ML20148A821
| ML20148A821 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200002 |
| Issue date: | 01/31/1997 |
| From: | ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY, ASEA BROWN BOVERI, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148A597 | List:
|
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9705090171 | |
| Download: ML20148A821 (403) | |
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O Copyright C 1997 Combustion Engineering, Inc., All Rights Reserved. Waming, Legal Notice and Disclaimer of Liability The design, engineenng and other information contained in this document have been prepared by or for Combustion Engineering, Inc. in connection with its application to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) for design certification of the i System 60+ nuclear plant design pursuant to Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations l Part 52. No use of any such information is authorized by Combustion Engineering, Inc. ' except for use by the US NRC and its contractors in connection with review and approval of such application. Combustion Engineering, Inc. hereby disclaims all
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responsibility and liability in connection with unauthorized use of such information. l I i l Neither Combustion Engineenng, Inc. nor any other person or entity makes any warranty ; or representation to any person or entity (other than the US NRC in connection with its review of Combustion Engineering's application) conceming such information or its use, except to the extent an express warranty is made by Combustion Engineering, Inc. to its customer in a written contract for the sale of the goods or services described in this document. Potential users are hereby wamed that any such information may be unsuitable for use except in connection with the performance of such a wntten contract by Combustion Engineenng, Inc. Such information or its use are subject to copyright, patent, trademark or other rights of Combustion Engineering, Inc. or of others, and no license is granted with respect to such rights, except that the US NRC is authorized to make such copies as are necessary for the use of the US NRC and its contractors in connection with the Combustion Engineenng, Inc. application for design certification. Publication, distribution or sale of this document does not constitute the performance of engineering or other professional services and does not create or establish any duty of care towards any recipient (other than the US NRC ih connection with its review of Combustion Engineering's application) or towards any person affected by this document. For information address: Combustion Engineering, Inc., Nuclear Systems Licensing, 2000 Day Hill Road; Windsor, Connecticut 06095 l 1
i System 80+ Design ControlDocument p Q Introduction j Certified Design Material 1.0 Introductior. 2.0 . System and Structure ITAAC 3.0 Non-System ITAAC 4.0 . Interface Requirements v 5.0 - Site Parameters Approvr.d Design Material - Design & Analysis 1.0 General Plant Description 2.0 Site Characteristics 3.0 Design of Systems, Structures & Components 4.0 Reactor ' 5.0 RCS and Connected Systems 6.0 Engineered Safety Features j 7.0 Instrumentation and Control 8.0 Electric Power l 9.0 Auxiliary Systems 10.0 Steam and Power Conversion f.3 11.0 Radioactive Waste Management ; ('J 12.0 13.0 Radiation Protection Conduct of Operations l I 14.0 Initial Test Program j 15.0 Accident Analyses - 16.0 Technical Specifications 17.0 Quality Assurance l 18.0 Human Factors , 19.0 Probabilistic Risk Assessment l 20.0 Unresolved and Generic Safety issues i Approved Design Material - Emergency Operations Guidelines i 1.0 Introduction 2.0 Standard Post-Trip Actions 3.0 Diagnostic Actions 4.0 Reactor Trip Recovery 5.0 Loss of Coolant Accident Recovery 6.0 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Recovery 7.0 Excess Steam Demand Event Recovery 8.0 Loss of All Feedwater Recovery 9.0 Loss of Offsite Power Recovery 10.0 Station Blackout Recovery ; 11.0 Functional Recovery Guideline l M v l i i Coerfenra !
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Srtem 80+ Design ControlDocument O) v Introduction Contents Page 1.0 Scope and Purpose of the Design Control Document . . . . ... .. .... .. .. I 1.1 Cenified Design Material . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ ... ... .. ...... I 1.2 Approved Design Material .......................... ............ I 1.3 Relationship of Certified Design Material to Approved Design Material ........... 2 1.4 Uses of the Design Control Document . .... .. ... ... .............. 2 1.4.1 Applicability under 10 CFR Part S2 . . . . . . . . ...... ........ ... .. 2 1.4.2 General Use ........ ... ... .......... .......... . .. . 2 2.0 Effect of the Cenified Design Material ........ . .......... ..... .. 2 2.1 Compliance with Certified Design Material . . ... ..... ... .......... 2 2.2 Design Descriptions ....... ... ................. . ........ . 3 2.3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria ...... ...... .... 3 2.4 Certified Design Material Interfare Requirements . . . . . . . ....... ........ 3 2.5 Site Parameters . .. ......... .... ..... .. ... ........ ... 3 3.0 Effect of the Approved Design Material . . ... ........... .. .... .. 4 3.1 Compliance with the Approved Design Material . ..... ...... .. . ... 4 3.2 COL information items ................. . ...... .. ....... ... 4 3.3 Approved Design Material Interface Requirements . ...... .... ......... 4 3.4 Conceptual Designs . ........ ............. .. ......... . .. 4 (n) 3.5 Plant-Specific Chr.nges to Designated Material in the Approved Design Material . . . . . . 5 5 l 3.6 Treatment of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Information . . . .. .... ... .... l 3.7 Treatment of Severe Accident Evaluations . . . . . ....... . ....... ... . 5 i 1 Introduction Tables ! I Page ) l 1-1 Index of Conceptual Design Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ........ . 6 l l-2 Index of ADM ltems Requiring NRC Approval for Change . . ......... .. .. 7 1 1-3 ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section III ....... .. .. ........ . 7 1-4 AISC-N690 !ndustrial Code . . . . . . . . .... .. ... .. .. ... . 7 ; l-5 ACI-3491ndustrial Code . . . . .............. ..... ..... . . . . 8 1-6 Design, Qualification and Preoperational Testing for Motor-Operated ... .. ..... 8 1-7 Equipment Seismic Qualification Methods . . ...... ...... .. . .... .. 8 1-8 Piping Design Acceptance Criteria .... ............. .... .......... 9 l-9 First Cycle Fuel and Control Rod Design . ........... . . .. . .... . 9 1-10 Instrumentation & Controls Setpoint Methodology . . . . .... . ...... . 9 l-11 Instrumentation & Controls Hardware and Software Changes . . . . . . . . . ........ 9 l-12 Instrumentation & Controls Environmental Qualification . . . . . ..... . .... . 10 1-13 Control F.oom Human Factors Engineering . . . . . . . ... .... .... ..... 10 1 14 Scismic Design Criteria for Non-Seismic Category I Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 l t r.\ 4 iv / DCD kutroduction (1/97) Page &
Syntem 80+ _ Deslan contrat Document A 1.0 Scope and Purpose of the Design Control Document v This Design Control Document [DCD] is a repository of information comprising the System 80+T 7 Standard Plant Design. The DCD also provides that design-related information to be incorporated by ; reference in the design certification rt.le for the System 80+ Standard Plant Design. t Applicants for a combined license pursuant to 10 CFR 52 must ensure that the final Design Certiftation Rule and the associated Statements of Consideration are used when making all licensing decisions nelevant to the System 80+ Standard Plant Design. , Futther sections of this introduction describe the contents and uses of the DCD. The Design Control Document contains this Introduction, the Certified Design Material [i.e., " Tier 1"), and the Approved Design Material [i.e., " Tier 2"] for the System 80+ Standard Plant Design. 1.1 Certified Design Material The Certified Design Material [CDM] for the System 80+ Standard Plant Design includes the following information:
- Definitions and General Provisions;
- Design Descriptions; p
- Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria [ITAAC];
O e Significant Interface Requirements for interfaces between the System 80+ Standard Plant Design l and systems that are wholly or panially outside the scope of the Standard Plant Design; and 1 o Significant Site Parameters. l For case of reference, the Cenified Design Material includes a Table of Contents, a Figure Legend, and l an Abbreviation List. 1.2 Approved Design Material The Approved Design Material [ADM], to the extent applicable for the System P'J+ Standard Plant Design, includes:
- The information required for the final safety analysis report under 10 CFR 50.34(b);
- Other relevant information required by 10 CFR 52.47(a), such as:
information related to the Three Mile Island requirements under 10 CFR 50.34(f);
- technical resolutions of the Unresolved Safety Issues, and medium- and high-priority Generic Safety issues; an expanded set of interface requirements and site parameters; and ' System 80+ is a trademark of Combustion Engineering, Inc.
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument imponant design features identified in risk assessments for the System 80+ Standard Plant Design; and
- Emergency Operations Guidelines.
For ease of reference, the ADM contains a general Table of Contents, as well as a specific Table of Contents for each chapter. 1.3 Relationship of Certified Design Material to Approved Design Material The Design Descriptions, Interface Requirements, and Site Parameters in the CDM are derived entirely from the provisions of the Approved Design Material, but may be more general than the design provisions in the ADM. Compliance with the more detailed Approved Design Material provides a l sufficient method, but not the only acceptable method, for complying with the more general design provisions in the CDM. However, the methods and provisions specified in the ADM shall be followed unless a change is made in accordance with the change processes specified in the design certification rule for the System 80+ Standard Plant Design. 1.4 Uses of the Design Control Document 1.4.1 Applicability under 10 CFR Part 52 The design certification rule for the System 80+ Standard Plant Design can be referenced in an application for a Combined License [ COL) under 10 CFR Pan 52, Subpan C, and in a subsequently issued COf . Because the DCD is incorporated by reference in the design cenification rule for the
. System 80t Standard Plant Design, the provisions of the DCD are effective with respect to an application or license that references that rule, with cenain exceptions as provided in the rule and described in this Introduction.
1.4.2 General Use The Design Control Document describes structures, systems, and components within the scope of the System 80+ Standard Plant Design, including associated prograrmnatic provisions as specified in this document, and the requirements governing the interfaces between the System 80+ Standard Plant Design and plant-specific design features. An application for a COL that references the design cenification rule for the System 80+ Standard Plant Design must provide a plant specific Safety Analysis Report [SAR) which shall include information about that pan of the plant that is outside the scope of the System 80+ Standard Plant Design or which is otherwise required by a reievant provision of 10 CFR Pan 52, but is not included in the DCD. Proprietary references or their equivalent, provided in the application for design cenification but not included in the DCD, must be either referenced by or included in the COL Application. Together, the Design Control Document and the plant-specific SAR provide the technically-relevant information required for a COL, or for an application for a COL, that references the design cenification rule for the System 80+ Standard Plant Design. 2.0 Effect of the Certified Design Material The following provisions describe the scope and effect of the Certified Design Material. DCO hatroArcWon (1/97) Page 2
C Syntem 80+ Deafan concer oceanent 2.1- Compliance with Certified Design Material All of the information in the Certified Design Material is approved by the NRC, and is applicable to a license application or a license that references the design cenification rule for the System 80+ Standard Plant Design; and is among the " matters resolved" under 10 CFR 52.63(a)(4). The provisions and methods specified in the CDM shall be complied with unless a plant-specific exemption is granted by the -
- NRC or a change is made to the CDM in accordance with the change process specified in the design cenification rule for the System 80+ Standard Plant Design. .
1 2.2 Design Descriptions 1 l The Design Descriptions penain only to the design of the structures, systems and components of a System . 80+ Standard Plant Design and not to their operation, maintenance and administration. In the event of an inconsistency between the Design Descriptions and the Approved Design Material, the Design Descriptions shall govern. ! 2.3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria ; An applicant for or holder of a COL shall perform and demonstrate conformance with the ITAAC prior ! to fuel load. An applicant for a COL may proceed at its own risk with design and procurement activities, i and a holder of a COL may proceed at its own risk with design, procurement, construction and , preoperational activities, even though the NRC staff may not yet have determined that any particular ITAAC have been satisfied. In the event of a noncompliance with an ITAAC, the applicant for or holder p of a COL shall either take corrective actions to comply with that ITAAC or request a change in or Q exemption from the ITAAC in accordance with the design certification rule for the System 80+ Standard Plant Design. In accordance with 10 CFR 52.103(g), the Commission must find that the acceptance criteria in the j ITAAC are met prior to operation. After the Commission has made the finding required by Section : 52.103(g), the ITAAC do not constitute regulatory requirements for subsequent modifications. However, i subsequent modifications must comp ly with the Tier i design descriptions, unless changes are made in the Tier I design descriptions in accordance with the change processes in the design cenification rule for l the System 80+ Standard Plant Design. Funbermore, after the NRC has issued its finding in accordance l with 10 CFR 52.103(g), the ITAAC do not, by virtue of their inclusion in the Design Control Document, j constitute regulatory requirements for the COL holder or for renewals of the COL. ! i 2.4 Certifled Design Material Interface Requirements . The CDM Interface Requirements describe the significant design provisions for interfaces between the System 80+ Standard Plant Design and structures, systems and components that are wholly or partially i outside the scope of the System 80+ Standard Plant Design. CDM Interface Requirements also define i the significant attributes and performance characteristics that the out-of-scope portion of the plant must ; have in order to suppon the in-scope ponion of the design. The plant-specific SAR shall contain , provisions which implement the Interface Requirements in accordance with 10 CFR 52.79(b). Any plant- ! specifi: application for a COL shall contain additional ITAAC corresponding to these implementing i provisions. In the event of an inconsistency between the CDM Interface Requirements and the Approved ! Design Material, the CDM Interface Requirements shall govem. ! O i O - DCD heeedwenen (1/97) Page.1
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System C0+ Design ControlDocument 2.5 Site Parameters h Site Parameters are specified in the CDM to establish the bounding parameters to be used in the selection of a suitable site for the facility referencing the System 80+ certified design. Since the CDM Site Parameters were used in the bounding evaluations of the certified design, they define the requirements for the design that must be met to ensure that a facility built on the site remains in conformance with the design cenification. In the event of an inconsistency between the CDM Site Parameters and the Approved Design Material, the CDM Site Parameters shall govern. 3.0 Effect of the Approved Design Material The following provisions describe the scope and effect of the Approved Design Material [ADM]. 3.1 Compliance with the Approved Design Material All of the information in the ADM is approved by the NRC and, with the exceptions noted in Sections 3.2 and 3.4 below, is applicable to a license application or license that references the design certification rule for the System 80+ Standard Plant Design, and is among the " matters resolved" under 10 CFR 52.63(a)(4). Compliance with the Approved Design Material is a sufficient, but not necessarily the only, method for complying with the CDM. The provisions and methods specified in the ADM shall be l followed unless a change is made in accordance with the change process specified in the design j cenification rule for the System 80+ Standard Plant Design. 3.2 COL Information Items The Approved Design Material identifies certain matters that need to be addressed by a COL applicant or licensee referencing the design certification rule for the System 80+ Standard Plant Design. These matters are designated as " COL Information hems." The purpose of these COL Information Items is to identify the type of infonnation that must be addressed in plant-specific SARs that reference the design certification rule for the System 80+ Standard Plant Design. These COL License Information Items do l not establish requirements; rather, they identify an acceptable set of information, but not the only acceptable set of information, for inclusion in a plant-specific SAR. An applicant may deviate from or omit these COL License Information Items provided that the deviation or omission is identified and justified in the plant-specific SAR. After issuance of a license, the COL License Information items have no further effect for that licensee; instead, the corresponding provisions in the plant-specific SAR become applicable. A summary listing of the COL Information Items is provided in Table 1.10-1 of the Approved Design Material. 3.3 Approved Design Material Interface Requirements The ADM Interface Requirements describe the design provisions for interfaces between the System 80+ Standard Plant Design and structures, systems and components that are wholly or partially outside the scope of the System 80+ Standard Plant Design. ADM Interface Requirements, summarized in Table 1.9-1 of the Approved Design Material, also define the attributes and performance characteristics that the out-of-scope portion of the plant must have in order to support the in-scope portion of the design. The plant-specific SAR shall contain provisions which implement the ADM Interface Requirements in accordance with 10 CFR 52.79(b). In the event of an inconsistency between the Certified Design Material Interface Requirements and the Approved Design Material Interface Requirements, the CDM Interface Requirements shall govern. DCD Sntroduction (1/97) Page 4
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/] 3.4 Conceptual Designs V
Conceptual designs for those portions of the plant that are outside the scope of the System 80+ Standard Plant Design are described and designated as out-of-scope in various places in the Approved Design Material. As provided by 10 CFR 52.47(a)(1)(ix), :hese conceptual designs are not a part of the design certification for the System 80+ Standard Plant Design, and do not impose requirements applicable to a COL, nor to an application for a COL, that references the design certification rule. Textual material comprising Conceptual Design information is denoted by brackets surrounding such material; a listing of this information is provided in Table 1-1. 3.5 Plant-Specific Changes to Designated Material in the Approved Design Material Cenain information [ Tier 2*] within sections of the Approved Design Material, summarized in Table 1-2, is designated with italicized text in the ADM. Plant-specific changes to any of this italicized design information shall require prior NRC Staff approval. The requirement for prior NRC Staff approval will expire for some of the designated information, as indicated in Table 1-2, when the COL holder first achieves 100% power operation. 3.6 Treatment of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Information A design-specific Probabilistic Risk Assessment [PRA] for the System 80+ Standard Plant Design was submitted as part of the application for design cenification, as required by 10 CFR 52.47. One purpose . of the PRA was to develop insights for the design and its features. Significant insights that resulted from l 3 the PRA are identified in ADM Section 19.15. However, the detailed methodology and quantitative l (V portions of the design-specific PRA were not included in the DCD because it is anticipated that this material will be subject to modifications and refinements as the detailed design is completed and the as-built plant parameters and new methodology become available. 3.7 Treatment of Severe Accident Evaluations The Approved Design Material contains various deterministic evaluations of severe accidents for the System 80+ Standard Plant Design. With respect to these evaluations, a proposed plant-specific departure from the Approved Design Material [ Tier 2], under Section B.5 of the change process, affecting resolution of a severe accident issue shall be deemed an unreviewed safety question if as a result of the proposed change:
- There is a substantial increase in the probability of a severe accident such that a particular severe accident previously reviewed and determined to be not credible could become credible; or,
- There is a substantial increase in the consequences to the public of a particular severe accident that has been previously reviewed.
O) t v DCD introduction (1/97) Page 5 a
Syctem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 1-1 Index of Conceptual Design Information h Conceptual Design item Reference ADM Section Administration Building 1.2.1.4.1.1 Personnel Access Portal 1.2.1.4.1.2 Warehouse 1.2.1.4.1.3 Switchyard 8.2.1.2 Compressed Gas Systems 1.2.11.18, 9.5.10.1.1, 9.5.10.2, 9.5.10.2.1, 9.5.10.5 Offsite Power System 8.1.1, 8.2.1.1, 8.2.1.6 Station Service Water Pump Structure 3.8.4.1.3, 9.2.1.2.1.2, 9.2.1.2.1.4 Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System 9.4.8.2, 9.4.8.5 Ultimate Heat Sink, including SSWS Intake / Discharge 9.2.5.1.3, 9.2.5.2, 9.2.5.4, 9.2.5.5 Potable and Sanitary Water System 9.2.4, 9.2.4.2, 9.2.4.2.1, 9.2.4.2.2, 9.2.4.5 , 1 i Offsite Communications 9.5.2.2.5 Steam and Power Conversion; 10.4.1.2, 10.4.5.1.1, 10.4.5.2, Condenser Circulating Water System; 10.4.5.5,10.4.6.2 Tbl 10.4.1-1, Condensate Cleanup System Tbls 10.4.5-1,10.4.6-1 Figs 10.1-1,10.4.1-1, Figs 10.4.5-1,10.4.6-1 Area Radiation Monitors 11.5.1.1 Layout and Equipment for the Laboratory Facilities 13.3.3.4.1 Emergency Operations Facility 13.3.3.2.1, 13.3.3.2.2 Layout and Equipment for the Onsite Decontamination Facilities 13.3.3.6.1 O OCD ktkoduction (11PJ6) Page 6
M I Sy: tem 80+ Design controio cument Table 1-2 Index of ADM Items Requiring NRC Approval for Change i item Expiration Reference j l ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section III First Full Power Table 1-3 ! l AISC-N690 and ACI-349 Industrial Codes First Full Power Tables 1-4,1-5 l Design, Qualification and Preoperational Testing First Full Power Table 1-6 j for Motor-Operated Valves ! Equipment Seismic Qualification Methods First Full Power Table 1-7 Piping Design Acceptance Criteria First Full Power Table 1-8 l ; 1 Fuel Cycle and Control Rod Design First Full Power Table 1-9 l Maximum Fuel Rod Average Burnup None Table 1-9 l l Instrumentation & Controls Serpoint Methodology First Full Power Table 1-10 instrumentation & Controls Hardware and Software Changes First Full Power Table 1-11 Instrumentation & Controls Environmental Qualification First Full Power Table 1-12 1 Control Room Human Factors Engineering None Table 1 13 Seismic Design Criteria for Non-Seismic Category I Structures First Full Power Table 1-14 l Note: The applicable portion of the designated Tier 2 reference mat : rial specified in Tables 1-3 through 1-13 is shown italicized within the identified Approved Design Matetial {ADM] text or table. Table 1-3 ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section III J l Commitment ADM Reference ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section 111, Rules for Construction of Table 1.8-6 l Nuclear Power Plant Components, Division 1 l ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 1, Subsection NE, 3.8.2.2
- Class MC Components" Table 1-4 AISC-N690 Industrial Code l l
Commitment ADM Reference AISC-N690, Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Steel Table 1.8-6 ; Safety-Related Structures for Nuclear Facilities O Q Analysis and Design of Seismic Category 1 Steel Structures 3.8.4.5.2 oco huroducew, tris 7) Pope 7
System 80+ Desi a controlDocument Table 1-5 ACI-349 Industrial Code h Commitment ADM Reference ACI-349, Code Requirements for Nuclear Safety-Related Concrete Structures Table 1.8-6 l Analysis and design of Seismic Category I Concrete Structures 3.8.4.5.1 i Table 1-6 Design, Qualification and Preoperational Testing for Motor-Operated Valves Commitment ADM Reference 1 Design and qualification requirements for motor-operated valves 3.9.6.2.1.1 ! l Pre-operational testing of safety-related motor operated valves 3.9.6.2.1.2 Table 1-7 Equipment Seismic Qualification Methods g Commitment ADM Reference j Seismic qualification requirements for mechanical and electrical equipment 3.10.1.1 Selection of qualification method 3.10.1.2 Methods and procedures for qualifying Seismic Category I 3.10.2.1 electrical equipment and instrumentation Methods and procedures for qualifying Seismic Category I 3.10.3.1 mechanical equipment including motors O' DCD hs& tion (r1jp6) Pope 8
Srtem 80+ Design ControlDocument Tab.'e 1-8 Piping Design Acceptance Criteria Commitment ADM Reference A3ME Code and code cases for System 80+ piping and pipe support design Tbl 1.8-6, 3.9A (1.1) Analysis methods; experimental stress analysis, independent support motion, 3.7.3.2, 3.7.3.8, 3.7.3.9, inelastic analysis, small bore piping, non-seismic / seismic interaction, 3.7.3.12, 3.7.3.13, buried piping 3.9.1.3,3.9A (1.1) Piping modeling; piping benchmark program, decoupling criteria 3.6.2.1.4.1, 3.9.1.2.1, 3.9A (1.5.2.2) Pipe stress analysis criteria; loading and load combinations, damping values, 3.6.2.2.2, 3.6.3.8, combination of n edal responses, high frequency modes, thermal oscillations 3.7.2.15, Tbl 3.7-1, in piping connected to the reactor coolant system, thermal stratification, 3.9.3.1, 3.9.3.1.4.3, safety-related valve design, installation and testing, functional capability, 3.9.3.3, combination of inertial and seismic motion effects, welded attachments, modal Tbis 3.9-10 & 11, damping for composite structures, minimum temperature for thermal analyses 3.9A (1.4.2,1.4.3.2.1, 1.4.7,1.5.2.2,1.6.5) Pipe support criteria; applicable codee, jurisdictional boundaries, pipe support 3.9.3.4, baseplate and anchor bolt design, use of energy absorbers and limit stops, pipe 3.9A (1.10.1,1.10.2, support stiffness, seismic self-weight excitation, design of supplementary steel, 1.7.2.3, 1.7.2.8, 1.7.2.9, consideration of 'ition forces, pipe support gaps and clearances, 1.7.2.10, 1.7.4, 1.7.5) instrumentation line support criteria s Table 1-9 Fuel Cycle and Control Rod Design l Commitment ADM Reference Fuel and initial core design description and permissible changes 4.1.1 Design features and acceptance criteria for fuel and initial core design Tables 41-1,4.1-2 Maximum fuel rod average burnup Table 4.1-1 l Table 1-10 Instrumentation & Controls Setpoint Methodology Commitment ADM Reference Generation of safety system setpoints 7.1.2.27 Table 1-11 Instrumentation & Controls Hardware and Software Changes J Commitment ADM Reference Design, verification, implementation and validation of computer systems 7.1.2.32 software changes in safety-related systems DCO keredocaion (1/97) Page 9
System 80+ Design ctntrol Document Table 1-12 Instrumentation & Controls Environmental Qualification Commitment ADM Reference l Environmental qualification of electrical equipment 3.11.2 Table 1-13 Control Room Iluman Factors Engineering Commitment ADM Reference liuman Factors program plan 18.4.2 Iluman Factors Engineering verification and validation plan 18,4.9 Functional task analysis, workload & environmental assumptions and bases 18.5.1.1 Task decomposition and data framework 18.5.1.3, 18.5.1.3.2, 18.5.1.3.3 Workload loading criteria 18.5.1.4 ; i Nuplex 80+ control room functional ta-k analysis, scope, PRA and critical 18.5.1.5.1, 18.5.1.5.2, l tasks, information and control requirements, time profile / workload 18.5.1.5.3, 18.5.1.5.4, i evaluation, link analysis, identification of overload situations 18.5.1.5.5, 18.5.1.5.6 1 Main control room annunciator, display and control inventory 18.5.4 : I Control room staffing assumptions 18.6.2.2 l Control room console panel profiles 18.6.5.7 Nuplex 80+ information presentation, standard features 18.7.1 Nuplex 80+ safety-related information 18.7.1.8.1 Remote shutdown panel safety. grade instrumentation and controls 18.8.1.1 l l Table 1-14 Seismic Design Criteria for Non-Seismic Category I Structures l l Commitment ADM Reference l Design of the Radwaste Building, Turbine Building, Station Service Building, 3.8.4.1.7, 3.8.4.1.8, and Auxiliary Boiler Structure to Seismic Category I Criteria 3.8.4.1.9 O DCD inVoduction (1/97) Page 10
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Systern 80+ Design ControlDocument O'" Effective Page Listing Certified Design Material Pages Date Pages Date i through iii 1/97 2.5-21 through 2.5-40 Original I iv, y Original 2.5-41 through 2.5-43 2/95 2.5-44 through 2.5-55 Original , 1.1-1, 1.1-2 Original 2.5-56 2/95 2.5-57 Original 1.2-1 through 1.2-3 Original 2.5-58 1/97 2.5-59 through 2.5-62 Original 1.3-1 through 1.3-6 Original 2.5-63 1/97
-1.3-7 2/95 2.5-64 through 2.5-75 Original 1.3-8 Original 1.3-9, 1.3-10 2/95 2.6-1 through 2.6-25 Original 1.3-11 Original 2.6-26 2/95 2.6-27 through 2.6-39 Original 2.1-1 through 2.1-19 Original 2.1-20 1/97 2.7-1 through 2.7-27 Original l f 2.1-21 through 2.1-28 Original 2.7-28 1/97 2.1-29 1/97 2.7-29 through 2.7-54 Original 2.1-30 through 2.1-37 Original 2.7-55 1/97 2.1-38 through 2.1-41 1/97 2.7-56 11/%
2.7-57, 2.7-58 Original 2.2-1 through 2.2-4 Original 2.7-59 11/% l 2.2-5 11/96 2.7-60 Original 2.2-6 Original 2.7-61 11/% 2.2-7 11/% 2.7-62 through 2.7-114 Original 2.31 through 2.3-29 Original 2.8-1 through 2.8-39 Original
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i 2.4-1 through 2.4-23 Original 2.9-1 through 2.9-12 Original 2.4-24 2/95 2.9-13, 2.9-14 2/95 2.4 25 through 2.4-60 Original 2.9-15, 2.9-16 Original 2.5-1,2.5-2 Original 2.10-1, 2.10-2 Original 2.5-3 2/95 2.5-4 through 2.5-14 Original 2.11-1 Original 2.5-15 through 2.5-17 2/95 2.5-18, 2.5-19 Original 2.12-1 through 2.12-10 Original (] V 2.5-20 11/% 2.12-11 11/96 l l l l MDen4m Aceterial (rtg7) page j
Sy~ tem 80 + Design Control Document Effective Page Listing (Cont'd.) Certified Design Material g Pages Date 2.12-12, 2.12-13 Origina: 3.1-1 through 3.1-4 Original 3.2-1 Original 3.2-2, 3.2-3 2/95 3.2-4 through 3.2-9 Original 3.3-1,3.3-2 Original : 4.1-1 Original 4.2-1 Original 4.3-1 Original 4.4-1 Original 5.0-1 through 5.0-7 Original l l O l Certined Desigrs Matennt (1/97) PageR
System 80+ Desi.gn ControlDocument
/ ; Certified Design Material Contents V. '
t Page 1.0 Introduction . . . . . . . . ....... ....... .............. .... . . 1.1-1 1.1 Definitions . . .. ..... .. .. ...... .. .... . ........ . .. .... .. .. . 1.1-2 1.2 General Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' 1.2- 1 1.3 Figure Leger.d and Abbreviation List . . . . . . . .................... ... 1.3-1 2.0 systua c4 Stmeture Based Design Descriptions and ITAAC . . . ... .. .... . 2.1-1 2.1 Design of Structures, Components, Equipment, and Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1-1 2.1.1 Nuclear lsland Structures . . . ............... ........... .... . 2.1-1 2.1.2 Turbine Building ..... ....... .. ... ............ ........ 2.1-18 2.1.3 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Structures .. . . . . . . ............ 2.1-21 - 2.1.4 Diesel Fuel Storage Structure . . . . . . ....................... ... . 2.1-24 2.1.5 Radwaste Building ........................................2.1-27 2.1.6 Reactor Vessel lnternals . . . . . . . .......................... .... 2.1-30 2.1.7 In-Core Instrument Guide Tube System ...... ............... . . . . 2.1-35 2.1.8 Station Service Building . ............ .......... .. ...... ... 2.1-38 2.1.9 Auxiliary Boiler Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ....... ... ...... 2.1-40 (O D 2.2 Reactor . ........ ........ . ......... .. .. .. ..... .. 2.2-1 2.2.1 Nuclear Fuel System . . . ......... ... .... ..... ... .. 2.2-1 2.2.2 Control Element Drive Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..... ..... ... . 2.2-7 2.3 Reactor Coolant System and Connecting Systems ................. ... 2.3-1 2.3.1 Reactor Coolant System . . . . . . . . . ............... . .. . . 2.3-1 2.3.2 Shutdown Cooling System . . . . . . . .... .. . .... ... ...... . 2.3-12 2.3.3 Reactor Coolant System Component Supports . . . ..... .... .... . . . 2.3-20 2.3.4 NSSS Integrity Monitoring System .. .... .. .. ........... .. . 2.3-26 , i 2.4 Engineered Safety Features . . . . . . . . . ... ........ ....... .. ... 2.4-1 2.4.1 Safety Depressurization System ... . ... .......... ........... 2.4-1 2.4.2 Annulus Ventilation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... .......... .. . .. . 2.4-7 2.4.3 Combustible Gas Control System ................................. 7.4-11 2.4.4 Safety Injection System ........ ... . ....................... 2.4-20 2.4.5 Containment Isolation System ............. . ......... ... ... 2.4-28 l 2.4.6 Containment Spray System . . . . . . . . .... ........ ......... .. 2.4-49 2.4,7 In-Containment Water Storage System ... ............. ...... .. 2.4-56 ; i 1 2.5 Instrumentation and Control .... ....... ... . . .... . .. .. 2.5-1 l! j
'O) 2.5.1 Plant Protection System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............... ..... 2.5-1 (V 2.5.2 Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System .... . ..... . . . . 2.5-20 i
I Corwned Dester, MaterM (1/97) PageiR I
I Sy tem 80+ Design ControlDocument 2.5 Instrumentation and Control (Continued) 2.5.3 Discrete Indication and Alarm System and Data Processing System . . .. .. 2.5-46 2.5.4 Power Control System / Process-Component Control System ... . 2.5-65 2.6 Electric Power . . . .. . . . . . ...... . 2.6-1 2.6.1 AC Electrical Power Distribution System . . . .. ... . .. . 2.6-1 2.6.2 Emergency Diesel Generator System . ... .. . . .. . 2.6-14 2.6.3 AC Instrumen ation and Control Power System and DC Power System . . . 2.6-21 2.6.4 Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies . . . . .. . .. . . 2.6-35 2.6.5 Alternate AC Source .. . .. . ...... 2.6-38 2.7 Auxiliary Systems .. . .. ... . . . . . 2.7-1 2.7.1 New Fuel Storage Racks . .. . .. . . . .. . . 2.7-1 2.7.2 Spent Fuel Storage Racks . . . .. . . . ... . . . . .. 2.7-3 2.7.3 Pool Cooling and Purification System . . . . . .. .. . 2.7-5 2.7.4 Fuel Handling System .. . ... .. . . ... 2.7-10 2.7.5 Station Service Water System . . . . . . . . . . .... ... 2.7-13 2.7.6 Component Cooling Water System . . . . . 2.7-18 2.7.7 Demineralized Water Makeup System . . 2.7-25 2.7.8 Condensate Storage System . . . . .. . 2.7-28 2.7.9 Process Sampling System . .. . .. . . . . ... .. . . 2.7-31 2.7.10 Compressed Air Systems . . .. . . 2.7-34 2.7.11 Turbine Building Cooling Water System . . . . .. . 2.7-39 2.7.12 Essential Chilled Water System . . . . . 2.7-42 2.7.13 Normal Chilled Water System . . . . . 2.7-45 2.7.14 Turbine Building Service Water System . . . . 2.7-48 2.7.15 Equipment and Floor Drainage System . . ... . 2.7-51 2.7.16 Chemical and Volume Control System . . . 2.7-55 ; 2.7.17 Control Complex Ventilation System .. . . . .. 2.7-60 l 2.7.18 Fuel Building Ventilation System ... .. . ... . 2.7-69 2.7.19 Diesel Building Ventilation System . 2.7-73 2.7.20 Subsphere Building Ventilation System . . .. 2.7-76 2.7.21 Containment Purge Ventibion Rystem . . . .. .. . 2.7-79 2.7.22 Containment Cooling am] Ventilation System . . . . . . 2.7-83 2.7.23 Nuclear Annex Ventilation System .. . . . .. . .. 2.7-86 2.7.24 Fire Protection System . . . . . . . . . .. . . 2.7-90 2.7.25 Communications Systems ... .. . .. . . .. 2.7-95 2.7.26 Lighting System .... . ..... . .. . .. . ... 2.7-98 2.7.27 Compressed Gas Systems . .... . . ... 2.7-103 2.7.28 Potable and Sanitary Water Systems .. . .. . . . 2.7-105 2.7.29 Radwaste Building Ventilation System . .. . . .. . .. . 2.7-107 2.7.30 Turbine Building Ventilation System . . . .. ... .. 2.7-110 2.7.31 CCW Heat Exchanger Structure Ventilation System . ., . . . 2.7-112 O Certified Design Material Page iv 1
l l , System 80+ Design ControlDocument l l l/G 2.8 Steam and Power Conversion System ................ . .. . .. .... . . 2.8-1
- d. 2.8-1 2.8.1 Turbine Generator ....... ... ......... .. .. .. ... ... .. .... ... .
2.8.2 Main Steam Supply System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... 2.8-4 2.8.3 Main Condenser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. 8-9 2.8.4 Main Condenser Evacuation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 2.8-12 2.8.5 Turbine Bypass System ..... .. ... .. ..... .... .. .. .... .. .. .. . .. 2.8-15 2.8.6 Condensate and Feedwater Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8-18 2.8.7 Steam Generator Blowdown System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....... 2.8-M 2.8.8 Emergency Feedwater System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8-28 2.8.9 Condenser Circulating Water System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. 8-3 7 4 2.9 Radioactive Waste Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9-1 2.9.1 Liquid Waste Management System ... ..... ... . .... .. .. . . .. .... . . 2.9-1 2.9.2 Gaseous Waste Management System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9-5 2.9.3 Solid Waste Management System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.9-8 2.9.4 Process and Effluent Radiological Monitoring and Sampling Systems . . . . . . . . . . 2.9-11 2.10 Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center ...... ........ 2.10-1 2.11 Initial Test Program ............................. . ........ 2.11-1 2.12 Human Factors . . . . . .................................. .. 2.12-1 2.12.1 Main Control Room .. ...... ............... . ........... . 2.12-1 2.12.2 Remote Shutdown Room . . . . . ..... ......... ...... ...... . 2.12-8 3.0 Non-System . Based Design Descriptions and ITAAC . . . . . . ...... .. . 3.1-1 3.1 Piping Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... .. .. . .. . . . ... ... . 3.1-1 3.2 Radiation Protection ... .............. ....... .... ......... 3.2-1 3.3 Design Reliability Assurance Program . .......... .. .. .. ... . .. .. ... . 3.3-1 4.0 Interface Requirements . . . . . . ....................... ......... 4.1-1 4.1 Offsite Power System ............ ...... ................ . . 4.1-1 4.2 Ultimate Heat Sink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2-1 4.3 Station Service Water Pump Structure . . . . ... .. .. .... .. . ... . ... .. . . 4.3-1 4.4 Station Service Water Pump Structure Ventilation System . ... . ... . .... ... 4.4-1 5.0 Site Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... .. . 5.0-1 Cerened Destgra nieeertal Pope v
System 80+ Desian controlDocument O i.o israooucrion This document contains the Certified Design Material for the Combustion Engineering, Inc., System 80+wt> Pressurized Water Reactor. It consists, by sections, of:
- 1. Introductory material (Definitions, General Provisions, and the Figure Legend & Abbreviation ,
List);
- 2. Cenified Design Material for System 80+ systems and structures;
- 3. Certified Design Material for non-system-based aspects of the System 80+ Cenified design;
- 4. Interface Requirements; and ,
- 5. Site Parameters.
1 l 1 1 i
,O v !
l t System 80+ is a trademark of Combustion Engineering, Inc. l cww w nesserw p,y, y,1 1 I
System 80+ Design ControlDocument 1.1 DEFINITIONS h The following definitions apply to terms used in the Design Descriptions and associated inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC): Acceptance Criteria means the performance, physical condition, or analysis result for a structure, system, or component that demonstrates the Design Commitment is met. Analysis means a calculation, mathematical computation, or enFmeering or technical evaluation. Engineering or technical evaluations could include, but are not limi'.ed to, comparisons with operating experience or design of similar structures, systems, or components j As-built means the physical properties of a structure, system, or component following the completion of I its installation or construction activities at its final location at the plant site. Basic Configuration (for a Building) means the arrangement of building features (e.g., floors, ceilings, walls, basemat, and doorways) and of the structures, systems or components within, as specified in the building Design Description. Basic Configuration (for a System) means the functional arrangement of structures, systems, or components specified in the Design Description and the verifications for that system specified in Section 1.2. l Design Commitment means that portion of the Design Description that is verified by ITAAC. l Design Description means that portion of the design that is certified. Division (for electrical systems or equipment) is the designation applied to a given safety-related system or set of components which are physically, electrically, and functionally independent from other redundant sets of components. Division (for mechanical systems or equipment) is the designation applied to a specific set of safety-related components within a system. Inspect or Inspection mean visual observations, physical examinations, or reviews of records based on visual observation or physical examination that compare the structure, system, or component condition to one or more Design Commitments. Examples include walkdowns, configuration checks, measurements of dimensions, or non-destructive examinations. Test means the actuation, operation, or establishment of specified conditions to evaluate the performance or integrity of as-built structures, systems, or components, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Type Test means a test on one or more sample components of the same type and manufacturer to qualify other components of that same type and manufacturer. A Type Test is not necessarily a test of the as-built structures, systems, or components. O Certified Design Material page 1,1 2
Sy~ tem 80 + Design Control Document 1.2 GENERAL PROVISIONS w The following general provisions are applicable to the Design. Descriptions and associated ITAAC: Verifications F,w Rasic Configuration For Systems Verifications for Basic Configuration of systems include and are limited to inspection of the system functional arrangement and the following inspections, tests, and analyses:
- 1. Inspections, including non-destructive examination (NDE), of the as-built, pressure boundary welds for American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Class 1,2, or 3 components identified in the Design Description to demonstrate that the requirements of ASME Code Section III for the quality of pressure boundary welds are met.
- 2. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses, of the Seismic Category I mechanical and electrical equipment (including connected instrumentation and controls) identified in the Design Description, to demonstrate that the as-built equipment including associated anchorage, is qualified to withstand design basis dynamic loads without loss of its safety function.
- 3. Type tests, or type tests and analyses, of the Class IE electrical equipment identified in the Design Description (or on accompanying Figures) to demonstrate that it is qualified to withstand the environmental conditions that would exist during and following a design basis accident without loss of its safety function for the time needed to be functional. These environmental O
conditions, as applicable to the bounding design basis accident (s), are as follows: expected time-dependent temperature and pressure profiles, humidity, chemical effects, radiation, aging, submergence, and their synergistic effects which have a significant effect on equipment performance. As used in this paragraph, the term " Class 1E electrical equipment" constitutes the equipment itself, connected instrumentation and controls, connected electrical components (such i as cabling, wiring, and terminations), and the lubricants necessary to support performance of the l safety functions of the Class 1E electrical components identified in the Design Description, to the extent such equipment is not located in a mild environment during or following a design basis l accident. Electrical equipment environmental qualification shall be demonstrated through analysis of the environmental conditions that would exist in the location of the equipment during and following a design basis accident and through a determination that the equipment is qualified to withstand those conditions for the time needed to be functional. This determination may be demonstrated l by: I i
- a. type testing of an identical item of equipment under identical or similar conditions with l a supporting analysis to show that the equipment is qualified; or l
- b. type testing of a similar item of equipment under identical or similar conditions with a supporting analysis to show that the equipment is qualified; or
- c. experience with identical or similar equipment under identical or similar conditions with
,, supporting analysis to show that the equipment is qualified; or i
k d. analysis in combination with partial type test data that supports the 1 slytical assumptions I and conclusions to show that the equipment is qualified. Conined Design Material Page 1.2 1
Sy ~ tem 80 + Design controlDocument
- 4. Tests or type tests of active safety-related motor-Operated Valves (MOVs) identified in the Design Description to demonstrate that the MOVs are qualified to perform their safety functions under design basis differential pressure, system pressure, fluid temperature, ambient temperature, minimum voltage, and minimum and/or maximum stroke times.
Treatment ofIndividualItems The absence of any discussion or depiction of an item in the Design Description or accompanying Figures shall not be construed as prohibiting a licensee from utilizing such an item, unless it would prevent an item from performing its safety functions as discussed or depicted in the Design Description or accompanying Figures. When the term " operate," " operates," or " operation" is used with respect to an item discussed in the Acceptance Criteria, it refers to the actuation and runnir.g of the item. When the term " exist," " exists," or " existence" is used with respect to an item discussed in the Acceptance Criteria, it means that the item is present and meets the Design Description. Implementation of ITAAC The ITAAC are provided in tables with the following three<olumn format: Inspections Design Commitment Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria Each Design Commitment in the left-hand column of the ITAAC tables has an associated Inspections, Tests, or Analyses (ITA) requirement specified in the middle column of the tables. The identification of a separate ITA entry for each Design Conunitment shall not be construed to require that separate inspections, tests, or analyses must be performed for each Design Commitment. Instead, the activities associated with more than one ITA entry may be combined, and a single inspection, test, or analysis may be sufficient to implement more than one ITA entry. An ITA may be performed by the licensee of the plant, or by its authorized vendors, contractors, or consultants. Furthermore, an ITA may be performed by more than a single individual or group, may be implemented through discrete activities separated by time, and may be performed at any time prior to fuel load (including before issuance of the Combined Operating License for those ITAAC that do not necessarily pertain to as-installed equipment). Additionally, an ITA may be performed as part of the activities that are required to be performed under 10 CFR Part 50 (including, for example, the Quality Assurance (QA) program required under Appendix B to Part 50); therefore, an ITA need not be performed as a separate or discrete activity. Discussion of Matters Related to Operations In some cases, the Design Descriptions in this document refer to matters that relate to operation, such as ' normal valve or breaker alignment during normal operation modes. Such discussions are provided soldy to place the Design Description provisions in context (e.g., to explain automatic features for operung or closing valves or breakers upon off-normal conditions). Such discussions shall not be construed as requiring operators during operation to take any particular action (e.g., to maintain valves or breakers in a particular position during normal operation). l 7 l Certihed Design Material Pa.w 1.2 2
,2_, .,,_.a.u,_. a4_-
i l l System 80+ Deslan controlDocument Interpretation of Figures In many but not all cases, the Design Descriptions in Section 2 include one or more Figures. The Figures may represent a functional diagram, general structural representation, or other general , i illustration. For instrumentation and control (I&C) systems, Figures also represent aspects of the relevant
' logic of the system or pan of the system. Unless specified explicitly, the Figures are not indicative of the scale, location, dimensions, shape, or spatial relationships of as-built structures, systems, and components, in panicular, the as-built attributes of structures, systems, and components may vary from !
the attributes depicted on the Figures, provided that those safety functions discussed in the Design ] Description penaining to the Figure are not adversely affected. ! 1 Maximum Reactor Core Thermal Pcwer The initial rated reactor core thermal power for the System 80+ Cenified Design is 3914 megawatts thermal (MWt). l i l I l i 1 l
)
l 1 i i s M Deelyn n0eserial pope 1.2 3 l
i Svatem 80+ Design controlDocument i V,rN 1.3 Figure Legend and Abbreviation List , The conventions presented in this Section are employed for Figures used in the Design Descriptions. The , abbreviations presented in this Section are used in the Certified Design Material. The figure legend and ; abbreviation list are provided for information only and are not part of the Certified Design Material. i l ( t 1 4 . 'l i 1 E 1 5 f 1 j O , Cerened Decipre Meterial Pope 1.3-1
Syst m 80+ Drsign Crntrol Document O FIGURE LEGEND instrumentation Flow Instrument b Temperature Instrument h Radiation instmment @ Differential Pressure Instrument Pressure Instrument g LevelInstrument g Current instrument @ Humidity Detector g , Ultrasonic instrument g Smoke Detector g Sensor g Annunciator (Alarm) p 9 Certi6ed Design Material Page 1.3 2
System 80+ Desi.gn ControlDocument m C FIGURE LEGEND Valves Gate Valve N Globe Valve l>ed Check Valve Butterfly Valve lN Ba!! Valve @ Relief Valve Three Way Valve k Post Indicator Valve Valve Type Not Specified Q Valve OogralDIA Operator Of Unspecified Type 9 O Fluid Powered Operator - Motor Operator Solenoid Operator Hydraulic Operator Pneumatic Operator Position Indications For Hydraulic And Pneumatic Ooerators
-Fails As is py
-Falls Closed FC
-Falls Open FO Mechanical Eouloment Positive Displacement Pump O l CartMed Desipts Material Pope 1,3-3
Sy~ tem 80 + Design crntrolDocument O FIGURE LEGEND _ Centrifugal Pump % I Pump Type Not Specified : Header [ ] m Tank u Filter F OR FILTER s Strainer Flexible Connection @ Delay Coil M Orffice '!l l Venturi Compressor Or Fan O
- n Air Distribution Device !!!!
Air Distribution Header 1"ITl Vaneaxial Fan M Heat Exchanger Ml lW Ih Vacuum Breaker Vent o v e Certened Desigrs Material Page 1.34
I' l Sy? tem 80+ Desi.en controlDocument -t FIGURE LEGEND Damners T Manually Operated Damper og e Remotely Operated Damper 6 Louver , Fire Damper k Smoke Damper 5 Back Draft Damper O Finned Cooling Coll T C Pumn Drive [1 Turbine Drive Motor Drive u Electrical Eauioment T l Battery g Circuit Breaker A Disconnect Switch j _,,,, l O I M Des > MeterW page 1,3 5
Synt m 80 + Design controlDocumeu O; FIGURE LEGEND ; W 4 Voltage Regulator M Y l Multiplexer l 1 Isolation I Transformer NN Mjscellaneous A System Or Component I ~ ~ "" ~ ~ ~ l l That is not Part Of The i ! Defined System ,_____,_,e Containment : I Containment with Penetration .. .. Building Separation , i 7 i ii 7 i i risisisin ASME Code Class Break An ASME Code class break is identified by a single line to the designated location for the class break, as shown in the example below. I Aswe coot SECTON W CLASS I (NOTE 1) LLtLI X + N Notes:
- 1. The header, "ASME Code Section ll1 Class", must appear at least once on each figure on which ASME class breaks are shown, but need not appear at every class break shown on a figure.
E Indicates Non-ASME Code Section Ill O Certined Desigrr Material Page 1.3-6
System 80+ Design ControlDocumart I Ie)' ABBREVIATION LIST Meaning Abbreviation AAC Alternate AC Source A/C Air Conditioning ADM Atmospheric Dump Valve ~ AFAS Alternate Feedwater Actuation Signal ALMS Acoustic Leak Monitoring System APC Auxiliary Process Cabinet APS Alternate Protection System . ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
'ASME Code American Society'of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code AVS Annulus Ventilation System BAC Boric Acid Concentrator BAS Breathing Air System CAS Compressed Air System CCCF Containment Cooler Condensate Tank CCS Qomponent Control System ,
CCVS ol Complex Ventilation System CCW Compone ' ling Water CCWHXSVS CCW Heat Exchanger Structure Ventilation System CCWLLSTAS Component Cooling Water Low Level Surge Tank Actuation CCWS Component Cooling Water System CEA Control Element Assembly l CEACP CEA Change Platform n) CEAE GEA Elevator Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System CEDMCS CEDM Control Element Drive Mechanism CET Core Exit Thermocouple CFR Code of Federal Regulations CFS Cavity Flooding System CGCS Combustible Gas Control System CGS Compressed Gas Systems CH Channel CHRS Containment Hydrogen Recombiner System CIAS Containment Isolation Actuation Signal CIS Containment Isolation System CIV Containment Isolation Valve COL Combined License l j CONT Containtnent , CPC Core Proiection ".alculator CPVS Containment Purga Venti!aion System l CRS Control Room Supervisar CSAS Contamment Spray Actaition Signal CSB Core Support Barrel CSS Containment Spray System j CST- Chemical Sample Tank l CT Combustion Turbine / Generator CVAP Comprehensive Vibration Assessment Program i [)
'% \
cerowed Duure nearerw (2/95) Pope 1.3-7 , I l
System 80+ Design Contro1 Document ABBREVIATION LIST (Continued) Abbreviation Meaning CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System CWT Chemical Waste Tank DBVS Diesel Building Ventilation System DEMIN Demineralized DFSS Diesel Fuel Storage Structure DIAS Discrete Indication and Alann System DIAS-N Discrete Indication and Alarm System - Channel N DIAS-P Discrete Indication and Alarm System - Channel P DNBR Deparf.ure From Nucleate Boiling Ratio DPS Data Processing System D-RAP Design Reliability Assurance Program DVI Direct Vessel Injection DWMS Demineralized Water Makeup System EAB Exclusion Area Boundary ECW Essential Chilled Water ECWS Essential Chilled Water System EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EDT Equipment Drain Tank EFAS Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal EFDS Equipment and Floor Drainage System EFW Emergency Feedwater EFWS Emergency Feedwater System EFWST Emergency Feedwater Storage Tank ENS Emergency Notification System EPDS Electrical Power Distribution System ESF Engineered Safety Features ESFAS Engineered Safety Features Actuation System ESF-CCS Engineered Safety Features - Component Control System EWT Equipment Waste Tank FBOC Fuel Building Overhead Crane FBVS Fuel Building Ventilation System FDT Floor Drain Tank FHS Fuel Handling System FTC Fuel Temperature Coefficient FTS Fuel Transfer System GCB Generator Circuit Breaker GWMS Gaseous Waste Management System HA High Activity HDR Header HFE Human Factors Engineering IUTC Heated Junction Thermocouple HMS Hydrogen Mitigation System HPN Health Physics Network HSI Human-System / Interface HVAC Heating, Ventilating, Air Conditioning HVT Holdup Volume Tank HX Heat Exchanger CertrWed Design Material Page 1.3-8
System 80+ Deslan ControlDocenent I Q(~% ABBREVIATION LIST (Continued) . Abbreviation Meamna HZ Hertz IAS Instrument Air System l ICI In-Core Instrument 'i ILRT Integrated Leak Rate Test
~INIT Initiation .
INJ Injection ! INST Instrumentation IPSO -Integrated Process Status Overview , IP,WST - In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank l
; ' ITAAC Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria j ITP Interface and Test Processor IVMS - Internals Vibration Monitoring System IWSS In-containment Water Storage System - ;
IX lon Exchanger ! LA Low Activity j LBB- Leak-Before-Break i LOCA Loss-of-coolant Accident - l LOOP Loss-of-Offsite-Power LPMS Loose Parts Monitoring System . LPZ Iow Population Zone l LS Liquid Sample 'O V LTOP LWMS Low Temperature Overpressure Protection Liquid Waste Management System l ) MCC Motor Control Center j MCR Main Control Room i MCRACS Main Control Room Air Conditioning System MDNBR Minimum Departure From Nucleate Boiling Ratio MFIV Main Feedwater Isolation Valve MG Main Generator MOV Motor Operated Valve
-MPC Moderator Pressure Coefficient MSIS Main Steam Isolation Signal MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve MSLB Main Steam Line Break MSSS Main Steam Supply System MSSV Main Steam Safety Valve MSVH Main Steam Valve House MTC Moderator Temperature Coefficient NA Nuclear Annex NAVS Nuclear Annex Ventilation System
. NCW Normal Chilled Water NCWS Normal Chilled Water System NDE- Non-destructive Examination l NFE New Fuel Elevator NFS Nuclear Fuel System
~
-NI Nuclear Instrumentation !
