learned from previous PRAs were addressed.

l Forty-seven design alternatives were considered and the expected risk reduction from twenty-two of those alternatives were l quantified. These were selected based on the Design Alternatives (DAs) evaluated for the Limerick plant2 and the results from the System 80+ PRA performed by C-E. The DAs were selected to address the sequences that either have the largest risk to the public or

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sequences that have high CDF. The analysis used a bounding technique. It was assumed that each DA worked perfectly and completely eliminated the accident sequences that the DA was to address. This approach maximizes the benefits associated with each DA. The benefits were the reduction in risk in terms of whole body person-rems per year received by the total population around the ALWR site. Consistent with the standard used by NRC to evaluate radiological impacts, health effect costs were evaluated based on l a value of $1000 per offsite person-rem averted. Using this $1,000 per person-rem, and a levelized capital cost rate of 17.9%, this l risk reduction was converted to a maximum capital benefit that was compared with capital costs. !

Table 2-1 summarizes the results of the Design Alternative analysis. The first column, is the annual risk reduction to the general population using $1000 per person-rem / year reduction for each design alternative. The next column, labeled capital benefit, l is an equivalent present worth of the annual dose reduction. It is !

also the maximum amount that could be spent in capital to be cost j l beneficial. The third column is a capital cost estimate for the ,

design alternatives. The net benefit (capital benefit - capital i

! cost) is given in the last column.

l The System 80+ plant was designed to meet the stringent design goals in the EPRI ALWR Utility Requirements Document. The System 80+ design has a core damage frequency approximately two orders of

! magnitude lower than existing plants. Therefore, the benefits of l improving the existing design are significantly lower than 2

I predicted for the Limerick Plant. The analysis presented in this

! report conservatively estimated the benefits of the DAs by assuming i

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l that they would work perfact1'; Lo eliminate the type of accident they are designed to address and would requi.c no maintenance or testing. Because of the small initial risk associated with the System 80+ design, none of the DAs are cost beneficial.

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TABLE 2-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)

SUMMARY

OF THE' RISK REDUCTIONS OF THE DESIGN ALTERNATIVES DESIGN ALTERNATIVE ANNUAL RISK CAPITAL CAPITAL NET CAPITAL REDUCTION BENEFIT

COST BENEFIT

$/Y l 1) ALT. CONTAINMENT SPRAY $7.27 $41 $1,500,000 ($1,499,959)

2) FILTERED VENT (CONTAINMENT) $0.53 $3 $10,000,000 ($9,999,997)

3) ALT. DC BATTERY AND EFWS $1.87 $10 $2,000,000 ($1,999,990) i :- 4) RCP SEAL COOLING $0.04 $0.25 $100,000 ($100,000) 4

5) ALT. PRESSURIZER AUX SPRAY $90.44 $505 $5,000,000 ($4,999,495)

6) ALT. ATWS RELIEF VALVES $1.02 $6 $1,000,000 ($999,994)

7) ALT. CONCRETE COMPOSITION $4.87 $27 $5,000,000 ($4,999,973)

8) RV EXTERIOR COOLING $32.64 $182 $5,500,000 ($5,499,818)

9) ALT. H2 IGNITORS $0.75 $4 $1,000,000 ($999,006)

10) ALT. HPSI $83.38 $466 $20,000,000 ($19,999,534)

11) ALT. RCS DEPRESSURIZATION $15.14 $85 $500,000 ($499,915)

12). 100% SG INSPECTION $100.38 $561 $1,500,000 ($1,499,439) 19A - 4 4

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TABLE 2-1 (Sheet 2 of 2)

SUMMARY

OF THE RISK REDUCTIONS OF THE DESIGN ALTERNATIVES DESIGN ALTERNATIVE ANNUAL RISK CAPITAL CAPITAL NET CAPITAL REDUCTION BENEFIT

COST BENEFIT

$/Y

13) MSSV AND ADV SCRUBBING $97.30 $544 $6,000,000 ($5,999,456) 14). THIRD DIESEL GENERATOR $0.45 $3 $10,000,000 ($9,999,997)

15) ATWS INJECTION SYSTEM $1.02 $6 $300,000 ($299,994) a-

16) DIVERSE PPS SYSTEM $1.02 $6 $3,000,000 ($2,999,994)

17) ALT. CONTAINMENT MONITORING SYSTEM $1.67 $9 $1,000,000 ($999,991)

18) CAVITY COOLING $32.64 $182 $50,000 ($49,818)

19) 12-HOUR BATTERIES- $0.71 $4 $300,000. ($299,996)

20) TORNADO-PROTECTION FOR.

COMBUSTION TURBINE $1.60 $9 $3,000,000 ($2,999,991)

21) DIESEL SI PUMPS (2) $83.79 $468 $2,000,000 ($1,999,532)

22) ALT. STARTUP FEEDWATER.

SYSTEM $34.57 $193 $3,000,000- ($2,999,807) i

' THE CAPITAL BENEFIT IS THE PRICE OF A PIECE OF EQUIPMENT .THAT HAS A LEVELIZED (ANNUAL) COST l- EQUAL TO THE ANNUAL BENEFIT IN RISK REDUCTION AND ASSUMES NO MAINTENANCE OR TESTING OF

, ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT 19A - 5

3.0 METHODOLOGY The Design Alternative (DA) evaluation followed the format and procedure used by the NRC in evaluating DAs for Limerick 2. The DAs were evaluated in terms of cost benefit where the cost of the additional equipment is compared with the savings in terms of a reduced exposure risk to the general population. The savings, in person-rems per year, were converted to dollars using $1,000 per person-rem. The risk of the base System 80+ design is described in the Section 15 of Chapter 19 of this CESSAR-DC.

3.1 RISK REDUCTION Risk (person-rem / year) in this analysis is the product of the frequency of core damage for each type of accident (events /y) times the consequence of the accident (person-rem /cVent) . The total risk is the sum of the risks from all the types of accidents. For each Design Alternative, the reduction in total risk is the difference between the risk of the base System 80+ design and the risk with the Design Alternative added. The risk reduction was converted to an annual benefit ($/y) using $1000 per person / rem. This was then converted to an equivalent capital cost which could be compared to the estimated price for the DA.

Risk is defined as the product of frequency and consequence. The frequency of core damage for various accident sequences are calculated. These sequences are then grouped (" binned") into releases classes depending on the timing of the accident and the conditions of the core, vessel, containment, and release characteristics for the sequence. Each Design Alternative is evaluated in terms of how it might affect each release class. For this analysis it is assumed that each DA is perfect: that is, if installed it completely eliminates all failures associated with the systems for which it is designed to be an alternative or addition.

This implies that each DA is also tied to perfect support systems.

This is a conservative upper limit approach since it overestimates the benefits associated with any design addition. If a DA is cost beneficial using this screening approach, then a more detailed analysis could be performed.

The Design Alternatives can be divided into two groups. One group prevents core damage and the other group protects the containment or reduces the releases. For the Design Alternatives that prevent core damage, the frequency of affected release classes .w as decreased based on the sequences that were binned and the risk reduction was calculated. For example, an Alternative pressurizer auxiliary spray (DA5) is assumed to eliminate all core melt risk of a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) by always getting the plant depressurized and into shutdown cooling. Therefore the frequency of core damage for the Plant Damage States (PDS) with failure to 19A - 6

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i aggressively cooldown was reduced to zero and a risk reduction was calculated.

Some Design Alternatives protect the containment or reduce the amount of radioactive material that is released in an accident.

These Alternatives reduce the consequence of the accident and I therefore reduce the risk (risk = frequency x consequence). Using the MACCS Code', the consequence in terms of dose to the general-population is calculated for the ALWR site. This site conservatively represents the characteristics of most potential sites". For DAs that prevent containment failure, the releases were j assumed to be reduced to zero and the risk was reevaluated.

1 i i l 3.2 COST ESTIMATES l l

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the DAs, the benefits

, were compared to the costs of the Alternatives. Conservatively low cost estimates were made for each potential modification. These costs represent the incremental costs that would be incurred in incorporating the alternative in a new plant. The cost estimate for ,

each of the modifications is given in Section 4 where the I modification is discussed. j The cost estimates were intentionally biased on the low side, but i all known or reasonably expected costs were accounted for in order '

that a reasonable assessment of the minimum cost would be obtained.

Actual plant costs are expected to be higher than indicated in this evaluation. l All costs for the DAs are referenced to 1993 U.S. ,

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The analysis presented here conservatively neglects any annual costs associated with the operation of the Design Alternatives.

These Alternatives would have to be tested and maintained at regular intervals. Regular training would also be required. In a more detailed analysis, such costs would be converted to an annual cost and be used to reduce the annual benefits.

3.3 COST BENEFIT COMPARISON As described in Section 3.1, the benefit of a design alternative is l risk reduction which was evaluated in terms of reduced exposure of the general population (in units of person-rem /y). The cost of additional equipment is in dollars, a one-time initial capital cost. To compare these two numbers, a common measure must be used.

In this analysis, the risk reduction was converted to a single capital benefit which can be directly compared with the capital cost.

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The benefits of a particular DA were defined as the risk reduction i to the general public. Offsite factors evaluated were limited to i health effects to the general public based on total exposure (in !

person-rem). ' Consistent with the standard used by the.NRC to !

evaluate radiological impacts, health effects costs were evaluated based on a value of $1,000 per offsite person-rem averted due to the design modification. This factor converts person-rem /y to $/y.

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The annual benefit in $/y is converted to a single capital benefit- J' using a levelized capital cost rate. Using the method described in Ref. 5, and typical economic assumptions taken from a recent Wall Street Journal and given in Table 3-1, a conservatively ' high !

levelized capital cost rate of 17.9% was used.- The DA results are l not very sensitive to the detailed economic assumptions used in- ,

calculating a levelized capital cost rate. '

The offsite costs for other items, - such as relocation of local residents, elimination of land use and decontamination of contaminated land are not considered. Economic losses ~, replacement-power costs and direct accident costs incurred by the plant owner also are not considered in this evaluation.

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TABLE 3-1 ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS FOR LEVELIZED CAPITAL COST RATE ASSUMPTIOFS VALUE BOND (DEBT) INTEREST RATE, % 10.48

, DEBT FRACTION 0.55 RETURN ON EQUITY, % 12.48 INCOME TAX RATE, % 50.0 RATE OF INFLATION, % 4.O ANNUAL PROPERTY TAX + INSURANCE, % 2.0 TAX DEPRECIATION LIFE, YRS. 20.0 COMPONENT ECONOMIC LIFE, YRS. 24.0' RESULTING LEVELIZED CAPITAL COST RATE, % 17.9 I

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l 4.0 PRA RELEASE CLASSES In assessing the risk reduction of each Design Alternative (DA),

the potential for each DA to reduce the frequency of occurrence or the consequence o' each release class (RC) is assessed. To do this, an understanding of each RC is required.

In Section 12 of Chapter 19, the containment event anc.' " s i s ,

describes the possible accident pathways in a containment avent :

I tree (CET). This CET was developed so that each end point of an accident sequence uniquely specified the mode of containment l failure and the status of the various phenomena which have the ;

potential to affect the source term characteristics. Therefore, l each of the accident end points is a distinct release class. A release class (RC) can be fully characterized by the following parameters ,

i l A) its frequency of occurrence, j i B) the isotopic content and magnitude of the release, l C) the energy of the release, )

( D) the time of the release, j l E) the duration of the release, and l F) the location of the release.

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The RC frequency is determined directly from the cumulative I

frequency for its respective containment event tree end point. The location of the release was assigned as follows:

1) For overpressure containment failure RCs, the release was assumed to occur at the top of the containment building. This !

is at an elevation of 52.8 meters above grade, i i

2) For containment bypass RCs initiated by an interfacing systems i LOCA and for containment melt-through RCs, the release from containment occurs in the region of the auxiliary building located below the containment sphere. The actual release to the environment occurs at grade level.

3) For all other RCs, the releases are assumed to occur at grade level.

MAAP' analyses were used to determine the isotopic content and l magnitude of the source term and the time of the release. In general, releases were calculated for a period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months from the time of containment failure or from the time of vessel failure for containment bypass and containment isolation failure RCs. The MAAP analyses are based on specific accident sequences. To select the appropriate accident sequence for a specific RC, the following process was used:

1) The Plant Damage State (PDS) with the largest contribution to l

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the RC's total frequency was determined.

2) The dominant ~ plant accident sequence was used for the RC.

This defined the initiating event tnd the status of the l

various plant systems.

3) The Containment Event Tree (CET) and the plant accident sequence definition were reviewed to determine if any special phenomenological conditions had to be specified.

4) A containment failure pressure, failure time or failure condition was specified based on the RC definition.

I Table 4-1 presents a brief description for each release class with a frequency greater than or egaal to 1.0E-10. This table is used to identify the effect of mitigation equipment (more details of each RC is given in Section 12.3 of Chapter 19). Table 4-2 gives the mapping of each PDS into each release class. Also given in this table are the mapping of the CDF sequences into the PDSs. In addition, the description of each sequence and the sequence CDF is also presented. This table is used to reduce each RC frequency (column 2 of Table 4-2) for preventative DAs.

