ML20096F727
| ML20096F727 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200002 |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1992 |
| From: | ABB ATOM, INC. (FORMERLY ASEA ATOM, INC.) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20096F454 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9205220008 | |
| Download: ML20096F727 (77) | |
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DLil247.WP-1 NUPLEX 80+ HUMAN FACTORS DESIGN PROCESS
SUMMARY
PREPARED BY ABB-CE NUCLEAR POWER MAY 8, 1992 A PDR
DLH247.WP 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS E192 PURPOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 BACKGROUNO .............................. 4 REFERENCES .............................. 6 NUPLEX 80+ DESIGN PROCESS REVIEW ................... 7 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 APPENDICES APPENDIX A - THE EVOLUTIONARY BASIS OF NUPLEX 80+
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- L, .i DLH247.WP-3 PURPOSE The' purpose of this document is to define the human factors engineering (HFE) ;
components of the Nuplex 80+ design process, to date, in relatlon to the contents of the Draft Human Factors Review Criteria elements (Reference 1). Since ABB CE agrees with the NRC Staff (herein referred to as "the Staff") on the overall goals of a process to incorporate human factors into the design product, the intent here is to identify the differences (i.e., ' deltas") between the ABB CE approach and that embodied in Reference 1. This is being done to fccilitate Staff review of the System 80+ design features that are the products of the ABB CE process.
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DLH247.WP 4 BACKGROUBQ !
l ABB CE submitted CESSAR DC Chapter 18 for staff review in December 1988.
Chapter 18 contained mostly information relating to the design of the Nuplex 80+
control room and man mechine interface features (the product), along with a lesser amount of in!crma'Jon on the design process. However, up to this point. the Staff review (as re'iccted in the RAis) has focused primarily on the design process, with
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little emphasis on the design product. In an April 9,1992 meeting, ABB CE requested !
that the Staff also review the MMI design features (as defined in a subsequent letter to l the NRC.) Staff reviewers have indicated that they cannot complete their review of the design features from a Human Factors Engineering (HFE) standpoint because they cannot determine that the design process to this point has been acceptable.
The NRC Staff's current basis for an acceptable design process for an advanced nuclear power plant is embodied in the Draft Human Factors Review Criteria Report (Reference 1). Reference 1 identifies eight elements of an HFE program (see Figure 1), and defines Design Acceptance Criteria (DAC) in terms of various criteria on the i program (rather than on the resulting design itself).
Reference 1 was provided to ABB CE in April 1992; but the Nuplex 80+ Design was begun in 1987. ABB-CE and the Staff are in agreement that it is impractical to repeat or reorganize the previous five years of design activity, ex post facto, to correspond to a subsequent approach. However, ABB-CE believes that its own design process has thus far achieved the necessary and verifiable goals of an adequate HFE program, including the performance of many activities that typify the Reference 1 Elements (e.g.,
task analysis). More importantly, ABB CE believes that its own design process has produced an adequate design product in Nuplex 80+. Finally, ABB-CE believes that some portions of the Reference 1 approach are inappropriate for evolutionary design,
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Dl.H247.WP-5 and would lead to a less conservative product, in a less cost effective manner, thun the approach cmployed by ABB CE for Nuplex 80+.
This last point is of key importance, since the Staff and ABB CE ogree that most of the problematic deltas between the Reference 1 process regulroments and the ABB-CE procesc to date reflect different views of the evolutionary / revolutionary status of the Nuplex 80+ design. ABB CE believes that both the System 80+ plant and Nuplex 80+ control room are evolutionary upgrades of successful designs; the modest changes from the existing designs have been made to solve specific, existing problems, and reflect lessons learned from operating experience (not hypothesized from analysis). The Staff concurs that System 80+ is an evolutionary design from the System 80 plants. However, the Staff views the Nuplex 80+ control room as a completely new design which warrants extensive design studies and analyses before an adequate MMI can be developed. Appendix A identifies the basis for ABB CE's position that Nuplex 80+ is an incremental and modest step from previous generation control room designs.
The purpose of the present document is to summarize the HFE activities within the ABB-CE d;:Ign process up to the present time with respect to each of the Reference 1 Elements (resolution of the future process will be conducted as part of the human factors ITAAC/DAC for ABB-CE.) This process has produced the present Nuplex 80+
features (MCR Configuration, Integrated Process Status Overview, standard MMI features, and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) panel) for which ABB CE is requesting Staff review. This report also identifies significant differences between the Reference 1 and the ABB-CE processes, to facilitate their resolution, so that Staff review of the design product may proceed, in this regard, it is ABB CE's position that deficiencies in the past process are moot points if they do not result in irremediable deficiencies in the design product itself, or in our future ability to verify and validate it.
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Element A. Human Factors Engineering Program Management
- Hi E program Manepoment han F
Element D . Operating Experience F4eview e impemersaten Man
- Nuysis NeuPts Reptet e HFE Deshn Team Ivaluatkwi Report 1P Element C . Development ed System Fenettonat Hoquitwnenta e impementation Man
- Aruhais Navas Resxwt
- HFE Design Team Evalua'en Nport 1f Element D. AlloceGon of Ft.netione
+ implementa1hn f%n !
+ Aru# sis Nsutis Npwt
- l4FE Doingn Team Evtluaton Nport i
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Element E. Taek Analyste e trnpomentatum P(;ei
- kwilysis Nsut? Report e HFE Dessen Team Evalualun Regett i
V U Eternent F . HSI Design Element G . Procedure Developtnent
- Imp 6amersateon Plan m m e implementation Man
- Anaff sis Results Nport
- Anatple Resuts Nport
+ HFE Design Taarn Evstuaikwi Report + HFE Design loam Evaluation ikgort k
Element H . HF Verification and Validation e implemereation han
. Analysis Resuas Fhport e HFE Design Team Evaluation Nport i
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- i. woonnie Einineras Figure 1. HFE Elements (orart 4/17/92)
Oraft Review Criteria Report (April 21, 1992) Page 6
I DLH247.WP+6 REFERENCE _S (1) ' Interim Human Factors Review Criteria for the Design Process of an Advanced Nuclear Power Reactor," Brookhaven National Laboratory, April 21,1992.