NI Structures Nuclear Island Structures j NIMS . NSSS Integrity Monitoring System ! Cerennet Dee@n M I235) Pese 1.3-9 I
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument ABBREVIATION LIST (Continued) l Abbreviation Meanine NNS Non-Nuclear Safety NPSH Net Positive Suction Head NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PA Public Address PABX Private Automatic Business Exchange PAMI Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentat. ion PASS Post Accident Sampling System ; i P-CCS Process-Component Control System PCPS Pool Cooling and Purification System i PCS Power Control System l PCS/P-CCS Power Control System / Process-Component Control System i PERMSS Processing and Effluent Radiological Monitoring and Sampling System l PPC Plant Protection Calculator PPS Plant Protection System PRA Probalistic Risk Assessment ! PSS Process Sampling System PSWS Potable and Sanitary Water Systems PZR Pressurizer ) RAT Reserve Auxiliary Transformer RB Reactor Building t RCGVS Reactor Coolant Gas Vent Subsystem RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCPB Reactor Coolant Pressure Bomxlary ) RCS Reactor Coolant System RDS Rapid Depressurization Subsystem RDT Reactor Drain Tank RM Refueling Machine RPS Reactor Protective System RSP Remote Shutdown Panel RSR Remote Shutdown Room RSSH Resin Slice Slurry Header RT Reactor Trip l RTSG Reactor Trip Switchgear RV Reactor Vessel RWBVS Radwaste Building Ventilation System SAFDL Specified Acceptable Fuel Design Limit SAS Station Air System SB Shield Building SBCS Steam Bypass Control System SBVS Subsphere Building Ventilation System l SCS Shutdown Cooling System SDS Safety Depressurization System SFHM Spent Fuel Handling Machine SFP Spent Fuel Pool SFPCS Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System j SG Steam Generator j SGBS Steam Generator Blowdown System SGDT Steam Generator Drain Tank CertMient Design Material (2/95) Pope 1.3-10 l
_ _ . _ . ~ . . _ . __. ..__ _ .. .._ _.. . _ _ . _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ r System 80+ Design ControlDocument ABBREVIATION LIST (Continued) . Abbreviation Meaning { SI: Safety injection i SIAS . Safety injection Actuation Signal l SIS Safety Injection System ; j, SIT . Safety Injection Tank SSC Systems, Structures, and Components i 4 4 SSE. Safe Shutdown Earthquake Station Service Water :
- SSW SSWS Station Service Water System I, i SWMS Solid Waste Manageme~ cvstem i TBCWS Turbine Building Coohus ./ater System ;
i Turbine Building Service Water System i TBSWS '
-TBV - Turbine Bypass Valve l 'TBVS Turbine Building Ventilation System i
+ TC Thermocouple- l TGSS Turbine Gland Scaling System l TSC- Technical Support Center TSCACS Technical Support Center Air Conditioning System ,; UGS Upper Guide Structure : UHS Ultimate Heat Sink i UAT; Unit Auxiliary Transformer j UMT Unit Main Transformer - VCT Volume Control Tank s VDU Video Display Unit WMT Waste Monitor Tank
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument () 2.0 System and Structure Based Design Descriptions and ITAAC 2.1 Design of Structures, Components, Equipment, and Systems 2.1.1 Nuclear Island Structures Design Description The Nuclear Island (NI) Structures house, protect, and support plant equipment and provide personnel and equipment access, suppon for systems and components under operating loads, radiation shielding, structural components to withstand loads due to design basis external and internal events, physical separation between Divisions of safety-related equipment, and barriers to minimize or prevent the release of radioactive materials. The Basic Configuration of the NI Structures is as shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12. 2 The NI Structures are safety-related. The NI Structures consist of the Reactor Building (RB) and the Nuclear Annex (NA). The RB and NA are further sub-divided into sttuctures, buildings and areas. The RB and NA are structurally integrated on a common basemat which is embedded below the finished plant grade level. The top of the nuclear island basemat is located 40.75 ft. i 1.0 ft, below the finished grade elevation. The RB is a reinforced concrete and structural steel structure, which consists of the Shield Building (SB), (n) V the RB Subsphere, the Containment, and the Containment Internal Structures. The SB is composed of a reinforced concrete right cylinder with a hemispherical dome which encloses the Containment and is structurally connected to the NA. The area between the SB and the Containment is the RB Annulus. The RB Subsphere is located below the RB Anulus area and the Containment and is divided by a Divisional wall. Within the RB Subsphere, each Division is further divided, such that the RB Subsphere is separated into quadrants. The structural components of the RB Subsphere are structurally connected to the SB and support the Containment and Containment Internal Structures. The Containment is a spherical welded steel structure supported by embedding a lower segment between the Containment Internal Structures concrete and the Reactor Building Subsphere concrete. There is no structural connection between the free-standing portion of the containment and adjacent structures other than penetrations and their supports. Shear bars are welded to the containment vessel in the embedded region to provide restraint against sliding. The L ntainment retains its integrity at the pressure and temperature conditions associated with the most limiting Design Basis Accident without exceeding the design leakage rate to the SB. Access to the Containment is provided through personnel air locks and an equipment hatch. Penetrations are also provided for electrical and mechanical components and for the transport of nuclear fuel. 1 The location of the NI Structures relative to the Turbine Building, the Component Cooling Water System Heat Exchanger Structures, the Diesel Fuel Storage Structures, and the Radwaste Building is described in Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.5, respectively, n ( ) v 2 The building dimensions and elevations provided in Figures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12 are provided for information only and are not part of the certified design information. Certined Desen Material Page 2.1-1 l
Sy0 tem C0 + Design CvntrolDocument The Containment Internal Structures are reinforced concrete and structural steel structures that support the reactor vessel and reactor coolant system. The primary shield wall supports and laterally surrounds the reactor vessel. The reactor vessel and reactor coolant system can be supported without the reactor cavity wall directly below the reactor vessel support corbels. The reac*or vessel support corbels are constructed of reinforced concrete and are at least 10 feet thick. The secondary shield wall (crane wall) laterally surrounds the primary shield wall and is structurally connected to the primary shield wall by reinforced concrete slabs and walls. The secondary shield wall also provides support for the polar crane. The Containment Internal Structures provide a reactor cavity area below the reactor vessel which can be flooded with water. An indirect gas vent path is provided between the reactor cavity and the free volume of the Containment. The reactor cavity has a corium debris chamber. The reactor cavity floor is constructed with a limestone aggregate concrete with a minimum CACO 3 content of 17 percent. The minimum floor thickness in the flat region of the cavity floor is 3.0 ft. The flat floor area is free from obstructions to corium debris spreading. The minimum flat floor area for the reactor cavity is 693 ft.2 The reactor cavity sump is constructed with a limestone aggregate concrete having a minimum thickness of 3.2 feet. The Containment and its penetrations, shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12, are designed and constructed to ASME Code Section III, Class MC.3 The Containment and its penetrations, shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12, retain their pressure boundary integrity associated with the design pressure of at least 53 psig. The Containment pressure boundary is evaluated to assure that the ASME Code Section III Service Level C stress limits are not exceeded for a Containment internal pressure of 120 psig. The Containment and its penetrations, shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12, maintain the Containment leakage rate less than the maximum allowable leakage rate associated with the peak containment pressure for the design basis accident. i The NA consists of the Control Complex, the Diesel Generator Areas, the Fuel Handling Area, the Spent i Fuel Storage Area, the Cheinical and Volume Control System and Maintenance Area, and the Main Steam Valve Ilouses. The NA is a reinforced concrete and structural steel structure which is structurally connected to the SB. The NA laterally surrounds the RB and is divided by a Divisional wall. The Seismic Category I NI Structures provide the features which accommodate the static and dynamic loads and load combinations which define the structural design basis. The design basis loads are those loads associated with:
- Normal plant opration (including dead loads, live loads, lateral earth pressure loads, and equipment loads, including the effects of temperature and equipment vibration); i l
i O 3 Containment isolation devices are addressed in Section 2.4.5, Containment isolation System. Certifad Design Atatorial Page 2.12
System 80+ D sign ControlDocument im, I e External events (including rain snow, wind, flood, tornado, tornado generated missiles, and i earthquake); and
- Internal events (including flood, pipe rupture, equipment failure, and equipment failure generated missiles).
i' The NI Structures, shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12, are Seismic Category I, except as noted i on Figure 2.1.1-12. Flood barriers and fire barriers are shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12. Flood doors shown on Figures 2.1.1-1 through 2.1.1-12 have sensors with open and closed status displays provided at a central fire alarm station. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria , Table 2.1.1-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Nuclear Island Structures. 6 o ( O
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, Systern 80+ Design Control Document Table 2.1.1-1 Nuclear Island Structures h Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1.a) The Basic Configuration of 1.a) Inspection of the Basic 1.a) For the structures shown the Nuclear Island Configuration of the as- on Figures 2.1.1-1 Structures is as shown on built Nuclear Island through 2.1.1 12, the Figures 2.1.1-1 through Structures will be Nuclear Island Structures 2.1.1-12. conducted. conform with the Basic Configuration. 1.b) The top of the nuclear 1.b) Inspection of the as-built 1.b) The top of the nuclear island baseaat is located nuclear island basemat . island basemat is located 40.75 ft i 1.0 ft. below structure will be 40.75 ft. i 1.0 ft. below the finished grade conducted. the finished grade elevation. elevation. 2.a) The Containment and its 2.a) Inspection for ib 2.a) An ASME Code Design , penetrations shown on existence of ASME Code Report and Certified Figures 2.1.1-1 through required documents will be Material Test Report 2.1.1-12 are designed and conducted. exists for the Containment constructed to ASME and its penetrations. Code Section III, Class MC. 2.b) The Containment and its 2.b) A pneumatic pressure test 2.b) The results of the penetrations shown on will be conducted on the pneumatic pressure test on Fi.gures 2.1.1-1 through Containment and its the Containment and its 2.1.1 12 retain their penetrations required to be penetra' ions conform with pressure boundary pressure tested by ASME the pressure testing integrity associated with Code Section Ill. acceptance criteria in the design pressure. ASME Code Section Ill. 2.c) The Containment and its 2.c) Inspection and leak rate 2.c) The results of the penetrations shown on testing on the Coaminment inspection and leak rate Figures 2.1.1 1 through and its penetratioas will be testing demonstrate that 2.1.1 12 maintain the conducted. the Containment leakage Containment leakage rate rate is less than or equal less than the maximum to 0.50 percent by volume allowable leakage rate of the original content of associated with the peak Containment air at the containment pressure for peak containment pressure the design basis accident. for the design basis accident during a 24 hour test period.
- 3. The Nuclear Island 3. A structural analysis will 3. A structural analysis Structures are Seismic be performed which report exists which Category 1, except as reconciles the as-built data t oncludes that the as-built noted on Figure 2.1.1-12, with the structural design Nuclear Island Structures and will withstand the basis loads specified in the will withstand the structural design basis Design Description structural design basis loads specitled in the (Section 2.1.1). loads specified in the Design Description Design Description (Section 2.1.1). (Section 2.1.1).
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(g) Table 2.1.1-1 Nuclear Island Structures (Cont'd.) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 4. Flood doors, shown on 4. Inspection for existence of 4. The flood door sensors Figures 2.1.1 1 through flood door sensors and and open and close status
- 2.1.1-12, have sensors open and closed status displays exist.
with open and close status displays will be conducted. displays provided at a ' central fire alarm station.
- 5. The reactor cavity sump 5. Inspection of the reactor 5. The reactor cavity sump !
has a minimum thickness cavity sump and/or has a minimum thickness of 3.2 feet. inspection of reactor cavity of 3.2 feet. sump construction records will be performed. The thickness of the reactor cavity sump from the bottom of the sump to the top surface of the lower portion of the embedded conts'.nment snell will be de'.crmined. A NA 4 e 4 s P O m Deewn***wW .Page 2.1 11
Syotem 80+ Design ControlDocument 2.1.2 Turbine Building Design Description The Turbine Building is a non-safety-related structure which houses the main turbine generator and provides housing and support for power conversion cycle equipment and auxiliaries. There is no safety-related equipment in the Turbine Building. The Turbine Building is located on a separate foundation adjacent to the Nuclear Island (NI) Structures. The Basic Configuration of the Turbine Building is as shown on Figure 2.1.2-1. The Turbine Building contains a reinforced concrete turbine generator pedestal, ard a structural steel frame supporting bridge cranes, an operating floor, and a mezzanine. The structural components of the Turbine Building accommodate safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) loads to the extent that the Turbine Building response to these loads cannot result in a loss of safety function of the NI Structures or other safety-related structures, systems, or components adjoining the turbine building. The turbine generator orientation and projected low trajectory turbine missile path are as shown on Figure 2.1.2-1. Inspections, Tests, Analyscs, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.1.2-1 specifes the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Turbine Building. O Certifed Design Material Page 2.1-18
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Sy~t m 80 + Design ControlDocument Table 2.1.2-1 Turbine Building Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the structure shown of the Turbine Building Turbine Building on Figure 2.1.2-1, the is as shown on Figure configuration will be as-built Turbine Building 2.1.2-1. conducted. conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The structural 2. A structural analysis of 2. A structural analysis l components of the the as-built Turbine report for the Turbine Turbine Building Building will be Building exists which accommodate safe performed. concludes that structural shutdown earthquake components of the as-loads to the extent that built Turbine Building .
the Turbine Building accommodate safe , response to those loads shutdown earthquake ) loads to the extent that ! cannot result in a loss of safety function of the NI the Turbine Building l Structures, or other response to these loads i safety-related structures, cannot result in a loss of l systems, or components safety function of the N1 ! adjoining the turbine Structures or other building. safety-related structures, systems, or components adjoining the turbine building. l Ol1 l Cortshed Des / pre Atatenal (1/97) Page 2.1-20
System 80+ Design ControlDocument /3 lj 2.1.3 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Structures Design Description Each of two Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchanger Structures houses and provides protection and support for component cooling water heat exchangers and supporting equipment. The CCW Heat Exchanger Structures are located outside the projected low trajectory turbine missile path. The Basic Configuration of a CCW Heat Exchanger Structure is as shown on Figure 2.1.3-l'. The CCW Heat Exchanger Structures are safety-related. The two CCW Heat Exchanger Structures provide personnel and equipment access, support for systems and components under operating loads, structural components to withstand loads due to design basis external and internal events, and physical separation between Divisions of safety-related equipment. Each CCW Heat Exchanger Structure is a separate reinforced concrete structure constructed of slabs and shear walls, and contains a Division of CCW Heat Exchangers and CCW components. Each CCW IIeat Exchanger Structure provides features which acconunodate the static and dynamic loads and load combinations which define the structural design basis. The design basis loads are those associated with: Normal plant operation (including dead loads, live loads, and equipment loads, including the effects of [,v ] temperature and vibration); External events (including flood, wind, tornado, tornado generated missiles, earthquake, rain, and snow); ard Internal events (including flood, pipe rupture, equipment failure, and equipment failure generated missiles). CCW piping enters and exits a CCW Heat Exchanger Structure through underground vaults. The CCW pipe vaults are routed underground from the CCW Heat Exchanger Structure to the CCW pipe chases located on either side of the Nuclear Island (NI) Structures. Each CCW lleat Exchanger Structure is Seismic Category I. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.1.3-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for CCW Heat Exchanger Structures. i 1 l 3 The building dimensions and elevations provided in Figure 2.1.3-1 are provided for information only and are not intended to be part of the Cenified Design information. I Certinied Design Material Page 2.1-21 l l l l
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Sy? tem 80+ Design ControlDocument r% Q. Table 2.1.3-1 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Structure . Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of each as- 1. For the structure shown of each Component built CCW Heat on Figure 2.1.3-1, each Cooling Water (CCW) Exchanger Structure will CCW Heat Exchanger i Heat Exchanger Structure be conducted. Stmeture conforms with is as shown on Figure the Basic Configuration.
2.1.3-1.
- 2. Each CCW Heat 2. Inspection of the location 2. Each CCW Heat l Exchanger Structure is of each CCW Heat Exchanger Structure is 4 located outside the Exchanger Structure will located outside the projected low trajectory be performed. projected low trajectory turbine missile path, turbine missile path.
- 3. Each CCW Heat 3. A structural analysis will 3. A structural analysis ,
Exchanger Structure is be performed which report exit,ts which i Seismic Category I and reconciles the as-built concludes that each as- l withstands the structural data with the structural built CCW Heat design basis loads design basis specified in Exchanger Structure l specified in the Design the Design Description withstands the structural l Description (Section (Section 2.1.3). design basis loads i 2.1.3). specified in the Design O Description (Section
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument l 2.1.4 Diesel Fuel Storage Structure Design Description i Two separate Diesel Fuel Storage Structures (DFSSs) house and provide protection and support for the diesel generator fuel oil storage tanks and associated piping and equipment. The DFSSs are not connected to the Nuclear Island (NI) Structures except by underground diesel fuel transfer piping. I The Basic Configuration of each DFSS is as shown on Figure 2.1.4-1 1 The DFSSs are safety-related. The DFSSs are located outside the projected low trajectory turbine missile path. I l Each Diesel Fuel Storage Structure provides personnel and equipment access, support for systems and , components under operating loads, and structural components to withstand loads due to design basis ! external and internal events. Each DFSS is a reinforced concrete vault containing two Fuel Storage Tank Areas and an attached I equipment room and is constructed of slabs and shear walls. Each Fuel Storage Tank Area provides ) space for a diesel fuel oil storage tank and associated piping and pumps. Each DFSS provides features which accommodate the static and dynamic loads and load combinations , which define the structural design basis. The design basis loads are those associated with: l Normal plant operation (including dead loads, Itve loads, lateral earth pressure loads, and equipment loads, including the effects of temperature and vibration); External events (including flood, wind, tornado, tornado generated missiles, earthquake, rain, and snow); and Internal events (including flood, pipe rupture, equipment failure, and equipment failure generated missiles). The DFSSs are Seismic Category 1. The two DFSSs are physically separated by their placement on opposite sides of the NI Structures. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.1.4-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Diesel Fuel Storage Structures. I The building dimensions and elevations provided in Figure 2.1.4-1 are provided for information only and O are not pan of the Cenified Design information. Cerbrant Desigt, Material Page 2.1-24
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l Syntem 80+ Design Control Document Table 2.1.4-1 Diesel Fuel Storage Structure Design Commitment , Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of each as- 1. For the stnicture shown of each Diesel Fuel built Diesel Fuel Storage on Figure 2.1.4-1 each Storage Structure is as Structure's configuration as-built Diesel Fuel shown on Figure 2.1.4-1. will be conducted. Storage Structure conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The DFSSs are located 2. Inspection of the location 2. The DFSSs are located outside the projected low of the DFSSs will be outside the projected low trajectory turbine missile performed. trajectory turbine missile path, path.
- 3. Each Diesel Fuel Storage 3. A structural analysis will 3. A structural analysis Structure is Seismic be performed which report exists which Category I and will reconciles the as-built concludes that each as-withstand the structural 6ta with the structural built Diesel Fuel Storage design basis loads as design basis as specified Structure will withstand specified in the Design in the Design Description the design basis loads as Description (Section (Section 2.1.4). specified in the Design 2.1.4). Description (Section 2.1.4).
- 4. The two DFSSs are 4. Inspection of the DFSSs 4. The two DFSSs are physically separated by will be perfortned. separated by the Nuclear their placement on Island Structures.
opposite sides of the NI Structures. L O Coroned Design Motorial Page 2.126
System 80+ Design ControlDocument 2.1.5 Radwaste Building Design Description
. The Radwaste Building is a non-safety-related structure that houses liquid and solid radioactive waste management structures, systems, and components and provides containment for liquid and solid radioactive waste materials. The Radwaste Building is located on a separate ba anat adjacent to the Nuclear Annex. A minimum gap of 6" between the structures will be provided. .
The Basic Configuration of the Radwaste Building is as shown on Figure 2.1.5-1. , The Radwaste Building consists of a reinforced concrete and structural steel structure. The structural components of the Radwaste Building accommodate safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) loads . such that the Radwaste Building response to these loads cannot result in a loss of safety function of the l adjoining NI Structures. The Radwaste Building foundations and walls accommodate safe shutdown i earthquake loads such that the maximum liquid inventory in the building is contained. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.1.5-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria forthe Radwaste Building. O l 1 l l
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l Sy~ tem 80+ D: sign controlDocument i Table 2.1.5-1 Radwaste Building f Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the structure shown of the Radwaste Building Radwa:te Building on Figure 2.1.5-1, the is as shown on Figure configuration will be as-built Radwaste 2.1.5-1. conducted. Building conforms with ,
the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The structural 2. A stmetural analysis of 2. A structural analysis components of the the as-built Radwaste report for the Radwaste l Radwaste Building Building will be Building exists which accommodate safe performed. concludes that structural shutdown earthquake components of the as- ;
loads such that the built Radwaste Building [ Radwaste Building accommodate safe response to these loads shutdown earthquake 1 cannot result in a loss of loads such that the safety function of the Radwaste Building adjoining NI Structures. response to these loads cannot result in a loss of i safety function of the [ adjacent NI Structures. ; The Radwaste Building A capacity analysis of the 3. A capacity analysis e 3. 3. Radwaste Building will report for the Radwaste l foundations and walls ( accommodate safe be performed using as- Building exists which j j shutdown carthquake built liquid inventory concludes that loads such that the data. foundations and walls maximum liquid contain the maximum inventory in the building liquid inventory in the is contained, building. l O ; coroned Des 4 pre neaterial (1/9 71 Pope 2.129 l
Syotem 80+ D^ sign ControlDocurnent 2.1.6 Reactor Vessel Internals Design Description The Reactor Vessel Internals consist of a Core Support Barrel (CSB) Assembly and an Upper Guide Structure (UGS) Assembly. The Basic Configurations of the CSB and the UGS are as shown on Figures 2.1.6-1 and 2.1.6-2, respectively. The Reactor Vessel Internals are safety-related. Dimensions of the core suppon barrel and the upper guide structure assembly are listed in Table 2.1.6-1. The CSB assembly is suspended from the reactor vessel flange. The CSB assembly provides support and location positioning for the fuel assembly lower end fittings. The CSB assembly contains structural elements that provide an instrumentation guide path from the lowcr vessel, and hydraulic flow paths through the vessel from the inlet nozzles to the upper end of the fuel assemblies. The core barrel assembly contains a grid structure which suppons the core and provides flow distribution from the lower plenum region to the bottom of the fuel assemblies. The core shroud is part of the CSB assembly and provides an envelope to direct the primary coolant flow through the core. Instrument nozzles in the grid structure provide a guide path for in-core instruments from the reactor vessel lower head to the fuel assemblies. The UGS assembly is supported by the CSB upper flange and extends into the CSB assembly to engage the top of the fuel assemblies. i he UGS assembly provides an insertion path for the control element assemblies (CEA). The UGS assembly contains structural elements which provide both a guide path and lateral support for the upper portion of the control element assemblies and extension shafts in the reactor vessel upper plenum region. The UGS assembly also provides guide paths for heated junction thermocouple (IUTC) assemblies. The CSB and UGS assemblies are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section Ill Subsection NG requirements and are classified Seismic Category I. The reactor vessel internals maintain their integrity during normal operation, transients, and during SSE and design basis accident condition < not eliminated by leak-before-break evaluations. The material of construction for the CSB and UGS components is austenitic stainless steel with the exception of the lioldown Ring, which is made of martensitic stainless steel. Cobalt base material, if used, is used only for hardsurfacing of wear parts. The Reactor Vessel Internals withstand the effects of flow induced vibration caused by the operation of the reactor coolant pumps. Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.1.6-2 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Reactor Vessel Internals. , O Cenined Design Marwiel page 2.130
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Srtem 80+ Design control Document } () Table 2.1.6-1 Nominal Design Dimension Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals Component Nominal Dimension Core Support Barrel: Length in. 383 Inside diameter in. 157 Upper thickness in. 3 , Outlet nozzle inside diameter in. 46-5/8 Upper Guide Structure Assembly: Outside barrel diameter in. 156 Barrel thickness in. 3 Fuel alignment plate diameter in. 156 i b(% I l l l l l i Note: These nominal dimensions are provided for information only and are not part of the Certified Design ) information. l a AW Mereniet f*90 2.133 l
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.1.6-2 Reactor Vessel Internals g Design Commitment Inspections Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components of the Reactor Vessel Reactor Vesse! Internals and equipment shown Internals is as shown on will be conducted. on Figures 2.1.6-1 and Figures 2.1.6-1 and 2.1.6-2, the as-built 2.1.6-2. Reactor Vessel Internals conform with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The Core Support Barrel 2. Inspection will be 2. The completed ASME and Upper Guide performed of the ASME Code Section 111 Structure are designed Code Section ill required required Owner's and constructed in Owner's Review of the Review of the ASME accordance with ASME ASME Design Repon. Design Report exists.
1 Code Section 111 Subsection NG I requirements and are classified Seismic Category I.
- 3. The Reactor Vessel 3.a) Testing will be performed 3.a) Testing and inspection {
internals withstand the to subject the Reactor results demonstrate that I effects of flow induced Vessel Internals to flow the Reactor Vessel vibration caused by induced vibration. Pre- Internals retain their operation of the reactor and post-test visual integrity. coolant pumps. inspection will be performed on the Reactor Vessel Internals. 3.b) A vibration type test will 3.b) A vibration type test be conducted on the report exists and prototype reactor vessel concludes that the internals. prototype reactor vessel internals retain . heir integrity and have no loose pans as a result of the test. O Cernted Design Material Page 2.1-34
J ' l L t Sy" tem 80+ Deslan controlDocument : J 2.1.7 In core Instrument Guide Tube System f
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The In-Core Instrument (ICI) Guide Tube System having guide tubes, suppons, seal housings and a seal table .is safety related in that the guide tubes, and seal housing are pressure retaining components of the ; reactor coolant system. . i The Basic Configuration of the ICI guide tubes, seal housings, suppons, and seal table is as shown on Figure 2.1.7-1. ;
- The ICI guide tubes serve as a guide path and provide suppon for the in-core detector assemblies. The {
ICI guide tubes connect to the bottom of the reactor vessel and terminate in a seal housing assembly , located at the seal table. The ICI guide tubes and seal housings provide the reactor coolant pressure - i i bamdary for the ICI guide path outside the reactor vessel. Pressure retaining seals are installed between the seal housing and the m-core mstrument, at the seal housing. ! De ICI suppons and seal table suppon the ICI guide tubes and provide tube to tube spacing. The seal ! table also sevis the ICI chase from water ingress during refueling. l The ASME Code Section III classification for the ICI guide tube pressure retaining components is shown ! on Figure 2.1.7-1. Components shown on Figure 2.1.7-1 are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Class I requirements. ; The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.1.7-1 is classified Seismic Category I. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria l Table 2.1.7-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the ICI Guide Tubes System. O ! M De*4Fe M Page 2.1-M
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- 1. ICL CUIDE TUBES, SUPPORTS, SEAL HOUSMG AND SEAL TABLE ARE ASME CODE CLASS 1 COMPONENTS.
- 2. ICI GUIDE TUBES AND SEAL HOUSMGS 4.RE PRESSURE HETAIMNG COMPONENTS.
- 3. TE SEAL TABLE ELEVATION IS AT THE i AME ELEVATION OR HIGHER THAN THE REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL CLOSURE HC AD MATMG SURFACE ELEVATION.
In-Core Instrumentation Guide Tube System Figure 2.1.7-1 Certined Desbyn Material Page 2.136
Sy' tem 80+ Design contr:t Document t Table 2.1.7-1 In-core Instrument Guide Tube System , Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- l. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components for the ICI Guide Tube ICI Guide Tube System and equipment shown System is as shown on configuration will be on Figure 2.1.7-1, the Figure 2.1.7-1. conducted. as-built ICI Guide Tube System conforms with the Basic Configuration.
2.a) The ICI guide tubes and 2.a) A pressure test will be 2.a) The results of the seal housings retain their conducted on those pressure test of ASME pressure boundary portions of the ICI Guide Code Section ill integrity under internal Tube System required to components of the ICI pressures that will be be pressure tested by the guide tubes and seal experienced during ASME Code Section Ill. housings conform with service. the pressure testing acceptance criteria in ASME Code Section III. 2.b) Components shown as 2.b) Inspection of the ASME 2.b) The ASME Code ASME Code Class 1 on design reports will be Section 111 design e Figure 2.t.7-1 are conducted. reports exist for the f designed and constructed ICS Guide Tube in accordance with System Class 1 ASME Code Class I components. , requirements. i I f j ( M Design A0sterief page 2.137
Sy~ tem 80 + Design Control Document 2.1.8 Station Service Building Design Description The Station Service Building is a non-safety-related structure which houses staff office space and food service and break facilities. There is no safety-related equipment in the Station Service Building. The Station Service Building is located adjacent to the Turbine Building. The structural components of the Station Service Building accommodate safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) l loads to the extent that the Station Service Building response to these loads cannot cause: a Turbine l Building response that results in a loss of safety function of the NI Structures or other safety-related structures, systems, or components adjoining the Turbine Building; or, a loss of safety function of safety-related structures, systems, or components adjoining the Station Service Building. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria I Table 2.1.8-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Station Service Building. O' O CertWmd Design Material (1/97) page 2.138
Sy? tem 80+ Design CrntJIDocument Table 2.1.8-1 Station Service Building Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteda l
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the structure of the Station Service Station Service Building described in the design Building is as described configuration will be description (Section 2.1),
in the Design Description conducted. the as-built Station (Section 2.1.8). Service Building conforms with the Basic Configuration. -
- 2. The structural 2. A structural analysis of 2. A structural analysis components of the Station the as-built Station report for the Station i Service Building Service Building will be Service Building exists accommodate safe performed. which concludes that shutdown earthquake structural components of loads to the extent that the as-built Station the Station Service Service Building Building response to accommodate safe these loads cannot cause: shutdown earthquake a Turbine Building loads to the extent that response that results in a the Station Service loss of safety function of Building response to the NI Structures, or these loads cannot cause: ,
G other safety-related a Turbine Building l structures, systems, or response that results in a
~ l components adjoining the loss of safety function of ,
Turbine Building; or, a the NI Structures or l loss of safety function of other safety-related safety-related structures, structures, syrtems, or systems, or components components adjoimag the adjoining the Station Turbine Building; or, a Service Building. los5 of safety function of stietv-e! red structures, systems, or components adjoining the Station Service Building. 1 i M Dee# hintedel (t/97) page 2.139
Syntem 80+ Design controiDocument 2.1.9 Auxiliary Boiler Structure Design Description The Auxiliary Boiler Strucwre is a non-safety-related structure which houses the auxiliary bo.ler and its auxiliaries. There is no safety-rdated equipment in the Auxiliary Boiler Structure. The AuxiFary Boiler Structure is located adjacent to the Turbine Building. The structural components of the Auxiliary Boiler Structure accommodate safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) loads to the extent that-the Auxiliary Boiler Structure response to these loads cannot cause: a Turbine Building response. that results in a loss of safety function of the NI Structures or other safety-related structures, systems, or components adjoining the Turbine Building; or, a loss of safety function of safety-related struuures, systems, or components adjoining the Auxiliary Boiler Structure. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.1.9-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Auxiliary Boiler Structure. O O CerDned Design Material (1/97) Page 2.1-40
l Syst m 80+ D* sign C:ntrolDocument e, ,i Table 2.1.9-1 Auxiliary Boiler Structure l V l Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria l
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the structure of the Auxiliary Boiler Auxiliary Boiler described in the design Structure is as described Structure configuration description (Section 2.1),
in the Design Description will be conducted. the as-built Auxiliary (Section 2.1.9). Boiler Structure conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The structural 2. A structural analysis of 2. A structural analysis components of the the as-built Auxiliary report for the Turbine Auxiliary Boiler Boiler Structure will be Building exists which Structure accommodate performed. concludes that structural safe shutdown earthquake components of the as-loads to the extent that built Auxiliary Boiler the Auxiliary Boiler Suucture accommodate Structure response to safe shutdown earthquake these loads cannot cause: loads to the extent that a Turbine Building the Auxiliary Boiler response that results in a Structure response to loss of safety function of these loads cannot cause:
the NI Structures, or a Turbine Building other safety-related response that results in a
/
C structures, systems, or loss of safety function of components adjoining the the NI Structures or Turbine Building; or, a other safety-related loss of safety function of structures, systems, or safety-related structures, components adjoining the systems, or components Turbine Building; or, a adjoining the Auxiliary loss of safety function of Boiler Structure safety-related structures, syswms, or components adjoining the Auxiliary j Boiler Structure. j I l 1 l O (v Coroned Design Afeterial (rj97) page 2. r.4 r
i
. System 80+ Deslan ControlDocument' I p- 2.2 Reactor . ,
j 2.2.1 - . Nuclear Fuel Systesa Design Descdption' 3 The Nuclear Fuel System (NFS) generates heat by a controlled nuclear reaction and transfers the heat i generated'io the reactor coolant. The NFS consists of an arrangement in the reactor vessel of fuel assemblies and control element assemblies (CEAs). The NFS has the safety-related functions of providing : a barrier against the release of radioactive material generated by nuclear reactions in the nuclear fuel and ~ , providing a means to make the reactor core suberitical. .. . A The Basic Configuration of the fuel assembly. the CEAs, and their arrangement in the reactor core is as -! shown on Figures 2.2.1-12.2.1-2, and 2.2.1-3. The reactor core has a maximum of 241 fuel assemblies , and a minimum of 93 CEAs. Each fuel assembly has fuel rods, spacer grids, guide tubes, and upper and lower end fittings. In each f fuel assembly, a minimum of 236 locations are occupied by fuel rods or rods containing burnable neutron , absorber material or other non-fuel material. The remaining locations are subdivided into symmetric ; regions, each of which contains one or more guide tubes. Each guide tube provides a channel for l insertion of a CEA finger or an in-core instrument. Each guide tube is attached to fuel assembly spacer ; grids and to fuel assembly upper and lower end fittings to provide a structural frame to position the fuel -; rods. ; h V Each CEA has a maximum of 12 CEA fingers, each containing neutron absorbing material within a i cylindrical, sealed metal tube. The CEA fingers are held in position at one end and are spaced to allow entry into the guide tubes of fuel assembliec. j Each fuel rod has fissile material in the form of ceramic pellets. The fuel pellets in each fuel rod are contained within a cylindrical, sealed metal tube. Fuel rods can also contain burnable neutron absorbing ; , material. Fuel rods can also be displaced by rods containing burnable neutron absorbing material or other ; non-fuel material. i One or more fuel assemblies can have a neutron generating source located within a guide tube. I The fuel assemblies and CEAs are classified as Seismic Category I. 1 i The fuel assembly, fuel assembly components (including fuel rods and rods containing burnable neutron l absorber material or other non-fuel material), and CEA materials are compatible with the reactor j environment. 1 Fuel rod failure is predicted not to occur during normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences as a result of known fuel rod failure mechanisms during the design lifetime of the fuel. Specified acceptable fuel design limits are predicted not to be exceeded during normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences during the design lifetime of the fuel. z - Coolability will be maintained for all design basis events. Cerend Dee@e asesenial rege 2.2-1
l D~ sign ControlDocument j System 80+ The CEAs are capable of insertion into the core during all modes of plant operation within the insertion time limits assumed in the plant safety analyses for those analyses which presume CEA insertion. The CEAs are capable of controlling reactivity changes to assure that under normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences, with appropriate margin for stuck CEAs, specified acceptable fuel design limits are predicted not to be exceeded. l l The potential amount and rate of reactivity insertion from the CEAs for design basis reactivity accidents are predicted not to result in (i) damage to the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) greater than limited local yielding, or (ii) disruption of the reactor core or reactor internals which would impair the capability to cool the core. In the power operating range, the net effect of the prompt inherent nuclear feedback characteristics (fuel temperature coefficient, moderator temperature coefficient, moderator void coefficient and moderator pressure coefficient) to an increase in reactor thermal power is predicted to be a decrease in reactivity. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.2.1-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Nuclear Fuel System. O, l i 1 I l I I l l O l Cerdtied Design Motorial Page 2.2-2 l l
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GUIDE TUBE 4---FUEL HOD LOCATION NOTE: The number of fuel sed locations shown on this figure represnts a minimum number of fuel rod locations. A fuel rod location c . . . . . . . , LOWER SPACER GRID may be occupied by a fuelrod of egesesee.seseseg S: ****- a rod containing burnable neutron absorber meter 6al or other 1b ..... [ LOWER END F1TTING non. fuel material. __ m _ Fuel Assembly Figure 2.2.1-1 , l 1
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l i Syctem C0 + Design ControlDocument Table 2.2.1-1 Nuclear Fuel System l Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the fuel assemblies, fuel assemblies, CEAs, equipment shown on the CEAs, and the and Nuclear Fuel System Figures 2.2.1 1 and Nuclear Fuel System arrangement will be 2.2.1-2, and the Nuclear arrangement is as showu conducted. Fuel System arrani,ement on Figures 2.2.1-1, shown on Figure 2.2.1-2 and 2.2.1-3. 2.2.1-3, the fuel assemblies, CEAs, and Nuclear Fuel System arrangement conform with the Basic Configuration. i O
O Certi5ed Design Material Page 2.2-6
l System 80+' Deskn Control Document 2.2.2 Control Element Drive Mach ==i== o n - o. ! 1 The control element drive mechanism is a magnetic jack device that positions and holds the control element assemblies relative to the fuel assemblies. ] The primary safety-related function of the Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM) is to release the Control Element Assembly (CEA) upon termination of electrical power to the CEDM. A minimum of 93 CEDMs is required. l ~ The CEDM also acts a a primary pressure boundary as part of the Reactor Coelant System. Refer to Section 2.3.1 for CEDM primary pressure boundary aspects. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Ace ==ca Criteria None The initial test program addressed in Section 2.11 will test the ability of the CEDM to release the CEA upon termination of electrical power to the CEDM. The Basic Configuration of the CEDM prunary pressure boundary components will be verified as part
- of Section 2.3.1.
The CEDM pattern will be verified as part of Section 2.2.1. t 6 6 I i, ; M Deeko heind (11/96) Pope 2.2-7
l i Sv tem 80+ Design ContmlDocwnent
- 2.3 Reactor Coolant System and Connecting Systems 2.3.1 Reactor Coolant System -
Design Descdption . ; i
= The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) removes heat generated in the reactor core and transfers the heat to ;
the steam generators. The reactor coolant system forms part of the pressure and fission product boundary l between the reactor coolant and the Contamment atmosphere. l The' Basic Configuration of the RCS is as shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through,2.3.1-4. The pressure retaining components of the RCS and the RCS instrumentation shown on the figures, except as noted on the Figures, are safety related. The RCS is located in the Containment and has a reactor vessel (RV), two vertical, U-tube steam j ' generators (SGs), four vertical, shaft sealed reactor coolant pumps (RCPs), one pressurizer (PZR), four pressurizer safety valves, piping, heaters, controls, instrumentation, and valves. l The reactor vessel has a vessel assembly and a removable closure head assembly. The vessel assembly ! has a shell, lower head, and vessel flange forgings, welded together. The closure head assembly has a ; dome and head flange forgings, welded together. Forged reactor coolant inlet and outlet nozzles are j welded to a shell section. Nozzles for control element drive mechanisms and instrumentation are welded l to the closure head assembly, and nozzles for instrumentation are welded to the lower head forging. i O 1 RCP seal injection flow is provided by the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS). The RCPs l have anti-reverse rotation devices, i r The RCPs circulate reactor coolant water in loops through the RV to the SGs and back to the RV. The PZR provides a surge volume for the reactor coolant and pressurizes the RCS. ; 1 RCS instrumentation has core exit thermocouples (CETs) in the in-core instrumentation (ICI) detector l I assemblies, heated junction thermocouples (HJTCs) in the HJTC probe assemblies, and differential pressure-based level detectors between the shutdown cooling system (SCS) suction lines and two safety injection system (SIS) direct vessel injection (DVI) lines, and differential pressure-based level detectors J between the SCS suction lines and the reactor coolant gas vent subsystem (RCGVS) in the safety l, depressurization system (SDS). Instrumentation is also provided to measure reactor coolant level across + the vertical span of the reactor vessel outlet nozzles. The pressurizer safety valves provide overpressure protection for reactor coolant pressure boundary components in the RCS. Low temperature overpressure protection for the RCS is provided by the shutdown cooling system (SCS). 1 The pressure retaining components of the reactor coolant pressure boundary that are made of ferritic materials meet the fracture toughness requirements of the ASME Code Section III. Reactor vessel beltline materials have Charpy upper shelf energy of no less than 75 ft.-lb. initially. The RV beltline materials
- are SA-508 Class 2 or 3 for forgings and austenitic stainless steel or Ni-Cr-Fe alloy equivalent to SB-166
. for cladding. The reactor vessel base metal in the active core region has a minimum thickness. 1 N cwena owe m.ww r.o. u1
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Syntem 80+ Design ControlDocument ; l The RV is equipped with holders for at least six capsules for accommodating material surveillance specimens. Specimens taken from materials actually used in fabrication of the belt line region are inserted in the capsules and include Charpy V-notch specimens of base metal, weld metal and heat. affected zone material, and tensile specimens from base metal and weld metal. I The RCPs circulate coolant at a rate which removes heat generated in the reactor core. Each RCP motor has a flywheel which retains its integrity at a design overspeed condition of 125 percent of operating speed. Each RCP has rotating inertia to slow the pump flow coastdown when electrical power is disconnected. Each SG steam outlet nozzle has an integral flow-limiting venturi. Each direct vessel injection nozzle cross sectional flow area is limited. The ASME Code Section III Class for the RCS pressure retaining components shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4 is as depicted on the Figures. Components shown as ASME Code Class I on Figures 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4 are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Class I requirements. The RV pressure boundary welds are ultrasonically examined during construction in accordance with ASME Code Section XI as it pertains to pre-service baseline inspection. The safety related equipment shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4 is classified Seismic Category 1. ASME Class 1 and 2 components shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4 have a design pressure of at least 2485 psig and a design temperature of at least 650'F, except the ASME Class 2 portions of the steam generator on Figures 2.3.1-1 and 2.3.1-4, which have a design pressure of at least 1185 psig and a design temperature of at least 570*F. Displays of the RCS instrumentation shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4 exist in the main control . room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. J Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the RCPs, open and close those power operated valves shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4, and energif.e or de-energize the pressurizer heaters. !
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Two pressurizer backup heater banks are powered from different Class IE Divisions. The other pressurizer heaters, the reactor coolant pump motors, and power-operated valves shown on Figure 2.3.1-1 are powered from non-Class IE sources. Instrumentation shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4 is powered from its respective Class IE Division except as follows: the instrumentation to measure reactor coolant level across the vertical span of the reactor vessel outlet nozzles, the refueling water level instruments between the SCS suction lines and safety injection system lines, and the refueling water level instruments between the SCS suction lines and the SDS on Figure 2.3.1-1 are powered from non-Class IE sources. Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, in the RCS. O Certified Design Meterial Page 2.32
System 80+ Design ControlDocument ; Valves with response positions indicated on Figure 2.3.1-1 change position to that indicated on the figure _; upon loss of motive powcr. inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria ; Table 2.3.1-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, anxi associated acceptance criteria for the Reactor Coolant System. ! J
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Sy tem 80 + Design CrntrolDocument O NO77tE SCHEDtRE CEDM UPPER SERVICE ' HO. PRESSURE HOUSNG COOLANT INLET 4 CEDM AND COOLANT OUTLET 2 INSTRUMENTATION CEDM AND HOZZLES NCEDM MOTOR INSTRUMENTATION N0ZZLES (MMMUM) \ HOUSNG ASSEMSLY IN-CORE INSTRUMENTATION 4 YENT.RCGVs t g[ CLOSUR6 SEAL LEAK MONITOR DIRECT VESSEL IN.L 1 4 VENTJtCGVS [ MATING SURFACE \.. " SEAL LEAK f MONITOR I"9 t 4 -- N HEATED A FJ JUNCTION DVINOZZLE I B , MMOCOWLE g INLET c_. e PHOSES
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1 CORE EXfT T I TERMOCOUPLE % BASE METAL TMCKNESS IN CORE REGION - *-D G LETTER DWENSIONS (INCHES)[ NOTE 2] A 194.32 8 30.00 C 42.00 D 9.06 E 182.25 : - E F B.5 g 489.35 NOTES:
- 1. The Reactor Veeeel Presswo Retaavieng Cofnpements are AStaE Code Section II o Class 1 and are Safety-Related IN40RE
- 2. The sfunenosone in tNa Figwe see j\lNSTRUMENTATION provided for informansa only and are not NOZZLES part of the Certilled Dealga Material Reactor Coolant System (Reactor Vessel) Figure 2.3.1-3 Certined Design nesterial Page 2.3-6
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RCS SUCTION LEG RCS HOT LEG l D m I* Y g NOTES: Q y 1. TWO OF FOUR INETRUMENT CNANNELS ARE SHOWN. OTHER TWO CHANNELS ARE ARRAMGED S6MILARLY. 3 y 2. g t SQUIPMNT FOR VROCH PARACNLAPH NUMBER 3 OF THE ' VERIFICATION FOR BASIC CONFIGURATION FOR SYSTEMS
- seenON OFTHE GENERAL PROVISIONS (SECnON 1.2) APPLIES. q&
4 L 3. THE INSTRUMENTATION AND ASABE CODE SECTION N CLASS 1 AND 2 PRESSURE RETAmeNG COMPONENTS SHOWN ARE SAFETY-RELATED THE SAFETY-RELATED INSTRUMENTATION 85 POWERED FROM FTS RESPECTIVE e o j CLASS 1E DIVISION. '@ u 5 b I-s _
1 l Sy~ tem 80 + Design ControlDocument I Talile 2.3.1-1 Reactor Coolant System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptan:e Criteria ! L
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components i of the RCS is as shown RCS configuration will be and equipment shown l on Figures 2.3.1-1 conducted. on Figures 2.3.1-1 l through 2.3.1-4. through 2.3.1-4, the as- l built RCS conforms l with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. 'Ihe pressurizer safety 2.a) Testing and analysis in 2.a) Pressurizer Safety valves provide accordance with ASME Valve set pressure overpressure protection Code Section Ill will be equals 2500 psia i 25 for reactor coolant performed to determine set psi.
pressure boundary pressure. components in the RCS. b) Type tests of flow capacity b) The minimum valve of the pressurizer safety capacity is $25,000 valves will be performed in Ib/hr steam. accordance with ASME Code Section Ill. c) Type tests of the c) The pressurizer safety pressurizer safety valves at valves have been type full flow and full pressure tested at inlet pressures will be perfonned. of at least 2575 psia and the measured valve stem lift is greater than or equal to full flow lift.
- 3. RV beltline materials 3. Testing of Charpy V-notch 3. The initial RV beltline have Charpy upper-shelf specimens of RCS beltline Charpy upper shelf energy of no less than 75 materials will be energy is no less than ft-Ib initially. performed. 75 ft-lb.
4.a) The RV beltline materials 4.a) Inspection of the RV 4.a) The RV beltline are SA-508 Class 2 or 3 beltline material test materials are SA-508 for forgings and reports will be conducted. Class 2 or 3 for austenitic stainless steel forgings and austenitic or Ni-Cr-Fe alloy stainless steel or Ni-Cr-equivalent to SB-166 for Fe alloy equivalent to cladding. SB-166 for cladding. 4.b) The reactor vessel base 4.b) Inspection of the as-built 4.b) The RV base metal in metal in the active core RV will be pcrformed. the active core region region has a minimum is at least 9.06 inches thickness. thick. O , certdied Design Material Page 2.3-8
System 80+ Design Control Document
.(VD) Table 2.3.1-1 Reactor Coolant System (Continued)
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 5. The RV is equipped with 5. Inspection of the RV for 5. At least six capsules are holders for at least six presence of capsules will in the reactor vessel.
capsules for be performed. accommodating material surveillance specimens.
- 6. RV material specimens 6. Inspection of RV material 6. RV material specimens taken from the actual specimens will be are made from material
- material from which the performed. used in RV fabrication, vessel was fabricated are and include Charpy V-inserted in the capsules, notch specimens of base and include Charpy V- metal, weld metal, and notch specimens of base heat-affected zone metal, weld metal, and material, and tensile ,
heat-affected zone specimens from base material, and tensile metal and weld metal. specimens from base j metal and weld metal. l 7.a) The RCPs circulate 7.a) Testing to measure RCS 7.a) Calculated post-core RCS !
% flow rate is at least 95 !
coolant at a rate which flow with four RCPs removes heat generated operating at normal zero percent of 445,600 in the reactor core. reactor power pressure gallons per minute ! i and temperature (423,320 gpm). conditions will be performed. Analyses to I convert the measured l pre-core flow rate to an expected post-core flow rate will be performed. 7.b) Each RCP motor has a 7.b) Shop testing of each RCP 7.b) Each RCP flywheel has flywheel which retains its flywheel will be passed an overspeed test integrity at 125% of performed at the vendor of no less than 125% of operating speed. facility at overspeed operating speed. conditions. % 7.c) Each RCP has rotating 7.c) Inspection of as-built 7.c) The rotating inertia of inertia to slow the pump RCP vendor data will be each RCP and motor flow coastdown when performed. assembly is no less than electrical power is 147,401 pounds-foot disconnected. squared.
- 8. Each steam generator 8. Inspection of as-built SG 8. Each SG steam ouilet steam outlet nozzle has steam outlet nozzles will nozzle has an integral an integral flow-limiting be performed. venturi with a throat area venturi, no greater than 1.283 square feet.
CersrnmiDesigro A000eniel Page 2.3-9
! l l Syntem 80+ Design Control Document l Table 2.3.1-1 Reactor Coolant System (Continued) 9i) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 9. Each direct vessel 9. Inspection of as-built 9. Each direct vessel nozzle 1 l
injection nozzle cross direct vessel injection has a cross sectional flow sectional flow area is nozzles will be area no greater than limited. performed. 56.75 square inches. 10.a) The ASME Code Section 10.a) A pressure test will be 10.a) The results of the III RCS components conducted on those pressure test of the shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 components of the RCS ASME Code Section Ill through 2.3.1-4 retain required to be pressure components of the RCS their pressure boundary tested by ASME Code conform with the integrity under internal Section III. pressure testing pressures that will be acceptance criteria in the experienced during ASME Code Section III. sersce. 10.b) Components shown as 10.b) Inspection of the ASME 10.b) The ASME Code Section l ASME Code Class 1 on design reports will be III design reports exist Figures 2.3.1-1 through conducted. for the RCS Class 1 2.3.1-4 are designed and components. constructed in accordance l with ASME Code Class I requirements. l lI.a) Displays of the RCS 11.a) Inspection for the 11.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown on existence or retrievability instrumentation shown on Figures 2.3.1-1 through in the MCR of Figures 2.3.1-1 through 2.3.1-4 exist in the MCR instrumentation displays 2.3.1-4 exist in the MCR or can be retrieved there. will be performed. or can be retrieved there. I1.b) Controls exist in the 11.b) Testing will be 11.b) RCS controls in the MCR to start and stop performed using the RCS MCR operate to start and the RCPs, to open and controls in the MCR. stop the RCPs, to open close those power and close those power operated valves shown on operated valves shown Figures 2.3.1 1 through on Figures 2.3.1-1 2.3.14, and to energize through 2.3.1-4, and to or de-energize the energize or de-energize pressurizer heaters. the pressurizer heaters. 12.a) Two pressurizer backup 12.a) Testing will be 12.a) Within the RCS, a test heater banks are powered performed on the signal exists only at the from different Class IE pressurizer heaters by equipment powered from Divisions. providing a test signal m the Class IE Division or only one Class IE bus under test. Division at a time. O Cerarmt Design Materlat Page 2.3-r0
Sy' tem 80+ Design ControlDocument \ m i l (v) Table 2.3.1-1 Reactor Coolant System (Continued) j 1 l Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria i 12.b) Instrumentation shown on 12.b) Testing will be 12.b) Within the RCS, a test Figures 2.3.1 1 through performed on the Class signal exists only at the ( 2.3.1-4 is powered from lE instrumentation shown equipment powered from l its respective Class IE on Figures 2.3.1-1 the Class IE Division or ) bus, except as listed in through 2.3.1-4 by bus under test. the Design Description. providing a test signal in l only one Class IE bus at a time. 12.c) Independence is provided 12.c) Inspection of the as- 12.c) Physical separation exists between Class IE installed Class IE between Class IE Divisions, and between Divisions of the RCS will Divisions in the RCS. Class IE Divisions and be performed. Physical separation exists non-Class IE equipment, between Class IE in the RCS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the RCS. j
- 13. Valves with response 13. Testing of loss of motive 13. These valves change positions indicated on power to these valves position to the position Figure 2.3.1-1 change will be performed. indicated on Figure position to that indicated 2.3.1-1 on loss of motive
( 7]3 on the figure upon loss of power. l motive power. l l i 1 l I d I Certifed Design Material Page 2.311
Syntem 80+ oesign controlDocument 2.3.2 Shutdown Cooling System Design Description The Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) is a safety-related system which removes heat from the reactor coolant and transfers the heat to the componen: cooling water system (CCWS) during reduced reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure and temperature conditions. The SCS can be aligned to remove heat from the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) and transfer the heat to the CCWS. The SCS is actuated manually. The SCS provides low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) for the RCS. The SCS is located in the reactor building subsphere and Containment. The Basic Configuration of the SCS is as shown on Figure 2.3.2-1. The SCS consists of two Divisions. Each SCS Division has a SCS pump, a SCS heat exchanger, valves, piping, controls, and instrumentation. Each SCS Division has the heat removal capacity to cool the reactor coolant from SCS entry conditions to cold shutdown conditions, within 36 hours after reactor shutdown, assuming SCS operation commences no later than 14 hours after reactor shutdown. Each SCS Division has the heat removal capacity to cool the IRWST after design bases events or feed and bleed operation using the SIS and SDS. Each SCS Division contains a relief valve that provides LTOP for the RCS when the RCS is connected to the SCS. The SCS pump and the containment spray system (CSS) pump in the same Division are connected by piping and valves such that the CSS pump in a Division can perform the pumping function of the SCS pump in that Division. The piping and valves in the cross-connect line between the SCS pump suction and the CSS pump suction permit flow in either direction. In each Division, a flow-limiting device is installed downstream from the SCS pump discharge between the cross-connect line from the CSS pump discharge and the Containment isolation valves in the SCS pump discharge line to limit runout flow. The piping from the RCS to the SCS pump suction is self venting and contains no loop seals. The SCS pumps can be tested at design flow during plant operation. The ASME Code Section III Class for the SCS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.3.2-1 is as depicted on the Figure. Safety related equipment shown on Figure 2.3.2-1 is classified Seismic Category 1. SCS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.3.2-1, except the shell sides of heat exchangers, have a design pressure of at least 900 psig. O Certified Design Material Page 2.312
System 80+ Design controlDocument (n Displays of the SCS instn::r.cntation shown on Figure 2.3.2-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the SCS pumps, and to open and close those power operated valves shown on Figure 2.3.2-1. SCS alarms shown on Figure 2.3.2-1 are provided in the MCR. Water is supplied to each SCS pump at a pressure greater than the pump's required net positive suction head (NPSH) during expected operations. The Class IE loads shown on Figure 2.3.2-1 are powered from their respective Class IE Division. The SCS pump motor and the CSS pump motor in each Division are powered from different Class IE buses in that Division. Independence is provided between Class 1E Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, in the SCS. The two mechanical Divisions of the SCS are physically separated. A containment spray actuation signal (CSAS) can be aligned to start an SCS pump when the CSS pump in the same Division is not operable. If the CSAS is aligned to start the SCS pump in a Division, the CSS pump in the same Division will not start on a CSAS. . SCS suction line isolation valves have independent interlocks to prevent opening the isolation valves if reactor coolant pressure would cause the SCS LTOP relief valve to lift. }p .g Motor operated valves (MOVs) having an active safety function will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under differential pressure or fluid flow conditions and under temperature conditions. Check valves shown on Figure 2.3.2-1 wil: open, or will close, or will open and also close, under system pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.3.2-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Shutdown Cooling System. l t I CoroNed Deelgrr Motoriel , Pope 2.313
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument I id f'N Tal,le 2.3.2-1 Shutdown Cooling System ; Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria !
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the SCS is as shown SCS configuration will be equipment shown on on Figure 2.3.2-1. conducted. Figure 2.3.2-1, the as-built SCS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
2.a) Each SCS Division has 2.a) Testing and analysis of 2.a) Flew through the SCS the heat removal capacity the SCS to measure heat exchanger and heat to cool the reactor pump head and the exchanger bypass line coolant from SCS entry shutdown cooling flow at can be adjusted while conditions to cold the combined discharge maintaining a flow of no , shutdown conditions. of the SCS heat less than 5000 gpm per exchanger and heat Division. Each SCS exchanger bypass line pump provides at least will be performed. 400 feet of head at a Testing, inspection, and flow rate no less than analyses will be 5000 gpm. The heat j performed to determine removal capability of one the heat removal SCS Division, as capability of the SCS measured by the product !f heat exchanger. of the service heat transfer coefficient and I the effective heat transfer , area of the SCS heat , exchanger is no less than 1.38 x 106 BTU /hr 'F. 2.b) Each SCS Division has 2.b) Testing and analyses of 2.b) Each SCS pump develops the heat removal capacity the SCS to measure at least 400 feet of head to cool the IRWST after pump head and flow at at a flow rate no less design bases events or the combined discharge than 5000 gpm. feed and bleed operation of the SCS heat using the SIS and SDS. exchanger, with suction and rerum lines aligned to the IRWST, will be e- performed.
- 3. Each SCS Division 3. Shop testing of the LTOP 3. LTOP relief valve set contains a relief valve relief valve se' pressure pressure is not greater that provides LTOP for will be perfo'mt.d. Shop than 545 psia and each the RCS when the RCS testing and analyses of valve has a capacity of ,
is connected to the SCS. the LTOP relief valves no less than 5000 gpm. capacity will be i conducted in accordance ; with ASME Code Section III. j I CerNNed Design A0esariel Page 2.3-r5 l
Sy~ tem 80 + Design controlDocument Table 2.3.2-1 Shutdown Cooling System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 4. The CSS pump in a 4. Testing to measure the 4 The CSS pump in a Division can perform the flowrate produced by the Division develops at least function of the SCS CSS pump, when its 400 ft oflicad at a flow pump in the Division. suction is cross-connected of at least 5000 gpm to the SCS pump suction through the SCS heat and its discharge to the exchanger in the SCS pump discharge, Division.
will be performed.
- 5. In each Division, a flow 5. Testing will be 5. In each Division, a flow limiting device is performed with flow limiting device is installed downstream aligned to the RCS installed downstream from the SCS pump (suction from the hot leg from the SCS pump discharge between the and discharge to the discharge between the cross-connect line from direct vessel injection cross-connect line from the CSS pump discharge nozzle.) the CSS pump discharge and the Containment and the contaimnent isolation valves to limit isolation valves. The runout flow. SCS maximum flow is less than or equal to 6500 gpm in each Division.
- 6. The piping from the RCS 6. Inspection of the as-built 6. The piping from the RCS to the SCS pump suction piping will be conducted. to the SCS pump suction is self-venting and has no loop seals and is contains no loop seals. oriented downward or horizontal except for an upward section connecting to the pump suction flange.
- 7. The SCS pumps can be 7. Testing and analysis of 7. Each SCS pump develops ,
tested at design flow the SCS will be at least 400 ft of head at during plant operation. performed by manually a flow of at least 5000 aligning suction and gpm through the test discharge valves to the loop. IRWST and starting the SCS pumps manually.
- 8. The ASME Code Section 8. A pressure test will be 8. The results of the Ill SCS components conducted on those pressure test of ASME shown on Figure 2.3.2-1 components of the SCS Code Section III retain their pressure required to be pressure components of the SCS boundary integrity under tested by ASME Code conform with the intemal pressures that Section Ill. pressure testing will be experienced acceptance criteria in during sewice. ASME Code Section III.
Certmed Design atatorial Page 2.3-16
Sv' tem 80 & Design ControlDocument 1 O Table 2.3.2 Shutdown Cooling System (Continued) j l I Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses l Acceptance Criteria 9.a) Displays of the SCS 9.a) laspection for the 9.a) Displays of the i tstrumentation shown on existence or retrievability instrumentation shown on f i hgure 2.3.2-1 exist in in the MCR of Figure 2.3.2-1 exist in the MCR or can be instrumentation displays the MCR or can be , retrieved there. will be performed. retrieved there. 9.b) Controls exist in the 9.b) Testing will be 9.b) SCS controls in the MCR i MCR to start and stop performed using the SCS operate to start and stop the SCS pumps, and to controls in the MCR. the SCS pumps, and to open and close those open and close those power operated valves power operated valves shown on Figure 2.3.21. shown in Figure 2.3.2-1. 9.c) SCS alarms shown on 9.c) Testing of the SCS 9.c) The SCS alarms shown Figure 2.3.2-1 are alarms shown on Figure on Figure 2.3.2-1 actuate l provided in the MCR. 2.3.2-1 will be in the MCR in response performed using signals to a signal simulating simulating alarm alarm conditions. conditions. ;
- 10. Water is supplied to each 10. Testing to measure SCS 10. The calculated available
/m\ SCS pump at a pressure pump suction pressure NPSH exceeds each SCS U
4 greater than the pump's will be performed. pump's required NPSH. , required net positive laspections and analyses i suction head (NPSH). to determine NPSH available to each pump will be prepared based on test data and as-built I data. II.a) Class IE loads shown on ll.a) Testing will be 11.a) Within the SCS, a test Figure 2.3.2-1 are performed on the SCS by signal exists only at the powered from their providing a test signal in equipment powered from respective Class IE only one Class IE the Class IE Division Division. Division at a time. under test. II.b) The SCS pump motor ll.b) Testing on the SCS and ll.b) A test signal exists only and the CSS pump motor the CSS will be at the SCS pump motor in each Division are conducted with a test or CSS pump motor l powered from different signal applied to one powered f-om the Class Class IE buses in that class IE bus at a time. IE bus under test. Division.
!!.c) Independence is provided ll.c) Inspection of the as- 11.c) Physical separation exists between Class IE installed Class IE between Class IE Divisions, and between Divisions of the SCS will Divisions in the SCS.
Class IE Divisions and be performed. Physical separation exists s non-Class IE equipment, between Class IE s in the SCS. Divisions and non-Class 1E equipme it in the SCS. cwamw onion aseennet Pope 2.3-r7
System 80+ Design ControlDocument l 1 Table 2.3.2-1 Shutdown Cooling System (Continued) l 1 Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria l l
- 12. The two mechanical 12. Inspection of the as-built 12. The two mechanical Divisions of the SCS are SCS mechanical Divisions of the SCS are physically separated. Divisions will be separated by a Divisional j performed, wall or a fire barrier I except for components of the system within Containment which are separated by spatial arrangement or barriers.
- 13. SCS suction line isolation 13. Testing using a simulated 13. The SCS suction valves have independent RCS pressure signal isolation valves do not interlocks to prevent greater than the SCS open. l opening the isolation suction line valves valves if RCS pressure interlock pressure will be would cause the SCS performed by attempting LTOP relief valve to lift. to open the valves from i l
the MCR. Each valve will be tested independently. ,
- 14. Motor operated valves 14. Testing will be 14. Each MOV having an O'l (MOVs) having an active performed to opan, or active safety function safety function will open, close, or open and also opens, or closes, or or will close, or will close, MOVs having an opens and also closes.
open and also close, active safety function under differential under preoperational pressure or fluid flow differential pressure or conditions and under fluid flow conditions and temperature conditions, under temperature conditions.