Table 4-3 gives the ranking of the release classes in terms of risk to ' the general population (mr/y). It also gives the base l

frequency, and population dose for each RC that is used in the risk reduction analysis. The first three sequences are associated with steam generator tube ruptures. This table (used with the previous two tables) was used in selecting the DAs because it highlights the importance of the failure modes. Table 4.4 gives the ranking of l the Level I sequences in terms of CDF. This table is useful for selecting DAs for preventing core damage.

Each release class was evaluated for total person-rem exposure using MACCS. Table 4-3 gave the initiating frequency, and total person-rem dose for the twenty three release classes with initiating frequencies greater than 1.0E-10. The lifetime doses were calculated for the people within 50 miles of the site and assumes the evacuation strategy used in NUREG 1150. The risk for each release class is the product of frequency (events / year) times the total person-rem exposure per event. This product gives person rem per year and is a measure of the risk. The total risk of the dominant release classes is 0.135 person-rem /y. These results are for the ALWR site which is representative of most of the current U.S. sites *.

Table 4-1 summarizes the accident characteristics for each release class. These are the dominant sequences of the binned accidents.

, For each DA, the release class was reviewed assuming that the DA l worked perfectly (failure rate = 0.0) . This means that each DA had perfect support systems, power supplies and heat sinks. In addition, for each DA, no other failure modes were considered when the DA was employed. For example, when the pressurizer auxiliary 19A - 11

spray Design Alternative is employed to ensure that the primary coolant pressure can be decreased to enter SCS operation, the SCS system is assumed to always work. This represents an upper limit scoping analysis and maximizes the benefit of each Design Alternative. If a DA is cost beneficial in this analysis then a more detailed analysis addressing the actual failure rate of the Design Alternative can be undertaken.

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SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM 80+ RELEASE CLASSES l Release Release Class Definition l Class )

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RC1.1E Early core melt, Intact containment, Annulus filtering, Core damage less than 8 hrs RC1.1M Mid core melt, Intact containment, Annulus filtering, Coro damage 8 to 24 hrs RC2.1E Early core melt, Late Containment failure, in-vossel 4 scrubbing, no vaporization or revaporization ,

releases, Core damage less than 8 hrs, H2 burn !

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RC2.2E Early core melt, In-vessel scrubbing, no vaporization releases, revaporization releases, releases scrubbed, Late Containment failure, H2 burn RC2.4E Early core melt, Late Containment failure, in-vessel scrubbing, vaporization releases, no revaporization releases, releases scrubbed, Basemat melt through RC2.5E Early core melt, Late Containment failure, in-vessel scrubbing, vaporization releases, no revaporization releases, releases not scrubbed, Basemat melt thru RC2.6E Early core melt, Late Containment failure, in-vessel scrubbing, vaporization releases and revaporization releases, releases scrubbed, Basemat melt through RC2.7E Early core melt, Late Containment failure, in-vessel scrubbing, vaporization releases and revaporization releases, revaporization releases scrubbed, vaporization releases not scrubbed, Basemat melt

RC2.2M Mid core melt, Late Containment failure, in-vessel scrubbing, no vaporization releases, revaporization releases, releases scrubbed, CSS fls, Steam failure RC2.5M Mid core melt, Late Containment failure, in-vessel scrubbing, vaporization releases, no revaporization releases, releases not scrubbed, Basemat melt thru RC2.6M Mid core melt, Late Containment failure, in-vessel scrubbing, vaporization releases and revaporization releases, releases scrubbed, Basemat melt through RC2.7M Mid core melt, Late Containment failure, in-vessel scrubbing, vaporization releases and revaporization releases, revaporization releases scrubbed, vaporization releases not scrubbed, Basemat melt 19A - 13 b

Table 4-1

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION OF BYSTEM 80+ RELE3SE CLASSES i

j Release Release Class Definition j Class RC3.1E Early core melt, early containment failure, in-vessel scrubbing, no vaporization or revapcrization releases, Steam explosion ,

i RC3.2E Early core molt, early contnmnt failure, in-vessel I scrubbing, no vaporization release, revaporization I releases, releases scrubbed, Steam explosion l l

RC3.4E Early core melt, early containment failure, in- l vessel scrubbing, vaporization release, no revap. ;

releases, releases scrubbed, steam explosion RC3.6E Early core melt, early containment failure, in-vessel scrubbing, vaporization release, revap.

releases, releases scrubbed, steam explosion RC3.2M Mid core melt, early containment failure, in-vessel scrubbing, no vaporization release, revap. releases,

, releases scrubbed, CSS failed, steam explosion RC3.6M Mid core melt, early containment failure, in-vessel scrubbing, vaporization release, revap. releases, releases scrubbed, CSS failed, Steam explosion l RC4.4E Early core melt (SGTR), in-vessel scrubbing, vaporization releases, no revaporization releases, releases scrubbed, isolation failure RC4.8E Early core melt, isolation failure, in-vessel i scrubbing, vaporization releases, revaporization I releases, vaporization releases scrubbed, j revaporization releases not scrubbed i

RC4.12E Early core melt (SGTR), isolation failure, in-vessel scrubbing, vaporization releases, revaporization releases, releases scrubbed RC4.18L Late core melt (SGTR), isolation failure, in-vessel scrubbing, vaporization releases, revaporization releases, releases not scrubbed RC5.1E Early core melt, containment bypass, vaporization releases, releases scrubbed / attenuated in auxiliary building 19A - 14

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TABLE 4 2 (Sheet 1 of 4)

MAPPING SEQUENCES INTO RELEASE CLASSES l

RC RC FREQ PDS SEQUENCE DESCRIPTION SEQ.FREQ'.

RC1.iE 1.36E-6 PDS235 LSSB-9A (LSSB)(Safety injection OK)(Fallure to Deliver feedwater) 2.2E 09 (Safety Depressurization for Bleed Falls)

LOFW-9A (LOFW)(Emergency Feedwater Falls)(Safety Depressuri- 4.6E 07 zation for Bleed Falls)

TOTH-9A (Other Transients)(Feedwater Falls)(Safety 2.7E-09 l Depressurization Falls) i LOOP-9A (LOOP)(Falture to Deliver Emergency Feedwater)(Safety 3.BE 09 l Depressurization for Bleed Falls)

PDS184 SGTR-16A (SGTR)(Ssfety Injection Falls)(Aggressive Cooldown OK) 1.!E-08 1' (RHR Injection Falls)

SGTR 17A (SGTR)(Injection Falls)(Aggressive Secondary Cooldown 2.7E 07 Falls)

PDS3 LL-3A (LLOCA)(SITS Inject OK)(Safety Injection Falls) 1.1E-07 LL-4A (LLOCA)(SITS Fall to Inject) 4.7E 09 VR A Vesset Rupture 1.0E-07 PDS85 ML2 3A (Meditsn LOCA 2)(Safety Injection Falls) 1.6E-07 PDS201 SL 11A (SLOCA)(Safety Injection Falls)(Aggressive Cooldown 1.6E-07 Falls)

RC1.1M 3.81E 7 PDS148 LOFW-4E (LOFW)(Emergency feedwater OK)(Long-term Decay Heat 3.6E-08 Removal Falls)(Bleed OK)(Safety Injection for Feed Falls)

TOTH 4E (other Transients)(Deliver Feedwater OK)(Long-term 6.9E 08 Decay Heat Removat Falls)(Safety Injection for Feed Falls)

TRND-4E Tornado, PSV reseats, EFW OK, LTDHR Faits, Bleed OK, Feed 2.5E-07 Falls PDS136 LOFW-4A (LOFW)(Emergency Feedwater OK)(Long-term Decay Heat 3.6E 08 Removal Falls)(Bleed OK)(Safety injection for Feed Falls)

TOTH 4A (Other Transients)(Deliver Feedwater OK)(Long term 6.9E-08 Decay Heat Removal Falls)(Safety injection for Feed Falls)

TRND-4A Tornado, PSV reseats, EFW OK, LTDHR Falls, Bleed OK, Feed 2.5E 07 Falls RC2.1E 3.46E-9 PDS3 LL-3A (LLOCA)(SITS Inject OK)(Safety Injection Falls) 1.1E-07 ,

LL-4A (LLOCA)(SITS Fait to inject) 4.7E-09 ;

VR A Vessel Rupture 1.0E-07 i PDS235 LS$8*9A (LSSB)(Safety Inject {on OK)(Failure to Deliver Feedwater) 2.2E-09 )

(Safety Depressurization for Bleed Falls) i LOFW 9A (LOFW)(Emergency Feedwater Falls)(Safety Depressuri- 4.6E 07 l ration for Bleed Falls) !

TOTH 9A (Other Transients)(Feedwater Falls)(Safety 2.7E-09 l Depressurization Falls)

LOOP-9A (LOOP)(Fallure to Deliver Emergency Feedwater)(Safety 3.8E-09 Depressurization for Bleed Falls)

RC2.2E 2.04E-9 PDS201 SL-11A (SLOCA)(Safety Injection Falls)(Aggressive Cooldown 1.6E 07 Falls)

PDS235 LSSB-9A (LSSB)(Safety injection OK)(Falture to Deliver Feedwater) 2.2E-09 j (Safety Depressurization for Bleed Falls) ,

LOFW-9A (LOFW)(Emergency Feedwater Falls)(Safety Depressuri- 4.6E-07 I ration for Bleed Falls) l TOTH 9A (Other Transients)(Feedwater Falls)(Safety 2.7E-09 )

Depressurization Falls)

LOOP-9A (LOOP)(Fallure to Deliver Emergency Feedwater)(Safety 3.8E 09 Depressurization for Bleed Falls)

RC2.4E 3.64E 8 PDS233 LOFW-98 (LOFW)(Emergency Feedwater Falls)(Safety Depressuri- 4.6E 07 ration for Bleed Falls)

PDS83 ML2-38 (Meditsn LOCA 2)(Safety Injection Falls) 1.6E 07 PDS18 ML1 38 (Meditsn LOCA 1)(Safety injection Falls) 1.4E-07 PDS3 LL-3A (LLOCA)(SITS Inject OK)(Safety Injection Falls) 1.1E-07 LL-4A (LLOCA)(SITS fait to Inject) 4.7E-09 VR-A Vessel Rupture 1.0E-07 PDS1 LL 38 (LLOCA)(SITS Inject OK)(Safety Injection Falls) 1.1E-07 RC2.5E 2.84E 8 PDS241 LOFW-9F (LOFW)(Emergency Feedwater Falls)(Safety Depressuri- 4.6E-07 zation for Bleed Falls) 19A - 15

TABLE 4 2 (Sheet 2 of 4)

! MAPPING SEQUENCES bNTO RELEASE CLASSES l l RC RC FREQ PDS SEQUENCE DESCRIPTION SEQ.FREQ*.

RC2.6E 3.45E-8 PDS181 SGTR-17B (SGTR)(Injection Falls)(Aggressive Secondary Cooldown 2.7E-07 Falls)

PDS199 SL 11B (SLOCA)(Safety injection Falls)(Aggressive Cooldown 1.6E-07 Faits)

PDS233 LOFW-98 (LOFW)(Emergency Feedwater Falls)(Safety Depressuri- 4.6E*07 ration for Bleed Falls)

RC2.7E 1.62E 8 PDS241 LOFW-9F (LOFW)(Emergency Feedwater Falls)(Safety Depressuri- 4.6E-07 zation for Bleed Fails)

RC2.2M 4.05E 9 PDS148 LOFW 4E (LOFW)(Emergency Feedwater OK)(Long-term Decay Heat 3.6E 03 !

Removal Falls)(Bleed OK)(Safety injection for Feed Falls)

! TOTH-4E (Other Transients)(Deliver Feedwater OK)(Long-term 6.9E-08 l Decay Heat Removal Falls)(Safety injection for Feed Falls) '

TRND 4E Tornado, PSV reseats, EFW OK, LTDHR Falls, Bleed OK, Feed 2.5E-07 Falls l PDS136 LOFW-4A (LOFW)(Emergency Feedwater OK)(Long term Decay Heat 3.6E-08 )

Removal Falls)(Bleed OK)(Safety injection for Feed Falls) !

