ML20247H308
| ML20247H308 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200002, 05000470 |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1989 |
| From: | ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247G537 | List:
|
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8904040437 | |
| Download: ML20247H308 (94) | |
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CECC A D DESI:N Em&&MER CEIJTIFICATISN O EFFECTIVE PAGE LISTING.
1 CHAPTER 8 ,
Table of Contents f
p_a_g e Amendment ]
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Page Amendment 8.1-1 E O 8.1-2 8.1-3 E
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CHAPTER 8 Tables (Cont'd) Amendment 8.3.1-3 E 8.3.1-4 E 8.3.2-1 (Sheet 1) E 8.3.2-1 (Sheet 2) E 8.3.2-2 E 8.3.2-3 E 8.3.2-4 E Fiqures Amendment 8.2-1 E 8.3.1-1 E 8.3.2-1 E 8.3.2-2 E O
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O Antendment E December 30, 1988
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l TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 8 Section Subiect Pace No.
8.0 ELECTRIC POWER 8.1-1
8.1 INTRODUCTION
8.1-1 8.1.1 UTILITY GRID SYSTEM AND INTERCONNECTIONS 8.1-1 E 8.1.2 ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS 8.1-1 8.1.3 DESIGN BASES 8.1-2 8.1.4 DESIGN CRITERIA 8.1-4 8.1.4.1 General Desian Criteria 8.1-4 8.1.4.2 NRC Reculatory Guides 8.1-4 i
[V 8.1.4.3 IEEE Standards 8.1-9 8.1.5 INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS 8.1-10 8.2 OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM 8.2-1 8.2.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS 8.2-1 8.2.1.1 Utility Grid System 8.2-1 8.2.1.2 Utility Grid and Switchyard 8.2-1 Interconnections 8.2.1.3 Station Switchyard 8.2-1 8.2.1.3.1 Switchyard 480V AC Auxiliary 8.2-1 Power System 8.2.1.3.2 Switchyard 125V DC Auxiliary 8.2-2 Power System I 8.2.1.3.3 Switchyard Protective Relaying System 8.2-2 >
8.2.1.3.4 Switchyard Control System 8.2-2 8.2.1.4 Switchyard and_ Station 8.2-2 Interconnections
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8.2.1.5 Cffsite Power System Operational Description 8.2-3 Amendment E i December 30, 1988
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) i CHAPTER 8 .
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Section pubiect Pace No.
1 8.3.1.1.4.1 Starting Circuits 8.3-8 8.3.1.1.4.2 Starting System 8.3-8 8.3.1.1.4.3 Combustion Air System 8.3-8 8.3.1.1.4.4 Diesel Generator Protection 8.3-8 E
Systems 8.3.1.1.4.5 Control Room Indication of 8.3-10 Diesel Generator Operational Status l 8.3.1.1.4.6 Load Shedding and Sequencing 8.3-10 8.3.1.1.4.7 Lube Oil System 8.3-11 8.3.1.1.4.8 Fuel Oil Storage System 8.3-11 8.3.1.1.4.9 Cooling System 8.3-11 8.3.1.1.4.10 Diesel Generator Proven 8.3-11 Technology S.3.1.1.4.11 Preoperational and Periodic 8.3-11 Testing 8.3.1.1.4.12 125V DC Diesel Control Power 8.3-12 Os 8.3.1.1.5 Non-Class 1E Alternate AC Source 8.3-12 Standby Power Supply l 8.3.1.1.5.1 AAC Starting and Loading 8.3-13 8.3.1.1.5.2 AAC Instrumentation and Controls 8.3-13 8.3.1.1.5.3 AAC Auxiliary Support Systems 8.3-13 8.3.1.1.5.4 AAC Periodic Testing 8.3-14 8.3.1.1.5.5 AAC Quality Assurance 8.3-14 8.3.1.1.6 Protective Relaying System 8.3-14 8.3.1.1.7 Monitoring Instrumentation and 8.3-15 Controls for Onsite Power System 8.3.1.1.8 Design Bases for Class 1E Motors 8.3-17 8s3.1.2 Analysis 8.3-17 8.3.1.2.1 Compliance with General Design 8.3-17 Criterion 17 and Regulatory Guide.l.32 8.3.1.2.2 Compliance with General Design 8.3-18 Criterion 18 8.3.1.2.? Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.6 8.3-18 8.3.1.2.4 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.9 8.3-19 8.3.1.2.5 Compliance with IEEE Standards 308, 8.3-19
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CHAPTER 8 l l
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Page Amendment 8.3-13 E 8.3-14 E 8.3-15 E l 8.3-16 E 8.3-17 E 8.3-18 E 8.3-19 E 8.3-20 E 8.3-21 E 8.3-22 E l E l 8.3-23 8.3-24 E 8.3-25 E 8.3-26 E 8.3-27 E 8.3-28 E l 8.3-29 E 8.3-30 E 8.3-31 E 8.3-32 E 8.3-33 E 8.3-34 E 8.3-35 E Tables Amendment 8.2-1 (Sheet 1) E '
8.2-1 (Sheet 2) E 8.2-2 (Sheet 1) E 8.2-2 (Sheet 2) E 8.2-3 (Sheet 3) E 8.3.1-1 (Sheet 1) E 8.3.1-1 (Sheet 2) E 8.3.1-1 (Sheet 3) E 8.3.1-1 (Sheet 4) E 8.3.1-1 (Sheet 5) E 8.3.1-1 (Sheet 6) E E
8.3.1-1 (Shoot 7) L 8.3.1-2 (pheet 1) .
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CHAPTER 8 Tables'(Cont'd) Amendment 8.3.1-3 E 8.3.1-4 E 8.3.2-1 (Sheet 1) E 8.3.2-1 (Sheet 2) E !
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TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 8 Section Subiect Pace No_..
8.0 ELECTRIC POWER 8.1-1
8.1 INTRODUCTION
8.1 8.1.1 UTILITY GRID SYSTEM AND INTERCONNECTIONS 8.1-1 E 8.1.2 ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS 8.1-1 8.1.3 DESIGN BASES 8.1-2 8.1.4 DESIGN CRITERIA 8.1-4 8.1.4.1 General Desian Criteria 8.1-4 8.1.4.2 NRC Reculatory Guides 8.1-4 8.1.4.3 IEEE Standards 8.1-9 8.1.5 INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS 8.1-10 8.2 OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM 8.2-1 8.2.1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS 8.2-1 8.2.1.1 Utility Grid System 8.2-1 8.2.1.2 Utility Grid and Switchvard 8.2-1 Interconnections 8.2.1.3 Station Switchvard 8.2-1 8.2.1.3.1 Switchyard 480V AC Auxiliary 8.2-1 Power System 8.2.1.3.2 Switchyard 125V DC Auxiliary 8.2-2 Pnwer System 8.2.1.3.3 %'.tchyard Protective Relaying System 8.2-2 8.2.1.3.4 Mitchyard Control System 8.2-2 8.2.1.4 Switchyard and Station 8.2-2 Interconnections O 8.2.1.5 Offsite Power Cvstem Operational Description 8.2-3 Amendment E l 1 December 30, 1988
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 8 Section Bubiect Pace No.
8.2.1.5.1 Offsite Power System Protective 8.2-3 Relaying 8.2.1.6 Reliability Considerations 8.2-3 E 8.2.2 ANALYSIS 8.2-4 8.2.2.1 Grid Stability and Availability 8.2-4 Analysis 8.2.2.2 Offsite and Switchvard Power Systems 8.2-4 Sincle Failure Analysis 8.3 ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS 8.3-1 8.3.1 AC POWER SYSTEMS 8.3-1 8.3.1.1 System Descriptions 8.3-1 8.3.1.1.1 Non-Class 1E AC Power Systems 8.3-1 1
8.3.1.1.1.1 Unit Main Power System 8.3-1 8.3.1.1.1.2 13,800 Volt Normal Auxiliary 8.3-1 Power System 8.3.1.1.1.3 4,160 Volt Normal Auxiliary 8.3-2 Power System 8.3.1.1.1.4 480 Volt Normal Auxiliary 8.3-3 Power System 8.3.1.1.2 Class 1E AC Power Systems 8.3-4 8.3.1.1.2.1 4,160 Volt Class 1E Auxiliary 8.3-4 Power System 8.3.1.1.2.2 480 Volt Class 1E Auxiliary 8.3-5 Power System 8.3.1.1.3 Tests 8.3-5 8.3.1.1.3.1 Preoperational Tests 8.3-5 8.3.1.1.3.2 Periodic Tests 8.3-5 8.3.1.1.4 Class L" Standby Power Supplies 8.3-7 g Amendment E l 11 December 30, 1988 l i
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v TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
CHAPTEP. 8 Section Subiect Pace No.
8.3.1.1.4.1 Starting Circuits 8.3-8 8.3.1.1.4.2 Starting System 8.3-8 8.3.1.1.4.3 Combustion Air System 8.3-8 8.3.1.1.4.4 Diesel Generator Protection 8.3-8 E
Systems 8.3.1.1.4.5 Control Room Indication of 8.3-10 Diesel Generator Operational Status 8.3.1.1.4.6 Load Shedding and Sequencing 8.3-10 8.3.1.1.4.7 Lube Oil System '8.3-11 8.3.1.1.4.8 Fuel Oil Storage System 8.3-11 8.3.1.1.4.9 Cooling System 8.3-11 8.3.1.1.4.10 Diesel Generator Proven 8.3-11 Technology 8.3.1.1.4.11 Preoperational and Periodic 8.3-11 Testing O 8.3.1.1.4.12 125V DC Diesel Control Power 8.3-12 8.3-12 8.3.1.1.5 Non-Class 1E Alternate AC Source Standby Power Supply 8.3.1.1.5.1 AAC Starting and Loading 8.3-13 8.3.1.1.5.2 AAC Instrumentation and Controls 8.3-13 8.3.1.1.5.3 AAC Auxiliary Support Systems 8.3-13 8.3.1.1.5.4 AAC Periodic Testing 8.3-14 8.3.1.1.5.5 AAC Quality Assurance 8.3-14 8.3.1.1.6 Protective Relaying System 8.3-14 8.3.1.1.7 Monitoring Instrumentation and 8.3-15 ,
Controls for Onsite Power System l 8.3.1.1.8 Design. Bases for Class 1E Motors 8.3-17 8a3.1.2 Analysis 8.3-17 l
8.3.1.2.1 Compliance with General Design 8.3-17 Criterion 17 and Regulatory Guide 1.32 8.3.1.2.2 Compliance with General Design 8.3-18 Criterion 18 8.3.1.2.3 Compliance with. Regulatory Gaide 1.6 8.3-18 C.3.1.2.4 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.9 8.3-19 8.3.1.2.5 Compliance with IEEE Standards 308, 8.3-19
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lll. 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) ,
l CHAPTER 8 j Bection Subject Pace No.
8.3.1.2.6 Compliance with IEEE Standard 8.3-19 384-1981 and Regulatory Guide 1.75 ,
8.3.1.2.7 Compliance with IEEE Standard 379-1977 8.3-20 l 8.3.1.2.8 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.63 8.3-20 1 8.3.1.2.9 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.106 8.3-20 E 8.3.1.3 Physical Identification of S&fetv- 8.3-20 Related Eauipment 8.3.1.4 Indonendence of Redundant Systems 8.3-22 c 8.3.1.4.1 Diesel Generators 8.3-22 j 8.3.1.4.2 Switchgear and Load Centers 8.3-22 )
8.3.1.4.3 Motor Control Centers 8.3-22 j!
8.3.1.4.4 Batteries, Chargers, Inverters and 8.3-22 i Panelboards 8.3.1.4.5 Cable Installation and Separation 8.3-22 I
8.3.1.4.5.1 Cable and Conduit Installation 8.3-22 l and Support j 8.?.1.4.5.2 Cable Separation 8.3-24 l 8.3.1.5 Cable Deratina and Cable Trav Fill 8.3-24 8.3.1.5.1 Cable Derating 8.3-24 8.3.1.5.2 Cable Tray Fill Criteria 8.3-24 8.3.1.6 Fire Protection and Detection 8.3-24 8.3.2 DC POWER SYSTEMS 8.3-27 l
8.3.2.1 System Descriptions 8.3-27 l 8.3.2.1.1 Non-Class 1E DC Power Systems 8.3-27 8.3.2.1.1.1 125V DC Auxiliary Control 8.3-27 Power System 8.3.2.1.1.2 208/120V AC Auxiliary Control 8.3-27 Power System 8.3.2.1.1.3 250V DC Auxiliary Power System 8.3-27 8.3.2.1.1.4 Alternate AC Source 125V DC 8.3-28 i
Power System ,
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TABLE OF. CONTENTS (Cont'd)
CHAPTER 8 pection Bubiect Pace No.
Class 1E DC Power Systems 8.3-28 8.3.2.1.2 8.3.2.1.2.1 125V DC and 120V AC Vital 8.3-28 Instrumentation and Control Power System-8.3.2.1.2.1.1 125V DC Vital 8.3-28 Instrumentation and Control Power Battery Chargers ('
8.3.2.1.2.1.2 125V DC Vital 8.3-29 Instrumentation and Control Power Batteries 8.3.2.1.2.1.3 125V DC Vital 8.3-29 Instrumentation and Control Power Distribution Centers and Panelboards
[ 8.3.2.1.2.1.4 120V AC Vital 8.3-30 I
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Instrumentation and Control Power System ,
8.3.2.1.2.1.5 125V DC and 120V AC Vital 8.3-30 Instrumentation and Control 1 Power System Status Information 8.3.2.1.2.2 Testing 8.3-31 8.3.2.1.2.2.1 Reoperation Tests 8.3-31 8.3.2.1.2.2.2 Periodic Tests 8.3-31 8.3.2.2 Analysis 8.3-32 8.3.2.2.1 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.32, 8.3-32
- IEEE Standards 308-1980 and 450-1980 L 8.3.2.2.2 Class 1E Equipment Qualification 8.3-32 !
Requirements 8.3.2.3 Physical Identification of Class 8.3-32 1E Eauipment 8.3.2.4 Independence of Redundant Systems 8.3-32 l
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) ;
CHAPTER 8 k
Section S_ubiect Pace No. j 8.3.3 FIRE PROTECTION FOR CABLE SYSTEMS 8.3-33 8.3.4 ONSITE POWER SYSTEM INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS 8.3-33 E 8.3.4.1 AC Power System 8.3-33 8.3.4.2 DC Power System 8.3-35
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\.J LIST OF TABLES CHAPTER 8 Table Subiect 8.2-1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the Offsite Power System 8.2-2 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the Switchyard 125V DC System 8.3.1-1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the Onsite Power System E
8.3.1-2 Typical Class 1E Loads 8.3.1-3 Typical Class 1E Equipment Capacities 8.3.1-4 Typical Load Sequencing and Bases for Class 1E Buses 8.3.2-1 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the 125V DC Class 1E Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System 8.3.2-2 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for the 120V AC Class 1E Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System 8.3.2-3 Typical Class 1E 120V AC Vital I&C Power System Loads 8.3.2-4 Typical Class 1E DC Vital Power System Loads V
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LIST OF FIGURES CHAPTER 8 Floure Title 8.2-1 Typical Onsite Power System Interconnection with Offsite Power 8.3.1-1 Typical Unit Main Power System One-line E 8.3.2-1 Typical Non-Class 1E DC and AC Instrumentation and Control Power Supply Systems 8.3.2-2 Typical Class 1E DC and Vital AC Instrumentation and Control Power Supply Systems e
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8.1 INTRODUCTION
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An offsite power system and an onsite power system are provided to supply the unit auxiliaries during normal operation and the Reactor Protection System and Engineered Safety Feature Systems during abnormal and accident conditions.
