ML20247E047
| ML20247E047 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 07/21/1989 |
| From: | George Minor, Sholly S MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF, MHB TECHNICAL ASSOCIATES |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247E035 | List: |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8907260063 | |
| Download: ML20247E047 (124) | |
Text
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t,
.. t c UNITED STATES OF AMERICA j NUCLEAR REGULA'IDRY COMMISSION q ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD j 1
Before AdministrativeJudges: {
Ivan W. Smith, Chairman i Dr. Richard F. Cole {
Kenneth A. McCollom j i
I In the Matter of n
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF Docket Nos. 50-443-OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL Inv-Power Operation /50-444-OL 21 July 1989 (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2 JOINT AFFIDAVrr OF GREGORY C. MINOR AND STEVEN C. SHOLLY I, Gregory C. Minor, do make oath and say:
- 1. My name is Gregory C. Minor. I am a Vice President of MHB Technical Associates. My business address is 1723 Hamilton Avenue, Suite K, San lose, California 95125. I received a B.S. in Electrical Engineering from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1%0 and a M.S. in Electrical Engineering from Stanford University in 1966.
- 2. I have over twenty-five years of experience in the design, development, research, start-up testing, and management of nuclear reactor systems. From 1960-1976, I worked for General Electric Company in the design, development, and testing of safety and control systems for nuclear plants. As part of these activities, I was responsible for system check out and 8907260063 890721 PDR ADOCK 05000443l q PDR :
ATTACHMENT A JUL 21 '95 13: 47 408 265 7149 PAGE.002 l
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- 4 preparation 'of pre-operational test procedures for a nuclear research reactor, including the direction of craft personnel performing the necessary system modifications.' My responsibilities
- included equipment and systems design, as well as management of a large engineering group responsible for new control room design. These new designs required the detailed evaluation of the technical and ergonometric factors necessary to ensure that operations data presented:to operators would provide tbem with the {nformation necessary to make the proper decisions for-safe operation.
. 3. For the past thirteen years, I have been an independent technical consultant. In that s capacity, I have participated in a variety of studies addressing nuclear facility economic,- !
management, and safety issues for various organizations,. including the Department of '
Energy /Sandia National 14boratories, the Swedish Government, and the offices of several states'.
Attorneys General. I am currently a consultant on several nuclear plant cases in which design, management, and compliance with existing regulations are being investigated.
4 I am a member of the Nuclear Power Plant Standards Committee for the Instrument Society of America. Also, I participated in a Peer Review Group of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Three Mile Island Special Inquiry Group. Further details of my qualifications and professional experience are summarized in my Statement of Profenfonal Onalifications which is appended to this affidavit as Attachment 1.
i i
- I, Steven C. Sholly, to make oath and say
1
- 5. My name is Steven C. Sholly. Since September 1985, I have been employed as an Associate Consultant by MHB Technical Associates. My business address is 1723 Hamilton Avenue, Suite K, San Jose, California 95125.
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- 6. 'I have been previously employed by the Union of Concerned Scientists as a
'. Technical Research Associate and Risk Analyst from February 1981 to September 1985, and by the' Three Mile Island Public Interest Resource Center as Research Coordinator and Project Director from January 1980 to January 1981. I also have non-nuclear experience in the wastewater treatment and science education Helds from September 1975 to January 1980. I
. received a B.S. in Education, with a major in Earth and Space Science and a minor in i
Environmental Education, from Shippensburg State College (now Shippensburg University),
Shippensburg, Pennsylvania, in 1975.
- 7. For the last ninE and a half years, I have been engaged in analyzing. technical nuclear safety, management, design, construction, and regulatory issues and providing technical advice to state and local governments (including the States of California, New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Maine, Connecticut, and Massachusetts, and Suffolk County, New he) and independent organizations on these issues. I have presented testimony concerning these issues before the Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control on behalf of the Prosecutorial li Division and Division of Consumer Counsel, before the California Public Utility Commisdon on behalf of the Division of Ratepayer Advocates, before the Pennsylvania Public Utility Corrmission J on behalf. of the Office of Consumer Advocate, and before the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities on behalf of the Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
I have also participated as an expert witness in proceedings before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the Indian Point Special Investigation and the operating license resiew of the Catawba nuclear plant, and have presented testimony before the United States Congress on nuclear safety issues. I have previously served as principal investigator for monitoring startup testing and low power operations of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station for the New York Consumer Protection Board. Further details of my experience and qualifications are contained in my Statemem of Profeminn=1 Qualifications which is appended to this affidavit as Attachigent 2.
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l DISCUSSION
- 8. MHB Technical Associates has been retained by the Office of the Attorney
' General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, to assist in a review of the results of the low power testing program for Seabrook Station, Unit 1. Seabrook Unit 1 received a license from the NRC permitting the conduct of such tests on May 26,1989 (License No. NPF-67). V In issuing that license, the NRC staff found that the facility would operate in conformance with the application,
'as amended, the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, and the regulations of the Commission, and that there was reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by the operating license would
! be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations. 2/
1
- 9. The Commission's regulations require,in part, that the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), submitted as part of the operating license application, include the managerial and admirdstrative controts to be used to assure safe operation and the plans for preoperational testing l and initial operations. # The regulations specifically reference 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, as setting forth the requirements for managerial and administrative controls for. nuclear power plants. # Moreover, the Technical Specifications for Seabrook Unit 1 (App:ndix A to License No. NPF-67) require that lines of authority, responsibility, and communication shall be established and defined for the highest management levels through intermediate levels to and including all V Letter dated May 26,1989, from Steven A. Varga (Director, Lfvision of Reactor Projects to I/II, EdwardOffice of Nuclear A. Brown Reactor (President Regulation, and Chief Executive U.S. Nuclear Officer, Regulatory New Hampshire Yan Commission Division, Public Service Company of New Hampshire),
Subject:
" Issuance of Facility Opemting LJcense NPF Seabrook Station, Unit No.1".
2/ These findings are required to be made by 10 CFR 50.57(a)(1) and (2).
F 10 CFR 50.34(b)(6)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.34(b)(6)(iii).
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_ operating organization positions. 5/ Accordingly, as required by the Commission's regulations and by the Seabrook Station's Technical Specifications, the lines of authodty and responsibility and communication must be established and defined down to the level of individual reactor operators.'
9.
On June 22, 1989, with the reactor at r. approximately 3% of full power, plant operators were performing a natural circulation test (1-ST 22). The reactor coolant pumps were -
tripped at 12:19 p.m. to initiate the test. At 'approximately 12:26 p.m., steam dump valve MS-PV-3011 went full open. Pressurizer level, which had been slowly decreasing as expected, continued to decrease even though letdown was at a minimum (approximately 10 gpm) and charging pump flow was almost at maximum (approximately 122 gpm). This further decrease was due to cooling of the primary side by steam released through the stuck-open steam dump valve MS-PV-3011. At '
approximately 12:29 p.m., pressurizer level decreased below 17%, which according to the requirements of the test procedure 1-ST-22 required a manual trip of the reactor. f/
- 10. The reactor was not tripped, however, until 12:36 p.m., some seven minutes later when the Unit Shift Supervisor (SRO-licensed) ordered a manual trip in anticipation of exceeding a manual trip criterion of 2340 psig pressurizer pressure (the actual pressure was at 2310 psig and rising). 2/
5/ Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Technical snecihtlons: Saabrook station. Unit t Docket No. 5N41 Anoendnr "A" to leanne No. N T-67, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, N REG-G31, May 1989, Section 6.2.1.a.
6/ New Hampshire Yankee, EVENT EVALUATION REPORT: vanual Reactor Trio Dur na 1-s" n Naniral Circulation Test at 1-2, Enclosure 2 to NYM-89086, letter dated ~
12 .u y 1919 from Edward A. Brown (President and Chief Executive Officer, New Hampshire Yankee) to William T. Russell (Regional Administrator, NRC Region I).
2/ IhkL JOL 21 '89.13:50 405 EGE 7149 FAGE.006
- 11. New Hampshire Yankee concedes that the Unit Shift Superintendent "should lun'e !
immediately directed the mactorshut down when thepressuruerlevel reached the 17% test limit" g/
- 12. New Hampshire Yankee does not dispute that the manual trip criteria listed in 1-ST-22 were exceeded for several minutes before a manual trip was initiated. 2/ New Hampshire Yankee also does not dispute that the failure to initiate the manual trip as required by the Natural Circulation Test procedure (1 ST-22) is clearly a case of procedural noncompliance.10/11/
- 13. New Hampshire Yankee also concedes that the procedural noncompliance violated the Seabrook Station Administrative Controls, Policy, and Guidance with respect to procedural adherence.12/
- 14. Further, New Hampshire Yankee concedes that the Seabrook Station Operations Management Manual required that plant operation be conducted in accordance with applicable procedures.13/
8/ New Hampshire Yankee, Manavement Effectiveness Analysis Reoort: Natural Circulation Test. Manual Reactor Trio and 7 110wun 6 Actions. at 20, Enclosure 4 to NYN 89086, letter dated 12 July 1989 from Edward A. Brown (President and Chief Executive Officer, New Hampshire Yankee) to William T. Russell (Regional Administrator, NRC Region 1).
2/ M, at 4.
10/ New Hampshire Yankee, Operational hues evaluation of the Natural Circulation Test (1-ST-22) on June 22.1989. at 4 Enclosure 3 to NYN-89086, letter dated 12 July 1989 from Edward A. Brown (President and Chief Executive Officer, New Hampshire Yankee) to William T. Russell (Regional Administrator, NRC Region I). J 11/ It should be noted that the Seabrook FSAR commits operations personnel to procedural adherence. Sec, Seabrook FSAR, at 13.5-3.
j 12/ E. at 5-6.
13/ New ' Hampshire Yankee, Management Effectiveness Analysis Report: Natural Circulation Test. Mannal Reactor TH) and Followun Actions. at 7, Enclosure 4 to NYN-89086, letter dated 12 July 1989 from 3dward A. Brown (Presidem ed Chief Executive Officer, New Hampshire Yankee) to William T. Russell (Regional Administrator, NRC Region I).
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New Hampshire Yankee, however, fails to acknowledge that the 'proceduml noncompliance" (which it concedes occmTed) represents a violation of 10 CFR 50,
, Criterion V.14/ SpecifIcally, Criterion V, states, " Activities affecting quality s documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type Appropriate to the cirtwns be accomplished in accordance with these irutructions, procedures, orInstructioru, drawings.
procedures, or drawings shall include Appropriate quantitative or qualitative acce determining that important activities have been satisfactorily accomplished." T that the conduct of tests while a reactor is at power is an " activity affecting quality" meaning of Criterion V of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. (Indeed,in order to conduct such first required an operating license issued by the NRC, without which even bringing th critical would have violated the Atomic Energy Act.) There also can be no dispute t 1-ST-22 was the " procedure", within the meaning of Criterion V of 10 CFR 50, Appe governed the conduct of the Natural Circulation Test. Indeed, it should be noted that p 1 ST-22 was prepared by the Startup Test organization, and reviewed and approved b Operation Review Committee. M/ The procedure was also reviewed by the NRC 14/
2h 2.C of Ucense No, NPF-67), the licensee s failme toIn Commission's regulations (Paraga comply with 10 CFR 50, Appenc terms of the operatinglicense. ix 3, Criterion V, also means that the licensee violated the II/
The Station Operation Review Committee (SORC) functions to advise the Station Manager on all matters related to nuclear safet Manager Manager,, and includes Technical Supwrt Manager, membership as follows: y. The SORC is cha 4 Maintenance Department Supervisor, Supervisor, Health Physics Department Supervisor, Te Chemistry Department Supervisor.
procedures affecting nuclear safety, and all tests andThe SORC is specifically charge Sie, Office of Nuccar Reactor Regulation, Techni runents that affect nuclear safety. i t S*cificatinns: habrook Station. I Comnussion, NUREG-1331, May 1989, Section 6.4.1.I nit 1. Dnch N 7-i 1
JUL 21 'E9 13:52 !
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' Westinghouse, the Seabrook NSSS vendor. M/ In addition, the procedure was reviewed by New Hampshire Yankee Quality Assurance.17/
16.
There is also no dispute, therefore, that compliance with the provisions of that procedure, including manual trip criteria, was mandatory. Indeed, prior to the test, the operating crew read the entire test procedure, and the Test Director briefed these personnel and made individual copies of the manual reactor trip criteria for these personnel. Accordingly, inasmuch as an activity affecting quality was not performed in accordance with the governing procedure, this constitutes a violation of Criterion V of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.
- 17. Moreover,10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion II, provides that the quality assurance program "shall provide for indoctrination and training of persormel performing activities affecting quality as necessary to assure that suitableproficiency is achieved and maintained".18} It is bcyond dispute that being an operator at the controls of a nuclear power reactor is an "activly affecting quality" within the meaning of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Accordingly, indoctrination and training oflicensed operators of the requirements of the NRCis required.
- 18. New Hampshire Yankee states that under normal conditions operators function in a i crew consisting of three members. During the conduct of the Natural Circulation Test, there were five crew members. New Hampshire Yankee claims that the additional two members in the shift M/ - New Hampshire Yankee, Manwement Effectiveness Analvsis Renort: Natural Circulation Test Manual Reactor Trio ane Totowuo Actions. at 3, Enclosure 4 to NYN-89086, letter !
dated 12 July 1989 from Ecward A. Brown (President and Chief Executive Officer, New l l
Hampshire Yankee) to William T. Russell (Regional Administrator, NRC Region I).
If} Id., at 8.
18/ 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion II, "QuahryAssurance Program".
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crew made the reporting relationships, lines of authority, and communications more compier".12) 29/ This is misleading. Ah *ive members of the shift crew at the time of the Natural Circulation Test had the authority to order the reactor to be tripped or the authority to manually trip the reactor (all were licensed operators, and at least the Unit Shift Superintendent was SRO-licensed). Whatever " complications" might have been introduced by the addition of two members to the normal shift crew of three members, none of these complications change the fact that gash of the shift crew members possessed the authority to promptly terminate the test by either ordering the manual trip of the reactor or by rianuaP.y tripping the reactor hirr.self once the test conditions were exceeded, and, indeed, the terms of the test procedure (1-ST-22) required that the reactor be manually tripped when the test conditions were exceeded.11/
- 19. Nonetheless, the shift crew permitted power operation to continue for approximately seven minutes until a second test condition was nearly exceeded before manually tripping the reactor. Indeed, the Unit Shift Supervisor was cognizant of the requirements of procedure 1-ST-22, and was cognizant of the pressurizer level throughout the test, even to the point of conferring several times with the primary side control board operator and informing the lff New Hampshire Yankee, Ooen tional Issues evaluntion of the Natural arculation Test (1-ST-22) on June 22.1989. af 3, ?nclosure 3 to NYN 89086, letter dated 12 July 1989 from Edward A. Brown (President and Chief Executive Officer, New Hampshire Yankee) to William T. Russell (Regional Administrator, NRC Region I).
29/ Note that the Seabrook Unit 1 Technical Specifications ,(Appendix A to License No. NPF.
- 67) require that the minimum shift crew composition whde m Mode 1,2,3, or 4 consist of a total of fgu licensed oxrators (two SROs and two ROs), and not Ihrge as asserted by NHY. Sgc, Office of Nuclear Reactor Replation, Technical Soec fientions: Seabrook Stndnn. Unit 1. Docket No. 50-443. Anoennx "A" to I kenne No. N?F-67. U.S. Nuclear
~
Regulatory Commission, NUREG-1331, May 1989, Section 6.2.2.a and Table 6.21. Power operation at less than or equal to 5% of rated thermal power is Mode 2. hL, at Table 1.2.
the Seabrook FSAR reflects a four-member shift crew (Shift Superintendent, Similarly,ft Unit Shi Supervisor, a Supervisory Control Room Operator, and a Operator). Sec, Seabrook FSAR, at 13.1-10.
21/ New Hampshire Yankee, Manas >ement Effectiveness Analysis Reoort: Natural Circulation Test. Manual Reactor Tri) and Followuo Actions. at 2, Enclosure 4 to NYN-89086, letter Hampshire Yankee) to William T. Russell (R(egional Administrator, NR 9
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Test Director that the pressurizer level was approaching and later was below 17% Morei i
three separate noti 5 cations were made to New Hampshire Yankee personnel t by NRC arso!
who were present in the control room at the time of the test that the 17% pressurizer level manual trip criterion had been exceeded. NRC pc.rsonnel informed the Startup Manager, the Test
. Director (who informed the Unit Shift Supervisor, who acknowledged this infonnation), and t
' Assistant Operations Manager of this fact. W The Assistant Operations Manager confirmed t
{
test trip criteria with the Test Director and con 6rmed that the pressurizer level status had been -
conveyed to the Unit Shift Supervisor. Thus, despite a number of management and operations
. personnel knowing of the low pressurizer level condition, none of them acted to shut down or recommend shut down of the reactor. As the Assistant Operations Manager was fully assessin
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plant status to determine whether to personally intercede with the Unit Shift Supervisor with regard to actions being taken, the Unit Shift Supervisor (responding to another situation, na pressurizer pressure increase) directed the second of the two primary side board operators to mann11y trip the reactor. 22/ Clearly, the simultautam failure of five licensed operators to i con 2 ply with the explicit written requirements of a procedure governing power operations in which
- they were engaged is a serious matter, and one which is not easily explained by a lapse in 1
judgment. Moreover, none of the other licensed personnel and managers who were present, L apparently not "at the controls", acted to recommend shut down. 2d/
23/ Note that the Seabrook Unit 1 Technical Specifications (Appendix A to IJcense No. NPF-
- 67) require that the Assistant Operations M er shall bold a senior reactor operator license. 2:, Office of Nuclear Reactor Re 'on, Technien1 Smci6catiane: Seabrook Station. L n t t Dociet No. 5 %443 Annend Regulatory Commission, NUR3G-133i, May 1989, Section 6.2.2.f."A" to License No i
23/ New Hampshire Yankee, Manneement Mectiveness Annivsis Renort: Natural Cirentation W at Manimi haetor Trb md Fnlinwun Actions. at 4, Enclosure 4 to NYN 89086, letter l
L c!ated 12 Juy 1989 from & ward A. Brown (President and Chief Executive Officer, New Hampshire T ankee) to William T. Russell (Regional Administ;ator, NRC Region I). .
23/ According to NHY, there were 6 management personnel,15 operators on shift I l
(presuma>ly including the five operators at the controls l observing as part of their traming. Also present o in the c),ntrol roorn at the time ;
t incident were 8 test 7ersonne 4 training department personnel,3 people from QA/QC, representative from LSEG, an one representative from SAT. Sag, hL, at 5.
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20.
In addition, New Hampshire Yankee concedes that the Startup Test Director should have 'strongly and immediately recom.nended shutting the reactor down, in a clearprecise manner" to the Unit Shift Supervisor when the test trip criteda were reached, but that the Startup Test Director failed to do so. New Hampshire Yankee also concedes that the Startup Manager and the Test Director should have been *immediately responsive to the information provided by the NRC inspector".15/
- 21. New Hampshire Tankee states that, "The Operations personnel believed that the Startup Test Procedures, by their nature, were inherently flerible und did not require verbatim compliance." 26/ This is incorrect and misleading, since these procedures were being used to control operation of a power reactor, and were approved and issued for use for that purpose in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Cdterion V of whichI ggitos compliance with written procedures governing activities affecting quality.
- 22. Accordingly, based on the above, it is our conclusion that a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, occurred in that licensed operators at the controls of Seabrook Unit 1 on June 22,1989, failed to manually trip the reactor when the procedure 1-ST-22 manual trip criterion of 17% pressurizer level was reached. Moreover, it is apparent that the training program was not effective in this instance. Therefore, some improvement in the training program is essential if similar violations are to be prevented in the future.
- 23. New Hampshire Yenkee states, "At no time during the transient were any technical specipcation parameters or design limits exceeded nor was there any danger to public health and 25/ 11, et 6.
2ft/ li, at 10.
JUL 21 '53 13:54 408 255 7149 FAGE.012
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- safety, to the safety ofplantpersonnelor toplant equipment." lif Even ii this is technically correct,
. it is irrelevant to the violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B described above. There is a stro safety assurance aspect to the Commission's quality assurance regulations, and these regulatio cannot be waived by licensee personnel at their convenience in favor of a les6 limiting set of criteria. Fallste to follow procedures carries with it significant safety implications which cannot be
. Ignored.
24.
Moreover, it should be noted that the procedural noncompliance which occurred during the Natural Circulation Test ou 22 June 1989 may not be an isolated event. There is at i a
least some evidence of other possibly related procedural noncompliance problems. Inspection {
Report 89-3 (2/28/89-4/24/89) states: 38/ i
- Four incidents h&i. ted a potential reduction in addition to detailin the conduct of mutineplant Two involvedfailures to propety position and lock a valve to preventpot boron dilution ef the reactor coolant system. Another concemed the genemnon the trip se of a reactor trip signal when steam genemtor levels were allowed to drop to pressurize!poire. t.ile in rpo jopemted wetvalvede retiri layur Afourth event involved the inadvertent opening of a I&C testing. While none of these incsdents had s&nficant safety impact, they may
- ate apotential weanness in what has been to date, an excellest opening record.
25.
More recently, in a memorandum to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor i Regulation, the NRC Regional Administrator (Mr. Russell) stated: 31/
I i
32/
New Hampshire Yankee letter NYN-89086, dated 12 July 1989, from Edward A. Brown i (President and Chief Executive Officer, New Hampshire Yankee) to William T. Russel' (Regional Administrator, NRC Region I), at 1.
38/ NRC Inspection Report 50-443 dilutionincident described above/89-3, Inspection Report Summary, at 2.The boron '
was the subject of a Notice of Violation (89-03-02),
32/
Station, Unit 1 Low PowerLtcense Recommendation, Supple
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1 Recently, sevemi minor events andproblems have occwred at the site which raise NRC concem over the attention to detail in operations displayed by theplant staff The most l significant of,th locked valves. While none of the mdividual associated m safery, taken together they indicated apossible declining trend in facilityperformance.