(2)
- Description of the Human Factors Program Plan for the System 80+ Standard Plant Design,' P. M. Simon, February 1992.
(3) EPRI Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Utility Requirements Document (URD),1989.
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DU1247 WP-7 NUPLEX 80+ DEJ_lGN PROCESS REVIEW l
ELEMENT A - HFE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT !
DescrheyJ The human factors engineering (HFE) efforts performod during the Muplex 30+ design process have been an integrated part of the overall advanced control complex design process. Human factors specialists were part of the design team, and also served as independent reviewers, but were not organized as a separate human factors entity.
This was consistent with the presence and organization of other disciplines in design team activities, and permitted HFE to interact effectively with other design team members. The multi-disciplinary design team assembled for Nuplex 80+ consisted of members having the expertise identified in Element A of Reference 1.
The overall Nuplex 80+ man-machine interface (MMI) design process, with integral HFE elements, was defined in CESSAR-DC. In response to RAI 620.1, a dedicated human factors program plan description was written describing the HFE activities performed to date and defining future HFE activities with their schedule relative to the
- overall System 80+ schedule (Reference 2). In response to RAI 620.3, a dediuated method for tracking HFE issues is being implemented based on a project wide open issues tracking system. Thase issues thus have received a commitment for resolution.
Deslan Process / Criteria Differences The referenced RAls are taken to represent Element A deltas whose resolution is in progress.
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OLH247 WP-8 IJnresoked deltas include criteria requiring the design team to afford special or Superordinate status to the HFE discipline in terms of 1) dominance of the design team focus (Criterion 6),2) ' freedom from cost and schedule considerations,"
(Criterion 5), and 3) specialized stop work mechanisms without clear connection to program safety or quality requirements (Criterion 4).
ABB-CE views HFE as a discipline on a par with other design team discipihes. Thus, HFE is subject to similar cost, schedule, and tradeoff constraints, and has available to it the same stop work mechanisms as other project disciplines (through Nuclear Systems Quality Assurance) to protect the health and safety of the public, Remaining deltas are limited to relatively minor issues related to the contents of program plan description (Reference 2).
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DLH247.WP-9 ELEMENT B - OPERATING EXPERIENCI! REVIEW Descriotion Operating experience from existing nuclear plants, including System 80 control rooms, has been factored into the Nuplex 80+ design. This has been accomplished primarily by using existing nuclear industry reporte and studies to define tne design bases for the advanced control complex which, in turn, have been used to direct the design.
The design bases clearly define the past industry problems for which Nuplex 60+ is expected to provide on acceptable MMI design.
A major veh%le used to incorporate operating experience into Nuplex 80+ has been
. the EPRI ALWR URD (Reference 3) which contains requirements developed by the nuclear industry specifically to solve MMI concerns with existing plants. Other sources of operating plant problems included reviews of LERs, DCRDR reports, and INPO's Significant Operating Event Reports. Industry studies performed by NRC (NUREGs),
tEPRI (nuclear power reports) and the OECD Halden Reactor Project were also used to identify concerns based on operating experience, in selected areas, such as alarm and annunciation problems, separate reports were generated for Nuplex 80+ to consolidate the information from Industry wide sources. Problems identified in other areas (e.g., via the Corrective Actions Program) were factored directly into the design bases for Nuplex 80+.
As one evolutionary espect of the Nuplex 80+ design, operating experience is implicitly incorporated through the use of mature MMI designs that have been through iterations of implementation and upgrade in existing plants. For_ example, the Critical Function Monitoring Systems (CFMS) is in use at four existing ABB CE plants, and has received few changes for its application in Nuplex 804
DLH247.WP 10 Another important source of operating experience is the use of licensed operators on both the design and design review teams, both at ABB CE and at Duke Engineering Services, a subcontractor. Finally, the Executive Advisory Board brings industry l operating concerns to the attention of the project.
Deslan Process / Criteria Differenegg ABB-CE believes that sufficient operating experience information has boon incorporated into the Nuplex 80+ design using existing Industry sources, mature design concepts, and experienced designers, operators, and reviewers. A single stand alone effort performing and documenting the review of operating experience has not been performed, nor is it deemed necessary. However, ABB CE has clearly documented the design bases for Nuplex 80+ in general and for each MMI element of the design to track resolution of identified concerns.
The most significant difference with Reference 1 is the lack of formality of ABB CE efforts. However, ABB CE has documented its
- boiler room' meetings in which past problems were identified, and Nuplex 80+ solutions were developed. This process was similar to that utilized in development of Reference 3, tand is an accepted raethod of integrating expert knowledge and decision-making.
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- i ELEM.ENT C - SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL RriQQlBEMENISM]ALYSIS l
.DECf 'QD System 80+ is a design evolved from the System 80 standard plant design with few changes to the system requirements and system functions. Existing plant operating functions are sufficiently developed and well understood. Refinement to, rather than complete reassessment of operating functions was appropriate and resulted in few identified impacts. The System 80+ function and task analysis was used to organize functions without extensive system functional requirements analysis as would be expected for a new plant design.
Simitarly, the Nupler. 30+ control room is an evolutionary step from the previous generation System 80 plant control rooms (the Nuplex 80 control room was not a baseline, but only a hypothetical point of departure for considering t,olutions to probleme Mentified with the baseline conventional control room.) Each Nuplex 80+
MMI meets the same or similar system and functional requirements as their predecessor MMI implementations in conventional plants (baseline functional MMI requirements are indication and control Availabihty data based on Palo Verde instrument lim and the SONGS 2 & 3 Instrument and Controls Characteristics Review.) For example, the Nuplex 80+ alarms perform the same operating functions of alerting, gulding, informing and confirming as conventional annunciators. Operator functions interacting with process End component controls is likewise similar to conventional plant implementations. This is true for each of the Nuplex 80+ MMI features (see Aopendix A).
What has changed is the detailed interface design and the underlying l&C technology used to implement these functional MMI requirements. However, even at this l
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OLH247.WP 12 underlying level (which is not the issue here, under Element C), only proven technology that has previously been used in nuclear control rooms has been utilized.