8.1.1 UTILITY GRID SYSTEM AND INTERCONNECTIONS The typical transmission grid system may consist of interconnected hydro plants, fossil-fueled plants, combustion turbine units, and nuclear plants supplying energy to the service area at various voltages.
The unit is connected to a switchyard and thereby to the j transmission system via two separate and independent transmission lines. The generator circuit breaker, along with the unit step-up transformers, allows one of these lines not only to supply power to the transmission system during normal operation, but also to serve as an immediate available source of preferred power. The other separate transmission line is connected, via (m) v the switchyard and a standby auxiliary transformer, to provide an independent second immediate source of offsite -power to the onsite power distribution system for safety and permanent non-safety loads.
A detailed description of the offsite power system is provided in Section 8.2. ,
E 8.1.2 ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS The onsite power system for the unit, as depicted on Figure 8.3.1-1, consists of the main generator, the generator circuit breaker, main unit transformers, the unit auxiliary transformers, standby auxiliary transformer, the diesel generators, an alternate AC source, the batteries, and the auxiliary power system. Under normal operating conditions, the main generator supplies power through isolated phase bus and generator circuit breaker to the unit main step-up and unit auxiliary transformers.
The unit auxiliary transformers are connected to the bus between the generator circuit breaker and the unit main transformers.
During normal operation, station auxiliary power is supplied from the main generator through these unit auxiliary transformers.
During startup and shutdown, the generator circuit breaker is open, and station auxiliary power is supplied from the transmission system through the unit main step-up and unit auxiliary power transformers.
V Amendment E 8.1-1 December 30, 1988 a__-_-______-__. _
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The Class lE safety loads are divided into two redundant and independent load group Divisions I and II. Each Load Division is capable of being supplied power from the following sources, listed in decreasing order of priority:
A. Unit Main Turbine Generator B. Unit Main Transformers (Offsite Preferred Bus-1)
C. Standby Auxiliary Transformer (Offsite Preferred Bus-2)
D. Emergency Diesel Generators E. Alternate AC Source E
If both the offsite power sources and the standby diesel generators are unavailable, either one of the Divisions may be powered independently from the Alternate AC Source. The .ACC source is furnished with a battery and charger to provide power to the DC loads associated with its generator.
A 125V DC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System is available to provide power to the Class 1E DC loads and the diesel generators. Additionally, this system provides power to i Class lE 120V AC loads through inverters.
The unit also has a 125V DC Auxiliary Control Power System and a 250V DC Auxiliary Power System to supply essential Non-Class lE DC loads. Additionally, this system also provides power to Non-Class lE 208/120V AC loads through inverters.
The onsite power systems are described in detail in Section 8.3.
8.1.3 DESIGN DASES The design bases for the offsite power system and the onsite power system are presented below.
A. Offsite Power System
- 1. Each of the two offsite power circuits has sufficient capacity, is continuously energized, and is available to supply power to the plant safety-related systems within a few seconds following a loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) to assure that core cooling, containment integrity, and other vital safety functions are maintained.
- 2. The two offsite power circuits (not to include the switchyard) are designed to be independent and Amendment E 8.1-2 December 30, 1988
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v physically separate to assure their availability under normal and postulated accident conditions.
B. Onsite Power System
- 1. The Class 1E onsite power systems are located in Category I structures to provide protection from natural phenomena.
- 2. The redundant Class 1E onsite power system equipments are located in separate rooms or fire tones with adequate independence to assure that the Plant Protection System safety functions can be performed assuming a single failure.
- 3. Voltage levels at the class lE safety-related buses are optimized for the full load and minimum load conditions that are expected throughout the anticipated range of voltage variations of the power source by the E adjustments of the voltage tap settings on the transformers.
- 4. The Class 1E onsite power systems have sufficient h
d capacity to safely shut the unit down or to mitigate the effects of an accident assuming loss of offsite power (LOOP) .
- 5. The Class 1E onsite power systems are designed to permit appropriate surveillance, periodic inspections, and testing of important areas and ' features to assess the continuity of the systems and the condition of their components.
- 6. The onsite standby AC power sources are designed to be automatically initiated in the event of an accident or a LOOP.
- 7. The vital batteries have adequate capacity, without chargers, to provide the necessary DC power to perform the required safety functions in the event of a J postulated accident assuming a single failure.
- 8. Each vital battery charger has adequate capacity to supply its assigned steady-state loads while ]
simultaneously recharging its associated-battery.
- 9. An onsite non-Class 1E AAC source is provided to help mitigate the effects of LOOP and station blackout (SBO) 1 O scenarios.
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- 10. The power distribution system is designed to maintain independence between the Main Control Room and Remote Shutdown Room such that a fire in either location will not prevent a transfer of control to the other location as described in Sections 7.4.1.1.10 and 7.7.1.3.
- 11. R3n-Class 1E electrical equipment is designed or located to preclude adverse affects on Class 1E electrical equipment due to their failure during normal, accident or post-accident modes of plant operation. Where there is a risk of adverse impact, due to post-accident environment or seismic events, the Non-Class 1E electrical equipment is qualified for non-interference in accordance with the same '
qualification standards as is the Class 1E equipment.
8.1.4 DESIGN CRITERIA The design criteria, including the General Design Criteria, NRC Regulatory Guides, and IEEE Standards that are considered in the design of the Class 1E AC and DC Power Systems, are presented and discussed below.
8.1.4.1 General Desien Criteria The General Design Criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A are discussed in Chapter 3. Additionally, compliance with General Design Criteria 17 and 18 is discussed in Sections 8.2.1.4, 8.3.1.2, and 8.3.2.2. ,
i 8.1.4.2 NRC Regulatory Guides E
A. Regulatory Guide 1.6 The design of the Class 1E onsite power systems, both AC and ,
DC, meets the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.6 as discussed in l Sections 8.3.1.2.3 and 8.3.2.2. j l
B. Regulatory Guide 1.9 l The selection criteria for the diesel generators used as standby power sources meets the intent of the requirements of Regu),atory Guide 1.9 as discussed in Section 8.3.1.2.4.
C. Regulatory Guide 1.17 The following design features address the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.17 " Protection of Nuclear Power Plants Against Industrial Sabotage":
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- 1. Separate Geographic Locations for Equipment -
Redundant divisions and channels of safety-related electrical sources and power distribution equipment are located in separate plant locations. These equipment locations can be designed by the site operator to control and monitor personnel access.
- 2. Limited Ability to Change System Hardware Configurations -
Portions of systems are designed to limit the ability of operating and maintenance personnel to change basic system functions (e.g., Key lock administrative control with built-in alarms).
- 3. Fail-Safe Design Philosophy -
Test modes and methods are designed to minimize disturbing the power distribution system loads. The test methods and equipment are designed to preclude loss of independence between redundant electrical divisione and channels of equipment, such that G tampering with one redundant system.
system will not disable the
- 4. Power Distribution System Status Monitoring -
The status of all safety related power distribution system equipment is provided locally and remotely in the main control room, such that unauthorized changes E in systems can be detected.
The above features are derigned to impede sabotage. See Chapter 13 for a more compt.nensive discussion on protection against sabotage.
D. Regulatory Guide 1.22 Periodic testing of the Class 1E power systems meets the intent of the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.22 as discussed in Sections 8.3.1.1.3.2 and 8.3.2.1.2.2.2.
E. Regulatory Guide 1.26 The quality group classifications of the Class 1E portions of the Onsite Power systems major equipment are identified in Section 3.2.2.
O Amendment E 8.1-5 December 30, 1988
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F. Regulatory Guide 1.29 Class 1E power system equipment is classified as Se'smic Category I in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.29. Category I electrical equipment is discussed in Section 3.10.
G. Regulatory Guide 1.30 The quality assurance requirements for the installation, inspection, and testing of Class 1E electrical equipment is discussed in Chapter 17.
H. Regulatory Guide 1.32 The design of the Class 1E onsite power systems, both AC and DC, meets the intent of the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.32 as discussed in Sections 8.3.1.2.5 and 8.3.2.2.1.
1 I. Regulatory Guide 1.40 The qualification of continuous duty Class 1E motors installed inside the containment is discussed in Section 3.11.
Preoperational testing to verify the assignment of loads for I the Class 1E power systems complies with the intent of this l regulatory guide and is included in the tests described in i Chapter 14.
K. Regulatory Guide 1.47 Automatic indication of a bypass or deliberately induced inoperable status is provided for class 1E power systems required for safety.
L. Regulatory Guide 1.53 The Class 1E onsite power systems, both AC and DC, have sufficient independence and redundancy to perform their safety function assuming a single failure.
M. Regulatory Guide 1.62 Means for manual initiation of Class 1E power systems required for safety are provided in the control room that meet the intent of the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.62.
Amendment E 8.1-6 December 30, 1988
CESSAR naibou 9 Regulatory Guide 1.63 N.
The intent of the mechanical, electrical, and test requirements set forth in Regulatory Guide 1.63 for the design, construction, and installation of electric penetration assemblies in the containment structure are met.
For information regarding the environmental qualification of electrical penetrations, refer to Section 3.11.
O. Regulatory Guide 1.68 Preoperational and startup testing meets the intent of this Regulatory Guide as described in Chapter 14.
P. Regulatory Guide 1.73 The qualification of Class 1E electric valve operators located inside containment is discussed in Section 3.11.
Q. Regulatory Guide 1.75 The routing of 1E and associated electrical cabling and from sensors meets the requirements of 9 sensing lines Regulatory Guides 1.75 and 1.151.
minimize the possibility of common mode failure.
They are arranged to This requires that the cabling for the four safety channels be routed separately; aowever, the cables of different safety functions within one channel may be routed together. Low energy signal cables are routed separately from all power cables. Safety-related redundant sensors are separated.
The separation of their safety-related cables requires that the cables be routed in separate cable trays. Associated circuit cabling from redundant channels is handled the same E
as 1E cabling.
Cabling associated with redundant channels of safety-related circuits is installed such that a single credible event cannot cause multiple channel malfunctions or interactions between channels.
Non-Class 1E instrumentation circuits and cables (1cw level) which may be in proximity to Class 1E or associated circuits and cables, are treated as associated circuits unless analyses or tests demonstrate that credible features therein cannot adversely affect Class 1E circuits. Non-Class 1E channels X and Y instrumentation and control circuits and cabling are separated from each other.
The independence of redundant systems is further discussed in Section 8.3.1.4.
Amendment E 8.1-7 December 30, 1988
CESSAR 8la%mou Regulatory Guide 1.81 O
R.
The intent of this guide is met in that the Class 1E AC and DC power systems are not shared between units.
- k. Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.89 is discussed in Section 3.11.
T. Regulatory Guide 1.93 The availability of electric power sources with respect to limiting conditions for operation is presented in Chapter 16, Technical Specifications.
U. Regulatory Guide 1.100 The seismic qualification of Category I instrumentation and electrical equipment is discussed in Section 3.10.
V. Regulatory Guide 1.106 The application of thermal overload protection devices in Class IE motor-operated valve circuits meets the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.106. The thermal overload protection devices are used to only provide alarm functions as described in Section 7.3.1.1.
W. Regulatory Guide 1.108 The periodic testing requirements for the safety-related diesel generators are presented in Chapter 16, Technical n Specifications.
X. Regulatory Guide 1.118 The periodic testing requirements of the electric power and protection system are presented in Chapter 16, Technical Specifications.
Y. Regulatory Guide 1.128 The installation design and installation of Class 1E batteries are in compliance with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.128.
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Amendment E 8.1-8 December 30, 1988
CESSARseacuia O' Z. Regulatory Guide 1.129 Maintenance, testing, and replacement of large lead batteries complies with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.129.
i AA. Regulatory Guide 1.131 The qualification testing of electric cables, field splices, and connections complies with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.131.
BB. Regulatory Guide 1.155 The installation and design of the_onsite AAC power source system is in compliance with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.155 for a station blackout (SBO). The AAC power source is designed to be made available to power one safety load division and its corresponding essential non-safety load bus within 10 minutes of the onset of the SBO; such that the plant is capable of maintaining core cooling and containment integrity per Section 50.63 of 10 CFR Part 50.
The ACC source is not normally directly connected to the O plant's main or standby offsite power sources or to the Class 1E Safety Division power distribution system. There is a minimum potential for common cause failure with the offsite power system or with the standby Class lE power sources (EDG units).
8.1.4.3 IEEE Standards E
A. IEEE Standard 387-19E,4 The preoperational and periodic testing of the emergency diesel generators complies with the requirements of IEEE Standard 387-1984.
'1 B. IEEE Standard 741-1986 Protection for degraded voltage and loss of voltage conditions for safety and non-safety buses is provided, as described in Section 8.3.1.1.6.
C. IEEE Standard 765-1983 The offsite preferred power supply and its interface with '
the onsite power system comply with IEEE Standard 765-1983.
A The offsite supply consists of two independent transmission designed to minimize Q lines. These transmission lines are j Amendment E 8.1-9 December 30, 1988 l
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the probability of their simultaneous loss due to a pylon failure or a failure of a crossing transmission line. The switchyard design minimizes the probability of a single equipment failure causing the simultaneous loss of both preferred power supply circuits.
8.1.5 INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS Listed below are the General Design Criteria, Regulatory Guides, E
and industry standards which are considered relevant. They are not, however, imposed as interface requirements on plant operation unless specifically stated in a particular section of this chapter.
A. General Design Criterion 1; Quality Standards and Records.
B. General Design Criterion 2; Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena.
C. General Design Criterion 3; Fire Protection.
D. General Design Criterion 4; Environmental and Missile Design Bases.
E. General Design Criterion 5; Sharing of Structures, Systems and Components.
F. General Design Criterion 13; Instrumentation and Control.
G. General Design Criterion 17; Electric Power Systems.
11 . General Design Criterion 18; Inspection and Testing of Electrical Power Systems.
I. General Design Criterion 21; Protection System Reliability and Testability.
J. General Design Criterion 22; Protection System Independence.
K. General Design Criterion 33; Reactor Coolant Makeup.
L. General Design Criterion 34; Residual Heat Removal.
M. General Design Criterion 35; Emergency Core Cooling.
N. General Design Criterion 38; Containment Heat Removal.
O. General Design Criterion 41; Containment Atmosphere Cleanup.
Amendment E 8.1-10 December 30, 1988 l 1
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P. General Design Criterion 44; Cooling Water.
