ML20247E032
| ML20247E032 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 07/21/1989 |
| From: | Brock M MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247E035 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#389-8947 OL, NUDOCS 8907260057 | |
| Download: ML20247E032 (37) | |
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. NUCLEAR-REGULATORY COMMISSIO'N '89' JdL 24 P3 :32-ATOMIC SAFETY AND' LICENSING BOARD- p g_ ^
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Before the' Administrative Judges: ' 1' ' H > -
Ivan W.. Smith, Chairman-Dr..' Richard F. Cole.
Kenneth A. McCollom
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In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL
) 50-444-OL.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY ) (Off-Site'EP): ~
OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, EI AL. )'
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(Seabrook~ Station, Units 1 and 2) ) July 21, 1989'
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INTERVENERS' MOTION TO ADMIT CONTENTION,.
OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO REOPEN THE RECORD,-AND REQUEST FOR-' HEARING INTRODUCTION
.The Massachusetts Attorney General (Mass AG),.' Seacoast Anti Pollution League (SAPL), and New' England Coalition'on Nuclear Pollution (NECNP), (hereinafter' " Interveners")',. pursuant to
.S189(a) of.the. Atomic' Energy Act, move this Board to admit for litigation the Contention filed herewith as Exhibit 1 L- (" Contention").
In the alternative, Interveners request this Board to reopen the record, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. S2.734, and admit the g 1
Contention.
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Interveners request a hearing on all issues raised by the Contention, prior to further low power operation, or issuance of'a full power license for Seabrook Station.
TEE._CDETENTlDN On June 22, 1989, during low power testing at Seabrook Station, the operating performance of plant personnel revealed serious deficiencies in training, management control, supervision, communication, and procedures compliance. Plant operators deliberately disregarded test procedures requiring
,nrompt shutdown of the reactor after a steam dump valve failed open.
The failed valve caused changes in temperature and pressure which under start-up test procedures required manual trip of the reactor. Senior management personne.'., including the Vice president --Nuclear production, unit shift supervisor, assistant operations manager, and the operations manager, knew fa that' continued operation violated test procedures. Even when '!
I repeatedly advised of the violation by NRC inspectors, these plant personnel continued to willfully violate test procedures, j ignored NRC notifications, and initially refused to shutdown i
the reactor. J Subsequently, senior management personnel provided inaccurate and incomplete information to NRC on the shutdown, refused to acknowledge the seriousness of their procedural
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non-compliance,landfeven. suggested restarting the reactor without. resolution of these. issues. In response the NRC.
suspended Applicants low power operating license. Exhibit.2.
Applicants'~ disregard'of operating procedures undermines public safety. Low power testing- at Seabrook-has demonstrated that. operators and management personnel'are not adequately trained or' supervised. ' procedures necessary to assure
. operating' proficiency:and regulatory Sompliance are-not ad' equate. 10 C.F.R. part 50 Appendix B (II).
' Applicants' performance during low power testing precludes alfindingLat present that there is reasonable assurance that Seabrook Station will operate in conformance with Commission regulations, licensing requirements, or without endangering the health and safety of the public. 10 C.F.R. $50.57(a).
Applicants' operators have willfully violated the terms of
-their operating-license by ignoring repeated notifications by.
NRC o'f test procedure violations. zSee 10 C.F.R. S55.53(d).
presently, Applicants are not. qualified to be granted a low or ful1~ power license. 10 C.F.R. 50.57. pending a full evidentiary. hearing and resolution of these. matters, further low power testing should remain suspended, and a full power operating license should not issue.
l JURISDICTION This Board has jurisdiction over all issues raised in the Contention. ALAB 916, 29 NRC , slip op. at 5-9 (5/25/89).
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i l' ; 1 IHE CONTENTION IS STIMELY Jpursuant;to S189(a):of the Atomic-Energy Act-(Act),Jand'as
- a. consequence of the NRC's license suspension of Applicants' low power license,. Exhibit 2, Interveners are' entitled to a hearing prior to full power licensing on,their Contention and do-not ~have to meet any additional' procedural requirements such as successfully moving to reopen the record.
- 1. The Act provides lilp any oroceedina under this chapter, for'the
-grantina, suspendinu 'revokina, or amendina of any:
license or construction permit, or application to transfer control, and in any proceeding for the-issuance or modification of rules and regulations dealing with the activities of licensees,.and in any proceeding for the payment of compensation, an award or royalties-under Sections 2183, 2187, 2236(c) or 2238lof this title, the Commission shall crant a hearina upon the request of any persons whose interest may be affected by the proceeding, and_shall admit any such person as a party to such proceeding.
Act, S189(a); 42 U.S.C; S2239(a). (Emphasis supplied.)
NRC's suspension of Applicants' low power operating license
. affords' Interveners a statutory hearing right, since the suspension is expressly designated as a " proceeding" giving rise to a hearing under the Act. Cf. Commentina.lth_Q.L.
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1/ The designated " proceedings" that trigger hearing rights under the Act have been strictly construed. Thus, for example, while an " amendment" to a' license gives rise to a hearing, a L c mision by NRC to lift a license suspension, and reinstate the 1: onse, does not.
[T]he extension of the term of a license constitutes a L
license " amendment" within the meaning of Section L 189(a). petitioners were therefore entitled to a
! hearing.