26.
Based on the above circumstances, we conclude that the procedural noncompilance i of 22 June 1989 is not an isolated event, but is rather part of a pattern of procedural i
{
s noncompliance at the Seabrook Station. Moreover, the 22 June 1989 event is much more serious- j i
since it represents a pervasive noncompliance, involving the entire shift crew on duty at the time j of the incident.
1 Signed under the pains and penalties of perjury this 21st day of July 1989. '
Gregory C/Mmo/
W j
AC l$
Steven C. Sbolly
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i ATTACHMENT 1-Statement of Professional Qualifications Gregory C Minor h
- PanPmtONAL QUAUPicATIONS OF C EGORY C. MINOR e
GREGORY C.heNOR MMB Toshalost Ammaaimea, 1723 Hamilton Agene Seite K San Jose, California 95125 (408) 266 2716 ExFEUENCE-1976 to PRESENT vien.= "' MHn Tod :- t A ~:-e nn In*, c z t ,da 87-T -f aand energy consultant to state, federal, and private organizations and individuals.
. Major activities indade studies of safety and risk involved la caergy generation, providag technical eonsulting to logialative, regulatory, public and private groups and expert witness in behalf of state organizations and citanus' group Was oo. editor of a critique of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH 1dOO) for the Union of Concerned teiaarlera and co author of a risk analysis of Swedish reactors for the Swedish Energy e = Served on the Peer Review Group of the NRC/TMI Special laquiry Group (Rogovin r==h=). Acthcly latched in .
the Nuclear Power Plant Standards C--Wee merk for the lastrument Socety of America OSA).
1972 19 % -
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=*==*=-I. .a Fr='n =-ina G*aaral Fl=Me P -- ---- .. I N m A -- srsa ar c ' ' * = c . ina , r * _ ,;, ~ ~~
A Managed a design and developanent group of thirty four engineers and support persomaci designing systems for noe in the measurement, control and operation of nacisar reactors.
lavohed e coordination with other reactor design organizations, the Nuclear Regulatory
- '=, and costomers, both overseas and domestic. R=p-MI: lies included coordinating and managing and design and dowlopment of control systems, safety systems, and new control concepts for use on the mest generation of reactors. The position included E ;-- " "Py for standards applicable to control and lastrumentation, as we!! as the design of
' short-term solutions to Sold problems. He di Aana~ involwd included electrical and me-chanical ear'mering, seismic design and process computer control /programsung, and i equipment :calil"=carian 1970 - 1972 Maa- Pa=>'or control Svntame Denien Ocncral Efertric Comnany. Nurfene Enerev Divialaa ha Jaar California Managed a group of seven engineers and two support personnelin the design and preparation of the detailed system drawings and control documents relating to safety and emergency systems for nuclear reactors. Responsibility required coordination with other design i
i JUL 21 '99 14: 01 408 256 7149 eAGE.002
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a organisticas and interadion with the customer's engineerug perseasel, as well as regulatory personnel. J 4
1963 1970 eCw a - . n. _a sr_-_-- , c,_ _- - - : w . - - - w - _. n;-/ - a-- Jan.IaNsunia n pa md, for the design of speci6c coattel and instr ==aavath systems for nuclear reestors, w dosip i - ' 'm
- y for various sobeystems of lastrumentation used to measure asueron Sus in the reactor during startup and intermediate power operation. !
' Performed lead system design fumaica in the design of a maior system for measuring the. I power pseersted in nuclear reactors. Other r=pa==lhHirias included on-site checkout and tessag of a complete reactor control rystem at an experimental reactor is the Southwest.
. Received patent for Nuclear Pcmer Monitorlag System. ' i 1960 - 1963 3m a,__.---._- p c _ -g psa c_,,, 3 s _-- _ _.- ;, ugo,,
California. and Annona Rotating assignments in a variety of dWi==
Engineer, reactor maintenance and lastrument design, KE and D reaaors, Hanford, 1
W- "p, circuit design and equiposent mala *e==an coord==*h Design engineer, Microwave Departacat, Palo Alto, California. Work on design of cavity coupiers for Microwave Traveling Wave Tubes (T%T). J l -
Design engineer, Camputer E ,1-'-', Phoenix, Anzona. Design of core driving circaitry.
i Design aegineer, Atomic Power Equipment Department, San Jose, California. l Circuit desgn and analysis.
Design omgineer, Space Systems Department, Santa Barbara, California. Prepared i
costrof portion of satellite proposal,
- t Technien! Staff - Technical Military Planning Operation. (TEMPO), Santa Barbara, -
California. Picpare analyses of enlaalla exchanges.
During this period, completed three year General Electric program of extensive education in advanced engiacering principles of higher mathematics, probability and analysis. Also l
completed courses in Kepner Trogoe, Effective Preser.tation, Management Training Program, '
and various technicalsem' mars.
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, EDUCATION Uniwesity of California at Berkeley, BSEE,1960. :
Advanced Course in Na~ing three-year curriculum, General Electric Company,1963.
Stanford Univerniry, MSEE,1966.
HONOR $ AND ASSOCIATIONS Tau Beta Pi'T- - W Honorary Society Co-holder of U.S. Patent No. 3,565 *160," Nuclear Reactor Power Monitoring System,'
February,1971.
Member: American Assnelatian for the Advancement of Science.
Member: Nuclear Power Plant Standards Committee, Instrument Society of America.
l PUBLICATIONS AND TESTIMONY
\
- 1. G. C. Minor, S. E. Moore, ' Control Rod Sigcal Multiplexing,' IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, Vol NS 19, February 1972.
- 2. t G. C. Minor, W. G. Mdam, "An Integrated Control Room System for a Nuclear Pour Plant,"
- NEDO-10658, prama=r I at International Nuclear Industri.s Fair and Techmeal Meetags, October,1972, Basie, Swimerland.
- 3. The above article was also published in the German Technical Magazine, N'I', March,1973.
4 Testimony of G. C. Minor, D. G. Bridenbaugh, and R. B. Hubbard before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearing held February 18,1976, and published by the Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, Manschusetts.
- 5. Testimony of G. C. Minor, D. G. Bridenbaugh, and R. B. Hubbard before the California Stat:
Assembly Committee on Resotu4 Land Use, and Energy, March 8,1976.
- 6. Testimony of G. C. Minor and R. B. Hubbard before the Caillornia State Senate Con:mittee on Public Utilities, Transit, and Er,ergy, March 23,1976.
- 7. Testimony of G. C. Minor regarding the Grafenrheinfeld Nuclear Plant, March 16 17, 1977, Wurzbuerg, Germany.
- 8. Testimony of G. C. Minor before the Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry, Regina, Saskatchewan, Canada, September 21,1977.
i 3
JUL 21 '89 14: 02 408 ZEE ?!49 PAGE.004
9.
The al-L- of M- '--- Pe-r Ba*aeasr A Rnkw of the NRO Raamar a'^ . Atudy WASH-1400 fNUREG 75/0141 H. Kandall, et al, edited by G. C. Minor and R. B. Hubbard for the Union of Concerned Scientista, August,1977.
10.
~a-_e', t. .a - =_;=3a u t.k A - ^
~^ MHB Taehaical Mas, January,12. (Pubbshed by Swedish Departiment ofIndustry as Docament Dst im:1) 11.
Testisaaey by G. C. Minor before the Wiaranaia Public Service Commission, February 13,1978, 1 m of rw- 1.- ==
TL-l "ran:Y v ==A r.--- --- _-
12.
Testimoey. by G. C. Minor before the Cahfornia Legistenere Assembly cn==ltre+ om Resourc@nd Use, and Energy, AB 3108, April 26,1978, Sacramento, California. {
4
- 13. i Frama=*M an by G. C. Minor before the Federal . Ministry for Research and Technology (BMPT), Meeting on Reactor Safety Research, u..w.,hu. fara fmer in Neta- Rama'a+t.
August 22, and September 1,1978, Bonn, Germany.
14.
Testimony of G. C. Minor, D. G. Bridenbaugh, and R. B. Hubbard, before the Atomic Safety and IJconsing Board, Sap *-=h - 25, 1978, in the matter of Black Faz Nuclear Power Station Construmlen Permit Hearings, Tulaa, Oldaboma.
- 15. Testimony of G. C. Minor, ASUI Hearings Related to TMI 2 Accident, Rancho Seco Power Plant, or. behalf of Friends of the Earth, September 13,197).
M. Thy of G. C. Minor before the Michigan State legidature, Special Joint Ca a-i=== on Nuclear Energy,1==L=*la=* of Three uit. 1,1==A A r * '==^ for Nnel*** Pew Pta=+= la MirJkaa, Odober 15,1979.
- 17. A Cr4*1+=8 View of P -ar'ae hr**v by G. C. Minor, paper prescated to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Symposium on Nuclear Reactor Safety, January 7, 1980, San Frandsco, California.'
is, m Nm,.. ara.:. on breev of Na,1... Pc P'- ^ paper presented at Forum on Swedssh Nuclear Referenduet, Staeb_kal= Sweden, March 1,1980.
- 19. V *= N-^'= Pla s. r==w F=1 ta==.Studv. MHB Technical Asociates, September 1960, prepared for the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, Roseville, MN.
- 20. Testimony of G. C. Minor and D. G. Bridenbaugh before the New York State Public Service Co==iamina, Rharaha- Norf =e Plaar Panzernerin m. *= EL in the matter of Long Island l ighting Company Temporary Rate Case, case # 27T/4 September 22,1980.
- 21. Direct testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. Minor before the New York State Public Service Commission, Y=L N==ia--'s Power comoratiaa Review of Shor ham Nuela=,
power cemenna t n . = A Sch.Anla in the matter of Long Island Lightin; Cornpany Temy tary Rate Case, Case Number 27774, September 29,1980.
22.
Svera== Interactiaa and Sinnie Failure criterion. MHB Technical Associates, January,1981, prepared for and available from the Swedish Nuclear Power inspectorate, Stockholm, Sweden.
1 1
JUL 21 *89 14: 02 408 266 7119 PAGE.005
.3
,- 23.
Testimony Utilities, WofCreek G. C. 19a0 Minorn='"
and D. G. Bridenbaugh before the New Jersey Board of Pubbe .}
- c== :=. = a= -
in the matter of the Petition of
{
j Jersey C.=r.1 Power and Light Company for approval of an increase in the rates for electrical servios and adjuatment clause and factor for such nervice, OAL Docket No. PUC 3518 80,l DocketNon 304-285,807-4s8, February 19,198L )
)
24.
Testiacey of G. C. Minor and D. G. Br6deabaugh on PORV's -" P-7 Diablo Canyon operating uccese hearing before ASLB, la the saatter of Paci6e Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unks 1 and 2), Docket Nos. 50 275 OL,50- )
3D OL, January 11,1982. J 1
- 25. Testimony of G. C. Manor and R.~ B. Hubbard on 8'--- ===_= P - --
Diablo Canyon Operating License hearing before ASLJt, Docket Nos. 50 275-OL,50 32M)L, Janu 11,1982.
- 26. se -- T-e-asa- A e' "- F 4
"=e Crha- Ph== ff n =-i MHB Technical Associates, Fds.-i 1982, St a!--A Sweden,prepared for and available from the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspedorate, i
- 27. i Tastissomy of G. C. Minor, R. B. Hubberd, M. W. Goldsmith, S. J. Harwood on behalf of
{
SuBolk County, before the Atonnic Safety and Ucensing Board, in the matter of Long Island Ughting ei *e=+.=Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, ae- - = _-L.c.=
regarding Contention 7B, Seleu { !
'Jocket No. 50-322-OL, April 13,1982.
28.
Testianomy of G. C. Minor and D. G. Bridenbaugh on behalf of Suffolk County, before the Atoatic Safety and ucensing Board, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company, $boreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, regarding M-" " c= w c===^:an IL P- i ?M - '=1 Vahat Fallarm. Docket no. 50-322 0L, April 13,1982, 29 Thy of G. C. Minor and R. B. Hubbard on behalf of Suffolk Couary, before the Atossic Safety and i te== sing Board, in the matter of inng Island Ughting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, regarding e am e -r# c==t_2s-. 27 -s Soc ec= =2:a= 1 Paar.
Accident Manitoring. Docket No. 50 322 01, May 25,1982.
30.
Teethnomy of G. C. Minor and D. G. Bridenbaugh on behalf of Suffolk County, bedore the Atonde Safety and ucensing Board, la the matter c *1ong Island Ughtas Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, regarding t= Nark znontv ce--daa 22. SRV Test Pm--.
Docket No.50 322 OL, May 25,1982.
31.
Testimony of G. C. Minor and D. G. Bridenbaugh on behalf of Suffolk County, before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham i
Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, regarding B A-daa af SRV M " ---- Docket No. 50-322-OL, June 14,1982.
32.
Toothnany of G. C. Minor on behalf of Suffolk County, before the Atomic Safr.y and Ucensing 4 Board, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, regarding Enviraamaa* 1 On=1&ation, Docket No. 50-322 OL, January 18,1983.
33.
Testimony of G. C. Minor and D. G. Bridenbaugh before the Pennsylvania Public Utility I j
Commission, on behalf of the Office of Consumer Advocate, Ruardina the Coar of
{
5 JUL 21 '85 14: 03 408 2EE 7149 PAGE.005
L j l n I c__ - m.--
rhe s'-- ^ --- - E - - pla, erie m=d== (
Unir L Re: Pennsylvania Power and '
Light, Docket No. R422189, March 18,1983.
- 34. * ,,'- '
testimony of G. C. Minor, R. B. Hubbard, and M. W. Goldsmith on behalf of I
Suffek Commty, before the Atomic Safety and ucensing Board, in the matter of IAeg Island
{
i c Ughting a- Conspany, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, regarding 6
-- - t - j e' .= frw,- :b 7BL Docket No.50 322, March 23,1933,
- 35. Verbal testimony before the District Court Judge in the case of Sierra' Club et. al vs. DOE {
regarding the Clean-up of Uranium Mill Tailings. June 20,1983.
&^ '-
- 36. -= '
"**'-F"' . h'=* 7 - - 1 C- -t MHB Taehatral Aaaariata, June,1983, prepared for and available frena. the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, stockholm, Sweden.
- 37. " - E. '- laa fa _ . ***== n = t - J r-hi 1 E ' "n= MHB Technical
.""- June,1983, prepared for and available from the Swedish Nuclear Power fg 2 - is, Stockhohn, Sweden.
38.
Testimony of G. C. Minor, F. C. Pinlayson, and E. P. Radford before the Atomic Safety and Ucessing Board, in the Matter of I.ong Island Ughting Compnay, Shoreham Nuclear Power Statlam, Unit 1, regarding F- = - =m P'- " E =d- T- -=A E =" fr~-6== 61 21 D and 23 ML Docket No. 50 322-01,3, Novensber 18,1983.
- 39. Teethnomy of G. C. Minor, Slaswell 'B' Power Stadoa Public Inquiry, Prpof of Evidamee Ramardiep Safarv Issues. Daaamhar,1983.
- 40. Tase3=any of D. G. Brideabaugh, L. M. Danieleos, R. B. Hubbard and G. C. Minor before the State of New York Public Service &- '='-m PSC Case No. 27563, in the matte- of Ieng Island Ughting Conspany Proceeding to Inw='t-* the r=* of the th=A- N= 1-=-
Generating Faclhty -- Phase IL on behalf of County of Suffolk, February 10,1984
- 41. - Testimony of Fred C. Finlayson, Orspory C. Minor and Edward P. Radford before the Atomic
'daEsty and 1 naansing Board, in the Matter of Long Island ughting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, on behalf of Suffolk County Regarding E- _
m PI--la Rh-!='
(CentaatimLnD, Docket No. 50 322 OL, March 21,1984.
42.
Testimony of G. Dennis Eley, C. John Smith, Gregory C. Minor and Dale G. Brideabaugh before the Atomic Safety and f i===ing Board, in the matter of Long Island Lighting company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, regardaag mn Dia=*i Caa -ana a -d 20 MW Gas
.[lghing, Docket No. 50-322-OL, March 21,1984.
- 43. Revised Taatimany of Gregory C. Minor before the Atomic Safety and Ll****1a* Board, in the matter ofleng Island Lighting Company, $boreham Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, on behalf of Suffolk County regarding F=- maaev Pimaniae - F . - . and R - w (cantraslana 85 =ad 88L Docket No. 50 322 01, July 30,1984.
44 Testimony of Dr. Christian Meyer, Dr. Jose Roesset, and Gregory C. Minor before the Atomic Safety and Ucensing Board, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, on behalf of Suffolk County, regarding Low Power Hearia= Rai =le rh.httittee of AC Power Sourcel Docket No. 50-322 OL, July 1984.
6-I JUL 21 '89 14: 04 408 265 7149 FAGE.007 i
45.
Surrebutta' Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh, Lynn M. Dardelson, Richard B. Hubbard, and Oregory C. Minor, Before the New York State Public service Connaission, FSC Case No.
27563, Shoreham Nuclear Station, long Island IJghting Compsay, on behalf of Suffolk County and New York State Consumer Protection Board, regardlag lawart-adam af the rw of the e_m .
._c_____.. . pg.,v OctM,1964.
46, Direct Tanelmany of Dale O. P,d-i+' - f . Lynn M. Danielson and Gregory C. Minor on behalf of Maanwhn*+ts Attorney Geacral, DPU 84-145, before the Massachusetts Department of Public Utihties, rosarding Pr=A.=~ _of P-d4=es by Pierwan Gas - > ri~<eie f w tha--v for C--k-rd Unit i Nc.-a 23,1964,84 pgs.
- 47. Direct Testhnomy of Dale G. Bridenbaugh, Lyna M. Danielson and Gregory C. Minor oc behalf of Maine Public Utilities Commisalan Staff regarding Prad-- of Cante of e=8- -A Unit 1 Docket No. 84113, December 21,1984.
48.
Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. Minor on behalf of Suffolk Cotuy regarding % *k R= ara-~v D:a=>i C - tae Ie A- Decket No. 50-322-OL, January 25, 1985.
- 49. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbengh, Lynn M. Daakl==. and Gregory C. Minor on behalf of the Vermont Department of Public Service, PSB Docket No. 5030, regarding Prudence of r,=6.nl Vermane Puh16 Service CA - duma rMa for 4 *--.h 2. November 11,1985.
- 50. Surrebuttal testimony of Oregory C. Minor on behalf of the Vermont Department of Public Service, PSB Docket No. 5030, Prnd-~- of c a+ al Vermaar Pnhlir serAc C_ti- rsera for hh 1 December 13,1985.
- 51. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh, Oregory C. Minor, Lynn K. Price, and Steven C.
Sholly on behalf of State of Connemicut Department of Public Utility Control Pw4urial Division and Division of Consumer Counsel regarding the Prd>=aa of 5' = ad h ms on Misistone Unh 3. Docket No. 83 07-03, February 18,1986. )
52, Direct Teatimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. M'm or on behalf of Massachusetts Attorney General regarding the Prada=~ of FwadNres by New Kn*Imad Pem., Co. for
)
Seabrook Unk 2. Docket Nos. ER 85-646 000, ER 85 647 000, February 21,1986.
- 53. Direct Testimony of Oregory C. Mmor on behalf of the Prosecutorial Division of CDFUC regarding M 2P coa.,rnaiaa Prwt-=~ for Milla'= Unit 3. Docket No. ER 85 720 001 March 19,1986. i I
i
- 54. Direct Testimony of Dalc G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. Minor on behalf of Massachusetts Attorney General regarding WMEco Canar r nalnn Pradaae> for Mihane Unit i Docket No.
85 270, March 19,1986.
- 55. Direct Testhnomy of Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. Minor on behalf of Massachusetts Attorney General regarding WMEco's Onmmercint Oneratina Dates and Deferred Canital Additiane on Miustone Unit 1 Docket No. 85 270, March 19,1986.
1 i
1 7
I l
1 JUL 21 *E3 14: 05 408 166 -'149 FAGE.008 ;
n; .
. 56. , Rebuttal Teethnomy of Dale G.LW=' -- 7 and Gregory C. Minor on behalf of Ma==achaserra .
Attorney General regarding ad = 8 n h 8"--J Paner e-- -- /s " _._ 1 pm -
i
)
Nos. ER45446 001, ER45447 001, April 2,1986.
- 57. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbeugh and Gregory C. Minor on behalf of state of Maine .
~ Staff of Public Utilities Comamisaica regardlag Construmian Pradanqm af Millatame Una 3. in ,
the saatser of Maine Power Company Proposed Increase la Rates, Docket No. 85 212, April 21, - '
1996.
- 58. Innlications of the thenahvl4 arm = for Nurl== F --- -- , v P' ' - for the trase of New XogL prepared for the State of New York raasn=er Protection Board, by MHB Terhalent i Aaaae:a**=, June 1986.
- 59. Direct Testianomy of Dale G. Bridenbeugh and Gregory C. Minor on behalf of the Vermont Department of Public Service, regarding Pr=nta- of ca=** tw cameral vera ,=t Pukite L-1.=
Corporation far Millstana 1 Docket No. 5132, August 25,1986.
- 60. Surrebettal Testimony of Gregory C Minor in the matter of Jersey Central Poner and Light Company, regarding TMI Rastart anal Performance Incenthus. (Oral testimony), OAL Docket No. PUC 793945, BPU Docket No. ER851116, September 11,1986.
- 61. Surrebuttal Testimony of Gregory C Minor on behalf of State of Vermont Department of Public Service,regardis6CVPS/NU r - :--:b Prud*= r= 8-a-Jt o Mn=t- Unk 1 Docket No. 5132, November 6,1986.
- 62. Direct Testimony of Gregory C. Minor and Lyna K. Price on behalf of State of Vermont Department of Public Service, regarding Prudence of Ernendmurca fo Seabrook 1. Docket No.
5132, December 31,1986.
- 63. Direct Testimony of Gregory C Mmor on behalf of Suffolk County, t.efore the Atomic Safety and Oceasing Board, concerning tha '- . Pen *=arise Amelam p==--Minna (Pantmeek E20),in the matter ofleeg Island ughting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Stmelan, Unit 1, Dochet No. 50-322 0L 5, February 27,1987.