Q. Regulatory Guide 1.6; Independence Between Redundant Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems.
R. Regulatory Guide 1.9; Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies.
S. Regulatory Guide 1.22; Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions.
T. Regulatory Guide 1.29; Seismic Design Classification.
m U. Regulatory Guide 1.30; Quality Assurance Requirements for the Installation, Inspection, and Testing of Instrumentation and Electric Equipment.
V. Regulatory Guide 1.32; Criteria for Safety-Related Electric Power Systems for Nuclear Power Plants.
W. Regulatory Guide 1.40; Qualification Tests of Continuous-Duty Motors Installed Inside the Containment of Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants.
X. Regulatory Guide 1.41; Preoperational Testing of Redundant on-Site Electric Power Systems to Verify Proper Load Group Assignment.
Y. Regulatory Guide 1.47; Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems.
Z. Regulatory Guide 1.53; Application of the Single Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Plant Protection Systems.
. AA. Regulatory Guide 1.62; Manual Initiation of Protective Action.
AB. Regulatory Guide 1.63; Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants.
AC. Regulatory Guide 1.68; Preoperational and Initial Start-up Test Programs for Water-Cooled Power Reactors.
AD. Regulatory Guide 1.73; Qualification Tests of Electric Valve Operators Installed Inside the Containment of Nuclear Power Plants.
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AE. Regulatory Guide 1.75; Physical Independence of Electric Systems.
AF. Regulatory Guide 1.81; Shared Emergency and Shutdown Electric Systems for Multi-Unit Nuclear Power Plants.
AG. Regulatory Guide 1.89; Qualification of Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants.
AH. IEEE Standard 279-1971; Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
AI. IEEE Standard 308-1980; Criteria for Class 1E Electric E Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
AJ. IEEE Standard 317-1983; Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating l E Stations.
AK, IEEE Standard 323-1983; Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for l E Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
AL. IEEE Standard 334-1974; Trial Use Guide for Type Tests of Continuouo-Duty Class I Motors Installed Inside thelE Containment of Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
AM. IEEE Standard 336-1985; Installation, InspectionandTestinglE Requirements for Instrumentation and Electric Equipment During the Construction of Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
AN. IEEE Standard 338-1977; Criteria for the Periodic Testing of l E Nuclear Power Generating Station Protection Systems. 1 1
AO, IEEE Standard 344-1987; Guide for Class 1 Electrical Equipment for Nuclear SeismicPower Qualification Generatingof l E Stations.
AP. IEEE Standard 379-1977; Guide for the Application of the Single Failure Criterion to Nuclear Power Generating Station l E i Protection Systems.
IEEE Standard 382-1980; Trial Use Guide for Type Test AQ.
Class I Electric Valve Operators for Nuclear offE Power Generating Stations. l 1
AR. IEEE Standard 383-1974; Type Test of Class 1E Electric Cables, Field Splices, and Connections for Nucle.ar Power Generating Stations. i Amendment E 8.1-12 December 30, 1988 4
CESSAR E!3incuen LJ AS. IEEE Standard 384-1981; Criteria for Separation of Class IE E Equipment and Circuits.
AT IEEE Standard 387-1984; Criteria for Diesel Generator Units l E Applied as Standby Power Supplies for Nuclear Power Stations.
AU. IEEE Standard 415-1986; Guide for Planning of Preoperational Testing Programs for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear E Pcwor Generating Stations.
AV. IEEE Standard 450-1980; Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing and Replacement of Large Stationary Type Power Plant and Substation Lead Storage Batteries.
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8.2 OFFJlTE POWER SYSTEE j 6.2.1 BYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS 8.2.1.1 Utility Grid System The utility grid system may consist of interconnected hydro, fossil fueled and nuclear plants supply-ing energy to the service j area at various voltages. The grid transmission system is also-a !
source of reliable and stable power for the onsite power distribution system. The grid system design includes at least two preferred power circuits, each capable of supplying the plants' necessary safety loads and other equipment.
8.2.1.2 Utility Grid _and Switchyard Interconnections The switchyard is connected to the primary transmission system by.
overhead transmission lines. Figure 8.2-1 depicts a typical.
interconnection of the switchyard and onsite power.
8.2.1.3 Station Switchyard E
Transmission lines from the primary transmission system terminace in the switchyard with provisions for additional lines to' be O- added in the future. Additionally,. the Unit and Standby Auxiliary Transformers are tied to the switchyard by separate and independent overhead lines. ,
The entire switchyard, including the power circuit breakers, cabling system, AC and DC auxiliary power systems, protective relaying system, and control system is divided into two preferred power buses designated 1 and 2. These designations are ,
consistent with the preferred power feeder designations. I Additionally, the incoming transmission lines are also assigned to power buses in such a way as to separate the associated i cabling, protective relaying, and controls for each circuit t' transmission line into two distinct sources of offsite power..
'nhe switchyard design provides redundant offsite power feed capability to the nuclear unit.
8.2.1.3.1 Switchyard 480V AC Auxiliary Power System !
l A 480V AC Auxiliary Power System is provided in the switchyard to supply a reliable source of continuous AC power for the power circuit breaker auxiliaries, battery chargers, relay house air conditioning, and switchyard lighting.
The status of this system is monitored in the switchyard relay x house with annunciators and in the control room via the Data Amendment E 8.2-1 December 30, 1988
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O' Processing System (DPS) and Discrete Indication and Alarm System (DIAS) systems described in Chapters 7 and 18.
8.2.1.3.2 Switchyard 125V DC Auxiliary Power System A 125V DC Auxiliary Power System is provided to supply a reliable source of continuous DC power for all relaying, control, and monitoring equipment in the switchyard. This system consists of two independent trains each supplying DC power to its associated preferred power bus equipment.
8.2.1.3.3 Switchyard Protective Relaying System The Switchyard Protective Relaying System is provided to protect switchyard equipment and to contribute to power system stability by promptly and reliably removing a transmission line and/or switchyard bus from service under a fault or an abnormal condition. )
8.2.1.3.4 Switchyard Control System l
\
The Switchyard control System consists of all control circuits for operating switchyard power circuit breakers (PCBs) and motor-operated disconnect switches (MODS). Controls are provided, via the Process-CCs described in Section 7.7, in the l main control room for the PCBs and MODS associated with the unit l E
feeders. ]
In addition to the controls provided in the main control room, each PCB or MOD may be operated at the switchyard relay house or at the local control cabinet of the PCB or MOD.
8.2.1.4 Switchyard and station Interconnections Two separate and physically independent overhead transmission line circuits are provided to connect the switchyard to the Unit.
These transmission lines are designed to withstand the heavy loading conditions defined in the National Electric Safety Code, i Compliance with General Desicin Criterion 17 The offsite power system is designed with sufficient independence, capacity,, and capability to meet the requirements of GDC 17. The transmission network is connected to the onsite power system by two physically independent circuits.
The offsite power system is designed to minimize the probability of losing electric power from any supplies as a result of or coincident with the loss of the unit generator, the transmission network, or the onsite electric power supplies.
Amendment E 8.2-2 December 30, 1988
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V Compliance with Gene.ral Desian Criterion 18 i The requirements of General Design Criterion 18 are implemented '
.in the design of the of f aite power system. The design permits periodic inspection and testing of important areas and features.
The design includes the capability to periodically test the operability and functional performance of the components of the systems as a whole and under conditions as-close to design as practical.
8.2.1.5 Offsite Power System Operational Descriptio_n The nuclear generating unit is provided with two independent immediate access circuits of offsite power. Prior to and during startup of the nuclear unit, the Unit Auxiliary Power System receives power from the transmission system through the main unit step-up transformers and the unit auxiliary transformers. [
During this period, the generator circuit breaker and associated disconnect switches are open.
After the unit generatot has been brought to rated speed and its field applied, the unit generatcr is then connected to the system by closing the generator circuit breaker. Automatic and manual synchronization are provided and supervised by synchronizing ON relays.
8.2.1.5.1 Offaite Power System Protective Relaying The of fsite power system protective relaying system is designed to remove from service with precision and accuracy any element of the offsite power system subjected to an abnormal condition that E may prove detrimental to the effective operation or integrity of g the unit. !
8.2.1.6 Reliability Considerations i l
The transmission system is designed to conform to the reliability I criteria established by the owners appropriate electric J reliability council. Typically, transmission systems are designed to avoid system cascading upon the occurrence of any one ,
of the following: l A. Loss of Generation
- 1. Sudden loss of entire generating capability in any one plant.
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B. Loss of Load
- 1. Sudden lost of large load or major load center.
C. Loss of Transmission
- 1. The outage of the most critical transmission line caused by a three-phase fault during the outage of any other critical transmission line, or
- 2. Sudden loss of all lines on a common right-of-way, or
- 3. Sudden loss of a substation (limited to a single i
voltage level within the substation plus transformation from the voltage level), including any generating capacity connected thereto, or
- 4. Delayed clearing of a three-phase fault at any point on the system due to failure of a breaker to open. l In addition to the transmission system design, the switching arrangement in the switchyard and the redundant relaying that is provided minimizes the probability of losing offsite power.
8.2.2 ANALYSIS E 8.2.2.1 Grid Stability and Avhila,bility Analysis Grid stability and availability analyses involving ,
interconnections with the primary transmission system are performed by the site operator. These analyses will demonstrate that the 13,800V non-safety load buses do not subject the reactor coolant pumps to sustained frequency decays of greater than 3 Hz/sec, and there is at least three seconds delay between a j turbine trip and subsequent LOOP event, in order to satisfy RCP i flow conditions assumed in Chapter 15 Safety Analyses. 1 i
8.2.2.2 O_ffsite and Switchyard Power Systems Sinole j Failure Analysis j An evaluation of the effects of single failures within the offsite power system is contained in Tables 8.2-1 and 8.2-2.
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TABLE 8.2-1 (Sheet 1 of 2) l FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR THE OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM i
l Component Malfunction Resultina Consequences
- 1. Transmission loss of Power (a) The switchyard PCB's connecting System the unit to the system (switchyard)' trip automatically.
(b) If main turbine generator is available, the onsite diesel generators and AAC source start.
All unit and Class lE auxiliaries continue to receive an uninterrupted flow of power.
(c) If the main turbine generator is-not available, the onsite diesel g generators and AAC source start
/ and the loads are sequenced on C]
! automatically to provide power to l their respective permanent l non-safety and Class IE loads.
- 2. Redundant loss of one (a) No consequence. The redundant
- switchyard bus power circuit breakers (as applicable) trip. . The unit is still cennected to the system through the remaining switchyard bus.
- 3. Switchyard power Loss of one due (a) The faulted equipment is isolated circuit breakers a to fault by protective relaying and connecting the protective equipment.
step-up trans-formers to the (b) The other independent offsite switchyard circuit remains unaffected.
O I Amendment E December 30, 1988
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0!l TABLE 8.2-1 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 2 of 2) ,
i FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR THE OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM j Component Malfunction Resultina Consequences
- 3. (Continued) or Circuit from (c) If on-line, the unit generator is switchyard to automatically run back to the main unit trans- appropriate rated output and all former unit and Class lE auxiliaries continue to receive uninterrupted or power.
Main Unit (d) If the unit generator is off Transformer line, one of the two independent offsite circuits is available for the Permanent Non-safety and Class IE Division auxiliaries via e the Standby Auxiliary Transformer.
FIDil: lhe Offsite Power System is protected such that it is unaffected by failures in the Onsite Power System.
O Amendment E December 30, 1988
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TABLE 8.2-2 l (Sheet 1 of 3)
EAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR THE SWITCHYARD 125V DC SYSTEM u
Component Mal function _ Comments & Consequences
- 1. 480V AC power Loss of power (a) No consequences - power from supply to charger battery is available to supply power without ;
interruption.
- 2. Battery charger loss of power (a) The 125 volt DC bus from one continues to receive power from its respective battery without interruption except as in (b) below.
(b) Severe internal faults may cause high short circuit currents to flow with the e resulting voltage reduction E f on the 125 volt DC bus until the fault is cleared by the isolating circuit breakers.
Complete loss of voltage on the 125 volt DC bus may result if the battery circuit breakers open. However, l redundant protective relaying and panelboards are provided and are supplied from the other redundant 125 volt DC bus, a
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TABLE 8.2-2 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 2 of 3)
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR THE SWITCHYARD 125V DC SYSTEM ;
Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences
- 3. 125V DC battery loss of power Only those 125 volt DC from one control panelboards supplied from the affected bus are lost. However, the redundant panelboards supplied from the other 125 volt DC bus are unaffected and continue to l provide power for protection i
and control.
- 4. DC distribution Bus shorted Same comment as 3.
center buses E
- 5. 125V DC bus Grounding a The 125 volt DC single bus system is an ungrounded j electrical system. Ground detector equipment monitors and alarms a ground anywhere on the 125 volt DC system. A single ground does not cause any malfunction or prevent operation of any safety feature.
- 6. 125V DC bus Gradual decay Each 125 volt bus is I of voltage on monitored to detect the one bus voltage decay on the bus and initiate an alarm. Upon detection, power is restored by correcting the deficiency.
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O' Amendment E December 30, 1988
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TABLE 8.2-2 (Cont'd) l (Sheet 3 of 3) ;
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR THE SWITCHYARD 125V DC SYSTEM Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences
- 7. DC distribution Cables shorted Same comment as 3.
center load feeder l cables
- 8. 125V DC primary or Bus shorted in (a) Voltage on associated 125 backup panelboards one volt DC bus decays until isolated by isolating circuit breakers.
(b) Protective relaying connected to the affected panelboards are lost; however, redundant protective relaying supplied from the other 125 volt DC O E bus provide protection.
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V 8.3 'ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS 8.3.1 AC' POWER SYSTEMS 8.3.1.1 _B_ystem Descriptions 8.3.1.1.1 Non-Class 1E AC Power Systems 8.3.1.1.1.1 Unit Main Power System The Unit Main Power System, as shown on Figure 8.3.1-1, consists l
of the main generator, associated isolated phase bus, generator I circuit breaker, four unit step-up transformers (including one spare) and two half-sized unit auxiliary transformers. The ,
primary function of this system is to generate and transmit power to the transmission system while simultaneously supplying power to the unit auxiliaries. In the event that the main generator is not in service, this system is used to supply power from the transmission system to the unit auxiliaries. The ~ design bases for the Unit Main Power System are discussed in Section 8.1.3.
E 8.3.1.1.1.2 13,800 Volt' Normal Auxiliary Power System l ;
1 The 13,800 Volt Normal Auxiliary Power System consists of two V non-safety switchgear groups. The first switchgear group ,
l designated X is normally connected through a main breaker to one ]
l of the dual voltage 13,800/4,160V Unit Auxiliary Transformers. A second switchgear group designated Y is normally connected to the other independent Unit Auxiliary Transformer.
The 13,800 Volt Normal Auxiliary Power System furnishes power to l large motors such as the reactor coolant pump motors and condensate water pump motors.
