ML20069N409
| ML20069N409 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200002 |
| Issue date: | 06/20/1994 |
| From: | ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY, ASEA BROWN BOVERI, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20069N406 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9406220382 | |
| Download: ML20069N409 (539) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. - --. . .. -- . - - . . . -. . . . b SYSTEM 80+" O rints or coureurs 1.0 Introduction 1.1 Definitions ! 1.2 General Provisions i 1.3 Figure Legend and Abbreviation List 2.0 System and Structure Based Design Descriptions and ITAAC 2.1 Design of Structures, Components, Equipment, and Systems 2.1.1 Nuclear Island Structures 2.1.2 Turbine Building 2.1.3 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Structures ; 2.1.4 Dietel Fuel Storage Structure ! 2.1.5 Radwaste Building 1 2.1.6 Reactor Vessel Internals 2.1.7 In-Core Instrument Guide Tube System 2.2 Reactor 2.2.1 Nuclear Fuel Syo.em i 2.2.2 Control Element Drive Mechanism 2.3 Reactor Coolant System and Connecting Systems 2.3.1 Reactor Coolant System 2.3.2 Shutdown Cooling System 2.3.3 Reactor Coolant System Component Supports , 2.3.4 NSSS Integrity Monitoring System O
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SYSTEM 80+" , TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) i 2.4 Engineered Safety Features : 2.4.1 Safety Depressurization System t 2.4.2 Annulus Ventilation System 2.4.3 Combustible Gas Control System l l 2.4.4 Safety Injection System f 2.4.5 Containment Isolation System [ 2.4.6 Containment Spray System [ 2.4.7 In-Containment Water Storage System 2.5 Instrumentation and Control 2.5.1 Plant Protection Sy-tem j O 2.5.2 Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System 2.5.3 Discrete Indication and Alarm System and Data Processing System l l 2.5.4 Power Control System / Process-Component Control System ! 2.6 Electric Power 2.6.1 AC Electrical Power Distribution System 1 2.6.2 Emergency Diesel Generator System 2.6.3 AC Instrumentation and Control Power System and DC Power System 2.6.4 Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies 2.6.5 Alternate AC Source O Si?-w (ii) i
SYSTEM 80+* TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 2.7 Auxiliary Systems 2.7.1 New Fuel Storage Racks 2.7.2 Spent Fuel Storage Racks 2.7.3 Pool Cooling and Purification System 2.7.4 Fuel Handling System 2.7.5 Station Service Water System 2.7.6 Component Cooling Water System 2.7.7 Demineralized Water Makeup System 2.7.8 Condensate Storage System 2.7.9 Process Sampling System O 2.7.10 Compressed Air Systems 2.7.11 Turbine Building Cooling Water System 2.7.12 Essential Chilled Water System ; 2.7.13 Normal Chilled Water System 2.7.14 Turbine Building Service Water System 2.7.15 Equipment and Floor Drainage System 2.7.16 Chemical and Volume Control System 2.7.17 Control Complex Ventilation System 2.7.18 Fuel Building Ventilation System 2.7.19 Diesel Building Ventilation System 2.7.20 Subsphere Building Ventilation System %) 06-i7-94 (iii) i
SYSTEM 80+" TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 2.7.21 Containment Purge Ventilation System i 2.7.22 Containment Cooling and Ventilation System ; 2.7.23 Nuclear Annex Ventilation System 2.7.24 Fire Protection System , 2.7.25 Communications Systems ! l 2.7.26 Lighting System 2.7.27 Compressed Gas Systems 2.7.28 Potable and Sanitary Water Systems 2.7.29 Radwaste Building Ventilation System 2.7.30 Turbine Building Ventilation System O 2.7.31 CCW Heat Exchanger Structure Ventilation System 2.8 Steam and Power Conversion System 2.8.1 Turbine Generator 2.8.2 Main Steam Supply System 2.8.3 Main Condenser i 2.8.4 Main Condenser Evacuation System 2.8.5 Turbine Bypass System 2.8.6 Condensate and Feedwater Systems 2.8.7 Steam Generator Blowdown System 2.8.8 Emergency Feedwater System 2.8.9 Condenser Circulating Water System e6.s v.,. ( iv )
l l SYSTEM 80+" l 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) l 2.9 Radioactive Waste Management 2.9.1 Liquid Waste Management System j l 2.9.2 Gaseous Waste Management System i 1 2.9.3 Solid Waste Management System l 1 2.9.4 Process and Effluent Radiological Monitoring and Sampling Systems l l 2.10 Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center ! i 2.11 Initial Test Program l 2.12 Human Factors 2.12.1 Main Control Room 2.12.2 Remote Shutdown Room O 3.0 Non-System Based Design Descriptions and ITAAC 3.1 Piping Design 3.2 Radiation Protection 4.0 Interface Requirements 4.1 Offsite Power System 4.2 Ultimate Heat Sink 4.3 Station Service Water Pump Structure 4.4 Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System 5.0 Site Parameters O . (V) #17-M l I
ex SYMM 80+
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This document contains the Certified Design Material for the Combustion Engineering, Inc., System 80+" Pressurized Water Reactor. It consists, by sections, of:
- 1) Introductory material (Definitions, General Provisions, and the Figure 1.cgend
& Abbresiation List);
- 2) Certified Design Material for System 80+" systems and structures;
- 3) Certified Design Material for non-system-based r.spects of the System 80+"
Certified design;
- 4) Interface Requirements; and
- 5) Site Parameters.
,o b C) ' 1.0 owi7/94
3 m SYSTEM 80+" 1.1 DEFINITIONS The following definitions apply to terms used in the Design Descriptions and associated inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC): Acceptance Criteria means the performance, physical condition, or analysis result for a structure, system, or component that demonstrates the Design Commitment is met. Analysis means a calculation, mathematical computation, or engineering or technical evaluation. Engineering or techmcal evaluations could include, but are not limited to, comparisons with operating experience or design of similar structures, systems, or components. As-built means the physical properties of a structure, system, or component following the completion of its installation or construction activities at its final location at the plant site. Basic Configuration (for a Building) means the arrangement of building features (e.g., floors, ceilings, walls, basemat, and doorways) and of the structures, systems or components within, as specified in the building Design Description. Basic Configuration (for a System) means the functional arrangement of structures, p systems, or components specified in the Design Description and the verifications for that d system specified in Section 1.2. Design Commitment means that portion of the Design Description that is verified by ITAAC. 1 Design Description means that portion of the design that is certified. Division (for electrical systems or equipment)is the designation applied to a given safety-related system or set of components which are physically, electrically, and functionally independent from other redundant sets of components. Division (for mechanical systems or equipment)is the designation applied to a specific set of safety-related components within a system. Inspect or Inspection mean visual observations, physical examinations, or reviews of records based on visual observation or physical examination that compare the structure, system, or component condition to one or more Design Commitments. Exampies include walkdowms, configuration checks, measurements of dimensions, or non-destructive examinations. V 1.1 wu l
I SYMM 80+" U l Test means the actuation, operation, or establishment of specified conditions to evaluate the performance or integrity of as-built structures, systems, or components, unless explicitly stated otherwise. l Type Test means a test on one or more suuple components of the same type and f manufacturer to qualify other components of that same type and manufacturer. A Type Test ; is not necessarily a test of the as-built structures, systems, or components. , 1
)
l 1 1 1 J . l l 1 l l sJ 1.1 2- Sn.u i
f- SYSTEM 80+" ( L2 GENERAL PROVISIONS The following general provisions are applicable to the Design Descriptions and associated ITAAC: Verifications For Basic Configuration For Systems Verifications for Basic Configuration of systems include and are limited to inspection of the system functional arrangement and the following inspections, tests, and analyses: (1) Inspections, including non-destructive examination (NDE), of the as-built, pressure boundary welds for American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class 1,2, or 3 components identified in the Design Description to demonstrate that the requirements of ASME Code Section III for the quality of pressure boundary welds are met. (2) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses, of the Seismic Category I mechanical and electrical equipment (including connected instrumentation and controls) identified in the Design Description, to demonstrate that the as-built equipment including associated anchorage, is qualified to withstand design basis g dynamic loads without loss of its safety function. (3) Type tests, or type tests and analyses, of the Class 1E electrical equipment identified in the Design Description (or on accompanying Figures) to demonstrate that it is qualified to withstand the emironmental conditions that would exist during and following a design basis accident without loss of its safety function for the time needed to be functional. These emironmental conditions, as applicable to the bounding design basis accident (s), are as follows: expected time-dependent temperature and pressure profiles, humidity, chemical effects, radiation, aging, submergence, and their synergistic effects which have a significant effect on j equipment performance. As used in this paragraph, the term " Class 1E electrical ; equipment" constitutes the equipment itself, connected instrumentation and controls, connected electrical components (such as cabling, wiring, and terminations), and the lubricants necessary to support performance of the safety functions of the Class 1E . l electrical components identified in the Design Description, to the extent such equipment is not located in a mild environment during or following a design basis accident. Electrical equipment emironmental qualification shall be demonstrated through analysis of the environmental conditions that would exist in the location of the equipment during and following a design basis accident and through a determination that the equipment is qualified to withstand those conditions for the time needed to be functional. This determination may be demonstrated by: I O 1.2 e6- 7 94
1 l q SYSTEM 80+" i O (a) type testing of an identical item of equipment under identical or similar conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment is qualified; or (b) type testing of a similar item of equipment under identical or similar conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment is qualified; or j 1 (c) experience with identical or similar equipment under identical or similar conditions with supporting analysis to show that the equipment is qualified; or ] 1 I (d) analysis in combination with partial type test data that supports the analytical assumptions and conclusions to show that the equipment k qualified. (4) Tests or type tests of active safety-related motor-Operated Valves (MOVs) identified in the Design Description to demonstrate that the MOVs are qualified to perform , their safety functions under design basis differential pressure, system pressure, fluid I temperature, ambient temperature, minimum voltage, and minimum and/or maximum stroke times. Treatment of Individual Items The absence of any discussion or depiction of an item in the Design Description or accompanying Figures shall not be construed as prohibiting a licensee from utilizing such an . item, unless it would prevent an item from performing its safety functions as discussed or depicted in the Design Description or accompanying Figures. 1 When the term " operate," " operates," or " operation" is used with respect to an item discussed l in the Acceptance Criteria. it refers to the actuation and running of the item. When the term l
" exist," " exists," or " existence" is used with respect to an item discussed in the Acceptance Criteria, it means that the item is present and meets the Design Description.
Implementation of ITAAC The ITAAC are provided in tables with the following three-column format: l Inspections Desien Commitment Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria Each Design Commitment in the left-hand column of the ITAAC tables has an associated Inspections, Tests, or Analyses (ITA) requirement specified in the middle column of the tables. (^\
\v$ 1.2 0 o 7-94
SYSTEM 80+" %) The identification of a separate ITA entry for each Design Commitment shall not be construed to require that separate inspections, tests, or analyses must be performed for each Design Commitment. Instead, the activities associated with more than one ITA entry may be combined, and a single inspection, test, or analysis may be sufficient to implement more than one ITA entry. An ITA may be. performed by the licensee of the plant, or by its authorized vendors, contractors, or consultants. Furthermore, an ITA may be performed by more than a single individual or group, may be implemented through discrete activities separated by time, and may be performed at any time prior to fuel load (including before issuance of the Combined . Operating License for those ITAAC that do not necessarily pertain to as-installed ) equipment). Additionally, an ITA may be performed as part of the activities that are required to be performed under 10 CFR Part 50 (including, for example, the Quality Assurance (QA) j program required under Appendix B to Part 50); therefore, an ITA need not be performed ; as a separate or discrete activity. Discussion of Matters Related to Operations i 1 1 In some cases, the Design Descriptions in this document refer to matters that relate to operation, such as normal valve or breaker alignment during normal operation modes. Such discussions are provided solely to place the Design Description provisions in context (e.g., to 3 explain automatic features for opening or closing valves or breakers upon off-normal (\ conditions). Such discussions shall not be construed as requiri ig operators durir g operation to take any particular action (e.g., to maintain valves or breakers in a particular position during normal operation). Interpretation of Figures In many but not all cases, the Design Descriptions in Section 2 include one or more Figures. The Figures may represent a functional diagram, general structural representation, or other general illustration. For instrumentation and control (I&C) systems, Figures also represent aspects of the relevant logic of the system or part of the system. T.'dess specified explicitly, the Figures are not indicative of the scale, location, dimensions, sh' ;;, or spatial relationships of as-built structures, systems, and components. In particular, the as-built attributes of structures, systems, and components may vary from the attributes depicted on the Figures, provided that those safety functions discussed in the Design Description pertaining to the Figure are not adversely affected. Maximum Reactor Core Thermal Power The initial rated reactor core thermal power for the System 80+" Certified Design is 3914 megawatts thermal (MWt). I.2 o6 iv.,4
. SYSTEM 80+" \-
1.3 FIGURE LEGEND and ABBREVIATION LIST The conventions presented in this Section are employed for Figures used in the Design Descriptions. The abbreviations presented in this Section are used in the Cenified Design Material. The figure legend and abbreviation list are provided for information only and are not part of the Cenified Design Material. L ( 'v e 1.3 . n.y
b Q FIGURE LEGEND Instrumentation Flow instrument b - Temperature Instrument b l i Radiation Instrument @ Differential Pressure instrument t Pressure Instrument
@ l Level Instrument Q i Current Instrument Humidity Detector g l Ultrasonic Instrument g Smoke Detector g. l Sensor g l Annunciator (Alarm) 1 I
b O 1.3- 1 os.i7 94
-_.-.._...__.._._.-_..__J
FIGURE LEGEND (continued) l Valves u) Gate Valve N Globe Valve W Check Valve ; i Butterfly Valve l%l l Ball Valve @ Relief Valve j l Three Way Valve k l Post Indicator Valve Valve Type Not Specified O Valve Operators ; Operator Of Unspecified Type Fluid Powered Operator Motor Operator Solenoid Operator ! Hydraulic Operator Pneumatic Operator I Position Indications For Hydraulic And Pneumatic Ooerators
-Fails As is FAI
-Fails Closed FC 1
-Fails Open F0 Mechanical Eauipment 1.3 Positive Displacement Pump
- k. -
06-17-94
u 06-17-94 ; FIGURE LEGEND (continuedi l Centrifugal Pump = 0~ : I l Pump Type Not Specified _ Header [ ] n Tank I U Filter F OR FILTER s l Strainer l Flexible Connection @ Delay Coil M Orifice l!l l I v Ventun. n l Compressor Or Fan Air Distribution Device ::::: Air Distribution Header 1111 Vaneaxial Fan M Heat Exchanger + + ' U$ Vacuum Breaker O Vent Ov ' i-06-17 94
06-17-94 l . FIGURE LEGEND (continued) Damoers ! Manually Operated Damper OR Remotely Operated Damper e; 1 Louver Fire Damper ar Smoke Damper k 5 Back Draft Damper Finned Cooling Coil T C Pumo Drivers Turbine Drive Motor Drive M Electrical Eauloment ll Battery & Circuit Breaker A Disconnect Switch / 1.3 4 06-17-94
FIGURE LEGEND (continued) ( W Voltage Regulator M Multiplexer f Isolation T Transformer NW NY Miscellaneous A System Or Component l ~ ~ ~ ~ "" - l That is not Part Of The l l Defined System ,______ Containment
~
Containment with Penetration - . . - - . . T Building Separation i u e e u e e euereeni ASME Code Class Break An ASME Code class break is identified by a single line to the designated location for the class break, as shown in the example below. l ASME CODE SECTION fit CLASS l (NOTE 1)
- 2. t!J X +
N Notes:
- 1. The header, "ASME Code Section 111 Class", must appear at least once n each figure on which ASME class breaks are shown, but need not eppear at every class break shown on a figure.
E Indicates Non-ASME Code Section 111 06-17-94 1.3 SYSTEM 80+" /m. i b' ' AllllREVIATION LIST Abbreviation Meaning AAC Alternate AC Source A/C Air Conditioning ADM Atmospheric Dump Valve AFAS Alternate Feedwater Actuation Signal ALMS Acoustic Leak Monitoring System APC Auxiliary Process Cabinet APS Alternate Protection System ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASME Code American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code AVS Annulus Ventilation System BAC Boric Acid Concentrator lO v) BAS Breathing Air System CAS Compressed Air System CCCT Containment Cooler Condensate Tank CCS Component Control System CCVS Control Complex Ventilation System CCW Component Cooling Water CCWIIXSVS CCW Heat Exchanger Structure Ventilation System CCWLLSTAS Component Cooling Water Low 12 vel Surge Tank Actuation CCWS Component Cooling Water System CEA Control Element Assembly CEACP CEA Change Platform CEAE CEA Elevator CEDMCS Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System CEDM Control Element Drive Mechanism p] N. CET Core Exit Thermocouple 1.3 wiv.,4
SYSTEM 80+ ( ( AHHREVIATION LIST (Continued) Abbreviation Meaning CFR Code of Federal Regulations CFS Cavity Flooding System 1 CGCS Combustible Gas Control System CGS Compressed Gas Systems CH Channel C11RS Containment liydrogen Recombiner System CIAS Containment Isolation Actuation Signal CIS Containment Isolation System CIV Containment Isolation Valve COL Combined Operating License CONT Containment
, CPC Core Protection Calculator '
( CPVS Containment Purge Ventilation System l CRS Control Room Supervisor CSAS Containment Spray Actuation Signal i CSB Core Support Barrel l 1 CSS Containment Spray System CST Chemical Sample Tank CT Combustion Turbine / Generator CVAP Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System l CWT Chemical Waste Tank DBVS Diesel Building Ventilation System DEMIN Demineralized DFSS Diesel Fuel Storage St:ucture DIAS Discrete Indication and Alarm System
)
DIAS-N Discrete Indication and Alarm System - Channel N . (s. ; 1.3 wm i i
SYSTEM 80+" (( ,/ AllllREVIATION
\
LIST (Continued) Abbreviation Meaning l DIAS-P Discrete Indication and Alarm System - Channel P DNBR Departure From Nucleate Boiling Ratio DPS Data Processing System < DVI Direct Vessel Injection DWMS Demineralized Water Makeup System EAB Exclusion Area Boundary ECW Essential Chilled Water I ECWS Essential Chilled Water System EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EDT Equipment Drain Tank EFAS Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal EFDS Equipment and Floor Drainage System
\ EFW Emergency Feedwater EFWS Emergency Feedwater System EFWST Emergency Feedwater Storage Tank ENS Emergency Notification System EPDS Electrical Power Distribution System ESF Engineered Safety Features ESFAS Engineered Safety Features Actuation System ESF-CCS Engineered Safety Features - Component Control System EWT Equipment Waste Tank FBOC Fuel Building Overhead Crane FBVS Fuel Building Ventilation System FDT Floor Drain Tank FHS Fuel Handling System FTC Fuel Temperature Coefficient FTS Fuel Transfer System 1.3 wu
SYSTEM 80+ rm (j) t i AHHREVIATION LIST (Continued) i Abbreviation Meaning GCB Generator Circuit Breaker GWMS Gaseous Waste Management System IIA liigh Activity HDR licader HFE Iluman Factors Engineering IlJTC Ileated Junction Thermocouple llMS Hydrogen Mitigation System IIPN llealth Physics Network IISI Iluman-System / interface HVAC Heating, Ventilating, Air Conditioning HVT Holdup Volume Tank s HX lleat Exchanger () IlZ Hertz IAS Instrument Air System ICI In-Core Instrument ILRT Integrated Leak Rate Test INIT Initiation INJ Injection INST Instrumentation IPSO Integrated Process Status Overview IRWST In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank ITAAC Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria ITP Interface and Test Processor : IVMS Internals Vibration Monitoring System ) IWSS In-containment Water Storage System ) IX lon Exchanger l
, LA Low Activity i.3 9 ~ , .
1 1
SYSTEM 80+" g (,) AllllREVIATION LIST (Continued) Abbreviation Meaning LBB Leak-Before-Break LOCA Loss-of-coolant Accident LOOP Loss-of-Offsite-Power LPMS 12)ose Parts Monitoring System LPZ I2)w Population Zone LS Liquid Sample LTOP Low Temperature Overrpressure Protection LWMS Liquid Waste Management System MCC Motor Control Center MCR Main Control Room MCRACS Main Control Room Air Conditioning System y- MDNBR Minimum Departure From Nucleate Boiling Ratio ' MFIV Main Feedwater Isolation Valve MG Main Generator , 1 MOV Motor Operated Valve l MPC Moderator Pressure Coefficient MSIS Main Steam Isolation Signal MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve MSLB Main Steam Line Break MSSS Main Steam Supply System MSSV Main Steam Safety Valve MSVII Main Steam Valve House l MTC Moderator Temperature Coefficient i NA Nuclear Annex NAVS Nuclear Annex Ventilation System ; NCW Normal Chilled Water NCWS Normal Chilled Water System l 1.3 w ,4
SYSTEM 80+"
\
[/ ( ABBREVIATION LIST (Continued) Abbreviation Meaning l l l NDE Non-destructive Examination j NFE New Fuel Elevator ! NFS Nuclear Fuel System NI Nuclear Instrumentation NI Structures Nuclear Island Structures ! NIMS NSSS Integrity Monitoring System NNS Non-Nuclear Safety NPSII Net Positive Suction IIead NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PA Public Address PABX Private Automatic Business Exchange PAMI Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation ' d PASS Post Accident Sampling System P-CCS Process-Component Control System PCPS Pool Cooling and Purification System PCS Power Control System PCS/P-CCS Power Control System / Process-Component Control System PERMSS Processing and Effluent Radiological Monitoring and Sampling System PPC Plant Protection Calculator PPS Plant Protection System PRA Probabalistic Risk Assessment l PSS Process Sampling System PSWS Potable and Sanitary Water Systems PZR Pressurizer ) RAT Reserve Auxiliary Transformer p \ RB Reactor Building 1.3 wu 1 l l
l l SYSTEM 80+" l /^; I V AHilREVIATION LIST (Continued) Abbreviation Meaning RCGVS Reactor Coolant Gas Vent Subsystem RCP Reactor Coolant Pump. l RCPB Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary RCS Reactor Coolant System RDS Rapid Depressurization Subsystem RDT Reactor Drain Tank RM Refueling Machine I RPS Reactor Protective System i RSP Remote Shutdown Panel l l RSR Remote Shutdown Room i 1 RSSH Resin Sluce Slurry Header RT Reactor Trip
}
{C RTSG Reactor Trip Switchgear i RV Reactor Vessel l I RWBVS Radwaste Building Ventilation System SAFDL Specified Acceptable Fuel Design Limit SAS Station Air System SB Shield Building SBCS Steam Bypass Control System SBVS Subsphere Building Ventilation System SCS Shutdown Cooling System I SDS Safety Depressurization System SFIIM Spent Fuel llandling Machine l SFP Spent Fuel Pool SFPCS Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System SG Steam Generator rm l SGBS Steam Generator Blowdown System . /()\ l 1.3 <w.u l 1
SYSTENT80+" m
\
/ AllllREVIATION LIST (Continued)
Abbreviation Meanine SGDT Steam Generar,r Drain Tank SI Safety Injection SIAS Safety Injection Actuation Signal i SIS Safety injection System SIT Safety Injection Tank SSC Systems, Structures, and Components SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake SSW Station Service Water SSWS Station Service Water System SWMS Solid Waste Management System TBCWS Turbine Building Cooling Water System A TBSWS Turbine Building Service Water System ' TBV Turbine Bypass Valve TBVS Turbine Building Ventilation System TC 'I herinocouple TGSS Turbine Gland Sealing System TSC Technical Support Center j TSCACS Technical Support Center Air Conditioning System UGS Upper Guide Structure UHS Ultimate IIeat Sink UAT Unit Auxiliary Transformer UMT Unit Main Transformer VCT Volume Control Tank VDU Video Display Unit WMT Waste Monitor Tank l (O)%d : 1.3 w .u
SYSTEM 80+" 8 2.1.1 NUCLEAR ISLAND STRUCTURES Design Description The Nuclear Island (NI) Structures house, protect, and support plant equipment and ; provide personnel and equipment access, support foi systems and components under , operating loads, radiation shielding, structural componcuts to withstand loads due to t design basis external and internal events, physical sep, ration between Divisions of j safety.related equipment, and barriers to minim't.e or prevent the release of ; radioactive materials. ! The Basic Configuration of the NI Structures is as shown on Figures. 2.1.1-1 through . 2.1.1-12."2 The NI Structures are safety-related. j The NI Structures consist of the Reactor Building (RB) and the Nuclear Annex (NA). The RB and NA are further sub-divided into structures, buildings and areas. The RB , and NA are structurally integrated on a common basemat which is embedded below the finished plant grade level. The top of the nuclear island basemat is located 40.75 ft. i 1.0 ft. below the finished grade elevation. De RB is a reinforced concrete and structural steel structure, which consists of the s Shield Building (SB), the RB Subsphere, the Containment, and the Containment Internal Structures. The SB is composed of a reinforced concrete right cylinder with a hemispherical dome which encloses the Containment and is structurally connected to the NA. The area between the SB and the Containment is the RB Annulus. The RB Subsphere is located below the RB Annulus area and the Containment and is divided by a Divisional wall. Within the RB Subsphere, each Division is further , divided, such that the RB Subsphere is separated into quadrants. The structural components of the RB Subsphere are structurally connected to the SB and support . , the Containment and Containment Internal Structures. 1 The Containment is a spherical welded steel structure supported by embedding a lower segment between the Containment Internal Structures concrete and the Reactor Building Subsphere concrete. There is no structural connection between the - free-standing portion of the containment and adjacent structures other than penetrations and their supports. Shear bars are welded to the containment vesselin the embedded region to provide restraint against sliding. The Containment retains ; its integrity at the pressure and temperature conditions associated with the most limiting Design Basis Accident without exceeding the design leakage rate to the SB. Access to the Containment is provided through personnel air locks and an equipment hatch. Penetrations are also provided for electrical and mechanical components and for the transport of nuclear fuel. The Containment Internal Structures are reinforced concrete and structural steel structures that support the reactar vessel and reactor coolant system. The primary 2.1.1 e6.iv.94
p SYSTEM EO+" (- shield wall supports and laterally surrounds the reactor vessel. The reactor vessel and reactor coolant system can be supported without the reactor cavity wall directly below the reactor vessel support corbels. The reactor vessel support corbels are constructed of reinforced concrete and are at least 10 feet thick. The secondary shield wall (crane wall) laterally surrounds the primary shield wall and is structurally connected to the primary shield wall by reinforced concrete slabs and walls. The secondary shield wall also provides support for the polar crane. The Containment Internal Structures provide a reactor cavity area below the reactor vessel which can be flooded with water. An indirect gas vent path is provided between the reactor cavity and the free volume of the Containment. The reactor cavity has a corium debris chamber. The reactor cavity floor is constructed with a limestone aggregate concrete with a minimum CACO3 content of 17 percent. The minimum floor thickness in the flat region of the cavity floor is 3.0 ft. The flat Door area is free from obstructions to corium debris spreading. The minimum flat floor area for the reactor cavity is 693 ft. . The reactor cavity sump is constructed with a limestone aggregate concrete having a minimum thickness of 3.2 feet. The Containment and its penetrations, shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12, are designed and constructed to ASME Code Section III, Class MC.' The Containment and its penetrations, shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12, retain their pressure boundary integrity associated with the design pressure of at least 53 psig. The Containment pressure boundary is evaluated to assure that the ASME Code Section III Service Level C stress limits are not exceeded for a Containment internal pressure of 120 psig. The Containment and its penetrations, shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12, maintain the Containment leakage rate less than the maximum allowable leakage rate associated with the peak containment pressure for the design basis accident. The NA consists of the Control Complex, the Diesel Generator Areas, the Fuel Handling Area, the Spent Fuel Storage Area, the Chemical and Volume Control System and Maintenance Area, and the Main Steam Valve Houses. The NA is a reinforced concrete and structural steel structure which is structurally conn:cted to the SB. The NA laterally surrounds the RB and is divided by a Divisional wall. The Seismic Category I NI Structures procide the features which accommodate the static and dynamic loads and load combinations which define the structural design basis. The design basis loads are those loads associated with: A O, 2.1J o6.it.,4
SYSTEM 80+" O ' Normal plant operation (including dead loads, live loads, lateral earth pressure loads, and equipment loads, including the effects of temperature and equipment sibration): External events (including rain, snow, wind, flood, tornado, tornado generated missiles, and carthquake); and Internal events (including flood, pipe rupture, equipment failure, and equipment failure generated missiles). The NI Structures, shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12, are Seismic Category I, except as noted on Figure 2.1.1-12. Flood doors, shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12, have sensors with open and closed status displays provided at a central fire alarm station. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.1.1-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Nuclear Island Structures. A b l
' The location of the NI Structures relative to the Turbine Building, the Component Cooling Water i System Heat Exchanger Structure, the Diesel Fuel Storage Structures, and the Radwaste Building is described in Sections 2.1.2,2.1.3,2.1.4, and 2.1.5, respectively.
I 2 The building dimensions and elevations provided in Figures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12 are provided i for information only and are not part of the certified design information. 2 Containment isolation devices are addressed in Section 2.4.5, Containment Isolation System. I i (D l () 2.1.1 *nu l 1
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f) % f~h V d d SYSTEM 80+* um.a tf0Its r0R rmuRES.
- 1. FLIK33 DOORS ARE PROvtCED IN FLOD3 BARRIERS AND PENE TRATIONS ARE SE ALED UP TO THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL FLOOD LEVELS.
* *N*M" SENSORS ARE PROVIDED ON FLOOD DO[PS VITH OPEN AND CLOSE ST ATUS INDICATICNS AT A MONITORED LOCAYTOR WTDTEAL E 3-NOUR FIRE RATED DOORS AND ELECTRICAL AND MECHANIC AL m'" E PENETRATION SE AL$ ARE PROV1CED FOR OPENINGS IN THE 3-HOUR FIRE RATED BARRIERS-O . catm 1 THE FOLLOVING STRUCTURES SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS DEPICTED ON TFESE FIGURES ARE NOT SEISMIC CATEGDRY I.
ruita sanssa D00RVAY OPENINGS VERTICAL ACCESS [FENINGS se rent saaesa STAIRS ELEVATORS g gm g UN!T VENT MEREVI A T fDNSe BLDG . . BUILDING CONT CONTAINMENT ELECT.. . ELECTRICAL ELEV- . ELEVAYOR EQUIP . EQUIPMENT HR HOUR NAINT . MAINTENANCE SYS SYSTEM NUCLEAR I! LAND STRUCitRES NOTES. LE[ ENDS AND ABBREV!ATIONS FIGURE 21.1-12 06-17-94
im N SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.1.1-1 NUCLEAR ISLAND STRUCTURES Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses AcceDiance Criteria 1.a) The Basic Configuration of the Nuclear 1.a) inspection of the Basic Configuration of 1.a) For the structures shown on Figures Island Structures is as shown on Figures the as-built Nuclear Island Structures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12, the Nuclear 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12. will be conducted. Island Structures conform with the Basic Configuration. 1.b) The top of the nuclear island basemat is 1.b) Inspection of the as-built nuclear island 1.b) The top of the nuclear island basemat is located 40.75 ft i 1.0 ft. below the basemat structure will be conducted. located 40.75 ft. i 1.0 ft below the finished grade elevation. finished grade elevation. 2.a) The Containment and its penetrations 2.a) Inspection for the existence of ASME 2.a) An ASME Code Design Report and shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through Code required documents will be Certified Material Test Report exists for 2.1.1-12 are designed and constructed to conducted. the Containment and its penetrations. ASME Code Section lit, Class MC. 2.b) The Containment and its penetrations 2.b) A pneumatic pressure test will be 2.b) The results of the pneumatic pressure shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through conducted on the Containment and its test on the Containment and its 2.1.1-12 retain their pressure boundary penetrations required to be pressure penetrations conform with the pressure integrity associated with the design tested by ASME Code Section 111. testing acceptance criteria in ASME pressure. Code Section 111. 2.c) The Containment and its penetrations 2.c) Inspection and leak rate testing on the 2.c) The results of the inspection and leak shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through Containment and its penetrations will be rate testing demonstrate that the 2.1.1-12 maintain the Containment conducted. Containment leakage rate is less than or leakage rate less than the maximum equal to 0.50 percent by volume of the allowable leakage rate associated with original content of Containment air at the peak containment pressure for the the peak containment pressure for the design basis accident. design basis accident during a 24 hour test period. 2.1.1 06-iv.,4
O fN G b d V SYSTEh! 80+= TABLE 2.1.1-1 (Continued) NUCLEAR ISLAND STRUCTURES Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. AnaIYSc5 Acceptance Criteria
- 3. The Nuclear Island Structures are 3. A structural analysis will be performed 3. A structural analysis report exists which Seismic Category I, except as noted on which reconciles the as-built data with concludes that the as-built Nuclear Figure 2.1.1-12, and will withstand the the structural design basis loads Island Structures will withstand the structural design basis loads specified in specified in the Design Description structural design basis loads specified in the Design Description (Section 2.1.1). (Section 2.1.1). the Design Description (Section 2.1.1).
- 4. Fh>od doors, shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 4. Inspection for existence of flood door 4. The flood door sensors and open and through 2.1.1-12, have sensors with sensors and open and closed status close status displays exist.
open and close status displays provided displays will be conducted. at a central fire alarm station.
- 5. The reactor cavity sump has a minimum 5. Inspection of the reactor cavity sump 5. The reactor cavity sump has a thickness of 3.2 feet. and/or inspection of reactor cavity sump minimum thickness of 3.2 feet.
construction records will be performed. The thickness of the reactor cavity sump from the bottom of the sump to the top surface of the lower portion of the embedded containment shell will be determined. 2.1.1 e5i7,4
\
l SYSTEM 80+" O 2.1.2 TURBINE BUILDING Design Description j The Turbine Building is a non-safety-related structure which houses the main turbine : generator and provides housing and support for power conversion cycle equipment )' and auxiliaries. There is no safety-related equipment in the Turbine Building. The Turbine Building is located on a separate foundation adjacent to the Nuclear Island j (N1) Structures. The Basic Configuration of the Turbine Building is as shown on Figure 2.1.2-1.' The Turbine Building contains a reinforced concrete turbine generator pedestal, and l a structural steel frame supporting bridge cranes, an operating floor, and a mezzanine. The structural components of the Turbine Building accommodate safe shutdown f earthquake (SSE) loads to the extent that the Turbine Building response to these j loads cannot result in a loss of safety function of the NI Structures or other safety- l related structures, systems, or components adjoining the turbine building. - The turbine generator orientation and projected low trajectory turbine missile path are as shown on Figure 2.1.2-1. O Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria j Table 2.1.2-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance l criteria for the Turbine Building. 1
)
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i \ / l TURRINE_t0W { l PRESSURE STAGES IN
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TUpBINE BUILDitt PLAN FIGURE 212-3 s/t r/se
) b o J SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.1.2-1 TURBINE BUILDING Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the Turbine 1. Inspection of the as-built Turbine 1. For the structure shown on Figure Building is as shown on Figure 2.1.2-1. Building configuration will be 2.1.2-1, the as-built Turbine Building conducted. conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The structural components of the 2. A structural analysis of the Turbine 2. A structural analysis report for the Turbine Building accommodate safe Building will be performed. Turbine Building exists which concludes shutdown earthquake loads to the extent that structural components of the that the Turbine Building response to Turbine Building accommodate safe those loads cannot result in a loss of shutdown earthquake loads to the extent safety function of the NI Structures, or that the Turbine Building response to other safety-related structures, systems, these loads cannot result in a loss of or compments adjoining the turbine safety function of the NI Stmetures or building. other safety-related structures, systems, or components adjoining the turbine building.
2.1.2
- n =4
I l
- i SYSW.M 80+" l 2.1.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGER !
STRUCTURES l Design Description Each of two Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchanger Structures houses : and provides protection and support for component cooling water heat exchangers , I ' l and supporting equipment. The CCW Heat Exchanger Structures are located outside I the projected low trajectory turbine missile path. ; The Basic Configuration of a CCW Heat Exchanger Structure is as shown on Figure l l 2.1.3-1. The CCW Heat Exchanger Structures are safety-related. 8 l The two CCW Heat Exchanger Structures provide personnel and equipment access, support for systems and components under operating loads, structura! components to withstand loads due to design basis external and internal events, and physical 1 separation between Divisions of safety-related equipment. : Each CCW Heat Exchanger Structure is a separate reinforced concrete structure constructed of slabs and shear walls, and contains a Division of CCW Heat Exchangers and CCW components. l Each CCW Heat Exchanger Structure provides features which accommodate the static I and dynamic loads and load combinations which define the structural design basis. The design basis loads are those associated with: Normal plant operation (including dead loads, live loads, and equipment loads, including the effects of temperature and vibration); 1 External events (including flood, wind, tornado, tornado generated missiles, l earthquake, rain, and snow); and Internal events (including flood, pipe rupture, equipment failure, and equipment failure generated missiles). CCW piping enters and exits a CCW Heat Exchanger Structure through underground vaults. The CCW pipe vaults are routed underground from the CCW Heat Exchanger Structure to the CCW pipe chases located on either side of the Nuclear Island (NI) Structures. Each CCW Heat Exchanger Structure is Seismic Category I. L i i !O l 2.1.3 5 :7 94 1 l ,_ -
- SYSTEM 80+"
/ 'n V Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.1.3-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for CCW Heat Exchanger Structures. r% U l
)
' The building dimensions and elevations provided in Figure 2.1.3-1 are provided for information only and are not intended to be part of the Certified Design information.
O 2.1.3 Sn.u
O v v SYS TEM 80+ '"
" 'Nh rtRE RATED 000Rs AND ELECte CAL AND MECHANICAL PENETRATION SEALS ARE PROVIDED r0R OPEN!NGS IN THE 3-HOUR FIRE RATED BARRIERS. 9 . stumv.,
- 2. TFE FOLLOVING STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS DEPICTED ON THIS FIGURE ARE NOT SEISMIC CATEGORY l' '
D00RVAY OPENINGS . Utr'E swis
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O O O SYmM 80+= TABLE 2.13-1 COMPONENT COOLING WATER 11 EAT F,XCIIANGER STRUCTURE Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. T:.e Basic Configuration of each I. Inspection of each as-built CCW lleat 1. For the structure shown on Figure Component Cooling Water (CCW) lleat Exchanger Structure will be conducted. 2.1.3-1, each CCW lleat Exchanger Exchanger Structure is as shown on Structure conforms with the Basic Figure 2.1.3-1. Configuration.
- 2. Each CCW IIeat Exchanger Structure is 2. Inspection of the location of each CCW 2. Each CCW IIeat Exchanger Structure is located outside the projected low IIeat Exchanger Structure will be located outside the projected low trajectory turbine missile path. performed. trajectory turbine missile path.
- 3. Each CCW lient Exchanger Structure is 3. A structural analysis will be performed 3. A structural analysis report exists which Seismic Category I and withstands the which reconciles the as-built data with concludes that each as-built CCW Ileat structural design basis loads specified in the structural design basis specified in Exchanger Structure withstands the the Design Description (Section 2.1.3). the Design Description (Section 2.1.3). structural design basis loads specified in the Design Description (Section 2.1.3).
2.1.3 os-i7-94
-- - - - - . . - - - --...--a ..---,.--_--a - e -, , e.--
l i i SYSTEM 80+" O 2.1.4 DIESEL FUEL STORAGE STRUCTURE Design Description Two separate Diesel Fuel Storage Structures (DFSSs) house and provide protection and support for the diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks and associated piping and equipment. The DFSSs are not connected to the Nuclear Island (NI) Structures except by underground diesel fuel transfer piping. The Basic Configuration of each DFSS is as shown on Figure 2.1.4-l'. The DFSSs l are safety-related. 1 The DFSSs are located outside the projected low trajectory turbine missile path. Each Diesel Fuel Storage Structure provides personnel and equipment access, support for systems and components under operating loads, and structural components to withstand loads due to design basis external and internal events. Each DFSS is a reinforced concrete vault containing two Fuel Storage Tank Areas and an attached equipment room and is constructed of slabs and shear walls. Each Fuel Storage Tank Area provides space for a diesel fuel oil storage tank and - associated piping and pumps. O Each DFSS provides features which accommodate the static and dynamic loads and i load combinations which define the structural design basis. The design basis loads are those associated with: Normal plant operation (including dead loads, live loads, lateral earth pressure loads, and equipment loads, including the effects of temperature and vibration); External events (including flood, wind, tornado, tornado generated missiles, earthquake, rain, and snow); and Internal events (including flood, pipe rupture, equipment failure, and - equipment failure generated missiles). The DFSSs are Seismic Category I. The two DFSSs are physically separated by their placement on opposite sides of the - NI Structures. L O 2.1.4 ow7-94 . l
^
1
<w SYSTEM 80+"
h Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.1.4-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Diesel Fuel Storage Structures. l l l D
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8 The building dimensions and elevations provided in Figure 2.1.4-1 are provided for information only and are not part of the Certified Design information. (
\> 2.1.4 OGI7-94
O O O SYSTEM 80 + '" " 1 HOUR FIRE RATED 000RS AND ELECTRICAL AND NECHANICAL PENETRATION SEALS ARE PROVIDED FOR OPENINGS IN THE 3-HOUR FIRE RATED BARRIERS g . ano.wa,
- 2. THE FULLOVjNG STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS DEPICTED ON THIS FIGURE ARE NOT SEISMIC CATEGORY I: vr.enat D00RVAY OPENINGS VERTICAL ACCESS UPENINGS
- 733l 1 STAIRS QU MENT ROOH a -o- -
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DIESEL ruEL STORAGE STRUCTURE rfGURE 214-I 6/1F/94
t I SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.1.4-1 DIESEL FUEL STORAGE STRUCTURE Inspections. Tests. Analvscs and Acceptance Criteria l l Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of each Diesel 1. Inspection of each as-built Diesel Fuel 1. For the structure shown on Figure Fuel Storage Structure is as shown on Storage Structure's configuration will be 2.1.4-1 each as-built Diesel Fuel Storage Figure 2.1.4-1. conducted. Structure conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The DFSSs are located outside the 2. Inspection of the location of the DFSSs 2. The DFSSs are located outside the projected low trajectory turbine missile will be performed. projected low trajectory turbine missile path, path.
- 3. Each Diesel Fuel Storage Structure is 3. A structural analysis will be performed 3. A structural analysis report exists which Seismic Category I and will withstand which reconciles the as-built data with concludes that each as-built Diesel Fuel the structural design basis loads as the structural design basis as specified in Storage Structure will withstand the specified in the Design Description the Design Description (Section 2.1.4). design basis loads as specified in the (Section 2.1.4). Design Description (Section 2.1.4).
l
- 4. The two DFSSs are physically separated 4. Inspection of the DFSSs will be 4. The two DFSSs are separated by the l by their placement on opposite sides of performed. Nuclear Island Structures. l the NI Structures.
i 2.1.4 os_iv.,4
SYSTEM 80+" 2.1.5 RADWASTE BUILDING Design Description The Radwaste Building is a non-safety-related structure that houses liquid and solid i radioactive waste management structures, systems, and components and provides containment for liquid and solid radioactive waste materials. The Radwaste Building is located on a separate basemat adjacent to the Nuclear Annex. A minimum gap of 6" between the structures will be provided. , The Basic Configuration of the Radwaste Building is as shown on Figure 2.1.5-1. l r The Radwaste Building consists of a reinforced concrete and structural steel structure. The structural components of the Radwaste Building accommodate safe shutdown j earthquake (SSE) loads such that the Radwaste Building response to these loads , cannot result in a loss of safety function of the adjoining NI Structures. The I Radwaste Building foundations and walls accommodate safe shutdown earthquake j i loads such that the maximum liquid inventory in the building is contained. i Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria i Table 2.1.5-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Radwaste Building. ! I l l l O 2.1.5 .6.it.,4 l
_ _. _ _ . .. ___ __. . . _ . . . - . . - . _ . . _ . . -_ . _ _ = . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ i A $YSTEM 00+" i 1 i t I i r------------- 7 I I i rw (win) # ~s g I
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SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.1.5-1 RADWASTE BUILDING Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the 1. Inspection of the as-built Radwaste 1. For the structure shown on Figure Radwaste Building is as shown on Building configuration will be 2.1.5-1, the as-built Radwaste Building Figure 2.1.5-1. conducted. conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The structural components of the 2. A structural analysis of the Radwaste 2. A structural analysis report for the Radwaste Building accommodate safe Building will be performed. Radwaste Building exists which shutdown earthquake loads such that the concludes that structural components of Radwaste Building response to these the Radwaste Building accommodate loads cannot result in a loss of safety safe shutdown earthquake loads such function of the adjoining NI Structures. that the Radwaste Building response to these loads cannot result in a loss of safety function of the adjacent NI Structures.
- 3. The Radwaste Building foundations and 3. A capacity analysis of the Radwaste 3. A capacity analysis report for the walls accommodate safe shutdown Building will be performed using as- Radwaste Building exists which earthquake loads such that the maximum built liquid inventory data, concludes that foundations and walls liquid inventory in the building is contain the maximum liquid inventory in contained. the building.
2.1.5 u-n-u
l 1 SYSTEM 80+" O 2.1.6 REACTOR VESSEL INTERNALS Design Description l The Reactor Vessel Internals consist of a Core Support Barrel (CSB) Assembly and l an Upper Guide Structure (UGS) Assembly. ! The Basic Configurations of the CSB and the UGS are as shown on Figures 2.1.6-1 i and 2.1.6-2, respectively. The Reactor Vessel Internals are safety-related. Dimensions of the core support barrel and the upper guide structure assembly are I listed in Table 2.1.6-1. . The CSB assembly is suspended from the reactor vessel flange. The CSB assembly provides support and location positioning for the fuel assembly lower end fittings. i The CSB assembly contains structural elements that provide an instrumentation guide : path from the lower vessel, and hydraulic flow paths through the vessel from the inlet nozzles to the upper end of the fuel assemblies. l 1 The core barrel assembly contains a grid structure which supports the core and f provides flow distribution from the lower plenum region to'the bottom of the fuel ! assemblies. The core shroud is part of the CSB assembly and provides an envelope i to direct the primary coolant flow through the core. Instrument nozzles in the grid j structure provide a guide path for in-core instruments from the reactor vessel lower head to the fuel assemblies. The UGS assembly is supported by the CSB upper flange and extends into the CSB ! assembly to engage the top of the fuel assemblies. The UGS assembly provides an '! insertion path for the control element assemblies (CEA). The UGS assembly contains [ structural elements which provide both a guide path and lateral support for the upper ; portion of the control element assemblies and extension shafts in the reactor vessel ! upper plenum region. The UGS assembly also provides guide paths for heated junction thermocouple (HJTC) assemblies. The CSB and UGS assemblies are designed and constructed in accordance with i ASME Code Section III Subsection NG requirements and are classified Seismic Category I. The reactor vessel internals maintain their integrity during normal operation, transients, and during SSE and design basis accident conditions not eliminated by leak-before-break evaluations. The material of construction for the CSB and UGS components is austenitic stainless steel with the exception of the Ibidown Ring, which is made of martensitic stainless steel. Cobalt base material, if used, is used only for hardsurfacing of wear parts. The Reactor Vessel Internals withstand the effects of flow induced vibration caused by the operation of the reactor coolant pumps. 2.1.6 ou7.,4
l l l 1 l SYSTEM 80+" Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.1.6-2 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Reactor Vessel Internals. i O l l l l O 2.1.6 <6i v. ,4 1 l l l
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SYSTEM 80+ TAHLE 2.1.6-1 NOMINAL DESIGN DIMENSION REACI'OR PRESSURE VESSEL INTERNALS COMPONENT NOMINAL DIMENSION CORE SUPPORT BARREL: Length in. 383 Inside diameter in. 157 Upper thickness in. 3 Outlet nozzle inside diameter in. 46-5/8 O UPPER GUIDE STRUCTURE ASSEMBLY: Outside barrel diameter in. 156 Barrel thickness in. 3 Fuel alignment plate diameter in. 156 i Note: These nominal dimensions are provided for information only and are not part of the Certified Design information. O 2.1.6 06-37 94 1
(3 (" v ( b3 SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.1.6-2 REACTOR VESSEL INTERNALS Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the Reactor 1. Inspection of the as-built Reactor Vessel 1. For the components and equipment Vessel Internals is as shown on Figures Internals will be conducted. shown on Figures 2.1.64 and 2.1.6-2, 2.1.6 1 and 2.1.6-2. the as-built Reactor Vessel Intemals conform with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The Core Support Barrel and Upper 2. Inspection will be performed of the 2. The completed ash 1E Code Section III Guide Structure are designed and ash 1E Code Section 111 required required Owner's Review of the ash 1E constructed in accordance with ash 1E Owner's Review of the ash 1E Design Design Report exists.
Code Section III Subsection NG Report. requirements and are classified Seismic Category I.
- 3. The Reactor Vessel Internals withstand 3.a) Testing will be performed to subject the 3.a) Testing and inspection results the effects of flow induced vibration Reactor Vessel Intemals to flow induced demonstrate that the Reactor Vessel caused by operation of the reactor vibration. Pre- and post-test visual Internals retain their integrity, coolant pumps. inspection will be performed on the Reactor Vessel Internals.
3.b) A vibration type test will be conducted 3.b) A vibration type test report exists and on the prototype reactor vessel internals. concludes that the prototype reactor vessel intemals retain their integrity and have no loose parts as a result of the test. 2.1.6 os.t7-,4
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l l SYSTEM 80+" 2.1.7 IN-CORE INSTRUMENT GUIDE TUBE SYSTEM Design Description The In-Core Instrument (ICI) Guide Tube System having guide tubes, supports, seal , housings and a seal table is safety related in that the guide tubes, and seal housing are ' pressure retaining components of the reactor coolant system. The Basic Configuration of the ICI guide tubes, seal housings, supports, and seal table is as shown on Figure 2.1.7-1. The ICI guide tubes serve as a guide path and provide support for the in-core detector assemblies. The ICI guide tubes connect to the bottom of the reactor vessel ; and terminate in a seal housing assembly located at the seal table. The ICI guide ; tubes and seal housings provide the reactor coolant pressure boundary for the ICI l guide path outside the reactor vessel. Pressure retaining seals are installed between - the seal housing and the in-core instrument, at the seal housing. The ICI supports and seal table support the ICI guide tubes and provide tube to tube spacing. The seal table also seals the ICI chase from water ingress during refueling. i The ASME Code Section III classification for the ICI guide tube pressure retaining , O components is shown on Figure 2.1.7-1. Components shown on Figure 2.1.7-1 are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Class 1 requirements. t The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.1.7-1 is classified Seismic Category i I. ; i Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria ; Table 2.1.7-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the ICI Guide Tubes System. , i l j i 1 0 2.1.7 wu i
SYSTEM 80+* ; O l l i gl S4 l SEAL HOUSINGS l AND SEAL TABLE I l NOTE 3 s NOTE 3 1 l Em g'_ _ _ _\g ;
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v ICI GUIDE TUBE SUPPORTS ' NOTES:
- 1. ICI GUIDE TUBES, SUPPORTS, SEAL HOUSING AND SEAL TABLE ARE ASME CODE CLASS 1 COMPONENTS.
- 2. ICI GUIDE TUBES AND SEAL HOUSINGS ARE PRESSURE RETAINING COMPONENTS.
- 3. THE SEAL TABLE ELEVATION IS AT THE SAME ELEVATION OR HIGHER THAN THE REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL CLOSUPE HEAD MATING SURFACE ELEVATION.
FIGURE 2.1.7-1 IN-CORE INSTRUMENTATION GUIDE TUBE SYSTEM os.iv.34
SMTEM 80+" TABLIr21.7-1 (h IN-CORE INSTRUMENT GUIDE TURE SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration for the ICI 1. Inspection of the as-built ICI Guide 1. For the components and equipment Guide Tube System is as shown on Tube System configuration will be shown on Figure 2.1.7-1, the as-built Figure 2.1.7-1. conducted. ICI Guide Tube System conforms with the Basic Configuration.
2.a) The ICI guide tubes and seal housings 2.a) A pressure test will be conducted on 2.a) The results of the pressure test of retain their pressure boundary integrity those portions of the ICI Guide Tube ASME Code Section III components of under internal pressures that will be System required to be pressure tested by the ICI guide tubes and seal housings experienced during service. the ASME Code Section III. conform with the pressure testing acceptance criteria in ASME Code Section III. 2.b) Components shown as ASME Code 2.b) Inspection of the ASME design reports 2.b) The ASME Code Section III design Class I on Figure 2.1.7-1 are designed will be conducted. reports exist for the ICS Guide Tube and constructed in accordance with System Class I components. ASME Code Class I requirements. 2.1.7 i v.,4
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jm SYSTEM 80+" V 2.2.1 NU~ CLEAR FUEL SYSTEM Design Description The Nuclear Fuel System (NFS) generates heat by a controlled nuclear reaction and transfers the heat generated to the reactor coolant. The NFS consists of an arrangement in the reactor vessel of fuel assemblies and control element assemblies (CEAs). The NFS has the safety-related functions of providing a barrier against the release of radioactive material generated by nuclear reactions in the nuclear fuel and providing a means to make the reactor core suberitical. The Basic Configuration of the fuel assembly, the CEAs, and their arrangement in the reactor core is as shown on Figures 2.2.1-12.2.1-2, and 2.2.1-3. The reactor core has a maximum of 241 fuel assemblies and a minimum of 93 CEAs. Each fuel assembly has fuel rods, spacer grids, guide tubes, and upper and lower end fittings. In each fuel assembly, a minimum of 236 locations are occupied by fuel rods or rods containing burnable neutron absorber material or other non-fuel material. The remaining locations are subdivided into symmetric regions, each of which contains one or more guide tubes. Each guide tube provides a channel for insertion of a CEA finger or an in-core instrument. Each guide tube is attached to fuel assembly spacer p grids and to fuel assembly upper and lower end fittings to provide a structural frame V to position the fuel rods. Each CEA has a maximum of 12 CEA fingers, each containing neutron absorbing material within a cylindrical, scaled metal tube. The CEA fingers are held in position at one end and are spaced to allow entry into the guide tubes of fuel assemblies. Each fuel rod has fissile material in the form of ceramic pellets. The fuel pellets in each fuel rod are contained within a cylindrical, sealed metal tube. Fuel rods can also contain burnable neutron absorbing material. Fuel rods can also be displaced by rods containing burnable neutron absorbing material or other non-fuel material. One or more fuel assemblies can have a neutron generating source located within a l guide tube. 1 I The fuel assemblics and CEAs are classified as Seismic Category I. The fuel assembly, fuel assembly components (including fuel rods and rods containing burnable neutron absorber material or other non-fuel material), and CEA materials are compatible with the reactor environment. , l Fuel rod failure is predicted not to occur during normal operation and anticipated I operational occurrences as a result of known fuel rod failure mechanisms during the design lifetime of the fuel. O V 2.2.1 % iv..,
SYSTEM 80+" Specified acceptable fuel design limits are predicted not to be exceeded during normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences during the design lifetime of the ) fuel. ; Coolability will be maintained for all design basis events. The CEAs are capable ofinsertion into the core during all modes of plant operation within the insertion time limits assumed in the plant safety analyses for those analyses which presume CEA insertion. The CEAs are capable of controlling reactivity changes to assure that under normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences, with appropriate margin for stuck CEAs, specified acceptable fuel design limits are predicted not to be exceeded. The potential amount and rate of reactivity insertion from the CEAs for design basis reactivity accidents are predicted not to result in (i) damage to the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) greater than limited local yielding, or (ii) disruption of the reactor core or reactor internals which would impair the capability to cool the core. In the power operating range, the net effect of the prompt inherent nuclear feedback characteristics (fuel temperature coefficient, moderator temperature coefficient, moderator void coefficient and moderator pressure coefficient) to an increase in reactor thermal power is predicted to be a decrease in reactivity. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.2.1-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Nuclear Fuel System. l l l 1 l l l 2.2.1 2- - u.u l l
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SYSTEM 80+" TAHLE 2.2.1-1 NUCLEAR FUEL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the fuel 1. Inspection of the as-built fuel 1. For the components and equipment assemblies, the CEAs, and the Nuclear assemblies, CEAs, and Nuclear Fuel shown on Figures 2.2.1-1 and 2.2.1-2.