- 15. Check valves shown on 15. Testing will be 15. Each check valve shown Figure 2.3.2-1 will open, performed to open, or on Figure 2.3.2-1 opens, or will close, or will close, or open and also or closes, or opens and open and also close under close check valves shown also closes.
system pressure, fluid on Figure 2.3.2-1 under flow conditions, or system preoperational temperature conditions. pressure, INid flow conditions or temperature conditions. O Certified Design Motenel Pope 2.3.r8
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Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 16. A contamment spray 16. Testing will be 16. A signal simulatmg a 4 actuation signal (CSAS) performed with the CSAS starts the SCS can be aligned to stan an CSAS aligned to stan the pump in a Division and SCS pump when the CSS SCS pump using a signal does not start the CSS i pump in the same simulating a CSAS. pump in the same -
Division is not operable. Division, when the If the CSAS is aligned to CSAS is aligned to start stan the SCS pump in a the SCS pump. Division, the CSS pump in the same Division will - not stan on a CSAS. l I 4 O
System 80+ Design ControlDocument l 2.3.3 Reactor Coolant System Component Supports Design Description The reactor vessel, the steam generators, the reactor coolant pamps and the pressurizer are supported by the reacior coolant system (RCS) component supports. The RCS component supports permit movement of the RCS components due to expansion and contraction of the RCS. The component supports are safety related. i The RCS component suppons are located within the containment. The four reactor vessel support columns vertically support the reactor vessel and accommodate horizontal thermal expansion. Each reactor vessel nozzle cold leg forging mates with a reactor vessel suppon column and serves as a key which mates with a keyway. Lower keys protruding from the reactor vessel ; i mate with a slot in each support column base plate. The slot in the support column base plate serves as a keyway. These horizontal keys and keyways guide the vessel during expansion and contraction of the i RCS, maintain the vessel centerline position, and laterally support the vessel. The Basic Configuration ) of the Reactor Vessel Supports is as shown on Figure 2.3.3-1. Each steam generator (SG) is supponed at the bottom by an integral skin attached to a sliding base plate resting on bearings. The bearings allow the SG to move as the RCS expands and contracts. Keys and keyways within the sliding base guide the movement of the SG during expansion and contraction of the ; RCS and limit movement of the SG bottom in the direction at right angles to the direction of motion l during RCS expansion and contraction. The upper ponion of the SG is supported by a system of keys, keyways and snubbers. The upper SG support system guides the top of the steam generator during l expansion and contraction of the RCS and laterally suppons the SG. The Basic Configuration of the SG l Supports is as shown on Figure 2.3.3-2. i Each reactor coolant pump (RCP) is supported by vertical columns, lower and upper horizontal columns, and snubbers. The columns provide vertical and horizontal support of the RCP, while allowing movement of the RCP during expansion and contraction of the RCS. The Basic Configuration of the RCP Supports is as shown on Figure 2.3.3-3. The pressurizer is supponed at the bottom by an integral skin. Keys and keyways provide lateral support of the upper portion of the pressurizer. The Basic Configuration of the Pressurizer Supports is as shown on Figure 2.3.3-4. The RCS Suppons are designed for loads due to normal operation, testing, seismic, and accident conditions. The Reactor Coolant System Component Supports are designed and constmeted in accordance with the ASME Code, Section III requirements and are classified Seismic Category I. Inspection, Test, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.3.3-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Reactor ! Coolant System Component Suppons. O Certifonef Desipre Ataterm! Pege 2.3-20
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Sy~ tem 80 + Design control Document CT Reactor Coolant System Component Supports Table 2.3.3-1 () Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The RCS component 1. A test of the RCS will be 1. Required gaps exist for suppons permit performed to monitor the RCS component movement of the RCS thermal motion during suppons.
components due to heatup and cooldown of expansion and contraction the RCS. of the RCS.
- 2. The Reactor Coolant 2. Inspection will be 2. ASME Ccde Section 1I1 System Component performed for the Design Repons exist for Suppons are designed existence of the ASME the Reactor Coolant and constructed in Code Section III Design System Component accordance with the Repons for the Reactor Suppons.
ASME Code, Section III. Coolant System Component Suppons.
- 3. The Basic Configuration 3. Inspection of the as-built 3. For the RCS Componoit l
of the RCS Component RCS Component Suppons shown on Suppons is as shown on Suppons configuration Figures 2.3.3-1 th.ough Figures 2.3.31 through will be conducted. 2.3.3-4, the as-built RCS ; 2.3.3-4. Component Supports ! conform with the Basic Configuration. (v ) 4 The as built RCS 4. Inspection of the RCS 4. The as-built RCS Component Suppons are Component Suppons will Component Suppons are l reconciled with the as- be performed to confirm reconciled with the as- l designed configuration. their designed conditions. designed suppon system. i D u ! 4 Q'
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Syotem 80 + Design ControlDo:ument 2.3.4 NSSS Integrity Monitoring System Design Description The NSSS Integrity Monitoring System (NIMS) is a non-safety-related instrumentation and control system which consists of the Internals Vibration Monitoring System (IVMS), the Acoustic Leak Monitoring System (ALMS), and the Loose Parts Monitoring System (LPMS). The NIMS provides data to the data processing system (DPS). The IVMS provides data from which changes in the motion of the reactor internals can be detected. The ALMS provides data and alarms in response to high acoustic levels originating from a reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) leak. The LPMS provides data and alarms in response to vibration of the RCPB associated with loose parts within the RCPB. it . NIMS is located in the nuclear island stractures. Displays of the NIMS instrumentation exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.3.41 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptaace criteria for the NSSS Integrity Monitoring System. O: J l 1 l l I O l Certined Design Material Page 2.3-26 I
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- 1. The IVMS provides data 1. Testing will be 1. The IVMS provides data from which changes in performed on the IVMS to the DPS in response to '
the motion of the reactor by providing a test signal the test signal. internals can be detected. simulating a time-varying - signal from the excore neutron detector channels.
- 2. The ALMS provides data 2.a) Inspection of the as-built 2.a) ALMS sensors are and alarms in response to ALMS configuration will provided in locations high acoustic levels be performed. specified in Table originating from a RCPB 2.3.4-2.
leak. 2.b) Testing will be 2.b) The ALMS provides data performed on the ALMS and alarms to the DPS in by providing a test signal response to the test simulating high acoustic signal. levels.
- 3. The LPMS provides data 3.a) Inspection of the as-built 3.a) LPMS sensors are and alarms in response to LPMS configuration will provided in locations :
(- vibration of the RCPB be performed. specified in Table l ( 2.3.4-3. I associated with loose 1 parts within the RCPB. 3.b) Testing will be 3.b) The LPMS provides data performed on the LPMS and alarms to the DPS in by providing a test signal response to the test simulating motion of the signal. RCPB locations.
- 4. Displays of the NIMS 4. Inspection for the 4. Displays of the NIMS instrumentation exist in existence or retrievability mstrumentation exist in the MCR or can be in the MCR of the MCR or can be retrieved there. instrumentation displays retrieved there.
will be performed. ! l l l I
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Sy tem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.3.4-2 Sensor Locations for Acoustic Leak Monitoring System h Component Number of Sensors Location Reactor Coolant Pump 4 (1 per pump) Seal Stam Generators 2 (1 per SG) Primary side, manway llot legs 2 (1 per Leg) Reactor vessel outlet nozzle Cold Legs 4 (1 per Leg) Reactor vessel inlet nozzle Reactor Vessel 3 Upper head, CEDM nozzles Reactor Vessel 1 Lower head, instrument nozzle Pressurizer Safety Valves 4 (1 per valve) Discharge line Pressurizer 1 Heater region l l 1 l 1 l l I I O I l Certined Design Maternel Page 2.3-28 , 1 l i
i System 80+ Design ControlDocument rm Table 2.3.4-3 Sensor Locations for Loose Parts Monitoring System t (J Component - Number of Sensors Location Reactor Vessel 3 Lower Head 3 Upper Head Steam Generator 1 4 Primary (inlet plenum) Primary (outlet plenum) Secondary (economizer region) Secondary (can deck
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Steam Generator 2 4 Primary (inlet plenum) Primary (outlet plenum) Secondary (economizer region) Secondary (can deck region)
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- System 80+ oeslan controlDocument ii '2.4 Engineered Safety Systems 2.4.1 Safety Depressurization System Design Description The Safety Depressurization System (SDS) is a safety-related system composed of two subsystems. The reactor coolant gas vent subsystem (RCGVS) provides a means to vent steam and non-condensible gases from the pressurizer (PZR) and the reactor vessel upper head (RVUH). The rapid depressurization subsystem (RDS) provides a means to rapidly depressurize the RCS by venting the PZR. The SDS is manually actuated.
The SDS is located inside Containment. The Basic Configuration of the SDS is as shown on Figure 2.4.1-1.
' The SDS consists of two redundant RDS piping trains from the pressurizer to the spargers in the in- I containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST), and two RCGVS piping trains, one from the -
pressurizer and one from the RVUH, which discharge to either the reactor drain tank (RDT) or the IRWST spargers. The RCGVS venting capacity will depressurize the RCS following design basis events.
/9 The RDS depressurization capacity, in conjunction with safety injection system (SIS) operation, will V prevent uncovering the core during a total loss of feedwater (TLOFW).
The ASME Code Section Ill Class for the SDS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.4.1-1 is as depicted on the figure, , The safety-related equipment and the ultrasonic instruments on the PZR safety valve discharge lines shown on Figure 2.4.1-1 are classified Seismic Category I. Displays of the SDS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.4.1-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to open and close those power-operated valves shown on Figure 2.4.1-1. SDS I alarms shown on Figure 2.4.1-1 are provided in the MCR. Within the RDS, in one mechanical train, each isolation valve is powered from a different Class IE bus within its Class IE Division, and in the other mechanical train, each isolation valve is powered from a i different Class IE bus in the other Class IE Division. Within the RCGVS, in the pressurizer vent train and in the RVUH vent train, each isolation valve in one branch line is powered from a different Clar.s IE bus within its Class IE Division, and c.ach isolation valve in the other branch line is powered from a different Class IE bus in the other Class 1E Division. The isolation valve to the RDT and the cross-connect valve between discharge lines to the RDT and the IRWST are powered from different Class 1E Divisions, i v};
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Syntem 80+ Design ControlDocument Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, in the SDS. Within the RCGVS in the pressurizer vent train and in the RVUH vent train, the two branch lines with isolation valves are physically separated. Motor operated valves (MOVs) having an active safety function will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under differential pressure or fluid flow conditions and under temperature conditions. Valves with response positions indicated on Figure 2.4.1-1 change position tc, that indicated on the Figure upon loss of motive power. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.4.1-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Safety Depressurization System. O t O Certined Deskrn Material page 2,4 2
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- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the SDS is as shown SDS configuration will equipment shown on on Figure 2.4.1-1. be conducted. Figure 2.4.1-1, the as-built SDS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
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- 2. The RCGVS venting 2. Testing to determine 2. The RCGVS capacity will depressurize RCS depressurization depressurizes the RCS at the RCS following design rate will be performed. a rate of at least 0.9 psi basis events. Analyses will be per second at an initial performed to convert the pressurizer pressure of test results to a 2250 psia.
depressurization rate at ; aa RCS starting pressure. l
- 3. The RDS 3. Type tests of the RDS 3. A single RDS train in l depressurization capacity, valve flow capacity will conjunction with two of in conjunction with SIS be performed. Analysis four safety injection (SI) operation, will prevent of totalloss of feedwater pumps, prevents core i uncovering the core will be performed, using uncovery following a j during a total loss of the as-built system TLOFW if feed and (
feedwater, characteristics. bleed is initiated immediately following the opening of pressurizer safety valves. The two RDS trains have sufficient total flow capacity with all SI pumps operating to prevent core uncovery following a TLOFW if feed and bleed is delayed up to 30 minutes from the time pressurizer safety valves lift.
- 4. The ASME Code Section 4. A pressure test will be 4. The results of the Hi CDS components conducted on those pressure test of ASME shown ou Figure 2.4.1 1 components of the SDS Code Section 111 portions retain their pressure required to be pressure of the SDS conform with boundary integrity under tested by ASME Code the pressure testing internal pressures that Section Ill. acceptance criteria in will be experienced ASME Code Section !!!.
during service. O Certtfd Design Materist Pope 2.4-4
System 80+ Design ControlDocument fm Table 2.4.1-1 Safety Depressurization System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 5.a) Displays of the SDS . 5.a) Inspection for the existence 5.a) Displays of the instmmentation shown on or retrievability in the instrumentation shown Figure 2.4.1-1 exist in MCR ofinstrumentation on Figure 2.4.1-1 exist -; the MCR or can be displays will be performed. in the MCR or can be , retrieved there. retrieved there. 5.b) Controls exist in the 5.b) - Testing will be perfonned 5.b) SDS controls in the MCR to open and close using the SDS controls in MCR operate to open those power operated the MCR. and close those power valves shown on Figure operated valves shown [ 2.4.1 1. on Figure 2.4.1 1. j 5.c) SDS alarms shown on 5.c) Testing of the SDS alarms 5.c) The SDS alarms shown Figure 2.4.1-1 are shown on Figure 2.4.1-1 on Figure 2.4.1 1 ' provided in the MCR. will be performed using actuate in response to signals simulating alarm signals simulating , conditions. alarm conditions. 6.a) Within the RDS, in one 6.a) Testing will be performed 6.a) A test signal exists only mechanical train, each on the RDS valves by at the RDS valves - isolation valve is providing a test signal in powered from the Class powered from a different only one Class IE bus at a IE bus under test. Class IE bus within its time. Class IE Division, and in ; the other mechanical 4 train, each isolation valve is powered from a j different Class IE bus in ; the other Class lE ; Division. ! 6.b) Within the RCGVS, in 6.b) Testing will be performed 6.b) A test signal exists only l the pressurizer vent train on the RCGVS valves by at the RCGVS valves and in the RVUll vent providing a test signal in powered from the Class train, each isolation valve only one Class IE bus at a IE bus under test. in one bianch line is time. i powered from a different Class IE bus within its Class lE Division, and each isolation valve in the other branch line is powered from a different Class IE bus in the other Class IE Division.
/
V Ceridad Desipre Adafsnist Pepe 2,4-5
i 1 System 80+ Design Control Document ~ l Table 2.4.1-1 Safety Depressurization System (Continued) Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 6.c) The isolation valve to the 6.c) Testing will be performed 6.c) A test signal exists only RDT and the cross- on the RCGVS valves by at the RCGVS valves connect valve between providing a test signal in powered from the Class discharge lines to the only one Class IE Division IE Division under test. RDT and IRWST are at a time. powered from different Class IE Divisions. 6.d) Independence is provided 6.d) Inspection of the as- 6.d) Physical separation between Class 1E installed Class IE exists between Class Divisions, and between Divisions of the SDS will IE Divisions in the Class IE Divisions and be performed. SDS. Physical non-Class IE equipment, separation exists in the SDS. between Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the SDS.
- 7. Within the RCGVS, in 7. Inspection of as-built 7. Within the RCGVS, in the pressurizer vent train, mechanical trains will be the pressurizer vent and in the RVUlf vent performed. train, and in the RVUH train, the two branch vent train, the two lines with isolation valves branch lines are are physically separated. separated within Containment by spatial arrangement or barriers.
- 8. Motor operated valves 8. Testing will be performed 8. Each MOV having an (MOVs) having an active to open, or close, or open active safety function i safety function will open, and also close, MOVs opens, or closes, or or will close, or will having an active safety opens and also closes. l open and also close, function under j under differential preoperational differential pressure or fluid flow pressure or fluid flow conditions and under conditions and under temperature conditions, temperature conditions.
- 9. Valves with response 9. Testing of loss of motive 9. These valves change positions indicated on power to these valves will position to the position )
Figure 2.4.1 1 change be performed. indicated on Figure l position to that indicated 2.4.1-1 upon loss of l i on the Figure upon loss motive power. of motive power. O Carnfhnt Des &rs Materi,af Page 2.44
l l Sy tem 80+ Design ControlDocument O V
.2.4.2 Annulus Wardadon System i i
Design Desedption ; n The Annulus Ventilation System (AVS) reduces the concentration of radioactivity in the annulus air by l filtration, holdup (decay), and recirculation before annulus air is released to the atmosphere. j The Basic Configuration of the AVS is as shown on Figure 2.4.2-1. The AVS components shown on Figure 2.4.2-1 are safety-related. l
- l Components of the AVS are located in the nuclear annex and annulus portion of the reactor building. l c The AVS takes air from the upper annulus above the primary containment dome, filters it, and discharges {
part of the air through openings to the lower annulus near the annulus floor and the remainder of the air , through the unit vent to the atmosphere. ; The AVS has two Divisions. Each Division of the AVS has a filtration unit, a fan, dampers, ductwork, l instrumentation, and controls. Each AVS filtration unit removes particulate matter. , 4 Each Division has dampers to modulate exhaust air to maintain a negative pressure within the annulus relative to atmosphere when the AVS is in operation. 1 The safety-related components of the AVS are classified Seismic Category I. l l V Safety related components of the AVS are powered from their respective Class IE Division. Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class ;
- IE equipment, in the AVS. ,
Active components of the two Divisions of the AVS are physically separated. Displays of the AVS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.4.2-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or " can be retrieved there, i Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the AVS fans, to set the pressure control setpoint, and to open and close those power operated dampers shown on Figure 2.4.2-1. Each AVS Division is activated by a Contairunent Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS). i Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria i Table 2.4.2-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Annulus , Ventilation System. i i Corned Dee&n neesene! Pope 2.4-7 b I i
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Sy~ tem 80+ Design Control Document b Table 2.4.2-1 Annulus Ventilation System Design Commitment Inspections Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria i
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the AVS is as shown AVS configuration will equipment shown on i on Figure 2.4.2-1. be conducted. Fis;ure 2.4.21, the as-built AVS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. Each AVS filtration unit 2. Testing and analysis will 2. The AVS Siter efficiency removes particulate be performed on each is greater than or equal matter. AVS filtration unit to to 2:99% for particulate determine filter matter greater than 0.3 efficiency. microns. ;
- 3. Each Division has 3. Testing will be 3. The AVS achieves a dampers to modulate performed on each negative pressare in the exhaust air to maintain Division to measure annulus greater than or negative pressure within annulus pressure during equal to 0.25 inches the annulus relative to AVS operation. water gauge relative to atmosphere when the atmosphere within 110 AVS is in operation. seconds.
4.a) Safety-related AVS 4.a) Testing will be 4.a) Within the AVS, a test components are powered performed on the AVS signal exists only at the b from their respective system by providing a equipment powered from 4 Class IE Division. test signal in only one the Class IE Division Class IE Division at a under test. time. 4.b) Independence is provided 4.b) Inspection of the as- 4.b) Picsical separation exists between Class IE installed Class IE between Class IE Divisions, and between Divisions in the AVS will Divisions in the AVS. Class IE Divisions and be performed. Separation exists between a non-Class IE equipment, Class IE Divisions and in the AVS. non-Class IE equipment in the AVS.
- 5. Active components of the 5. Inspection of the as-built 5. The active components two Divisions of the mechanical Divisions will of the two mechanical AVS are physically be performed. Divisions of the AVS are separated. separated by a Divisional wall or a fire barrier.
6.a) Displays of the AVS 6.a) Inspection for the 6.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown on existence or instrumentation shown on Figure 2.4.2-1 exist in retrieveability in the Figure 2.4.2-1 exist in the MCR or can be MCR of instrumentation the MCR or can be retrieved there. displays will be retrieved there. performed. i C\
- k Cereneet Doeterr Materief Pope 2.4-9
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.4.2-1 Annulus Ventilation System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections. Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 6.b) Controls exist in the 6.b) Testing will be 6.b) AVS controls in the MCR to stan and stop performed using the AVS MCR operate to start and the AVS fans, and to controls in the MCR. stop the AVS filtration open and close the units, and to open and isolation dampers shown close those isolation on Figure 2.4.2-1. dampers shown on Figure 2.4.2-1.
- 7. Each AVS Division is 7. Testing will be 7. Each AVS Division is activated by a performed using a activated by a simulated Containment Spray simulated Containment Containment Spray Actuation Signal. Spray Actuation Signal. Actuation Signal.
O l l I l O Certsford Desipus Material Page 2.410
l System 80+ oestan contrat Document l 2.4.3 Combustible Gas Control System Design Description The Combustible Gas Control System (CGCS) is used to maintain hydrogen gas concentration in Containment at a level which precludes an uncontrolled hydrogen and oxygen recombination within Containment following design basis and beyond design basis accidents. ) i The CGCS consists of the Containment Hydrogen Recombiner System (CHRS) and the Hydrogen Mitigation System (HMS). The Basic Configuration of the CHRS is as shown on Figure 2.4.3-1. The HMS consists of hydrogen igniters located inside Containment. The CHRS hydrogen analyzers are located in the Nuclear Annex and locations are provided in the Nuclear Annex for installation of hydrogen recombiner units post-accident. ; The ASME Code Section III Class 2 components shown on Figure 2.4.3-1 are safety-related. { The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.4.3-1 is classified Seismic Category I. . The Class IE loads shown on Figure 2.4.3-1 are powered from their respective Class IE Division. Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the CGCS. At least 80 hydrogen igniters are provided. Forty hydrogen igniters are powered by one Division of Class IE power sources, of which at least 17 can be powered by the Class IE batteries. Forty hydrogen i igniters are powered by the other Division of Class IE power sources, of which at least 17 can be powered by the Class IE batteries. The hydrogen igniters are non-safety related and classified Seismic Category I. l Displays of the CGCS hydrogen analyzer instrumentation exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to energize and de-energize the hydrogen analyzers and the hydrogen igniters. , Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.4.3-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Combustible Gas Control System. O CeM Dee&e ninternd Pope 2.411
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1 System 80+ oesign controlDocument Table 2.4.3-1 Combustible Gas Control System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the CHRS is as shown CHRS configuration will equipment shown on j on Figure 2.4.3-1. be conducted. Figure 2.4.3-1, the as- l built CHRS conforms I
with the Basic Configuration. Testing will be 2.a) Within the CHRS, a test l 2.a) The Class IE loads 2.a) shown on Figure 2.4.3-1 performed on the CHRS signal exists only at the are powered from their by providing a test signal equipment powered from respective Class IE in only one Class IE the Class IE Division - Division. Division at a time. under test. Independence is provided 2.b) Inspection of the as- 2.b) Physical separation exists 2.b) between Class lE installed Class IE between Cass IE Divisions, and between Divisions in the CGCS Divisions in the CGCS. Class IE Divisions and will be performed. Separation exists between non-Class 1E equipment, Class IE Divisions and in the CGCS. non-Class 1E equipment in the CGCS.
- 3. The ASME Code Section 3. A pressure test will be 3. The results of the 111 CHRS components conducted on those pressure test of ASME ,
shown on Figure 2.4.3-1 components of the CHRS Code Section 111 retain their pressure required to be pressure components of the CHRS boundary integrity under tested by ASME Code conform with the internal pressures that Section 111. pressure testing will be experienced acceptance criteria in during service. ASME Code Section 111. 4.a) Displays of tiac CGCS 4.a) Inspectiori for the 4.a) Disp!:ys of the CGCS , hydrogen concentration existence or hydrogen concentration instrumentation exist in retrieveability in the instrumentation exist in the MCR or can be MCR of instrumentation the MCR or can be retrieved there. displays will be retrieved there. cerformed. 4.b) Controls exist in the 4.b) Testing will be 4.b) CGCS controls in the MCR to energize and de- performed using the MCR operate to energize energize the hydrogen CGCS controls in the and de-energize the analyzers and the MCR. hydrogen analyzers and hydrogen igniters, the hydrogen igniters.
- 5. Hydrogen recombiner 5. Testing to connect 5. Hydrogen recombiner units can be connected to hydrogen recombiner units can be connected.
the CHRS. units will be performed. O CertWied Design Material page 2.41g
Sy~ tem (0 + D slan controlDocument L Table 2.4.3-1 Combustible Gas Control System (Continued) Design Comicitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria J
- 6. At least 80 bydrogen 6. Inspection for the number 6. At least 80 hydrogen igniters are provided. and location of igniters igniters are provided.
will be performed. The igniters are ' generally located as shown in Figures 2.4.3 2 through 2.4.3-6.
- 7. Fony hydrogen Igniters 7. Testing will be 7. At least 40 hydrogen i are powered by one perfonned to determine igniters are powered Division of Class IE number of igniters that from each Division of power sources, of which can be energized from Class IE power sources, at least 17 can be each Division of Class At least 17 igniters can powered by the Class IE lE power sources, be powered from each batteries. Fony including the number that Division of Class IE hydrogen igniters are can be energized from batteries.
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System 80+ Design Control Document 2.4.4 Safety Injection System Design Description The Safety injection System (SIS) is a safety-related system which injects borated water into the reactor vessel to provide core cooling and reactivity control in response to design basis accidents. The SIS provides core cooling during feed and bleed operation, in conjunction with the safety depressurization system. The SIS is located in the reactor building subsphere and Containment. The Basic Configuration of the SIS is as shown on Figure 2.4.4-1. The SIS consists of two Divisions. Each SIS Division has two SIS pumps, two safety injection tanks (SITS), valves, piping, controls, and instrumentation. Two SIS pumps, in conjunction with the SITS, have the capacity to cool the core during design basis events. One SIS pump, in conjunction with the SITS, has the capacity to cool the core during a direct vessel injection line break. The SITS contain borated water pressurized by a nitrogen cover gas. When RCS pressure falls below SIT pressure and the associated SIT isolation valve is open, water flows from the SIT into the reactor vessel. The SITS can be depressurized by venting for entry into shutdown cooling. A flow recirculation line from each SIS pump discharge to the in-containment refueling water storage tank , (IRWST) provides a minimum flow recirculation path. , The SIS pumps can be tested at full flow during plant operation. The ASME Code Section Ill Class for the SIS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 is as depicted on the Figure. The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 is classified Seismic Category I. SIS Pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 outside Containment have a design pressure of at least 900 psig. Displays of the SIS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 exist in the main control roora (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the SIS pumps, and to open and close those power operated valves shown on Figure 2.4.4-1. SIS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 are provided in the MCR. Water is supplied to each SIS pump at a pressure greater than the pump's required net positive suction head (NPSH). The Class IE loads shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 are powered from their respective Class IE Division. Within a Division, one SIS pump arid associated valves and controls are powered from a different Class IE bus in the same Class IE Division than the other SIS pump and associated valves and controls. Certined Design Motwiel Page 2.4-20
Sv: tem 80+ oesian contratDocument i Q' Within a Division, the two hot leg injection isolation valves are powered from different Class IE buses in the same Class IE Division. t independence is provided between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class :
. IE equipment, in the SIS. ;
i The two mechanical Divisions of the SIS are physically separated. Valves with response positions indicated on Figure 2.4.4-1 change position to that indicated on the Figure upon loss of motive power. The SIS is automatically initiated by a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS). An interlock automatically opens the SIT motor-operated isolation valves when RCS pressure increases above the SIT normal operating pressure. The interlock pre tents closing the SIT motor-operated isolation valves until RCS pressure decreases below the interlock r: set point. l The SIS can be manually realigned for simultaneous ho. leg injection and direct vessel injection (DVI). Hot leg injection is used in long term post-LOCA cooling. Motor operated valves (MOVs) having an active safety ftnction will open, or will close, or will open and ' also close, under differential pressure or fluid flow conditions and under temperature conditions. F Check valves shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under system ; pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. l Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.4.41 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Safety injection System. i i i d f . 5 c ueneer ono w nee m pope 2.4 21
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System 80+ , Desian controlDocument (n) v Table 2.4.4 Safety Injection System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and ;
of the safety injection SIS configuration will be equipment shown on system (SIS) is as shown conducted. Figure 2.4.4-1, the as-on Figure 2.4.4-1. built SIS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. Two SIS pumps, in 2.a) Testing to determine SIS 2.a) Each SIS pump has a conjunction with the flow will be performed. pump-developed pressure SITS, have the capacity Analysis will be differential of no less to deliver coolant to the performed to convert the than 1600 psid and no reactor vessel to cool the test results from the test more than 2040 psid at core during design basis conditions to the design the vendor's specified events. conditions. minimum flow rate, and injects no less than 980 gpm and no more than .
I 1232 gpm of borated water into the reactor vessel at atmospheric pressure. Q
\j 2.b) Testing will be performed using signals 2.b) The SIS initiates and begins to deliver flow to simulating a safety the reactor vessel within injection actuation signal 40 seconds following (SIAS). receipt of a signal ,
simulating SIAS, including emergency diesel generator start time and load time. 2.c) Tecing will be tc) The pressurized SITS performed to open the discharge water to the SIT isolation valves with depressurized RCS. the SITS pressurized and the RCS depressurized. Resistance coefficient K Analysis will be of the discharge line performed to convert the from the SIT to the test results from the test reactor vessel is equal to conditions to the design or between 4.5 to 30 conditions. (based on a cross-sectional area of 0.6827 ft2), t v Cerennt Desips Afstenfel Page 2.4 23
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.4.4-1 Safety Injection System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspectioris, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria l 2. (Continued) 2.d) Inspection of construction 2.d) The volume in each records for SIS piping will direct vessel injection be conducted. line, from the connection for the SIT return header to the piping-to-DVI nozzle weld, is no greater than 27.8 cubic feet.
- 3. The safety injection tanks 3. Testing will be performed 3. The SIT vent valves can be depressurized by with the SITS pressurized can be opened from the venting for entry into and the associated SIT MCR and the SIT shutdown cooling. isolation valve shut. Each pressure decreases SIT vent valve will be while the SIT is being opened from the MCR. vented.
- 4. A flow recirculation line 4. Testing of SIS will be 4. Minimum flow from each SIS pump performed by manually recirculation rate meets discharge to the IRWST aligning SI flow to the or exceeds the pump provides a minimum flow IRWST through the vendor's minimum recirculation path, minimum flow flow requirements.
recirculation line and manually starting each SIS pump.
- 5. The SIS pumps can be 5. Testing of the SIS will be 5. Each SIS pump has a tested at full flow during performed by manually flow capacity of at plant operation. aligning SIS flow to the least 980 gpm to the IRWST and manually IRWST through the test starting each SIS pump. line.
- 6. The ASME Code Section 6. A pressure test will be 6. The results of the III SIS components conducted on those pressure test of ASME shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 components of the SIS Code Section III retain their pressure required to be pressure components of the SIS boundary integrity under tested by ASME Code conform with the internal pressures that Section III. pressure testing will be experienced under acceptance criteria in service. ASME Code Section III.
7.a) Displays of the SIS 7.a) Inspection for the existence 7.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown on or retrievability in the instrumentation shown Figure 2.4.4-1 exist in MCR of instrumentation on Figure 2.4.4-1 exist the MCR or can be displays will be performed. in the MCR or can be retrieved there. retrieved there. O Cer3ined Desipre Materiet (2/95) Page 2.4-24
Sy~ tem 80 + 0: sign contro1 Document
/ \
V Table 2.4.4-1 Safety Injection System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 7.b) Controls exist in the 7.b) Testing will be perfonned 7.b) SIS controls in the MCR to start and stop using the SIS controls in MCR operate to start the SIS pumps, and to the MCR. and stop the SIS pumps open and close those and to open and close power operated valves those power operated shown on Figure 2.4.4-1. valves shown on Figure 2.4.4-1. 7.c) SIS alarms shown on 7.c) Testing of the SIS alarms 7.c) The SIS alarms shown Figure 2.4.4-1 are shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 on Figure 2.4.4-1 provided in the MCR. will be performed using actuate in the MCR in signals simulating SIS response to signals alarm conditions. simulating SIS alarm conditions.
- 8. Water is supplied to each 8. Testing to measure SIS 8. The calculated SIS pump at a pressure pump suction pressure will available NPSH greater than the pump's be performed. Inspection exceeds each SIS required NPSH. and analysis to determine pump's required NPSH available to each NPSH.
SIS pump will be 7m ( ) performed based on test V data and as-built data. 9.a) The Class IE loads 9.a) Testing on the SIS will be 9.a) Within the SIS, a test shown on Figure 2.4.4-1 conducted by providing a signal exists only at the are powered from their test signal in only one equipment powered respective Class IE Class IE Division at a from the Class IE Division. time. Division under test. 9.b) Within a Division, one 9.b) Testing on the SIS will be 9.b) Within the SIS, a test Si$ pump and associated wadwed isy puvidin r, a ' siy,nal cains culy t da valves and controls are test signal in only one equipment powered powered from a different Class IE bus at a time. from the Class IE bus Class IE bus in the same under test. Class IE Division than the other SIS pump and associated valves and controls. 9.c) Within a Division, the 9.c) Testing on the SIS will be 9.e) Within the SIS, a test two hot lei; injection conducted by providing a signal exists only at the isolation valves are test signal in only one equipment powered powered from different Class IE bus at a time. from the Class IE bus Class IE buses in the under test. same Class IE Division.
,m f i
\,_,/ CorOfted Design Material Page 2.4-25
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.4.4-1 Safety Injection System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 9.d) Independence is provided 9.d) Inspection of the as- 9.d) Physical separation between Class IE installed Class IE exists between Class Divisions, and between Divisions of the SIS will IE Divisions in the Class IE Divisions and be performed. SIS. Physical non-Class IE equipment, separation exists in the SIS. between Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the SIS.
- 10. The two mechanical 10. Inspection of as-built 10. The two mechanical Divisions of the SIS are mechanical Divisions will Divisions of the SIS physically separated. be performed, are separated by a Divisional wall or a fire barrier except for components of the system within containment which are separated by spatial arrangement or barriers.
I1. Valves with response Ili Testing of loss of motive 11. These valves change positions indicated on power to these valves will position to the position Figure 2.4.41 change be performed. indicated on Figure , position to that indicated 2.4.4-1 upon loss of on the Figure upon loss motive power. of motive power.
- 12. The SIS is automatically 12. Testing will be performed 12. A signal simulating )
initiated by a safety by generating a signal SIAS starts the Si l injection actuation signal simulating SIAS. pumps and opens the SI (SIAS). header isolation nhc: and safety injection tank (SIT) isolation I valves. The SIT l isolation valves, when open, receive a confirmatory open signal.
- 13. The SIS can be manually 13. Testing will be performed 13. The SIS injects no less realigned for with the system manually than 980 and no more simultaneous hot leg aligned for simultaneous than 1232 gpm through injection and direct vessel DVI and hot leg injection. each hot leg injection injection (DV1), line with the RCS at atmospheric pressure.
O Cert:5ed Desiges Material Page 2.&26
System 80+ oesign controlDocument ,O Table 2.4.4-1 Safety Injection System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria i
- 14. MMor operated valves 14. Testing will be performed 14. Each MOV having an (MOVs) having an active to open, or close, or open active safety function saf :ty function will open, and also close MOVs opens, or closes, or or ' vill close, or will having an active safety opens and also closes, open and also close, function under under differential preoperational differential pressure or fluid flow pressure or fluid flow conditions and under conditions and under temperature c>nditions. temperature conditions.
15, Check valves shown on 15. Testing will be performed 15. Each check valve Figure 2.4.4-1 will open, to open, or close, or open shown on Figure or will close, or will and also close check valves 2.4.4-1 opens, or open and also close under shown on Figure 2.4.41 closes, or opens and system pressure, fluid under system also closes, flow conditions, or preoperational pressure, temperature conditions. fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. 16.a) An interlock 16.a) Testing will be performed 16.a) The SIT motor-O automatically opens the using a signal simulating operated isolation h SIT motor-operated isolation valves when increasing RCS pressure, with the SIT isolation valves open in response to a signal simulating RCS pressure increases valves closed. RCS pressure above the SIT normal increasing above the operating pressure. SIT normal operating l pressure. 16.b) The interlock prevents 16.b) Testing will be performed 16.b) The SIT motor- ! closing the SIT motor- using a signal simulating operated isolation l operated isolation valves decreasing RCS pressure valves do not close until RCS pressure with the SIT isolation when RCS pressure is decreases below the valves open and attempting above the interlock interlock reset point. to close the valves from reset point. the main control room. I O U l Ceraned Design Meterini page 2.4 27 1
Srtem 80 + Design Control Document 2.4.5 Containment Isolation System Design Description The Containment Isolation System (CIS) provides a safety-related means to close valves in fluid system piping that passes through Containment penetrations . The CIS provides a pressure barrier at each of these Containment penetrations. The Basic Configuration of the Containment isolation valves for piping which penetrates containment is as shown on Figure 2.4.51; each Containment isolation valve arrangement is as shown in one of the configurations on the figure. The ASME Code Section Ill Class for the CIS pressure retaining components is as shown on Figure 2.4.5-1.2 The Containment isolation valves and connecting ASME Code Section III Class 2 piping shown on Figure 2.4.5-1 are classified Seismic Category I. Electrically-powered Containment isolation valves are Class IE. These Class IE loads are powered from their respective Class IE Divisions. The Containment equipment hatch trolley receives Class IE power. Redundant Containment isolation valves which require electrical power are powered from different Class IE Divisions.3 Independence is provided between Class IE Divisiara, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class l IE equipment in the CIS. Displays of CIS valve positions for remotely operated and automatic Containment isolation valves exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to cpen and c!cce CIS power operated valves. l Only those valves required to close automatically for Containment isolation are closed by a Containment i isolation actuation signal (CIAS). Containment isolation valves that receive a CIAS close within the tune allocated to the function perfonned. j Containment isolation valves that receive a CIAS, upon closure, do not reopen as a direct result of reset of the CIAS. Pneumatic Containment isolation valves close upon loss of motive or control power to the valve. l l I Containment isolation valves are assigned as components of their respective systems. 2 Containment penetration leak rate testing is addressed in Section 2.1.1, Nuclear Island Structures. 3 Electrical penetrations are addressed in Section 2.6.4, Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies. Certined Destgrs Material Page 2.4 28
1 Syitem 80+ Design ControlDocument Motor-operated valves (MOVs) that receive a CIAS will close under differential pressure or fluid flow conditions, and under temperature conditions. Contaimnent isolation check valves having an active safety function will close under system pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. Containment isolation valves required to close automatically against containment atmosphere systems are l designed to close against at least containment design pressure. Containment Isolation valves and piping between CIVs are designed for pressures at least equal to the containment design pressure. The induced stresses in the pressure retaining components of the CIVs due to an internal containment pressure of less than or equal to 120 psig are within the ASME Code Section III service Level C stress limits. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.4.5-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Containment Isolation System. o w W MotorW pay,2.4 2y
Sy tem 80+ Deirgn CentrolDocument CONTAINMENT INSIDE l OtfrSIDE l2J op M al g NOTE 1 , # *. i g_ 1 , ma n l l AUTDetAMC l AUT004ATIC j ORmrJecTELY OR REh80TELY l OPERATED 5 5 OPERATED l l i i i , n(. ' NorE 2 NUTE2 i j 12.s oM N 2I g Ia 2.3 on n l [ ASaaE CODE EEC1 IOed 5 CLASE I g 1 l I 5 AurcesAfac ORREnf0TELY I OPERATED 5 2. NOTE 2 AND 12.s OR N 2I B MOTC 3 12 3.3 om N I G, , E f
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- 1. UQUID RELiff VALVE CAN DE INCLUDED IN CONFIGURATION
- 2. VALVE CAN DE OPEN OM CLOSF.D IN NORMAL PostTION
- 3. FLOW ELEMENT / MOOT VALVES CaNTTED FOM CLAMITY.WHERE APPUCABLE.
A CHECK VALVE IS NOT A CONTAlNa8ENTis0LATION VALVE O Containment Isolation Valve Configuration
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Figure 2.4.5-1 (Sheet 4 of 4) Cornned Desigrs Masonial page 2.4 33
Sy-tem 80 + Design ControlDocwnent Table 2.4.5-1 Containment Isolation System Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-huilt 1. For the components and g of the Containment CIS configuration will be equipment shown on isolation valves for conducted. Figure 2.4.5-1 and piping which penetrates specified in Table Containment is as shown 2.4.5-2, the as-built CIS on Figure 2.4.5-1; each conforms with the Containment isolation specified Basic valve anangement is as Configuration shown on shown in one of the Figre 2.4.5-1.
configurations on the figure.
- 2. The ASME Code Section 2. A pressure test will be 2. The results of the III valves shown on performed on those pressure test of ASME Figure 2.4.5-1 retain components of the CIS Code Section 111 their pressure boundary required to be pressure components of the CIS integrity under internal tes:ed by ASME Code specified in Table pressures that will be Section Ill. 2.4.5-2 conform with the experienced during pressure testing service. acceptance criteria in ASME Code Section 111.
3.a) Electrically-powered 3.a) Testing will be 3.a) Within the CIS, a test Containment isolation performed on the signal exists only at the valves are Class IE. Containment isolation equipment powered from These Class IE loads are valves by providing a test the Class IE Division powered from their signal in only one Class under test. respective Class IE 1E Division at a time. Divisions. 3.b) The Containment 3.b) Inspection of the as-built 3.b) The Containment equipment hatch trolley Containment equipment equipment hatch trolley receives Class 1E power. hatch trolley will be receives Class 1E power. perfonned. 3.c) Independence is provided 3.c) Inspection of the as- 3.c) Physical separation exists between Class IE installed Class IE between Class IE Divisions and between Divisions in the CIS will Divisions in the CIS. Class IE Divisions and be performed. Separation exists between non-Class IE equipment Class 1E Divisions and in the CIS. non-Class IE equipment in the CIS.
- 4. Red'mdant Containment 4. Testing will be 4. Within the CIS, a test
; tion valves which performed on the signal exists only at the require electrical power Containment isolation equipment powered from are powered from valves by providing a test the Class IE Division different Class IE signal in only one Class under test.
Divisions. IE Division at a time. Certified Design Material Page 2.4-34 4
]
r l l t System 80+ Design ControlDocument n (V) Table 2.4.5-1 Containment Isolation System (Continued) Design Commitment inspections, Tests Analyses Acceptance Criteria 5.a) Displays of CIS valve 5.a) Inspection for the 5.a) Displays of CIS valve positions for remotely existence or retrievability positions for remotely operated and automatic in the MCR of displays operated and automatic Containment isolation of Contaimnent isolation Containment isolation valves exist in the MCR valve positions will be valves exist in the MCR or can be retrieved there. performed. or can be retrieved there. 5.b) Controls exist in the 5.b) Testing will be 5.b) Controls in the MCR MCR to open and close performed using the operate to open and close CIS power operated Containment isolation power operated valves, valve controls in the Containment isolation MCR. valves. 6.a) Only those valves 6.a) Testing of the isolation 6.a) Containment isolation required to close function will be valves respond to a automatically for performed using a signal signal simulating CIAS Containment isolation are simulating CIAS. as specified in Table closed oy a CIAS. 23.5-2. 6.b) Containment isolation 6.b) Testing of the closure 6.b) Containment isolation valves that receive a times of automatically valves close upon receipt
;g) CIAS close within the actuated Containment of a signal that simulates V time allocated to the isolation valves will be a CIAS in less than or function performed. performed using a signal equal to the time that simulates a CIAS. specified in Table 2.4.5-2, if specified. j 6.c) Containment isolation 6.c) Following closure of 6.c) Containment isolation valves that receive a Containment isolation valves, once closed by a CIAS, upon closure, do valves on a signal that signal that simulates a j not reopen as a direct simulates a CIAS, tests CIAS, do not reopen as a j result of reset of the will be performed to direct result of a signal l CIAS. verify that the valves do that simulates resetting j not reopen when a signal the CIAS.
that simulates the CIAS reset is applied. - 1 l
- 7. Pneumatic Containment 7. Testing will be 7. Pneumatic Contaitunent 1 isolation valves close performed on each isolation valves cicse.
upon loss of motive or pneumatic Containment control power to the isolation valve to valve, simulate a loss of motive i power and a loss of control power.
)I i
l j O i d Certined Des &n atsterief page 2.4-35
Sy3 tem 80+ Design controlDocument Table 2.4.5-1 Containment Isolation System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 8. Motor-operated valves 8. Testing to close MOVs 8. Each MOV that receives (MOVs) that receive a that receive a CIAS will a CIAS closes.
CIAS will close under be conducted under differential pressure or preoperational differential fluid flow conditions, and pressure or fluid flow under temperature conditions, and under conditions. temperature conditions.
- 9. Containment Isolation 9. Testing of Containment 9. Each Containment check valves having an isolation check valves isolation check valve active safety function will will be conducted under specified in Table close under system system preoperational 2.4.5-2 closes.
pressure, fluid flow pressure, fluid flow conditions, or conditions, or temperature conditions. temperature conditions. 10.a) Containment isolation 10.a) Inspection and analysis 10.a) Reports exist which valves required to close will be performed on conclude that against containment Containment isolation containment isolation atmosphere are designed valves required to close valves required to close to close against at least against containment against containment containment design atmosphere. atmosphere are designed pressure. to close against at least containment design pressure. 10.b) Containment isolation 10.b) Inspection and analysis of 10.b) Reports exist which valves and piping containment isolation conclude that { between CIVs are valves and piping containment isolation ! designed for pressures at between CIVs will be valves and piping j least equal to the perforrned. between CIVs are j containment design designed for pressures at pressure. least equal to the containment design pressure. 1 0
l System 80+ Design Control Document A U Table 2.4.5-2 Containment Penetrations (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 3) Maximum Valve Closes On Closure Item Valve CIAS Time No. Servlee Arrangement (Yes, No) on CIAS , 1- Main Steam Line #1 from Steam Generator #1 9 No r Remotely Operated Safety Valve Safety Valve Safety Valve Safety Valve Safety Valve Remotely Operated Remotely Operated Remotely Operated Manual Valve Manual Valve 2 Main Steam Line #2 from Steam Generator #1 9 No b d Remotely Operated Safety Valve Safety Valve Safety Valve Safety Valve Safety Valve Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Manual Valve - 3 Main Steam Line #1 from Steam Generator #2 9 No Remotely Operated - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Manual Valve - O) t V w W M* w !*e* 2.4-37 m
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.4.5-2 Containment Penetrations (Continued) (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 3) Maximum Valve Closes On Closure Item Valve CIAS Time No. Service Arrangement (Yes, No) on CIAS 4 Main Steam Line #2 from Steam Generator #2 9 No Remotely Operated Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Safety Valve - Safety Valve Safety Valve - Remotely Operated Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated Manual Valve - Manual Valve - 5 Main Feedwater to Downcomer Nozzle Steam Generator 8 No
#1 Remotely Operated -
Remotely Operated - Check Valve - Check Valve - 6 Main Feedwater to Downcomer Nozzle Steam Generator 8 No
#2 Renotely Operated -
Remotely Operated - Check Valve - Check Valve - 7 Main Feedwater to Economizer Nozzles for Steam 7 No Generator #1 Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 8 Main Feedwater to Economizer Nozzles for Steam 7 No Generator #2 Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Check Vilve - Cerdned Design Material Page 2.4 38
System 80+ Design ControlDocument U Table 2.4.5-2 Containment Penetrations (Continued) l (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 3) Maximum Valve Closes On Closur- l Item Valve CIAS Time No. Service Arrangement (Yes, No) on CIAS 9' Motor. Driven EFW Pump #1 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated Check Valve 10 Motor Driven EFW Pump #2 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated Check Valve 11 Steam-Driven EFW Pump #1 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated Check Valve 12 Steam-Driven EFW Pump #2 Discharge 2 No I (,/ Remotely Operated Check Valve _ 13 Safety injection Pump #4 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve (Note 4) 14 Safety injection Pump #2 Discharge 14 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Check Valve (Note 4) Remotely Operated - 15 Safety injection Pump #3 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve (Note 4) - 16 Safety injection Pump #1 Discharge 14 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Check Valve (Note 4) - Remotely Operated - ' (V Cer#Nmf Designs Materiel Page 2,4-39
)
Syntem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.4.5-2 Containment Penetrations (Continued) l (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 3) 1 Maximum j Valve j Closes On Closure l Item Valve CIAS Time i No. Service Arrangement (Yes, No) on CIAS l l 17 SCS Pump #2 Suction 11 No . f Remotely Operated , Relief Valve j Remotely Operated J 18 SCS Pump #1 Suction 11 No l Remotely Operated Relief Valve Remotely Operated 19 Hot Leg Injection Loop #2 15 No Remotely Operated Check Valve 20 llot kg Injection Loop #1 15 No Remotely Operated Check Valve 21 Containment Spray Pump #2 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 22 Containment Spray Pump #1 Discharge 2 No Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 23 Safety Injection Pump #1 and Containment Spray Pump 6 No
#1 Suction Line Remotely Operated -
24 Safety injection Pump #2 and Containment Spray Pump 6 No
#2 Suction Line Remotely Operated -
25 Safety injection Pump #3 Suction 6 No Remotely Operated - CwDfed Design Material Page 2.M0
System 80+ Deslan controlDocument
! Table 2.4.5-2 Containement Penetrations (Cor.tinued)..
(Note 1) (Note 2) . (Note 3) .! Maximum Valve Closes On Close:re - Itens Valve CIAS Tine a No. Service Arrangessent ' (Yes, No) oc CIAS . ) 26 Safety injection Pump #4 Suction 6- - No Remotely Operated: J 27 SIS Division 1 Miniflow Retum to IRWST 12 No j Remotely Operated ; J Check Valve - Remotely Operated . 28 SIS Division 2 Miniflow Return to IRWST 12 No j i Remotely Operated , Check Valve Remotely Operated _ l 29 Return Header from Si Tanks 13 No Remotely Operated Manual Valve Relief Valve $ 30- CCW Supply to letdown Heat Exchanger 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sec Check Valve - 31 CCW Return from letdown Heat Exchanger 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve - 32 CCW Supply to RCP Heat Exchangers I A and IB 1 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - Check Valve - 33 CCW Return from RCP Heat Exchangers I A and IB 1 No Remotely Operated - p Remotely Operated - ,t 1- Check Valve - 'V I l coroned Deep noneerd page 2.4 41 i
System 80 + Design ControlDocument Table 2.4.5-2 Containment Penetrations (Continued) (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 3) Maximun; Valve Closes On Closure item Valve CIAS Time No. Service Arrangement (Yes, No) on CIAS 34 CCW Supply to RCP Heat Exchangers 2A and 2B 1 No Remotely Operated Remotely Operated Check Valve 35 CCW Return from RCP IIcat Exchangers 2A and 2B 1 No Remotely Operated Remotely Operated Check Valve 36 Shutdown PurificItion Line to Letdown Heat Exchanger 4 No Manual Valve Check Valve 37 letdown to Purification System 1 Yes l Rernotely Operated 60 sec l Remotely Operated 60 sec l 38 CVCS Charging Line 2 No j I Remotely Operated Check Valve 39 RCP Seal injection 2 No Remotely Operated Check Valve 40 RCP Seal Return Flow 1 No Remotely Operated Remotely Operated 41 RDT Flow to RDPs ! Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 42 Resin Sluice Supply to Reactor Drain Tank 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve - Certened Design MaterW Pope 2.442
System 80+ oesian controlDocummt , r\ . O Table .1.5-2 Containment Penetrations (Continued) (NMe 1) (Note 2) (Note 3) k i Maximum Valve Closes On Closure , item Valve CIAS Time No. Service Arrangement (Yes, No) on CIAS 43 Breathing Air Supply 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve 44 Station Air Supply 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve , 45 Instrument Air Supply 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec ; Check Valve 46 Instrument Air Supply 2 Yes , (n)
\- Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve 47 Refueling Pool Cleanup Suction Line 3 No 1
Manual Valve Manual Valve 48 Refueling Pool Cleanup Return Header 3 No Manual Valve Manual Valve 49 Pressurizer Liquid Sample Line 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 50 Pressurizer Steam Space Sample Line 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec < Remotely Operated 60 sec ! l 51 Hot Leg Sample Line 1 Yes ; Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sec g '. (
%.)' '
Cerennf Deeipe ainawW Pope 2.4 43 1
Syntem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.4.5-2 Containment Penetrations (Continued) (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 3) Maximum Valve Closes On Closure Item Valve CIAS Time No. Service Arrangement (Yes, No) on CIAS 52 lloldup Volume Tank Sample Line 10 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 53 Steam Generator #1 Cold Leg Sample i No Remotely Operated Remotely Operated 54 Steam Generator #1 flot leg Sample 1 No Remotely Operated Remotely Operated - 55 Steam Generator #1 Downcomer Sample 1 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - 56 Steam Generator #2 Cold leg Sample 1 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - 57 Steam Generator #2 Ilot Ixg Sample 1 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - 58 Steam Generator #2 Downcomer Sample 1 No Remotely Operated - Remotely Operated - 59 liigh Volume Containment Purge System Supply #1 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sec 60 liigh Volume Containment Purge System Supply #2 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 see Certoned Deshpn Motenal Page 2.4-44
System 80+ Deskn Control Document . k Table 2.4.5-2 Containment Penetrations (Continued) (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 3) Maximum Valve Closes On Closure Item Vsere CIAS Time No. Service Arrangement (Yes, No) on CIAS 61 High Volume Containment Purge System Exhaust #1 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sec 62 High Volume Containment Purge System Exhaust #2 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sec 63 Low Volume Containment Purge System Supply 2 Yes Remotely Operated 30 see Check Valve - 64 tow Volume Containment Purge System Exhaust 1 Yes (U} Remotely Operated 30 see 30 sec Remotely Operated 65 Steam Generator #1 Combined Blowdown 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve 66 Steam Generator #2 Combined Blowdown 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve 67 Fire Protection Water Supply to Containment (Line 2 Yes Number 1) Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve - 68 Fire Protection Water Supply to Containment (Line 2 Yes Number 2) i Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve - r
'~
Cerened Denton nienwiel Pege 2.M5
System 80 + Design ControlDocument Table 2.4.5-2 Containment Penetrations (Continued) (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 3) Maximum Valve Closes On Closure Item Valve CIAS Time No. Service Arrangement (Yes, No) on CIAS 69 Division 1 NCWS Supply to Containment Ventilation 1 Yes Units and CEDM Units Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sec 70 Division 2 NCWS Supply to Containment Ventilation 1 Yes Units and CEDM Units Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sec 71 Division 1 NCWS Return From Containment Ventilation 1 Yes Units and CEDM Units Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 72 Division 2 NCWS Return From Containment Ventilation 1 Yes Units and CEDM Units Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sec 73 Containment Radiation Monitor (Inlet) 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec < 60 sec l Remotely Operated 74 Containment Radiation Monitor (Outlet) 1 Yes i Remotely Operated 60 sec ; Remotely Operated 60 sec : 75 ILRT Pressure Sensing Line 3 No j l Manual Valve - 1 Manual Valve - l 76 Demineralized Water 2 Yes i l Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve - 77 Nitrogen Supply to Safety injection Tanks and RDT 2 Yes I Remotely Operated 60 sec , Check Valve - l l Cornfed Desigrr Materia! Page 2.M6 I l l
l Sy' tem 80+ oesian controlDocument ,
/N Cl Table 2.4.5-2 Containment Penetrations (Continued)
(Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 3) Maximum Valve Closes On Closure i Item Valve CIAS Time No. Service Arrangement (Yes, No) on CIAS 78 ILRT Pressurization Line 5 No Manual Valve Flange 79 RCP Oil Fill Line 1 Yes 60 sec l Remotely Operated Remotely Operated 80 Containment Sump Pump Discharge Line 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sec l Check Valve 81 Containment Ventilation Units' Condensate Drain Header 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec ; Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve 82 Reactor Drain Tank Gas Space to GWMS 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 83 Decontamination Line 3 No Manual Valve - Manual Valve - 84 Division 1 Hydrogen Recombiner Suction from 1 Yes Containment Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sec 85 Division 2 Hydrogen Recombiner Suction from 1 Yes Containment Remotely Operated 60 sec Remotely Operated 60 sec V c a- o . w r., nw
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.4.5-2 Containment Penetrations (Continued) l (Note 1) (Note 2) (Note 3) Maximum Valve Closes On Closure Item Valve CIAS Time No. Service Arrangement (Yes, No) on CIAS 86 Division 1 Hydrogen Recombiner Discharge to 2 Yes Containment Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve 87 Division 2 Hydrogen Recombiner Discharge to 2 Yes Containment Remotely Operated 60 see Check Valve
)
88 Steam Generator Wet Layup Recirculation Return to 4 No l Steam Generator #1
- l Manual Valve Check Valve 89 Steam Generator Wet Layup Recirculation Return to 4 No l l
Steam Generator #2 Manual Valve - Check Valve - 90 S! IRWST Boron Recovery Supply to CVCS 1 Yes Remotely Operated 60 see Remotely Operated 60 sec 91 CVCS IRWST Boron Recovery Return 2 Yes Remotely Operated 60 sec l Check Valve - 1 1 NOTES:
- 1. Valve arrangements are in accordance with the Containment isolation valve configurations shown on Figure 2.4.5-1.
- 2. Paragraph Number 3 of the General Provisions (Section 1.2) applies to Containment isolation valves which receive a CIAS.
- 3. A dash (-) denotes NOT APPLICABLE
- 4. Not a containment isolation valve.
O l Cerdhed Design Material Page 2.4 48 l
Sy: tem 80 + Design ControlDocument n 2.4.6 Containment Spray System {} Design Description The Containment Spray System (CSS) is a safety-related system which removes heat and reduces the concentration of radionuclides released from the fuel from the Containment atmosphere and transfers the heat to the component cooling water system following events which increase Containment temperature and pressure. The CSS can also remove heat from the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST). The CSS is located in the reactor building subsphere and Containment. The Basic Configuration of the CSS is as shown on Figure 2.4.6-1. The CSS consists of two Divisions. Each CSS Division has a CSS pump, a CSS heat exchanger, valves, piping, spray headers, nozzles, controls, and instrumentation. Each CSS Division has the heat removal capacity to cool and depressurize the containment atmosphere, such that containment design temperature and pressure are not exceeded following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) or a main steam line break (MSLB). Each CSS Division has the capacity to reduce the concentration of radioactive material in the containment atmosphere such that the design basis accident dose criteria are not exceeded. V The CSS limits the maximum flow in each Division. The CSS pump and the Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) pump in the same Division are connected by piping and valves such that the SCS pump in a Division can perform the pumping function of the CSS pump in that Division. The piping and valves in the cross-connect line between the SCS pump suction and the CSS pump suction permit flow in either direction. A flow recirculation line around each CSS pump provides a minimum flow recirculation path. The CSS pumps can be flow tested during plant operation. The ASME Code Section III Class for the CSS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 is as depicted on the Figure. The safety related equipment shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 is classified Seismic Category I. 1 CSS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.4.6-1, except the shell side of the heat exchangers, l have a design pressure outside Containment of at least 900 psig. l l Displays of the CSS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or l can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the CSS pumps, and to open and j l close those remote-operated valves shown on Figure 2.4.6-1. CSS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 are
, provided in the MCR. '
/ ,)'i Certined Design MaterW Page 2.4-49 I
System 80+ Design ControlDocument -- Water is supplied to each CSS pump at a pressure greater than the pump's required net positive suction , head (NPSH). The Class IE loads shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 are powered from their respet.tive Class IE Division. The CSS pump motor and the SCS pump motor in each Division are powered fro n different Class IE buses in that same Division. Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions and between Class IE Divisions and nr. 3 IE equipment in the CSS. The two mechanical Divisions of the CSS are physically separated. The CSS pumps are started upon receipt of a containment spray actuation signal (CSAS), except when the CSAS is aligned to the SCS pump in the same Division. The isolation valves to the CSS spray headers and nozzles are opened upon receipt of a containment spray actuation signal (CSAS). Motor operated valves (MOVs) having an active safety function will open, or will close, or will open and also close under differential pressure or fluid flow conditions, and under temperature conditions. Check valves shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 will open, or will close, or will open and also close under system pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.4.6-1 specifies the inspectiors, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Containment Spray System. l I l l I O Cerbfed Design htsterial Page 2.4 50 I
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- CONTAWMENT CONTA!MMENT E SHOWN ON THis FIGURE ARE CLASS 1E. ALARMS AND PRESSURE T AND CURRENTINSTRUMENTS ARE NOTSAFETY.RELATED AND NOT E CLASS 1 E. CSS HEADERS
- 3. THE ASME CODE SECTION Rt CLASS 2 ANO 3 PRESSURE METAINING -,,,yg +
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.4.6-1 Containment Spray System Gl l Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria l l
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and l of the CSS is as shown CSS configuraticr, will be equipment shown on j on Figure 2.4.6-1. conducted. Figure 2.4.6-1, the as- l built CSS conforms with I the Basic Configuration.