The protective relaying for the 13,800V switchgear feeders and buses can be classified as follows:
l A. Protection of large motors.
l B. Protection of buses and bus feeders.
l 1
The protective schemes are designed primarily to isolate the l faulted equipment from the rest of the system, to minimize the ;
effect of the fault and to maximize availability.of the remaining ,
equipment. The scheme also limits.the damage and the time out of i service of the faulty equipment. Each scheme is designed to best ;
achieve this for the specific equipment protected. The basic !
schemes consist of ground fault protection, instantaneous p overcurrent and timed overcurrent protection. Other forms of l 'd l
Amendment E 8.3-1 December 30, 1988 i
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protection are provided where applicable and consist of current or undervoltage differential and reverse power flow protection. Each breaker in the auxiliary power system is provided with time overcurrent protection and an anti-pump device.
Each switchgear assembly has a short circuit capability which has been verified by manufacturers prototype tests and exceeds the short circuit requirements of the 13,800 Volt Normal Auxiliary Power System.
8.3.1.1.1.3 4,160 Volt Normal Auxiliary Power System The 4,160 volt Normal Auxiliary Power System consistL of four switchgerr groups and a non-Class 1E AAC source. The first switchgear group designated "X" is connected to the Unit Auxiliary "X" Transformer to power large non-safety loads such as main circulating water pumps, turbine building CCW pumps, etc.
The second switchgear group "Y" is connected to the other Unit Auxiliary "Y" Transformer to power the remaining large non-safety l
loads.
The third switchgear group designated Permanent Non-safety "X" provides power to auxiliary and service loads which must typically remain operational independent of the plant operating conditions or during plant outages (such as CVCS charging pump and building supply fans) . Its normal source is preferred power E from the 4,160 volt Unit Auxiliary Transformer. In the event that its normal source is lost, this switchgear may be connected either to the Standby Auxiliary Transformer (preferred bus 2) or to the Alternate AC source. An interlock is provided between the ;
normal (preferred-1) power and standby (preferred-2) power source l breakers to preclude them from both being closed simultaneously.
In case of failure of the normal power source, i.e., the Unit Auxiliary Transformers, without loss of offsite power; the 1 Permanent Non-safety buses are automatically transferred to the 2nd preferred source of offsite power, i.e., the Standby Auxiliary Transformer. l The Standby Auxiliary Transformer also provides power to the stations Auxiliary Boiler and, if required, Cooling Tower forced cooling motors.
The fourth switchgear group designed Permanent Non-safety "Y" is normally connected to the 4,160 volt Unit Auxiliary Transformer Y. It also has the same ability to be connected to either the Standby Auxiliary Transformer or Alternate AC source as previously described for the third switchgear.
Amendment E 8.3-2 December 30, 1988
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The Permanent Non-safety "X" and "Y" switchgears also are the normal supply of preferred power to their respective 4,160 volt Class 1E Auxiliary Power System Safety Load Divisions I and II as described in Section 8.3.1.1.2.
These four non-Class 1E switchgear groups, with the four sources of power (preferred-1, preferred-2, main generator and AAC) and their ability to energize the Division I or II safety loads reduce the likelihood of SBO.
The protective relaying for the 4,160 volt switchgear feeders and buses can be classified in four separate protection configurations. The type, size, and function of the protected equipment determines which of the schemes below will be employed.
A. Protection of large (5MVA or above) motors and (or special) transformers.
B. Protection of small motors and small transformers.
C. Protection of AC sources.
D. Protection of buses and bus feeders.
The protective schemes are designed primarily to isolate the faulted equipment from the rest of the system, to minimize the E
offect of the fault, and to maximize availability of the remaining equipment. The scheme also limits the damages and the time out of service of the faulty equipment. Each scheme is designed to best achieve this for the specific equipment protected. The basic schemes consist of ground fault protection, instantaneous overcurrent and timed overcurrent protection.
Other forms of protection, such as undervoltage, reverse power flow, are provided where applicable. Each breaker in the auxiliary power system is provided with timed overcurrent protection and an anti-pump device.
8.3.1.1.1.4 480 Volt Normal Auxiliary Power System The 480 volt AC Normal Auxiliary Power system is energized by the 4160 Volt Normal Auxiliary Power System switchgear through 4160 to 480 VAC transformers. l The secondary of a typical transformer is connected to a 480V l load center bus through a 480V load center circuit breaker.
Connected to the load centers are large motors, large heaters and 480 volt motor control centers located throughout the plant in areas of concentrated 480 volt loads.
Amendment E 8.3-3 December 30, 1988-l
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In the application of the 480 volt load centers, a selective system is used whereby both the main and feeder circuit breakers have interrupting capacity greater than their required duty.
The main breakers are equipped with overcurrent trip devices having long-time and short-time delay functions, and the feeder breakers are equipped with overcurrent trip devices having long-time and instantaneous functions. Each breaker in the auxiliary power system is provided with an anti-pump device.
8.3.1.1.2 Class 1E AC Power Systems B.3.1.1.2.1 4,160 Volt Class 1E Auxiliary Power System Each unit has two redundant and independent 4,160 Volt Class 1E Auxiliary Power Systems, identified as Safety Divisions I and II, which normally receive power from the 4,160V Normal Auxiliary Power System. The incoming source breakers trip upon loss of normal power, and emergency power is provided to each of the redundant 4,160 Volt Class 1E Auxiliary Power System Divisions by separate and completely independent diesel-electric generating units. In the event of a diesel generator out of service or failure condition, the AAC source can be aligned to provide {
emergency power to either Class 1E Safety Load Division.
Each of the redundant 4,160V safety buses is provided with undervoltage protection to monitor bus voltage.
6 The under-voltage setpoint is selected such that relay operation ;
will not be initiated during normal motor starting; however, I these relays will detect loss of voltage and initiate action in a (
time frame consistent with the accident analysis. j l
All cafety-related equipment in the plant requiring electrical power during a LOOP, LOCA, or major secondary system break condition is fed from the 4,160 Volt Class 1E Auxiliary Power l System, either directly if at 4,160 volts or through transformers if at a lower voltage. All Engineered Safety System loads are assigned to the two 4,160V Class 1E Auxiliary Power Systems with capacities and quantities such that the failure of any component in one of the two Class 1E Auxiliary Power Systems does not
'Eact the other system. Refer to Tables 8.3.1-2 and 8.3.1-3 for 1isting of typical Class IE equipment, loads and design ratings.
With such an arrangement of diesel-electric generating power sources, electrical distribution system and loads, complete redundancy of the entire Class 1E Auxiliary Power System is provided.
In addition, the non-Class 1E onsite AAC is also provided to help cope with effects of LOOP and SBO scenarios.
Amendment E 8.3-4 December 30, 1988 l
CESSAR En9,caria O 480 Volt Class 1E Auxiliary Power System 8.3.1.1.2.2 Each of the redundant 4,160V AC Class 1E Auxiliary Power Systems, Divisions I and II, includes two load centers, each normally fed from a separate 4,160/480 volt load center transformer connected to the 4,160 Volt Class 1E Auxiliary Power System buses. Circuit breakers are provided on both the primary and secondary sides of the transformer. As shown on Figure 8.3.1-1, this results in four rodundant load centers designated A, C for Division I and B, D for Division II.
The load centers furnish power to large heater loads, large 480 volt motors, and 480 volt motor control centers which are located in concentrated load areas in the station. Connected to the motor control centers are all of the 480 volt loads which require power during LOOP or accident conditions. A list of typical Class 1E equipment, loads and design ratings are provided in Tables 8.3.1-2 and 8.3.1-3. Redundancy is provided in order to assure proper operation of Engineered Safety Feature Systems in the event of the failure of any single component in the 480V AC Class 1E Auxiliary Power Systems.
In the application of the 480V AC Class 1E Auxiliary Power System J'oad centers, a selective system is used whereby both the main O and feeder circuit breakers have interrupting capacity greater than their required duty.
E The main source breakers are equipped with overcurrent trip devices having long time and short time delay functions, and the feeder breakers are equipped with overcurrent trip devices having long time and instantaneous functions.
All Class 1E motor-operated valve starters are equipped with thermal overload devices which are connected to alarm only.
8.3.1.1.3 Tests 8.3.1.1.3.1 Preoperational Tests l Preoperational tests are performed on the Onsite AC Power System i equipment to assure proper installation and operation as ,
described in Chapter 14 and in accordance with IEEE 415-1986. .
8.3.1.1.3.2 Periodio Tests Inspection, maintena'nce and testing is performed in accordance with a periodic testing program. The periodic testing program is ,
conducted so as not to interfere with unit operation. Where !
O tests do not interfere with unit operation, system and equipment tests are scheduled with the nuclear unit in operation. The means to accomplish this testing is described below.
Amendment E 8.3-5 December 30, 1988 l
L_____________________________________________________-___________ _ _ . . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ __ ____-_ _
CESSAREEbo O
The 13,800 and 4,160 volt circuit breakers and associated equipment can be tested in service where testing does not interfere with the operation of the Unit. These circuit breakers can be " racked out" to a test position and operated without energizing the circuits. A separate feed (whose breakers are normally open) from the Standby Auxiliary Transformer to each Class 1E Safety Load Division is provided to facilitate maintenance and testing of the normal source breakers feeding each Division.
The 480 volt circuit breakers, motor contactors and associated equipment can be tested in service by opening and closing the circuit breakers or contactors. Transfers to the various emergency power sources can be tested on a routine basis to prove the operational ability of these systems.
In compliance with General Design Criterion 18 and the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.22, the Class 1E Auxiliary Power System design is such that inspection, maintenance and periodic testing can be '
carried out with a minimum of interference with operation of the :
nuclear unit. Unit design includes two completely redundant 4,160V, four redundant 480V, and four redundant 120 Volt Class 1E j Auxiliary Power busses. Testing during reactor operation can be l accomplished by allowing one system to be taken out of service {
for testing. Breakers can be racked out to the test position i while the system is undergoing test. Continuous indication of unavailable systems is provided in the control room.
E I The generator power circuit breaker (PCB) periodic test program i includes load close-measurements, and dielectric tests.
Testing of protective relays is performed on a periodic basic.
Testing facilities are provided to meet the capability for testing in compliance with General Design Criterion 18 and the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.22. Relay sensors such as current transformers are tested before initial installation and unit operation and periodically thereafter. These protective devices are in service during normal operation. The preoperational tests for the protective relaying system verify the continuity of the system and the condition of all the components. The methods used to accomplish this are as follows:
A. All relays and other momentary duty type operating devices associated with the protective relaying of the onsite power system are tested to determine ipdividual performance characteristics, and assure repeatability of design settings, under various simulated conditions. This ensures device integrity.
O Amendment E 8.3-6 December 30, 1988
CESSAR E!Ebm,.
O B. All relay sensors such as current and potential transformers are tested for correct and reliable outputs.
C. All interconnecting wiring and cabling is inspected for proper installation and connections.
D. All protective relaying systems are tested under necessary simulated conditions to verify correct operation in preferred, alternate and abnormal modes.
The 120V AC Vital Power System is normally powered from inverters which are in use during normal operation. The continuous operation of the inverters is indicative of their operability and functional performance since accident conditions will not substantially change their load.
8.3.1.1.4 Class 1E Btandby Power Supplies Each Division of the 4,160V AC Class 1E Auxiliary Power System is !
supplied with emergency standby power from an independent diesel !
generator. The emergency diesel generator is designed and sized with sufficient capacity to operate all the needed engineered safety feature and emergency shutdown loads powered from its O
N) respective Class 1E Safety Division bus.
Each diesel generator is designed to attain rated voltage and frequency within 20 seconds and to begin accepting load within 40 seconds after receipt of a start signal to meet the response E times assumed in Chapter 15 analyses. Refer to Table 8.3.1-4 for loading sequence and bases. The characteristics of the generator exciter and voltage regulator provide satisfactory starting and acceleration of sequenced loads and ensures rapid voltage recovery when starting large motors. The generator voltage and frequency excursions between sequencing steps are in compliance with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.9. i l
Each diesel generator and its associated auxiliaries are installed in separate rooms and are protected against tornadoes, i external missiles, and seismic phenomena. The diesel rooms are l protected with firewalls which are designed to prevent the spread ;
of fire from one diesel room to the redundant diesel room. Refer to Section 9.5.9 for a description of the diesel room sump pump.
Each diesel generator room is provided with its own independent i ventilation system which is designed to automatically maintain a '
suitable environment in each diesel room for equipment operation and personnel access.
(O Amendment E 8.3-7 December 30, 1988
I CESSAREnecm i
l ei\
The diesel generator controls and monitoring instrumentation, with the exception of the sensors and other equipment that must necessarily be mounted on the diesel generator or its associated piping, are installed in free standing floor mounted panels.
These panels are designed for their normal vibration environment and qualified to Seismic Category I requirements. j The Diesel Generator engine-mounted components and piping are Seismic Category I, seismically qualified in accordance with IEEE Standard 344-1987.
8.3.1.1.4.1 Starting Circuits Each diesel generator is automatically started and loaded by the ESF-Component Control System diesel loading sequencer as discussed in Section 7.3.1.1.2.3. ,
l If offsite power is available and the diesel generators are ]
started on an ESFAS initiated by a plant condition actually I requiring operation of the ESF loads appropriate to the ESFAS, f the diesel generators are left running for a period of at least i one hour.
In addition to the above automatic start signals, each diesel '
generator can also be manually started for test and maintenance purposes from the control room or from the local diesel control ;
panel.
{
8.3.1.1.4.2 Starting System g Each diesel-electric generating unit has an independent air starting system with storage to provide at least five fast starts. The diesel generator starting air system is further described in Section 9.5.6.
8.3.1.1.4.3 Combustion Air System Refel to Section 9.5.8 for a description of the diesel air intake l and exhaust system.
8.3.1.1.4.4 Diesel Generator Protection Systems The diesel generator protection systems initiate automatic and immediate protective actions to prevent or limit damage to the diesel generator. The following protective trips are provided to protect each diesel generator at all times and are not bypassed when the diesel generator !s started as a result of an ESF-t 'S automatic or manual start signal.
O Amendment E 8.3-8 December 30, 1988
e- < ,
k)!b!hh$k!Ib!RT ICATION
()
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A. Engine Overspeed. 4 l
B. Generator Differential Protection.
C. Low-low Lube Oil Pressure. ]
l D. Generator Voltage-Controlled Overcurront (Protection From f External Faults). ]
The implementation of these protective trips is in accordance with Branch Technical Position EICSB-17. Overspeed protection is provided by an overspeed trip, the set-point is above the maximum engine speed on a full-load rejection. Therefore, in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.9, the engine speed resulting from a step increase or decrease in load will not exceed nominal speed plus 75% of the difference between nominal speed and the overspeed trip setpoint.
The following mechanical trips are provided to protect the diesel generators during test periods and while running with offsite power available:
A. Low Pressure Turbo 011.
(
B. Low Pressure Lube Oil.
C. High Pressure Crankcase.
D. High Temperat.u. Bearings. E E. High Tempe ature Lube Oil Out.
F. High Temperature Jacket Water.
G. High Vibration.
Ther,e mechanical trips are bypassed in the event of an ESF actuation condition, concurrent with a LOOP.