TOTH-4A (Other Transients)(Deliver Feedwater OK)(Long term 6.9E-08 Decay Heat Removat Falls)(Safety Injection for Feed Falls)

TRND-4A Tornado, PSV reseats, EFW OK, LTDHR Falls, Bleed OK, Feed 2.5E-07 Falls RC2.5M 3.95E-9 PDS242 SBOBD F Station Blackout with Battery Depletion 2.1E 08 TRND-SBF Tornado, Station Blackout with Battery Depletion 1.69-08 i RC2.6M 9.08E-9 PDS134 LOFW 4B (LOFW)(Emergency Feedwater OK)(Long-term Decay Heat 3.6E-08 i Removat Falls)(Bleed OK)(Safety Injection for Feed Falls) l TOTH-4B (Other Transients)(Deliver Feedwater OK)(Long-term 6.9E-08 l Decay Heat Removal Falls)(Safety Injection for Feed Falls) i t PDS148 LOFW-4E (LOFW)(Emergency feedwater OK)(Long term Decay Heat 3.6E 08 l

! Removal Falls)(Bleed OK)(Safety injection for Feed Falls)

TOTH-4E (Other Transients)(Deliver Feedwater OK)(Long-term 6.9E-08 Decay Heat Removal Falls)(Safety injection for Feed Falls)

TRND-4E Tornado, PSV resents, EFW OK, LTDHR Falls, Bleed OK, Feed 2.5E-07 Falls RC2.7M 1.22E 8 PDS145 TRND-4F Tornado, PSV ressats, EFW OK, LTDHR f alls, Bleed OK, Feed 2.5E 07 Falls PDS242 $8000 F Station Blackout with Battery Depletion 2.1E-08 TRND-SBF Tornado, Station Blackout with Battery Depletion 1.69 08 RC3.1E 6.5BE-9 PDS235 LS$8-9A (LSSB)(Safety Injection OK)(Falture to Deliver Feedwater) 2.2E-09 (Safety Depressurization for Bleed Falls) l LOTW-9A (LOFW)(Emergency Feedwater Falls)(Safety Depressuri- 4.6E 07 l ration for Bleed Falls) i TOTH-9A (Other Transients)(Feedwater Falls)(Safety 2.7E-09 I Depressurization Falls)

LOOP-9A (LOOP)(Fallure to Deliver Emergency feedwater)(Safety 3.BE-09 l

Depressurization for Bleed Falls) i i PDS85 ML2-3A (Medlun LOCA 2)(Safety Injection Falls) 1.6E-07 i PDS3 LL 3A (LLOCA)(SITS Inject OK)(Safety injection Falls) 1.1E 07 LL-4A (LLOCA)(SITS Fall to Inject) 4.7E 09 VR-A Vessel Rupture 1.0E-07 l RC3.2E 3.08E-9 PDS184 SGTR-16A (SGTR)(Safety injection Falls)(Aggressive Cooldown OK) 1.5E-08 (RHR Injection Falls)

SGTR-17A ($GTR)(injection Falls)(Aggressive Secondary Cooldown 2.7E-07

! Falls)

PDS235 LSSB 9A (LSSB)(Safety injection OK)(Fallure to Deliver Feedwater) 2.2E-09 l (Safety Depressurization for Bleed Falls) l LOFW 9A (LOFW)(Emergency feedwater Falls)(Safety Depressuri- 4.6E 07 zation for Bleed Falls) l TOTH-9A (Other Transients)(Feedwater Falls)(Safety 2.7E-09 Depressurization Falls)

LOOP-9A (LOOP)(Falture to Deliver Emergency Feedwater)(Safety 3.BE 09 Depressurization for Bleed Falls) 19A - 16 1

. _ .~ ._

TABLE 4-2 (Sheet 3 of 4)

MAPPING SEQUENCES INTO RELEASE CLASSES RC RC FREQ PDS SEQUENCE DESCRIPTION SEQ.FREQ*.

RC3.4E 6.73E 9 PDS235 LSSB 9A (LSSB)(Safety injection OK)(Falture to Deliver Feedwater) 2.2E-09 (Safety Depressurization for Bleed Falls)

LOTW-9A (LOFW)(Energency Feedwater Falls)(Safety Depressurl. 4.6E 07 zation for Bleed Falls) j TOTH-9A (Other Transients)(Feedwater Falls)(Safety 2.7E-09 ,

Depressurization Falls) ;

LOOP 9A (LOOP)(Falture to Deliver Emergency Feedwater)(Safety 3.8E-09 Depressurization for Bleed Falls)

PDS20 ML1 3A (Medium LOCA 1)(Safety Injection Falls) 1.4E-07 PDS3 LL 3A (LLOCA)($1Ts Inject OK)(Safety injection Falls) 1.1E-07 LL 4A (LLOCA)(SITS' Fall to Inject) 4.7E 09 VR A Vessel Rupture 1.0E 07 PDS85 ML2 3A (Medium LOCA 2)(Safety Injection Falls). 1.6E-07 RC3.6E 3.12E-9 PDS184 SGTR 16A (SGTR)(Safety injection Falls)(Aggressive Cooldown OK) 1.5E-08 !

(RNR Injection Falls)

SGTR 17A (SGTR)(Injection Falls)(Aggressive Secondary Cooldown 2.7E-07 Falls)

PDS235 LSSB 9A (LSSB)(Safety Injection Or)(Falture to Deliver feedwater) 2.2E-09 (Safety Depressurization sor Bleed Fails)

LOFW-9A (LOFW)(Emergency Feedwater Falls)(Safety Depressuri- 4.6E-07 zation for Bleed Falls) ;

TOTH-9A (Other Transients)(Feedwater Falls)(Safety 2.7E-09 Depressurization Falls)

LOOP-9A (LOOP)(Falture to Deliver Emergency Feedwater)(Safety 3.8E-09 Depressurization for Bleed Falls)

RC3.2M 1.80E-9 PDS148 LOFW-4E (LOFW)(Emergency Feedwater OK)(Long-term Decay Heat 3.6E 08

! Removal Falls)(Bleed OK)(Safety Injection for Feed Falls)

T0tH-4E (Other Transients)(Deliver Feedwater OK)(Long-term 6.9E 08 Decay Heat Removal Falls)(Safety Injection for Feed Falls) -

TRND-4E Tornado, PSV rescots, EFW OK, LTDHR Falls, Bleed OK, Feed 2.5E-07

Falls

PDS136 LOFW-4A (LOFW)(Emergency Feedwater OK)(Long-term Decay Heat 3.6E-08 .

Removal Falls)(Bleed OK)(Safety Injection for feed Falls) '

TOTH-4A (Other Transients)(Deliver Feedwater OK)(Long-ters 6.9E-08 i Decay Heat Removal Falls)(Safety Injection for Feed Falls)

TRND 4A Tornado, PSV reseats, EFW OK, LTDNR Faits, Bleed OK,' Feed 2.5E-07 Falls RC3.6M 1.81E-9 PDS148 LOFW-4E (LOFW)(Emergency Feedwater OK)(Long-term Decay Heat 3.6E-08 i Removal falls)(Bleed OK)(Safety Injection for Feed Falls) '

TOTH-4E (Other Transients)(Deliver Feedwater OK)(Long term . 6.9E-08 Decay Heat Removal Falls)(Safety Injection for Feed Falls)

TRND-4E Tornado, PSV reseats, EFW OK, LTDHR Falls, Bleed OK,- Feed 2.5E 07 i Falls PDS136 LOFW 4A (LCFW)(Emergency Feedwater OK)(Long term Decay Heat . 3.6E 08

, Removal faits)(Bleed OK)(Safety Injection for Feed Falls) l TOTH 4A (Other Transients)(Deliver Feedwater OK)(Long-ters 6.9E 08 l Decay Heat Removal Falls)(Safety injection for feed Falls) i TRND-4A Tornado, P'i' reseats, EFW OK, LTDHR Falls, Bleed OK, Feed 2.5E 07 l Falls l RC4.4E 5.98E 9 PDS184 SGTR 16A (SGTR)(Safety Injection Falls)(Aggressive Cooldown OK) 1.5E-08 (RNR Injection Falls)

SGTR 17A (SGTR)(Injection Falls)(Aggressive Secondary Cooldown 2.7E-07 Falls)

I b

I 19A - 17

__ _ . . . _ . . ~ ,

i TABLE 4 2 (Sheet 4 of 4)

MAPPING SEQUENCES INTO RELEASE CLASSES RC RC FREQ PDS SEQUENCE DESCRIPTION SEQ.FREQ'.

RC4.8E 1.12E 9 PDS235 LSS8-9A' (LSSB)(Safety Injection OK)(Falture to Deliver Feedwater) 2.2E-09 (Safety Depressurization for Steed Falls)

LOFW-9A (LOFW)(Emergency Feedwater Falls)(Safety Depressuri- 4.6E-07 ration for Bleed Falls)

TOTH-9A (other Transients)(Feedwater Falls)(Safety 2.7E-09 Depressurization Falls) .

LOOP 9A (LOOP)(Falture to Deliver Emergency Feedwater)(Safety 3.8E-09 Depressurization for Bleed Faits)

PDS20 ML1 3A (Medlun LOCA 1)(Safety Injection Faits) 1.4E-07 PDS3 LL-3A (LLOCA)(SITS Inject OK)(Safety injection Falls) 1.1E-07 (L-4A (LLOCA)(SITS Fait to inject) 4.7E-09.

VR A Vessel Rupture 1.0E-07 PDS85 ML2 3A (Mediun LOCA 2)(Safety Injection Falls) '1.6E 07 RC4.12E 6.54E-9 PDS184 SGTR 16A (SGTR)(Safety Injection Faits)(Aggressive Cooldown OK) 1.5E 08 (RHR Injection Falls)

SGTR 17A (SGTR)(Injection Falls)(Aggressive Secondary Cooldown 2.7E-07 Falls)

PDS181 SGTR 17B (SGTR)(Injection Falls)(Aggressive Secondary Cooldown 2.7E-07' i Falls) .

RC4.18L 5.56E-9 PDS194 SGTR-9F (SGTR)(Safety Injection OK)(Deliver Feedwater OK)(RCS 4.4E-09 Pressure Control Falls)(SG not Isolated)(Falture to-Refill IRWST)

SGTR-15F (SGTR)(Safety Injection Falls)(Aggressive Cooldown 1.2E-09 OK)(SCS Injection OK)(Unisolable Leak in Ruptured SG)(Falture to Re-fill.lRWST) 5.10E-10 ISLOCA 'AILURE OF CHECK AND ISOLATION VALVES IN ONE SCS line 5.1E 10 !

l RCS.1E F l

I l FREQUENCY FOR COPE DAMAGE (LEVEL 1) l f

l i

i f

I 1

19A - 18

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . . _ . . - - . -, , ._ - .. . - , , - , , - ,a - - . ,

l TABLE 4-3 RANKING OF RELEASE CLASSES BY OFFSITE RISK :

RANK Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk 4 Class Events /y. .Br/ event ar/y ,

P 1 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 2 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 3 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 ,

4 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03.

5 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06' 6.71E-03 i

6 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E

7 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 8 RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 9 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 10 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 .1.68E-03 11 RCS.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 12 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 13 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 14 RC2.5E 2~84E-08'

. 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 15 RC2.2M 4.05E 1.31E+05 -5.31E-04 16 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 17 RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 18 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 .

19 RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 ]

20 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 21 RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 22 RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 23 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 SUM = 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 1

19A - 19 ,

i

Table 4-4 (Sheet 1 of 2)

RANKING OF SEQUENCES BY CDF SEQUENCE CDF CODE SEQUENCE EV/ YEAR LOFW-9 (LOFW) (Emergency Feedwater Fails) (SDS 4.6E-7 for Bleed Fails)

SGTR-17 (SGTR) (Injection Fails) (Aggressive Secondary 2.7E-7 Cooldown Fails)

SL-11 (SLOCA) (Safety Injection Fails) (Aggressive Cooldown 1.6E-7 Fails)

ML2-3 (Medium LOCA 2) (Safety Injection Fails) 1.6E-7 ML1-3 (Medium LOCA 1) (Safety Injection Fails) 1.4E-7 LL-3 (LLOCA) (SITS Inject OK) (Safety Injection Fails) 1.1E-7 VR Vessel Rupture 1.0E-7 TOTH-4 (Other Transients) (Deliver Feedwater OK) (Long-term 6.9E-8 ,

Decay Heat Removal Fails) (SIS for Feed Fails) '

ATWS-29 (ATWS) (Adverse MTC) 4.7E-8 LOFW-4 (LOFW) (Emergency Feedwater OK) (Long-term DHR 3.6E-8

, Fails) (Bleed OK) (SIS for Feed Fails)

SBO Station Blackout with Battery Depletion' 2.1E-8 l

LOFW-8 (LOFW) (Emergency Feedwater Fails) (Bleed OK) (Safety 2.1E-8 '

Injection for Feed Fails)

SGTR-16 (SGTR) (Safety Injection Fails) (Aggressive Cooldown 1.5E-8 a OK) (RHR Injection Fails)

LOOP-12 (LOOP) (PSV Fails to Rescat) (SIS Injection Fails) 1.3E-8 SL-10 (SLOCA) (Safety Injection Fails) (Aggressive Cooldown 9.0E-9 I (RHR Injection Fails) l l

SL-4 (SLOCA) (Safety Injection OK) (Deliver Feedwater OK) 8.9E-9 (Long-term Decay. Heat Removal Fails) (SDS Fails) 19A - 20

l l

l Table 4-4 :

(Sheet 2 of 2)

RANKING OF SEQUENCES BY CDF BEQUENCE CDF-CODE SEQUENCE EV/ YEAR TOTH-S (Other Transients) (Deliver Feedwater OK) (Long-term 6.9E-9 I Decay Heat Removal Fails) (SDS Fails)

SGTR-12 (SGTR) (Safety Injection OK) (Feedwater Fails) 6.3E-9 (SDS - Bleed Fails)

LOFW-5 (LOFW) (Emergency Feedwater OK) (Long-term DHR 5.6E-9 ,

Fails) (SDS for Bleed Fails) j LL-4 (LLOCA) (SITS Fail to Inject) 4.7E-9 SGTR-9 (SGTR) (Safety Injection OK) (EFW OK) (RCS 4.4E-9 Pressure Control Fails) (SG not Isolated) (Failure j to Refill IRWST) l l

LOOP-9 (LOOP) (Failure to Deliver Emergency Feedwater) 3.8E-9 (SDS for Bleed Fails) I I

LHV-3 (LHVAC) (Deliver Feedwater OK) (Long-term Decay Heat 3.6E-9 l- Removal Fails) (SDS for Bleed Fail)

TOTH-9 (Other Transients) (Feedwater Fails) (Safety 2.7E-9 Depressurization Fails) )

l LSSB-9 (LSSB) (Safety Injection OK) (EFW Failure 2.2E-9 (Safety Depressurization for Bleed Fails)

ATWS-9 (ATWS) (PSVs Open and Re-close OK) (No Consequential 2.lE-9 SGTR) (Deliver Feedwater OK) (Failure to Borate by Charging Pumps) (Safety Depressurization Fails)

SGTR-15 (SGTR) (Safety Injection Fails) (Aggressive Cooldown 1.2E-9 OK) (SCS Injection OK) (Unisolable Leak in Ruptured SG) (Failure to Re-fill IRWST) i 19A - 21 !

l i

i

5.0 DESIGN ALTERNATIVES Potential modifications to the System 80+ design were derived from a survey of the dominant failure modes are shown in Table 4-1 through Table 4-4. Others were suggested by the PRA or design engineering staff. Some of the DAs were suggested by a foreign utility. Table 5-1 gives the DAs considered and how they were treated.