- 2. Each CSS Division has 2.a) Testing of the CSS to 2.a) Each CSS pump develops the heat removal capacity measure the containment at least 400 feet of head to cool and depressurize spray flow at the at a flow rate no less j the containment discharge of the CSS than 5000 gpm. i atmosphere such that pump will be performed. l containment design Testing and analysis will temperature and pressure be performed to are not exceeded determine the pump following a LOCA or head.
MSLB. 2.b) Testing of the CSS will 2.b) Flow to the spray I be performed using nozzles begins within 68 signals simulating a seconds after receipt of a CSAS. The test results CSAS. will be converted by analysis to a delay time for spray initiation. 2.c) Testing and analyses will 2.c) One CSS heat exchanger be performed to cools CSS flow to a determine the heat maximum temperature of removal capability of the 175'F with an inlet CSS heat exchanger. temperature of 218'F when supplied with 8000 gpm from the CCWS at 120*F.
- 3. Each CSS Division has 3. Inspection of the CSS 3. Each CSS Division has the capacity to reduce the spray headers will be spray headers and concentration of performed. nozzles as follow:
radioactive material in the containment At least 168 nozzles at atmosphere such that the plant elevation of at least design basis accident 225 feet, at least 121 dose criteria are not nozzles at plant elevation exceeded. of at least 197 feet, and at least 40 nozzles at plant elevation of at least 141 feet. O Certifred Design Material Page 2.4-52
t System 80+ Design Control Documenj Table 2.4.6-1 Containment Spray System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 4. "he CSS limits the 4. Testing of the CSS will 4. The CSS maximum maximum flow in each be performed with flow expected flow is less than Divisic . aligned to the IRWST. or equal to 6500 gpm in Inspection of the as-built each Division.
spray header will be performed. Analyses will convert the test flow rates to the maximum expected flow rate.
- 5. The SCS pump in a 5. Testing to measure the 5. The SCS pump in a Division can perform the flowrate produced by the Division pumps at least pumping function of the SCS pump when its 5000 gpm through the CSS pump in the suction D connected to CSS heat exchanger in Division. the CSS pump suction the Division.
and its discharge to the CSS pump discharge will be performed.
- 6. A flow recirculation line 6. Inspection of the as-built 6. Minimum flow recirculation rate meets p) system configurat!On will i around each CSS pump provides a minimum flow be performed rad testing or exceeds the pump
\ ' recirculation path. of the midnum flow vendor's requirements, recirculation rate will be perforrr.ed.
- 7. The CSS pumps can be 7. Testing of the CSS will 7. The CSS pump has a flow tested during plant be performed by flow capacity of at least ;
operation. manually aligning suction 5000 gpm each through I and discharge valves to the test loop. the IRWST and starting the CSS pumps manually.
- 8. The ASME Code Section 8. A pressure test will be 8. The results of the Ill CSS components conducted on those pressure test of ASME shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 components of the CSS Code Section Ill retain their pressure required to be pressure components of the CSS boundary integrity under tested by ASME Code conform with the internal pressures that Section Ill. pressure testing will be experienced acceptance criteria in during service. ASME Code Section III.
9.a) Displays of the CSS 9.a) Inspection for the 9.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown on existence or retrievability instrumentation shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 exist in in the MCR of Figure 2.4.6-1 exist in the MCR or can be instrumentation displays the MCR or can be retrieved there, will be performed. retrieved there. Certrhed Desepts Acetonint rbge 2.4 52
e Srtem 80+ Design controlDocument Table 2.4.6-1 Containment Spray System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 9.b) Controls exist in the 9.b) Testing will be 9.b) CSS controls in the MCR MCR to start and stop performed using the CSS operate to start and stop the CSS pumps, and to controls in the MCR. the CSS pumps and to open and close those open and close those power operated valves power operated valves shown on Figure 2.4.6-1. shown on Figure 2.4.6-1. 9.c) CSS alarms shown on 9.c) Testing of the CSS 9.c) The CSS alarms shown Figure 2.4.6-1 are alarms shown on Figure on Figure 2.4.6-1 actuate provided in the MCR. 2.4.6-1 will be in response to signals performed using signals simulating alarm simulating alarm conditions. conditions.
- 10. Water is supplied to each 10. Testing to measure CSS 10. The calculated available CSS pump at a pressure pump suction pressure NPSH exceeds each CSS greater than the pump's will be performed. pump's required NPSH.
required net positive inspection and analysis to suction head (NPSH). determine NPSH available to each pump will be performed based on test data and as-built data. The Class 1E loads 11.a) Testing will be 11.a) Within the CSS, a test I1.a) shown on Figure 2.4.6-1 performed on the CSS by signal exists only at the ; are powered from their providing a test signal in equipment powered from l respective Class IE only one Class IE the Class IE Division Division. Division at a time, under test. 11.b) The CSS pump motor ll.b) Testing on the CSS and ll.b) A test signal exists only and the SCS pump motor the SCS will be at the CSS pump motor in each Division are conducted with a test or SCS pump motor powered from different signal applied to one powered from the Class Class IE buses in that Class IE bus at a time. IE bus under test. same Division. I1.c) Independence is provided 11.c) Inspection of the as- 11.c) Physical separation exists between Class IE installed Class IE between Class IE Divisions and between Divisions in the CSS will Divisions in the CSS. Class IE Divisions and be performed. Physical separation exists non-Class IE equipment between Class IE in the CSS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the l CSS. O Certined Design Motonial Pope 2.4 54
Sy' tem 80 + Design ControlDocument O t Table 2.4.6-1 Containment Spray System (Continued) ; Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 12. The two mechanical 12. Inspection of as-built 12. The two mechanical Divisions of the CSS are mechanical Divisions will Divisions of the CSS are physically separated. be performed. separated by a Divisional ;
wall or a fire barrier excqt for coreponents of the system within Contamment which are separated by spatial arrangement or barriers.
- 13. The CSS pumps are 13. Testing will be 13. The CSS pumps start st:sted upon receipt of a performed on the CSS upon receiving a signal .
CSAS, except when the pumps using a signal simulating a CSAS, l CSAS is aligned to the simulating a CSAS. except when the CSAS is SCS pump in the same aligned to the SCS pump Division, in the same Division.
- 14. In each Division, the 14. Testing will be 14. The CSS isolation valve CSS isolation valve to the performed using a signal to the CSS spray header CSS spray header and simulating a CSAS. and nozzles opens upon nozzles opens upon receipt of a signal receipt of a CSAS. simulating a C3AS.
(
- 15. Motor operated valves 15. Testing will be 15. Each MOV having an (MOVs) having an active performed to open, o- active safety function .
safety function will open, close, or open and also opens or closes, or opens or will close, or will close MOVs having an and also closes. open and also close under active safety function differential pressure or under preoperational fluid flow conditions, and differential pressure or under temperature fluid flow conditions and condklons, under temperature conditions.
- 16. Cht k valves shown on 16. Testing will be 16. Each check valve shown Figure 2.4.6-1 will open, performed to open, or on Figure 2.4.6-1 opens, of; will close, or will close, or open and also or closes, or opens and c> pen and also close under close check valves shown also closes.
trystem pressure, fluid on Figure 2.4.6-1 under flow conditions, or system preoperational temperature conditions. press-. fluid flow conditivas, or temperature conditions.
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Cerened Sesign Mad Pope 2.4 55
Sy~ tem 80+ Design ControlDocument 2.4.7 In-containment Water Storage System l i Design Description l The In-containment Water Storage System (IWSS) includes the in-containment refueling water storage i tank (IRWST) which is an integral part of the Nuclear Island (NI) structures, the holdup volume tank ; (ifVT) which is an integral part of the Ni structures, and the cavity flooding system (CFS). l The IRWST provides borated water for the safety injection system (SIS) and the containment spray system (CSS). It is the primary heat sink for discharges from the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressurizer safety valves and the safety depressurization system (SDS) rapid depressurization subsystem. It is the source of water for the CFS. It is the source of water to fill the refueling pool via the SIS and CSS. The IRWST and IRWST instrumentation are safety-related except as noted in Figure 2.4.7-1. The HVT collects water released in Containment during design basis events and returns water to the IRWST through spillways. It also collects component leakage not routed to other drain systems inside Containment and receives water discharged from the IRWST by the CFS. The CFS is used to provide water to flood the reactor cavity in response to beyond design basis events. CFS valves located in the holdup volume are designed such that they may be actuated while submerged. The IWSS is located in the Containment. l The Basic Configuration of the IWSS is as shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 and locations of IRWST and IIVT are shown on Figure 2.1.1-1 in Section 2.1.1, Nuclear Island Structures. The IRWST has a volume above the SIS / CSS pumo suction .ne penetrations to permit proper SIS and CSS operation following design basis events. The IRWST has a total volume that permits dilution of radionuclides from core and RCS release following design basis loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs). The IRWST can be vented to allow conununication between the IRWST and the containment atmosphere. Stainless steel baskets containing trisodium phosphate are located in the HVT. The ASME Code Section III Class for the IWSS pressure retaining compone its is as shown on Figure 2.4.7-1. The safety related equipment shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 is classified Seistnic Category I. Displays of IWSS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to open and close those power operated valves shown on Figure 2.4.7-1. IWSS alarms shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 are provided in the MCR. The power operated valves and IRWST instrumentation, except alarms, shown s Figure 2.4.7-1 are powered from their respective Class IE Division. Within the CFS each of the four valves in the spillways from the IRWST to the HVT is powered from a different Class IE bus, and each of the two valves in the spillways from the HVT to the rentor cavity is powered from a different Class IE Division. CertWed Design Material page 2.4 56
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Sy3 tem 80+ Design ControlDocument t Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions, and between Class 1E Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, in the IWSS. l 3 j Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Cdteria
! Table 2.4.7-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the i Incontainment Water Storage System.
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3 NUTES: @ y t. THE fMSTRUMENTATION SHOWN, EXCEPT ALARMS AND SUMP LEVEL INSTRUMFMTATION, ARE SAFETY-RELATED 3 M
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- 2. THE POWER OPERATED VALVES ANO IRWSTINSTRUMENTAtlON SHOWN, EXCEPT ALARMS O F ARE POWERED FROM THEIR RCSPECTIVE CLASS lE DIVISION ko
." 3. * ! EQUIPMENT FOR WIRCH PARAGRAPIf MUMBER 3 OF THE 'VFRfFEATION FOR Y BASIC CONFIGURATION FOf1 SYSTEMS
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument C Table 2.4.7-1 In-containment Water Storage System
- Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the IWSS is as shown IWSS con-figuration will equipment shown on on Figure 2.4.7-1. be conducted. Figure 2.4.7-1, the as-built IWSS conforms with the Basic ,
Configuration. 2.a) The IRWST has a 2.a) Inspection of construction 2.a) The IRWST has a volume above the records for the IRWST useable volume of at SIS / CSS pump suction will be performed. least 495,000 gallons line penetrations to above the SIS / CSS pump permit proper SIS and suction line penetrations. CSS operation following design basis events. 2.b) The IRWST has a total 2.b) Inspection of construction 2.b) The IRWST ho a volume that permits records for the IRWST minimum total volume of dilution of radionuclides will be performed. at least 545,800 gallons. from core and RCS release following design D basis LOCAs.
- 3. Stainless steel baskets 3. Inspection of the as-built 3. Stainless steel baskets containing trisodium flVT will be performed. containing trisodium phosphate are located in phosphate are located in the HVT. the HVT.
- 4. The ASME Code Section 4. A pressure test will be 4. The results of the 111 IWSS components conducted on those pressure test of ASME shown on Figure 2.4.7-1 components of the IWSS Code Section !!! portions retain their pressure required to be pressure of the IWSS conform boundary integrity under tested by ASME Code with the pressure testing internal pressures that Section III. acceptance criteria in will be experienced ASME Code Section Ill.
during service. 5.a) Displays of the IWSS 5.a) Inspection for the 5.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown on existence or retrievability instrumentation shown on Figure 2.4.71 exist in in the MCR of Figure 2.4.7-1 exist in the MCR or can be instrumentation displays the MCR or can be retrieved there. will be performed. retrieved there. 5.b) Controls exist in the 5 b) Testing will be 5.b) IWSS controls in the MCR to open and close performed using the MCR operate to open those power operated IWSS controls in the and close those power valves shown on Figure MCR. operated valves shown 2.4.7-1. on Figure 2.4.7-1. O V CertMed Design aenteniel Page 2.4-59
System 80+ oesign controlDocument Table 2.4.7-1 In-containment Water Storage System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 5.c) IWSS alarms shown on 5.c) Testing of the IWSS 5.c) The IWSS alarms shown Figure 2.4.7-1 are alarms shown on Figure on Figure 2.4.71 actuate provided in the MCR. 2.4.7-1 will be in response to signals performed using signals simulating alarm simulating alarm conditions. conditions. 6.a) The power operated 6.a) Testing will be 6.a) A test signal exists only valves and IRWST performed on the IWSS at the IWSS components instrumentation, except components by providing powered from the Class alarms, shown on Figure a test signal in only one IE Division under test. 2.4.7-1 are powered Class IE Division at a from their respective time. Class IE Division. 6.b) Within the CFS, each of 6.b) Testing will be 6.b) A test signal exists only the four valves in the performed on the CFS at the CFS valves spillways from the valves by providing a test powered from the Class IRWST to the HVT is signal in only one Class IE bus under test. powered from a different IE bus at a time. Class IE bus. 6.c) Independence is provided 6.c) Inspection of the as- 6.c) Physical separation exists between Class IE installed Class IE between Class IE Divisions, and between Divisions in the IWSS Divisions in the IWSS. Class 1E Divisions and will be performed. Separation exists between non-Class IE equipment, Class IE Divisions and in the IWSS. non-Class IE equipment in the IWSS. O MfM Des @ Mat & page 2.4 60
i e System 80+ Deelan ControlDocanent 2.5 Instrunwatatkm and Control
~. , ; '2.5.1 Plant Protection Systen !
- Design Description )
i The Plant Protection System (PPS) is a safety related instrumentation and control system which initiates '[ i- reactor trip, and actuation of engineered safety features in response to plant conditions monitored by '
! process instrumentation. Initiation signals from the PPS logic are sent to the reactor trip switchgear and +
to the Engineered Safety Features - Component Control System (ESF-CCC', to actuate protective j functions. ] The PPS is located in the nuclear island structures. , i
- The Basic Configuration of the PPS is as shown on Figure 2.5.1-1. ;
The PPS and the electrical equipment that initiate reactor trip or engineered safety feature actuation are [ classified Seismic Category I.
)
The PPS uses sensors, transmitters, signal conditioning equipment, and digital equipment which performs [ l the calculations and logic to generate protective function initiation signals. . l 4 ~
~ The PPS features and equipment are software programmable processors, that operate with fixed sequenced i[ program execution, and fixed memory allocation tables. There are two bistable processors per channel a '
which provide separate trip paths where multiple sensors are available to detect the same transient. i There are two coincidence processors per channel each providing a local coincidence logic (LCL) for each assigned bistable trip function. Each coincidence processor has dedicated remote multiplexing from each ; bistable processor. The Interface and Test Processor (ITP) communicates with the bistable trip processors, and coincidence ! processors. Separation is provided between protective (safety critical) PPS processing functions and auxiliary functions of man-machine interfaces, data communications, and automatic testing. ! i 4 Data communication networks support the transmission of safety critical data on a continuous cyclical basis independent of plant transients. The PPS equipment is classified Class IE. ! c An environmental qualification program assures the PPS equipment is able to perform its intended safety j function for the time needed to be functional, under its design environmental conditions. The ; environmental conditions, bounded by applicable design basis events, are: temperature, pressure, { 2 humidity, chemical effects, radiation, aging, seismic events, submergence, power supply voltage & ] l , : frequency variations, electromagnetic compatibility, and synergistic effects which may have a significant effect on equipment performance. The environmental qualification of PPS equipment is achieved via tests, analyses, or a combination of analyses and tests. , l <t I s 1 r cwened Dea 6n aseeener rene 2.5-1 1
- ,e,
Sy^ tem 80 + Design C~ntrol Document Electromagnetic interference (EMI) qualification is applied for equipment based on operating environment and/or inherent design characteristics. The PPS is qualified according to an established plan for Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC). The qualification plan requires the equipment to function properly when subjected to the expected operational electrical surges, EMI, electrostatic discharge (ESD), and radio frequency interference (RFI). The equipment to be tested will be configured for intended service conditions. A site survey is performed upon completion of system installation to characterize the installed EMI environment. PPS software is designed, tested, installed, and maintained using a process which:
- a. Defines the organization, responsibilities, and software quality assurance activities for the software engineering life cycle that provides for:
- establishment of plans and methodologies
- specification of functional, system, and software requirements and standards, identification of safety critical requirements
- design and development of software o software module, unit, and system testing practices e installation and checkout practices
- reporting and correction of software defects during operation ;
l
- b. Specifies requirements for: J l
- software management, documentation requirements, standards, review requirements, and i procedures for problem reporting and corrective action
- software configuration management, historical records of software, and control of software changes
- verification & validation, and requirements for reviewer independence
- c. Incorporates a graded approach according to the software's relative importance to safety.
The use of commercial grade computer hardware and software items in the PPS is accomplished through a process that has:
- requirements for supplier design control, configuration management, problem reporting, and change control;
- review of product performance;
- receipt acceptance of the commercial grade item;
- final acceptance, based on equipment qualification and software validation in the integrated system.
Setpoints for initiation of PPS safety-related functions are determined using methodologies which have the following characteristics: , Certrned Design Mater \ial Page 2.5-2
-System 80+ Denlan conealDocument e Requirements that the design basis analytical limits, data, assumptions, and methods used as the l bases for selection of trip setpoints are specified and documented.
-e l Instrumentation accuracies, drift and the effects of design basis transients are accounted for in the .l !
determination of setpoints. i i e The method utilized for combining the various uncertainty values is specified. l t i e Identifies required pre-operational and surveillance testing. l i t e i Identifies performance requirements for replacement of setpoint related instrumentation. l i e - The serpoint calculations are consistent with the physical configuration of the instrumentation. l
]
Reactor Trio Initiation Function , Process instrumentation, the Plant Protection Calculators (PPCs), the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs), l and the reactor trip switchgear function to initiate an automatic reactor trip. The process instrumentation ; i
- provides sensor data input to the PPS which monitors the following plant conditions to provide a reactor
- trip:
Reactor Power - High . 3 Reactor Coolant System Pressure - Low or High :
~
Steam Generator Water Level - Low or High ; Steam Generator Pressure - Low i Containment Pressure .High } Reactor Coolant Flow - Low I- Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio - Low l
- . Linear Heat Generation Rate - High t
Setpoints for initiation of a reactor trip are installed for each monitored condition to provide for initiation ! of a reactor trip prior to exceeding reactor fuel thermal limits and the Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary limits for anticipated operational occurrences, If a monitored condition reaches its setpoint, the PPS automatically actuates the reactor trip switchgear. I Fnaineered Safety Features Initiation Function Process instrumentation, the PPCs, the ESF-CCS, motor starters, and other actuated devices function to . initiate the engineered safety feature systems. The process instrumentation provides sensor data input to the PPCs, which monitor the following plant conditions to initiate the engineered safety features systems. Pressurizer Pressure - Low .. Steam Generator Water Level - Low or High l Steam Generator Pressure - Low [ . Containment Pressure - High lf a monitored condition reaches its setpoint, the PPCs automatically generate one or more of the .! following Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Signals (ESFAS).
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument Safety Injection Actuation Signal , Containment Isolation Signal Containment Spray Actuation Signal Main Steam Isolation Signal Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signals These initiating signals are provided to the ESF-CCS, which responds by actuating the engineered safety feature systems. Bements Of The PPS The PPS is divided into four redundant channels. The following &ments, depicted in Figures 2.5.1-2 and 2.5.1-3, are included in each channel of the PPS: Process Instrumentation Signal Conditioning Equipment Limit Logic (PPC Bistables and CPCs) Local Coincidence Logic Initiation Logic Reactor Trip Switchgear Interface and Test Processor Operator's Modules Switches for Manual Activation of Reactor Trip Signals Switches for Manual Activation of ESF Initiating Signals Figure 2.5.1-2 shows the plant systems in which process instrumentation is implemented for generation of the sensor signal input to the PPS. Limit logic for process-value to setpoint comparison is implemented in bistable processors in each channel. System protective functions are distributed between 1 bistable processors to provide functional diversity. The bistable processors generate trip signals based on the channel digitized value reaching a digital setpoint. The PPS maintenance and test panels provide the capability for trip limit serpoint changes. Limit logic for calculated departure from nucleate boil ratio and high linear heat generation rate are implemented in each channel in a section of the PPS refened to as the Core Protection Calculator (CPC). The trip output signals of the bistable processors and the CPC in each channel are sent to the local coincidence logic processors in all four PPS channels. Therefore, for each trip condition, the local coincidence logic processor in each channel receives four trip signals, one from its associated bicable processors or CPC from within the channel, and one from the equivalent bistable processors or CPC located in each of the other three redundant channels. The coincidence processors evaluate the local coincidence logic based on the state of the four like trip signals and their respective bypasses. A coincidence of any two like trip signals is required to generate a reactor trip or ESF initiation signal. Operating bypasses are implemented in the PPS to provide for the bypass of trip functions which are plant mode specific. These bypasses are manually activated. The PPS automatically removes an operating bypass if the plant approaches conditions for which the associated trip function is designed to provide protection. Bistable trip channel bypasses allow one channel of the bistable inputs to the coincidence processors to be bypassed for each trip function. This converts the local coincidence logic to two-out-of-three coincidence for each trip function for which a bistable trip channel bypass is initiated. For each trip function, the PPS allows only one bistable trip channel to be bypassed at a time. Cordned Design Material Pope 2.5-4
System 80+ Design control Document (n) v Upon coincidence of two like signals indicating one of the conditions for reactor trip, the PPS logic initiates actuation of a channel of the reactor trip switchgear. As shown on Figure 2.5.1-2, actuation of a selective two single channels of the reactor trip switchgear is required to cause a reactor trip. The reactor trip switchgear breakers interrupt power to the Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM) coils, allowing all Control Element Assemblies to drop into the core by gravity. The reactor trip switchgear system (RTSS) can be tripped manually from the Main Control Room or the Remote Shutdown Room. The manual reactor trip uses hardwired circuits which are independent of the PPS bistable and coincidence processors. Once a reactor trip has been initiated, the breakers in the RTSS latch open. Upon coincidence of two like signals indicating a condition for generating an ESFAS, the ESF initiation logic transmits the respective initiation signal to the ESF-CCS. The PPS interfaces in the Main Control Room allow for manual activation of each of the ESF initiating signals input to the ESF-CCS. The PPS interfaces in the Remote Shutdown Room allow for manual activation of the initiating signals for Main Steam Isolation. Manual activation of these initiating signals is independent of the PPS bistable and coincidence processors. The PPS operator's modules at the Main Control Room., the Remote Shutdown Room and at the maintenance and test panel allow operators to enter trip channel bypasses, operating bypasses, and variable setpoint resets. These modules provide indication of bypass status and bistable trip and pre-trip status. (G) Manual control capability for the PPS it transferred from the Main Control Room to the Remote J Shutdown Room upon actuation of the Master Transfer Switches via signals from the ESF-CCS for all control functions except reactor trip. The inanual reactor trip switches are active in both locations at all times. Provision for transferring PPS cor. trol capability back to the Main Control Room is provided at the maintenance and test panel. I I Loss of power to, or disconnection of a reactor trip path component in a PPC or CPC will cause a trip l initiating state to be detected in a downstream component in that charmel. l
)
Periodic testing to verify operability of the PPS can be performed with the reactor at power or when { shutdown without interfering with the protective function of the system. Overlap in individual tests I assures that all functions are tested from sensor input through to the actuation of a reactor trip circuit breaker and to the generation of protection function initiation signals provided to the ESF-CCS. j The ITP monitors the on-line continuous automatic PPC and CPC hardware testing and performs on-line periodic automatic software logic functional testing of PPS logic. i Where automatic testing is implemented in the PPS, it does not degrade the capability of the PPS to l' perform its protective function. Indication of the automatic test system status and test results are provided to the operator via the Interface and Test Processor interface to the DIAS and DPS. Manual testing of PPS functions and hardware can be performed at the maintenance and test panel. O l l 1 Cerefod Design Matenial Page 2.5-S l 1
Sy~ tem 80 + Design ControlDocument PPS Channel Separation and Isolation Figure 2.5.13 shows the PPS channels and the signal flow from the process instrumentation to the individual channels for initiation of protection system functions. Four measurement channels with electrical independence are provided for each parameter used in the direct generation of these initiation , signals, with the exception of the Control Element Assembly position which is a two channel measurement. The four PPS channels are physically separated and electrically isolated. Each PPS channel is powered from its respective Class IE bus. System Characteristics: Number of independent channs of equipment 4 Minimum number of sensors per trip variable 4 (at least one per channe! except as identified above for the Control Element Assembly position) Coincidence logic used for plant sensor inputs Local 2-out-of-4 Reactor Manual / Automatic actuation trip logic Selective 2-out-of-4 ESF Manual / Automatic Actuation Logic Selective 2-out-of-4 Electrical isolation and physical separation are provided between the PPS and the process control system. Where the PPS and the process control system interface with the same component (e.g., with sensors, signal conditioners, or actuated devices), electrical isolation devices are provided between the process control system and the shared component. Electrical isolation devices are provided at PPS interfaces with the Power Control System, the Discrete Indication and Alarm System - Channel N, and the Data Processing System as shown on Figure 2.5.1-2. Electrical isolation devices are provided between the signal conditioning equipment and the Discrete Indication and Alarm System - Channel P. Physical separation is provided between PPS channels for the hardwired circuits used for manual initiation of reactor trip signals. Other operator interfaces from the main control panel and the remote shutdown panel to the PPS have electrical isolation devices. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.5.1-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Plant Protection System. O Certined Design A4sterial Page 2.6-6
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3 EACH PPS CHANIEL (4 N nut 4 BEN)19 POWERED FROM A SEPARATE CLASS 1E BUS. l 1 i i PPS Configuration Figure 2.5.1-1 i i i 4 WWNW Page 2.5-7 l
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Syat m 80 + D: sign controlDocument O PROCESS PROCES PROCESS PROCESS "F #F *F isgr . d 1 r u -u u < I cyc l ' I cpc I ' ' CIC l CPC CH A D63 C8+C Q&O BISTAsi.E BtBTABLE geSTABLE St3 TABLE TMIP 7 pop TruP TRP " PM W eense ppIOCESSORs PptOCESSORS PROCESSORS ) U nk ru iri n n r b r u u1 rk 9 n r uI n rul yup 58GN ALISCLATION l I IG ID II d i i I i: ED f A I b I ID E F A IE Ee1 2 m
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SyOtem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.5.1-1 Plant Protection System i Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria , l .a) The Basic Configuration of 1.a) . inspection of the as-built 1.a) For the componen's sad the PPS is as shown on PPS configuration will be equipment shown on 14re Figure 2.5.1-1. conducted. 2.5.1-1, the as-built PPS conforms with the Basic Configuration. 1.b) Separation is provided 1.b) Inspection of the as-built 1.b) The as-built PPS hardware between safety critical PPS PPS hardware and software and software has: processing functions and will be conducted. auxiliary functions of man-
- Processors that provide machine interfaces, data fixed sequenced program communications and execution with fixed mtomatic testing. memory allocation Data communication
- Separation provided networks support the between safety critical PPS transmission of safety processing functions and critical data on a continuous auxiliary functions of man-cychcal basis independent of machine interfaces, data plant transients. communications and automatic testing.
- Data communication networks that support the transmission of safety critical data on a continuous cyclical basis independent of plant transients.
- 2. The four PPS channels are 2. Inspection for separation 2. Physical separation exists physically separated and and isolation of the four as- between the 4 PPS electrically isolateJ. built PPS channels will be channels. Electrical conducted. isolation devices are l provided at interfaces between the 4 PPS channels.
- 3. Each PPS channelis 3. Testing will be performed 3. Within the PPS, a test powered frr.m its respective on the PPS by providing a signal exists only at the Class IE bus. test signal in only one Class equipment powered from l IE bus at a time. the Class IE bus under test.
l
- 4. Where the C and the 4 Inspection of the as-built 4. Eiectrical isolation devices process centro. system PPS configuration will be are provided between the j interface to the same conducted. process control system and component, isolation sensors, signal conditioners I devices are provided and actuated devices which between the process control interface to the PPS.
system and the shared component. O Certined Design Material Page 2.5-10 1
)
I i
i i Sy tem 80 + oe'lon controlDocument } l Table 2.5.1-1 Plant Protection System (Continued) l 1 Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 2
- 5. Electrical isolation devices 5. Inspection of the as-built 5. Electrical isolation are provided at PPS configuration will be devices are provided at interfaces with the Power conducted. PPS interfaces with the Control System, the Discrete Power Control System.
Indication and Alarm System the Discrete Indication Channel N and the Data and Alarm System - ! Processing System and Channel N and the Data
. between the signal Processing System and ,
conditioning equipment and between the signal l the Discrete Indication and conditioning equipment Alarm System - Channel P. and the Discrete Indication and Alarm System - Channel P.
- 6. Loss of power to. or 6. Loss of power and 6. Loss of power to, or disconnection of any reactor component disconnect type disconnectionof a trip path active component testing will be conducted at reactor trip path active ;
(i.e., circuit boards and the factory or on the as- component (i.e., circuit j power supply modules)in a installed equipment. boards and power supply l PPC or CPC will cause a trip modules)in a PPC or i initiating state to be detected CPC causes a trip in a downstream component initiating state to be ! in that channel. detected in a downstream component in that channel. When a process value input 7.a) Testing will be performed 7.a) Bistable processor 7.a) signal crosses the setpoint using simulated initiating generates a trip signal , threshold, the trip limit input signals to the PPS. when an input signal ) 1 bisrahle processor si:: crosses a limit loge ; generate a u;p ;;gnal. setpoint threshold. l 7.b) The PPS maintenance and 7.b) Testin;; will be performed 7.b) Setpoint changes affect test panels provide the using the built-in trip limit only the intended trip capability for trip limit setpoint change feature, limit functions. setpoint changes. i l I I A
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Sy~ tem 80 + Design ControlDocument Table 2.5.1-1 Plant Protection System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria Upon coincidence of two like 7.c) Testmg will be performed 7.c) The PPS generates 7.c) signals indicating one of the using simulated initiating reactor trip switch-gear following conditions for signals to the PPS. actuation signals. reactor trip, the PPS logic initiates a reactor trip: Reactor Power - liigh Reactor Coolant System Pressure - Low or liigh Steam Generatoc Level
- Low or liigh Steam Generator Pressure
- Low Containment Pressure - liigh Reactor Coolant Flow - Low Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio - Low Linear IIcat Generation Rate
- liigh 7.d) Testing will be performed 7.d) Each coincidence using simulated input signals processor outputs a trip to each coincidence signal whenever it processor, for combinations receives 2 or more like of 2,3 and 4 like signals for signals.
a trip condition and for combinations of 2 and 3 like signals with one bistable trip channelin bypass. O Certsfied Design Material Page 2.512
Srt m 80+ Design ControlDocument (~ Table 2.5.1-1 Plant Protection System (Continued)
\
. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 8. Upon coincidence of two like 8.a) Testing will be performed 8.a) The PPS generates signals indicating one of the using simulated initiating ESFAS signals related to following conditions for an s to the PPS. the initiating conditions l ESFAS, the ESF initiation for each condition iisted logic transmits the respective in the Design initiation signal to the ESF- Commitment as follows:
CCS. ' ESFAS PARAMETER Pressurizer Pressure - Low SIAS & Low Pressurizer Pressure Steam Generator Water CIAS High Containment Level - Low or High Pressure CSAS High-High Containment Steam Generator Pressure Pressure
- Low MSIS Low Steam Generator Pressure Containment Pressure High Containment High Pressure !
i High Steam Generator 1 Level l 4 EFAS Low Steam Generator Level High Steam Generator Level 8.b) Testing will be performed 8.b) Each coincidence using simulated input signals processor outputs the to each coincidence respective initiation I processor, for combinations signal whenever it of 2,3 and 4 like signals receives 2 or more like indcating a condition for signals indicating generstmg an ESFAS, and conditions for generating for combinations of 2 and 3 an ESFAS. like signals with one bistable trip channel in bypass. 9.a) A reactor trip initiation signal 9.a) Testing of the as-built reactor 9.a) The reactor trip initiation from a PPS channel results in trip switchgear actuation signal from each PPS actuation of the correct circuits will be conducted. channel actuates the reactor trip switchgear correct single reactor trip breaker, switchgear breaker, j 9.b) Each reactor trip switchgear 9.b) Testing will be performed 9.b) Each reactor trip breaker can be tripped by separately for the under switchgear breaker trips ; either an under voltage or a voltage trip and the shunt trip for either an under i shunt tr'.p. for each reactor trip voltage trip or a shunt ! switchgear breaker. trip. I J
- 10. The RTSS can be tripped 10. Testing of manual reactor trip 10. Actuation of either pair manually from the Main from Main Control Room and of reactor trip switches Control Room or the Remote Remote Shutdown Room will at the Main Control Shutdown Room. be performed. Room or either pair of trip switches at the Remote Shutdown Room interrupts power to the CEDMCS.
. Coponent Deelger Aceterief Pope 2.513
Sy tem 80+ Design controlDocument Table 2.5.1-1 P!=a Protection System (Continued) Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria ll.a) The following ESFAS signals ll .a) Testing of manual ESF ll.a) Actuation of either pair can be manually actuated at actuation from Main Control of ESFAS actuation the Main Control Room. Room will be perfonned. switches for an ESF function at the Main Safety injection Actuation Control Room initiates Signal the associated ESFAS signal input to the ESF-Containment Spray Actuation CCS. Signal Con:ainment isolation Signal Main Steam Isolation Signal Emergency Feedwater
. Actuation Signal ll.b) Testing of manual MSIS II.b) Following transfer of ll.b) A Main Steam isolation Signal can be manually actuation from the Remote control from the Main actuated at the Remote Shutdown Room will be Control Room to the Shutdown Room. performed. Remote Shutdown Room actuation of either pair of MSIS actuation switches at the Remote Shutdown Room initiates a MSIS input to the ESF-CCS.
12.a) A bistable trip channel bypass 12.a) Testing of PPS Trip Channel 12.a) With one trip channel in can be activated in only one Bypasses will be performed. bypass, attempts to channel at a time. actuate a second like parameter bypass in a second channel are , rejected. 12.b) The PPS automatically 12.b) Testing will be performed for 12.b) Each operating bypass removes an operating bypass each operating bypass becomes deactivated if the plant approaches implemented in the PPS. when the input signal for conditions for which the the mode dependent associated trip function is parameter monitored for designed to provide that function reaches the protection. associated setpoint.
- 13. The PPS initiates reactor trip 13. Testing and analysis will be 13. Measured response times and ESF system actuations performed to measure PPS are less than or equal to l within allocated response equiprnent response times. the response time values times. required for reactor trip and ESF actuations.
l l l 9\ Cartened Des &n Material Page 2.514
Sy: tem 80+ oestan controlDocument , I b Table 2.5.1-1 Plant Protection System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 14. Setpoints for initiation of PPS 14. Inspection will be performed 14. The inspection of the safety-related functions are on the setpoint calculations. setpoint calculation determined using confirms the use of methodologies which have the setpoint methodologies following characteristics: that require:
- Requirements that the design
- Documentation of data, l basis analytical limits, data, assumptions, and ,
assumptions, and methods mer*:Ms used in the l used as the bases for bases !or selection of trip selection of trip setpoints are serpemts is performed. specified and documented.
- Consideration of
- Instrumentation accuracies, instrument calibration !
drift, and the effects of uncertainties and design basis transients are uncertainties due to accounted for in the environmental determination of setpoints. conditions, instrument drift, power supply
- The method utilized for variation, and the effect l ,
combining the various of design basis event uncertainty values is transients is included in , specified. determining the margin i (
- Identifies required between the trip setpoint and the safety limit. l
+
preoperational and : surveillance testing.
- The methods used for l combining uncertainties
- Identifies performance is consistent with those l requirements for replacement specified in the of seapoint related methodology plan.
instrumentation.
- The use of written
- The setpoint calculations are procedures for required consistent with the physical preoperational and configuration of the surveillance testing.
instrumentation.
- Evaluauon for equivalent l or beuer performance of replacement instrumentation which is not identical to original equipment is documented.
I
- The configuration of the l ]
as-built instrumentation is consistent with the l attributes used in the l setpoint calculations for location of taps and d sensing lines. . I careneer Dee p neorneser (2/95) Pope 2.5-15 1 i
System 80+ Design controlDocument Table 2.5.1-1 Plant Protection System (Continued) Design Cornmitment Inspections. Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 15. PPS software is designed, 15. Inspection will be performed 15.a) The process defmes the tested, installed and of the process used to design, organization, naintained using a process test, install, and maintain the responsibilities and which: PPS safety related software. activities for the following phases of the Defines the organization, software engineering life l 15.a) responsibilities, and software cycle:
quality assurance activities for the software engineering
- Establishment of plans life cycle that provides for: and methodologies for all software to be
- establishment of plans and developed.
methodologies
- Specification of
- specification of functional, functional, system and system and software software requirements, requirements and standards, and identification of identification of safety critical safety critical requirements requirements.
e design and development of
- Design of the software software architecture, program structure, and dermition
- sofrware module, unit, and of the software modules, system testing practices
- Development of the e installation and checkout software code and testing practices of the software modules.
- reporting and correction of
- Interpretation of software software defects during and hardware and operation performance of unit and system tests.
- Software installation and checkout testing.
- Reporting and correction of software defects during operation.
O Cornhed Des &n MeterW (2/95) Page 2.5-16
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.5.1-1 Plant Protection System (Continued) Design Comnutment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 15. (Continued) 15. (Continued) 15. (Continued) 15.b) Specifes requirements for: 15.b) The process has l requirements for the o software management, following software documentation requirements, development functions:
standards, review requirements, and procedures
- Software management, ,
for probVm reporting and which defines corrective action organization i responsibilities, e software configuration documentation management, historical requirements, standards records of software, and for software coding and control of software changes testing, review requirements, and
- verification & validation, and procedures for problem requirements for reviewer reporting and corrective ;
independence actions. I
- Software configuration management, which establishes methods for A maintaining historical (V) records of software as it is developed, controlling software changes and for recording and reporting software changes.
- Verification and validation, which specifies the requirements for the verification review process, the validation testing process, review and test activity documentation, and reviewer independence, 15.c) Incorporates a graded 15.c) The process establishes l approach according to the the method for ;
software's relative importance classifying PPS software to safety, elements according to their relative importance to safety. The process I defines the tasks to be performed for software assigned to each safety C classification. l 1 Cereneef Deodon nieennlet (2/95) Page 2.517 I i
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.5.1-1 Plant Protection System (Continued) Design Conunitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 16. The use of commercial grade 16. Inspection will performed of 16. A process is defmed that computer hardware and the process defined to use has:
software items in the PPS is commercial grade accomplished through a components in the e requirements for process that has: application. supplier's design and production control,
- requirements for supplier configuration design control, configuration management, prob!cm management, problem reporting, and change reporting, and change control; control;
- review of product
- review of product performance; performance;
- receipt of acceptance of
- receipt acceptance of the commercial grade item; commercial grade item; e final acceptance, based
- fatal acceptance, based on on equipment equipment qualification and qualification and software validation in the software validation in the integrated system. integrated system.
- 17. The PPS is qualified 17. Inspection of the PPS EMC 17. For the PPS components according to an established qualification reports and the and equipment shown on plan for Electromagnetic as-built PPS equipment Figure 2.5.1-1, the as-cnmpatibility (EMC). installation configuration and built installation environment will be configuration and site The qualification plan conducted. survey are bounded by requires the equipment to those used in the PPS function properly when EMC qualification subjected to the expected report (s).
operational electrical surges or electromagnetic interference (emf), electrostatic discharge (ESD), and radio frequency interference (RFI). The qualification plan will require that the equipment to be tested be configured for intended service conditions. O Certoned Des &rn Ataterial Page 2.5-18
l l l System 80+ Deshur CongrelDocurrmrt ' fj Table 2.5.1-1 Plant Protection System (Continued) Design Conu=k===t Inspections. Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 18. An environmental 18. Inspectaon of the PPS 18. For the PPS componems qualifcation program assures qualifcation report and the and equipment shown on the PPS equipment is able to as-buik PPS equipment Figure 2.5.1 1, the as-perform its intended safety installation configuration and built installation, function for the time needed environment will be configuration, and design to be functional, under its conducted. environmental conditions design environmental are bounded by those conditions. The used in the ,
environmental conditions, environmental l bounded by applicable design qualifcation report. , basis events, are: temperature, pressure, humidity, chemical effects, t radiation, aging, seismic events, submergence, power supply voltage & frequency variations, electromagnetic compatibility, and synergistic effects which may have a significant effect on equipment performance. The environmental qualifwation of PPS equipment is achieved via tests, analysis or a combination of analyses and tests.
\
( M W as**enet enge 2.5-1s
l 1 i System 80+ Design ControlDocument i I 2.5.2 Engineered Safety Features - Component Control System Design Description The Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System (ESF-CCS) is a safety-related instrumentation and control system which provides automatic actuation of Engineered Safety Features (ESF) systems upon receipt of ESF initiation signals from the Plant Protection System (PPS). The ESF-CCS also provides the capability for manual actuation of ESF systems, manual control of ESF system components and manual control of other safety-related systems and components identified below. The ESF-CCS is located in the nuclear island structures. The Basic Configuration of the ESF-CCS is as shown on Figure 2.5.2-1. The ESF-CCS is classified Seismic Category I. The ESF-CCS equipment is classified Class 1E. An environmental qualification program assures the ESF-CCS equipment is able to perform its intended safety function for the time needed to be functional, under its design environmental conditions. The environmental conditions, bounded by applicable design basis events, are: temperature, pressure, humidity, chemical effects, radiation, aging, seismic events, submergence, power supply voltage & frequency variations, electromagnetic compatibility, and synergistic effects which may have a significant effect on equipment performance. The environmental qualification of ESF-CCS equipment is achieved via tests, analyses or a combination of analyses and tests. l Electromagnetic interference (EMI) qualification is applied for equipment based on operating environment and/or inherent design characteristics. The ESF-CCS is qualified according to an established plan for Electromagnetic Corrpatibility (EMC). l The qualification plan requires the equipment to function properly when subjected to the expected operational electrical surges or electromagnetic interference (EMI), electrostatic discharge (ESD), and i radio frequency interference (RFI). l The equipment to be tested will be configured for intended service conditions. A site survey is performed upon completion of system installation to characterize the installed EMI environment. , l The ESF-CCS uses sensors, transmitters, signal conditioning equipment, and digital equipment which I perform the calculations, communications, and logic to generate signals to actuate protective system equipment. This equipment is Class IE. The ESF-CCS design incorporates the following features: software programmable processors arranged in primary and standby processor configurations within each ESF-CCS division. Processors provide fixed sequence program (non-interrupt driven) execution with fixed memory allocation. ESFAS functions are divided into ESF-CCS distributed segments with two separate multiplexers per segment which receive
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Corsned Desbart nieterial 111/96) Page 2.5-20
Sy: tem 80+ Design ControlDocument (n ) PPS initiation signals. Separation is provided between protection (safety critical) ESFAS processing functions and auxiliary functions of man-machine interfaces, data conununication and automatic testing. Redundant data communication networks support the transmission of protection (safety critical) data on a continuous cyclical basis independent of plant transients. For each defined failure of the ESF-CCS data communication links, a predetermined failure mode for the affected system has been defined and determined to have acceptable consequences. The ESF-CCS is divided into four divisions. Each division of the ESF-CCS has the following elements, as depicted on Figure 2.5.2-2: selective 2-out-of-4 logic, component control logic, process instrumentation, signal conditioning equipment, maintenance and test panel, control and display interface devices, and a master transfer switch. The four ESF-CCS divisions are physically separated and cieuncally isolated. Each ESF-CCS division is powered from its respective Class IE bus. p Each ESF-CCS division receives 4 channels of initiation signals from the PPS which are processed using selective 2-out-of-4 logic to generate actuation signals for the ESF systems controlled by that division. V Basic block diagrams for the functional logic used in the ESF-CCS for actuation of ESF systems are shown on Figures 2.5.2-3 and 2.5.2-4. The ESF-CCS provides control capability and, upon receipt of initiation signals from the PPS, automatically generates actuation signals to the following ESF systems within allocated response times: I l safety injection system, containment isolation system, l containment spray system, I main steam isolation, and I steam generator 1 and steam generator 2 emergency feedwater system. Once initiation signals are received from the PPS, the ESF-CCS actuation logic signals remain following removal of the initiation signal. ESF functions are assigned to individual group control segments within each ESF-CCS division. This j functional assignment approach limits the effect of a single group failure to selected ESF functions in a given division. Additional segmentation of functional assigrunent is applied within each ESF-CCS group control segment. This practice limits the effect of a single multiplexer or module failure to selected ESF functions in the O division. ESF system interfaces are also confined within group control segments to minimize reliance on the intradivision communication network i r ESF operability. l CertMed Design Afsterint Page 2.5-21
System 80+ Design ControlDocument The ESF-CCS provides control capability and, upon receipt of initiation signals from the PPS, automatically generates actuation signals to the following non-ESF systems: annulus ventilation system, component cooling water system, onsite power system, diesel generators, and control complex ventilation system. The ESF-CCS provides control and display capability for the following safety-related systems: shutdown cooling system, safety depressurization system, atmospheric dump system, station service water system, heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems, and hydrogen mitigation devices. Upon receipt of ESF initiation signals for safety injection, containment spray or emergency feedwater, the ESF-CCS initiates an automatic start of the diesel generators and automatic load sequencing of ESF loads. Upon detecting loss of power to Class IE Division buses through protective devices, the ESF-CCS automatically initiates startup of the diesel generators, shedding of electrical load, transfer of Class IE bus connections to the diesel generator, and sequencing of the reloading of safety-related loads to the Class IE bus. In performing load sequencing, normally used safety related plant loads are loaded first in a predetermined sequence unless an ESF actuation signal is generated. Upon ESF actuation, the normal load sequence is interrupted and priority is given to loading the actuated ESF systems and associated safety-related systems. The sequence for loading the normally used safety related plant loads is then resumed. The ESF-CCS provides interlock control for isolation valves in the shutdown cooling system (SCS) suction lines, the safety injection tank (SIT) discharge lines and the emergency feedwater (EFW) pump discharge lines. The SCS interlocks prevent the ESF-CCS from generating a signal to open the SCS isolation valves when the RCS pressun is above the entry pressure of the SCS. The SIT interlocks prevent the ESF-CCS from generating a signal to close the SIT isolation valves when the RCS pressure is above the entry pressure of the SCS. The interlock on the EFW isolation valves automatically closes the isolation valves on high SG levels when an Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal is not present. The control and display interface devices of the ESF-CCS in the MCR provide for automatic and manual control of ESF systems and components. In the remote shutdown room, the control and display interface devices provide for manual control of ESF system components needed to achieve hot standby. Actuation of master transfer switches at either exit of the MCR transfers control caribility from the control and display interface devices in the MCR to those in the remote shutdown room. Indication of transfer is provided in the MCR. Each ESF-CCS division's maintenance and test panel provides capability to transfer control from the MCR to the remote shutdown room for its respective ESF-CCS division and to transfer control back to the MCR for its respective ESF-CCS division. O CertiRed Design Material Page 2.5-22
System 80+ Design ControlDocument I Diverse manual actuation switches are provided as an alternate means for manual actuation of ESF l components'in two divisions of the ESF-CCS as follows: l 4 I 1 2 trains of safety injection, j 1 train of containment spray, ;
- 1 train of emergency feedwater to each steam generator, 1 main steam isolation valve in each main steam line.
I isolation valve in each containment air purge line, and .l l [- 1 letdown isolation valve. l t The diverse manual actuation switches provide input signals to' the lowest level in the ESF-CCS digital equipment. Communication of the signals from the switches is diverse from the software used in the i higher levels of the ESF-CCS. Actuation of the switches provides a signal which overrides higher level signals,' to actuste the associated ESF component or components. Diverse manual actuation status ' indication is provided in the MCR. , Periodic testing to verify operability of the ESF-CCS can be performed with the reactor at power or when shutdown without interfering with the protective function of the system. Capability is provided for testing all functions, from ESF initiating signals received from the PPS through to the actuation of protective system equipment. Testing consists of on-line automatic hardware testing, automated functional testing
. of PPS/ESFAS initiations and interfaces, and manual testing. The maintenance and test panel provides
- capability for manual testing of ESF-CCS functions and hardware.
~ Where the ESF-CCS and the process control system interface with the same component (e.g., with
' sensors, signal conditioners, or actuated devices), electrical isolation devices are provided between the
- process control system and the shared component. Electrical isolation devices tre provided at ESF-CCS i interfaces with the discrete indication and alarm system - channel N (DIAS-N), the data p rocessing system l (DPS). the process-component control system (P-CCS), the control and display interface devices, the master transfer switches and between the signal conditioning equipment and the discrete indicatior and 4
alarm system - channel P (DIAS-P), as shown on Figure 2.5.2-2. ESF-CCS software is designed, tested, installed, and maintained using a process which: l 1 h a. Defines the organization, responsibilities, and software quality assurance activities for the software engineering life cycle that provides for: , j
- establishment of plans and methodologies
- specification of functional, system and software requirements and standards, identification of safety critical requirements l
- design and development of software l
* . software module, unit and system testing practices i i-
- installation and checkout practices :
- reporting and correction of software defects during operation !
t O l T M 0009N aC0 W Pope 2.5-23 i
System 80+ Design ControlDocument
- b. ' Specifies requirements for:
- software management, documentation requirements, standards, review requirements, and procedures for problem reporting and corrective action
- software configuration management, historical records of software, and control of software changes e verification & validation, and requirements for reviewer independence
- c. Incorporates a graded approach according to the software's relative importance to safety.
The use of commercial grade computer hardware and software items in the ESF-CCS is accomplished through a dedication process that has:
- requirements for supplier design control, configuration management, problem reporting, and change control;
- review of product performance;
- receipt acceptance of the commercial grade item;
- final acceptance, based on equipment qualification and software validation in the integrated system.
Setpoints for interlocks and actuation of ESF-CCS safety-related functions are determined using methodologies which have the following characteristics:
- a. Requirements that the design basis analytical limits, data, assumptions, and methods used as the bases for selection of trip setpoints are specified and documented.
- b. Instrumentation accuracies, drift and the effects of design basis transients are accounted for in the determination of setpoints.
- c. The method utilized for combining the various uncertainty values is specified.
- d. Identifies required pre-operational and surveillance testing.
- e. Identifies performance requirements for replacement of setpoint related instmmentation.
- f. The setpoint calculations are consistent with the physical configuration of the instrumentation.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.5.2-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Engineered Safety Features-Component Control System. O Certined Des @ historial Page 2.5-24
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OFAS ESFAS ESFAS BFAS NTIATION NTIATION NTIATION INmATION WGNALS WGNALs SNINALS 4 SENALS T r i T T I Il fI fI f l fI fI Il f I Il fI II I I fI fI fI f smac m utse m utscru mucna 20070F4 200f0F4 20UT0F4 2 0UTOF4 4 LDGC LOQC LDGC (DGC _ I II 1f II i lf COMPNENT - T COMPCNENT i COM MNENTl CONTROL C00mI0L CONffl0L CONTROL LDl2 LOOC t00C LOlc i f I I 1 I f If f TMNC TRAIN D TRAIN A- TMN3 COIRMNTg COMP 00OfTS COMPONWiTSI COMP 0MNTS l 4 l ESFAS Basic Block Diagram for Safety Injection Actuation and Figure 2.5.2 3 Emegency Feedwater Actuation W #* Pope 2.5-27
1 Sy;' tem 80 + Design controlD:cument I Ol ESFAS ESFAS INmATION INmATION SIGNALS SIGNALS A A f A r A l fI fI fl f I II II II f sauerna saucru 2 DUT OF 4 2ourOFA LD RIC LOGIC lf 3I CoasP3NENT COMPONENT l CONTROL CONTHOL LO Osc t.OGIC a i l I _ lI TRMN A TRAIN B COMPONENTS ConBPONENTS 1 l ESFAS Basic Block Diagram for Main Steam Isolation and Containment figure 2.5.2-4 Isolation I cusw ws+ nearew p,,, ,_ g.,g i 1
1 i Sy tem 80+ Design controlDocument ; 1 l
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's/ Table 2.5.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Component Control System Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria l 1 1.a) The Basic Configuration of 1.a) Inspection of the as-built 1.a) For the components and ! the ESF-CCS is as shown ESF-CCS configuration equipment sMwn on l on Figures 2.5.2-1 and will be conducted. Figures 2.5.2-1 and 2.5.2-2.5.2-2. 2, the as-built ESF-CCS conforms with the Basic Configuration. 1.b) The ESF-CCS has the 1.b) Inspection of the as-built 1.b) The ESF-CCS has the l folloeiing features: ESF-CCS will be following features: j performed. !
- Software programmable
- Software programmable processors arranged in processors arranged in primary and standby primary and standby processor configuration processor configuration within each ESF-CCS within each ESF-CCS ,
division division
- Processors provide fixed
- Processors provide fixed sequence program (non- sequence program (non-interrupt driven) execution interrupt driven) execution with fixed memory with fixed memory allocation allocation i ESFAS functons are G
- ESFAS functions are *
/ divided into ESF-CCS divided into ESF-CCS l distributed segments with distributed segments with two separate multiplexers two separate multiplexers per segment which receive per segment which receive PPS initiation signals. PPS initiation signals
- Separation is provided
- Separation is provided between protective (safety between safety critical critical) ESFAS processing ESFAS processing functions and auxiliary functions and auxiliary functions of man-machine functions of man-machine interfaces, data interfaces, data communications, and communications, and automatic testing automatic testing
- Redundant data
- Redundant data communication networks communication networks support the transtr.ission of support the transmission safety critical data on a of safety critical data on a continuous cyclical basis continuous cyclical basis independentof plant independent of plant transients transients O
Cortened Design MaterW page 2.5-2s
System 80+ oesign controlDocument Table 2.5.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Component Control Sy#em (Continued) Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 2. Each division of the ESF- 2. Inspection of the four as- 2. Each ESF-CCS division CCS has the following built ESF-CCS divisions has equipment for the elements, as depicted on will be performed. following:
Figure 2.5.2-2: selective 2-out-of-4 logic, selective 2-out-of-4 logic, component controllogic, component control logic, process instrumentation, process instrumentation, signal conditioning signal conditioning equipment, maintenance equipment, maintenance and test panel, control and and test panel, control and display interface devices, display interface devices, and a master transfer and a master transfer switch. switch.
- 3. The four ESF-CCS 3. Inspection for separation 3. Physical separation exists divisions are physically and isolation of the four between the 4 ESF.CCS separated and electrically as-built ESF-CCS divisions. Electrical isolated. divisions will be isolation devices are conducted. provided at interfaces between the four ESF-CCS divisions.
- 4. Each ESF-CCS division is 4. Testing will be performed 4. Within the ESF-CCS, a powered from its on the ESF-CCS by test signal exists only at respective Clast 1E bus. providing a test signal in the equipment powered only one Class IE bus at a from the Class IE bus time. under test.
- 5. Each ESF-CCS division 5. Testing will be performed 5.a) Each ESF-CCS division receives 4 channels of using simulated PPS receives four channels of initiation signals from the signals for ESF initiation PPS initiation signals for PPS which are processed input to each division of each ESF actuation using selective 2-out-of-4 the ESF-CCS. function performed by that logic to generate actuation ESF-CCS division.
signals for the ESF sye ns controlled by that division. Basic block diagrams for the function logic used in the ESF-CCS for actuation of ESF systems are shown on Figures 2.5.2-3 and 2.5.2 4. O CorbM Dessgre Afsterial Page 2.5-30 l
System 80+ Design controloccument 1 [V) Table 2.5.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Component Control System (Continued) Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 5. (Continued) 5. (Continued) 5.b) For each ESF actuation function performed by an ESF-CCS division, receipt of an ESF initiation signal from only one PPS channel does not result in generationof an ESF actuation signal The receipt of like PPS initiation signals which do
' not satisfy the selective 2-out-of-4 logic does not result in actuation signals for that ESF function. The receipt of like PPS ESF initiation signals which satisfy the selective 2-out-of-4 logic does result in actuation signals g for that ESF function.
- 6. The ESF-CCS provides 6.a) Testing will be performed 6.a) The control and display control capability and, on the as-built ESF-CCS interface equipment l upon receipt of initiation control and display provide control capability signals from the PPS, interface equipment. for the following systems:
automatically generates actuation signals to the safety injection system, following ESF systems containment isolation within allocated response system, containment spray times: system, main steam isolation, and emergency safety injection system, feedwater system. containment isolation system, containment spray system, main steam isolation, and emergency feedwater system. [ Cerened Design Menerial Page 2.5-31
i
. Syntem 80 + Design CrntrolDocument Table 2.5.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Component Control System (Continued)
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 6. (Continued) 6.b) Testing will be performed 6.b) PPS initiation signals using signals simulating which satisfy the selective Once initiation signals are PPS initiation to the ESF- 2 out of 4 criteria result in received from the PPS, the CCS. ESF actuation signals for ESF-CCS actuation logic related system components signals remain following for the following systems:
removal of the initiation signal. safety injection system, containment isolation system, contaimr:e ?t spray system main steam isolation, and steam generator 1 and steam ; generator 2 emergency feedwater system. 6.c) Testing will be performed 6.c) Measured response times using signals simulating are less than or equal to , PPS initiation to the ESF- the response time values l CCS. required for each ESF l actuation signal. 6.d) Testing will be performed 6.d) Once initiated, ESF-CCS l using signals simulating actuation logic signals j PPS initiation to the ESF- remain following removal CCS. of the initiation signal.
