ML20062C265
| ML20062C265 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 10/18/1990 |
| From: | Mileti D PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20062C263 | List: |
| References | |
| OL-1, NUDOCS 9010300244 | |
| Download: ML20062C265 (76) | |
Text
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- s. October 18, 1990 j
' UNITED STATES OF! AMERICA i
before the .
1 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD.'
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In the Matter of ) _
~ PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) Docket Nos. 50 443 OL 1- -]
NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al. )' 50 444 0L 1 I ) (Offsite - Emergency
.(Seabrook= Station,- Units 1 and 2) ) Planning and Safety i
) Issues) 1 l
. _____ __ __ )
AFFIDAVIT OF DR. DENNIS S. MILETI 3
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I, Dr. Dennis S. Mileti, being on oath, depose and say as follows: 't
~1. I. am a Professor of Sociology and Director'of the Hazards Assessment Laboratory,=
i Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado. My trofessional qualifications are a i
matter of record in this proceeding. I have testified before ahis Licensing. Board regarding l
.y the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan ano specifically with regard to M' the issues of human behavior and role conflict during emergencies, I have also testified .
. regarding the~ Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities on the issue of human behavior
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during emergencies. ;
5% 2. The purpose of this affidavit is to address the issue of whether Massachusetts school [
t teachers and day care center personnel would respond to assignments in an emergency to escort children on buses and care for them at the School Host Facility at the College of the Holy Cross until they are no longer needed.
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J.3 This affidavit. is' divided into four sections. The first- two sections entitled ' Bus
' Escorts
- and ' Host Facility Personnel *, present the theoretical basis for'why'it is reasonable "I, to expect Massachusetts school teachers and day care center personnel to accompany students _
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'on evacuation buses, and' to stay with students in the host school facility until they are no
,3 longer needed. The third section entitled 'A Case Example", illustrates how these theoretical ,
conclusions are supported by. empirical observations. The fourth section- of this affidavit ,
provides my overall conclusions on these issues.
Bus Escorts
-4. An elaborate research base exists in the social sciences on the topic of people performing emergency work roles during emergencies (cf., Lewis M. Killian,1952, 'The Significance of Mulligroup Membership in Disaster ' American Journal of Sociolony.
. January: 309 314; _ Lewis M. Killian,1954. 'Some Accomplishments and Some Needs in Disaster Study". ' The Journal of Social Issues. X: 66 72; M. White,1962. ' Role Conflict
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in - Disasters: Not Family But Familiarity First.' Unpublished, M. A. Thesis. Chicago:
Department. of Sociology, University of Chicago; E. L. Quarantelli. No date. ' Structured <
Factors in - the Minimization of Role Conflict: A Re examination of the Significance ~ of l
Multiple Group Membership in Disasters." Working Paper. _ Columbus, Ohio: _ The Disaster
- Research Center at the Ohio State University; and many others). A thorough reading of all available research on this topic leads to the following interpretations and conclusions. -
i' 5.~ Would be emergency workers may perform other roles before engaging in emergency work if their emergency roles are not 'certain.' Emergency work role certainty did not exist for most emergency workers in reference to most types of emergencies several decades ago.
I The reason for this is straightforward; several decades ago there were very few emergency plans that clearly specified emergency work roles for responding to infrequently occurring
. natural or technological emergencies. Early sociological research interpreted as role :
.E ' conflict' or ' abandonment" observations of people in emergencies performing non emergency response roles before volunteering for emergency work roles. This conclusion was sometimes I
s reached in reference to members of the general public, as well as for people who worked-t 2
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for some governmental entity that the researcher concluded- ex post facto should-have an ,
emergency response function, in both cases, the conclusion'was often reached that role
' conflict
- kept emergency workers from performing emergency work until oth'er non-emergency _ roles were performed. Subsequent sociological research suggested that emergency _ )
I workers do not abandon emergency work roles when they know that they have them, that is,-
l when role certainty prevails.
I 6. There are itwer and fewer examples in American soc!cty of emergency workers who
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s I lack role certainty, because as time passes the nation plans and trains for more emergency
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types. On rarer and rarer occasions, examples do surface.that are reminiscent of the early sociological studies done when role certainty for emergency workers' did not exist. For example, some members of the National Guard evacuated with their families during the-1979 accident at Three Mile Island. Later on, their headquarters had trouble locating them to call them for duty. There was no offsite emergency plan in place at _ the time. The evacuating guardsmen hardly abandoned an emergenc'y role because of role conflict. These Guardsmen signply did not know that they had an emeigency role, that is, they lacked role certainty.