Fuel System arrangement is as shown on System arrangement will be conducted. and the Nuclear Fuel System Figures 2.2.1-1, 2.2.1-2 and 2.2.1-3. arrangement shown on Figure 2.2.1-3, the fuel assemblies, CEAs, and Nuclear Fuel System arrangunent conform with the Basic Configuration. 1 i 2.2.1 ' os.i7.,4 .-- . _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ - _ . ---_____-_ ___ - _ _ _ _ __- --___ _. . . _ _ . - . . _ . _ _ . ~. . _ -. - . - -- -. _
l 1 i SYSTEM 80+" O 2.2.2 CONTROL ELEMENT DRIVE MECHANISM i Design Description i The control element drive mechanism is a magnetic jack device that positions and holds the control element assemblies relative to the fuel assemblies. . The primary safety-related function of the Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM) is to release the Control Element Assembly (CEA) upon termination of electrical power to the CEDM. A minimum of 93 CEDMs is required, however, a maximum of one hundred one CEDM can be installed. The CEDM also acts as a primary pressure boundary as part of the Reactor Coolant System. Refer to Section 2.3.1 for CEDM primary pressure boundary aspects. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria ! None He initial test program addressed in Section 2.11 will test the ability of the CEDM , to release the CEA upon termination of electrical power to the CEDM. The Basic Configuration of the CEDM primary pressure boundary components will be verified as part of Section 2.3.1. The CEDM pattern will be verified as part of Section 2.2.1. j i a i
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i O 2.2.2 -1 wn.u l 1 I
I SYSTEM 80+" ! O 2.3.1 RFsACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM l Design Description The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) removes heat generated in the reactor core and transfers the heat to the steam generators. The reactor coolant system forms part of the pressure and fission product boundary between the reactor coolant and the Contamment ; atmosphere. ; The Basic Configura' ion of the RCS is as shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4. The pressure retaining components of the RCS and the RCS instrumentation shown on r the figures, except as noted on the Figures, are safety related. l The RCS is located in the Containment and has a reactor vessel (RV), two vertical, U- i tube steam generators (SGs), four vertical, shaft sealed reactor coolant pumps (RCPs), l one pressurizer (PZR), four pressurizer safety valves, piping, heaters, controls, l instrumentation, and valves. The reactor vessel has a vessel assembly and a removable closure head assembly. The vessel assembly has a shell, lower head, and vessel flange forgings, welded together. ! The closure head assembly has a dome and head flange forgings, welded together. Forged reactor coolant inlet and outlet nozzles are welded to a shell section. Nozzles for control element drive mechanisms and instrumentation are welded to the closure head assembly, and nozzles for instrumentation are welded to the lower head forging. RCP seal injection flow is provided by the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS). The RCPs have anti-reverse rotation devices. The RCPs circulate reactor coolant water in loops through the RV to the SGs and back to the RV. The PZR provides a surge volume for the reactor coolant and pressurizes the RCS. RCS instrumentation has core exit thermocouples (CETs) in the in-core instrumentation (ICI) detector assemblies, heated junction thermocouples (HJTCs) in the 14TTC probe assemblies, and differential pressure-based level detectors between the shutdown cooling system (SCS) suction lines and two safety injection system (SIS) direct vessel injection (DVI) lines, and differential pressure-based level detectors between the SCS suction lines and the reactor coolant gas vent subsystem (RCGVS) in the safety depressurization system (SDS). Instrumentation is also provided to measure reactor coolant level across the venical span of the reactor vessel outlet nozzles. The pressurizer safety valves provide overpressure protection for reactor coolant pressure boundary components in the RCS. Low temperature overpressure protection for the RCS is provided by the shutdown cooling system (SCS). 2.3.1 iv.,4
1 l c SYSTEM 80+" The pressure retaining components of the reactor coolant pressure boundary that r.re made of ferritic materials meet the fracture toughness requirements of the ASME Code Section III. Reactor vessel beltline materials have Charpy upper shelf energy of no less than 75 ft.-lb. initially. The RV beltline materials are ; A-508 Class 2 or 3 for forgings and austenitic stainless steel or Ni-Cr-Fe alloy equivalent to SB-166 for cladding. The reactor vessel base metal in the active core region has a minimum thickness. l i The RV is equipped with holders for at least six capsules for accommodating material i ! surveillance specimens. Specimens taken from materials actually used in fabrication of l the belt line region are inserted in the capsules and include Charpy V-notch specimens , i of base metal, weld metal and heat-affected zone material, and tensile specimens from base metal and weld metal. l The RCPs circulate coolant at a rate which removes heat generated in the reactor core. l Each RCP motor has a flywheel which retains its integrity at a design overspeed ! condition of 125 percent of operating speed. Each RCP has rotating inenia to slow the pump flow coastdown when electrical power is disconnected Each SG steam outlet nozzle has an integral flow-limiting venturi. Each direct vessel injection nozzle cross sectional flow area is limited. The ASME Code Section III Class for the RCS pressure retaining components shown on , Figures 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.14 is as depicted on the Figures. Components shown as I ASME Code Class 1 on Figures 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4 are designed and constructed l in accordance with ASME Code Class I requirements. The RV pressure boundary welds l are ultrasonically examined during construction in accordance with ASME Code Section XI as it pertains to pre-service baseline inspection. The safety related equipment shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.14 is classified Seismic Category I. ASME Class I and 2 components shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.14 have a design pressure of at least 2485 psig and a design temperature of at least 650*F, except l the ASME Class 2 portions of the steam generator on Figures 2.3.1-1 and 2.3.14, which have a design pressure of at least 1185 psig and a design temperature of at least 570*F. Displays of the RCS instrumentation shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.14 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. C 2.3.1 wu l i l
s SYSTEM 80+"
\
l Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the RCPs, open and close those power operated valves shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4, and energize or de-energize the pressurizer heaters. l Two pressurizer backup heater banks are powered from different Class IE Divisions. The other pressurizer heaters, the reactor coolant pump motors, and power-operated valves shown on Figure 2.3.1-1 are powered from non-Class 1E sources. Instrumentation shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4 is powered from its respective Class IE Division except as follows: the instrumentation to measure reactor coolant level across the vertical span of the reactor vessel outlet nozzles, the refueling water level instruments , between the SCS suction lines and safety injection system lines, and the refueling water level instruments between the SCS suction lines and the SDS on Figure 2.3.1-1 are powered from non-Class IE sources. Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, in the RCS. Valves with response positions indicated on Figure 2.3.1-1 change position to that indicated on the figure upon loss of motive power. l Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.3.1-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Reactor Coolant System. O V 1 l l l l 2.3.1 u.nm l l
O O l SYSTEM 80 +'" SPRAY lCVCS)
-4 O
r r I [ FC - d Qa rc rSmEn, CHARGmG Las ; m3CTeN g iCvC --+- , ISTE seal-l g MXCTION g4---- g ( oETAmt(CVCS.). 6_ L .'
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M S RCP EM RCP p) Nort,. r - - - - - - - - :- - - - - - #di nCP~E I FROM SEALS I
- 1. SG TUeES ARE AsME CODE SECTION M CLAs31. worg g g
& TUBE SfDE IS CLASS 1 AND SHELL SIDE IS NON-AsME SECTION BL I CVCS S.
- 1 EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH PARAGRAPH NUMBER S OF THE 'VERIFICATONS FOR BASIC CONFIGURATION FOR I"~~ N o gEA S SYSTEMS
- SECTON OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS (SECTON 1.4 APPLIES. l l
- 4. FOR NsTRUMENTS,THE NUMBER OF REDUNDANT DETECTORS AND CHANNELS is LISTED N PARENTHESES. g 1
S.THE INSTRUMENTATON (EXCEPT THE LEVELINsTRUMENTS) AND AsME CODE SECTMN N CLAs51 AND 2 1P PRESSURE RETAINING COMPONENTS SHOWN ARE SAFETY RELATED. THE SAFETY & ELATEDINsTRUMENTATION l 0 ANo Two SETS OF PREsSURRER ELECTRICAL HEATERS ARE POWERED FROM THEIR RESPECTfvE CLASS 1E DmSmN- (---- ;g,g;,g ,,------ g C FIGURE 2.3.1-1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 06-1744
(v3 O V Cd SYSTEM 80 +* henar CODF RFI' TION til CLASS I LLM gs
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RCGVS (SDS)M- - - - @ a
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! RCGVS (SDS)4 - - - - - - - -
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ED ED 1 I t I I l l NOTES: ED ED EQU!PMENT FOR WHICH PAR AGRAPH NUMBER 3 ELECTRICAL PRESSURIZER
- 1. g: OF THE ' VERIFICATIONS FOR BASIC CONFIGURATION HEATERS FOR SYSTEMS
- SECTION OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS (SECTION 1.2) APPUES.
- 2. THE INSTRUMENTATION AND ASME CODE SECTION III C O SURGE UNE CLASS 1 AND 2 PRESSURE RETAINING COMPONENTS SHOWN ARE SAFETY RELATED. THEINSTRUMENTATION AND TWO SETS OF PRESSURIZER ELECTRICAL HEATERS ARE '
POWER ED FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE CLASS 1E DIVISION. REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (PRESSURIZER) 06-17-94
SYSTEM 80+* NOZZLE SCHEDULE CEDM UPPER SERVICE NO. PRESSURE HOUSING l COOLANT INLET 4 CEDM AND COOLANT OUTLET 2 INSTRUMENTATION NOZZLES CEDM AND NCEDM MOTOR INSTRUMEIRATION HOUSING ASSEMBLY NO771 FR (MINIMUM) 3g3 ,,,,,,t,,,,,,,,,,y,,, IN-CORE INSTRUMENTATION 61 M d VENT-RCGVS 1 CLOSURE l SEAL LEAK MONITOR DIRECT VESSEL INJ. 1 4 VENT-RCGVS
'/
[ MATING SURFACE SEAL LEAK ' M.ONITOR# NHEATED A F JUNCTION DVINOZZLE THERMOCOUPLE g (
-[q PROBES ([ 4 l
(MINIMUM OF 2) l OUTLET OZZLE j v O t CORE EXIT f THERMOCOUPLE % BASE METAL THICKNESS IN CORE REGION ---* +-- D' G LETTER DIMENSIONS (INCHES)(NOTE 21 A 196.32 B 30.00 C 42.00 D 9.06 E 182.25 E r F 8.5 G 469.35 NOTES:
- 1. The Reactor Vessel Pressure Retaining Components are ASME Code Section ill Class 1 and are Safety-Related
- 2. The dimensions in this Figure are I provided for information only and are not N INSTRUMENTATION part of the Certified Design Material. NOZZLES FIGURE 2.3.1-3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM os 17-94 (REACTOR VESSEL)
(o-SYSTEM 80 +TM O Cr usSS AA m STEAM O* GENERATOR P FEEDWATER L L SYSTEM
-> N j(
EMERGENCY ! FEEDWATER - - - SYSTEM L L To FEEDWATER --> $ SYSTEM --> u 2 E 2 SG BLOWOOWN 4-SYSTEM q O (ONE OF TWO O CONNECTIONS E SHOWN) 8 RCS SUCTION LEG RCS HOT LEG f
.sL NOTES:
1.TWO OF FOUR INSTRUMENT CHANNELS ARE SHOWN. OTHER TWO CHANNELS ARE ARRANGED SIMILARLY.
- 2. * : EOUIPMENT FOR WHICH PARAGRAPH NUMBER 3 OF THE ' VERIFICATION FOR BASIC CONFIGURATION FOR SYSTEMS
- SECTION OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS (SECTION 1.2) APPLIES.
3.THE INSTRUMENTATION AND ASME CODE SECTION lli CLASS 1 AND 2 PRESSURE RETAINING COMPONENTS SHOWN ARE SAFETY. RELATED. THE SAFETY-RELATED INSTRUMENTATION IS POWERED FROM ITS RESPECTIVE CLASS 1E DIVISION. 06-17-94 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (STEAM GENERATOR )
O O O SYSTEM 80+a TABLE 2.3.1-1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM InsDections. Tests. Analyses. and AcceDiance Criteria Desien Commitment InSDections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the RCS is 1. Inspection of the as-built RCS 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through configuration will be conducted. shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4. 2.3.1-4, the as-built RCS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The pressurizer safety valves provide 2.a) Testing and analysis in accordance with 2.a) Pressurizer Safety Valve set pressure overpressure protection for reactor ASME Code Section 111 will be equals 2500 psia i 25 psi.
coolant pressure boundary components performed to determine set pressure. in the RCS. b) Type tests of flow capacity of the b) The minimum valve capacity is 525,000 pressurizer safety valves will be Ib/hr steam. performed in accordance with ASME Code Section III. c) Type tests of the pressurizer safety c) The pressurizer safety valves have been valves at full flow and full pressure will type tested at inlet pressures of at least be performed. 2575 psia and the measured valve stem lift is greater than or equal to full flow lift.
- 3. RV beltline materials have Charpy 3. Testing of Charpy V-notch specimens of 3. The initial RV beltline Charpy upper upper-shelf energy of no less than 75 ft- RCS beltline materials will be shelf energy is no less than 75 ft-lb.
Ib initially. performed. 2.3.1 o6-i7.,4
- _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ___ ____-__ _ _____- _-_-___________ __-_-__-_ ___--_ -_ ___ ____-__
, s s
)
SYSTEM 80+" 16BI4 2.3.1-1 (Continued) REACTOR COOLANT . STEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 4.a) The RV beltline materials ara SA-508 4.a) Inspection of the RV beltline material 4.a) He RV beltline materials are SA-508 Class 2 or 3 for forgings and austenitic test reports will be conducted. Class 2 or 3 for forgings and austenitic stainless stcel or Ni-Cr-Fe alloy stainless steel or Ni-Cr-Fe alloy equivalent to SB-166 for cladding. equivalent to SB-166 for cladding. 4.b) The reactor vessel base metal in the 4.b) Inspection of the as-built RV will be 4.b) The RV base metal in the active core active core region has a minimum performed. region is at least 9.06 inches thick. thickness. '
- 5. The RV is equipped with holders for at 5. Inspection of the RV for presence of 5. At least six capsules are in the reactor least six capsules for accommodating capsules will be performed. vessel.
material surveillance specimens.
- 6. RV material specimens taken from the 6. Inspection of RV material specimet.s 6. RV material specimens are made faom actual material from which the vessel will be performed. material used in RV fabrication, and was fabricated are inserted in the include Charpy V-notch specimens of capsules, and include Charpy V-notch base metal, weld metal, and heat-specimens of base metal, weld metal, affected zone material, and tensile and heat-affected zone material, and specimens from base metal and weld tensile specimens from base metal and metal.
weld metal. 7.a) The RCPs circulate coolant at a rate 7.a) Testing to measure RCS flow with four 7.a) Calculated post-core RCS flow rate is at which removes heat generated in the RCPs operating at normal zero reactor least 95 percent of 445,600 gallons per reactor core. power pressure and temperature minute (423,320 gpm). conditions will be performed. Analyses to convert the measured pre-core flow rate to an expected post-core flow rate will be performed. 2.3.1 e6-n-u
O v Q
~J SYSTFAI 80+= TABLE 2.3.1-1 (Continued)
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM InSDections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptarae Criteria 7.b) Each RCP motor has a flywheel which 7 b) Shop testing of each RCP flywheel will 7. Each RCP flywheel has passed an retains its integrity at 125 % of operating be performed at the vendor facility at overspeed test of no less than 125% of speed. overspeed conditions. operating speed. 7.c) Each RCP has rotating inertia to slow 7.c) inspection of as-built RCP vendor data 7.c) The rotating inertia of each RCP and the pump flow coastdown when will be performed. motor assembly is no less than 147,401 electrical power is disconnected. pounds-foot squared.
- 8. Each steam generator steam outlet 8. Inspection of as-built. SG steam outlet 8. Each SG steam outlet nozzle has an nozzle has an integral flow-limiting nozzles will be performed, integral venturi with a throat area no venturi. greater than 1.283 square feet.
- 9. Each direct vessel injection nozzle cross 9. Inspection of as-built direct vessel 9. Each direct vessel nozzle has a cross sectional flow area is limited. injection nozzles will be performed. sectional flow area no greater than 56.75 quare inches.
10.a) He ASME Code Section III RCS 10.a) A pressure test will be conducted on 10.a) The results of the pressure test of the components shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 those components of the RCS required ASME Code Section III components of through 2.3.1-4 retain their pressure to be pressure tested by ASME Code the RCS conform with the pressure boundary integrity under intemal Section III. testing acceptance criteria in the ASME pressures that will be experienced Code Section III. during service. 10.b) Components shown as ASME Code 10.b) Inspection of the ASME design reports 10.b) The ASME Code Section 111 design Class I on Figures 2.3.1-1 through will be conducted. reports exist for the RCS Class 1 2.3.1-4 are designed and constructed in components. accordance with ASME Code Class I requirements. 2.3.1 os t7-,4
A O p U d d SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.3.1-1 (Continued) REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM IESDeClions. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 11.a) Displays of the RCS instrumentation i1.a) Inspection for the existence or 11.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown l shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through retrievability in the MCR of on Figures 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4 exist 2.3.1-4 exist in the MCR or can be instrumentation displays will be in the MCR or can be retrieved there. retrieved there. performed. II.b) Controls exist in the MCR to start and ll.b) Testing will be performed using the ll.b) RCS controls in the MCR operate to stop the RCPs, to open and close those RCS controls in the MCR. stut and stop the RCPs, to open and power operated valves shown on Figures close those power operated valves 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4, and to energize shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through or de-energize the pressurizer heaters. 2.3.1-4, and to energize or de-energize the pressurizer heaters. 12.a) Two pressurizer backup heater banks 12.a) Testing will be performed on the 12.a) Within the RCS, a test signal exists only are powered from different Class IE pressurizer heaters by providing a test at the equipment powered from the Divisions. signal in only one Class IE Division at Class IE Division or bus under test. a time. 12.b) Instrumentation . shown on Figures 12.b) Testing will be performed on the Class 12.b) Within the RCS, a test signal exists only 2.3.1-I through 2.3.1-4 is powered from IE instrumentation shown on Figures at the equipment powered from the its respective Class IE bus, except as 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4 by providing a Class IE Division or bus under test. listed in the Design Description. test signal in only one Class IE bus at a time. 12.c) Independence is provided between Class 12.c) Inspection of the as-installed Class 1E 12.c) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions of the RCS will be performed. 1E Divisions in the RCS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, separation exists between Class IE in the RCS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the RCS. 2.3.1 e6-i7-,4
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.3.1-1 (Continued) REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria l Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria l 13. Valves with response positionsindicated 13. Testing of loss of motive power to these 13. These valves change position to the on Figure 2.3.1-1 change position to valves will be performed. position indicated on Figure 2.3.1-1 on i that indicated on the figure upon loss of hiss of motive power. i motive power. l l l 1 l 2.3.1 e6-i7-,4
l i l p SYSTEM 80+" 2.3.2 SHUrDOWN COOLING SYSTEM Design Description The Shutdown Cooling System (SCS)is a safety-related system which removes heat from the reactor coolant and transfers the heat to the component cooling water system (CCWS) during reduced reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure and temperature conditions. The SCS can be aligned to remove heat from the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) and transfer the heat to the CCWS. The SCS is actuated manually. The SCS provides low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) for the RCS. The SCS is located in the reactor building subsphere and Containment. The Basic Configuration of the SCS is as shown on Figure 2.3.2-1. The SCS consists of two Divisions. Each SCS Dhision has a SCS pump, a SCS heat exchanger, valves, piping, controls, and instrumentation. Each SCS Division has the heat removal capacity to cool the reactor coolant from SCS entry conditions to cold shutdown conditions, within 36 hours after reactor n shutdown, assuming SCS operation commences no later than 14 hours after reactor Q shutdown. Each SCS Division has the heat removal capacity to cool the IRWST after design bases events or feed and bleed operation using the SIS and SDS. Each SCS Division contains a relief valve that provides LTOP for the RCS when the RCS is connected to the SCS. The SCS pump and the containment spray system (CSS) pump in the same Division are connected by piping and valves such that the CSS pump in a Di ision can perform the pumping function of the SCS pump in that Dhision. The piping and valves in the cross-connect line between the SCS pump suction and the CSS pump suction permit flow in either direction. In each Division, a flow-limiting device is installed downstream from the SCS pump discharge between the cross-connect line from the CSS pump discharge and the Containment isoladon valves in the SCS pump discharge line to limit runout flow. The piping from the RCS to the SCS pump suction is self venting and contains no loop seals. The SCS pumps can be tested at design flow during plant operation. / O 2.3.2 .I- w-tr.w e
SYSTEM 80+" The ASME Code Section III Class for the SCS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.3.2-1 is as depicted on the Figure. Safety related equipment shown on Figure 2.3.2-1 is classified Seismic Category I. SCS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.3.2-1, except the shell sides of heat exchangers, have a design pressure of at least 900 psig. Displays of the SCS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.3.2-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the SCS pumps, and to open and close those power operated valves shown on Figure 2.3.2-1. SCS alarms shown on Figure 23.2-1 are provided in the MCR. Water is supplied to each SCS pump at a pressure greater than the pump's required net positive suction head (NPSH) during expected operations. The Class 1E loads shown on Figure 23.2-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E Division. The SCS pump motor and the CSS pump motor in each Division are powered from different Class IE buses in that Division. I ,e Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions, and between Class 1E ( Divisions and non-Class 1E equipment,in the SCS. The two mechanical Divisions of the SCS are physically separated. A containment spray actuation signal (CSAS) can be aligned to start an SCS pump when the CSS pump in the same Division is not operable. If the CSAS is aligned to start the SCS pump in a Division, the CSS pump in the same Division will not start on a CSAS. SCS suction line isolation valves have independent interlocks to prevent opening the isolation valves if reactor coolant pressure would cause the SCS LTOP relief valve to lift. Motor operated valves (MOVs) having an active safety function will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under differential pressure or fluid flow conditions and under temperature conditions. O 2.3.2 05:7.,4 i i
n EYSTEM 80+" U Check valves shown on Figure 2.3.2-1 will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under system pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.3.2-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Shutdown Cooling System. x
)
l 1 l l 1 l l l l /~~'\ V 2.3.2 Si7-94
SYSTEg0+w (sl o V l CN SIS (TO DVt) 4- 'A h l ASME CODE SECTON RI CLASS l l Ed l LTOP RELI- - CSS CSS HOLDUP + VALVE I l VOLUME TANK Nb 3 M (NOTE 5)" " RCSl HOT -
"r="ea 4(D ---
+
SCS HX NOTE 1 g I "
. . CCW C"
g MINIFLOW HX SIS ' NOTE 1h g T INSIDE OUTSOE CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT b'h
- b SIS (TO IRWST) 4 --8)b#
l ( 1 NOTE: ($ 1.TUBESIDEIS ASME CODE SECTON tilCLASS 2 AND SHELLSIDEIS ASME CODE SECTION lit CLASS 3.
- 2. SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND EOUTPMENT SHOWN ON THtS FIGURE AFtE CLASS 1E. ALARMS AND PRESSURE AND CURRENT INSTRUMENTS ARE NOT SAFETY. RELATED AND NOT CLASS 1E.
- 3. NECUIPMENT FOR WHICH PARAGRAPH NUMBER 3 OF THE
- VERIFICATION FOR BASIC CONFIGURATION FOR SYSTEMS" SECTON OF THE GENERAL PFtOVISDNS (SECTON 1.2) APPLIES.
- 4. THE ASME CODE SECTION 111 CLASS 1 ANO 2 PRESSURE RETAINING COMPONENTS SHOWN ARE SAFETY.RELATED.
S. ONLY WHEN THE CSAS IS ALIGNED TO THE SOS PUMP. FIGURE 2.3.2-1 SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM o+ '"4 (ONE OF TWO DIVISIONS)
O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 23.2-1 SIIUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the SCS is 1. Inspection of the as-built SCS 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.3.2-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.3.2-1, the as-built SCS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
2.a) Each SCS Division has the heat removal 2.a) Testing and analysis of the SCS to 2.a) Flow through the SCS heat exchanger capacity to cool the reactor coolant from measure pump head and the shutdown and heat exchanger bypass line cart be SCS entry conditions to cold shutdown cooling flow at the combined discharge adjusted while maintaining a flow of no conditions. of the SCS heat exchanger and heat less than 5000 gpm per Division. Each exchanger bypass line will be per- SCS pump provides at least 400 feet of formed. Testing, inspection, and head at a flow rate no less than 5000 analyses will be performed to determine gpm. The heat removal capability of the heat removal capability of the SCS one SCS Division, as measured by the heat exchanger. product of the service heat transfer coefficient and the efrective heat transfer area of the SCS heat exchanger is no less than 1.38 x 108 BTU /hr 'F. 2.b) Each SCS Division has the heat removal 2.b) Testing and analyses of the SCS to 2.b) Each SCS pump develops at least 400 capacity to cool the IRWST after design measure pump head and flow at the feet of head at a flow rate no less than bases events or feed and bleed operation combined discharge of the SCS heat 5000 gpm. using the SIS and SDS. exchanger, with suction and retum lines aligned to the IRWST, will be
- performed.
i l 2.3.2 e i7.,4
O O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.3.2-1 (Continued) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 3. Each SCS Division contains a relief 3. Shop testing of the LTOP relief valve 3. LTOP relief valve set pressure is not valve that provides LTOP for the RCS set pressure will be performed. Shop greater than 545 psia and each valve has when the RCS is connected to the SCS. testing and analyses of the LTOP relief a capacity of no less than 5000 gpm.
valves capacity will be conducted in accordance with ASME Code Section III.
- 4. The CSS pump in a Division can 4. Testing to measure the flowrate 4. The CSS purnp in a Division develops at perform the function of the SCS pump produced by the CSS pump, when its least 400 ft of head at a flow of at least in the Division. suction is cross-connected to the SCS 5000 gpm through the SCS heat pump suction and its discharge to the exchanger in the Division.
SCS pump discharge, will be performed.
- 5. In each Division, a flow limiting device 5. Testing will be performed with flow 5. In each Division, a flow limiting device is installed downstream from the SCS aligned to the RCS (suction from the is installed downstream from the SCS pump discharge between the cross- hot leg and discharge to the direct vessel pump discharge between the cross-connect line frem the CSS pump injection nozzle.) connect line from the CSS pump discharge and the Containment isolation discharge and the containment isolation valves to limit runout flow. valves. The SCS maximum flow is less than or equal to 6500 gpm in each Division.
- 6. The piping from the RCS to the SCS 6. Inspection of the as-built piping will be 6. The piping from the RCS to the SCS pump suction is self-venting and conducted, pump suction has no loop seals and is cor.tains no loop seals.
oriented downward or horizontal except for an upward section connecting to the pump suction flange. 2.3.2 i r.,4 m '
O O O , SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.3.2-1 (Continued) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 7. The SCS pumps can be tested at design 7. Testing and analysis of the SCS will be 7. Each SCS pump develops at least 400 ft flow during plant operation. performed by manually aligning suction of head at a flow of at least 5000 gpm and discharge valves to the IRWST and through the test loop.
starting the SCS pumps manually.
- 8. The ash 1E Code Section III SCS 8. A pressure test will be conducted on 8. The results of the pressure test of components shown on Figure 2.3.2-1 those components of the SCS required to ASME Code Section III components of retain their pressure boundary integrity be pressure tested by ASME Code the SCS conform with the pressure under intemal pressures that will be Section III. testing acceptance criteria in ash 1E experienced during service. Code Section III.
9.a) Displays of the SCS instrumentation 9.a) Inspection for the existence or 9.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.3.2-1 exist in the retrieveability in the htCR of on Figure 2.3.2-1 exist in the htCR or h1CR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there. performed. 9.b) Controls exist in the h1CR to start and 9.b) Testing will be performed using the SCS 9.b) SCS controls in the hfCR operate to stop the SCS pumps, and to open and controls in the htCR. start and stop the SCS pumps, and to close those power operated valves open and close those power operated shown on Figure 2.3.2-1. valves shown in Figure 2.3.2-1. 9.c) SCS alarms shown'on Figure 2.3.2-1 9.c) Testing of the SCS alarms shown on 9.c) The SCS alarms shown on Figure 2.3.2-are provided in the htCR. Figure 2.3.2-1 will be performed using i actuate in the h1CR in response to a signals simulating alarm conditions. signal simulating alarm conditions.
- 10. Water is supplied to each SCS pump at 10. Testing to measure SCS pump suction 10. The calculated available NPSil exceeds a pressure greater than the pump's pressure will be performed. Inspections each SCS pump's required NPSil.
required net positive suction head and analyses to determine NPSII (NPSII). available to each pump will be prepared based on test data and as-built data. 2.3.2 o6 ir.,4
- p. /%.
d (.) SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.3.2-1 (Continued) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria i1.a) Class 1E loads shown on Figure 2.3.2-1 11.a) Testing will be performed on the SCS 11.a) Within the SCS, a test signal exists only are powered from their respective Class by providing a test signal in only one at the equipment powered from the IE Division. Class IE Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. II.b) The SCS pump motor and the CSS ll.b) Testing on the SCS and the CSS will be ll.b) A test signal exists only at the SCS pump motor in each Division are conducted with a test signal applied to pump motor or CSS pump motor powered from different Class IE buses one class IE bus at a time. powered from the Class IE bus under in that Division. test. I1.c) Independence is provided between Class 11.c) Inspection of the as-installed Class !E I1.c) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions of the SCS will be performed. IE Divisions in the SCS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, separation exists between Class IE in the SCS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the SCS.
- 12. The two mechanical Divisions of the 12. Inspection of the as-built SCS 12. He two mechanical Divisions of the SCS are physically separated. mechanical Divisions will be performed. SCS are separated by a Divi-sional wall or a fire barrier except for components of the system within Containment which are sep-arated by spatial arrangement or barriers.
- 13. SCS suction line isolation valves have 13. Testing using a simulated RCS pressure 13. The SCS suction isolation valves do not independent interlocks to prevent signal greater than the SCS suction line open.
opening the isolation valves if RCS valves interlock pressure will be pressure would cause the SCS LTOP performed by attempting to open the relief valve to lift. valves from the MCR. Each valve will be tested independently. 2.3.2 e6 i7-,4
h O (d V SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 23.2-1 (Continued) SilUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 14. hiotor operated valves (h10Vs) having 14. Testing will be performed to open, or 14. Each h10V having an active safety an active safety function will open, or close, or open and also close, hiOVs function opens, or closes, or opens and will close, or will open and also close, having an active safety function under also closes, under differential pressure or fluid flow preoperational differential pressure or conditions and under temperature fluid flow conditions and ender conditions. temperature conditions.
- 15. Check valves shown on Figure 2.3.2-1 15. Testing will be performed to open, or 15. Each check valve shown on Figure will open, or will close, or will open close, or open and also close check 2.3.2-1 opens, or closes, or opens and and also close under system pressure, valves shown on Figure 2.3.2-1 under also closes.
fluid flow conditions, or temperature system preoperational pressure, fluid conditions. flow conditions or temperature conditions. Au
- 16. A containment spray actuation signal 16. Testing will be performed with the 16. A signal simulating a CSAS starts the (CSAS) can be aligned to start an SCS CSAS aligned to start the SCS pump SCS pump in a Division and does not pump when the CSS pump in the same using a signal simulating a CSAS. start the CSS pump in the same Division is not operable. If the CSAS is Division, when the CSAS is aligned to aligned to start the SCS pump in a start the SCS pump.
Division, the CSS pump in the same Division will not start on a CSAS. 2.3.2 .6.i7 94
l I i i g SYSTEM 80+" l V 1 233 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM COMPONENT SUPPORTS Design Description The reactor vessel, the steam generators, the reactor coolant pumps and the pressurizer are supported by the reactor coolant system (RCS) component supports. The RCS component supports permit movement of the RCS components due to expansion and contraction of the RCS. The component supports are safety related. The RCS component supports are located within the containment. The four reactor vessel support columns vertically support the reactor vessel and accommodate horizontal thermal expansion. Each reactor vessel nozzle cold leg forging mates with a reactor vessel support column and serves as a key which mates with a keyway. Lower keys protruding from the reactor vessel mate with a slot in ! cach support column base plate. The slot in the support column base plate serves as a keyway. These horizontal keys and keyways guide the vessel during expansion and contraction of the RCS, maintain the vessel centerline position, and laterally support the vessel. ' Hie Basic Configuration of the Reactor Vessel Supports is as shown on Figure 2.3.3-1. i Each steam generator (SG) is supported at the bottom by an integral skirt attached to a sliding base plate resting on bearings. The bearings allow the SG to move as the RCS expands and contracts. Keys and keyways within the sliding base guide the movement of the SG during expansion and contraction of the RCS and limit movement of the SG bottom in the direction at right angles to the direction of motion during RCS expansion and contraction. The upper portion of the SG is supported by a system of keys, keyways and snubbers. The upper SG support system guides the ; top of the steam generator during expansion and contraction of the RCS and laterally , supports the SG. The Basic Configuration of the SG Supports is as shown on Figure 2.3.3-2. l Each reactor coolant pump (RCP) is supported by vertical columns, lower and upper horizontal columns, and snubbers. The columns provide vertical and horizontal i support of the RCP, while allowing movement of the RCP during expansion and l contraction of the RCS. The Basic Configuration of the RCP Supports is as shown i on Figure 2.3.3-3. I The pressurizer is supported at the bottom by an integral skirt. Keys and keyways l provide lateral support of the upper portion of the pressurizer. The Basic ! Configuration of the Pressurizer Supports is as shown on Figure 2.3.3-4. i The RCS Supports are designed for loads due to normal operation, testing, seismic, and accident conditions. O 2.3.3 o6.iv.94 l l
es SYSTEM 80+" (J) The Reactor Coolant System Component Supports are designed and constructed in accordance with the ASME Code, Section III requirements and are classified Seismic Category I. Inspection, Test, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.3.31 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Reactor Coolant System Component Supports. t J l 1 i i 1 l 1 I l
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SYSTEM 80+* I _,._,j HOT LEG AXIS C f
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UPPER SUPPORTS O riouRE 2.3.3 2 STEAM GENERATOR SUPPORTS oe-n-s4 i
l SYSTEM 80+" m l r~^ l I I I f MOTOR MOTORy I f '
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SYSTEM 80+* i O . I i l l KEYS I i O i l l 1 k r
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O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 233-1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM COMPONENT SUPPORTS Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The RCS component surports permit 1. A test of the RCS will be performed to 1. Required gaps exist for the RCS movement of the RCS components due monitor thermal motion during heatup component supports.
to expansion and contraction of the and cooldown of the RCS. RCS.
- 2. The Reactor Coolant System Component 2. Inspection will be performed for the 2. ASME Code Section III Design Reports Supports are designed and constructed in existence of the ASME Code Section III exist for the Reactor Coolant System accord & ace with the ASME Code, Design Reports for the Reactor Coolant Component Supports.
Section III. System Component Supports.
- 3. The Basic Configuration of the RCS 3. Inspection of the as-built RCS 3. For the RCS Component Supports Component Supports is as shown on Component Supports configuration will shown on Figures 2.3.3-1 through Figures 2.3.31 through 2.3.3-4. he conducted. 2.3.3-4, the as-built RCS Component Supports conform with the Basic Configuration.
- 4. The as-built RCS Component Supports 4. Inspection of the RCS Component 4 The as-built RCS Component Supports are reconciled with the as-designed Supports will be performed to confirm are reconciled with the as-designed configuration. their designed conditions. support system.
2.3.3 anu
SYSTEM 80+= 23.4 NSSS INTEGRITY MONITORING SYSTEM i Design Description l The NSSS Integrity Monitoring System (NIMS) is a non-safety-related j instrumentation and control system which consists of the Internals Vibration Monitoring System (IVMS), the Acoustic Ieak Monitoring System (ALMS), and the Loose Parts Monitoring System (LPMS). The NIMS provides data to the data processing system (DPS). The IVMS provides data from which changes in the motion - ; of the reactor internals can be detected. 'Ihe ALMS provides data and alarms in ;
^
response to high acoustic levels originating from a reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) leak. The LPMS provides data and alarms in response to vibration of the , RCPB associated with loose parts within the RCPB. l t The NIMS is located in the nuclear island structures. j Displays of the NIMS instrumentation exist in the main control room (MCR) or can j be retrieved there. ; i Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria i Table 2.3.4-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance - O criteria for the NSSS Integrity Monitoring System. i 1 I t i l l O .2.3A u -w l
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/
SYSTEM 80+" TAHLE 23.4-1 NSSS INTEGRITY MONITORING SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The IVMS provides data from which I. Testing will be performed on the IVMS 1. The IVMS provides data to the DPS in changes in the motion of the reactor by providing a test signal simulating a response to the test signal.
intemals can be detected. time-varying signal from the ex-core neutron detector channels.
- 2. The ALMS provides data and alarms in 2.a) Inspection of the as-built ALMS 2.a) ALMS sensors are provided in locations response to high acoustic levels configuration will be performed. specified in Table 2.3.4-2.
originating from a RCPB leak. 2.b) Testing will be performed on the ALMS 2.b) The ALMS provides data and alarms to by providing a test signal simulating the DPS in response to the test signal. high acoustic levels.
- 3. The LPMS provides data and alarms in 3.a) Inspection of the as-built LPMS 3.a) LPMS sensors are provided in locations response to vitration of the RCPB configuration will be performed. specified in Table 2.3.4-3.
associated with loose parts within the RCPB. 3.b) Testing will be performed on the LPMS 3.b) The LPMS provides data and alarms to by providing a test signal simulating the DPS in response to the test signal. motion of the RCPB locations.
- 4. Displays of the NIMS instrumentation 4. Inspection for the existence or 4. Displays of the NIMS instrumentation exist in the MCR or can be retrieved retrievability in the MCR of exist in the MCR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be there.
performed. 2.3.4 os-i7.,4
SYSTEM 80+" O TABLE 23.4-2 SENSOR LOCATIONS FOR ACOUSTIC LEAK MONITORING SYSTEM ; COMPONENT NUMBER OF LOCATION SENSORS Reactor Coolant Pump 4 (1 per pump) Seal Steam Generators 2 (1 per SG) Primary side, manway , Hot Legs 2 (1 per Leg) Reactor vessel outlet nozzle Cold Legs 4 (1 per Leg) Reactor vessel inlet nozzle Reactor Vessel 3 Upper head, CEDM nozzles Reactor Vessel 1 Lower head, instrument nozzle ! Pressurizer Safety Valves 4 (1 per valve) Discharge line Pressurizer 1 Heater region ; I 1 i l O 2.3.4 Sn.u
l i I l SYSTEM 80+" l 1 TABLE 23.4-3 l l l SENSOR LOCATIONS FOR IDOSE PARTS MONITORING SYSTEM i COMPONENT NUMRER OF SENSORS LOCATION Lower Head Reactor Vessel 3 l 3 Upper Head l
\
Steam Generator 1 4 Primary (inlet plenum) Primary (outlet plenum) Secondary (economizer region) Secondary (can deck i l region) l 1 Steam Generator 2 4 Primary (inlet plenum) Primary (outlet plenum) Secondary (economizer j region) Secondary (can deck region) l i l l l 1 i l l 1 i l l l 1 i l l r i (h) 2.3.4 u-n.u l l
SYSTEM 80+" 2.4.1 SAFETY DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM Design Description The Safety Depressurization System (SDS) is a safety-related system composed of two subsystems. The reactor coolant gas vent subsystem (RCGVS) provides a means to vent steam and non-condensible gases from the pressurizer (PZR) and the reactor vessel upper head (RVUH). The rapid depressurization subsystem (RDS) prosides a means to rapidly depressurize the RCS by venting the PZR. The SDS is manually actuated. The SDS is located inside Containment. The Basic Configuration of the SDS is as shown on Figure 2.4.1-1. The SDS consists of two redundant RDS piping trains from the pressurizer to the spargers in the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST), and two RCGVS piping trains, one from the pressurizer and one from the RVUH, which discharge to either the reactor drain tank (RDT) or the IRWST spargers. The RCGVS venting capacity will depressurize the RCS following design basis events. l The RDS depressurization capacity, in conjunction with safety injection system (SIS) operation, will prevent uncovering the core during a total loss of feedwater (TLOFW). j The ASME Code Section III Class for the SDS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.4.1-1 is as depicted on the figure. The safety-related equipment and the ultrasonic instruments on the PZR safety valve discharge lines shown on Figure 2.4.1-1 are classified Seismic Category I. Displays of the SDS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.4.1-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to open and close those power-operated valves shown on Figure 2.4.1-1. SDS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.1-1 are provided in the MCR. Within the RDS, in one mechanical train, each isolation valve is powered from a different Class IE bus within its Class 1E Division, and in the other mechanical train, L each isolation valve is powered from a different Class 1E bus in the other Class IE Division. Within the RCGVS, in the pressurizer vent train and in the RVUH vent train, each isolation valve in one branch line is powered from a different Class 1E bus within its Class 1E Division, and each isolation valve in the other branch line is powered from a different Class IE bus in the other Class IE Division. The isolation 2.4.1 es.it.w
6 SYSTEM 80+" valve to the RDT and the cross-connect valve between discharge lines to the RDT l and the IRWST are powered from different Class 1E Divisions. ' Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions, and between Class 1E Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, in the SDS. ; Within the RCGVS in the pressurizer vent train and in the RVUH vent train, the two ? branch lines with isolation valves are physically separated. M'otor operated valves (MOVs) having an active safety function will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under differential pressure or fluid flow conditions and under temperature conditions. ! Valves with response positions indicated on Figure 2.4.1-1 change position to that indicated on the Figure upon loss of motive power. ]l Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.4.1-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Safety Depressurization System. f-(
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IREACT ESSELI I' I m NOTES: ------
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- 1. ALL COMPONENTS SHOWN ARE INSIDE CONTAINMENT. ~ ~
l 2. THE ASME CODE SECTION lli CLASS 1 AND 2 PRESSURE bPZR AFETY , RETAINING COMPONENTS SHOWN ARE SAFETY-RELATED. ALL VALVE VALVES SHOWN ARE POWERED FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE CLASS lolSCHARGE l . 1E BUS, AS NOTED IN THE DESIGN DESCRIPTION. - (Rj $) _,
- 3. * : EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH PARAGRAPH NUMBER 3 OF THE
" VERIFICATION FOR BASIC CONFIGURATION FOR SYSTEMS
- SECTION OFTHE GENERAL PROVISIONS (SECTION 1.2) APPLIES.
FIGURE 2.4.1-1 SAFETY DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM 06-17-94 p-es e w+w -e vm --e,e ei- v .-a e e
L N a J {. SYSTEM 80+= TABLF, 2.4.1-1 SAFETY DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the SDS is 1. Inspection of the as-built SDS 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.4.1-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.4.1-1, the as-built SDS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The RCGVS venting capacity will 2. Testing io determine RCS 2. The RCGVS depressurizes the RCS at a depressurize the RCS following design depressurization rate will be performed. rate of at least 0.9 psi per second at an basis events. Analyses will be performed to convert initial pressurizer pressure of 2250 psia.
the test results to a depressurization rate at an RCS starting pressure.
- 3. The RDS depressurization capacity, in 3. Type tests of the RDS valve flow 3. A single RDS train in conjunction with conjunction with SIS operation, will capacity will be performed. Analysis of two of four safety injection (SI) pumps, prevent uncovering the core during a total loss of feedwater will be prevents core uncovery following a total loss of feedwater. performed, using the as-built system TLOFW if feed and bleed is initiated characteristics. immediately following the opening of pressurizer safety valves.
'Ihe two RDS trains have sufficient total flow capacity with all Si pumps operating to prevent core uncovery following a TLOFW if feed and bleed is delayed up to 30 minutes from the time pressurizer safety valves lift.
2.4.1 S n.n
O O J SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2A.1-1 (Continued) SAFFTY DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM Insacctions. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 4. The ASSIE Code Section til SDS 4. A pressure test will be conducted on 4. The results of the pressure test of components shown on Figure 2.4.1-1 those components of the SDS required ash 1E Code Section 111 portions of the retain their pressure boundary integrity to be pressure tested by ash 1E Code SDS conform with the pressure testing under internal pressures that will be Section 111. acceptance criteria in ash 1E Code experienced during service. Section III.
5.a) Displays of the SDS instrumentation 5.a) Inspection for the existence or 5.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.4.1-1 exist in the retrievability in the h1CR of on Figure 2.4.1-1 exist in the htCR or A1CR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there. performed. 5.b) Controls exist in the h1CR to open and 5.b) Testing will be performed using the SDS 5.b) SDS controls in the h1CR operate to close those power operated valves controls in the h1CR. open and close those power operated shown on Figure 2.4.1-1. valves shown on Figure 2.4.1-1. 5.c) SDS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.1-1 5.c) Testing of the SDS alarms shown on 5.c) The SDS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.1-are provided in the A1CR. Figure 2.4.1-1 will be performed using I actuate in response to signals signals simulating alarm conditions. simulating alarm conditions. 6.a) Within the RDS, in one mechanical 6.a) Testing will be performed on the RDS 6.a) A test signal exists only at the RDS train, each isolation valve is powered valves by providing a test signal in only valves powered from the Class IE bus from a different Class IE bus within its one Class IE bus at a time. under test. Class IE Division, and in the other mechanical train, each isolation valve is powered from a different Class lE bus in the other Class IE Division. 2.4.1 wir.,4
O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.4.1-1 (Continued) SAFETY DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analvscs, and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 6.b) Within the RCGVS, in the pressurizer 6.b) Testing will be performed on the 6.b) A test signal exists only at the RCGVS vent train and in the RVUll vent train, RCGVS valves by providing a test valves powered from the Class IE bus each isolation valve in one branch line is signal in only one Class 1E bus at a under test. powered from a different Class IE bus time. within its Class IE Division, and each isolation valve in the other branch line is powered from a different Class IE bus in the other Class IE Division. 6.c) The isolation valve to the RDT and the 6.c) Testing will be performed on the 6.c) A test signal exists only at the RCGVS cross <onnect valve between discharge RCGVS valves by providing a test valves powered from the Class IE lines to the RDT and IRWST are signal in only one Class IE Division at Division under test. powered from different Class IS a time. Divisions. 6.d) Independence is provided between Class 6.d) Inspection of the as-installed Class 1E 6.d) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions of the SDS will be performed. IE Divisions in the SDS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, separation exists between Class IE in the SDS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the SDS.
- 7. Within the RCGVS, in the pressurizer 7. Inspection of as-built mechanical trains 7. Within the RCGVS, in the pressurizer vent train, and in the RVUll vent train, will be performed. vent train, and in the RVUll vent train, the two branch lines with isolation the two branch lines are separated valves are physically separated. within Containment by spatial arrangement or barriers.
2.4.1 wit.,4
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2A.1-1 (Continued) SAFETY DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria j Desizn Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria i 8. Motor operated valves (MOVs) having 8. Testing will be performed to open, or 8. Each MOV having an active safety i an active safety function will open, or close, or open and also close, MOVs function opens, or closes, or opens and will close, or will open and also close, having an active safety function under also closes. under differential pressure or fluid flow preoperational differential pressure or conditions and under temperature fluid flow conditions and under conditions. temperature conditions.
- 9. Valves with response positions indicated 9. Testing of loss of motive power to these 9. These valves change position to the on Figure 2.4.1-1 change position to valves will be performed. position indicated on Figure 2.4.1-1 that indicated on the Figure upon loss of upon loss of motive power.
motive power. l 2.4.1 06-i7-,4
SYSTEM 80+" %J 2.4.2 ANNULUS VENTILATION SYSTEM Design Description The Annulus Ventilation System (AVS) reduces the concentration of radioactisity in the annulus air by filtration, holdup (decay), and recirculation before annulus air is released to the atmosphere. The Basic Configuration of the AVS is as shown on Figure 2.4.2-1. The AVS components shown on Figure 2.4.2-1 are safety-related. Components of the AVS are located in the nuclear annex and annulus portion of the reactor building. The AVS takes air from the upper annulus above the primary containment dome, filters it, and discharges part of the air through openings to the lower annulus near the annulus floor and the remainder of the air through the unit vent to the atmosphere. The AVS has two Divisions. Each Division of the AVS has a filtration unit, a fan, campers, ductwork, instrumentation, and controls. Each AVS filtration unit removes particulate matter. Each Division has dampers to modulate exhaust air to maintain a negative pressure within the annulus relative to atmosphere when the AVS is in operation. The safety-related components of the AVS are classified Seismic Category I. Safety-related components of the AVS are powered from their respective Class 1E Disision. Independence is provided between Class 1E Divisions, and between Class 1E ! Divisions and non-Class 1E equipment, in the AVS. ! l l Active components of the two Divisions of the AVS are physically separated. - Displays of the AVS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.4.2-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. U 2.4.2 w.u
gs SYMM 80+" Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the AVS fans, to set the pressure control setpoint, and to open and close those power operated dampers shown on Figure 2.4.2-1. Each AVS Division is activated by a Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS). Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.4.2-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Annulus Ventilation System. l i O O 2.4.2 Sn.u
SYSTE 0+ INSIDE E - T CONTAINMENT IANNULUS NUCLEAR ANNEX A FAN 3
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g STATUS
.... . CSAS E q 5 I g \+
= FILTRATION UNIT # 1 Q \
UPPER gANNULUS E T m iss;; A FAN g D . .CSAS T 1 s UNIT VENT g Q I Np s ; p .! f 5
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7 FILTRATION UNIT # 2 O s m]s. , , Nc1E, s E 1 - 9x E k *7E P E UN,IT VENT I L s ' ; N , l , IN\\' OlFFERENTIAL I PRESSURE E 1 I b I b p I F 1 I F _ GLOWER gANNULUS NOTE: ,
- 1. THE DUCT WORK FROM THE BUILDING EXIT UP TO AND INCLUDING THE ISOLATION DAMPER IS FIGURE 2.4.2-1 ..,7.,,
QUAUFIED FOR TORNADO DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE. ANNULUS VENTILATION SYSTEM M r- - - - a-__ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ - ___--_________c_.____
O F ) SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.4.2-1 ANNULUS VENTILATION SYSTEM InsDections. Tests. Analyses and AcccDiance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the AVS is 1. Inspection of the as-built AVS 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.4.2-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.4.2-1, the as-built AVS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. Each AVS filtration unit removes 2. Testing and analysis will be performed 2. The AVS filter efficiency is greater than particulate matter. on each AVS filtration unit to determine or equal to 299% for particulate matter filter efficiency. greater than 0.3 microns.
- 3. Each Division has dampers to modulate 3. Testing will be performed on each 3. The AVS achieves a negative pressure exhaust air to maintain negative pressure Division to measure annulus pressure in the anmdus greater than or equal to within the annulus relative to during AVS operation. 0.25 inches water gauge relative to atmosphere when the AVS is in atmosphere within 110 seconds.
operation. 4.a) Safety-related AVS components are 4.a) Testing will be performed on the AVS 4.a) Within the AVS, a test signal exists only powered from their respective Class 1E system by pmviding a test signal in only at the equipment powered from the Division. one Class IE Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. 4.b) Independence is provided between Class 4.b) Inspection of the as-installed Class 1E 4.b) Physical separation exists between Class 1E Divisions, and between Class IE Divisionsin the AVS will be performed. IE Divisions in the AVS. Separation Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, exists between Class IE Divisions and in the AVS. non-Class IE equipment in the AVS.
- 5. Active components of the two Divisions 5. Inspection of the as-built mechanical 5. The active components of the two of the AVS are physically separated. Divisions will be performed. mechanical Divisions of the AVS are separated by a Divisional wall or a fire barrier.
2.4.2
- n-u
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.4.2-1 (Continued) ANNULUS VENTILATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 6.a) Displays of the AVS instrumentation 6.a) Inspection for the existence or 6.a) Displays of the instrumentation showm shown on Figure 2.4.2-1 exist in the retrieveability in the htCR of on Figure 2.4.2-1 exist in the htCR or h1CR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there. performed. 6.b) Controls exist in the hiCR to start and 6.b) Testing will be performed using the 6.b) AVS controls in the htCR operate to stop the AVS fans, and to open and AVS controls in the htCR. start and stop the AVS filtration units, close the isolation dampers shown on and to open and close those isolation Figure 2.4.2-1. dampers shown on Figure 2.4.2-1.
- 7. Each AVS Division is activated by a 7. Testing will be performed using a 7. Each AVS Division is activated by a Containment Spray Actuation Signal, simulated Containment Spray Actuation simulated Containment Spray Actuation Signal. Signal.