- 64. Direct Testimony of Gregory C Minor et. al. on behalf of the State of New York and Suffolk County, before the Atomic Safety and Ucensing Board, regarding The Scope of the Emergency Pra, p.,eine (en. a to., my 15 a.a la. in the matter oflang Island Ughting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. Unit 1. Docket No. 50 322 01 5, April 6,1987.
- 65. Direct Testimony of Gregory C. Minor regarding P=em Pla-8== Rae arina centera -
Monitoring and Decontamination. Shoreham Docket 50 322-01 3 (Emergency Plannag), April 13,1967.
- 66. Testiscey of Gregory C. Minor, Steven C. Sbolly et. al. on behalf of Suffolk County, regarding s
in roi u.-etna c#aters . Pl==ata ** 1- before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in the matter of Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, Docket No. 50 322 OL 3, April 13,1987.
- 67. Rebuttal Testimony of Gregory C Minor and Steven C Sholly on behalf of Suffolk County regarding ulrO's Reception centres (Rebuttal to Te.atimony of 12wis G. Hnimant in the 8-1 l
JUL 21.'89 14: 05 408 266 7149 PAGE.009
matter of imag Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unk 1, Docket No.
SD 32ML3, May 27,1987,
- 68. Dired Testu' nomy of Dale G. Bridenbaugh and Gregory C. Minor on behalf of Massachusetts Asterasy cc --
General, before the Federal Emergy Regulatory n- ' ' . regarding Canal Elmarie
- 7. ' m.w to e _*_ ._1 unk 2 P= =F-
"a Docket No. ER86-706401,h431,1987.
t 69.
Direct Testimony e--~'
of Dale G. Br ' ' and Gregory C Minor before the Pennsylvania Public Utility ':=, Regarding '-
79010318, OCA Statsasent No. 2, August 31,1987.
var Unit i lirs CS Docket No.1-
- 70. Oral ***I=*=y of Gregory C. Minor Before the De FoDutfos Control Board om behalf of Reed Caster Community Unit School District No. 255-U, re: Braidanad Coolinqr Pond Scytember 8,1988, Case PCB 87-209.
71.
Testimony of Oregory C. Minor in the U. S. District Court, Brooidya, New York, September 31, 195, re:Conny of Sipfalk a llLCO at. al Case CV 87-646.
- 72. OE n--J n--
-t
- e. t .,. n= -- Insees 5,10, and 24, prepared by MHB Technical Ananciaame for The Ohio State University Nuclear Engineering Program Expert Review Panel, Public Utilky th-iv=le= of Ohio, October 19g8.
- 73. Dired Testbacey and Exhibits of Dale G Br" ' . Gregory C. Minor and Steven C. Sholly on Behalf of Massachusetts Department of the Attorney Gcaeral, Re: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Statica,la===r===h of Pilarlm Ontaan DPU 88 28, November 30,1988. l 74.
Suppleasental Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh, Oregory C. Minor and Steven C. Shouy on Behalf of F - ' m Department of the Attorney General, Re: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Imd--h of Pilmde Gar === DPU 88 28, January 20,1999, Exhibit AG>2.
75.
Testimony of Gregory C Minor, U. S. District Court, Brooklyn, New York, February 3,1989, -
re: f%='v af e.sra a in r0 er. mL Case g7 CIV.646 (JBW).
Surrebuttal Testimony of Dale G. Bridesbaugh, Gregory C. Mm* or and Steven C. Shouy on Behalf of Massachusetts Department of the Attorney General, Re: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station,In d--% of Pihnim Out- DPU 88-28, February 13,1989, Exhibit AG 74.
77.
Surrebuttal Testimony of Dale G. Brldenbaugh, Gregory C. Minor and Steven C. Shony on Behalf of Massachneetts Department of the Attorney General, Re: Pilgrim Nuclear Pmrer Station,in-=d==h of Pilarim One=- DPU 88 28, February 17,1989, Exhibit AG-93.
l l
9 JUL'21 '89 14: 06 408 266 7149 MGE.010
ATTACHMENT 2 Statement of Professional Qualifications Steven C. Sholly
_. _..&. A1.15h 6 .$ @\ k D - ^ ~ ^
.j
'J
. . panntanONAL OtfAf JWICATIONS OF STEVEN c. EMnti y STEVEN C.SHOI1Y .
MHS Toshidsel Assoaisees 1723 Hambtos Agnes , Sake E SanJose, California 95125 (408) 266-2716 EEEEEEtER September 1985-PRESENT !
,...m . . m 7__< ,m, _ .. .._ ... ,_ c,u,a w e in e rgy id.: arm that wai- in t.chnican and economie - -,-te of >
arEr production facilitiu, :;:'? suelear,
/ for local, age, and federal governments and I private ors-i=w was is emensively in na,ed la regalatory proceedings and the preparatica of m. dies a.4 reports. Condom rm arch, write reports, participants la demgry process in regulatory ;;;-:: "7, develop testimony and chi daa-ata for regulatory gw-:--- "1. and respond to client inquiries. Clients 1,rs bcinded: State of California, State of New York, State ofIllinois.
February 1981 September 1985 { T - * * -- ' a - - ' A = % ad Risk _A - '_^ - LIah of P =- -- ' C '- " - - W- "- 7__ Df. Reenarch assadete and risk analyst for pubbe interest group based in c= = %, h8aa-husetta, that specinhaes in esamining the impaa of advanced technologies on society, principnEy la the areas of arms control and energy. Technical work focused rm auclear power plant safety, with emphasis on y.-)-a"'"'= risk a==-=*, radiological amenjeney planning and vs, :'--
- . and generic safetyissues. Condused research, prepared repots and studies, participated in adelaistrative proceedings before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory C-- ~ "::':=,
developed testimony, analymd NAC rule making proposals and draft reports and prepared i
==*a**a theroca, and responded to inquiries frees aponsors, the general public, and the 1 media. Pes';1:f as a messber of the Panel on ACRS Effectiveness (1985), the Panel on Regulatory Uses of Probabuistic Risk Assessment (Pear Review of NUREG-1050; 1984),
Invited Observer to NRC Peer Review meetings on the source term --eat (Rh0 2104; !
'19831984), and the Independent Advisory Committee on Noclear Risk for the Nuclear Risk j Task Porce of the National Association ofInsurance Ca-=1 awers (1964). !
j 1 I m m .ee 1 , o m rime .m I j
January 1980-January 1981 l Proled f%yp ==A R==~eh raar*a=*ne - Three Mile N==A N.S Interest Ru.c-- Cantarmi\ pp er_ Pennsvivania Provided adeninistrative diredian and coordinated research projems for a public intercat groep based in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, centered around lasues related to the 'lliree Mile Island , j l Nuclear Power Plant. Prepared fundraising proposals, tracked progress of U.S. Nuclear a Regulatory rb-1== ton, U.S. Department of Energy, and General Public Utihties activities concerning deanup of Three Mile Island Unit 2 and preparation for restart of Three Mile Island f i Unit 1, and monitored developments related to emergency r -"-- the Anandal health of 8 General Public Utilldes, and NRC rulemaking areia== related to Three Mile Island. July 1778-January 1980 r%f Blain te.1 Prneaan Onerator - Wmatew fa Treatment Ptant Deis Tc;e- =k:n Mi Ida=1 Auth-- A Hernhev. Pr .h- I= Chief Biological P.-ocess Operator at a 2.5 million gallon per day tertiary, activated sludge, wastewater treatment plant. Responsible for biological process monitoring and control, including analysis of physical, ekM-1. and biological test results, process fluid and mass flow management, micro. biological analysis of activated sludge, and maintenance of de4alled process loss for input into state and federal reports on treatment process and effluent quality. Recched certification from the Commonweakh of Pe--.i h la as a wastewater treatment plant operator. Member of Water Polh; tion Control Association of Pennsylvania, Central Section,1980. July 1977-July 1978 Wa t-water Tremema=' Plant Cw tar - Barc-eh of1 *=ovne. T >=owne. Pr =vivaa-Wastewater treatment plant operator at 2.0 millian gallon per day secondary, maivated sludge, wastewater treatment plant. Performed tasks as assigned by supervison, including simple physical and chemical tests on wastewater streams, maintenance and operation of plant equipment, and maintenance of the cdbem system. September 1976-June 1977 Selmaae Tauhar - West Shore Schnal Distria c'==o HIIL Penar.h =;a Taught Earth and Space Science at alath grade level. Developed and implemented new course materials on plate tectonia, environmental geology, and space science. Served as Assistant Coach of the district gymnastics team. September 1975-June 1976 SAaaaa T**eka* - Carlisle Area School Diarrier. carliale Pcannvivania Taught Earth and Space Scicoce and Environmental Science at ninth grade level. Developed and implemented new course materials on plate tectonics, environmental geology, noise pollution, water pollution, and energy. Served as Advisor to the Science Projects Club. 2
.JUL 21 '89 14: 07 -108 266 7149 PAGE.011
- f-EDUCATION:
. 33., Edeendon, sagiors in Earth and Space Science and Gescral Science, minor in Enviroaamental h h Shippensburg State College, Shippensbws, Pennsylvania,1975. -
Gradassa coarsework in land Use Planalag, Shippensburg State Couage, Shippensberg, P- __f - '; 19771978. PURI.1CATIONE: 1.
"Determalaing Mercalli he-hid from Newspaper Reports,* Jaarnal d Gaalapical Edacation.
Vol.25,1777, ] 2. A UF- -- d- An Q " ^ M ----
- d Em T'r e f a m M r' ' h r !
Panner Plant. 'Iluse Mile Island Public Interest Resource Center, Harrisburg, P-- 7-January 1981. , l
- 3. A Reimi Rawia= a J Crb- of the Bade'd t'=2, P '! A ' R- - -- 7. c -. "- - -
Elsa, Union of Cm. id Scientists, psepared for Rockland Comary Emergency Pleaning Paracasal and the Chairman of the County legislature, Washington, D.C., August 17,1981. 4 The t'- -- ' J for a r. w P * *'- A*-^: = t'* - N lathe 7
- T -- Pathway est at FM -- Poner Pt-w "'- Unica of Conocrosd Sdentists, Crideal Mass Energy Project, Naciser Information and Resource Service, Environmental Action, and New York Public In- !
terest Research Group, Washington, D.0, August 27,1981.
- 5.
" Union of Concerned $ dentists, Inc., r ~.- ^- on Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Aasendment to 10 CPR 50, Appendix E, Secdon IV.D.3,* Union of Concerned Scisadsts, '
Washington, D.C., October 21,1981. *
- 6. 'The Evolution of Emergency Pleasias Rules,'la N I *-- Pedd Mar 4* A Bi" = on the
*"1* -Eh of the F rd r*" - - ?w Ph h Wine, % Us &
Concerned Sdentists (Wasinngton, D.C.) and New York Pubbc Interest Research Group (New York, NY),1981. 7.
" Union of Concerned tdaati=ra Comuments, Proposed Rule,10 CPR Part 50, Emergency Plaaming and Preparedness: Esercises, Clarificah of Rg.h:iaiiks,46 F.R. 61134,' Union of Concerned Scientists, Washington, D.C, January 15,1982.
- 8.
Testimony of Robert D. Pouard and Steven C. Sholly before the Subconnaittee on Energy and the Environment, Cosamittee ca Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. Ilouse of Represcatatives, Middistown, Pennsylvania, March 29,1982, available from the Union of Concerac4 Scientists. 9.
' Union of Concerned Scientists Detailed Comments on Petition for Rulemaklag by Citizen's Task Force, Emergency Planning,10 CPR Parts 50 and 70, Docket No. PRM 50-31,47 F.R.
12639,* Union of Concerned Scientists, Washington, D.C., May 24,1982.
- 10. Supplements to the Testimony of Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq., General Counsel, Union of Concerned Scientists, before the Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power, Committee on Energy I
3 ( l I JUL 21 '89 14: 06 40A 266 7149 PAGE.013
.r
- i.
- and Commerca, US. House of Represcatatives, Unica of Cmd Sdentists, Washington, i D.C, Augast 16,1982.
(.
- 11. Testimony of Steven C. Shelly, Union of Concemed Scientists, Washington, D.C., on behalf of the New York Public Interest Research Orows, Inc., before the Special Committee on Nuclear Power Safety of the Asseeably of the State of New York, hearings on Iagislative Overnight of the F-g Radiologic Preparedaces Aa, Chyter *108, Laws of 1981, September 2,1982.
- 12. *r====h on 'Dratt Supplement to Final Environmental Statement Related to Construction and Operation of Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant'," Docket No. 50 537, Union of Comeermed 63-*i*o Washington. D.C., Septessber 13,1982. *
- 13. ' Union of Concerned Scientists Camacats on ' Report to the County Ca==i=1a==rs', by the Advisory Committee on Radiological PA sf Plan for Colmabia County, Pennsylvania,"
Union of Css.i~.4 9-+1=* . Washington, D.C., September 15,1982 ' 14.' ' Radiological Emergency Planning for Nuclear Reador Accidents," presented to r_u =_4 Ostasantend Congress, Rotterdam, %e Netherlands, Union 'of C i 4 L G,., Washington,D.C October 8,1982.
- 15. 'Noclear Reactor Accident C- ,. - Impliaria= for Radiological Emergency Planning,*
presented to the Citisea's Advisory C-W to Revicw Rockland County's Own Nuclear Evacuation and Ti; i - Phm and General Disaster Preparedness Plan, Union of , Commersed himatisan i Washington, D.C., November 19,1982.
- 16. Testimony of Steven C. Sholly before the Sak~-ittee on Oversight and Investigations, r==Arta- on latorior and lasular Affairs, US. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.,
Union of Concerned Scioatists, Deccabr3r 13,1982,
- 17. Testimony of Gordon R. Thompson and Steven C. Shouy on ca==3=aiaa Question Two, ra=#aatlana 2.1(a) and 2.1(d), Union of Concerned Sdaariara and New York Pubhc Interest Research Group, before the US. Naclear Regulatory rammi=la= Atomic Safety and IJeansing Board,in the Matter of Consolidated Edisco Cosepnay of New York (Indian Point Unit 2) and the Power Authoney of the State sof New York (Indian Point Unit 3), Docket Nos. 50247 SP and 50 286 SP, December 28,1982. *
- 18. Teethnomy of Steven C. Sholly em the Consequences of A~A-" at Indian Point (cammisalaa Question One and Board Ovestion 1.1 Union of r= =4 Scientists and New York Public Interest Research Group, ly; fore the US. Nuclear Regulatory ca==intaa Atoanic Safety and 11*a*1at Board, la the Matter of ramaalidated Edison Company of New York (Indian Point Unit 2) and the Power Authority of the State of New York (Indian Point Unit 3), Docket Nos.
50 247 SP and 50 286 SP, February 7,1983, as W,i.4ts4 February 16,1983. *
- 19. Testimony of Steven C. Shelly on Commission Ouestion Five, Union of Concerned Scioatists and New York Public Interest Research Group, before the US. Nuclear Regulatory ra==*==la= Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, in the Matter of Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Indian Point Unit 2) and the Power Authority of the State of New York (Indian Point Unit 3), Docket Nos. 50 247 SP and 50 286-SP, March 22,1983. *
- 20. " Nuclear Reactor Accidents and Accident Consequences: Pfanning for the Worst," Union of Conectned Scientists, Washington, D.C., presented at Critical Mass '83, March 26,1983.
-4
,JUL 21 '99 14: 09 408 266 ?!49 PAGE.014
--_____-___2--_---____-- _ _ - - _ - _
s.
;} 'ai l21. - Taaa;aa-y of Steven C. Shouy os Emergency Planalag and Preparadaces at Commerdal Nuclear- Power Plants, Union of Concerned tdaariara Washington, D.C., before the Suhra==ntra, on Nuclear Regulados, e--'= -- on Environment and Public Works, U.S.
Seasta, April 15,1983, (with " Union of Concerned Scientists' Response to Questicas for the Record fines Senator Alan K. Simpson," Steven C. Sholly and Michael E. Padea). 22.
'PRA: What Can it Ready Tell Us About Pubbe Risk from Nacicar Accidents?,' Unica of
~
Concerned Scientists, Washington, D.C., pra===*=*ian to the 14th Annual Meeting, Samea-r Anti-Pollution League, May 4,1983.
- 23. 'M+t"S*= Risk A= -- -"-
The Impact of Uncertainties on Radiological Emergency Flamaing and Preparedness r bM*=f Union of Coe.orned SAaatat- Washington, D.C., Jane 28,1983.
]j 24.
"Resposee to GAO Questions on NRC's Usc of PRA,* Union of rane ened Scicatists, Washington, D.C., October 6,1983, attachment to letter dased October 6,1983, freen Steven C. )
Shally to John E. Bagnolo (GAO, Washington, D.C.). i j
- 25. The i= =aat of "5'wa mal E= =*=* an R 1 " " = c=1 W-- '
unew P r=- - = PI-
- 7 Gesidataliens, Union of Concerned Seimatiara, Washlagton, D.C., Daremher 22, 1983, attach =aat to letter dated Decessber 22,1985, from Steven C. Shony to NRC r==I=lr=ae James K. Anselsiina. !
- 26. Sisewoll 'B' Pi,61ic Inquiry, Proof cf Evidence on: ta'-'v =ad Wa a- M 7-- f= d --- l af_the_SizanalLPWR. Gordon Thompson, with supportag evidence by Steven Shelly, on behalf of the Town and Country Planning Associanon, February 1984, including Annex 0, 'A review of -- I i (
PM+t*""'c Risk Analysis and ks Applientlaa to the Sizewell PWR." Steven ShoDy and Gordon Thompsca, (August 11,1983), and Aases 0, " Emergency Planning la the UK and the US: A { j Comparison," Steven ShoDy and Gonica %csnpsca (October 24,1983). I
- 27. Testimony of Steven C. Shady on Emergency Plaanlag Contention Number Eleven, Union of Concerned Scicatists, Washington, D.C., on behalf of the Palmetto Alliance and the Carolina Envirnamantal Study Group, before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory C Mon Atomic Safety i and Licensing Board, in the Matter of Duke Power Company, et. al. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), Dodet Nos. $0 413 and 50-414, April 16,1984. *
- 28. ' Risk Indicators Relevant to Assessing Nuclear Accident Liability Premiums,' la Prehminarv
- m nant to the ' ' -- '
A 'J . i ra==le+a* to the NAIC N="- r Rin Tad Faree. December 11,1984, Steven C. ShoDy, Unica of Concerned Sea 4=** Washagton, D.C.
-f 29.
' Union of Concerned Scientists' and Nuclear Information and Resource Service's Jotat I Comuments on NRC's Proposal to Bar from Ib- 8-- Prae =>% the Consideration of Earthquake Effects on E.T.- l cf Planning," Union of Concerned Scientists and Nuclear laformation and Resource Sevice, Washington, D.C., Diane Curran and EDyn R. Weiss (with l Input from Steven C. ShoUy), February 28,1985.
- 30.
- Severe Accident Source Terms: A Presentation to the Comminioners on the Status of a Review of the NRC's Source Term Reassessment Study by the Union of Concerned Scicatists,' Union of Concerned Scientists, Wa6hington, D.C., April 3,1985.
- i
.s.
i
. 1 j_ JUL El G 9 14: 10 408 266 7149 PAGE.015 l
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- 31. '
" Severe Aandent Souros Terms for Ught Water Nuclear Poemr Flaats: A Praamme rian to the !
IIEsais B ; ^ - of Nuclear Safery on the Status of a Review of the NRC's Source Term a- a- a e seedy (stas) by the Union of Concerned ww union of Concera.4 Scienduta, Washlagton, D.C. May 13,1985.
. 32. h *- - Te * - -A*
. T_ _ . ins - s- - ' af rk c__ . _ "-Tar o rhe NRC "--
' - *for W " r! "_ __ A - " ^ "=5
. - (NURFgg 30, Union of Coocarned teimatista, Cambrides, M^ * -~= Steven C. ShoDy and G'.rdon Dompson, Jeneary 1986.-
1 33. Direct Testimony of Dale G. Bridenbaugh, Oregory C. Minor, Lyon K. Prics, and Steven C. ShoDy on behalf of State of ramaamie=t Department of PubEc UtIHty Control, Prammeuraem! Division and DMaion of ra===cr Counsel, regarding the prudsace of espeeditures on .
' Miustans Unit IH, February 18,1996.
34. Impl eatta== of the Chernobyl-4 McWat for Nuclear Emergency Planning for the State of New York, prepared for the State of New York Consonner Protection Board, by MHB Technical Associates, June 1986,
- 35. malew of V :==t Y* rw * - * * ~ ^ . ed. " A " ;' of r=+ '- -^ V=:--
r- gar the V -;==f Y=k= N=* - Pa=== P'== prepared for New England Coaution ca Nuclear PoBution, Inc., D-=be 16,1986.
- 36. A8idavit of Steven C. ShoDy before the Atomile Safety and Licensing Board, la the matter of Pubbe Service Company of New Hampshire, et al., regardag Seabrook Statica Unha 1 and 2 Off site Emersoscy Flamaing Issues, Docket Nos. 50-443 OL & 50 444 OL, January 23,1987.