Of significant importance to safety, the existing critical function and success path approach for safety monitoring in CE plants has been implemented in Nuplex 8^+ as an integrated part of the interface. The Nuplex 80+ functions will be validated as part !
of the human factors Verification i.m.i Validation activities describe in the Humar, ;
Factors Program Plan (Reference 2).
Desion Process /Cnteria Differeneta ABB-CE and NRC staff agree that the System 80+ plant is an evolutionary design from System 80 and, therefore, the need for extensive functional analysis does not exist for plant functions. ABB CE considers the Nuplex 80+ control room design to J be similarly evolutionary in nature and, thus, also does not require extensive functional reassessment. However, the Staff reviewers perceive Nuplex B0+ to be a completely new declgn which warrants extensive functional re analysis accorriing to the criteria of +
Element C in Reference 1, before an adequate MMI can be developed.
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l DLli247.WP 13 ELEMENT D - AI,t.OCATION OF FUNQIJQN Descriotio.0, As described in the description of Element C, the functions for the System 80+ plant ,
and Nuplex 80+ control room have not changed extensively from previous generation plants. As operating experience has dictated in existing plants, the assignment of functions to personnel, machines or a combination of the two has been changed to address specific problems (e.g., low power feedwater control has been automated). A similar function c! location philosophy has been applied to th's evolutionary design.
Changos from the previous generation (System 80) were made only to address identified problems.
After review of operating experience from a function allocation perspective, only two r
functions have been automated. These are automatic load dispatching and automatic margin preservation. The resulting function allocation (prim # . ichanged from
- existing plants) will be validated as part of the verification and vandation activities.
This approach to allocating functions is conservative and appropriate for an evolutionary design. It has resulted in no substantial change to the control rcom operators role or function between baseline System 80 plants and System 80+.
Substantial changes to the existing allocation based on a theoretical analysis would plausibly have led to more problems than they solved (particularly since few problems resembling allocation issues have been loentified) and would certainly have required extensive validation. To minimize such risk, and to maintain an acceptable function allocation in System'80+, the ABB-CE approach was to change only problem areas.
This is explicitly an evolutionary approach. Note that there are virtually no changes in RCS Indication and control functions, reflecting the maturity of the baseline design.
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Also, in the wake of these design dec!slons, there have been no specific problems j surfaced in review of these allocation decisions. ABB CE feels that this reflects the
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soundness and adequacy of thesy allocations. .,
Deslan Process / Criteria Difference ABB-CE has maintained the existing function allocation of the System 80 plant and its conventional control room with char 4es only to address identified problem areas, as !
~ appropriate for an evolutionary design that reflects nearly'100 reactor operating years :
a of experience, it is unclear that making formal analyses the basis for allocation would. (
- have added significant value to this approach, (and one should probably question any -
analysis whose results contradicted such an experienn base) but it would have added j some costs _ and liabilities to an otherwise evolutionary design process. Nonetheless,
, the DAC in Element D of Reference 1 requi res af ormalfunct on i a locat l on i ana lysis w ith
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DLH247;WP-15 ELEMENT U - TASK ANALYSIS
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DescriotiOD A top-down preliminarv task snah/sla has been performed for RCS related functions and tasks as part of the RCS panel design procen. This analys!s was based on an accepted function and task analysis methodology used for DCRDRs in existing CE plantt. It identified task (i.e., information and controls) requirements for the RCD and evaluated the 5cceptability of operator task loading based on time response requirements for limiting events, with minimum stoftnig. This was sufficient to support panel design activities, and will be repeated for subsequent panels. Because of the evolutionary nature of the System 80+ plant, the analysis relied heavily on existing task analysis results for function and controls requirements. The task analysis analyzed event sequences for accidents (e.g., LOCA, SGTR), normal operations (e.g.,
steady state power, start up) and abnormal operations.
The results of the task anaiysis were used to develop the RCS panel MMI and layout and in an availability verification b ensure the accessibility of necessary indications and controls.
" Critical' talk analv;'s 5 defined by and limited to analysis of human tasks by HRA methods that have M .dentified by PRA to have a significant effect on plant safety.
However, nc such critical tasks have yet been identified.
Further analysis and confirmation of tasks will be performed as part of the Validation process using a control room prototype, when the design is at or near completion.
This will allow more appropriate analyses of Interactive tasks associated with communication had workplace factors than could be performed through formal paper
DLH247.WP-16 analyses. Performance with limiting staff sizes (both minimum and maximum) will be validated at this time. Also at this ticae, detailed task analysis shall be performed as a documenting mechanism, resulting in Availability data in the form of instrumentation and Controls Characteristics Review (ICCR) data.
DesirqProcess/ Criteria Difference ABB-CE considers the preliminary task analysis methodology to be appropriate for the purpose to which it has been applied, including support for the design of features which the Staff has been requested to review. The same analysis will be performed for subsequent panels. Element E of Reference 1 requires formai identification of critical tasks; this will be performed in the context of PRA (and then fed to the design, as analysis deems issues significant) rather than control room design, per se, N NRC staff has questioned why separate task analyses were not performed for
. ous crew sizes. This is felt to be an issue of methods, not goals; however, it is rc'ed that iv k analysis of maximum staffing would have afforded no useful infc mation in the context of the present analysis. Also, there are likely some staff concerns related to the depth of the analysis for identified tasks and assumptions made in limiting the scope of the analysis.
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DLH247.WP 17 ELEMENT F - HUMAN SYJ_T_EM INTERFACE DESIGN
_D_Q2priptin The Nuplex 80+ man machine interface has been developed incorporating accepted principles arid guidelines from the HFE literature. High lovel design bases were developed for the control room as a whole, and certain generic man-machine interface features. Low level or elemental human factors criteria were obtained from standard human factors reference sources. These elemental criteria have since been consofidated into an HFE Standards and Guidelines document which defines specific criteda selections for Nuplex 80+.