- 7. The ESF-CCS provides 7.k) Testing will be performed 7.a) The control and display control capability and, on the as-built ESF-CCS interface equipment upon receipt of initiation control and display provide control capability signals from the PPS, interface equipment. for the following systems:
automatically generates actuation signals to the annulus ventilation system, following non-ESF component cooling water systems: system, onsite power system, diesel generators, annulus ventilation system, and control complex component cooling water ventilation system. system, onsite power system, diesel generators, and control complex ventilation system. O Certified Deshrn AtaterW page 2.5 32
System 80+ Design ControlDocument A s V Table 2.5.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Component Control System (Continued) Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 7. (Continued) 7.b) Testing will be performed 7.b) PPS inidation signals i using signals simulating which satisfy the selective PPS initiation to the ESF. 2 out of 4 criteria result in i CCS. ESF actuation signals for related system components for the following systems:
annulus ventilation system, component cooling water system, onsite power system, diesel generators, and contr01 complex i ventilation system.
- 8. The ESF-CCS provides 8. Testing will be performed 8. The control and display i control and display on the as-built ESF-CCS interface equipment capability for the following control and display provide component status
, safety-related zystems: interface equipment. and control capability for the following systems: s shutdown cooling system, safety deptessurization shutdown cooling system, A system, atmospheric dump safety depressurization system, station service system, atmospheric dump water system, heating, system, station service ventilating, and air water system, heating, conditioning systems, and ventilating and air hydrogen mitigation conditioning systems, and devices. hydrogen mitigation devices.
- 9. Upon receipt of ESF 9. Testing will be performed 9. Upon receipt of signals initiation signals for safety using signals simulating simulating initiation of injection, containment ESF initiation signals. safety injection, spray, or emergency containment spray, or feedwa.er, the ESF-CCS emergency feedwater initiates an automatic start which satisfy the selective of the diesel generators 2-out-of-4 criteria, the and automatic load ESF-CCS will initiate an sequencing of ESF loads. automatic start of the diesel generators and ;
automatic load sequencing l' of ESF loads. The loads are sequenced in the assigned order for [ each of the accident sequencing scenarios. j U l Cerend Design hierwiel rope 2.5-33 i
Syotem 80+ Design Control Docurnent Table 2.5.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Component Control System 9i I (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria j 10.a) Upon detecting loss of 10.a) Testmg will be performed 10.a) Upon loss of power at a I power to Class IE division using simulated loss of Class IE bus, signals are I buses through protective power to the Class IE generated automatically by ( devices, the ESF-CCS buses. each of two ESF-CCS automatically initiates divisions which will: startup of the respective I diesel generators, shedding 1) initiate an automatic start l of electricalload, transfer of the emergency diesel i of Class 1E bus generator associated with , connections to the diesel that division, ,l generators, and sequencing to the reloading of safety- 2) cause each medium related loads to the Class voltage switchgear circuit IE bus. breaker to open,
- 3) cause transfer of the Class IE bus connections to the diesel generator, and
- 4) sequentially reclose each j medium voltage switchgear circuit breaker ,
after the diesel generator has started. l 10.b) Upon ESF actuation, the 10.b) Testing will be performed 10.b) Upon receipt of the PPS normal load sequence is using a simulated loss of initiation signal, the E5F.- interrupted and priority is power to the Class IE CCS automatically given to loading the buses and simulated PPS interrupts the loading actuated ESF systems and initiation signals input to sequence to load the associated safety-related the ESF-CCS during the equipment associated with systems. reloading sequence for the ESF initiation signal each of the following ESF and then resumes the initiation signals: reloading sequence. safety injection actuation signal, containment spray actuation signal, emergency feedwater actuation signal to steam i generator 1, and emergency feedwater l actuation signal to steam generator 2. 10.c) Loss of power in an ESF. 10.c) Testing will be performed 10.c) Loss of power in an ESF-CCS Division results in simulating loss of power in CCS Division results in l ESF-CCS outputs the ESF-CCS Division. ESF-CCS outputs l assuming fail-safe output assuming fail-safe output operation. Operation. Certifad Design Material Page 2.5-34
Sy' tem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.5.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Component Control System (Continued) I
. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 10.d) Protective d: vices are 10.d) Inspection of the as-built 10.d) Protective devices are designed to detect loss of protective devices will be installed to detect loss of power if a setpoint is performed. power,if a setpointis exceeded. exceeded.
1 . I1.a) The ESF-CCS provides an 11.a) Testing will be performed ll.a) Manual control signals , interlock which prevents using signals simulating input to the ESF-CCS to the ESF-CCS from RCS pressure input to the open the shutdown cooling generating a signal to open ESF-CCS. system isolation valves do the shutdown cooling not result in generation of system isolation valves signals to open the valves when the RCS pressure is when the ESF-CCS above the entry pressure receives signals simulating of the shutdown cooling RCS pressure that is system. greater than the shutdown cooling system entry pressure. I1.b) The ESF-CCS provides an i1.b) Testing will be performed 11.b) Manual control signals interlock which prevents using signals simulating input to the ESF-CCS to l p the ESF-CCS from RCS pressure input signals close the SIT isolation j Q generating signals to close the SIT isolation valves to the ESF-CCS. valves do not result in generation of signals to when the RCS pressure is close the valves when the above the entry pressure ESF-CCS receives signals of the SCS. simulating RCS pressure ; that is greater than the SCS entry pressure. I1.c) The interlock on the EFW l1.c) Testing will be performed 11.c) Input of signals indicating isolation valves using signals simulating high SG level results in automatically closes the SG level and Emergency generation of a signal to ) isolation valves on high Feedwater Actuationinput close the EFW isolation SG levels when an signals to the ESF-CCS. valves unless signals for Emergency Feedwater Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal is not Actuation are also input to present. the ESF-CCS.
- 12. The operator interface 12. Addressed in 6.a),7.a), 12. Addressed in 6.a),7.a) j devices of the ESF-CCS in and 8. and 8.
the MCR provide for automatic and manual control of ESF systems and components. <f
\
cuand on4n unserw rape 2.5-35
System 80+ , Design controlDocument Table 2.5.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Component Control System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 13. In the remote shutdown 13. Testing will be performed 13. Control capability is room, operator interface on the as-built ESF-CCS provided at the ESF-CCS devices provide for manual control and display control and display controlof ESF system interface devices in the interface devices in the components needed to remote shutdown room remote shutdown room for achieve hot standby. following a transfer of the following systems:
control capability to the remote shutdown room. safety injection system, steam generator I and steam generator 2 emergency feedwater system, component cooling water system, onsite power system, diesel generators, shutdown cooling system, safety depressurization system, atmospheric dump system, station service water system, and heating, ventilating and tir conditioning systems. 14.a) Actuation of master 14.a) Testing will be performed 14.a) Upon actuation of the transfer switches at either using master transfer master transfer switches in exit in the MCR transfers switches at each exit of the the MCR at either exit: control capability from the MCR and each of the ESF-CCS control and ESF-CCS control and 1) control actions at the ESF-display interface devices display interface devices in CCS control and display depicted in the MCR to the MCR and the remote interface devices do not those in the remote shutdown room. cause the ESF-CCS to shutdown room. generate the associated control signals, and Indication of transfer status is provided in the 2) control actions at the ESF-MCR. CCS control and display interface devices in the remote shutdown room cause the ESF-CCS to generate the associated control signals.
- 3) indicationof transfer status is provided in the MCR.
O Certined Design Materis! Page 2.5-36
System 80+ Design ControlDocument f%
- V) Table 2.5.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Component Control System (Continued)
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 14.b) Each ESF-CCS division's 14.b) Testing will be performed 14.b) Upon actuation of the maintenance and test panel using each ESF-CCS master transfer switching
. provides capability to division's maintenance and function from each ESF-transfer comroi from the test panel and control and CCS division's MCR to the remete display interface devices in maintenance and test shutdown panel for its the MCR and the remote panet:
respretive ESF-CCS shutdown room. div'.sion and to transfer 1) control actions at the ESF-co.itrol back to the MCR CCS control and display for its respective ESF-CCS interface devices in the division. MCR for that ESF-CCS division do not cause the ESF-CCS to generate the associated control signals, and
- 2) control actions at the ESF-CCS control and display interface devices in the remote shutdown room for pI that ESF-CCS division
( cause the ESF-CCS to generate the associated control signals. Upon de-actuation of the master transfer switching function from each ESF-CCS division's maintenance and test pancl:
- 3) control actions at the ESF-CCS control and display interface devices in the remote shutdown room for that ESF CCS division do not cause the ESF-CCS to generate the associated control signals, and
- 4) control actions at the ESF-CCS control and display interface devices in the MCR for that ESF-CCS division cause the ESF-CCS to generce the
]-j. associated control signals.
Certmed Daniert Meteriel Page 2.5 37 1
Srtem 80+ Design CantrolDocument Table 2.5.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Component Control System (Continued) Design Commitment inspectiore, Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 14.c) Prior to transfer of control 14.c) Testing will be performed 14.c) Prior to transfer of control to the remote shutdown on the as-built ESF-CCS to the remote shutdown room, control actions in control and display devices room, control actions in the remote shutdown room in the remote shutdown the remote shutdown room do not cause the ESF-CCS room prior to transfer of do not cause the ESF-CCS to generate the associated control capability to the to generate tile associated control signals. remote shutdown room. control signals. 15.a) Diverse manual actuation 15.a) Testing will be performed 15.a) Actuation of the switches switches are provided as using the diverse manual provides signals to achieve an alternate means for actuation switches. actuation of ESF manual actuation of ESF components for the components in two following: divisions of the ESF-CCS as follows: 2 trains of safety injection, 2 trains of safety injection, I train of containment spray, I train of containment spray, I train of emergency feedwater to each steam , i train of emergency generator feedwater to each steam i generater 1 main steam isolation l valve in each main steam 1 main steam isolation line, valve in each main steam line, 1 isolation valve in each j containment air purge 1 isolation valve in each line, and containment ait purge line, and I letdown isolation valve. I letdown isolation valve. j 15.b) The diverse manual 15.b) Inspection of the as-built 15.b) Communicationof the ) actuation switches provide ESF-CCS equipment will signals from the diverse i signals to the lowest level be performed. manual actuation switches 1 in the ESF-CCS digital implements hardwired equipment. signal communication to Communicationof tha the lowest level in the signals from the sv.tches ESF-CCS digital ; is diverse from the equipment. j software used in the higher levels of the ESF-CCS. l Certaned Design Material Page 2.5-38
f System 80+ Design controlDocument 1 W Table 2.5.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Component Control System (Continued) Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria , 15.c) Actuation of the switches 15.c) Testing will be performed 15.c) Each diverse manual provides a signal which for each diverse manual actuation switch is able to overrides the higher level actuation switch with generate a signal which signals, to actuate the concurrent and opposing t~errides the manual associated ESF component control commands initiated signals input via the or components. from the control and control and display display interface devices interface devices, such depicted on Figure 2.5.2- that signals are provided
- 2. to the associated motor control centers to actuate the ESF equipment.
15.d) Diverse manual actuation 15.d) Testing will be performed 15.d) Diverse manual actuations a status indication is for each diverse manual are indicated in the MCR. provided in the MCR. actuation switch. Periodic testing to verify 16.a) Inspection of design 16.a) The design documentation 16.a) operability of the ESF- documentation will be specifies tests that can be ; CCS can be performed performed to verify the performed while the plant , with the reactor at power capability to perform is operating without or when shutdown without surveillance tests while the disabling the protection , , O) ( interfering with the prote.ctive function of the plant is operating. functions to verify operability of the selective system. Manual surveillance tests 2-out-of-4 logic and the will be conducted while response of ESF systems simulating ESF initiation to ESF actuation signals signals, and interlocks. h The manual test does not interfere with the actuation of the ESF-CCS. i G.b) Capability is provided for 16.b) Inspection of the as-built 16.b) Testing capability provides testing all functions from ESF-CCS equipment will overlap in individual tests ESF initiating signals be performed to verify the such that all functions received from the PPS capability for functional from ESF initiating signals testing. received from the PPS through to the actuation of l protective system through to the actuation of equipment. Testing protective system consists of on-line equipment are tested. automatic hardwcre testing, automated testing Te.: ting consists of on-line . of PPS/ESFAS initiations automatic hardware and interfaces, and manual testing, automated , testing, functional testing of ! PPS/ESFAS initiations and interfaces, and manual testing. i l j Corsneef Design nseconel Page 2.5-39 1
Sy~ tem 80+ oesign controiDocument Table 2.5.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Component Control System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 16.c) The maintenance and test 16.c) Inspection of the as-built 16.c) 'Ihe maintenance and test panel provides capability ESF-CCS equipment will panelincludes the for manual testing of ESF- be performed. capability to perform CCS functions and manual testing of ESF-hardware. CCS functions and hardware. 17.a) Where the ESF-CCS and 17.a) Inspection of the as-built 17.a) Electricalisolation devices the process control system ESF-CCS configuration are provided between the interface to the same will be conducted. process control system and component, electrical sensors, signal isolation devices are conditioners and actuated provided between the devices which interface to process control system and the ESF-CCS. the shared component.
,17.b) For each defined failure of 17.b) Testing of the ESF-CCS 17.b) For each defined failure of the ESF-CCS data and a failure mode and the ESF.CCS data communication links, a affects analysis will be commum ationlinks, a predetermined failure performed. predeterm.ned failure mode for the affected mode for the affected system has been defined system has been defined and determined to have and determined to have acceptable consequences. acceptable consequences.
- 18. Electrical isolation devices 18. Inspection of the as-built 18. Electricalisolation devices I are provided at ESF-CCS ESF-CCS equipment will are provided at ESF-CCS !
interfaces with the DIAS- be conducted. interfaces with the DIAS-N the DPS, the P-CCS, N, the DPS, the P-CCS, the control and display the control and display i interface devices, the interface devices, the ! master transfer switches, master transfer switches, I and between the signal and between the signal l conditioning equipment conditioning equipment ! and the DIAS-P, as shown and the DIAS-P, as shown I on Figure 2.5.2 2. on Figure 2.5.2-2. l 1 l l l I Certified Design Motorial Page 2.540 i l
System 80+ Deskn ControlDocument O V Table 2.5.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Component Control System : (Continued)
- Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 19. Serpoints for interlocks 19.a) Inspection will be 19.a) The inspection of the and actuation of ESF-CCS performed on the serpoint setpoint calculation safety-related functions are calculations. confirms the use of determined using setpoint methodologies methodologies which have that require:
the following characteristics:
- Documentation of data, l assumptions, and methods
- Requirements that the used in the bases for l design basis analytical selection of trip setpoints limits, data, assumptions, is performed.
and methods used as the
- Consideration of l bases for selection of trip instrument calibration setpoints are specified and uncertainties and documented, uncertainties due to
- Instrumentation accuracies, environmentalconditions. l drift and the effects of instrument drift, power design basis transients are supply variation, and the i accounted for in the effect of design basis determination of setpoints. event transients is included
- The method utilized for in determining the margin l combining the various between the trip setpoint uncertainty values is and the safety limit.
specified.
- The methods used for
- Identifies of required combining uncertainties is preoperational and consistent with those 1 surveillance tesdng. specified in the
- Identifies performance methodology plan.
requirements for
- The use of written replacementof setpoint procedures for required l related instrumentation. preoperationaland
- The serpoint calculations surveillance testing.
are consistent with the
- Evaluation for equivalent physical configuration of or better performance of the insttumentation. replacement instrumentation which is not identical to original j equipment is documented.
- The configuration of the l )
as-built instrumentation is l consistent with the l attributes used in the setpoint calculations for I location of taps and sensing lines. O . cwened Deern neenerw (219 5) Page 2.541 4 J
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.5.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Component Control System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 19. (Continued) 19.b) Testing will be performed 19.b) 1) The correct ESF-CCS to verify interlock and response occurs when an actuation responses to input signal crosses the simulated input signals. setpoint threshold.
- 2) Changing of a setpoint does not also 6hange the setpoints of other trips or interlocks.
- 20. ESF-CCS software is 20. Inspection will be 20.a) The process defines the designed, tested, installed, performed of the process organization, and maintained using a used to design, test, responsibilities and process which: install, and maintain the activities for the following ESF-CCS software. phases of the software 20.a) Defines the organization, engineering life cycle:
l responsibilities, and software quality assurance
- Establishment of plans and activities for the software methodologies for all engineering life cycle that software to be developed; provides for:
- Specification of functional.
- establishment of plans and system, and software methodologies requirements and identification of safety
- specification of functional, critical requirements; system and software requirements and
- Design of the software standards, identification of architecture, program safety critical requirements structure, and definition of the software modules;
- design and development of software
- Developmentof the software code and testing
- software module, unit and of the software modules; system testing practices
- Interpretation of software and hardware and performance of unit and system tests;
- Software installation and checkout testing; and
- Reporting and correction of software defects during operation.
O l Certrned Desigrs Notend (2/95) Pope 2.5-42
System 80+ oeskn controlDocument p i k Table 2.5.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Component Control System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 20. (Continued) 20. (Continued) 20.b) The process has l requirements for the
- installation and checkout following software practices development functions:
- reporting and correction of
- Software management, software defects during which defines organization operation responsibilities, documentation 20.b) Specifies requirements for: requirements, standards l for software coding and
- software management, testing, review documentation requirements, and requirements, standards, procedures for problem review requirements, and reporting and corrective procedures for problem actions; reporting and corrective action
- Software configuration management, which
- software configuration establishes methods for management, historical maintaining historical
( records of software, and records of software as it is control of software developed, controlling changes software changes and for recording and reporting
- verification & validation, software changes; and and requirements for revicwer independence
- Verification and validation, which specifies 20.c) Incorporates a graded the requirements for the l approach according to the verification review software's relative process, review and test importance to safety. activity documentation, and reviewer independence.
20.c) The process establishes the l method for classifying ESF-CCS software elements according to their relative importance to safety, The process defines the tasks to be performed for software assigned to each safety classincation. O -s CerstVent Deekn Motorief (2Ap5) Papa 2.5m s
System 80+ Deslyn ControlDocument Table 2.5.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Component Control System (Continued) Dedgn Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 21. An environmental 21. An inspection of the ESF- 21. For the ESF-CCS qualification program CCS qualification report components and equipment assures the ESF-CCS and the as-built ESF-CCS shown on Figure 2.5.2-1, equfpment is able to equipment installation the as-built installation, perform its intended safety configuration and configuration, and design function for the time environment will be environmental conditions needed to be functional, conducted. are bounded by those used und-r its design in the environmental environmental coaditions. qualification report.
The environmental conditions, bounded by applicable design basis events, are: temperature, pressure, humidity, chemical effects, radiation, aging, seismic events, submergence, power supply voltage & frequency variations, electromagnetic compatibility, and synergistic effects which may have a significant effect on equipment performance. The environmental qualification of ESF-CCS equipment is achieved via tests, analysis, or a combination of analyses and tests. O
,Certined Design hintaniel Page 2.5-44
1 1 System 80+ oesign controloccument l Table 2.5.2-1 Engineered Safety Features Component Control System ) (Continued) Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 22. The use of commercial 22. Inspection will be 22. A process is defined that grade computer hardware performed of the process has:
and software items in the defined to use commercial ESF-CCS is accomplished grade components in the e requirements for supplier's through a dedication application. design and production process that has: control, configuration management, problem o requirements for supplier reporting, and change design control, control; configuration management,
- review of product problem reporting, and performance; change control;
- receipt of acceptance of
- review of product commercial grade item; performance; e final acceptance, based on
- receipt acceptance of the equipment qualification commercial grade item; and software validation in
- final acceptance, based on the integrated system, equipment qualification and software validation in the integrated system.
n
- 23. The ESF-CCS is qualified 23. An inspection of the ESF- 23. For the ESF-CCS according to an established CCS EMC qualification components and equipment ,
plan for Electromagnetic reports and the as-built shown on Figure 2.5.2-1, f compatibility (EMC). ESF-CCS equipment the as-built installation installation configuration configuration and site i The qualification plan and environment will be survey are bounded by l requires the equipment to conducted. those used in the ESF-function properly when CCS EMC qualification subjected to the expected report (s). operational electrical surges or electromagnetic interference (EMI), I l clectrostatic discharge (ESD), and radio l frequency interference (RF1). The qualification plan will l require that the equipment to be tested be configured for intended service conditions. I l l l /] (, l Ceratted Design Meterief page 2.545 I l
Syctem 80+ Design ControlDocument 2.5.3 Discrete Indication and Alarm System and Data Processing System Design Description The Discrete Indication and Alarm System (DIAS) and the Data Processing System (DPS) are non-safety related instrumentation and display systems which display information for monitoring conditions in the reactor, the reactor coolant system, Containment, and safety-related process systems during and following design basis events. The DIAS and DPS are non-Class IE systems used to display safety-related infonnation. The Basic Configuration for the DIAS and DPS is as shown on Figure 2.5.3-1. The DIAS and the DPS are located in the nuclear island structures. The DIAS and the DPS use sensors, transmitters, signal conditioning equipment, information display equipment, and digital equipment which perform the data processing, data communication, calculations, and logic to display safety-related information. Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation (PAMI) Category I instruments and computers up to and including the channel isolation devices are Class IE environmentally qualified. The DIAS power supplies, displays, and processors are seismically qualified for physical and functional integrity. The main control room (MCR) and remote shutdown room (RSR) DPS display devices are seismically qualified for physical integrity. The DIAS is divided into two segments: DIAS - Channel P (DIAS-P) DIAS - Channel N (DIAS-N) The DIAS hardware components have the following attributes:
- software progranunable processors;
- software execution without process dependent interrupts;
- segmented design such that the impact of a single electrical failure is limited to the display devices of the segment.
Physical separation and electrical isolation are provided between the DIAS-P, the DIAS-N and the DPS as shown on Figure 2.5.3-2. The DIAS displays and processors are non-class IE which are designed for room ambient temperature and humidity envirorunental conditions. Temperature sensors mounted in the DIAS cabinets provide high temperature status indication in the MCR. The hardware and software used in the DPS for information processing and display is diverse from that used in the DIAS-N and the DIAS-P. O Cortshed Design Material Pope 2.546
i Sv~ tem 80+ oesign controlDocument
-( The. DIAS-P provides a continuous display in the main control room (MCR) of key parameters for indication of critical function status during and following design basis events. These parameters are provided to the DIAS-P displays via two channels of instrumentation which include protection system signal conditioning equipment and post accident monitoring instrumentation (PAMI) equipment, as shown
~ on Figure 2.5.3-2. The PAMI computers calculate values for the reactor coolant subcooled margin, the coolant temperature at the core exit, and the coolant level in the reactor vessel which are displayed by the DIAS-P. The information provided to the DIAS-P displays are communicated via means which are )
diverse from the communication software used in the plant protection system (PPS) and the engineered
. safety features-component control system (ESF-CCS).
9 The DIAS-N provides for display of the key parameters for indication of critical function status during i and following design basis events, and the operating status of success path systems using dedicated display devices. The DIAS-N provides multi-parameter displays with access to backup information for the key 3 indicators, and access to diagnostic information. The DIAS-N provides displays for specified alarm conditions. The DIAS-N also provides displays with access to information from non-safety-related .
- systems.
l The DPS displays provide access to information from safety related systems, as identified above for DIAS-N, and to non-safety related information. The DIAS-N and the DPS provide for monitoring of the following: l
- a. Specified process conditions in the reactor and related systems for startup, operation, and
- shutdown from the MCR and for shutdown to hot standby from the remote shutdown room.
- b. Reactor trip system status to confirm that a reactor trip has taken place and whether or not a l
> setpoint for idiation of a reactor trip response has been reached. l
- c. - The status and operation of each engineered safety features system and for specified related systems in the post accident period.
- d. The positions of the control element assemblies,
- c. Specified parameters that provide information to indicate whether plant safety functions are being accomplished during and following design basis accident events,
- f. . Indication of bypassed and inoperable status of plant safety systems, as follows:
- 1. Status of plant operating mode related bypasses of the PPS. >
ii. Bypass status of each channel of the PPS. t iii. Bypass and inoperable status of engineered safety feature systems. lt
- g. The status of core cooling prior to and following an accident, as follows:
- i. Subcooling. ;
s ii. Liquid inventory in the reactor vessel above the fuel alignment plate. [ t
\
cwemw oseen aseserist rene 2. m
. -- i . .- - . - - -- .h
l ==s Sy~ tem 80 + Design C*ntrolDocument iii. Coolant temperature at the core exit.
- h. Four channels of PPS status information.
- i. Four channels of status and parameter information from the ESF-CCS.
j . The following information from the power control system and the process component control system (PCS/P-CCS): alternate reactor trip status, alternate feedwater actuation signal status, pressurizer pressure, and steam generator 1 and 2 levels. The DIAS-N and DPS provide alarm indication consisting of alarm tiles (DIAS-N only) and display messages, provision for alarm acknowledgement, and priority distinction in alarm display. The DIAS-N and the DPS perform automatic signal validation using cross channel data comparison prior to data presentation and alarm generation. Electrical isolation devices are provided at DIAS-N and DPS interfaces to the PPS, ESF-CCS, PCS/P-CCS, and at interfaces to display devices in the MCR and remote shutdown room. Electrical isolation is provided between the DIAS-P display devices and protection system signal conditioning equipment, as shown on Figure 2.5.3-2. DIAS uses redundant networks for communications. The networks utilize isolation technology (e.g., fiber optics) to ensure electrical independence of the redundant safety channels and electrical independence of the MCR and the RSR. The DIAS communications network provide communication paths to allow display of information from safety-related I&C systems. Data communications is on a cyclical basis, I independent of plant transients. l 1 I A loss of electrical power to DIAS or DPS equipment will result in a blank screen, inactive running indicator, or bad data symbol. 1 EMI qualification is applied for equipment based on operating environment and/or inherent design l characteristics. I l The DIAS /DPS is qualified according to an established plan for Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC). The qualification plan requires the equipment to function properly when subjected to the expected operational electrical surges, electromagnetic interference (EMI). electrostatic discharge (ESD), and radio l frequency interference (RFI). The equipment to be tested will be configured for intended service conditions. A site survey is performed upon completion of system installation to characterize the installed EMI ' environment. Certif.ed Design Material Page 2.5-48 l m_______
Svitem 80+ Design ControlDocument The use of commercial grade computer hardware and software items in the DIAS /DPS is accomplished through a process that has: : i
- requirements for supplier design control, configuration management, problem reponing atxi j change control; J
- review of product performance,
- receipt acceptance of the commercial grade item; l
* ' final acceptance, based on equipment qualification and software validation in the integrated l
system. [ DIAS /DPS sohware is designed, tested, installed, and maintained using a process which: ; Defines the organization, responsibilities, and software quality assurance activities for the :
- a.
I software engineering life cycle that provides for: l
- establishment of plans and methodologies ,
j
- specification of functional, system and software requirements and standards, identification ,
i of safety critical requirements ;
- design and development of software
- software module, unit and system testing practices !
i
- installation and checkout practices
!
- reponing and correction of software defects during operation i
i
- b. Specifies requirements for:
i e software management, documentation requirements, standards, review requirements, and procedures for problem reponing and corrective action
- software configuration management, historical records of software, and control of software changes
- verification & validation, and requirements for reviewer independence
- c. Incorporates a graded approach according to the software's relative importance to safety.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.5.3-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for the Discrete Indication and Alarm System and Data Processing System. , ' l 1 1 l T E V , t Cerennel Deekn aseenrint Page 2.549 ; 5
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Sr tem 80 + oesign controlDocument Table 2.5.3-1 Discrete Indication and Alarm System and Data Processing System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the DIAS and DPS is configuration of the equipment shown on as shown on Figure DIAS and the DPS will Figure 2.5.3-1, the as-2.5.3-1. be conducted. built DIAS and DPS conform with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. Physical separation and 2. Inspection of the as-built 2. Physical separation exists electrical isolation are DIAS-P, DIAS-N, and between the DIAS-P, the provided between the DPS equipment will be DIAS-N, and the DPS.
DIAS-P, the DIAS-N and conducted. Electrical isolation the DPS as shown on devices are provided at Figure 2.5.3-2. interfaces between the DIAS-P, DIAS-N and DPS, consistent with Figure 2.5.3-2.
- 3. The hardware and 3.a) Inspection of the vs built 3.a) Digital equipment used software used in the DPS DIAS-P, DIAS-N, and for data processing, data for information DPS equipment will be communication and processing and display performed. display in the DPS uses are diverse from that microprocessors which used in the DIAS-N and are diverse from the the DIAS-P. microprocessors used in corresponding equipment in the DIAS-N and the DIAS-P.
3.b) Inspection of the DPS, 3.b) The design DIAS-N and DIAS-P documentation confirms design documentation that the design group (s) will be performed to which developed the confirm that the software DPS software is different was developed by from the design group (s) different design groups. which developed the DIAS-N and DIAS-P software. O Certthed Design Mateweal Page 2.5 52
System 80+ oesign controlDocument n Table 2.5.3-1 Discrete Indication and Alarm System and Data Processing System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria , 4.a) The DIAS-P provides a 4.a) Inspection of as-built 4.a) The DIAS-P displays in continuous display in the DIAS-P equipment will the MCR provide the key MCR of the key be performed. parameters for indication parameters for indication of critical function status of critical function status during and following during and following design basis events, and design basis events. two channels of These parameters are instrumentation which provided to the DIAS-P include protection system displays via two channels signal conditioning of instrumentation which equipment and PAMI include protection system equipment are used to signal conditioning provide the information equipment and PAMI to the DIAS-P displays equipment, as shown on consistent with Figure Figure 2.5.3-2. 2.5.3-2. 4.b) The information provided 4.b) Inspection of the as-built 4.b) Communication of the the DIAS-P displays are DIAS-P equiprnent will signals from the signal ,O communicated via means be perforTaed. Where conditioning equipment to the DIAS-P display l L/ which are diverse from digital equipment is used the communication for communication of devices is consistent with software used in the plant signals to DIAS-P, then Figure 2.5.3-2 and protection system (PPS) inspection of the implements either of the and the engineered safety documentation will be following: features ESF-CCS. performed to confirm that the signal i. hardwired signal communication software communication for l is diverse from the signal displays derived directly communication software from the signal for the PPS and ESF- conditioning equipment, ! CCS. ii. digital signal I communication equipment that uses software that is diverse from the signal communication for the ; I PPS and ESF-CCS. I l ..(.)) Cornent Design Ated Page 2.5-53
Syntem 80+ D.rsign ControlDocument Table 2.5.3-1 Discrete Indication and Alarm System and Data Processing System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 5. The DIAS-N provides for 5. Inspection of the as-built 5. The DIAS-N provides display of the key DIAS-N equipment will dedicated display devices prameters for indication be performed. in the MCR for the of critical function status display of the key during and following parameters for indication design basis events and of critical function status the operating status of during and following success path systems design basis events and using dedicated display the operating status of devices. The DIAS-N success path systems.
provides multi-parameter The DIAS-N provides displays with access to multi-parameter displays backup information for in the MCR with access the key indiccors and to backup information access to diagnostic for the key indicators information. The DIAS- and access to diagnostic N provides displays for information. The DIAS-speci'ied alarm N provides displays in conditions. the MCR for specified alarm conditions.
- 6. The DPS provides for 6. Inspection of the as-built 6. The DPS displays in the display of the key DPS equipment will be MCR previde for display parameters for indication performed. of the key parameters for of critical function status indication of critical during and following function status during design basis events, the and following design operating status of basis events, the success path systems, operating status of bacrup information for success path systems, the key indicators, access backup information for to diagnostic information, the key indicators, access and for specified alarm to diagnostic conditions. information, and for specified alarm conditions.
l l O Cerwhed Design Ataterial page 2.5 54
i 1 System 80+ Design contratDocument
)
1 y) Table 2.5.3-1 Discrete Indication and Alarm System and Data Processing j System (Continued) i l Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 7. The DIAS-N and the 7. Inspection of the as-built 7. The DIAS-N and DPS DPS provide for DIAS-N and DPS display equipment monitoring the following: displays in the MCR and provides monitoring l
remote shutdown room capability for the , will be performed. following: 1 Testing will be ; performed using actual or simulated input signals. 7.a) Specified process 7.a) Specified process conditions in the reactor conditions in the reactor i and related systems for and related systems for startup, operation, and l startup, operation, and l shutdown from the MCR shutdown from the MCR and for shutdown to hot and for shutdown to hot I standby from the remote standby from the remote shutdown room. shutdown room. (NOTE I) (NOTE I) ' 7.b) Reactor trip system status 7.b) Reactor trip system V to confirm that a reactor status to confirm that a trip has taken place and reactor trip has taken whether or not a serpoint place and whether or not for initiation of a reactor a setpoint for initiation of trip response has been a reactor trip response reached. has been reached. 7.c) The status and operation 7.c) The status and operation of each engineered safety of each engineered safety feature system and for feature system and for specified related systems specified related systems in the post accident in the post accident period, period. 7.d) The position of the 7.d) The position of the { control elenent ! control element assemblies. assemblies. 1 V M Des # ateterial paye 2,5 55
Sy~ tem 80 + Design ControlDocument Table 2.5.3-1 Discrete Indication and Alarm System and Data Processing System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 7.e) Specified parameters that 7. (Continued) 7.e) Specified parameters that provide information to provide information to indicate whether plant indicate whether plant safety functions are being safety functions are being accomplished during and accomplished during and following design basis fo!!owing design basis accident events. accident events. 7.f) Indication of bypassed 7.f) Indication of bypassed and icoperable status of and inoperable status of plant safety systems, as plant safety systems, as follows: follows:
- 1. Status of plant operating i. Status of plant operating mode related bypasses of mode related bypasses of the PPS. the PPS.
ii. Bypass status of each ii. Bypass status of each channel of the PPS. channel of the PPS. iii. Bypass and inoperable status of engineered kii. Bypass and inoperable O status of engineered safety feature systems. safety feature systems. 7.g) The status of core 7.r 7he status of core cooling prior to and cooling prior to and following an accident, as following an accident, as follows: follows:
- 1. Subcooling. i. Subcooling.
- 11. Liquid inventory in the ii. Liquid inventory in the reactor vessel above the reactor vessel above the fuel alignment plate. fuel alignment plate.
iii. Coolant temperature at iii. Coolant temperature at the core exit. the core exit. 7.h) Four channels of PPS 7.h) Four channels of PPS status information, status information. l 7.i) Four channels of status 7.i) Four channels of status and parameter and parameter information from the information from the ESF-CCS. ESF-CCS. Coroned Design Material (2/9S) Pege 2.5-66
Sy~ tem 80 + w controlM-nent /% C Table 2.5.3-1 Discrete Indication and Alarm System and Data Processing System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteda 7.j) The following 7. (Continu@ 7.j) The following information from the information from the PCS/P-CCS: PCS/P-CCS: alter > < actor trip altemate reactor trip statu status, alternate feedwater alternate feedwater actuation signal status, actuation signal status, pressurizer pressure, and pressurizer pressure, and steam generator I and 2 steam generator I and 2 levels. levels.
- 8. The DIAS-N and the 8. Testing will be DPS perform automatic performed simulating the signal validation using multiple channel input cross channel data s.ignals to the DIAS-N comparison prior to data and DPS for each presentation and alarm paraweter selected as a generation. key indette: of critical tq qj function status, as follows:
8.a) The input signals will 8.a) The DIAS-N and the simulate a failure of one DPS display a value for of the multiple channels the parameter under test of input signals for the which is consistent with parameter under test, the signals which were simulated not to fail, and the DIAS-N and DPS indicate that the displayed value is ! validated. 8.b) The input signals will 8.b) The DIAS-N and DPS simulate a failure of all indicate that the i but one of the multiple displayed value for the channels of input signals parameter under test is i for the parameter under not validated. test. l l l 1 l 0 , l I M O**i n neoterial 9 pay,2.5 57 1
System 80+ Design cog 4 Document Table 2.5.3 Discrete Indication and Alarm System and Data Processing System (Coctinued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 8. (Continued) 8.c) ne input signals will 8.c) The DIAS-N and DPS simulate failure of one display a value for the channel with the other parameter under test channel previously which is consistent with removed from service. the signals which were simulated not to be removed from service or failed, and the DIAS-N and DPS indicate that the value is validated.
8.d) The DIAS-N and DPS 8.d) The DIAS-N and DPS display capability will be indicate operability by verified. verifying that the status signal is present and functional. The display used to verify 8.a) through 8.c) display these signals upon request, which make up the validated signal. 9.a) Electrical isolation 9.a) Inspection of the as-built 9.a) Electrical isolation devices are provided at DIAS-N and DPS devices are provided at DIAS-N and DPS equipment will be DIAS-N and DPS interfaces to the PPS, conducted. interfaces to the PPS, ESF-CCS, PCS/P-CCS ESF-CCS, PCS/P-CCS and at interfaces to and at interfaces to display devices in the display devices in the MCR and remote MCR and remote shutdown room. shutdown room, consistent with Figure 2.5.3-2. 9.b) Electrical isolation is 9.b) Inspection of the as-built 9.b) Electrical isolation provided between the DIAS-P equ;pment will devices are provided DIAS-P display devices be conducted, between the DIAS-P and one of the two display devices and one channels of protection of the two channels of system signal protection system signal conditioning equipment, conditioning equipment, as shown on Figure consistent with Figure 2.5.3-2. 2.5.3-2. O Certified Design Materist (1/97) Page 2.5-58
Sy~ tem 80+ Design ControlDocument V Table 2.5.3-1 Discrete Indication and Alarm System and Data Processing System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 10. DIAS /DPS software is 10. Inspection will be 10.a) The process defines the de.igned, tested, performed of the process organization, installed, and maintained used to design, test, responsibilities and using a process which: install, and maintain the activities for the DIAS and DPS software. following phases of the 10.a) Defines the organization, software engineering life responsibilities, and cycle:
software quality assurance activities for
- Establishment of plans the software engineering and methodologies for all life cycle that provides software to be for: developed.
e establishment of plans
- Specification of and methodologies functional, system and software requirements and identification of safety critical requirements.
/%
M Des # Mew page 2,5 59
System 80+ Design CTntrolDocument l Table 2.5.3-1 Discrete Indication and Alarm System and Data Processing System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 10. (Continued) 10. (Continued) 10. (Continued)
- specification of
- Design of the software functional, system and architecture, program software requirements structure and definition and standards, of the software modules.
identification of safety critical requirements
- Development of the e design and development software code and testing of software of the software modules.
e software module, unit, and system testing
- Interpretation of software practices and hardware and e installation and checkout performance of unit and practices system tests.
- reporting and correction of softv.are defects
- Software installation and during operation checkout testing.
10.b) Specifies requirements
- Reporting and correction for: of software defects during operation.
- software management, documentation 10 b) The process has requirements, standards, requirements for the review requirements, and following software procedures for problem development functions:
reporting and corrective action
- Software management, o software configuration which defines management, historical organization records of software, and responsibilities, control of software documentation changes requirements, standards e verification & validation, for software coding and and requirements for testing, review reviewer independence requirements, and procedures for problem 10.c) Incorporates a graded reporting and corrective approach according to the actions.
software's relative importance to safety.
- Software configuration management, which establishes methods for maintaining historical records of software as it is developed, controlling software changes, and Certified Design atatorist Page 2.5-60
r Sy~ tem 80+ Deslan ControlDocument /#% N Table 2.5.3-1 Discrete Indication and Alarm System and Data Processing System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 10. (Continued) 10. (Continued) 10. (Continued)
- Verification and validation, which ,
specifies the requirements for the verification review process, the validation testing process, review and test activity documentation, and reviewer independence. t 10.c) The process establishes the method for classifying DIAS and DPS software elements I according to their relative importance to ; (m safety. The process defines the tasks to be l performed for software assigned to each safety classification. I1. The DIAS /DPS is 11. Inspection of the !!. For the DIAS /DPS qualified according to an DIAS /T'2S EMC components and established plan for qualification reports and equipment shown on Electromagnetic the as-built DIAS /DPS Figure 2.5.3-1, the as-compatibility (EMC). equipment installation built installation configuration and configuration and site The qualification plan environment willbe survey are bounded by requires the equipment to conducted. those used in the function properly when DIAS /DPS EMC subjected to the expected qualification report (s). operational electrical surges or electromagnetic interference (EMI), electrostatic discharge (ESD), and radio frequency interference (RFI). The qualification plan p will require that the (-} equipment to be tested be configured for intended - service conditions. CoraMied Desigrs Matenfal Page 2.541
Sy ~ tem 80 + Design ControlDocument Table 2.5.3-1 Discrete Indication and Alarm System and Data Processing System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 12. DIAS and DPS are non- 12. Inspection of the DIAS 12. DIAS and DPS display Class IE systems used to and DPS equipment will safety-related information display safety-related be performed. (NOTE 2).
information.
- 13. The DIAS-N and DPS 13. Testing will be 13. The DIAS-N and DPS provide alarm indication performed to verify provide alarm indication consisting of alarm tiles DIAS-N and DPS alarm consisting of alarm tiles (DIAS N only) and indication. (DIAS-N only) and display messages, display messages, provisions for alarm provisions for alarm acknowledgement, and acknowledgement, and priority distinction m priority distinction in alarm display. alarm display.
- 14. DIAS communications 14. Inspection of the as-built 14. The equipment used for has the following safety DIAS will be performed. DIAS has the following critical attributes: attributes:
- cyclical data e cyclical data communications communications independent of plant independent of plant transients, transients,
- redundant networks for
- redundant networks for communication, communication.
- networks utilize isolation
- networks utilize isolation technology to ensure technology to ensure electrical independence of electrical independence redundant safety channels of redundant safety and electrical channels and electrical ;
independence of the Main independence of the l Control Room and Main Control Room and i Remote Shutdown Room, Remote Shutdown Room, e and networks provide e and networks provide communication paths to communication paths to l allow display of allow display of l information from safety- information from safety- i related I&C systems. related I&C systems. j 15.a) PAMI Category I 15.a) Inspection of the PAMI 15.a) The qualification repon instmments arid Category I equipment concludes that the PAMI 1 computers up to and qualification repon and Category I instruments . including the channel the as-built equipment and computers are Class l 15olation devices are installation, IE environmental and i Class IE environmentally configuration, and seismically qualified. and seismically qualified. environment will be conducted. Cartsned Design Material Page 2562
Sv tem 80+ De, control Documart O Q Table 2.5.3-1 Discrete Indication and Alarm System and Data Processing System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria i 15.b) The DIAS displays and 15.b) Inspection of non-Class 15.b) The non-Class IE DIAS processors are non-Class IE equipment equipreent environmental IE which are designed documentation will be specifications envelope for room ambient conducted. the room's design temperature and humidity ambient temperature and environmental conditions, humidity environmental conditions. 15.c) Temperature sensors 15.c) Testing will be 15.c) Temperature sensors mounted in the DIAS performed to simulate mounted in the DIAS cabinets provide status high temperature in the cabinets provide status indication in the MCR. DIAS cabinets. indication in the MCR. 15.d) The DIAS power 15.d) Inspection of the DIAS 15.d) The qualification report supplies, displays and equipment qualification concludes the DIAS ; processors are report and an inspection equipment is seismically seismically qualified for of the as-built equipment qualified for physical and physical and functional installation, functional integrity. integrity. configuration, and location will be conducted. 15.e) The MCR and RSR DPS 15.c) Inspection of the DPS 15.e) The seismic qualification display devices are display device seismic report concludes the DPS seismically qualified for qualification report and display device is physical imegrity. an inspection of the as. seismically qualified for built equipment physical integrity, installation, configuration, and location will be conducted.
- 16. The DIAS hardware 16. Inspection of the design 16. The design components have the documentation for the as. documentation concludes following attributes: built DIAS equipment that the DIAS equipment I will be performed. has the following
- software programmable features:
processors; e software execution
- software programmable without process processors; dependent interrupts;
- software execution l
- segmented design such without process that the impact of a dependent intertupts, single electrical failure is e segmented design such l limited to the display that the impact of a ;
devices of the segment. single electrical failure is ,
,O - limited to the display )
( devices of the segment, i I CMinnet Denipe Meneriet (1/97) page 2.5 63 1 l
Syntem 80 + oesign controlDocument Table 2.5.3-1 Discrete Indkation and Alarm System and Data Processing System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 17. Loss of electrical power 17. Inspection of the DIAS 17. Loss of power to a will result in either a and DPS during loss of display device results in blank display, inactive power will be petformed. a blank screen. Loss of status indicator, or bad power to a DIAS data status symbol, segment results in an inactive mnning indicator. Loss of power to a DPS application processor results in a bad data symbol on the display device.
- 18. The use of commercial 18. Inspection will be 18. A process is defined that grade computer hardware performed of the process has:
and software items in the defined to use DIAS /DPS is commercial grade e requirements for accomplished through a components in the supplier's design and process that has: epplication. production control, configuration a requirements for supplier management, problem design control, reporting, and change configuration control; management, problem o review of product reporting and change performance; control; e receipt acceptance of
- review of product commercial grade item; performance; e final acceptance, based
- receipt acceptance of the on equipment commercial grade item; qualification and
- final acceptance, based software validation in the on equipment integrated system.
qualification and software validation. l NOTEI Refer to Section 2.12.1, MCR and 2.12.2, RSR for identification of MCR and RSR indications I and controls provided by DIAS-N and DPS. I NOTE 2 Refer to Section 2.12.1, MCR for identification of information displayed. Cm1Wed Design Meterial p,y yw
1 Sv:t m 80+ Deslan contrar Document r . 2.5.4 ' Power Control System / Process-Component Control System Design Description t The Power Control System and the Process-Component Control System (PCS/P-CCS) are non-safety- !
. related instrumentation and control systems which provide control of functions to maintain the plant within its normal operating range for all normal modes of plant operation.
The PCS/P-CCS are located in the nuclear island structures. The Basic Configuration of the PCS/P-CCS is as shown on Figure 2.5.4-1. i The PCS/P-CCS use sensors, transmitters, signal conditioning equipment, control and display interface ' devices, and digital processing equipment which perform the calculations, data communications, and logic
. to support the control functions. The digital equipment and software used in the PCS/P-CCS are diverse ;
from those used in the plant protection system (PPS) and the engineered safety features - component i control system (ESF-CCS). The PCS/P-CCS provide control interfaces for the following control functions: PCS-reactivity control using control element assemblies, . PCS-reactor power cutback, PCS-power change limiter (Megawatt Demand Setter), P-CCS-pressurizer pressure and level, P-CCS-main feedwater flow, P-CCS-main steam bypass flow, P-CCS-boron concentration, P-CCS-alternate reactor trip actuation, and P-CCS-alternate emergency feedwater actuation. The circuits used for alternate actuation of reactor trip, turbine trip, and emergency feedwater are independent and diverse from the protection system actuation circuits. The PCS/P-CCS provide the following information to the Discrete Indication and Alarm System (DIAS): alternate reactor trip status, alternate feedwater actuation signal status, pressurizer pressure, and ; steam generator I and 2 levels.
- For parameters used in PCS/P-CCS control functions which are provided from the redundant Class IE sensors that are used independently by each channel of the protective system, the PCS/P-CCS monitors the four redundant instrument channels. The PCS/P-CCS apply signal validation logic to the signals received from the four redundant channels to detect bypassed or failed sensors and to determine the sensed value to be used in the control system. j
, Control and display interface devices for the PCS/P-CCS are provided in the main control room (MCR)
' and in the remote shutdown room for control and monitoring of PCS/P-CCS controlled equipment.
ceromed Des (p Afefenist Pope 2.5-65 ;
Sy' tem 80 + Design ControlDocument I 1 Actuation of master transfer switches at either exit of the MCR transfers control capability from the PCS/P-CCS control and display interface devices in the MCR to those in the remote shutdown room. The transfer can also be performed at the PCS/P-CCS equipment cabinets, which also provide capability for transferring control back to the MCR. Indication of transfer status is provided in the MCR. Electrical isolation devices are implemented between the PCS/P-CCS and the protection system signal c%ditioning equipment for each protection signal provided to them, as shown on Figure 2.5.4-2. Electrical isolation devices are provided for the PCS/P-CCS interfaces with the MCR equipment, the remote shttdown room equipment, the DIAS-N and the Data Processing System (DPS), the protection system, and with protection system components as shown on Figure 2.5.4-2. PCS/P-CCS software is designed, tested, installed, and maintained using a process which:
- a. Defines the organization, responsibilities, and software quality assurance activities for the software engineering life cycle that provides for:
- establishment of plans and methodologies
- specification of functional, system and software requirements and standards, and identification of safety critical requirements
- design and development of software e software module, unit, and system testing practices e installation and checkout practices
- reporting and correction of software defects during operation
- b. Specifies requirements for:
- software management, documentation requirements, standards, review requirements, and procedures for problem reporting and corrective action
- software configuration management, historical records of software, and control of software changes e verification & validation, and requirements for reviewer independence
- c. Incorporates a rued approach according to the software's relative importance to safety.
The use of commercial grads computer hardware and software items in the PCS/P-CCS is accomplished through a process that has: i
- requirements for supplier design control, configuration management, problem reporting, and change control; )
- review of product performance, I
- receipt acceptance of the commercial grade item;
- final acceptance, based on equipment qualification and software validation.
Inspection, Test, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.5.4-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Power Control System / Process-Component Control System. O l l l Carrined Design Material Page 2.5-66 ! l
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument (V Table 2.5.4-1 Power Control System / Process-Component Control System i Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Crheria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and the PCS/P-CCS is as shown configurationof the equipment shown on Figure on Figure 2.5.4-1. PCS/P-CCS will be 2.5.4-1, the as-built conducted. PCS/P-CCS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The digital equipment and 2.a) Inspection of the as-built 2.a) The digital equipment used software used in the PCS/P-CCS. PPS and ESF- in the PCS/P-CCS uses '
PCS/P-CCS are diverse CCS equipment will be microprocessors which are from those used in the PPS performed. diverse from the i and ESF-CCS. microprocessors used in the PPS and ESF-CCS equipment. b) Inspection of the design b) The software documentation documentation will be confirms that the design ! performed to confirm that group (s) which developed the software was developed the PCS/P-CCS software is by different design groups. different from the design group (s) which developed the PPS and ESF-CCS software.
- 3. The PCS/P-CCS provide 3. Inspection will be 3. PCS/P-CCS control g
control interfaces for the performed on the as-built interfaces are provided for following control functions: PCS/P-CCS control the following functions: interface equipment. PCS-reactivity control using PCS-reactivity control using control element assemblics, control element assemblies, PCS-reactor power cutback, PCS-reactor power cutback, PCS-power change limiter PCS-power change limiter (Megawatt Demand Setter), (Megawatt Demand Setter), ; P-CCS-pressurizer pressure P-CCS-pressurizer pressure and level, and level, P-CCS-main feedwater P-CCS-main feedwater flow, flow. P-CCS-steam bypass flow. P-CCS-steam bypass flow. P-CCS-boron concentration, P-CCS-boron concentration, P CCS-ahernate reactor trip P-CCS-alternate reactor trip actuation, and actuation, and P-CCS alternate emergency P-CCS-alternate emergency feedwater actuation, feedwater actuation. J Caa M De. # Ate d at page 2.5 69
i l System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.5.4-1 Power Control System / Process-Component Control System (Continued) l l Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 4. The circuits used for 4. Inspection of the design 4. The documentation l alternate actuation of reactor documentation will be confirms that circuits are I trip, turbine trip, and performed to confirm that implemented in the PCS/P- l emergency feedwater are the specified alternate CCS to perform actuation ;
independent and diverse actuation circuits are of reactor trip, turbine trip, from the protection system independent and diverse and emergency feedwater actuation circuits. from the protection system which do not utilize signals actuation circuits. from the PPS or ESF-CCS and that the PPS and ESF-CCS digital equipment is not used to communicate the actuation signals from the PCS/P-CCS to the actuated components.
- 5. The PCS/P-CCS piovide the 5. Inspection will be 5. The following information following informatit u to the performed of the as-built is available at a DIAS-N DIAS. DIAS equipment. display device:
alternate reactor trip status, alternate reactor trip statut alternate feedwater actuation alternate feedwater signal status, pressurizer actuation signal status, pressure, and steam pressurizer pressure, and generator I and 2 levels. steam generator I and 2 levels.
- 6. For parameters used in 6. Testing will be performed 6. For each parameter, the PCS/P-CCS control using signals simulating representative parameter functions which are each parameter provided to value determined by the provided from the redundant the PCS/P-CCS via the PCS/P-CCS from the Class Class IE sensors that are redundant Class IE sensors IE sensor inputs is bounded used independently by each that are used independently by the three signals which channel of the protective by each channel of the are simulated to be system, the PCS/P-CCS protective system. The unaffected by the failure.
monitors the four redundant signals will simulate a instrument channels. The failure of one of the four PCS/P-CCS applies signal sensor inputs for each vahdation logic to the parameter. signals received from the four redundant channels to i detect bypassed or failed l sensors and to determine the sensed value to be used in the control system.
- 7. Control and display 7. Inspection will be 7. Control and display i interface devices ici the performed of the as-built interface devices for the I PCS/P-CCS are provided in PCS/P-CCS control and PCS/P-CCS are provided in )
the MCR and in the remote display interface devices in the MCR and in the remote j shutdown room, the MCR and remote shutdown room. shutdown room. Certmed Design Matxi.nl Page 2.S-70 l
_ _. . . --. - - - .~ -. . - Sv: tem 80+ Deslan controlDocument p V Table 2.5.4-1 Power Control System / Process-Component Control System (Continued) 8.a) - Actuation of master transfer 8.a) Testing will be performed 8.a) Upon actuation of the switches at either exit of the using the master transfer master transfer switches at MCR transfers control switches at each exit of the either MCR exit: capability from the PCS/P- MCR and each of the ' CCS control and display PCS/P-CCS control and 1) control actians at the interface devices in the display interface devices in PCS/P-CCS control and MCR to those in the remote the MCR and the remote display interface devices in , shutdown room. Indication shutdown panel. the MCR do not cause the of transfer status is provided process control systems to in the MCR. generate the associated control signals; and
- 2) control actions at the PCS/P-CCS control and display interface devices in the remote shutdown room ;
cause the process control ; i systems to generate the associated control signals.
- 3) Indication of transfer status is provided in the MCR.
8.b) The transfer of control 8.b) Testing will be performed at 8.b) Upon actuation of the capability can also be the equipment cabinets for master transfer switching performed at the PCS/P- the PCS/P-CCS and using function from the equipment CCS equipment cabinets, the PCS/P-CCS control and cabinets for the PCS/P-which also provide display interface devices in CCS: capability for transferring the MCR and the remote ' control back to the MCR. shutdown room. Indication of transfer status is provided in the MCR. l 1 l I A v
Sy tem 80 + Design ControlDocument Table 2.5.4-1 Power Control System / Process-Component Control System 9!I (Continued) l 8.b) (Continued) 8.b) (Continued) 8.b) (Continued)
- 1) control actions at the PCS/P-CCS control and )
display interface devices in the MCR do not cause the process control systems to generate the associated control signals; and
- 2) control actions at the PCS/P-CCS control and display interface devices in the remote shutdown room cause the process control systems to generate the associated control signals.
- 3) Indication of transfer status is provided in the MCR.
Upon de-actuation of the master transfer switching function from the equipment cabinets for the PCS/P-CCS:
- 1) control actions at the PCS/P-CCS control and display interface devices in the remote shutdown room do not cause the process control systems to generate the associated control signals; and
- 2) control actions at the PCS/P-CCS control and display interface devices in the MCR cause the process control systems to generate the associated control signals.
- 3) Indication of transfer status is provided in the MCR.
O CortWnd Design Material Page 2.5-72
i Design Control Document j Sy' tem 80 + p Table 2.5.4-1 Power Control System / Process-Component Control System ! (Continued) 2 9.a) Electrical isolation devices 9.a) Inspection of the as-built 9.a) Electrical isolation devices are provided between the PCS/P{CS configuration are provided between the PCS/P-CCS and the wid be conducted. PCS/P-CCS and the - protection system signal protection system signal conditioning equipment for conditioning equipment, each protection signal consistent with Figure provided to them, as shown 2.5.4-2 for each protection on Figure 2.5.4-2. signal provided to them. 9.b) Electrical isolation devices 9.b) Inspection of the as-built 9.b) Electrical isolation devices are provided for the PCS/P-CCS configuration are provided for the PCS/P-CCS interfaces with will be conducted. PCS/P-CCS interfaces with the MCR, the remote the MCR, the reniote shutdown room, the safety shutdown room, the safety related display related display instrumentation, the instrumentation, the protection systems, and with protection systems, and protection sy".etn with protection system components, as shown on components, conforming to Figure 2.5.4 2. Figure 2.5.4-2.
- 10. PCS/P-CCS sohware is 10. Inspection will be 10.a) The process defines the designed, tested, installed, performed of the process organization.
[e and maintained using a process which: used to design, test, install, and maintain the PCS/P-responsibilities, and activities for the following CCS software. phases of the software 10.a) Defines the organization, engineering life cycle: responsibilities, and software quality assurance o Establishment of plans and activities for the software methodologies for all engineering life cycle that software to be developed: provides for:
- Specification of functional, system, and software o establishment of plans and requirements and methodologies identification of safety e specification of functional, critical requirements; system, and software o Design of the softw.*re requirements and standards, architecture, program identification of safety structure, and definition of critical requirements the software modules; e design and development of e Development of the software software code and testing of ,
e software module, unit and the software modules: system testing practices e Interpretation of software . e installation and checkout and hardware and practices performance of unit and e reporting and correction of system tests; software defects during e Software installation and operation checkout testing; and e Reporting and correction of p) e V software defects during operation. Carawed Design heenerW Page 2.5-73
System 80+ Design controiDocument Table 2.5.4-1 Power Control System / Process-Component Control System (Continued)
- 10. (Continued) 10. (Continued) 10.b) The process has requirements for the 10.b) Specifies requirements for: following software development functions:
e software management, documentation
- Software management, requirements, standards, which defines organization review requirements, and responsibilities, procedures for problem documentation reporting and corrective requirements, standards for action software coding and testing, review requirements, and a software configuration procedures for problem management, historical reportmg and corrective records of software, and action; control of software changes
- Software configuration e verification & validation, management, which and requirements for establishes methods for reviewer independence maintaining historical records of software as it is developed, controlling software changes, and for recording and reporting software changes; and e Verification and validation, which specifies the requirements for the verification review process, the validat.on testing process, review and test activity documentation, and reviewer independence.