' (footnote continued)
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Massachusetts v. NRC, No. 88-2211 (First'Cir. 6/29/89) slip op
- p. 13 ("Because (license) reinstatement is not listed as a specific action giving rise to a hearing, no hearing right is created by 52239(a).") Exhibit 6.
Having commenced a $189(a) proceeding by suspending the license, NRC must permit public participation in the proceeding on all issues relevant and material to the suspension. UES v s HRC, 735 F.2d 1437, 1443 (1984) ("once a hearing on a licensing proceeding has begun, it must encompass all material factors bearing on the licensing decision raised by the requester . . .
such proceedings as are begun shall be formal, public hearings").
As defined by the Commission, adequate training and qualifications of plant operators and senior management are a fundamental and material precondition to licensing and continued operation.
(footnote continued)
- a l If a particular form of Commission action does not a fall within one of the eight categories set forth in the section, no hearing need be granted by the Commission.... Nor do we believe that Congress !
intended the lifting of a license suspension to be subsumed within the statutory category of license ;
suspensions. If it had, then we should also conclude !
that license revocations are implicitly included in the category of license grants; but Congress found it necessary to list revocations as a separate category.
Because none of the actions specified in section 189(a) may be said to include the lifting of a license suspension, we conclude that such action does not give rise to the right to a hearing.
I San _.LuiA_Rbispo Motheri_101 Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287, 1312
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and 1314 (D.C. Circuit, 1984). l l
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e Before it may issue an operating license for a nuclear power plant, the Commission is required by its regulations to find that "the facility will operate in conformity with the application as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission"* "[tjhere is reasonable' assurance
... that the activities authorized by the operating license can be conducted without. endangering the health and safety of the public"; and "[v}he applicant is technically ... qualified to engage in the activities authorized by the regulations." Essential to_.t b e sfLLi ndi n ga_is_a._dete_r mi n at in tL1ha t_t h e_p 1 a n t ' s reactor operators have been orgperly trained ansi Li_ceused . tiolhe r s fo_Lle m , suria, 751 F.2d at 1309, citing 10 C.F.R. SS50.57(a)(2), (3) and (4).
1 (Emphasis supplied.)
Commission regulations establishing adequate training and qualifications for plant personnel as a precondition to licensing, seg e.o. 10 C.F.R. Appendix B (Quality Assurance Criteria), 10 C.F.R. part 55 (operator licensing) S50.47 (technical qualification)), are in turn mandated by Congress.
l ~ 42 U.S.C. S10226. ($306, Nuclear Waste policy Act, quoted I
infla). As a matter of federal statute, and commission regulation, personnel training and qualifications are material to a license grant, continuing operation and, in this case. the lic'twe suspension flowing from serious deficiencies in the competence of Seabrook operators and management personnel.
Applicants' performance during low power testing l
l demonstrated plant personnel are not trained _or qualified to meet minimum licensing requirements. NRC therefore suspended Applicants' low power license, indicating that the prior grant l.
L of a low power license was prematurc aad not consistent with public safety. Interveners are entitled to a hearing on all 1
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issues raised by the Contention, including 1) the circumstances surrounding the suspension, 2) the lack of training and qualifications of plant operators and management personnel, 3) the lack of adequate operating procedures, 4) whether Applicants meet minimum regulatory requirements to operate the facility at low or full power in view of plant personnel
. incompetence, and willful disregard of test procedures and NRC directives.A#
In addition, whether or not NRC elects to characterize the events of June 22 as a license " suspension" is not dispositive of Interveners' rights to a hearing.
Edison, by its voluntary shutdown and continued cessation of operations, made it unnecessary for lhe NRC to revoke formally its license. Ihe_HRC anDatheless stated clearly and consistently t h a_t it wan111_no t a llow Pilar _iJn to restart until it was shtisfied wi.th Edison's improvements. Ihg_ fatt_t h a_t the_NBC did not' call its decision to restart _a
" Reinstatement" of the license is not coat.r,QlliD9 Columbi.a Broad.c,3stina System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942) ("the particular label placed upon [its action] by the Commission is not necessarily 2/ Unlike Commonwealth of Mass., sugra, Interveners here do not challenge a decision by NRC to lift'a suspension, and reinstate a license, which would fall outside the " specific action giving rise to a hearing" under the Act. Id. at p. 13.
Indeed, NRC has made no such reinstatement decision in this
' case. pursuant to Interveners' statutory hearing rights, Interveners rather seek to participate with NRC, in a public hearing, in assuring the public safety through a thorough exploration of the above-referenced issues.
3/ Applicants themselves, however, have admitted that NRC j crdered a " temporary suspension" following the reactor i shutdown. Exhibit 5.
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conclusive,'for it is the substance of what the Commission has purported to do and has done which is decisive ~.") The_ substance of t be_tilLC 's a c tinD_ wa s tilal_ Edison cottid,_not ooe r a te_PJ 1a r im_pu r su ant _tm ils p': 1 i_c_erae_nnti l_Atte_ HRC_a llsLwEl_it_ Lo_do_ss . The F
deci'sion allowing this was a reinstatement of the right to operate Pilgrim pursuant to the license that had been in effect prior to the shut-down.
C_ommonw_eAlth. oi.Mana , SupJ_a, slip. op . pp. 11-12.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Exhibit 6. 1 It is undisputed that as a consequence of the events of June 22,.1989, Seabrook Station was shut down and operation cannot resume without appropriate corrective actions and without prior approval by the NRC Regional Administrator for Region 1. Exhibit 2. The " substance" of NRC's actions therefore constitutes a suspension of Applicants' low power license, and gives rise to hearing rights on all issues raised by the Contention.