- 7. Role certainty is a consequence of emergency planning and training; however, emergency planning and training are not the only vehicles for attaining emergency role-certainty For example, the National Guard has now been incorporated into= emergency plans for nuclear power plant- accidents at some plant sites. This will provide role certainty for guardsmen since planning and training will lead guardsmen to perceive their response role -i with certainty. However, planning and training are not necessary to lead a -teenaged babysitter to perceive certainty in her role of responsibility for an infant during an.
' emergency; that role certainty exists by virtue of having assumed the role of babysitter.
There; are roles in society that put people in positions of responsibility for others that
! provide role certainty in emergencies independent of emergency plans and training. More than a few of these roles come to mind, for example, the roles of teacher, nursing home I'
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worker, babysitter and others.
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l I 8. . People who are performing roles of responsibility for others before an emergencyc begins have role ' certainty about being responsible for their- charges' during- an emergency independent of planning and training. The reason people in such roles perform emergency work remains' role certainty; however, role certainty exists in the emergency for a reason I other than planning and training. This is likely why, to the best of my knowledge, I know of no case in any' emergency in which charges - for example, students, nursing home I inhabitants, and so on - have been abandoned regardless of the presence or lack on pre-
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. emergency plans and training. Consequently, an emergency at the Scabrook Station would -
8- witness Massachusetts teachers and day care center personnel holding perceptions ~ of responsibility for their students. This role certainty would exist independent of = pre-emergency planning and training. It would exist independent of whether organized emergency response were part of a state or utility response plan. -This role certainty would prevail since it originates in the routine teacher student role relationship which exists independent of emergencies, training, plan sponsorship and so on. It is most probable that teachers and
' day care center personnel would escort children on buses to the school host facility at the College of the Holy Cross in Worcester to ensure students' safety while en route. The distance to this facility. would not significantly dissuade teachers 'and day care center personnel from fulfilling their ongoing and traditional role of responsibility for children.
- 9. One factor could intervene to keep teachers and day care center personnel from accompanying their students on the bus ride to the school host facility, it would not be role conflict or abandonment. The factor would be if teachers perceived that the obligations and -
duties of their role relationship with students were adequately transferred to someone else.
For example, a teacher may not accompany his or her class on the bus if responsibility for those students were shifted to another teacher who was making the trip. This shifting of responsibility would not leave students on buses unsupervised.
Host Facility Personnel
- 10. The' adeqt.acy of staffing to run the school host facility at the College of the Holy Cross in Worcester, and the number of teachers and day care center personnel who will i
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remain'with children at that facility, can not be adequately addressed in lependent of the t
. general context in which the evacuation would occur.
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- 11. An emergency evacuation, because of an - accident at Seabrook Station, would constitute a collective threat situation. These situations change the human character. People give up personal forms of identification, ladividual interests and private motives for behavior. .
lInstead, people identify with the entire human collective; and the eme'rgency goal of helping others takes precedence over almost everything else. The staffing and ' operation of the school host facility can only be understood in this context of altruistic emergency consensus.
- 12. The school host facility is a college that will likely be in session if day care centers
' and schools in the Massachusetts EPZ are evacuating . children and students. it is very-probable, therefore, that a variety of persons will be at the school host facility who would volunteer to provide help to run the facility, for example, older students who were themselves evacuated to the facility, students and faculty at the College of the Holy Cross, college staff like' maintenance, cafeteria workers, administrators, and even adults arriving to pick up evacuated children or the public who live nearby. These volunteers would undoubtedly be joined by teachers and day care center personnel who accompanied students on evacuation v buses. In short, the basic functions to be provided at the school host facility would be fulfilled by volunteers including teachers .who evacuated with students. This is how evacuation centers are traditionally staffed in evacuations.
-13. Volunteering a help operate the school host facility would occur because' of the altruistic emergency consensus context in which the facility would operate. All such emergency host facilities operate in such a context. In fact, the American Red Cross in -
4 their operation of congregate care centers does so by conscripting volunteers. Such organizations " expand' their ability to adequately perform work in emergencies by using volunteers as part of the work force (cf., Russell R. Dynes.1970. Ornanized Behavior in Disaster. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Co.). Most shelter workers in emergencies are typically volunteers.