10.c) Incorporates a graded 10.c) The process establishes the approach accordmg to the method for classifying software's relative PCS/P-CCS software importance to safety. elements according to their relative importance to safety. The process defines the tasks to be performed for software assigned to each safety classification. O Certi6ed Design Material page 2.5 74
System 80+' Design ControlDocument O 'V Table 2.5.4-1 Power Control System / Process-Component Control System (Continued)
- 11. The use of commercial ll, inspection will be 11. A process is defmed that grade computer hardware performed of the process has:
and software items in the defined to use commercial PCS/P-CCS is accomplished grade components in the o rvquirements for through a process that has: application. configuration management; e requirements for
- review of product configuration management; performance;
- review of product
- receipt acceptance of the performance; commercial grade item; and a receipt acceptance of the
- final acceptance based on commercial grade item; and equipment qualification and software validation in the e fmal acceptance based on integrated system.
equipment qualification and software validation. f t
\
l t NJ Coroned Design MeterW Pope 2.575 l
i l l System 80+ Design ControlDocument I s (]q 2.6 Electric Power 2.6.1' AC Electrical Power Distribution System l Design Description The AC Electrical Power Distribution System (EPDS) consists of the transmission system, the plant switching stations, the Unit Main Transformer (UMT), two Unit Auxiliary Transformers (UATs), two Reserve Auxiliary Transformers (RATS), a Main Generator (MG), Generator Circuit Breaker (GCB), buses, switchgear, load centers (L/Cs), motor control centers (MCCs), breakers, and cabling. The EPDS includes the power, instrumentation, and control cables and buses to the distribution system loads, and electrical protection devices (circuit breakers and fuses) for the power, instrumentation, and control cables and buses. The portion of the EPDS from the high voltage sides of the UMT and RATS to the distribution system loads constitutes the EPDS Certified Design scope. Interface requirements for the transmission system, plant switching stations, UMT, and RATS are specified below under the heading,
" Interface Requirements."
Two Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) provide Class IE power to the two independent Class 1E Divisions. A non-safety-related Alternate AC Source (AAC)(i.e., combustion turbine) supplies non-Class 1E power to the EPDS. The backup pressurizer heaters, emergency lighting, RCP seal injection pump, and RCP seal injection /] V pump room ventilation fan are the only electrical loads classified as non-Class 1E which are directly connectable to the Class IE buses. Class IE equipment is classified as Seismic Category I. The Basic Configuration of the Class IE portion of the EPDS is as shown on Figure 2.6.1-1. During plant power operation, the MG supplies power through the GCB through the UMT to the transmission system, and to the UATs. When the GCB is open, power is backfed from the transmission system through the UMT to the UATs. The UATs are sized to supply the design operating requirements of their respective Class IE buses and non-Class IE medium voltage non-safety and permanent non-safety buses. The UMT and UA*> ar9 separatnt from the RATS. UMT, UATs, and RATS are provided with their own oil pit, drain, fire deluge system, grounding, and i lightning protection systems. The MG and GCB are separated from the RAT power feeders. The MG and GCB instrumentation and control circuits are separated from the RAT's instrumentation and control circuits. Each RAT is sized to supply the design operating power requirements of at least its respective Class IE 7 buses and permanent non-safety bus, and one reactor coolant pump and its reactor coolant pump support loads. Each RAT has the capability of supplying power directly (i.e., not through any bus supplying non-Class 1E loads) to its respective Class IE buses. canner onon ueww rose 2.s-t
System 80+ Design ControlDocument UAT power feeders, and instrumentation and control circuits are separated from the RAT's power feeders, and instrumentation and control circuits Power feeders, and instrumentation and control circuits for the UMT and its switching station are separated from power f*-ders, and instrumentation and control circuits for the RATS and their switching station. EPDS medium voltage switchgear, low voltage switchgear and their respective transformers, MCCs, and MCC feeder and load circuit breakers are sized to supply their load requirements. EPDS medium voltage switchgear, low voltage switchgear and their respective transfornwrs, and MCCs are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source. The GCB, medium voltage switchgear, low voltage switchgear, and MCC feeder and load circuit breakers are rated to interrupt fault currents. EPDS interrupting devices (circuit breakers and fuses) are coordLiated so that the circuit interrupter closest to the fault is designed to open before other devices. Instrumentation and control power for Class IE Divisional medium voltage switchgear and low voltage switchgear is supplied from the Class IE DC Power System in the same Division. The GCB is equipped with redundant trip devices supplied from separate non-Class IE DC powcr systems. EPDS cables and buses are sized to supply their load requirements. EPDS cables and buses are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source. For the EPDS, Class IE power is supplied by two independent Class IE Divisions. Independence is maintained between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment. Class IE medium voltage switchgear, low voltage switchgear, and MCCs are identified according to their
' Class 1E Division. Class IE medium voltage switchgear, low voltage switchgear, and MCCs are located in Seismic Category I structures and in their respective Division areas.
Class IE EPDS cables and raceways are identified according to their Class IE Division. Class IE EPDS cables are routed in Seismic Category I structures and in their respective raceways. Class IE equipment is not prevented from performing its safety functions by harmonic distortion waveforms. The EPDS supplies an operating voltage at the terminals of the Class IE equipment which is within the equipment's voltage tolerance limits. Class IE equipment is protected from degraded voltage conditions. An electrical grounding system is provided for (1) instrumentation, control, and computer systems (2) electrical equipment (switchgear, motors, transformers, distribution panels), and (3) mechanical equipment (fuel and chemical tanks). Lightning protection systems are provided for buildings, structures and transformers located outside of the buildings. Each grounding system and lightning protection system is separately grounded to the plant ground grid. Certified Design Material Page 2.6-2
System 80+ Desian controlDocument There are no automatic connections between Class 1E Divisions. Displays of EPDS voltage, amperage, frequency, watts and vars instrumentation exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to operate the EPDS, specifically to open and close the main turbine generator breaker, the 4.16kv supply and crossover breakers for the Class IE buses, and the diesel generator output breakers. Interface Requirements The offsite system shall consist of a minimum of two independent offsite transmission circuits from the transmission system. The offsite transmission circuits shall be sized to supply their load requirements, during all design operating modes, of their respective Class 1E divisions and non-Class IE loads. The UMT and RATS shall be connected to independent switching stations. Switching stations and their circuit breakers shall be sized to supply their load requiren% r.nd *oe rated to interrupt fault currents. Voltage variations of the transmission system shall not cause voltage variations at the loads of more than plus or minus 10% of the loads' nominal voltage rating. The normal steady-state frequeny' of the offsite system shall be within plus or minus 2 Hertz of 60 Hertz during recoverable periods of sys em instability. The transmission system does not subject the reactor coolant pumps to sustained frequency decays of greater than 3 Hertz per second Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.6.11 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the AC Electrical Power Distribution System. 1 V. CereM Dee&n aseterW Page 2.6-3 1
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f [; . oesian controlDocument i
. Sv' tem 80 + /~
( Table 2.6.1-1 AC Electrical Power Distribution System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses AW-e Criteria The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built . 1. The as-built EPDS .;
- 1. ~
of the EPDS is as EPDS will be conducted. conforms with the Basic described in the Design Configuration as Description (Section described in the Design
'2.6.1). Description (Section ;
2.6.1). _
- 2. UATs are sized to supply 2. Analysis for the as-built 2. Analysis for as-built the design operating UATs to determine their UATs exists and ,
I
. power requirements of load requirements will be concludes that the their respective Class IE performed. capacity of each UAT, as ;
~ buses and non-Class IE deter ained by its ;
medium voltage non- nameplate rating, safety and permanent exceeds the analyzed non-safety buses. design operating load requirements of its 3 respective Class IE buses and non-Class IE medium voltage non-safety and permanent non-safety buses. 3, UMT and UATs are 3. Inspection of the as-built 3. As-built UMT and UATs
. separated from the UMT and UATs will be are separated from the RATS. conducted. RATS by a minimum of 50 feet.
- 4. UMT, UATs, and RATS 4. Inspection of the as-built 4. As-built UMT, UATs, are provided with their UMT and UATs will be and RATS are provided own oil pit, drain, fire conducted. with their own oil pit, deluge system, drain, fire deluge grounding, and lightning system, grounding, and protection systems. lightning protection systems.
l
.l Cwened Design asesenief Page 2.5-5
1 l l Sy~ tem 80+ Design ControlDocument ' l Table 2,6.1-1 AC Electrical Power Distribution System (Continued) ! Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 5. The MG and the GCB 5. Inspection for the as-built 5. As-built MG and GCB are separated from the MG, the GCB, the are separated from the RAT power feeders. RATS, and their RATS' power feeders by The MG and GCB respective a minimum of 50 feet, or instrumentation and instrumentation end by firerated walls or control circuits are control circuits will be firerated floors. Outside separated from the conducted. the MCR, the MG and l RATS' instrumentation GCB instrumentation and j and control circuits. control circuits are separated from the RATS' instrumen*ation and control circuits by a ;
minimum of 50 feet, or I by firerated walls or l fircrated floors. Within the MCR, the MG and GCB instrumentation and control circuits are separated from the RATS' instrumentation and control circuits by routing the circuits in separate raceways.
- 6. Each RAT is sized to 6. Analysis for the as-built 6. Analysis for as-built l supply the design RATS to determine their RATS exists and l operating power load requirements will be concludes that the l requirements of at least performed. capacity of each RAT, as its respective Class lE determined by its buses and permanent nameplate rating, non-Safety bus, and one exceeds the analyzed reactor coolant pump and design operating load its reactor coolant pump requirements of at least support loads. its respective Class IE buses and permanent non-safety bus, and one reactor coolant pump and its reactor coolant pump support loads.
O Certined Design Material Page 2.6-6
Sy.' tem 80 + Design ControlDocument pn b Table 2.6.1-1 AC Electrical Power Distribution System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 7. UAT power feeders, and 7. Inspection of the as-built 7. As-built UAT power instrumentation and UATs' and RATS' power feeders are separated control circuits are feeders, and from the RATS' power separated from the instmmentation and feeders by a minimum of RATS' power feeders, control circuits will be 50 feet or by firerated and instrumentation and conducted. walls or firerated floors, control circuits. except at the switchgear, where they are routed to opposite ends of the medium voltage switchgear. As-built UAT instmmentation and control circuits are separated from the RATS' instrumentation and control circuits by a minimum of 50 feet or by firerated walls or fircrated floors, except as follows: a) inside the MCR, where they are
[s\s} separated by routing the circuits in separate raceways, and b) at the switchgear, where they are routed to opposite ends of the medium voltage switchgear. A A M DenkerMe d Page 2.6-7 i
System 80+ oesign controlDocument Table 2.6.1-1 AC Electrical Power Distribution System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 8. Power feeders and 8. Inspection for the as-built 8. Outside the MCR, power instrumentation and power feeders, feeders and control circuits for the instrumentation and instrumentation and UMT and its switching control circuits for the control circuits for the station are separated UMT, RATS, and their UMT and its switching from power feeders, and respective switching station are separated instrumentation and stations will be from the instrumentation control circuits for the conducted. and control circuits for RATS and their switching the RATS and their station. switching station by a minimum of 50 feet, or by firerated walls or fircrated floors. Within the MCR, instrumentation and control circuits for the UMT and its switching station are separated from the instrumentation and control circuits for the RATS and their ,
switching station by routing in separate raceways.
- 9. EPDS medium voltage 9. Analysis for the as-built 9. Analysis for the as-built switchgear, low voltage EPDS to determine load EPDS exists and switchgear and their requirements will be concludes that the ;
respective transformers, perfonned. capacities of the Class MCCs, and MCC feeder IE medium voltage and load circuit breakers switchgear, low voltage are sized to supply their switchgear and their load requirements. respective transformers, MCCs, and MCC feeder and load circuit breakers, as determined by their nameplate ratings, exceed their analyzed load requirements. I i l O'l Certi6ed Design Material Pege 2.6-8
' System 80 + Design ControlDocument I
V Table 2.6.1-1 AC Electrical Power Distribution System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 10.a) EPDS medium voltage 10.a) Analysis for the as-built 10.a) Analysis for the as-built switchgear, low voltage EPDS to determine fault EPDS exists and switchgear and their currents will be concludes that the respective transformers, performed. current capacities of the and MCCs are rated to Class IE medium voltage withstand fault currents switchgear, low voltage for the time required to switchgear and their clear the fault from its respective transformers, power source. and MCCs exceed their analyzed fault currents for the time required, as determined by the circuit interrupting device coordination analyses, to clear the fault from its power source. 10.b) The GCB, medium 10.b) Analysis for the as-built 10.b) Analysis for the as-built voltage switchgear, low EPDS to determine fault EPDS exists and voltage switchgear, and currents will be concludes that the f MCC feeder and load performed. analyzed fault currents \ circuit breakers are rated do not exceed the GCB to interrupt fault and medium voltage currents. switchgear, low voltage , switchgear, and MCC l feeder and load circuit breakers interrupt capacities, as determined by their nameplate ratings.
- 11. EPDS interrupting 11. Analysis for the as-built 11. Analysis for the as-built ]
devices (circuit breakers EPDS to determine EPDS exists and and fuses) are circuit interrupting device concludes that the coordinated so that the coordination will be analyzed Class IE circuit circuit intermpter closest performed. interrupter closest to the to the fault is designed to analyzed fault will open open before other before other devices. devices. 12, Instrumentation and 12. Testing of the as-built 12. A test signal exists in control power for Class Class IE medium and only the Class IE lE Divisional medium low voltage switchgear Division under test. voltage switchgear and will be conducted by low voltage switchgear providing a test signal in is supplied from the only one Class IE i p Class IE DC power Division at a time. l system in the same ; Division. l l Certoned Design Meterief Page 2.6-9
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.6.1-1 AC Electrical Power Distribution System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 13. The GCB is equipped 13. Testing of the as-built 13. A test signal exists in with redundant trip GCB will be conducted only the circuit under devices which are by providing a test signal test.
supplied from separate in only one trip circuit at non-Class IE DC power a time. systems.
- 14. EPDS cables and buses 14. Analysis for the as-built 14. Analysis for the as-built are sized to supply their EPDS cables and buses EPDS exists and load requirements. will be performed. concludes that Class IE cables and bus capacities, as determined by cable and bus ratings, exceed their analyzed load requirements.
- 15. EPDS cables and buses 15. Analysis for the as-built 15. Analysis for the as-built are rated to withstand EPDS to determine fault EPDS exists and fault currents for the time currents will be concludes that Class IE required to clear the fault performed. cables and buses will from its power source. withstand the analyzed fault currents for the time required, as determined by the circuit interrupting device coordination analyses, to clear the analyzed faults from their power sources.
- 16. For the EPDS, Class IE 16.a) Testing on the as-built 16.a) A test signal exists in power is supplied by two EPDS will be performed only the Class lE independent Class IE by providing a test signal Division under test in the Divisions. Independence in only one Class IE EPDS.
is maintained between Division at a time. Class IE Divisions and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class 1E equipment. 16.b) Inspection of the as-built 16.b) In the EPDS, physical EPDS Class IE Divisions separation or electrical will be conducted. isolation exists between Class IE Divisions. Physical separation or electrical isolation exists between these Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment. l l l Certified Design Material Page 2.6-10
.- - - - . .. . - ~ - ...
System 80+ Design ControlDocument G ( 8 'V Table 2.6.1-1 AC Electrical Power Distribution System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria ; l l
- 17. Class IE medium voltage 17. Inspection of the as-built 17. As-built Class IE switchgear, low voltage EPDS Class IE medium medium voltage switchgear, and MCCs voltage switchgear, low switchgear, low voltage are identified according voltage switchgear, and switchgear, and MCCs to their Class IE MCCs will be conducted. are identified according Division. to their Class IE Division.
- 18. Class IE medium voltage 18. Inspection of the as-built 18. As-built Class IE switchgear, low voltage Class IE medium voltage medium voltage switchgear, and MCCs switchgear, low vol; age switchgear, low voltage are located in Seismic switchgear, and MCCs switchgear, and MCCs Category I structures and will be conducted. are located in Seismic in their respective Category I stmetures and Divisional areas. in their respective Divisional areas.
- 19. Class IE EPDS cables 19. Inspection of the as-built 19. As-built EPDS cables ,
and raceways are Class IE EPDS and raceways are identified according to Divisional cables and identified according to their Class IE Division. raceways will be their Class IE Division. conducted.
- 20. Class IE Division cables 20. Inspection of the as-built 20. As-built Class IE are routed in Seismic EPDS Division cables Division cables are Category I stmetures and and raceways will be routed in Seismic in their respective conducted. Category I structures and raceways. in their respective Division raceways.
- 21. Class lE equipment is 21. Analysis for the as-built 21. Analysis for the as-built not prevented from EPDS to determine EPDS exists and performing its safety harmonic distortions will concludes that harmonic functions by harmonic be performed, distortion waveforms do distortion waveforms. not exceed 5 percent voltage distonion on the Class IE EPDS.
( 0 Cera%ed Deelyn heaterid pope 2.611
Syntem 80+ D: sign ControlDocument Table 2.6.1-1 AC Electrical Power Distribution System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 22. The EPDS supplies an 22.a) Analysis for the as-built 22.a) Analysis for the as-built operating voltage at the EPDS to determine EPDS exists and terminals of the Class IE voltage drops will be concludes that the equipment which is performed. analyzed operating within the equipment's voltage supplied at the voltage tolerance limits. terminals of the Class IE equipment is within the equipment's voltage tolerance limits, as determined by their nameplate ratings.
22.b) Testing of the as-built 22.b) Connected Class IE EPDS will be performed loads operate at the by operating connected analyzed minimum Class IE loads at the voltage determined by analyzed minimum the voltage drop analysis. voltage. l l
- 23. Class IE equipment is 23.a) Analysis for the as-built 23.a) Analysis for the as-built I protected from degraded EPDS to determine the EPDS exists and voltage conditions. trip conditions for concludes that the Class ,
l degraded voltage IE preferred offsite conditions will be power feeder breakers to performed. the Class IE medium voltage switchgear will trip before Class IE l loads experience degraded voltage conditions exceeding those voltage conditions for which the Class IE equipment is qualified. 23.b) Testing for each as-built 23.b) As-built Class IE feeder Class IE medium voltage breakers from preferred switchgear will be offsite power to the Class i conducted by providing a 1E medium voltage simulated degraded switchgear trip when a voltage signal, degraded voltage conditions exists. O Certi6ed Des @ Atatorial Page 2.6-12
Syntem 80+ oesign controlDocument , O*
<V Table 2.6.1-1 AC Electrical Power Distribution System (Continued)
Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 24. An electrical grounding 24. Inspection of the plant 24. The as-built EPDS system is provided for grounding and lightning instrumentation, control, (1) instrumentation, protection systems will and computer grounding control, and computer be performed. system, electrical systems, (2) electrical equipment and equipment (switchgear, mechanical equipment transformers, distribution grounding system, and panels, and motors), and lightning protection (3) mechanical equipment systems provided for (fuel and chemical buildings and for tanks). Lightning structures and protection systems are transformers located provided for major plant outside of the buildings, ,
structures, transformers are separately grounded and equipment located to the plant ground grid. outside buildings. Each grounding system and lightning protection system is separately I grounded to the plant I ground grid.
- 25. There are no automatic 25. Inspection of the as-built 25. There are no automatic
, connections between Class IE Divisions will connections between Class IE Divisions. be conducted. Class IE Divisions. 26.a) The EPDS displays 26.a) Inspection for the 26.a) Displays of the identified in the Design existence or retrievability instrumentation identified Description (Section in the MCR of in the Design Description 2.6.1) exist in the MCR instrumentation displays (Section 2.6.1) exist in or can be retrieved there. will be conducted. the MCR or can be retrieved there. I i 26.b) Controls exist in the 26.b) Testing will be 26.b) EPDS controls in the MCR to operate the performed using the MCR operate to open EPDS, specifically to EPDS controls in the and close the main open and close the main MCR. turbine generator turbine generator breaker, the 4.16kv breaker, the 4.16kv supply and crossover supply and crossover breakers for the Class IE breakers for the Class IE buses, and the diesel buses, and the diesel generator output generator output breakers. breakers. E - , Corsn6ed Desten Matenial Page 2.6-13
System 80+ Design ControlDocument 2.6.2 Emergency Diesel Generator System Design Description The Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) System is a safety-related system which has two diesel generators and their respective fuel oil, lube oil, engine cooling, starting air, and air intake and exhaust support systems. One EDG is connectable to the two Class IE buses of an Electrical Power Distribution System (EPDS) Class IE Division and the other EDG is connectable to the two Class IE buses of the other EPDS Class IE Division. Each EDG and its support systems are physically separated from the other EDG and its support systems, and are located in physically separate areas of the Nuclear Island Structures. Portions of the EDG support systems which perform the safety function of starting and operating the EDG are classified ASME Code Class 3. The EDG generators are classified Class IE. Class IE equipment is classified Seismic Category I. The EDG engine and ASME Code Class 3 portions of its respective support systems are classified Seismic Category I. The diesel fuel storage tanks for each of the two EDGs are located in physically separate diesel fuel storage structures. The underground fuel oil piping from each diesel fuel storage structure to its respective EDG day tank is classified Seismic Category I. Divisional separation is established by pipe routing and use of the Divisional wall. The EDGs are sized to supply their load demands following a design basis accident which requires use of emergency power. Each EDG has fuel storage capacity to provide fuel to its EDG for a period of no less than 7 days with the EDG supplying the power requirements for the most limiting design basis accident. The starting air system receiver tanks of each EDG have a combined air capacity for 5 starts of the EDG without replenishing air to the receiver tanks. l The EDG combustion air intakes are separated from the EDG exhaust ducts. Electrical independence is provided between Class IE Divisions and between the Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment. A loss of power to a Class IE bus initiates an automatic start of the respective EDG, load shedding of both Class IE buses within the affected Division, and automatic connection to the Class IE buses in the affected Division. Fo!!owing attainment of required voltage and frequency, the EDG automatically I l connects to its iespective Divisional buses. After the EDG connects to its respective buses, the non-accident loads are automatically sequenced onto the buses. I Ib:h EDG receives an automatic start signal in response to a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS), a containment spray actuation signal (CSAS), or an emergency feedwater actuation signal (EFAS). An EDG does not automatically connect to its Divisional Class IE buses, if the Divisional Class IE buses are energized. O CertiMed Design Material Page 2.614
System 80+ Design contr-1 Document For a loss-of-power to a Class IE medium voltage safety bus condition concurrent with a Design Basis Accident condition (SIAS/CSAS/EFAS), each EDG automatically starts and load shedding of both Class 1E buses within the affected Division occurs. Following attainment of required voltage and frequency, the EDG automatically connects to its respective buses, and loads are sequenced onto the buses. When operating in a test mode, an EDG is capable of responding to an automatic start signal. Displays of EDG voltage, amperage, frequency, watts, and vars instrumentation exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to manually start and stop each EDG and to synchronize each EDG to its respective Class IE buses. Controls exist at each EDG local control panel to manually start and stop its respective EDG.
- Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.6.2-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Emergency Diesel Generator System.
A V j 4 M Des @ Med Page 2.6-15
Srtem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.6.2-1 Emergency Diesel Generator System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. The as-built EDG System of the EDG System is as EDG System will be conforms with the Basic described in the Design conducted. Configuration as Description (Section described in the Design 2.6.2). Description (Section 2.6.2).
- 2. Each EDG and its 2. Inspection of the as-built 2. The two EDGs and their support systems are EDGs and EDG suppon respective support physically separated from systems will be systems are located on the other EDG and its performed. opposite sides of the suppon systems, and are nuclear island structures located in physically and are separated by the separate areas of the Divisional wall.
nuclear island structures.
- 3. The ASME Code Section 3. A pressure test will be 3. The results of the 111 components of the conducted on the EDG's pressure test of ASME EDG's and their fuel oil, and their fuel oil, lube Code Section 111 lube oil, engine cooling, oil, engine cooling, components of the staning air, and air staning air, and air EDG's and their fuel oil, intake and exhaust intake and exhaust tube oil, engine cooling, support systems retain suppon systems required staning air, and air their pressure boundary to be pressure tested by intake and exhaust integrity under internal ASME Code Section 111. suppon systems pressures that will be conform with the grienced during pressure testing service. acceptance criteria in ASME Code Section III.
- 4. The diesel fuel storage 4. Inspection of the as-built 4. The diesel fuel storage tanks for each o.he two diesel fuel storage tank tanks for one EDG are EDGs are located in structures will be located in a different physically separate diesel performed. structure from the diesel fuel storage structures. fuel storage tanks for the other EDG.
- 5. The fuel oil piping from 5. Inspection of the as-built 5. The as-built fuel oil each diesel fuel storage piping from each diesel piping from each diesel structure to its respective fuel storage structure to fuel storage structure to EDG day tank is its respective EDG day its respective EDG day classified Seismic tank will be performed, tank is classified Seismic Category I. Divisional Category 1. Divisional separation is established separation is established by pipe routing and use by pipe routing and use of the Divisional wall. of the Divisional wall.
O Certifed Design Material Page 2,6-16
Sy-tem 80 + Design ControlDocument f% b Table 2.6.2-1 Emergency Diesel Generator System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 6. The EDGs are sized to 6. Analysis to determine 6. Analysis for the as-built supply their load EDG load demand, based EDGs exists ard demands following a on the as-built EDG load concludes that the EDGs' design basis accident profile, will be capacities exceed, as which requires use of performed. determined by their emergency power. nameplate ratings, their load demand following a design basis accident which requires the use of emergency power.
- 7. Each EDG has fuel 7. Inspection and analysis 7. An analysis exists and storage capacity to will be performed to concludes that each EDG provide fuel to its EDG determine fuel storage has fuel storage capacity for a period of no less capacities and EDG fuel to operate the EDG for 7 than 7 days with the consumption. days with the EDG EDG supplying the supplying power during power requirements for the most limiting design the most limiting design basis accident.
basis accident. f'\ 8. The starting air system 8. Testing will be 8. Each EDG can be started receiver tanks of each performed with the 5 times without EDG have a combined EDGs and their air stan replenishing air to the air capacity for 5 starts systems. receiver tanks. of the EDG without replenishing air to the receiver tanks.
- 9. The EDG combustion air 9. Inspection of the as-built 9. Each EDG's air intake l intakes are separated EDG air intakes and air and air exhaust is from the EDG exhaust exhaust will be separated by distance and j ducts. performed. orientation. 'Ihe air intakes and exhausts of the two EDGs are separated by the location of the EDGs on opposite sides of the nuclear island structures.
- 10. Electrical independence is 10.a) Testing will be 10.a) A test signal exists only provided between Class performed on each EDG in the EDG and support IE Divisions and and suppon systems by systems Division under between the Class IE providing a test signal in test.
Divisions and non-Class only one Class 1E 1E equipment. Division at a time. ( Cerened Design Material Page 2.6-17
i System 80+ Design Control Document Table 2.6.2-1 Emergency Diesel Generator System (Continued) Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria l
- 10. (Continued) 10.b) Inspection of the as. 10.b) Physical separation exists j installed Class lE between Class lE l Divisions of the EDG Divisions of the EDG System will be system. Separation j performed. exists between Class IE I Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the j EDG system.
I1. A loss-of-power to a 11. Testing for the actuation 11. As-built EDGs Class lE medium voltage and connection of each automatically start on .l safety bus automatically EDG will be performed receiving a LOOP signal j starts its respective EDG using a signal that and attain a voltage and and load sheos both Class simulates a loss-of- frequency in s 20 l IE buses within the power. seconds which will affected Division. assure an operating Following attainment of voltage and frequency at required voltage and the terminals of the Class frequency, the EDG IE equipment that is automatically connects to within the equipment's its respective Divisional tolerance limits, 1 buses. After the EDG automatically connect to connects to its respective their respective buses, the non-accident Divisional buses, and loads are automatically sequence their non- l sequenced onto the accident loads onto their l buses. Divisional buses.
- 12. Each EDG receives an 12. Testing for the actuation 12. Each EDG receives a automatic start signal in of each EDG will be start signal in response to response to a safety performed using signals each of the following injection actuation signal that simulate a SfAS, a simulated signals; a (SIAS), a containment CSAS, and a EFAS. SIAS, a CSAS, and a spray actuation signal EFAS. but does not (CSAS), or an automatically connect to emergency feedwater its Divisional buses if the actuation signal (EFAS). Divisional buses are An EDG does not energized.
autor.mcally connect to its Divisional buses, if the Divisional Class IE buses are energized. O Certified Design Material Page 2.6-18
Sy tem 80 + Design control Document
- / 3 s/ Table 2.6.l:-1 Emergency Diesel Generator System (Continued)
Design Commitment luspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 13. For a lossef-power to a 13. Testing on the as-built 13. In the as-built EDG Cla: s IE medium voltage EDG Systems will be Systems, when l safety bus condition performed by providing SIAS/CSAS/EFAS and concurrent with a Design simulard loss-of-power signals Ba;is Accident condition SIAs/CSAS/EFAS and exist, the EDG (SIAS/CSAS/EFAS), loss-of-power signals. automatically starts, each EDG automatically attains required voltage i stans and load shedding and frequency and is ;
of both Class IE buses connected to its r within the affected Divisional buses within Division occurs. 20 seconds. Following Following attamment of connection, the automatic required voltage and load sequence begins. frequency, the EDG Upon application of each j automatically connects to load, the voltage on these its respective buses and buses does not drop loads are sequet ced onto more than 20% measured the buses. at the buses. Frequency is restored to within 2% of nominal, and voltage ! is restored to within 10%
,\ of nominal within 60%
of each load sequence ] time interval. The SI, i CS, and EFW loads are sequenced onto the buses in s; 40 seconds total time from initiating SIAS/CSAS/EFAS.
- 14. When operating in a test 14. Testing will be 14. When operating in a test mode, sn EDG is capable performed with each mode, each EDG resets of responding to an EDG in a test mode to its automatic control automatic stan signal. configuration. An mode upon receipt of a automatic start signal will simulated automatic start be simulated. signal.
i l l A i 1
'L/ :
1 l CoranniDeakn nta W Page 2.6-19 i l
System 80+ Design controloocument Table 2.6.2-1 Emergency Diesel Generator System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 15.a) The EDG System 15.a) Inspection for the 15.a) Displays of the displays identified in the existence ot retrievability instrumentation identified Design Description in the MCR of in the Design Description (Section 2.6.2) exist in instrumentation displays (Section 2.6.2) exist in the MCR or can be will be conducted. the MCR or can be retrieved there. retrieved there. 15.b) Controls exist in the 15.b) Testing will be 15.b) EDG controls in the MCR to start and stop performed using the MCR operate to start and each EDG and to EDG controls in the stop each EDG and to synchronize each EDG to MCR and EDG local synchronize each EDG to its respective Class IE control panels. its respective Class IE buses. Controls exist at buses. EDG controls at each EDG local control each EDG local control panel to manually stan panel operate to stan and and stop its respective stop its respective EDG. EDG. After staning, the EDG remains in a standby mode, unless a LOOP signal exists. O I i l l O \ l l Cwnfied Destyn Material page 2,s.20
. System 80+ Design ControlDocument fh Q 2.6.3 AC Instrumentation and Control Power System and DC Power System Design Descdption The AC Instrumentation and Control (I&C) Power System and DC Power System consist of Class IE and non-Class 1E power systems. The non-Class 1E AC I&C Power System and DC Power System have non-Class IE batteries, inverters, electrical distribution panels, and battery chargers. The non-Class IE ,
AC I&C Power System and DC Power System provide power to non-Class IE equipment. The Class 1E AC Instrumentation and Control (I&C) Power System (also referred to as the Vital AC I&C Power System) and the Class IE DC Power System (also referred to as the Vital DC Power System) consist of Class IE uninterruptible power supplies, their respective alternating current (AC) and direct , current (DC) distribution centers, along with power, instrumentation and control cables to the distribution system loads. The Class IE AC I&C Power System and the Class IE DC Power System include the , protection equipment provided to protect the AC and DC distribution equipment. l The containment equipment hatch trolley, the reactor cavity flood valves, the holdup volume flood valves, and the hydrogen ignitors are the only electrical loads classified as non-Class IE which are directly connectable to the Class IE buses. Class IE equipment is classified as Seismic Category I. The Basic Configuration of the Class IE AC Instrumentation and Control Power System and Class IE O DC Pown " 1m is as shown on Figures 2.6.3-1 and 2.6.3-2. I h Class lE AC Instmmentation and Control Power System The Class IE AC I&C Power System consists of two Division (Division I and II) and four Channel (A, B, C, D) uninterruptible power supplies, with their respective distribution panels. Each Class IE AC I&C power supply is a constant voltage constant frequency invener power supply unit, which in normal operating mode receives Class IE direct current (DC) power from its respective Class IE DC distribution center. Each Claes IE inverter power supply unit also has capability to automatically and manually transfer from its respective Class IE DC distribution center to an alternate source of , l alternating current (AC) power to directly supply the Class IE AC I&C Power System loads while maintaining continuity of power during transfer from the inverter power supply unit to the alternate power supply. This alternate power source is a voltage regulating device which is supplied power from the same AC power source as the battery charger associated with the Class IE DC distribution center servicing the inverter power supply unit. : Each Class IE inverter power supply unit is sized to provide power to its respective distribution center loads. Class 1E inverter power supply units and their respective distribution centers are identified according to their Class IE Division / Channel and are located in Seismic Category I structures and in their respective Division / Channel areas. Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions. Independence is provided between Class IE i Cluumels. Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions / Channels and non-Class IE equipment. ' Certmed Design Motorial Pope 2.6-21
Srtem 80+ Design ControlDocument Class IE AC I&C Power System distribution panels and their circuit breakers, disconnect switches, and fuses are sized to supply their load requirements. Distribution panels and disconnect switches are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source. Circuit breakers and fuses are rated to interrupt fault currents. Class IE AC I&C Power System interrupting devices (circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupter closest to the fault opens before other devices. Class IE AC I&C Power System cables are sized to supply their load requirements and are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source. The Class IE AC I&C Power System supplies an operating voltage at the terminals of the Class IE equipment which is within the equipment's voltage tolerance limits. Class IE AC I&C Power System cables and raceways are identified according to their Class IE Division / Channel. Class IE cables are routed in Seismic Category I structures and in their respective Division or Channel raceways. Class IE equipment is classified as Seismic Category I. Class IE DC Power System The Class iE DC Power System consists of two Divisional (Division I and II) and four Channel (A, B, C, D) batteries (2 Channel batteries per Division) with their respective DC electrical distribution panels ' and battery chargers. The Class IE DC distribution system provides DC power to Class IE DC equipment and instrumentation and control circuits. Each Class IE batter'/ is provided with a battery charger supplied alternating current (AC) from a MCC ) in the same Class IE Division as the battery. 1 Each Class IE battery is sized to supply its Design Basis Accident (DBA) loads, at the end-of-installed- ; life, for a minimum of 2 hours without recharging. Each Class IE battery charger is sized to supply its respective Class IE Division / Channel steady-state I loads while charging its respective Class IE battery. Manual interlocked transfer capability exists within a Division between Class 1E DC distribution centers. The Class IE batteries, battery chargers and respective MCCs, DC distribution panels, disconnect j switches, circuit breakers, and fuses are sized to supply their load requirements. The Class IE batteries, battery chargers and respective MCCs, DC distribution panels, and disconnect switches are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source. Class IE DC Power System circuit breakers and fuses are rated to interrupt fault currents. Class IE DC Power System electrical distribution system circuit interrupting devices (circuit breakers and fuses) are coordinated so that the circuit interrupter closest to the fault is designed to open before other ' devices. Certined Design Material Page 2.6-22
Y l System 80+ Design ControlDocumart Class IE DC Power System electrical distribution system cables are sized to supply their load requirements and are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source. l The Class IE DC Power System electrical distribution system supplies an operating voltage at the terminals of the Class IE equipment which is within the equipment's voltage tolerance limits. Each Class IE battery is located in a Seismic Category I structure and in its respective Division / Channel battery room. Class IE DC Power System distribution panels and MCCs are identified according to their Class IE Division / Channel. Class IE DC Power System cables are identified according to their Class IE Division / Channel. Class IE cables are routed in Seismic Category I structures and in their respective Division / Channel raceways. Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions. Independence is provided between Class IE ' Channels, independence is prov9ed between Class IE Divisions / Channels and non-Class 1E equipment. The Class IE DC Power System has the following alarms and displays in the main control room (MCR):
- 1) Alarms for battery ground detection.
- 2) Parameter displays for battery voltage and amperes.
?
- 3) Status indication for battery circuit breaker / disconnect position.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.6.3-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the AC Instrumentation and Control Power System and DC Power System. l l 1 i I[
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument j Table 2.6.3-1 AC Instrumentation and Control Power System and DC Power ; System 4 1 l l Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. The as-built AC ,
the AC Instrumentation and AC Instrumentation and Instrumentation and Control l Control Power System and Control Power System and Power System and the as-the DC Power System is as the DC Power System built DC Power System described in the Design configuration will be conforms with the Basic Description (Section 2.6.3). conducted. Configuration as described in the Design Description (Section 2.6.3).
- 2. Each Class IE constant 2. Inspection of the as-built 2. Each Class IE constant voltage, constant frequency Class IE constant voltage, voltage, constant frequency inverter power supply unit constant frequency inverter inverter power supply unit in normal operating mode power supply unit will be in normal operating mode receives Class IE direct conducted. receives Class IE direct current (DC) power from its current (DC) power from respective DC distribution its respective DC center. Each Class IE distribution center. Each inverter power supply unit Class 1E inverter power also has capability to supply unit also has automatically and manually capability to automatically transfer from its respective and manually transfer from Class IE DC distribution its respective Class IE DC center normal power source distribution center normal to an alternate source of power source to an alternate alternating current (AC) source of alternating current power to directly supply the (AC) power to directly Class lE AC I&C Power supply the Class IE AC System loads. This 1&C Power System loads, alternate power source is a This alternate power source vokage regulating device is a voltage regulating which is supplied power device which is supplied from the same AC power power from the same AC source as the battery power source as the battery charger associated with the charger associated with the Class IE DC distribution Class IE DC distribution ;
center servicing the inverter center servicing the inverter power supply unit, power supply unit. 1 l l l l 9 m Desipt Ma%I (2/95j page 2.6 2g
System 80+ oesign controlDocument (} V Table 2.6.3-1 AC Instrumentation and Control Power System and DC Power System (Continued) Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 3. Automatic transfer between 3. Testing on each as-built 3. Each Class IE invener the nonnat and alternate Class IE invener power power supply unit
. power supplies for each supply unit will be automatically and manually Class IE invener power conducted by providing a transfers between its normal supply unit is provided and test signal in one power and alternate power sources maintains continuity of source at a time. A test of and maintains continuity of power during transfer from the manual transfer will also power during transfer from the invener power supply be conducted, the invener to the alternate unit to the alternate power supply.
supply, Manual transfer between the normal and alternate power supplies for each Class IE invener power supply unit is also provided.
- 4. Each Class IE invener 4. Analyses for each as-built 4. Analyses for each as-built power supply unit is sized Class IE invener power Class IE invener power to provide power to its supply unit to detennine the supply unit c'xist and respective Class IE power requirements of its conclude that each inverter p) distribution center loads. loads will be performed. power supply unit's capacity, as determined by its nameplate rating, exceeds its analyzed load requirements.
- 5. Class IE invener power - 5. Inspection of the as built 5. The as-built Class IE supply units and their Class IE invener power invener power supply units respective distribution supply units and their and their respective panels are identified respective distribution distribution panels are according to their Class IE panels will be conducted. identified according to their Division / Channel and are Class IE Division / Channel located.in Seismic Category and are located in Seismic I structures and in their Category I structures and in respective Division / Channel their Drvision/ Channel areas. areas.
d Cars 6ef Desips Meenrent page 2.s.27
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.6.3-1 AC Instrumentation and Control Power System and DC Power System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 6. In the Class IE AC I&C 6.a) Testing on the Class IE AC 6.a) A test signal exists only in Power System, I&C Power System will be the Class IE independence is provided conducted by providing a Division / Channel under test between Class IE Divisions. test signal in only one Class in the Class IE AC I&C Independence is provided IE Division / Channel at a Power System.
between Class IE Channels. time. Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions / Channels and non-Class IE equipment. 6.b) Inspection of the as-built 6.b) In the Class IE AC 1&C ; Class IE Power System, physical Divisions / Channels in the separation or electrical Class IE AC Power System isolation exists between the will be conducted. Class IE Divisions / Channels. Physical separation or electrical isolation exists between these Class IE Divisions / Channels and non-Class IE equipment.
- 7. Class IE AC I&C Power 7. Analysis for the as-built 7. Analysis for the as-built System distribution panels, Class IE AC I&C Power Class IE AC I&C Power disconnect switches, circuit System distribution panels, System distribution panels, breakers, and fuses are disconnect switches, circuit disconnect switches, circuit sized to strpply their load breakers, and fuses to breakers, and fuses exists requirements. determine their load and concludes that the requirements will be capacities of the distribution 3 performed. panels, disconnect switches, circuit breakers, and fuses exceed, as determined by their nameplate ratings, their analyzed load requirements.
- 8. Class IE AC !&C Power 8. Analysis for the as-built 8. Analysis for the as-built System distribution panels Class IE AC I&C Power Class IE AC I&C Power and disconnect switches are System to determine fault System exists and concludes rated to withstand fault currents will be performed. that the current capacities of currents for the time the distribution panels and required to clear the fault disconnect switches exceed from its power source. their analyzed fault currents for the time required, as determined by the circuit interrupting device coordination analyses, to clear the fault from its power source.
Certifmi Design Material Page 2.6-28
System 80+ Design ControlDocument ,O\ V' Table 2.6.3-1 AC Instrumentation and Control Power System and DC Power System (Continued) Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 9. Class IE AC I&C Power 9. Analysis for the as-built 9. Analysis for the as-built System circuit breakers and ~ Class IE AC I&C Power Class IE AC 1&C Power fuses are rated to interrupt System to determine fault System exists and concludes fault currents. currents will be performed. that the analyzed fault currents do not exceed the distribution system circuit breakers and fuses interrupt capabilities, as determined by their nameplate ratings.
- 10. Class IE AC I&C Power 10. Analysis for the as-built 10. Analysis for the as-built System interrupting devices Class IE AC !&C Power Class IE AC 1&C Power (circuit breakers and fuses) System to determine circuit System circuit interrupting are coordinated so that the interrupting device devices (circuit breakers circuit interrupter closest to coordination will be and fuses) coordination the fault is designed to open performed. exists and concludes that before other devices, the analyzed circuit interrupter closest to the fault will open before other devices.
s
/ 11. Class IE AC !&C Power 11. Analysis for the as-built 11. Analysis for the as-built
! System cables are sized to Class IE AC I&C Power Class IE AC I&C Power supply their load System cables to determine System exists and concludes requirements. their load requirements will that the capacities of the be performed. distribution system cables exceed, as determined by their cable ratings, their analyzed load requirements.
- 12. Class IE AC I&C Power 12. Analysis for the as-built 12. Analysis for the as-built System cables are rated to Class IE AC I&C Power Class IE AC I&C Power withstand currents for the System to determine fault System cables exists and time required to clear the currents will be performed, concludes that the fault from its power source, distribution system cable current capacities exceed their analyzed fault currents for the time required, as determined by the circuit ;
interrupting device coordination analysis, to clear the fault from its l power source, l J l 1 CertMned Design Meterial Page 2.6-29
Syntem 80+ De-ign ControlDocument Table 2.6.3-1 AC Instrumentation and Control Power System and DC Power System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 13. The Class IE AC I&C 13. Analysis for the as-built 13. Analysis for the as-built Power System supplies an Class IE AC I&C Power Class IE AC 1&C Power operating voltage at the System to determine voltage System exists and concludes terminals of the Class IE drops will be performed. that the analyzed operating equipment which is within voltage supplied at the the equipment's voltage terminals of the Class IE tolerance limits. equipment is within the equipment's voltage tolerance limits, as determined by their nameplate ratings.
- 14. Class 1E AC I&C Power 14. Inspection of the as-built 14. As-built Class IE AC System cables and raceways Class IE AC Power System Power System cables and are identified according to cables and raceways will be raceways are identified their Class IE conducted. according to their Class IE Division / Channel. Class 1E Division / Channel. Class cables are routed in Seismic IE Divisional / Channel Category I structures and in cables are routed in Seismic their respective Division or Category I structures and in Channel raceways, their respective Division / Channel raceways,
- 15. Each Class IE battery is 15. Inspections of the as-built 15. Each Class IE battery is provided with a normal Class IE DC Power System provided with a battery battery charger supplied wil; be conducted, charger supplied alternating altemating current (AC) current (AC) from a MCC from a MCC in the same in the same Class IE i Class IE Division as the Division as the battery.
battery. l
- 16. Each Class IE battery is 16.a) Analysis for the as-built 16.a) Analysis for the as-built i sized to supply its Design Class IE batteries to Class IE batteries exists Basis Accident (DBA) determine battery capacities and concludes that each 1 loads, at the end-of- will be performed based on Class IE battery has the l installed hfe, for a the DBA duty cycle for capacity, as determined by I minimum of 2 hours without each battery. the as-built battery rating, l recharging. to supply its an.dyred DBA l loads, at the end-of- )
I installed-life, for a minimum of 2 hours without recharging. 16.b) Testing of each as-built 16.b) The capacity of each as-Class IE battery will be built Class IE battery conducted by simulating equals or exceeds the loads which envelope the analyzed battery design duty analyzed battery DBA duty cycle capacity. cycle. 1 Certined Design Material Page 2.6.10
System 80+ Design ControlDocument G Table 2.6.3-1 AC Instrumentation and Control Power Systerfi and DC Power System (Continued) Design Commitment laspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 17. Each Class IE battery 17. Testing of each Class IE 17. Each Class IE battery charger is sized to supply its battery charger will be charger can supply its respectise Class IE conducted by supplying its respective Class IE Division's steady-state loads respective Class IE Division's/ Channel's while charging its respective Division's normal steady- normal steady-state loads Class t C, battery. state loads while charging while charging its its respective Class IE respective Class IE battery, battery.
- 18. Manual interlocked transfer 18. Testing of the as-buit Class 18. The as-built Class IE capability exists within a IE DC distribution centers interlocks prevent Division between Class IE will be performed by paralleling of the Class IE DC distribution centers. attempting to close DC distribution centers interlocked breakers, within a Division.
- 19. The Class IE DC Power 19. Analysis for the as-built 19. Analysis for the as-built System batteries, battery Class IE DC Power System Class IE DC Power System chargets, MCCs, DC electrical distribution system exists and concludes that distribution pancis, to determine the capacities the capacities of the disconnect switches, circuit of the battery, battery batteries, battery chargers, breakers, and fuses are charger, MCCs, DC MCCs, DC distribution
,O sized to supply their load distribution panels, disconnect switches, circuit panels, disconnect switches, circuit breakers, (,) requirements. breakers, and fuses will be and fuses, as determined by performed. their ttameplate ratings, I exceed their analyzed load requirements. 20.a) The Class IE batteries. 20.a) Analysis for the as-built 20.a) Analysis for the as-built battery chargers, DC Class IE DC Power System Class IE DC Power System distribution panels, MCCs, to determine fault currents exists and cor,cludes that and disconnect switches are will be performed. the capaaties of the as-built rated to withstand fault Class IE batteries, battery currents for the time chargers, DC distribution l required to clear the fault panels, MCCs. and from its power source. disconnect switches current capacities exceed their analyzed fault currents for the time required, as determined by the circt'it interrupting device coordination analyses, to clear the fault from its power source. 20.b) Class IE DC Power System 20.b) Analysis for the as-built 20.b) Analysis for the as-built circuit breakers and fuses Class IE DC Power System Class IE DC Power System are rated to interrupt fault to determine fault currents exists and concludes that currents. will be performed. the analyzed fault currents p do not exemt the circuit ( I breaker and tuse interrupt capacities, as determined by their nameplate ratings. Cortened Deskyn Atatorial Page 2.6-31
System 80+ Design C*ntrolDocument Table 2.6.3-1 AC Instrumentation and Control Power System and DC Power System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria -
- 21. Class IE DC Power System 21. Analysis for the as-built 21. Analysis for the as-built circuit interrupting devices Class IE DC Power System Class IE DC Power System (circuit breakers and fuses) to determine circuit circuit interrupting devices are coordinated so that the interrupting device (circuit breakers and fuses) circuit interrupter closest to coordination will be exists and concludes that the fault is designed to open performed. the analyzed circuit before other devices. interrupter closest to the fault is designed to open before other devices.
- 22. Class IE DC Power System 22. Analysis for the as-built 22. Analysis for the as-built cab):s are sized to supply Class lE DC Power System Class IE DC Power System the r load requirements, cables to determine their cables exists and concludes load requirements will be that the Class IE DC performed. electrical distribution system cable capacities, as determined by cable ratings, exceed their analyzed load requirements.
- 23. Class lE DC Power System 23. Analysis for the as-built 23. Analysis for the as-built cables are rated to withstand Class lE DC Power System Class IE DC Power System fault currents for the time to determine fault currents exists and concludes that required to clear the fault will be performed the Class IE DC electrical from its power source. distribution system cables will withstand the analyzed fault currents for the time required, as determined by the circuit interrupting device coordination analysis, to clear the fault from its power source.
- 24. The Class IE DC Power 24.a) Analysis for the as-built 24.a) Analysis for the as-built System supplies an Class IE DC Power System Class IE DC Power System operating voltage at the to determine system voltage exists and concludes that terminals of the Class IE drops will be performed, the analyzed operating equipment which is within voltage supplied at the the equipment's voltage terminals of the Class IE tolerance limits. equipment is within the equipment's voltage tolerance limits, as determined by their nameplate ratings.
l l l I O 1 l Catoliiod Design Material Page 2.6 32
I Sy* tem 80 + Design ControlDocument j O 1 V Table 2.6.3-1 AC Instrumentation and Control Power System and DC Power System (Continued) 1 4 Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 24. (Continued) 24.b) Testing of the as-built Class 24.b) Connected as-built Class IE l IE DC Power System will loads operate at less than or l be conducted by operating equal to the minimum l connected Class IE loads at allowable battery voltage less than or equal to and at greater than or equal minimum allowable voltage to the maximum charging and at greater than or equal voltage.
to the maximum battery charging voltage.
- 25. Each Class IE battery is 25. Inspection of the as-built 25. Each Class IE battery is located in a Seismic Class IE batteries will be located in a Seismic 4 Category I structure and in conducted. Category I structure and in its respective its respective Division / Channel battery Division / Channel battery room, room. j
- 26. Class IE DC Power System 26. Inspection of the as-built 26. Class IE DC Power System distribution panels and Class IE DC distribution distribution panels and .
MCCs are identified panels and MCCs will be MCCs are identified according to their Class IE conducted. according to their Class IE Division / Channel. Division / Channel.
- 27. Class IE DC Power System 27. Inspection of the as-built 27. As-built Class IE DC cables are identified Class IE DC Power System Power System cables are according to their Class IE cables will be conducted, identified according to their Division / Channel. Class IE Division / Channel.
- 28. Class IE Division / Channel 28. Inspection of the as-built 28. Class IE Division / Channel i cables are routed in Seismic Class IE DC Power System cables are routed in Seismic ,
Category I structures in cable., and raceways will be Category I structures in ! their respective conducted. their respective i Division / Channel raceways. Division / Channel raceways. I
- 29. In the Class IE DC Power 29.a) Testing will be conducted 29.a) A test signal e..ists in only )
System, independence is on the as-built Class IE DC the Class IE provided between Class 1E Power System by providing Division / Channel under test Divisions. Independence is a test signal in only one in the Class IE DC Power provided between Class IE Class IE Division / Channel System. Channels. Independenceis at a time. ) provided between Class IE Divisions / Channels and non- j Class lE equipment. ! i i
)
in\ V CerJRed Design Atatoriel Page 2.6-33 i
1 i l System 80+ oesign controlDocument Table 2.6.3-1 AC Instrumentation and Control Power System and DC Power Systein (Continued) Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 29. (Continued) 29.b) Inspection of the as-built 29.b) In the as-built Class IE DC Class IE DC Power System Power System. physical will be conducted. separation or electrical isolation exists between Class IE Divisions / Channels.
Physical separation or electrical isolation exists between these Class IE Divisions / Channels and non-Class IE equipment.
- 30. The Class IE DC Power 30. Inspection for the existence 30. Displays of the System displays identified in or retrievability in the MCR instrumentation identified in the Design Description of instmmentation displays the Design Description (Section 2.6.3) exist in the will be conducted. (Section 2.6.3) exist in the MCR or can be retrieved MCR or can be retrieved there. there.
O O Carbried Destgru Afsterint p,,,g_g.34
System 80+ Design ControlDocument (~ Q) 2.6.4 Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies Design Description . Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies are provided for electrical cables passing through the primary containment. Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies are classified as Seismic Category I. Class 1E Division Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies only contain cables of one Class IE Division, and Class 1E Channel Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies only contain cables of one Class IE Channel. Independence is provided between Division Containment Electrical Penetrations Assemblies.
- Independence is provided between Channel Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies. Independence is provided between Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies containing Class 1E cables and Containment Electrical Penetration Ar.semblies containing non-Class 1E cables.
Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies are protected against currents which are greater than their , continuous ratings. Containment E!ectrical Penetration Assemblies are equipment for which paragraph number (3) of the
" Verification for Basic Configuration for Systems" of tl:e General Provisions (Section 1.2) applies.
C\ b# ' Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criwia Table 2.6.4-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies. r k' t M Deegn henterW page 2,s.25
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.6.4-1 Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies Design Commitment Inspections. Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1 The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. The as-built Containment of the Containment Containment Electrical Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Penetration Assemblies Assemblies conforms Assemblics is as will be conducted. with the Basic described in the Design Configuration described Description (Section in the Design Description 2.6.4). (Section 2.6.4).
- 2. Class IE Division 2. Inspection of the as-built 2. As-built Class IE Containment Electrical Division and Channel Divisional Containment Penetration Assemblies Containment Electrical Electrical Penetration only contain cables of Penetration Assemblies Assemblies only contain one Class IE Division, will be conducted. cables of one Class IE and Class IE Channel Division, and Class lE Containment Electrical Channel Containment Penetration Assemblies Electrical Penetration only contain cables of Assemblics only contain one Class IE Channel. cables of one Class lE Channel.
- 3. Independence is provided 3. Inspection of the as-built 3. Physical separation exists between Division Containment Electrical between as-built Division Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblics Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies. will be conducted. Penetration Assemblies.
Independence is provided Physical separation exists between Channel between Channel Containment Electrical Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies. Penetration Assemblies. Independence is provided Physical separation exists between Containment between Containment Electrical Penetration Electrical Penetration Assemblies containing Assemblies containing Class 1E cables and Class 1E cables and Containment Electrical Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies Penetration Assemblies containing non-Class IE containing non-Class IE cables. cables. 1 l l Certrf;ed Ossign Material Page 2.6-36
Sy tem 80+ _ Design controlDocument b V Table 2.6.4-1 Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 4. Containment Electrical 4. Analysis for the as-built 4. Analysis exists for the Penetration Assemblies Containment Electrical as-built Containment are protected against Penetration Assemblies Electrical Penetration currents which are will be performed. Assemblies and greater than their concludes either (1) that ,
continuous ratings. the maximum current of the circuits does not exceed the continuous rating of the Containment Electrical Penetration Assembly, or (2) that the circuits have redundant protection devices in series and that the redundant current protection devices are coordinated with the Containment Electrical Penetration Assembly's rated short circuit n thermal capacity data and
- (b} prevent current from exceeding the continuous j current rating of the '
Containment Electrical Penetration Assembly. 1 4 O("g c.~ o + -.-w e u.n
Sy' tem i~0 + D sign Controi Document 2.6.5 Alternate AC Source Design Description The Alternate AC Source (AAC) (i.e., combustion turbine) is a self-contained power generating unit with its own supporting auxiliary systems. The AAC is classified as non-safety-related. The AAC can supply power to the non-Class IE permanent non-safety buses or to a Class IE Division through its associated non-Class IE permanent non-safety bus. The load capacity of the AAC is at least as large as the capacity of an emergency diesel generator (EDG). The AAC is located in its own structure. The AAC has the following displays and controls in the main control room (MCR):
- 1) Parameter displays for the AAC output voltage, amperes, watts, and frequency.
- 2) Controls for manually starting the AAC.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Accernance Criteria Table 2.6.5-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Alternate AC Source. O Cwtined Design Material Page 2.6-38
System 80+ oesten controlDocument
/~T - U Table 2.6.5-1 Alternate AC Source :
Design Commitment Inspections. Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. The as-built AAC of the A.AC is as AAC will be conducted. conforms with the Basic described in the Design Configuration as Description (Section described in the Design 2.6.5). Description (Section 2.6.5).
- 2. The AAC can supply 2. Testing on the as-built 2. The as-built AAC can power to: AAC will be conducted supply power to:
by connecting the AAC to: ' *
- the non-Class IE the non-Class IE permanent non-safety
- the non-Class IE permanent non-safety buses; or permanent non-safety buses; or buses; and then
- to a Class IE Division
- to a Class IE Division through its associated
- to a Class IE Division through its associated non-Class IE permanent through its associated non-Class IE permanent non-safety bus. non-Class IE permar.ent non-safety bus.
non-safety bus.
- 3. The load capacity of the 3. Inspection of the as-built 3. The as-built AAC load AAC is at least as large AAC and EDGs will be capacity is at least as as the capxity of an conducted. large as the capacity of EDG. an EDG as determined by the AAC and EDG nameplate ratings.
- 4. The AAC displays and 4. Inspection for the 4. Displays and controls controls identified in tne existence or retrievability identified in the Design Design Description in the MCR of Description (Section (Section 2.6.5) exist in instrumentation displays 2.6.5) exist in the MCR the MCR or can be and controls will be or can be retrieved there.
retrieved there. conducted. 1 I i l O l CertMed Design Materiet Pope 2.6-39
)
L ! t System 80+ oestan controlDocument .i O Q 2.7 ' Auxiliary Systems ! l 2.7.1 New Fuel Storage Racks , Design Description 1 The New Fuel Storage Racks provide on-site storage for at least 121 new fuel assemblies. The New Fuel - Storage Racks are safety-related. The New Fuel Storage Racks are located in the nuclear island structures in the new fuel storage pit. - The New Fuel Storage Racks support and protect new fuel assemblies. The New Fuel Storage Racks l maintain the effective neutron multiplication factor less than the required criticality limits during normal j l~ ' operation and design postulated accident conditions. The New Fuel Storage Racks are anchored to embedments at the bottom of the' storage cavity. ; l _ The New Fuel Storage Racks are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III, ; i Subsection NF, Class 3 Component Supports requirements. The New Fuel Storage Racks are designed to accommodate design basis loads and load combinations ' I i including the effects of impact of fuel assemblies on the racks and the impact due to postulated fuel handling accidents without losing the structural capability to maintain the fuel in a non-critical configuration. The New Fuel Storage Racks are classified Seismic Category I. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria , Table 2.7.1-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the New f Fuel Storage Racks. l l A h r' M D*** ^*** Page 2.71
System 80+ oesign controlDocument Table 2.7.1-1 New Fuel Storage Racks Design Commitment Inspection, Test, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the New Fuel of the New Fuel Storage New Fuel Storage Racks Storage Racks described Racks is as described in configuration will be in the Design Description the Design Description conducted. (Section 2.7.1), the as-(Section 2.7.1). built New Fuel Storage Racks conform with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The New Fuel Storage 2. Analysis will be 2. The calculated effective Racks maintain the performed to calculate neutron multiplication effective neutron the effective neutron factor for the New Fuel multiplication factor less multiplication factor. Storage Racks is less than the required than 0.95 during norrmd criticality limits during operation and postulated normal operation and accident conditiotts (less design postulated accident than 0.98 for immersion conditions. in a uniform density aqueous foam or mist of optimum moderation density).