Preliminary designs for these features were then developed by the design team; this included significant involvement of human factors specialists, as well as the incorporation (by the full design team) of the HFE Standards and Guidelines. The preliminary design activity included an exhaustive effort to resolve misfit allocations to Interface devices which existed in previous generation designs. For example, operator aids and status information were removed from alarm tiles and provided through a CRT interface. The resulting desigra were then reviewed by a multi-disciplinary team which included human factors specialists and licensed operators.
- A design document was generated specifying the preliminary standard design for each MMI feature. Once matured these standard interfaces are used to design all Nuplex 80+ panels. Each preliminary design 'aature was prototyped using the RCS panelinformation and controts as a demonstration application. Each prototype was made sufficiently dynamic so that interactve operations could be performed with the prototype. The prototypes were evaluated via a suitability verification using human factors and operations expertise. This waluation determined the interface acceptability
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DI.H247.W-18 for supporting intended user tasks. Significant feedback to the designs was provided, resulting in mature designs to be used as design standards for all panels within Nuplex 80+. These designs were documented in project documentation and CESSAR DC, and are the features that ABB-CE is requesting the NRC staff to review.
_Deslan Proegis/ Criteria Differences The ABB-CE process for the design of the man-machine interfaces meets most of the criteria in the draft review criteria report for Element F. The HFE Standards and Guidelines Document has only appeared in draft form but will be available for formal Staff review, along with its basis docurnent.
Staff concerns exist regarding the formality of documentation early in the design process; a desire has at times been expressed to review ABB CE's unselected design alternatives. ABB-CE does not consider this necessary for reviewing the adequacy of the design submittal.
There is concern that not all documentation is up-to-date; ABB CE is committed to providing this where needed.
The possible Staff concern for a lack of specification of human task performance require mnts is felt by ABB-CE to be an issue of methodological approach and detail, but should not result in any inadequacy in the design features being reviewed.
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1 OLH247.WP-19 ELEMENT G - PLANT AND EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE.pEVELOPMENT Element G is being addiessed by Building Block 7 of the NPOC Strategic Plan. It has not been addressed by the Nuplex 80+ design process, to date.
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DLH247.WP-20 ELEMENT H - HUMAN FACTORS VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION Descriotion .
To date, the HF Verification and Validation activities have focused on verification of the RCS panelinterfaces and IPSO. An Availability Analysis was performed to d0termine if all necessary information and controls identified in the task analysis were available.
The Availability Anslysis also mapped the resultant RCS panelinformation and controls to functional groups identi'ied in the task analysis to assure that no unnecessary information or controls were present.
A Suitability Analysis was performed on dynamic prototypes of all MMI features to verify their capability to support the performance of specific tasks intended for the feature. It evaluated both the adequacy and appropriateness of the features design selections. A formal Verification Analysis report documented the Availability and Suitability results, recommendations and design team resolutiors.
No Validation activities have been performed, to date, because Validation is appropriate for the entire control room ensemble. Validation of the entire Nuplex 80+
control room is planned using an integration test facility consisting of fully dynamic MMI features driven by simulation models. Plans for continued verification activities and eventual validation activities are developed and documented.
Desian Process / Criteria Differences ABB-CE believes that there are no significant differences between the draft review criteria and the implementation of the Verification (and Validation) activities, to date.
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DLH247.WP-21 CONCI.USION This document has described the design process used, to date, to develop the Nuplex 80+ MMI features for which ABB-CE is requesting NRC Staff review. It has also identified the major differences between this process and the Draft Human Factors Review Criteria by which the design process, and by extension, the design, is being evaluated. The major source of these differences is ABB-CE's perception that Nupiex 80+ is a modest evolutionary' step in centrol room implementation that is properly grounded in operating experience, versus the NRC Staff's perception that Nuplex 80+
is a completely new control room design that should be grounded in more extensive thecretical analyses.
Even in light of these differences, it is ABB-CE's belief that review of the design features and their development process can proceed. Nonetheless, there must be some consideration given by such a review process for the use of alternate approaches to the design process which, though not strictly matching the criteria specified in Reference 1, are technically justifiable, and more importantly, can produce
( a viable product.
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DLH248.WP - 1 APPENDIX A THE EVOLUTIONARY BASIS OF NVPLEX 80+
A fundaniental principle of the Nuplex 80+ advanced control complex is its evoluttor.ary nature with respect to previous generations of control rocm technology. A decision was made early in the design process to make changes to existing man-machine intarface (MMI) features and their integration only where problems existed. The result of this premise was a relatively small step in design advancement primarily to use advances in technology to solve
- the existing problems. The fact that Nuplex 80+ was purposely evolved from an existing, proven generation of control room and MMI designs having extensive operating experience has had a significant impact on the design process used to develop the control room and its man-machine interfaces. The design approach has relied heavily on operating experience input and design review to make improvements to similar existing designs. An emphasis has then been placed on verification and validation to demonstrate acceptability of the resulting design.
This Appendix identifies the basis for ABB-CE's position that the Nuplex 80+
control room and the MMI features embodied therein are, in fact, modest and incremental steps from previous generation designs.
The Nuplex 80+ control room represents an advancement in instrumentation and control implementation of the existing MMI functions that are presently used
.in System 80 plants. This includes only minimal changes to the plant operating philosophy due to the close correlation of System 80+ to its predecessor plant design System 80 and the conservative application of functional changes. The control room operator's role has not changed in that the changes to operational functions and tasks are minimal and operational support information (e.g., procedures, technical specifications) is essentially the same as that employed in previous generation plants. In addition, the inventory and availability of plant indicating and control
DLH248.WP fune,tions has changed little as is evidenced by comparing the Nuplex 80+ RCS panel prototype to the System 80 RCS panel interfaces.