The risk reduction values of twenty two DAs were quantified. These were selected based on the SAMDAs for the Limerick plant2 and a review of the dominant failure modes for the System 80+ plant. In addition, suggestions from C-E personnel with technical expertise in containment response were employed. Design Alternatives from earlier plant studies were also considered.

The Design Alternatives can be divided into two groups. One group prevents core damage and the other group protects the containment j or reduces the releases. For the DA that prevent core damage, the i

frequency of affected release classes are reduced by the fraction that the sequence contributes to the RC and the total risk reduction is calculated. This group includes the high capacity HPSI systems, improved DC Battery and EFWS, ATWS pressure relief valves, improved pressurizer auxiliary spray, improved primary depressurization system, and alternative RCP seal cooling system.

For the DAs that protect the containment, the releases are put to zero and then the risk is reevaluated. These DAs include the improved containment sprays, filtered vent, concrete composition, reactor vessel exterior cooling, and H2 igniters.

f The following sections discuss each Design Alternative.

5.1 ALTERNATIVE CONTAINMENT SPRAY An alternative containment spray system is assumed to prevents the high pressure containment failures caused by slow steam pressurization (RC2.2M) and eliminate the sequences where scrubbing does not occur. This system is assumed to have a perfect power 1 supply and heat sink and work in all release classes where the containment is challenged regardless of the sequence of ever.ts or equipment failures that led to core damage and containment challenge. These assumptions overestimate the benefits of this i design alternative. It also reduces the releases in all the ;

l release classes where no scrubbing of fission products was !

l initially predicted.

I This DA reduces the risk of six of the release classes (see Table 5-3) . Using a risk conversion factor of

$1,000 . per person-rem, this DA would have an annual value of ;

$7.27/y. The annual benefit of the Design Alternative could be 19A - 22 l

l

I converted to a capital benefit using the levelized capital cost rate of 17.9% developed in Section 2. The ideal containment spray system would be cost beneficial if it could be installed for less than $41 and have no maintenance and testing costs. Any annual l operating costs would have to be subtracted from the annual risk l reduction benefits.

The above analysis assumes that the system has a failure rate of 0.0 in terminating the accident by protecting the containment. The capital benefit is inversely proportional to the reliability of the system. For example, if the design had a conditional reliability i

of 0.5 in these accident sequences, then the DA would have to cost I less than $21 to be cost effective. !

Estimating the cost to design and build a perfect containment spray system is not realistically possible. However, one option would be l to provide piping from the containment spray header to the exterior j of the Nuclear Annex for a temporary hook-up of a fire truck should all containment spray and shutdown cooling pumps be unavailable.

The cost of the additional Class 2 piping, pipe supports, valves, on-site fire truck with the required pumping capacity and pump head and building to store the fire truck is estimated to exceed $1.5 million. This design modification has been included in the design.

1 I

5.2 FILTERED VENT (CONTAINMENT) l The filtered vent Design Alternative prevents all slow high pressure containment failures and therefore reduces the doses in l

RC2.2M (see Table 5-4) . Using a value of $1,000 per person-rem avoided, this Design Alternative has a benefit of $0.53/y. Using a levelized capital cost rate of 17.9%, a system with a capital i cost of $2.96 would just be cost effective. !

l The Swiss recently purchased a filtered vent system for one of l their BWRs for approximately $3 million7 for equipment alone. With !

the building structure to house the equipment and installation 1 costs, the total cost is estimated to exceed $10 million. I 5.3 ALTERNATIVE DC BATTERIES AND EFWS This Design Alternative addresses the release classes where emergency feedwater is lost after battery depletion during a station blackout. The System 80+ design already has an improved battery system that will carry the DC loads for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . There are still accident sequences where the batteries are depleted and emergency feedwater is lost leading to core damage. The improved DC batteries and EFWS DA is assumed to have the capability to remove decay heat using batteries and the turbine feedwater pump for whatever time period that is required (without any failures).

19A - 23

This Design Alternative prevents core damage and therefore removes l two of the release classes. Using a $1,000 per averted person / rem ;

and a levelized cost rate or 17.9%, such a system would be cost l beneficial if it cost less than $10.45. j Design of a battery system with unlimited capacity is not possible. I However, to increase the existing battery capacity for the EFWS pumps from the current System 80+ design capacity of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months will require 9 times the number of current battery cells and thus approximately 9 times the space for building storage. The increased building space will also increase the HVAC requirements.

The cost for the extra battery cells, building volume and increased l HVAC requirements is estimated to exceed $2 million.

5.4 RCP SEAL COOLING The System 80+ employs a type of Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal which can withstand a loss of cooling and not result in a LOCA.

This type of seal design has been employed in the operating C-E plants and experience has shown that the seals do not fail when seal cooling is lost'. To estimate a risk reduction associated with an improved seal cooling system, a different approach is used than used for the other Design Alternatives. It is assumed that for all station blackouts that last four hours, the seal fails and leads to core damage (frequency = 3.64E-8/y) . It is also assumed that total loss of the component cooling water (CCW) might lead to seal failure (1.64E-2/d, Section 19.10 of PRA) and core damage.

Appendix A contains the fault tree for the analysis of total loss of CCW which requires loss of four CCW pumps or loss of the four service water pumps and would probably require a common cause failure. The frequency for this event is 2.25E-5/y. The containment is assumed to remain intact (conditional containment failure probability = 0.099) and the expected dose is 119 mr (RC1.1E). Therefore, the risk of seal loss leading to core damage is 4.39E-5 person-rem /y (2.25E-5 events /y x 1.64E-2/d x 119 person-rem / event). Using a value of $1,000 per person-rem avoided, this Design Alternative has a benefit of $0.04/y. Using a levelized capital cost rate of 17.9%, a system with a capital cost of $0.25 would juct be cost effective.

The rel ility of the reactor coolant pump seal cooling could be improve ay adding a small dedicated positive displacement pump for diverst seal injection. This pump would be powered from the Alternate AC Source (Combustion Turbine). It would take suction l from the boric acid storage tank and would connect to the normal supply line for seal injection inside the containment. This design addition will provide additional diversity for RCP seal cooling and I

provide a seal cooling system that is not dependent on CCW. The cost of the additional pump, piping, valves, containment i

19A - 24

l' l

l penetration, instrumentation, electrical cable and building space l

is estimated to exceed $100,000. Such a RCP seal cooling pump has been added.to the System 80+ plant as a result on NRC's questions on testing of the RCP seals.

5.5 ALTERNATIVE PRESSURIZER AUXILIARY SPRAY This Design Alternative was introduced to specifically address steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) which is the initiating event-for the largest three RCs. The analysis assumes that during a SGTR, the auxiliary spray will always depressurize ' the primary system to the SCS operation mode with sufficient speed and the SCS system will always remove decay heat. This reduces the risk of SGTR in the System 80+ design has for six RCs (see Table 5-6) .

Using a $1,000 per averted person-rem and a levelized cost rate or 17.9%, such a system would be cost beneficial if it cost less than'

$505. ;

l Designing a perfect pressurizer ' auxiliary spray system is not l possible. However, increased reliability L and diversity can be I obtained by increasing the redundancy and- diversity of the I pressurizer spray valves and providing -a diverse positive displacement charging pump that is powered from a diverse power source. The reliability of the SCS can be improved by providing a diverse shutdown cooling pump with a diverse power source and providing a diverse heat sink. The cost for the additional components, piping, power supplies, instrumentation and building volume is estimated to exceed $5 million.

l 5.6 ALTERNATIVE ATWS PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES

, This Design Alternative was selected because the System 80+ design uses an advanced digital plant protection system that has raised much interest. It consists of'a system of relief valves that can prevent any equipment damage from a primary coolant pressure spike in an ATWS accident sequence. This DA is assumed to eliminate all

, the ATWS core damage sequences. ATWS does not show up as a l dominant PDS but represents 3% of the CDF (see Figure 15.2.1 of the PRA). Therefore the risk of all release classes from transients

! was reduced by 3% (see Table 5-7). Using a $1,000 per averted person-rem and a levelized cost rate or 17.9%, such a system would be cost beneficial if it cost less than $5.70.

To implement this design alternative, the safety relief valve sizes <

l and discharge piping size would need to be increased. It may also l require additional safety relief valves and thus additional safety relief valve discharge piping and supports. In addition, the size and possible the number of safety valve nozzles on top of the pressurizer would need.to be increased.- The cost of'this design alternative is estimated to exceed $1 million.

19A - 25

l i

l 5.7 ALTERNATIVE CONCRETE COMPOSITION The containment building for System 80+ uses a spherical containment with an area below it that can be considered part of

, the nuclear annex building. It is assumed that in accident sequences where corium/ concrete interaction are not stopped, containment failure would lead to releases through the nuclear annex building. This Design Alternative assumes that an ideal concrete composition could be developed that prevents basemat melt-through. This would eliminate seven RCs where basemat melt-through is modeled (see Table 5-8) Using a $1,000 per averted person-rem and a levelized cost rate or 17.9%, such a system would be cost beneficial if it cost less than $27.21.

An advanced concrete composition to prevent corium/ concrete interaction is not currently available. However, additional concrete could be added to increase the time before containment failure would occur. In order to increase the thickness of the concrete at the bottom of the reactor cavity the containment diameter would need to be increased. An increase in containment diameter also requires an increase in containment plate thickness.

The cost of increasing the concrete thickness by two feet is estimated to exceed $5 million.

, 5.8 REACTOR VESSEL EXTERIOR COOLING l

A reactor vessel exterior cooling system is assumed to prevent .

l vessel melt-through and subsequent basemat attack or steam l l

explosions. This Design Alternative reduces the consequences of j eleven RCs (see Table 5-9). Using a $1,000 per averted person-rem l and a levelized cost rate or 17.9%, such a system would be cost beneficial if it cost less than $182.

The current arrangement for the IRWST will allows wetting the bottom of the reactor vessel through the cavity flood system.

However, the water level of the IRWST is not high enough to flood the entire cavity for reactor vessel exterior cooling. Reactor vessel exterior cooling could be accomplished by raising the elevation of the IRWST such that the entire reactor cavity can be flooded up the reactor ficnge. Raising the elevation of the IRWST would require an increase in containment diameter. In addition, the reactor vessel would have to-be qualified to demonstrate that wetting the exterior will not cause a thermal shock which would l cause vessel failure. To implement this design alternative is estimated to exceed $5.5 million.

19A - 26 l

5.9 ALTERNATIVE H2 IGNITERS Ideal hydrogen (H2) igniters would prevent release classes i associated with containment failures from hydrogen burns or I explosions. The System 80+ design already has H2 ignitors and, j therefore, only two release class (RC2.1E and 2.2E) has containment failure from hydrogen burning. This Design Alternative reduces the risk of these RCs (see Table 5-10). Such a system would have to i cost $4.19 to be cost beneficial, j Providing perfect hydrogen ignitors which have no probability of failure is not possible. However, the reliability of the hydrogen igniters could be improved by either providing dedicated batteries for the existing design (glow plug igniters) or by providing catalytic hydrogen recombiners which do not require a power source.

Since catalytic hydrogen reconbiners are not fully developed, i possible failure modes, including common cause failure modes, are i not known. Therefore, they are not being selected for the System 80+ design at this time. The addition of dedicated batteries for the hydrogen igniters along with the additional equipment such as battery chargers and invertor and the additional building space to store this equipment is estimated to exceed $1 million.

5.10 ALTERNATIVE HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION The System 80+ design has a very reliable four train HPSI system to begin with. The high pressure safety injection Design Alternative l assumes that all sequences with HPSI failures can be eliminated (see Table 5-11). This Design Alternative would have to cost $466 to be cost beneficial.

Providing a perfect high pressure safety injection system is not possible; however, the reliability of the system could be improved slightly by adding two more diesel generators. The cost of adding two more diesel generators, with the associated support systems and the building space is estimated to exceed $20 million.

