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Category:GENERAL EXTERNAL TECHNICAL REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20148A8211997-01-31031 January 1997 Abb System 80+ Design Control Document - Volume 1 ML20078Q4311995-02-28028 February 1995 Revs to Sys 80+ Design Control Document ML20080E2051995-01-0505 January 1995 Rev 2 to Technical Support Document for Amend to 10CFR51 Considering Severe Accidents Under NEPA for Plants of Sys 80+ Design ML20076F3301994-10-0707 October 1994 Rev 1 of Technical Support Document for Amends to 10CFR51 Considering Severe Accidents Under NEPA for Plants of Sys 80+ Design ML20069N4091994-06-20020 June 1994 System 80+ Certified Design Material ML20029E1991994-05-0606 May 1994 Technical Support Document for Amends to 10CFR51 Considering Severe Accidents Under NEPA for Plants of Sys 80+ Design. ML20062L8631993-12-31031 December 1993 Certified Design Matl ML20058E9971993-11-15015 November 1993 Amend T to C-E Std SAR - Design Certification. W/31 Oversize Figures ML20062J3551993-10-29029 October 1993 C-E Ssar - Design Certification,Amend S. W/15 Oversize Encls ML20058N1001993-09-23023 September 1993 Rev 2 to Design Alternatives for Sys 80+ Nuclear Power Plant ML20045C4901993-06-30030 June 1993 Evaluation of Sys 80+ Std Design to Interfacing Sys LOCA Challenges, Special Rept ML20045D3421993-06-30030 June 1993 Rev 1 to Design Alternatives for Sys 80+ Nuclear Power Plant. ML20045C6351993-06-15015 June 1993 Amend P to Sys 80+ Cessar - Design Certification. ML20044G7061993-05-19019 May 1993 Common Mode Failure Evaluation for Limiting Fault Events. ML20044C0061993-03-17017 March 1993 ABB-C-E Sys 80+ Structural Analysis of Nuclear Island & Nuclear Annex Structures. ML20044B9411993-02-23023 February 1993 Rev 0 to Human Factors Evaluation & Allocation of Sys 80+ Functions. ML20012G3351993-02-16016 February 1993 Sys 80+ Advanced LWR PRA-Based Seismic Margin Evaluation. ML20127M4171993-01-15015 January 1993 Control Complex Info Sys Bases for Nuplex 80+ ML20126F6771992-12-0808 December 1992 Review of CE 80+ FMEA & D&Did Analysis, Technical Ltr Rept ML20126E6191992-10-30030 October 1992 Amend K to CESSAR - Design Certification. W/50 Oversize Encls ML20126J0521992-10-30030 October 1992 Amend K to C-E Std SAR - Design Certification ML20012G3361992-09-30030 September 1992 Draft Basis for Seismic Provisions of UCRL-15910. ML20114F5611992-09-30030 September 1992 Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth & Diversity in ABB-C-E Nuplex 80+ Advanced Control Complex for Sys 80+ Std Design ML20104A8551992-09-0202 September 1992 Sys 80+ Design Certification Fire Hazard Risk Assessment ML20104A8501992-09-0202 September 1992 Sys 80+ Design Certification PRA Flood Protection Assessment LD-92-095, Draft Sys 80+ Design Certification Piping Analysis Specification1992-08-31031 August 1992 Draft Sys 80+ Design Certification Piping Analysis Specification ML20099D8031992-07-31031 July 1992 Final Sys 80+ Shutdown Risk Evaluation Rept ML20101S7281992-07-31031 July 1992 Criteria for Design of Main Control Room & Other Operating Stations for Sys 80+ ML20099D8301992-07-25025 July 1992 Draft Sys 80+ Design Certification Distribution Sys Design Guide ML20101G5261992-06-15015 June 1992 Draft Sys 80+ Shutdown Risk Evaluation Rept ML20097A1251992-05-31031 May 1992 Human Factors Engineering Stds,Guidelines & Bases for Nuplex 80+ ML20096F7271992-05-0808 May 1992 Nuplex 80+ Human Factors Design Process Summary ML20095L5041992-04-30030 April 1992 Draft Sys 80+ Shutdown Risk Evaluation Rept, Part 1 ML20095J2321992-04-30030 April 1992 Rev 0 to Design Alternatives for Sys 80+ Nuclear Power Plant ML20095A9601992-04-15015 April 1992 Selection of Control Motion for ABB-C-E Sys 80+ Std Design ML20094E9431992-02-11011 February 1992 LOCA Aspects of C-E Advanced LWR - Sys 80+ ML20106D7341990-01-15015 January 1990 Nuplex 80+ Advanced Control Complex Design Bases ML20096F4761989-12-31031 December 1989 Nuplex 80+ Rev 2 to Verification Analysis Rept ML20096F4611989-01-31031 January 1989 Sys 80+ Function & Task Analysis Final Rept 1997-01-31