2.4.2 e6.i7.,4
SYSTEM 80+" '\' ' 1 2.4.3 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL SYSTEM Design Description The Combustible Gas Control System (CGCS) is used to maintain hydrogen gas concentration in Containment at a level which precludes an uncontrolled hydrogen and oxygen recombination within Containment following design basis and beyond design basis accidents. The CGCS consists of the Containment Hydrogen Recombiner System (CHRS) and the Hydrogen Mitigation System (HMS). The Basic Configuration of the CHRS is as shown on Figure 2.4.3-1. The HMS consists of hydrogen igniters located inside Containment. The CHRS hydrogen analyzers are located in the Nuclear Annex and locations are provided in the Nuclear Annex for installation of hydrogen recombiner units post-accident. The ASME Code Section III Class 2 components mi on Figure 2.4.3-1 are safety-related. The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 4 .3-1 is classified Seismic Category O I' O The Class 1E loads shown on Figure 2.4.3-1 are powered from tb :ir respective Class IE Division. Independence is provided between Class 1E Divisions, and between Class 1E Divisions and non-Class 1E equipment in the CGCS. At least 80 hydrogen igniters are provided. Forty hydrogen igniters are powered by one Division of Class 1E power sources, of which at least 17 can be powered by the Class IE batteries. Forty hydrogen igniters are powered by the other Division of Class 1E power sources, of which at least 17 can be powered by the Class IE batteries. The hydrogen igniters are non-safety related and classified Seismic Category I. Displays of the CGCS hydrogen analyzer instrumentation exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. 2.4.3 wi7. 4
1 l l l l i SYSTEM 80+" i Controls exist in the MCR to energize and de-energize the hydrogen analyzers and the hydrogen igniters. ! l Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.43-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Combustible Gas Control System. ( 1 'w) l l l l 1 l l (L 2.4.3 5:7 ,4 l
SYSTE 80 +* INSIDE a OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT a CONTAINMENT
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= l cly CIV
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NOTES: A. ALL PIPING AND COMPONENTS SHOWN ARE ASME CODE SECTION 111 CLACS 2. B. SAFETY-RELATED COMPONENTS AND EQUIPMENT SHOWN ON THE FIGURE ARE POWERED FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE CLASS 1E DIVISION. C.
- EQUlPMENT FOR WHICH PARAGAPH NUMBER (3)
OF THE " VERIFICATIONS FOR BASIC CONFIGURATION FOR SYSTEMS" OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS (SECTION 1.2) APPLIES. FIGURE 2.4.3-1 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN RECOMBINER SYSTEM oS- 7-94
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s HYD. IGNITER - e llYl). IGNilER I I HYD. IGNITER Can be powered by a Class 1E battery
, HYD. IGNITER FIGURE 2.4.3-4: HYDROGEN IGNITER LOCATIONS: PLAN VIEW ABOVE ELEVATION 91+9 06-17-94 AND BELOW 115+6 m.__ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . - _ _ - _ - -__m -_ _ _ - _ _ - - +_ - m --4 --
'U HYD. IGNITER ,,
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- HYD. IGNITER 4 0 5 FIGURE 2.4.3-5: HYDROGEN IGNITER LOCATIONS: PLAN VIEW ABOVE ELEVATION 115+6 06-17-94 AND BELOW ELEVATION 146+0
HYD. IGNITER ,. SYSTEM 80 +" ,,.7 HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER
- HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER PRESSURIZLH ~ ~ N DELOV
\
HYD. IGNITER I HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER - N HYD. IGNITER-
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HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER e HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER N '
- HYD. IGNITER HYD. IGNITER FIGURE 2.4.3-6: HYDROGEN IGNITER LOCATIONS: PLAN VIEW ABOVE ELEVATION 146+0 06-17-94 TO TOP OF DOME
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2A3-1 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the CilRS is 1. Inspection of the as-built CHRS 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.4.3-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.4.3-1, the as-built CHRS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
2.a) The Class IE loads shown on Figure 2.a) Testing will be performed on the CHRS 2.a) Within the CHRS, a test signal exists 2.4.3-1 are powered from their by providing a test signal in only one only at the equipment powered from the respective Class IE Division. Class IE Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. 2.b) Independence is provided between Class 2.b) Inspection of the as-installed Class IE 2.b) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions in the CGCS will be IE Divisions in the CGCS. Separation Divisions and non-Class IE equipment. performed, exists between Class IE Divisions and in the CGCS. non-Class IE equipment in the CGCS.
- 3. The ASME Code Section III CliRS 3. A pressure test will be conducted on 3. The results of the pressure test of components shown on Figure 2.4.3-1 those components of the CHRS required ASME Code Section III components of retain their pressure boundary integrity to be pressure tested by ASME Code the CHRS conform with the pressure under intemal pressures that will be Section Ill. testing acceptance criteria in ASME experienced during service. Code Section III.
4.a) Displays of the CGCS hydrogen 4.a) Inspection for the existence or re- 4.a) Displays of the CGCS hydrogen concentration instrumentation exist in trieveability in the MCR of instru- concentration instrumentation exist in the MCR or can be retrieved there. mentation displays will be performed. the MCR or can be retrieved there. 4.b) Controls exist in the MCR to energize 4.b) Testing will be performed using the 4.b) CGCS controls in the MCR operate to and de-energize the hydrogen analyzers CGCS controls in the MCR. energize and de-energize the hydrogen and the hydrogen igniters. analyzers and the hydrogen igniters. 2.4.3 05:7-s4
O O O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.43-1(Continued) COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 5. Hydrogen recombiner units can be 5. Testing to connect hydrogen recombiner 5. liydrogen recombiner units can be connected to the CilRS. units will be performed. connected.
- 6. At least 80 hydrogen igniters are 6. Inspection for the number and location 6. At least 80 hydrogen igniters are provided. of igniters will be performed, provided. The igniters are generally located as shown in Figures 2.4.3-2 through 2.4.3-6.
- 7. Forty hydrogen igniters are powered by 7. Testing will be performed to determine 7. At least 40 hydrogen igniters are one Division of Class 1E power sources, number ofigniters that can be energized powered from each Division of Class 1E of which at least 17 can be powered by from each Division of Class IE power power sources. At least 17 igniters can the Class IE batteries. Forty hydrogen sources, including the number that can be powered from each Division of Class igniters are powered by the other be energized from each Division of IE batteries.
Division of Class IE power sources, of Class IE batteries. which at least 17 can be powered by the Class IE batteries. 2.4.3 om-u
i a m SYSTEM 80+" '
) 2.4.4 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM '
Design Description ! The Safety Injection System (SIS) is a safety-related system which injects borated , water into the reactor vessel to provide core cooling and reactivity control in response ! to design basis accidents. The SIS provides core cooling durbg feed and bleed i operation. in conjunction with the safety depressurization system. The SIS is located j in the reactor building subsphere and Containment. t { The Basic Configuration of the SIS is as shown on Figure 2.4.4-1. l The SIS consists of two Divisions. Each SIS Division has two SIS pumps, two safety injection tanks (SITS), valves, piping, controls, and instrumentation. ? Two SIS pumps, in conjunction with the SITS, have the capacity to cool the core during design basis events. One SIS pump, in conjunction with the SITS, has the capacity to cool the core during a direct vessel injection line break. The SITS contain borated water pressurized by a nitrogen cover gas. When RCS pressure falls below SIT pressure and the associated SIT isolation valve is open, water , flows from the SIT into the reactor vessel. The SITS can be depressurized by venting for entry into shutdown cooling. A flow recirculation line from each SIS pump discharge to the in-containment . refueling water storage tank (IRWST) provides a minimum flow recirculation path. The SIS pumps can be tested at full flow during plant operation. The ASME Code Section III Class for the SIS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 is as depicted on the Figure. The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 is classified Seismic Category I. SIS Pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 outside Containment have a design pressuie of at least 900 psig. Displays of the SIS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the SIS pumps, and to open and close
- those power operated valves shown on Figure 2.4.4-1. SIS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 are provided in the MCR. ,
1 0 2.4.4 es.iv-,4 1
-__ _ _ I
SYSTEM 80+" g) b Water is supplied to each SIS pump at a pressure greater than the pump's required : net positive suction head (NPSH). The Class 1E loads shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 are powered from their respective Class IE Disision. j Within a Division, one SIS pump and associated valves and controls are powered from a different Class 1E bus in the same Class IE Division than the other SIS pump and associated valves and controls. Within a Division, the two hot leg injection isolation valves are powered from different Class 1E buses in the same Class 1E Division. Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class 1E equipment, in the SIS. He two mechanical Divisions of the SIS are physically separated. Valves with response positions indicated on Figure 2.4.4-1 change position to that indicated on the Figure upon loss of motive power. The SIS is automatically initiated by a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS). p) ( An interlock automatically opens the SIT motor-operated isolation valves when RCS pressure increases above the SIT normal operating pressure. The interlock prevents closing the SIT motor-operated isolation valves until RCS pressure decreases below the interlock reset point. The SIS can be manually realigned for simultaneous hot leg injection and direct vessel injection (DVI). Hot leg injection is used in long term post-LOCA cooling. 1 Motor operated valves (MOVs) having an active safety function will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under differential pressure or fluid flow conditions and under temperature conditions. Check valves shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under system pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.4.4-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Safety Injection System. ! n b 2.4.4 w .u 5
SYS M 80+ O lASME CODE SECTION lli CLASS l
-~_ !
,_SCS(TO RCS HOT LEG)'W
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' WV (lWSS) civ I '
INSIDE CONTAINMENT l OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT NOTES:
- 1. SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND EQUIPMENT SHOWN ON THIS FIGURE ARE CLASS 1E. ALARMS ARE NOT SAFETY-RELATED AND NOT CLASS 1E.
- 2.
- EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH PARAGRAPH NUMBER 3 OF THE " VERIFICATION FOR BASIC CONFIGURATION FOR SYSTEMS" SECTION OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS (SECTION 1.2) APPLIES.
- 3. THE ASME CODE SECTION lil CLASS 1 AND 2 PRESSURE RETAINING COMPONENTS SHOWN ARE SAFETY-RELATED GURE 2AA-1 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM * ' "
(ONE OF TWO DIVISIONS)
O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.4.4-1 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the safety 1. Inspection of the as-built SIS 1. For the comptments and equipment injection system (SIS) is as shown on configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.4.4-1, the as-built Figure 2.4.4-1. SIS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. Two SIS pumps, in conjunction with the 2.a) Testing to determine SIS flow will be 2.a) Each SIS pump has a pump-developed SITS, have the capacity to deliver performed. Analysis will be performed pressure differential of no less than 1600 coolant to the reactor vessel to cool the to convert the test results from the test psid and no more than 2040 psid at the core during design basis events. conditions to the design conditions. vendor's specified minimum flow rate, and injects no less than 980 gpm and no more than 1232 gpm of borated water into the reactor vessel at atmospheric pressure.
2.b) Testing will be performed using signals 2.b) The SIS initiates and begins to deliver simulating a safety injection actuation flow to the reactor vessel within 40 signal (SIAS). seconds following receipt of a signal simulating SIAS, including emergency diesel generator start time and load time. 2.c) Testing will be performed to open the 2.c) The pressurized SITS discharge water to SIT isolation valves with the SITS the depressurized RCS. pressurized and the RCS depressurized. Analysis will be performed to convert Resistance coefficient K of tne discharge the test results from the test conditions line from the SIT to the reactor vessel is to the design conditions. equal to or between 4.5 to 30 (basal on 2 a cross-sectional area of 0.6827 ft), 2.4.4 e i7.,4
( % D SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.4.4-1 (Continued) SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 2. (Continued) 2.d) Inspection of construction records for 2.d) The volume in each direct vessel SIS piping will be conducted. injection line, from the connection for the SIT return header to the piping-to-DVI nozzle weld, is no greater than 27.8 cubic feet.
- 3. The safety injection tanks can be 3. Testing will be performed with the SITS 3. The SIT vent valves can be opened from depressurized by venting for entry into pressurized and the associated SIT the MCR and the SIT pressure decreases shutdown cooling. isolation valve shut. Each SIT vent while the SIT is being vented.
valve will be opened from the MCR.
- 4. A flow recirculation line from each SIS 4. Testing of SIS will be performed by 4. Minimum flow recirculation rate meets pump discharge to the IRWST provides manually aligning SI flow to the IRWST or exceeds the pump vendor's minimum a minimum flow recirculation path. through the minimum flow recirculation flow requirements.
line and manually starting each SIS pump.
- 5. The SIS pumps can be tested at full flow 5. Testing of the SIS will be performed by 5. Each SIS pump has a flow capacity of at during plant operation. manually aligning SIS flow to the least 980 gpm to the IRWST through the IRWST and manually starting each SIS test line. !
pump.
- 6. The ASME Code Section 111 SIS 6. A pressure test will be conducted on 6. The results of the pressure test of components shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 those components of the SIS required to ASME Code Section III components of retain their pressure boundary integrity be presure tested by ASME Code the SIS conform with the pressure under internal pressures that will be Section Ill. testing acceptance criteria in ASME experienced under service. Code Section III.
2.4.4 05 7.,4
O , O SYSTE5180+ TABLE 2.4.4-1 (Continued) SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 7.a) Displays of the SIS instrumentation 7.a) Inspection for the . existence or 7.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 exist in the retrievability in the hiCR of on Figure 2.4.4-1 exist in the h1CR or h1CR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there. performed. 7.b) Controls exist in the A1CR to start and 7.b) Testing will be performed using the SIS 7.b) SIS controls in the htCR operate to start stop the SIS pumps, and to open and controls in the htCR. and stop the SIS pumps and to open and close those power operated valves close those power operated valves shown on Figure 2.4.4-1. shown on Figure 2.4.4-1. 7.c) SIS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 are 7.c) Testing of the SIS alarms shown on 7.c) The SIS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.4-provided in the htCR. Figure 2.4.4-1 will be performed using I actuate in the h1CR in response to signals simulating SIS alarm conditions, signals simulating SIS alarm conditions.
- 8. Water is supplied to each SIS pump at a 8. Testing to measure SIS pump suction 8. The calculated available NPS11 exceeds pressure greater than the pump's pressure will be performed. Inspection each SIS pump's required NPSil.
required NPSil. and analysis to determine NPSil available to each SIS pump will be performed based on test data and as-built data. 9.a) The Class IE loads shown on Figure 9.a) Testing on the SIS will be conducted by 9.a) Within the SIS, a test signal exists only 2.4.4-1 are powered from their providing a test signal in only one Class at the equipment powered from the respective Class IE Division. IE Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. 9.b) Within a Division, one SIS pump and 9.b) Testing on the SIS will be conducted by 9.b) Within the SIS, a test signal exists only associated valves and controls are providing a test signal in only one Class at the equipment powered from the powered from a different Class IE bus IE bus at a time. Class IE bus under test. in the same Class IE Division than the other SIS pump and associated valves and controls. 2.4.4 e6.i7.,4
O O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.4.4-1 (Continued) SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria l Desien Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria l 9.c) Within a Division, the two hot leg 9.c) Testing on the SIS will be conducted by 9.c) Within the SIS, a test signal exists only injection isolation valves are powered providing a test signal in only one Class at the equipment powered from the from different Class IE buses in the IE bus at a time. Class IE bus under test. same Class IE Division. 9.d) Independence is provided between Class 9.d) Inspection of the as-installed Class 1E 9.d) Physical separation exists between Class lE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions of the SIS will be performed. IE Divisions in the SIS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, separation exists between Class IE in the SIS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the SIS.
- 10. The twa mechanical Divisions of the SIS 10. Inspection of as-built mechanical 10. The two mechanical Divisions of the SIS are physically separated. Divisions will be performed. are separated by a Divisional wall or a fire barrier except for components of the i system within containment which are separated by spatial arrangement or l barriers.
I1. Valves with response positions indicated 11. Testing of loss of motive power to these 11. These valves change position to the on Figure 2.4.4-1 change position to valves will be performed. position indicated on Figure 2.4.4-1 that indicated on the Figure upon loss of upon loss of motive power. motive power.
- 12. The SIS is automatically initiated by a 12. Testing will be performed by generating 12. A signal simulating SIAS starts the SI safety injection actuation signal (SIAS). a signal simulating SIAS. pumps and opens the SI header isolation valves and safety injection tank (SIT) isolation valves. The SIT isolation )
valves, when open, receive a j confirmatory open signal. i
\
2.4.4 e6-i7 94
O _ O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.4.4-1 (Continued) SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria ,
- 13. The SIS can be manually realigned for 13. Testing will be performed with the 13. The SIS injects no less than 980 and no simultaneous hot leg injection and direct system manually aligned for more than 1232 gpm through each hot vessel injection (DVI). simultaneous DVI and hot leg injection. leg injection line with the RCS at atmospheric pressure.
- 14. Motor operated valves (MOVs) having 14. Testing will be performed to open, or 14. Each MOV having an active safety an active safety function will open, or close, or open and also close MOVs function opens, or closes, or opens and will close, or will open and also close, having an active safety function under also closes, under differential pressure or fluid flow preoperational differential pressure or conditions and under temperature fluid flow conditions and under conditions. temperature conditions.
- 15. Check valves shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 15. Testing will be performed to open, or 15. Each check valve shown on Figure will open, or will close, or will open close, or open and also close check 2.4.4-1 opens, or closes, or opens and and also close under system pressure, valves shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 under also closes.
fluid flow conditions, or temperature system preoperational pressure, fluid conditions. flow conditions, or temperature conditions. 16.a) An interlock automatically opens the 16.a) Testing will be performed using a signal 16.a) The SIT motor-operated isolation valves SIT motor-operated isolation valves simulating increasing RCS pressure, open in response to a signal simulating ! when RCS pressure increases above the with the SIT isolation valves closed. RCS pressure increasing above the SIT SIT normal operating pressure. normal operating pressure. 16.b) The interlock prevents closing the SIT 16.b) Testing will be performed using a signal 16.b) The SIT motor-operated isolation valves motor-operated isolation valves until simulating decreasing RCS pressure with do not close when RCS pressure is RCS pressure decreases below the the SIT isolation valves open and above the interlock reset point. interlock reset point. attempting to close the valves from the main control room. 2.4.4 o6 i7.,4
O 2.4.5 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM Design Description
'Ihe Containment Isolation System (CIS) provides a safety-related means to close. ,
valves in fluid system piping that passes through Containment penetrations'. The CIS provides a pressure barrier at each of these Containment penetrations. The Basic Configuration of the Containment isolation valves for piping which penetrates containment is as shown on Figure 2.4.5-1; each Containment isolation . valve arrangement is as shown in one of the configurations on the figure. The ASME Code Section III Class for the CIS pressure retaining components is as shown on Figure 2.4.5-1.2 The Containment isolation valves and connecting ASME Code Section III Class 2 . I piping shown on Figure 2.4.5-1 are classified Seismic Category I. Electrically-powered Containment isolation valves are Class 1E. These Class 1E loads are powered from their respective Class IE Divisions. The Containment equipment hatch trolley receives Class 1E power. O J l Redundant Containment isolation valves which require electrical power are powered from different Class 1E Divi 5ans.' i Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions, and between Class 1E j Divisions and non-Class 1E equipment in the CIS. Displays of CIS valve positions for remotely operated and automatic Containment isolation valves exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to open and close CIS power operated valves. Only those valves required to close automatically for Containment isolation are closed by a Containment isolation actuation signal (CIAS). Containment isolation valves that receive a CIAS close within the time allocated to the function performed. Containment isolation valves that receive a CIAS, upon closure, do not reopen as a direct result of reset of the CIAS. Pneumatic Containment isolation valves close upon loss of motive or control power l to the valve. ! 4 O 2.o .,. _,_
1 l 1 SYSTEM 80+" (o'"') Motor-operated valves (MOVs) that receive a CIAS will close under differential pressure or fluid flow conditions, and under temperature conditions. Containment isolation check valves having an active safety function will close under system pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. Containment isolation valves required to close automatically against containment atmosphere systems are designed to close against at least containment design pressure. Containment Isolation valves and piping between CIVs are designed for pressures at least equal to the containment design pressure. The induced stresses in the pressure retaining components of the CIVs due to an internal containment pressure ofless than or equal to 120 psig are within the ASME Code Section III service Level C stress limits. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.4.5-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Containment Isolation System. r I '( i NOTES- ) Containment isolation valves are assigned as components of their respective systems. I 2 Containment penetration leak rate testing is addressed in Section 2.1.1, Nuclear Island Structures. 3 Electrical penetrations are addressed in Section 2.6.4, Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies. l i (Ov
)
2.4.5 wim
SYSTEM 80+TM CONTAINMENT INSIDE l OUTSIDE 12.3 OR N 2l g NOTE 1
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5. E l ir Ni 9 FIGURE 2.4.5-1 (PAGE 1 OF 4) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE CONFIGURATION 06-17-94
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1 FIGURE 2.4.5-1 (PAGE 2 OF 4) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE CONFIGURATION 06-17-94 j l
-4
SYSTEM 80+* CONTAINMENT INSIDE l OUTSIDE i,.. e N ,,
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ED O eiauRE 2.4.5-1 (PAGE 3 OF 4) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE CONFIGURATION 06-17-94
SYSTEM 80+ CONTAINMENT INSIDE OUTSIDE I IN 21 AUTOMATIC NOTE 2 T an : an . l. E l2 2l REMOTELY OPERATED NOTE 4 D
- 14. 1 NOTE 3
/ REMOTELY
, , g OPERATED E
I l REMOTELY I OPERATED Qy l AUTOMATIC ! OR REMOTELY 5 OPERATED E l 15.
+
/ NOTE 2 1
IE EN E3 l2 2.3 OR N l s NOTES:
- 1. UQUID REUEF VALVE CAN BE INCLUDED IN CONFIGURATION
- 2. VALVE CAN BE OPEN OR CLOSED IN NORMAL POSITION
- 3. FLOW ELEMENT / ROOT VALVES OMITTED FOR CLARITY, WHERE APPUCABLE.
- 4. CHECK VALVE IS NOT A CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE FIGURE 2.4.5-1 (PAGE 4 OF 4)
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE CONFIGURATION os.3 7.,
O s SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.4.5-1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment InsDections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Conliguration of the Contain- 1. Inspection of the as-built CIS con- 1. For the components and equipment ment isolation valves for piping which figuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.4.5-1 and specified penetrates Containment is as shown on in Table 2.4.5-2. the as-built CIS Figure 2.4.5-1; each Containment conforms with the specified Basic isolation valve arrangement is as shown Configuration shown on Figure 2.4.5-1.
in one of the configurations on the figure.
- 2. The ASME Code Section III valves 2. A pressure test will be performed on 2. The results of the pressure test of shown on Figure 2.4.5-1 retain their those components of the CIS required to ASME Code Section III components of pressure boundary integrity under be pressure tested by ASME Code the CIS specified in Table 2.4.5-2 intemal pressures that will be Section III. conform with the pressure testing experienced during service, acceptance criteria in ASME Code Section III.
3.a) Electrically-powered Containment 3.a) Testing will be performed on the 3.a) Within the CIS, a test signal exists only isolation valves are Class lE. These Containment isolation valves by at the equipment powered from the Class IE loads are powered from their providing a test signal in only one Class Class IE Division under test. respective Class IE Divisions. IE Division at a time. 3.b) The Containment equipment hatch 3.b) Inspection of the as-built Containment 3.b) The Containment equipment hatch trolley receives Class IE power. equipment hatch trolley will be tmiley receives Class IE power. performed. 3.c) Independence is provided between Class 3.c) Inspection of the as-installed Class 1E 3.c) Physical separation exists between Clos 1E Divisions and between Class 1E Divisions in the CIS will be performed. IE Divisions in the CIS. Separation Divisions and non-Class IE equipment exists between Class IE Divisions anc' l in the CIS. non-Class IE equipment in the CIS. l l l l i 2.4.5 as-iv.,4
.. ~ . - . - ,, . . .
O O 3 SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.4.5-1 (Continued) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 4. Redundant Containment isolation valves 4. Testing will be performed on the 4. Within the CIS, a test signal exists only which require electrical power are Containment isolation valves by at the equipment powered from the powered from different Class IE providing a test signal in only one Class Class IE Division under test.
Divisions. IE Division at a time. 5.a) Displays of CIS valv positions for 5.a) Inspection for the existence or retriev- 5.a) Displays of CIS valve positions for remotely operated and automatic ability in the MCR of displays of remotely operated and automatic Containment isolation valves exist in the Containment isolation valve positions Containment isolation valves exist in the MCR or can be retrieved there. will be performed. MCR or can be retrieved there. 5.b) Controls exist in the MCR to open and 5.b) Testing will be performed using the 5.b) Controls in the MCR operate to open close CIS power operated valves. Containment isolation valve controls in and close power operated Containment the MCR. isolation valves. 6.a) Only those valves required to close 6.a) Testing of the isolation function will be 6.a) Containment isolation valves respond to automatically for Containment isolation performed using a signal simulating a signal simulating CIAS as specified in are closed by a CIAS. CIAS. Table 2.4.5-2. 6.b) Containment isolation valves that receive 6.b) Testing of the closure times of 6.b) Containment isolation valves close upon a CIAS close within the time allocated automatically actuated Containment receipt of a signal that simulates a CIAS to the function performed. isolation valves will be performed using in less than or equal to the time a signal that simulates a CIAS. specified in Table 2.4.5-2, if specified. 6.c) Containment isolation valves that receive 6.c) Following closure of Containment 6.c) Containment isolation valves, once a CIAS, upon closure, do not reopen as isolation . valves on a signal that closed by a signal that simulates a a direct result of reset of th CIAS. simulates a CIAS, tests will be CIAS, do not reopen as a direct result performed to verify that the valves do of a signal that simulates resetting the not reopen when a signal that simulates CIAS. the CIAS reset is applied. 2A.5 um
s SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.4.5-1 (Continued) CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM Insocctions. Tests. Analyses, and Acccotance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 7. Pneumatic Containment isolation valves 7. Testing will be performed on each 7. Pneumatic Containment isolation valves close upon loss of motive or control pneumatic Containment isolation valve close.
power to the valve. to simulate a loss of motive power and a loss of control power.
- 8. Motor-operated valves (MOVs) that 8. Testing to close MOVs that receive a 8. Each MOV that receives a CIAS closes.
receive a CIAS will close under CIAS will be conducted under differential pressure or fluid flow preoperational differential pressure or conditions, and under temperature fluid flow conditions, and under conditions. temperature conditions.
- 9. Containment isolation check valves 9. Testing of Containment isolation check 9. Each Containment isolation check valve having an active safety function will valves will be conducted under system specified in Table 2.4.5-2 closes.
close under system pressure, fluid flow preoperational pressure, fluid flow conditions, of temperature conditions. conditions, or temperature conditions. 10.a) Containment isolation valves required to 10.a) Inspection and analysis will be 10.a) Reports exist which conclude that close against containment atmosphere performed on Containment isolation containment isolation valves required to are designed to close against at least valves required to close against close against containment atmosphere containment design pressure. containment atmosphere. are designed to close against at least containment design pressure. 10.b) Containment isolation valves and piping 10.b) Inspection and analysis of containment 10.b) Reports exist which conclude that between CIVs are designed for pressures isolation valves and piping between containment isolation valves and piping at least equal to the containment design CIVs will be performed. between CIVs are designed for pressures pressure. at least equal to the containment design pressure. 2.4.5 i 7.,4
TABh.4 5-2 ) CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS (Note 11 (Note 2) (Note 3) Maximum Closes On Vafve item Service Valve CtAS Closure No. Artangement (Yes, No) Time on CIAS 1 Main Steam Une #1 from Steam Generator #1 9 No Remotely Operated - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Manual Valve - Manual Valve - 2 Main Steam Une #2 from Steam Generator #1 9 No Remotely Operated - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Manual Valve - 3 Main Steam Line #1 from Steam Generator #2 9 No Remotely Operated - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Manual Valve - 2.4.5 ecim
O L/ SY M 80 +" TABLE 2,43- (Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 31 Maximum Closee On Velve item Service Valve CtAS Closure N o. Arrangement (Yes, Not Time on CtAS 4 Main Steam Line #2 from Steam Generator #2 9 No Remotely Operated - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Manual Valve - Manual Valve - 5 Main Feedwater to Downcomer Nozzle Steam Generator #1 8 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Check Valve - Check Valve - 6 Main Feedwater to Downcomer Nozzle Steam Generator #2 8 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Check Valve - Check Vahre - 7 Main Feedwater to Economizer Nozzles for Steam Generator #1 7 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 2.4.5 wi7.,4
/
SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2,4.5-2 (Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 3) Maximum Cloese On Velve item Service Velve CIAS Closure No. Arrangement (Yes, Not Time on CIAS 8 Main Feedwater to Economizer Nozzles for Steam Generator #2 7 No Remotely Operated - , i Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 9 Motor-Driven EFW Pump #1 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 10 Motor-Driven EFW Pump #2 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated - - Check Valve - 11 Steam-Driven EFW Pump #1 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 12 Steam-Driven EFW Pump #2 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 13 Safety injection Pump #4 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve (Note 4) - 14 Safety injection Pump #2 Discharge 14 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Check Valve (Note 4) - Remotely Operated - 2.4.5 e6-i7-,4
(~'s 4 t S FEM 80+" TABLE 2 4 (Continued) O CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS (Note 11 (Note 2i (Note 3) Maximum Closes 0.1 Velve item Service Velve CIAS Closure No. Arrangement (Yes, No) Time on CIAS 15 Safety injection Pump #3 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve (Note 4) - 16 Safety injection Pump #1 Discharge 14 No Remote'/ Operated - Remotely Operated - Check Valve (Note 4) - Remotely Operated - 17 SCS Pump #2 Suction 11 No Remotely Operated - Relief Valve - Remotely Operated - 18 SCS Pump #1 Suction 11 No Remotely Operated - Relief Valve - Remotely Operated - 19 Hot leg injection Loop #2 15 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 20 Hot Leg injection Loop #1 15 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 2.4.5 nim
SVSTEM 80+= TABLE 2,45-2 (Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 3) t Maximum Closes On Valve item Service Velve CIAS Closure N o. Arrengement (Yes, No) Time on CIAS 21 Containment Spray Pump #2 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operatea - Check Valve - 22 Containment Spray Pump #1 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 23 Safety injection Pumo #1 and Containment Spray Pump #1 Suction Line 6 No Remotely Operated - 24 Safety injection Pump #2 and Containment Spray Pump #2 Suction Line 6 No Remotely Operated - 25 Safety injection Pump #3 Suction 6 No , Remotely Operated - 26 Safety injection Pump #4 Suction 6 No Remotely Ooerated - 27 SIS Division 1 Miniflow Retum to IRWST 12 No j Remotely Operated - l Check Valve - l Remotel/ Operated - l 28 SIS Division 2 Miniflow Return to IRWST 12 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve - l Remotely Operated - 2A.5 i7.,4 t________ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . - . . - _ _ _ _ . - . _ _ . _ ._ _
p s REM 80+" TABLE 2A5 (Continued) O CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS (Note 11 (Note 21 (Note 31 Maximum Closes On Vefve item Service Velve CIAS Closure No. Arrangement (Yes, Not Time on CIAS 29 Return Header from Si Tanks 13 No Remotely Operated - Manual Valve - Relief Valve - 30 CCW Supply to Letdown Heat Exchanger 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 see Check Va!ve - 31 CCW Return from Letdown Heat Exchanger 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve - 32 CCW Supply to RCP Heat Exchangers 1 A and 18 1 No Remotely Operated - Remo'tely Operated - Check Valve - 33 CCW Return from RCP Heat Exchangers 1A and 1B 1 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 34 CCW Supply to RCP Heat Exchangers 2A and 2B 1 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 2.4.5 o6. 7.,4
G
-O) %. \J SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2 4.5-2 (Continued)
CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS (Note 11 (Note 2) (Note 3) Maximum Closes On Valve , item Service Velve CLAS Closure No. Arrangement (Yes, No) Time on CIAS 35 CCW Retum from RCP Heat Exchangers 2A and 28 1 No i Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Check Wlve - 36 Shutdown Purification Une to Letdown Heat Exchanger 4 No Manual Valve - Check Valve - 37 Letdown to Purification System 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec , 38 CVCS Charging Une 2 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 39 RCP Seal injection 2 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 40 RCP Seal Return Flow 1 No Remotely Operated - E Remotely Operated - 41 RDT Flow to RDPs 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 2.4.5 es i7-94
SY, TEM 80+= TARLE 2AS$- (Crntinued) O CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS l (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 31 Mesimum Closee On Velve item Service Valve CIAS Closure No. Arrangement (Yes,Nol Time on CIAS 42 Resin Sluice Supply to Reactor Drain Tank 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve - 43 Breathing Air Supply 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve - 44 Station Air Supply 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec , Check Valve - 45 Instrument Air Supply 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve - 46 instrument Air Supply 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve - 47 Refueling Pool Cleanup Suction Line 3 No Manual Valve - Manual Valve - 48 Refueling Pool Cleanup Return Header 3 No Manual Valve - Manual Valve - I i l 2.4.5 c6.iv-,4
h SYSTEM 80+" h TABLE 2,4 5-2' (Continued) b CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 31 Maximum Closes On Valve item Service Velve CIAS Closure No. l Arreegement (Yes, No) Time on CIAS 49 Pressurizer Uquid Sample une 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 50 Pressurizer Steam Space Sample une 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 00 :::: 51 Hot Leg Sample une 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 52 Holdup Volume Tank Sample Une 10 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 53 Steam Generator #1 Cold Leg Sample 1 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - 54 Steam Generator #1 Hot Leg Sample 1 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - l
- 55 Steam Generator #1 Downcomer Sample 1 No l
l Remotely Operated - ( Remotely Operated - 2A.5 e6-iv.,4
- p. m
( SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2,45- (Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS (Note il (Note 2) (Note 3) Maximum Closes On Velve Item Service Velve CIAS Closure No. Arrangement (Yes, No) Time on CIAS 56 Steam Generator #2 Cold Leg Sample 1 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - 57 Steam Generator #2 Hot Leg Sample 1 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - 58 Steam Generator #2 Downcomer Sample 1 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - 59 High Volume Containment Purge System Supply #1 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 60 High Volume Containment Purge System Supply #2 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 61 High Volume Containment Purge System Exhaust #1 1 Yes Remctely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sec 62 High Votume Containment Purge System Exhaust #2 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 2.4.5 es-i7-,4 _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ - _ _ - . ~ _ . ., - --- . ..
l O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2,4.5$- (Continued)
^
CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS (Note 11 (Note 21 (Note 31 Maximum Closes On Velve item Service Velve CIAS Closure No. Arrangement (Yes, Noi Time on CIAS 63 Low Volume Containment Purge System Supply 2 Yes Remotely Operated 30 see Check Valve - 64 Low Volume Containment Purge System Exhaust 1 Yes Remotely Operated 30 see Remotely Operated 30 sec 65 Steam Generator #1 Combined Blowdown 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 seo Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve 66 Steam Generator #2 Combined Blowdown t Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve 67 Fire Protection Water Supply to Containment (Une Number 1) 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve - 68 Fire Protection Water Supply to Containment (Une Number 2) 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve - 69 Division 1 NCWS Supply to Containment Ventilation Units and CEDM Units 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 see 2.4.5 u.n.n
O V SY M 80+= TABLE 2s4.5- (Continued) CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS (Note 11 (Note 2) (Note 3) M aximum Closee On Velve item Service Velve CIAS Closure No. Arrangement (Yes, Not Time on CIAS 70 Division 2 NCWS Supply to Containment Ventilation Units and CEDM Units 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 71 Division 1 NCWS Return From Containment Venti!ation Units and CEDM Units 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 72 Division 2 NCWS Return From Containment Ventilation Units and CEDM Units 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 73 Containment Radiation Monitor (Inlet) 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 64 sec 74 Containment Radiation Monitor (Outtet) 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 75 ILRT Pressure Sensing Line 3 No Manual Vatve -- Manual Valve - 76 Domineralized Water 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve - 2.4.5 i t.,4
O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2AS9- (Continued) O CONTAINMENT PENFFRATIONS
- 2 (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 31 Mesimum Closee On Velve item Service Velve CIAS Closure No. Arrangement (Yes. Not Time on CIAS 77 Nitrogen Supply to Safety injection Tanks and RDT 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve -
78 ILRT Pressurization Une 5 No Manual Valve - Flange - 79 RCp Oil Fill Une 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Rernotely Operated - 80 Containment Sump Pump Discharge une 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see i ! Remotely Operated 60 sec ' Check Valve - 81 Containment Ventitation Units' Condensate Drain Header 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve 82 Reactor Drain Tank Gas Space to GWMS 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec
- 83 Decontamination Une 3 No Manual Valve -
Manual Valve - 2A.5 esiv.,4
.)
SYSTEM 80+= TARLE 2,4 5-2 (Continued) , CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS (Note 1) (Note 21 (Note 31 Maximum closes On Velve item Service Vetve CIAS Closure N o. Arrangement (Yes Nel Time on CIAS 84 Division 1 Hydrogen Recombiner Suction from Containment 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 85 Division 2 Hydrogen Recombiner Suction from Containment 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sec 86 Division 1 Hydrogen Recombiner Discharge to Containment 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve - 87 Division 2 Hydrogen Recombiner Discharge to Containment 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve - 88 Steam Generator Wet Layup Recirculation Return to Steam Generator #1 4 No Manual Valve - Check Valve - 89 Steam Generator Wet Layup Recirculation Retum to Steam Generator #2 4 No Manual Valve - Check Valve - 90 St IRWST Boron Recovery Supply to CVCS 1 Yes , Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sec 2.4.5 os-it.e4
. _ . . . . . _ . . _ _~ .
O SYSTEM 80+= TARLE 2,459- (Continued) O CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS (Note 1) (Note 21 (Note 31 Maximum Closes On Vatve item Service vetve CtAS Closure I No. Arrangement (Yes, Nol Time on CIAS 91 CVCS IRWsT Boron Recovery Return 2 Yes Remotefy Operated 60 sec Check Valve - NOTES:
- 1. Valve arrangements are in accordance with the Containment isolation valve configurations shown on Figure 2.4.5-1.
- 2. Paragraph Number 3 of the General Provisions (Section 1.2) applies to Containment isolation valves which receive a CIAS. '
- 3. A dash (-) denotes NOT APPLICABLE
- 4. Not a containment isolation valve.
1 1 2.4.5 05:7-,4 -
SYSTEM 80+" 2.4.6 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM Design Description The Containment Spray System (CSS) is a safety-related system which removes heat and reduces the concentration of radionuclides released from the fuel from the Containment atmosphere and transfers the heat to the component cooling water system following events which increase Containment temperature and pressure. The CSS can also remove heat from the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST). The CSS is located in the reactor building subsphere and Containment. He Basic Configuration of the CSS is as shown on Figure 2.4.6-1. The CSS consists of two Divisions. Each CSS Division has a CSS pump, a CSS beat exchanger, valves, piping, spray headers, nozzles, controls, and instrumentation. Each CSS Division has the heat removal capacity to cool and depressurize the containment atmosphere, such that containment design temperature and pressure are not exceeded following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or a main steam line break (MSLB). v Each CSS Division has the capacity to reduce the concentration of radioactive material in the containment atmosphere such that the design basis accident dose criteria are not exceeded. The CSS limits the maximum flow in each Division. The CSS pump and the Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) pump in the same Division are connected by piping and valves such that the SCS pump in a Division can perform the pumping function of the CSS pump in that Division. The piping and valves in the cross-connect line between the SCS pump suction and the CSS pump suction permit flow in either direction. A flow recirculation line around each CSS pump provides a minimum flow recirculatine path. The CSS pumps ct.n be flow tested during plant operation. l The ASME Code Section III Class for the CSS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 is as depicted on the Figure. The safety related equipment shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 is classified Seismic Category I. ( 1 2A.6 06-iv.,4 I
l SYSTEM 80+" CSS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.4.6-1, except the shell side of the heat exchangers, have a design pressure outside Containment of at least 900 psig. Displays of the CSS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the CSS pumps, and to open and close those remotemperated valves shown on Figure 2.4.6-1. CSS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 are provided in the MCR. Water is supplied to each CSS pump at a pressure greater than the pump's required net positive suction head (NPSH). The Class 1E loads shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E Division. The CSS pump motor and the SCS pump motor in each Division are powered from different Class 1E buses in that same Division. Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions and between Class 1E Divisions and non-Class 1E equipment in the CSS. The two mechanical Divisions of the CSS are physically separated. The CSS pumps are started upon receipt of a containment spray actuation signal (CSAS), except when the CSAS is aligned to the SCS pump in the same Division. O The isolation valves to the CSS spray headers and nozzles are opened upon receipt of a containment spray actuation signal (CSAS). Motor operated valves (MOVs) having an active safety function will open, or will close, or will open and also close under differential pressure or fluid flow conditions, and under temperature conditions. Check valves shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 will open, or will close, or will open and also close under system pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Ta% 2.s.a-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Containment Spray System. 2.4.6 u n-u 1 1
SYST 80+ Notes:
- 1. TUBE SIDES ARE ASME CODE SECTION til CLASS 2 AND SHELL (CCW) SIDES ARE ASME CODE SECTION 11! CLASS 3.
- 2. SAFEW-RELATED ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS AND EQUIPMENT INSIDE lOUTSIDE SHOWN ON THIS FIGURE ARE CLASS 1E. ALARMS AND PRESSURE CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT AND CURRENTINSTRUMENTS ARE NOT SAFETY-RELATED AND NOT CLASS 1 E. CSS HEADERS '
- 3. THE ASME CODE SECTION lli CLASS 2 AND 3 PRESSURE RETAINING y y yg +
COMPONENTS SHOWN ARE SAFETY-RELATED CIV SgS SQS g
, SPRAY NOZZLES CS S- - CIV u [M]- n SIS [M)"A tg CSAS l U i P
@ h b: '
N CSS Hx SIS (FROM IRWST) + - --{>IgQ' M I " TE'
, A _.g y 8 Y i e MINIFLOW Hx CCW Oh AINMENT CO NMENT NOTE 1 l ASME CODE SECTION iil CLASS I h CCWl
=
, y PCPSwe- -l HX l iTA INSIDE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT M
SIS (TO IRWST) + - - - c - SCS n >Civ< e EMERGENCY ' FIGURE 2.4.6-1 ' sis CSS 8^Cxup 06-17-94 * "" " CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM (ONE OF TWO DIVISIONS)
Q O b G-SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.4.6-1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the CSS is 1. Inspection of the as-built CSS 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.4.6-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.4.6-1, the as-built CSS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. Each CSS Division has the heat re- 2.a) Testing of the CSS to measure the 2.a) Each CSS pump develog at least 400 moval capacity to cool and depressurize containment spray flow at the discharge feet of head at a flow rate no less than the containment atmosphere such that of the CSS pump will be performed. 5000 gpm.
containment design temperature and Testing and analysis will be performed pressure are not exceeded following a to determine the pump head. LOCA or MSLB. 2.b) Testing of the CSS will be performed 2.b) Flow to the spray nozzles begins within using signals simulating a CSAS. The 68 seconds after receipt of a CSAS. test results will be converted by analysis to a delay time for spray initiation. 2.c) Testing and analyses will be performed 2.c) One CSS heat exchanger cools CSS flow to determine the heat removal capability to a maximum temperature of 175'F of the CSS heat exchanger. with an inlet temperature of 218'F when supplied with 8000 gpm from the CCWS at 120*F.
- 3. Each CSS Division has the capacity to 3. Inspection of the CSS spray headers will 3. Each CSS Division has spray headers reduce the concentration of radioactive be performed. and nozzles as follow:
material in the containment atmosphere such that the design basis accident dose At least 168 nozzles at plant elevation of criteria are not exceeded. at least 225 feet, at least 121 nozzles at plant elevation of at least 197 feet, and at least 40 nozzles at plant elevation of at least 141 feet. 2.4.6 es. 7-,4
O f V s d SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.4.6-1 (Continued) CONTAINMENT SPR.AY SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 4. The CSS limits the maximum flow in 4. Testing of the CSS will be performed 4. He CSS maximum expected flowis less each Division. with flow aligned to the IRWST. than or equal to 6500 gpm in each Inspection of the as-built spray header Division, will be performed. Analyses will convert the test flow rates to the maximum expected flow rate.
- 5. The SCS pump in a Division can 5. Testing to measure the flowrate 5. The SCS pump in a Division pumps at perform the pumping function of the produced by the SCS pump when its least 5000 gpm through the CSS heat CSS pump in the Division. suction is connected to the CSS pump exchanger in the Division.
suction and its discharge to the CSS pump discharge will be performed.
- 6. A flow recirculation line around each 6. Inspection of the as-built system 6. Minimum flow recirculation rate meets CSS pump provides a minimum flow configuration will be performed and or exceeds the pump vendor's recirculation path. testing of the minimum flow requirements.
recirculation rate will be performed.
- 7. The CSS pumps can be flow tested 7. Testing of the CSS will be performed by 7. He CSS pump has a flow capacity of at during plant operation. manually aligning suction and discharge least 5000 gpm each through the test valves to the IRWST and starting the loop.
CSS pumps manually.
- 8. The ASME Code Section III CSS 8. A pressure test will be conducted on 8. He results of the pressure test of components shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 those components of the CSS required to ASME Code Section III components of retain their pressure boundary integrity be pressure tested by ASME Code the CSS conform with the pressure under internal pressures that will be Section III. testing acceptance criteria in ASME experienced during service. Code Section III.
2.4.6 os.i7.,4
C') v pJ O G l SYSTEM 804 TABLE 2.4.6-1 (Continued) l CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria l l Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 9.a) Displays of the CSS instrumentation 9.a) Inspection for the existence or 9.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 exist in the retrievability in the MCR of on Figure 2.4.6-1 exist in the MCR or l MCR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there. 1 performed. l 9 b) Controls exist in the MCR to start and 9.b) Testing will be performed using the CSS 9.b) CSS controls in the MCR operate to stop the CSS pumps, and to open and controls in the MCR. start and stop the CSS pumps and to close those power operated valves open and close those power operated shown on Figure 2.4.6-1. valves shown on Figure 2.4.6-1. 9.c) CSS alarms shown ca Figure 2.4.6-1 9.c) Testing of the CSS alarms shown on 9.c) The CSS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.6-are provided in the MCR. Figure 2.4.6-1 will be performed using I actuate in response to signals signals simulating alarm conditions. simulating alarm conditions.
- 10. Water is supplied to each CSS pump at 10. Testing to measure CSS pump suction 10. The calculated available NPSH exceeds a pressure greater than the pump's pressure will be performed. Inspection each CSS pump's required NPSH.
required net positive suction head and analysis to determine NPSH (NPSH). available to each pump will be performed based on test data and as-built data. I I I i 2.4.6 es tv.,4
O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2A.6-1 (Conth:ued] CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria ll.a) The Class IE loads shown on Figure ll.a) Testing will be performed on the CSS II.a) Within the CSS, a test signal exists only 2.4.6-1 are powered from their by providing a test signal in only one at the equipment powered from the i respective Class IE Division. Class IE Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. l II.b) The CSS pump motor and the SCS II.h) Testing on the CSS and the SCS will be ll.b) A test signal exists only at the CSS pump motor in each Division are conducted with a test signal applied to pump motor or SCS pump motor powered from different Class IE buses one Class IE bus at a time. powered from the Class IE bus under in that same Division. test. I1.c) Independence is pmvided between Class 11.c) Inspection of the as-installed Class 1E I1.c) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions and between Class IE Divisions in the CSS will be performed. IE Divisions in the CSS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment separation exists between Class IE in the CSS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the CSS.
- 12. The two mechanical Divisions of the 12. Inspection of as-built mt chanical 12. The two mechanical Divisions of the CSS are physically separated. Divisions will be performed. CSS are separated by a Divisional wall or a fire banier except for components of the system within Containment which are separated by spatial arrangement or barriers.
- 13. The CSS pumps are started upon receipt 13. Testing will be performed on the CSS 13. The CSS pumps start upon receiving a of a CSAS, except when the CSAS is pumps using a signal simulating a signal simulating a CSAS, except when aligned to the SCS pump in the same CSAS. the CSAS is aligned to the SCS pump in Division. the same Division.
2.4.6 anu
p D
\ d SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.4.6-1 (Continued)
CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 14. In each Division, the CSS isolation 14. Testing will be performed using a signal 14. The CSS isolation valve to the CSS valve to the CSS spray header and simulating a CS AS. spray header and nozzles opens upon nozzles opens upon receipt of a CSAS. receipt of a signal simulating a CSAS.
- 15. hiotor operated valves (MOVs) having 15. Testing will be performed to open, or 15. each MOV having an active safety an active safety function will open, or close, or open and also close MOVs function opens or closes, or opens and will close, or will open and also close having an active safety function under also closes.
under differential pressure or fluid flow preoperational differential pressure or conditions, and under temperature fluid flow conditions and under conditions. temperature conditions.
- 16. Check valves shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 16. Testing will be performed to open, or 16. Each check valve shown on Figure will open, or will close, or will open close, or open and also close check 2.4.6-1 opens, or closes, or opens and and also close under system pressure, valves shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 under also closes.
fluid flow conditions, or temperature system preoperational pressure, fluid conditions. flow conditions, or temperature conditius. 2.4.6 i 7.,4
SYSTEM 80+" O 2.4.7 IN-CONTAINMENT WATER STORAGE SYSTEM l Design Description J The In-containment Water Storage System (IWSS) includes the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) which is an integral part of the NI structures, , the holdup volume tank (HVT) which is an integral part of the NI structures, and the i cavity flooding system (CFS). l The IRWST provides borated water for the safety injection system (SIS) and the containment spray system (CSS). It is the primary heat sink for discharges from the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressurizer safety valves and the safety depressurization ; system (SDS) rapid depressurization subsystem. It is the source of water for the CFS. j It is the source of water to fill the refueling pool via the SIS and CSS. The IRWST i and IRWST instrumentation are safety-related except as noted in Figure 2.4.71. ! I The HVT collects water released in Containment during design basis events and returns water to the IRWST through spillways. It also collects component leakage ; not routed to other drain systems inside Containment and receives water discharged : from the IRWST by the CFS. ! The CFS is used to provide water to flood the reactor cavity in response to beyond . O
~
design basis events. ; i CFS valves located in the holdup volume are designed such that they may be actuated ; while submerged. i l The IWSS is located in the Containment. The Basic Configuration of the IWSS is as shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 and locations of ! IRWST and HVT are shown on Figure 2.1.1-1 in Section 2.1.1, Nuclear Island l Structures. l t The IRWST has a volume above the SIS / CSS pump suction line penetrations to l permit proper SIS and CSS operation following design basis events. The IRWST has ; a total volume that permits dilution of radionuclides from core and RCS release following design basis loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs). The IRWST can be vented j to allow communication between the IRWST and the containment atmosphere. j Stainless steel baskets containing trisodium phosphate are located in the HVT. t The ASME Code Section III Class for the IWSS pressure retaining components is as shown on Figure 2.4.7-1. ; i O- 2.4.7 unm i h 6
i e SYSTEM 80+" The safety related equipment shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 is classified Seismic Category I. Displays of IWSS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to open and close those power operated valves shown on Figure 2.4.7-1. IWSS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 are provided h. ihe MCR. The power operated valves and IRWST instrumentation, except alarms, shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E Division. Within the CFS, each of the four valves in the spillways from the IRWST to the HVTis powered from a different Class 1E bus, and each of the two valves in the spillways from the HVT to the reactor cavity is powered from a different Class 1E Division. Independence is provided between Class 1E Divisions, and between Class 1E Divisions and non-Class 1E equipment, in the IWSS. 1 I Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria ( Table 2.4.7-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance L criteria for the Incontainment Water Storage System. 1 I l l 2.4.7 wi7.,4
SYSTE O+ *" ' " ' ' "'" " S* (D LL. f.J LtJJ SS SDS - V '
,. _Y_. _I R Rsc5 ft{2 " " '#d ss y q gi E l SIS- h 3
- =
2 SIS- - p IN CONTAINMENT REFUELING d
- > PSS 2
CVCS - - - > WATER STORAGE HOLDUP TANK I VOLUME L - > PSS
, TANK
- ,_2 l ,E am 7 1 E
E ! M*g '-
>< 5' B CVCS 4 -) h {
c'v ' av >< e >< = REACTOR,
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! )< Al CAVITYl
>d INSIDE CONTAINMENT ((((]1 h7 T 3-UMP 7
-"~i
{ susp ,
.- -- -_ .- -- -- - 6I sJ g r OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT y fU SIS SIS SIS SIS 1I
-- - -+ EFDS ,
EFDS NOTES:
- 1. THEINSTRUMENTATION SHOWN,EXCEPT ALARMS AND SUMP LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION, ARE SAFETY-RELATED
- 2. THE POWER OPERATED VALVES AND IRWST INSTRUMENTATION SHOWN, EXCEPT ALARMS ARE POWERED FROM THElR RESPECTIVE CLASS 1E DIVISION
- 3. o : EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH PARAGRAPH NUMBER 3 OF THE " VERIFICATION FOR BASIC CONFIGURATION FOR SYSTEMS" SECTION OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS (SECTION 1.2) APPLIES.
FIGURE 2.4.7-1 IN-CONTAINMENT WATER STORAGE SYSTEM ** n _
O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.4.7-1 IN-CONTAINMENT WATER STORAGE SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the IWSS is 1. Inspection of the as-built IWSS con- 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.4.7-1. figuration will be conducted, shown on Figure 2.4.7-1, the as-built IWSS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
2.a) The IRWST has a volume above the 2.a) Inspection of construction records for 2.a) The IRWST has a useable volume of at SIS / CSS pump suction line penetrations the IRWST will be performed. least 495,000 gallons above the SIS / CSS to permit proper SIS and CSS operation pump suction line penetrations. following design basis events. 2.b) The IRWST has a total volume that 2.b) Inspection of construction records for 2.b) The IRWST has a minimum total permits dilution of radionuclides from the IRWST will be performed. volume of at least 545,800 gallons. core and RCS release following design basis LOCAs.
- 3. Stainless steel baskets containing 3. Inspection of the as built ilVT will be 3. Stainless steel baskets containing trisodium phosphate are located in the performed. trisodium phosphate are located in the llVT. IIVT.