- 2. Independent of these hearing rights arising from the suspension, Interveners are entitled to a hearing under S 189(a) since Applicants' failures in training, management, and )
I operator procedures during low power testing are relevant and material to the gtant of a Lull power license. Sag S 189(a);
Mothers For leAc_e, 751 F.2d at 1309, quoted supla. Consistent with the Congressional mandate, 42 U.S.C. 10226, the Commission j requires adequate operator training, management, procedures and performance as a precondition to full power licensing.
Recent events revealed by low power testing, however, demonstrate that Applicants have not met these regulatory i
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requirements. Indeed, NRC has suspended further plant
. operations at any level of power until there is full examination and corrective action concerning the shutdown.
Both by regulation, and through suspension in this case, therefore, the Commission has determined _that the training and I
qualifications of plant personnel are material and relevant to the grant of a full power license for Seabrook Station.
Interveners are therefore entitled to a hearing on these issues raised by the Contention. UCS v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437, 1443 (1984).
Interveners have previously presented argument in support of their right to litigate events, such as those presented by the Contention, which arise put of low power testing. Exhibit
- 3. That argument is incorporated by reference, and is grounded in the proposition that low power testing is material to full power licensing and that the Commission has made successful ]
. completion of_ low power testing a precondition to the receipt of a full power license. Low power testing has now revealed {
specific defects in personnel training and qualifications. UCS l
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therefore mandates that Interveners be afforded " formal, public
[ hearings" on these issues. UCS at 1443.4# E#
For this reason, Applicants cannot avoid public scrutiny, through the hearing process, even if they elect to forgo further testing pursuant to the 10.y power license, where the same issues of concern raised in the Contention are material to full power licensing.E#
l 4/ prior to the events involving the manual reactor trip, this '
Board declined to reach the issue of Interveners' hearing rights involving low power testing, apparently on grounds the issue was not ripe. See T. 28287.
l S/ In response to MAG's prior motion for hearing on low power issues, Exhibit 3, Applicants proffered the argument that
"[N]ever has the successful completion of low power. testing been a legal prerequisite to issuance of a full power l license." Applicants' Response to Motion of the Massachusetts E
Attorney General to Hold Open the Record Pending Low Power Testing and the Required Yearly Onsite Exercise.and for Other Relief, (June 12, 1989) p. 5. Applicants' low power license is now suspended. Prior to startup of the unit, to any level of power, adequate examination and corrective action involving personnel and procedural failures during low power testing must be undertaken. Exhibit 2. Necessarily,i NRC has determined in this case that the subject defects in low power testing are material to full power licensing and operation. This is consistent with well established NRC views. See Exhibit 3, pp.
3-6. Applicants'Jguibble over " legal prerequisite" should be rejected. j 6/ As UCS provides: "Thus, unlike in Balintti, here the Commission has removed from the licensing hearing consideration of evidence that it considers relevant to a material issue in the section 189(a) proceeding as it has defined that issue l j
Not only is this different from the NRC position we condoned in l Bellotti, in fact, it is in tension with Rellriti's conclunion, l l in the context of a license amendment, that "public j l
participation is automatic with respect to all [section 189(a)] 'j Commission actions that are potentially harmful to the public l health and welfare." UCS 735 F.2d at 1443 citing hella.tli v_.
(footnote continued) l 1
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REOPENING THE RECORD l
.The Contention provides the requisite basis and
, ; specificity,Lasserting'that plant peternnel are~not adequately )
trained,.or managed,- and have wil'1fulli violated operating !
, procedures, and-ignored NRC notifications of test procedute- l 1
violations./ ' Applicants lack adequate procedures to reasonably 1
assure that theLfaci.lity will operate in accordance with l regulatory requirements. These allegations principally arise l'
from the events 1 involving;the Applicants' low power license suspension. Since the basis for Interveners' request for'
. hearing flows from their statutory rights conferred.under'the Atomic Energy Act,- those rights cannot be burdened with the l
higher standard imposed by NRC regulation for reopening the i
l record. See'10 C.F.R. .52.734. l we cannot conclude that tlie'conortttnity'to_ m h teopenina wa s an adeauate' subs ti tute _LQL.the_jlgar i rtg_ .
L auaranteed petitioners as a matter'of riaht under i section 189(a). In order to obtain reopening 2. I pStil,ioners wpre reauired-to show that t ite y _ g o E g e s s_ef)._
new evidencg__w.,Jtch was timsly_;_.JDaiEIi a1 in ttLe se.nse- .
that it would have resulted in a different outcqme__ba.d I lc . it been known earlier, and safety-sianifiI.ADt._.. FQue_ 1 1
(footnote continued)
NRC, 725 F.2d 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Having determined that ,
the management, training, and related issues are material Fo full power licensing, the Commission, unlike in Hellatii, cannot limit the scope of the " proceeding" to preclude heating j on these matters. Similarly, unlike Bellotti where NRC j impesed;a license amendment to enhance safety, the present ]
suspension at Seabrook suggests the decision to grant the low '
power license initially was unfounded and incorrect.