- 37. Dired Tsetimony of Richard B. Hubbard and Steven C. Shony os behalf of Caufornia Public UtiEties tw ' * =, regarding Diablo Canyon Rate Case, PG&E's Pailure to Establish its o
r*-W d Desige QA Program, Appucation Nos. 84 06 014 and 85 08425, Eshlbit No.10,935, March,1987. 38. Testianomy of Gregory C. Minor, Steven C, Shouy et. al. on behalf of Suffek County, regarding I.nrO's Reception Centers (Planning Basis), before the Atomic Safety and Ucensing Board,la the matter of Iang Isised Lighting Comepany, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, Docket No. $0 322 OL-3, Apru 13,1987. 39. Rebuttal Testimony of Gregory C. Minor and Steven C. Sholly on behalf of Suffolk County regarding LILCO's Reception Centers (Addressing Testimony of Lewis G. Huhnan), Docket No. 50 322-01-3, May 27,1987. 40. Review of Selected Aspects of NUREG-1150, "Resaor Risk Reference Document," prepared for the IHinois Department of Nuclear Safety by MHB Technical Associates, September 1987. 41. Direct Teethnomy of Richard B. Hubbard and Steven C. Sholly on behalf of the Pennsylvania < Of6ce of Consumer Advocate, before the Pennsylvania Public Utility C==6taa Evaluation of Beaver VaBey Unit 2 Plant Costs, OCA Statement 6, Docket No. R-87065L October 23,1987. I 42. Final Resort: Kinnificant Factora A%rtine the Cost of Beaver Vallev Powenstation. Unit 1 prepared for Pennsylvania Office of Consumer Advocate, by MHB Techtdcal Associates, OCA Exhibit 6A, October 1987. I l
n. 4 e
- 43. F' n- _. -- Facea- A
- 7 de rw of -. V_"-. B-
- te=' = Unk_ r prepared for Pennsyhania Office of Consumer Aeocate, by MMB Technical Aaaaciasaa, OCA EshEnt 6A,Omeber 1987.
44.- Surrebuttal Tesdmony of Richard B. Hubbard and Steven c shoBy before the Pennsykamia Peik vimy e- '
. on behalf of the Pennsybania Oma of Causamer Advocate, regarding Evalostlos of Beaver VaBoy Unit 2 Plant Costs, OCA Statement 61, Docket No. R.
810651, December 7,1987. 45. Testimony on Diablo Canyon Rate Case, Dealga Omailty Assurance. Supplemental and Rebuttal Testissony of Richard B. Hubbard and Steven C. Shony, on behalf of the Califerala Public UtBities e ' ' - Division of a ti Advocates, Applienemaa Nos. 844014 and 85 08-025, Babbit No.16,600, Scytember 1988.
- 46. Temimony on Diablo Canyon Rate Case, n'.-i-*aa- af QA Rm 1.I And That-t r '- -- " - av % N= "= t='=w t' "^ A - - As A C --t Tand Vohames I and H, Supplemental and Rebuttal Testimony of Richard B. Hubbard and Steven C. Shelly on behalf of the California Public Usuisies r==3=Er= Division of Ratepeyer Advocate, Application Nos. 844014 and 85 08 025, Exhibit No.16,650, Septsesber 1988.-
- 47. GE Reed Report Safety Issue Reviews, Issues 1, 6, and 14, J by MHB Technical Associates for he Ohio State University Nuclear Engineering Program Empert Review Panel, Public UtDity ca=ac=*= alaa of Ohio, October 1908.
48. Direct Testissony and Fabihits of Dalc O. Bridenbsagh, Oregory C. Minor and Steven C. Sholly on Behalf of Massachusetts Department of the Attorney General, Re: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station,1====W of Pilgrim Outap, DPU 86 28, November 30,1988. 49. Supplemental Testimony of Dale G. Bridenceugh, Oregory C. Minor and Steven C. Sholly on Behalf of Massachusetts Department of the Attorasy General, Re: Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, L-d-- ^' - of P?!srim Outage, DPU 88 28, January 20,1999, FM AG 2.
$0. ;
Sarrebuttal Testissony of Dale G. Bridenbeugh, Gregory C. Minor and Steven C. Sho0y on ( Behalf of Massadmeetts Department of the Anorney Geacrat, Re: Filgrim Noclear Power f Station, Investigation of Pilgrim Outage, DPU 88 28, Pobruary 13,1989, Exhibit AG 74 51. Surrebattal T***ima=y of Dale G. Bridenbaugh, Gropry C. Minor and Steven C. Sholly on { Behalf of Maaaachusetts Department of Attorney General, Re: Pilgrim Nucleair Power Station, Investigation of Pilgrim Outage, DPU 88 28, February 17,1999, Exhibit AG 93. { j
- 52. Pt==1 Reaaet?s ' Accidents at Thraa 2=
, _ m. _ . m i ,_. - falaad Unk 1: Severe AreMa=* Cha*=et= Mica for
, n - ,e plan r--
--- .., prepared for Institute for Resource and Security Studies, Pobruary1989.
Available from the U.S. Nucicar Regulatory I'n=misaion, Public Document Room, Lobby,1717 N Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. I I i l I
'JUL 21 '89 14: 11 408 266 7149 PAGE.017
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I 4 1 I ATTACHMENT B l l.
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o l , , i L .k t* ENCLOSURE 4 TO NYN-89086. NAMAGBIENT EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS REPORT. Natural Circulation Towt, Manual Reactor Trip and Followup Actions. 4
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ATTACHMENT B
L l' V I i IRT NEY M&M&GBIENT EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS REPORT NHY Performance During and Following The Natural Circulation Test of June 22, 1989 ISSUED: July 10, 1989 l' , g ,
- 6
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS IRT NBY MA=^"-EMENT arraChv==ssS m1YSIS REPORT SECTION _ PAGE 1.0 Executive Su== ry 1 2.0 Analysis and Review A. _ Command and Control Policy 2 1.
- 2. Background and Existing Policy Application of the Command and Control 2 Policy
- 3. Conclusions 3
- 4. 5 Command And Control Policy Reconunendations 6
B. Precedure ComoJiance Poliev 7 1.
- 2. Background and Existing Policy j
7 Application of the Existing Procedure Compliance Policy
- 3. Conclusions 8
- 4. 10 Procedure Compliance Policy Recommendations 11 C.
Post Trio Review Pollev 12 1.
- 2. Background and Existing Policy Application of the Post Trip Review 12 Policy
- 3. Conclusions 13
- 4. 24 Post Trip Review Policy Recommendations 27 D.
Steam Dumn valve Incomplete Work Recuest 29
- 1. Background
- 2. Conclusions
- 3. Recommendations i
ip i
r - L~ j l I TABLE OF CONTENTS IRT 1 NHY M&MAGDENT EFFECTIVENESS AMALYSIS REPORT q ATTACEMENT: KHY MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS CHRONOLOGY,- SECTION PAGE Thursday. June 22. 1989: 1 1219 -- Initiation of Natural Circulation Test (1-ST-22) 1 NRC Communications To NHY in Main Control Room 1 1236 -- Manual Reactor Trip 3 1350 -- VP-NP Communications To President and CEO, VP-Engineering, Licensing and Quality Programs 5 1500 -- Post Trip Review Critique In TSC 7 1800 -- NHY Telecon To NRC Projects Branch Chief 9 2315 -- VP-NP Briefing Of President and CEO 14 Fridsv. June 23 #1989: 15 0730 -- NHY Telecon To NRC Projects Branch Chief 16 1140 -- NHY/NRC Heating 20 1350 - NRC/NHY Conficastory Action Letter Telecon 23 1430 -- NHY Meeting To Plan and Schedule NHY CAL Response Activities 25
1 1 NHY Mananament Effectiveness Analysis Report ) i I l.0 Executive Summary New Hampshire Yanken (NHY) conducted a review and analysis of the policies, procedures and implementing actions taken by NHY personnel to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of the NHY Management response during and subsequent to the Natural Circulation Test conducted at Seabrock Station on June 22, 1989. Short ar.d longer term corrective action recommendations have been developed and are presented in this report based on the review and analysis conducted by the NHY Independent Review Team (IRT), a staff group not functionally associated with the NHY groups that conducted the Low Power Test Program. The scope of the IRT review was specifically focu, sed on, but not Ibnited to three NHY policy areas as they relate to this event: Command and Control Procedure Compliance
. Post Trip Review NHY has established written policies and implementing procedures and has conducted training for NHY personnel as part of the normal administrative process for providing guidance on the conduct of operations for Seabrook Station. The results of the IRT review and analysis form the basis for recommending enhancements in each policy area. Each of the following analysis and review sections of this report provides a background and summary of the NHY policy in effect at the time of the event, provides a discussion of the application of that policy during and subsequent to the event, provides the IRT management effectiveness analysis conclusions and provides recommended corrective actions for each of the above three policy areas.
?.
t 1 J.0' Analysis'and Review
-A. 'Ca==and and Control Policy
- 1. Backsround ard Existina Policy A series of hierarchical NHY manuals describe the lines of authority delineating responsibility for command and. control at Seabrook-Station.
' The . Seabrook Station Management Manual, operations Management Manual and Startup Test Program Description provide the guidance applicable to the operation of'the Station and conduct of testing. The Operations Group is responsible for ensuring the safe operation,of Seabrook Station in accordance with regulatory guidance, technical specifications and approved procedures. NHY uses <12 shift crews of Operations Group personnel to provide continuous manning of the station. Each shift consists of a Shift. Superintendent,' Unit Shift Supervisor, a Supervisory Control Room Operator, Control Room Operator and Auxiliary. Operators. The Operations Hansgement Manual details the responsibilities, qualifications, authority and source of direction for each shift position. Each licensed operator retains the authority to either order the shutdown or to shutdown the reactor. The Unit Shift Supervisor is the shift position normally responsible fbr maintaining a
. comprehensive perspective on operational conditions and in an emergency
, or transient situation becomes the sole authority in charge of the Control Room unless relieved of that duty. The Startup Test Program Description describes the organization, responsibilities and procedures which ensure that components, t structures and systems are tested to verify that they function as designed. The Startup Test organization is structured to provide l' parallel counterpart positions to the Operations Group. Under the overall direction of the Startup Manager, each Startup test shift is comprised of a Shift Test Director, Test Director and Test Engineers. [ These personnel ar.e trained and qualified to perform assigned responsibilities, but are not licensed operators. The Startup Test Program consists of specific individual tests performed during and subsequent to initial fuel loading. These tests 2 L _ _ ___ _ ___-____- _ _ _ _ _ -
4 ' j , m na @,1 ' '
. verify the proper design.of the reactor core and thel dynamic .
h i.S < characteristics of,.the' plant during both normal and anticipated 1 1 abnormal operating conditions at' power levels uplto and including 100I g b design ~ reactor power. Individual test procedures for Low Power Testing ( ,' were written by the Startup Test organization, were reviewed and y approved by the Startup organization and the Station Operation Review-Committee. In addition, all FSAR listed Startup-Test procedures were y reviewed by.the NRC and selected Startup Test procedures including [ 1-ST-22, were reviewed by the NSSS supplier (Westinghouse). The plant Loperation for each' test.was done.by the operations Group with' technical assistance and direction _provided by the Startup Test. organization.to ensure the technical adequacy and satisfaction of test parameters. The 0 Startup Test organization retains'the authority to interrupt or
. terminate tests based on the conduct of-the test or plant parameters.
The authority and responsibility for overall plant conditions.
' including the conduct of tests, and reactor shutdown is vested only in
' licensed operators..- The Operations and Startup Test organizations developed a working' relationship, policy and practice whereby Startup-personnel provide.the' technical direction for conducting the test and Operations personnel implement the test.
- 2. Acolication of the C - nd and control Poliev The conduct of Startup Test-22. Natural Circulation, was initiated using the standard practice where the Startup Test Director briefed the Operations shift on the conduct of the test, expected plant performance and limiting conditions for the test. The Test Director provided copies of Attachment 9.3 to 1-GT-22. Expected Plant Response and Manual Trip Criteria (which included pressurizer level less than 172), to the Shift Superintendent Unit Shift Supervisor (USS), and licensed board operators. During the actual conduct of the test the following events occurred:
(a) One of two primary board operators focused primarily on pressurizer level, letdown and charging. This operator monitored and audibly informed the USS of pressurizer levels several times
. throughout the test.
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.____________.____.____________m . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . . - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _
(b) The Unit Shift Supervisor was cognizant of pressurizer level throughout th* test. The USS conferred with the primary side board operator several times and informed the Test Director that pressurizer level was approaching and later was below 172. The Test Director did not subsequently recall receiving this
'information.
(c) A NRC inspector informed the Startup Manager that pressurizer level was below 172. (d) A NRC inspector informed the Test Director (second NRC to NHY notification) that pressurizer level was below 172. The Test Director informed the USS. The USS acknowledged this communication. (e) Two NRC inspectors subsequently informed the Assistant Operations Mansger (AOM), (third NRC to NHY notification) that pressurizer level was below 172. The AOM confirmed the test trip criteria with the Test Director and that the pressurizer level status information had been conveyed to the USS. The AOM began to more fully assess plant status to determine the need to personally intercede with the USS actions being taken. Prior to completing the assessment the USS had directed the second of the two primary side board operators to shut down the reactor. (f) After tripping the reactor, the operators entered their post trip emergency procedures and brought the plant to the HOT STANDBY condition. The following fact' ors influenced the application of the Command and Control policy. The Operations Manager and Assistant Operations Maneger were swure that the test procedure contained trip criteria but were not aware of the specific trip criteria (172 pressurizer level) cited if. the startup procedure. The Shift Test Director and Test Director were involved in detailed in-process data gathering and analysis to ensure that certain test parsmeters were maintained. The Shift $cperintendent heard the report that letdown had isolated 4 L _ _ _ . . _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
yg -- - -- - - A l (pressurizer level less than 172) but continued with his personal efforts to identify-the cause of the unexpected cooldown. He was I focused on the Tavg trend and on the condenser steam dump valve performance. The Shift Superintendent was ne*, aware of.the l communications between the NRC, Test Director and Unit Shift Supervisor and was not aware of their substance. Due to the unique nature of this test and a FSAR commitment for operator training, a totallof fifty-seven people were in the control Room to conduct or observe the test. The Control Board was manned with supplemental primary and secondary side operators. Three additional full shift crews of operators were also present to observe the test as part of an FSAR training commitment. Summary: 6 - NHY Management 15 - Operators (On-Shift) 8 - Test Personnel (On-Shift) 3 - NRC. 16 - Operators (Observation training to satisfy FSAR Commitment) 4 - Training Department Personnel 3 - QA/QC 1 - ISEG _1 - SAT 57 - TOTAL
- 3. Conclusions Analysis and comparison of the existing Command and Control Policy with the events of June 22, 1989 provides the basis for the following conclusions:
(a) Operations Department Command and Control Policy functioned as designed if consideration is strictly limited to the Limiting Conditions for Operation sections of Seabrook Station Technical Specifications and the Operations Department Operating procedures which provide'the bounding criteria for safe plant operation and transient recovery. However, the Operations Command and Control Policy did not function as designed with respect to adherence to 5
I the Seabrook Station Administrative Controls, Policy and Guidance l associated with procedure compliance. (b) The members of the assigned Operations shift crew should have exercised their authority to either direct a shutdown or to shutdown the reactor when the pressurizer level fell below the 17% test specified trip criteria. (c) The Startup Test Director should have strongly and immediately recommended shutting the reactor down, in a clear precise manner 3 to the Operations individual in command.(USS), when the test trip criteria was reached. (d) The Startup Manager and Test Director should have been immediately responsive to the information provided by the NRC inspector. (e) .The addition uf supplemental board operators could have been more fully supported through more specific training and simulator exercises designed to practice comm.nd and control functions unique to the 1-ST-22 test and the actual crew assigned to conduct the test.
- 4. Command and Control Policy Recommendations The following corrective actions are reconnended:
(a) Revise the existing Command and Control policy to clarify the integration, participation and input of the Startup Test organization and other groups that interact with the shift operators concerning station operations. (b) Revise the existing Command and Control Policy to delineate responsibility and authority when supplemental operators are assigned on shift. l (c) Revise the existing Command and Control Policy to specifically encourage non-shift, licensed Operations personnel to provide 6
points of clarification or information when an assigned operator's actions appear to be inappropriate or not understood by the observer.
-B. Procedure Come11ance policy
- 1. Backaround and Existina Poliev The Seabrook Station Technical Specifications, NHY Operational Quality Assurance Program Seabrook Station Management Manual ar.d Operations Management Manual collectively delineate the criteria for issuing approved procedures and assuring that implementing activities are conducted using approved procedures. In addition, the Seabrook Station Management Manual (Chapter 2, Section 1.5) and Operations Management Manual (Chapter 3, Section 2) provide specific. guidance regarding adherence to procedures. The Operations Management Manual provides instructions for Operations procedures including the following:
' Plant operation should be conducted in accordance with applicable
-procedures. If procedures are deficient, a procedure change should be initiated. An exception to this policy is that in emergency conditions operators may take whatever action is necessary to place the plant in a safe condition, and to protect equipment, personnel and public safety without first initiating a procedure change."
The recent Self Assessment Team review of existing Operations procedures indicates that procedure revisions are approved and issued per existing administrative guidance. Changes to procedures are prepared and issued to correct identified procedural deficiencies. A further review of recent (1989) Station Information Reports indicates that the Operations Group has experienced two incidents where additional policy clarification (valve and component position verification) in implementing procedures required incorporation. Corrective actions to incorporate the enhanced policy and provide initial anr atinuing training were taken. 7 4 _______ _ ___ 3
l I i NHY personnel Escently attended a regional forum where the NRC l discussed adherence to procedures as a key industry factor for j necessary performance improvements ' More recently (March), the Operations Group, Station Management and j Self Assessment Team.each proposed the formation and staffing of a group of personnel within the Operations Group specifically dedicated to perform periodic procedure reviews, reducing the number of approved changes not incorporated in procedure revisions, procedure preparation, and a one time special consistency review for all Operations procedures. The March proposals also recommended the addition of one senior level operator position on each shift, who in turn would be assigned responsibilities designed to further relieve the USS of administrative duties. The NHY Management Oversight Committee of the Self Assessment Team accepted the recommendation. NHY has established j a schedule for implementing the recommendations by the end of 1989. The Startup Test organization prepared and issued test procedures several years ago to support the proposed low power testing scheduled to be conducted subsequent to the 1986 core load. These FSAR designated Startup test procedures were prepared per the Startup Test Program Description format, were reviewed by the NRC, Westinghouse, NHY Quality Assurance, and were approved by SORC. Prior to conducting the 1989 Low Power Test Program, the technical content of these procedures was re-reviewed by Startup and Quality Assurance, and recommended changes were approved by SORC.
- 2. Anolication of the Existing Procedure Comolisnee Policy Startup Test 1-ST-22, Natural Circulation, was revised, approved by SORC and reissued on April 14, 1989. Field Change Number 1, which provided additional instructions regarding references, initial conditions for secondary p)'nt warmup and typographical corrections, was issued June 21, 1989.
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Discussions with Op2rctions Group p2rsonnsl. indicated that they had1the opportunity to read.the entire test procedure and that.they were' aware-of the manual trip criteria _ listed on Attachment 9.3 of Startu'. Zest
, Ptocedure 1-ST-22. . Prior to conducting 1-ST-22, the Test Director--
briefed the assigned crew'and.made individual copies of the manual. p ~ rea'ctor. trip criteria (Attachmerit ' 9.3) for'the-operators. The' attached
~
chronology indicates that the Control Room operators were aware..of!the. stated manual trip criteria and, associated with one-~of those criteria 'had' started timing a'15 minute period to trip'the reactor unless they could recover from a.-Tavg of_less_than 541*F. 1In _ addition'.
.they were calling out pressurizer levels auring the conduct of the.
test. The USS'specifically-informed the Test Director-of approaching. the procedure trip criteria of pressurizer level less than-172. The Test Director did not appear to have acknowledged these consnunications'
.regarding:the approach to trip criteria _nor the subsequent.
communication by the USS that pressurizer level was below 172. The USS~ subsequently directed the primary board operator to inform him when' pressurizer level approached 152. Concurrent with interactions among the" Control Room operators . there were a series of consnunications between the NRC and NHY Startup and Operations personnel regarding1the_- level of,the pressurizer below the 172 manual trip criteria setpoint. Discussions with operations personnel subsequent to'the event indicate that they recognized the non-Technical Specification test parameters as conditions for Startup to either interrupt or terminate the test. The operations personnel siso indicated'that based on their own
. operations procedures and training they did not consider the non-Technical Specification, Startup test procedure trip limit at l7%
pressurizer-level to be a limiting criterion because of the bounding natuS and' inherent conservatism for safe operation incorporated in the more familiar Excess Cooldown and Loss of Letdown Recovery system operating procedures. Prior to leaving the Control Room, the Vice President - Nuclear Production, Station Manager, Operations Manager and Assistant Operations Manager were aware of the procedure violation. Within one and one half (1%) hours of the event all of NNY's Executive Management was aware of a. procedure violation and the need for corrective actions
. 9
i on procedure adherence. During the course of the day, NHY management ') discussed the procedure violation and the need to revise the-policy regarding adherence to procedures. This-war the sole topic of a one and one-half hour meeting on Thursday evening where the revised policy and corrective action options were discussed. On Friday morning a revised policy was established ar.d it was directed that the revised policy be communicated to the Operations Group personnel through verbal presentations by Station Senior Management. NHY Executive and Station management met at 0645 on Friday. June 23 1989 to determine the proposed policy and schedule for corrective action. NHY subsequently related the revised policy and schedule for proposed corrective actions to the NRC at 0730 en Friday, June 23, 1989 and began implementation later that day.
- 3. Conclusions Analysis and comparison of the existing NHY procedure adherence policy with the events of June 22 and 23, 1989 provides the basis for the following conclusions:
(a) The assigned Operations shift crew should have followed the manual trip criteria in ST-22 and should have shut down the reactor when pressurizer level went below 172. (b) New Hampshire Yankee did not fully comply with its own Administrative Controls, Policy and Guidance associated with procedure com'pliance. (c) The Station and Operations Management policy on procedure adherence requires additional clarification to clearly delineate those circumstances where it would be acceptable to deviate from a 50RC approved or Quality Assurance related procedure. (d) The Operations personnel believed that the Startup Test Procedures, by their nature, were inherently flexible and did not require verbatim compliance. 10 l
[E , (e) Startup Test personnel should have immediately considered and taken appropriate actions to recommend shutting the reactor'down af ter being informed by the NRC that the plant condition had exceeded the indicated test trip criteria.