- 4. The ASME Code Section til IWSS com- 4. A pressure test will be conducted on 4. The results of the pressure test of ponents shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 retain those components of the IWSS required ASME Code Section 111 portions of the their pressure boundary integrity under to be pressure tested by ASME Code IWSS conform with the pressure testing intemal pressures. that will be Section III. acceptance criteria in ASME Code experienced during service. Section Ill.
2.4.7
- n.u
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.4.7-1 (Continued) IN-CONTAINMENT WATER STORAGE SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. AnaIYSes Acceptance Criteria 5.a) Displays of the IWSS instrumentation 5.a) Inspection for the existence or re- 5.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 exist in the trievability in the MCR of instru- on Figure 2.4.7-1 exist in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieved there, mentation displays will be performed. can be retrieved there. 5.b) Controls exist in the MCR to open and 5.b) Testing will be performed using the 5.b) IWSS controls in the MCR operate to close those power operated valves IWSS controls in the MCR. open and close those power operated shown on Figure 2.4.7-1. valves shown on Figure 2.4.7-1. 5.c) IWSS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 5.c) Testing of the IWSS alarms shown on 5.c) The IWSS alarms shown on Figure are provided in the MCR. Figure 2.4.7-1 will be performed using 2.4.7-1 actuate in response to signals signals simulating alarm conditions. simulating alarm conditions. 6.a) The power operated valves and IRWST 6.a) Testing will be performed on the IWSS 6.a) A test signal exists only at the IWSS instrumentation, except alarms, shown components by providing a test signalin components powered from the Class IE on Figure 2.4.7-1 are powered from only one Class IE Division at a time. Division under test. their respective Class IE Division. 6.b) Within the CFS, each of the four valves 6 b) Testing will be performed on the CFS 6.b) A test signal exists only at the CFS in the spillways from the IRWST to the valves by providing a test signal in only valves powered fmm the Class IE bus llVT is powered from a different Class one Class IE bus at a time. under test. 1E bus. 6.c) Independence is provided between Class 6.c) Inspection of the as-installed Class 1E 6.c) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions in the IWSS will be IE Divisions in the IWSS. Separation Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, performed. exists between Class IE Divisions and in the IWSS. non-Class IE equipment in the IWSS. 2.4.7 e6.i7 94
SYSTEM 80+" 2.5.1 PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Des:gn Description The Plant Protection System (PPS) is a safety related instrumentation and control system which initiates reactor trip, and actuation of engineered safety features in response to plant conditions monitored by process instrumentation. Initiation signals from the PPS logic are sent to the reactor trip switchgear and to the Engineered Safety Features - Component Control System (ESF-CCS) to actuate protective functions. The PPS is located in the nuclear island structures. The Basic Configuration of the PPS is c.s shown on Figure 2.5.1-1. The PPS and the electrical equipment that initiate reactor trip or engineered safety feature actuation are classified Seismic Category I. The PPS uses sensors, transmitters, signal conditioning equipraent, and digital equipment which performs the calculations and logic to generate protective function initiation signals. The PPS features and equipment are software programmable processors, that operate with fixed sequenced program execution, and fixed memory allocation tables. There are two bistable processors per channel which provide separate trip paths where multiple sensors are available to detect the same transient. There are two coincidence processors per channel each providing a local coincidence logic (LCL) for each assigned bistable trip function. Each coincidence procersor has dedicated remote multiplexing from each bistable processor. The Interface and Test Processor (ITP) communicates with the bistable trip processors, and coincidence processors. Separation is provided between protective (safety critical) PPS processing functions and auxiliary functions of man-machine interfaces, data communications, and automatic testing. Data communication networks support the transmission of safety critical data on a continuous cyclical basis independent of plant transients. The PPS equipment is classified Class 1E. / ( k 2.5.1 wim
g SYSTEM 80+" (' An environmental qualification program assures the PPS equipment is able to perform its intended safety function for the time needed to be functional, under its design environmental conditions. The environmental conditions, bounded by applicable design basis events, are: temperature, pressure, humidity, chemical effects, radiation, aging, seismic events, submergence, power supply voltage & frequency variations, i electromagnetic compatibility, and synergistic effects which may have a significant effect on equipment performance. The environmental qualification of PPS equipment is achieved via tests, analyses, or a combination of analyses and tests. Electromagnetic interference (EMI) qualification is applied for equipment based on operating environment and/or inherent design characteristics. The PPS is qualified according to an established plan for Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC). The qualification plan requires the equipment to function properly when subjected to the expected operational electrical surges, EMI, electrostatic discharge (ESD), and radio frequency interference (RFI). The equipment to be tested will be configured for intended service conditions. A site survey is performed upon completion of system installation to characterize the p installed EMI emironment. V PPS software is designed, tested, installed, and maintained using a process which:
- a. Defines the organization, responsibilities, and software quality assurance activities for the software engineering life cycle that provides for:
- establishment of plans and methodologies e specification of functional, system, and software requirements and standards, identification of safety critical requirements
- design and development of software e software module, unit, and system testing practices
- installation and checkout practices
- reporting and correction of software defects during operation
- b. Specifies requirements for:
- software management, documentation requirements, standards, resiew requirements, and procedures for problem reporting and corrective action a software configuration management, historical records of software, and control of software changes O
i N 2.5.1 .6-i v-,4
m SYSTEM 80+" , ) U e verification & validation, and requirements for reviewer independence
- c. Incorporates a graded approach according to the software's relative importance to safety.
The use of commercial grade computer hardware and software items in the PPS is accomplished through a process that has: a requirements for supplier design control, configuration management, problem reporting, and change control;
- review of product performance;
- receipt acceptance of the commercial grade item;
- final acceptance, based on equipment qualification and software validation in the integrated system.
Setpoints for initiation of PPS safety-related functions are determined using methodologies which have the following characteristics: a) Requirements that the design basis analyticallimits, data, assumptions, and methods used as the bases for selection of trip setpoints are specified and documented. O b) Instrumentation accuracies, drift and the effects of design basis V transients are accounted for in the determination of setpoints. c) The method utilized for combining the various uncertainty values is specified. d) Identifies required pre-operational and surveillance testing. c) Identifies performance requirements for replacement of setpoint related instrumentation. f) The setpoint calculations are consistent with the physical configuration of the instrumentation. Reactor Trip initiation Function Process instrumentation, the Plant Protection Calculators (PPCs), the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs), and the reactor trip switchgear function to initiate an automatic reactor trip. The process instrumentation provides sensor data input to the PPS which monitors the following plant conditions to provide a reactor trip: Reactor Power - High Reactor Coolant System Pressure - 1.nw or High O V 2.5.1 05:7.,4
SYSTEM 80+"
\o)
Steam Generator Water Level - Low or High Steam Generator Pressure - low Containment Pressure - IIigh Reactor Coolant Flow - low Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio - low Linear IIcat Generation Rate - High Setpoints for initiation of a reactor trip are installed for each monitored condition to provide for initiation of a reactor trip prior to exceeding reactor fuel thermal limits and the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary limits for anticipated operational occurrences. If a monitored condition reaches its setpoint, the PPS automatically actuates the reactor trip switchgear. Encineered Safety Features Initiation Function Process instrumentation, the PPCs, the ESF-CCS, motor starters, and other actuated devices function to initiate the engineered safety feature systems. The process instrumentation provides sensor data input to the PPCs, which monitor the following plant conditions to initiate the engineered safety features systems. Pressurizer Pressure - Low Steam Generator Water Ixvel - Low or High
/ Steam Generator Pressure -law !
I Containment Pressure - High If a monitored condition reaches its setpoint, the PPCs automatically generate one or more of the following Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Signals (ESFAS). Safety Injection Actuation Signal Containment Isolation Signal Containment Spray Actuation Signal l Main Steam Isolation Signal 1 Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signals These initiating signals are provided to the ESF-CCS, which responds by actuating the i engineered safety feature systems. l Flements Of The PPS The PPS is divided into four redundant channels. The following elements, depicted in Figures 2.5.1-2 and 2.5.1-3, are included in each channel of the PPS: Process Instrumentation Signal Conditioning Equipment Limit Imgic (PPC Bistables and CPCs) t% 2.5.1 w .u
SYSTEM 80+" %.) Local Coincidence Logic Initiation Logic Reactor Trip Switchgear Interface and Test Processor Operator's Modules Switches for Manual Activation of Reactor Trip Signals Switches for Manual Activation of ESF Initiating Signals Figure 2.5.1-2 shows the plant systems in which process instrumentation is implemented for generation of the sensor signal input to the PPS. Limit logic for process-value to setpoint comparison is implemented in bistable processors in each channel. System protective functions are distributed between histable processors to provide functional diversity. The bistable processors generate trip signals based on the channel digitized value reaching a digital setpoint. The PPS maintenance and test panels provide the capability for trip limit setpoint changes. Limit logic for calculated departure from nucleate boiling ratio and high linear heat generation rate are implemented in each channel in a section of the PPS referred to as the Core Protection Calculator (CPC). The trip output signals of the bistable processors and the CPC in each channel are sent to the local coincidence logic processors in all four PPS channels. Therefore, for each trip condition, the local coincidence logic processor in each channel receives four f] trip signals, one from its associated bistable processors or CPC from within the ( ,/ channel, and one from the equivalent histable processors or CPC located in each of the other three redundant channels. The coincidence processors evaluate the local coincidence logic based on the state of the four like trip signals and their respective bypasses. A coincidence of any two like trip signals is required to generate a reactor trip or ESF initiation signal. , i Operating bypasses are implemented in the PPS to provide for the bypass of trip functions which are plant mode specific. These bypasses are manually activated. The PPS automatically removes an operating bypass if the plant approaches conditions for which the associated trip function is designed to provide protection. Bistable trip channel bypasses allow one channel of the bistable inputs to the coincidence processors to be bypassed for each trip function. This converts the local coincidence logic to two-out-of-three coincidence for each trip function for which a bistable trip channel bypass is initiated. For each trip function, the PPS allows only one bistable trip channel to be bypassed at a time. l Upon coincidence of two like signals indicating one of the conditions for reactor trip, the PPS logic initiates actuation of a channel of the reactor trip switchgear. As shown on Figure 2.5.1-2, actuation of a selective two single channels of the reactor trip switchgear is required to cause a reactor trip. The reactor trip switchgear breakers interrupt power to the Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM) coils, allowing all Control Element Assemblics to drop into the core by gravity. 7_ r C 2.5.1 wu
l l n SYSTEM 80+" I i \ l
\'j The reactor trip switchgear system (RTSS) can be tripped manually from the Main Control Room or the Remote Shutdown Room. The manual reactor trip uses hardwired circuits which are independent of the PPS bistable and coincidence processors. Once a reactor trip has been initiated, the breakers in the RTSS latch open. !
Upon coincidence of two like signals indicating a condition for generating an ESFAS, the ESF initiation logic transmits the respective initiation signal to the ESF-CCS. The PPS interfaces in the Main Control Room allow for manual activation of each of the ESF initiating signals input to the ESF-CCS. The PPS interfaces in the Remote Shutdown Room allow for manual activation of the initiating signals for Main Steam Isolation. Manual activation of these initiating signals is independent of the PPS bistable and coincidence processors. The PPS operator's modules at the Main Control Room, the Remote Shutdown Room and at the maintenance and test panel allow operators to enter trip channel bypasses, operating bypasses, and variable setpoint resets. These modules provide indication of bypass status and bistable trip and pre-trip status. Manual control capability for the PPS is transferred from the Main Control Room to the Remote Shutdown Room upon actuation of the Master Transfer Switches via q signals from the ESF CCS for all control functions except reactor trip. The manual b reactor trip switches are active in both locations at all times. Provision for transferring PPS control capability back to the Main Control Room is provided at the maintenance and test panel. Loss of power to, or disconnection of a reactor trip path component in a PFC or CPC will cause a trip initiating state to be detected in a downstream component in that channel. Periodic testing to verify operability of the PPS can be performed with the reactor at power or when shutdown without interfering with the protective function of the system. Overlap in individual tests assures that all functions are tested from sensor input through to the actuation of a reactor trip circuit breaker and to the generation of protection function initiation signals provided to the ESF-CCS. The ITP monitors the on-line continuous automatic PPC and CPC hardware testing and performs on-line periodic automatic software logic functional testing of PPS logic. , Where automatic testing is implemented in the PPS, it does not degrade the capability of the PPS to perform its protective function. Indication of the automatic test system status and test results are provided to the operator via the Interface and Test Processor interface to the DIAS and DPS. O J 2.5.1 m it.,4 i i 1
SYSTEM 80+" \ Manual testing of PPS functions and hardware can be performed at the maintenance and test panel. PPS Channel Separation and Isolation Figure 23.1-3 shows the PPS channels and the signal flow from the process instrumentation to the individual channels for initiation of protection system functions. Four measurement channels with electricalindependence are provided for each parameter used in the direct generation of these initiation signals, with the exception of the Control Element Assembly position which is a two channel measurement. The four PPS channels are physically separated and electrically isolated. Each PPS channel is powered from its respective Class IE bus. System Characteristics: Number of independent channels of equipment 4 Minimum number of sensors per trip variable 4 (at least one per channel except as identified above for the Control Element Assembly position)) Coincidence logic used for plant sensor inputs local 2-out-of-4 Reactor Manual / Automatic actuation trip logic Selective 2-out-of-4 ESF Manual / Automatic Actuation Logic Selective 2mut-of-4 Electrical isolation and physical separation are provided between the PPS and the process control system. Where the PPS and the process control system interface with the same component (e.g., with sensors, signal conditioners, or actuated devices), electrical isolation devices are provided between the process control system and the shared component. Electrical isolation devices are provided at PPS interfaces with the Power Control System, the Discrete Indication and Alarm System - Channel N, and the Data Processing System as shown on Figure 2.5.1-2. Electrical isolation devices are provided between the signal conditioning equipment and the Discrete Indication and Alarm System - Channel P. Physical separation is proviaed between PPS channels for the hardwired circuits used for manual initiation of reactor trip signals. O 2.5.1 it 7.,4
SYSTEM 80+" Other operator interfaces from the main control panel and the remote shutdown panel to the PPS have electrical isolation devices. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.5.1-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Plant Protection System.
!O v
l l r k 2.5.1 o$iv. 4
SYSTEM 80+* l O S I r------i i t- - - ESF-CCS s , :: : : :,
' -* ( ,
i,,_ ,_ t PR _OCESS-CCS i pps _ _ _ .I I SIGNAL
' - - - -90WER CONTROL' s CONDITIONING t- 8
- '_ _ SYSTEM
' I I g i r-I i
' ' SAFETY RELATED' '
DISPLAY
, '_ . ' INSTRUMENTATIONI PPCs i e i OPERATORS &
MODULE '~ ~ ~: ' s CPCs I k I I i i r- -' I RTSS I
- a___
s I '__ES F-C C S_ ' l I I
, . . .l. . . ,
CEDMCS * . NOTES:
- 1. PPS EQUIPMENT SHOWN ON THE FIGUAE IS CLASS 1E.
- 2. PPS EQUIPMD4T IS POWERED FROV, CLASS 1E SUPPLIES.
- 3. EACH PPS CHANNEL (4 IN NUMBERf IS POWERED FROM A SEPARATE CLASS 1E BUS.
O FIGURE 2.5.1-1 PPS CONFIGURATION m-27 94
O sys csx._.:t 4 O[\ R~~
* ~
t ~EACTOR C"OOLANT SY"STE"M 7
,. - - - - - - - 3 g . HOT & COLD LEG TEMP. g NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION . PRESSURIZER PRESSURE g - NUCLEAR POWER i 3.RCP PLOW 4
.CEA POSITION .RCP SPEED e- e
' MAIN STEAM AND PEED -.3 - .
I CONTAINMENT SYSTEM
---..3 e .SG PRESSURE g- ,- - - - . . -g .- CONTAINMENT PRESSURE---
3 n . SG, LEVEL, , , , , , - . - - - DISCRETE INDICATION & U e ALARM SYSTEM. CHANNEL P t m
- - - - - - - - innrir REDUNDANT CH ANNELS B, C & D , ESP.CCS- - - - . , -
g DMS!ON A e' , , [o , , , , , _ _ _ CHANNEL A StGNAL CONDITIONING
- I,
' ' M MED MAINTENANCE M g g AND TEST PANEL OR DATA N 3 db NON CONOUCTeeG PROCESS COMPONENT "g g
- p onTA m OR g- CONTROL SYSTEM e " 1f DISCRETE SONAL 3 TO.7 ROM ITP'S (E.0 FIRER OPTIC)
+ - - - 4%- . . - - - sk -
---l{ 1 = >1N OTHER g- * * " ~ " " *
"1 4 -8 CHANNELS POWER CONTROL SYSTEM g. g
.g
@ NoumN 3 INTERFACE I AND I TEST " PHYStCAL
. . : II SEPARATION PROCESSOR -
q ' H EETWEENCHANNELS g- - - - - - - - , ir y 3, ,, DISCRETE INDtCATION t & ALARM SYSTEM 4HANNEL N 3 ~ ~ ~ N ~~ stSTABLE CORE 1 ". " ". 1 ".
- TRtP PROTECTION
'1 PROCESSORS CALCULATOR DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM d
- Ul* * ,
9
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- - - - - - - , 2 OTHER CH ANNELS
- - e, "
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- J g COtNCIDENCE PROCESSORS
+
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- - = .6 OTHER CHANNELS
, t -
-D 1I l MANUALINITIATIONS l, 'I I'
' INITtATION INITIATION I e LOGICS LOGICS
, REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL g ' - - - -
g CEDMCS POWER g I->B e
- - ~' - -
'E TO OTHER
- - - e
- DIVISIONS OP t l OPERATOR'S MODULE lI ' 1r #
3 {u-> D ESP-CCS l ppg PPS Cna A ,B ] e I MANUALINITIATIONS l: #
, Cns8 l 3
.. - - - - - - . g RTSS FROM OTHER ppS PPS' '
C PPS CHANNEL Cg C D CHD g I D
.- - - - . - - - t I" " " " " " " 9 1I MAIN CONTROL ROOM 1 TRANSPER SWITCH I
- ll-[- . - -
., rCEbMCS 8 * * *f I
- . . - - - g
- (" ESP-CCS
- - - - - - - Le DMSION A g FIGURE 2.5.1-2 PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM lNTERCONNECTIONS -m
CH D SYSTEM 80+ ru CH A CH-3 CH-C PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS PROCESS INjT INST INST INST 4 - 7 T r Tr Tr T t l , , , , l1 r CPC l 1 r CPC ] l ' CPC l l ' CPC CH-A CH-B CH C CH-D l BISTABLE BISTABLE BlSTABE BISTABLE TRIP TRIP TRIP TRIP PROCESSORS PROCESSORS PROCESSORS PROCESSORS
- : : n , - , ,
e " i fi fi f1 ri fI n n f 1 r Ul fI n n fi n f i fi n f1 rI I1 f1 ri f SIGNAL ISOLATION E, IC l D ll Y~l I IC 11 D I A I J l ID 11 A IB IC 1
- - 1 l
. ) < .
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( i nt mr inf l CH-A CH-B CH-C CH-D COINCIDENCE ColNCIDENC2 COINCIDENCE ColNCIDENCE PROCESSORS PROCESSORS PROCESSORS PROCESSORS O lI lI lI INITATION LOGIC RTlESF RT ESF RT ESF RT ESF CH-A CH-B CH-C CH-D INIT l INIT INIT l l NIT INIT l INIT INIT l INIT i f 1r If 3r SwlT$HGE l RT-A l l RT B l l RT-C l l RT-D l I f lf if U U If U I f
- ~ q - ,,_ ,
if U -C 9 3r l ESF FUNCTIONS lf lf 8 If lf = O l ESF-CCS-A L ' FIGURE 2.5.1-3 PPS BASIC BLOCK DIAGRAM oe-u-94
h SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.1-1 PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1.a) The Basic Configuration of the PPS is 1.a) Inspection of the as-built PPS con- 1.a) For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.5.1-1. figuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.5.1-1, the as-built PPS conforms with the Basic Configuration. 1.b) Separation is provided between safety 1.b) Inspection of the as-built PPS hardware 1.b) The as-built PPS hardware and software critical PPS processing functions and and software will be conducted. has: auxiliary functions of man-machine interfaces, data communications and
- Processors that provide fixed sequenced automatic testing. program execution with fixed memory allocation Data communication networks support the transmission of safety critical data
- Separation provided between safety on a continuous cyclical basis critical PPS processing functions and independent of plant transients. auxiliary functions of man-machine interfaces, data communications and automatic testing.
- Data communication networks that support the transmission of safety critical data on a continuous cyclical basis independent of plant transients.
- 2. The four PPS channels are physically 2. Inspection for separation and isolation of 2. Physical separation exists between the 4 separated and electrically isolated. the four as-built PPS channels will be PPS channels. Electrical isolation conducted. devices are provided at interfaces between the 4 PPS channels.
2.5.1 o+i7-s4
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.1-1 (Continued) PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 3. Each PPS channel is powered from its 3. Testing will be performed on the PPS 3. Within the PPS, a test signal exists only respective Class IE bus. by providing a test signal in only one at the equipment powered from the Class IE bus at a time. Class IE bus under test.
- 4. Where the PPS and the process control 4. Inspection of the as-built PPS con- 4. Electrical isolation devices are provided system interface to the same component, figuration will be conducted. between the process control system and isolation devices are provided between sensors, signal conditioners and actuated the process control system and the devices which interface to the PPS.
shared component.
- 5. Electrical isolation devices are provided 5. Inspection of the as-built configuration 5. Electrical isolation devices are provided at PPS interfaces with the Power will be conducted. at PPS interfaces with the Power Control System, the Discrete Indication Control System, the Discrete Indication and Alarm System - Channel N and the and Alarm System - Channel N and the Data Processing System and between the Data Processing System and between the signal conditioning equipment and the signal conditioning equipment and the Discrete Indication and Alarm System - Discrete Indication and Alarm System -
Channel P. Channel P.
- 6. Loss of power to, or disconnection of 6. Loss of power and component 6. Imss of power to, or disconnection of a any reactor trip path active component disconnect type testing will be conductui reactor trip path active component (i.e.,
(i.e., circuit boards and power supply at the factory or on the as-instdied circuit boards and power supply module-s) in a PPC or CPC will cause a equipment. modules)in a PPC or CPC causes a trip trip initiating state to be detected in a initiating state to be detected in a downstream component in that channel. domistream component in that channel. 2,5.1 es.i7.,4
( C O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.1-1 (Continued) PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criieria 7.a) When a process value input signal 7.a) Testing will be performed using 7.a) Bistable processor generates a trip signal crosses the setpoint threshold, the trip simulated initiating input signals to the when an input signal crosses a limit limit bistabb processor will generate a PPS. logic setpoint threshold. trip signal. 7.b) The PPS maintenance and test panels 7.b) Testing will be performed using the 7.b) Setpoint changes affect only the intended provide the capability for trip limit built-in trip limit setpoint change trip limit functions. setpoint changes. feature. 7.c) Upon coincidence of two like signals 7.c) Testmg will be performed using 7.c) The PPS generates reactor trip switch-indicating one of the following simulated initiating signals to the PPS. gear actuation signals. conditions for reactor trip, the PPS logic initiates a reactor trip: 7.d) Testing will be performed using 7.d) Each coincidence processor outputs a Reactor Power - liigh simulated input signals to each trip signal whenever it receives 2 or Reactor Coolant System Pressure - Low coincidence processor, fc,r combinations more like signals. orIligh of 2, 3 and 4 like signals for a trip Steam Generator Level - Low or liigh condition and for combinations of 2 and Steam Generator Pressure - Low 3 like signals with one bistable trip Containment Pressure - liigh channel in bypass. Reactor Coolant Flow - Low Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio - Low Linear l{ eat Generation Rate - liigh 2.5.1 os.i7.,4
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.1-1 (Continued) PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 8. Upon coincidence of two like signals 8.a) Testing will be performed using 8.a) The PPS generates ESFAS signals indicating one of the following simulated initiating signals to the PPS. related to the initiating conditions for conditions for an ESFAS, the ESF each condition listed in the Design initiation logic transmits the respective Conunitment as follows:
initiation signal to the ESF-CCS. ESFAS PARAMETER Pressurizer Pressure - low Steam Generator Water Level - Low or SIAS and CIAS Low Pressurizer Pressure liigh liigh Containment Pressure Steam Generator Pressure - Low CSAS liigh-High Containment Pressure Containment Pressure - High MSIS Low Steam Generator Pressure Ifigh Containment Pressure liigh Steam Generator Level EFAS Low Steam Generator Level liigh Steam Generator Level 8.b) Testing will be performed using 8.b) Each coincidence processor outputs the simulated input signals to each respective initiation signal whenever it coincidence processor, for combinations receives 2 or more like signals of 2, 3 and 4 like signals indicating a indicating conditions for generating an condition for generating an ESFAS, and ESFAS. for combinations of 2 and 3 like signals with one bistable trip channel in bypass. 2.5.1 e5:7-,4
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.1-1 (Continued) PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 9.a) A reactor trip initiation signal from a 9.a) Testing of the as-built reactor trip 9.a) The reactor trip initiation signal from PPS channel results in actuation of the switchgear actuation circuits will be each PPS channel actuates the correct correct reactor trip switchgear breaker, conducted. single reactor trip switchgear breaker. 9.b) Each reactor trip switchgear breaker can 9.b) Testing will be performed separately for 9.b) Each reactor trip switchgear breaker be tripped by either an under voltage or the under voltage trip and the shunt trip trips for either an under voltage trip or a shunt trip. for each reactor trip switchgear breaker. a shunt trip.
- 10. The RTSG can be tripped manually 10. Testing of manual reactor trip from 10. Actuation of either pair of reactor trip from the Main Control Room or the Main Control Room and Remote switches at the Main Control Room or Remote Shutdown Room. Shutdown Room will be performed. either pair of trip switches at the Remote Shutdown Room interrupts power to the CEDMs.
11.a) The following ESFAS signals can be I1.a) Testing of manual ESF actuation from II.a) Actuation of either pair of ESFAS actu-manually actuated at the Main Control Main Control Room will be performed. ation switches for an ESF function at the Room. Main Control Room initiates the assoc-iated ESFAS signal input to the ESF-Safety Injection Actuation Signal CCS. Containment Spray Actuation Signal Containment Isolation Signal Main Steam Isolation Signal Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal ll.b) A Main Steam Isolation Signal can be II.b) Testing of manual MSIS actuation from II.b) Following transfer of control from the manually actuated at the Remote Shut- the Remote Shutdown Room will be Main Control Room to the Remote Shut-down Room. performed. down Room actuation of either pair of MSIS actuation switches at the Remote Shutdown Room initiates a MSIS input to the ESF-CCS. 2.5.1
- n-u
Q o o V U C SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.1-1 (Continued) PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 12.a) A bistable trip channel bypass can be 12.a) Testing of PPS Trip Channel Bypasses 12.a) With one trip channel in bypass, at-activated in only one channel at a time. will be performed. tempts to actuate a second like para-meter bypass in a second channel are rejected. 12.b) The PPS automatically removes an oper- 12.b) Testing will be performed for each 12.b) Each operating bypass becomes deac- ; ating bypass if the plant approaches operating bypass implemented in the tivated when the input signal for the j conditions for which the associated trip PPS. mode dependent parameter monitored function is designed to provide for that function reaches the associated protection. setpoint.
- 13. The PPS initiates reactor trip and ESF 13. Testing and analysis will be performed 13. Measured response times are less than system actuations within allocated to measure PPS equipment response or equal to the response time values l
response times. times. required for reactor trip and ESF l actuations.
- 14. Setpoints for initiation of PPS safety- 14. Inspection will be performed on the 14. The inspection of the setpoint calculation related functions are determined using setpoint calculations. confirms the use of setpoint method-methodologies which have the following ologies that require: ;
characteristics: l ! a) Documentation of data, assumptions, a) Requirements that the design basis and methods used in the bases for analytical limits, data, assumptions, selection of trip setpoints is and methods used as the bases for performed. I selection of trip setpoints are specified and documented. l 2.5.1 e6-i7 ,4 _____ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ a
3 ( O (J \ V SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.1-1 (Continued) PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 14. (Continued) 14. (Continued) 14. (Continued) b) Instrumentationaccuracies drift,and b) Consideration of instrument cali-the effects of design basis transients bration uncertainties and uncer-are accounted for in the tainties due to environmental con-determination of setpoints. ditions, instrument drift, power supply variation, and the effect of c) The method utilized for combining design basis event transients is the various uncertainty values is included in determining the margin specified. between the trip setpoint and the safety limit.
d) Identifies required preoperational and surveillance testing. c) He methods used for combining uncertainties is consistent with those e) Identifies performance requirements specified in the methodology plan, for replacement of setpoint related instrumentation. d) The use of written procedures for required preoperational and f) The setpoint calculations are surveillance testing. consistent with the physical configuration of the instrumentation. e) Evaluation for equivalent or better performance of replacement instrumentation which is not identical to original equipment is documented. f) The configuration cf the as-built instrumentation is consistent with the attributes used in the setpoint calculations for location of taps and sensing lines. 2.5.1 m-n.u
O O C SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.1-1 (Continued) PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 'S PPS software is designed, tested, 15. Inspection will be performed of the 15.a) The process defines the organization, installed and maintained using a process process used to design, test, install, and responsibilities and activities for the which: maintain the PPS safety related following phases of the software software. engineering life cycle:
- a. Defines the organization, respon-sibilities, and software quality assurance
- Establishment of plans and activities for the software engineering methodologies for all software to be life cycle that provides for: developed.
- establishment of plans and
- Specification of functional, system and methodologies software requirements, and identification of safety critical requirements.
- specification of functional, system and software requirements and standards,
- Design of the software architecture, identification of safety critical program structure, and definition of the requirements software modules.
- design and development of software
- Development of the software code and testing of the software modules.
- software module, unit, and system testing practices
- Interpretation of software and hardw~are and performance of unit and system
- installation and checkout practices tests.
- reporting and correction of software
- Software installation and checkout defects during operation testing.
- Reporting and correction of software defects during operation.
2.5.1 e6 i7 94
.r. n n U U SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.1-1 (Continued)
PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM L Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 15. (Continued) 15. (Continued) 15. (Continued) b) Specifies requirements for: b) The process has requirements for the following software development
- software management, documentation functions:
requirements, standards, review requirements, and procedures for
- Software management, which defines or-problem reporting and corrective action ganization responsibilities, documen-tation requirements, standards for soft-
- software configuration management, ware coding and testing, review require-historical records of software, and ments, and procedures for problem control of software changes reporting and corrective actions.
- verification & validation, and
- Software configuration management, requirements for reviewer independence which establishes methods for maintain-ing historical records of software as it is c) Incorporates a graded approach developed, controlling software changes according to the software's relative and for recciding and reporting software importance to safety. changes.
- Verification and validation, which speci-fies the requirements for the verification review process, the validation testing process, review and test activity docu-mentation, and reviewer independence.
15.c) The process establishes the method for classifying PPS software elements according to their relative importance to safety. The process defines the tasks to be performed for software assigned to each safety classification. 2.5.1 *im
p rm V U J SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.1-1 (Continued) PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment in=,caions. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 16. The use of commercial grade computer 16. Inspection will performed of the process 16. A process is defined that has:
hardware and software items in the PPS defined to use commercial grade is accomplished through a process that components in the application.
- requirements for supplier's design i has: and production control, configuration management, problem reporting, and
- requirements for supplier design change control, control, configuration management, problem reporting, and change
- review of product performance; control;
- receipt of acceptance of commercial
- review of product performance; grade item; l
l
- receipt acceptance of the commercial
- final acceptance, based on equipment grade item; qualification and software validation j in the integrated system.
- final acceptance, based on equipment qualification and software validation l in the integrated system.
- 17. The PPS is qualified according to an 17. Inspection of the PPS EMC qualification 17. For the PPS components and equipment established plan for Electromagnetic reports and the as-built PPS equipment shown on Figure 2.5.1-1, the as-built compatibility (EMC). 'nstallation con figuration and installation configuration and site survey tivironment will be conducted. are bour.ded by those used in the PPS The qualification plan requires the EMC qualification report (s).
equipment to function properly when subjected to the expected operational electrical surges or electromagnetic interference (EMI), electrostatic discharge (ESD), and radio frequency interference (RFI). 2,5.1 e6.i7.,4
O O O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.1-1 (Continued) PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 17. (Continued)
The qualification plan will require that the equipment to be tested be configured for intended service conditions.
- 18. An environmental qualification program 18. Inspection of the PPS qualification 18. For the PPS components and equipment assures the PPS equipment is able to report and the as-built PPS equipment shown on Figure 2.5.1-1, the as-built perform its intended safety function for installation configuration and installation, configuration, and design the time needed to be functional, under environment will be conducted. environmental conditions are bounded its design environmental conditions. by those used in the environmental ne environmental conditions, bounded qualification report.
by applicable design basis events, are: temperature, pressure, humidity, chemical effects, radiation, aging, seismic events, submergence, power supply voltage & frequency variations, electromagnetic compatibility, and synergistic effects which may have a significant effect on equipment performance. The environtrental qualification of PPS equipment is achieved via tests, analysis or a combination of analyses and tests. 2.5.1 os.i7.,4 ___ _ ___ __ _ __ _~ _ .. _ _ _ - . . - _ . _ - - - __________________ _ ______
I l l SYSTEM 80+" O 2.5 2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES - COMPONENT CONTROL l SYSTEM ! Design Description The Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System (ESF-CCS) is a safety- l related instrumentation and control system which provides automatic actuation of Engineered Safety Features (ESP) systems upon receipt of ESF initiation signals from the Plant Protection System (PPS). The ESF-CCS also provides the capability for i manual actuation of ESF systems, manual control of ESF system components and manual control of other safety-related systems and components identified below. l The ESF-CCS is located in the nuclear island structures. ; The Basic Configuration of the ESF-CCS is as shown on Figure 2.5.2-1. f The ESF-CCS is classified Seismic Category I. The ESF-CCS equipment is classified Class 1E. . P An environmental qualification program assures the ESF-CCS equipment is able to fj ( perform its intended safety function for the time needed to be functional, under its ; design environmental conditions. The environmental conditions, bounded by i applicable design basis events, are: tempenature, pressure, humidity, chemical effects, ! radiation, aging, seismic events, submergence, power supply voltage & frequency ; variations, electromagnetic compatibility, and synergistic effects which may have a significant effect on equipment performance. The environmental qualification of i ESF-CCS equipment is achieved via tests, analyses or a combination of analyses and i tests. i Electromagnetic interface (EMI) qualification is applied for equipment based on .i operating environment and/or inherent design characteristics. l t i' The ESF-CCS is qualified according to an established plan for Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC). ; The qualification plan requires the equipment to function properly when subjected to the expected operational electrical surges or electromagnetic interference (EMI), i electrostatic discharge (ESD), and radio frequency interference (RFI). j The equipment to be tested will be configured for intended senice conditions. j l O 2.5.2 .6 17.,4
I p SYSTEM 80+" A site survey is performed upon completion of system installation to characterize the installed EMI environment. The ESF-CCS uses sensors, transmitters, signal conditionmg equipment, and digital l equipment which perform the calculations, communications, and logic to generate i signals te actuate protective system equipment. This equipment is Class 1E. The ESF-CCS design incorporates the following features: software programmable processors arranged in primary and standby processor configurations within each ESF-CCS division. Processors provide fixed sequence program (non-interrupt driven) execution with fixed memory allocation. ESFAS functions are divided into ESF-CCS distributed segments with two separate multiplexers per segment which receive PPS initiation signals. Separation is provided between protection (safety critical) ESFAS processing functions and auxiliary functions of man-machine interfaces, data communication and automatic testing. Redundant data communication networks support the transmission of protection (safety critical) data on a continuous cyclical basis independent of plant transients. For each defined failure of the ESF-CCS data communication links, a predetermined failure mode for the affected system has been defined and determined to have acceptable consequences. The ESF-CCS is divided into four divisions. Each division of the ESF-CCS has the following elements, as depicted on Figure 2.5.2-2: selective 2-out-of-4 logic, component control logic, process instrumentation, signal conditioning equipment, maintenance and test panel, control and display interface devices, and a master transfer switch. The four ESF-CCS divisions are physically separated and electrically isolated. Each ESF-CCS division is powered from its respective Class 1E bus. Each ESF-CCS division receives 4 channels of initiation signals from the PPS which are processed using selective 2-out-of-4 logic to generate actuation signals for the ESF systems ccmtrolled by that division. Basic block diagrams for the functionallogic used in the ESF-CCS for actuation of ESF systems are shown on Figures 2.5.2-3 and 2.5.2-4. 2.5.2 ou r-,4 l l l
SYSTEM 80+" %./ The ESF-CCS provides control capability and, upon receipt of initiation signals from the PPS, automatically generates actuation signals to the following ESF systems within allocated response times: safety injection system, containment isolation system, containment spray system, main steam isolation, and steam generator 1 and steam generator 2 emergency feedwater system. i Once initiation signals are received from the PPS, the ESF-CCS actuation logic signals remain following removal of the initiation signal. ESF functions are assigned to individual group contial segments within each ESF-CCS division. This functional assignment approach limits the effect of a single group failure to selected ESF functions in a given division. Additional segmentation of functional assignment is applied within each ESF-CCS group control segment. This practice limits the effect of a single multiplexer or module failure to selected ESF functions in the division. ESF system interfaces are ,P also confined within group control segments to minimize reliance on the intradisision \ communication network for ESF operability. The ESF-CCS provides control capability and, upon receipt of initiation signals from the PPS, automatically generates actuation signals to the following non-ESF systems: annulus ventilation system, component cooling water system, onsite power system, diesel generators, and control complex ventilation system. The ESF-CCS provides control and display capability for the following safety-related systems: : shutdown cooling system, safety depressurization system, atmospheric dump system, station service water system, heating, ventilatmg, and air conditioning systems, and hydrogen mitigation devices. ( \ 2.5.2 e6-i 7-,4
SYSTEM 80+* Upon receipt of ESF initiation signals for safety injection, containment spray or emergency feedwater, the ESF-CCS initiates an automatic start of the diesel generators and automatic load sequencing of ESF loads. Upon detecting loss of power to Class 1E Division buses through protective desices, : the ESF-CCS automatically initiates startup of the diesel generators, shedding of electrical load, transfer of Class 1E bus connections to the diesel generator, and -l sequencing of the reloading of safety-related loads to the Class 1E bus. In performing t load sequencing, normally used safety related plant loads are badeil first in a i predetermined sequence unless an ESF actuation signal is generated. Upon ESF l actuation, the normal load sequence is interrupted and priority is given to loading the , actuated ESF systems and associated safety-related systems. The sequence for loading , the normally used safety related plant loads is then resumed. i The ESF-CCS provides interlock control for isolation valves :n the shutdown cooling system (SCS) suction lines, the safety injection tank (SIT) discharge lines and the ! emergency feedwater (EFW) pump discharge lines. The SCS interlocks prevent the , ESF-CCS from generating a signal to open the SCS isolation valves when the RCS l pressure is above the entry pressure of the SCS. The SITinterlocks prevent the ESF- i CCS from generating a signal to close the SIT isolation valves when the RCS pressure ; is above the entry pressure of the SCS. The interlock on the EFW isolation valves - automatically closes the isolation valves on high SG levels when an Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal is not present. - The control and display interface devices of the ESF-CCS in the MCR provide for ! automatic and manual control of ESF systems and components. In the remote ! shutdown room, the control and display interface devices provide for manual control of ESF system components needed to achieve hot standby. Actuation of master ! transfer switches at either exit of the MCR transfers control capability from the control and display interface devices in the MCR to those in the remote shutdown : room. Indication of transfer is provided in the MCR. Each ESF-CCS division's i maintenance and test panel provides capability to transfer control from the MCR to the remote shutdown room for its respective ESF-CCS division and to transfer control back to the MCR for its respective ESF-CCS division. , Diverse manual actuation switches are provided as an alternate means for manual ; actuation of ESF components in two divisions of the ESF-CCS as follows: 2 trains of safety injection, ! 1 train of containment spray, ; 1 train of emergency feedwater to each steam generator, 1 main steam isolatior. valve in each main steam line, ! I isolation valve in each containment air purge line, and j 1 letdown isolation valve. ; O i 2.5.2 eu 7.,4 l l i
I c SYSTEM 80+" C) ( The diverse manual actuation switches provide input signals to the lowest level in the ESF-CCS digital equipment. Communication of the signals from the switches is diverse from the software used in the higher levels of the ESF-CCS. Actuation of the switches provides a signal which overrides higher level signals, to actuate the associated ESF component or components. Diverse manual actuation status indication is provided in the MCR. Periodic testing to verify operability of the ESF-CCS can be performed with the reactor at power or when shutdown without interfering with the protective function of the system. Capability is provided for testing all functions, from ESF initiating signals received from the PPS through to the actuation of protective system equipment. Testing consists of on-line automatic hardware testing, automated functional testing of PPS/ESFAS initiations and interfaces, and manual testing. The maintenance and test panel provides capability for manual testing of ESF-CCS functions and hardware. Where the ESF-CCS and the process control system interface with the same component (e.g., with sensors, signal conditioners, or actuated devices), electrical isolation devices are provided between the process control system and the shared component. Electricalisolation devices are provided at ESF-CCS interfaces with the discrete indication and alarm system - channel N (DIAS-N), the data processing A system (DPS), the process-component control system (P-CCS), the control and display U interface devices, the master transfer switches and between the signal conditioning equipment and the discrete indication and alarm system - channel P (DIAS-P), as shown on Figure 2.5.2-2. ESF-CCS software is designed, tested, installed, and maintained using a process which:
- a. Defines the organization, responsibilities, and software quality assurance activities for the software engineering life cycle that provides for:
- establishment of plans and methodologies ;
a specification of functional, system and software requirements and standards, identification of safety critical requirements a design and development of software e software module, unit and system testing practices i e installation and checkout practices
- reporting and correction of software defects during operation l
l 3 (V 2.5.2 i+iv.s i
l 1 l l l ym SYSTEM 80+" l \ l l
- b. Specifies requirements for: 1
- software management, documentation requirements, standards, review requirements, and procedures for problem reporting and corrective action a software configuration management, historicai records of software, and control of software changes
- verification & validation, and requirements for reviewer independence
- c. Incorporates a graded approach according to the software's relative importance to safety.
The use of commercial grade computer hardware and software items in the ESF-CCS is accomplished through a dedication process that has:
- requirements for supplier design control, configuration management, problem reporting, and change control;
- resiew of product performance; a receipt acceptance of the commercial grade item;
- final acceptance, based on equipment qualification and software validation in the integrated system.
f 6 , \ Setpoints for interlocks and actuation of ESF-CCS safety-related functions are ! determined using methodologies which have the following characteristics: 1 a) Requirements that the design basis analytical limits, data, assumptions, 1 and methods used as the bases for selection of trip setpoints are i specified and documented. i b) Instrumentation accuracies, drift and the effects of design basis l transients are accounted for in the determination of setpoints. c) The method utilized for combining the various uncertainty values is specified. d) Identifies required pre-operational and surveillance testing. e) Identifies performance requirements for replacement of setpoint related instrumentation. f) The setpoint calculations are consistent with the physical configuration of the instrumentation. ,m i 2.5.2 wu
SYSTEM 80+" Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.5.2-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System. O l
)
2.5.2 wi7-94
SYST +" l PPS-I
._________________-.1 --------
t i ESF-CCS i I i i CONTROL & DISPLAY l INTERFACE DEVICES g
! MASTER TRANSFER SwrrCHES COMPONENT i i
I DIVERSE MANUAL ACTUATION SWITCHES CONTROL I LOGC I J_________, i _ _ i i I_ SAFETY RELATED DISPLAY _ __ _ _ _ ! INSTRUMENTATION ! I ,I l l l~ ~PROCE SC S ! g g m _ _ ____ . i~ l POWER CONTROL SYSTEM'l l SIGNAL I m ___ ___ , i CONDITIONING i l_ _ _PPS_ _ _ _ . , , a I i_ ____L___________.i J_,
,_ SENSORS
,_J__, ESF l_ _ ( lCOMPONENTSl FIGURE 2.5.2-1 l
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES-COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM oe.i7.e4 CONFIGURATION
SYSTElvrB0+ a ESF INITIATING SIONALS I O
, FROM 4 CHANNELS OF PPS ,
y A B C D g
~~ ~~
,g9 _ , _ _ _ _ .; ESF-CCS DIVISION l CONTROL & DISPLAY 4 ,, g . . . ,, II II II II g a MAINTENANCE SELECTIVE = HARD WIRED OR 5 & TEST PANEL 24UT-OF-4 DATA LINK MASTER TRANSFER SMTCH ,, . . . g,' g , , E , tooge g a e & NON-CONDUCTING DATA LINK OR l DIVERSE MANUAL l 5 E lf II ggg gg I
ACTUATION SWITCHES E 4em> (E.G. FIBER OPTIC) r (NOTE 1) E,, ,, ,, ,, , g
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , O ISOLATION PHYSICAL l REMOTE SHUTDOWN ROOM--------*l ' SEPARATION BETWEEN CHANNELS !
i 1 i Cur %%'o'Sfc'^! +=+1=======> COMPONENT
'-------- CONTROL t LOGIC
! DIAS - CHANNEL N . .se... . l TO ONE
+ .{:' y ESF-CCS l IDATA PROCESSING SYSTEM he as e e a e m ,a e = l DIVISION l
'_eeS
.. _ _____ 'a .....
E _ -- > j j( NOTE 1: IMPLEMENTED IN TWO DIVISIONS
!_ PROCESS _CCS_ _ _ _ - .p . _ ,,,, _
4 = ==" IP
,OWER CONTROL SYSTEM _ _ _ _ - g4 ,, ,, . 4 ......-======
,, ,, a se m - as = = ' SIGNAL CONDITIONING
,""'",,,~.,,~~_~_~_
lm
! ,,lASgHANNEL P, D
i , _IL_ ' e' % ! _ESF SENSORS & IS1 COMPONENTS t
\/ 06-17-94 f FIGURE 2.5.2-2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES-COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM ONE DIVISION AND INTERCONNECTIONS
i SYSTEM 80. l o ESFAS ESFAS ESFAS ESFAS INmATION INmATION INmATION INmATION l SIGNALS SIGNALS SIGNALS SIGNALS A A A A ; f A f \ f \ r A l Iflfl flf l fI fl flf I fI Il fl f l fl fl flf SELECTNE SEECTIVE SELECTIVE SEECTNE 2 OUT OF 4 2 OUT OF 4 2 OUT OF 4 2 OtJT OF 4 LOGC LOGC LOGC LOGlc lf II lf lf COMPONENT COMPONEMT COMPONENT COMPONENT l CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL CONTROL LOGC LOGC LOGC LOGC lf lf lf II l TRAIN D [ TRAIN A COMPONENTS TRAIN B COMPONENTS TRAIN C COMPONENTS COMPONENTS l l l l I l l 1 FIGURE 2.5.2-3 ESFAS BASIC BLOCK DIAGRAM FOR SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION AND EMERGENCY FEEDWATER ACTUATION os-17-$4
i SYSTEM 80.* I O ESFAS ESFAS INITIATION INITIATION SIGNALS SIGNALS
^ ^
< s , s 1 r1 rv 1 r 1 r1 r1 r1 r segmenvs semenvs 2 OUT OF 4 2 OUT OF 4 LDoc LOGC l
1r 1r COMPONENT COMPONENT CONTROL CONTROL LOGC LOGC i i 1r 1 r O TRAIN A COMPONENTS TRAIN 8 COMPONENTS FIGURE 2.5.2-4 ESFAS BASIC BLOCK DIAGRAM FOR MAIN STEAM ISOLATION, AND CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
) O O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.2-1 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analvscs. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1.a) The Basic Configuration of the ESF- 1.a) Inspection of the as-built ESF-CCS 1.a) For the components and equipment CCS is as shown on Figures 2.5.2-1 and configuration will be conducted. shown on Figures 2.5.2-1 and 2.5.2-2, 2.5.2-2. the as-built ESF-CCS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
1.b) The ESF-CCS has the following 1.b) Inspection of the as-built ESF-CCS will 1.b) The ESF-CCS has the following features: be performed. features:
- Software programmable processors
- Software programmable processors arranged in primary and standby arranged in primary and standby processor c<mfiguration within each processor configuration within ea:h ESF-CCS division ESF-CCS division
- Processors provide fixed sequence
- Processors provide fixed sequence prog ra m (non -interru pt d riven) execution program (non-interrupt driven) execution with fixed memory allocation with fixed memory allocation
- ESFAS functions are divided into ESF-
- ESFAS functions are divided into ESF-CCS distributed segments with two CCS distributed segments with two separate multiplexers per segment which separate multiplexers per segment which receive PPS initiation signals. receive PPS initiation signals
- Separation is provided between
- Separation is provided between safety protective (safety critical) ESFAS critical ESFAS processing functions and processing functions and auxiliary auxiliary functions of man-machine functions of man-machine interfaces, interfaces, data communications, and data communications, and automatic automatic testing testing
- Redundant data communication networks
- Redundant data communication networks support the transmission of safety support the transmission of safety critical data on a continuous cyclical critical data on a continuous cyclical basis independent of plant transients basis independent of plant transients 2.5.2 e6.ir-,4
q b m s SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. TcSts. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acce nce Criteria
- 2. Each division of the ESF-CCS has the 2. Inspection of the four as-built ESF-CCS 2. Each ESF-CCS division has equipment following elements, as depicted on divisions will be performed. for the following:
Figure 2.5.2-2: selective 2-out-of-4 logic, selective 2-out-of-4 logic, component control logic, compenent control logic, process instrumentation, process instrumentation, signal conditioning equipment, signal conditioning equipment, maintenance and test panel, maintenance and test panel, control and display interface devices, control and display interface devices, and a master transfer switch. and a master transfer switch.
- 3. The four ESF-CCS divisions are 3. Inspection for separation and isolation of 3. Physical separation exists between the 4 physically separated and electrically the four as-built ESF-CCS divisions will ESF-CCS divisions. Electricalisolation isolated. be conducted. devices are provided at interfaces beveen the four ESF-CCS divisions.
- 4. Each ESF-CCS division is powered 4. Testing will be performed on the ESF- 4. Within the ESF-CCS, a test signal exists from its respective Class 1E bus. CCS by providing a test sign.! in only only at the equipment powered from the one Class IE bus at a time. Class IE bus under test.
- 5. Each ESF-CCS division receives 4 5. Testing will be performed using 5.a) Each ESF-CCS division receives four channels of initiation signals from the simulated PPS signals for ESF initiation channels of PPS initiation signals for PPS which are processed using selective input to each division of the ESF-CCS. each ESF actuation function performed 2-out-of-4 logic to generate actuation by that ESF-CCS division.
signals for the ESF systems controlled by that division. Basic F.ock diagrams for the function logic used in the ESF-CCS for actuation of ESF systems are shown on Figures 2.5.2-3 and 2.5.2-4. 2.5.2 o6.i7.,4
n)
\v A
\d SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acccotance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 5. (Continued) S.b) For each ESF actuation function performed by an ESF-CCS division, receipt of an ESF initiation signal from only one PPS channel does not result in generation of an ESF actuation signal The receipt oflike PPS initiation signals which do not satisfy the selective 2-out-of-4 logic does not result in actuation signals for that ESF function.
The receipt of like PPS ESF initiation signals which satisfy the selective 2-out-of-4 logic does result in actuation signals for that ESF function.
- 6. The ESF-CCS provides control 6.a) Testing will be performed on the 6.a) The control and display interface capability and, upon receipt of initiation as-built ESF-CCS control and display equipment provide control capability for signals from the PPS, automatically interface equipment. the following systems:
generates actuation signals to the following ESF systems within allocated safety injection system, response times: containment isolation system, containment spray system, safety injection system, main steam isolation, and containment isolation system, emergency feedwater system. containment spray system, main steam isolation, and emergency feedwater system. 2.5.2 os_i7.,4
O O
~
V V SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 6. (Continued) 6.b) Testing will be performed using signals 6.b) PPS initiation signals which satisfy the simulating PPS initiation to the ESF- selective 2 out of 4 criteria result in Once initiation signals are received from CCS. ESF actuation signals for related system the PPS, the ESF-CCS actuation logic components for the following systems:
signals remain following removal of the initiation signal. safety injection system, containment isolation system, containment spray system main steam isolation, and steam generator I and steam generator 2 emergency feedwater system. 6.c) Testing will be performed using signals 6.c) Measured response times are less than simulating PPS initiation to the ESF- or equal to the response time values CCS. required for each ESF actuation signal. 6.d) Testing will be performed using signals 6.d) Once initiated ESF-CCS actuation logic simulating PPS initiation to the ESF- signals remain following removal of the ' CCS. initiation signal.
- 7. The ESF-CCS provides control cap- 7.a) Testing will be performed on the as- 7.a) 7he control and display interface equip-ability and, upon receipt of initiation built ESF-CCS control and display ment provide control capability for the signals from the PPS, automatically gen- interface equipment. following systems:
erates actuation signals to the following non-ESF systems: annulus ventilation system, component cooling water system, annulus ventilation system, onsite power system, component cooling water system, diesel generators, and onsite power system, control complex ventilation system. diesel generators, and control complex ventilation system. 2.5.2 e6.t7.,4
O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 7. (Continued) 7.b) Testing will be performed using signals 7.b) PPS initiation signals which satisfy the simulating PPS initiation to the ESF- selective 2 out of 4 criteria result in CCS. ESF actuation signals for related system components for the following systems:
annulus ventilation system, component cooling water system, onsite power system, diesel generators, and control complex ventilation system.
- 8. The ESF-CCS provides control and 8. Testing will be performed on the as- 8. 7he control and display interface display capability for the following built ESF-CCS control and display equipment provide component status and safety-related systems: interface equipment. control capability for the following systems:
shutdown cooling system, safety depressurization system, shutdown cooling system, atmospheric dump system, safety depressurization system, station service water system, atmospheric dump system, heating, ventilating, and air conditioning station service water system, systems, and heating, ventilating and air conditioning hydrogen mitigation devices. systems, and hydrogen mitigation devices. 2.5.2 os.17.,4
( bp n b SYSTEM 80+= TAHLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 9. Upon receipt of ESF initiation signals 9. Testing will be performed using signals 9. Upon receipt of signals simulating for safety injection, containment spray, simulating ESF initiation signals. initiation of safety injection. containment or emergency feedwater, the ESF-CCS spray, or emergency feedwater which initiates an automatic start of the diesel satisfy the selective 2-out-of-4 criteria, generators and automatic load the ESF-CCS will initiate an automatic sequencing of ESF loads. start of the diesel generators and automatic load sequencing of ESF loads.