The remainder of this Appendix compares the Nuplex B0+ main control room (MCR) configuration and MMI features to their corresponding previous generation designs to demonstrate their evolutionary naturo, d
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DLH248.h'P - 3 Main Control Room Confiuuration Control room panels in previous generation nuclear plants are typically
. dedicated to plant systems with one or two systems per panel arranged in appropriate functional groups. The Nuplex 80+ design makes use of this same approach, assigning system related indications and controls to desianated panels. The footprint fer previous ger.eration control rooms typialty separates freq'sently used system panels (e.g., CVCS) from those that are infrequently used (e.g., ESF panels). Nuplex 80+ has evolved this concept into separate consoles for normal cperations, safety operations and auxiliary operations. Pane 1' profiles used for Nuplex 80+ are similar to those of many previous generation control roc ns with minor changes to accommodate the
- pecific interface hardware, v'eving requirements and the anthropometric
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assumptions made (e.c, Nuplex A0+ is designed for the 5th percentile female).
The location and design of the control room supervisor's console is :imilar to that used in existing control rooms.
The Nuplex 80+ controlling workspace is designed to accommodate operating staff complements equivalent to those in currently operating plants per requirements in the EPRI ALWR VRD. Also equal to current plants, the division of work among operators is by plant systems with fur. tion coordination by the control room supervisor. In Huplex 80+ the addition of all plant information available at every panel minimizcs unnecessary covement and miscommunication 1
among personnel.
l The addition of control room offices in Nuplex 80+ is an improvement to accommodate the interaction of control room staff with non-operating personnel without impacting operations at the panels. This has only an ir.cremental but beneficial impact on plant operations in tne controlling workspace.
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v-DLH248.WP - 4 Intearated Process Status Overview
-The Nuplex 80+ IPSO,directly addrr, ' the EPRI ALWR URD requirements relating to provision of an integrating-display and mimic. The_ purpose of this display is to provide a spatially dedicated, continuously viewable presentation of aggregate plant function status .information. This is similar to and an
. extension-of the~ spatially dedicated information presented in conventional -
control rooms- for bypassed and inoperable status (RG 1.47) and critica15 safety
- functions _(NUREG-0696). - For IPSO, as;in these conventional applications, raw data _ is processed into useful overview information.
The Nuplex 80+ IPS0 concept evolved-from the critical function and success path methodology used- as a basis for: existing Emergency Operating Procedures I
(EOPs),-based on CEN-152, and Safety Parameter Olsplay Systems-(SPOS). This methodologyLis evidenced in the SONGS 2?and 3 E0P and Critical Function Monitoring System (CFMS). The critical function and success path approach lhas -
long been ' accepted in the nuclear industry and extensively applied irr ABB-CE a plants.-
. The IPS0 display has~ evolved- from top level SPDS displays which consolidate-
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the derived status of critical functions and success paths: for integrated-presentation 1to the operator. The large panel implementation of IPS0 in
- Nuplex~ 80+ has evolved from=a similar design lin use at the Borsselle plant in the Netherlands? In-addition to-the operating experience acquired from Borsse11e,:!PSO' received' positive ' evaluation results1from the OECD Halden
- Reactor Project for its effectiveness ir, supporting operations. The primary
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difference between previous generation IPS0s and that in Nuplex 80+ are-implementation details specific to .the System 80+ plant and hardware implementation using rear screen- projection technology. This remains" consistent;with.the evolutionary nature of the design, i
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DLH248.WP - 5 AlarmTiles The Nuplex 80+ alarm tiles .are an evolutionary step from previous generation control room alarm tile designs. The Nuplex 80+ alarms tiles provide the same basic operational functions (to alert, inform, guide and confirm feedback) as do existing alarm tiles. The Nuplex 80+ tiles are functionally grouped in a matrix arrangement located at the top of control room panels in a similar manner to current designs. These alarm tile matrices have attributes which mimic conventional alarm tiles through a flat panel display implementation.
The changes incorporated into the Nuplex 80+ alarm tiles have been made to resolve identified problems with existing systems. These changes have been implemented without radically altering the presentation of alarms or the operator's interaction with them. The potential overload of alarm information during high alarm activity conditions has been addressed by using alarm tiles only for alarms relating to significant operator action conditions (i.e., no status alarms), combining functionally similtr alarms into single tile presentations and signal validation. Validating data before alarm presentation ensures that alarms now will reliably indicate important process deviations not equipment failures. Upon acknowledgement, tiles representing <
grouped alarms automatically display messages identifying the specific alarm condition.- This is an evolutionary improvement from conventional plants where specific messages for grouped alarms were displayed through a separate plant computer display. Alarm tiles-are individually acknowledged in Nuplex 80+ by touching the tile touch-target on the flat panel display implementation. This change from a global acknowledgement button in previous geMration designs was
. made to assure that pertinent information was not lost oy common acknowledgemec.t of many alarms. Use of touch for interaction with video display units has previously been used acceptably in other HMI applications for nuclear plants (e.g., I&C system operator modules).
To allow the desired operational changes to be made the alarm tiles have been implemented through st,ftware based flat panel display technology rather than a
DLH248.WP - 6 light box matrix. The advancement in alarm display media technology has little effect on the MMI other than to facilitate the evolutionary functional changes previously discussed. A key benefit of flat panel technology implementations is the flexibility and ease of making future changes in the software enviornment rather than with previous generation hardware environments. Flat panel displays have been used extensively in the nuclear industry as operator modules, SPDS interfaces and local control and monitoring stations. It is likely that every currently operatirg nuclear control room makes use of similar flat panel displays. The Nuplex 80+ design also uses these for implementing discreto indicators and process contrc11ers.
9 l
1 l
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DLH248.WP - 7 Discrete indicators Discrete indicators are an improved aethod of displaying spatially dedicated parameter information in Nuplex 80+ without overloading the operator with all plant data available. Discrete indicators are designed to meet the same information and controls requirements as previous generation control rocn meters, trend recorders and digital indicators. The interface is designed to retain a critically useful aspect of previcus generation hardwired displays (i.e., spatial dedication) using flat panel display technology (discussed in the alarm section). The benefit of spatial dedication could be lost by blanket implementation of CRTs.
Extraneous spatially d dicated information has been eliminated by using data reduction techniques to generate synthesized process representation values.
Similar techniques have been used in generating representative Core Exit Thermocouple temperatures in Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring Systems (ICCMS) and synthesized neutron flux distributions in the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System. This methodology has only received wider use in Nuplex 80+.