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20210R2131997-05-31031 May 1997 Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Certification of the System 80+ Design.Docket No. 52-002.(Asea Brown Boveri-Combustion Engineering) ML20148A8211997-01-31031 January 1997 Abb System 80+ Design Control Document - Volume 1 ML20078Q4311995-02-28028 February 1995 Revs to Sys 80+ Design Control Document ML20080E2051995-01-0505 January 1995 Rev 2 to Technical Support Document for Amend to 10CFR51 Considering Severe Accidents Under NEPA for Plants of Sys 80+ Design ML20076F3301994-10-0707 October 1994 Rev 1 of Technical Support Document for Amends to 10CFR51 Considering Severe Accidents Under NEPA for Plants of Sys 80+ Design ML20069N4091994-06-20020 June 1994 System 80+ Certified Design Material ML20029E1991994-05-0606 May 1994 Technical Support Document for Amends to 10CFR51 Considering Severe Accidents Under NEPA for Plants of Sys 80+ Design. ML20062L8631993-12-31031 December 1993 Certified Design Matl ML20058E9971993-11-15015 November 1993 Amend T to C-E Std SAR - Design Certification. W/31 Oversize Figures ML20062J3551993-10-29029 October 1993 C-E Ssar - Design Certification,Amend S. W/15 Oversize Encls ML20058N1001993-09-23023 September 1993 Rev 2 to Design Alternatives for Sys 80+ Nuclear Power Plant ML20046B3621993-07-15015 July 1993 Session 3.7;Review of SG Tube Rupture Procedure at Borssele Nuclear Power Station. ML20045C4901993-06-30030 June 1993 Evaluation of Sys 80+ Std Design to Interfacing Sys LOCA Challenges, Special Rept ML20045D3421993-06-30030 June 1993 Rev 1 to Design Alternatives for Sys 80+ Nuclear Power Plant. ML20045C6351993-06-15015 June 1993 Amend P to Sys 80+ Cessar - Design Certification. ML20044G7061993-05-19019 May 1993 Common Mode Failure Evaluation for Limiting Fault Events. ML20059F4751993-03-29029 March 1993 Application of Advanced Full Scope Simulators to Severe Accident Precursor Training, Presented at 1993 Simulation Multiconference on 930329-0401 in Washington,Dc ML20044C0061993-03-17017 March 1993 ABB-C-E Sys 80+ Structural Analysis of Nuclear Island & Nuclear Annex Structures. ML20044B9411993-02-23023 February 1993 Rev 0 to Human Factors Evaluation & Allocation of Sys 80+ Functions. ML20012G3351993-02-16016 February 1993 Sys 80+ Advanced LWR PRA-Based Seismic Margin Evaluation. ML20127M4171993-01-15015 January 1993 Control Complex Info Sys Bases for Nuplex 80+ ML20126F6771992-12-0808 December 1992 Review of CE 80+ FMEA & D&Did Analysis, Technical Ltr Rept ML20126E6191992-10-30030 October 1992 Amend K to CESSAR - Design Certification. W/50 Oversize Encls ML20126J0521992-10-30030 October 1992 Amend K to C-E Std SAR - Design Certification ML20012G3361992-09-30030 September 1992 Draft Basis for Seismic Provisions of UCRL-15910. ML20114F5611992-09-30030 September 1992 Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth & Diversity in ABB-C-E Nuplex 80+ Advanced Control Complex for Sys 80+ Std Design ML20104A8551992-09-0202 September 1992 Sys 80+ Design Certification Fire Hazard Risk Assessment ML20104A8501992-09-0202 September 1992 Sys 80+ Design Certification PRA Flood Protection Assessment LD-92-095, Draft Sys 80+ Design Certification Piping Analysis Specification1992-08-31031 August 1992 Draft Sys 80+ Design Certification Piping Analysis Specification ML20101S7281992-07-31031 July 1992 Criteria for Design of Main Control Room & Other Operating Stations for Sys 80+ ML20099D8031992-07-31031 July 1992 Final Sys 80+ Shutdown Risk Evaluation Rept ML20099D8301992-07-25025 July 1992 Draft Sys 80+ Design Certification Distribution Sys