5.11 ALTERNATIVE RCS DEPRESSURIZATION The System 80+ design has motor operated relief valves (MORVs) that l permit residual heat removal using the valves and HPSI pumps in a

" feed and bleed" mode of operation. This Design Alternative models l a perfect MORV system that permits the primary coolant system to be

! quickly depressurized so that the safety Injection pumps are effective in getting coolant into the core and removing decay heat.

This DA eliminates all sequences in Table 4-2 where the SDS fails.

The risk reduction, shown in Table 5.12 is worth $84.60 in capital to be cost beneficial.

19A - 27

Designing a perfect safety depressurization system is not possible.

However, increased reliability and diversity of the system can be obtained by increasing the redundancy of the safety depressurization valves and/or providing valves that are diverse.

Providing the additional valves, piping and instrumentation is estimated to exceed $500,000.

5.12 100% SG INSPECTION Inspection of 100% of the tubes in a steam generator is not really a design alternative but is a maintenance practice. It was selected because it is has reasonable costs, and can be executed with a management decision. This DA was introduced to specifically address steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) which is the initiating event for the largest three RCs. The analysis assumes that all SGTR are eliminated. This reduces the risk of SGTR in the System 80+ design has for six RCs (see Table 5-6) . Using a.$1,000 per averted person-rem and a levelized cost rate or 17.9%, such. a system.would be cost beneficial if it cost less than $561.

The increased cost of performing eddie current' testing ~on 100% of the steam generator tubes compared to a 20% random inspection of the steam generator tubes.is $1.5 million per refueling outage.

Assuming an eighteen month refueling, this would cost $1.0M/y or be equivalent to a capital cost of $5.59M.

5.13 MSSV AND ADV SCRUBBING The discharges of the main steam safety valves (MSSVs) and atmospheric dump valves (ADVs) could be scrubbed by routing the discharges back to the reactor containment. This DA was introduced to specifically address steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) where isolation fails (the largest three RCs). Table 5-14 gives the risk reduction of this DA. The additional risk of having normal ADV discharging into the containment was not included in this analysis.

The risk reduction is worth $544 in capital to be cost beneficial.

This modification would require adding approximately 960 feet of 10-inch schedule 80 piping, 200 feet of.8-inch schedule 80 piping, 20-10 inch containment penetrations,. 4-8 -inch containment penetrations, 40-10 inch containment isolation valves and 8-8 inch containment isolation valves. The cost of this modification would be in excess of $6 million.

I 19A - 28

5.14 THIRD DIESEL GENERATOR The System 80+ plant is designed to have two diesel generators (DGs), a combustion turbine and two independent switchyards. Many plants are using a third DG as a swing unit or during a refueling when one DG is out for maintenance. This DA was selected to i

address the risk reduction of installing an additional unit. It was assumed that the unit was offected by common cause failure and had a conditional failure rate'0 (7) of 0.76/d given that the other DGs had failed. This reduced the risk of the two RCs for station blackout by 24% (see Table 5-15). Using a $1,000 'per averted person-rom and a levelized cost rate or 17.9%, such a system would be cost beneficial if it cost less than $2.51.

Addition of a third diesel generator to lower the probability of station blackout would require the addition of a 6.4 MW diesel generator, its associated support systems, additional component i cooling water piping to and from the diesel generator cooling water I heat exchanger, an addition swing bus, additional cabling for connecting the diesel generator to the electrical distribution systen and additional building volume to house the diesel generator and its associated support systems. The cost of this modification would be in excess of $10 million.

5.15 ATWS INJECTION SYSTEM An " ink" injection system was proposed for the heavy water New Production Reactor as a shutdown system diverse from the mechanical rods. also a foreign utility also showed some interest in this concept. Therefore, this DA was selected for evaluation. In terms of risk reduction benefits, this DA has the same advantage as the ATWS pressure relief valves (see Table 5-7) and would have an l equivalent capital value of $5.70.

l l For estimating the cost of this'DA, it was assumed that the RCP l

seal cooling pump could be used with existing sources of boron and existing piping and valves. The cost of this DA is $#00,000 and i is associated with the instrumentation and control system to j activate the pump and align it.

5.16 DIVERSE PPS

This Design Alternative was selected because the System 80+ design l uses an advanced digital plant protection system that has raised l much interest. A foreign utility also inquired about this DA. In this analysis, it was assumed that the redundant PPS eliminated all ATWS. This DA has the same risk reduction as the ATWS pressure relief valves (see Table 5-7) and using a $1,000 per averted 19A - 29

i i

l person-rem and a levelized cost rate or 17.9%, such a system would be cost beneficial if it cost less than $5.70. The cost of a i diverse PPS was estimated to be $3,000,000. !

5.17 ALTERNATIVE CONTAINMENT MONITORING SYSTEM i

The alternative containment monitoring system was selected to !

address the RCs where containment bypass is predicted. It does not address steam generator tube rupture where failure to isolate the SG is predicted. This DA is assumed to eliminate the containment j bypass RC4.8E and the interf acing LOCA RC5.1E (see Table 5-16).

Using a $1,000 per averted person-rem and a levelized cost rate or ,

17.9%, such a system would be cost beneficial if it cost less than

$9.33.

l This modification would require the addition of a redundant and diverse limit switch to each containment isolation valve, and the addition of control and fiber optic cabling to the plant computer, i The cost of this modification would be in excess of $1 million.

l 5.18 CAVITY COOLING The Cavity Cooling DA uses the SCS heat exchangers in the IRWST to cool the reactor vessel cavity under natural circulation. In the i upper limit, this DA is assumed to eliminate vessel failure, steam explosions and concrete interactions. It has the same advantages and risk reduction worth as the reactor vessel cooling system (see I Section 5.8 and Table 5-9) but has a lower capital cost because it !

uses existing equipment. This modification would be cost !

beneficial if the cost was less than $182. )

1 This modification would require increasing the size of the cavity l flood lines and performing analysis that there is adequate mixing I between the reactor cavity and IRWST. The cost of this ;

modification would be in excess of $50,000. !

5.19 12-HOUR BATTERIES The DA described in Section 5.3 is for an ideal battery system.

This DA is for a specific and technically realistic design alternative of using a battery system that would maintain load for twelve hours. Such an improvement would decrease the failure to restore offsite power from 0.081 to 0.0312, a 38% improvement. In terms of risk reduction benefits, this DA reduces the risk of two RCs (see Table 5-17) and would have an equivalent capital value of

$3.97.

Increasing the current battery six for station blackout loads from 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months would require 1.5 times the number of battery 19A - 30

cells and thus approximately 1.5 times the space for building storage. The increased building Lpace and battery size will also increase the HVAC requirements. The cost of this modification would be in excess of $300,000.

5.20 TORNADO-PROTECTION FOR COMBUSTION TURBINE The PDSs in Table 4-2 with the designator "TRND" are for tornados and it was assumed that offsite power was lost and the combustion turbine was not available. For these three sequences, it was assumed that the DA completely protected the turbine and it was available to supply AC with a failure rate" of 0.025/d. This reduced the risk of two RCs (see Table 5-18) and would be cost beneficial if it could be installed for less than $8.94.

The cost of this DA was estimated at over $3M ind includes protection of the turbine, fuel tank, and tunneling for cooling line. The cost could be as high as $4M depending on tunneling distances.

5.21 DIESEL SI Pumps (2)

The System 80+ design has a very reliable four train HPSI system to begin with. The high pressure safety injection Design Alternative (Section 5.10) assumes that all sequences with HPSI failures can be eliminated (see Table 5-11). This Design Alternative is more specific. It assumes that two of the electric SIS pumps are replaced with diesel pumps. This reduces common cause failures of all four pumps and also reduces the risk of station blackout.

Using the failure rates and common cause dependencies in Reference 10, the reliability or the SIS would be increased by factor of 60.

Station blackout was assumed to be eliminated. Table 5-19 shows that nineteen RCs are reduced with a risk worth of $83.79/y. This DA would be cost beneficial in terms of offsite risk reduction if it could be installed for less than $468 in capital.

This modification would require replacing the electric motors on two of the safety injection pumps with diesel engines. The diesel engines will also require addition support systems and additional building volume to house the diesel drives and support systems compared to electric motor drives. The cost of this modification would be in e:: cess of $2 million.

5.22 ALTERNATIVE STARTUP FEEDWATER SYSTEM The startup feedwater system introduces the feedwater upstream of the main feedwater control valves and is assumed to be unavailable for transients such as loss of feedwater. The alternative startup 19A - 31

- - - . - .. - -. - - - . . ~ . .. .

i l

l I feedwater system would be available as a backup to the EFWS, It is I

assumed to eliminate the sequences:in Table 4-2 where the EFWS fails. This reduces the risk of thirteen'RCs (see Table 5-20) and would be cost beneficial if-.it could be installed for'a cost'under

$193.

This modification requires the addition of 800 feet of 6-inch schedule 80 piping, the addition of 4-6 inch startup feedwater isolation valves, 2-6 inch startup feedwater control valves, and a diverse protection system to prevent the main steam isolation signal to prevent steam generator overfill and overcooling. The cost of this modification would be in excess of $3 million.

1 1

l l

1 i

I l

l 19A - 32

- - - - . . . _ _ . - . . . , _ - , . . ..,--i

l Table E-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)

DESIGN ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED DESIGN ALTERNATIVE , CATEGORY *

1. Larger pressurizer -l'

2. Larger steam generators _

1 3.- High-pressure Shutdown Cooling. System-(SCS). 1

4. Functionally interchangeable SCS and Containment 1 spray System (CSS) pumps

5. Multiple independent connections to the grid 1

6. Turbine-generator runback capability 1

7. Dedicated startup feedwater system 1

8. Improved control room design 1

9. Improved normally operating Component Cooling Water 1 System (CCWS)/ Station Service Water System'(SSWS)

10. Four train Safety Injection System (SIS) with direct 1 -

vessel injection

11. Safety Depressurization System (SDS) 1

12. Four train Emergency Feedwater System 1

13. Two emergency diesel generators and a standby alternate 1 AC source (combustion turbine) '

14. Six vital batteries 1

15. In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) 1

16. Cross-connected CSS and SCS trains 1 ,

17. Improved control room design 1 l

18. Large spherical containment 1 l 19. Reactor cavity designed for corium disentrainment 1 i

20. Reactor cavity designed for debris coolability 1-

21. IRWST and SDS interconnected 1

22. Hydrogen mitigation system 1

23. Alternative containment spray 4

24. Filtered vent 2

25. Alternative DC batteries and EFWS 2 j 26. RCP seal cooling 4 l 27. Alternative pressurizer auxiliary spray 2 l- 28. Alternative ATWS pressure relief valves 2

29. Alternative concrete composition 2

30. Reactor vessel exterior cooling 2

31. Alternative H2 ignitors 2

32. Alternative high pressure safety injection 2

33. Alternative RCS depressurization 2

34. 100% SG inspection 2

35. MSSV scrubbing 2

36. Third diesel generator 2

, 2 l 19A - 33 i

1 .- . . - -

Table 5-1 l (Sheet 2 of 2) l DESIGN ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED l

DESIGN ALTERNATIVE CATEGORY *

38. Boron injection system (ATWS) 2

39. Diverse PPS 2

40. Alternative containment monitoring system valves 2

41. Cavity cooling

42. 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months batteries 2

43. Tornado protection for combustion turbino 2

44. Diesel SI pumps (2) 2

45. Alternative startup feedwater system 2

46. Vacuum building 3 j

47. Ribbed containment liner 3 l i

I l

I i

1 Category: 1 Modification is applicable to the System 80+

and already incorporated in the design. No further evaluation is needed.

2 Modification was quantified in this report and not included in the System 80+.

3 Modification was not quantified because costs l

exceeded other alternatives that were in category 2.

4 Modification was quantified and included in System 80+.

19A - 34 l

t 1

. Table 5-2 DESIGN ALTERNATIVES QUANTIFIED NUMBER DESIGN ALTERNATIVE DA1 Alternative containment spray l DA2 Filtered vent (containment) l DA3 Alternative DC batteries and EFWS l DA4 RCP seal cooling DAS Alternative pressurizer auxiliary spray l DA6 Alternative ATWS pressure' relief valves DA7 Alternative concrete composition DA8 Reactor vessel exterior cooling DA9 Alternative H2 ignitors DA10 Alternative high pressure safety injection 1 DAll Alternative RCS depressurization DA12 100% SG inspection DA13 MSSV and ADV scrubbing I DA14 Third diesel generator DA15 ATWS injection system '

DA16 Diverse PPS

! DA17 Alternative containment monitoring system l DA18 Cavity cooling l DA19 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months batteries j DA20 Tornado protection for combustion turbine DA21 Diesel SI pumps (2)

DA22 Alternative startup feedwater system l

1 l

(

I 19A - 35 l

t

(

I

i I

1 1

Table 5-3 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR ALTERNATIVE CO'JTAINMENT SPRAY ~

. Benefit Release ' Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract.- Savings Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. $/y RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 $0.00 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1. 3 */ E+ 0 5 4.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.00- $0.00 I RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.05 .$0.03 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.00 $0.00 _

RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 $0.00 l RC2.2M 5.31E-04.