Discrete indicators are also used to provide selectable access to a limited set of plant phrameters not requiring spatially dedication but required to be displayed on diverse technology from CRTs to meet comon mode failure criteria. Similar touch selectable applications of multiple parameter flat panel displays have been used in the ICCMS and in system operator modules in previous generation plants.
l 1
l l
DLH248.WP B CRT Displays Nuplex 80+ CRTs provide essentially the same operational functions as previous generation plant computer and SPDS CP,T interfaces. The primary change is enhanced integration of this interface into the MMI ensemble by having a single CRT to serve both purposes at each MCR panel. Previous generation control rooms typically have stand-alone locations for both SPDS and plant computer CRTs.
The CRT displays provided in Nuplex 80+ are directly evolved from previous generation. plant computer _ display sets and SPUS (i.e., the Critical Function Monitoring System) displays. Previous generation plant computers have all Nuplex 80+ display types implemented in a similar hierarchy and in like fashion. This includes graphic mimic displays, alarm lists, historical data storage and retrieval displays and hierarchy directories. Tha critical function hierarchy display set in Nuplex 80+ is identical to the previous generation CFMS hierarchy with changes only to accommodate plant tifferences and extension of the concept to power production functions, d
The Nuplex 80+ navigation method is based on touch, but similar in nature to cursor oriented techniques which use trackballs or keyboards. CRT touch screens hcve been used extensively and effectively in the fossil power industry.
The coding conventions used in CRT displays and throughout the control room interfaces are similar to those used in existing plant computer and SPDS applications. All of the coding methods (e.g., reverse video, flashing, color, etc.) have beer, used in previous ABB-CE conputer generated display applications. Though some unique coding meanings have been generated for Nuplex 80+, most are consistent with previous applications. CRT symbology has also been derived from previous computer $nerated display implementation.
- DLH248 WP - 9 Controls
'The implementation'of controls on Nuplex 80+ panels is nearly unchanged'from previous-generation control rooms. ' A _ combination of process control and spatially dedicated component control is afforded the same function allocation
-as exists for System 80. In addition, the availability requirements for
~
controls in Nuplex 80+ are the same as for previous generation System 80 control-rooms. Control-panel switches use the same momentary switch
- technologyf employed.in System 80 control rooms and on other. units. - The Nuplex-60+~ switch design is the same as the previous generation. Process control is
~
providedLthrough. fiat panel- displays which mimic previous generation manual /autostations. This interface allcws selection of. mode and inputs, setpoint selection and output control. ' This meets . control ' requirements defined by.the task analysis for a given function. The advantage of the flat-panel 4 implementation is that:it-allows master and subloop controls to be
-ir.tegrated on one functionally dedicated device'(e.g., pressurizer pressure control ~ integrated with spray and heater controls) instead of requiring.
E -. multiple devices, c
l i
e n
DLH248.WP - 10 Combination of Spatially Dedicated and Selectable MMI I
Nuplex 80+ uses a combination of selectable MMI devices (e.g., CRTs) and spatially dedicated MMI devices (e.g. alarm tiles). This approach is similar to that used in previous generation control rooms. In these control rooms the greatest portien of MMI are spatially dedicated devices, though this is changing as selectable backfit interfaces are being implemented. Nuplex 80+
likewise uses a mix of selectable and spatially dedicated MMI, but has evolved to make greater use of selectable displays. This allows operational needs to be met with les: panel real estate and greater operational flexibility.
Selectively n.aintaining the advantages of. spatially dedicated displays and controls allows important controls and information to be accessed without the burden of :earching through.less important devices. Nuplex 80+ uses the MMI mix in a cohesive, integrated manner which is not as readily achieved for backfit applications.
N -
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DLH248.WP - 11 Conclusion The Nuplex 80+ control room is a System 80+ implementation of nearly the same functional requirements as pre.vious generation plants using advances in technology to resolve identified problems. The plant operating philosophy, indication and control functions and operator's role have minimal changes from previous generation control rooms. The control room configuration and the design of each HMI feature are relatively small steps from previous designs, typically employing advances in I&C technology to provide solutions to problem areas without radical change to the overall HMI functions.
~ Based on the evolutionary nature of the entire control room and the HMI features described herein, it is ABB-CE's position that Nuplex 80+ is en evolutionary step from previous generation control rooms. It is therefore prudent to develop and use a design process which makes most effective use of previous generation designs with an emphasis on verification and validation of the design result, not analysis of the design inputs.
7 .
l
q $ A- A k .s-+, eu.- >ae- e --- ,nA* - 4 ATTACHMENT 4 f'
[ --
l l
i
. . . - < y . _ - . . _ . _ _ . . _ . . _ . ._ _ .
ABB-CE has reviewed human factors-related submittr.lsl pertaining to the System 80+
. Standard Design :.-in: order to determine- which- referenced documents should be- '
docketed in whole or in part. A list summarizing the resolution of the documents
. identified:1_n_ Reference 2 of this;1etter is provided below. The documents which -
ishould)be docketed are enclosed with this attachment. The two bases used to select documents for docketing were: ,
1): relevance to- the RCS/ IPSO /Nuplex- 80+ configuration and
.(Attachment 1 of this-letter) to clearly reference the docketed documents and.to delete references to- documents not placed on the docket'.
In, addition- to .the above, thirty-two revised CESSAR-DC figures are enclosed..
These figures will be. included in the'next amendment of Chapter 18.
DOCUMENTS REFERENCED IN RAIs-
! Note on DAq9mtBM : Resolution- Iqpic ALWR-87-109 1- . Letters Regarding Advanced I&C Program Schedule & Plan-ALWR-88-014-. I "
TALWR-89-02'8- 1 DP-791-01 2 Cond/FW Panel Layout SD-791-01 4 System Description for Control Complex Info.
Systems (RAI 620.5)
TE-790.-01 3 Verification Report (RAI620.1)
SD640 CCS System Descriptior.