Design Guide ML20101G5261992-06-15015 June 1992 Draft Sys 80+ Shutdown Risk Evaluation Rept ML20097A1251992-05-31031 May 1992 Human Factors Engineering Stds,Guidelines & Bases for Nuplex 80+ ML20096F7271992-05-0808 May 1992 Nuplex 80+ Human Factors Design Process Summary ML20095J2321992-04-30030 April 1992 Rev 0 to Design Alternatives for Sys 80+ Nuclear Power Plant ML20095L5041992-04-30030 April 1992 Draft Sys 80+ Shutdown Risk Evaluation Rept, Part 1 ML20095A9601992-04-15015 April 1992 Selection of Control Motion for ABB-C-E Sys 80+ Std Design ML20090K4851992-03-12012 March 1992 QA Program Topical Rept LD-92-031, Marked-up Copy of QA Program Topical Rept1992-03-12012 March 1992 Marked-up Copy of QA Program Topical Rept ML20094E9431992-02-11011 February 1992 LOCA Aspects of C-E Advanced LWR - Sys 80+ ML20079C9641991-06-13013 June 1991 Description of Nuclear QA Program ML20043H2201990-05-18018 May 1990 Seminar on Use of Unusual Event Repts for Improving Nuclear Power Plant Safety. ML20106D7341990-01-15015 January 1990 Nuplex 80+ Advanced Control Complex Design Bases ML20096F4761989-12-31031 December 1989 Nuplex 80+ Rev 2 to Verification Analysis Rept ML20247H0331989-03-30030 March 1989 Chapter 6, Esfs, to CESSAR Sys 80+ Std Design.W/One Oversize Encl ML20248C3921989-03-30030 March 1989 App 3.11B, Identification & Location of Mechanical & Electrical Safety-Related Sys Components, to CESSAR Sys 80+ Std Design ML20248C3801989-03-30030 March 1989 App 3.11A, Environ Qualification for Structures & Components, to CESSAR Sys 80+ Std Design ML20248B0021989-03-30030 March 1989 App 3A, Discussion of Finite Difference Analysis for Analysis of Pipe Whip, to CESSAR Sys 80+ Std Design ML20247G6661989-03-30030 March 1989 Chapter 1, Introduction & General Plant Description, to CESSAR Sys 80+ Std Design.W/One Oversize Encl 1997-05-31
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ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR POWER COMBUSTION ENGINEERING.1NC.
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ADVANCED LIGHT WATER REACTOR CERTIFICATION PROJECT SYSTEM 80I" DESIGN CERTIFICATION PRA FLOUD PROTECTION ASSESSMENT t
M
e i PRA FLOOD PROTECTION ASSESSMENT
- The System 80+" btandard Plant includes a number of design features which provide flood protection to safety-related structures, systems, and components. These flood protection measures are designed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.102, " Flood i Protection for Nuclear Power Plants."
The System 80+" design emphasizes the elimination and minimization of potential flood sources within safety-related areas as a means of flood protection. For example, s*ation service water and component cooling water heat exchangers are located outside the Nuclear Annex, Water-cooled components within the Nuclear Annex are cooled by Component Cooling Water with the exception of HVAC
- equipment which is cooled by chilled water syr e 's. These cooling water systems are closed systems !th a defi rolume of water.
Component Cooling Water, Emergency Feedwate sential Chilled
- water, etc. are fully separated by division . .h no-open cross connections, thus eliminating the possibility of a single pipe 4 break from flooding one division and the other division being lost due to loss of pressure boundary integrity. Condenser circulating water is also located outside of the Nuclear Annex. These features reduce in-plant cooling water to a limited volume which can be easily accommodated to limit the extent'of flooding.
i The System 80+" control complex is protected from flooding in that no water lines are routed above or through the control room or computer room. Water lines routed to HVAC air-handling units, etc., around the-control room are contained in rooms with curbs which prevent any potential water leakage from entering the control room or computer room.