'Ihe loads are sequenced in the assigned order for each of the accident sequencing scenarios.
10.a) Upon detecting loss of power to Class 10.a) Testing will be performed using 10.a) Upon loss of power at a Class IE bus, IE division buses through protective simulated loss of power to the Class IE signals are generated automatically by devices, the ESF-CCS automatically buses. each of two ESF-CCS divisions which initiates startup of the respective diesel will: generators, shedding of electrical load, transfer of Class IE bus connections to 1) initiate an automatic start of the the diesel generators, and sequencing to emergency diesel generator the reloading of safety-related loads to associated with that division, the Class IE bus.
- 2) cause each medium voltage switchgear circuit breaker to open,
- 3) cause transfer of the Class IE bus connections to the oiesel generator, and
- 4) sequentially reclose each medium voltage switchgear circuit breaker after the diesel generator has started.
2,5.2 u-n-r
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TAHLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM InSpeClions. TcSts. AnalyScS. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 10.b) Upon ESF actuation, the normal load 10.b) Testing will be performed using a 10.b) Upon receipt of the PPS initiation sequence is interrupted and priority is simulated loss of power to the Class IE signal, the ESF-CCS automatically given to loading the actuated ESF buses and simulated PPS initiation interrupts the loading sequence to load systems and associated safety-related signals input to the ESF-CCS during the the equipment associated with the ESF systems. reloading sequence for each of the initiation signal and then resumes the following ESF initiation signals: reloading sequence. safety injection actuation signal, containment spray actuation signal, emergency feedwater actuation signal to steam generator 1, and emergency feedwater actuation signal to steam generitor 2. 10.c) Loss of power in an ESF-CCS Division 10.c) Testing will be performed simulating 10.c) less of power in an ESF-CCS Division results in ESF-CCS outputs assuming loss of power in the ESF-CCS Division. results in ESF-CCS outputs assuming fail-safe output operation. fail-safe output operation. 10.d) Protective devices are designed to detect 10.d) Inspection of the as-built protective 10.d) Protective devices are installed to detect loss of power if a setpoint is exceeded. devices will be performed. loss of power, if a setpoint is exceeded. 2.5.2 .6.iv.,4
O O O SYSTEM 80+"- TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURF,S COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria , Design Commitment InSDeClions. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 11.a) The ESF-CCS provides an interlock 11.a) Testing will be performed using signals 11.a) Manual control signals input to the ESF-which prevents the ESF-CCS from simulating RCS pressure input to the CCS to open the shutdown cooling generating a signal to open the shutdown ESF-CCS. system isolation valves do nat result in cooling system isolation valves when the generation of signals to oper the valves RCS pressure is above the entry when the ESF-CCS receives signals pressure of the shutdown cooling simulating RCS pressure that is greater system. than the shutdown cooling system entry pressure. I1.b) The ESF-CCS provides an interlock i1.b) Testing will be performed using signals 11.b) Manual control signals input to the ESF-which prevents the ESF-CCS from simulating RCS pressure input signals to CCS to close the SIT isolation valves do generating signals to close the SIT the ESF-CCS. not result in generation of signals to isolation valves when the RCS pressure close the valves when the ESF-CCS is above the entry pressure of the SCS. receives signals simulating RCS pressure that is greater than the SCS entry pressure. I1.c) The interlock on the EFW isolation i1.c) Testing will be performed using signals 11.c) Input of signals indicating high SG level valves automatically closes the isolation simulating SG level and Emergency results in generation of a signal to close valves on high SG levels when an Feedwater Actuation input signals to the the EFW isolation valves unless signals Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal ESF-CCS. for Emergency Feedwater Actuation are is not present. also input to the ESF-CCS. i ( 2.5.2 e6_i7.,4
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 12. The operator interface devices of the 12. Addressed in 6.a) 7.a), and 8. 12. Addressed in 6.a), 7.a) and 8.
ESF-CCS in the MCR provide for automatic and manual control of ESF systems and components.
- 13. In the remote shutdown room, operator 13. Testing will be performed on the as- 13. Control capability is provided at the interface devices provide for manual built ESF-CCS control and display ESF-CCS control and display interface control of ESF system components interface devices in the remote shutdown devices in the remote shutdown room needed to achieve hot standby. room following a transfer of control for the following systems:
capability to the remote shutdown room. safety injection system, steam generator I and steam generator 2 emergency feedwater system, component cooling water system, onsite power system, diesel generators, shutdown cooling system, safety depressurization system, atmospheric dump system, station service water system, and heating, ventilating and air conditioning systems. 2.5.2 e6.i7.,4
~ m pD SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued)
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 14.a) Actuation of master transfer switches at 14.a) Testing will be performed using master 14.a) Upon actuation of the master transfer either exit in the MCR transfers control transfer switches at each exit of the switches in the MCR at either exit: capability from the ESF-CCS control MCR and each of the ESF-CCS control and display interface devices depicted in and display interface devices in the 1) control actions at the ESF-CCS the MCR to those in the remote MCR and the remote shutdown room. control and display interface devices shutdown room. do not cause the ESF-CCS to generate the associated control Indication of transfer status is provided signals, and in the MCR.
- 2) control actions at the ESF-CCS control and display interface devices in the remote shutdown room cause the ESF-CCS to generate the associated control signals.
- 3) indication of transfer status is provided in the MCR.
14.b) Each ESF-CCS division's maintenance 14.b) Testing will be performed using each 14.b) Upon actuation of the master transfer and test panel provides capability to ESF-CCS division's maintenance and switching function from each ESF-CCS transfer control from the MCR to the test panel and control and display division's maintenance and test panel: remote shutdown panel for its respective interface devices in the MCR and the ESF-CCS division and to transfer remote shutdown room. 1) control actions at the ESF-CCS control back to the MCR for its control and display interface devices respective ESF-CCS division. in the MCR for that ESF-CCS division do not cause the ESF-CCS to generate the associated control signals, and 2.5.2 tv-,4
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria f I I j Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 14.b) (Continued)
- 2) control actions at the ESF-CCS control and display interface devices in the remote shutdown room for that ESF-CCS division cause the ESF-CCS to generate the associated control signals.
Upon de-actuation of the master transfer switching function from each ESF-CCS d: -ision's maintenance and test panel:
- 3) control actions at the ESF-CCS control and display interface devices in the remote shutdown room for -
that ESF-CCS division do not mse the ESF-CCS to .gnerate the associated centro! signals, and
- 4) control actions at the ESF-CCS control and display interface devices in the MCR for that ESF-CCS division cause the ESF-CCS to generate the associated control signals.
2.5.2 u.n.u l
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 14.c) Prior to transfer of control to the remote 14.c) Testing will be performed on the as- 14.c) Prior to transfer of control to the remote shutdown room, control actions in the built ESF-CCS control and display shutdown room, control actions in the remote shutdown room do not cause the devices in the remote shutdown room remote shutdown room do not cause the ESF-CCS to generate the associated prior to transfer of control capability to ESF-CCS to generate the associated control signals. the remote shutdown room. control signals. 15.a) Diverse manual actuation switches are 15.a) Testing will be performed using the 15.a) Actuation of the switches provides provided as an alternate means for diverse manual actuation switches. signals to achieve actuation of ESF manual actuation of ESF components in components for the following: two divisions of the ESF-CCS as follows: 2 trains of safety injection, 2 trains of safety injection, I train of containment spray, I train of containment spray, I train of emergency feedwater to each I train of emergency feedwater to each steam generator steam generator I main steam isolation valve in each I main steam isolation valve in each main steam line, main steam line, I isolation valve in each containment air 1 isolation valve in each containment air purge line, and purge line, and I letdown isolation valve. I letdown isolation valve. 15.b) The diverse manual actuation switches 15.b) Inspection of the as-built ESF-CCS 15.b) Communication of the signals from the provide signals to the lowest level in the equipment will be performed. diverse manual actuation switches ESF-CCS digitalequipment. Communi- implements hardwired signal cation of the signals from the switches is communication to the lowest level in the diverse from the soflware used in the ESF-CCS digital equipment. higher levels of the ESF-CCS. 2.5.2 osir.,4
e m (s tn\ V SYSTEM 80+" TARLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Desinn Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 15.c) Actuation of the switches provides a 15.c) Testing will be performed for each 15.c) Each diverse manual actuation switch is signal which overrides the higher level diverse manual actuation switch with able to generate a signal w hich overrides signals, to actuate the associated ESF concurrent and opposing control the manual signals input via the control component or components. commands initiated from the control and and display interface devices, such that display interface devices depicted on signals are provided to the associated Figure 2.5.2-2. motor control centers to actuate the ESF equipment. 15.d) Diverse manual actuation status 15.d) Testing will be performed for each 15.d) Diverse manual actuations are indicated indication is provided in the MCR. diverse manual actuation switch. in the MCR. 16.a) Periodic testing to verify operability of 16.a) Inspection of design documentation will 16.a) The design documentation specifies tests the ESF-CCS can be performed with the be performed to verify the capability to that can be performed while the plant is reactor at power or when shutdown perform surveillance tests while the operating without disabling the protec-without interfering with the protective plant is operating. tion functions to verify operability of the function of the system. selective 2-out-of-4 logic and the res-Manual surveillance tests will be ponse of ESF systems to ESF actuation conducted while simulating ESF signals and interlocks. initiation signals. The manual test does not interfere with the actuation of the ESF-CCS. 16.b) Capability is provided for testing all 16.b) Inspection of the as-built ' ESF-CCS 16.b) Testing capability provides overlap in functions from ESF initiating signals equipment will be performed to verify individual tests such that all functions received from the PPS through to the the capability for functional testing. from ESF initiating signals received actuation of protective system from the PPS through to the actuation of equipment. Testing consists of on-line protective system equipment are tested. automatic hardware testing, automated testing of PPS/ESFAS initiations and Testing consists of on-line automatic interfaces, and manual testing. hardware testing, automated functional testirig of PPS/ESFAS initiations and interfaces, and manual testing. t 2.5.2 u-n.,4
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 16.c) The maintenance and test panel provides 16.c) Inspection of the as-built ESF-CCS 16.c) The maintenance and test panel includes capability for manual testing of ESF- equipment will be performed. the capability to perfonn manual testing CCS functions and hardware. of ESF-CCS functions and hardware. 17.a) Where the ESF-CCS and the process 17.a) Inspection of the as-built ESF-CCS 17.a) Electrical isolation devices are provided control system interface to the same configuration will be conducted. between the process control system and component, eletrical isolation devices sensors, signal conditioners and actuated are provided between the process devices which interface to the ESF-control ' system and the shared CCS. component. 17.b) For each defined failure of the ESF- 17.b) Testing of the ESF-CCS and a failure 17.b) For each dermed failure of the ESF-CCS data communication links, a mode and affects analysis will be CCS data communication links, a predetermined failure mode for the performed. predetermined failure mode for the affected system has been defmed and affected system has been defmed and determined to have acceptable determined to have acceptable consequences. consequences.
- 18. Electrical isolation devices are provided 18. Inspection of the as-built ESF-CCS 18. Electrical isolation devices are provided at ESF-CCS interfaces with the DIAS- equipment will be conducted. at ESF-CCS interfaces with the DIAS-N, the DPS, the P-CCS, the control and N, the DPS, the P-CCS, the control and display interface devices, the master display interface devices, the master transfer switches, and between the signal transfer switches, and between the signal conditioning equipment and the DI AS-P, conditioning equipment and the DIAS-P, as shown on Figure 2.5.2-2. as shown on Figure 2.5.2-2.
l ! 2.5.2 osiv-,4 l l l
O O 3 SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM ' Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 19. Setpoints for interlocks and actuation of 19. Inspection will be performed on the 19. The inspection of the setpoint calculation ESF-CCS safety-related functions are setpoint calculations. confirms the use of setpoint methmi-determined using methodologies which ologies that require:
have the following characteristics: a) Documentationofdata, assumptions, a) Requirements that the design basis and methods used in the bases for analytical limits, data, assumptions, selection of trip setpoints is and methods used as the bases for performed. selection of trip setpoints are b) Consideration ofinstrument calibra-specified and documented. tion uncertainties and uncertainties b) Instrumentation accuracies, drift and due to environmental conditions, in-the effects of design basis transients strument drift, power supply varia-are accounted for in the tion, and the effect of design basis determination of setpoints. event transients is included in deter-c) The methm! utilized for combining mining the margin between the trip the various uncertainty values is setpoint and the safety limit. specified. c) The methods used for combining un-d) Identifies of required preoperational certainties is consistent with those and surveillance testing. specified in the methodology plan. e) Identifies performance requirements d) The use of written procedures for re-for replacement of setpoint related quired preoper6Sonal and sur-instrumentation. veillance testing. f) The setpoint calculations are e) Evaluation for equivalent or better consistent with the physical performance of replaceraent instru-configuration of the instrumentation. mentation which is not identical to original equipment is documented. f) The configuration of the as-built in-strumentation is consistent with the attributes used in the setpoint cal-culations for location of taps and sensing lines. 2.5.2 e5i7.,4
O O l SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Ins _pections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 19. (Continued) 19.b) Testing will be performed to verify 19.b) 1) The correct ESF-CCS response interlock and actuation responses to occurs when an input signal crosses simulated input signals. the setpoint threshold.
- 2) Changing of a setpoint does not also change the setpoints of other 14ips or intedais.
- 20. ESF-CCS software is designed, tested, 20. Inspection will be performd of the 20.a) The process defines the organization, installed, and maintained using a process process used to design, test, install, and responsibilities and activities for the which: smirdain the ESF-CCS software. following phases of the software engineering life cycle:
- a. Defines the organization, respomi-bilities, and software quality assurance
- Establishment of plans and method-activities for the software engineering ologies for all software to be developed; life cycle that provides for:
- Specification of functional, system, and
- establishment of plans and method- software requirements and identification ologies of safety critical requirements; e specification of functional, system
- Design of the software architecture, pro-
, and software requirements and gram structure, and definition of the standards, identification of safety soft-ware modules; critical requirements
- Development of the software code and
- design and devel pment of software testing of the software modules;
- software module, u. it and system
- Interpretation of software and hardware testing practices and performance of unit and system tests; 2.5.2 06-i7.,4
n- p b 'b SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acccotance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 20. (Continued) 20.a) (Continued)
- installation and checkout practices
- Software installation and checkout testing; and
- reporting and correction of software defects during operation
- Reporting and correction of software defects during operation.
- b. Specifies requirements for:
20.b) The process has requirements for the
- software management, documen- following software development tation requirements, standards, functions:
review requirements, and procedures for problem reporting and corrective
- Software management, which defines action organization responsibilities, docu-mentation requirements, standards for
- software configuration management, software coding and testing, review historical reen*ds of software, C requirements, and procedures for control of software changes problem reporting and corrective actions;
- verification & validation, and re-quirements foc reviewer inde-
- Software configuration management, pendence which establishes methods for main-taining historical records of software as
- c. Incorporates a graded approach accord- it is developed, controlling software ing to the software's relative importance changes and for recording and reporting to safety. software changes; and
- Verification and validation, which specifies the requirements for the veri-fication review process, review and test activity documentation, and reviewer independence.
2.5.2 es.ir-,4 . - . . - _ _ ~__ _ - _ _ _-. . __ _ _ . __ _- _ - . _ _ _
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 20.c) He process establishes the method for classifying ESF-CCS software elements according to their relative importance to safety. He process defines the tasks to be performed for software assigned to each safety classification.
- 21. An environmental qualification program 21. An inspection of the ESF-CCS 21. For the ESF-CCS components and assures the ESF-CCS equipment is able qualification report and the as-built ESF- equipment shown on Figure 2.5.2-1, the to perform its intended safety function CCS equipment instaiIation as-built installation, configuration, and fur the time needed to be functional, configuration and environment will be design environmental conditions are under its design environmental conducted. bounded by those used in the conditions. The environmental environmental qualification report.
conditions, bounded by applicable design basis events, are: temperature, pressure, humidity, chemical effects, radiation, aging, seismic events, submergence, power supply voltage & frequency variations, electromagnetic compatibility, and synergistic effects which may have a significant effect cn equipment performance. The environmental qualification of ESF-CCS equipment is achieved via tests, analysis, or a combination of analyses and tests. 2.5.2
- n.u
O O O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.2-1 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 22. The use of commercial grade computer 22. Inspection will be performed of the 22. A process is defined that has:
hardware and software items in the process defined to use commercial grade ESF-CCS is accomplished through a components in the application.
- requirements for supplier's design dedication process that has: and production control. configuration management, problem reporting, and
- requirements for supplier design change control; control, configuration management,
- review of product performance; problem reporting, and change
- receipt of acceptance of commercial control; grade item;
- review of product performance; e final acceptance, based on equipment
- receipt acceptance of the commercial qualification and software validation grade item; in the integrated system.
- final acceptance, based on equipment qualification and software validation in the integrated system.
- 23. The ESF-CCS is qualified according to 23. An inspection of the ESF-CCS EhtC 23. For the ESF-CCS components and an established plan for Electromagnetic qualification reports and the as-built equipment shown on Figure 2.5.2-1, the compatibility (EhtC). ES F-CCS equipment installation as-built installation configuration and configuration and environment will be site survey are bounded by those used in The qualification plan requires the conducted. the ESF-CCS EhtC qualification equipment to function properly when report (s).
subjected to the expected operational electrical surges or electromagnetic interference (Eh11), electrostatic discharge (ESD), and radio frequency interference (RFI). The qualification plan will require that the equipmerit to be tested be configured for intended service conditions, 2,5.2 S n.n
SYSTEM 80+" O . 2.5.3 DISCRETE INDICATION AND ALARM SYSTEM AND DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM Design Description r The Discrete Indication and Alarm System (DIAS) and the Data Processing System ! (DPS) are non-safety related instrumentation and display systems which display information for monitoring conditions in the reactor, the reactor coolant system, Containment, and safety-related process systems during and following design basis , events. The DIAS and DPS are non-Class 1E systems used to display safety-related information. , The Basic Configuration for the DIAS and DPS is as shown on Figure 2.5.3-1. : The DIAS and the DPS are located in the nuclear island structures. The DIAS and the DPS use sensors, transmitters, signal conditioning equipment, + information display equipment, and digital equipment which perform the data processing, data communication, calculations, and logic to display safety-related O information. Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation (PAMI) Category I instruments and computers up to and including the channel isolation devices are Class 1E environmentally qualified. The DIAS power supplies, displays, and processors are seismically qualified for physical and functional integrity. The main control room (MCR) and remote , shutdown room (RSR) DPS display devices are seismically qualified for physical integrity. The DIAS is didded into two segments: i DIAS - Channel P (DIAS-P) DIAS - Channel N (DIAS-N) The DIAS hardware cornponents have the following attributes:
- software programmable processors; e software execution without process dependent interrupts; e segmented design such that the impact of a single electrical failure is limited to the display devices of the segment.
O 2.5.3 .6-iv.,4
i (~] SYSTEM 80+" V Physical separation and electrical isolation are provided between the DIAS-P, the DIAS-N and the DPS as shown on Figure 2.53-2. The DIAS displays and processors are non-class IE which are designed for room ambient temperature and humidity environmental conditions. Temperature sensors mounted in the DIAS cabinets provide high temperature status indication in the MCR. The hardware and software used in the DPS for information processing and display is diverse from that used in the DIAS-N and the DIAS-P. The DIAS-P provides a continuous display in the main control roorr. (MCR) of key parameters for indication of critical function status during and following design basis events. These parameters are provided to the DIAS-P displays via two channels of instrumentation which include protection system signal conditionir.g equipment and post accident monitoring instrumentation (PAMI) equipment, as shown on Figure 2.5.3-2. The PAMI computers calculate values for the reactor coolant si:bwoled margin, the coolant temperature at the core exit, and the coolant levelin the reactor vessel which are displayed by the DIAS-P. The information provided to the DIAS-P displays are communicated via means which are diverse from the communication software used in the plant protection system (PPS) and the engineered safety features-component control system (ESF-CCS). The DIAS-N provides for display of the key parameters for indication of critical function status during and following design basis events, and the operating status of success path systems using dedicated display devices. The DIAS-N provides multi-parameter displays with access to backup information for the key indicators, and access to diagnostic information. The DIAS-N provides displays for specified alarm . conditions. The DIAS-N also provides displays with access to information from non-safety-related systems. The DPS displays provide access to information from safety related systems, as identified above for DIAS-N, and to non-safety related information. , i The DIAS-N and the DPS provide for monitoring of the following: l 1 a) Specified process conditions in the reactor and related systems for startup, operation, and shutdown from the MCR and for shutdown to hot standby from the remote shutdown room. b) Reactor trip system status to confirm that a reactor trip has taken place and whether or not a setpoint for initiation of a reactor trip response has been reached. /~N 2.5.3 w .u i
l l ,3 ATSTEM 80+" c) The status and operation of each engineered safety features system and for specified related systems in the post accident period. d) The positions of the control element assemblies. c) Specified parameters that provide information to indicate whether plant safety functions are being accomplished during and following design basis accident events. f) Indication of bypassed and inoperable status of plant safety systems, as follows:
- i. Status of plant operating mode related bypasses of the PPS.
ii. Bypass status of each channel of the PPS. iii. Bypass and inoperable status of engineered safety feature systems. g) The status of core cooling prior to and following an accident, as follows:
- i. Subcooling.
ii. Liquid inventory in the reactor vessel above the fuel alignment plate. iii. Coolant temperature at the core exit. h) Four channels of PPS status information. i) Four channels of status and parameter information from the ESF-CCS. j) The following information from the power control syste-m and the process component control system (PCS/P-CCS): alternate reactor trip status, alternate feedwater actuation signal status, pressurizer pressure, and steam generator 1 and 2 levels. The DIAS-N and DPS provide alarm indication consisting of alarm tiles (DIAS-N only) and display messages, provision for alarm acknowledgement, and priority distinction in alarm display. The DIAS-N and the DPS perform automatic signal validation using cross channel data comparison prior to data presentation and alarm generation. /~T tV' 2.5.3 e.u
,3 SYSTEM 80+" U Electrical isolation devices are provided at DIAS-N and DPS interfaces to the PPS, ESF-CCS, PCS/P-CCS, and at interfaces to display devices in the MCR and remote shutdown room. Electrical isolation is provided between the DIAS-P display devices and protection system signal conditioning equipment, as shown on Figure 2.5.3-2. DIAS uses redundant networks for communications. The networks utilize isolation technology (e.g., fiber optics) to ensure electrical independence of the redundant safety channels and electricalindependence of the MCR and the RSR. The DIAS communications network provide communication paths to allow display ofinformation from safety-related I&C systems. Data communications is on a cyclical basis, independent of plant transients. A loss of electrical power to DIAS or DPS equipment will result in a blank screen, inactive running indicator, or bad data syrnbol. EMI qualification is applied for equipment based on operating environment and/or inherent design characteristics. The DIAS /DPS is qualified according to an established plan for Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC). The qualification plan requires the equipment to function properly when subjected to the expected operational electrical surges, electromagnetic interference (EMI), electrostatic discharge (ESD), and radio frequency interference (RFI). The equipment to be tested will be configured for intended service conditions. A site survey is performed upon completion of system installation to characterize the installed EMI emironment. The use of commercial grade computer hardware and software items in the DIAS /DPS is accomplished through a process that has: e requirements for supplier design control, configuration management, problem reporting and change control; e review of product performance; e receipt acceptance of the commercial grade item; e final acceptance, based on equipment qualification and software validation in the integrated system. DIAS /DPS software is designed, tested, installed, and maintained using a process which: C l k 2.5.3 e6-iv.,4 j 1 l J
I SYSTEM 80+" O
- a. Defines the organization, responsibilities, and software quality assurance activities for the software engineering life cycle that ,
provides for: l l e establishment of plans and methodologies 1 e specification of functional, system and software requirements and ; standards, identification of safety critical requiremena , e design and development of software e software module, unit and system testing practices e installation and checkout practices ; e reporting and correction of software defects during operation j
- b. Specifies requirements for: ;
e software management, documentation requirements, standards, review l requirements, and procedures for problem reporting and corrective ! action e software configuration management, historical records of software, and ; control of software changes e verification & validation, and requirements for reviewer independence i
- c. Incorporates a graded approach according to the software's relative !
O-
.' importance to safety. j Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria l Table 2.5.3-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for the Discrete Indication and Alarm System and Data Processing System.
i O -2.5.3 wiv-w
I SYST 80+ I I I I
' I DIAS CHANNEL P DIAS CHANNEL N DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM I I I I i i I I I
PAMI I I I I I I I 1111 ll f ~ l I 11ll 11ll 1 I __ Illi lill l PROTECTION SYSTEM I
, _ _P P S g
_ _[lll ___ _ _ ] lll ll l l SIGNAL i l ~ ~ ~ ~ l- - 11 I I UI ME T
' ~ll
,,, i_
,_ __ _.i_ _ _ _ .
____gi l _~ _~ _~ _~ l- - - -l J I _P-CCS___l_ _ _ _ FIGURE 2.5.3-1 DIAS AND DPS CONFIGURATION oe-i7-e4
SYSTE 80 + M Q DPS DISPLAY DEVICES DIAS CHANNEL N PRINTERS & INFORMATION DISPLAY DEVICES STORAGE DEVICES A A I I DIAS CHANNEL P DIAS CHANNEL N DPS DISPLAYS PROCESSORS PROCESSORS AA' ' 4A' A r- 4
, D ,SNe1.ORx ll ' l AAAAAA AAAA AiA ,AS csANNeL N Ne1 0,
' s'6666 6666 ii i m
4 6666 6666 m 4
'I C Dl g g I I
g I I' Al AlhC Dll~PCS P-CCS l EI AlhC Dl Al C DlI~PCS l P-CCS I
~ ~ ~ " ~~
PPS II ESF-CCS I~ II I II ESF-CCS I i i . . . . _ i i _ .a s PPS g y yp___.g, ,.3.___________ . 3
, gg i I I. I g_______________i I I I I g PAMI l PAMI COMPUTER COMPUTER KEY:
I CHANNEL A I CHANNEL B g j( j( g ji jg > HARD WIRED OR DATA UNK lPROTECTIONI lPROTECTIONI PAMI PAMI SYSTEM D$T LN OR SYSTEM g l i DISCRETE SIGNAL l SC-A l SC-B l i SC-A i
@ ISOLATION
}\ ] k bN SC-A SIGNAL CONDITIONING es e% es # CHANNEL A (S)
(S) (S) (S) FIGURE 2.5.3-2 DIAS-P, DIAS-N, DPS, AND INTERCONNECTIONS ==
SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.3-1 DISCRETE INDICATION AND ALARM SYSTEM AND DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses f,cceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the DIAS 1. Inspection of the as-built configuration 1. For the components and equipment and DPS is as shown on Figure 2.5.3-1. of the DIAS and the DPS will be sh,wn on Figure 2.5.3-1, the as-built conducted. DIAS and DPS conform with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. Physical separation and electrical 2. Inspection of the as-built DIAS-P, 2. Physical separation exists between the isolation are provided between the DIAS-N, and DPS equipment will be DIAS-P, the DIAS-N, and the DPS.
DIAS-P, the DIAS-N and the DPS as conducted. Electrical isolation devices are provided shown on Figure 2.5.3-2. at interfaces between the DIAS-P, DIAS-N and DPS, consistent with Figure 2.5.3-2.
- 3. The hardware and software used in the 3.a) Inspection of the as-built DIAS-P. 3.a) Digital equipment used for data DPS for infonnation processing and DIAS-N, and DPS equipment will be processing, data communication and display are diverse from that used in the performed. display in the DPS uses microprocessors DIAS-N and the DIAS-P. which are diverse from the microprocessors used in corresponding equipment in the DIAS-N and the DIAS-P.
3.b) Inspection of the DPS, DIAS-N and 3.b) The design documentation confirms that DIAS-P design documentation will be the design group (s) which developed the performed to confirm that the software DPS software is different from the was developed by different design design group (s) which developed the groups. DIAS-N and DIAS-P software. l l l l
- 2.5.3 e6-i7-,4 i
G A pJ u U SYSTEST 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 4.a) The DIAS-P provides a continuous dis- 4.a) Inspection of as-built DIAS-P equipment 4.a) The DIAS-P displays in the htCR pro-play in the htCR of the key parameters will be performed. vide the key parameters for indication of for indication of critical function status critical function status during and fol-during and following design basis lowing design basis events, and two events. These parameters are provided channels of instmmentation which in-to the DI AS-P displays via two channels clude protection system signal condi-of instrumentation which include pro- tioning equipment and PAh11 equipment tection system signal conditioning equip- are used to provide the information to ment and PAh11 equipment. as shown the DIAS-P displays consistent with on Figure 2.5.3-2. Figure 2.5.3-2. 4.b) The information provided the DIAS-P 4.b) Inspection of the as-built DIAS-P 4.b) Communication of the signals from the displays are communicated via means equipment will be performed. Where signal conditioning equipment to the which are diverse from the digital equipment is used for DIAS-P display devices is consistent communication software used in the communication of signals to DIAS-P, with Figure 2.5.3-2 and implements plant protection system (PPS) and the then inspection of the documentation either of the following: engineered safety features ESF-CCS. will be performed to confirm that the signal communication software is i. hardwired signal communication diverse from the signal communication for displays derived directly from software for the PPS and ESF-CCS. the signal conditioning equipment. ii. digital signal communication equipment that uses software that is diverse from the signal communication for the PPS and ESF-CCS. 2.5.3 06-i7.,4
O ( O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.5.3-1 (Continucd) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Anaivses Acceptance Criteria
- 5. The DIAS-N provides for display of the 5. Inspection of the as-built DIAS-N 5. The DIAS-N provide-s dedicated display key parameters for indication of critical equipment will be performed. devices in the MCR for the display of function status during and following the key parameters for indication of design basis events and the operating critical function status during and status of success path systems using following design basis events and the dedicated display devices. The DIAS-N operating status of success path systems.
pmvides multi-parameter displays with The DIAS-N provides multi-parameter access to backup information for the key displays in the MCR with access to indicators and access to diagnostic backup infonnation for the key information. The DIAS-N provides indicators and access to diagnostic displays for specified alarm conditions. information. The DIAS-N provides displays in the MCR for specified alarm conditions.
- 6. The DPS provides for display of the key 6. Inspection of the as-built DPS equipment 6. The DPS displays in the MCR provide parameters for indication of critical will be performed. for display of the key parameters for function status during and following indication of critical function status design basis events, the operating status during and following design basis of success path systems, backup events, the operating status of success information for the key indicators, path systems, backup information for the access to diagnostis information, and for key indicators, access to diagnostic specified alarm .onditions. information, and for specified alarri conditions.
2.5.3 05i7-s4 _ _ _ _ = _ = _ _ _ _ _
O ) O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 7. The DIAS-N and the DPS provide for 7. Inspection of the as-built DIAS-N and 7. The DIAS-N and DPS display equip-monitoring the following: DPS displays in the MCR and remote ment provides monitoring capability for shutdown room will be performed. the following:
Testing will be performed using actual a) Specified process conditions in the or simulated input signals. a) Specified process conditions in the reactor and related systems for startup, reactor and related systems for startup, operation, and shutdown from the MCR operation, and shutdown from the MCR and for shutdown to hot standby from and for shutdown to hot standby from the remote shutdown room (NOTE 1), the remote shutdown room (NOTE 1). b) Reactor trip system status to confirm h) Reactor trip system status to confirm that a reactor trip has taken place and that a reactor trip has taken place and whether or not a setpoint for initiation whether or not a setpoint for initiation of a reactor trip response has been of a reactor trip response has been reached. reached. c) The status and operation of each c) The status and opeistion of each engineered safety feature system and for engineered safety featuro system and for specified related systems in the post specified related systems in the post accident period. accident period. d) The position of the control element d) The position of the control element assemblies. assemblies. e) Specified parameters that provide e) Specified parameters that provide information to indicate whether plant information to indicate whether plant safety functions are being accomplished safety functions are being accomplished during and following design basis during and following design basis accident events. accident events. NOTEI Refer to Section 2.12.1, MCR and 2.12.2, RSR for identification of MCR and RSR indications and controls provided by DIAS-N and DPS 2.5.3 es.i7.,4
O O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 7. (Continued) 7. (Continued) f) Indication of bypassed and inoperable f) Indication of bypassed and inoperable status of plant safety systems, as status of plant safety systems, as follows: follows:
- i. Status of plant operating mode i. Status of plant operating mode related bypasses of the PPS. related bypasses of the PPS.
ii. Bypass status of each channel of ii. Bypass status of each channel of the PPS. the PPS. iii. Bypass and inoperable status of iii. Bypass and inoperable status of engineered safety feature systems. engineered safety feature systems. g) The status of core cooling prior to and g) The status of core cooling prior to and following an accident, as follows: following an accident, as follows:
- i. Subcooling. i. Subcooling.
ii. Liquid inventory in the reactor ii. Liquid inventory in the reactor vessel above the fuel alignment vessel above the fuel alignment plate. plate. iii. Coolant temperature at the core iii. Coolant temperature at the core exit. exit. 2.5.3 e5:7-,4
v O% V SYSTESI 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFFTY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 7. (Continued) 7. (Continued) h) Four channels of PPS status h) Four channels of PPS status information. information.
i) Four channels of status and parameter i) Four channels of status and parameter information from the ESF-CCS. information from the ESF-CCS. j) The following information from the j) The following information from the PCS/P-CCS: PCS/P-CCS: alternate reactor trip status, alternate reactor trip status, alternate feedwater actuation signal alternate feedwater actuation signal status, status, pressurizer pressure, and pressurizer pressure, and steam generator I and 2 levels. steam generator 1 and 2 levels.
- 8. The DIAS-N and the DPS perform 8. Testing will be performed simulating the automatic signal validation using cross multiple channel input signals to the channel data comparison prior to data DIAS-N and DPS for each parameter presentation and alarm generation. selected as a key indicator of critical function status, as follows:
8.a) The input signals will simulate a failure 8.a) The DIAS-N and the DPS display a . of one of the multiple channels of input value for ttie parameter under test which signals for the parameter under test. is consistent with the signals which were simulated not to fail, and the DIAS-N i and DPS indicate that the displayed value is validated. l l l
- 2.5.3
- n-u
O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 8.b) The input signals will simulate a failure 8.b) The DIAS-N and DPS indicate that the of all but one of the multiple channels of displayed value for the parameter under input signals for the parameter under test is not validated. test. 8.c) The input signals will simulate failure of 8.c) The DIAS-N and DPS display a value one channel with the other channel for the parameter under test which is previously removed from service. consistent with the signals which were simulated not to be removed from service or failed, and the DIAS-N and DPS indicate that the value is validated. 8.d) The DIAS-N and DPS display capability 8.d) The DIAS-N and DPS indicate will be verified. operability by verifying that the status signal is present and functional. The display used to verify 8.a) through 8.c) display these signals upon request, which make up the validated signal. 9.a) Electrical isolation devices are provided 9.a) Inspection of the as-built DIAS-N and 9.a) Electrical isolation devices are provided at DIAS-N and DPS interfaces to the DPS equipment will be conducted. at DIAS-N and DPS interfaces to the PPS, ESF-CCS, PCS/P-CCS and at PPS, ESF-CCS, PCS/P-CCS and at interfaces to display devices in the MCR interfaces to display devices in the MCR and remote shutdown room. and remote shutdown room, consistent with Figure 2.5.3-2. 9.b) Electrical isolation is provided between 9.b) Inspection of the as-built DIAS-P 9.b) Electrical isolation devices are provided the DIAS-P display devices and one of equipment will be conducted. between the DIAS-P display devices and the two channels of protection system one of the two channels of protection signal conditioning equipment, as shown system signal conditioning equipment, on Figure 2.5.3-2. consistent with Figure 2.5.3-2. 2.5.3 os.i7.,4 ___ --___._---__ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ .. _ _ _ _ .-~ _ ~ ._ ~ _ _ - _ .
O C O SYSTE3180+ TABLE 2.5.3-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 10. DIAS /DPS software is designed, tested, 10. Inspection will be performed of the 10.a) The process defines the organization, installed, and maintained using a process process used to design, test, install, and responsibilities and activities for the which: maintain the DIAS and DPS software. following phases of the software engineering life cycle:
- a. Defines the organization, respon-sibilities, and software quality
- Establishment of plans and assurance activities for the soft- methodologies for all software to be ware engineering life cycle that developed.
provides for:
- Specification of functional, system and
- establishment of plans and method- software requirements and identification ologies of safety critical requirements.
- specification of functional, systen and software requirements and
- Design of the software architecture, standards, identification of safety program structure and definition of the critical requirements software modules.
- design and development of soft-ware
- Development of the software code and
- software module, unit, and system testing of the software modules.
testing practices e installation and checkout practices
- Interpretation of software and hardware
- reporting and correction of soft- and performance of unit and system ware defects during operation tests.
- b. Specifies requirements for:
- Software installation and checkout testing.
- software management, documen-tation requirements, standards, re-
- Reporting and correction of softwire view requirements, and procedures defects during operation.
for problem reporting and cor-rective action 2.5,3 w n-u
O O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFFIY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 10. (Continued) 10,b) The process has requirements for the following software development
- sof tware c o n fi g u r a ti o n functions:
management, historical records of software, and control of software e Software management, which defines or-changes ganization responsibilities, documen-e verification & validation, and tation requirements, standards for soft-requirements for reviewer ware coding and testing, review require-independence ments, and procedures for problem re-porting and corrective actions.
- c. Incorporates a graded approach according to the software's relative
- Software configuration management, importance to safety. which establishes methods for main-tainir.g historical records of software as it is developed, controlling software changes, and for recording and reporting software changes.
e Verification and validation, which specifies the requirements for the veri-fication review process, the validation testing process, review and test activity l documentation, and reviewer inde-l pendence. ( 10.c) The process establishes the method for classifying DIAS and DPS software ele-ments according to their relative impor-tance to safety. The process defines the tasks to be performed for software as-signed to each safety classification. 2.5.3 e6-i7-94
O O SYSTEM 80+ TARLE 2.5.3-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Insocctions. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Desist Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 11. The DIAS /DPS is qualified according to i1. Inspection of the DIAS /DPS EMC 11. For the DIAS /DPS components and an established plan for Electromagnetic qualification reports and the as-built equipment shown on Figure 2.5.3-1, the compatibility (EMC). DIAS /DPS equipment installation as-built installation configuration and configuration and environment will be site survey are bounded by those used in The qualification plan requires the conducted. the DIAS /DPS EMC qualification equipment to function properly when report (s).
subjected to the expected operational electrical surges or electromagnetic interference (EMI), electrostatic discharge (ESD), and radio frequency interference (RFI). The qualification plan will require that the equipment to be tested be configured for intended service conditions.
- 12. DIAS and DPS are non-Class IE 12. Inspection of the DIAS and DPS 12. DIAS and DPS display safety-related systems used to display safety-related equipment will be performed. information (NOTE 2). .
information.
- 13. The DIAS-N and DPS provide alarm 13. Testing will be performed to verify 13. The DIAS-N and DPS provide alarm indication consisting of alarm tiles DIAS-N and DPS alarm indication. indication consisting of alarm tiles (DIAS-N only) and display messages, (DIAS-N only) and display messages, provisions for alarm acknowledgement, provisions for alarm acknowledgement, and priority distinctionin alarm display. and priority distinction in alarm display.
NOTE 2 Refer to Section 2.12.1, MCR for identification of information displayed. 2.5.3 u.n-u
O O SYSTEM 80* TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Caiteria
- 14. DI AS communications has the following 14. Inspection of the as-built DIAS will be 14. The equipment used for DIAS has the safety critical attributes: performed. following attributes:
- cyclical data communications
- cyclical data communications independent of plant transients, independent of plant transients.
- redundant networks for
- redundant networks for communication, communication,
- networks utilize isolation
- networks utilize isolation technology to ensure electrical technology to ensure electrical independence of redundant safety independence of redundant safety channeIs and eIectrica1 channels and electrical inde-independence of the Main Control pendence of the Main Control Room and Remote Shutdown Room and Remote Shutdown Room, Room, e and networks provide
- and networks provide communication paths to allow communication paths to allow display of information from safety- display ofinformation from safety-related I&C systems, related I&C systems.
15.a) PAMI Category 1 instruments and 15.a) Inspection of the PAMI Category 1 15.a) The qualification report concludes that computers up to and including the equipment qualification report and the the PAMI Category 1 instruments and channel isolation devices are Class IE as-built equipment instaliation, computers are Class IE environmental environmentally and seismically configuration, and environment will be and seismically qualified. qualified. conducted. 15.b) The DIAS displays and processors are 15.b) Inspection of non-Class IE equipment 15.b) The non-Class IE DIAS equipment non-Class IE which are designed for documentation will be conducted. environmental specifications envelope room ambient temperature and humidity the room's design ambient temperature environmental conditions. and humidity environmental conditions. 2.5.3 es-i7.s4 A--, ,.- _ y e " g e- w --P ' 1su Wtr- >t+w- - - - - - - - -------------a
O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTFMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 15.c) Temperature sensors mounted in the 15.c) Testing will be performed to simulate 15.c) Temperature sensors mounted in the DIAS cabinets provide status indication high temperature in the DIAS cabinets. DIAS cabinets provide status indication in the MCR. in the MCR. 15.d) He DIAS power supplies, displays and 15.d) Inspection of the DIAS equipment 15.d) The qualification report concludes the processors are seismically qualified for qualification report and an inspection of DIAS equipment is seismically qualified physical and functional integrity. the as-built equipment installation, for physical and functional integrity. configuration, and location will be conducted. 15.e) De MCR and RSR DPS display devices 15.e) Inspection of the DPS display device 15.e) ne seismic qualification report are seismically qualified for physical seismic qualification report and an concludes the DPS display device is integrity. inspection of the as-built equipment seismically qualified for physical installation, configuration, and location integrity, will be conducted.
- 16. He DIAS hardware components have 16. Inspection of the design documentation 16. The design documentation concludes that the following attributes: for the as-built DIAS equipment will be the DIAS equipment has the following performed. features:
- softwareprogrammable processors;
- software execution without process
- softwareprogrammableprocessors; dependent interrupts;
- software execution without process
- segmented design such that the dependent interrupts; impact of a single electrical failure
- segmented design such that the is limited to the display devices of impact of a single electrical failure the segment. is limited to the display devices of the segment.
I 2.5.3 .5 7.,4 l
O O ! SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.53-1 (Continued) DISPLAY INSTRUMENTATION FOR INFORMATION FROM SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
)
Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 17. Loss of electrical power will result in 17. Inspection of the DIAS and DPS during 17. Loss of power to a display device either a blank display, inactive status loss of power will be performed. results in a blank screen. Loss of indicator, or bad data status symbol, power to a DIAS segment results in an inactive running indicator. Loss of power to a DPS application processor results in a bad data symbol en the display device.
l l 18. The use of commercial grade computer 18. Inspection will be performed of the 18. A process is defined that has: hardware and software items in the process defined to use commercial grade DIAS /DPS is accomplished through a components in the application.
- requirements for supplier's design I process that has: and production control, configuration management.
- requirements for supplier design problem reporting, and change control, configuration manage- control; ment, problem reporting and
- review of product performance; change control;
- receipt acceptance of commercial l
- review of product performance; grade item;
- receipt acceptance of the e final acceptance, based on commercial grade item; equipment qualification and e final acceptance, based on software validation in the equipment qualification and integrated system.
software validation. 2.5.3 06-i7-s4
i l 1 i l - 3 SYSTEM 80+" ; 2.5.4 POWER CONTROL SYSTEM / PROCESS. COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Design Description The Power Control System and the Process-Component Control System (PCS/P-CCS) are non-safety-related instrumentation and control systems which provide control of functions to maintain the plant within its normal operating range for all normal modes of plant operation. The PCS/P-CCS are located in the nuclear island structures. The Basic Configuration of the PCS/P-CCS is as shown on Figure 2.5.4-1. The PCS/P-CCS use sensors, transmitters, signal conditioning equipment, control and display interface devices, and digital processing equipment which perform the calculations, data communications, and logic to support the control functions. The digital equipment and software used in the PCS/P-CCS are diverse from those used 6 in the plant protection system (PPS) and the engineered safety features - component ! control system (ESF-CCS). \ The PCS/P-CCS provide control interfaces for the following control functions: PCS-reactivity control using control element assemblies, PCS-reactor power cutback, , PCS-power change limiter (Megawatt Demand Setter), , P-CCS-pressurizer pressure and level, P-CCS-main feedwater flow, P-CCS-main steam bypass flow, P-CCS-boron concentration, P-CCS-alternate reactor trip actuation, and P-CCS-alternate emergency feedwater actuation. 7 The circuits used for alternate actuation of reactor trip, turbine trip, and emergency
- feedwater are independent and diverse from the protection system actuation circuits.
The PCS/P-CCS provide the following information to the Discrete Indication and Alarm System (DIAS): alternate reactor trip status, alternate feedwater actuation signal status, pressurizer pressure, and , steam generator 1 and 2 levels. l l
)
2.5.4 -1 u .u I I l l
l l SYSTEM 80+" ( i t - For parameters used in PCS/P-CCS control functions which are provided from the redundant Class 1E sensors that are used independently by each channel of the protective system, the PCS/P-CCS monitors the four redundant instrument channels. The PCS/P-CCS apply signal validation logic to the signals received from the four redundant channels to detect bypassed or failed sensors and to determine the sensed value to be used in the control system. Control and display interface devices for the PCS/P-CCS are provided in the main control room (MCR) and in the remote shutdown room for control and monitoring of PCS/P-CCS controlled equipment. Actuation of master transfer switches at either exit of the MCR transfers control capability from the PCS/P-CCS control and display interface devices in the MCR to those in the remote shutdown room. The transfer can also be performed at the PCS/P-CCS equipment cabinets, which also provide capability for transferring control back to the MCR. Indication of transfer status is provided in the MCR. Electrical isolation devices are implemented between the PCS/P-CCS and the protection system signal conditioning equipment for each protection signal provided to them, as shown on Figure 2.5.4-2. Electrical isolation devices are provided for the PCS/P-CCS interfaces with the MCR equipment, the remote shutdown room equipment, the DIAS-N and the Data Processing System (DPS), the protection d system, and with protection system components as shown on Figure 2.5.4-2. PCS/P-CCS software is designed, tested, installed, and maintained using a process whieb
- a. Defines the organization, responsibilities, and software quality assurance activities for the software engineering life cycle that prosides for:
- establishment of plans and methodologies e specification of functional, system and software requirements and standards, and identification of safety critical requirements e design and development of software e software module, unit, and system testing practices e installation and checkout practices e reporting and correction of software defects during operation
- b. Specifies requirements for:
- software management, documentation requirements, standards, review requirements, and procedures for problem reporting and corrective action 2.5.4 wou
7- SYSTEM 80+" t , e software configuration management, historical records of software, and control of software changes
- verification & validation, and requirements for reviewer independence
- c. Incorporates a graded approach according to the software's relative importance to safety.
The use of commercial grade computer hardware and software items in the PCS/P-CCS is accomplished through a process that has:
- requirements for supplier design control, configuration management, problem reporting, and change control;
- review of product performance;
- receipt acceptance of the commercial grade item;
- final acceptance, based on equipment qualification and software validation.
Inspection, Test, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.5.4-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Power Control System / Process-Component Control System. O O p L 2.5.4 w a.u
SY M 80 + 0 O I I I PROCESS CONTROL EQUIPMENT I I I CONTROL & DISPLAY I I INTERFACE DEVICES I I I I I MASTER TRANSFER SWITCHES I COMPONENT I CONTROL I
- - ~"_- - - - ~ -l-- - - - -
I LOGIC l l SAFETY RELATED 1 1 g DISPLAY g g INSTRUMENTATION , 3 y g PROTECTION I I I SYSTEM I SIGNAL g l [ VALIDATION I I I ' I i i SIGNAL I-I I i CO_ND_ITI.ONING -- g y I l i __J___ em i PROTECTION I (Sj g SYSTEM l ,% - - a- ---
'" . COMPONENTS, _ _ (Sjl PROCESS I
-- ICOMPONENTS I FIGURE 2.5.4-1 PROCESS CONTROL EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION *me
SYSTE h +'" PROCESSC TROL EQUIPMENT lEUNlON3RO5RO3M I key; I CONTROL & DISPLAY + - -@ - - - > > HARDWIRED OR INTERFACE DEVICES DATA UNK g
- + NON40NDUCTING l MASTER TRANSFER SWITCH
---Q--> DATA UNK OR I~ DISCRETE SIGNAL (E.G. FIBER OPTIC)
IREuOTE SHUTDOWN ROOu 'l COMPONENT POWER SUPPLY UNE CONTROL NE D CW +- --- LOGIC tu ISOLATION
~ ~~ ""' ~ ~ ~
DIAS DISCRETE INDICATION & g DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM-----
,+-.Q- - ALARM SYSTEM
~ " " " ~ " " " ~ ~ '
~~~~~~
MCC MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS l~ DIAS - CHANNEL N -S---- L ------ I RT90 REACTOR TRIP SWITCHGEAR gPROTECTION SYSTEMS------- g ; g ji
, ;t a CEDMCS CONTROL ELEMENT DRIVE g g MECHANISM l
l SIGNAL l- -@ - - + VA A ON W' l CON IT NING lI
' l CONDITIONING I CEDMCS l l- ~' ~ l Ak POWER AN MCC g
,..g SUPPLY l l y a, s ,i ----
i
,_RTSG_, .;
i s- s T I (s; I ti---to----------.I l_ WIRED l
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l-g U l~MCC
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l 1 f u y
~
lCEDMe!! RBINEl lEMERGENTY FTEDWATER l
. .C,,,0,, NT,,R,,OL_S., ,,, $MPS &lAL3S_ ,
FIGURE 2.5.4-2 l PROCESS CONTROL EQUIPMENT AND INTERCONNECTIONS os o s4
O SYSTEM 80+" TABLbi4-1 O O POWER CONTROL SYSTEM / PROCESS-COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Conimitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the PCS/P- 1. Inspection of the as-built configuration 1. For the coniponws and equipment CCS is as shown on Figure 2.5.4-1. of the PCS/P-CCS will be conducted. shown on Figure 5.4-1, the as-built PCS/P-CCS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The digital equipment and software used 2.a) Inspection of the as-built PCS/P-CCS, 2.a) The digital equipment used in the in the PCS/P-CCS are diverse from PPS and ESF-CCS equipment will be PCS/P-CCS uses microprocessors which those used in the PPS and ESF-CCS. performed. are diverse from the microprocessors useo in the PPS and ESF-CCS equi; ment.
2.b) Inspection of the design documentation 2.b) The software documentation confirms will be performed to confirm that the that the design group (s) which developed software was developed by different the PCS/P-CCS software is different design groups. from the design group (s) which d vel-oped the PPS and ESF-CCS software.
- 3. 'Ihe PCS/P-CCS provide controi inter- 3. Inspection will be performed on the as- 3. PCS/P-CCS control interfaces are pro-faces for the following control functions: built PCS/P-CCS control interface vided for the following functions:
equipment. PCS-reactivity control using control PCS-reactivity control using control element assemblies, element assemblies, PCS-reactor power cutback, PCS-reactor power cutback, PCS-per change limiter (Megawatt PCS-power change limiter (Megawatt Demand Setter), Demand Setter), P-CCS-pressurizer pressure and level, P-CCS-pressurizer pressure and level, P-CCS-main feedwater flow, P-CCS-main feedwater flow, P-CCS-steam bypass flow, P-CCS-steam bypass flow, P-CCS-boron concentration, P-CCS-boron concentration, P-CCS-altemate reactor trip actuation, P-CCS-alternate reactor trip actuation, and and P-CCS-altemate emergency feedwater P-CCS-alternate emergency feedwater actuation. actuation. 2,5A o6.iv.,4 - _- ._ ~ , . - - , - - - - - - - .. -- - .. - _ ----__
s m pd d SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.4-1 (Continued) POWER CON FROL SYSTEM / PROCESS-COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 4. The circuits used for alternate actuation 4. Inspection of the design documentation 4. The documentation confirms that circuits of reactor trip, turbine trip, and emer- will be performed to confirm that the are implemented in the PCS/P-CCS to gency feedwater are independent and specified alternate actuation circuits are perform actuation of reactor trip, turbine diverse from the protection system independent and diverse from the trip, and emergency feedwater which do actuation circuits, protection system actuation circuits. not utilize signals from the PPS or ESF-CCS and that the PPS and ESF-CCS digital equipment is not used to com-municate the actuation signals from the PCS/P-CCS to the actuated components.
- 5. The PCS/P-CCS provide the following 5. Inspection will be performed of the as- 5. The following information is available at information to the DIAS: built DIAS equipment. a DIAS-N display device:
attemate reactor trip status, attemate reactor trip status, alternate feedwater actuation signal alternate feedwater actuation signal status, status, pressurizer pressure, and pressurizer pressure, and steam generator I and 2 levels. steam generator I and 2 levels.
- 6. For parameters used in PCS/P-CCS con- 6. Testing will be performed using signals 6. For each parameter, the representative trol functions which are provided from simulating each parameter provided to parameter value determined by the the redundant Class IE sensors that are the PCS/P-CCS via the redundant Class PCS/P-CCS from the Class IE sensor used independently by each channel of IE sensors that are used independently inputs is bounded by the three signals the protective system, the PCS/P-CCS by each channel of the protective which are simulated to be unaffected by monitors the four redundant instrument system. The signals will simulate a the failure.