4.05E-09. 1.31E+05 1.00 $0.53 RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.36' $0.07 ,

RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 i RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.78 $1.31 RC3.1E- 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.00 $0.00 ;

l RC3.2M 1.80E-09 '1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.78 $2.54 i RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.78- -$2.78 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02' O.00 $0.00 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02. 0.00 $0.00 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 $0.00 ,

RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 l

________ ________ ________ j SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $7.27 I I

19A - 36 l

l j

. . . - . _ . = _ _ _ . _ . - , - - . _ . , , , _ _ . . _ , , _ , _ _ , . - . , . _ . , , , . . . . , , , , , _ . . . , .,.I

l i

i d

, Table 5-4 l

RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR FILTERED VENT (CONTAINMENT)

Benefit I Release Frequency. Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings l Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. '$/y RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 -0.00 $0.00 i RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 - $0.00 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 l RC2.2E 2.04E-09_ 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.00 $0.00 l RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 ' 8.66E-04 0.00 $0.00 l

$0.00 RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.00 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E . 0. 0 0. $0.00 RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3;81E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 1.00 . $0.53 RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.00 ' $0.00 RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 . 2.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.1E . 6.58E-09 1.'02E+06 6.71E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.00- $0.00 RC3.4E - 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E 0.'00 $0.00 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 -0.00 $0.00 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06. 3.57E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02' O.00 $0.00 ]

. RC4.8E- 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 $0.00 i RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 !

SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $0.53 i

19A - 37 l

l.

l L.

t wr w g--s=- y-w t- sm.- +-n---w i- 7 -- eg y-* * - - - m v ey ww ee u

Table 5-5 l RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR I ALTERNATIVE DC BATTERIES AND EFWS Benefit Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y . reduct. $/y RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 $0.00 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.00 ~ $0.00 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 1.00 $0.19 RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 1.00 $1.68 RC3.1E- 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.00 ~ $0.00 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.00 $0.00 l

RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.00 - $0.00 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.00 $0.00 l RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $1.87 l

1 19A - 38 l

l l P +

3 - yr 1-vtv y -

Table 5-6 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR ALTERNATIVE PRESSURIZER AUXILIARY SPRAY Benefit Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings class- Events /y .mr/ event ar/y reduct. $/y RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04~ 0.21 $0.03 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 $0.00 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E -0.00 $0.00 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.6E 3.45E 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.7E 1~.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.00 '$0.00 RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.00' $0.00 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E 0.36 $1.46 RC3.4E -6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03' O.00 $0.00 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3. 9 6E 0.36 $1.43 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 .3.26E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06- 3.57E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 0.95 $29.77 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.97 $32.16 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.78 $25.59 RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 SUM 1.93E-06' 1.35E-01 $90.44 i

i I

19A - 39

Table 5-7 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR-ALTERNATIVE ATWS PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES Benefit Release Frequency- Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. $/y RC1.1E 1.36E 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.03 -$0.00-RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.03 $0.00 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.03 $0.01 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.03 $0.01 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.03 $0.03-RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.03 $0.02 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.03 $0.02 RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.03 $0.02 RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 -1.87E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 0.03 $0.01 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 -6.71E-03 0.03 $0.20

RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.03 $0.12

RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.03: $0.24 l l

RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.03 $0.12 l RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.03 $0.10 l RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.03 $0.11 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.03 $0.01 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 $0.00 i RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 l l

SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $1.02 l

l 19A '

l L 1 l

. _ _. _. . . ___.J

\

i I l

l i

l Table 5-8 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR l ALTERNATIVE CONCRETE COMPOSITION Benefit Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Bavings Class Events /y mr/ event ar/y reduct. $/y RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 $0.00 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37F+05 4.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 )

RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1 37 E-e R 2.79E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 ?.3BF+C4 8.66E-04 1.00 $0.87 RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.3bN 04 6.67E-04 l'.00 $0.67 j

$0.81 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 b.21E-04 1.00 RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35Ft04 3.8;3-04 1.00 $0.38 j RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1. 3 ] E *0 5 S.37E 04 0.00 $0.00 l RC2.5M 3.95E-09 1. 7 3'r:3 04 1.E7E-04 l'.00 $0.19 '

RC2.6M 9.08E-09 '., . D 2 C+ 0 /. 2.74E-04 1.00 $0.27 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1 48E405 1.68 03 1.00 $1.68 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.12'N06 r 6.7'7-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1. 3.'R: 06 4 . 'E E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E > s.08E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06- 3.96E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 -0.00 $0.00 RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01' $4.87 1

I l

l l

19A - 41 l

l

Table 5-9 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR REACTOR VESSEL EXTERIOR COOLING Benefit Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings I Class Events /y mr/ event ar/y reduct. $/y RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.00 $0.00 j RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 $0.00 i RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 1.00 $0.87 l RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 1.00 $0.67 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 1.00 $0.81 !

RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 1.00 *' '8 j RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.00 $0.00 j RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.00 $0.00 )

RC2.6M $0.27 i

9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 1.00 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 1.00 $6.71 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 1.00 $4.07 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 1.00 $8.08 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 1.00 $3.96 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 1.00 $3.26 RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 1.00 $3.57 I RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 l SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $32.64 l

19A - 42 l

l l

l

l l

Table 5-10 ,

l j' RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR j ALTERNATIVE H2 IGNITERS I

Benefit Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk' fract. Savings Class Events /y ar/ event' ar/y_ reduct.. $/y RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.00 $0.00 J RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 $0.00 l RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 l'.00 $0.47 j RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 '2.79E-04 1.00 .$0.28 3 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.00 $0.00 ;

RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.00 $0.00 i RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.7E' 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 .

$0.00 ,

RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.00 $0.00 l RC2.5M 3.95E-09 .4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E 0.00 $0.00 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 -1.38E+05 1.68E-03' O.00 $0.00 i RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06- 6.71E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.00 $0.00 i RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.00' $0.00 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06- 3.26E 0.00 ' $0.00 RC3.6M -1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.00. $0.00 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 $0.00 2.08E-04 0.00 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E 0.00 $0.00 RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $0.75 19A - 43

i. - - .. - , - . - _ . . . . - . . . , -_..- r _ .. , - . _ . , - - -

l Table 5-11 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR ALTERNATIVE HIGH PRESBURE SAFETY INJECTION Benefit Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Bavings Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. $/y RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.55 $0.09 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 1.00 $0.04 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.16. $0.08 i RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.38 $0.11 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.48 $0.42 RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.48 $0.39 RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 1.00 $0.53 RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 1.00 $0.27 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.87 $1.46 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.32 $2.15 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.38 $1.54 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.42 $3.39 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.38 $1.51 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 1.00 $3.26 l RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 1.00 $3.57

RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02. 1.00 $31.34 l RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.42 $0.09 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 1.00 $33.16

RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 $0.00 t RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 1

________ ________ l l SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $83.38 l

19A - 44 l

l l

l Table 5-12 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR ALTERNATIVE RCS DEPRESSURIZATION Benefit Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings Class Events /y mr/ event ar/y reduct. $/y l RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.36 $0.06 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 $0.00 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.69 $0.33 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.75 $0.21 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.42 $0.36 RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 1.00 $0.67 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.52 $0.42 RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 1.00 $0.38 '

RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.56 $3.76 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.62 $2.52 ;

RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.48 $3.88 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.62 $2.46 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 0.00 $0.00

RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.48 $0.10 l

RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $15.14 l

l 19A - 45 l

l

l l

Table 5-13 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR '

100% SG INSPECTION Benefit !

Release Frequency Mean' Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings I Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. $/y RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 'O.21 $0.03 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 $0.00 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.00 $0.00' RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.00- $0.00 RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.00 $0.00 '

RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.00 $0.00 .

RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04. 0.00- $0.00 RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 ,

RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.00 $0.00 ,

RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.00 $0.00 i RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 .0.38 $1.54 !

l RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.00 $0.00 '

RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.38' $1.51 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC4.4E- 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 1.00 $31.34 l RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 1.00 $33.16 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28,E-02 1.00 $32.80 RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $100.38 l

19A - 46 l

t

!~

l l

, _ . . . . , . . . .__ m.. . . . . . , .

h l

l i i a j i

Table 5-14 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR ,

MSSV AND ADV SCRUBBING j Benefit-Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. $/y J

RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 $0.00 ;

RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04' O.00 $0.00-RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05- 1.68E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 1.00 $31.34 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 1.00 $33.16 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 1.00 $32.80 RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $97.30 19A - 47

l I

l Table 5-15 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR THIRD DIESEL GENERATOR Benefit Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. $/y RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 $0.00 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.00 $0.00 I RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.7E -1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.24 $0.04 RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.24 $0.40 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.00- $0.00 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.00 $0.00~

RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.00 $0.00 j RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.00 $0.00 l RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 0.00 S0.00 l RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $0.45 l

l I 19A - 48 l

l

Table 5-16 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR ALTERNATIVE CONTAINMENT MONITORING SYSTEM i

Benefit l Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings l Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. $/y RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 $0.00 i RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E 0.00 $0.00 )

RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.7E- 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 $0.00 l RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.00 $0.00 l RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.00 $0.00 i RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 0.00 $0.00' RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.00 $0.00 j RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.00 $0.00 '

RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 1.00 $0.21 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC5.1E 5.10E-10 . 87E+06 1.46E-03 1.00 $1.46 .!

l SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $1.67 l

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Table 5-17 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR 12-HOUR BATTERIES Benefit Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk- fract. . Savings Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. $/y RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.00 $0.00 l RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 '$0.00 !

RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 .

4.74E-04 0.00= $0.00 .!

RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.00 $0.00 j RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.00 $0.00 l RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.'81E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.00 $0.00_ l

^

RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04- 1.87E-04 0.38 $0.07 RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04. 0.00 $0.00 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.38' $0.64 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.00 $0.00 I RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.00 $0.00.

RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 $0.00 l RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E $0.71 l

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Table 5-18 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR TORNADO-PROTECTION FOR COMBUSTION TURBINE Benefit Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk -fract. Savings Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y .reduct. $/y RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 $0.00 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2 .- 3 5 E+ 0 4 8.11E-04 'O.00 $0.00 RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.43 $0.08 RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.90 $1.52 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 -4.07E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 .

3.26E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 $0.00 RCS.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $1.60 l

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I Table 5-19 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION FOR ;

DIESEL SI PUMPS (2)

Benefit Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Bavings Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. $/y ;

i RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.55 $0.09 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 1.00 $0.04 RC2.1E 3'.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E 0.16 $0.08

RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.38 $0.11 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.48 $0.42 .

RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 =0.48 $0.39 <

RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04' O.00 $0.00 RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 1.00 $0.53 j RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 1.00 $0.19 RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 1.00 $0.27 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 1.00 .$1.68 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.32 $2.15. j RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.38 $1.54 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E 0.42 $3.39 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.38 $1.51 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03' 1.00 $3.26 RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 1.00 $3.57 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 1.00 $31.34 j RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.42 $0.09 l RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 1.00 $33.16

RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 $0.00 RCS.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 l SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $83.79 i

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Table 5-20 i

RISK RELUCTION EVALUATION FOR ALTERNATIVE STARTUP FEEDWATER SYSTEM-Benefit Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. $/y RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.36 $0.06 j RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 $0.00 ;

RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 -4.74E-04 0.69 $0.33 !

RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.75 $0.21 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.42 $0.36 RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 1.00 $0.67 '

RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.52 $0.42 RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E 0.00 $0.00 RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.00 $0.00

RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.56 $0.94 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.62 $4.16 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.48 $1.95 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.62 $5.01 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.75 $2.97 l RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.75 $2.44 l RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.00 $0.00 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 0.48 $15.04 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.00 $0.00 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.00 $0.00 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 $0.00 1 RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 l SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $34.57 l

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6.0 REFERENCES

1. Crutchfield, D.M. , " Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives for Certified Standard Designs", Docket no.52-002, November 21, 1991.

t

2. Varga, S.A., " Supplement to the Final Environmental l Statement - Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2",

Docket nos. 50-352/353, August 16, 1989.

3. Chanin, D.I., et al, "HELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS)", NUREG/CR-4691, February, 1990. 1

4. Hedrick, G.E., Duke Power, Letter to Sugnet, W.R., EPRI, "AIWR PRA Key Assumptions and Groundrules (KAG) Reference Site CRAC2 Input Files and Narrative Duke File: ASI-1407",

April 17, 1989.

5. Delene, J.G., Bowers, H.I., " Draft Proposed Power Generation Cost Methodology for NASAP/INFCE", U.S.

Department of Energy, Office of Fuel Cycle Evaluation, November 30, 1978.

6. Fauski & Associates, Inc.: Modular Accident AnalLqis Procram (MAAP), Atomic Industrial Forum, IDCOR Program l Technical Report 16.2-3, February 1987.

7. Nucleonics Week, February 20, 1992, Page'3.

9. " Generic Issue - 23, Evaluation of the Reactor Pump Seal l Integrity Issue", Combustion Engineering Inc., CEN-408, 1 September, 1991.

I

10. " Advanced Light Water Reactor Utility Requirements i Document," Volume ii, ALWR Evolutionary Plant, Chapter 1, Appendix A, PRA Key Assumptions and Groundrules, Revision 3, November, 1991.