-CEN-307 5 CE Owners Group Task' Analysis t
~ _
DP790.02 3 FTA Report (RAI 620.13, 620.5, 620.1, d nL )
RR-791-01 2 RCS Panel Description SC-710 2_ DPS System Description NPX-IC-RR-791-01' 6 (Same as DP-791-01)
NPX80-1000-2706-00 6 (Same as DP-791-002)
STD-100-2706-00 6 (Same as HF 5tandards and Guidelines)
Human Factors Standards 8 (RAI 620.C. 620.1, and Guidelines for 620.31, d i )
System 80+
Critical Functions 4 Monitoring.
Information Systems ~ 6 (Same as 50-791-01)
' Descriptions Alarm Processing 2
' Description Halden Critical 9 INR 213/222 (RAI 620.1, Functions Monitoring E20.11)
Study Halden Success Path -9 HWR 223/224 (RAI 620.1,
' Monitoring Study 620.11)
Halden IPS0 Study 9 HWR 158/184 (RAI 620.1, 620.11)
Department of Energy 7 Human Factors Design Guidelines for Maintainability DE 85-016790 System 80+ Quality 2 Assurance Plan 18386-QO-001
l NOTES
- 1. This reference will be deleted as it has been superseded by the modified response to RAI 620.1.
- 2. Reference to this item has been deleted. Pertinent data are already docketed.
- 3. This item-is being docketed in its entirety.
- 4. Applicable portions of this document contain proprietary information which is being docketed in a separate transmittal (letter LD-92-066).
- 5. This document is proprietary to the CE Owners Group. It was referenced for historical purposes only. The reference will be deleted.
- 6. Th;s item is the same as an item listed et ler.
- 7. This item is-in the public domain (not a CE document).
- 8. This item will be docketed as soon as finalized.
- 9. . Abstracts of these studies are being docketed to show a summary of findings and provide the applicable study numbers and titles to the NRC.
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PMS019.WP-1 A3STRACTS OR SUMMARIES HALDEN REACTOR REPORTS IIWR-158 Integrated Process Status Overview (lPS0): Status Report HWR 184 Further Evaluation Exercises with the IPS0 IlWR-213 Success Path Honitoring System (PMS)
HWR-222 SPM System Description and Implementation Base HWR-223 SPMS Design and Methodology HWR-224 SPMS Results and Concerns q
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HWR-158 INTEGRATED PROCESS STATUS OVERVIF.W (IP50): STATUS REPORT ABSTRACT This report surmart es findings to date with the Ipso, a large plant status overview currently under development at the OECD Halden Reactor Project. As part of a joint Halden and Combustion Engineering pro]ect, the overview is being tested in part to determine whether the large screen overview concept being entertained f6r use in the nuclear power plant (NPP) _ industry will lan111 tate operator performance. To this end an interactive slaulation technique was used to establish a proof-of-principle test for the IPSO. Process control, operations, and human factors experts at Halden participated in the test and evaluation. Tive sub)ects well versed in the NORS PWR slaulator made use or the NORS display formats in conjunction with the IPS0 overview.
Results show that even with limited training, a properly designed large format ove1 view supports positive operator performance. Accurate detection and diagnoses were noted for all conditions tested and subjects were Tble to make good use of the detailed process formats.
( Analysis of. Post-test questionnaire respontes suggests that IPSO highlighted plant systems, pointing the subjects toward lower level formats, and providing them with an adequate update rate for plant process data. Data presented herein also provide information regarding strengths and weaknesses of the current IPSO design. Additional, in depth testing of the IP30 system will be conducted later in 1986.
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1 HWR-184 FURTHER EVALUATION EXERCISES WITH THE IPS0
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( ) The rncent trend twanis tM uwatatico t of pmcess informativi cn relatively stinulated interest in the potential bcrefitsahexd tzrall CRT scroms which cust be seqxntially, has of pnnidire coerators with a emputer-<pcarated cemrview of plant and pro as status. Cre agroach to this qursticn has been purtrxd at tM tialdcn Project with t!e develyxmnt, in cooperai.Icn with Cbntusticn Engirwrirg, of tre laI90 acrtwn Integrated Process preliminary "prtof of prirriple" study rgrxtod Sthus Omrview in IMt-158 (1PSO). The that the ird;.ated IPSO coulc' holp cparators ira the detecticn ani diaynsts of plant disturtar.:es, W subject operators respcnbd favcurably to the cmyt of a 1 arty, acrem o.urviw display.
This
'IM report describes two furtter evaluaticn exertises witti the IPSO.
first experimcnt rgerted here irwwtig.atos five irdividual subjects' harviling, plantuse ofrnanipulaticn the IPSO durirg three phases of cporaticn - transient realistic ocntrol and ntnitnrirg -
as they perform a rom task involv1ng rurnire up both TORS turbines.
The task lasted for nore thar. two hours, cktrirg which two transimts were inserted into the process. The results shcw that tN IPSO was used noot frequcntly citring mcnitoring, ard subjects felt tie display was note suited to rcrmal than atrormal cperations. alttogh subjects rogarded tM size of the display as an advantage they mte critical of catain aspects of its design and contmt.
The sooand expnriment irwestigates use of tSo IPSO by a team of t #
cperators, IPSO as it has been suggested tint a kemtlal tenefit of 'a 7ho teismthat was itexp might medact as astatic to nine focal point for crew derisicn- making, Qm U
-i snapshots of tie 1GS prococs presmted in three display ocrditions; IPSO, IPSO plus text alarm list and ? ORS formats plus text alarm list. The snapshots showed the plant in different the tem wasstages mguiredof to rcrmal oparaticn or afftetod by transiants, ard ascertain the plant stee. Althat.gh few cystmatic differences betwem performarce in us trace display ccniiticris wre oboarved, tin IPSO facilitated a rapid inpressicn of plant state, ard prtrnoted lively diemicn betwom crew mmtors.