The PCS/P-CCS applies channels. failure of one of the four sensor inputs ! signal validation logic to the signals for each parameter. i received from the four redundant j channels to de-tect bypassed or failed j sensors and to determine the sensed l value to be used in the control system. I 2.5.4 os.n. 4
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TARLE 2.5.4-1 (Continuejd POWER CONTROL SYSTEM / PROCESS-COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acccotance Criteria
- 7. Control and display interface devices for 7. Inspection will be performed of the as- 7. Control and display interface devices for the PCS/P-CCS are provided in the built PCS/P-CCS control and display the PCS/P-CCS are provided in the MCR and in the remote shutdown room. interface devices in the MCR and MCR and in the remote shutdown room.
remote shutdown room. 8.a) Actuation of master transfer switches at 8.a) Testing will be performed using the 8.a) Upon actuation of the master transfer either exit of the MCR transfers control master transfer switches at each exit of switches at either MCR exit: capability from the PCS/P-CCS control the MCR and each of the PCS/P-CCS and display interface devices in the control and display interface devices in 1) control actions at the PCS/P-CCS MCR to those in the remote shutdown the MCR and the remote shutdown control and display interface devices room. Indication of transfer status is panel. in the MCR do not cause the process provided in the MCR. control systems to generate the associated control signals; and
- 2) control actions at the PCS/P-CCS control and display interface devices in the remote shutdown room cause the process control systems to generate the associated control signals.
l 3) Indication of transfer status is provided in the MCR. l 8.b) The transfer of control capability can 8.b) Testing will be performed at the 8.b) Upon actuation of the master transfer ! also be performed at the PCS/P-CCS equipment cabinets for the PCS/P-CCS switching function from the equipment l equipment cabinets. which also provide and using the PCS/P-CCS control and cabinets for the PCS/P-CCS: capability for transferring control back display interface devices in the MCR l to the MCR. Indication of transfer and the remote shutdown room. status is provided in the MCR. 2.5.4 it ,4
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.4-1 (Continued) POWER CONTROL SYSTEM / PROCESS-COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 8.b) (Continued) 8.b) (Continued) l) control actions at the PCS/P-CCS control and display interface devices in the MCR do not cause the process control systems to generate the associated control signais; and
- 2) control actions at the PCS/P-CCS control and display interface devices in the remote shutdown room cause the process control systems to generate the associated control signals.
- 3) Indication of transfer status is provided in the MCR.
Upon de-actuation of the master transfer switching function from the equipment cabinets for the PCS/P-CCS:
- 1) control actions at the PCS/P-CCS control and display interface devices in the remote shutdown room do cot cause the process control systems to generate the associated control signals; and 2.5.4 u-n-n
O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.4-1 (Continued) POWER CONTROL ,T(STEM / PROCESS-COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptancc Criteria 8.b) (Continued) 8.b) (Continued)
- 2) control actions at the PCS/P-CCS control and display interface devices in the MCR cause the process con-trol systems to generate the associated control signals.
- 3) Indication of transfer status is provided in the MCR.
9.a) Electrical isolation devices are provided 9.a) Inspection of the as-built PCS/P-CCS 9.a) Electrical isolation devices are provided between the PCS/P-CCS and the pro- configuration will be conducted. between the PCS/P-CCS and the pro-tection system signal conditioning equip- tection system signal conditioning equip-ment for each protection signal provided ment, consistent with Figure 2.5.4-2 fi>r to them, as shown on Figure 2.5.4-2. each protection signal provided to them. 9.b) Electrical isolation devices are provided 9.b) Inspection of the as-built PCS/P-CCS 9.b) Electrical isolation devices are provided for the PCS/P-CCS interfaces with the configuration will be conducted. for the PCS/P-CCS interfaces with the MCR, the remote shutdown room, the MCR, the remote shutdown room, the safety related display instrumentation, safety related display instrumentation, the protection systems, and with pro- the protection systems, and with pro-tection system components, as shown on tection system components, conforming Figure 2.5.4-2. to Figure 2.5.4-2. 2.5.4 .5 7.,4
hJ Ov bJ SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.5.4-1 (Continued) POWER CONTROL SYSTEM / PROCESS-COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 10. PCS/P-CCS software is designed, 10. Inspection will be performed of the 10.a) The process defines the organization, tested, installed, and maintained using a process used to design, test, install, and responsibilities, and activities for the process which: maintain the PCS/P-CCS software. following phases of the software engineering life cycle:
- a. Defines the organization, respon-sibilities, and software quality assurance
- Establishment of plans and activities for the software engineering methodologies for all software to be life cycle that provides for: developed;
= establishment of plans and method-
- Specification of functional, system, and ologies software requirements and identification of safety critical requirements;
= specification of functional, system, and software requirements and standards,
- Design of the software architecture, pro-identification of safety critical gram structure, and definition of the requirements soft-ware modules;
- design and development of software
- Development of the software code and testing of the software modules; a software module, unit and system testing practices
- Interpretation of software and hardware and performance of unit and system
- installation and checkout practices tests;
- reporting and correction of software
- Software installation and checkout defects during operation testing; and
- Reporting and correction of software de-fects during operation.
2.5.4 wir.n
~
O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.4-1 (Continued) POWER CONTROL SYSTEM / PROCESS-COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analvscs and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 10.b) (Continued) 10.b) The process has require:aents for the following software development
- b. Specifies requirements for: functions:
- software management, documentation
- Software management, which defines requirements, standards, review organization responsibilities, requirements, and procedures for documentation requirements, standards problem reporting and corrective action for software coding and testing, review requirements, and procedures for a software configuration management, problem reporting and corrective action; historical records of software, and control of software changes
- Software configuration management, which establishes methods for
= verification & validation, and maintaining historical records of requirements for reviewer independence software as it is developed, controlling software changes, and for recording and
- c. Incorporates a graded approach reporting software changes; and according to the software's relative importance to safety.
- Verification and validation, which specifies the requirements for the verification review process, the validation testing process, review and test activity documentation, and reviewer independence.
t l 2.5.4 c6.i7 94
A G
\) O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.5.4-1 (Continued)
POWER CONTROL SYSTEM / PROCESS-COMPONENT CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 10.c) The process establishes the method for classifying PCS/P-CCS software elements according to their relative importance to safety. The process defines the tasks to be performed for software assigned to each safety classification. I1. The use of commercial grade computer 11. Inspection will be performed of the 11. A process is defined that has: hardware and software items in the process defined to use commercial grade PCS/P-CCS is accomplished through a components in the application.
- requirements for configuration manage-process that has: ment;
- requirements for configuration
- r-view of product performance; management;
- receipt acceptance of the commercial
- review of product performance; grade item; and
- receipt acceptance of the commercial
- final acceptance based on equipment grade item; and qualification and software validation in the integrated system.
- final acceptance based on equipment qualification and software validation.
2.5A w .u
.-. -- - . - . - . . - - - . - .- - - - - - . . _ = .- _ _
SYSTFAf 80+" O 2.6.1 AC ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM DESIGN DESCRWrION ,; The AC Electrical Power Distribution System (EPDS) consists of the transmission system, the plant switching stations, the Unit Main Transformer (UMT), two Unit , Auxiliary Transformers (UATs), two Reserve Auxiliary Transformers (RATS), a Main Generator (MG), Generator Circuit Breaker (GCB), buses, switchgear, load centers (L/Cs), motor control centers (MCCs), breakers, and cabling. The EPDS includes the power, instrumentation, and control cables and buses to the distribution system loads, and , electrical protection devices (circuit breakers and fuses) for the power, instrumentation, and control cables and buses. The portion of the EPDS from the high voltage sides of the UMT and RATS to the distribution system loads constitutes the EPDS Certified , Design scope. Interface requirements for the transmission system, plant switching stations, UMT, and RATS are specified below under the heading, " Interface i Requirements." Two Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) provide Class IE power to the two independent Class IE Divisions. A non-safety-related Alternate AC Source (AAC) (i.e., combustion turbine) supplies non-Class IE power to the EPDS. -i O The backup pressurizer heaters, emergency lighting, RCP seal injection pump, and RCP seal injection pump room ventilation fan are the only electrical loads classified as non. Class IE which are directly connectable to the Class IE buses. Class IE equipment is classified as Seismic Category I. The Basic Configuration of the Class IE portion of the EPDS is as shown on Figure 2.6.1-1. During plant power operation, the MG supplies power through the GCB through the UMT to the transmission system, and to the UATs. When the GCB is open, power is backfed from the transmission system through the UMT to the UATs. The UATs are sized to supply the design operating requirements of their respective Class IE buses and non-Class IE medium voltage non-safety and permanent non-safety buses. ! l The UMT and UATs are separated from the RATS. UMT, UATs, and RATS are provided with their own oil pit, drain, fire deluge system, . l grounding, and lightning protection systems. O 4..., 1 _ , .
] L.
e
SYSTEM 80+" (O V The MG and GCB are separated from the RAT power feeders. The MG and GCB instrumentation and control circuits are separated from the RAT's instrumentation and control circuits. Each RAT is sized to supply the design operating power requirements of at least its respective Class IE buses and permanent non-safety bus, and one reactor coolant pump and its reactor coolant pump support loads. Each RAT has the capability of supplying power directly (i.e., not through any bus supplying non-Class IE loads) to its respective Class lE buses. UAT power feeders, and instrumentation and control circuits are separated from the RAT's power feeders, and instrumentation and control circuits Power feeders, and instrumentation and control circuits for the UMT and its switching station are separated from power feeders, and instrumentation and control circuits for the RATS and their switching station. EPDS medium voltage switchgear, low voltage switchgear and their respective transformers, MCCs, and MCC feeder and load circuit breakers are sized to supply their load requirements. EPDS medium voltage switchgear, low voltage switchgear and their respective transformers, and MCCs are rated to withstand fault currents for the time , required to clear the fault from its power source. The GCB, medium voltage switchgear, low voltage switchgear, and MCC feeder and load circuit breakers are rated to interrupt fault currents. EPDS interrupting devices (circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupter closest to the fault is designed to open before other devices. Instrumentation and control power for Class lE Divisional medium voltage switchgear and low voltage switchgear is supplied from the Class lE DC Power System in the same Division. The GCB is equipped with redundant trip devices supplied from separate non-Class IE DC power systems. EPDS cables and buses are sized to supply their load requirements. EPDS cables and buses are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source. For the EPDS, Class IE power is supplied by two independent Class IE Divisions. Independence is maintained between Class 1E Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment. i 2.6.I *2- OM7 94 1 I
SYS_ TEM 80+" 5 Class IE medium voltage switchgear, low voltage switchgear, and MCCs are identified according to their Class 1E Division. Class 1E medium voltage switchgear, low voltage switchgear, and MCCs are located in Seismic Category I structures and in their respective Division areas. Class IE EPDS cables and raceways are identified according to their Class IE Division. Class IE EPDS cables are routed in Seismic Category I structures and in their respective l raceways. Class IE equipment is not prevented from performing its safety functions by harmonic distortion waveforms. The EPDS supplies an operating voltage at the terminals of the Class IE equipment which is within the equipment's voltage tolerance limits. ) l Class IE equipment is protected from degraded voltage conditions. t I An electrical grounding system is provided for (1) instrumentation, control, and computer systems, (2) electrical equipment (switchgear, motors, transformers, distribution panels), and (3) mechanical equipment (fuel and chemical tanks). Lightning protection systems are provided for buildings, structures and transformers located outside of the buildings. Each grounding system and lightning protection system is separately grounded to the ( ( plant ground grid. 1 { There are no automatic connections between Class IE Divisions. Displays of EPDS voltage, amperage, frequency, watts and vars instrumentation exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to operate the EPDS, specifically to open and close the main l turbine generator breaker, the 4.16kv supply and crossover breakers for the Class IE buses, and the diesel generator output breakers. Interface Requirements The offsite system shall consist of a minimum of two independent offsite transmission circuits from the transmission system.
'Ihe offsite transmission circuits shall be sized to supply their load requirements, during all design operating modes, of their respective Class IE divisions and non-Class IE loads. J i
The UMT and RATS shall be connected to independent switching stations. Switching j stations and their circuit breakers shall be sized to supply their load requirements and be rated to interrupt fault currents. D (V 2.6.1 ou t.,4 l l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . J
l SYSTEM 80+" s Voltage variations of the transmission system shall not cause voltage variations at the loads of more than plus or minus 10% of the loads' nominal voltage rating. l The normal steady-state frequency of the offsite system shall be within plus or minus 2 Hertz of 60 Hertz during recoverable periods of system instability. I The transmission system does not subject the reactor coolant pumps to sustained frequency decays of greater than 3 Hertz per second. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.6.1-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the AC Electrical Power Distribution System. t
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FEEDER o -uilt Class IE AC are sized to supply their load I&C Power System cables to determine I&C Power System exists and concludes requirements. their load requirements will be that the capacities of the distribution performed. system cables exceed, as determined by their cable ratings, their analyzed load requirements.
- 12. Class IE AC I&C Power System cables 12. Analysis for the as-built Class IE AC 12. Analysis for the as-built Class IE AC are rated to withstand currents for the I&C Power System to determine fault I&C Power System cables exists and time required to clear the fault from its currents will be performed. concludes that the distribution system power source. cable current capacities exceed their analyzed fault currents for the time required, as determined by the circuit interrupting device coordination analysis, to clear the fault from its power source.
- 13. The Class IE AC I&C Power System 13. Analysis for the as-built Class IE AC 13. Analysis for the as-built Class IE AC supplies an operating voltage at the I&C Power System to determine voltage I&C Power System exists and concludes terminals of the Class IE equipment drops will be performed. that the analyzed operating voltage which is within the equipment's voltage supplied at the terminals of the Class IE I tolerance limits. equipment is within the equipment's voltage tolerance limits, as determined l by their nameplate ratings.
2.6.3 os i7,4
O O SYSTEM 80+" TARLE 2.6.3-1 (Continued) AC INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM AND DC POWER SYSTEM Insocctions. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 14. Class IE AC I&C Power System cables 14. Inspection of the as-built Class IE AC 14. As-built Class IE AC Power System and raceways are identified according to Power System cables and raceways will cables and raceways are identified ac-their Class 1E Division / Channel. Class be conducted. cording to their Class IE Divi-IE cables are routed in Seismic sion/ Channel. Class IE Division-Category I structures and in their al/ Channel cables are routed in Seismic respective Division or Channel Category I structures and in their raceways. respective Division /Channet raceways.
- 15. Each Class IE battery is provided with 15. Inspections of the as-built Class IE DC 15. Each Class IE battery is provided with a normal battery charger supplied Power System will be conducted. a battery charger supplied alternating alternating current (AC) from a MCC in current (AC) from a MCC in the same the same Class IE Division as the Class IE Division as the battery.
battery.
- 16. Each Class IE battery is sized to supply 16.a) Analysis for the as-built Class IE 16.a) Analysis for the as-built Class IE its Design Basis Accident (DBA) loads, batteries to determine battery capacities batteries e.tists and concludes that each at the end-of-installed-life, for a will be performed based on the DBA Class 1E battery has the capacity, as minimum of 2 hours without recharging. duty cycle for each battery. determined by the as-built battery rating, to supply its analyzed DB A loads, at the end-of-installed-life, for a minimum of 2 hours without recharging.
16.b) Testing of each as-built Class IE battery 16.b) "Ihe capacity of each as-built Class IE will be conducted by simulating loads battery equals or exceeds the analyzed which envelope the analyzed battery battery design duty cycle capacity. DBA duty cycle. 2.6.3 m.im
q fm, 3 O V / SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.63-1 (Continued) AC INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM AND DC POWER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and AcceDtance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 17. Each Class IE battery charger is sized 17. Testing of each Class IE battery charger 17. Each Class IE battery charger can sup-to supply its respective Class IE will be conducted by supplying its ply its respective Class IE Divi-Division's steady-state loads while respective Class IE Division's normal sion's/ Channel's normal steady-state charging its respective Class 1E battery, steady-state loads while charging its loads while charging its respective Class respective Class IE battery. IE battery.
- 18. Manual interlocked transfer capability 18. Testing of the as-built Class IE DC 18. The as-built Class IE interlocks prevent exists within a Division between Class distribution centers will be performed by paralleling of the Class 1E DC IE DC distribution centers. attempting to close interlocked breakers. distribution centers within a Division.
- 19. The Class 1E DC Power System 19. Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC 19. Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC batteries, battery chargers, MCCs, DC Power System electrical distribution Power System exists and concludes that distribution panels, disconnect switches, system to determine the capacities of the the capacities of the batteries, battery circuit breakers, and fuses are sized to battery, battery charger, MCCs, DC chargers, MCCs, DC distribution supply their load requirements. distribution panels, disconnect switches, panels, disconnect switches, circuit circuit breakers, and fuses will be breakers, and fuses, as determined by performed. their nameplate ratings, exceed their analyzed load requirements.
2.6.3 m.im
( O O l SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.63-1 (Continued) l l l AC INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM AND DC POWER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 20.a) The Class IE batteries, battery chargers, 20.a) Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC 20.a) Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC DC distribution panels, MCCs, and Power System to determine fault Power System exists and concludes that disconnect switches are rated to currents will be performed. the capacities of the as-built Class IE withstand fault currents for the time batteries, battery chargers, DC dis-required to clear the fault from its tribution panels, MCCs, and disconnect power source. switches otrrent capacities exceed their analyzed fault currents for the time required, as determined by the circuit interrupting device coordination analyses, to clear the fault from its power source. 20.b) Class IE DC Power System circuit 20.b) Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC 20.b) Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC breakers and fuses are rated to interrupt Power System to determine fault Power System exists and concludes that fault currents. currents will be performed. the analyzed fault currents do not exceed the circuit breaker and fuse interrupt capacities, as determined by their nameplate ratings.
- 21. Class IE DC Power System circuit 21. Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC 21. Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC intermpting devices (circuit breakers and Power System to determine circuit Power System circuit interrupting fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupting device coordination will be devices (circuit breakers and fuses) interrupter closest to the fault is performed. exists and concludes that the analyzed designed to open before other devices. circuit interrupter closest to the fault is designed to open before other devices.
2.6.3 os-i7-,4
O C O SYSTEM 80+" TAHLE 2.63-1 (Continucd) AC INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM AND DC POWER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 22. Class IE DC Power System cables are 22. Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC 22. Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC sized to supply their load requirements. Power System cables to determine their Power System cables exists and con-load requirements will be performed. cludes that the Class IE DC electrical distribution system cable capacities, as determined by cable ratings, exceed their analyzed load requirements.
- 23. Class IE DC Power System cables are 23. Ar alysis for the as-built Class IE DC 23. Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC rated to withstand fault currents for the Power System to determine fault Power System exists and concludes that time required to clear the fault from its currents will be performed the Class IE DC electrical distribution power source. system cables will withstand the analyzed fault currents for the time required, as determined by the circuit interrupting device coordination analysis, to clear the fault from its power source.
- 24. The Class IE DC Power System 24.a) Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC 24.a) Analysis for the as-built Class IE DC supplies an operating voltage at the Power System to determine system Power System exists and concludes that terminals of the Class IE equipment voltage drops will be performed. the analyzed operating voltage supplied which is within the equipment's voltage at the terminals of the Class IE tolerance limits. equipment is within the equipment's voltage tolerance limits, as determined by their nameplate ratings.
2.6.3 e6-iv.,4
O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.63-1 (Continued) AC INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM AND DC POWER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 24.b) Testing of the as-built Class IE DC 24.b) Connected as-built Class IE loads Power System will be conducted by operate at less than or equal to the opetating connected Class iE loads at minimum allowable battery voltage and less than or equal to minimum allowable at greater than or equal to the maximum voltage and at greater than or equal to charging voltage. the maximum battery charging voltage.
- 25. Each Class IE battery is located in a 25. Inspection of the as-built Class IE 25. Each Class IE battery is located in a Seismic Category I structure and in its batteries will be conducted. Seismic Category I structure and in its re<pective Division / Channel battery respective Division / Channel battery room. room.
- 26. Class 1E DC Power System distnbution 26. Inspection of the as-built Class IE DC 26. Class 1E DC Power System distribution panels and MCCs are identified distribution panels and MCCs will be panels and MCCs are identified according to their Class IE conducted. according to their Class IE Division / Channel. Division / Channel.
- 27. Class IE DC Power System cables are 27. Inspection of the as-built Class IE DC 27. As-built Class IE DC Power System identified according to their Class IE Power System eables will be conducted. cables are identified according to their Division / Channel. Class IE Division / Channel.
- 28. Class IE Division / Channel cables are 28. Inspection of the as-built Class IE DC 28. Class IE Division / Channel cables are routed in Seismic Category I structures Power System cables and raceways will routed in Seismic Category I structures in their respective Division / Channel be conducted. in their respective Division / Channel raceways. raceways.
2.6.3 i v.,4
m
)
- s SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.63-1 (Continued)
AC INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM AND DC POWER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 29. In the Class IE DC Power System, 29.a) Testing willbe conducted on the as-built 29.a) A test signal exists in only the Class IE independence is provided between Class Class IE DC Power System by Division / Channel under test in the Class IE Divisions. Independence is provided providing a test signal in only one Class 1E DC Power 'ystem.
between Class IE Channels. IE Division / Channel at a time. Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions / Channels and non-Class IE equipment. 29.b) Inspection of the as-built Class IE DC 29.b) In the as-built Class IE DC Power Power System will be conducted. System, physical separation or electrical isolation exists between Class IE Divisions / Channels. Physicalseparation or electrical isolation exists between these Class IE Divisions / Channels and non-Class IE equipn'ent.
- 30. The Class IE DC Power System 30. Inspection for the existence or 30. Displays of the instrumentation displays identified in the Design retrievability in the MCR of identified in the Design Description Description (Section 2.6.3) exist in the instrumentation displays will be con- (Section 2.6.3) exist in the MCR or can MCR or can be retrieved there. ducted. be retrieved there.
2.6.3 w .u
, _~. _ _ _ i SYSTEM 80+" t 2.6A CONTAINMENT ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ASSEMBLIES ; DESIGN DESCRIIYI'lON l Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies are provided for electrical cables ; passing through the primary containment. Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies are classified as Seismic Category I. f Class 1E Division Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies only contain cables of one Class 1E Division, and Class 1E Channel Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblics only contain cables of one Class IE Channel. l t Independence is provided between Division Containment Electrical Penetrations ! Assemblies. Independence is provided between Channel Containment Electrical l Penetration Assemblies. Independence is provided between Containment Electrical ! Penetration Assemblics containing Class 1E cables and Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies containing non-Class 1E cables. Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies are protected against currents which are greater than their continuous ratings. Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblics are equipment for which paragraph number (3) of the " Verification for Basic Configuration for Systems" of the General ' Provisions (Section 1.2) applies. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.6.4-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance ; criteria for the Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies. 1 2.6.4 u-w
O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.6.4-1 CONTAINMENT ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ASSEMBLIES Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria 1 l Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the Con- 1. Inspection of he as-built Containment 1. The as-built Containment Electrical tainment Electrical Penetration Assem- Electrical Penetration Assemblies willbe Penetration Assemblies conforms with blies is as described in the Design conducted. the Basic Configuration described in the Description (Section 2.6.4). Design Description (Section 2.6.4).
- 2. Class IE Division Containment Elec- 2. Inspection of the as-built Division and 2. As-built Class IE Divisional Contain-trical Penetration Assemblies only Channel Containment Electrical Pene- ment Electrical Penetration Assemblies contain cables of one Class l E Division, tration Assemblies will be conducted. only contain cables of one Class 1E and Class IE Channel Containment Division, and Class IE Channel Con-Electrical Penetration Assemblies only tainment Electrical Penetration contain cables of one Class 1E Channel. Assemblies only contain cables of one Class IE Channel.
- 3. Independence is provided between 3. Inspection of the as-built Containment 3. Physical separation exists between as-Division Containment Electrical Electrical Penetration Assemblies will be built Division Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies. Independence conducted. Penetration Assemblies. Physical is provided between Channel separation exists between Channel Containment Electrical Penetration Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies. Independence is provided Assemblies. Physical separation exists between Containment Electrical between Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies containing Class Penetration Assemblies containing Class IE cables and Containment Electrical IE cables and Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies containing non- Penetration Assemblies containing non-Class IE cables. Class IE cables.
2.6.4 .6.i7.,4
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.6.4-1 (Continued) CONTAINMENT ELECTRICAL PENETRATION ASSEMBLIES Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 4. Containment Electrical Penetration 4. Analysis for the as-built Containment 4 Analysis exists for the as-built Con-Assemblies are protected against Electrical Penetration Assemblies will be tainment Electrical Penetration Assem-currents which are greater than their performed. blies and concludes either (1) that the continous ratings. maximum current of the circuits does not exceed the continuous rating of the Containment Electrical Penetration Assembly, or (2) that the circuits have redundant protection devices in series and that the redundant current protection devices are coordinated with the Containment Electrical Penetration Assembly's rated short circuit thermal capacity data and prevent current from exceeding the continuous current rating of the Containment Electrical Penetration Assembly.
2.6.4 wim
i l SYSTEM 80+" O 2.6.5 ALTERNATE AC SOURCE DESIGN DESCR.IPTION i The Alternate AC Source (AAC) (i.e., combustion turbine) is a self-contained power i generating unit with its own supporting auxiliary systems.
]
The AAC is classified as non-safety-related.
'Ihe AAC can supply power to the non-Class 1E permanent non-safety buses or to ;
a Class 1E Division through its associated non-Class 1E permanent non-safety bus. ! The load capacity of the AAC is at least as large as the capacity of an emergency diesel generator (EDG). The AAC is located in its own structure. l The AAC has the following displays and controls in the main control room (MCR):
- 1) Parameter displays for the AAC output voltage, amperes, watts, and ;
frequency. l
- 2) Controls for manually starting the AAC. ;
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria l O Table 2.6.5-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Alternate AC Source. I i 2.6.5 <*i7-94
4 ( r O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.6.5-1 ALTERNATE AC SOURCE InsDections. Tests. Analyses, and AcceDtance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the AAC is I. Inspection of the as-built AAC will be 1. The as-built AAC conforms with the as described in the Design Description conducted. Basic Configuration as described in the (Section 2.6.5). Design Description (Section 2.6.5).
- 2. The AAC can supply power to: 2. Testing on the as-built AAC will be 2. The as-built AAC can supply power to:
conducted by connecting the AAC to: a) the non-Class IE permanent non-safety a) the non-Class IE permanent non-safety a) the non-Class IE permanent non-safety buses; or buses; and then buses; or b) to a Class IE Division through its b) to a Class IE Division through its b) to a Class IE Division through its associated non Class 1E permanent non- associated non-Class IE permanent non- associated non-Class 1E permanent non-safety bus. safety bus. safety bus.
- 3. The load capacity of the AAC is at least 3. In=pection of the as-built AAC and 3. The as-built AAC load capacity is at as large as the capacity of an EDG. EDGs will be conducted. least as large as the capacity of an EDG as determined by the AAC and EDG nameplate ratings.
- 4. The AAC displays and controls 4. Inspection for the existence or 4. Displays and controls identified in the identified in the Design Description retrievability in the MCR of Design Description (Section 2.6.5) exist (Section 2.6.5) exist in the MCR or can instrumentation displays and controls in the MCR or can be retrieved there.
be retrieved there. will be conducted. 2.6.5 e5 7.,4
SYSTEM 80+" 2.7.1 NEW FUEL STORAGE RACKS Design Description The New Fuel Storage Racks provide on-site storage for at least 121 new fuel assemblies.
'Ihe New Fuel Storage Racks are safety-related. .
The New Fuel Storage Racks are located in the nuclear island structures in the new fuel i storage pit. The New Fuel Storage Racks support and protect new fuel assemblies. The New Fuel Storage Racks maintain the effective neutron multiplication factor less than the required criticality limits during normal operation and design postulated accident conditions. The New Fuel Storage Racks are anchored to embedments at the bottom of the storage . cavity. ! l The New Fuel Storage Racks are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III, Subsection NF, Class 3 Component Supports requirements. The New Fuel Storage Racks are designed to accommodate design basis loads and load j combinations including the effects of impact of fuel assemblies on the racks and the O impact due to postulated fuel handling accidents without losing the structural capability to maintain the fuel in a non-critical configuration. The New Fuel Storage Racks are classified Seismic Category I. l Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.1-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the New Fuel Storage Racks. 2.7.1 u.nm
^
(N V - SysTat 80+~ TABLE 2.7.1-1 NEW FUEL STORAGE RACKS Inspection. Tests. Analyses and AcceDtance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspection. Test. Analyses Accentance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the New 1. Inspection of the as-built New Fuel 1. For the New Fuel Storage Racks Fuel Storage Racks is as described in Storage Racks configuration will be described in the Design Description the Design Description (Section 2.7.1). conducted. (Section 2.7.1), the as-built New Fuel Storage Racks conform with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The New Fuel Storage Racks maintain 2. Analysis will be performed to calculate 2. The calculated effective neutron the effective neutron multiplication the effective neutron multiplication multiplication factor for the New Fuel factor less than the required criticality factor. Storage Racks is less than 0.95 during limits during normal operation and normal operation and postulated accident design postulated accident conditions. conditions (less than 0.98 for immersion in a uniform density aqueous foam or mist of optimum moderation density).
- 3. The New Fuel Storage Racks are 3. Inspection will be performed of the 3. The Fabrication Data Package, designed and constructed in accordance Fabrication Data Package, Certificate of Certificate of Conformance and the with ASME Code Section 11I Subsection Conformance and the Design Report Design Report Document exist, and NF, Class 3 Component Supports Document. conclude that the design requirements requirements and are classified Seismic are met.
Category I. 2.7.1 as-iv.,4
SYSTEM 80+" O 2.7.2 SPENT FUEL STORAGE RACKS Design Description The Spent Fuel Storage Racks provide on-site storage for at least 907 spent fuel j assemblies. The Spent Fuel Storage Racks are safety-related. - t The Spent Fuel Storage Racks are located in the nuclear island structures in the spent fuel pool. The Spent Fuel Storage Racks are free standing structures that support and protect i spent fuel assemblies. The Spent Fuel Storage Racks maintain the effective neutron multiplication factor less than the required criticality limits during norrnal operation : and postulated accident conditions. L The Spent Fuel Storage Racks are designed and fabricated in accordance with ASME l Code Section III, Subsection NF, Class 3 Component Supports requirements. ; The Spent Fuel Storage Racks are designed to accommodate design basis loads and load combinations including the effects of impact of fuel assemblies on the racks and i the impact due to postulated fuel handling accidents without losing the structural capability to maintain the fuel in a non-critical configuration. O The Spent Fuel Racks and support system are classified Seismic Category I. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.2-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Spent Fuel Storage Racks. . J i 4 4 2.7.2 .I. c.w i i
m. U s O. . SYSTEM 80+a TABLE 2.7.2-1 SPENT FUEL STORAGE RACKS Inspection. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspection. Test. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the Spent 1. Inspection of the as-built Spent Fuel 1. For the Spent Fuel Storage Racks Fuel Storage Racks is as described in Storage Racks configuration will be described in the Design Description the Design Description (Section 2.7.2). conducted. (Section 2.7.2) the as-built Spent Fuel Storage Racles conform with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The Spent Fuel Storage Racks maintain 2. Analysis will be performed to calculate 2. The calculated effective neutron the effective neutron multiplication the effective neutron multiplication multiplication factor is less than 0.95 factor less than the required criticality factor. during normal operation and postulated limits during normal operation and accident conditions.
postulated accident conditions.
- 3. Tne Spent Fuel Storage Racks are de- 3. Inspection will be performed of the 3. The Fabrication Data Package, signed and fabricated in accordance with Fabrication Data Package, Certificate of Certificate of Conformance and the the ASME Code Section III, Subsection Conformance and Design Report approved Design Report Document exist NF, Class 3 Component Supports Document. and conclude that the design requirements and are classified Seismic requirements are met.
Category I. t 2.7.2 u.n-u _ -_ __ _ ~_. . . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _
i p SYSTEM 80+" v 2.73 POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM l Design Description l The Pool Cooling and Purification System (PCPS) consists of a spent fuel pool cooling system (SFPCS) and a pool purification system. The SFPCS removes heat generated by the stored spent fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool water. The pool purification system pumps spent fuel pool water, refueling pool water, and fuel l transfer canal water through filters and ion exchangers. 1 The Basic Configuration of the PCPS is as shown on Figure 2.73-1. The SFPCS is j safety-related and the pool purification system is non-safety-related. The PCPS is located in the reactor building and nuclear annex. The SFPCS has two Divisions, each with a spent fuel pool (SFP) pump, a SFP heat , exchanger, and associated valves, piping, controls, and instrumentation. A cross- ! connect line with isolation valves between the SFP pump discharge lines is provided to allow either pump to be used with either heat exchanger. Each SFPCS Division has the heat removal capacity to prevent boiling in the spent fuel pool with a full core offload of fuel assemblics and a ten year inventory of stored Og irradiated fuel. Heat from the spent fuel pool is transferred to the component cooling water system (CCWS) in the spent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers. The PCPS includes provisions to prevent gravity and siphonic draining of the spent fuel pool and refueling pool. The ASME Code Section III Class for the PCPS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.73-1 is as depicted on the figure. Safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.73-1 is classified Seismic Category 1. 1 Displays of the PCPS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.73-1 are available as noted on the Figure. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to start and stop the spent fuel pool cooling pumps. i PCPS alarms shown on Figure 2.73-1 are provided as shown on the Figure. Water is supplied to each SFPCS pump at a pressure greater than the pump's required net positive suction head (NPSH). 2.7.3 emm
- r. SYSTEM 80+"
( The Class 1E loads shown on Figure 2.7.3-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E Division. Independence is provided between Class 1E Divisions, and between Clas 1E Divisions and non. Class 1E equipment,in the PCPS. He two mechanical Divisions of the SFPCS are physically separated except for the cross-connect line between SFPCS pump discharge lines. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.3-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Pool Cooling and Purification System. O i I l
\
2.7.3 S n.u
O O O SYSTEM 80+* CONTAINMENT INSIDE OUTSIDE NOTE 1 l ASME CODE SECTION lli CLASS I V 7 FU _EL TRANSFER ____q T t g A I CANAL I l EE n -- --- r--------- g -i r-----] ; lE El l pgg i {] I l {@ PURIF AilON SYSTEM MAKE.UP i I 1 I Civ Civ
=
6 - - ---- - FROM CvCS- M ' L I SPENT FUEL I
- 1 POOL [l y 8 I
l2 I{ i I I
]lI i I
_L_ I_ SPOOL PIECE !_ SPOOL PIECE _L_\ NOTE 2
- (css) , (css) g l g X ti CCWS X
w
- w NOTES:
h NOTE 2 g g
- 1. LOCAL INDICATION ONLY, NOT IN CONTROL ROOM; ALARM IN CCNTROL ROOM
- 2. PFIESSURE SWITCH WITH ALARM IN COPEROL ROOM; NO CONTROL ROOM INDICATION g
- 3. THEINSTRUMENTATION, EXCEPT ALARMS, AND ASME CODE SECTION ill CLASS 2 AND 3 COMPONENTS SHOWN ARE SAFETY CCWS RELATED. THE PUMPS ANDINSTRUMENTATION SHOWN, EXCEPT ALARMS, ARE POWERED FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE CLASS 1E DIVISION.
FIGURE 2.7.3 -1 06-17-94 POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM _ _ - _ - - - - - - - _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I
~
O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.73-1 i POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the PCPS is 1. Inspection of the as-built PCPS 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.7.3-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.3-1, the as-built PCPS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. Each SFPCS Division has the heat 2. Testing to measure SFPCS pump flow 2. Each SFPCS Division will remove at -
removal capacity to prevent boiling in in each Division will be performed. least 67.25 million bru/hr from the spent the spent fuel pool with a full core Inspection and analysis to determine the fuel pool, with the spent fuel pool at offload of fuel assemblies and a ten year heat removal capability of each SFPCS ISO'F and component cooling water inventory of stored irradiated fuel. Division will be performed based on test supplied at 5000 gpm and 105'F. data and as-built data.
- 3. The PCPS includes provisions to prevent 3. Inspection of the PCPS suction and 3. Spent fuel pool cooling suction gravity and siphonic draining of the retum line connections to the refueling connections are located at least 10 feet spent fuel pool and the refueling pool, pool and spent fuel pool will be above the top of the spent fuel. Anti-performed. siphon devices are provided in the lines for spent fuel pool cooling retum, spent fuel pool purification suction and return.
and refueling pool suction and retum. i
- 4. The ash 1E Code Section Ill PCPS 4. A pressure test will be conducted on 4. The results of the pressure test of !
components shown on Figure 2.7.3-1 those components of the PCPS required ash 1E Code Section III components of retain their pressure boundary integrity to be pressure tested by the ash 1E Code the PCPS conform with the pressure under intemal pressures that will be Section III. testing acceptance criteria in ASN1E experienced during service. Code Section III. 2.7.3 - 1- -i 7-,a 4 _. .m___.___._______m.-_2_-m _ <rm m __ m -e w- -. - v- . , . = - .,,-w
O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.3-1 (Continued) POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Ar.ceptance Criteria 5.a) Displays of the PCPS instrumentation 5.a) Inspection for the existence or 5.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.7.3-1 are available retrieveability of instrumentation on Figure 2.7.3-1 are available as noted as noted on the figure. displays will be performed, on the figure. 5.b) Controls exist in the MCR to start and 5.b) Testing will be performed using the 5.b) PCPS controls in the MCR operate to stop the spent fuel pool cooling SFP PCPS controls in the MCR. start and stop the SFP pumps. pumps. 5.c) PCPS alarms shown on Figure 2.7.3-1 5.c) Testing of the PCPS alarms shown on 5.c) The PCPS alarms shown on Figure are provided as shown on the figure. Figure 2.7.3-1 will be performed using 2.7.3-1 actuate in response to signals signals simulating alarm conditions. simulating alarm conditions.
- 6. Water is supplied to each SFP cooling 6. Testing to measure SFP pump suction 6. The available NPSil exceeds each SFP pump at a pressure greater than the pressure will be performed. Inspection pump's required NPSil.
pump's required net positive suction and analysis to determine NPSH head (NPSH). available to each SFP pump will be performed based on test data and as-built data. 7.a) The Class IE loads shown on Figure 7.a) Testing will be performed on the SFPCS 7a) Within the SFPCS, a test signal exists 2.7.3 1 are powered from their system by providing a test signal in only only at the equipment powered from the respective Class IE Division. one Class IE Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. 7.b) Independence is provided between 7.b) Inspection of the as-installed Class IE 7.b) Physical separation exists between Class Class IE Divisions, and between Divisions in the PCPS will be IE Divisions in the PCPS. Physical Class 1E Divisions and non-Class IE performed. separation exists between Class IE equipment, in the PCPS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the PCPS. 2.7.3 .5 t 7.,4
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.73-1 (Continued) POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 8. The two mechanical Divisions of the 8. Inspections of as-built mechanical 8. The two mechanical Divisions of the SFPCS are physically separated except Divisions will be performed. SFPCS are separated by a wall, or by a for the cross-connect line between SFP fire barrier, or by spatial separation in pump discharge lines. the spent fuel pool, except for the cross-connect line between SFP pump dis-charge lines.
i 2.7.3 e6-iv.,4
SYSTEM 80+" 2.7.4 FUEL HANDLING SYSTEM Design Description The Fuel Handling System (FHS) is a non-safety system of equipment and tools that handles and moves fuel assemblies and control element assemblies (CEAs), and also , provides storage for them during fuel transfer operations. The FHS load handling i devices are designed to reduce the potential for damage to a fuel assembly. ] The FHS has a refueling machine (RM), a spent fuel handling machine (SFHM), a CEA change platform (CEACP), a fuel trans fer system (FTS), a CEA elevator l (CEAE), a new fuel elevator (NFE), and a fuel building overhead crane (FBOC). The reactor building polar crane is used to remove and replace the reactor vessel head and reactor vessel internals during refueling. The RM, CEACP, CEAE and reactor building polar crane are located in the reactor building. The SFHM, NFE and FBOC are located in the nuclear annex. The fuel transfer tube is located in both the reactor building and the nuclear annex. , i The RM, SFHM, and CEACP hoists are each pmided with load-measuring devices and are interlocked to interrupt hoisting if their individual loads exceed an overload limit and to interrupt lowering if their individual loads decrease below an underload i limit. The RM, SFHM, CEACP hoists, and reactor building polar crane are interlocked to limit upward hoist travel. They are also provided with positive mechanical stops to limit upward movement of the hoists. In the event of a safe shutdown earthquake or of loss of electrical power to the RM or SFHM, the RM or SFHM will not drop a fuel assembly held by its hoist. The RM and SFHM each have manual drive mechanisms to allow hoist operation and machine translation without electrical power. The new fuel handling hoist is interlocked to prevent moving new fuel over the spent ! fuel racks. ; The cask handling hoist is interlocked and equipped with mechanical stops to prevent moving a cask over either the new or spent fuel racks. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria i Table 2.7.4-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses,' and associated acceptance criteria for the Fuel Handling System. l O 2.7.4 m.n.u i i
,,,-~m. . . , , .
. s SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.4-1 FUEL IIANDLING SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the RM, 1. Inspection of the as-built system will be 1. For the RM, SFilM, CEACP, FTS, SFliM, CEACP, FTS, CEAE, NFE, conducted. CEAE, NFE, and FBOC described in and FBOC is as described in the Design the Design Description (Section 2.7.1),
Description (Section 2.7.4). the as-built equipment conforms with the basic configuration. 2.a) The RM, SFliM, and CEACP hoists are 2.a) Testing of the RM, SFIIM, and CEACP 2.a) The RM, SFilM, and CEACP hoist provided with load-measuring devices hoists will be performed to evaluate load measuring devices and interlocks and are interlocked to interrupt hoisting equipment response to simulated loads. interrupt hoisting when simulated load ifload limits are reached. limits are reached. 2.b) The RM, SFIIM, and CEACP hoists are 2.b) Testing of the RM, SFHM, and CEACP 2.a) De RM, SFIIM, and CEACP hoist provided with load-measuring devices hoists will be performed to evaluate load measuring devices and interlocks and interlocks to interrupt lowering if equipment response to simulated loads. interrupt lowering when simulated load load limits are reached. limits are reached.
- 3. The RM, SFHM, CEACP, and reactor 3. Testing of the RM, SFHM, CEACP, 3. He RM, SF11M, CEACP hoist, and building polar crane hoists, are each and reactor building polar crane hoists reactor building polar crane are interlocked to limit upward hoist travel. will be performed to confirm interlock interlocked to limit upward hoist travel.
function to limit upward hoist travel.
- 4. The RM, SFHM, and CEACP hoists are 4. Testing of the RM, SFHM, and CEACP 4. The RM, SFliM, and CEACP hoist each provided with mechanical stops to hoists will be performed to confirm the mechanical stops limit upward hoist limit upward hoist travel. functioning of mechanical stops to limit travel.
upward hoist travel. 2.7.4 i7.,4 (. --
I l SYSTEM 80t" TABLE 2.7.4-1 (Continued) l FUEL HANDLING SYSTEM l Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria ( Desien Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria j 5. In the event of loss of electrical power 5. Testing of the RM and SFIIM will be 5. The grapple does not open upon loss of r to the RM or SFilM, the RM or SFliM performed by removing electrical power electrical power. will not drop a full assembly held by its from the loaded equipment, hoist.
- 6. The RM and SFilM each have manual 6. Testing of the RM and SFilM hoists 6. He hoists operate and the machines drive mechanisms to allow hoist will be performed manually without move manually, operation and machine translation electrical power.
without electrical power.
- 7. The new fuel handling hoist is 7. Testing of the new fuel handling hoist 7. The new fuel handling hoist is interlocked to prevent moving new fuel will be performed to confirm interlock interlocked to prevent moving new fuel over the spent fuel racks. functmaing. over spent fuel racks.
- 8. The cask handling hoist is interlocked to 8. Testing of the cask handling hoist will 8. The cask handling hoist is interlocked to prevent moving a cask over either the be performed to confirm interlock prevent moving a cask over either the new or spent fuel racks. functioning. new or spent fuel racks.
2.7.4 stm
SYS'mM 80+" 2.7.5 STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM Design Description ne Station Service Water System (SSWS),in conjunction with the ultimate heat sink (UIIS), provides cooling water to remove heat from the component cooling water system (CCWS). The Basic Configuration of the SSWS is as shown on Figure 2.7.5-1. The SSWS is a safety-related system as noted on the Figure. The SSWS consists of two Divisions. Each SSWS Division receives heat from its corresponding CCWS Division through the component cooling water heat exchangers. Each Division of the SSWS has two station service water pumps, two station senice water strainers, piping, valves, controls, and instrumentation. The SSWS pumps and strainers are located in the SSWS pump structure (s). Interconnecting piping runs between the SSWS pump structure (s) and the component cooling water heat exchanger structure. ne SSWS has the capacity to remove heat from the CCWS during operation, O shutdown, refueling, and design basis accident conditions. Each Division has the heat dissipation capacity to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. I ! The ASME Code Section III Class for the SSWS pressure retaining components ! shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 is as depicted on the Figure. : The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 is classified Seismic Category I. l The Class 1E loads shown on Figure 2.7.51 are powered from their respective Class j IE Division. Independence is provided between Class 1E Divisions, and between Class 1E Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, in the SSWS. He two mecharical Divisions of the SSWS are physically separated. Displays of the SSWS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the station service water pumps, and to open and close those power operated valves shown on Figure 2.7.51. 3 l O 2.7.5 omm
SYSTEM 80+" ( Check valves shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under system pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. Interface Requirements The Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) transfers heat from the SSWS to the environment during operation, shutdown, refueling, and design basis accident conditions. The Ultimate Heat Sink is capable of dissipating a heat load of at least 134.3 million BTU /hr during the initial phase of a design basis accident. The UHS is sized so that makeup water is not required for at least 30 days following a design basis accident. During this period of 30 days, the design basis temperatures of safety-related equipment are not exceeded. Water is supplied to each SSWS pump at a net positive suction head (NPSH) greater than the pump's required NPSH. The Station Service Water Pump Structure is classified Seismic Category I and provides a physical barrier and fire barrier to maintain separation of SSWS mechanical Di5isions. The SSWS pump structure ventilation system is classified Seismic Category I, and its mechanical Divisions are separated by physical barriers. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.5-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Station Servic Water System. I l l l r i 2.7.5 n n-u
3 SYSTEM 80+" 0 (d CCwS CCwS STATION ' FROM SERVICE WATER PUMP A[v I
,S----%-.
( ULTIMATE N s * CCW HX *' HEAT SINK - - - - - + s STRAINER OO TO
- - - > ULTIMATE HEAT SINK STATION SERVICE WATER FROM PUMP _ , ,,,,,, i ULTIMATE bN' s ..
HX ,. . HEAT SINK - - - - - , s '.'. . STRAINER I j( OO ' NOTES: f A. SSWS COMPONENTS AND EQUIPMENT SHOWN ON THE CCWS CCWS ! FIGURE ARE ASME CODE SECTION lli CLASS 3 AND ARE l SAFETY-RELATED. I B. SAFETY-RELATED COMPONENTS AND EQUIPMENT SHOWN i ON THE FIGURE ARE POWERED FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE CLASS 1E DIVIS:ON. I FIGURE 2.7.5-1 STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (ONE OF TWO DIVISIONS) l
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.5-1 STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the SSWS is 1. Inspection of the as-built SSWS con- 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.7.5-1. figuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.5-1, the as-built SSWS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The SSWS has the capacity to remove 2. Testing will be performed to measure 2. The SSWS has the capacity to remove heat from the CCWS during operation. SSWS flow rates, inspections will be heat from the CCWS during operation, shutdown, refueling, and design basis conducted of the as-built SSWS, and shutdown, refueling, and design basis accident condi: ions. analyses will be performed to determine accident conditions.
the heat removal capacities of the as-built SSWS.
- 3. The ASME Code Section !!! SSWS 3. A pressure test will be conducted on 3. The results of the pressure test of components shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 those components of the SSWS required ASME Code Section til components of retain their pressure boundary integrity to be pressure tested by ASME Code the SSWS conform with the pressure under internal pressures that will be Section Ill. testing acceptance criteria in ASME experienced during service. Code Section III.
4.a) The Class IE loads shown on Figure 4.a) Testing will be performed on the SSWS 4.a) Within the SSWS, a test signal exists 2.7.5-1 are powered from their by providing a test signal in only one only at the equipment powered from the respective Class IE Division. Class IE Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. 4.b) Independence is provided between Class 4.b) Inspection of the as-installed Class iE 4.b) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions in the SSWS will be IE Divisions in the SSWS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, performed. separation exists between Class IE in the SSWS. Divisions and non-Class ^. d equipment in the SSWS. 2.7.5 os.iv.94
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.5-1 (Continued) STATION SERVICE WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 5. The two mechanical Divisions of the 5. Inspection of the as-built mechanical 5. The two mechanical Divisions of the SSWS are physically separated. Divisions will be performed. SSWS are separated by a Divisional wall or a fire barrier.
6.a) Displays of the SSWS instrumentation 6.a) Inspection for the existence or 6.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 exist in the retrieveability in the MCR of on Figure 2.7.5-1 exist in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there. performed. 6.b) Controls exist in the MCR to start and 6.b) Testing will be performed using the 6.b) SSWS controls in the MCR operate to stop the station service water pumps, SSWS controls in the MCR. start and stop station service water and to open and close those power pumps, and to open and close those operated valves shown on Figure power operated valves shown on Figure 2.7.5-1. 2.7.5-1, 4
- 7. Check valves shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 7. Testing will be conducted to open, or 7. Each check valve shown on Figure will open, or will close, or will open close, or open and also close, check 2.7.5-1 opens, or closes, or opens and and also close under system pressure, valves shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 under also closes.
fluid flow conditions, or temperature system preoperational pressure, fluid conditions. flow conditions, or temperature conditions. 2.7.5 o6.nm
SYSTEM 80+" O 2.7.6 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Design Description
)
1 The Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) is a closed loop cooling water system that, in conjunction with the station service water system (SSWS) and the ultimate
)
heat : ink (UllS), removes heat generated from the plant's safety-related and non-safety related components connected to the CCWS. Equipment listed in Table 2.7.6-1 can receive cooling water flow during the plant modes indicated. The ASME Code Section III Class 2 and 3 components and the instrumentatior. (except the radiation instrument) shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 are safety-related. The Basic Configuration of the CCWS is as shown on Figure 2.7.6-1. The CCWS consists of two Divisions. Each CCWS Division transfers heat to its corresponding SSWS Division through the component cooling water heat exchangers. Each Division of the CCWS has two component cooling water heat exchangers, a j cornponent cooling water surge tank, two component cooling water pumps, piping, l valves, controls, and instrumentation. O The CCWS heat exchangers are located in the CCWS heat exchanger structure. The remainder of the CCWS components and equipment is located within the nuclear island structures except for piping that connects the CCWS heat exchangers to the components and equipment in the nuclear island structures. The CCWS, in conjunction with the SSWS and UHS, has the capacity to dissipate the heat loads of connected components during operation, shutdeen, refueling, and design basis accident conditions. Each Division has the heat dissipation capacity to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. The ASME Code Section III Class for the CCWS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 is as depicted on the Figure. The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 is classified Seismic Category I. The Class IE loads shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 are powered from their respective Class IE Division. Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, in the CCWS. l The two mechanical Divisions of the CCWS are physically separated. l 2.7.6 w n-u
l l SYSW,M 80+" Displays of the CCWS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. l l Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the component cooling water pumps, and to I open and close those power operated valves shown on Figure 2.7.6-1. I Upon receipt of a Safety injection Actuation Signal (SIAS), the system response is as l follows:
- 1) ' Hie ASME Code Section III Class 3 valves that separate ASME Code Section III Class 3 component cooling water piping and non-ASME Code Section III _
component cooling water piping close automatically.
- 2) The spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger isolation valve closes automatically. ;
- 3) The component cooling water heat exchanger bypass valves close automatically.
Upon receipt of a Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS), the containment spray heat exchanger isolation valve opens automatically. Upon receipt of a component cooling water low-low surge tank level signal, isolation valves for cooling loops composed of non-ASME Code Section III piping close l automatically. Motor-operated valves (MOVs) having an active safety function will open, or will close,
- or will open and also close, under differential pressure or fluid flow conditions and under temperature conditions. ,
Check valves shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 will open, or will close, or will open and also , close, under system pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. I i Valves with response positions indicated on Figure 2.7.6-1 change position to that indicated on the Figure upon loss of motive power. Makeup water to the CCWS is supplied by the demineralized water makeup system l (DWMS). A safety-related Seismic Category I makeup line is provided to each Division ! from the SSWS via a spool piece which can be connected. l Pressure relief and flow isolation valves are provided for each reactor coolant pump as shown on Figure 2.7.6-1. Pressure relief capacity is sized to accept the maximum. , expected in-leakage from a reactor coolant pump seal cooler tube tupture. 2.7.6 u-n_w i I l
-._-__-__.--__L
SYSTEM 80+" (] C#' The CCWS pipe channels from the nuclear island structures to the component cooling water heat exchanger structures are classified Seismic Category I and provide physical barriers between CCWS mechanical Divisions. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.6-2 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Component Cooling Water System. i 10 V 2.7.6 w-o-* l l l i
SYSTEM 80+'" uOTt C r sAS e rm .t-# i {g L.W
- m (
ETATIOst SERVICf , WATER SYSTEM
- g. .
( CCW g DEMDe tRAll2ED WATER MW4 mer 5NE, . MAKEUP SYSTEM x e>lCCW HX h TANK (DWMS) MAKEUP g
+ e T CCW PUMP gSWs $sWs
-- MC 1
+
CCW PUMP av FC E N d CCW MX H "c + cm um . , P
;;miriolis W o*e 5 56WS
. ......... 3 4
SAFETY FELATED Putsp I MOTOR COOLERS. aHNIPLOW, I MEAT EXCMANGER5 ANO a leOTE C 4 ESSENTML C8eLLED WATER g g CONDENSER 5 S*AS " * * ..........9
*Sd 5 P N P N 't
,, . . . " 1'? "". .i a CONTAHf ENT SPRAY
".*.*.*..*.*.*.*5 meset aENeRATOR ,
6 ........ m .=.=.o. I CHAfDGNO PUMP g I MOTORCOOLER AND ' g OtARGNG PUMP 89NSPL b . . . .DW. MX..4 8 DAM M' a PLRIP AND rut 4P g CONTApeBENT . . . I. SOT.OR. .4 OLfTWDE mgsog CONTAINMENT
- v: : _E _ D, CCWusTAS * '
l
- CCWusTAS Cu OV CW CN I REAbOR e PWP AND PUR4P I
g
. . . N.OTOR ..u. .e
........I g NO8us4L DeLLED WATER CONDEN$ Eft 5 e
'. . ......e CCWLLSTAS NOTE A SEAS , -RAS g MPL) MEA EXChANGERS. 3 0
QAS STRIPPER AND I ca motCONTAM.4E.NT OE . COseCENTRATOR , -E -DE
, 6 ..