- 4. Procedure Compliance Poliev Recommendations The following corrective actions are recommended:
'(a) Revise the Policy regarding adherence to procedures. This policy should clearly delineate under what conditions it might be acceptable to deviate from an issued, approved procedure. These
~
conditions must be based on compelling safety reasons: (1) Protecting the public health and safety.
'(2) Preventing personnel injury or life threatening situations.
(3) Preventing plant system, component, os structure damage. (b) Incorporate the revised Policy in established administrative and management manuals. (c) Ensure that all NHY personnel receive initial and continuing training on the revised policy for adherence to procedures. (d) Revise the Startup Test Program and procedures tos (1) Rewrite and issue those Startup procedures, that would not ordinarily exist as Operations procedures, as Special Procedures that support infrequent evolutions and testing. The preparation, alpha-numeric designation, review, approval I and distribution of these procedures should be brought into full compliance with the existing guidance in the Station and Operations Management Manuals. 11 l =_- __- - _ ____ -_ _
r~n-- - .,..
-l p.
+
(2) -Provide additional guidance for terminating the test and-exiting the test procedure when plant transients or equipment malfunctions occur during the conduct of tests. (3) Establish a program to' conduct additional review and rehearsals for tte test crews in the classroom and on the simulator, as necessary, when complex or unfamiliar test procedures will te conducted. C. Post Trio Review Poliev
- 1. Background atM Existing Policy
'New Hampshire Yankee reviews-and analyzes unplanned reactor trips.
Engineered Safety Features (ESP) actuations and other similar significant operational events through a series of integrated procedures performed by the Operations Group, an independent Event Evaluation Team composed of NHY individuals with the requisite experience and training to provide immediate analysis, a Root Cause analysis conducted by the Reliability and Safety Engineering Department and two other overall mandatory reviews'by the Station Operation Review Committee (SORC) and the Nuclear Safety Audit Review Committee (NSARC). The specific requirements and conduct of activities are delineated in the following: (A) Technical Specification 6.4.2.7
'The NSARC shall be responsible for the review oft
- a. Violations of codes, regulations, orders, technicst specifications, license requirements, or of internal procedures or instructions having nuclear safety significance;
- g. ALL REPORTABLE EVENTS *
(B) Technical Specification 6.5 - Reportable Event Action 12 i
I r [ L , The following actions shall be taken for REPORTABLE EVENTS: l n a. I The Commission shall be notified and a report submitted l pursuant to the requirements of Section 50.73 to 10.CTR Part 50, and
- b. Each REPORTABLE EVENT shall be reviewed by the SORC and the results of this review shall be.subr 'ted to the NSARC and.
the Vice President - Nuclear Production. (C) ' Operations Procedure OS 1000.08, Post Trio Rev.iew. (D) NHY Procedure 12830. jvent Evaluation and Reduction Program. (E)' NHY Procedure 12810 Root Cause Analysis. t (F) NHY Reporting Manual, Station Information Reoorts. The intent of these activities is to provide a thorough, detailed analysis'of the physical plant, as well as.the procedural and personnel factors that were the root cause or contributing factors to the event.
-By design, portions of this analysis must be initiated and the entire Operations Post Trip. review (OS 1000.08) must be completed to the satisfaction of Station management prior to an authorized restart of the reactor.
- 2. Anolication of the Post Trio Review Policy The attached chronology provides a detailed account of the substantive activities and communications relevant to the post trip review process and NHY involvement in reviewing and analyzing data, developing resolutions t'o identified problems, and implementing corrective actions. The following narrative addresses certain key events and activities and incorporates the perspectives of NHY personnel interviewed as part of this report.
13
, ew . .
. . -). q
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was in a stable condition. Making'use of'the. increased number of operators present, the. Assistant Operations Manager directed 1 the on-
. coming Shift Superintendent and Unit Shift Supervisor to begin the post trip review data. collection in parallel with-the' assigned shift performing-the notification process. At 1320 the assigned Shift Superintendent completed the NRC offsite notification. This communication reported the followings-
' While performing low power physics testing, Startup test procedure 1-ST-22 Rev. #2 (Natural Circ.), Tavg had reduced.to below 541'F, pressurizer pressure at 2340 PSIG and pressurizer water level'1ess than-172: these were manual trip criteria per i procedure. MS-P3011 stuck open causing initial cooldown."
The INPO Nuclear Network'(PS section).contailed the following summary-of the June 22, 1989 Seabrook reactor shutdown based'on this communication. JFacility : Seabrook Event Date : 06/22/89 Time : 12:35 EDT Unit : Unit : Emergency : Not Applicable'
' Reactor Trip (1). .;
- Auto with Rod Motion Reactor Trip (2) :
Reactor Trip (3) : Reactor Critical : Y L Prior Mode : Startup Prior PWR : 003 Current Mode : Hot Standby Current PWR : WITH THE UNIT AT 3Z POWER AND ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH NATURAL CIRCULATION AS PART OF A LOW POWER PHYSICS STARTUP TEST PROCEDURE, A , MAMUAL' REACTOR TRIP WAS INSERTED DUE TO A TRANSIENT' INITIATED BY A i FAILURE OF A STEAH DUMP TO THE CONDENSER. DURING THIS TEST A STEAM- .
-DtRir FAILED OPEN. THE STEAM DUMP WAS THEN CLOSED BY CYCLING'IT. THE I TEST WAS CONTINUED. HOWEVER. THIS SEQUENCE WHILE ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH NATURAL CIRCULATION RESULTED IN TfAVE) BEING REDUCED TO 541 DEGREES. PRESSURIZER LEVEL BEING REDUCED TO JUST LESS THAN 17! AND THEN l PRESSURIZER PRESSURE INCREASING AGAIN TO 2340 PSI. THESE WERE ALL CRITERIA FOR MANUATt-Y TRIPPING'THE UNIT PER THE STARTUP TEST PROCEDURE.
ALL SYSTEMS FUNCTIONED AS REQUIRED FOR THE TRIP AND UNIT IS NOW STABLE i IN MODE 3. PRESSURIZER LEVEL HAS BEEN RETURNED TO NORMAL. FOUR REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS WERE RESTARTED WITHIN ABOUT 30 - 45 MINUTES. 14
f ' ;- F (Dnphasis cddad) b H. 'The three trip criteria indicated in this report were three of several
~
trip criteria listed;in Attachment 9.3 of 1-ST-22. Comparison with' l actual events, the procedure and technical specifications. indicate that (1). The Pressurizer level went below 17Z for approximately five minutes but had been recovered to 21% at the= time of the manual reactor trip. Pressurizer level below 17Z is a non-Technical Specification trip criteria listed in 1-ST-22. (2) The.Tavg less.than 541*F criteria has a 15 minute window to correct the condition (Technical Specification 3.10.3 ACTION J Statement b) or to place the reactor in Hot Standby within the next 15 minutes. Tavg went below 541*F at 1232:50 and was noted 1by Operations personnel. he reactor was shut down. prior to.the action required by this criteria. (3) The USS directed the shut down of-the reactor in anticipation of reaching the pressure trip criteria of 2340 PSIG. The actual peak' pressure was 2310 PSIG and therefore this trip criteria was not exceeded. At 1423 on June 22 the Test Director initiated a Station Information 1 l Report (SIR), which is an additional method for NHY to document an event.or condition for further review and analysis. The SIR becomes the document which encompasses or includes the Event Evaluation Team Report'and the Root Cause Analysis. The SIR includes recommended 15
r corrective' actions which are reviewed'by SORC and NSARC. 50RC and NSARC review the entire package for the adequacy of the review, analysis and recommended' corrective actions. The on-coming Shift Superintendent and Unit Shift Supervisor began implementing Operations Procedure OS 1000.08 Post Trip Review, at 1250 on June 22. This procedure provides a detailed checklist, with required signoffs, that focuses on gathering Post Trip /SI data, evalnating the data and making a recommendation for plant startup. The assigned SS, USS and SCR0 completed the post trip review and submitted. it to the Operations Manager at approximately 1700. The Station Manager reviewed the post trip review document package at 1755 and indicated that reactor restart would be contingent upon his personal approval. The Operations notification process includes' contacting the assigned Site Emergency Director (SED) for any reportable event. NHY Procedure 12830. Event Evaluation and Reduction Program, further requires the SED to assign an Event Team Leader to begin data gathering and analysis, assist the Shift Superintendent in the completion of OS 1000.08 and to communicate this information to the:
- Director of Corporate Communications
- NSARC Event Reduction Committee Members
- Station Manager
- Vice President -
Nuclear Production
- Vice President, Engineering, Licensing and Quality Programs
- President 16
_m.~ -- . _ _ - _ . _ -.
4 NRC Resident. Inspector. 4
- q Regulatory Services Manager 1 ISEG Supervisor-Event Evaluation Team Members This procedure also integrates the parallel activities associated with the Post Trip Review and Station Information Report processes and serves as.an input to the Root Cause Analysis Procedure 12810.
The chronology indicates that the assigned Site Emergency Director.
- initiated the Event Evaluation Team (EET) at approximately 1330. Thts Event Team Leader began the data gathering and analysis and assisted the assigned Operations shift crew in completing the Post Trip Review.
The EET debriefed the assigned. shift crew and had the sequence of physical plant events and responses completed prior to the Station Manager's post trip review critique at 1500 in the Technical Support Center. The Event Evaluation Report will be attached to the SIR and reviewed by SORC and NSARC. At approximately 1515 on June 22, the Station Manager conunenced the verbal debriefing of the events that caused the reactor shutdown. The preliminary results discussed at this meeting were: (1) The sequence of events, starting with the initiation of 1-ST-22, based on various plant data collection systems. (2) The primary side of the physical plant responded to the events and l reactor shutdown as anticipated. 17 I l . _ - - - _ _ - - - _ - - - - _ - - - - - - -
tT 3 l 1 i
, .(3) The secondary side of the plant responded to the events as 1
anticipated and designed with the exception of the condenser steam- ) dump valve. (4) A work request was initiated to correct MS-PV-3011.'the condenser ~ steam dump valve that caused the excessive cooldown. (5)- A work request was initiated to investigate whatLevolved.to be an
-unrelated 'D' Main Steam Isolation. Valve position problem (an air A
maintenance pump sticking pilot valve lead to component replacement to resolve the problem). (6) _The Startup Test Procedure, (1-ST-22), trip setpoints were adequate and required no revisions'. (7) The Operations Post Trip Review. EET and SIR had been initiated. The Station Manager reviewed the actions necessary for completion of the event evaluation to support a tentative restart the next day. Discussions regarding the violation of procedures and procedural corrective actions were intentionally excluded in order to focus the discussion on physical plant. This critique ended at approximately a 1630. s At approximately 1630 the Vice President - Nuclear Production and Station Management met to prepare for an 1800 conference phone call with the NRC Region I, to explain the events that transpired during the 6 18
J l .w Natural Circulation Test and to' discuss the corrective actions that NHY ! either had in progress or anticipated to be necessary prior to' restart. A discussion of the Startup procedure and Station policy on procedure adherence concluded with the recognition that the reactor should have been shut down, the recognition that the precedure adherence policy. required resolution prior to restarting the reactor and that Operations-personnel should be indoctrinated on any policy changes prior to ristarting the reactor. The discussion also included consideration of. the operator's actions based on normal operating ~ parameters and procedures which would have explained the operator's actions from a technical and operational basis. This brief period,' prior to the 1800 telephone conference call, did not provide sufficient time to fully develop and finalize.the proposed policy' revision. At 1800. NHY, on-site NRC inspectors and NRC Region I personnel conducted a telephone conference call to discuss the reactor shutdown.: NHY described the chronological sequence of events and actions currently in progress to determine and correct the failure mechanism for.the condenser dump valve and the position indicator for the 'D' MSIV. NHY also indicated that the physical parameters of the plant rreponded as anticipated and designed and that based on current maintenance activities, it was estimated that the plant could be made ready for restart by 0700 on Friday, June 23, 1989. NHY proposed to place the plant in a reactor critical, standby mode in anticipation of l correcting the physical impediments prior to resuming low power testing. l 19 l f I b_ _ ___ _ _ __ ._
y , , 4 , During the discussion f.NHY described the basis'for'the operator's 1 actions taken during the event. It'was. explained that the USS was.in command and the operators felt that they had control over the cooldown p . sequence. The operators-recognized that they were below the test procedure pressurizer low level trip limit, but knew that they were within the parameters and criteria listed in the Technical Specifications and Operations procedures. Notwithstanding their
~
procedure violation error, the operators had taken otLerwise appropriate actions to restore the pressurizer level and to re-establish the test parameters. Once they became aware of the cause, I the operators'took corrective action to close the condenser steam dump valve and thereby terminate the unanticipated excess cocidown. Four minutes and forty-eight seconds (4:48) after isolating the condenser steam' dump valve the USS ordered the reactor shut down when he determined that the plant might possibly exceed pre-specified plant. parameters before normal operating system lineups could be fully restored in a conservative, controlled fashion. 4 With regard to test procedure adherence, the NHY position was that although the USS and board operators had taken actions to operate the plant in a safe and technically sound manner, they had inappropriately violated the specific manual reactor trip criteria listed in the test procedure. NHY's position was that the USS should have immediately directed the reactor shut down when the pressurizer level reached the i 172 test limit. 20
+- m-a~----__----_.---- - - _ - - - _ - -
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h l 6 1: : l .l I x
'NHY and the NRC agreed that'a follow-up conference call would occur at 0730 on Friday morning and that'NRC concurrence would be achieved prior to restarting the reactor.
At approximately 1830, NHY Production and Station Management continued.
.their discussion of procedural adherence begun at their previous 1630' meeting. This meeting continued.until approximately 2100-and adjourned with the following conclusions and corrective actions:
The 1-ST-22 Manual Trip Criteria, indicated on Attachment 9.3 to the procedure, was appropriate and should remain in the procedure. The USS should have ordered the shut down of the reactor. NHY needed stronger policy and gsider.cc regarding procedural adherence. At approximately 2315. after having arrived home from Washington,'DC, the NHY President and CEO phoned the NHY-VP-NP for a status report. The VP-NP provided a brief summary of the 1800 conference call with the NRC Region I (Wiggins) making the following points:
-- The NRC 'seemed to be pretty well satisfied" with the NHY explanation of the details of the event.
A. couple of hardware corrective actions and some relatively minor procedure changes needed to be taken care of, but once these were concurred with by the NRC, the plant should be ready for restart. 21
,,,-- --- _ _ -- ~ _ NHY had committed to review with the NRC, its schedule of completion of hardware corrective actions such as the corrective maintenance being performed on the steam dump valve that had malfunctioned during the test. Another conference call with NRC Region I had been scheduled for 0730 Friday morning to review these items. The VP-NP then spent a few minutes focusing on the procedure compliance issue and reviewed the NHY management group's proposed position that had been developed following the 1800 conference call with the NRC. l The President and CEO indicated that he would participate in the 0730' conference call on Friday. NOTE: The President and CEO was not made aware, either during this briefing or during the next morning's 0645 pre-NRC telecon briefing, of a number of key facts associated with the 1800 NHY/NRC telecons i.e. the defense of operator actions taken os not taken, the suggestion that the operator actions were more conservative than strictly adhering to a test procedure, the possibility that the NNY procedure compliance policy was essentially adequate as written and the proposal that reactor restart be allowed to occur in parallel with NRC/NHY event evaluation conclusions and corrective action determinations. 22
, _ -_ __ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ - _ - . _ - _ _ - -_-----------_--------A
7;. 77 6 i
' yp;t ', s 4-h C ;j3
' IAd 0730 on June 23, 1989 NHY, NRC.' Region;I and on-site NRC. Inspectors Hi _.s ,
e 1
' participated in a telephone conference call that wassa-continuation'of
.the. discussion from the previous evening. . The topics. discus' sed t included:.
3r , The 1-ST-22 procedure, including the manual trip criteria; was appropriate and that revisions were not required.g NHY had adequate existing procedure adherence guidance that applied to static conditions but that this guidance was not fully: satisfactory for unanticipated transient or emergency conditions. The NHY policy recognized that strict, verbatim' compliance to ' procedures would not always be appropriate:during such transient or emergency. conditions. Otherwise NHY personnel are expected.'to-o. follow procedures. NHY recognized the need to revise the-r procedure adherence policy to accossaodate. an. unanticipated transient or emergency. situation. NHY proposed that the procedure adherence policy would'be revised' and issued through SORC within two weeks. The Station Manager would brief each operating crew prior to their assuming their next assigned shift. NHY would conduct ongoing procedure adherence training. NHY related,the status of the prerequisite actions considered to be necessary prior to a reactor restart and estimated.that they could be resolved prior to 1030 that day. 23
I ,
' Tho NRC'indicctsd that thsy had'no additional questions but' !
expressed the need~to further brief their management. The NRC committed to respond to NHY by 1000 and requested that NHY not restart until after the return telephone call. The 1000 NRC return phone call did not occur, and at approximately 1030 t the Vice President - Nuclear Production phoned the NRC Region'I to indicate that the restart readiness target had been slipped to 0700 on Saturday, June 24, 1989. Reference to the attached chronology also indicates that numerous additional internal (NHY - NHY) and external (NHY - Others) communications occurred between individuals and at impromptu meetings.
- 3. Conclusions Analysis and' comparison of the existing NHY Post Trip Review Process with the actions taken in response to the events of June 22 provides the basis for the following conclusions:
(1) NHY should have allowed the existing, conservative and deliberate approach to analyzing the events of June 22, 1989 to be completed before discussing restart schedules with the NRC. The following actions should have been completed: (a) Completion of a thorough and detailed analysis of the j .- physical events that had initiated the unanticipated l L 24 )
r-f.., transient as well as the operator actions taken in responding to the transient. (b) Completion of corrective maintenance and post' maintenance testing for the specific component that failed and a determination that similar components did not exhibit the same condition. (c) Compl'etion of the determination and dissemination of revised
= corporate policy on procedure adherence.
(d) Completion of Operations and Startup personnel specific training on the revised policy. (e) Completion of the Event Evaluation Team Report. (f) Completion of a NHY Executive Management meeting with the NRC to brief them on the results of the completed analysis and the status of in-progress corrective actions. (2) KHY should have more fully utilized the Event Evaluation Team leader as the communication rocal point within NHY. This is currently described as a primary function for this position. (3) NHY should have designated single points of contact to provide information to individuals or groups, both internal and external to NHY, for this event: 1.e. NHY to NRC, NHY to State. NHY Production to the rest of NHY. 25
(4) Communications with the NRC should have'more accurately conveyed n. that the total NHY post trip review process was still in progress, U ' that the event conclusions were still being determined, that restart decisions were still being made and that even though plant- I l equipment corrective actions were being taken in order to j _ W establish physical plant readiness to restart no restart determination would be made until all NHY and NRC concerns had been fully: addressed. (5) The NRC required (10 CFR 50.72) report should have been more accurate. The NHY four-hour reportable event communication to the NRC (Bethesda) on Thursday at 1320 was inadvertently incomplete, inaccurate and may have been a source of
~
misconmunication regarding the actual event. (6) The event evaluation review process should have more adequately-addressed the procedure or personnel contributions to events. (7) NHY should not have conveyed an inappropriate focus on resuming the Low Power Test Program and should not have engaged in inappropriate justifications of the operator actions taken in responding to the event. (8) NHY personnel contacted by the NRC during the performance of 1-ST-22 and i'nformed of the pressurizer low level trip criteria should have more appropriately conveyed this information, in a timely and effective manner, to N1fY management. 26
. 4. Post Trio Review Policy Recommendations a- w s
(1) NHY should reinforce its policy.of using a deliberate, cautious
.i and conservative-approach when! responding to future unplanned reactor shutdowns or ESF actuations,- NHY should emphasize the
' completion of the full post trip review process including a
. discussion of the results with the NRC. prior to recommending the restart of the reactor or the resumption of testing. During power ascension testing the Event Evaluation Report should be completed.
prior to recommending the restart of the reactor.
- (2) NHY Operations should review the 10 CFR 50.72 reportable event-notification process to. determine the need to use a preparer and
~
m reviewer methodology prior.to. actual transmittal of the report.
.NHY Operations should also consider confirming the reportable event communication by verification on the same day or by a next day comparison of the INPO Nuclear Network data base.
~
(3) NHY should review the effectiveness of the current internal and external post event communications processes and the assigned responsibilities to ensure that management expectations will be met in terms of timely, focused,~ accurate communications appropriate to the significance of the event. (4) NNY should re-evaluate the overall post trip review process for unplanned reactor shutdowns and the assignment of personnel by, position (i.e. Operations Manager or Assistant Operations Manager) to the Event Evaluation Team. These key management positions 27 _ _ _ _ m ___.m___m. . _ _ _ _ - - - _ - - _ _ - - - _ . _ _
i. retain line management responsibilities irrespective'of the-current post trip review processes. The direct participation, by these individuals. in the event evaluation process will assure that the individual (s). with the decision making responsibilities leading up to restart of the unit. will be fully aware of the post trip review status and conclusions. l (5) HHY should further review the event evaluation process and should evaluate the adequacy of its present criteria that concern procedure and. personnel contributions to events. NHY shoulds (a) consider incorporating the post' trip review critique meeting (held in the TSC) as a standard practice, (b) require each key participant in the event to prepare a written, chronological report as'part of their post trip report debriefing, and (c) upgrade the event evaluation process with respect.to human factors and performance analysis and corrective action determinations. (6) NHY should aggressively pursue resolution of these recommendations and complete implementation prior to Power Ascension Testing. 28 1 1 ._-l--____ _ __- _ b
D. Steam Dumo Valve Incomolete Work Reeuest j
- 1.