In addition, the following electrical trips are provided to protect the diesel generators during testing periods:
A. Generator Instantaneous Overcurrent Protection.
B. Generator Loss of Field Protection.
C. Generator Reverse Power Protection.
D. Generator Ground Protection.
Amendment E 8.3-9 December 30, 1988
CESSAREBinemn These electrical trips are bypassed in the event of an ESF o
actuation condition, concurrent with a LOOP.
8.3.1.1.4.5 Control Room Indication of Diesel Generator Operational Status Various monitoring devices are provided in the diesel room and the control room to give the operator the complete status of operability for the diesels. The following is a listing of the typical parameters monitored:
A. Lube Oil Temperature and Pressures.
B. Bearing Temperatures.
C. Cooling Water Temperatures and Pressures. l D. Generator Parameters. 1 E. Speed. q F. Starting Air Pressure.
In order to meet the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.47, the i following conditions are monitored to determine the operable status of the diesel generator:
A. Cooling water not available.
E I B. Diesel generator breaker racked out. 1 C. Diesel generator overspeed. ;
1 D. Loss of control power.
E. Generator fault.
F. Low air and oil pressure.
G. Maintenance mode.
1 8.3.1.1.4.6 Load St>Cding and Sequencing l
All Class lE switchgear and load center breakers that are l required to automatically close following an accident, LOOP ar.d/or station blackout condition are controlled by the ESF-CCS load sequencer associated with each diesel generator.
O Amendment E 8.3-10 December 30, 1988
CESSAR 8lnificari:n t l V ;
Load shedding of all loads at the 4,160 volt level (except the 4,160/480 volt load center transformers) occurs whenever a sustained bus under voltage condition is detected by the ESF-CCS l logic. l 4
Following the load shedding operation, the diesel generator load )
sequencer automatically sequences the required loads per Table l 8.3.1-4, as described in Section 7.3.1.1. !
I I
8.3.1.1.4.7 Lube Oil System Reference Section 9.5.7 for a description of the diesel lube oil system.
8.3.1.1.4.8 Fuel Oil Storage System Reference Section 9.5.4 for a description of the diesel fuel oil storage system.
8.3.1.1.4.9 Cooling System Reference Section 9.5.5 for a description of the diesel cooling system.
8.3.1.1.4.10 Diesel Generator Proven Technology The diesel generators are of proven technology that has been applied successfully for several years in existing LWRs.
8.3.1.1.4.11 Preoperational and Periodic Testing In addition to the factory tests, tb following preoperational onsite acceptance tests and periodic tests will be conducted on E each diesel generator and their associated auxiliary systems.
A. Prooperational Testing Preoperational acceptance tests meet the intent of the .
following: l
- 1. IEEE Standard 387-1984, Sections 6.4 and 6.5.
- 2. Regulatory Guide 1.9, Section C.3 and C.4.
- 3. Regulatory Guide 1.41, Section C.
- 4. Regulatory Guide 1.68, Appendix A, Section 1.g.3.
- 5. Regulatory Guide 1.108, Sections C.2.a and C.2.b.
Q(q Amendment E 8.3-11 December 30, 1988
CESSARH5 Gem i
i ei
- 6. Regulatory Guide 1.137, Section C.1.c. j
- 7. ANSI N195, 1976, Section 6.1.
These preoperational tests conform with the provisions of ,
Regulatory Guide 1.108, C.2.a and C.2.b regarding tests to t be performed on standby diesel generator units.
B. Periodic Testing Periodic testing of the diesel generator meets the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.108 and NRC Generic Letter 84-15.
The diesel generator is removed from service in accordance with approved procedures. Any maintenance work on the diesels is performed and inspected by qualified personnel in accordance with i approved procedures. Upon completion of maintenance work, appropriate tests are completed to assure operability of the diesel generator. Upon complet! n of testing, appropriate operating procedures restore the diesels to standby readiness.
8.3.1.1.4.12 125V DC Diesel Control Power 125V DC control power for each emergency diesel is provided by !
the Class 1E 12SV DC power system batteries as described in Section 8.3.2.1.2.
8.3.1.1.5 Non-Class 1E Alternate AC Source Standby Power E supply The Alternate AC Source (AAC) is a non-safety power source provided to cope with LOOP and SBO scenarios. This standby unit is independent and diverse from the Class 1E standby emergency diesel generators.
The AAC is sized with sufficient capacity to accommodate either of the following load configurations:
A. Both sets of X and Y Permanent Non-safety loads; or i'
B. One set of Permanent Non-Safety loads and one set of a Safety Division's loads as indicated below:
- 1. Permanent Non-Safety X with Division I only, or,
- 2. Permanent Non-Safety Y with Division II only.
1 O
Amendment E 8.3-12 December 30, 1988
CESSAR8Hibia O
The AAC is not normally nor automatically directly connected to any Class 1E Safety Load Division. However, it can be manually aligned to power one Safety Load Division via one Permanent Non-Safety Bus, to accommodate a diesel generator out of service condition.
8.3.1.1.5.1 AAC Starting and Loading The AAC is designed to start within ten minutes from the onset-of a LOOP event. It is then available for loading if either of the 4,160V Permanent Non-Safety Load Busses X and Y become de-energized. Automatic connection and sequential loading of the l X and/or Y non-safety loads will occur utilizing a sequencer design similar to that described in 7.3.1.1.2.3.
8.3.1.1.5.2 ACC Instrumentation and Controls The instrumentation and controls necessary to start and run the AAC are powered from a dedicated local 125V DC battery.
Various monitoring and control devices are provided locally and in the control room to give the operator control and operational status information. The following typical parameters are
[ monitored and/or alarmed:
U) E A. Lube oil temperatures and pressures B. Bearing temperatures C. Cooling temperatures and pressures D. Generator parameters and status E. Speed l F. Starting air pressure l
G. Control mode status (standby, starting, running, local). l I
8.3.1.1.5.3 AAC Auxiliary Support Systems l A. Fuel System and Supply The AAC is equipped with redundant fuel systems. Sufficient fuel is stored on site to support 24 incur operation at rated
, load.
(
Amendment E i 8.3-13 December 30, 1988
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CESSARn h a .
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B. Starting System The AAC is equipped with redundant starting systems and controls. The system is designed with sufficient capacity for five starts.
C. Cooling System The AAC is equipped with a self-contained cooling system.
D. Lubrication System The AAC design includes a pre / post lubrication system that utilizes redundant components.
8.3.1.1.5.4 AAC Periodic Testing The AAC is designed to be routinely inspected and maintained while the plant is at power.
Instrumentation and controls are provided to permit its synchronization and loading during refueling periods to periodically demonstrate its operability.
8.3.1.1.5.5 AAC Quality Assurance The intent of the quality assurance guidelines to incorporate a g lesser degree of stringency as identified in Regulatory Guide 1.155 Section 3.5 will be implemented. The Q/A program as described in Chapter 17 contains all the necessary elements to address the guidance given in Regulatory Guide 1.155 Appendix A.
Selected features of this program will be used to address all applicable AAC Q/A requirements.
8.3.1.1.6 Protective Relaying System The basic criterion for the Protective Relaying System is that it shall, with precision and reliability, promptly initiate the operation of isolation devices that serve to remove from service any element of the Onsite Power System when that element is slibjected to an abnormal condition that may prove detrimental to the effective operation or integrity of the unit.
The basic protective relaying has zone-over-lapping differential relaying with redundant circuits. Each circuit has independent current sources, separate DC sources, independent lockout relays and independent trip coils. Each redundant circuit is composed of independent channels of relaying. Each channel is also
}
Amendment E !
8.3-14 December 30, 1988 ;
CESSAR8l Enc-O comprised of diverse relaying. Tripping of the independent lockout relays is achieved through a coincidence of like trip signals.
This requirement prevents a false trip of the lockout relays due to a malfunction of one relay. The scheme also allows for testing and maintenance of each channel without causing a false trip and without removing the protection from the system. The inherent quality of this scheme is that each primary channel provides the redundancy needed for proper operation in case one relay fails and assurance of not tripping due to false operation of one relay.
Non-safety buses feeding loads required for unit operation only ;
are provided with an undervoltage protection scheme design to !
protect the loads against damage due to sustained operation under degraded voltage conditions and shed all major loads under loss-of-voltage conditions.
Class 1E Division buses and non-safety buses feeding permanent non-safety loads are provided with separate bus voltage monitoring and protection schemes for degraded voltage and loss of voltage conditions, respectively. These schemes are designed
} according to the recommendations of IEEE Standard 741 "IEEE V Standard Criteria for the Protection of Class 1E Power Systems E
and Equipment in Nuclear Power Generating Systems." Two separate time delays are selected for degraded voltage protection as recommended in IEEE Standard 741, Appendix A. Based on the automatic bus transfer sequences adopted, a time delay is provided for loss of voltage relay actuation to preclude unnecessary starting of the onsite standby power sources during t"e transfer sequences. The undervoltage protection schemes use coincidental logic (e.g., two out of three phases) to avoid l spurious trips of the offsite power sources.
The relay zones in the Onsite Protection System overlap to maintain protection throughout the system. Any fault condition in a particular tripping zone trips the circuit breakers in that zone by its associated protective relays.
8.3.1.1.7 Monitoring Instrumentation and Controls for Onsite Power System The monitoring instrumentation associated with the Onsite Power System provides a reliable source of information in the control room and protective functions for major components. The instrumentation provides quantitative values and status conditions for the operator in the control room. This p instrumentation provides the operator with the information
( necessary for efficient operation of the unit. The Amendment E 8.3-15 December 30, 1988
l CESSAR8Ha mu instrumentation also provides pertinent quantitative values and Oi status conditions for alarming and tripping action. All control l room instrumentation and controis are designed in accordance with !
the Human Factors Engineering design criteria and implementation methods, as described in Chapter 18.
Manual and automatic controls are provided in the main control l room and locally to permit the following operations l l
A. Selection of the most suitable power source for the various onsite distribution systems.
B. Disconnection of appropriate loads when normal and emergency ;
power are not available. j In addition to the controls provided in the main control room aM {
in the remote shutdown control room, local (near equipment; controls are also provided for:
A. Switchgear operation, in particular, for the circuit breakers that transfer Class 1E buses and Class 1E loads from preferred to standby sources.
B. Operation of auxiliary supporting systems, e.g, transformer I
fans, heaters, etc..
C. Startup of standby power sources.
Class 1E local controls are located behind doors or otherwise ,
protected against operation by inadvertent contact, e.g. I E
protected with keys or interlocks.
All Class 1E 4,160V Safety Division switching devices are equipped with redundant trip coils. Each Class 1E medium voltage switchgear assembly is provided with two separate sources of control power, one per redundant tripping circuit. One of the poter sources is the Class 1E 125VDC Vital Instrumentation battery of the switchgear's safety division; the other power source is the Class 1E Divisions battery used to power of the Standby Emergency Diesel Generator of the same division.
The 4,160V switchgear used to connect the onsite standby non-safety AAC source to the plant Permanent Non-safety loads is provided with two separate sources of control power, one of which is the dedicated starting battery of the standby AAC source.
Provisions are included to permit opening and closing all 13,800V and 4,160V switching devices manually in the absence of any DC or AC power supply, i
Amendment E 8.3-16 December 30, 1988 l
CESSAR ninamu O
8.3.1.1.8 Design Bases for Class 1E Motors As a minimum, Class 1E motors are capable of' accelerating their loads within the required time with a starting voltage as low as 75% of rated motor voltage.
When operated under nominal conditions, the_ plant motors have a continuous power rating greater than the maximum power rating'of the driven equipment. Service factor requirements are in accordance with the latest revision of NEMA Standard MG 1 " Motors and Generators" - Section MG 1-12.47.
Except where specified otherwise, medium voltage motors which are required to operate continuously during normal plant operation, are designed for Class B temperature rises and provided with Class F insulation systems.
Medium voltage motors which are required to operate continuously during normal plant operation are provided with thermocouple or resistance temperature devices to measure winding and bearing temperatures.
8.3.1.2 Apalvsis The 4,160V AC and 480V AC Safety Auxiliary Power Systems (Divisions I and II) are Class 1E systems, and as such are designed to meet the requirements of General Design Criteria 17 and 18, and the intent of NRC Regulatory Guides 1.6, 1.9, 1.32, 1.63, 1.81, and 1.106 as discussed below. A failure modes and E
effects analysis for the onsite power system is presented in Table 8.3.1-1.
8.3.1.2.1 Compliance with General Design Criterion 17 and Regulatory Guide 1.32 Two separate circuits from the transmission network are normally available to the Class 1E Auxiliary Power Systems.-
The separation of the two independent circuits at the offsite I voltage level is maintained by the switchyard power circuit breakers. Each circuit is separately connected through transformers and breakers to the redundant 4,160V Permanent Non-safety switchgear, which in turn are connected through double isolation feeder breakers to the redundant Division I or II 4160V Class 1E Safety Division switchgear. Since each of the supplies is normally available within seconds following the tripping of the reactor and the opening of the generator breakers, the requirements of GDC 17 and the intent of guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.32 are fully met.
O Amendment E 8.3-17 December 30, 1988
_____________m
CESSAR innnCATICN j i
i In the event that one of the two half-sized Unit Auxiliary O'
transformers is out of service, the 4,160V Class 1E Safety Division System switchgear supplied from that transformer will be '
supplied from the Standby Auxiliary transformer, thereby maintaining two independent circuits to the Class 1E Divisions I and II during this period. .In the event that the unit main step-up transformers are out of service, both of the 4,160V Class
} can be supplied from the remaining single 1E Divisions independent Standby Auxiliary Transformer circuit.
The Onsite Power System is designed to minimize the probability of losing electric power from any of the remaining supplies as a result of, or coincident with, the loss of the unit generator, the transmission network, or the onsite electric power supplies.
8.3.1.2.2 Compliance with General Design Criterion 18 Provisions are made for periodic testing of all important components of the Class 1E AC power systems. Further provision is made for periodic testing of the emergency diesel generators to assure to start and to accept loads within their capability design limits. Electric $6wer systems important to safety are designed to allow periodic testing to the extent practical.
Included in the system design is the capability to periodically test the operability and functional performance of these systems as a whole and under conditions as close to design as practical.
Staggered tests may be employed to avoid the testing of redundant E equipment at the same time.
The 4,160 volt circuit breakers and associated equipment are tested in-service by opening and closing the breakers so as not to interfere with the operation of the unit. The 480 volt breakeda motor starters, and associated equipment are also tested ih-sers w:e by opening and closing the breakers and contactors so as not to interfere with unit operation.
Additionally, the protective relaying associated with the 4,160V AC and 480V AC Safety Auxiliary Power System Divisions are inspected, tested, and maintained on a routine basis.
8.3.1.2.3 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.6 The design of the Class 1E AC power systems complies with the l intent of independence requirement of Regulatory Guide 1.6.
The electrically powered Class 1E AC loads are separated into two redundant and completely independent divisions for the unit.
There are no direct automatic or manual ties between redundant divisions.