- 3. The New Fuel Storage 3. Inspection will be 3. The Fabrication Data Racks are designed and performed of the Package, Certificate of constructed in accordance Fabrication Data Conformance and the with ASME Code Section Package, Certificate of Design Report Document III Subsection NF, Class Conformance end the exist, and conclude that 3 Component Supports Design Report the design requirements requirements and are Document. are met, classified Seismic Category 1.
O Cordf,ed Design Material Page 2.7 2
System 80+ Design ControlDocument f~
'y), 2.7.2 Spent Fuel Storage Racks Design Description The Spent Fuel Storage Racks provide on-site storage for at least 907 spent fuel assemblies. The Spent Fuel Storage Racks are safety-related.
The Spent Fuel Storage Racks are located in the nuclear island structures in the spent fuel pool. The Spent Fuel Storage Racks are free standing stmetures that support and protect spent fuel assemblies. The Spent Fuel Storage Racks maintain the effective neutron multiplication factor less than the required criticality limits during normal operation and postulated accident conditions. The Spent Fuel Storage Racks are designed and fabricated in accordance with ASME Code Section III, Subsection NF, Class 3 Component Supports requirements. The Spent Fuel Storage Racks are designed to accommodate design basis loads and load combinations including the effects of impact of fuel assemblies on the racks and the impact due to postulated fuel handling accidents without losing the structural capability to maintain the fuel in a non-critical configuration. The Spent Fuel Racks and support system are classified Seismic Category 1. g Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.2-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated ace.ptance criteria for the Spent Fuel Storage Racks.
)
I O U c~ew o + u.~w r.e. 2.ns l >
Svatem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.7.2-1 Spent Fuel Storage Racks Design Commitment Inspection, Test, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. " Die Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the Spent Fuel of the Spent Fuel Storage Spent Fuel Storage Racks Storage Racks described Racks is as described in configuration will be in the Design Description the Design Description conducted. (Section 2.7.2) the as-(Section 2.7.2). built Spent Fuel Storage Racks conform with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The Spent Fuel Storage 2. Analysis will be 2. The calculated effective Racks maintain the performed to calculate neutron multiphcation effective neutron the effective neutron factor is less than 0.95 multiplication factor less multiplication factor. during normal operation than the required and postulated accident criticality limits during conditions.
normal operation and postulated accident conditions.
- 3. The Spent Fuel Storage 3. Inspection will be 3. The Fabrication Data Racks are designed and performed of the Package, Certificate of fabricated in accordance Fabrication Data Conformance and the with the ASME Code Package, Certificate of approved Design Report Section III, Subsection Conformance and Design Document exist and NF, Class 3 Component Report Document. conclude that the design Supports requirements requirements are met.
and are classified Seismic Category I. l 1 l I l t i O Cartmed Desip Material Pop 2.7-4
System 80+ Design ControlDocument t'h Q 2.7.3 Pool Cooling and Purification System Design Description The Pool Cooling and Purification System (PCPS) consists of a spent fuel pool cooling system (SFPCS) and a pool purification system. The SFPCS removes heat generated by the stored spent fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool water. The pool purification system pumps spent fuel pool water, refueling pool water, and fuel transfer canal water through filters and ion exchangers. The Basic Configuration of the PCPS is as shown on Figure 2.7.3-1. The SFPCS is safety-related and the pool purification system is non-safety-related. The PCP5 is located in the reactor building and nuclear annex. The SFPCS has two divisions, each with a spent fuel pool (SFP) pump, a SFP heat exchanger, and associated valves, piping, controls, and instrumentation. A cross-connect line with isolation valves between the SFP pump discharge lines is provided to allow either pump to be used with either heat exchanger. Each SFPCS Division has the heat removal capacity to prevent boiling in the spent fuel pool with a full core offload of fuel assemblies and a ten year inventory of stored irradiated fuel. Heat from the spent fuel pool is transferred to the component cooling water system (CCWS) in the :; pent fuel pool cooling heat exchangers. n The PCPS includes provisions to prevent gravity and siphonic draining of the spent fuel pool and refueling pool. The ASME Code Section III Class for the PCPS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.7.3-1 is as depicted on the figure. Safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.3-1 is classified Seismic Category I. Displays of the PCPS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.3-1 are available as noted on the Figure. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to start and stop the spent fuel pool cooling pumps. PCPS alarms shown on Figure 2.7.3-1 are provided as shown on the Figure. Water is supplied to each SFPCS pump at a pressure greater than the pump's required net positive suction head (NPSH). The Class IE loads shown on Figure 2.7.3-1 are powered from their respective Class IE Division. Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, in the PCPS. , The two mechanical divisions of the SFPCS are physically separated except for the cross-connect line (m) %,/ between SFPCS pump discharge lines. Certified Design Matavini Page 2.7 5
Sy' tem 80+ D: sign Control Document Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.3-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Pool Cooling and Purification System. l 2 9 O Certified Design Material Page 2.7-6
- - . ~ . . . . _ . _ _ . _ _ . _
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- 5.
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- 1. LOCAL INotCATION ONLY NOT IN CONTAOL HOOta;I LARM tM CtpfTROL M0000 p g 2 PRESSURE SWITCM WITH ALAftli 91 CONTftol R00#. NO CONTROL ftOOM NWICAlt006
,W & Tttt INSTM'JMENTATION. EXCEPT ALARIES AfD AStBE CODE EPCTIOM 91 CLASS 2 AND 3 CORAPONENTS SHOWN ARE SAFETY CCWS $
Q HELATED, THE PURIPS ANDINSTRut0EffrATION SHOWN, EXCEPT ALARIst, ARE POWERED Fnote THENt RESPECTIVE CLASS 4 y SE EfVISlON. 0
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Syatem 80 + Design ControlDocument Table 2.7.3-1 Pool Cooling and Purification System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the PCPS is as shown PCPS configu4ation will equipment shown on on Figure 2.7.3-1. be conducted. Figure 2.7.3-1, the as-built PCPS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. Each SFPCS Division 2. Testing to measure 2. Each SFPCS Division has the heat removal SFPCS pump flow in will remove at least capacity to prevent each division will be 67.25 million bru/hr boiling in the spent fuel performed. Inspection from the spent fuel pool, pool svith a full core and analysis to determine with the spent fuel pool offload of fuel assemblies the heat removal at 180*F and component and a 4en year inventory capability of each SFPCS cooling water supplied at of sioud irradiated fuel. Division will be 5000 gpm and 105'F.
performed based on test data and as-built data.
- 3. The PCPS includes 3, inspection of the PCPS 3. Spent fuel pool cooling provisions to prevent suction and retum line suction connections are gravity and siphonic connections to the located at least 10 feet draining of the spent fuel refueling pool and spent above the top of the pool and the reft.eling fuel pool will be spent fuel. Anti-siphon pool. performed. devices are provided in the lines for spent fuel pool cooling return, spent fuel pool purification suction and return, and refueling pool suction and return.
- 4. The ASME Code Section 4. A pressure test will be 4. The results of the III PCPS components conducted on those pressure test of ASME shown on Figure 2.7.3-1 components of the PCPS Code Section III ,
retain their pressure required to be pressure components of the PCPS l boundary integrity under tested by the ASME conform with the internal pressures that Code Section Ill, pressure testing will be experienced acceptance criteria in during service. ASME Code Section Ill. j 1 5.a) Displays of the PCPS 5.a) Inspection for the 5.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown on existence or instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.3-1 are retrieveability of Figure 2.7.3-1 are l available as noted on the instrumentation displays available as noted on the I figure. will be performed. figure. 5.b) Controls exist in the 5.b) Testing will be 5.b) PCPS controls in the MCR to start and stop performed using the MCR operate to start and l the spent fuel pool PCPS controls in the stop the SFP pumps. I cooling SFP pumps. MCR. ; 4 Cersrhed Des}pn Ataterid Page 2.7-8
~ .- . - -
Sy: tem 80+ Design ControlDocument n Table 2.7.3-1 Pool Cooling and Purification System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 5.c) PCPS alarms shown on 5.c) Testing of the PCPS 5.c) The PCPS alarms shown Figure 2.7.3-1 are alarms shown on Figure on Figure 2.7.3-1 actuate provided as shown on the 2.7.3-1 will be in response to signals figure. performed using signals simulating alarm simulating alarm conditions. conditions.
- 6. Water is supplied to each 6. Testing to measure SFP 6. The available NPSH SFP cooling pump at a pump suction pressure exceeds each SFP pressure greater than the will be performed. pump's required NPSH.
pump's required net inspection and analysis to positive suction head determine NPSH (NPSH). available to each SFP pump will be performed based on test data and as-built data. 7.a) The Class IE loads 7.a) Testing will be 7.a) Within the SFPCS, a test shown on Figure 2.7.3-1 performed on the SFPCS signal exists only at the are powered from their system by providing a equipment powered from test signal in only one the Class IE Division r respective Class IE Class 12 Division at a under test, ii Division. time. 7.b) Independence is provided 7.b) Inspection of the as- 7.b) Physical separation exists i between Class IE installed Class IE between Class IE l Divisions, and between Divisions in the PCPS Divisions in the PCPS. 1 Class IE Divisions and will be performed. Physical separation exists l non-Class 1E equipment, between Class 1E { in the PCPS. Divisions and non-Class 1 IE equipment in the PCPS.
- 8. The two mechanical 8. Inspections of as-built 8. The two mechanical ,
divisions of the SFPCS mechanical divisions will divisions of the SFPCS are physically separated be performed. are separated by a wall, except for the cross- or by a fire barrier, or connect line between SFP by spatial separation in pump discharge lines. the spent fuel pool, except for the cross-connect line between SFP pump discharge lines. O M Dessgo ACOM Page 2.7-9
System 80+ Design Control Document 2.7.4 Fuel Handling System Design Description The Fuel Handling System (FHS) is a non-safety system of equipment and tools that handles and moves , fuel assemblies and control element assemblies (CEAs), and also provides storage for them during fuel transfer operations. The FHS load handling devices are designed to reduce the potential for damage to a fuel assembly. The FHS has a refueling machine (RM), a spent fuel handling machine (SFHM), a CEA change platform (CEACP), a fuel transfer system (FTS), a CEA elevator (CEAE), a new fuel elevator (NFE), and a fuel building overhead crane (FBOC). The reactor building polar crane is used to remove and replace the reactor vessel head and reactor vessel internals during refueling. The RM, CEACP, CEAE and reactor building polar crane are located in the reactor building. The SFHM, NFE and FBOC are located in the nuclear annex. The fuel transfer tube is located in both the reactor building and the nuclear aimex. The RM, SFHM, and CEACP noists are each provided with load-measuring devices and are interlocked to interrupt hoisting if their individual loads exceed an overload limit and to interrupt lowering if their individual loads decrease below an underload limit. The RM, SFHM, CEACP hoists, and reactor building polar crane are interlocked to limit upward hoist travel. They are also provided with positive mechanical stops to limit upward movement of the hoists. In the event of a safe shutdown earthquake or of loss of electrical power to the RM or SFHM, the RM or SFHM will not drop a fuel assembly held by its hoist. The RM and SFHM each have manual drive mechanisms to allow hoist operation and machine translation without electrical power. The new fuel handling hoist is interlocked to prevent moving new fuel over the spent fuel racks. The cask handling hoist is interlocked and equipped with mechanical stops to prevent moving a cask over either the new or spent fuel racks. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.4-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Fuel Handling System. O Corsined Design Materna! Page 2.710
Syitem 80+ Design ControlDocument
?
Table 2.7.4-1 Fuel Handling System
+ Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the RM, SFHM, of the RM, SFHM, system will be CEACP,FTS,CEAE, CEACP,FTS,CEAE, conducted. NFE, and FBOC NFE, and FBOC is as described in the Design Description (Section ;
described in the Design i Description (Section 2.7.1), the as-built
-2.7.4). equipment conforms with
' the basic configuration. 2.a)- The RM, SFHM, and 2.a) Testing of the RM, 2.a) The RM, SFHM, and CEACP hoists are SFHM, and CEACP CEACP hoist load provided with load- hoists will be performed measuring devices and - 3 measuring devices and to evaluate equioment interlocks interrupt i are interlocked to response to simulated hoisting when simulated interrupt hoisting ifload loads. load limits are reached. l
! limits are reached.
I 2.b) The RM, SFHM, and 2.b) Testing of the RM, 2.b) The RM, SFHM, and
- CEACP hoists are SFHM, and CEACP CEACP hoist load provided with load- hoists will be performed measuring devices and l
measuring devices and to evaluate equipment interlocks interrupt interlocks to interrupt response to simulated lowering when simulated lowering ifload limits loads. load limits are reached. are reached.
- 3. The RM, SFHM, 3. Testing of the RM, 3. The RM, SFHM, i CEACP, and reactor SFHM, CEACP, and CEACP hoist, and building polar crane reactor building polar reactor building polar hoists, are each crane hoists will be crane are interlocked to interlocked to limit performed to confirm limit upward hoist travel.
upward hoist travel. interlock function to limit upward hoist travel. , 4. The RM, SFHM, and 4. Testing of the RM, 4. The RM, SFHM, and CEACP hcists are each SFHM, and CEACP CEACP hoist mechanical provided with mechanical hoists will be performed stops limit upward hoist stops to limit upward to confirm the travel. hoist travel. functioningof mechanical stops to limit upward hoist travel.
- 5. In the event of loss of S. Testing of the RM and 5. The grapple does not electrical power to the SFHM will be performed open upon loss of RM or SFHM, the RM by removing electrical electrical power.
or SFHM will not drop a power from the loaded full assembly held by its equipment. hoist. cwesesowe ases nist rese 2.7 7r
System 80+ Design controlDocument Table 2.7.4-1 Fuel Handling System (Continued) Design Coaimitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 6. The SM and SFHM cach 6. Testing of the RM and 6. The hoists operate and have manual drive SFHM hoists will be the machines move rrochanisms to allow performed manually manually.
hoist operation and without electrical power. machine translation without electrical power.
- 7. The new fuel handling 7. Testing of the new fuel 7. The new fuel handling hoist is interlocked to handling hoist will be hoist is interlocked to prevent moving new fuel performed to confirm prevent moving new fuel over the spent fuel racks. interlock functioning, over spent fuel racks.
- 8. The cask handling hoist 8. Testing of the cask 8. T1, cask handling hoist is interlocked to prevent handling hoist will be i.; interlocked to prevent moving a cask over performed to confirm moving a cask over either the new or spent interlock functioning. either the new or spent fuel racks. fuel racks.
l l I O l l O Certined Ossign Material page 2.712
Syrtem 80+ De'ign CentrolDocument
- 2.7.5 Station Service Water System Design Description The Station Service Water System (SSWS), in conjunction with the ultimate heat sink (UHS), provides cooling water to remove heat from the component cooling water system (CCWS).
The Basic Configuration of the SSWS is as shown on Figure 2.7.5-1. The SSWS is a safety-related system as noted on the Figure. The SSWS consists of two divisions. Each SSWS Division receives heat from its corresponding CCWS l Division through the component cooling water heat exchangers. Each division of the SSWS has two station service water pumps, two station service water strainers, piping, valves, controls, and instrumentation. j The SSWS pumps and strainers are located in the SSWS pump structure (s). Interconnecting piping runs ,
?
between the SSWS pump structure (s) and the component cooling water heat exchanger structure. The SSWS has the capacity to remove heat from the CCWS during operation, shutdown, refueling, and { design basis accident condi'. ions. Each division has the heat dissipation capacity to achieve and mamtam , cold shutdown. . t The ASME Code Section III Class for the SSWS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 is as depicted on the Figure. ; The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 is classified Seismic Category I. The Class IE loads shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 are powered from their respective Class IE Division. i Independence is provided between Class 1E Divisions, and between Class 1E Divisions and non-Class ! IE equipment, in the SSWS. i ! I The two mechanical divisions of the SSWS are physically separated. Displays of the SSWS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. ! Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the station service water pumps, and to open and close those { power operated valves shown on Figure 2.7.5-1. ; Check valves shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under system , pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. j i interface Requiresnents ]
- The Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) transfers heat from the SSWS to the environment during operation, shutdown, refueling, and design basis accident conditions. The Ultimate Heat Sink is capable of i dissipating a heat load of at least 134.3 million BTU /hr during the ir.itial phase of a design basis accident.
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i l l Sy tem 80 + D sign ControlDocument j l The UHS is sized so that makeup water is not required for at least 30 days following a design basis accident. During this period of 30 days, the design basis temperatures of safety-related equipment are not exceeded. Water is supplied to each SSWS pump at a net positive suction head (NPSH) greater than the pump's required NPSH. The Station Service Water Pump Structure is classified Seismic Category I and provides a physical barrier and fire barrier to maintain separation of SSWS mechanical divisions. The SSWS pump structure ventilation system is classified Seismic Category I, and its mechanical divisions are separated by physical barriers. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.5-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Station Service Water System. i 1 i O l l I l Certined Desspro nesterial Page 2.714 i
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System 80+ Design controlDocument Table 2.7.5-1 Station Service Water System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the SSWS is as shown SSWS configuration will equipment shown on on Figure 2.7.5-1. be conducted. Figure 2.7.5-1, the as-built SSWS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The SSWS has the 2. Testing will be 2. The SSWS has the capacity to remove heat performed to measure capacity to remove heat from the CCWS during SSWS flow rates, from the CCWS during operation, shutdown, inspections will be operation, shutdown, refueling, and design conducted of the as-built refueling, and design basis accident conditions. SSWS, and analyses will basis accident conditions.
be performed to determine the heat removal capacities of the as-built SSWS.
- 3. The ASME Code Section 3. A pressure test will be 3. The results of the 111 SSWS components conducted on those pressure test of ASME shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 components of the SSWS Code Section III retain their pressure required to be pressure components of the SSWS boundary integrity under tested by ASME Code conform with the intemal pressures that Secticn 111. pressure testing
~ will be experienced acceptance criteria in during service. ASME Code Section Ill. 4.a) The Class IE loads 4.a) Testing will be 4.a) Within the SSWS, a test shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 performed on the SSWS signal exists only at the are powered from their by providing a test signal equipment powered from the Class IE Division respective Class IE in only one Class IE Division. Division at a time. under test. 4.b) Independence is provided 4.b) Inspection of the as- 4.b) Physical separation exists i between Class IE installed Class IE between Class IE l Divisions, and between Divisions in the SSWS Divisions in the SSWS. Class IE Divisions and will be performed. Physical separation exists non-Class IE equipment, between Class IE in the SSWS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the SSWS.
- 5. The two mechanical 5. Inspection of the as-built 5. The two nwchanical divisions of the SSWS mechanical divisions will divisions of the SSWS are physically separated. be performed. are separated by a divisional wall or a fire l barrier.
O Cer#ed Design Material Page 2.716
System 80+ Design ControlDocument
.p O Table 2.7.5-1 Station Service Water System (Continued)
Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria , 6.a) Displays of the SSWS 6.a) Inspection for the 6.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown on existence or instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.5-1 exist in retrieveability in the Figure 2.7.5-1 exist in the MCR or can be MCR of instrumentation the MCR or can be retrieved there. displays will be retrieved there. performed. 6.b) Controls exist in the 6.b) Testing will be 6.b) SSWS controls in the MCR to start and stop performed using the MCR operate to start and the station service water SSWS controls in the stop station service water 4 punrps, and to open and MCR. pumps, and to open and close those power close those power operated valves shown on operated valves shown Figure 2.7.5-1. on Figure 2.7.5-1.
- 7. Check valves shown on 7. Testing will be conducted 7. Each check valve shown Figure 2.7.5-1 will open, to open, or close, or on Figure 2.7.5-1 opens, or will close, or will open and also close, or closes, or opens and open and also close under check valves shown on also closes.
system pressure, fluid Figure 2.7.5-1 under l (g flow conditions, or system preoperational Q temperature conditions. pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. i
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System 80+ D: sign C*ntrolDocument 2.7.6 Component Cooling Water System Design Description The Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) is a closed loop cooling water system that, in conjunction with the station service water system (SSWS) and the ultimate heat sink (UHS), removes heat generated from the plant's safety-re'ated and non-safety-related components connected to the CCWS. Equipment listed in Table 2.7.6-1 can receive cooling water flow during the plant modes indicated. The ASME Code Section III Class 2 and 3 components and the instrumentation (except the radiation instrument) shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 are safety-related. The Basic Configuration of the CCWS is as shown on Figure 2.7.6-1. The CCWS consists of two divisions. Each CCWS Division transfers heat to its corresponding SSWS Division through the component cooling water heat exchangers. Each division of the CCWS has two component cooling water heat exchangers, a component cooling water surge tank, two component cooling water pumps, piping, valves, controls, and instrumentation. The CCWS heat exchangers are located in the CCWS heat exchanger structure. The remainder of the CCWS components and equipment is located within the nuclear island structures except for piping that connects the CCWS heat exchangers to the components and equipment in the nuclear island structures. The CCWS, in conjunction with the SSWS and UHS, has the capacity to dissipate the heat loads of connected components during operation, shutdown, refueling, and design basis accident conditions. Each division has the heat dissipation capacity to achieve and maintain cold shutdown. The ASME Code Section III Class for the CCWS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 is as depicted on the Figure. The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 is classified Seismic Category I. The Class IE loads shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 are powered from their respective Class IE Division. l
)
Independence is provided between Class lE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, in the CCWS. j The two tuechanical divisions of the CCWS are physically separated. Displays of the CCWS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) f I or can be retneved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the component cooling water pumps, and to open and close those power operated valves shown on Figure 2.7.6-1. O\ Certified Desigrs Material Page 2.718 j
N t i - System 80+ - Design ControlDocument Upon receipt of a Safety injection Actuation Signal (SIAS), the system response is as follows:
- l) The ASME Code Section III Class 3 valves that separate ASME Code Section III Class 3 component cooling water piping and non-ASME Code Section III component cooling water piping '
close automatically.
- )
- 2) The spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger isolation valve closes automatically. l i
- 3) The component cooling water heat exchanger bypass valves close automatically.
l
- Upon receipt of a Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS), the containment spray heat exchanger
! isolation valve opens automatically. L Upon receipt of a component cooling water low-low surge tank level signal, isolation valves for cooling loops composed of non-ASME Code Section III piping close automatically. i a Motor-operated valves (MOVs) having an active safety function will open, or will close, or will open and :
- also close, under differential pressure or fluid flow conditions and under temperature conditions.
- Check valves shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under system pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. ,
Valves with response positions indicated on Figure 2.7.6-1 change position to that indicated on the Figure ; upon loss of motive power. Makeup water to the CCWS is supplied by the demineralized water makeup system (DWMS). A safety- ]~~ related Seismic Category I makeup line is provided to each division from the SSWS via a spool piece-4- 'which can be connected. Pressure relief and flow isolation valves are provided for each reactor coolant pump as shown on Figure . 2.7.6-1. Pressure relief capacity is sized to accept the maximum expected in-leakage from a reactor coolant pump seal cooler tube rupture. The CCWS pipe channels from the nuclear island structures to the component cooling water heat exchanger structures are classified Seismic Category I and provide physical barriers between CCWS i mechanical divisions. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.6-2 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Component Cooling Water System.
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System 80+ Design ControlDocument l Table 2.7.6-1 Equiprnent Receiving Component Cooling Water Flow-Plant Mode / Nonnal Shutdown Cooling Refueling Design Basis Components Operation , Accident SAFETY RELATED (Note 0 i Shutdown cooling - X X - heat exchanger Containment spray - - - X heat exchanger Spent fuel pool X 'X X X (Note 2) cooling heat exchanger Diesel Generator X X X X Pump Motor Coolers, X X X X Miniflow Heat Exchangers, and Essential Chilled Water Condensers NON-SAFETY RELATED (Note 1) Reactor coolant pumps and X X X X f3 pump motors Charging pump motor X X X X coolers Charging pump miniflow X X X X heat exchanger _ Instrument Air Compressors X X X X Normal Chilled Water X X X - Condensers (Note 3) Letdown Heat Exchanger, X X X - Sample Heat Exchangers, Gas Stripper, and Boric Acid Concentrator (Note 3) NOTES 1, (X) = Equipment can receive component cooling water flow in this mode. (-) = Equipment does not receive component cooling water flow in this mode.
- 2. Will require operator action to restore.
- 3. Assignment of the non-safety-related CCWS heat removal loads to the respective CCWS Division is dependent upon the location of the components associated with those loads.
O b Cerened Det% nieteriel Page 2.7 21
l I l System 80+ Design controlDocument Table 2.7.6-2 Component Cooling Water System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and )
of the CCWS is as shown CCWS configuration will equipment shown on l on Figure 2.7.6-1. be conducted. Figure 2.7.6-1, the as- l built CCWS conforms ) with the Basic ! Configuration.
- 2. The CCWS, in 2. Testing will be performed 2. The CCWS, in ;
conjunction with the to measure CCWS flow conjunction with the SSWS and UHS, has the rates, inspections will be SSWS and UHS, has the capacity to dissipate the conducted of the as-built capacity to dissipate the heat loads of connected CCWS, and analyses will heat loads of connected components during be performed to determine components during operation, shutdown, the heat removal operation, shutdown, refueling and design basis capacities of the as-built refueling and design basis accident conditions. component cooling water accident conditions. heat exchangers.
- 3. The ASME Code Section 3. A pressure test will be 3. The results of the III CCWS components conducted on those pressure test of ASME shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 components of the CCWS Code Section III retain their pressure required to be pressure components of the CCWS l boundary integrity under tested by ASME Code conform with the pressure )
Section III, testing acceptance criteria j internal pressures that will be experienced during in ASME Code Section j service. III. ! l 4.a) The Class IE loads shown 4.a) Testing will be performed 4.a) Within the CCWS, a test on Figure 2.7.6-1 are on the CCWS by signal exists only at the i powered from their providing a test signal in equipment powered from i respective Class IE only one Class IE the Class IE Division Division. Division at a time. under test. 4.b) Independence is provided 4.b) Inspection of the as- 4.b) Physical separation exists between Class IE installed Class IE between Class 1E Divisions, and between Divisions in the CCWS Divisions in the CCWS. Class IE Divisions and will be performed. Physical separation exists non-Class IE equipment, between Class 1E in the CCWS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the CCWS.
- 5. The two mechanical 5. Inspection of the as-built 5. The two mechanical I divisions of the CCWS mechanical divisions will divisions of the CCWS are physically separated. be performed. are separated by a i divisional wall or a fire l barrier except for components of the CCWS within Contamment which are separated by spatial ,
arrangement or physical barriers. I Certified Design Matenial Page 2.7 22
System 80+ D sign ControlDocument
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(.) Table 2.7.6-2 Component Cooling Water System (Continued) Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 6.a) Displays of the CCWS 6.a) Inspection for the 6.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown on existence or retrieveability instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.6-1 exist ja the in the MCR of Figure 2.7.6-1 exist in the MCR or c 1 be retrieved instrumentation displays MCR or can be retrieved there, will be performed, there. 6.b) Controls exist in the Main 6.b) Testing will be performed 6.b) CCWS controls in the Control Room to start and using the CCWS controls MCR operate to start and stop the component in the MCR. stop component cooling cooling water pumps, and water pumps, and to open to open and close those and close those power power operated valves operated valves shown on shown on Figure 2.7.6-1. Figure 2.7.6-1.
- 7. Upon receipt of a Safety 7. Testing will be performed 7. The system responds as injection Actuation Signal using a simulated SIAS. follows:
(SIAS), the system response is as follows: 7.a) The ASME Code Section 7.a) Upon receipt of a SIAS, 111 Class 3 valves that the valves close. separate the ASME Code Section 111 Class 3 [V,_]. component cooling water piping and non-ASME Code Section III i component cooling water piping close automatically. 7.b) The spent fuel pool 7.b) Upon receipt of a SIAS, ) cooling heat exchanger the valve closes. j isolation valve closes ; automatically. j Upon receipt of a SlAS, l 7.c) The component cooling 7.c) water heat exchanger the valves close. bypass valves close automatically.
- 8. Upon the receipt of a 8. Testing will be performed 8. Upon the receipt of a component cooling water using a simulated component cooling water low-low surge tank level component cooling water surge tank low-low level signal, isolation valves for surge #_ank low-low level signal, the valves close.
cooling loops composed of signal. non-ASME Code Section 111 piping close automatically.
- 9. Upon receipt of a 9. Testing will be performed 9. Upon receipt of a CSAS, ,
Containment Spray using a simulated CSAS the valve opens. 1 Actuation Signal (CSAS), signal. h(7 the containment spray heat , exchanger isolation valve opens automatically. Certified Desigrs Materid Page 2.7-23 I l
1 l j Syntem 80+ Design controlDocument Table 2.7.6-2 Component Cooling Water System (Continued) i Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 10. Motor-operated valves 10. Testing will be performed 10. Each MOV having an ,
(MOVs) having an active to open, or close, or open active safety function ! safety function will open, and also close, MOVs opens, or closes, or opens or will close, or will open having an active safety anc' also closes. and also close, under function under differential pressure or preoperational differential fluid flow conditions and pressure or fluid flow under temperature conditions and under conditions. temperature conditions. I1. Check valves shown on 11. Testing will be performed 11. Each check valve shown Figure 2.7.6-1 will open, to open, or close, or open on Figure 2.7.6-1, opens, or will close, or will open and also close, check or closes, or opens and and also close, under valves shown on Figure also closes. system pressure, fluid 2.7.6-1 under system flow conditions, or preoperational pressure, temperature conditions. fluid flow conditions or temperature conditions. i
- 12. Valves with response 12. Testing of loss of motive 12. These valves change positions indicated on power to these valves will position to the position l Figure 2.7.6-1 change be performed. indicated on Figure ;
position to that indicated 2.7.6-1 on loss of motive on the figure upon loss of power. I motive power.
- 13. The spool piece on the 13. Testing of the spool piece 13. The spool piece on the ,
SSWS makeup line to will be performed to SSWS makeup line to each division of the confirm that it can be each division of the CCWS can be connected. connected. CCWS can be connected.
- 14. Pressure relief capacity 14. An analysis will be 14. An analysis exists and provided for each reactor performed to confirm the concludes that the ,
coolant pump is sized to pressure relief capacity pressure relief capacity l accept the maximum provided for each reactor provided for each reactor ! expected in-leakage from coolant pump. coolant pump is sized to I a reactor coolant pump accept the maximum in- I seal cooler tube rupture, leakage from a reactor I coolant pump seal cooler tube rupture. W 1 1 1 O caww onien wraw nga 2.7 2a
l System 80+ Design centrolDocument 2.7.7 Demineralized Water Makeup System
~
Design Desedption I The Demineralized Water Makeup System (DWMS) supplies filtered water reduced in gases and ions to ) the condensate storage system, component cooling uter system (CCWS), emergency feedwater system (EFWS), normal and essential chilled water systems, and the diesel generator cooling system. The Basic Configuration of the DWMS is as shown on Figure 2.7.7-1. The DWMS is non-safety-related with the exception of the containment penetration isolation valves and piping in between covered in Section 2.4.5. The DWMS has pumps, demineralizers, a degasifier, a demineralized water storage tank, piping, instrumentation, and controls. The DWMS demineralizers, pumps, regeneration, and neutralization equiprnent, including the regenerant waste neutralization tank are located in the station service building. The demineralized water storage tank is located in the yard. I Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria j Table 2.7.7-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Demineralized Water Makeup System. O v i O : 1 M Desker n6ed page 2.7 25 _____._____I
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Syst m 80 + o sign controlDocument Table 2.7.7-1 Demineralized Water Makeup System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the DWMS is as DWMS configuration equipment shown on shown on Figure 2.7.7-1. will be performed. Figure 2.7.7-1, the as-built DWMS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
s I' ( ' Certned Desiers MaterW Page 2.7-27
1 l 1 Design Control Documer t [ystem 80+ 2.7.8 Condensate Storage System Design Description The Condensate Storage System provides a source of condensate for makeup to the main condenser, is a source of startup feedwater to the steam generators, and provides a non-safety source of condensate to the emergency feedwater storage tanks. The Basic Configuration is as shown on Figure 2.7.8-1. The Condensate Storage System is non-safety-related. l The Condensate Storage System has a condensate storage tank surrounded by a dike, a condensate storage tank recycle pump, and associated valves, piping, and controls. The condensate storage tank is located in the yard. The Condensate Storage System recycle pump is located in the station services building. The Condensate Storage System provides makeup or receives excess condensate from the main condenser hotwell. The Condensate Storage System also serves to collect and store condensate from plant condensate drains. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.8-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Condensate Storage System. O. l l 1 l J 9 CertiSed Design Material (1/97) Page 2.7-28
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i Syst m 80+ Design controlDocument Table 2.7.8-1 Condensate Storage System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the Condensate Condensate Storage equipment shown on Storage System is as System configuration will Figure 2.7.8-1, the as-shown on Figure 2.7.8-1. be conducted, built Condensate Storage System conforms with the Basic Configuration.
O O Cardhed Design Meterial Page 2.7 30
Sy t m 80+ oestan conw Uxument
; 2.7.9 Process Sampling System Design Description .
" i The Process Sampling System (PSS) collects and delivers samples from process systems to sample stations for analyses. Portions of the system which form part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are safety-related. A sub-system of the PSS is the post-accident sampling system (PASS). The PASS is used to ;
- ' collect post accident samples of containment atmosphere and reactor coolant for analysis. Reactor coolant i samples are collected for boron, radiological, and total dissolved gas measurements. Containment
! atmosphere samples are collected for radiological measurements. The PASS may be remotely operated 1
as necessary to reduce personnel radiation exposure. The'PSS is located within the nuclear island structures.
? The Basic Configuration of the PSS is as shown on Figure 2.7.9-1.
The ASME Code Section III Class for the PSS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.7.9-1 l
'is as depicted on the Figure. ,
The safety related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.9-1 is classified Seismic Category I. , t Displays of the PSS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.9-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or
- can be retrieved there.
Controls exist in the MCR to open and close those power operated valves shown on Figure 2.7.9-1. PSS alarms shown on Figure 2.7.9-1 are provided in the MCR. Valves with response positions indicated on Figure 2.7.9-1 change position to that indicated on the Figure upon loss of motive power. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . Table 2.7,9-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Process F Sampling System. d 4 1 coroned Deeen scenerd . rey,2.7 2r
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System 80+ Design ContvlDocument ig\ V Table 2.7.9-1 Process Sampling System . Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the PSS is as shown PSS configuration will be equipment shown on on Figure 2.7.9-1. conducted. Figure 2.7.9-1, the as-built PSS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The ASME Code Section 2. A pressure test will be 2. The results of the III PSS components conducted on those pressure test of ASME shown on Figure 2.7.9-1 components of the PSS Code Section III retain their pressure required to be pressure components of the PSS boundary integrity under tested by ASME Code conform with the internal pressures that Section III. pressure testing will be experienced acceptance criteria in during service. ASME Code Section III.
3.a) Displays of the PSS 3.a) Inspection for the 3.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown on existence or instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.9-1 exist in retrieveability in the Figure 2.7.9-1 exist in the MCR or can be MCR of instrumentation the MCR or can be retrieved there. displays will be retrieved there. performed. q U 3.b) Controls exist in the 3.b) Testing will be 3.b) PSS controls in the MCR MCR to open and close performed using the PSS operate to open and close those power operated controls in the MCR. those power operated valves shown on Figure valves shown on Figure 2.7.9-1. 2.7.9-1. 3.c) PSS alarms shown on 3.c) Testing of the PSS 3.c) The PSS alarms shown Figure 2.7.9-1 are alarms shown on Figure on Figure 2.7.9-1 actuate provided in the MCR. 2.7.9-1 will be in the MCR in response performed using signals to signals simulating i simulating alarm alarm conditions. ; conditions. j
- 4. Valves with response 4. Testing of loss of motive 4. These valves change positions indicated on power to these valves position to the position Figure 2.7.9-1 change will be performed. indicated on Figure position to that indicated 2.7.9-1 on loss of motive I on the Figure upon loss power.
of motive power.
- 5. The PASS can collect 5. Testing of the PASS 5. Samples of reactor j samples of reactor capability to obtain coolant and containment coolant and containment samples will be atmosphere are collected atmosphere. performed under by the PASS.
preoperational conditions. i Certrhed Design Material Page 2.7 33
Srtem 80+ Design ControlDocument 2.7.10 Compressed Air Systems Design Description The Compressed Air Systems (CAS) consist of the Instrument Air System (IAS), Station Air System (SAS), and Breathing Air System (BAS). The IAS supplies compressed air to air-operated instrumentation, air-operated controls, and air-operated valves. The Basic Configuration of the IAS is as shown on Figure 2.7.10-1. IAS air compressors, air receivers, and dryer / filters are located in the nuclear annex. The IAS supply lines extend to, and end at, the controller of the connected component. Each IAS air compressor shown on Figure 2.7.10-1 is powered from a permanent non-safety bus. A display of the IAS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.10-1 exists in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. The SAS supplies compressed air for air-operated tools and for general use in the plant. The Basic Configuration of the SAS is as shown on Figure 2.7.10-2. The BAS supplies compressed air for breathing protection. The Basic Configuration of the BAS is as shown on Figure 2.7.10-3. The CAS are non-safety-related systems with the exception of the containment penetration isolation valves and piping in between which are covered in Section 2.4.5. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.10-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Compressed Air Systems. O Certified Design Materid Page 2.7-34
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System 80+ Design contro? Document Table 2.7.10-1 Compressed Air Systems Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the IAS is as shown IAS configuration will be equipment shown on on Figure 2.7.10-1. conducted. Figure 2.7.10-1, the as-built IAS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The Basic Configuration 2. Inspection of the as-built 2. For the components and of the SAS is as shown SAS configuration will equipment shown on on Figure 2.7.10-2. be conducted. Figure 2.7.10-2, the as-built SAS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 3. The Basic Configuration 3. Inspection of the as-built 3. For the components and of the BAS is as shown BAS configuration will equipment shown on on Figure 2.7.10-3. be conducted. Figure 2.7.10-3, the as-built BAS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 4. A display of the IAS 4. Inspection for the 4. A display of the instrumentation shown on existence or instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.10-1 exists in retrieveability in the Figure 2.7.10-1 exists in the MCR or can be MCR of instrumentation the MCR or can be retrieved there. displays will be retrieved there, performed.
- 5. The I AS electrical loads 5. Testing will be 5. Within the IAS, a test shown on Figure performed on the IAS by signal exists at the 2.7.10-1 are powered providing a test signal in equipment powered by from a permanent non- the permanent non-safety the permanent non-safety safety bus. bus, bus under test.
l l Certihed Design Meterial Page 2.7-38 l
Design conaalDocument Sy te,m 80+ 2.7.11 Turbine Building Cooling Water System t
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Design Description The Turbine Building Cooling Water System (TBCWS) provides cooling water to the non-safety-related turbine plant auxiliary system components. The Basic Configuration of the TBCWS is as shown on Figure 2.7.11-1. The TBCWS is non-safety-related. The TBCWS is a sbgle closed loop cooling water system. The TBCWS has two heat exchangers, two pumps, one surge tank, piping, valves, and controls. The TBCWS is located in the turbine building and yard. The TBCWS transfers heat from turbine building auxiliary system components to the turbine building service water system (TBSWS). Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.11-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Turbine Building Cooling Water System. O 1 e l *
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r System 80+ oesign controt Document iQ (V' Table 2.7.11-1 Turbine ' Building Cooling Water System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the TBCWS is as TBCWS configuration equipment shown on shown on Figure will be conducted. Figure 2.7.11-1, the as-2.7.11-1. built TBCWS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
O i V 1 I i i i p A l l CersMed Desips Mamrid page 2.7 41
System 80+ Design ControlDocument 2.7.12 Essential Chilled Water System , Design Description The Essential Chilled Water System (ECWS) is a safety-related closed loop chilled water system that serves safety-related HVAC cooling loads. The ECWS provides chilled water to connected safety-related air handling units. The Basic Configuration of the ECWS is as shown on Figure 2.7.12-1. The essential chilled water (ECW) expansion tanks, ECW pumps, essential chillers, and ECW heat exchangers are located in the nuclear annex. The ECWS consists of two divisions. Each division includes a chiller, a heat exchanger, two chilled water pumps, an expansion tank, piping, valves, controls and instrumentation. The ASME Code Section III Class for the ECWS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.7.12-1 is as depicted on the Figure. The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.12-1 is classified Seismic Category I. The Class IE loads shown on Figure 2.7.12-1 are powered from their respective Class IE Division. The two mechanical divisions of the ECWS are physically separated. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to start and stop the essential chilled water pumps and essential chiller shown on Figure 2.7.12-1. Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class lE equipment, in the ECWS. 1 The ECWS is automatically actuated to furnish essential chilled water upon a loss of the normal chilled l water system (NCWS). l I Makeup water to the ECWS is supplied by the demineralized water makeup system (DWMS) A safety-related Seismic Category I makeup line is provided to each division from the station service water system i (SSWS) via a spool piece which can be connected. Inspections, Tes'.s, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.12-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Essential Chilled Water System. O Canified Desigts Mstoria! Page 2.7-42
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Srtem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.7.12-1 Essential Chilled Water System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of 1. Inspection of the as-Suilt 1. For the components and the ECWS is as shown on ECWS configuration will be equipment shown on Figure Figure 2.7.12-1. conducted. 2.7.12-1, the as-built ECWS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The ASME Code Section III 2. A pressure test will be 2. The results of the pressure ECWS components shown conducted on those test of the ASME Code on Figure 2.7.121 retain components of the ECWS Section III components of their pressure boundary required to be pressure the ECWS conform with integrity under internal tested by ASME Code the pressure testing pressures that will be Section Ill. acceptance criteria in experienced during service. ASME Code Section III.
The Class IE loads shown 3.a) Testing will be performed 3.a) Within the ECWS, a test 3.a) on Figure 2.7.12-1 are on the ECWS by providing signal exists only at the powered from their a test signal in only one equipment powered from respective Class lE Class IE Division at a time. the Class IE Division under Division, test. 3.b) Independence is provided 3.b) Inspection of the as-installed 3.b) Physical separation exists between Class IE Divisions, Class IE Divisions in the between Class IE Divisions and between Class IE ECWS will be performed. in the CCWS. Physical Divisions and non-Class IE separation exists between equipment, in the ECWS. Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the ECWS.
- 4. The two mechanical 4. Inspection of the as built 4 The two mechanical divisions of the ECWS are mechanical divisions will be divisions of the ECWS are physically separated. performed. separated by a divisional wall or by a fire barrier.
- 5. Controls exist in the MCR 5. Testing will be performed 5. ECWS controls in the MCR to start and stop the using the ECWS controls in operate to start and stop the essential chilled water the MCR. essential chilled water pumps and essential chiller pumps and essential chiller shown on Figure 2.7.12-1. shown on Figure 2.7.12-1.
- 6. The ECWS is automatically 6. Testing will be performed 6. The ECWS is automatically actuated to furnish essential using a signal to simulate actuated to furnish essential chilled water upon a loss of loss of the normal chilled chilled water upon a loss of the normal chilled water water system. the NCWS.
system (NCWS).
- 7. The spool piece on the 7. Testing of the spool piece 7. The spool piece on the SSWS makeup line to each will be performed to SSWS makeup line to each division of the ECWS can confirm that it can be division of the ECWS can be connected. connected. be connected.
g O Certined Design Material Page 2.7-44
o System 80+ oesign controlDocument O 2.7.13 Nonnal Chilled Water System Design Description With the exception of the Containment penetration isolation valves and piping in between covered in Section 2.4.5, the Normal Chilled Water System (NCWS) is a non-safety-related closed loop chilled water system that serves non-safety-related IIVAC cooling loads. The NCWS provides chilled water to connected air handling units and the essential chilled water heat exchanger. The Basic Configuration of the NCWS is as shown on Figure 2.7.13-1. The normal chilled water (NCW) expansion tanks, NCW pumps, and normal chillers are located in the nuclear annex. The NCWS consists of two divisions. Each division of the NCWS includes two chillers, two chilled water pumps, an expansion tank, piping, valves, controls and instrumentation. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.13-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Normal Chilled Water System. O CorWAed Des @ AfeterW psG* 2.7-45
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i. Sy~ tem 80 + Design ControlDocument C - Table 2.7.13-1 Normal Chilled Water System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the NCWS is as NCWS configuration will equipment shown on i shown on Figure be conducted. Figure 2.7.13-1, the as-2.7.13-1. built NCWS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
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Sy3 tem 80+ Design ControlDocument 2.7.14 Turbine Building Service Water System Design Description The Turbine Building Service Water System (TBSWS) removes heat from the turbine building cooling water system (TBCWS) and transfers heat to the condenser circulating water system. The Basic Configuration of the TBSWS is as shown on Figure 2.7.14-1. The TBSWS is non-safety-related. The TBSWS has two pumps and associated piping, valves, and controls which provide cooling water to the TBCWS heat exchangers. The TBSWS is located in the yard. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.14-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associs ted acceptance criteria for the Turbine Building Service Water System. O I l O I Page 2.7-48 j Certified Design Material l l
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- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the Turbine Building TBSWS configuration equipment shown on Service Water System will be conducted. Figure 2.7.14-1, the as-(TBSWS) is as shown on built TBSWS conforms Figure 2.7.14-1. with the Basic Configuration.
O O Cortshed Design Material Page 2.7-50
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' 2.7.15 Equipment and Floor Drainage System
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The Equipment and Floor Drainage System (EFDS) segregates and transports liquids containing wastes , to the liquid waste management system (LWMS). The EFDS has components in the nuclear island structures, the turbine building and the radwaste building. The Basic Configuration of the EFDS is as shown on Figure 2.7.15-1. The ASME Code Section III Class 2 and 3 components shown on Figure 2.7.15-1 are safety-related. The equipment and floor drains are separated into equipment drains, floor drains, chemical waste drains, and detergent waste drains. Liquid wastes are routed to the LWMS subsystem that processes the particular waste type, Nonradioactive equipment and floor drains are not connected to radioactive or potentially radioactive equipment and floor drains.
. Floor drains in the nuclear annex (NA) are physically separated into two divisions and there are no common drain lines between divisions. Floor drains in the reactor building (RB) subsphere are physically separated into quadrants (two in each division) and there are no common floor drain lines between quadrants.
Within Containment, the EFDS has no direct downward gravity flowpaths that will allow the release of ' radioactive material. The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.15-1 is classified Seismic Category I. The Class 1E loads shown on Figure 2.7.15-1 are powered from their respective Class IE Division. Independence is provided between Class 1E Divisions, and between Class 1E Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, in the EFDS. The turbine building floor drain sump is equipped with a radiation detection instrmnent. If radioactivity is detected in the turbine building floor drain sump, the sump discharge is automatically terminated and can be routed to the LWMS. The ASME Section III Class for the EFDS pressure retaining components shown on Figure 2.7.15-1 is as depicted on the Figure'. Displays of EFDS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.15-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.15-1 specifies the inspections tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the p Equipment and Floor Drainage System. h cwanent Deein" meserie! !*oe 2.7-51 l
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l Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1.a) The Basic Configuration of 1.a) Inspection of the as-built 1.a) For the components and the EFDS is as shown on EFDS configuration will equipment shown on Figure 2.7.15-1. be conducted. Figure 2.7.15-1, the as- j built EFDS conforms with ) the Basic Configuration. I.b) Displays of the EFDS 1.b) Inspection for the 1.b) Displays of the instrumentation shown on existence or retrievability instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.15-1 exist in in the MCR of Figure 2.7.15-1 exist in the MCR or can be instrumentation displays the MCR or can be retrieve there. will be performed. retrieved there.
- 2. The ASME Code Section 2. A pressure test will be 2. The results of the pressure III EFDS components conducted on those test of ASME Code shown on Figure 2.7.151 components of the EFDS Section III components of retain their pressure required to be pressure the EFDS conform with boundary integrity under tested by ASME Code the pressure tasting internal pressures that will Section III. acceptance criteria in be experienced during ASME Code Section III.
service,
- 3. The equipment and floor 3. Inspection of the EFDS 3. Equipment drain liquid waste, floor drain liquid (n'v) drains are separated into equipment drains, floor drains, chemical waste will be performed.
waste, chemicalliquid waste, and detergent liquid drains, and detergent waste are transported waste drains. Liquid through separate piping to wastes are routed to the the LWMS subsystem that LWMS subsystem that processes that waste type. processes the particular waste type.
- 4. Nonradioactive equipment 4. Inspection of the EFDS 4. Nonradioactive equipme2t and floor drains are not will be performed. and floor drains are not connected to radioactive or connected to radioactive or potentially radioactive potentially radioactive equipment and floor equipment and floor drains. drains.
5.a) Floor drains in the NA are 5.a) Inspection of the EFDS 5.a) The floor drains in the NA physically separated into will be performed. are separated by a two divisions and there are divisional wall and have no common drain lines no common drain lines between divisions. between divisions. 5.b) Floor drains in the RB 5.b) Inspection of the EFDS 5.b) The EFDS RB subsphere subsphere are physically will be performed. floor drains in each separated into quadrants quadrant of the RB (two in each division) and subsphere are separated by A there are no common floor walls and have no () drain lines between quadrants.
- common drain lines between quadrants.
CeraWed Design Meterial Page 2.7-53
System 80+ Design Control Document Table 2.7.15-1 Equipment and Floor Drainage System (Continued) Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria Within Containment, the 6. Inspection of the EFDS 6. Within Containment, no 6. will be performed. direct downward flowpath EFDS has no direct gravity downward that would allow the flowpath that will allow release of radioactive the release of radioactive material exists. material. Testing will be performed 7.a) Within the EFDS, a test 7.a) The Class IE loads shown 7.a) on Figure 2.7.15-1 are on the EFDS by providing signal exists only at the powered from their a test signalin only one equipment powered from respective Class IE Class IE Division at a the Class IE Division Division. time. under test. Independence is provided 7.b) Inspection of the as- 7.b) Physical separation exists 7.b) between Class IE installed Class IE between Class IE Divisions, and between Divisions of the EFDS Divisions in the EFDS. Class IE Divisions and will be performed. Physical separation exists non-Class IE equipment, between Class IE in the EFDS. Divisions and non-Class 1E equipment in the EFDS. 8.a) The turbine building floor 8.a) Inspection of the turbine 8.a) A tadiation detection drain sump is equipped building floor drain sump instrument is installed. with a radiation detection will be performed. instrument. 8.b) If radioactivity is detected 8.b) Testing of the flow 8.b) In response to a signal that in the turbine building termination from the simulates radioactivity in floor drain sump, the turbine building floor the turbine building floor sump discharge is drain sump will be drain sump, the sump automatically terminated perforrr.ed using a signal discharge is automatically and can be routed to the that simulates radiation in terminated. LWMS. the sump. O i Certifmf Design Material Page 2.7-S4
Systim 80 + D? sign ControlDocument 2.7.16 Chemical and Volume Control System (V) Design Description The Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) maintains the required volume of water in the reactor coolant system (RCS) (in conjunction with the pressurizer level control system), removes noble gases from the RCS, and permits addition of chemicals for primary coolant chemistry control. The CVCS removes coolant water from the RCS, passes the coolant water through filters and ion exchangers, adds or removes soluble boron from the coolant, provides backup spray water to the pressurizer, provides cooling water to the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals, collects controlled RCP seal bleedoff, provides water to the spent fuel; yol, and returns water to the RCS. The CVCS is a non-safety-related system except for portions of the system which form part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, which are safety-related. The Basic Configuration of the CVCS is as shown on Figure 2.7.16-1. Components shown on the Figure are located in the nuclear island stmetures. The Holdup Tank, Reactor Makeup Water Storage Tank, and Boric Acid Storage Tank are located in the yard and are surrounded by a dike. The CVCS includes pumps, valves, canks, heat exchangers, ion exchangers, piping, instrumentation, and controls. Flow limiting orifices are provided in the letdown line.
)
The ASME Code Section III Class for the CVCS pressure retaining components shown on Figure j (p~) 2.7.16-1 is as depicted on the Figure. The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 is 1 classified Seismic Category I. Pressure retaining components in the charging pump suction line from the f check valve to the pumps have a design pressure of at least 900 psig. j Displays of the CVCS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) ! or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the charging pumps and the dedicated seal injection pump, ; I and to open and close those power operated valves shown on Figure 2.7.16-1. s CVCS alarms are provided as shown on Figure 2.7.16-1. The dedicated seal injection pump receives Class 1E power. Each ASME Code Section III Class 1 ; letdown line isolation valve is powered from a different Class IE Division. ; I Motor operated valves (MOVs) having an active safety function will open, or will close, or will open and ; also close, under differential pressure or fluid flow conditions and under temperature conditions. i l Check valves shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 will open, or will close, or will open and also close, under I system pressure, fluid flow conditions, or temperature conditions. Valves with response positions indicated on Figure 2.7.16-1 change position to that indicated on the ; Figure upon loss of motive power. j (~\ r i Certified Design Material (U97) Page 2.7-55 i
Sy~ tem 80 + Design contriDocument The letdown line is isolated by a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS). The RCP controlled bleedoff line is isolated by a containment spray actuation signal (CSAS). l The CVCS piping design limits the maximum charging flowrate to the RCS. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.16-1 specifies the inspections, ter:;, malyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Chemical and Volume Control System. O O Certified Desiger Material (11/96) Page 2.7 56
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System 80+ oesign cvntroloocument Table 2.7.16-1 Chemical and Volume Control System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration of 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and the CVCS is as shown on CVCS configuration will equipment shown on Figure 2.7.16-1. be conducted. Figure 2.7.16-1, the as-built CVCS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The ASME Code Section 2. A pressure test will be 2. The results of the pressure III CVCS components conducted on those test of ASME Code shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 components of the CVCS Section III components of retain their pressure required to be pressure the CVCS conform with boundary integrity under tested by ASME Code the pressure testing internal pressures that will Section III. acceptance criteria in be experienced during ASME Code SectionIll.
service. Displays of CVCS 3.a) Inspection for the 3.a) Displays of the 3.a) instrumentation shown on existence or retrievability instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.16-1 exist in in the MCR of Figure 2.7.16-1 exist in the MCR or can be instrumentation displays the MCR or can be retrieved there. will be performed. retrieved there. 3.b) Controls exist in the MCR 3.b) Testing will be performed 3.b) CVCS controls in the to start and stop the using the CVCS controls MCR operate to start and charging pumps and the in the MCR. stop the charging pumps dedicated seal injection and the dedicated seal pump, and to open and injection pump, and to close those 'ower operated open and close those valves shown on Figure .$ power. operated valves 2.7.16-1. shown on Figure 2.7.16-1. 3.c) CVCS alarms shown on 3.c) Testing of the CVCS 3.c) The CVCS alarms shown Figure 2.7.16-1 are alarms shown on Figure on Figure 2.7.16-1 actuate provided as shown on the 2.7.16-1 will be performed in response to signals Figure. u*ing signals simulating simulating alarm alarm conditions. conditions. 4.a) The dedicated seal 4.a) Testing will be performed 4.a) A test signal exists at the injection pump receives on the CVCS by providing CVCS component Class IE power. a test signalin the Class powered from the Class IE Division which IE Division under test. supplies power to the dedicated seal injection pump. 4.b) Each ASME Code Section 4.b) Testing will be performed 4.b) A test signal exists only at 111 Class I letdown line on the CVCS by providing the CVCS component I isolation valve is powered a test signalin only one powered from the Class l from a different Class IE Class IE Division at a IE Division urder test. i Division. time. 1 Certi6ed Design Material Page 2.7-58
i System 80+ Design control Document
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U Table 2.7.16-1 Chemical and Volume Control System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 5. Valves with response 5. Testing ofloss of motive 5. These valves change positions indicated on power to these valves will position to the position Figure 2.7.16-1 change be performed. indicated on Figure position to that indicated 2.7.16-1 on loss of motive on the Figure upon loss of power.
motive power. 6.a) The letdown line is 6.a) Testing will be performed 6.a) The two CVCS letdown isolated by a safety using a signal simulating isolation valves inside injection actuation signal an SIAS. containment close upon (SIAS). receipt of a signal simulating an SIAS. 6.b) The RCP seal controlled 6.b) Testing will be performed 6.b) The RCP seal controlled bleedoffline is isolated by using a signal simulating a bleedoffline isolation a containment spray CSAS. valves close upon receipt actuation signal (CSAS), of a signal simulating a CSAS.
- 7. The CVCS piping design 7. Testing will be performed 7. The CVCS maximum (pumps to the RCS) limits by operating both charging combined charging the combined maximum pumps and increasing the flowrate is less than or
( charging flowrate to the flowrate to a maximum equal to 160 gpm. G; RCS. while the RCS pressure is
.t "0" psig.
- 8. Motor operated valves 8. Testing will be performed 8. Each MOV h:ving an N(MOVs) having an active to open, or close, or open active safety function safety function will open, and also close, MOVs opens, or closes, or opens or will close, or will open having an active safety and also closes.
and also close, under function under differential pressure or preoperationaldifferential fluid flow conditions and pressure or fluid flow under temperature conditions and und:r conditions. temperature conditions. i
- 9. Check valves shown on 9. Testing will be performed 9. Each check valve shown Figure 2.7.16-1 will open, to open, or close, or open on Figure 2.7.16-1, )
or will close, or will open and also close, check opens, or closes, or opens i and also close, under valves shown on Figure and also closes. ] system pressure, fluid flow 2.7.16-1 under system i conditions, or temperature preoperational pressure, conditions, fluid flow conditions, or , temperature conditions.
- 10. Flow limiting orifices are 10. Inspection of the as-built 10. Each letdown line flow )
provided in the letdown letdown orifices will be limiting orifice has a i line, performed. cross-sectional area not greater than 0.01556 i n square feet. (J CertMed Design Meteriel (11/96) Page 2.7-59 j l l
System 80 + - Design ControlDocument 2.7.17 Control Complex Ventilation System Design Description The Control Complex Ventilation System (CCVS) maintains environmental conditions within the control complex areas in the nuclear annex. The CCVS consists of (a) the main control room air conditioning system (MCRACS) and the technical support center air conditioning system (TSCACS), and (b) the balance of the control complex air conditioning systems.