Applicants presently do not meet even the minimum regulatoty requirements for operation and cannot reasonably assure the public safety. 10 CFR 50.57(a). The public therefore has a fundamental interest in participating in a hearing on the j issues involving personnel and training, that are material to ]
theEoriginal grant of the low power license, the suspension, i L and to any further operation of the facility at any level of I power.. I I
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l of_th e s e ' t h r e e c r iie_tia_. app l i e s _.t o reg.ufsts for a heaIJna under section 189(a). Under the latter provision parties-need only show that their " interest ~
may be affected" by a proceeding to bring about une of eight specified types of Commission. At most, parties must show that a particular issue is " material" in order to prevent its exclusion from a hearing under section 189(a); this much our decision in Unio.Itof CD11cerneiScientists v. Nuclear Reau1atorv C2mmiEG19B establishes.
RiO_the r s F_QI_Egan.e, 7 51 F . 2d a t 1316. (emphasis supplied)
AcnnIA, UCS._v. NRC, 735 F.2d at 1443-1444.1 In the alternative, in the event this Board subjects Interveners' contention to the late filed contention criteria, 10 C.F.R. S2.714(a)(1), and/or the reopen the record standard, 10 C.F.R. S2.734, Interveners' Contention meets these standards in any event.
LATE._EILED CONTEtlT1QN STANDARD, 10 CFR S 2. 711La_)_Llh
- 1. GQQD_CAUSE Interveners' Contention principally arises out of the events of June 22, 1989, when Applicants disregarded operating 2/ The Appeal Board has recently cited the holding in the flCS decision. "[T]he Court also rejected the Commission's argument that a party's hearing rights were protected because a patty could always seek to reopen the record if the exercise identified fundamental defects in the emergency plans." ALAB 918, (6/20/89) slip opinion p. 13, n.21. In the same opininn, however, the Appeal Board nevertheless permitted imposition of the late filed criteria for contention admissibility, 10 C.F.R.
S2.714(a)(1), as " reasonable procedural requirements". Ed.
Interveners have appealed this decision, and continue to assert g that imposition of late filed criteria is an impermissible j
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infringement on Interveners' S189(a) hearing rights.
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'and low-power test procedures and NRC directives to promptly shut down'the reuctor. "NRC indefinitely halted further operation'at Seabrook Stat' ion and suspended Applicants' -low I
power license. Important information on these e'.'ents, including NRC's own report from-its Augmented Inspection Team ]
.' .(AIT), has not yet been released. To minimize the anticipated charges by Applicants and the NRC Staff.that the Contention s
filing'is not timely, however, Interveners file-the Contention based upon the limited information presently available, as
' described below.E B/ This Board previously. declined.to grant Massachusetts Attorney-General's request to establish a schedule for filing contentions on low power testing. Tr. 28287 at agg. In addition, the Appeal Board recently' concluded that Intervenor's.
- onsite exercise contention was not " tendered promptly upon the discovery of the information upon which it is based." -Ege ALAB 918.(6/20/89) slip.op. p. 16. Under these. circumstances, Interveners feel ccmpelled to file this Contention at this time. .It meets the minimum requirements for basis and specificity'under the regulations. 10 CFR S.2'714(b). .
Interveners anticipate, however, that additional bases;and perhaps additional-contentions will.later be filed based upon NRC's investigation, NRC production of documents. responsive to Interveners' outstanding FOIA Request, and information obtained from other sources. For example,~the Applicants' July 12, 1989
-response to CAL 89-11 indicates that a Licensee Event Report will be submitted July 24, 1989. Other issues presented by the events of June 22 and 23 - for example, hardware issues, reactor maintenance issues, Licensee /NRC interface issues - may well be raised by subsequent contentions based on information not yet available but which will be made available in the near future. Interveners note that the procedural context in this regard is very much a " Catch 22" because they are called upon to decide what amount of information is sufficient to file an admissible contention on a particular issue knowing that more U detailed information which would augment the contention and bases will be available shortly. It is for this very reason that Interveners sought unsuccessfully a filing deadline tot i low power testing contentions. This filing reflects the judgment that certain issues - training and management issueu -
are sufficiently supportable at this time while others -
hardware, maintenance and licensee interface issues - are not without further information which is expected to be available ,
in some cases in a few days.
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On June 23, following media inquiries to this office, counsel for Mass AG called NRC and was advised that Seabrook
- Station'had been shut down as a result of problems during low power testing. -NRC stated that.the reactor would not be restarted until these matters were explored, but declined to elaborate in detail.
Following June 23, through the public Document Room, Interveners obtained copies of Applicants' Preliminary Notifications of Event, Exhibit 4. These preliminary notifications provided only a bare outline of the circumstances surrounding the shutdown and suspension. There is no clear reference to operator delay in tripping the reactor or disregard by senior rtant personnel of NRC notifications of test procedure violations prior to shut down.
Similarly, Applicants' press releases on these events were inconsistent and, predictably, understated. Exhibit 5. The press release of June 22, alleges Applicants performed the shut down "i'n accordance with the strict technical criteria governing the current low power test program." On June 23.
however, Applicants conceded that "NRC orders temporary 3
suspension of low power tes' ing . . . control room operatots !
did not strictly follow a procedure in determining when to shut j down the reactor." Again, however, this description of events ]
9 remained clipped, vague, and no reference given to repeated i
notificat' ions by NRC of a procedural violation, or that plant ]
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i l personnel knowingly operated the plant in contravention of test i procedures.