O Amendment E l 8.3-18 December 30, 1983 l
CESSARnahmu 1 O
No single failure can prevent operation of the minimum number of d required safety loads, and loss of any one division will not prevent the minimum safety functions from being performed. Each Class 1E 4,160 volt switchgear has access to an offsite power source, the AAC and an onsite standby diesel generator power source.
l Each diesel generator is Two diesel generators are provided.
connected exclusively to its associated Class 1E 4,160 volt l Safety switchgear div.ision which ensures independence of the onsite standby power sources.
8.3.1.2.4 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.9 The design of the diesel generators used as standby' power supplies complies with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.9.
Each diesel generator set is capable of starting and accelerating to rated speed, in the proper sequence, all of the required engineered safety feature and emergency shutdown loads.
8.3.1.2.5 Compliance with IEEE Standards 308-1900, 387-1984 l and Regulatory Guide 1.32 The Onsite 1E AC Electric Power System distribution design and configuration as described herein, is capable of transmitting sufficient energy to start and operate all required loads. The systems redundant division equipment is physically and electrically independent from each other in accordance with IEEE Standard 308-1980. Instrumentation and controls are provided to l perform maintenance and periodic surveillance tests. The design complies with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.32.
E l
The requirements of IEEE Standard 387-1984 are implemented in the i design of the standby power system. Standby generators are l I
l tested on a periodic basis, as identified in Chapter 16 Technical specifications. j l
8.3.1.2.6 Compliance with IEEE Standard 384-1981 and Regulatory Guide 1.75 The physical layout and separation of the Class 1E AC electrical system equipment circuits is designed- to minimize the vulnerability of the Reactor Protection Systems, Engineered Safety Feature Systems and Class 1E Power Systems to physical ,
damage. l l
l l
l Amendment E i 8.3-19 December 30, 1988
1 1
CESSAR E%"lCATION l
A further description of the methods used to comply with the 9
intent of this standard and Regulatory Guide regarding physical ,
identification and independence of redundant power sources, switchgear, inverters, motor control centers and related cabling '
are contained in Sections 8.3.1.3 and 8.3.1.4.
8.3.1.2.7 Compliance with IEEE Standard 379-1977 The singic failure criterion as set forth in 4.2 of IEEE Standard 279-1971 and interpreted in IEEE Standard 379-1977 is applied to the design and analysis of the Class 1E AC Power System.
Any single failure within the Class 1E Auxiliary Power System will not prevent proper Class 1E AC Power System action when required.
l 8.3.1.2.8 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.63 i
The mechanical, electrical, and test guidance as set forth in l Regulatory Guide 1.63 for the design, construction, and installation of electric penetration assemblies in the containment structure are followed.
8.3.1.2.9 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.106 The intent of Regulatory Guide 1.106 is met by not using thermal overload protective devices in safety-related motor-operated valve control circuits. The thermal overload signals are used only for status annunciation. The ESF-CCS, as described in Section 7.3, has the capability to provide MOV thermal overload status information to the operator via the DPS displays described E in Section 7.7.1.7.
8.3.1.3 Physical Identification of Safetv-Related Ecruipment i
All Class 1E equipment, cables, and raceways are identified l according to the particular safety division train or channel with I which they are associated.
All major Class 1E equipment is identified with a nameplate which categorizes the particular equipment.
All Class 1E cables and raceways are identified by a color coding method. The color coding method is implemented with four basic colors: red, green, yellow, and blue. These colors correspond to the following safety Divisions and channels:
O Amendment E 8.3-20 December 30, 1988
CESSARnSincum i
l f
Q '
1 Protective Electrical 1 Channels Divisions Associated Channels 1
Channel A: Red I: Red Channel J: White / Red Stripe Channel B: Green II: Green Channel K: White / Green Stripe Channel C: Yellow Channel L: White / Yellow Stripe Channel D: Blue Channel M: White / Blue Stripe All non-panel mounted Class 1E system instrumentation and equipment is identified with a name tag which provides the channel number and the suffix A, B, C, or D to specifically identify the protection channel with which the component is identified. .
Non-Class 1E cables channels "X" or "Y" do not use the above color coding scheme.
Class 1E cables are marked prior to or during installation with the appropriate color code at intervals not to exceed five feet and are also identified by tags affixed at both ends bearing the E appropriate cable number. Color-coded tags are also used to identify Class 1E cable tray and major pieces of equipment.
Cable routing documentation is prepared to establish a permanent record of the cable numbers (Class 1E cables have a unique identifier in the number), cable types, origin, terminations, routing, restriction code, and color code.
All cable trays, conduits, and wireways containing Class 1E E !
cables are also color coded for ease of identification and to assure that separation is maintained. These raceways are marked at each end, at all entrances and exits to rooms, and at intervals not to exceed 15 feet. Raceways are marked prior to the installation of their cables.
8.3.1.4 Independence of Redundant Systems The physical layout of Class 10 systems is designed to minimize the vulnerability of redundant equipment and cabling to damage.
Elecial consideration is given to potential hazards- in the various areas of the plant where Class 1E systems are located.
In particular, these areas are analyzed for potential pipe whips, missiles, and other hazards. Separation and/or barriers are {
provided such that damage from potential hazards does not preclude the performance of a required safety function.
O l
Amendment E l 8.3-21 December 30, 1988 k
_- - -- - - - 1
CESSAR 8EnCATl!N ,
the O
The criteria established to assure the preservation of independence of Class 1E systems is discussed below:
8.3.1.4.1 Diesel Generators Two mutually redundant diesel generators are provided and are structure to separated in individual Category 1 physically preserve their independence and integrity and to assure their No common failure mode exists which may maximum availability.
jeopardize independence for any design basis event.
8.3.1.4.2 Switchgear and Load Centers Redundant trains of Class 1E switchgear and associated load centers are provided and are located in separate rooms within Category 1 structures, thereby establishing maximum availability through their separation and independence. No common failure between the mode exists which may jeopardize independence redundant groups for any design basis event.
j 8.3.1.4.3 Motor Control Centers j Redundant groups of Class 1E motor control centers are provided.
Physical separation is employed to provide the required independence of the groups. No common failure mode exists which may jeopardize independence between the redundant groups for any design basis event.
8.3.1.4.4 Batteries, Chargers, Inverters and Panelboards E ,
J I
Each of the four channels of the 125V DC and 120V AC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System is located in a separate I compartment in a Category 1 structure to preserve its independence. No common failure mode exists which may jeopardize independence between the redundant groups.
8.3.1.4.5 Cable Installation and Separation ,
l Cables of redundant systems are routed separately to preserve their independence. Separation criteria are established based on I location of the cables within the station to preclude any single credible event from preventing the safe shutdown of the unit.
8.3.1.4.5.1 Cable and Conduit Installation and Support cables are installed in open ventilated ladder type trays, open electray channels, conduit, or wireways. A ventilated seismically qualified cable support system is provided for all raceways containing Class 1E cables. Additionally, all raceways are of non-combustible construction.
I' Amendment E 8.3-22 December 30, 1988 l
1 CESSAR!aec-O U
Cables are routed in separate raceway systems according to voltage level and function. Where practical, a vertical stack of j trays is arranged such that the highest voltage level is on top J with the lower trays in descending order of voltage levels and !
finally control and instrumentation trays at the lowest level.
The 125V DC and 120V AC vital instrument buses and cabling are l designed and installed such that their maximum voltage fault will j not exceed 480V AC +10% or 325V DC + 10% values assumed for the l I
qualification of Class lE isolation devices used in various instrumentation and control systems. Cable splicing is not allowed in raceways.
Cable tray and conduit are located a safe distance from the high temperature piping system to preclude the necessity of reducing the cable ampacity as a result of increased ambient temperature.
Multi-level cable tray systems provide, as a minimum, one-foot, four-inch vertical spaces between the bottom of the upper tray and the top of the lower tray, and two feet of horizontal space between adjacent trays.
Drip loops are provided in conduit runs at the inlet to electrical devices where conduit enters from the top and when
('L required to maintain device qualification as an alternative to device-sealing type hardware.
Light weight conduit, fittings, and cable tray materials are utilized in lieu of rigid steel. Installation of intermediate metal conduit or aluminum rigid conduit shall be utilized where j technically acceptable. 1 In cable tunnels, in lieu of ceiling supportu, large seismic cable tray support structures are mounted on floors.
E Precast concrete trenches, ductbanks, and manholes are used whenever technically acceptable.
Planning of cable pulls are included in the design of equipment l locations, cable tray routings, and conduit routings to maximize l group pulling of cables.
Color-coded jacketing for multi-paired conductors are specified where possible.
Exothermic cadwelded connections are used in the installation of ground grid system in lieu of wedge pressure cable connectors where possible.
O V
Amendment E 8.3-23 December 30, 1988
l l
1 CESSARnahmw 8.3.1.4.5.2 Cable Separation el The minimum separation between Class 1E cables and between Class j' lE and Non-Class lE cables meets the intent of Regulatory Guide l.75.
8.3.1.5 Cable Deratina and Cable Tray Fill l l
8.3.1.5.1 Cable Derating ]
The cable ampacities for both AC and DC power cables are derated per IEEE Standard S-135 and IPCEA P-46-426 to assure minimum degradation of cable insulation caused by high temperatures should the cables be loaded to their maximum ampacity rating. l l
The maximum ampacities for all power cables are determined by l multiplying the appropriate cable manufacturer's IPCEA cable ampacity rating by 0.7. l 8.3.1.5.2 Cable Tray Fill Criteria The cable tray fill criterion for those trays containing power cables allows only one single layer of power cables to be routed in any tray, and, in general, separation of one-quarter the diameter of the larger cable is maintained between adjacent power -
cables within a tray. l The cable tray fill criterion for those trays containing instrumentation and control cables is that the cross-sectional area of these cables will not exceed the usable cross-sectional area of the tray.
8.3.1.6 Fire Protection and Detection The fire protection system provided in the unit is discussed in Section 9.5.1. !
All openings for cable and cable tray runs in fire rated walls and floors are protected consistent with the rating of the wall or floor. The barrier openings are protected with approved devices such as fire dampers and fire stopping material of Class C (3/4 hour) for openings in one hour fire barriers and Class B (1-1/2 hours) for openings in two hour fire barriers and Class A (3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />) for openings in three hour fire barriers.
O !
Amendment E 8.3-24 December 30, 1988
CESSARn h m i
O V
The type of fire stop and seal used at each fire barrier opening for cable or cable tray depends on the cable or cable tray configuration penetrating the barrier. The primary types used are multiple cable transit assemblies (a metal frame with fire-proof elastomer building blocks which form a compression fit around each cable), mineral wool fiber packing (voids around cable and cable tray filled with mineral wool fiber and then sprayed with a fire retardant spray), and foam (two fire retardant plates placed on each side of the barrier and any void filled with fire retardant foam).
Specifications for fire stops and seals require the manufacturer to supply material and/or components that will remain functional
-throughout the life of the plant.
Proper installation of the fire stops and seals is assured by following approved manufacturer's installation procedures and techniques. Each installation is visually inspected periodically to verify that its integrity is maintained. When it becomes necessary to breach a completed fire stop or seal to add or remove cables, a documented inspection is performed to ensure that the fire stop or seal is reinstalled to the specifications of the original installation.
There are no cable fire stops installed at locations other than fire barrier penetrations on vertical or horizontal cable tray runs. Fire retardant cables are used throughout the unit. All cables, except a few Non-Class 1E instrumentation and control cables, are of the interlocked armor type, with a fire retardant i jacket and will not propagate fire to another area, or add to the E severity of the fire. These cables have passed the flame test of IEEE Standard 383-1974.
Fire detect' ors and water sprinkler systems are provided in the areas identified in the hazard analysis.
I The fire protection system cannot prevent a fire from damaging equipment and materials necessary to nuclear safety, but it is intended to aid in preventing a fire from damaging redundant safety equipment as well as preventing the spread of fire or flammable materials due to fire.
Mutually redundant Class 1E cables are separated in accordance with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.75. The separation criteria utilized is based on the location of the cables within the station so as to preclude any single credible event applicable to that location from rendering inoperative a ;
sufficient number of mutually redundant cables to prevent the 1
(]
%.)
fulfillment of the required safety function. {
)
Amendment E 8.3-25 December 30, 1988 i
____---___-_-_________N
CESSAR !anncarian 9
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY BLANK i
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O Amendment E 8.3-26 December 30, 1988
CESSAR Ei% nema t t i V
TABLE 8.3.1-1 (Sheet 1 of 7) '
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR THE ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS Component Malfunction Resultina Consequences
- 1. Isolated phase Loss of one due (a) The faulted equipment is isolated bus from unit to a fault by protective relaying and main transformer protective equipment.
to the generatcr breaker or to (b) The other independent preferred ;
the unit offsite circuit remains '
auxiliary unaffected.
transformer.
(c) Automatic reactor trip occurs.
or (d) The unit generator automatically Unit Auxiliary trips and its breaker opens.
transformer (e) The Permanent Non-Safety O Auxiliary System switchgear bl supplied from the faulted circuit E is connected in a automatic rapid bus transfer to the Standby Auxiliary transformer in the second independent circuit and Class lE auxiliaries continue to receive uninterrupted offsite power.
(f) Emergency diesel generator and AAC source automatically start.
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. Amendment E j December 30, 1988 j i
1
CESSAREinacm2 O
TABLE 8.3.1-1 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 2 of 7)
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR THE ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS l Component Malfunction Resultina Consequences
- 2. Standby loss due (a) The faulted equipment is isolated Auxiliary to a fault by protective relaying and Transformer protective equipment. ,
J (b) The other independent preferred l offsite circuit remains !
unaffected.
(c) No effect on unit power generation or Essential Safety buses, since not normally connected to onsite system.
(d) Loss of power source to Auxiliary g Boiler (and, if supplied, Cooling Tower Fans).
- 3. Isolated phase loss due to (a) Generator breaker trip, bus connecting the a fault generator circuit (b) The unit generator is tripped breaker and the automatically, unit generator (c) Reactor Power Cutback System or initiation.
Unit generator (d) All unit and Class 1E auxiliaries continue to receive uninterrupted offsite power from the Unit Auxiliary transformers.
- 4. Generator circuit loss of one (a) The other two poles of the breaker pole of the breaker trip. !
breaker.
(b) The Non-Safety Auxiliary System switchgear are supplied from the ,
Unit Main Transformers, all unit l and Class lE auxiliaries continue to receive uninterrupted power through the preferred offsite ,
circuit. l Amendment E December 30, 1988
CESSAREnnncum
/7 O
TABLE 8.3.1-1 (Cont'd) 1 (Sheet 3 of 7) l FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR THE ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS l
Component Malfunction Resultina Consequences
- 4. (Cont'd) (c) The unit generator is tripped i automatically. ]
1 (d) Reactor Power Cutback System ;
f initiation.
J
- 5. Isolated Phase loss of (a) No immediate consequence. The I Bus Cooling bus cooling unit and Class lE auxiliaries {
System continue to receive an E 1 uninterrupted flow of power from !
the Unit Auxiliary Transformers. .