Protection from external flooding-is provided by elevated building entrances. Secondary flooding sources located in the Turbine Building are confined to that building. Entrances from the Turbine Building ;' the Nuclear hnnex are sufficiently elevated to allow operator uction to isolate a break in the Condenser Circulating
' Water System before the water level from the Turbine Building flood reaches the Nuclear Annex entrance.
Lengths of high energy and moderate- energy piping have been minimized by equipment location. Equipment is located in quadrants around the spherical containment to minimize the lengths of piping runs. The subsphere_provides further close proximity of equipment to reduce piping runs from containment.
Flood barriers have been integrated into the design to provide further flood protection while minimizing the impact on maintenance accessibility. The primary means of flood control in the Nuclear Annex is provided by the structural wall which serves as a barrier-between redundant divisions of safe shutdown systems and Page 1 of 3
i components. At the lowest elevation, this structural wall contains no doors or passages, and the limited penetrations through the wall-are sealed. This design confines floodwater to one division up to elevation 70+0. Migration of- floodwater to the _other division would begin only after the water level in the flooded o vision reaches elevation-70+0. Preliminary determination of major flood volumes such as the Component Cooling Water and Emergency Feedwater-Systems show that the volume of water contained in one division of these systems would not rise above elevation 70+0 should a large uncontrollable break occur. Thuc, the other division is unaffected.
Each half of the subsphere is compartmentalized to separate
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redundant safe shutdown components to the extent practical, while maintaining accessibility requirements. The subsphere, which houses the front line safety systems is' compartmentalized into quadrants,.with two. quadrants on either side ot the - divisional structural wall. Flood barriers provide separation between the quadrants, _wnile maintaining equipment removal- capability.
Emergency Feedwater pumps are located in separate compartments-within the quadrants with each compartment protected by flood-
'd barriers also provide ~ separation between
~
barriers.
electrical equn. tent and_ fluid mechanical systems at the lowest elevation within the Nuclear Annex. Elevated equipment pads prevent equipment from being inundated-in the event of flooding.
Flood protection is also integrated into the floor drainage systems. The floor drainage systems are-separated by division and Safety Class 3, Seismic Category I valves prevent backflow of water to areas containing safe 2y-related . equipment . Each subsphere quadrant contains its own separate sump equipped - with : redundant safety Class 3, Seismic Category- I: sump - pumps and associated.
instrumentation. These pumps are _ also powered u 3 the diesel-generator in the event of loss- of offsite power._ The Nuclear- Annex also has -its own divisionally separated = floor drainage ' system, having no common drain lines between divisions. Floors are gently =
sloped to allow good drainage to ; the; divisional . sumps . Floor drains are routed to the lowest elevation to prevent flooding of the upper elevations. The lower elevation in each division has -
adequate volume t.o collect water from a break in any ' system withoutL
-flooding the other division. In addition, potential discharge'of fixed fire suppression systems and fire. hoses is_ considered'in-the
~
sizing of floor drains to preclude flooding of. areas should the fire protection systems be-initiated.
The Diesel Generator Building floor drain sump pumps and associated- -
instrumentation are-Safety Class 3, Seismic Category-I'to prevent flooding of the diesel generators. _These pumps are.also powered from the diesel generators to: accommodate-a loss'of offsite power.
Flood protection is also incorporated into.the Component _ Cooling-Page 2 of 3 l
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Water Heat. Exchanger Building and Station Service Water' Structure.
i These structures are divisionally' separated by walls such that'a
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- flood in one division cannot flood the other division.
! In addition to the -- above design features, the_Nuc' lear Annex-and l Reactor Building are designed to ' maintain a dry environment during-F all floodc by inccrporuting the following safeguards into their- ,
i construction:
i A. No exterior access openings will be lower than 9" above
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- plant grade elevation.
j B. The finished yard grade _ adjacent to the safety-related"
- structures will be maintained at least 9" below the_
l- ground floor elevation.
1 i C. Waterstops are used in all horizontal and vertical
- construction joints in all exterior walls up to flood 4 level elevation. -
- 4. .
t e D. Water seals are provided .for all penetrations in exterior.
walls up to flood level elevation.
l E. Waterproofing of walls subject to flooding is provided.
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