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q 14 -The teachers and day care center personnel who accompanied students on evacuation' i buses would likely stay at the school host facility to help for, two' reasons. : First, to do so I. 'is consistent with the context of altruistic emergency consensus which-will operate' to direct-most human behavior. Second, to do so is consistent.with continuing ~ to play out a role of f ;
L ) responsibility for students; for example, teachers will perceive that they can help inform _
facility operators of their students' names and so on. -
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A Case Examnle
- 15. The prior sections of this affidavit have presented the . theoretical reasons why 1 ,
believe it is reasonable to expect teachers and day care centes personnel to accompany students on evacuation buses, and to stay with students in the host fa :llity until they are no longer needed. An evacuation study I and a colleague recently completed illustrates how these theoretical conclusions are supported by empirical observations (cf., Dennis S. Mileti and Colleen Fitzpatrick.1989. Emernency Resoonse to the Seaford. Lone Island Pronane -
Tank Truck Accident. Report Prepared for Long Island-Lighting Company. Fort Collins, s Colorado: The-Hazards Assessment Laboratory at Colorado State University, attached and
' marked "A").
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- 16. A propane gas tank truck overturned on a highway in a populated section of Long Island. . The propane ignited; a large area of the community was evacuated since the risk
-f of a great explosion was high. The evacuation included schools. The evacuation host facility -
was the Seaford Middle School. There was no emergency response - plan in place for ,
responding to .a propane tank truck emergency. In people's memories, no evacuation had r ever occurred in this part of Long Island before this event, o
- 17. The following paragraph describes the conclusions reached regarding the behavior of teachers who worked at evacuated schools in reference to accompanying pupils to the host facility and then volunteering to stay there to help. It also describes how other volunteers
- surfaced frorn other available populations to perform host facility operations.
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Volunteering for emer was characteristic witkency in allwork in response relevant to this. performing-organizations emergency
- emergency. response. For example, volunteerina for emernency i y,,gy.1 at the Seaford Middle School where the Red Cross Shelter
+I was - in' operation was prototypical. Teachers from the Montessori School and St. Williams of the Abbot School brouaht their students to the shelter and then volunteered to stav to B, . help with child identification. The Seaford Middle School gr,g, volunteered to remain at the school since the Red Cross did not immediately bring a nurse. The cook and cafeteria staff = ,
volunteered to pr,cpare snacks when the shelter first opened; and I then they came in on followin other meals for the evacuees.g days Sometoteachers prepareevenbreakfast stayed vo onteer ticir services. and the school's administrative secretary vo unteerec to maintain a communication center for the shelter.
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.r Evacuees in the shelter even volunteered to help with things that 1 needed to be done. - (Mileti and Fitzpatrick,1989, at pages 54 i4 and 55; emphasis added.)
- 18. This case documents'th'at teachers evacuated with pup!!;, a:S then stayed at the host is facility t'o help with child identification. This observation suggests that techers remained
'in roles of responsibility with pupils until they were no longer needed; that is, when the 4 .
. responsibility function of the teacher student role relationship could be assumed by others =
at the host facility.
- 19. This case also illustrates how people, (the school nurse, the cook, cafeteria staff, host !
facility teachers and administrators - the latter are not referenced in the quoted paragraph), -)
1 volunteered to do work to' run the host facility and 'get done what~ needed to be T accomplished. This illustrates how people identify with the entire human collective in
+ emergencies,- and= how the emergency goal of helping others takes precedence over almost W
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. cverything else in the climate of altruistic emergency consensus.
- E 's 20. This study went on to address the topic of role ' conflict' or abandonment even more.
broadly. The study's general conclusion on this issue follows.
'I Organizational respondents were also asked- about any known incidents of role conflict or emergency role abandonment by i
lp emergency workers. That is, were emergency workers in a position of havin to choose between performing non emer ency l', roles for exam , staying at their non emergency jobs or eing Q"' with t cir fami ) versus emergency work roles, and did anyone l actually abandon their emergency job, No cases of role :
f abandonment were identified. In fact ' most organizational resoondents reported an excess of emergency workers. and even L an excess of emergency response organizations in the case of responding fire departments. Additionally, staff absences at the Seaford Middle School were reported'the same as under normal I circumstances. 1989, at page 55; emphasis added.)(Mileti- and Fitzpatrick, 7
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. This case documents h'ow role abandonment was not a problem in response to'the! j
\g5, emergency.