Background:
The steam dump valve, MS-PV-3011, that was the cause of the unplanned plant cooldown, had an open cork request pending completion of a normal operating pressure, normal operating temperature dynamic flow and stroke time retest. This retest was a NHY identified and conservative option selected to further determine valve operability and functionality following some corrective maintenance performed subsequent to the second Seabrook Station Hot Functional during February of 1987, Although it was being tracked by the Station Work Control Planning and Scheduling process, this retest was not conducted prior to the Natural Circulation Test. Several requests had been made by the retest implementation department (Instrumentation and Controls) but plant conditions did not allow retest at those times. It can not be determined at this time (post event) whether the specified retest would have successfully identified the MS-PV-3011 impending failure or not. The retest callea for a one-time, rapid stroke of the valve to verify freedom of movement over one full cycle from full shut to full open to full shut and to collect valve stroke timing data. Because the valve appeared to operate correctly during the preparations for and the onset of the Natural Circulation Test, it most probably would have successfully passed the retest without the subsequent valve binding and positioner feedback linkage problems becoming evident. 29
r-- , - - 2.
Conclusions:
- 1. . Seabrook Station Technical Specifications do not require that this-valve be OPERABLE during MODE 2 operation of.the plant.
- 2. By the Seabrook Station Maintenance Manual operability test criteria and the specified retest criteria determined to be appropriate subsequent to the corrective maintenance performed on this valve, MS-PV-3011 had not been detennined to be OPERABLE nor-had t:4 operability retest been waived'through'the applicable NHY justification / documentation procedures.
- 3. The Startup Test Program Description requires that temporary
. modifications and tag occs be evaluated but does not require that-open retests be identified or addressed prior to the conduct of a Startup Test.
1-ST-22 did require, as a-prerequisite, that the Steam Dump System be available for use. System availability was specifically considered and was determined to be satisfied by virtue of the system use during the tuergency Feedwater System testing completed on June 12, 1989 and use during the June 22, 1989 pre Natural Circulation Test preparatory activities just prior to 1-ST-22 performance. l l i 30 l l 1 _ - - _ - _
4
- 3. Recensenda tions :
- 1. Resolve the Steam Dump Valve positioner feedback linkage and valve:
binding problems on the twelve steam dump valves and other Seabrook Station valves that are of similar design and provided by the manufacturer of these valves.
'2. Revise the Startup Test Program Description to require consideration of any outstanding tetests associated with equipment to be used in any specific Startup test., outstanding retests so identified should either be performed or waived through'-
an acceptable, documented process. et i 31
a4 ' jfer.
.,-N*, 5
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l V J-l r-f A ii , ATTACHMENT C i t i e J. I \, l
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- = mm__.__m..__E__. m.____ . ' - '
- - - - . _ _ _ - - - - - ~ _ , , (i i
SB 3 & 2 Amendment 59 FSAR May 1986 1
.13.2 TRAINING 13.2.1 Operator License Trafaing Program
- a. General Discussion-1 The program will provide personnel associated with the operation of Seabrook Station training in various disciplines necessary to ensure {
that each individual can safely and effectively perform various assignments. The degree to which an employee is trained will be consistent with the individual's experience, intended position and j A regulatory requirements. Eligibility of individuals to license or renew a license pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR55 and - 45li NUREG-1021 will be certified by the Vice President - Nuclear Production. IR The Seabrook specific simulator will be made available to NRC I personnel to conduct Seabrook Operator License examinations. i Qualified requested. staff members will be available for assistance if 4& The overall objectives of the Operator License Training Program are: o To train a staff to operate and maintain the units safely, dependably and economically. o To prepare shift superintendents, unit shift supervisors, control room operators and selected station managers for the NRC licensing. examination for Reactor Operator (RO) and Senior Reactor Operator (SRO). 45 The safe, efficient operation of a nuclear power plant depends on the qualifications and proficiency of its eersonnel. Several l basic categories of training are necessary to provide licensed 45 personnel with a high degree of competence and professian-alism. Specifically, these categories of training are as follows: 45
- 1. Operator License Training All personnel requiring NRC operating licenses, as speci- '
fied in ANSI /ANS 3.1-1981, will have to undergo intensive training which will meet or exceed the minimum requirements i of 10CFR55. Prior to the initial criticality, operator 4(gl license training comes under the Initial Operator License Training Program. Operator license training completed af ter the first criticality is given by the Replacement j Operator License Training Program. i-i hh 13.2-1
SB 1 &.2 Am.ndment 62 FSAR 13.2 TRAINING 1 13.2.1. Licensed Operator Traioing
- a. General Discussion The licensed operator traini.na.Erpgragis will provide personnel skills and knowledge related to the operation of Seabrook Station necessary to ensure _that_ sach individua.' can safely _and .ef.fectively perfarto v'a'rious_ ashgnmental. Eligibili y of individuals to license or renew a license pursuant to the requi. ements of 10CFR$5 will be certified by the Vice President - Nuclear Production.
The overall objectives of the licensed operator training programs are: o To train a staff toyerate and maintain the units safely, Wpendably and economically. o To prepare shif t superintendents, unit shif t supervisors, control room operators and selected members of the Station Staff for the NRC licensing examination for Reactor Operator (RO) and Senior Reactor Operator (SRO). s: The_. safe, efficient op1 ration of a nuclear oower DlanLjepends e on the qualifications and proficiency of its personnel. Several
~
basic catigories of training are_pe_ceiurv to provide licenssd
~
gersonnel with_a_high_ degree of.. competenc,e and professionalism.. Specifically, these categories of training are as follows:
- 1. Licensed Operator Initial Training All personnel requiring NRC operating licenses, as speci-fied in 10CFR55 will have to undergo intensive training which will meet or exceed the minimum requirements of 10CFR55.
- 2. Shift Technical Advisor Training New Hampshire Yankee has a training program for the Shif t l Superintendents or Unit Shif t Supervisors to meet the long 6 2.
ters plan of satisfying the need for a Shift technical Advisor on shift. The Shif t Technical Advisor Training is designed to meet or exceed the recommended guidelines referenced by NUREG-0737.
- 3. Licensed Operator Requalific'ation Training Program This category describes the training necessary to maintain the proficiency of all Seabrook licensed personnel. This Program will meet or exceed the minimum requirements of 10CFR55, Appendix A.
13.2.1
.N
SB 1 & 2 Amzndm3nt 62
, FSAR
" Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities. Adminis t rative .
Controls and Quality . Assurance", issued by USNRC letter in August, 1977. NUREG 0737, November 1980, " Clarification of. TMI Action Plan Requirements". 13.2.2. Training for Technical and Management Staff
- a. General Discussion A comprehensive t raining program is in place for technical and management personnel, complying with the provisions and intent of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.8, Revision 1-R, with ANSI /ANS 3.1-1978 used' as ;
the standard in lieu of ANS 18.1-1971. The ororram will provide personnel invol ved with the startup _and operation of Seabrook Station training in various disciplines nee ammyy to ensure that each can saf ely and ef tective2v perrorm his assignments. The degree to which an employee is trained will be consistent with his experience, task lists for his position, and regulatsry require- l ments. 64 The overall objectives of the training _ program are: o To train a staff tr _ ope _ rate and maintain the units safely 2 dye @~SIyua f e_ con.cp1eally. o To' prepare technical service groups for their functions neces-sary for the support and safety of plant operation.
- b. Responsibilities The responsibilities for implement at i an of training programs are described in Subsection 13.2.1.b.
13.2.2.1 ' Program Description
&L Several basic categories of training help technical praccel to attain a high level of competence and professionalism. Specifically .ese categories include the following:
- a. Initial Orientation All persons joining the Seabrook Station operational organization regardless of job assignment, initially will receive orientation training. This phase of training consists of a brief informational program explaining site organization, employee benefits, company' policies and procedures.
13.2-14 I l [
k SB 1 & 2 Amendment 58 FSAR April 1986 ANSI /ANS 3.1-1981, "American National Standard for Selection and Training of l Nuclear Power Plant Personnel." 47 ANSI /ANS 3. 5-1981, " Nuclear Power Plant Simulators for Use in Operator Training."
" Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities.s, Administrative d' Controls and Quality Assurance", issued by USNRC letter in August, 1977.
KUREG 0737, November 1980, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements". 13.2.2 Training for Technical and Management Staff 45
- a. General Discussion A comprehensive training program is in place for technical and management personnel, complying with the provisions and intent of RRCl Regulatory Guide 1.8, Revision 1-R, with ANSI /ANS 3.1-1978 used as As H the standard in lieu of ANS 18.1-1971.
4T The program wil1 ~ provide personnel involved with the startup and operation of Seabrook Station training in various disciplines necessary to ensure that each can safely and effectively perform his assignments. The degree to which an employee is trained will be #6 consistent with his experience, intended position, and regulatory requirements. 5T t The overall objectives of the training program are To train a staff to operate and maintain the units safely, dependably, and economically. To prepare technical service groups for their functions necessary for the support and safety of plant operation.
- b. Responsibilities The following Seabrook personnel are responsible for this training: l
- 1. Station Manager ss n The Seabrook Station Manager has the overall responsibility for the qualification of personnel. He will review and approve all plant training programs.
l 5% i 13.2-20
SB 1 & 2 FSAR Amendment 45. June 1982 24.- Control of Special Processes Several procedures inc'.ude the following: (a) The requirements of ANS 3.2, Section 5.2.18, i.e. : (1) . Measures shall be established and documented to assure that special processes, are accomplished under controlled conditions in accordance with applicable codes, standards, specifications, criteria, and other special requirements, j and use qualified personnel and procedures. (2) Qualification of personnel, procedures, and equipment shall comply with the requirements of applicable codes and standards. (3) Special procesces are those that require interim inprocess controls in addition to final inspection to assure quality, including such process as welding, hear treating, chemical cleaning, and nondestructive examination. For special processes not covered by existing codes or standards, or where item quality requirements exceed the requirements of established codes or standards, the necessary qualifications of personnel, procedures, or equipment shall.be defined.
- 25. . Test control Several procedures include the following:
(a) The requirements of ANS 3.2, Section 5.2.19, i.e. : (1) A test program shall be established to assure that testing required to demonstrate that the item will perform satis-factorily in service is identified and documented, and that the testing is performed 'in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate or reference the re-quirements and acceptance limits contained in applicabic design documents. The test program shall cover all re-quired tests including: (a) Tests during the preoperational period to demonstate that performance of plant systems is in accordance with design intent and that the coordinated operatica of the plant as a whole is satisfactory, to the extent feasible. (b) Tests during the initial operational phase to demon-strate the performance of systems that could not be tested prior to operation, and to confirm those 45 13.5-16
- j. . . . . .
EXHIBIT 2
a
#,js coq % UNITsD sTATss
! NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASMOToN. D. C. 20:36
....+
June 26, 1989 Ivan W. Smith Esq., Chairman Richard F. Cole Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. N uclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D C 20555 Washington, D C 20555 Kenneth A. McCollom Administrative Judge
. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D C 20555 In the Matter of PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL.
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) , Docket Nos. 50-443. 50-444 Off-Site Emergency Planning i
Dear Administrative Judges:
On June 22, 1989, the facility was manually scramed due to difficulties encountered during a natural circulation startup test. As a result, NRC Region I issued the attached confinnatory action letter (CAL) 89-11. The niittt4LeirmlaH=yan3e 1Att, tatt in the inw power tatt ntogram. The Licensee is investigating sne circumstances of tne event and the NRC Staff is sending an Augmented Inspection Toast (AIT) to investigate the incident. Yours truly. I I EdwinJ.fais Deputy / Assistant General Counsel Licensing Reactor Branch l
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/o encls: Service list i 40 ~ ( L- _ - _- -_ - m -
% useree : states (o NUCLSAR RetWLAttMY COMMId$0N \....) .
i N. .mue. mees 0N I JPe ALLANSALS MOAO mumvAum , Ocekets No.: 50-443 CAL No.: 49-11 79 bite Servi:e of New Hampshire (PSNH) ATIN: Mr. Edward A. Br:wn, President and Chief Executive Officer 1 New Hampshire Yankee Divisten Post Office Box 300 Seaprook, New Hampshire 03874 Gentlemen:
Subject:
1 CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER (CAL) 8911 This letter confirms our understanding of those actions you intend to take in response to the reactor manual trip which occurrod o1 June 22,1989 during the performance of the natural circu*ation startup test. Those actions were discussed during a June 23, 1989 phone conversation b.$ tween yourself and Mr. Thomas T. Martin, Deputy Regional Administrator, NRC Regen 1. Specifteelty, we understand that, prior to startup of the unit, PSNH will: (1) Cooplete and document the results of the post-trip review process associated with the June 22, 1989 event; (2) Establish those short-term corrective actions to be completed prior to resta-t of the undt to address the specific deficiencies identified during your post-trip rev*ew; 1 (3) Determine those longer tere corrective actions and their respective I schedules, to address any potentially broader implications associated with the specific deficif ncias identified as a casult of your review; and, (4) Review the results of items (1), (2) and (3), above, with the NRC staff. We further understand that the agreement ot' the Aegtenal Administrator, Region 1, would be obtstred prior to restart of the unit. .
_. 1 "i Public' 5ervice of New Hampshire 2 i If your understanding immediately. differs from that set forth above, please call me Sincerel , b : ^-^ 1 ~ William T. Russell Regional Acministrater cc: J. C. Duffett, President and Chtef Executive J. M. Peschel, Regulatory Services Manager, NHY gram NHY Office{ i D. E. Moody, Station Mahager, NMY P. W. Agnet, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Public Safety, Commonwe41th of Massachusetts Public Document Acom (PCR)
. Local Pub 1Ic Document Room (LPOR)
Nuclear NRC Safety Resident Infomation Center (hSIC) inspector State of New Hampshire Commonwealth of Massachvaatts - Osabrcok Hearing Service 1.ist i e
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3 L UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY. COMMISSION A*0MIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before the Administrative Judges:- l Ivan W.' Smith, Chairman Dr. Richard F. Cole Kenneth A. McCollom
)
In the Matter of ) Docket.Nos. 50-443-OL
) 50-444-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY ) (Off-Site'EP)
OF NEW' HAMPSHIRE, _E_T _A_L . )-
)
'(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) May 31, 1989
)
MOTION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS ATTORNEY GENERAL TO
' HOLD OPEN THE-RECORD PENDING LOW POWFR TESTING AND THE REQUIRED YEARLY ONSITE EXERCISE AND FOR OTHER'RELATED RELIEF INTRODUCTION: GENERAL OVERVIEW'OF THIS MOTION The Massachusetts Attorney General (" Mass AG') moves that this Board hold open the record in the Seabrook full-power proceeding pending two events both of which are material and relevant to the issuance of a full-power license. These events are: 1) the testing presently contemplated pursuant to a recently issued low-power operational license; and 2) the require yearly onsite exercise presently scheduled for the
} .
s weekfof September 25, 1989.- In addition, the Mass.AG requ'est's that this Board assert its jurisdiction over any litigation arising from these two material events,. schedule a' pre-hearing. conferences pursuant to 10 CFR 2.751a, 2.752 and 2.714 at which-a-schedule.for the filing of contentions may be set, and permit. the Mass AG (and other Interveners who'may be so inclined)-the necessary access and observational opportunities to enable the timely formulation and' filing of contentions.- This motion addresses the following issues: A. Jurisdiction of this Board B. Materiality of Low-Power Testing to a Full-Power License C. Materiality of the September 1989 Onsite Exercise to a Full-Power License D. Extent and Nature of the Hearing Rights that Attach to all Issues Material to a Full-Power License
'l. Basis for Request that Record on Full Power be Held Open
- 2. Need for -a Schedule in Light of the Commission's Catawba holding E. Access is Necessary to Provide Interveners Meaningful Right to a Hearing on these Material Issues
- 1. Access to Relevant Documents
- 2. Observational status F. Need for Expedited Disposition of this Motion and Request for Schedule for Briefing and Argument ARGUMENT A. JURISDICTION OF THIS BOARD In light of recent guidance from the Appeal Board there can be no doubt that this Board has general jurisdiction "over all l
4 _____:_--____-_-___ t
l
- matte'rs pertaining now or in the' future to the application for a l'icense to' operate Units 1 and 2 [ sic] of the Seabrook i Station...." ALAB-916, May 24, 1989 Appeal Board Memorandum i and Order at'6 of slip opinion (emphasis supplied). '(Attached i as Exhibit 1). The issues raised by this motion and the matters sought to be litigated by the Mass AG pertain directly to the issuance of a full-power- license and as such are within the jurisdiction of this Board.
B. MATERIALITY OF LOW-POWER TESTING FOR A FULL-POWER LICENSE In what follows the Mass AG sets forth in some detail the basis for his claim that low-power testing 's an event (or series of events) that is material and relevant to the determination by the Commission _to issue a full-power license.
- 1. The testing, authorized in this case-pursuant to a low-power license, is required by.the Commission's regulations.
An application for an operating license must set forth "[p]1ans for preoperational testing and initial operations." 10 CFR 50.34(b)(6)(iii). The'e s plans are set forth in the FSAR and'are reviewed by the NRC Staff pursuant to the Standard Review plan and several Regulatory Guides.- See Seabrook SER, NUREG-0896, Moren 1983, Chapter 14 (Attacnea as Exnioit 2). This test program must be inclusive enough to " demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service" (SER at 14-4), and the results must be such that the " successful completion of the program will demonstrate the functional adequacy of plant structures, systems and i
1 t components."- Iji . (Emphasis supplied.). See also 10 C.p.m. 50.56, 50.57 and Part 50, App. 3, XI and Part'50, App. A, GDC 1, 14;'18, 21, 30,.31, 32, 37, 40, 43, 46, 53 and 54. (All'of which1 require. testing of specific systems and compcnents.) . 7. t is on the basis of this testing program, inter alia,'that the
~
Commission Will make the requisite finding that the'Seabrook
" facility will operate in conformity with the application as amenued, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission." 10 C.F.R. 50.57(a)(2). See also 50.57(a)(1) and (3).
- 2. Successful completion of an adequate low-power test is a precondition for the issuance of a full-power license in those circumstances in which that testing is authorized under a separate testing license.
- a. As the Appeal Board has noted:
Low-power testing is a normal,-necessary and-expected step in'the' life of every nuclear = plant. This is true whether such testing is-planned under the authorization of a' separate fuel loading and low-power testing license .... . or scheduled as the first step toward operation under the authority of a full-power license, pacific Gas & Electric Co'. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777, 794-95 (1983). Because the Commission has determined that in this case low-power testing should precede the issuance of a full-power license, the successful completion of that testing itself becomes an issue material and relevant to that full power license. If this were not the case, then the Commission's statements nnn
4 p I i regarding the relationship between a further delay.in' low-powe.r testing and a concomitant delay in full-power licensing would be senseless'and unsupported. See, e.g.,_CLI-89-08, May 18, 1989, slip opinion at'27 b. Successful completion of an adequate low-power testing program _is also a precondition to_ full-power licensing oecause of the purposes which low-power testing serves. Specifically, low-power testing should." allow the early discovery and correction of unforeseen but possib; problems which may prevent or delay full-power operation. . . . Long Island Lighting Company, (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), CLI-85-12, 21 NRC 1587, 1590 (1985)(emphasis supplied) ' (Attached as Exhibit 3). Thus, low-power testing may well reveal " undiscovered design and construction defects." 47 Fed.
- ( i_.
Reg. 30232, 30233 (July 13, 1982).
- 3. The Commission itself views preoperational and low-power testing as material to its full-power licensing decision. See portions of NRC's Brief For Respondents, dated July 1983 filed with the D.C.. Circuit in UCS v. NRC, No.
82-2053, 735 F.2d 1437 (1984) attached as Exhibit 4. However, the NRC has asserted (and no doubt will again assert) that such "preoperational tests, low-power tests and power ascension tests are not the subject of Licensing Board hearings." Respondent's Brief at 15 n.7 However, this position is no ! longer tenable in light of the D.C. Circuit's decision in UCS
- V. NRC. The Court held that:
_ _ __ a b _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - - _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1 Once a hearing on a licensing proceeding is begun, it must encompass all naterial factors bearing requestor. on the licensing decision raised by the 735 F.2d at 1443. (This case is attached as Exhibit 5.) Because the successful completion of an adequate low-power test program is material and relevant to the issuance of a full-power license, the Mass AG has a right to litigate that testing.1 i 1/ As is clear from a review of UCS v. NRC and the relevant portions of the NRC's brief attached as Exhibit 4, the Commission defended its challenged 1982 rulemaking setting emergency exercises outside of the adjudicatory hearing process while maintaining such exercises as material to a licensing decision by comparing them to preoperational testing which the Commission asserted is similarly material but not litigable. In developing this comparison, the Commission expressly highlighted the extent to which both emergency exercises and preoperational testing involve issues of judgment concerning complex matters. In fact, the Commission noted that: The full scale exercise is analogous to the evaluation of plant systems at operating power levels during power ascension testing. Where problems are discovered, they are addressed > I before full commercial operation is achieved. On the other hand, the applicant's emergency plan is akin to the design of the facility. . . . pre-operational testing is no less crucial to plant safety than the full-scale exercise is crucial to measuring emergency preparedness. . . . ; 48 Fed. Reg. 16691, 16692, 16694 (April 19, 1983). The Commission no doubt believed that since preoperational testing assertedly is not litigable and emergency exercises are analogous to that testing, the Court would find that such exercises need not be litigated. The Court, of course, ruled directly contra and ; i held that the exercises are material to licensing and, therefore, litigable. { Although unchallenged from that day to this, the NRC's j assumption that it can by fiat exclude from litigation the low- l power testing program which it acknowledges is material to a full- ' power license directly contradicts the decision of the Court in UCS v. NRC. For the same reasons the NRC argued to the D.C. Circuit that preoperational testing is analogous to emergency exercises and should be treated similarly, the Commission cannot , exclude such testing from the adjudicatory process without contravening UCS v. NRC. i
C. MATERIALITY OF THE SEPTEMBER 1989 ONSITE EXERCISE A partial participation onsite emergency exercise is presently scheduled for the week of September 25, 1989 (See May 5, 1989 letter of William Lazarus to PSNH attached as Exhibit 6.) This emergency exercise is a requirement for.the issuance cf any full-power license to Seabrook after June 27, 1989 (i.e., one year after the last onsite exercise). This requirement is unambiguously set forth at Part 50, App. E, IV, F.1: If the full participation exercise is conducted more than one year priot to issuance of an operating license for full power, an exercise which tests the licensee's onsite emergency plans shall be conducted within one year before issuance of an operating license for full power. As an emergency exercise material and relevant to the issuance of a full-power license, the Mass AG has a right under the Atomic Energy Act to litigate the results of this exercise. UCS v. NRC. The Commission as recently as May 1987 ta'citly acknowledged the Mass AG's right to litigate an onsite exercise prior to the issuance of a full-power license. In promulgating its Final Rule setting two years as the timing requirement for a full participation exercise prior to full-power licensing, the Commission noted that a " pre-operational onsite exercise will continue to be required one year prior to full-power l operation." 52 Fed. Reg. 16823, 16825 (May 6, 1987) (Attached as Exhibit 7). ;e Commission noted further that: I _ _ _ __ ___ g
I i 1 it'is clear.that the results of exercises are litigable in the operating license proceeding, irrespective of when those exercises are' held,aso long as the holding of an exercise is a
' pre-license requirement.