However, continued unit operation s is dependent upon bus design {
capacities with and without
[~T forced cooling.
(/ )
- 6. Auxiliary Trans- Loss of one (a) No immediate consequence. The formers Cooling of the cooler unit and the Class lE auxiliaries System banks continue to receive an j uninterrupted flow of power from this source. However, continued I transformer and unit operation is !
dependent upon its rated design capacities with and without i cooling. l i
- 7. Main Transformer Loss of one (a) No immediate consequence with Cooling System of the cooler step-up transformer at full load, banks The operator must reduce load to 70% of the transformer forced I cooling rating and maintain the self-cooled rating of the transformer. The unit and the !
Class lE auxiliaries continue to I receive an uninterrupted flow of power.
d("%
Amendment E December 30, 1988
CESSAR EEncAMN O
TABLE 8.3.1-1 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 4 of 7)
FAILURE H0 DES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR THE ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS Component Malfunction Resultina Consequences
- 8. 13,800V Non- Breaker fault (a) The unit trips automatically due Safety Auxiliary to Reactor Coolant Pump System switch- coastdown.
gear source breaker (b) No affect on the 4,160V onsite power system.
- 9. 4,160V Non- Breaker fault (a) Loss of normal source to 4,160V Safety Auxiliary Non-Safety Bus. Requires unit ,
Power System power reduction to the capacity Switchgear break- supported by remaining non-safety er auxiliaries. May cause Reactor Power Cutback or unit to trip.
(b) No effect on Permanent Non-Safety or Class lE Safety Division E loads.
- 10. 13,800V Non- Bus shorted (a) The switchgear source breaker Safety Auxiliary or trips. ,
System switch- Breaker fault !
gear bus or (b) The plant will experience a !
switchgear re.: tor trip due to the loss of )
'eactor
. coolant pumps. j (c) No effect on Permanent Non-Safety or Class lE Safety Division loads. j
- 11. 4,160V Non- Fault (a) The appropriate 4,160V Non-Safety Safety Source Auxiliary System and 4,160V Class Feeder cable to lE Safety Division switchgear ,
the 4,160V breakers trip. Sufficient i Permanent Non- redundant auxiliaries remain Safety switch- operable from the redundant Class i gear bus or IE switchgear Division for the i switchgear safe shutdown of the reactor, f
GI l Amendment E '
December 30, 1988 ]
CESSAR EnWicaritu (O 1 TABLE 8.3.1-1 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 5 of 7)
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR THE ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS s
Component Malfunction Resultina Consequences (b) Loss of normal source to 4,160V ;
Permanent Non-Safety bus causes '
it to fast transfer to Standby Auxiliary transformer. Onsite EDG automatically starts.
l 12. 4,160V Permanent Fault (a) Normally no effect.
Non-Safety Auxi-l liary Power (b) If the Standby Auxiliary System switchgear transformer is the Source source breaker or connected and the Unit Auxiliary cable from Transformer source is not Standby Auxili- available, the appropriate source ary Transformer breakers open to isolate the O
affected Class lE Safety Division !
b Bus. The ACC~and EDG start and are load sequenced, g ,
l
- 13. 4,160V AAC Faul t (a) If the AAC Source is connected, Source or consequences similar to 11.(a),
feeder cable (b) above.
l or breaker to I
the 4,160V Permanent non-safety switchgear
- 14. 4,160V Class lE Fault (a) Source breaker trips and the Safety Auxiliary affected 4,160V Class 1E Power System Division switchgear is Division deenergized. Loss of redundant switchgear IE 480V loads (Channels A, C or B, 0) associated with' division.
or Sufficient redundant auxiliaries re.nain operable from the 4,160V Safety redundant Class 1E Safety Division Source Auxiliary Power System Division feeder cables or for the safe shutdown of the breakers from reactor.
l ,A 4,160V Permanent l \
non-Safety switchgear Amendment E December 30, 1988
CESSAR En9cari:u l
TABLE 8.3.1-1 (Cont'd)
- \i (Sheet 6 of 7) <
I FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR THE ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS I
Component Malfunction Resultina Consequences 15, 4,160V Safety Fault (a) If the EDG source is connected, Division the affected 4,160V Safety l Emergency Division is deenergized until the Diesel Generator fault is cleared and the AAC or its breaker source can be manually aligned to i re-energize the division. I (b) Sufficient redundant auxiliaries I remain operable from the l redundant Class 1E Safety Power l System Division.
- 16. 4,160V Class lE Fault on one (a) The associated load feeder Safety Auxiliary breaker trips and isolates the i Power System fault from the system. Remaining Division switch- Division loads should not be gear feeder affected. However, if the fault E cables trips the Division's source breaker, sufficient redundan" or auxiliaries remain operable trom the redundant Class 1E Safety 4,160/480 Volt Power System Division and IE load center channels for safe shutdown.of transformer the reactor.
or 480 V Class lE load center source breaker l
- 17. 480 Volt Class Fault (a) The load center source circuit j lE load center breaker trips. Sufficient j bus redundant auxiliaries remain i operable from the redundant Class ;
1E Safety Power System Division or for the safe shutdown of the !
reactor.
480 Volt Class IE load center feeder breaker Amendment E December 30, 1988 L___________ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ )
CESSAR 8!!Fincma n v TABLE 8.3.1-1 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 7 of 7)
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR THE ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS Component Malfunction Resultina Consequences
- 18. 480 Volt Class Fault (a) The load center feeder breaker i 1E load center trips. Sufficient redundant feeder cable auxiliaries remain operable from the redundant Class 1E Safety or. Power System Division for the-safe operation of the reactor.-
480 Volt Class 1E motor control center bus
- 19. 480 Volt Class Fault (a) The motor control center feeder 1E motor control breaker trips. Sufficient center feeder redundant auxiliaries remain cable operable from the redundant Class lE Safety Power System Divisiori O, for the safe operation of the E reactor.
l
]
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l I
I O
Amendment E December 30, 1988 1
CESSAREnMouun O
TABLE 8.3.1 '2 (Sheet 1 of 3)
TYPICAL CLASS 1E LOADS Rated Locked Actual Full Rotor Quantity Rated Load Current Current Description on Bus HP (KW) (AMP) (AMP)
Division I:
4160 Volt loads Safety Injection Pumps 2 l
Shutdown Cooling Pump 1 l Containment Spray Pump 1 Emergency Feedwater Pump 1 Fire Pump 1 [LATER]
CCW Pumps 2 Spent Fuel Pool Pump 1 O Service Water Pumps 2 V Essential HVAC Chiller 1 E
480 Volt loads Channel A SIS Valves SCS Valves CSS Valves CIS Valves EFW Valves SDS Valves CCW Valves Service Water Valves [LATER]
Battery Chargers ,
Essent. HVAC Circ.
Pumps and Valves Control Room Air l Handling Units Essent. B0P Air i Handling Units t
r\
U j Amendment E December 30, 1988
CESSAR EHL"icari:n I
TABLE 8.3.1-2 (Cont'd) !
(Sheet 2 of 3)
TYPICAL CLASS lE LOADS i
Rated Locked Actual Full Rotor !
Quantity Rated Load Current Current Description _,_cn Bus HP (KW) (AMP) (AMP)
Division I: (Cont'd) 480 Volt Loads Channel C SIS Valves
Division II: ;
4160 Volt loads Safety injection Pumps 2 Shutdown Cooling Pump 1 ,
E Containment Spray Pump 1 l Emergency Feedwater Pump 1 Fire Pump 1 [LATER]
CCW Pumps 2 Spent Fuel Pool Pump 1 Service Water Pumps 2 Essential HVAC Chiller 1 480 Volt loads Channel B l SIS Valves SCS Valves CSS Valves CIS Valves [LATER]
EFW Valves SDS Valves CCW Valves l
9\
Amendment E December 30, 1988 l
CESSAR inlinem:u i l
O v
I TABLE 8.3.1-2 (Cont'd)
(Sheet 3 of 3)
TYPICAL CLASS 1E LOADS Rated Locked Actual Full Rotor ;
Quantity Rated Load Current Current I Description on Bus HP (KW) (AMP) (AMP) I Division II: (Cont'd) 480 Volt loads Channel B (Cont'd) j Service Water Valves Battery Chargers )
Essent. HVAC Circ. 1 Pumps and Valves !
Control Room Air [i.ATER]
Handling Units Essent. B0P Air Handling Units C 480 Volt Loads Channel D SIS Valves g l SCS Valves l CIS Valves !
EFW Valves [LATER]
SDS Valves ]
Battery Chargers I
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(
Amendment E i December 30, 1988
l CESSAR 88Gcm O
\m / !
TABLE 8.3.1-3 TYPICAL CLASS 1E EOUIPMENT CAPACITIES Continuous Fault !
Equipment Description Capacity Capacity 4160V Switchgear Bus ,
E 4160V Switchgear Incoming breakers j 4160V Switchgear Feeder breakers 480V Load Center Transformers 480V Load Center Bus I l 480V Load Center Incoming breakers [LATER] ,
480V Load Center Feeder breakers l 480V Motor Control Center Buses 480V Motor Control Center Breakers O
l l l
([3) i \
Amendment E December 30, 1988
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8.3.2 DC POWER SYSTEMS 8.3.2.1 System Descriptions 8.3.2.1.1 Non-Class 1E DC Power Systems 8.3.2.1.1.1 125V DC Auxiliary Control Power System The 125V DC Auxiliary Control Power System consists of two 125 volt batteries, two battery chargers, and two 125 volt DC distribution centers. The system is divided into two channels which supply DC power to the Non-Class 1E instrumentation, controls, Data Processing System (DPS) and the 125V DC - 120V AC auxiliary control power inverters. The 125V DC Auxiliary Control Power System is shown on Figure 8.3.2-1.
8.3.2.1.1.2 208/120V AC Auxiliary Control Power System The 208/120V AC Auxiliary Control Power System consists of 125V DC - 208/?2GV AC inverters, static and manual bypass transfer switches, distribution centers, and panelboards as indicated in Figure 8.3.2-1.
The system is divided into two trains, each supplying f' non-interruptible 120 volt AC power to Non-Class 1E instrumentation and controls; 208/120 volt AC power to the DPS l and security lighting systems.
E Two 125V DC - 120V AC inverters supply power from the 125V DC l Auxiliary Control Power System to separate non-interruptible l 208/120 volt AC panelboards. Backup power is available for ;
each inverter from an associated Permanent Non-Safety 480/208 )
volt AC regulated power distribution center.
8.3.2.1.1.3 250V DC Auxiliary Power System The 250V DC Auxiliary Power System consists of two 250 volt ,
l batteries, two battery chargers and two distribution centers. l l This system is shown on Figure 8.3.2-1. I The 250V DC Auxiliary Power System supplies power to high inrush DC loads that generally serve as backups to AC loads. l The current limiting battery chargers are normally connected to their respective 250 volt DC distribution centers to maintain the charge on the batteries. The chargers are sized to recharge the battery or to carry the largest single DC load for l testing purposes. Power to the battery chargers is from their respective Essential Non-Safety Auxiliary Power System.
Amendment E 8.3-27 December 30, 1988
CESSAR!anncm !
Alternate AC Source 125V DC Power System 9
8.3.2.1.1.4 The 125 VDC power system for the onsite AAC consists of a local 125 VDC battery, battery charger and distribution panel as shown on Figure 8.3.2-1. This system is designed to supply the DC power necessary to start and operate the AAC. The battery charger is powered from a non-safety 480V AC MCC.
8.3.2.1.2 Class 1E DC Power Systems 8.3.2.1.2.1 125V DC and 120V AC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System The 125V DC and 120V AC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power system provides a reliable, continuous source of power to Class 1E instrumentation and controls. The system consists of four independent and physically separated load groups that supply instrumentation and control channels A, B, C, and D. Each load group includes a battery, a battery charger, a DC distribution center and associated DC panelboard, an inverter, and an AC panelboard. Each instrumentation bus is powered from a separate battery to provide stable and noise free power to its respective control channel. This system is shown on Figure 8.3.2-2.
1 The Divisions I and II each also include an additional battery, battery charger, DC distribution center, and associated DC panelboard, inverter and AC panel board for their respective Divisions and switchgear controls and indication.
The 125V DC and 120V AC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power E system is a seismic Category 1 system and is located in the Control Building. The 125 volt batteries are located in their separate respective channelized rooms within the Control Building. The vital instrumentation and control f.awer system is an ungrounded system. Refer to Tables 8. 3.2-3 and 8.3.2-4 for typical AC and DC vital buses loads.
8.3.2.1.2.1.1 135V DC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power Dattery Chargers Each load group of the 125V DC Vital Instrumentation and l Control Power System is provided with a separate and !
independent 125 volt battery charger. The battery chargers of load group channels A and C are powered from Division I of the ,
Class 1E Safety Auxiliary Power System. The chargers of load group channels B and D are powered from Division II. Each charger is capable of supplying the steady-state loads of its !
own load group while recharging its associated battery.
O.
Amendment E 8.3-28 December 30, 1988
________ - ____-__________ _________ ________ ___ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . l
m .
CESSARSina m,.
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/ l' Each battery charger normally supplies the loads of its associated distribution center while maintaining a float charge on its associated battery. The battery chargers are designed to prevent a battery from discharging back into any internal charger load in the event of a charger malfunction or AC power supply failure.
Should a battery be removed from service, either the normal charger associated with the isolated battery or a bus tie to one of the other DC buses in the same Division can be closed such that the two inter-tied channels would have one battery and two chargers in operation.
Each charger can recharge its associated battery, assuming the battery was discharged for one hour, in approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> while also supplying worst case steady-state loads.
Each battery charger is provided with an overvoltage sensing circuit.
The Class 1E DC loads have an operating voltage range of 105 to 140 volts. The minimum battery discharge voltage is 105V DC.
O 8.3.2.1.2.1.2 125V DC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power Batteries !
Each of the independent load group channels and divisions of 125 Volt DC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power is provided with a separate and independent 125 volt battery.
Each battery is sized to supply the continuous emergency load of its own load group for a period of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. In addition, the batteries provide a SB0 coping capability which, assuming manual load shedding or the use of load management programs, exceeds 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and, as a minimum, permits operating the instrumentation and control loads associated with the .
turbine-driven emergency feedwater pumps for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
8.3.2.1.2.1.3 125V DC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power Distribution Centers and Panelboards A 125 volt DC distribution center is provided for each of the 125V DC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System load groups. Each distribution center supplies an independent channel of vital instrumentation and control, and is powered directly from an independent 125 volt battery and battery charger. Each of the distribution centers supplies one DC panelboard and one 125V DC -
120V AC static inverter. Each
/N Division I and II distribution center also powers its d respective emergency diesel generator.
1 Amendment E !
l 8.3-29 December 30, 1988 l l
CESSARnnLmu O
8.3.2.1.2.1.4 120V AC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System The 120V AC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System consists of four separate and independent 120 volt AC power panclboards, each powered from a 125 volt DC load group distribution center via a 125V DC -
120V AC static inverter.