- a. The Basic Configuration of the MCRACS and the TSCACS is as shown on Figure 2.7.17-1. The safety-related components of the MCRACS and the TSCACS are as indicated on the Figure.
The MCRACS consists of two Divisions. Each Division has an outside air intake, louver, tornado dampers, dampers, filtration unit, air conditioning with fan, ducting, instrumentation, and controls. The TSCACS receives outside air from the MCRACS air intake ducts and has a filtration unit and an air conditioning unit. Each outside air intake has a mintmum of two redundant isolation dampers, at least one detector to detect the products of combustion, two radiation detection monitors, and a tornado damper.
- The air intake isolation dampers close upon receipt of a signal indicating the detection of smoke.
The smoke isolation signals can be manually overridden to open the isolation dampers from the main control room (MCR). l Upon detection of radiation in the outside air intakes, the air intake isolation dampers in the air 1 I intake having the higher radiation level close automatically. The air intake isolation dampers in the other air intake line remain open. After initial actuation of the air intake isolation dampers, the air intake isolation dampers realign automatically, such that the air intake having the lower radiation level opens before the isolation dampers in the air intake line having a higher radiation level close. The air intake isolation dampers can be manually controlled from the MCR. Each MCR filtration unit and the technical support center (TSC) filtration unit remove particulate matter and iodine. The MCR is maintained at a positive pressure with respect to adjacent areas. The TSC can be pressurized with respect to adjacent areas. The designated MCR filtration unit starts automatically and the MCR air conditioning unit starts or continues to operate, if running, on receipt of a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) or a j high radiation signal. In addition, the dampers in the MCR circulation lines and the bypass lines l reposition to establish the flow path through the MCR filtration units. l l l CertMed Design Material Page 2.7-60
System 80+ Design ControlDocument 4 m (j b. The Basic Configuration of the balance of the CCVS is as shown on Figures 2.7.17-2 and 2.7.17-3. The safety-related portions of the balance of the CCVS are as shown on the Figures. The CCVS serves the following safety-related areas: essential electrical equipment rooms, vital instrumentation and equipment rooms, battery rooms, and the remote shutdown panel room. The CCVS serves the following non-safety related areas: the operation support center, non-essential electrical rooms, computer rooms, non-safety battery rooms and other non-essential areas within the control complex. Each battery room has an exhaust fan taking suction near the battery room ceiling. Hydrogen detection devices are installed in the battery rooms. Smoke removal is accomplished with the smoke purge fans. The CCVS equipment shown on Figures 2.7.17-1,2.7.17-2, and 2.7.17-3 is classified seismic Category I except as noted on the Fibures. Safety-related components of the CCVS are Class IE. The Class 1E loads shown on Figures 2.7.17-1,2.7.17-2 and 2.7.17-3 are powered from their respective j Class IE Division. p Yhe a wo MCRACS air intake isolation dampers in a Division are powered from different Class IE buses. i d Ithiependence is provided between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, in the CCVS. The active components of the two mechanical Divisions of the CCVS are physically separated. Displays of the CCVS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.17-1 exist in the MCR or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the MCR filtration units and air conditioning units, and the TSC filtration unit and air conditioning unit, and to open and close those power operated isolation dampers shown on Figures 2.7.17-1,2.717-2, and 2.7.17-3. Components with response positions indicated on Figure 2.7.17-1 change position to that indicated on the Figure upon loss of motive power. The leakage through MCRACS intake ductwork is less than the maximum allowable for the associated design. The fire dampers in the CCVS HVAC ductwork can close under design air flow conditions. laspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria l (A) v Table 2.7.17-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Control Complex Ventilation System. Core lned Deekn ateean\nl (11/96) Page 2.7-61
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f , Sv' tem 80+ oestan c ntrolDocument [ Table 2.7.17-1 Control Complex Ventilation System ; Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the MCRACS and MCRACS and TSCACS equipment shown on
' TSCACS is as shown on configuration will be Figure 2.7.17-1, the as-Figure 2.7.171, conducted. built MCRACS and TSCACS conform with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The Basic Configuration 2. Inspection of the balance 2. For the components and t
. of the balance of the of the as-built CCVS will equipment shown on CCVS is as shown on be conducted. Figures 2.7.17-2 and Figures 2.7.17-2 and 2.7.17-3, the balance of
- 2.7.17-3. the as-built CCVS conforms with the Basic Configuration. ;
- 3. 'Ihe CCVS maintains 3. Testing will be 3. The CCVS controls the ,
temperature to: i I environmental conditions performed on the CCVS within the control to measure room ! - complex areas in the temperatures and 3.a) less than 85'F in the ; nuclear annex. analyses will be MCR. performed to convert test
& data to limit 3.b) between 60'F and 90*F :
temperatures. in the battery rooms. l 3.c) less than or equal to 104'F in mechanical equipment rooms. 3.d) less than or equal to 85'F in other areas of the control complex. , 4.a) The MCR outside air 4.a) Testing will be conducted 4.a) Each isolation damper ' intake isolation dampers on each MCR outside air closes upon receipt of a close upon receipt of a intake isolation damper signal simulating the signal indicating the using a signal that detection of smoke in the detection of smoke. simulates the detection of associated air intake. smoke in the associated air intake. I 4.b) Smoke isolation signals 4.b) Testing will be 4.b) With simulated smoke can be manually performed to simulate damper isolation signal l overridden to open the smoke isolation signals present, isolation ' isolation dampers from and verify that the dampers may be the MCR. isolation dampers may be manually opened from manually opened from the MCR. the MCR. Coraneer Deep hisserial Page 2.7-65 I i
System 80+ oesign controlDocument Table 2.7.17-1 Control Corglex Ventilation System (Continued) Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Accep*ance Criteria
- 5. Upon detection of 5. Testing will be performed 5. Upon detection of radiation in the outside air on the MCRACS isolation radiation in the outside air intakes, the air intake dampers using signals that intakes, the air intake isolation dampers in the simulate radiation levels in isolation dampers in the air intake having the the outside air intakes. air intake having the higher radiation level close higher radiation level automatically. The air close automatically. The intake isolation dampers in air intake isolation the other air intake line dampers in the other air remain open. After initial intake line remain open.
actuation of the air intake After initial actuation of isolation dampers, the air the air intake isolation intake isolation dampers dampers, the air intake realign automatically, such isolation dampers realign that the air intake having automatically, such that the lower radiation level the air intake having the opens before the isolation lower radiation level dampers in the air intake opens before the isolation line having a higher dampers in the air intake radiation level close. The litie having a higher air intake isolation radiation level close. The dampers can be manually air intake isolation controlled from the MCR. dampers can be manually controlled from the MCR.
- 6. Each MCR filtration unit 6. Testing and analysis will 6. The MCR and TSC filter and the TSC filtration unit be performed on each efficiencies are greater remove particulate matter MCR filtration unit and than or equal to 95% for and iodine. the TSC filtration unit to all forms of non-determine filter particulate iodine and efficiencies. greater than or equal to 99% for particulate matter greater than 0.3 micron.
- 7. The MCR is maintained at 7. Ter.ing and analysis will 7. The MCR is pressurized a positive pressure with be performed on the to at least 0.125 inches of respect to the adjacent MCRACS. water gauge relative to the areas, adjacent areas with outside air supply no more than 2000 CFM and a recirculation flow of at least 4000 CFM.
- 3. The TSC can be 8. Testing will be performed 8. The TSC can be pressurized with respect to on the TSC. maintained at a positive the adjacent areas. pressure with respect to the adjacent areas except l for the MCR.
O Certrned Design Material Page 2.7-66
Sy' tem 80+ Design ControlDocument
< k ') Table 2.7.17-1 Control Complex Ventilation System (Continued)
Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 9. The designated MCR 9. Testing will be performed 9. The MCR filtration units filtration unit starts on the MCR filtra%n and MCR air conditioning automatically and the units, MCR air units start on receipt of a MCR air conditioning unit conditioning units, and signal that simulates a starts or continues to dampers using a signal that SIAS,or a signal that operate, if running, on simulates a safety injection simulates high receipt of a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS). radiation.and dampers actuation signal (SIAS) or The testing will be reposition to establish the a high radiation signal. In repeated for a signal that flow path through the I addition, the dampers in simulates a 1.igh radiation MCR filtration units.
the MCR circulation lines signal. and the bypass lines reposition to establish the flow path through the MCR filtration units. 10.a) Each battery room has an 10.a) Inspection of the battery 10.a) An exhaust fan is installed exhaust fan taking suction rooms will be performed. in each battery room, and i near the battery room its suction duct is located ceiling. near the ceiling. A 10.b) liydrogen detection 10.b) Inspection for hydrogen 10.b) Hydrogen detection devices are installed in the detection devices in the devices are installed. battery rooms. battery rooms will be performed. 11.a) The Class IE loads shown 11.a) Testing will be performed 11.a) Within the CCVS, a test on Figures 2.7.17-1, on the CCVS by providing signal exists only at the 2.7.17-2 and 2.7.17-3 are a test signal in only one couipment powered from powered from their Class IE Division at a the Class 1E Division respective Class IE time. under test. Division. II.b) The two MCRACS air 11.b) Testing will be pr rl)rmed 11.b) Within the MCRACS intake imlation dampers in on the air intale isoladon Division, a test signal
.i Division .ce powered dampers in each MCRACS exists only at the air from different C!sss IE Division by providing a intake isolation damper buses. test signalin only one poweted from the Class Class IE bus as a time. IE bus under test.
11.c) Independence is provided 11.c) Inspection of the as- 11.c) Physical separation exists between Class IE installed Class IE between Class 1E Divisions, and between Divisions in the CCVS Divisions in the CCVS. Class 1E Divisions and will be performed. Physical separation exists non-Class IE equipment, between Class IE in the CCVS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the CCVS. I l l CorwenntDesign A0enen\n! Page 2.7-67
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.7.17-1 Control Complex Ventilation System (Continued) Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 12. The active components of 12. Inspection of as-built 12. The active components of the two mechanical mechanical separations the two CCVS Divisions divisions of the CCVS are will be conducted. are separated by a physically separated. Divisional Wall.
13.a) Displays of the CCVS 13.a) Inspection for te 13.a) Display of the instrumentation shown on existence or r c ,eveability instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.17-1 exist in in the MCR Figure 2.7.17-1 exist in the MCR or can be instrumentat n displays the MCR or can be retrieved there. will be perf med. retrieved there. 13.b) Controls exist in the MCR 13.b) Tests will be performed 13.b) CCVS controls in the to start and stop the MCR using the CCVS controls MCR operate to start and filtration units and the in the MCR. stop the MCR filtration TSC filtration unit, and to units and the TSC open and close the filtration unit and air isolation dampers shown conditioning unit, and to on Figures 2.7.17-1, open and close the power 2.7.17 2 and 2.7.17-3. operated isolation dampers shown on Figures 2.7.17-1,2.7.17-2 and 2.7.17-3. .
- 14. ( aponents with response 14. Testing of loss of motive 14 These components change positions indicated on power to these components position to the position Figure 2.7.17-1 change will be performed. indicated on Figure position to that indicated . 2.7.17-1 on loss of motive on the figure upon loss of power.
motive power,
- 15. The leakage through 15. The ductwork will be 15. Analysis of the dose to the MCRACS intake ductwork pressure tested for control room operators is less than the maximum leakage. Analysis of the due to the measured allowable for the dose to tie MCR operators leakage exists and associated design, due to the measured concludes that the leakage leakage will be performed, through ductwork is less than the maximum allowable for the associated design.
- 16. The fire dampers in the 16. A type test will be 16. A test and analysis report CCVS IIVAC ductwork performed to demonstrate exists that concludes the can close under design air that the dampers can close fire dampers can close flow conditions. under design air flow under design air flow conditions, conditions.
I I l O' l l l Certined Desogn Meterial Page 2.7 68
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System 80+ Dessen ContmlDocwnent i 2.7.18 Fud Building Vandladae System f i Design DMption i ~
. The Fuel Building Ventilation System (FBVS) provides ventilation, heating, and cooling to the fuel ;
handling and fuel storage areas located in the nuclear annex. : i The Basic Configuration of the FBVS is as shown on Figure 2.7.18-1. The FBVS has a non-safety- (
- related air supply subsystem and a safety-related air exhaust subsystem. i i
The FBVS has one air supply subsystem and two Divisions of air eBaust. The air supply subsystem has : an air supply unit,'a fan, dampers, ductwork, instrumentation, and controls. Each Division of air exhaust . l has a filtration unit, a fan, dampers, ductwork, instrumentation, and controls. The filtration unit in each l FBVS air exhaust Division removes particulate matter. {;
; Each Division of air exhaust has the capability to maintain the fuel handling and fuel storage areas of the !
I ! nuclear annex at a negative pressure relative to the atmosphere.
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i The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.18-1 is classified Seismic Category I. ! . The Class 1E loads shown on Figure 2.7.18-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E Division. l i I Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment, in the FBVS. i The active components of the two mechanical Divisions of the FBVS air exhaust subsystem are physically ; separated. : l , Displays of the FBVS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.18-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. ! Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the FBVS air supply unit, fans, and filtration units, and to ! open and close the power operated dampers shown on Figure 2.17.18-1. [ i 1 In response to a high radiation signal, the FBVS air exnaust bypass dampers close and the filtration unit , dampers open to direct flow through the filtration units. j i i { The exhaust and supply fars can be used for smoke removal. The fire dampers in HVAC ductwork close under design air flow conditions. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria
- Table 2.7.18-1' specifies the inspections,' tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Fuel Building Ventilation System.
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Sy' rem 80+ Deston ControlDocument j i O D' Table 2.7.18-1 Fuel Building Ventilation System , Design Coma itment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the FBVS is as shown FBVS configuration will equipment shown on i on Figures 2.7.18-1. be conducted. Figure 2.7.18-1, the as- .
built FBVS conforms with the Basic Configuration. ;
- 2. The filtration unit in each 2. Testing and analysis will 2. The FBVS filter FBVS air exhaust be performed on each efficiencies are greater :
Division removes FBVS filtration unit to than or equal to 99% for particulate matter, determine filter paniculate matter greater efficiency. than 0.3 microns.
- 3. .Each Division of air 3. Testing will be 3. A negative pressure ran exhaust has the capability performed for each be maintained relative to to maintain the fuel Division to measure the ' atmospheric pressure in i handling and fuel storage pressure in the fuel the fuel handling and fuel ,
areas of the nuclear handling and fuel storage storage areas of the i annex at a negative areas of the nuclear nuclear annex. pressure relative to the annex with a FBVS , atmosphere. Division operating. l
.l p} Testing will be 4.a) Within the FBVS, a test i %./ 4.a) The Class IE loads 4.a) shown on Figure performed on the FBVS signal exists only at the 2.7.18-1 are powered by providing a test signal equipment powered from i from their respective in only one Class IE the Class IE Division l Class IE Division. Division at a time, under test. I 4.b) Independence is provided 4.b) Inspection of the as- 4.b) Physical separation exists l between Class 1E installed Class IE between Class IE l Divisions, and between Divisions in the FBVS Divisions in the FBVS.
Class IE Divisions and will be performed. Physical separation exists non-Class IE equipment, between Class IE j in the FBVS. Divisions and non-Class j IE equipment in the l FBVS. l
- 5. The active components of 5. Inspection of the as-built 5. The active components i the two mechanical FBVS will be performed. of the two mechanical l Divisions of the FBVS Divisions of the FBVS i air exhaust subsystem are are separated by a physically separated. Divisional wall or fire barriers.
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Cers%ed Design atatorial Page 2.7-71 ___..-______l
System 80+ Design ControlDocument l Table 2.7.18-1 Fuel Building Ventilation System (Continued) j l Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria l 6.a) Displays of the FBVS 6.a) Inspection for the 6.a) Displays of the f instrumentation shown on existence or instrumentation shown on l Figure 2.7.18-1 exist in retrieveability in the Figure 2.7.18-1 exist in J the MCR or can be MCR of instrumentation the MCR or can be retrieved there. displays will be retrieved there. performed. 6.b) Controls exist in the 6.b) Testing will be 6.b) FBVS controls in the MCR to start and stop performed using the MCR operate to start and the FBVS air supply unit, FBVS controls in the stop the FBVS air supply fans, and filtration units MCR. unit, fans, and filtration and to open and close units, and to open and those pcwer operated close those dampers da.npers shown on shown on Figure Figure 2.7.18-1. 2.7.18-1.
- 7. In response to a high 7. Testing will be conducted 7. In response to a signal radiation signal, the while exhaust filters are that simulates a high FBVS air exhaust bypass in bypass mode using radioactivity level, the dampers close and the signals that simulate a bypass dampers in the air filtration unit dampers high radioactivity level. exhaust ductwork close open to direct flow and the dampers in the through the filtration filtration unit ductwork units. open.
- 8. The fire dampers in the 8. A type test will be F. A test and analysis report FBVS ductwork can performed to demonstrate exists that concludes the close under design air that the dampers can fire dampers can close flow conditions. close under design air under design air flow flow conditions. conditions.
O Cer#ed Design Material page 2.7 72
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. Sy~ tem 80 + Design controlDocument 2.7.19 Diesel Building Ventilation System Design Description The Diesel Building Ventilation System (DBVS) provides ventilation, cooling and heating to each of the two diesel generator areas inside the nuclear annex.
The exhaust and supply fans can be used for smoke removal. $- The Basic Configuration of the DBVS is as shown on Figure 2.7.19-1. The safety-related components of the DBVS are as shown on the Figure. i The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.19-1 is classified Seismic Category J.
- The safety-related components shown on Figure 2.7.19-1 are powered from : heir respective Class IE Divisions.
- Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class ,
, IE equipment, in the DBVS. ,
i Active components of the two mecimnical Divisions of the DBVS are physically separated. I Displays of the DBVS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.19-1 exist ir. tie main control room (MCR) , or can be retrieved there, Controls exist in the MCR to statt and stop the DBVS fans shown on Figure 2.7.19-1. The safety-related DBVS fans in a Division start automatically and the non-safety fans stop automatically when the diesel generator starts. ) Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.19-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Diesel Building Ventilation System. I 1 } i O !
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- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the DBVS is as shown DBVS configuration will equipment shown on 4 on Figure 2.7.19-1. be conducted. Figure 2.7.19-1, the as-built DBVS conforms
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The safety related DBVS 2.a) Testing will be 2.a) Within the DBVS, a test 2.a) components are powered performed on the DBVS signal exists only at the from their respective by providing a test signal equipment powered from Class IE Division. in only one Class IE the Class IE Division - Division at a time. under test. 2.b) Independence is provided 2.b) Inspection of the as- 2.b) Physical separation exists between Class IE installed Class IE between Class IE Divisions, and between Divisions in the DBVS Divisions in the DBVS. Class IE Divisions and will be performed. Physical separation exists non-Class IE equipment, between Class IE in the DBVS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the DBVS. O 3.a) Displays of the DBVS instrumentation shown on 3.a) Inspection for the existence or 3.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown on l Figure 2.7.19-1 exist in retrieveability in the Figure 2.7.19-1 exist in the MCR or can be MCR of instrumentation the MCR or can bc . retrieved there. displays will be retrieved there. performed. 3.b) Controls exist in the 3.b) Testing will be 3.b) DBVS controls in the 4 MCR to stan and stop performed using the MCR operate to start and the DBVS fans shown on DBVS controls in the stop the DBVS fans Figure 2.7.19-1. MCR. shown on Figure 2.7.19-1.
- 4. Active components of the 4. Inspection of the as-built 4. The active components two mechanical Divisions mechanical Divisions will of the two mechanical of the DBVS are be performed. Divisions of the DBVS physically separated. are separated by a Divisional wall or a fire i barrier.
- 5. The safety-related DBVS 5. Testing will be 5. The safety-related DBVS fans in a Division stan performed for each fans in a Division are automatically and the Division using an actual staned automatically and non-safety fans stop diesel stan or a signal the non-safety fans are ,
automatically when the that simulates a diesel stopped automatically by i O diesel generator stans. stan. an actual diesel stan, or by a signal that simulates a diesel stan, in the Division under test. l ceramed oeekn nemrier rope 2.7 7s I
System 80+ Dwign C7ntrolDocument 2.7.20 Subsphere Building Ventilation System Design Description The Subsphere Building Ventilation System (SBVS) provides ventilation, cooling and heating to the subsphere building. The SBVS is located in the nuclear annex (NA) and the reactor building (RB). The SBVS has a safety-related air exhaust subsystem and a non-safety-related air supply subsystem. The following safety-related rooms are cooled by the essential chilled water system recirculating units: safety injection pinnp rooms, shutdown cooling pump rooms, containment spray pump rooms, fuel pool heat exchanger rooms, motor-driven and steam-driven emergency feedwater pump rooms, shutdown cooling heat exchanger rooms, containment spray heat exchanger rooms, and penetration rooms. The Basic Configuration of the SBVS is as shown on Figure 2.7.20-1. tie SBVS has two Divisions. Each Division of the SBVS has a filtration unit, fans, dampers, an air supply unit, ductwork, instrumentation, and controls. Each SBVS filtration unit removes particulate matter. Each SBVS Division maintains its Division of the subsphere building at a negative pressure relative to the atmosphere, i i The safety-related equipment shown on Figure 2.7.20-1 is classified Seismic Category 1. l 1 Active components of the two Divisions of the SBVS are physically separated. Safety-related components of the SBVS are powered from their respective Class IE Division. Independence is provided between Class IE Divisions, and between Class IE Divisions and non-Class l IE equipment, in the SBVS. l l Displays of the SBVS instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.20-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the SBVS air supply units, filtration units and fans, and to open and close those power operated dampers shown on Figure 2.7.20-1. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria 1 Table 2.7.20-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Subsphere Building Ventilation System. l Certmed Design Meterial l' age 2.7-?6 > i l
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Syntem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.7.20-1 Subsphere Building Ventilation System Design Commitment l Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the SBVS is as shown SBVS configuration will equipment shown on on Figure 2.7.20-1. be conducted. Figure 2.7.20-1, the as-built SBVS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. Each SBVS filtration unit 2. Testing and analysis will 2. The SBVS filter removes particulate be performed on each efficiencies are greater matter. SBVS filtration unit to than or equal to 99% for determine filter efficiency. particulate matter greater than 0.3 micron.
- 3. Each SBVS Division 3. Testing will be performed 3. Each Division of the maintains its Division of to measure the subsphere SBVS maintains its the subsphere building at a building pressure in each Division of the subsphere negative pressure relative Division with the SBVS building at a negative to the atmosphere. operating. pressure relative to the atmosphere.
- 4. Active components of the 4. Inspection of the as-built 4. The active components of two Divisions of the SBVS will be performed. the two mechanical SBVS are physically Divisions of the SBVS are separated. separated by a Divisional wall or a fire barrier.
5.a) Safety related components 5.a) Testing will be performed 5.a) Within the SBVS, a test shown on Figure 2.7.20-1 on the SBVS by providing signal exists only at the are powered from their a test signal in only one equipment powered from respective Class IE Class IE Division at a the Class IE Division Divisions. time. under test. 5.b) Independence is provided 5.b) Inspection of the as- 5.b) Physical separation exists between Class IE installed Class lE between Class IE Divisions, and between Divisions in the SBVS Divisions in the SBVS. Class IE Divisions and will be performed. Physical separation exists non-Class IE equipment, between Class IE in the SBVS. Divisions and non-Class IE equipment in the SBVS. 6.a) Displays of the SBVS 6.a) Inspection for the 6.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown on existence or retrieveability instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.20-1 exist in in the MCR of Figure 2.7.20-1 exist in the MCR or can be instrumentation displays the MCR or can be retrieved there, will be performed. tetrieved there. 6.b) Centrols exist in the MCR 6.b) Testing will be performed 6.b) SBVS controls in the to stan and stop the SBVS using the SBVS controls MCR operate to start and air supply units, filtration in the MCR. stop the SBVS air supply units and fans, and to units, filtration units and open and close those fans, and to open and power operated dampers close those power shown on Figure 2.7.20- operated dampers shown
- 1. on Figure 2.7.20-1.
Corched Design Materuf Page 2.7 78
l 1 Sy' rem 80+ Design ControlDocument 2.7.21 Containment Purge Ventilation System i (Jn) \ Design Description The Containment Purge Ventilation System (CPVS) has a Low Purge Subsystem and a High Purge Subsystem. The Low Purge Subsystem provides Containment pressure relief during plant startup and shutdown and ventilation in the area of the in-containment refueling water storage tank. The High Purge Subsystem reduces airbome radioactivity and maintains environmental conditions within containment during plant outages. The CPVS is loca*ed in the nuclear annex (NA) and the reactor building (RB). The Basic Configuntions of the CPVS Low Purge and High Purge Subsystems are as shown on Figures 2.7.21-1 and 2.7.21-2, respectively. The CPVS is non-safety-related with the exception of the containment penetratico isolation valves and piping in between covered in Section 2.4.5. Each subsystem of the CPVS has an air supply unit, a filtration unit, fans, ductwork, instrumentation, and controls. Each CPVS filtration unit removes particulate matter. The safety-related equipment shown on Figures 2.7.21-1 and 2.7.21-2 is classified Seismic Category I. Displays of the CPVS instrumentation shown on Figures 2.7.21-1 and 2.7.21-2 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. O Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the CPVS air supply units, filtration units, and fans, and to () open and close those power operated dampers and valves shown on Figures 2.7.21-1 and 2.7.21 ' ) In response to a high radiation signal or a high humidity signal, the CPVS edaust Containment isolation valves close. i Inspection, Test, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria ! Table 2.7.21-1 provides the inspections, test, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Containment Purge Ventilation System. l l O < .LI Certifed Desiges Material Page 2.7 79 I
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Syntem 80+ Design controlDocument Table 2.7.21-1 Containment Purge Ventilation System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configurations 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the CPVS low Purge CPVS configuration will equipment shown on and liigh Purge be conducted. Figures 2.7.21-1 and Subsystems are as shown 2.7.21-2, the as-built on Figures 2.7.21-1 and CPVS Low Purge and 2.7.21-2, respectively. High Purge Subsystems conform with the Basic Configurations.
- 2. Each CPVS filtration unit 2. Testing and analysis will 2. The CPVS filter removes particulate be performed on each efficiencies are greater matter. CPVS filtration unit to than or equal to 99% for determine filter particulate matter greater efficiency, than 0.3 microns.
3.a) Displays of the CPVS 3.a) Inspection for the 3.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown on existence or instrumentation shown on Figures 2.7.21-1 and retrieveability in the Figure 2.7.21-1 exist in 2.7.21-2 exist in the MCR of insraumentation the MCR or can be MCR or can be retrieved displav will be retrieved there. there. performed. 3.b) Controls exist in t'ae 3.b) Testing will be 3.b) CPVS controls in the MCR to start and stop performed using the MCR operate to start and the CPVS air supply CPVS controls in the stop the CPVS air supply units, filtration units, and MCR. units, filtration units, and fans, and to open and fans, and to open and close the power operated close the power operated dampers and valves dampers and valves shown on Figures shown on Figures 2.7.21-1 and 2.7.21-2. 2.7.21-1 and 2.7.21-2.
- 4. In response to a high 4. Testing will be 4. The CPVS exhaust radiation signal or a high performed on the CPVS Containment isolation humidity signal, the exhaust Containment valves close upon receipt CPVS exhaust isolation valves using of a signal that simuistes Cor.tainment isolation signals that simulate high high radiation or high valves close. radiation or high humidity.
humidity in separate tests.
- 5. Valves with response 5. A test of loss d motive 5. These valves change positions indicated on power to these valves position to the position Figures 2.7.21 1 and will be performed. indicated on Figures 2.7.21-2 change position 2.7.21-1 and 2.7.21-2 on to that indicated on the loss of motive power.
Figutes upon loss of motive power. Certihed Design Material Page 2.7 82
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( j 2.7.22 Containnwnt Cooling and Ventilation System v Design Description r a ! The Containment Cooling and Ventilation System provides cooling and air recirculation in the Containment. The Containment Cooling and Ventilation System has a Containment Recirculation Cooling . Subsystem, a Control Element Drive Mechanism Cooling Subsystem, a Reactor Cavity Cooling
; Subsystem, a Containment Pressurizer Cooling Subsystem, and a Containment Air Cleanup Subsystem.
The Containment Cooling and Ventilation System is non-safety-related. The Containment Cooling and Ventilation System is located within the Containment except for the radiation instrument which can be located outside the Containment. The Basic Configuration of the Containment Cooling and Ventilation System is as shown on Figure 2.7.22-1. The Containment Recirculation Cooling Subsystem, the Control Element Drive Mechanism Cooling Subsystem, the Reactor Cavity Cooling Subsystem, and the Containment Pressurizer Cooling
! Subsystem combine cooling units and recirculation fans to cool and recirculate air within the '
Containment. r The Containment Recirculation Cooling Subsystem cools and recirculates air inside the Containment, , The Control Element Drive Mechanism Cooling Subsystem cools and recirculates air to the control element drive mechanisms. ; The Reactor Cavity Cooling Subsystem provides cooled air to the concrete surrounding the reactor. The Containment Pressurizer Cooling Subsystem delivers air to the pressurizer compartment. The Containment Air Cleanup Subsystem passes air in the Containment through filtration units to reduce radioactivity in Containment. Displays of the Containment Cooling and Ventilation System instrumentation shown on Figure 2.7.22-1 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the Containment Cooling and Ventilation System filtration 4 units, cooling units, and fans shown on Figure 2.7.22-1. Inspection, Test, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria . Table 2.7.22-1 provides the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Containment Cooling and Ventilation System. k CorsMied Desk A#eferiint reps 2.7 83
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System 80+ Design controt Document OV Table 2.7.22-1 Containment Cooling and Ventilation System ; Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria {
!. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For components and of the Containment Containment Cooling and equipment shown on ;'
Cooling and Ventilation Ventilation System Figure 2.7.22-1, the System is as shown on configuration will be as-built Containment ; Figure 2.7.22-1. conducted. Cooling and Ventilation System conforms with i the Basic ! Configuration. 2.a) Displays of the 2.a) Inspection for the existence 2.a) Displays of the Containment Cooling and or retrievability in the instrumentation shown Ventilation System MCR of instrumentation on Figure 2.7.22-1 , instrumentation shown on displays will be performed. exist in the MCR or Figure 2.7.22-1 exist in can be retrieved there. the MCR or can be retrieved there. Containment Cooling Testing will be performed 2.b) i 2.b) Controls exist in the 2.b) MCR to start and stop using the Containment and Ventilation System the Containment Cooling Cooling and Ventilation controls in the MCR and Ventilation System System controls in the operate to start and g filtration units, cooling MCR. stop the Containment i units, and fans shown on Cooling and Ventilation Figure 2.7.22-1. System filtration units, cooling units, and fans , shown on Figure ; 2.7.22-1. t l l t s j i M DeskrshieserW Page 2.7.g5 ;
l System 80+ Design ControlDocument , 2.7.23 Nuclear Annex Ventilation System Design Description The Nuclear Annex Ventilation System (NAVS) provides ventilation, cooling and heating to the nuclear ) annex and is located inside the nuclear annex. The exhaust and supply fans can be used for smoke , I removal. The safety-related component cooling water system pump rooms and essential chilled water system pump and chiller rooms are cooled by the Essential Chilled Water System recirculating units. The Basic Configuration of the NAVS is as shown on Figures 2.7.23-1 and 2.7.23-2. The NAVS is a non-safety-related system. The NAVS has two Divisions. Each Division of the NAVS has a filtration unit, fans, ductwork, instrumentation, and controls. Each division of the NAVS maintains its Division of the nuclear annex at a negative pres ~1re relative to the outside atmosphere. The two mechanical Divisions of the NAVS are physically separated. Displays of the NAVS instrumentation shown on Figures 2.7.23-1 and 2.7.23-2 exist in the main control room (MCR) or can be retrieved there. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop the NAVS filtration units and fans, and to open and close those power operated dampers shown on Figures 2.7.23-1 and 2.7.23-2. In response to a high radiation signal, the filtration unit bypass dampers close and the filtration unit dampers open to route exhaust air through the filtration units. The exhaust and supply fans can be used for smoke removal. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.23-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Nuclear Annex Ventilation System. O Certined Desier, MaterMI Page 2.7-86 1
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Sv' tem 80+ Design ControlDocument O Table 2.7.23-1 Nuclear Annex Ventilation System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components I of the NAVS is as shown ' NAVS configuration will and equipment shown
- on Figures 2.7.23-1 and be conducted. on Figures 2.7.23-1 2.7.23-2. and 2.7.23-2, the as-built NAVS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. Each Division of the 2. Testing will be performed 2. Each Division of the l NAVS maintains its to measure the nuclear NAVS maintains its Division of the nuclear r.nnex building pressure in Division of the nuclear annex at a negative each Division with the annen at a tegative pressure relative to the NAVS operating. pressure, -alrive to the outside atmosphere, outside atmosphere.
- 3. The two mechanical 3. Inspection of as-built 3. The two mechanical Divisions of the NAVS mechanica, Divisions will Divisions of the NAVS are physically separated, be performed. are separated by a Divisional wall or a
'M barrier.
, 4.a) Displays of the NAVS 4.a) Inspection for the existence 4.a) Displays of the instrumentation shown on or retrieveability in the instrumentation shown Figures 2.7.23-1 and MCR of instrumentation on Figures 2.7.23-1 2.7.23-2 exist in the displays will be performed. and 2.7.23-2 exist in MCR or can be retrieved the MCR or can be . I there. retrieved there. 4.b) Controls exist in the 4.b) Testing will be performed 4.b) NAVS controls in the i MCR to start and stop using the NAVS controls MCR operate to start j the NAVS filtration units in the MCR. and stop the NAVS ! l and fans, and to open filtration uni:s and and close the power fans, and to open and operated dampers shown close the power on Figures 2.7.23-1 and operated dampers 2.7.23-2. shown on Figures 2.7.23-1 and 2.7.23-2.
- 5. In response to a high 5. Testing will be conducted 5. Upon receipt of signals radiation signal, the in each Division with simulating high filtration unit bypass NAVS exhaust filters in radioactivity level, the dampers close and the bypass mode and using bypass dampers in the filtration unit dampers signals that simulate high exhaust ducting close open to route exhaust air radioactivity levels. and the dampers in the through the filtration filtration unit ducting units. open in the Division under test.
h V Cerened Design nieteriel Page 2.7-89
System 20+ Design ControlDocument 2.7.24 Fire Protection System Design Description The Fire Protection System (FPS) provides fire detection and suppression capabilities and nutigates fire propagation. The FPS consists of a water distributionsystem, automatic arr.1 manual suppression systems, a fire deation and alarm system, and portable fire extinguishers. The FPS provides as a minimum, fire protection for the reactor building, nuclear annex, turbine building, service building, and radwaste building. The FPS is non-safety-related with the exception of the containment penetration isolation valves and piping in between covered in Section 2.4.5. The Basic Configuration of the FPS water distribution system is as shown on Figure 2.7.24-1. Each fire protection water supply tank has a capacity of at least 300,000 gallons. Two fire pumps, one electric motor driven and one diesel engine driven, are provided. The electric motor driven fire pump and the diesel engine driven fire pump are separated by a three-hour fire barrier. The electric motor driven fire l pump is powered from a permanent non-safety bus. A diesel fuel oil storage tank is sized to provide at least an eight hour fuel supply to the diesel engine driven fire pump. A jockey pump is used to maintain fire protection water distribution system pressure. The fire protection system water supply tanks are located in the yard. The electric motor driven fire pump, the diesel engine driven fire pump and the jockey pump are located in the fire pump house. The diesel and motor driven pumps are design to meet the most hydraulically demanding fire suppression system and hose station. Standpipe systems have piping connections to the fire protection water dis.rwation system, isolation valves, and fire hoses. Water is supplied to the standpipe system from the fire protection water distribution system. Standpipe systems provided in the nuclear annex and in the reactor building are Seismic Category I. The standpipe systems in the nuclear annex and in the reactor building can be supplied water from a Seismic Category I classified backup water supply. The backup water supply has a capacity of at least 18,000 gallons. The Seismic Category I portions of the FPS are located in the nuclear annex and reactor building (Seismic Category I structures). Automatic sprinkler systems are provided for fire suppression. The sprinkler systems receive water from the fire protection water distribution system. Manual pull stations or individual fire detectors provide fire detection capability and can be used to initiate fire alarms. Batteries supply backup power for the fire detection and alarm system. The FPS has the following displays and a! arms in the main control room (MCR): detection system fire alarms; status of fire pumps; and sprinkler /preaction system alarms. Portable fire extinguishers are provided for fire suppression. Corkned Design Material Page 2.7 90
Sy-tem 80+ oesign controlDocument A plant fire hazards analysis considers potential fire hazards, determines the effects of fires on the ability to shutdown the reactor and to control the release of radioactivity to the environment, and specifies measures for fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, and fire containment. Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.24-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Fire Protection System. (v~h cerawed oneben neesaw rose 2.7-91
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System 80+ Design ContclDocument (V Table 2.7.24-1 Fire Protection System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the FPS water FPS water distribution equipment shown on distribution system is as system configuration will Figure 2.7.24-1, the as-shown on Figure 2.7.24- be conducted. built FPS water
- 1. distribution system conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. Each fire protection water 2. Inspection of the as-built 2. Each fire protection water supply r-M has a capacity fire protectic,n water supply tank has a of at '. cast 300,000 supply tanks will be capacity of at least gallt ns. performed. 300,000 gallons.
- 3. The electric motor driven 3. Inspection of the as-built 3. The electric motor driven fire purep and the diesel fire barrier will be fire pump and the diesel engine driven fire pump performed. engine driven fire pump are separated by a three- are separated by a three-hour fire barrier. bour fire barrier.
4 The electric motor driven 4. Testing will be performed 4. Within the FPS, a test fire pump is powered on the FPS by providing signal exists at the from a permanent non- a test signal in the equipment powered by safety bus. permanent non-safety bus. the permanent non-safety
/3 Q Testing and analysis will 5.
bus under test. An analysis exists and
- 5. The diesel and motor- 5.
driven pumps are be performed to concludes that each pump designed to meet the most determine pump minimum provides a minimum flow hydraulically demanding flow and pressure and pressure to supply the largest design demand l fire suppression system requirements are met. and bose station. of any sprinkler, j preaction or deluge ! system plus 500 GPM for ' manual hoses. i
- 6. A diesel fuel oil storage 6. Testing of the fuel 6. The diesel fuel oil storage
]
tank is sized to provide at consumption of the diesel tank has at least an eight J least an eight hour fuel engine driven fire pump hour fuel supply for the ; supply to the diesel will be performed. diesel engine driven fire engine driven fire pump. Inspection of the fuel pump. supply tank will be performed. The fuel supply capacity will be j determined. i i
- 7. The standpipe systems in 7. Seismic analysis of the 7. An analysis report exists the nuclear annex and as-built fire protection which concludes that the reactor building along system will be performed. standpipe systems in the with their backup water nuclear annex and reactor n supply are classified building along with their Seismic Category I. backup water supply are l
(] classified Seismic ! Category I.
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Certi6ed Desiger MeterW Page 2.7-93
Syotem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.7.24-1 Fire Protection System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 8. The backup water supply 8. Inspection of the as-built 8. The backup water supply to the standpipe systems backup water supply will has a capacity of at least in the nuclear annex and be performed. 18,000 gallons.
the reactor building has a capacity of at least 18,000 gallons.
- 9. Manual pull Gions or 9. Inspection and testing of 9. Manual pull stations can individual fire detectors the as-built manual pull be used to initiate fire provide fire detection stations and individual alarms and individual fire capability and can be used fire detectors will be detectors respond to to initiate fire alarms. performed. Individual simulated fire conditions.
fire detectors will be tested using simulated fire conditions.
- 10. Batteries supply backup 10. Testing of the fire 10. The fire detection and power for the fire detection and alarm alarm system is provided detection and alarm system will be conducted battery-supplied backup system. under a simulated loss of power.
power.
- 11. A plant fire hazards 11. A fire hazards analysis 11. A fire hazards analysis analysis considers will be performed. exists and considers potential fire hazards, potential fire hazards, determines the effects of determines the effects of fires on the ability to fires on the ability to shutdown the reactor and shutdown the reactor and to control the release of to contain the release of radioactivity to the radioactivity to the environment, and environment, and specifies measures for specifies measures for fire prevention, fire fire prevention, fire detection, fire detection, fire suppression, and fire suppression, and fire containment. containment.
- 12. MCR alarms and displays 12. Inspections will be 12. Alarms and displays exist provided for the FPS are performed on the MCR or can be retrieved in the as defined in the Design alarms and displays for MCR as defined in the Description (Section the FPS. Design Description 2.7.24). (Section 2.7.24).
O Certihed Design Materiel Page 2.7-94
Sy~ tem 80+' Design ControlDocument X ( 2.7.25 Communications Systems
; Design Description The Communications Systems are non-safety-related systems that provide onsite communications capability and means to communicate with offsite specified participating entities. The Communications Systems consist of a Portable Wireless Communication System, a Private Automatic Business Exchange (PABX) Telephone System, a Public Address (PA) System, a Sound-Powered Telephone System, and an
, Offsite Communications System. The Ponable Wireless Communication System provides communications capability among control room l operators, equipment operators, and maintenance technicians for routine and emergency operations. The PABX Telephone System and the PA System are provided as alternate means of communications. The PABX Telephone System provides intraplant communications and access to offsite telephone systems. The PA System provides a means to alert plant personnel through audible speakers located throughout the plant. ! The intraplant Sound-Powered Telephone System uses phone jacks which can be patched together to establish communications between areas of the plant where maintenance, refueling, or shutdown operations are conducted. t in addition to the PABX interface with the offsite telephone system, direct offsite communications, , independent of the PABX, are provided to the plant and suppon facilities. The direct offsite emergency telephones are identified distinctly from the PABX telephones. The emergency telephones provide links with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and specified participating local and state agencies. A security radio system and a crisis management radio system are provided for conununication between j specified panicipating entities. Loss of electrical power to any of the Communications Systems does not affect the operability of the remaining Communications Systems. The Ponable Wireless Communication System is provided with backup power. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.25-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Communications Systems. i l 1 V CereMed Desipt AfeforW page 2,7 95 l 1
- ~ - .
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l 1 l Syatem 80+ Design ControlDocument l Table 2.7.25-1 Communications Systems l Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Ponable Wireless 1.a) Testing of the Ponable 1.a) Voice transmission and I Communication System Wireless Communication reception are l provides communications System will be accomplished.
capability among contrcl performed. room operators, equipment operators, and maintenance technicians for routine and emergency operations. 1.b) Inspection of the Ponable 1.b) Ponable Wireless Wireless Communication Communication equipment for emergency equipment for emergency operations will be operations exists, performed.
- 2. The PABX Telephone 2. Testing of the PABX 2. Voice transmission and System provides Telephone System will be reception between plant intraplant performed. terminals are communications and accomplished. Voice access to offsite transmission and telephone systems. reception between onsite terminals and the offsite telephone systems are accomplished.
- 3. The PA System provides 3. Testing of the PA System 3. Voice transmission and a means to alen plant will be performed. reception are personnel through audible accomplished.
speakers located throughout the plant.
- 4. The intraplant Sound- 4. Testing of the intraplant 4. Voice transmission and Powered Telephone Sound-Powered reception are Syste.7 uses phone jacks Telephone System will be accomplished.
which san be patched performed. together !e e tablish communicaians between areas of the plant where maintenance, refueling, or shutdown operations are conducted. O Certified Design Materlat Page 2.7 96
Svatem 80+ Desian controlDocument -r + Table 2.7.25-1 Conununications Systems (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 5.a) In addition to the PABX 5.a) Testing of the offsite 5.a) Voice transmission and interface with the offsite telephone system will be reception are l telephone system, direct performed. accomplished to the NRC offsite communications, and specified . independent of the participating local and PABX, are provided to state agencies. the plant and support facilities. The emergency celephones provide links with the NRC, and specified panicipating local and state agencies. 5.b) The direct offsite 5.b) Inspection of the offsite 5.b) The direct offsite emergency telephones are emergency telephones emergency telephones identified distinctly from will be performed. are color coded to the PABX telephones. distinguish them from the PABX telephones.
- 6. A security radio system 6. Testing of the security 6. Two way communication and a crisis management radio system and the between specified radio system are crisis management radio participating entities is provided to provide system will be demonstrated.
communications between performed. specified participating entities.
- 7. less of electrical power 7. Testing for operability of 7. Loss of power to any of to any of the the Communications the Communications Communications Systems Systems will be Systems does not disrupt does not affect the performed. the voice transmission operability of the and reception capabilities i remaining of the remaining Communications Communication Systems.
Systems.
- 8. The Portable Wireless 8. Testing of the Portable 8. Voice transmission and Communication system is Wireless Communication reception are ,
provided with backup System will be performed accomplished. l' power. using backup power. O l
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Cere%nt DeeW ateteriet Pope 2.7-97 l
System 80+ Design ControlDocument 2.7.26 Lighting System Design Descr*ption The Lighting System is a non-safety related system that is used to provide illumination in the plant and on the plant site. The Lighting System has a Normal Lighting System, a Security Lighting System, and an Emergency Lighting System. The Normal Lighting System provides general illumination in the plant. The Security Lighting System provides illumination in isolation zones and outdoor areas within the plant protected perimeter. The Security Lighting System is powered from the permanent non-safety buses. The Emergency Lighting System consists of conventional AC fixtures fed from Class IE AC power sources and Class IE DC self contained battery operated lighting units. Class IE DC self contained battery operated lighting units are provided with rechargeable batteries with a minimum 8 hour capacity. Class 1E DC self contained battery operated lighting units are supplied AC power from the same power source as the Normal Lighting System in the area in which they are located. The Emergency Lighting System provides illumination in the vital areas that include the main control room (MCR), the technical support center, the operations support center, the remote shutdown room, and the stairway which provides access from the MCR to the remote shutdown room. Emergency lighting in the MCR is provided such that at least two circuits of lighting fixtures are powered from different Class IE Divisions. The emergency lighting in the MCR maintains minimum illumination levels in the MCR during emergency conditions including station blackout. The emergency lighting installations which serve the MCR are designed to remain operational following a design basis earthquake. Lighting circuits which are connected to a Class IE power source are treated as associated circuits. Independence is maintained between Class IE Divisions and between Class IE Divisicas and non-Class 1E equipment. Class 1E or associated lighting distribution system equipment is identified according to its Class IE Division. Class IE or associated lighting distribution system equipment is located in Seismic Category I structures and in its respective Divisional areas. Class IE or associated lighting system cables and raceways are identified according to their Class 1E Division. Class IE or associated lighting system cables are routed in Seismic Category I structures and in their respective Divisional raceways. Class IE equipment is classified as Seismic Category I. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.26-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Lighting System. O Certifsed Design Material Page 2.7-98
i 1 l System 80+ Design ControlDocument l
\ Table 2.7.26-1 Lighting System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the Lighting System of the Lighting System is Lighting System will be described in the Design as described in the conducted. Dc:ctiption (Section Design Description 2.7.26), the as-built (Section 2.7.26). Lighting System conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. The Security Lighting 2. Inspection and testing of 2. Security lighting is System provides illumination levels in installed in isolation illumination in isolation isolation zones and zones and outdoor are s zones and outdoor areas outdoor areas within the within the pl?nt protected 4 within the plant protected plant protected perimeter perimeter. Security perimeter. will be performed. lighting provides illuminationlevels greater than 0.2 foot-candles when measured horizontally at ground level in these areas.
A 3. The Security Lighting 3. Testing will be 3. Within the Security System is powered from performed on the security Lighting System, a test the permanent non-safety lighting by providing a signal exists at the : buses, test signal in the equipment powered by permanent non-safety the permanent non-safety buses. bus under test. 1 l l l
System 80+ Design Control Document Table 2.7.26-1 Lighting System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 4. The Emergency Lighting 4. Inspection of the MCR, 4. Emergency lighting is System provides the technical suppon installed in the MCR, the illumination in the vital center, the operations technical suppon center, areas that include the suppon center, the the operations suppon MCR, the technical remote shutdown room, center, the remote suppon center, the and the stairway which shutdown room, and the operations suppon provides access from the stairway which provides center, the remote MCR to the remote access from the MCR to shutdown room, and the shutdown room will be the remote shutdown stairway which provides performed. roorn and emergency access from the MCR to lighting provides the remote shutdown illuminationlevels room, greater than or equal to 10 foot-candles in the MCR, technical suppon center, operations suppon center, and the remote shutdown panel room. Emergency lighting provides an illumination level greater than or equal to 2 foot candles in the stairway which provides access from the MCR to the ;
remote shutdown room.
- 5. Class IE DC self 5.a) Inspection of the as-built 5.a) Class IE DC self contained battery Class IE DC self contained battery l operated lighting units contained battery operated lighting units i are provided with operated lighting units are provided with I rechargeable batteries will be conducted. rechargeable batteries with a min'.'aum 8 hour with a minimum 8 hour capacity. Class IE DC capacity. ,
self contained battery l operated lighting units ) are supplied AC power from the same power source as the normal lie.hting system in the area in which hey are located. , 1 l 9l: Certined Design Material Page 2.7-100 I i
t System 80+ Design ControlDocument A b Table 2.7.26-1 Lighting System (Continued) 1 Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 5. (Continued)' 5.b) Testing will be conducted 5.b) Class IE DC self by providing a test signal contained battery on electrical divisions operated lighting units that supply power to the are supplied AC power normal lighting system, from the same power source as the normal lighting system in the area in which they are ,
located. Class IE DC 4 self contained battery operated lighting units are turned on when the normal lighting system in the area in which they l are located is lost.
- 6. Emergency lighting in the 6. Testing will be 6. Within the MCR MCR is provided such performed on the emergency lighting that at least two circuits emergency lighting system, a test signal of lighting fixtures are system in the MCR by exists only at the providing a test signal in equipment powered from
] powertd from different
[V Class IE Divisions. only one Class IE Division at a time. the Class IE Division under test. I 7. Under simulated station
- 7. The emergency lighting 7. Testitig of the emergency in the MCR maintains lighting system will be blackout conditions, the minimum illumination performed under emergency lighting levels in the MCR during simulated station blackout system in the MCR l' emergency conditions conditions. maintains illumination including station levels greater than or ]
blackout. equal to 10 foot. candles.
- 8. Lighting circuits which 8. Inspection of the 8. The as-built associated !
are connected to a Class associated lighting lighting circuits are ; IE power source are circuits will be identified as associated l treated as associated conducted. circuits. j I circuits.
- 9. Independence is 9.a) Testing on the Lighting 9.a) A test signal exists only maintained between Class System will be conducted in the class 1E Division IE Divisions and by providing a test signal under test in the Lighting between Class IE in only one Class IE System.
Divisions and non-Class Division at a time, iE equipment. I d l I CerenedDesipus Ataserial page 2.71or
System 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.7.26-1 Lighting System (Continued) Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 9. (Continued) 9.b) Inspection of the as-built 9.b) In the Lighting System, Class IE Divisions in the physical separation or Lighting System will be electrical isolation exists conducted. between Class IE Divisions. Physical separation or electrical isolation exists between Class IE Divisions and non-Class IE equipment.
- 10. Class IE or associated 10. Inspection of the as-built 10. The as-built Class IE or lighting distribution Class IE and associated associated lighting system equipment is lighung distribudon distribution system identified according to its syr.en' equipmen will be equipment is identified Class IE Division. conducted. according to its Class IE Division.
- 11. Class IE or associated 11. Inspection of the as-built 11. The as-built Class IE or lighting distribution Class IE and associated associated lighting system equipment is lighting distribution distribution system located in Seismic system equipment will be equipment is located in Catagory I structures and conducted. Seismic Category I in its respective structures and in its Divisional areas. respective Divisional areas.
- 12. Class IE or associated 12. Inspection of the as-built 11. The as-built Class IE or lighting system cables Class IE and associated associated lighting and raceways are lighting system cables system cables and identified according to and raceways will be raceways are identified their Class IE Division. conducted. according to their Class IE Division.
- 13. Class IE or associated 13. Inspection of the as-built 13. The as-built Class IE or lighting system cables are Class IE and associated associated lighting routed in Seismic lighting system cables system cables are routed Category I structures and and raceways will be in Seismic Category 1 in their respective conducted. structures and in their Divisional raceways. respective Divisional raceways.
O Certined Design htsterial Page 2.7-102
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Sy: tem 80+ Desson controlDocument . O 2.7.27 Compressed Gas Systems Design Description , The Compressed Gas Systems (CGS) are non-safety-related systems, except for containment penetration isolation valves and piping in between covered in Section 2.4.5, which supply gases to equipment and instrumentation fer cooling, purging, diluting, inerting, and weldirg. The CGS consists of high pressure i gas cylinders and pressure regulators to control the pressure and distribution of the compressed gases. The CGS consists of some or all of the following separate subsystems:
- a. N2System
- b. H2System
- c. O2System
- d. CO2 System
- e. Argon / Methane System
- f. Acetylene Systen !
- g. Argon System The CGS gas cylinders are located in areas which contain no safety-related structures, systems, or
!. components. i Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria , Table 2.7.27-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the CGS. I i h f') v conned Deepn hieserial Page 2.7-103
Sy3 tem 80+ Design ControlDocument Table 2.7.27-1 Compressed Gas Systems Design Commitment Inspections. Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The CGS gas cylinders 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. "Ibe CGS gas cylinder are located in areas plant arrangement will be storage areas contain which contain no safety- performed. no safety-related related structures, structures, systems, or systems, or components, components.
O O Certdied Design Material Page 2.7104
Sy: tem 80+ Design controlDocument
/"
(S 2.7.28 Potable and Sani *r> Water Systems Design Description The Potable and Sanitary Water Systems (PSWS) are non-safety systems that provide water for general plant use and collect liquid wastes in order to convey them to a sewage treatment facility. The PSWS provide water to, and collect liquid wastes in, the reactor building, nuclear annex, turbine building, radwaste building, and station service building. Those portions of the PSWS that are within the reactor building, nuclear annex, turbine building, radwaste building, and station service building are within the scope of the Certified Design. Those portions of the PSWS that are not within the reactor building, nuclear annex, turbine building, radwaste building, and station services building are not within the scope of the Certified Design. There are no interconnections between the Potable and Sanitary Water Systems and systems having the potential for containing radioactive material. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.28-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Potable and Sanitary Water Systems. 4 h v I i i O Cereneef Des @ nestaief Page 2.7105
System 80+ Design ControlDocument l Table 2.7.28-1 Potable and Sanitary Water Systems Design Commitment Inspections, Tests Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the portions of the ;
of the PSWS is as PSWS configuration will PSWS described in the described in the Design be conducted. Design Description Description (Section (Section 2.7.28), the as-2.7.28), built PSWS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
- 2. There are no 2. Inspection and testing of 2. There are no interconnections between the as-built system will interconnections between the PSWS and systems be performed. the PSWS as described having the potential for in the Design Descript'on containing radioactive (Section 2.7.28) and material. systems having the potential for containing radioactive material.
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O Certt6ed Design Material Page 2.7106
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2.7.29 Radwaste Building Ventilation System Q_ Design Description The Radwaste Building Ventilation System (RWBVS) provides ventilation, heating and cooling in the ; radwaste building. The RWBVS is located within the radwaste building, except for the portion which connects with the unit vent at the juncture of the shield building and nuclear annex. The Basic Configuration of the RWBVS is as shown on Figure 2.7.29-1. The RWBVS is non-safety- f related. , 1
- The RWBVS has two supply subsystems and two exhaust subsystems. Each RWT/S supply subsystem has an air supply unit, fans, dampers, ductwork, instrumentation, and controls. Fach RWBVS exhaust i subsystem has a filtration unit, fan, dampers, ductwork, instrumentation, and controls.
The fire damper in the RWBVS liVAC ductwork can close under design air flow conditions. , in response to a high radiation signal, an alarm is activated in the radwaste building control room. , Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 2.7.29-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Radwaste Building Ventilation System. O , bO I' M Deelyn nieterW Pope 2.7107 i
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l l (Vl Table 2.7.29-1 Radwaste Building Ventilation System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components and of the RWBVS is as RWBVS configuration equipment shown on shown on Figure will be conducted. Figure 2.7.29-1, the as-2.7.29 1. built RWBVS conforms with the Basic Configuration. ,
' Testing will be 2. The RWBVS exhaust
- 2. In response to a high 2.
radiation signal, an performed using a signal duct radiation monitor alarm is activated in the that simulates a radiation activates an alarm in the radwaste building control level limit at the exhaust radwaste building control room. duct radiation monitor. room upon receipt of a signal simulating radiation above a limit at the radiation monitor.
- 3. The fire damper in the 3. A type test will be 3. A test and analysis report RWBVS HVAC performed to demonstr .e exists that concludes the ductwork can close under that the damper can close fire damper can close design air flow under design air flow under design air flow conditions.
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Sy~ tem 80 + Design ControlDocument 2.7.30 Turbine Building Ventilation System Design Description The Turbine Building Ventilation System (TBVS) is a non-safety-related system that is used to maintain the environmental conditions in the turbine building. The TBVS has fans, intake louvers, exhaust fans, ductwork, instrumentation and controls. The TBVS also has recirculation fans to provide mixing of air within the turbine building, and roof-mounted vents. The TBVS is located in the turbine building. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria: Table 2.7.30-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Turbine Building Ventilation System. O O _ . . , - - ~ ,...o
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'O Table 2.7.30-1 Turbine Building Ventilation System Design Commitment inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the TBVS described of the TBVS is as TBVS configuration will in the Design Description described in the Design be conducted. (Section 2.7.30), the as-Description (Section built TBVS conforms 2.7.30). with the Basic Configuration.
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Sy~ tem 80 + Design control Document 2,7.31 CCW IIcat Exchanger Structure Ventilation System Design Description The CCW Heat Exchanger Structure Ventilation System (CCWHXSVS) is a non-safety-related system that is used to maintain environmental conditions in a CCW heat exchanger structure. The Basic Configuration of the CCWHXSVS is as shown on Figure 2.7.31-1. A CCWilXSVS is located in each CCW heat exchanger structure. The CCWHXSVS has one air supply unit and one air exhaust unit for each Division of the CCW heat exchangers. Each CCWHXSVS air supply unit has a damper, instrumentation and controls. Each CCWIIXSVS air exhaust unit has an exhaust fan, a damper, ductwork, instrumentation, and controls. Air heaters are provided in each Division. Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria: Table 2.7.31 1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the CCW Heat Exchanger Structure Ventilation System. O: l I O' Certrned Design Material page 2,7.y12
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Sy' tem 80+ Design controlDocument Table 2.7.31-1 CCW Heat Exchanger Structure Ventilation System Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria
- 1. The Basic Configuration 1. Inspection of the as-built 1. For the components of the CCWHXSYS is as CCWHXSVS configuration and equipment shown shown on Figure will be conducted. on Figure 2.7.31-1, the 2.7.31-1. as-built CCWHXSVS conforms with the Basic Configuration.
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