Id. at 16827. j Finally, in response to a public comment concerning the i j i retention in the new rule of the one-year requirement, the j Commission stated as follows: } Summary of Comment
. . . Edison disagreed with the last two i sentences of the proposed rule which require the i Applicant to conduct an exercise of its onsite plan if the offsite exercise is more than one year prior to issuance of the operating license.
Edison argued that the additional test would be of marginal value and might tend to introduce additional issues into the operating license hearing. . On this basis Edison recommended deletion of the last two sentences of the proposed rule. Commission Response The Commission disagrees that a pre-operational onsite exercise within one year before issuance of a full-power operating-license is of marginal value . . .. And since, unlike the situation with offsite exercises, no one has-identified any existing response or timing' difficulty with the onsite requirement, we find no reason to-revise the requirement at this time. Id. at 16824-25. D. EXTENT AND NATURE OF THE HEARING RIGHTS THAT ATTACH TO ALL MATERIAL ISSUES
- 1. Request That The Record Be Held Open Pending Completion of Low-Power Testing and the September Onsite Exercise.
1 I
-a-
2 It is' clear that once it is determined that low-power testing and the. September onsite exercise are material and relevant.to the issuance of a full-power license, the Mass AG. has a right to litigate these~ events. UCS v. NRC at 1443.. Moreover, this public hearing right is impermissible' burdened if the Mass AG must seek to reopen closed proceedings in order to secure these hearing rights. Id. at 1444. Put another way: to the extent that low-power testing and the next annual < onsite exercise are themselves material to a future. full-power license, the full-power record should not be closed before the Mass AG has had an opportunity,. pursuant to the Commission's procedural regulations, to litigate these events. Just as the Interveners did not have to reopen the record to litigate the June 1988 exercise, so they should not have to do so to litigate low-power testing or the'1989 onsite exercise, the successful completion of which is a condition of. full-power licensing. To this end, the Mass AG requests that this Board hold the record open pending the admission of any acceptable contentions filed in response to these two events.
'2. Pre-hearing conference, late-filed contention standard and Catawba The Mass AG also requests that a pre-hearing conference be set at which a schedule can be determined for the filing of-contentions arising out of low-power testing and the September 1989 onsite exercise. Further, the Mass AG seeks clarification as to whether any contention arising therefrom is subject to 1
the late-filed contention standard. Cf. Duke Power Company (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2) 17 NRC 1041 (1983). (Attached as Exhibit 8.) Obviously, if the Board holds a pre-hearing conference and sets a schedule for the filing of contentions, as it did.for the June 1988 exercise, such contentions should not be subject to the late-filed contention standard. In any event, the Mass AG requests that a deadline for-the submission of contentions be established so that in the event the late-filed contention standard is applicable, the Mass AG can have notice as to when, after these future events, contentions, although " late-filed," are still filed with " good cause . .
. for failure to file on time." 10 C.F.R.
2.'/14(a)(1).2/ E. ACCE6S IS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE MEANINGFUL RIGHT TO A HEARING With regard to both low-power testing and the September onsite exercise,'the Mass AG requests that this Board provide reasonable access and observational status to the Mass AG and his experts so that he might meaningfully observe both events. 4 Such access should include, but not be limited to,'all documents generated prior to, during and after low-power testing and the September onsite exercise which are relevant to an assecament of the performance of both the plant and all plant systems tested and the emergency onsite staff. l 2/ Obviously, intelligible contentions cannot be filed before the events occur. If every contention fii.ed after the event is nonetheless late-filed ur. der Catawba, toer. the Mass AG seeks a ; schedule so that he can establish " good cause" for the failure j j to file on time. I - - _ -- - .i
j 1 i F. l REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED DISPOSITION-OF THIS MOTION The Mass AG seeks expedited disposition of this motion ' oecause'the ongoing low-power testing program.is possibly of short duration and, in the event the Board grants this motion in whole or in part, the request for access and observational status vis-a-vis this testing program requires immediate relief. Respectfully submitted, COMMONWEALTH OF' MASSACHUSETTS JAMES M. SHANNON ATTORNEY GENERAL I / n Traficonte '
.ief,' Nuclear Safety Unit epartment of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108-1698 (617) 727-2200 DATED: May 31, 1989
+
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..'5 EXHIBIT 4 4
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DCS No! 50443890622 Date: June 23, 1989 , ELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE--PNO-I-89-48A
-This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or put:lic interest significance. The information is as' initially received without verification or evaluation, and is basically all that is known by the Region I staff on this date.
Facility: Licensee Emergency Classification: Public Service of New Hampshire Notification of Unusual Event Seabrook, Unit 1 Alert Seabrook .New Hampshire Site Area Emergency Docket No. 50-443 General Emergency X Not Applicable
Subject:
UPDATE ON JUNE 22, 1989 MANUAL REACTOR TRIP EVENT - ISSUANCE OF CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER On June 23, 1989 Mr. Thomas'T. Martin issued Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) 89-11. The CAL confirms comitments made by Mr. Edward Brown, President and CEO of New Hampshire Yankee that, prior to restart of the unit, the licensee will complete its post-trip review process, establish and implement necessary short-term corrective actions to address the specific deficiencies identified during the review, determine appropriate long-term corrective actions to address any 30tentially broader implications of the identified deficiencies, and brief tie NRC staff on the results of
ese reviews. Further, the agreement of the Regional Administrator, Region I, would obtained prior to restart.
Media interest is anticipated associated with the issuance of the CAL. The State of New Hampshire and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts have been informed. A Commissioners' Assistants briefing is planned. CONTACT: J. Wiggins FTS 346-5224 DISTRIBUTION: OWFN MNBB H-St. NL Mail: ADM:DMB LTaTrman Zech AT55 EE ES DOT:Trans only Com. Roberts ARM PDR . . . . Com. Carr 0GC "NRC Ops Ctr Com. Rogers Com. Curtiss MINPO--M SECY NMSS NSAC---- CA NRR OGC OIA Regional Offices GPA 0! RI Resident Office PA SLITP . EDO OE Licensee: (Reactor Licensees) gion ! Form 83
.dev April 1988) l C/R Distribution: Chm, Cmrs' GPA. GC. CA. PDR, Historian' I SECY. Records. '
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I' . ( \ t f Ii l : 1 1. l l l* l l 1 t J. l-l' EXHIBIT 5 Ii I e _ ___._.m._--_m_.-_m._._._-. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . .
New Hampshire NE l CYankee , ___. l'
Contact:
Ron shs (603) 4, For Immediate Release (603)47 June 22, 1989 M_EDIA ADVISORY M Y'S TESTINE SEAggG0g $TATION OPERATORS SHUT O M REACTOR DURIN de ! seabrook, N.H. -- Operators at the Seabrook Station nuclear power p ' temporarily shut down the reactor at 12:36 p.m. today in accordanc , strict technical criteria governing the current low-power test program. New Hampshire Yanket spokesman Ron $her said preliminary indication are that a steam valve in the non-nuclear side of the plant remai longer than required. This valve is designed to direct steam from the four' shut down the reactor. steam generators to the plant's condenser. i too much aThe valve remained open' longer than it should have, draw ng . steam away from the plant's steam generators," Sher said. "Under ou operating procedures, control room operatort, manually shut down th Engineers are now checking the valve and once the situation is corr . operators will restart the reactor and resume the low-power testing program." The plant's reactor was at three percent power when the s ' occurred, Sher said. steam valves which delayed the start of low-power tesl !
$her said, 'To put this in perspective, there are approximately 6,000i '
valves in the plant. The reason we do tests is to ensure that all plant The low-power testing of the reactor in l systems are working as designed.the past nine days has gone very we've had in the test schedule.' ' the reactor will be re-started and the final phase o New Hampshire Yankee will notify the news media once the reactor resum . oeprations. 4 g b e S 9 9 A 4 g e ,
n. 3 .- New Hampshire tankee \EWS for km:ediate Release June 23, 1989
Contact:
Ron $her (603) 474-3564 (603)474-9521 NRC_0RDERS Seabrook TEMPORARY $USPENSION OF LOW-POWER TES N.H. -- The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission this suspension of further low power testing at Seabrook S yesterday's shutdown of the reactor. concerns that control room operators did not strictly follo in determining when to shut down the reactor.
"The NRC has indicated to us that they want a thorough review of the until this shutdown, reactor and thatBrown review is complete." they would said. not allow a re-start of the reactor soon as we can so we can complete these important se generalBrownpublic.said, "At no time was there a risk to plant systems or to the Control room cperators at all times maintained safe operation of the reactor."
During testing yesterday the four steam generators as p, art of ths low power test program, sinc turbine is not being used to produce electricity. steam was being sent to the condenser through one valve. ch Control system. room operators closef the valve and continued to monitor the After a few minutes, operators were not satisified with the s yesterday. and decided to manually shut down the reactor at 12:36 p.m.ystem operation, in systh consiti6Es,""We did not strictly adhere to our test procedures during thes too long before actually performing the shutdown.'Brcwn said.Mt NRC said we waite letter outlining their concerns and their requirements for addi information on yesterday's reactor shutdown. be scheduling a public meeting to discuss the matter.Tne NRC also said it would
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New Hampshire tankee NEWS "Ecr Imediate Release ' ontact: C Ron Sher (603) 474-3564 June 23, 1959 (603) 474-9521 NRC ORDERS TEMPORARY _ SUSPENSION OF LOW-POWER TESTING AT SEABROOK STATION Seabrook, N.H. -- The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission this af ternoon informed New Hampshire Yankee that it was ordering a temporary sur. pension of further low-power testing at Seabrook Station following yesterday's shutdown of the reactor. New Hampshire Yankee President Edward A. Brown said the NRC expressed concerns that control room operators did not strictly follow a procedure in determining when to shut down the reactor.
"The NRC has indicated to us that they want a thorough review of the reactor shutdown, and that they would not allow a re-start of the reactor until this review is complete," Brown said. "We intend to respond promptly anc thoroughly to the NRC's request, and to answer their questions as soon as we can so we can complete these important series of tests."
} Brown saic, "At no time was there a risk to plant systems or to the I general public. Control room operators at.all times maintained safe operation of the reactor." l During testing yesterday, steam was being sent into the condenser from I the four steam generators as part of the low-power test program, since the turbine is not being used to produce electricity. Ir.strumf1ts then showed changes in the pressure and temperature of plant systems since too much steam was being sent to the condenser through one valve. Control room operators closed the valve and continued to monitor the system. Aft 6r a few minutes, operators were not satisified with the system operation, and decided to manually shut d wn the reactor at 12:36 p.m. yesterday. I "We did not strictly adhere to cur test procedures during these changes in syliIE concriJons," Brown said. "The NRC said we waited savarsi minutes too long before actually performing the shutcown." The NRC informed New Hampshire Yankee today that it was sending a I letter outlining their concerns and their requirements for additional information on yesterday's reactor shutdown. The NRC also said it would be scheduling a public meeting to discuss the matter. Seabrook Station's plant systems are currently at normal operating l pressure and temperature while the reactor is snutdown.
"We take the NRC's concerns very seriously," Brown said. "We intend to respond to their concerns quickly, and to take all f.ecessary steps to ensure we're in compliance with the NRC's regulations."
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United States Court of Appea's
.For the First Circuit No. 88-2211 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, Petitioner,.
v. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondents. ; ON. PETITION FOR REVIEW OF ORDERS OF THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before Bownes and Breyer, Circuit Judcas, and Gray, Sanior District Judae. Steohen A. Jonas, Deputy Attorney General, Chief, Public Protection Bureau, with whom James M. Shannon, Attorney General, and John Traficontg,' Assistant Attorney. General, Chief, Nuclear Safety Unit, were on brief for petitioner. Carole F. Kaqan, Senior Attorney, with whom William C. Parler, General Counsel, William H. Bricas '. Jr., Solicitor, E. Leo Slaccie, Deputy Solicitor, and Jeffrav P. Kehne, . Land and Natural Resources Division, Department of Justice,. were on brief for respondents. R.K. Gad III with whom James B. Levy, Rones & Grq and William S. Stowe were on brief for intervenor Boston Edison Company. JUNE 29,1989 l' l l. l *O f the Central District of California, sitting by designation. l-Y __ _- __- ___ _- __
\
)
BOWNES, circuit Judae, Petitioner, Massachusetts, the Commonwealth of requests that we set aside three actions taken by the respondents, Nuclear Regulatory the United States and the Uniteds State Commission Commission), (collectively, NRC or with respect to the operation of Pilgrim Nuclea r Power Station (Pilgrim) by the Boston Ediso n Company (Edison), which is an intervenor in this action. to dismiss NRC and Edison moved the petition on jurisdictional grounds . For the reasons set forth below, we deny the petition; we do not dismiss it on jurisdictional grounds . j I. FACTS In 1972, . Edison was issued a license to operate Pilgrim. Because of problems, Pilgrim was shut down Edison in April 1986. voluntarily by The shut down and continued cessation of operation were accomplished without a formal NRC. order by the The NRC required, however, that Edison satisfy it that certain improvements had been made before it would restart of Pilgrim. allow the These improvements involving operations, maintenance covered 47 items and security. 1987, In August the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) its finding that Pilgrim's withdrew off-site adequate. emergency plan 1 was Shortly thereafter, NRC informed Edison that a 1 the nuclear power plant.An off-site emergency plan is one for the area surrounding
-mM" __- _ -- - ---- ~
decision to-restart Pilgrim would also involve consideration of the matters raised by FEMA. By late 1988, the NRC staff had completed its review of Edison's improvements and recommended that the Commission approve restart. On December 9, 1988, the Commission held-a meeting with state and-local officials at which the officials stated that restart was inappropriate because of the current state of the emergency plans. The NRC staff reiterated its position that, although the improvements were not complete, there had been sufficient progrees in all troubled areas so warrant restart. On December 21, 1988, the Commission voted unanimously to allow restart by a staged power ascension plan under NRC staff oversight. On December 29, 1988, the NRC denied part of a Commonwealth petition to modify, suspend or revoke Pilgrim's license brought pursuant to 10 C.F.R. SS 2.202, 2.206.2 The NRC had previously denied other parts of th'is petition with respect to issues not germane to the present case. The only 1 1 relevant issue concerned deficiencies in the emergency plans. ) The NRC's reasons for denying this part of the petition were i cet forth in a publi=hed decision. Egg Boston Edison Co., 28 l N,R.C. 814 (1988). I 2 This petition was different from the one at issue in Massachusetts Public Interest Research Grouo, Inct v. HEC, 852 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1988). I l w____-___-
[. On January 5, 1989, the NRC granted Edison its third exemption from the requirement under 10 CFR F. . .
. 50 App. E 5 IV 3 that it conduct a biennial full parti i preparedness drill. c pation emergency Edison was. exempted from that require "provided th ment at such an exercise be conductedayswithin after the completion of the power ascension program."
Reg. 336, 338-(1989). 54 Fed. On December 21, 1988, in this court seeking review of the NR 'the Comm Pilgrim to restart. C s decision to allow The petition was amended to include NRC' s subsequent-denial on December 29, ! 1988 of the Commonwealth's petition to modify, suspend or, revoke Pilgrim' Commonwealth has also requested s license. The tMt the NRC's grant of an exemption to Pilgrim from emergency preparedness addressed at this time. Its drills be. , motion' to amend, now pending before this court, to a nelude the emergen cy drill exemption fer. review is hereby grantind because all of the NRC' o n' the same' basic s actions bear issue--emergency plans at Pilgrim. The commonwealth seeks reversalof the r.0tions by NRC allowing Pilgrim to restart, denying its petitio
. the exemption. n and granting Edison It also contends that the 47 modifications required prior to restart and the emergency drill exemption entitled it to a hearing pursuant to 42 U S.C. .
189(a) 5 2239(a) (5 of the Atomic Energy Act) and asks that we order such a hearing and suspend the NRC's orders pending th e hearing. 1 5 4
a On January 11, '1989,- we ' permitted Edison t- intervene.
# . Ori January 24,. 1989,._NRC. and - Idison . moved to dismiss the A
petition on four jurisdictional grounds: '(1) there was no
" f i n a l ,; o r d e r " under 28 U.S.C.
5 2342(4)- and 42 U.S.C. 5 2239(b) ;l (2) the Commonwealth is not a " party" under 28 U.S.C.
>. 5 2344; (3) the NRC's. order did not involve the " granting,
' suspending,. revoking or amending" of. Pilgrim's license under.
742 U.S.C. 5 - 2239 (a) ;- and . (4) denials of 5 2.206 petitions 3 are not reviewable under ' Massachusetts Public Interest' Research - Groun. Inc. v. HEC, 852 c.2d 9 gist Cir. 12o6) (Mass. PING). On February 21, 1989, the Commonwealth moved for ' an' interlocutory. injunction to prevent Pilgrim from being operated at more- than. five percent ~ of full power. On March 7, we . denied the motion but -ordered an expedited briefing' and argument
- schedule.
.We' address initially the first two issues raised by the'
- motion to dismiss: finality and the Commonwealth's ' " party" status.. Thereafter, we turn. to the issues - raised by the .
. petition and incorporate in that discussion the other issues
. raised by the motion to dismiss.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS A.- Final Order Review of NRC decisions is governed by the Hobbs Act, 28 3 Section 2.206 petitions are requestar made by any person to have the NRC institute proceedings to modify, suspend or revoke a=. license already granted by the NRC. 5 -- I L- __- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ . _ _ .
's U.S.C. 5 2342(4).' .)
Recently wn addressed the finality requirement and stated: i
- y an agency hasThe standa'rd for determining whether 1 taken final agency action within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Boston MarineActTerminal is set forth in Port of I Association v. 1 Rederiaktiebolaaet 62, 91 S.Ct. 203 Transatlantic, 400 U.S. .
~
"(T]he relevan,t 27 L.Ed.2d 203 determining finality considerations are whether. the (1970) in :
3 hasnot will reached disrupt athe stage 9here judicial reviewproc adjudication ~ and orderly process of: whether rights or obligations have been determined or legal consequences action." JJi,.willat 71, flow ' from the agency , 91 S.Ct. at 209 ! (citations omitted). i Mass. PIRG, 852 F.2d at 13; agg also. Dickinson v. Zech, 846 F.2d 369, 371 (6th Cir. 1988) ("an order is final only if it 4 4 d This section appeals over "allgrants finalexclusive orders ofjurisdiction to th 4 e court of section 2239 pertinent part: of title 42." 42 [NRC) made reviewable U.S.C. 5 2239 provides by in 1 (a) (1) In any proceeding under this chapter, for the granting, revoking, suspending constructionorpermit, amending of any-license or, 1 or ^ transfer control, . application to shall grant a hearing upon the thecommission request of any person by the proceeding whose interest may be affected and shall admit any such person as a pa,rty to such proceeding. (b) Anyoffinal proceeding order entered in any the kind- specified in subsection (a) of this section shall be subject.to judicial prescribed in review in the manner section Act, aslo of the Administrative Procedure amended. l
' imposes an obligation, denies a right, or fixes some legal relationship, usually at the consummation of an administrative process.'") (quoting HED.C v. HB,C, 660 F.2d 810, 815 (D.C. Cir.
1982)). ' The December 21, 1988 decision authorizing the restart of Pilgrim was final. The decision was the last action necessary to be taken by the NRC prior to Edison being allowed to restart Pilgrim. Indeed, Pilgrim has already resumed low level operation. Barring some unforeseen event at Pilgrim, the liRC fill take no further action. There "5s thus no ongoing proce ding for judicial review to disrupt. And the decision determined Edison's right to restart Pilgrim. TP' grant of an exemption from emergency drills is a final order for the same i reasons the decision to restart is: there is no ongoing proceeding to disrupt and the exemption determined Edison's right not to conduct the drill. Finally, we have already held that the denial of a 5 2.206 petition is a final action. .; Mass. PIRG, 852 F.2d at 13-14. I B. Commonwealth as a " Party" I NRC and Edison next argue that because the Commonwealth i 1 was not a party to the Nnc's actions, it cannot be a " party aggrieved by the final order." 28 U.S.C. I 2344.5 1 This 5 This section provides in pertinent part: "Any party i aggrieved by the fi.nal order may, within 60 days after its I entry, file a petition to review the order in the court of appeals wherein vetae lies."