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- CVCS LITDOWN Mr ,
6 ........ esOTTR' OV CW OV OV
& ASS 60NM ENT OP THE NO8s EAPTTY RELAftD CCWS MEAT REFOV AL LOAD 5 TO ThBR PESPfCTWE CTWS DPMSf0N IB DEPENDENT UPON Thf LOCATION OP ComePQaeENTS
- fQUtPMENT POR WMcCM PAAAGRAPH NUMSER Q 30PTHE *VERIMCATtONS POft SAStC CONMGiURAfsOef PDA SYSTEMS' OF TME GENERAL PROVISaONS (S(CTION t.4 APPUES A150CIATED wf7M DO50 LOADS 6
'M EAPTTV RELATfD COMSONfMT4 AND EOlAPtPENT MOWN ON THE MOusIE ARE 3WtlWD PROes TMcR RESPECTwt CLASS 1E DMSON.
1 That VALVf 16 POR PLDW CONTROL, OPEstnOSE OPERATIOes PROel THE MAIN () cONTsoL ROcw as NOT REamREn. FIGURE 2.7.6-1 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM (ONE OF TWO DMS3ONS) WW
O v SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.6-1 Equipment Receivinz Component Cooline Water Flow 4 Plant Mode / Normal Operation Shutdown Cooling Refueling Design Basis i Components Accident 4 SAFETY RELATED (Note a) Shutdown cooling - X X - heat exchanger Containment spray - - - X heat exchanger Spent fuel pool X X X X (Note b) cooling heat exchanger , Diesel Generator X X X X Pump Motor Cool- X X X X ers, Miniflow 11 eat Exchangers, and Essential Chilled Water Condensers 2.7.6 a n.n
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.6-1 (Continued) Equipment Receivine Component Cooline Water Flow Plant Mode / Normal Operation Shutdown Cooling Refueling Design Basis Components Accident NON-SAFETY REIATED (Note a) Reactor coolant X X X X l pumps and pump motors Charging pump X X X X motor coolers Charging pump X X X X miniflow heat exchanger Instrument Air X X X X l Compressors Normal Chilled X X X - Water Condensers (Note c) Letdown IIcat X X X - Exchanger, Sample Ileat Exchangers, Gas Stripper, and Boric Acid Con-centrator (Note c) 2.7.6 *nm
p SYSTEM 80+" %.) NOTES FOR TABLES 2.7.6-1
- a. (X) = Equipment can receive component cooling water flow in this mode.
(-) = Equipment does not receive component cooling water flow in this mode.
- b. Will require operator action to restore.
- c. Assignment of the non-safety-related CCWS heat removal loads to the respective CCWS Division is dependent upon the location of the components associated with those loads.
O v f~3 2.7.6 06-iv ,4
s SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.7.6-2 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the CCWS 1. Inspection of the as-built CCWS 1. For the components and equipment is as shown on Figure 2.7.6-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.6-1, the as-built CCWS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The CCWS, in conjunction with the 2. Testing will be performed to measure 2. The CCWS, in conjunction with the SSWS and UllS, has the capacity to CCWS flow rates, inspections will be SSWS and UllS, has the capacity to dissipate the heat loads of connected conducted of the as-built CCWS, and dissipate the heat loads of connected components during operation, shutdown, analyses will be performed to determine components during operation, shutdown, refueling and design basis accident the heat removal capacities of the as- refueling and design basis accident conditions. built component cooling water heat conditions.
exchangers. '
- 3. The ASME Code Section III CCWS 3. A pressure test will be conducted on 3. The results of the pressure test of components shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 those components of the CCWS required ASME Code Section 111 components of retain *eir pressure boundary integrity to be pressure tested by ASME Code the CCWS conform with the pressure under internal pressures that will be Section 111. testing acceptance criteria in ASME experienced during service. Code Section llI.
4.a) ~Ihe Class IE loads shown on Figure 4.a) Testing will be performed on the CCWS 4.a) Within the CCWS, a test signal exists 2.7.6-1 are powered from their by providing a test signal in only one only at the equipment powered from the respective Class 1E Division. Class 1E Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. } 4.b) Independence is provided between Class 4.b) Inspection of the as-installed Class 1E 4.b) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions in the CCWS will be IE Divisions in the CCWS. Physical Divisions and non-Class 1E equipment, performed. separation exists between Class !E in the CCWS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the CCWS. 2.7.6 e5:7.,4 _ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - = _ _ _ _ _ _ _---_ -_ -. -. . _ - __ _ _ _ _ _
p EpMMUm O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.6-2 (Continued) COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acccotance Criteria
- 5. The two mechanical Divisions of the 5. Inspection of the as-built mechanical 5. The two mechanical Divisions of the CCWS are physically separated. Divisions will be performed. CCWS are separated by a Divisional wall or a fire barrier except for components of the CCWS within Containment which are separated by spatial arrangement or physical barriers.
6.a) Displays of the CCWS instrumentation 6.a) Inspection for the existence or 6.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.7.61 exist in the retrieveability in the MCR of on Figure 2.7.6-1 exist in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there. performed. l l 6.h) Controls exist in the Main Control 6.b) Testing will be performed using the 6.b) CCWS controls in the MCR operate to Room to start and stop the component CCWS controls in the MCR. stait and stop component cooling water cooling water pumps, and to open and pumps, and to open and close those close those power operated valves power operated valves shown on Figure shown on Figure 2.7.6-1. 2.7.6-1.
- 7. Upon receipt of a Safety Injection 7. Testing will be performed using a 7 The system responds as follows:
Actuation Signal (SIAS), the system simulated SIAS. response is as follows: 7.a) The ASME Code Section Ill Class 3 7.a) Upon receipt of a SIAS, the valves valves that separate the ASME Code close. Section Ill Class 3 component cooling water piping and non-ASME Code Section !!! component cooling water piping close automatically. 2.7.6 m.n.94
. O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.6-2 (Continued)
COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM InSDections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria , 7.b) The spent fuel pool cooling heat 7.b) Upon receipt of a SIAS. the valve exchanger isolation valve closes closes. automatically. 7.c) The component cooling water heat 7.c) Upon receipt of a SIAS, the valves .i exchanger bypass valves close close. automatically.
- 8. Upon the receipt of a component cooling 8. Testing will be performed using a 8. Upon the receipt of a component cooling water low-low surge tank level signal, simulated component cooling water water surge tank low-low level signal.
isolation valves for cooling loops surge tank low-low level signal. the valves close. composed of non-ASME Code Section III piping close automatically.
- 9. Upon receipt of a Containment Spray 9. Testing will be performed using a 9. Upon receipt of a CSAS, the valve Actuation Signal (CSAS), the simulated CSAS signal. opens.
containment spray heat exchanger isolation valve opens automatically.
- 10. Motor-operated valves (MOVs) having 10. Testing will be performed to open, or 10. Each MOV having an active safety an active oafety function will open, or close, or open and also close, MOVs function opens, or closes, or opens and j will close, or will open and also close, having an active safety function under alsocloses.
under differential pressure or fluid flow preoperational differential pressure or conditions and under temperature fluid flow conditions and under conditions. temparature conditions. 2.7.6 m.n u
O l O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7,6-2 (Continued) COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 11. Check valves shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 11. Testing will be performed to open, or 11. Each che
- alve shown on Figure will open, or will close, or will open close, or open and also close, check 2.7.6-1, og 2, or closes, or opens and and also close, under system pressure, valves shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 under also closes, fluid flow conditions, or temperature system preoperational pressure, fluid conditions, flow conditions or temperature conditions.
- 12. Valves with response positions indicated 12. Testing ofloss of motive power to these 12. These valves change position to the on Figure 2.7.6-1 change position to valves will be performed. position indicated on Figure 2.7.6-1 on that indicated on the figure upon loss of loss of motive power.
motive power.
- 13. The spool piece on the SSWS makeup 13. Testing of the spool piece will be 13. The spool piece on the SSWS makeup line to each Division of the CCWS can performed to confirm that it can be line to each Division of the CCWS can be connected. connected. be connected.
- 14. Pressure relief capacity provided for 14. An analysis will be performed to 14. An analysis exists and concludes that the each reactor coolant pump is sized to confirm the pressure relief capacity pressure relief capacity provided for accept the maximum expected in-leakage provided for each reactor coolant pump. each reactor coolant pump is sized to from a reactor coolant pump seal cooler accept the maximum in-leakage from a tube rupture. reactor coolant pump seal cooler tube rupture.
l 2.7.6 sn-u
SYSTEM 80+" 2.7.7 DEMINERALIZED WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM Design Description The Demineralized Water Makeup System (DWMS) supplies filtered water reduced in gases and ions to the condensate storage system, component cooling water system (CCWS), emergency feedwater system (EFWS), normal and essential chilled water systems, and the diesel generator cooling system. The Basic Configuration of the DWMS is as shown on Figure 2.7.7-1. The DWMS l is non-safety-related with the exception of the containment penetration isolation l valves and piping in between covered in Section 2.4.5. 1 l The DWMS has pumps, demineralizers, a degasifier, a demineralized water storage tank, piping, instrumentation, and controls. The DWMS demineralizers, pumps, regeneration, and neutralization equipment, including the regenerant waste neutralization tank are located in the station service building. The demineralized water storage tank is located in the yard. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.71 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Demineralized Water Makeup System. O 2.7.7 u-n-u
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O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.7-1 DEMINERALIZED WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM InSDeetions. TcSts. Analyses. and deCeDiance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the DWMS 1. Inspection of the as-built DWMS 1. For the components and equipment is as shown on Figure 2.7.7-1. configuration will be performed. shown on Figure 2.7.7-1, the as-built DWMS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
1 2.7.7 a n.u
. SYSTEM 80+"
2.7.8 CONDENSATE STORAGE SYSTEM Design Description The Condensate Storage System provides a source of condensate for makeup to the main condenser, is a source of startup feedwater to the steam generators, and provides a non-safety source of condensate to the emergency feedwater storage tanks. The Basic Configuration is as shown on Figure 2.7.8-1. The Condensate Storage System is non-safety-related. The Condensate Storage System has a condensate storage tank, a condensate storage tank recycle pump, and associated valves, piping, and controls. The condensate storage tank is located in the yard. The Condensate Storage System recycle pump is located in the station services building. The Condensate Storage System provides makeup or receives excess condensate from the main condenser hotwell. The Condensate Storage System also serves to collect and store condensate from plant condensate drains. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.8-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Condensate Storage System. O 2.7.8 *nu
O O O SYSTEM 80 +* DEMINERALIZED r 3 I WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM , - - > I _________I I (DEGASIFER) I c --) MAIN CONDENSER I HOTWELL t
- - >l I CONDENSATE I _---._~~I STORAGE I _________I DEMINERALIZED TANK , _ _ y EMERGENCY FEEDWATER I l WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM i-~ m
" STORAGE TANKS g l
l (DEMINERALIZED WATER _ _ STqpAGF,_T&NK_1_ _ g ---------- t J l _________I g - - - - - "" '"" - ~~ l DEMINERALIZED STARTUP I
- - ->I WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM I FEEDWATER '< ~
[) l (DEGASIFER) I l PUMP SUCTION LINE l ; i ---------- CONDENSATE
. $TORAGE TANK RECYCLE PUMP FIGURE 2.7.8-1 CONDENSATE STORAGE SYSTEM m-17-94
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.8-1 CONDENSATE STORAGE SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria _ _ Design Commitment Inspections. Tuts. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the 1. Inspection of the as-built Condensate 1. For the components and equipment Condensate Storage System is as shown Storage System configuration will be shown on Figure 2.7.8-1, the as-built on Figure 2.7.8-1. conducted. Condensate Storage System conforms with the Basic Configuration.
i 2.7.8 wm.
SYSTEM 80+" l 2.7.9 PROCESS SAMPLING SYSTEM I i Design Description f i The Process Sampling System (PSS) collects and delivers samples from process ; systems to sample stations for analyses. Portions of the system which form part of the : rea: tor coolant pressure boundary are safety-related. A sub-system of the PSS is the post-accident sampling system (PASS). The PASS is used to collect post-accident , samples of containment atmosphere and reactor coolant for analysis. Reactor coolant l samples are collected fer boron, radiological, and total dissolved gas measurements. ! Containment atmosphere samples are collected for radiological measurements. The ! PASS may be remotely operated as necessary to reduce persannel radiation exposure. ! The PSS is located within the nuclear island structures. l The Basic Configuration of the PSS is as shown on Figure 2.7.9-1. The ASME Code Section III Class for the PSS pressure retaining components shown i on Figure 2.7.9-1 is as depicted on the Figure. ,
'Ihe safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.9-1 is classified Seismic Category !
O Displays of the PSS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.9-1 exist in the main control I room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to open and close those power operated valves shown on Figure 2.7.9-1. PSS alarms shown on Figure 2.7.9-1 are provided in the MCR. Valves with response positions indicated on Figure 2.7.9-1 change position to that indicated on the Figure upon loss of motive power. ! 1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria l Table 2.7.9-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance l criteria for the Process Sampling System. { O 2.7.9 m-n w 4
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1m y l NOTES:
- 1. THE ASME CODE SECTION MI CLASS 2 COMPONENTS SHOWN ARE SAFETY-RELATED
- 2.
- EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH PARAGRAPH NUMBER 3 OF THE *VERtFICATION FOR BASIC CONFIGURATION FOR SYSTEMS' SECTION OF THE GENERAL *ROVISIONS (SECTION 1.2) APPUES FIGURE 2.7.9-1 """
PROCESS SAMPLING SYSTEM
O O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.7.9-1 l PROCESS SAMPLING SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment laspections. Tests. Ana6ses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the PSS is 1. Inspection of the as-built PSS con- 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.7.9-1. figuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.9-1. the as-built PSS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. He ASME Code Section III PSS 2. A pressure test will be conducted on 2. The results of the pressure test of components shown on Figure 2.7.9-1 those components of the PSS required to ASME Code Section III components of retain their pressure boundary integrity be pre .:re tested by ASME Code the PSS conform with the pressure under internal pressures that will be Section III. testing acceptance criteria in ASME experienced during service. Code Section III.
3.a) Displays of the PSS instrumentation 3.a) Inspection for the existence or 3.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shour. on Figure 2.7.9-1 exist in the retrieveability in the MCR of on Figure 2.7.9-1 exist in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there. performed. 3.b) Controls exist in the MCR to open and 3.b) Testing will be performed using the PSS 3.b) PSS centrols in the MCR operate to close those power operated valves controls in the MCR. open and close those power operated shown on Figure 2.7.9-1. valves shown on Figure 2.7.9-1. 3.c) PSS alarms shown on Figure 2.7.9-1 are 3.c) Testing of the PSS alarms shown on 3.c) He PSS alarms shown on Figure provided in the MCR. Figure 2.7.9-1 will be performed using 2.7.9-1 actuate in the MCR in response signals simulating alarm conditions, to signals simulating alarm conditions. 2.7.9 u.n-u
( O l SYSTEM 80+ TARLE 2.7.9-1 (Continucd) l PROCESS SAMPLING SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 4. Valves with response positions indicated 4. Testing of loss of motive power to these 4. These valves change position to the l_ on Figure 2.7.9-1 change position to valves will be performed. position indicated on Figure 2.7.9-1 on ,
l that indicated on the Figure upon loss of loss of motive power. motive power.
- 5. The PASS can collect samples of reactor 5. Testing of the PASS capability to obtain 5. Samples of reactor coolant and coolant and containment atmosphere. samples will be performed under containment atmosphere are collected by preoperational conditions. the PASS.
4 2.7.9 w,.n-u
SYSTEM 80+" 2.7.10 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEMS Design Description The Compressed Air Systems (CAS) consist of the Instrument Air System (IAS), t Station Air System (SAS), and Breathing Air System (BAS). The IAS supplies compressed air to air-operated instrumentation, air-operated ' controls, and air-operated valves. The Basic Configuration of th: IAS is as shown on Figure 2.7.10-1. IAS air compressors, air receivers, and dryer / filters are located in the nuclear annex. i i The IAS supply lines extend to, and end at, the controller of the connected component. Each IAS air compressor shown on Figure 2.7.10-1 is powered from a permanent non- ! safety bus. A display of the IAS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.10-1 exists in the main O control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. , The SAS supplies compressed air for air-operated tools and for general use in the . plant. The Basic Configuration of the SAS is as shown on Figure 2.7.10-2. The BAS supplies compressed air for breathing protection. The Basic Configuration of the BAS is as shown on Figure 2.7.10-3. The CAS are non-safety-related systems with the exception of the containment penetration isolation valves and piping in between which are covered in Section 2.4.5. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.10-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Compressed Air Systems. 1 0 2.7.10 w n.u 4
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+ OUTS:DE CONTAfMMENT AR COMPRESSOR DRYER 71LTER v
Am RECEfVER FIGURE 2.7.10-1 INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM os.i7 94
O SYSia 80 +" O (V3 O N AIR COMf9ESSOR DRYER 71LTER V AIR HECEfVER m N M MMSSCR DRYER,7ETER I ASWE CODE Ct ASS SECTION m l l ASaIE CODE Ct. ASS SECTOM M l
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N I I N AR CObrPftESSOR BREATMING AIR PUR!FIER AR RECENER N AR ConsPRESSOR BREATHsMGAR PURtFER l V l alwE CODE CLAS$ SECToss m l El ASWE COCE CL AS9 SECTww w l
. au : to RECENER BREATHING AR SUPPLY TO LOCATONS q -
IMSDE CONTAINWENT I W CN INSOE B OUTSOE CONTAINMENT CONTAlseedENT l u BREATHING AmSUPPLY TO PLANT SUILDINGS OUTS @E CONTAMWENT FIGURE 2.7.10-3 BREATHING AIR SYSTEM 00 17-94
t O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.10-1 COMPRESSED AlR SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the I AS is as 1. Inspection of the as-built IAS con- 1. For the components and equipment shown on Figure 2.7.10-1. figuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.10-1, the as-built IAS conforms with the Basic Con-figuration.
- 2. The Basic Configuration of the SAS is 2. Inspection of the as-built SAS 2. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.7.10-2. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.10-2, the as-built SAS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 3. The Basic Configuration of the BAS is 3. Inspection of the as-built BAS 3. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.7.10-3. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.10-3, the as-built BAS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 4. A display of the IAS instmmentation 4. Inspection for the existence or re- 4. A display of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.7.10-1 exists in the trieveability in the MCR of on Figure 2.7.10-1 exists in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be een be retrieved there.
performed.
- 5. The IAS electrical loads shown on 5. Testing will be performed on the IAS by 5. Within the IAS. a test signal exists at Figure 2.7.10-1 are powered from a providing a test signal in the permanent the equipment powered by the permanent non-safety bus. non-safety bus. permanent non-safety bus under test.
2.7.10 u.nm
SYSTEM 80+" 2.7.11 TURBINE BUILDING COOLING WATER SYSTEM Design Description De Turbine Building Cooling Water System (TBCWS) provides cooling water to the non-safety-related turbine plant auxiliary system components. He Basic Configuration of the TBCWS is as shown on Figure 2.7.11-1. The TBCWS is non-safety-related. The TBCWS is a single closed loop cooling water system. The TBCWS has two heat exchangers, two pumps, one surge tank, piping, valves, and controls. The TBCWS is located in the turbine building and yard. The TBCWS transfers heat from turbine building auxiliary system components to the turbine building service water system (TBSWS). Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.11-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Turbine Building Cooling Water System. O b 2.7.11 -I- m n-w
/'
Q SYSTEM 80 +* JL U TBSWS + -- H +- -TBSWS TBcWS SURGE TANK r 3 h V
-y TBSWS + --
HX 4- -TBSWS a =0 U i i pp--g; _ l l HEAT l 1-g ; LOADS g g' uu____: FIGURE 2.7.11-1 S" TURBINE BUILDING COOLING WATER SYSTEM
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.11-1 l TURBINE BUILDING COOLING WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the TBCWS 1. Inspection of the as-built TBCWS 1. For the components and equipment is as shown on Figure 2.7.11-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.11-1, the as-built TBCWS conforms with the Basic i Configuration.
l 2.7.11 -1 ,g ,
SYSTF,M 80+ O 2.7.12 ESSENTIAL CIIILLED WATER SYSTEM Design Description The Essential Chilled Water System (ECWS) is a safety-related closed loop chilled water system that serves safety-related HVAC cooling loads. The ECWS provides chilled water to connected safety-related air handling units. The Basic Configuration of the ECWS is as shown on Figure 2.7.12-1. The essential chilled water (ECW) expansion tanks, ECW pumps, essential chillers, and ECW heat exchangers are located in the nuclear annex. The ECWS consists of two Divisions. Each Division includes a chiller, a heat exchanger, two chilled water pumps, an expansion tank, piping, valves, controls and instrumentation. The ASME Code Section III Class for the ECWS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.7.12-1 is as depicted on the Figure. The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.12-1 is classified Seismic Category I' The Class 1E loads shown on Figure 2.7.12-1 are powered from their respective Class IE Division. The two mechanical Divisions of the ECWS are physically separated. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to start and stop the essential chilled water pumps and essential chiller shown on Figure 2.7.12-1. Independence is provided between Class 1E Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class 1E equipment, in the ECWS. The ECWS is automatically actuated to furnish essential chilled water upon a loss of the normal chilled water system (NCWS). U) 2.7.12 .6-i v.,4
i SYSTEM 80+ Makeup water to the ECWS is supplied by the demineralized water makeup system j (DWMS) A safety-related Seismic Category I makeup line is provided to each Division from the station service water system (SSWS) via a spool piece which can be connected. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.12-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Essential Chilled Water System. r [
' 2.7.12 o6-37. 4
SvSTeb o o l ASME COD E SFCTIO illi CLASS l 3 N STATiOM SERVICE WATER DEMINERALIZED WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM (SSWS) SYSTEM (DWMS) MAKEUP MAKEUP NCWS NCWS ECW EXPANSION TANK I Jk kJ l W v
'~
Nx ECW PUMP ESSENTIAL CHILLER
+
ECW PUMP I SA RELA ED I HVAC COOLING - 3 LOADS FIGURE 2.7.12-1 ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM o,.,,.,, (ONE OF TWO DIVISIONS)
SYS'EM 80+" TABLE 2.7.12-1 ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM InsDections. Tests. Analyses, and AcceDtance Criteria Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria t
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the ECWS is 1. Inspection of the as-built ECWS 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2-.7.12-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.12-1, the as-built ECWS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The ASME Code Section til ECWS 2. A pressure test will be conducted on 2. The results of the pressure test of the components shown on Figure 2.7.12-1 those components of the ECWS required ASME Code Section !!! components of retain their pressure boundary integrity to be pressure tested by ASME Code the ECWS conform with the pressure under intemal pressures that will be Section 111. testing acceptance criteria in ASME ;
experienced during service. Code Section 111. , 3.a) The Class IE loads shown on Figure 3.a) Testing will be performed on the ECWS 3.a) Within the ECWS. a test signal exists 2.7.12-1 are powered from their by providing a test signal in only one only at the equipment powered from the , respective Class IE Division. Class IE Division at a time. Class 12 Division under test. i 3.b) hulependence is provided beturen Class 3.b) Inspection of the as-installed Class 1E 3.b) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions in the ECWS will be IE Divisions in the CCWS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, performed. separation exists between Class IE in the ECWS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the ECWS.
- 4. The two mechanical Divisions of the 4. Inspection of the as-built mechanical 4. The two mechanical divisions of the ECWS are physically separated. Divisions will be performed. ECWS are separated by a Divisional wall or by a fire barrier.
4 2.7.12
- n-w
O O \ SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.12-1 (Continued) ESSENTIAL CIIILLED WATER SYSTEM InsDections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 5. Controls exi;t in the MCR to start and 5. Testing will be performed using the 5. ECWS controls in the MCR operate to stop the essential chilled water pumps ECWS controls in the MCR. start and stop the essential chilled water and essential chiller shown on Figure pumps and essential chiller shown on 2.7.12-1. Figure 2.7.12-1.
- 6. The ECWS is automatically actuated to 6. Testing will be performed using a signal 6. The ECWS is automatically actuated to fumish essential chilled water upon a to simulate loss of the normal chilled furnish essential chilled water upon a loss of the normal chilled water system water system. loss of the NCWS.
(NCWS).
- 7. He spool piece on the SSWS makeup 7. Testing of the spool piece will be 7. The spool piece on the SSWS makeup line to each Division of the ECWS can performed to confirm that it can be line to each Division of the ECWS can be connected. connect:x!. be connected.
2.7.12 2- .n.u
._ . . - . - - . ~ . .- - . -
SYMM 80+ 0 2.7.13 NORMAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM Design Description l With the exception of the Containment penetration isolation valves and piping in between covered in Section 2.4.5, the Normal Chilled Water System (NCWS) is a non-safety-related closed loop chilled water system that serves non-safety-related IIVAC cooling loads. The NCWS provides chilled water to connected air handling units and the essential chilled water heat exchanger. : The Basic Configuration of the NCWS is as shown on Figure 2.7.13-1. r The normal chilled water (NCW) expansion tanks, NCW pumps, and normal chillers are located in the nuclear annex. ; The NCWS consists of two Divisions. Each Division of the NCWS includes two chillers, two chilled water pumps, an expansion tank, piping, valves, controls and instrumentation. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.131 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance O criteria for the Normal Chilled Water System. t l l O' 2.7.13 *nm j
l O , SYST 80+ru U l l O DEMINERAUZED WATER MAKEUP
~ ~
- SYSTEM (DWMS) MAKEUP i
NCW EXPANSION TANK
- v NORMAL l + CHILLER NCW PUMP NORMAL CHILLER
+
NCW PUMP If ECW ! ! I Hx I NON-SAFETY RELATED OUTSIDE INSIDE OADS INSIDE OUTSIDE a
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- EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH PARAGRAPH NUMBER (3)
OF THE ' VERIFICATIONS FOR BASIC CONFIGURATION FIGURE 2.7.13-1 F,OR SYSTEMS OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS NORME CHIRED WATER SYSTN ,, (ONE OF TWO DIVISIONS)
O O O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.7.13-1 NORMAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the NCWS 1. Inspection of the as-built NCWS 1. For the components and equipn.ent is as shown on Figure 2.7.13-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.13-1, the as-built NCWS conforms with the Basic
, Configuration. l l l l l l 1 2.7.13 os.nm
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I 1 i SYSTEM 80+" O 2.7.14 TURBINE BUILDING SERVICE WATER SYSTEM ] 1 l Design Description l l The Turbine Building Service Water System (TBSWS) removes heat from the turbine ; building cooling water system (TBCWS) and transfers heat to the condenser circulating water system. The Basic Configuration of the TBSWS is as shown on Figure 2.7.14-1. The TBSWS is non-safety-related. The TBSWS has two pumps and associated piping, valves, and controls which provide cooling water to the TBCWS heat exchangers. The TBSWS is located in the-yard. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria i Table 2.7.14-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Turbine Building Service Water System. O l i i i e T 2.7.14 1 g.,
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- a. .a
SYST 80 + 0 TBCWS I J r r - - I, , m I I TBCWS I I I _RMAL__I NO -
~
[] I i LL___JJ HX l l LHEA{ _ SINK 1 CONDENSER I CIRCULATING I i WATER l l SYSTEM g II-- 77 m I I TBCWS I I INORMAL I m k - ~~
^
l_____ HEAT SINKI n TBCWS I FIGURE 2.7.14-1 TURBINE BUILDING SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 06-17-94
p gg
- b. 'd V SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.14-1 TURHINE BUILDING SERVICE WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. He Basic Configuration of the Turbine 1. Inspection of the as-built TBSWS 1. For the components and equipment Building Service Water System configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.14-1, the as-built (TBSWS) is as shown on Figure TBSWS confbrms with the Basic 2.7.14-1. Configuration.
2.7.14 % n.,4
i i l SYSTEM 80+" ! O 2.7.15 EQUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEM l Design Description ; The Equipment and Floor Drainage System (EFDS) segregates and transports liquids l containing wastes to the liquid waste management system (LWMS). The EFDS has .
- components in the nuclear island structures, the turbine building and the radwaste building.
The Basic Configuration of the EFDS is as shown on Figure 2.7.15-1. ' Die ASME Code ! Section Ill Class 2 and 3 components shown on Figure 2.7.15-1 are safety-related. The equipment and floor drains are separated into equipment drains, floor drains, chemical waste drains, and detergent waste drains. Liquid wastes are routed to the > LWMS subsystem that processes the particular waste type. ; i Nonradioactive equipment and floor drains are not connected to radioactive or potentially radioactive equipment and floor drains. , i Floor drains in the nuclear snnex (NA) are physically separated into two Divisions and there are no common drain lines between Divisions. Floor tirains in the reactor building l (RB) subsphere are physically separated into quadrants (two in each Division) and there are no common floor drain lines between quadrants. l Within Containment, the EFDS has no direct downward gravity flowpaths that will allow ! the release of radioactive material. The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.15-1 is classified Seismic Category ;
- 1. l l
i The Class IE loads shown on Figure 2.7.15-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E Division, i Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions ; and non-Class IE equipment, in the EFDS. i The turbine building floor drain sump is equipped with a radiation detection instrument. ! If radioactivity is detected in the turbine building floor drain sump, the sump discharge i is automatically terminated and can be routed to the LWMS. ' i f i
- 2.7.15 wu l
i SYSTEM 80+" J The ASME Section III Class for the EFDS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.7.15-1 is as depicted on the Figure. Displays of EFDS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.15-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.15-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Equipment and Floor Drainage System. o 2.7.15 Siv. 4 l l
o g n b V V SYSTEM 80+" tNWDE CONTAmedENT OUTSsof CO*f7AiNNENT N#GH RADIATION SIGNAL g
" N#
. l ,e
- HIGH P*11AT10N SIGNAL FL RAM ER CVCS EQUIPMENT r (RADCACTTVE LnUtos) y DRAM MEADER 3 ["Q r irt*R
- mAWaung . . . . . . . . . . p.PC Pc pFLOORDRAIN g NUCtEAR annex CVCs AREA FLOOR mEhg w TANK _, , floor DRAM MEADER r DRAfMME/ DER v
Civ crW 3 f0NEADIOACTfVE LfQUIDSg p .ce...Eeu 1 '
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p, 8 NUCLEAR ANNEX PLOOR ORAM CAVITY REACTOR BLDO. DIESEL GENER ATOR CWS ARE A CVCS SUMP SUMP lg SUBSPHERE MONRADiCACTIVE BUILDINa E3 etOOR DR Am EQUIPMENT GuADRANT PLOOR DRAM PtooR DRAW DRAW SUMP SUMP (oNE g PLOOR DR AW SUMP SUMP (ONE SUMP SUMP (ONE SUMP NUCLEAR ANNEX SUMP PER (ONE SUMP PER NE SUMP PER PER DMSION. PER DtVISION- RADIOACTIVE DMSION. 4 DMStON-4 PUMPS S PHE 4 PUMPS TOTAL) 4 PUMPS TOTA 4 TOTAL) PLOOR DRAW SUMP PUMPS TOTAL) e TOTAy flVISION-4 PUMPS NOTE
- 1. % EOUTPMENT FOR WHtCH PARAGRAPH NUMBER (3) OF THE
*VERTFICATION FOR 9 ASIC CONFM8URATION FOR SYSTEneS* OF THE GENERAL PROVf9908tS (GECT10801.f) APPUES.
- 2. THE SAFETYJtELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIP 8sENT IS CLASS 1E.
FIGURE 2.7.15-1 EQUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEM os-17-s4
s J pJ SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.7.15-1 EOUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEM Insocctions. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1.a) The Basic Configuration of the EFDS is 1.a) Inspection of the as-built EFDS 1.a) For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.7.15-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.15-1, the as-built EFDS conforms with the Basic Configuration. l.h) Displays of the EFDS instrumentation 1.b) Inspection for the existence or 1.b) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.7.151 exist in the retrievability in the MCR of on Figure 2.7.15-1 exist in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieve there. instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there. performed.
- 2. The ASME Code Section III EFDS 2. A pressure test will be conducted on 2. The results of the pressure test of components shown on Figure 2.7.15-1 those components of the EFDS required ASME Code Section ill components of retain their pressure boundary integrity to be pressure tested b} ASME Code the EFDS conform with the pressure under intemal pressures that will be Section III. testing acceptance criteria in ASME experienced during service. Code Section III.
- 3. The equipment and floor drains are 3. Inspection of the EFDS will be 3. Equipment drain liquid waste, floor separated into equipment drains, floor performed. drain liquid waste, chemical liquid drains, chemical waste drains, and waste, and detergent liquid waste are detergent waste drains. Liquid wastes transported through separate piping to are routed to the LWMS subsystem that the LWMS subsystem that processes that processes the particular waste type. waste type.
- 4. Nonradioactive equipment and floor 4. Inspection of the EFDS will be 4. Nonradioactive equipment and floor drains are not connected to radioactive performed. drains are not connected to radioactive or potentially radioactive equipment and or potentially radioactive equipment and floor drains. floor drains.
2.7.15 os.iv.,4
O O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.7.15-1 (Continued) EOUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desian Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 5.a) Floor drains in the NA are physically 5.a) Inspection of the EFDS will be 5.a) The floor drains in the NA are separated separated into two Divisions and there performed. by a Divisional wall and have no are no common drain lines between common drain lines between Divisions. Divisions. 5.b) Floor drains in the RB subsphere are 5.b) Inspection of the EFDS will be 5.b) The EFDS RB subsphere floor drains in physically separated into quadrants (two performed, each quadrant of the RB subsphere are in each Division) and there are no separated by walls and have no common common floor drain lines between drain lines between quadrants. quadrants.
- 6. Within Containment, the EFDS has no 6. Inspection of the EFDS will be 6. Within Containment, no direct direct gravity downward flowpath that performed. downward flowpath that would allow the
^
will allow the release of radioactive release of radioactive material exists. material. 7.a) The Class 1E loads shown on Figure 7.a) Testing will be performed on the EFDS 7.a) Within the EFDS, a test signal exists 2.7.15-1 are powered from their by providing a test signal in only one only at the equipment powered from the respective Class IE Division. Class 1E Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. 7.b) Independence is provided between Class 7.b) Inspection of the as-installed Class 1E 7.i.; Physical separation exists between Class 1E Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions of the EFDS will be IE Divisions in the EFDS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, performed. separation exists between Class IE in the EFDS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the EFDS. 2.7.15 iv.,4
O O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.7.15-1 (Continued) , EOUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAG' AGE SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and AcceDiance Criteria Desian Comrnitment Insocctions. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 8.a) The turbine building floor drain sump is 8.a) Inspection of the turbine building floor 3.a) A radiation detection instniment is equipped with a radiation detection drain sump will be performed. installed. instrument. 8.b) If radioactivity is detected in the turbine 8.b) Testing of the flow termination from the 8.b) In response to a signal that simulates building floor drain sump, the sump turbine building floor drain sump will be radioactivity in the turbine building floor discharge is automatically terminated performed using a signal that simulates drain sump, the sump discharge is and can be routed to the LWMS. radiation in the sump. automatically terminated. 2.7.15 m.n.u
I f l SYSTEM 80+"
- O 2.7.16 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM l Design Description i'
The Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) maintains the required volume of water in the reactor coolant system (RCS) (in conjunction with the pressurizer l level control system), removes noble gases from the RCS, and permits addition of ? chemicals for primary coolant chemistry control. The CVCS removes coolant water j from the RCS, passes the coolant water through filters and ion exchangers, adds or i removes soluble boron from the coolant, provides backup spray water to the i pressurizer, provides cooling water to the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals, collects controlled RCP seal bleedoff, provides water to the spent fuel pool, and returns water to the RCS. The CVCS is a non-safety-related system except for portions of the t system which form part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, which are safety- - related. The Basic Configuration of the CVCS is as shown on Figure 2.7.16-1. Components shcwn on the Figure are located in the nuclear island structures. t The CVCS includes pumps, valves, tanks, heat exchangers, ion exchangers, piping, . , instrumentation, and controls. i Flow limiting orifices are provided in the letdown line. t The ASME Code Section III Class for the CVCS pressure retaining components ; shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 is as depicted on the Figure. The safety-related equipment ' shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 is classified Seismic Category I. Pressure retaining components in the charging pump suction line from the check valve to the pumps I have a design pressure of at least 900 psig. l Displays of the CVCS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. i Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the charging pumps and the dedicated seal injection pump, and to open and close those power operated valves shown on i Figure 2.7.16-1. ; CVCS alarms are provided as shown on Figure 2.7.16-1. The dedicated seal injection pump receives Class 1E power. Each ASME Code Section III Class 1 letdown line isolation valve is powered from a different Class IE Division. O 2.7.16 m.n.u
I
\
l SYSTEM 80+" Motor operated valves (MOVs) having an active safety function will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under differential pressure or fluid flow conditions and under temperature conditions. Check valves shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under system pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. Valves with response positions indicated on Figure 2.7.16-1 change position to that indicated on the Figure upon loss of motive power. The letaown line is isolated by a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS). The RCP cont2olled bleedoff line is isolated by a containment spray actuation signal (CSAS). An interlock is provided so that no more than one charging pump is operating at a time. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.16-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Chemical and Volume Control System. (a O) ( 2.7.16 05 7.,4 l l l
/^)
V O
'd SYSTEM INSIDE OUTSIDE CONTAtNMENT CONTAINMENT g HtGM PRE %SURE SIGhAL LETDOWN * * *P * **
a
* ~
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gg ExCHANGERS PCTE 4) gg y CIV CCWS -- -s-s P 1 C,mRai G COLD LEG g PCS) I
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---- --- .- ,,,;g,gr CHEMICAL RESSURE A
O {g ADDfTION UNf7 MtGH g P,gggg AUX!LtARY : O PTR g g
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* ;""'e~cA>'*'I S
ti ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
+ REACTOR DRAIN HEADER " BORCN RECOVERY AND RECYCLE N
D N N( -->. RCGVS (SDS) = == = = & 5 (NOTE 4) + EO 3 " " ED M FROM REACTOR - a
+ Civ MAKEUP WATER
+
EB NO'ES:
- 1. HE AS COO ECT CLASS 1 AND 2 PRESSURE RETAINING COMPONENTS
- 2. THE DEDCATED SEAL INJECTION PUMP AND THE ASME CODE SECTON W CLASS 1 LETDOWN LINE ISOLATON VALVES RECENE CLASS 1E POWER.
- 3.
- EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH PARAGRAPM NUMBER 3 OP THE *VERIFICATONS POR BASIC CONFIGURATON FOR SYSTEMS
- SECTON OP THE GENERAL PROVISONS (SECTION 1.2) APPLIES.
- 4. 90 PONENTS WITHIN THESE SUBSYSTEMS ARE NO%ASME CODE SECTON S. T g==,E,SECTC,. . CUSS . A.C SHEu m SCE . AS"' FIGURE 2.7.16-1 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM . T.
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.16-1 CIIEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. AnalVses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Osts. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the CVCS is 1. Inspection of the as-built CVCS 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.7.16-1. configuration will be conducted, shown on Figure 2.7.16-1, the as-built CVCS conforms with the Basic Con-figuration.
- 2. The ASME Code Section III CVCS 2. A pressure test will be conducted on 2. The results of the pressure test of components shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 those components of the CVCS required ASME Code Section III components of retain their pressure boundary integrity to be pressure tested by ASME Code the CVCS conform with the pressure under internal pressures that will be Section III. testing acceptance criteria in ASME experienced during service. Code Section III.
3.a) Displays of CVCS instmmentation 3.a) Inspection for the existence or retriev- 3.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 exist in the ability in the MCR of instrumentation on Figure 2.7.16-1 exist in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieved there. displays will be performed. can be retrieved there. 3.b) Controls exist in the MCR to start and 3.b) Testing will be performed using the 3.b) CVCS controls in the MCR operate to stop the charging pumps and the CVCS controls in the MCR. start and stop the charging pumps and dedicated seal injection pump, and to the dedicated seal injection pump, and to open and close those power operated open and close those power-operated valves shown on Figure 2.7.16-1. valves shown on Figure 2.7.16-1. 3.c) CVCS alarms shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 3.c) Testing of the CVCS alarms shown on 3.c) The CVCS alarms shown on Figure are provided as shown on the Figure. Figure 2.7.16-1 will be performed using 2.7.16-1 actuate in response to signals signals simulating alarm conditions. simulating alarm conditions. 2.7.16 o6.i7,4
m m SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.16-1 (Continued) CIIEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Desitn Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 4.a) The dedicated seal injection pump 4.a) Testing will be performed on the CVCS 4.a) A test signal exists at the CVCS receives Class IE power. by providing a test signal in the Class component powered from the Class IE lE Division which supplies power to the Division under test. dedicated seal injection pump. 4.b) Each ASME Code Section ill Class 1 4.b) Testing will be performed on the CVCS 4.b) A test signal exists only at the CVCS letdown line isolation valve is powered by providing a test signal in only one component powered from the Class !E from a different Class IE Division. Class IE Division at a time. Division under test.
- 5. Valves with response positions indicated 5. Testing of loss of motive power to these 5. These valves change position to the on Figure 2.7.16-1 change position to valves will be performed. position indicated on Figure 2.7.16-1 on that indicated on the Figure upon loss of loss of motive power.
motive power. 6.a) The letdown line is isolated by a safety 6.a) Testing will be performed using a signal 6.a) The two CVCS letdown isolation valves injection actuation e,ignal (SIAS). simulating an SIAS. inside containment close upon receipt of a signal simulating an SIAS. 6.b) The RCP seal contrclied bleedoff line is 6.b) Testing will be performed using a signal 6.b) The RCP seat controlled bleedoff line isolated by a containment spray simulating a CSAS. ' isolation valves close upon receipt of a actuation signal (CSAS). signal simulating a CSAS.
- 7. An interlock is provided so that no more 7. Testing will be performed by attempting 7. The idle charging pump will not start than me charging pump is operating at to start each charging pump frort the when the other pump is running.
a time. MCR with the other pump running. 2.7.16 w.n-u
O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.16-1 (Continued) CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM : Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 8. Motor operated valves (MOVs) having 8. Testing will be performed to open, or 8. Each MOV having an active safety an active safety function will open, or close, or open and also close, MOVs function opens, or closes, or opens and will close, or will open and also close, having an active safety function under also closes, under differential pressure or fluid flow preoperational differential pressure or conditions and under temperature fluid flow conditions and under conditions, temperature conditions.
- 9. Check valves shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 9. Testing will be performed to open, or 9. Each check valve shown on Figure will open, or will close, or will open close, or open and also close, check 2.7.16-1, opens, or closes, or opens and and also close, under system pressure, valves shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 under also closes.
fluid flow conditions, or temperature system preoperational pressure, fluid conditions. flow conditions, or temperature conditions.
- 10. Flow limiting orifices are provided in 10. Inspection of the as-built letdown 10. Each letdown line flow limiting orifice the letdown line. orifices will be performed. has a cross-sectional area not greater than 0.01556 square feet.
2.7.16 os.i7.,4
SYS'MM 80+" 2.7.17 CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM Design Description The Control Complex Ventilation System (CCVS) maintains environmental conditions within the control complex areas in the nuclear annex. The CCVS consists of(a) the main control room air conditioning system (MCRACS) and the technical support center air conditioning system (TSCACS), and (b) the - balance of the control complex air conditioning systems. a) The Basic Configuration of the MCRACS and the TSCACS is as shown on Figure 2.7.17-1. The safety-related components of the MCRACS and the TSCACS are as indicated on the Figure. The MCRACS consists of two Divisions. Each Division has an outside air intake, louver, tornado dampers, dampers, filtration unit, air conditioning with fan, ducting, instrumentation, and controls. The TSCACS receives outside air from the MCRACS air intake ducts ; and has a filtration unit and an air conditioning unit. Each outside air intake has a minimum of two redundant isolation ;
~
dampers, at least one detector to detect the products of combustion, two radiation detection monitors, and a tornado damper. The air intake isolation dampers close upon receipt of a signal indicating the detection of smoke. The smoke isolation signals can be . manually overridden to open the isolation dampers from the main control room (MCR). Upon detection of radiation in the outside air intakes, the air intake isolation dampers in the air intake having the higher radiation level i close automatically. The air intake isolation dampers in the other air ' intake line remain open. After hitial actuation of the air intake isolation dampers, the air inttke isolation dampers realign automatically, such that the air intake having the lower radiation level opens before the isolation dampers in the air intake line having a higher radiation level close. The air intake isolation dampers can be manually controlled from the MCR. I Each MCR filtration unit and the technical support center (TSC) - filtration unit remove particulate matter and iodine. l 0-2.7.17 e6.i7.,4 i
I l I l c SYSTEM 80+" l The MCR is maintained at a positive pressure with respect to adjacent l areas. l The TSC can be pressurized with respect to adjacent areas. The designated MCR filtration unit starts automatically and the MCR air conditioning unit starts or continues to operate, if running, on receipt of a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) or a high radiation signal. In addition, the dampers in the MCR circulation lines and the bypass lines reposition to establish the flow path through the MCR filtration units. b) Tne Basic Configuration of the balance of the CCVS is as shown on Tigures 2.7.17-2 and 2.7.17-3. The safety-related portions of the balance of the CCVS are as shown on the Figures. The CCVS serves the following safety-related areas: essential electrical equipment rooms, vital instrumentation and equipment rooms, battery rooms, and the remote shutdown panel room. The CCVS serves the following non-safety related areas: the operation support center, non-essential electrical rooms, computer rooms, non-m safety battery rooms and other non-essential areas within the control complex. Each battery room has an exhaust fan taking suction near the battery room ceiling. Hydrogen detection devices are installed in the battery rooms. Smoke removal is accomplished with the smoke purge fans. The CCVS equipment shown on Figures 2.7.17-1,2.7.17-2, and 2.7.17-3 is classified seismic Category I except as noted on the Figures. Safety-related components of the CCVS are Class 1E. The Class 1E loads shown on Figures 2.7.17-1,2.7.17-2 and 2.7.17-3 are powered from their respective Class 1E Division. The two MCRACS air intake isolation dampers in a Division are powered frorn different Class 1E buses. Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions, and between Class 1E Divisions and non-Class 1E equipment, in the CCVS. O O 2.7.17 e6.it.,4
n SYSTEM 80+" b The active components of the two mechanical Divisions of the CCVS are physically separated. Displays of the CCVS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.17-1 exist in the MCR or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the MCR filtration units and air conditioning units, and the TSC filtration unit and air conditioning unit, and to open and close those power operated isolation dampers shown on Figures 2.7.17-1,2.7.17-2, and 2.7.17-3. Components with response positions indicated on Figure 2.7.17-1 change position to that indicated on the Figure upon loss of motive power. The leakage through MCRACS intake ductwork is less than the maximum allowable for the associated design. The fire dampers in the CCVS HVAC ductwork can close under design air flow conditions. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria: p/ s Table 2.7.17-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Control Complex Ventilation System. O k) 2.7.17 o.;-iv ,4
I
,s 1
SYSTE 80+ DIVISION 2 I l DIVISION 1 (v) l T "" ^ ' g- - - AIR OUTLET
, UP RT CE ER ,
l ik , u i JL TSC FILTRATION h j w g UNff AND At l gg NOTE 1g UNIT
**
- HIGH RADIATION SIGNAL ! b" h j( -
- H1GH RADIATION SIGNAL i * * * - SMOKE DETECTOR SIGNAL Ik l
- SMOKE DETECTOR SIGNAL E I.U-LJ LhDI2 ec
. rc g NOTE 1 NOTE 1 FC LOUVER LOUVER R SD $ SD R n OUTSIDE AIR INTAKE + ]-g ( s ff E s x
( k etNTAKE OUTSIDE AIR K S - F s
" " s /-
h N s 1 3 -
/
TORNADO TORNADO DA ER D P8 9 DIVISIONALWALL+ g, m, If I
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( if
* * * * - - SIAS j( } gigg ,, , ,,
* * * *
- HtGH RADtATION SIGNAL HIGH RADIATION SIGNAL a -
s_ N ( }........
. ' . . s-s s
s
,x P, ,
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'-+- *-
FC FC s FC FC Q ], NC O O; " ' [_ s_. FILTRATION i UNIT s
,', s UNIT -N'u FILTRATION UNIT -s-s 3r x UNIT l .
' 7 I Y
f, h Y I f, FO 1 ESSENTIAL ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER SYSTEM, CHILLED WATER SYSTEM, NOTES: CONTROL ROOM
- 1. NON SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS.
- 2. SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IS CLASS 1E.
FIGURE 2.7.17-1 CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM ~"~ (MCRACS AND TSCACS)
eveTefmTM o o SAFETY RELATED AND SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 NON-SAFETY-RELATED AND NON-SEISMIC CATEGORY 1
, - TO ATMOSPHERE ALAk Al l y- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .I e ELECTRICAL y AREAS SERVED BY NON- s. ROOM SMOKE OUTSIDE h -
ESSENTIAL RECIRCULATING I PURGE FAN hW AIR > \ -'
/
g
? I A/C UNITS, FOR EXAMPLE,
- t. g NON-ESSENTIAL ELECTRICAL l ROOMS, COMPUTER ROOM, I LOUVER NOTE 2 ,c,,
g l NON-SAFETY BATTERY ROOM, oauren l l CASUALTY AND SECURITY ROOM ; , T - SUBSPHERE l " ! VENTILATION SYSTEM i---------- E"E""
- - - - -1 y--------.
AREAS SERVED BY I ESSENTIAL RECIRCULATING A/C 1 [ UNITS, FOR EXAMPLE, y ESSENTIAL ELECTRICAL I ROOMS, I l VITAL INSTRUMENT AND g NOTES: EQUIPMENT ROOMS FOR y! CHANNELS A AND C, isW NOTE 3
- 1. REMOTE SHUTDOWN ROOM HAS A l REMOTE SHUTDOWN ROOM (NOTE 1) g REDUNDANT COOLING UNIT AND BATTERY ROOMS RECEIVING CHILLED WATER AND I '
, menoaan
"""" i CLASS 1E POWER FROM DIVISION 2. l / - '
g?
- 2. DAMPER TO BE CLOSED DURING / :
I 3. TORNADO WARNING SMOKE PURGE LINES AND DOWN l ommu,u,,,, ,o,
""" "' M_
n ,
"o*.'%"^=" I m STREAM COMPONENTS ARE NON- t uenon.n!
SAFETY-RELATED AND NON-SEISMIC I -
; "^""" ! =
CATEGORY 1. l ,
- 4. SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL .-----------------
EQUIPMENT IS CLASS 1E. FIGURE 2.7.17-2 CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM os-u.94 (BALANCE OF CCVS-DIVISION 1)
. SYST 80+ SAFETY RELATED AND SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 I NON-SAFETY-RELATED AND NON-SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 4 TO ATMOSPHERE g i JL ll il [
, ELECTRICAL OUTSIDE ROOM SMOKE
, , f l [ d AIR O / / -' URGE FAN l ; l AREAS SERVED BY NON- 4
/
; /
ESSENTIAL RECIRCULATING I \ LOUVER NOTE 1 l l A/C UNITS, FOR EXAMPLE, l t NON-ESSENTIAL ELECTRICAL *^*"Ta" o.. : I I ROOMS, AND NON-SAFETY I ' 7 l l BATTERY ROOM - / , I I ,J:'ry 7m; I I I l NON-SAFEW-RELATED I AREAS, FOR EXAMPLE, I , SUBSPHERE l N'$7' s "II PERSONNEL ROOMS, BREAK ROOM, DECONTAMINATION I SHIFT ASSEMBLY OFFICES l OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER, ,,,, l . AND RADIATION ACCESS '^" TO ( g$""' i _______________
' ^ """"""
NOTES: I g OTE2
- 1. DAMPER TO BE CLOSED l , l DURING TORNADO WARNING. > sacxoaart
- 2. SMOKE PURGE LINES AND DOWN l AREAS SERVED BY -
; "^""" ! = ;
i STREAM COMPONENTS ARE NON- ESSENTIAL RECIRCULATING z SAFETY-RELATED AND NON-SEISMIC l A/C UNITS, FOR EXAMPLE, mau r ; *^LT o l _ CATEGORY 1. IESSENTIAL ELECTRICAL sartwnoo - I
- 3. SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL ROOMS, VITALINSTRUMENT $ _,, ;
EQUIPMENT IS CLASS 1E. l AND EQUIPMENT ROOMS / -- 7 1FOR CHANNELS B AND D, l l t^"? 8A"_ERY R00MS, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ " _ _ _ FIGURE 2.7.17-3 CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM 06-17-9 0 (BALANCE OF CCVS-DIVISION 2)
3 SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.17-1 CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the 1. Inspection of the as-built MCRACS and 1. For the components and equipment MCRACS and TSCACS is as shown on TSCACS configuration will be shown on Figure 2.7.17-1, the as-built Figure 2.7.17-1. conducted. MCRACS and TSCACS conform with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The Basic Configuration of the balance 2. Inspection of the balance of the as-built 2. For the components and equipment of the CCVS is as shown on Figures CCVS will be conducted. shown on Figures 2.7.17-2 and 2.7.17-2.7.17-2 and 2.7.17-3. 3, the balance of the as-built CCVS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 3. The CCVS maintains environmental 3. Testing will be performed on the CCVS 3. The CCVS controls the temperature to:
conditions within the control complex to measure room temperatures and areas in the nuclear annex. analyses will be performed to convert 3.a) less than 85'F in the MCR. test data to limit temperatures. 3.b) between 60*F and 90*F in the battery rooms. 3.c) less than or equal to 104*F in mechanical equipment rooms. 3.d) less than or equal to 85*F in other areas of the control complex. I i l i I l l l 2.7.17 m-n-u I l
. - , . - - -- ~-. - - - . - - - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ -
O C O SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.7.17-1 (Continued) CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 4.a) The MCR outside air intake isolation 4.a) Testing will be conducted on each MCR 4.a) Each isolation damper closes upon dampers close upon receipt of a signal outside air intake isolation damper using receipt of a signal simulating the indicating the detection of smoke. a signal that simulates the detection of detection of smoke in the associated air smoke in the associated air intake. intake. 4.b) Smoke isolation signals can be manually 4.b) Testing will be performed to simulate 4.b) With simulated smoke damper isolation overridden to open the isolation dampers smoke isolation signals and verify that signal present, isolation dampers may be from the MCR. the isolation dampers may be manually manually opened from the MCR. opened from the MCR.