On or about June.26, 1989, Interveners were provided a copy- -
of the-confirmatory Action letter (CAL) which confirmed the I license suspension. Exhibit 2. The cover letter to the CAL advised of an on going investigation by NRC of the June 22 ,
i events, but no substantial details were provided on the progress of the investigation or when it would be concluded.
As of July 1, 1989, Thomas Murley of NRC suggested in the DDstan_.Gisbe tha t . NRC's own investigation was still in the preliminary stages:
That is why we have an augmented inspection team up there and are going to sit down with the licensee when they are done with their investigation to try and figure out what happened.
As of the date of this filing, NRC has not released a report on its investigation.
On July 13, 1989,E# Applicants released to the press and NRC its own report on the circumstances of June 22 involving the shutdown and suspension of the low power license.1E' See attached. Massachusetts Attorney General's office obtained a copy of the report on July 14, 1989, which provides Applicants' view of the June 22 events.
9/ That same day, Massachusetts Attorney General requested a copy of the report from Applicants' counsel and was advised that Ropes & Gray did not have the Report.
19/ See New Hampshire Yankee Response to Confirmatory Action Letter 89-11 (7/12/89).
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Upon receipt of the report, Interveners immediately consulted with their experts to prepare'the Contention, Affidavit, and supporting materials. Although Applicants' Report remains incomplete and uncorroborated, Interveners believe the report provides sufficient information to meet minimum requirements for basis and specificity.
Interveners have good cause for filing the Contention on this date,11'
- 2) Erotection of Interlanors' Interest There is no means other than by litigation of the Contention to protect Intervenorn' interest in ensuring that Seabrook Station operating procedures and management structure are clearly defined, the operations and management personnel adequately trained and qualified, and that facility operation at low or full power will conform to regulatory requirements and reasonably assure the public safety, 10 c.F.R. 50.57(a).
It is apparent that the Applicants, based on the NRC Staff's recommendation, were issued a low power license prematurely, and before Applicants were qualified to lawfully operate the plant at any power level. The Staff's error in judgment demonstrates that Interveners must protect their own interests ll/ While the Contention is primarily grounded upon the above identified information, certain limited additional data, involving prior procedural non-compliance problems, are included as part of the Contention basis. See Joint Affidavit of Gregory C. Minor and Steven C. Sholly, p. 12, filed herewith.
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through iitigation e' the Contention to rersonably assure I public safety.
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- 3. Development of a Sound Record Interveners will contribute to the development of a sound record through litigation of the issues set forth in the Contention, filed herewith. This adequately identifies the issues Interveners seek to raise. ALAB 918 (6/2/89) sl. op.
- p. 20. In support of the Contention, Interveners will offer the testimony of expert witnesses Gregory C. Minor and Steven C. Sholly.
The expert qualifications of Mr. Minor and Mr. Sholly are set forth in the attached affidavits and resumes, incorporated herein, and are summarized as follows.
Mr. Minor is'Vice President of MHB Technical Associates, and har over 25 years of experience in the design, development, research, start-up testiag, and management of nuclear reactor systems. For the past thi'. teen years, Mr. Minor has been a technical consultant and has participated in a variety of studies addressing nuclear facility management, and safety issues for various organizations, including the Department of Energy /Sandia National Laboratories, the Swedish Government, and the offices of several states' Attorneys General.
Mr. Sholly is an Associate Consultant for MHB Technical Associates. For the last nine and a half years, Mr. Sholly has been engaged in analyzing technical nuclear safety, management, l
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design, construction, and regulattry issues and providing-technical advice to a number of state and local governments.
He has previously participated as an expert witness in proceedings before Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards involving the Indian Point and Catawba facilities, and has presented testimony before the United States Congress on nuclear safety issues.
The testimony of Mr. Minor and Mr. Sholly, end the Applicants' admissions as set forth in Enclosure 4 to New Hampshire Yankee Response to Confirmatory Action Letter 89-11, and the Confirmatory Action Letter 89-11, filed herewith, may be summarized as follows:
- a. During low power testing at Seabrook Station, ;
Applicants operated the facility in knowing violation of the test procedures, the facility license application as amended, the terms of their operating license and Commission regulations, when operators failed to shut down the reactor l after a steam dump valve failed open.
- b. Despite repeated notifications from NRC inspectors in the control room of the test procedure violation, l
plant personnel continued to operate the reactor and initially j did not shut down.
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- c. Subsequently, senior management personnel p':avided inaccurate and incomplete information to NRC on the
, shut down, did not communicate to NRC their recognition of the seriousness of the procedural non-compliance and even suggested restarting the reactor prior to resolution of these issues.
- d. Commission quality assurance regulations require procedural compliance for activities affecting quality, which include operation of a reactor, as well as for indoctrination and training of personnel, such as operators, as necessary to assure that suitable proficiency is achieved. 10 C.F.R. part 50, Appendix B(II)(V).
- e. Applicants violated the Commission's quality assurance regulations mandating procedural compliance, it is apparent that the training program was not effective in thic instance, and some improvement in the training program is essential if'similar violations are to be prevented in the future,
- f. There is a strong safety assurance aspect of the Commisolon's quality assurance regulations. Failure to follow procedures carries with it significant safety implications l which cannot be ignored.
- g. Prior procedural non-compliance problems mean the procedural non-compliance is not an isolated event, but is part of a pattern of procedural non-compliance.