-argument is' circular. _
Thr. Commonwealth is, in part, claiming that the NRC should have made it a party t holding hearings and . instituting certain pr o these actio oceedings. The NRC cannot now claim that by refusing to grant the c requests .\ to become a party, commonwealth's j review. the NRC's decisions are bajond i l III. COMMONWEALTH'S RIGHT TO A BEAR l ' The - Commonwealth hearing pursuant contends that it was entitled tu a to 42 ' U.S.C. !i 2239(a) i restarted.' before Pilgrim _was
. It argues that the NRC's y
improvements, granting the actions--requiring 47 i and allowing Pilgrim exemption from emergency drills,
. to restart--amounted to either an amendment to or a reinstatement of se Pilgrim. Edison's to operatelicen A. Amendment 1 The Commonwealth contends that by requiring Edison to address 47 items and by granting the exemption fr om emergency drills, NRC amended Edison's license .
j The Third circuit was ! faced with a similar issue: whether an NRC decision that _155 conditions be met before restart constituted a license amendment requiring a hearing. In re Three Mile Island Alert, Inc_, 771 F.2d '/2 0 (3d Cir. 6 suDra.The relevant part of this statute is set for th i 1 n note 4, l i
~8- i t
)
_ - - - - - - - - ' ' - }
l 1985) (Ilil) , cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986). The court held this was not a license amendment; it reasoned as follows: The sole effect of that Order is to lift the 1979 shutdown orders; the licensee has j no greater operating authority by virtue j of the May 29, 1985 Order than it had on July 1, 1979. It is true that the l Commission, as a condition of lifting its shutdown order, has imposed numerous restrictions on the way in which the licensee may exercise its existing authority, but petitioners have pointed us to nothing in this record which indicates that the Commission has purported to effect amendments to the license or that license amendments are necessary to permit the licensee to operate in accoidance with the restrictions which have been imposed. The imposition of conditions on the lifcing of the stay and thus on the licensee's interim operations does not establish that the Commission has purported to amend the outstanding license since the Commission's regulations contemplate that such restrictions may be imposed during the course of a proceeding ; to determine whether or not license amendments or other actions are appropriate. li. at 729 (footnotes omitted); see also San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. HEC, 751 F.2d 1287, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (SLQ) (lifting of a license suspension is not an amendment to the license), reh'a en banc on other arounds, 789 F.2d 26 (D.C. Cir. ) , cert . denied, 479 U.9. 923 (19A6). ws adopt this reasoning and hold that the imposition of 47 requirements on Edison prior to restart was not a license amendment. The exemption to the regulation requiring biennial emergency drills raises a different problem because Edison's
e license requires it to operate in accordance with NRC regulations, one of which calls.for holding such drills. The NRC granted .the exemption pursuant .to 10 C.F.R. 5 50.12 (a) (2) (v) .# - .The same regulation which imposes the emergency drill requirement, 10 C.F.R. 50 App. E 5 IV F. 3, allows.for exemptions to it,'10 C.F.R. 5 50.12 (a) (2) (v) . The exemption did not change Edison's duty to follow NRC rules;.it only changed which rule applied for a brief period of time. ' Edison was thus operating in accordance with its unaltered license. This is not a situation in which the NRC permanently exempted the licensee from following a specific license i requirement. Nor is this a case where the NRC has changed Edison's license in such a way that Edison is no longer required to' follow NRC's regulations and rules. .Rather, this.
~
is a case where the NRC has temporarily exempted the licensee,
.i on the basis of an existing rule, from one of many rules marle I
3 7 This section states: f
\
(2) The Commission will not consider { granting an exemption unless special l circumstances are present. Special circumstances are present whenever-l l (v) The exemption would provide only temporary relief from the applicable regulation and the licensee or applicant has made good faith efforts to comply with the regulation. u I E- - -
1 I { generally applicable by the license. This does not amount to .l l a license amendment. i B. Reinstatement We agree with the Commonwealth that the deci; ion to allow
}
Edison to restart Pilgrim was a reinstatement of Edison's l license. NRC's and Edison's argument that because.there was no formal revocation of Edison's license there could be no reinstatement is not tenable. I Edison, by its voluntary shutdown and continued cessation 4 of operations, made unnecessary for the NRC to revoke
, formally its license The NRC nonetheless stated clearly and consistently that it would not allow Pilgrim to restart until it was satisfied with Edison's improvements.a The fact that the NRC did nc'. call its decision to restart a " reinstatement" of the license is not controlling. Columbia Broadcasting System. Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942) ("the particular label placed upon [its action) by the Commission is not - necessarily conclusive, for it is the substance of what 8 Edison's contention that it could have restarted at any time without first obtaining the MRC's approval is not supported by the record. 333, LL. , August 18, 1987 letter from NRC to Edison at 2 ("The determination to restart the Pilgrim plant will involve, in part, consideration of the FEMA identified emergency planning issues.") ; December 31, 1986 letter from NRC to Edison ("The NRC is looking for strong evidence of progress at Pil. grim prior to restart. . . . Further, you should note that we plan to complete a SALP review prior to reaching a position regarding the restart of the Pilgrim facility.").
SALP is an acronym for "Sytematic Assessment of Licensee Performance." m _ . - _ - - - - - - _ - _ _ _ . __ - - - - _ - -
th'e commission has purported to do and has done which is
' decisive.").
The substance of the NRC's action was that $ Edison could not operate' Pilgrim pursuant to its license until the NRC allowed it'to do so. The decision allowing this was { a reinstatement of the right to operate Pilgrim pursuant to the license that had been in effect prior to the shut-down . Holding that the NRC's action was a license reinstatement does not, however, mean that the Commonwealth is entitled to a hearing.' k A hearing is mandatory only when the proceeding concerns the " granting, suspending, revoking, or amending" of j the license. 42 U.S.C. 5 2239(a)." In a case involving the lifting of "a license suspension, the District of ' Columbia Circuit stated: ! As we have discussed above, what legislative history there exists suggests the Congress that section intended the provisions of to be construed quite literally. If a particular form of Commission action does not fall within one of the eight categories set forth in the section, no hearing need be granted by the Commission. 1 Section the lifting [2239(a)) of a makeslicensenosuspension. mention of Petitioners have suggested no reason for construing and our such action as an " amendment," suggests examination of the section , none. The lifting suspension does of a nothing to alter the k 9 ggsItsection does mean that there is judicial review of this action IV, infra. . i 10 2239(a) The other grounds for a mandatory hearing set forth in 9 are not relevant to this case. i { i r
gmmm %- p , 7 y. 5
, _. e . ;
original terms Lof a license: indeed, it L4 . removes a significant fimpedim'e nt- to the L enforcement of 'those -terms. ,Nor do G we h
.believe that. Congress intended'the. lifting o f . a l i c e n s e .'s u s p e n s i o n to -:be : subsumed -
within the statutory category ofGlicense- ! suspensions.
'~
If it had,. then' we should
' also conclude' that license revocations are.
implicitly; included in the category of
' license grants; but Congress- found 'it necessary to ' list revocations' as a separate category. Because none ofLthe actions'specified in section (2239(a)) may be said to- include the- lifting of 'a license suspension, we conclude that such
- action does not give rise-to-the right to a hearing.
71Q, 2 751- F.2d- at 1314 (footnotes. omitted; . ercphesis -- in
. original). We can'see no principled reason to ' distinguish -
between. the- lifting of. a license suspension and- the reinstatement of 2 a license for' purposes L of ~ l 2239(a). The Jeffects are the.same 'the licensee . may now operate again under its original license; the' terms'of the license have not beer altered.' Because reinstatement is not listed' as a specific action giving rise to a hearing, no hearing right is created b'y 5 2239(a)."
, 'IV. REVIEW-0F.NRC'8. ACTIONS .
- i. ;The NRC's actions with respect to' licensing matters are reviewable by this court even when no hearing is mandated.
11 Because we find that no hearing was required, we need not decide whether the Commonwealth is a "persor whose interest may' { be,affected by the proceeding" entitled to a hearing under S ) 2239. fla.'Belotti v. HRG, 725 F.2d 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that - the Commonwealth was not such a person with respect to an' earlier amendment of Pilgrim's license).
- _ _ )
- g. ..
l Florida Power & Liaht-Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S.-729, 737: (1985) ("We conclude . . .. that Congress intended to provide :for initial court of -appeals t. view of all final orders in
. licensing proceedings whether or not a hearing before the Commission occurred or'could have occurred."). We thus review the. three actions contested by the Commonwealth:~' (1) the
~
restart decision; (2) the exemption from the emergency drill L. L regulation; and (3) the denial of the Commonwealth's 5 2.206 petition to modify, suspend or revoke Pilgrim's license. The l: parties agree that the first two are reviewed under 5 U.S.C. . l~' 5 706 (2) (A) , i.,A,, .were the NRC's actions " arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in l accordance with law." The parties also agree that the 5 2.206 denial is - reviewd under the standard set forth by this court in Mass. PIRG, 852 F.2d 19: did the NRC inexcusably default on ,its fundamental responsibility to protect the public safety. A. The Restart Decision The. scope of, review of NRC actions is extremely limited. The Atomic Energy. Act of 1954 is hallmarked by the amount of discretion granted the ~~ 8~~4aa in working to achieve the statute's ends. The Act's regulatory scheme "is virtually unique in the degree to which broad responsibility is reposed in the administering agency, free of close prescription in its. charter as to how it shall proceed in achieving the statutory objective." sieaal v. Agg, 130 U.S. App. D.C. 307, 312, 400 F.2d 778, 783 (1968). l ___n._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ l
t
. Public Service Co. of N.H. v. HB.G. 582 F.2d 77, 82 (1st Cir.),
cert. signied, 439 U.S. 1046.,(1973). This review is "at its most deferential" when 'it involves scientific or technical issues. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983). In reviewing the findings made by the NRC, we may:not
" displace the (NRC's] choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though (we] would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before (us] de novo."
Universal Camera Coro, v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). The Third circuit explicated the stand;- J of review when it reviewed a similar vote to restart a nuclear power plant: Our " limited, albeit important, task" is to review " agency action to determine whether the agency conformed with' con-trolling statutes." Is;b. at 97, 103-S.Ct. at. 2252. In unde caking this task, we must be mindful both of the Congressional policy choice favoring the development of nuclear power and of the Congressional mandate that the Commission be charged with the responsibility of protecting the public health and safety.while overseeing the activities of the nuclear power industry. Tlil, 771 F.2d at 728; gas A1.3.52 Commonwealth of Mass. v. United States, 856 F.2d 378, 382-83 (1st Cir. 1988) ("we must uphold the agency's action so long as it is ' reasonable ano defensible.'") (quoting Bureau of AlcohpJ. Tobacco & Firearms
- v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 97 & n.7 (1983)).
I i The Commonwealth contends that the NRC abused i its discretion by allouing Pilgrim to restart despite problems j with the emergency plans. In particular, it argues that FEMA's conclusion that the plans were inadequate should have I been given more weight and that the NRC relied "on mischaracterizations of the record and distorted and hopeful ' conclusions about the status of emergency planning for the area." Petitioner's Br. at 39. Although the NRC's opinion denying the Commonwealth's 3 2.206 petition to modify, suspend or revoke Pilgrim's license had not been issued when the NRC allowed restart, both sides agrec. that the rease.;ing set forth 1 in it was the basis for the NRC's conclusions with respect to the restart decision as well as being the basis for its denial of the Commonwealth's 5 2:206 petition. For a plant such as Pilgrim--one in operation before 1981--the NRC, not FEMA, has the final decision-making responsibility with respect to the adequacy of emergency plans. State of Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. HEC, 868 F.2d 810, 815-16 (6th Cir. 1989). The NRC must, however, " base its finding on a review of the FEMA findings and determinations
. . . and on the NRC accecc=cnt" of the planc. 10 C.F.R. s
- 50. 54 (s) (3) . As the Sixth Circuit stated:
In summary, it is clear that section 50.54(s)(3) does not require formal FEMA approval for operating plants. . . . (U)nder the applicable section 50.54(s) the responsibility for making final determinations on the adequacy of off-site L emergency preparedness plans rests with the NRC. That section specifically' l-provides: "Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed. as limiting the authority of the Commission to take action under any other regulation or authority of the Commission or at.any time other than that specified in this paragraph." 233 also 44 C.F.R. 5 350.3(e) (1987) (supporting NRC's view that it can make )- determinations of reasonable assurance and l issue operating license ~ without formal FEMA approval).
- j. Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze,.868 F.2d at.815-16. Thus,.although the NRC must base its ultimate finding on a review of FEMA's findings and determinations, it need not give *. hose findings conclusive weight. Here, the NRC in its o.rinion discussed !
each point of concern raised by FEMA in its 1987. determination of inadequacy and discussed subsequent FEMA determinations as well. Sag, e.c., Boston Edisonc 28 N.0.C. at 821'("The August 1987 FEMA report included this as one of the six significant emergency preparedness issues. The FEMA position [on this issue) was modified subsequent to the issuance of FEMA's August 1987 report . . . . "). By basing its final conclusions in part on a review of FEMA's findings, the NRC acted properly. The other issue is whether the NRC based its determination on "mischaracterizations" of the record. It is important to note that the NRC did not find that Edison's plans were fully satisfactory. Rather, it found that
" substantial progress" had been made and that the " progress is j
j J l l __. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ i
continuing." Boston Edison, 28 N.R.C. at 827. In making its determination, the NRC addressed each point raised - by the Commonwealth in its 5 2.206 petition and by FEMA in its August 1987 determination.
- The Commonwealth's argument that the NRC has "mischaracterized" and " distorted" the record is, in reality, a complaint that the NRC did not give greater weight to evidence provided 'by st' ate and local officials and drew conclusions from the evidence that were different than the one's the Commonwealth would have wished. This, however, does
. not make the NRC's action arbitrary or capricious, and it is not for us to reassess the evidence.
Rather than address each of the many points raised by the Commonwealth, we discuss for illu1tration purposes, one of its most serious claims: that the NRC " base [d] its decision on alleged statements of local officials which were not, in fact, made." Petitioner's Br. at 43. The Commonwealth contends that local officials did not make statements attributed to them by the NRC that " local authorities are sufficiently familiar with the plans and procedures to properly respond and have indicated that they would de so." Petitiencr's Br. at 43. In late 1988, the NRC met with local officials including selectmen and civil defense directors. The officials stated that progress had and was being made; they also expressed deep concern over the fact that the plans were in many ways
)
1 L . incomplete, were' untested and relied on inadequately trained personnel. 3.a3, e.,_g,_, Testimony of Ms. Thompson,. Chairperson of Plymouth Board .of Selectmen: "I cannot express too strongly that while Plymouth has 'come a long way .'in the C planning process, we still- have a long way to go."; "To summarize, we are working assiduously, but our radiological plaAning is far from being complete, and therefore, is not approved at the local level; has had no higher' review; and is - untested." This is, in effect, what the NRC reported in poston Edison, 28 N.R.C. at 823: "Although the [ civil defense directors) expressed concerns related to ' the status of: the plans and procedures and with the availability of personnel and training, all,of the (civil defense directors) expressed the.cpinion'that the state of emergency preparedness is.much improved. "12 The'NRC did not mischaracterize thess' statements, rather it chose to emphasize the positive and downplay the { negative and based on this assessment, to allow the restart'of
' Pilgrim. This conclusion based on all available information is for the NRC to.make, not us.
The evidence that the Commonwealth highlights in the record indicates that Edison's plans are not perfect and--that 12 To the extent that the Commonwealth is complaining not of . what the NRC stated in Boston Edison, but rather of what it ! states in its brief to us, this complaint is irrelevant. The l NRC, in making its decisions, did not rely on this brief; it ; relied on the material set forth in Boston Edison. ; I -- _a___. - - - - - - - - _ . -
g improvements in many ' areas are still needed, but that is generally ~what the.NRC found. Sag, e ., 0 . , Boston Edison, 28 N.R.C. at 824:-
"the staff concludes that there has been.
substantial progress in offsite emergency preparedness at Pilgrim. .. . . Furthermore, current ' ongoug efforts are expected to fully resolve -the remaining concerns." The NRC provided a reasoned response to the Commonwealth's and FEMA's concerns based on -- information provided by state and local officials, Edison, FEMA and the NRC's staff. Its findings were not arbitrary or capricious.'3 -- B .- The Examntion From Emeraency Drills The Commonwealth argues that the NRC's granting to Edison of an exemption from the requirement that it hold biennial I drills of its emergency plan was arbitrar'r and capricious. We do not agree..=As the Commonwealth acknowledges, the exemption was based in large part on the same considerations as were discussed in' Boston Edison. We have already found that NRC's determinations of those considerations not to be arbitrary and capricious. Furthermore, the exemption was also based on the fact that' Edison's emergency plans are not yet complete. The NRC agreed with Edison that to hold a drill based on plans i l 13 We also note that a finding of inadequacy in emergency plans does not require the closing of a power plant. 10 C.F.R. 5 50. 54 '(s) (2) . Thus, the Commonwealth may not be entitled to the ultimate relief it seeks--the closing of Pilgrim pending the' implementation of adequate emergency plans--even if it is correct in asserting that Edison's plans are inadequate.
?
which are not completed would be futile and granted Edison a temporary reprieve. But, the NRC, in the same breath, 1 emphasized the need for Edison both to finalize its emergency plans and to conduct a drill with all due speed; the exemption only- lasts. until 120 days after Edison returns to full operation. .The NRC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in granting the exemption. C. The Denial of the E 2.206 Petition Denials of f 2.206 petitions are reviewable by courts of appeals. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729. But, such denials are usually solely within the NRC's discretion and our review is extremely limited. Mass. PIRG, 852 F.2d 9. In that case we addressed the issue-left opened by Lorion, 470 U.S. at 735 n.8, whether denials of f 2.206 petitions were committed to the c,ency's discretion by law. & at 14. We held that i 2.206 denials were "the very sort of agency decisionmaking which (Heckler v.] Chanev [470 U.S. 821 (1985)] cited in support of the presumption of immunity from judicial review." & at 19. We noted, however, that this holding "does not place the agency above the law." & And, that a i 2.206 deniel "which 'is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities' might be reviewable." & (quoting Chanev, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4). We would only overturn a i 2.206 denial
"'if we were strongly convinced that the Commission was inexcusably defaulting on its fundamental responsibility to
- = _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ . . _ __-__ . __ _- -
1: protect the public safety from nuclear accidents.'" & h
'(quoting Rockford Leacue of Woman Voters v. l%q, 679 F.2d 1218, 1222 (7th Cir. 1982)).
The Commonwealth's 5 2.206 petition was based, in relevant part, on the' deficiencies'it and FEMA perceived in - Edison's emergency plans. We have already found that the NRC's findings and conclusions on this issue were not arbitrary or capricious. It follows, a fortiori, that the denial of the petition cannot be overturned on the basis of the even more limited review accorded under Mass. PIRG, 85 F.2d 9. CONCLUSION
- The Commonwealth was not entitled to a hearing before the NRC decided to allow Pilgrim to restart.
The actions taken by the NRC were not arbitrary or capricious. The NRC's and Edison's motions to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds are denied. The commonwealth's motion to amend is granted. a The commonwealth's petition for review is denied. Adm. Office, U.S. Courts - Blanchard Press, Inc., Boston, Mass.
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o , CCLXLiED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA %%C NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD '89 JL 24 P3 :32 Before the Administrative Judges: crr!;E . ., 7 00CKE% s En ett.E Ivan W. Smith, Chairman 33#4 W Dr. Richard F. Cole Kenneph A. McCollom
)
In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL
) 50-444-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY ) (Off-Site EP)
OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET'RL. )
)
(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) July 21, 1989
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Matthew T. Brock, hereby certify that on July 21, 1989, I made service of the within INTERVENERS' MOTION TO ADMIT CONTENTION, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO REOPEN THE RECORD, AND REQUEST FOR HEARING by first class mail to: Ivan W. Smith, Chairman Kenneth A. McCollom i 1107 W. Knapp St. Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory -Stillwater, OK 74075 Commission . ! East West Towers Building Docketing and Service 4350 East West Highway U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
.Bethesda, MD 20814 Commission Washington, DC 20555 Dr. Richard F. Cole Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East West Towers Building 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 i
_ _ ___ ___._______ ____ __ __ _ ]
Robert R. Pierce, Esq. Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., Esq.
- Atomic. Safety & Licensing Board Katherine Selleck, Esq.
l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ropes & Gray [ East West Towers Buildinci One International Place 4350 East West dighway Boston, MA 02110 Bethesda, MD 20814 H. Joseph Flynn, Esq. Sherwin E. Turk, Esq. Assistant General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Office of General Cou.nsel, Commission Federal Emergency Management Office of the General Counsel l
-Agency 15th Floor 500 C Street, S.W. 11555 Rockville Pike Washington, DC 20472 Rockville, MD 20852 Atomic Safety & Licensing Robert A. Backus, Esq.
Appeal Board Backus, Meyer & Solomon U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 4 116 Lowell Street Commission P.O. Box 516 Washington, DC 20555 . Manchester, NH 03106 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Jane Doughty U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Seacoast Anti-Pollution League Washington, DC 20555 5 Market Street Portsmouth, NH 03801 Charles P. Graham, Esq. Barbara St. Andre, Esq. Murphy & Graham Kopelman & Paige, P.C. 33 Low Street 77 Franklin Street Newburyport, MA 01950 Boston, MA 02110 Judith H. Mizner, Esq. R. Scott Hill-Whilton, Esq. 79 State Street Lagoulis, Hill-Whilton 2nd Floor .
& Rotondi Newburyport, MA 01950 79 State Street Newburyport, MA 01950 Dianne Curran, Esq. Ashod N. Amirian, Esq.
Harmon, Curran, & Towsley 145 South Main Street Suite 430 P.O. Box 38 2001 S Street, N.W. Bradford, MA 01835 Washington, DC 20008 Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Senator Gordon J. Humphrey U.S. Senate One Eagle Square, Suite 507 Washington, DC 20510 Concord, NH 03301 (Attn: Tom Burack) (Attn: Herb Boynton)
m_._---_._ ___
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' John I?. l Arnold, Attorney General 'Phillip Ahrens, Esq. '
Office of the Attorney General Assistant Attorney General 25 Capitol Street- Department of the Attorney Concord,1NH 03301 General Augusta, ME 04333 William S.. Lord Board of Selectmen Richard-Donovan Town Hall - Friend Street FEMA Region 10 Amesbury, MA ;01913 130 228th Street, S.W. Federal Regional' Center
'e Bothell, WA 98021-9796 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 4
' JAMES M. SHANNON ,
ATTORNEY GENERAL I . p
'ss.
( n. Matthew T. Br&ck Assistant Attorney General ~ Nuclear Safety Unit Department of the. Attorney General One Ashburton Place Boston, MA 02108-1698 (617) 727-2200 DATED: July 21, 1989 L-__.____._____.___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _._m__}}