- 5. Upon detection of radiation in the 5. Testing will be performed on the 5. Upon detection of radiation in the outside air intakes, the air intake MCRACS isolation dampers using outside air intakes, the air intake isolation dampers in the air intake signals that simulate radiation levels in isolation dampers in the air intake having the higher radiation level close the outside air intakes. having the higher radiation level close automatically. The air intake isolation automatically. The air intake isolation dampers in the other air intake line dampers in the other air intake line remain open. After initial actuation of remain open. After initial actuation of the air intake isolation dampers, the air the air intake isolation dampers, the air intake isolation dampers realign intake isolation dampers realign automatically, such that the air intake automatically, such that the air intake having the lower radiation level opens having the lower radiation level opens before the isolation dampers in the air before the isolation dampers in the air intake line having a higher radiation intake line having a higher radiation level close. The air intake isolation level close. The air intake isolation dampers can be manually controlled dampers can be manually ' controlled from the MCR. from the MCR.
2.7.17 u.im
m m 5 SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.7.17-1 (Continued) CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 6. Each MCR filtration unit and the TSC 6. Testing and analysis will be performed 6. The MCR and TSC filter efficiencies filtration unit remove particulate matter on each MCR filtration unit and the are greater than or equal to 95% for all and iodine. TSC filtration unit to determine filter forms of non-particulate iodine and efficiencies. greater than or equal to 99 % for particulate matter greater than 0.3 micron.
- 7. The MCR is maintained at a positive 7. Testing and analysis will be performed 7. The MCR is pressurized to at least pressure with respect to the adjacent on the MCRACS. 0.125 inches of water gauge relative to areas, the adjacent areas with outside air supply no more than 2000 CFM and a recirculation flow of at least 4000 CFM.
- 8. The TSC can be pressurized with 8. Testing will be performed on the TSC. 8. The TSC can be maintained at a positive respect to the adjacent areas. pressure with respect to the adjacent areas except for the MCR.
- 9. The designated MCR filtration unit 9. Testing will be performed on the MCR 9. The MCR filtration units and MCR air starts automatically and the MCR air filtration units, MCR air conditioning conditioning units start on receipt of a conditioning unit starts or continues to units, and dampers using a signal that signal that simulates a SIAS,or a signal operate, if running, on receipt of a simulates a safety injection actuation that simulates high radiation,and safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) signal (SIAS). The testing will be dampers reposition to establish the flow or a high radiation signal. In addition, repeated for a signal that simulates a path through the MCR filtration units.
the dampers in the MCR circulation high radiation signal. lines and the bypass lines reposition to r establish the flow path through the MCR filtration units. l l l 2.7.17 os-tv.,4 l l l
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.17-1 (Continued) CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM InsDeClions. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 10.a) Each battery room has an exhaust fan 10.a) Inspection of the battery rooms will be 10.a) An exhaust fan is installed in each taking suction near. the battery room performed- battery room, and its suction duct is ceiling. located near the ceiling. 10.b) llydrogen detection devices are installed 10.b) Inspection for hydrogen detection 10.b) Hydrogen detection devices are in the battery rooms. devices in the battery rooms will be installed. performed. I1.a) He Class IE loads shown on Figures 11.a) Testing will be performed on the CCVS 11.a) Within the CCVS, a test signal exists 2.7.17-1, 2.7.17-2 and 2.7.17-3 are by providing a test signal in only one only at the equipment powered from the powered from their respective Class IE Class IE Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. Division II b) The two MCRACS air intake isolation ll.b) Testing will be performed on the air ll.b) Within the MCRACS Division, a test dampers in a Division are powered from intake isolation dampers in each signal exist., only at the air intake different Class IE buses. MCRACS Division by providing a test isolation damper powered from the signal in only one Class IE bus at a Class IE bus under test. time. I1.c) Independence is provided between Class 11.c) Inspection of the as-installed Class 1E I1.c) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions in the CCVS will be IE Divisions in the CCVS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, performed. separation exists between Class IE in the CCVS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the CCVS.
- 12. He active components of the two 12. Inspection of as-built mechanical 12. The active components of the two mechanical divisions of the CCVS are separations will be conducted. CCVS Divisions are separated by a physically sepamted. Divisional Wall.
2.7.17 m.n-u _ _ - _ _ _ ___ _ _ . _ . .. - . . . . . ~ . - - - -. - --- - .
i i SYSTEM 80+" TAHLE 2.7.17-1 (Continued) CONTROL COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 13.a) Displays of the CCVS instrumentation 13.a) Inspection for the existence or 13.a) Display of the instrumentation shown on shown on Figure 2.7.17-1 exist in the retrieveability in the MCR of Figure 2.7.17-1 exist in the MCR or can MCR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be be retrieved there. performed. 13.b) Controls exist in the MCR to start and 13.b) Tests will be performed using the CCVS 13.b) CCVS controls in the MCR operate to stop the MCR filtration units and the controls in the MCR. start and stop the MCR filtration units TSC filtration unit, and to open and and the TSC filtration unit and air close the isolation dampers shown on conditioning unit, and to open and close Figures 2.7.17-1, 2.7.17-2 and 2.7.17- the power operated isolation dampers
- 3. shown on Figures 2.7.17-1, 2.7.17-2 and 2.7.17-3.
- 14. Components with response positions 14 Testing of loss of motive power to these 14. These components change position to the indicated on Figure 2.7.17-1 change components will be performed. position indicated on Figure 2.7.17-1 on position to that indicated on the figure loss of motive power.
upon loss of motive power.
- 15. The leakage through MCRACS intake 15. The ductwork will be pressure tested for 15. Analysis of the dose to the control room ductwork is less than the maximum leakage. Analysis of the dose to the operators due to the measured leakage allowable for the associated design. MCR operators due to the measured exists and concludes that the leakage leakage will be performed. through ductwork is less than the maximum allowable for the associated design.
- 16. The fire dampers in the CCVS HVAC 16. A type test will be perfonned to 16. A test and analysis report exists that ductwork can close under design air demonstrate that the dampers can close concludes the fire dampers can close flow conditions, under design air flow conditions. under design air flow conditions.
2.7.17 os-it-,4
SYSTEM 80+" /s 1 2.7.18 FUEL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM Design Description The Fuel Building Ventilation System (FBVS) provides ventilation, heating, and cooling to the fuel handling and fuel storage areas located in the nuclear annex. The Basic Configuration of the FBVS is as shown en Figure 2.7.18-1. The FBVS has a non-safety-related air supply subsystem and a safety-related air exhaust subsystem. The FBVS has one air supply subsystem and two Divisions of air exhaust. The air supply subsystem has an air supply unit, a fan, dampers, ductwork, instrumentation, and controls. Each Division of air exhaust has a filtration unit, a fan, dampers, ductwork, instrumentation, and controls. The filtration unit in each FBVS air exhaust Division removes particulate matter. Each Division of air exhaust has the capability to maintain the fuel handling and fuel storage areas of the nuclear annex at a negative pressure relative to the atmosphere. The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.18-1 is classified Seismic Category I.
,m
( T The Class 1E loads shown on Figure 2.7.18-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E Division. Independence is provided between Class 1E Divisions, and between Class 1E Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, in the FBVS. The active components of the two mechanical Divisions of the FBVS air exhaust subsystem are physically separated. Displays of the FBVS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.18-1 exist in the main ; control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the FBVS air supply unit, fans, and ! filtration units, and to open and close the power operated dampers shown on Figure , 2.17.18-1. 1 l In response to a high radiation signal, tne FBVS air exhaust bypass dampers close and ) the filtration unit dampers open to dacct flow through the filtration units. l l l wJ 2.7.18 .6.iv-,4
I SYSTEM 80+ %d The exhaust and supply fans can be used for smoke removal. The fire dampers in HVAC ductwork close under design air flow conditions. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.18-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Fuel Building Ventilation System. O l l 2.7.18 .6-i t.,4
(G) SYSTEM 64'" f'
. . . "P"."^?"TPN,9G8lAL, , , ,
THE EXHAUST SUSSYSTEM IS SAFETY-RELATED *
- UNLESS IDENTIFIED OTHERWISE . e STATUS a
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4
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s _ _= s II g EXHAUST a
=
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= : = l AIR EXHAUST SUBSYSTEM . . . M"".""?" " *Y . . . E Q status #
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AIR ? ' I _oE m W- ' - SUPPLY O um NOTE 1 THE SUPPLY SUBSYSTEM 15 NON, SAFETY-RELATED. NOTE 3 AIR SUPPLY SUBSYSTEM FUEL HANDUNG AN F LSTORAGE AREAS L__.___I NOTES: r
- 1. THE DUCTWORK FROM TH9 BUILDING EXIT UP TO AND INCLUDING THE ISOLATION DAMPER IS f OUAUFIED FOR THE TORNADO DIFFERENTIAL I PRESSURE. l
- 2. THE ELECTRICAL LOADS SHOWN FOR THE AIR EXHAUST SUBSYSTEM ARE CLASS 1E.
}
- 3. THE RADIATION DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION IS NON-SAFETY-RELATED. { }* *}
FUEL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM - T-
O C O SYSTEM 804 " TABLE 2.7.18-1 FUEL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM InsDections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the FBVS is 1. Inspection of the as-built FBVS 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figures 2.7.18-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.18-1, the as-built FBVS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The filtration unit in each FBVS air 2. Testing and analysis will be performed 2. The FBVS filter efficiencies are greater exhaust Division removes particulate on each FBVS filtration unit to than or equal to 99% for particulate matter. determine filter efficiency. matter greater than 0.3 microns.
- 3. Each Division of air exhaust has the 3. Testing will be performed for each 3. A negative pressure can be maintained capability to maintain the fuel handling Division to measure the pressure in the relative to atmospheric pressure in the and fuel storage areas of the nuclear fuel handling and fuel storage areas of fuel handling and fuel storage areas of annex at a negative pressure relative to the nuclear annex with a FBVS Division the cuclear annex.
the atmosphere, operating. 4.a) The Class IE loads shown on Figure 4.a) TestNg will be performed on the FBVS 4.a) Within the FBVS, a test signal exists 2.7.18-1 are powered from their by providing a test signal in only one only at the equipment powered from the respective Class IE Division. Class IE Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. 4.b) Independence is provided between Class 4.b) Inspection of the as-installed Class 1E 4.b) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions in the FBVS will be IE Divisions in the FBVS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, performed. separstion exists between Class IE in the FBVS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the FBVS.
- 5. The active components of the two 5. Inspection of the as-built FBVS will be 5. The active components of the twu mechanical Divisions of the FBVS air performed. mechanical Divisions of the FBVS are exhaust subsystem are physically separated by a Divisional wall or fire separated. barriers.
2.7.18 os.iv.,4
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.18-1 (Continued) FUEL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses AcceptanG. Criteria 6.a) Displays of the FBVS instrumentation 6.a) Inspection for the existence or 6.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.7.18-1 exist in the retrieveability in the MCR of on Figure 2.7.18-1 exist in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there. performed. 6.b) Controls exist in the MCR to start and 6.b) Testing will be performed using the 6,b) FBVS controls in the MCR operate to stop the FBVS air supply unit, fans, and FBVS controls in the MCR. start and stop the FBVS air supply unit, filtration units and to open and close fans, and filtration units, and to open those power operated dampers shown on and close those dampers shown on Figure 2.7.18-1. Figure 2.7.18-1.
- 7. In response to a high radiation signal, 7. Testing will be conducted wiale exhaust 7. In response to a signal that simulates a the FBVS air exhaust bypass dampers filters are in bypass mode using signals high radioactivity level, the bypass close and the filtration unit dampers that simulate a high radioactivity level. dampers in the air exhaust ductwork open to direct flow through the filtration close and the dampers in the filtration units, unit ductwork open.
- 8. The fire dampers in the FBVS ductwork 8. A type test will be performed to 8. A test and analysis report exists that can close under design air flow demonstrate that the dampers can close concludes the fire dampers can close conditions. under design air flow conditions. under design air flow conditions.
2.7.18 e5 m
SYSTEM 80+= 2.7.19 DIESEL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM Design Description The Diesel Building Ventilation System (DBVS) provides ventilation, cooling and heating to each of the two diesel generator areas inside the nuclear annex. The exhaust and supply fans can be used for smoke removal. The Basic Configuration of the DBVS is as shown on Figure 2.7.19-1. The safety-related components of the DBVS are as shown on the Figure. I The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.19-1 is classified Seismic Category , I. '
'Ihe safety-related components shown on Figure 2.7.19-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E Divisions.
Independence is provided between Class 1E Divisions, and between Class 1E Divisions and non-Class 1E equipment, in the DBVS. Active components of the two mec anical Divisions of the DBVS are physically I O separated. Displays of the DBVS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.19-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. l [
^
Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the DBVS fans shown on Figure 2.7.19-1. The safety-related DBVS fans in a Division start automatically and the non-safety fans , stop automatically when the diesel generator starts. ! Inspections, Tests, Anaiy>c::, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.19-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Diesel Building Ventilation System. 2.7.19 esiv.,4
SYSTE 0+ I NOTE: OTHERWISE COMPONENTS OFTHE DIESEL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM ARE SAFETY RELATED UNLESS l NOTED. I I OUTSIDE 7 ouTslDE
^'3 k / f [gj AIR
' - l f
EMERGENCY VENTILATION FAN [f J < s jf FAN l STATUS l l _____l ELECTRIC l [ [( HEATER '7 oursics \ p lr outs DE
/
E O =
/
I w NON-SAF ETY
/ -/
VENT T ON FAN l PREFILTER I
, FgN ,
i _ _ r' tau =_ _ _ _ _I I I ouTsios 7 \ / I l I EMERGENCY I
/ L !
VENTILATION FAN l l- l DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING l i FIGURE 2.7.19-1 DIESEL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM (ONE OF TWO DIVISIONS)
d Oa ') SYSTEM 80+" TAHLE 2.7.19-1 DIESEL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commi . ent Inspections. Tests. AnaIYseS AcceDiance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the DBVS is 1. Inspection of the as-built DBVS 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.7.19-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.19-1, the as-built DBVS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
2.a) The safety-related DBVS components 2.a) Testing will be performed on the DBVS 2.a) Within the DBVS, a test signal exists are powered from their respective Class by providing a test signal in only one only at the equipment powered from the IE Division. Class IE Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. 2.b) Independence is provided between Class 2.b) Inspection of the as-installed Class 1E 2.b) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions in the DBVS will be IE Divisions in the DBVS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, performed. separation exists between Class IE in the DBVS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the DBVS. 3.a) Displays of the DBVS instrumentation 3.a) Inspection for the existence or 3.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figure 2.7.19-1 exist in the retrieveability in the MCR of on Figure 2.7.19-1 exist in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there. performed. 3.b) Controls exist in the MCR to start and 3.b) Testing will be performed using the 3.b) DBVS controls in the MCR operate to stop the DBVS fans shown on Figure DBVS controls in the MCR. start and stop the DBVS fans shown on 2.7.19-1. Figure 2.7.19-1.
- 4. Active components of the two 4. Inspection of the as-built mechanical 4. The active components of the two mechanical Divisions of the DBVS are Divisions will be performed. mechanical Divisions of the DBVS are physically separated. separated by a Divisional wall or a fire barrier.
2.7.19 m.n.u
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.19-1 (Continued) DIESEL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 5. The safety-related DBVS fans in a 5. Testing will be performed for each 5. The safety-related DBVS fans in a Division start automatically and the non- Division using an actual diesel start or a Division are started automatically and safety fans stop automatically when the signal that simulates a diesel start. the non-safety fans are stopped diesel generator starts. automatically by an actual diesel start, or by a signal that simulates a diesel start, in the Division under test.
2.7.19 os.i7.,4
~.
I SYSTEM 80+" l O 2.7.20 SUBSPHERE BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM - i Design Description j The Subsphere Building Ventilation System (SBVS) provides ventilation, cooling and l heating to the subsphere building. The SBVS is located in the nuclear annex (NA) and the reactor building (RB). The SBVS has a safety-related air exhaust subsystem and a non-safety-related air supply subsystem. _ i The following safety-related rooms are cooled by the essential chilled water system recirculating units: safety injection pump rooms, shutdown cooling pump rooms, containment ;
~
spray pump rooms, fuel pool heat exchanger rooms, motor-driven and steam-i driven emergency feedwater pump rooms, shutdown cooling heat exchanger rooms, containment spray heat exchanger rooms, and penetration rooms. l The Basic Configuration of the SBVS is as shown on Figure 2.7.20-1. The SBVS has two Divisions. Each Division of the SBVS has a filtration unit, fans, l dampers, an air supply unit, ductwork, instrumentation, and controls. Each SBVS -l filtration unit removes particulate matter. r O Each SBVS Division maintains its Division of the subsphere building at a negative t pressure relative to the atmosphere. The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.20-1 is classified Seismic Category I. ! l Active components of the two Divisions of the SBVS are physicrily separated. Safety-related components of the SBVS are powered from their respective Class 1E Division. [ Independence is provided between Class 1E Divisions, and between Class 1E .f I Divisions and non-Class 1E equipment, in the SBVS. Displays of the SBVS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.20-1 exist in the main ; control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. !
)
i i i i i O i 2.7.20 m.n.u i
I 73 SYSTEM 80+" (dI Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the SBVS air supply units, filtration units and fans, and to open and close those power operated dampers shown on Figure 2.7.20-1. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.20-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Subsphere Building Ventilation System.
,\
(v) 4 I
'w 2.7.20 % n.u
V SYSTE 0+ THE EXHAUST SUBSYSTEM IS SAFETY-RELATED UNLESS IDENTIFIED OTHERWISE. j,A , ,________q l SUBSPHERE l
', - NOTE 3 l l
= 9s a
9s 9 o t D l~-1 l _ ,,, I l
' " " [oTE 1 STATUS c --
FILTRATION -- s , ,, l UNIT 1 -l l g i i I O " %",TS T l H
@ l i
i i i l i
'^"
STATUS I I OUTSIDE AIR ' l -i l FROM CONTROL COMPLEX DUCT Ik O ' i ! SHAFT AIR l l
* '# 9
=:== " '
l -i l I THE SUPPLY SUBSYSTEM IS NON-SAFETY RELATED. 1P -l O d ! ! ! NOTES: l 1. THE DUCT WORK FROM THE BUILDING EXIT UP TO AND INCLUDING THE ISOLATION DAMPER l lS QUALIFIED FOR THE TORNADO DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE.
- 2. SAFETY-HELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT OF THE AIR EXHAUST SUBSYSTEM IS CLASS 1E.
- 3. THE RADIATION DETECTOR INSTRUMENTATION IS NON-SAFETY-RELATED.
06-17-94 i FIGURE 2.7.20-1 i SUBSPHERE BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM l (ONE OF TWO DIVISIONS)
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.20-t SUBSPHERE BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM InsDections. TcSts. Analyses. and AcceDtance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analvscs Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the SBVS is 1. Inspection of the as-built SBVS 1. For the components and equipment as shown on Figure 2.7.20-1. configuration will be conducted. shown on Figure 2.7.20-1, the as-built SBVS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. Each SBVS filtration unit removes 2. Testing and analysis will be performed 2. He SBVS filter efficiencies are greater particulate matter. on each SBVS filtration unit to than or equal to 99% for particulate determine filter efficiency. matter greater than 0.3 micron.
- 3. Each SBVS Division maintains its 3. Testing will be performed to measure 3. Each Division of the SBVS maintains its Division of the subsphere building at a the subsphere building pressure in each Division of the subsphere building at a negative pressure relative to the Division with the SBVS operating. negative pressure relative to the atmosphere. atmosphere.
- 4. Active components of the two Divisions 4. InspCion of the as-built SBVS will be 4. He active components of the two of the SBVS are physically separated. performed. mechanical Divisions of the SBVS are separated by a Divisional wall or a fire barrier.
5.a) Safety related components shown on 5.a) Testing will be performed on the SBVS 5.a) Within the SBVS, a test signal exists Figure 2.7.20-1 are powered from their by providing a test signal in only one only at the equipment powered from the respective Class IE Divisions. Class IE Division at a time. Class IE Division under test. 5.b) Independence is provided between Class 5.b) inspection of the as-installed Class IE 5.b) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions in the SBVS will be IE Divisions in the SBVS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, performed. separation exists between Class IE in the SBVS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the SBVS. 2.7.20 06-i7.,4
.1-
____________,-c _ - . w - - ---- - _ _ _ _ _
7
\ d SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.20-1 (Continued _1 SUBSPHERE BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM Insocctions. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 6.a) Displays of the SBVS instrumentation 6.a) Inspection for the existence or 6.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown rhown on Figure 2.7.20-1 exist in the retrieveability in the MCR of on Figure 2.7.20-1 exist in the MCR or MCR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there.
performed. 6.b) Controls exist in the MCR to start and 6.b) Testing will be perfi>rmed using the 6.b) SBVS controls in the MCR operate to stop the SBVS air supply units, filtration SBVS controls in the MCR. start and stop the SBVS air supply units, units and fans, and to open and close filtration units and fans, and to open and those power operated dampers shown on close those power operated dampers Figure 2.7.20-1. shown on Figure 2.7.20-1. i 2.7.20 u.n-u . - -i
I SYSTEM 80+" 2.7.21 CONTAINMENT PURGE VENTILATION SYSTEM Design Description he Containment Purge Ventilation System (CPVS) has a Low Purge Subsystem and a High Purge Subsystem. The Low Purge Subsystem provides Containment pressure relief during plant startup and shutdown and ventilation in the area of the in-containment refueling water storage tank. The High Purge Subsystem reduces airborne radioactivity and maintains environmental conditions within containment during plant outages. The CPVS is located in the nuclear annex (NA) and the reactor building (RB). The Basic Configurations of the CPVS Low Purge and High Purge Subsystems are as shown on Figures 2.7.21-1 and 2.7.21-2, respectively. The CPVS is non-safety-related with the exception of the containment penetration isolation valves and piping in between covered in Section 2.4.5. Each subsystem of the CPVS has an air supply unit, a filtration unit, fans, ductwork, i instrumentation, and controls. Each CPVS filtration unit removes paniculate matter. The safety-related equipment shown on Figures 2.7.21-1 and 2.7.21-2 is classified Seismic Category I. Displays of the CPVS instrumentation shown on Figures 2.7.21-1 and 2.7.21-2 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the CPVS air supply units, filtration units, and fans, and to open and close those power operated dampers and valves shown on , Figures 2.7.21-1 and 2.7.21-2. In response to a high radiation signal or a high humidity signal, the CPVS exhaust Containment isolation valves close. Inspection, Test, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.21-1 provides the inspections, test, analyses, and associated acceptance l criteria for the Containment Purge Ventilation System. t w.o.u 2.7.21 l l
TM ' V SYSTEM 80+
- HIGH FiADATION SGNAL
, HIGH HUMtDTY SGNAL NOTEt rsue cooe sccrion en ct Assr i
# C MLTRATON
_ _ _ _t CV OV t ON PURGF EXHAUST . b STATUS rO E. SU , 1 9; An erTAxE : SUPPLY A (civ FC *+ civ P J L
}
U s E HI Q tow ruRat surety l q NpN" ANNULUS B INSIDE CONTAINMENT NOTES:
- 1. THIS DAMPER IS MANUALLY CLOSED DURING A TORNADO l WARNING.
- 2.
- EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH PARAGRAPH NUMBER (3) OF THE
" VERIFICAltON3 FOR BASIC CONFIGURATION FOR SYSTEMS" OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS (SECTION 1.2) APPLIES.
- 3. THE SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IS CLASS 1E.
FIGURE 2.7.21-1 CONTAINMENT PURGE VENTILATION SYSTEM (LOW PURGE) mT
,y f%
SYSTEM BD/"
*
- HGH RADIATION SIGNAL s -
- HIGH HUMIDffY $MNAL NUCLEAR ANNEX ANNULUS g INSIDE CONTAINMENT E
I . 1 I l A%iE WUL hIiVN ni GLASS] NOTE 1 5 gy gg
,nrr, _
9: gg Mick ' 1
'=
45 '" o ,_T .
. T.
8 EE p . .. Eb ~,M HDGH PtlRGF FMHAt137 P'CiV ' FC ' FC STATUS 5 sr am . ICIV *i , AIR dk FC - FC AIR INTAKE SUPPLV 4 jr . E UNrf 1y ; . l HIGH PURGE SUPPLY , , , e Cfv er Q, FAN STATUS EE g Eb a I E NOTES:
- 1. THIS DAMPER IS MANUALLY CLOSED DURING A TORNADO WARNING.
- 2.
- EQUIPMENT FOR WHICH PARAGRAPH NUMBER (3) OF THE
" VERIFICATION FOR BASIC CONFIGURATION FOR SYSTEMS" OF THE GENERAL PROVISIONS (SECTION 1.2) APPLIES.
- 3. THE SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT IS CLASS 1E.
FIGURE 2.7.21-2 -"~ CONTAINMENT PURGE VENTILATION SYSTEM (HIGH PURGE)
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TAHLE 2.7.21-1 CONTAINMENT PURGE VENTILATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configurations of the CPVS 1. Inspection of the as-built CPVS 1. For the components and equipment Low Purge and High Purge Subsystems configuration will be conducted. shown on Figures 2.7.21-1 and 2.7.21-are as shown on Figures 2.7.21-1 and 2, the as-built CPVS low Purge and 2.7.212, respectively. High Purge Subsystems conform with the Basic Configurations.
- 2. Each CPVS filtration unit removes 2. Testing and analysis will be performed 2. The CPVS filter efficiencies are greater particulate nytter. on each CPVS filtration unit to than or equal to 99% for particulate determine filter efficiency. matter greater than 0.3 microns.
3.a) Displays of the CPVS instrumentation 3.a) Inspection for the existence or 3.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown en Figures 2.7.21-1 and 2.7.21-2 retrieveability in the MCR of on Figure 2.7.21-1 exist in the MCR or exist in the MCR or can be retrieved instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there. there. performed. 3.b) Controls exist in the MCR to start and 3.b) Testing will be performed using the 3.b) CPVS controls in the MCR operate to step the CPVS air supply units, CPVS controls in the MCR. start and stop the CPVS air supply filtration units, and fans,and to open and units, filtration units, and fans, and to close the power operated dampers and open and close the power operated valves shown on Figures 2 7.21-1 and dampers and valves shown on Figures 2.7.21-2. 2.7.21-I and 2.7.21-2. l l 2.7.21 , nn.u _____-__.___________u-____--___m_- _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _-- m-w+ -rw-T__1_m
p) q (3
% \J G' SYSTEM 80+= TAHLE 2.7.21-1 (Continued) i CONTAINMENT PURGE VENTILATION SYSTEM Inspedions. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 4. In response to a high radiation signal or 4. Testing will be performed on the CPVS 4 The CPVS exhaust Containment a high humidity signal, the CPVS exhaust Containment isolation valves isolation valves close upon receipt of a exhaust Containment isolation valves using signals that simulate high radiation signal that simulates high radiation or close. or high humidity in separate tests. high humidity.
- 5. Valves with response positions indicated 5. A test of loss of motive power to these 5. These valves change position to the on Figures 2.7.21-1 and 2.7.21-2 valves will be performed. position indicated on Figures 2.7.21-1 change position to that indicated on the and 2.7.21-2 on loss of motive power.
Figi;res upon loss of motive power. 2.7.21 w n-u
SYSTEM 80+" 2.7.22 CONTAINMENT COOLING AND VENTILATION SYSTEM Design Description The Containment Cooling and Ventilation System provides cooling and air recirculation in the Containment. The Containment Cooling and Ventilation System has a Containment Recirculation Cooling Subsystem, a Control Element Drive Mechanism Cooling Subsystem, a Reactor Cavity Cooling Subsystem, a Containment l Pressurizer Cooling Subsystem, and a Containment Air Cleanup Subsystem. The , Containment Cooling and Ventilation System is non-safety-related. The Containment Cooling and Ventilation System is located within the Containment except for the radiation instrument which can be located outside the Containment. 6 The Basic Configuration of the Containment Cooling and Ventilation System is as shown on Figure 2.7.22-1. The Containment Recirculation Cooling Subsystem, the - Control Element Drive Mechanism Cooling Subsystem, the Reactor Cavity Cooling Subsystem, and the Containment Pressurizer Cooling Subsystem combine cooling units and recirculation fans to cool and recirculate air within the Containment. i The Containment Recirculation Cooling Subsystem cools and recirculates air inside the Containment. - l O The Control Element Drive Mechanism Cooling Subsystem cools and recirculates air to the control element drive mechanisms. The Reactor Cavity Cooling Subsystem provides cooled air to the concrete surrounding the reactor. The Containment Pressurizer Cooling Subsystem delivers air to the pressurizer ; compartment. The Containment Air Cleanup Subsystem passes air in the Containment through filtration units to reduce radioactivity in Containment. , i Displays of the Containment Cooling and Ventilation System instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.22-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieven there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the Containment Cooling and Ventilation , System filtration units, cooling units, and fans shown on Figure 2.7.22-1. ! Inspection, Test, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.22-1 provides the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance , criteria for the Containment Cooling and Ventilation System. ! O- 2.7.22 .5:7.,4 t
,-- - . - ~ , . .
i l O O O X C X FAN R 3 FAN STATUS STATUS HIGH RADIATION SIGNAL m FILTER 3- - ,r FILTER m UNIT O
- I -
unit
\ CONTAINMENT AIR
[ . [ FC l FC l FC FC CLEAN-UP SUBSYSTEM
- s s e s - s - ,
3 OC oc 00 C M:3
/ \ / \ / \ / \
_L __ __ u - Es a u s= b u
!= u s ii CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION COOLING SUBSYSTEM f
W FAN A F STATUS 4 F C _ FAN STATUS w'OL FAN STATUS I FAN F f A STATUS C ~ SfATUS w O " r SA^TuS nore:
/ \ COMPONENTS SHOWN ON THIS CEDM REACTOR CAVITY CONTAINMENT PRESSURIZER COOLING COOLING SUBSYSTEM COOLING SUBSYSTEM SUBSYSTEM ,
' FIGURE 2.7.22-1 CONTAINMENT COOLING AND VENTILATION SYSTEM 08-17-94 .
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.22-1 CONTAINMENT COOLING AND VENTILATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the 1. Inspection of the as-built Containment 1. For components and equipment shown Containment Cooling and Ventilation Cooling and Ventilation System on Figure 2.7.22-1, the as-built System is as shown on Figure 2.7.22-1. configuration will be conducted. Containment Cooling and Ventilation System conforms with the Basic Configuration.
2.a) Displays of the Containment Cooling 2.a) Inspection for the existence or 2.a) Disolays of the instrumentation shown and Ventilation System instrumentation retrievability in the MCR of on Figure 2.7.22-1 exist in the MCR or shown on Figure 2.7.22-1 exist in the instrumentation displays will be can be retrieved there. MCR or can be retrieved there, performed. 2.b) Controls exist in the MCR to start and 2.b) Testing will be performed using the 2.b) Containment Cooling and Ventilation stop the Containment Cooling and Containment Cooling and Ventilation System controls in the MCR operate to Ventilation System filtration units, System controls in the MCR. start and stop the Containment Cooling cooling units, and fans shown on Figure and Ventilation System filtration units, 2.7.22-1. cooling units, and fans shown on Figure 2.7.22-1. 2.7.22 m.n.u
SYSTEM 80+" 2.7.23 NUCLEAR ANNEX VENTILATION SYSTEM Design Description The Nuclear Annex Ventilation System (NAVS) provides ventilation, cooling and heating to the nuclear annex and is located inside the nuclear annex. The exhaust and supply fans can be used for smoke removal. The safety-related component cooling water system pump rooms and essential chilled water system pump and chiller rooms are cooled by the Essential Chilled Water System recirculating units. 1 The Basic Configuration of the NAVS is as shown on Figures 2.7.23-1 and 2.7.23-2. The NAVS is a non-safety-related system. The NAVS has two Divisions. Each Division of the NAVS has a filtration unit, fans, ductwork, instrumentation, and controls. Each division of the NAVS maintains its Division of the nuclear annex at a negative q pressure relative to the outside atmosphere. The two mechanical Divisions of the NAVS are physically separated.
) Displays of the NAVS instrumentation shown on Figures 2.7.23-1 and 2.7.23-2 exist l in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there.
Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the NAVS filtration units and fans, and to open and close those power operated dampers shown on Figures 2.7.23-1 and 2.7.23-2. i In response to a high radiation signal, the filtration unit bypass dampers close and the filtration unit dampers open to route exhaust air through the filtration units. The exhaust and supply fans can be used for smoke removal. i Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.23-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Nuclear Annex Ventilation System. t 2.7.23 06-i7-+4
SYSTEM + l
. . . . . R."P'AT)0.N, Sip 5A,L , , , ,
p - CLEAR NU ANNEX DIVISION 1 ' g STAT 5s3 f l T l c s
,n i i NOTE , s - : 1 . i i n 1 O d' @ i i
-i i
~ - "a UNIT VENT T i x l g g FAN 1f
% - . *C s STATUS 4 FILTRATION s
% C' i g ) -=
UNIT --N T i
~
^
i i
-i i s' _ i O @ l l i i T
l I l STA S 9
\
l iq l l
^ O 1 i i i -i i OUT,,E AIR AIR SUPPLY FAN ' ' i
? l UNIT STATUS q l u
O l-i--------- i NOTE:
- 1. THIS DAMPER IS MANUALLY CLOSED DURING A TORNADO WARNING.
FIGURE 2.7.23-1 NUCLEAR ANNEX VENTILATION SYSTEM . , , (DIVISION 1)
p rm ( ( fm) SYSTEMu)+ . . . ri^**'"".""as) V FAN STATUS C s 1-' s NOTEt . unn n O 4' n 4"'.__T_ ' ,AN u T y
; g.
STATUS rug,0 __w_ x -
- o" ---@
T
. RADMT,08f SyNAL , ,
FAN e g STATUS s
, NUCLEAR ANNEX
- s .
DIVISION 2 N
~ ' e NOTEt s UNIT n 8 O dI Oa e
g
# FAN 1f +
(- STATUS c s -- pgyggy pggg gygg -_ s s
; ;' e 5 A \
\ e y e s -
e , 1f s O -- l4 : b@ FAN STATUS e ( ' e 4k y ' OUTSfDE
# FAN -
m ant SUPPLV m
- UNIT -
STATUS e e u ' ' y NOTES:
- 9. THtS DAMPER tS MANUALLY CLOSEO DURWetl A O " * ********'
TORNADO WARNHeG FIGURE 2.7.23-2 NUCLEAR ANNEX VENTILATION SYSTEM ** (DIVISION 2)
SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.23-1 NUCLEAR ANNEX VENTILATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configurationof the NAVS is 1. Inspection of the as-built NAVS config- 1. For the components and equiprxnt as shown on Figures 2.7.23-1 and uration will be conducted. shown on Figures 2.7.23-1 and 2.7.23-2. 2.7.23-2, the as-built NAVS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. Each Division of the NAVS maintains 2. Testing will be performed to measure 2. Each Division of the NAVS maintains its Division of the nuclear annex at a the nuclear annex building pressure in its Division of the nuclear annex at a negative pressure relative to the outside each Division with the NAVS operating. negative pressure relative to the outside atmosphere. atmosphere.
- 3. The two mechanical Divisions of the 3. Inspection of as-built mechanical 3. The two mechanical Divisions of the NAVS are physically separated. Divisions will be performed. NAVS are separated by a Divisional wall or a fire barrier.
4.a) Displays of the NAVS instrumentation 4.a) Inspection for the existence or re- 4.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown shown on Figures 2.7.23-1 and 2.7.23-2 trieveability in the MCR of instru- on Figures 2.7.23-1 and 2.7.23-2 exist exist in the MCR or can be retrieved mentation displays will be performed. in the MCR or can be retrieved there. there. 4.b) Controls exist in the MCR to start and 4.b) Testing will be performed using the 4.b) NAVS controls in the MCR operate to stop the NAVS filtration units and fans, NAVS controls in the MCR. start and stop the NAVS filtration units and to open and close the power oper- and fans, and to open and close the ated dampers shown on Figures 2.7.23-1 power operated dampers shown on and 2.7.23-2. Figures 2.7.23-1 and 2.7.23-2.
- 5. In response to a high radiation signal, 5. Testing will be conducted in each 5. Upon receipt of signals simulating high the filtration unit bypass dampers close Division with NAVS exhaust filters in radioactivity level, the bypass dampers and the filtration unit dampers open to bypass mcde and using signals that in the exhaust ducting close and the route exhaust air through the filtration simulate high radioactivity levels. dampers in the filtration unit ducting units. open in the Division under test.
2.7.23 u.nm
1 SYSTEM 80+" \'J 2.7.24 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM Design Description The Fire Protection System (FPS) provides fire detection and suppression capabilities and mitigates fire propagation. The FPS consists of a water distribution system, automatic and manual suppression systems, a fire detection and alarm system, and portable fire extinguishers. The FPS provides as a minimum, fire protection for the reactor building, nuclear annex, turbine building, service building, and radwaste building. The FPS is non-safety-related with the exception of the containment penetration isolation valves and piping in between covered in Section 2.4.5.
'Ihe Basic Configuration of the FPS water distribution system is as shown on Figure 2.7.24-1. Each fire protection water supply tank has a capacity of at least 300,000 gallons. Two fire pumps, one electric motor driven and one diesel engine driven, are provided. The electric motor driven fire pump and the diesel engine driven fire pump are separated by a three-hour fire barrier. The electric motor driven fire pump is powered from a permanent non-safety bus. A diesel fuel oil storage tank is sized to provide at least an eight hour fuel supply to the diesel engine driven fire pump. A jockey pump is used to maintain fire protection water distribution system pressure.
The fire protection system water supply tanks are located in the yard. The electric motor driven fire pump, the diesel engine driven fire pump and the jockey pump are located in the fire pump house. The diesel and motor driven pumps are design to meet the most hydraulically demanding fire suppression system and hose station. Standpipe systems have piping connections to the fire protection water distribution system, isolation valves, and fire hoses. Water is supplied to the standpipe system from the fire protection water distribution system. Standpipe systems provided in the nuclear annex and in the reactor building are Seismic Category I. The standpipe systems in the nuclear annex and in the reactor building can be supplied water from a Seismic Category I classified backup water supply. The backup water supply has a capacity of at least 18,000 gallons. The Seismic Category I portions of the FPS are located in the nuclear annex and reactor building (Seismic Category I structures). Automatic sprinkler systems are provided for fire suppression. The sprinkler systems receive water from the fire protection water distribution system. I I l !o) v 2.7.24 e -iv.,4
SYSTEM 80+" Manual pull stations or individual fire detectors provide fire detection capability and j can be used to initiate fire alarms. Batteries supply backup power for the fire I detection and alarm system. ] The FPS has the following displays and alarms in the main control room'(MCR)- detection system fire alarms; status of fire pumps; and sprinkler /preaction system alarms. ; Portable fire extinguishers are provided for fire suppression. ; A plant fire hazards analysis considers potential fire hazards, determines the effects of fires on the ability to shutdown the reactor and to control the release of radioactivity to the environment, and specifies measures for fire prevention, fire ! detection, fire suppression, and fire containment. Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria , Table 2.7.24-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance ; criteria for the Fire Protection System. ', O ; i i
)
I i i l j 1 d 1 2.7.24 S n.u i l I
SYST 80+ O r 3 MAKEUP _ _ _p WATER FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM WATER SUPPLY TANK L J 4
% df +
ELECTRIC MOTOR DRIVEN FIRE PUMP ' ANNEX, TURBINE BUILDING, SERVICE BUILDING, RADWASTE f i BUILDING, AND ADDITIONAL PLANT O BUILDINGS FIRE-PROTECTION DIESEL ENGINE DRIVEN FIRE PUMP SPRINKLERS AND STANDPIPES AND ' OUTSIDE FIRE HYDRANTS N rO JOCKEY
+
( 3 PUMP MAKEUP ~ ~ ~ WATER FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM WATER SUPPLY TANK L J FIGURE 2.7.24-1 ** FIRE PROTECTION WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
ry (/ J d SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.24-1 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Desien Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses AcccMance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the FPS 1. Inspection of the as-built it": water 1. For the components and equipment water distribution system is as shown on distribution system e.aJiguration will be shown on Figure 2.7.24-1, the as-built Figure 2.7.24-1. conducted. FPS water distribution system conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. Each fire protection water supply tank 2. Inspection of the as-built fire protection 2. Each fire protection water supply tank has a capacity of at least 300,000 water supply tanks will be performed. has a capacity of at least 300,000 gallons. gallons.
- 3. The electric motor driven fire pump and 3. Inspection of the as-built fire barrier 3. The electric motor driven fire pump and the diesel engine driven fire pump are will be performed. the diesel engine driven fire pump are separated by a three-hour fire barrier. separated by a three-hour fire barrier.
- 4. The electric motor driven fire pump is 4. Testing will be performed on the FPS 4. Within the FPS, a test signal exists at powered from a permanent non-safety by providing a test signal in the the equipment powered by the bus. permanent non-safety bus. permanent non-safety bus under test.
- 5. The diesel and motor-driven pumps are 5. Testing and analysis will be performed 5. An analysis exists and concludes that designed to meet the most hydraulically to determine pump minimum flow and each pump provides a minimum flow demanding fire suppression system and pressure requirements are met. and pressure to supply the largest design hose station. demand of any sprinkler, preaction or deluge system plus 500 GPM for manual hoses.
- 6. A diesel fuel oil storage tank is sized to 6. Testing of the fuel consumption of the 6. He diesel fuel oil storage tank has at provide at least an eight hour fuel diesel engine driven fire pump will be least an eight hour fuel supply for the supply to the diesel engine driven fire performed. Inspection of the fuel diesel engine driven fire pump.
pump. supply tank will be performed, ne fuel supply capacity will be determined. 2.7.24 w n.u
l SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.7.24-1 (Continued) FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 7. The standpipe systems in the nuclear 7. Seismic analysis of the as. built fire 7. An analysis report exists which annex and reactor building along with protection system will be performed. concludes that the standpipe systems in their backup water supply are classified the nuclear annex and reactor building Seismic Category I. along with their backup water supply are ,
classified Seismic Category I. i
- 8. The backup water supply to the 8. Inspection of the as-built backup water 8. The backup water supply has a capacity standpipe systems in the nuclear annex supply will be performed. of at least 18,000 gallons.
and the reactor building has a capacity of at least 18,000 gallons.
- 9. Manual pull stations or individual fire 9. Inspection and testing of the as-built 9. Manual pull stations can be used to detectors provide fire detection manual pull stations and individual fire initiate fire alarms and individual fire capability and can be used to initiate fire detectors will be performed. Individual detectors respond to simulated fire alarms. fire detectors will be tested using conditions.
simulated fire conditions.
- 10. Batteries supply backup power for the 10. Testing of the fire detection and alarm 10. He fire detection and alarm system is l fire detection and alarm system. system will be conducted under a provided battery-supplied backup power.
simulated loss of power. l l 11. A plant fire hazards analysis considers 11. A fire hazards analysis will be 11. A fire hazards analysis exists and l potential fire hazards, determines the performed. considers potential fire hazards, l effects of fires on the ability to determines the effects of fires on the shutdown the reactor and to control the ability to shutdown the reactor and to release of radioactivity to the contain the release of radioactivity to the environment, and specifies measures for environment, and specifies measures for l fire prevention, fire detection, fire fire prevention, fire detection, fire j suppression, and fire containment. suppression, and fire containment. l 2.7.24 es.it.,4 i l
O O O SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.7.24-1 (Continued) FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 12. MCR alarms and displays provided for 12. Inspections will be performed on the 12. Alarms and displays exist or can be the FPS are as defined in the Design MCR alarms and displays for the FPS. retrieved in the MCR as defined in the Description (Section 2.7.24). Design Description (Section 2.7.24).
1 2.7.24
- n-n
i SYSTEM 80+" (q/ 2.7.25 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS Design Description . The Communications Systems arc non-safety-related systems that provide onsite communications capability and means to communicate with offsite specified participating entities. The Communications Systems consist of a Portable Wireless Communication System, a Private Automatic Business Exchange (PABX) Telephone System, a Public Address (PA) System, a Sound-Powered Telephone System, and an Offsite Communications System. : The Portable Wireless Communication System provides communications capability , among control room operators, equipment operators, and maintenance technicians for routine and emergency operations. j The PABX Telephone System and the PA System are provided as alternate means of communications. The PABX Telephone System provides intraplant communications and access to offsite telephone systems. The PA System provides a means to alert plant personnel through audible speakers located throughout the plant.
?
The intraplant Sound. Powered Telephone System uses phone jacks which can be patched together to establish communications between areas of the plant where O maintenance, refueling, or shutdown operations are conducted. In addition to the PABX interface with the offsite telephone syste n, direct offsite communications, independent of the PABX, are provided to the plant and support facilities. The direct offsite emergency telephones are identified distinctly from the PABX telephones. The emergency telephones provide links with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and specified participating local and state agencies. A security radio system and a crisis management radio system are provided for communication between specified participating entities. Loss of electrical power to any of the Communications Systems does not affect the ! operability of the remaining Communications Systems. j i The Portable Wireless Communication System is provided with backup power. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . ! 1 Table 2.7.25-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance j criteria for the Communications Systems.
)
2.7.25 e6-iv.,4
O O O SYSTEM 80+" TABLE 2.7.25-1 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Portable Wireless Communication 1.a) Testing of the Portable Wireless 1.a) Voice transmission and reception are System provides communications Communication System will be accomplished.
capability among control room performed. operators, equipment operators, and maintenance technicians for routine and 1.b) Inspection of the Portable Wireless 1.b) Portable Wireless Communication emergency operations. Communication equipment for equipment for emergency operations emergency operations will be exists. performed.
- 2. The PABX Telephone System provides 2. Testing of the PABX Telephone System 2. Vcice transmission and reception intraplant communications and access to will be performed. between plant terminals are accom-offsite telephone systems. plished. Voice transmission and reception between onsite terminals and the offsite telephone systems are accomplished.
- 3. The PA System provides a means to 3. Testing of the PA System will be 3. Voice transmission and reception are alert plant personnel through audible performed. accomplished.
speakers located throughout the plant.
- 4. The intraplant Sound-Powered Tele- 4. Testing of the intraplant Sound-Powered 4. Voice transmission and reception are phone System uses phone jacks which Telephone System will be performed. accomplished.
can be patched together to establish communications between areas of the plant where maintenance, refueling, or shutdown operations are conducted. 2.7.25 e6.it.,4
SYSTEM 80+= TABLE 2.7.25-1 (Continued) COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Design Com nitment Inspections. Tests Analyses Acceptance Criteria 5.a) In addition to the PABX interface with 5.a) Testing of the offsite telephone system 5.a) Voice transmission and reception are the offsite telephone system, direct will be performed. accomplished to the NRC and specified offsite communications, independent of participating local and state agencies. the PABX, are provided to the plant and support facilities. The emergency tele-phones provide links with the NRC, and specified participating local and state agencies. 5.b) The direct offsite emergency telephones 5.b) Inspection of the offsite emergency 5.b) The direct offsite emergency telephones are identified distinctly from the PABX telephones will be performed. are color coded to distinguish them from telephones. the PABX telephones.
- 6. A security radio system and a crisis 6. Testing of the security radio system and 6. Two way communication between speci-management radio system are provided the crisis management radio system will fied participating entities is demon-to provide communications between be performed. strated.
specified participating entities.
- 7. Loss of electrical power to any of the 7. Testing for operability of the Communi- 7. Loss of power to any of the Communi-Communications Systems does not affect cations Systems will be performed. cations Systems does not disrupt the the operability of the remaining Com- voice transmission and reception cap-munications Systems. abilities of the remaining Communi-cation Systems.
- 8. He Portable Wireless Communication 8. Testing of the Portable Wireless 8. Voice transmission and reception are system is provided with backup power. Conununication System will be per- accomplished.
formed using backup power. 2.7.25
- n.n
l l SYSTEM 80+" O 2.7.26 LIGHTING SYSTEM , Design Description The Lighting System is a non-safety related system that is used to provide illumination in the plant and on the plant site. The Lighting System has a Normal Lighting System, a Security Lighting System, and an Emergency Lighting System. The Normal Lighting System provides general illumination in the plant. The Security Lighting System provides illumination in isolation zones and outdoor areas within the plant protected perimeter. The Security Lighting System is powered from the permanent non-safety buses. The Emergency Lighting System consists of conventional AC fixtures fed from Class 1E AC power sources and Class 1E DC self contained battery operated lighting units. Class 1E DC self contained battery operated lighting units are provided with rechargeable batteries with a minimum 8 hour capacity. Class 1E DC self contained battery operated lighting units are supplied AC power from the same power source as the Normal Lighting System in the area in which they are located. c The Emergency Lighting System provides illumination in the vital areas that include the main control room (MCR), the technical support center, the operations support center, the remote shutdown room, and the stairway which provides access from the MCR to the remote shutdown room. Emergency lighting in the MCR is provided such that at least two circuits of lighting fixtures are powered from different Class 1E Divisions. The emergency lighting in the MCR maintains minimum illumination levels in the MCR during emergency conditions including station blackout. The emergency lighting installations which serve the MCR are designed to remain operational following a design basis earthquake. Lighting circuits which are connected to a Class 1E power source are treateri as associated circuits. Independence is maintained between Class 1E Divisions and between Class 1E Divisions and non-Class IE equipment. Class 1E or associated lighting distribution system equipment is identified according to its Class 1E Division. . Class 1E or associated lighting distribution system equipment is located in Seismic Category I structures and in its respective Divisional areas. t
% 2.7.26 o62794
r SYSTEM 80+" (y) Class 1E or associated lighting system cables and raceways are identified according to their Class 1E Division. Class IE or associated lighting system cables are routed in Seismic Category I structures and in their respective Divisional raceways. Class 1E equipment is classified as Seismic Category I. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.26-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Lighting System. O l l'h) t U 2.7.26 -2 o6-iv-,4 ; I l l
O 3 V bN SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.7.26-1 LIGHTING SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of the Lighting 1. Inspection of the as-built Lighting 1. For the Lighting System described in the System is as described in the Design System will be conducted. Design Description (Section 2.7.26), the Description (Section 2.7.26). as-built Lighting System conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The Security Lighting System provides 2. Inspection and testing of illumination 2. Security lighting is installed in isolation illumination in isolation zones and levels in isolation zones and outdoor zones and outdoor areas within the plant outdoor areas within the plant protected areas within the plant protected protected perimeter. Security lighting perimeter. perimeter will be performed. provides illuminationlevels greater than 0.2 foot-candles when measured horizontally at ground level in these areas.
- 3. The Security Lighting System is 3. Testing will be performed on the 3. Within the Security Lighting System, a powered from the permanent non-safety security lighting by providing a test test signal exists at the equipment buses. signal in the permanent non-safety powered by the permanent non-safety buses. bus under test.
2.7.26 .6-i7.,4
n w w U ] ] SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.7.26-1 (Continued) LIGIITING SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 4. The Emergency Lighting System 4. Inspection of the MCR, the technical 4. Emergency lighting is installed in the provides illumination in the vital areas support center, the operations support MCR, the technical support center, the that include the MCR, the technical center, the remote shutdown room, and operations support center, the remote support center, the operations support the stairway which provides access from shutdown room, and the stairway which center, the remote shutdown room, and the MCR to the remote shutdown room provides access from the MCR to the the stairway which provides access from will be performed. remote shutdown room and emergency the MCR to the temote shutdown room. lighting provides illumination levels greater than or equal to 10 foot-candles in the MCR, technical support center, operations support center, and the re-mote shutdown panel room. Emergency lighting provides an illumination level greater than or equal to 2 foot candles in the stairway which provides access from the MCR to the remote shutdown room.
- 5. Class lE DC self contained battery 5.a) Inspection of the as-built Class IE DC 5.a) Class IE DC self contained battery operated lighting units are provided with self contained battery operated lighting operated lighting units are provided with rechargeable batteries with a minimum units will be conducted. rechargeable batteries with a minimum 8 hour capacity. Class IE DC self 8 hour capacity.
cor.tained battery operated lighting units are supplied AC power from the same 5.b) Testing will be conducted by providing 5.b) Class IE DC self contained battery power source as the normal lighting a test signal on electrical divisions that operated lighting units are supplied AC system in the area in which they are supply power to the normal lighting power from the same power source as located. system. the normal lighting system in the area in which they are located. Class IE DC self contained battery operated lighting units are turned on when the normal lighting system in the area in which they are krated is lost. 2.7.26 es.iv.,4
O O J SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.7.26-1 (Contiuued) LIGHTING SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 6. Emergency lighting in the MCR is 6. Testing will be performed on the 6. Within the MCR emergency lighting provided such that at least two circuits emergency lighting system in the MCR system, a test signal exists only at the of lighting fixtures are powered from by providing a test signal in only one equipment powered from the Class IE different Class IE Divisions. Class IE Division at a time. Division under test.
- 7. The emergency lighting in the MCR 7. Testing of the emergency lighting 7. Under simulated station blackout maintains minimum illumination levels system will be performed under conditions, the emergency lighting in the MCR during emergency simulated station blackout conditions. system in the MCR maintains conditions including station blackout. illumination levels greater than or equal to 10 foot-candles.
- 8. Lighting circuits which are connected to 8. Inspection of the associated lighting 8. The as-built associated lighting circuits a Class IE power source are treated as circuits will be conducted. are identified as associated circuits.
associated circuits.
- 9. Indapendence is maintained between 9.a) Testing on the Lighting System will be 9.a) A test signal exists only in the class IE Class IE Divisions and between Class conducted by providing a test signal in Division under test in the Lighting IE Divisions and non-Class IE only one Class IE Division at a time. System.
equipment. 9.b) Inspection of the as-built Class IE 9.b) In the Lighting System, physical Divisions in the Lighting System will be separetion or electrical isolation exists conducted. between Class IE Divisions. Physical separation or electrical isolation exists between Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment.
- 10. Class IE or associated lighting 10. Inspection of the as-built Class IE and 10. The as-built Class IE or associated distribution system equipment is associated lighting distribution system lighting distribution system equipment is identified according to its Class IE equipment will be conducted. identified according to its Class IE Division. Division.
2.7.26 (+ 7.s4
O O C SYSTEM 80+ TABLE 2.7.26-1 (Continued) LIGHTING SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Design Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria l1. Class 1E or associated lighting i 1. Inspection of the as-built Class 1E and 11. The as-built Class 1E or associated}}