- 22. Teachers accompanied children as bus escorts, stayed at the host facility to help until they. were no longer needed, and the host facility was adequately staffed .with volunteers
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including ' evacuated teachers during this emergency on Long Island. It is reasonable .to i
expect that the 'ulhavior of Massachusetts school teachers and day care center personnel will be the ssme in an evacuation because of an emergency at Seabrook.
General Conclusions l
- 23. Theoretical and empirical observations are_ consistent and lead me to the following-
! . conclusions regarding the evacuation of Massachuset:s schools and operation of the school
- host facility at the College of the Holy Cross. An abundance of Massachusetts teachers and l day care center personnel would act as bus escorts. These same people would' stay at the host facility to help until they were no longer needed. The host facility would not suffer j from a lack of workers to' do needed work. The host facility ould ssibly have an cess-of emergency volunteer workers. ,
E g Dr. Dennis S. Mileti a
- Denver County, Colorado October 18, 1990 K The above subscribed Dr. Dennis S. Mileti appeared before me and made oath that he had I read the foregoing affidavit and that the statements set forth therein are true to best of his knowledge.
Before me, 8 Notary Public h" b""
My Commission Expires: r/23/n I'
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ATTACHMENT A- -
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~ EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO TE SEAFORD, LONG ISLAND PROPANE tat 4< TRUCK ACCIDENT Dennis S. M11ett and Colleen Fitzpatrick l
Department of Sociology and Hazards Assessment Laboratory Colorado State University Fort Collins, Colorado 80523 3
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Report Prepared for Long Island Lighting Company
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April,1989 t
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..
We thank the residents and officials of Nassau County who provided us with time and Information through personal interviews, phone conversations, and correspondence. This study and report would not have been possible without their 4 cooperation. We appreciate their assistance.
We also thank the Long Island Lighting Company f or. asking the Hazards -
Assessment Laboratory to conduct this' case study. Thelt support is appreciated..
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We hope . that this report = enables them and others to better understand the
' re_sponse and lessons learned from the May 24,'1988 propane tank truck accident -
on Long Island.
Li Dennis S. Milet!'
Director, Hazards Assessment Laboratory Professor of Sociology n
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TABLE OF CONTENTS B
Pace
~ AC KNOWLEDGE ME NT S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . li
' T ABLE OF CONTE NT S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 -
LI ST OF FIGURE S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iv .
Chapter A. INT R O DU CT I ON . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
- 1. T he C o m m unit y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 ~
8 2. T he A c c i d e n t . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
- 3. T h e S t ud y . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .= . . . . . . 2 -
B. CHR ON OL OGY ' OF_ EVENT S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
- 1. I n t r o d u c ti o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 ~
- 2. T ue s da y 2 4 M a y 19 8 8 . . . . . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . .' . . . . . . . . . 7
- 3. W ednesday 25 May.19 88 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 B 4. T hur s da y 2 6 M a y .19 8 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 C. ORG ANIZ ATIONAL RESPONSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 -
I 1. F ire F i ghting . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Wantagh Fire Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .' 14 a.
- b. Seaford Fire Department ........................21-
- c. Nassau County Fire Marshal's Of fice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
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- 2. . T he Ev acua ti on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8
. a. Nassau County Police . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 5 3. Food, Shelter and T ransport ation . . . . . '. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Seaf ord Middle School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 J : a.
.b. R e d C ro ss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
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S alv ation Ar my ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 Nassau County Executive's Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 D. EVALUATIONS BY THOSE INVOLVED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
- 1. R e gu l a ti on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6 I 2. Emergency Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 E. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT EMERGENCY RESPONSE , . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 8 1. - Publi c R es ponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Emergency Worker Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 -
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- 3. Organizational Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 APPENDIX A. Int er view Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 ill B
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LIST OF FIGURES I
Figure ,
Page 1 . Pro p an e T an k F i r e - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -
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2 Organizations and. Positions of Persons Interviewed . ... . . . . . . . . . . . 5 -
l'w Firemen Holding Hoses to Keep Tank Cool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .;. .'15 3
4 Fire Hose Nozzles Used During Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5 Burning T ank under Bridge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 6 Unattended Hoses Spraying Water onto Burning Tank . . . . . . . . . . . 18 I
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l' A. INTRODUCTION
- 1. The Community
.Nassau County is located in the west-central section of Long Island, and it is bordered on the west by New York City and Suffolk County on the east. -It .
conslots of a 287-square-mile land area populated by about 4,610 people per square mile based on a 1980 population of- approximatelyJ1,321,582 people. About 40 percent of Nassau County residents work outside the county. Over half (61 percent) of the working population drive to work alone,16 percent carpool, and 17 -
percent rely on pubile transportation for commuting to and from' work.