7M firdings of the two experinants reinforce the cugort for a large screen plant overview in the control' recm. Itwsver, a rutex of y qualificaticns were raised regardity tte cxmttnt of the IPSO. Subjects egressed a danau for rnore proceso and alarm informaticn cn tM display. A future possibility is the large screen grasentaticn of the HALO alarm overview, the contmt of which receimi than tM IPro. has txxn nere favourably
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HWR-213 SOCCESS PATH MONITORING SYSTrM (SPMS)
AssrucT The Success Path Monitoring System is 4 advanced cernputer-based operator aid which is interk% to enhance the operator's ability to handle plant disturbances effectively. It achisvos this by providira an on-line assessment of both the status of critical safety functions and the status of appropriate success paths for correcting any threat to the critical functions. In ordor to obtain a systematic evaluation of the system, a prototypo version has boon implemented on the Haldon Proj ect's PWR simulator. This report describes the development of the system and its implementation at Halden, it also provides an outline of the proposed it,til-scale evaluation experiment which is to be carried out later in 1J87.
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3 HWR-222 p
p SPN SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION BASE -
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One goal of the " TORS-HNM.AB Success Path Ptnitorirq System project
- was to develop a workirq puiulype of a plant acnitoriin systarn baso$ [L on the Critical Safety Function - Success Path concept and to inte- ;
grate this system with the exictirg NORS/}WtiLAB ccruputerisod control roczn systems. The other major goal was to svaluate the parformance of operators utilisire this SINS prototype varsion by way of simulater L y experimants in the Malden Man Machine Laboratory. M To accomplish these goals, a svtutype versico of the SPMS was ingle-mented in the TORS /}WELAB ocntrol room ire-upsatirq critical safety fureticn and success path algorithms. These algorittuna perform the analyses which dotarmine the status of 4 critical safety furctions and 11 different success paths. To ocnetruct the suroess path algorittune, a plant axpert defirmd the nW of the algorittune in tarse of the _
availability and perfor m os of the various sysrtame and exantonents which, when utilised, constitute a succes; path. .s The objective of this report is first to give a description of the .
PORS-SPMS system o:mponents, the algorithme, the displays and interec-tion methods and how the system was integrated with the existing con-trol rocas systs:ns. Next, the implementers' arperierwe_ with this task are discussed from a system wi process engineering point of view.
_ Note. '1he implernenters' axperience anast be judged frca the fact that they war workirn with an unfinished system -
a r uiviype system. 'Ihair hope is that the comments are found useful by v
(,m) ' the designars of the SPHS system when they finalise it.
Finally, the report cercludes with a discussion of 1==a== which will te critical when putting the succesa path monitoring system into a real nuclear power plant ocntrol roca.
The experimental methodology and the resulta frcun the evalu.aticn experiment are given in (BakarSBa) ard (Baker 88b).
- 2. SPME BASIC CXNCZPTS A critical safety flowtion is a plant furction which sust be accccplished in order to keep the plant in a safe and stable condition.
The methods which can be employed by the plant operator to acm11sh these safety functions are defined as Success Paths.
For exi@le, establishing natural circulation in the primary coolant System Y
is ccnsidered to be a smaa path to accomplish the cor,e heat y removal (SPH3) iscritical safety funs tion. The Swaan Path Monitoring System envisicned as a reel time operator aid which would provide the inforn:aticm necessary to monitor the status of the critical safety functions ard to utilise the apsvriate sn-a paths. _
% Critical Safety Function and 3uccess Path Algorithms are "8 n the Loviisa plant design. 'the critical safety function r
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centinuously mcnitor plant status to detarmine if the critical algo-L
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I HWR-223 SPMS DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY I I
ABSTRACT I
w The Success Path Monitoring System is an advanced xrnputer-based operator support system which aims to ;,
provide an on-line assessment of both the status of critical safety functions and the status of success t
paths for i correcting the threat to the critical functions. In order to obtain a systematic evaluation of [
y the system, a prototype version has been installed on the Halden Proj ect 's PWR sinn. Aator. This report describes in detail the methodology and experimental f procedure adopted for carrying out the evaluation, and m P
provides an account of the training prograntne used to .L prepare subjects for participation in the study. F Y
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! HWR-224 pm SPMS RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS f.#
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The Succees Path R:nitorirq Systen is an advanced
- computer-based provide an operator support system which aims to critical asfetyon-line functi:ns assesenant and the of both the status of status of success paths for correcting the threat to the critical functionw in order to obtain a systanatic evaluation of the wystem, a prototype var:1cn has been installed on the Halden Project's PWR siaalator. This report describes the resulta and conclusima from the study.
Wree rzoups of experienced oparators were carefully observed copthg with a series of transients emb MW in a realistic room. Critical scenario in the sinulator control the status of these pr = == parameters were recorded and 4
ves related to use M the informatico dispisy systems available in th1 utree conditions. Operatee performance was evaluated on the baaim of video recordire and the stan11ator event log.
- Assessraent we.s made in terms of the ideal response to the trancient scenario, operator acticne and time taken to coupleta actions, Operators were encouraged to
> this conenent on the system after the experiment and provided valuable % more subjective, data -
about the system.
'the experimnt generated a data but there has been limitedgreat deal of valuable detailed analysis. Even so, ittime wasavailable for felt that the results aime ofobtained so far have fulfilled the principal '
illustrated quite distinct advantages of thethe Path evaluation. Overall the success ltrtitoring System, as currently implemented.
Speed and accuracy of operator performance in taking l
aw w iate cw .ctive action was clearly superior with the SPMS and well up to. pr1or expectations.
Subsequently operatore returned to take part .in retention trials and static tests with revised. SPMS p formats.. Results from these tests are also included.
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Attachment to ALWR-92-203 10-92-092 TABLE 1 - DOCKETED DOCUMENTS Nm
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Submittal Document Number: Proprietary Title Status NPX80-IC-DP-790-02 No Nuplex 80+ Function and Task A Analysis Report NPX80-IC-SD-791-01 Yes ~Nuplex 80+ Control Complex P Information Systems Description NPX80-IC-TE-790-01 No Nuplex 80+ Verification. A Analysis Report P
Draft (tareX) N/A [ALWR]HFStandardsand Guidelines and Bases (Sample Pages)
L NPX80-IC-SD790-02 _Yes Nuplex 80t Critical- P Functions Monitoring System Description- J A = Ail P = Partial _,,,,,
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