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i I h. The following training and management procedures are not adequate or in compliance with Commission regulations:
Operations Command and Control Policy, Operations shift crew procedures, management training and procedures for operation oversight, policy on procedural adherence, NHY post Trip Review process.
- 4. Whether Interest Represented By Existina paLtja9 In this proceeding, no other party has raised or is raising the issues set forth in the Contention.
- 5. Absence of Delay presently, admission of the Contention will not delay the proceeding, in that Applicants are barred from operating the facility at any power level until the issues raised by the shutdown and license suspension are resolved. Exhibit .
Admission will expand the issues to be addressed through public hearing before this Board, but will not expand the issues which NRC has determined must be resolved prior to opstation at any power level.
EEOpENING THE RECORD (22 734)
- 1. This motion arises out of the shutdown and license suspension on or after June 22, 1989. The motion is timely for the reasons set forth above. In addition, the Contention presents exceptionally grave issues which require hearing te assure the public safety.
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- 2. Through the Contention, this motion raises fundamental and significant safety and environmental issues on the training and qualifications of Seabrook operators and management personnel. To reasonably assure the public safety, these issues must be fully resolved prior to plant operation. 10 s
C.F.R. 50.57. The NRC Staff itself has recognized the
-significance of Interveners' concerns by suspending Applicants' low power license. This suggests that even the Staff I l
recognizes that Applicants' willful disregard-of operating procedures, and NRC directives for shutdown presents significant safety issues. Applicants' subsequent failure to fully and fairly report the events to NRC underscores these legitimate concerns for public safety. As determined by NRC, the appropriate remedy for these safety related violations is suspension of the low power license. Applicants are barrei from further operation at any powe level until complete resolution of these issues. This is consistent with the Commission's regulatory requirements where suspension should be ordered to protect the public safety.12#
12/ "A license . . . may be revoked, suspends 3, or modified, in whole or in part, for any material false statement . . . in the supplemental or other statement of fact required by the Applicant' or because of conditions revealed by the application for license or statement of fact or any report, record, inspection, or other means which would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on an original application .
or for failure to construct or operate a facility in accordance with the terms of the construction permit or license . . . or for violation of, or failure to observe, any of the terms and provisions of the act, regulations, license permit, or order of the Commission." 10 C.F.R. 50.100. ;
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i As1previonelyLeited in this motion,:the Commission has promulgated extensive' regulations.to assure adequate operator andl plant personnel qualifications as a. precondition to
" licensinng.
Every. applicant for an operating license.is requi'ted to include,:in its final. safety analysis' report, information pertaining to the mangerial and administrativeLcontrols to be used.to-assure safe-operation, e a
- Th'e authority and duties of personsLand organizations performing. activities affecting the safety related.
functions of structures, systems, and components shall- .
be clearly established and delineatedJin writing.
- m. n a The: program shall provide.for indoctrination and training 1of personnel performing activites affecting quality'as necessary to assure that suitable proficiency is achived and maintained.
10 C.F.R. Part 50,. App. B.
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(a) pursuant to $50.56, an operating license may be issued by the' Commission, up to the full term authorized by 550.51, upon finding that a a n (4) 'The applicant is technically and financially
'" qualified to engage in the activites authorized by the operating license in accordance with the regulations in this chapter.
10 C.F.R. S50.57(4).
(a) Requirements for the approval of an initial application. The Commission will approve an initial application for a license pursuant to the regulations in this part, if it finds that --
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(2) Written examination and operating test. The applicant has passed the requisite written examination and operating test in accordance with SS55.41 and 55.45 or 55.43 and 55.45. These examinations and tests determine whether the applicant for an operator's license has learned to operate a facility competently and safely, and additionally, in the case of a senior operator, whether the applicant has learned to direct the licensed activities of licensed operators competently and safely.
10 C.F.R. S55.33(a)
(b) Any license may be revoked, suspended, or modified, in whole or in part:
(3) For willful violation of, or failure to observe any of the terms and conditions of the Act, or the ,
license, or of any rule, regulation, or order of trhe !
Commission, or (4) For any conduct determined by the Commission to be a hazard to safe operation of the facility.
10 C.F.R. S55.61.
These regulations are responsive to the Congressional mandate that the Commission assure the public safety by providing for adequate training and qualifications for nuclear plant personnel.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is authorized and directed to promulgate regulations, or other appropriate Commission regulatory guidance, for the training and qualifications of civilian nuclear powerplant operators, supervisors, technicians and other appropriate operating personnel. Such regulations or guidance shall establish simulator training requirements for applicants for civilian nuclear powerplant operator licenses and for operator requalification programs; the requirements governing NRC administration of requalification examinations; requirements for operating rests at civilian nuclear
powerplant simulators, andlinstructional requirements I for. civilian nuclear powerplant? licensee personnel training. programs. Such re'gulations1or other:.
O regulatory. guidance shall be promulgated by the Commission within thecl2-month period-following H
January.7, 1983, and the Commission within the 12-month period following-January 7, 1983, shall submit'a report to Congress setting forth the actions c the Commission has-taken with respect to-fulfilling l 'its obligations under this section.
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42'USC S102h ($306, Nuclear' Waste Policy Act).11/
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Both Congress'and the Commission therefore have recognized that th'e training.and qualifications of~ plant operators and management were of such public. safety significance as to warrant. specific legislation and rulemaking. .This Board should similarly conclude that these issues, raised by.this Contention, are1significant safety issues.