This power supply system is designed to provide an output frequency of 60 10.5 Hz and voltage regulation to within 12% at full rated load. Each 120 volt AC power panelboard supplies one channel of AC vital instrumentation and controls. A manual make-before-break bypass switch is provided to bypass the inverter for maintenance. The 120V AC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System is shown in Figure 8.3.2-2.
The channelized portion of the AC vital instrumentation and control power system is an ungrounded system.
8.3.2.1.2.1.5 125V DC and 120V AC Vital Instrumentation and control Power System Status Information The following parameters or status points are monitored in the control room for the 125 volt DC and 120 volt AC Vital I&C power systems:
A. Battery charger output voltage low. E B. Battery charger output voltage high.
C. Loss of AC input to battery charger.
D. Battery charger output circuit breaker open. ,
E. Distribution center main circuit breaker open. i F. Battery circuit breaker open.
G. Vital distribution center tie breaker closed.
H. VitL1 123 volt DC panelboard undervoltage.
I. Battery positive or negative leg ground.
J. Battery undervoltage.
K. Inverter 125 volt DC input failure.
L. Inverter AC output voltage low.
O Amendment E 8.3-30 December 30, 1988
~
3 CESSARinancm.
) M. Inverte manual bypass switch in alternate source positi h N. Inverter alternate source abnormal _(voltage or frequency).
O. 120 volt AC inverter panelboard undervoltage.
.P. Static inverter manual bypass switch position. l l
Q. 120 volt AC regulated distribution center breaker status.
y '
8.3.2.1.2.2 Testing 8.3.2.1.2.2.1 Reoperation Tests Preoperational testing of the Class 1E DC systems is performed y in accordance.with the recommendations of Regulatory Gui~de 1.41 to verify proper . design, installation and operation. Testing of panelboard circuit. breakers and all circuit breakers associated with the 120 volt regulated AC power system consists i of operating the breakers to assure proper functioning. System !
voltage levels are verified and, in the 120 volt AC system, the capability to perform manual transfers from the inverters and-regulated power supply is demonstrated.
DC loads are verified to be in accordance with battery sizing i assumptions. The battery capacity is verified by a discharge ]
l performance test in accordance with IEEE Standard 450-1980. !
l Operability of vital loads is verified at reduced system voltage. E
~
Proper installation and operability of the Class 1E DC systems
- is demonstrated by verifying proper breaker operation,_ voltage levels and transfer schemes to alternate sources.
8.3.2.1.2.2.2 Periodic Tests Inspection, maintenance, and testing of Class 1E DC. systems are performed on a periodic testing program in accordance'with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.22. The periodic testing program is scheduled so as not to interfere with unit operation. Where tests do not interfere with unit operation, system and equipment' tests may be scheduled with the nuclear unit in operation, i
O I
, Amendment E l 8.3-31 December 30, 1988 ;
1
CESSARHniN m O
The continuous operation of the vital instrumentation and control system inverters is indicative of their operability and functional performance since accident conditions do not substantially change their load. The means for manual transfer to the various power sources available to the 120 volt AC vital power system can be tested on a routine basis to assure their operation.
8.3.2.2 Analysis The 125V DC and 120V AC Vital Instrumentation and Control Power System are Class 1E systems and as such are designed to meet the requirements of General Design Criteria 17 and 18, and the intent of Regulatory Guides 1.6 and 1.32. Foz a discussion of additional Regulatory Guides and Industry Standards applied in the desiga of the Onsite DC Power System, refer to Section 8.1.4. Refer to Table 8.3.2-3 and 8.3.2-2 for a single failure analysis of these systems.
8.3.2.2.1 Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.32, I*EE Standards 308-1980 and 450-1980 The design of C *tss 1E DC power systems complies with the intent of the requirements of IEEE Standard 308-1980 as augmented by Regulatory Guide 1.32. The Class 1E batteries are given a service test at an interval not to exceed 18 months.
Additionally, the Class 1E battery performance and acceptance tests comply with the intent of IEEE Standard 450-1980.
8.3.2.2.2 Class 1E Equipment Qualification Requirements The seismic and environmental qualifications of Class 1E DC E power system equipment are discussed in Sections 3.10 and 3.11, '
respectively.
8.3.2.3 Physical Identification of Class 1E Erruipment The physical identification of the Class 1E DC systems equipment is discussed in Section 8.3.1.3.
8.3.2.4 Independence of Redundant Systems The independence of redundant Class 1E DC systems is discussed in Section 8.3.1.4.
O Amendment E 8.3-32 December 30, 1988
'CESSAR Enace.
' (A)
TABLE 8.3.2-1 i I
(Sheet 1 of 2) i FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR THE 125V DC CLASS 1E VITAL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWEi! SYSTEM Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences
(
1
- 1. 480V AC power Loss of power No consequences - power from supply to chargers to one battery is available to supply power without interruption.
- 2. Battery chargers Loss of power The 125 volt DC bus continues to from one receive power from its respective battery without interruption.
Severe internal faults may cause high short circuit currents to flow with the resulting voltage reduction on the 125 volt DC bus ,
until the fault is cleared by the l G isolating circuit breakers.
Complete loss of voltage on one 125 volt DC bus may result ir the battery circuit breakers open.
E
- 3. 125V DC batteries Loss of power Isolating circuit breaker from one manually opened to clear the Division or battery from the bus on a fault Channel condition thereby allowing the battery battery charger to continue supplying power to the connected loads.
i No safety significance - an independent division of 125V DC ,
is provided for the redundant diesel generator. An alarm in '
the control room alerts the operator of the malfunction.
- 4. 125V DC distribution P and N buses Power is lost to the centers shorted on one instrumentation and control Channel or Division serviced by the shorted distribution center.
Remaining redundant division j channels are available for the i
, s safe operation of the Unit. I
)
I Amendment E December 30, 1988 q J
1 CESSAR EnnncATION j l
O TABLE 8.3.2-1 (Cont'd) 1 l
(Sheet 2 of 2)
FAILURE MODES _AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR THE 125V DC CLASS 1E VITAL
. INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences
centers singie bus ungrounded electrical system. l Ground detector equipment !
monitors and alarms a ground ' l anywhere on the 125 volt DC l system. A single ground does not i cause any malfunction or prevent ;
f operat:on of any safety feature.
- 6. 125V DC distribution Gradual decay of The 125 volt bus is monitored to !
centers voltage on one detect the voltage decay on the ]
bus and initiate an alarm at a !
voltage setting where the battery l can still deliver power for safe and orderly shutdown of the unit. j Upon detection power can be (
restored either by correcting the ,
deficiency, by switching to a j redundant source. 1 4
E
- 7. DC distribution Cables shorted Same comment as 4. Also, all l centers incoming on one incoming feeder cables are l feeder cables provided with isolating circuit I breakers that isolate the i
" shorted" cable on a sustained fault condition.
- 8. 125V DC instru- Bus shorted Voltage on the shorted 125 volt mentation and DC bus system of the affected control power unit decays until isolated by the panelboards isolating circuit breakers.
Remaining redundant division ;
channels are available for the l safe operation of the Unit.
I l
O l Amendment E December 30, 1988 a-________-___________-_____-____-_-_______-
CESSAREaecam, !
O N i TABLE 8.3.2-2 i FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR THE 120V AC CLASS 1E VITAL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM Component Malfunction Comments & Consequences
- 1. 125V DC distribution P and N buses One static inverter is lost. The centers shorted on one loss of one vital instrument bus. I results in the temporary loss of.
one channel of reactor protection and engineered safety instrumentation systems. Other remaining channels receive vital instrument control power from the i other panelboards thus i maintaining safe operation of the i Unit.
- 2. Static inverter Failure Same as 1.
- 3. Static inverter Failure If alternate source in use, eq alternate regulated similar to 1.
Q 480/120V AC source l
- 4. Vital instruments- Failure on For any one bus failure, only one E tion and control one Division or Channel of any system power panelboards associated with reactor protective system or engineered safety features actuation system is lost. Sufficient redundant Channels or Divisions supplied from other vital instrument buses q provide adequate protection. J I
l l
l l
l l O Amendment E December 30, 1988 l
n CESSAR Ennncam.
O TABLE 8.3.2-3 I
TYPICAL CLASS 1E 120V AC VITAL I&C POWER SYSTEM LOADB Description Load Note (a) pivision I Power Distribution I&C 1 I
Emergency Lighting channel A Vital I&C Bus f i
Channel C Vital I&C Bus-l E i O Division II ,
Power Distribution I&C Emergency Lighting Channel B i I
Vital I&C Bus Channel D Vital I&C Bus 1
1 NOTE: (a) Site-specific l l
l l
V Amendment E December 30, 1988
CESSAR 8!!L"icur..
TABLE 8.3.2-4 TYPICAL CLASS 1E DC VITAL POWER SYSTEM LOADS Load on Bus (Amoeres)
Description 4 Hours 8 Hours Note (a)
Division I:
Power Distribution I&C Emergency Diesel Generator I&C Bus Total Channel A:
Vital I&C Bus Bus Total E l
l Channel C,: 1 Bus Total [LATER]
Division II:
Power Distribution I&C Emergency Diesel Generator I&C Bus Total Channel B:
Vital I&C Bus Bus Total Channel D:
Vital I&C Bus Bus Total NOTES: (a) Load for SBO conditions assuming manual load shedding or use of load management programs to achieve 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> use of turbine-driven emergency feedwater pumps.
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! O December 30, 1988 l
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TvPICAL class 1E DC AND AC Figure JM / -
INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL eOweR surety sysreus
.2.22
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C E S S A R n!Mncarieu i
A j U i 8.3.3 FIRE PROTECTION FOR CABLE SYSTEMS 1 E
Refer to Section 8.3.1.6 for fire protection details. .
- )
8.3.4 ONSITE POWER SYSTEM INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS 8.3.4.1 AC Power System E
The AC Power System is provided by the site operator and will be further discussed in the site-specific SAR. The following ;
interface requirements are imposed to ensure safety-related equipment is provided with adequate and appropriate power under -
all operating conditions. Figure' 8. 3.1-1 shows a typical power distribution for the AC system.
Interface Requirements A. Following a turbine or reactor trip, power shall be provided 4 to the auxiliary loads as specified in Tables 8.3.1-2, E 1 8.3.1-4, 8.3.2-3 and 8.3.2-4. f B. Standby, onsite power shall be provided by two or more independent standby generators. Each standby generator i 3 shall supply to one ESF Division. This insures that the !
loss of one standby generator would only affect one ESF .
train. These standby generators shall be de31gned to' attain !
ratedvoltageandspeedwithin20secondsfollowingeitheralL !
loss of offsite power to the ESF bus, or initiation of the ,
CSAS, SIAS, or EFAS of the ESFAS and begin sequential l loading within 40 seconds.
C. The design of automatic sequencing features for loading the ,
standby generators shall be consistent with the following ,
requirements: J
- 1. If the standby generators are the only source of power to the ESF bus when an ESFAS is generated the ESF loads ,
which are appropriate to the particular ESFAS shall be )
automatically sequenced on, see Table 8.3.1-4.
- 2. In the event that offsite power is unavailable and the standby generators are not yet up to rated voltage and speed at the time that an ESFAS is generated, be a delay of up to 20 seconds before the therecanlE generator output breakers close and power is supplied standby to the ESF buses. After the generators are supplying the ESF buses, the ESF loads which are appropriate to the particular ESFAS shall be automatically sequenced O on, see Table 8.3.1-4.
Amendment E 8.3-33 December 30, 1988 i
l CESSAR En9lCATl3N
~
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- 3. If a standby generator is supplying power to an ESF bus (offsite power not available) and appropriate ESF equipment is operating on that bus, the operating ESF l equipment shall not be shed if another ESFAS is j generated. The ESF loads associated with the second J ESFAS shall have no additional sequencing imposed but shall be sequenced if that is the normal way that the components are operated. ,
- 4. If offuite power is lost at some time after the standby generators are up to rated voltage and speed, and after 1 the required ESF equipment is running following one or !
more ESFAS, the following requirements shall be met:
- a. Interrupted ECCS flow to the core shall be reestablished within 20 seconds. fully l E q
- b. Interrupted emergency feedwater flow to the steam j generator (s) shall be fully reestablished j 20 seconds. withinlg ]
- 5. If offsite power is available and the standby generators are started on an ESFAS initiated by a plant i condition actually requiring operation of the ESF loads appropriate to the ESFAS, the standby generators shall be left running for a period of at least one hour.
- 6. If offsite power is the source of power to an emergency bus when an ESFAS is generated, the ESF loads which are appropriate to the particular ESFAS shall be started, either immediately or by sequencing, on the offsite powered emergency bus. See Table 8.3.1-4.
4 1
D. Four physically and electrically independent 120 volt, 60 l Hz, single phase, ungrounded vital instrument sources are i required to provide power to NSSS instrumentation used for l protection. The output frequency shall be 60 0.5 Hz and the output voltage shall be regulated to within 2% at full output for a load power factor greater than 0.8 (towards unity).
E. The Engineered Safety Features electric system shall be designed on a two independent Division basis. EachDivisionlE shall be capable of furnishing power to equipment load groups of the ESF Systems. The ESF buses and associated cabling shall be physically separated and electrically isolated to allow for redundancy.
O Amendment E 8.3-34 December 30, 1988
1 CESSAR !!nhum O The consequences of frequency decays of up to 3 Hz/sec (with F.
bus voltage at its normal value and with all RCPs connected to their buses) on the Reactor Coolant Pump buses are not ~!
more severe than the consequences of loss of flow of the four RCPs due to loss of power. The site operator's RCP buses, therefore, shall not subject the RCPs to sustained -lE l frequency decays of greater than 3 Hz/sec. 3 G. The vital instrument buses shall be designed such that thelE maximum voltage fault shall not exceed 480 VAC + 10% or 325 j VDC + 10%. This maximum fault would remove the i channel from service. faulted lE H. Cabling shall meet the requirements specified in Sections 7.1.3, 7.2.3, and 7.3.3 for separation and independence so that no credible fault in one channel can be propagated.
8.3.4.2 DC Power System ,
The DC Power System is supplied by the site operator. ThelE following interface requirements are imposed to ensure !
safety-related equipment is provided with adequate and !
appropriate power under all operating conditions.
(Q/ Interface Requirements
'i A. The de power supplied shall be 125 volts with maximum limits of 105 volts to 140 volts.
B. Four vital buses, one for each safety channel, shall be supplied. Each shall have a battery and charger separate .
and independent from the other safety channel batteries and [
chargers. I i
C. Each battery shall be capable of supporting the dc loads f l until ac power is restored, from the standby power supply. j s
D. Non-safety loads shall not degrade the vital supplies.
1 and E. The de supplies shall meet the same seismic environmental requirements as the loads they supply, consistent with their location in the facility.
F. Maximum credible fault voltage applied to the distribution system shall be 480 Vac. This maximum fault would remove the faulted channel from service.
E l Amendment E l 8.3-35 December 30, 1988 I
l mrzhl 6
, STANDARD DESIGN l X
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CESSAR !!!n",cy,o, O
Volume 9 consusnon)susimmunius
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