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l 19A - 54

APPENDIX A FAULT TREE ANALYSIS FOR TOTAL LOSS OF I COMPONENT COOLING WATER -,

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FAULT TREE ANALYSIS FOR TOTAL LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER There are two trains of Component Cooling Water (CCW) . Each train has one pump operating and one pump in standby. In addition, each CCW ;

trains require service water. Each CCW train is supported by two service water pumps, one operating and one on standby. The following fault tree models total loss of CCW including common cause failures.

This tree was evaluated using the CAFTA code and the resulting failure frequency was 2.25E-5/y.

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FAILURE OF CCW l CCWdO0i l lI '

i FAILURE OF CCW FAILURE OF CCW TRAIN A TRAIN 8 1CCWih0011 ICCWT'001B I I i i I

FAILUAE OF TRAIN A FAILURE OF TRAIN 8 FAILUAE OF TRAIN B FAILUAE OF TAAIN A CCW PUMPS ESW. PUMPS CCW PUMPS ESW PUMPS 1CCWTh003i .ICCWT8002 1 1CCWT8003 I ICCwTA0021 Page 2 Page 4 ,

Page 7 Page 8 FAILURE'OF CCW .\ TREES \CCWSAMDA;CAF 4-15-92 Page 1

FAILURE OF TRAIN A CCW PUMPS

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FAILURE CF CCW PUMP FAILURE OF CCW PUMP At A2 I CCMT'acc5 I iCCwTh0061 f

I I I OPERATING CornON COMPONENT COOLING COPPCNENT COOLING CO*04)N CAUSE COMPONENT COCLING FAILURE OF TWO WATER PLDP at CAUEE FAILLFE DF 2 w&TER PUMP A2 WATER PUNP A2 FAILS TO RUN OF 2 RUNNING CCN FAILS TO RLN FAILS TO START STAPOSY CCM PLDPS PUMPS TO START l C99*. A t I 1CCW2C N ACCF I l CFB'* A2 l l CP9'JA2 l iCCw2PNSCCF l W E- ' O W I I CODFONENT COOLING BETA FACTOR FOR WATER PUMP A2 FAILLFE OF 2 0F 2 FAILS TD START CCW M.MPS TO START i CN'#2 l l CCMeF5 i KAssi/91 A.A-32 FAILURE OF CCW .\ TREES \CCWSAMDA.CAF 4-15-92 Page 2

OPERATING COMMON CAUSE FAILURE OF 2 A 'JF 2 AUNNING CCW

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OPEAATING COMMON SERVICE WATER PUMP COMMON CAUSE SERVICE WATER PUMD B1 FAILS CAUSE FAILUPE OF 2 82 FAILS FAILUAE OF 2 OF 2 TO Rt.N OF 2 RUNNING ESW TO START STANDBY ESW PUMPS PUMPS TO START l CPN.01 l lCESW2PMPACCF 1 I CPWUO2 l 1CE5W2PMPSCCF 1 Page 5 Page 6 SERVICE WATER PUMP

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FAILURE OF CCW .\ TREES \CCWSAMDA.CAF 4-15-92 Page 8

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i ATTACHMENT B THE INCLUSION OF AVERTED ONSITE COSTS IN THE EVALUATION OF DESIGN ALTERNATIVES .

FOR THE SYSTEM 80+ NUCLEAR POWER PLANT JUNE, 1993 1 j

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PURPOSE Appendix 19A to the CESSAR-DC contains an evaluation of Design Alternatives (DAs) for the System 80+ design which was based on the reduction of risk to the offsite population. The purpose of this ,

analysis is to evaluate the same design alternatives but include !

credit for Averted Onsite Costs (AOC).

SUMMARY

Section 4 of Appendix 19A describes the Release Classes (RCs) and the accident sequences that were binned into each RC. To evaluate l the risk reduction of each DA, the frequency of each RC was decreased proportionally to the contribution that each DA makes to the RC frequency. The AOC benefit was estimated as the product of the change in core damage frequency (CDF) times the total onsite !

cost for loosing the plant.

Table 1 summarizes the results of the Design Alternative quantification including AOC. The first column, is the annual risk reduction to the Combined License (CL) applicantfor each DA for both AOC and dose risk to the general population using $1000 per person-rem / year reduction. The next column, labeled capital benefit, is an equivalent present worth of the annual risk reduction. It is also the maximum amount that could be spent in capital to be cost beneficial. The third column is a capital cost estimate for the design alternatives. The net benefit (capital benefit - capital cost) is given in the last column.

The System 80+ plant was designed to meet the stringent design goals in the EPRI ALWR Utility Requirements Document. The System 80+ design has a core damage frequency approximately two orders of magnitude lower than existing plants. The analysis presented in this report conservatively estimated the benefits of the DAs by assuming that they would work perfectly to eliminate the type of accident they are designed to address and would require no maintenance or testing. Because of the small initial risk associated with the System 80+ design, none of the DAs are cost beneficial.

ANALYSIS l For plant modifications that reduced the Core Damage Frequency j (CDF), the annual benefit was increased by an amount proportioned l to the present worth of the reduction in risk of Averted Onsite Costs (AOC) and dose reduction to the general public.

Modifications that reduced the probability of containment failure, or reduced the amount of fission products leaving the site were assumed to have no significant AOC reduction.

Attach. B - 1

AOC included replacement power costs, direct accident costs (including cleanup), and the economic loss of the plant. Credit is given for property and replacement-power insurance. Evaluation of the AOC includes the following considerations:

1) The replacement power costs used ($386,000/ day) is a replacement power cost for the Palo Verde Reactor i System 80 plant) averaged for 1993 as predicted by ANL{a .

This cost is applied for a three year period because it is assumed that the utility will contract with an Independent Power Producer (IPP) during that period for power at a comparable cost as that incurred in the nuclear plant. Currently, IPPs can build new facilities in 12 months and IPP rates are _very competitive.

Therefore a three year replacement power period is a reasonable assumption. Replacement power costs are estimated at $423 Million (M) but will be artially offset by replacement power insurance of $365M

2) Direct accident costs, including cleanup costs were assumed to be $2 Billion (B). This is partially offset by the primary and excess nuclear-property insurance of

$1.625B . Most new, large plants and publicly owned plants carry the maximum amount of coverage. The NRC requires the plant owners to carry over $1B

3) The economic value of the facility at the time of the accident was calculated assuming that the initial plant invested cost was $1.4B based on DOE cost guidelines. It is also assumed that a straight line depreciation value ;

is used over a twenty year period and the accident is equz;11y probable during any year in the plants sixty year life. The economic value of the plant averages $233M and is assumed lost. The inclusion of both the value of the

-plant and .its output (replacement power) is conservatively exaggerate the size of the AOC.

The total AOC is estimated at $666M. This figure neglects credit I for premature decommissioning insurance or elimination of annual capital expenditures. Such credits would further reduce the AOC.

The maximum value for a capital expense for which AOC avoidance is cost beneficial can now be calculated. The core damage frequency (CDF) is approximately 1.93E-6/y. If an unspecified modification l completely eliminated core damage, it would be worth (1.93E-6/y x

$666M) or $1.29K/y in AOC avoidance. Using the economic assumptions given in Table 3-1 of Appendix 19A, a levelized capital cost rate of 17.9% is predicted. A capital expense of $7,250 would be justified for AOC avoidance if it completely eliminated any chance of core damage and had no annual maintenance, testing, or training costs, l

Attach. B - 2

Section 5 of Appendix 19A gives an analysis of the dose risk reduction for each DA. Tables 2 through 13 presents the annual risk reduction for twelve of the DAs that reduce Core Damage Frequency (CDF) and have an AOC benefit. The ATWS Injection DA and the Diverse PPS DA were not evaluated because they have the same risk reduction benefits as the ATWS Pressure Relief Valves-(Table 4). The reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal cooling DA was evaluated separately as described in Section 5.4 of Appendix 19A. The CDF-for RCP induced LOCA was conservatively estimated at 3.69E-7/y.

The AOC benefit of eliminating this sequence is ($6.66E+8/ event x 3.69E-7 events / year) $246/y. The annual _ credit for offsite dose' reduction was negligible. Using a levelized capital cost rate of 17.9%, this DA would be cost beneficial if it could be purchased and installed for $1374.

REFERENCES

1. Nucleonics Week, December 3, 1992, Page 13.

2. " Nuclear Insurance Newsletter,"_ Johnson & Higgins Inc.,

January, 1990 (90-1).

3. " Nuclear Insurance Newsletter," Johnson & Higgins Inc.,

July, 1990 (90-2).

Attach. B - 3

i TABLE 1 (Sheet 1 of 2)

SUMMARY

OF THE RISK REDUCTIONS (INCLUDING AOC) OF THE DESIGN ALTERNATIVES DESIGN ALTERNATIVE ANNUAL RISK CAPITAL CAPITAL NET CAPITAL '

REDUCTION BENEFIT

COST BENEFIT

$/Y l

1) ALT. CONTAINMENT SPRAY $7.27** $41 $1,500,000 -($1,499,959) l

2) FILTERED VENT (CONTAINMENT) $0.53** $3 $10,000,000 ($9,999,997)

3) . ALT. DC BATTERY AND EFWS $12.63 $72 $2,000,000 ($1,999,928)

4) RCP SEAL COOLING $246 $1374 $100,000 ($98,626)

5) ALT. PRESSURIZER AUX SPRAY $293- $1637 .$5,000,000 '($4,998,363)

6) ALT. ATWS RELIEF VALVES $38.64 $216 $1,000,000 ($999,784) l

7) ALT. CONCRETE COMPOSITION $4.87** $27 $5,000,000 ($4,999,973).

8) RV. EXTERIOR COOLING $ 3 2 . 6 4 ** ^ .$182 .$5,500,000 ($5,499,818)

.9). ALT. H2 ~ IGNITERS . $ 0. 75** '$4 $1,000,000 ($999,006) '

10) ALT. HPSI $890.57 $4975 $20,000,000 ($19,995,025)

~i

11) ALT. RCS DEPRESSURIZATION $403.18 $2252 $500,000 ($497,748)'

.l

12) 100% SG INSPECTION $304.20 $1699- $1,500,000 ($1,498,301)

Attach. B-4

i i

TABLE 1 (8heet 2 of 2)

SUNMARY OF THE RISK REDUCTIONS (INCLUDING AOC) OF THE DESIGN ALTERNATIVES ,

" DESIGN ALTERNATIVE ANNUAL RISK CAPITAL CAPITAL NET CAPITAL REDUCTION BENEFIT

COST BENEFIT

$/Y

13) MSSV AND ADV SCRUBBING $97.30 $544 $6,000,000 ($5,999,456)

14) THIRD DIESEL GENERATOR $3.03 $17 $10,000,000 ($9,999,983)

15) ATWS INJECTION SYSTEM $38.64 $216 $300,000 ($299,784)

16) DIVERSE PPS SYSTEM $36.64 $216 $3,000,000 ($2,999,784)

17) ALT. CONTAINMENT MONITORING SYSTEM $2.76 $15 $1,000,000 ($999,985) i

18) CAVITY COOLING $32.64** $182 $50,000- ($49,818)

19) 12-HOUR BATTERIES $4.80 $27 $300,000 ($299,973)

20) . TORNADO-PROTECTION.FOR

' COMBUSTION TURBINE $10.04 $56 $3,000,000- ($2,999,944)

21) DIESEL SI PUMPS (2) $894.66 $4998. $2,000,000 ($1,995,002)

$419.69

~

22) ALT. STARTUP FWS $2345 $3,000,000 ($2,997,345)

~ THE. CAPITAL . BENEFIT IS THE. PRICE OF A PIECE OF EQUIPMENT THAT HAS A LEVELIZED -( ANNUAL) COST EQUAL TO.THE ANNUAL BENEFIT IN RISK REDUCTION AND ASSUMES NO MAINTENANCE OR TESTING OF ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT

- NO AOC WAS ~ CREDITED TO - DOSE MITIGATION DESIGN ALTERNATIVES THAT DOES NOT REDUCE CDP.

Attach. B - 5

_ .___ _ _= __

l l I -

i Table 2 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION (INCLUDING AOC) FOR ALTERNATIVE DC BATTERIES AND EFWS 1

l Benefit MR Risk Release Frequency Hean Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings CDF j Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. $/y Reduction l RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.00 50.00 0 I RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 $0.00 0 I RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.00 S0.00 0 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 t

RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 l RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 ,

(

RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35F+04 3.81E-04 0.00 S0.00 0 !

RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 )

! RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 1.00 50.19 3.950E-09 !

l RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 1.22E-08 RC2.7M 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 1.00 $1.68 1.220E-08 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.00 50.00 0 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 0.00 $0.00 0 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.00 50.00 0 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.00 $0.00 0 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 S0.00 0 RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 50.00 0 1 SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $1.87 1.615E-08 AOC ($) 6.66E+08 AOC RISK REDUCTION S10.76 MR RISK REDUCTION $1.87 TOTAL RISK REDUCTION $12.63 Attach. B - 6

Table 3 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION (INCLUDING AOC) FOR ALTERNATIVE PRESSURIZER AUIILIARY SPRAY Benefit MR Risk Release Frequency Nean Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings CDF Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. $/y Reduction RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.21 $0.03 2.86E-07 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 50.00 0 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.00 S0.00 0 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 s RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04- 1.87E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 0.00 50.00 'O RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.00 50.00 0 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.36 S1.46 1.109E-09 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.00 S0.00 0 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.36 $1.43 1.123E-09 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3,26E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06- 3.13E-02 0.95 $29.77 5.681E-09 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.00 S0.00 0 j RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E 0.97 $32.16 6.344E-09 l RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.78 $25.59 4.337E-09 RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 0

_ _ _ =

SUN 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $90.44 3.04E-07 l

l AOC ($). 6.66E+08 !

l- AOC RISK REDUCTION $202.59 l MR RISK REDUCTION $90.44 l ----------

TOTAL RIS", REDUCTION $293.04 i

L I'

Attach. B - 7 l-

. . ~ , - . _ - _ . _ . . . . - , . - . -

! -. - - _ _ _ -.l l j 1

1 1

Table 4 ]

RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION (INCLUDING AOC) FOR ALTERNATIVE ATWS PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES Benefit MR Risk i Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings CDF Class Events /y ar/ event' ar/y reduct. $/y Reduction RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04' O.03 $0.00 4.080E-08 rpl.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.03 $0.00 1.143E-08 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.03 $0.01 1.038E-10 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.03 $0.01' 6.120E-11 ;

RC2.4h 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04~ 0.03 $0.03 1.092E-09 RC?.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.03 $0.02 8.520E-10 .

RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.03 $0.02 1.035E RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.03 $0.02 1.215E-10 RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.6M 9.08F-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 0.03 -$0.01 2.724E-10 RC2.7M 1.22E 1.38E+05' 1.68E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.03 $0.20 1.974E-10 RC3.2E 3.0BE-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.03' $0.12. 9.240E-11 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.03 $0.24 2.019E-10 ,

RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.03 $0.12 9.360E-11 )

RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.03 $0.10 5.400E-11 ']

RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.03 $0.11 5.430E-11 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06. 3.13E-02 0.00 $0.00 -0 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.03 $0.01- 3.360E-11 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.00 $0.00 0 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 $0.00 0 l RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 0

~l SUN .1.93E 1.35E-01 $1.02 5.650E-08

, AOC ($) 6.66E+08 AOC RISK REDUCTION $37.63 MR RISK REDUCTION $1.02

TOTAL RISK REDUCTION $38.64 1

1 1

I l

l Attach. B - 8 l

l

Table 5 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION (INCLUDING AOC) FOR ALTERNATIVE HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION Benefit MR Risk Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings CDP Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. $/y Reduction RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.55 $0.09 7.48E-07 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 1.00 $0.04 3.81E-07 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.16 $0.08 5.536E-10 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.38 S0.11 7.752E-10 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.48 $0.42 1.747E-08 RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.48 $0.39 1.656E-08 RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 1.00 $0.53 4.050E-09 RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 1.00 $0.27 9.080E-09 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.87 S1.46 1.061E-08 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.32 S2.15 2.106E-09 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.38 S1.54 1.170E-09 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.42 S3.39 2.827E-09 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.38 $1.51 1.186E-09 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 1.00 $3.26 1.800E-09 RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 1.00 S3.57 1.810E-09 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 1.00 $31.34 5.980E-09 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.42 $0.09 4.704E-10 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 1.00 $33.16 6.540E-09 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 S0.00 0 RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $83.38 1.21E-06 AOC (S) 6.66E+08 AOC RISK REDUCTION $807.19 MR RISK REDUCTION $83.38 TOTAL RISK REDUCTION $890.57 i

l 1

l

! Attach. B - 9 i

i l

L

j a

I l Table 6

. RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION (INCLUDING AOC) FOR 4

ALTERNATIVE RCS DESPRESSURIZATION Benefit MR Risk I Savings Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. CDF class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. S/y Reduction RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.36 $0.06 4.90E-07 I

RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 S0.00 0 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.69 $0.33 2.387E-09 i RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.75 $0.21 1.530E-09 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.42 $0.36 1.529E-08 RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.672-04 1.00 $0.67 2.840E-08 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.52 $0.42 1.794E-08 i RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 1.00 $0.38 1.620E-08 '

S RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 i

RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 l

RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 l RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.56 $3.76 3.685E-09 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.62 $2.52 1.910E-09 s

RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.48 $3.88 3.230E-09 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.62 $2.46 1.934E-09 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.00 $0.00 0

RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 0.00 $0.00 0

RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.48 $0.10 5.376E-10 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.00 $0.00 0 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 $0.00 0 RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $15.14 5.83E-7 i AOC ($) 6.66E+08 4 AOC RISK REDUCTION $388.04 MR RISK REDUCTION $15.14 q __________

TOTAL RISK REDUCTION $403.18 5

Attach. B - 10

I l

Table 7 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION (INCLUDING AOC) FOR 100% SG INSPECTION Benefit MR Risk l Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings CDP i Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. S/y Reduction RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.21 S0.03 2.86E-07 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 50.00 0 i RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.00 $0.00 L RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 i RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 1 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.38 $1.54 1.170E-09 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 i RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.38 S1.51 1.186E-09 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 1.00 $31.34 5.980E-09 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 1.00 $33.16 6.540E-09 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 1.00 S32.80 5.560E-09 l RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $100.38 3.06E-07 6.66E+08 AOC (S) $203.82 AOC RISK REDUCTION $100.38 MR RISK REDUCTION ----------

TOTAL RISK REDUCTION $304.20 l

l l l 1

l Attach. B - 11 l

Table 8 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION (INCLUDING AOC) FOR THIRD DIESEL GENERATOR Benefit MR Risk Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings CDF Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. $/y Reduction RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.00 50.00 0 RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.00 S0.00 0 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.00 S0.00 0 RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 S0.00 0 j RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5,31E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 i RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.24 $0.04 9.480E-10 I RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 l RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.24 $0.40 2.928E-09 l RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 l

RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.00 S0.00 0 l RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.0BE-03 0.00 $0.00 0 l RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.00 50.00 0 l RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.37E+06 3.57E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 l RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 0.00 $0.00 0 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.00 S0.00 0 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 $0.00 0 RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 SUM 1. 93E 1.35E-01 $0.45 3.88E-09 AOC ($) 6.66E+08 AOC RISK REDUCTION $2.58 MR RISK REDUCTION $0.45 TOTAL RISK REDUCTION S3.03 Attach. B - 12

I Table 9 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION (INCLUDING AOC) FOR ALTERNATIVE CONTAINMENT MONITORING SYSTEM Benefit MR Risk Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings CDF Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. S/y Reduction RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 1 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.00 S0.00 0 RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 ;

RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 0.00 50.00 0 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.00 S0.00 0 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 0.00 $0.00 0 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 1.00 $0.21 1.120E-09 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.00 $0.00 0 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 $0.00 0 RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 1.00 $1.46 5.100E-10

__________ __________ ________ _______ l SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $1.67 1.630E-09 AOC (S) 6.66E+08 AOC RISK REDUCTION $1.09 )

MR RISK REDUCTION $1.67 TOTAL RISK REDUCTION 02.76 1

l l

Attach. B - 13

Table 10 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION (INCLUDING AOC) FOR 12-HOUR BATTERIES I

Benefit MR Risk Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings CDF Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. S/y Reduction RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC1.1H 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-0+' O.00 $0.00 0 RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.00 S0.00 0 l RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.00 S0.00 0 l RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 l RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.38 $0.07 1.501E-09 RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 v.00 $0.00 0 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.38 $0.64 4.636E-09 ,

RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 l RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 l

RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.00 50.00 0 RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 !

RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 0.00 $0.00 0 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 )

RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.00 $0.00 0 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 S0.00 0 ,

RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 S0.00 0 l SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $0.71 6.137E-09 AOC ($) 6.66E+08 j AOC RISK REDUCTION $4.09 l MR RISK REDUCTION $0.71 !

TOTAL RISK REDUCTION $4.80 Attach. B - 14

Table 11 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION (INCLUDING AOC) FOR TORNADO-PROTECTION FOR COMBUSTION TURBINE Benefit MR Risk Release Frequency Mer.n Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings CDF Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. S/y Reduction RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.3E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 S0.00 0 RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.43 $0.08 1.699E-09 RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 0.00 S0.00 0 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.90 $1.52 1.098E-08 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.00 50,.00 0 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.00 S0.00 0 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.00 S0.00 0 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.00 S0.00 0 RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 0.00 S0.00 0 RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 0.00 S0.00 0 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.00 $0.00 0 1 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 S0.00 0 RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 1

---------- -------- ------- \

SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 S1.60 1.268E-08 i

AOC (S) 6.66E+08 i AOC RISK REDUCTION $8.44 MR RISK REDUCTION S1.60 TOTAL RISK REDUCTION S10.04 l

i Attach. B - 15

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i l

l Table 12 l

RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION (INCLUDING AOC) FOR .!

DIESEL SI PUNPS (2)

Benefit MR Risk Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings CDF l Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. $/y Reduction RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.55 S0.09 7.48E-07 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 1.00 $0.04 3.81E-07 RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.16 S0.08 5.536E-10 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.38 $0.11 7.752E-10 PC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.48 $0.42- 1.747E RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.48 $0.39 1.656E-08 RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 $0.00 0

. RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 1.00 50.53 4.050E-09 l l ..RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 1.00 $0.19 3.950E-09 I l

RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E 1.00' $0.27 9.080E-09 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 1.00 $1.68- 1.220E-08 RO3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.32 $2.15 2.106E-09 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.38 .$1.54 1.170E-09 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.42 $3.39 2.827E-09 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.38 S1.51 1.186E-09 RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 1.00 $3.26 1.800E-09 RC3.6M 1.81E-09 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 1.00 $3.57 1.810E-09 l RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 1.00 $31.34 5.980E-09 f RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.42 $0.09 4.704E-10 l RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 1.00 $33.16 6.540E-09 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 $0.00 0 RCS.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $83.79 1.22E-06 AOC ($) 6.66E+08 AOC RISK REDUCTION $810.87 MR RISK REDUCTION $83.79-TOTAL RISK REDUCTION $894.66 ll i

Attach. B - 16 i

t p:

. . . _ _ . . . . . . . . , - . - - - -+ -

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Table 13 RISK REDUCTION EVALUATION (INCLUDING AOC) FOR ALTERNATIVE STARTUP FEEDWATER SYSTEM l

Benefit MR Risk )

Release Frequency Mean Dose Dose Risk fract. Savings CDF

! Class Events /y ar/ event ar/y reduct. S/y Reduction ]

RC1.1E 1.36E-06 1.19E+02 1.62E-04 0.36 $0.06 4.90E-07 RC1.1M 3.81E-07 1.09E+02 4.15E-05 0.00 $0.00 0 !

RC2.1E 3.46E-09 1.37E+05 4.74E-04 0.69 $0.33 2.387E-09 RC2.2E 2.04E-09 1.37E+05 2.79E-04 0.75 $0.21 1.530E-09 RC2.4E 3.64E-08 2.38E+04 8.66E-04 0.42 $0,36 1.529E-08 RC2.5E 2.84E-08 2.35E+04 6.67E-04 1.00 $0.67 2.840E-08 RC2.6E 3.45E-08 2.35E+04 8.11E-04 0.52 $0.42 1.794E-08 RC2.7E 1.62E-08 2.35E+04 3.81E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.2M 4.05E-09 1.31E+05 5.31E-04 0.00 50.00 0 RC2.5M 3.95E-09 4.73E+04 1.87E-04 0.00 S0.00 0 l RC2.6M 9.08E-09 3.02E+04 2.74E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC2.7M 1.22E-08 1.38E+05 1.68E-03 0.56 $0.94 6.832E-09 RC3.1E 6.58E-09 1.02E+06 6.71E-03 0.62 $4.16 4.080E-09 RC3.2E 3.08E-09 1.32E+06 4.07E-03 0.48 $1.95 1.478E-09 RC3.4E 6.73E-09 1.20E+06 8.08E-03 0.62 $5.01 4.173E-09 RC3.6E 3.12E-09 1.27E+06 3.96E-03 0.75 S2.97 2.340E-09 i RC3.2M 1.80E-09 1.81E+06 3.26E-03 0.75 S2.44 1.350E-09 RC3.6M 1.97E+06 3.57E-03 l

1.81E-09 0.00 $0.00 0 '

RC4.4E 5.98E-09 5.24E+06 3.13E-02 0.48 S15.04 2.870E-09 RC4.8E 1.12E-09 1.86E+05 2.08E-04 0.00 $0.00 0 RC4.12E 6.54E-09 5.07E+06 3.32E-02 0.00 50.00 0 RC4.18L 5.56E-09 5.90E+06 3.28E-02 0.00 $0.00 0 RC5.1E 5.10E-10 2.87E+06 1.46E-03 0.00 $0.00 0 1 SUM 1.93E-06 1.35E-01 $34.57 5.78E-07 AOC ($) 6.66E+08 AOC RISK REDUCTION $385.13 ;

MR RISK REDUCTION $34.57 I TOTAL RISK REDUCTION $419.69 i l

)

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j Attach. B - 17 i

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ML20045D342

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

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