Both.the' license suspension and Commission regulations therefore plainly establish that the issues presented by the Contention are significant safety issues challenging the adequacy of the training, management, and procedures involving plant operators and senior management.
- 3. The issues raised by this Contention were not
' adjudicated before any Seabrook licensing board. Had the s' deficiencies in the Applicants' operator training and management review and control processes been known prior to licensing, it would have been likely that corrective actions would have been 11/ Following TMI, Congress recognized that adequate plant personnel training and qualifications were essential to public safety. "(L)ack of adequate power plant operator training had played a very significant role in the inability to control" the accident at'TMI. Statements of Senator Weiker, congressional Record, Vol. 128, p. 515643 (Daily Edition, 12/20/82).
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1 required prior.to that licensing just as.the.NRC has determined
.thatLsuch corrective actions are necessary prior to any further
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operation.
CONCLUSION For all the reasons set'forth above, the Interveners request that this Board admit the Contention for litigation and hold a hearing thereon.
Respectfully submitted, JAMES M. SHANNON ATTORNEY GENERAL COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS C
By: John Traficonte. *~
Chief, Nuclear Safety Unit Matthew Brock Assistant Attorney General Nuclear Safety. Unit Public Protection Bureau One Ashburton Place-Boston, Massachusetts 02108 (617) 727-2200 Dated: July 21, 1989 25 -
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. EXHIBIT'1. <
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EXHIBIT I INIERVEN0B5
- CONTERT10N 1_QLLOW.UlG_LlCENEE _EUSPENSION Events during Low power Testing at Seabrook Station on June 22, and 23, 1989 demonstrate that Applicants' plant operators, and management personnel, are not adequately trained or qualified, and lack adequate managerial and administrative procedures and controls, to operate the facility, at any level of power, in conformity with the facility application as i amended, the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), and the rules and regulations of the Commission. There is no reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by an operating license can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, or can be conducted in compliance with 10 C.F.R. Chapter 1, all as required by 10 C.F.R. S50.57. Low power testing also has demonstrated that Applicants have violated, and presently cannot meet, the following preconditions for licensing to operate at any power level:
- 1) 10 C.F.R. part 50, Appendix B which requires Every applicant for an operating license is required a to include, in its final safety analysis report, information pertaining to the manaaerial and administrative controls to be used to assure safe Operation.
The authority and duties of persons and organizations performing activities affecting the safety related functions of structures, systems, and components shall be clearly established and delineated in writing. ;
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LActivities affecting quality should-be. prescribed by documented instructions,' procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate.to.the circumstances and shall be-accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.
Instructions, proceudres, or drawings shall include appropriate-quantitative.or qualitative acceptance criteria for. determining that.imporant. activities have been satisfactorily accomplished.
The_ptograrrLshall_pIpXide_foI_ indoctrination _and itrainina of cersonnel oerformina activities affecting quality as necessary to assure that suitable proficiency is achieved and maintained.
- 2) 10 C.F.R. S50.34(b)(6) which requires:
(b) Final safety' analysis report. .Each application for a:licenre.to operate a facilityLshall include a-final safety analysis report. The final safety g"
analysis report shall include information that
' describes the facility, presents the design bases and H the limits on its operation, and presents a safety analysis of the structures, systems, and components and of the facility as a whole, and shall include the 1 following:-
.(6). The following information concerning facility-
' operation:
(i) The applicant's organizational structure, allocations or responsibilities and authorities, and personnel qualifications requi'rements.
(ii) Manacerial and administrative controls La_he used to assure safe coeration. Appendix B, " Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power plants and Fuel Reprocessing plants," sets forth the requirements for such-controls for nuclear power plants'and fuel reprocessing plants. The information on the controls.
to be used for a nuclear power plant or a fuel reprocessing plant shall include a discussion of how the applicable requirements of Appendix B.will be satisfied.
- 3) 10 C.F.R. $55.53(d) which requires Each license contains and is subject to the following conditions whether stated in the license or not:
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(d) The li_canae_i.s_suttier_t to, and the liceasee_sball Observe, all applicable rules, regulations 2_And ord.pls of the Commission.
DAS.lS A. .On June 22, 1989, during low power testing at Seabrook Station, plant personnel revealed serious deficiencies in their training and management procedures. Many plant personnel, including Operators, and New Hampshire Yankee Management, deliberately disregarded test procedures which required shut down of the reactor, when pressurizer levels fell below test criteria due to a failed valve. New Hampshire Yankee Response to Confirmatory Action Letter 89-11 (7/12/89) Enclosure 4, pp.
4-6 (hereafter identified as " Response", Attachment B.)
Under start up test procedures, operators were required to shut down the reactor. Operators were aware of these procedures, but ignored them. Senior supervisors and management personnel, including the unit shift supervisor, operations manager, and the assistant operations manager knew that the reactor was operating in violation of test procedures, and each, individually, had authority to order shut down.
Each, however, failed to exercise that authority. Even when repeatedly notified of the violation by NRC inspectors in the control room, plant operators and management continued to operate the facility in violation of test procedures and initially refused to shut down the reactor.
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4Pb Plant personnel's willful? disregard of. test: procedures asE well as: NRC notifications-of a violation, demonstrates-serious deficiencies in. training and management'; and raises' serious safety concerns.due to the poor judgment of plant personnel',
their unwillingness to' admit error,-and refusal'to properly.and timely respond to abnormal plant conditions.
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Subsequently, senior management personnel provided inaccurate and incomplete information to NRC on the shut-down, refused to acknowledge the seriousness of the. procedural non-compliance, and even suggested restarting the reactor prior
- to resolution of these issues. Applicants' lackLof candor in initially reporting on the shutdown to1NRC raises additional' ,
and' fundamental, concerns as to Applicants' corporate character and management' capability.
L Applicants' failure to comply with test procedures and the subsequent improper management actions, were of signif'icant' L concern to NRC. . Response, Attachment to. Enclosure 4, p. 11.
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NRC therefore suspended Applicants' low power license. That
[ suspension remains in effect and suggests significant safety l
l concerns are presente! by these events. Egg 10 C.F.R. 1 L .S50.100. These events demonstrate that there is no reasonable assurance that plant operation can be conducted in conformance l
with Commission regulations and witnout endangering the health and safety of the'public. 10 C.F.R. S50.57(a)(3).
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l B. In their Response, Applicants have admitted that the procedures involving training, qualifications and management must be fundamentally reevaluated and revised prior to operation.
Applicants thereby implicitly acknowledge that these primary safety-related procedures, that affect the quality of plant operation, presently are not adequate to reasonably assure public safety. These include:
- 1) ine Operations Command and Control Policy is not l adequate, and did'not function as intended. This was evidenced by the willful disregard by plant personnel, including l
operators and management, of test procedures and NRC notifications to shutdown the reactor. San Response, Encl. 4, pp. 5-6.
- 2) The training and management procedures for the Operations Shift crew are not adequate. This was demonstrated when each member of the crew failed to respond to NRC notifications, or exercise his individual authority, to timely shutdoan the reactor. Id.
- 3. Management procedures for oversight of plant e
operation are not adequate, and lines of authority and responsibility for management personnel are vague and confusing. This was demonstrated when senior personnel, including the Operations Manager, Assistant Operations Manager, and Unit Shift Supervisor, failed to override operators to p .
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, :promptly' order plant shutdown in conformance with. test- ,
gf 3 procedures,=id., or forcefullyipress'their~superiorsifor plant shutdown.
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- 4. The-Station and Operati~ons Management' policy oh.
procedure adherence is unclear and confusing. Clarification is necessary to clearlyEdelineate when deviation ~from procedures is acceptable, 14. at p. 10, and when conformity to procedures is mandatory. This was demonstrated when certain plant personnel purportedly " misunderstood" the mandatory. procedures for plant shut.down merely to be guidance, id., and disregarded' NRCl notifications. In fact, since.the same operators claim to have tripped the reactor in accordance withLthis test procedurec
.whi ch at least.in that instance was not treated merely as
" guidance",. it appears that the operators' simply chose to selectively follow operating procedures.
- 5. Present management training programs are not adequate. This was demonstrated when management failed to exercise authority to order a reactor' shutdown, or direct operators to take this action. In addition, training must be provided with respect to all procedures identified for revision (see #1-4, incorporated by reference).
- 6. The existing NHY Post Trip Review Process is not adequate. Id. at 24. This was demonstrated when senior management-provided wholly inaccurate and incomplete information on the circumstances surrounding the shutdown and I
i violated reporting requ'rements in 10 C.F.R. 50.72. Id. at l i
- 26. NHY improperly sou,1ht to justify its violation of test procedures to NRC, and sought to restart the plant prior to resolution of the problems revealed by the shutdown. Id.
C. In its application for an operating license, Applicants made certain statements and representations as to
.the " managerial and administrative controls to be used to assure safe operation", 10 C.F.R. S50.34(b)(6), and as to the training program for " personnel performing activities affecting quality as necessary to assure that suitable proficiency is achieved and maintained". 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B (II).
Egg sections of FSAR, Attachment C hereto. dased, in part, upon these statements and representations in the application which were incorporated into the low power license as preconditions to operation, 10 C.F.R. S50.57(a)(2), Applicants were issued an operating license. The events of June 22 demonstrate that Applicants have failed to comply with these statements and representations, and have violated these conditions of their license.as follows:
- 1. FSAR S13.2.l(a) which requires licensed operator training programs "to ensure that each individual can safely and effectively perform various assignments . . . to train a staff to operate and c .tain the units safely, depe'. 'y, and economically".
l 2. FSAR S13.2.2 which requires a " comprehensive training program" for technical and management staff "in (
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'various disciplines necessary to ensure that each can safely l
and effectively perform his assignments".
- 3. FSAR S13.5.1.3(25) which requires that testing during preoperational and initial operational phases "is performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate or reference the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable documents". ;
The failure of many operators and management personnel to comply with test procedures and NRC notifications for plant shutdown, or to accurately report events to NRC following shutdown, demonstrates the pervasive and fundamental defects in the cited programs and procedures.
D. As further basis for this Contention, Interveners rely upon, and incorporate by reference, the affidavit of Gregory C.
Minor and Steven C. Sholly, filed herewith. (Attachment A hereto).
E. As further basis for this Contention Interveners Reply upon, and incorporate by reference, Enclosure 4 (without j Attachments) to Applicants' Response, filed herewith, Attachment B hereto.
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f ATTACHMENT A
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