The v'llages i of Seaford and Wantagh are loceded in Nassau County, and they are about 15 miles east of New York City. They comprise a combined land area of almost seven square miles located in the south-central portion of Nassau County.
-This area has a combined population of 35,934 or approximately 5,133 persons per square mile.
The Village:of Seaford has a population of 16,117 and it consists of a land area of almost three square miles occupied by 4,887 housing units. Wantagh has a population of 19,817 residing in a land area of almost four square miles occupied by 5,949 housing units. Thus, Seaford has a population density of approximately 5,372 people and 1,629 housing units per square mile. Wantagh has a population-density of approximately 4,954 per square mile in which about 1,487 housing units are located.
Many roadways provide traffic access in and out of the Seaford-Wantagh area. The Long Island Railroad is an additional source of transportation, and it is relled upon by some commuters f or getting to and from New York City.
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Op Sunrise , Highway is a major' esst-west auto-route which runs through.the, 5
middle of' both- villages _ and also provides access to the;Seaford-Oyster Bay-
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Expressway. This expressway provides a major link to the LongIsland Expressway-which serves as the major east-west vehicle thoroughf are from New Y':k City to all of Long Island. The Long Island Railroad runs close to the junction of Sunrise Highway and the Seaf trd-Oyster Bay Expressway'. 'The railroad has stations fg located in both Seaford and Wantagh. :
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- 2. The Accident, On Tuesday morning, May 24,1988, a 2,500 gallon propane gas tank truck which was owned and operated by Conservative Gas Company of Hicksville, Long Island overturned in the Village of Seaford on the Seaford-Oyster Bay Expressway near its junction with the Sunrise Highway. The propane ignited and created a torch fire (see Figure 1) with the potential for a bolling liquid evaporation vapor explosion (BLEVE).
- The Sunrise Highway and the Seaford-Oyster Bay Expressway were closed to traffic as a result of the accident. The Long Island Railway was also closed.
Additionally, residents of Seaford within a one fourth mile radius of the accident were warned to evacuate their homes. The original period of evacuation was estimated to be up to 10 days, but it lasted only for about two and one-half days.
The tank burnt off all its propane f.nd it did not explode. The potential fire ball that could have resulted if the tank had exploded could have been almost as large as the area evacuated.
- 3. The Study This' report is a case study of emergency response to the May 24, 1988 propane tank truck accident. The report emphasis is on the response of people, groups, and organizations to the emergency.
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The study was undertaken at the request and sponsorship of Long Island Lighting Company. Early reports about the emergency suggested that it triggered many dif f erent emergency response elements, f or example, the mobilization of 1
many emergency e orkers, public warning and evacuation, sheltering and so on.
Additionally, few community-level emergencies have been documented in the recent history of Long Island. Consequently, it seemed worthwhile to study this emergency in order to document any response lessons that could be learned.
The propane tank truck accident and fire occurred on the morning of May 24, 1988 and ended on May 26, 1988. Our field work began about one week later and lasted f or nimost one week. People and of ficials were interviewed in person, and two interviews were conducteo by telephone. An interview guide was used to give some structure to the interviews, and to make all interviews as comparable as possible. It is attached to this report as Appendix A. The questions on the guide were adapted to fit this emergency from vttandard guides used in disaster research.
The interview guide was develeped drawing upon guides used by the Committee on Natural Disasters in the National Academy of Sciences. the Disaster Research Center at the University of Delaware, and our own experience in the Hazards Assessment Laboratory at Colorado State University. # .
A Interviews were completed with almost all ot ganizet B involved in emergency response. At least one interview was' relevant organizations with the exception of the c tr uck. The organizations represented in our inter interviewee are listed in Figure 2. A total of 16 int eight diff erent organizations. Interviews ranged In't I minutes to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. s Some respondents expressed initial reluctance to respondents became open, conf ? and cooperative once, the int
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4 The' study.was undertaken at the request and sponsorship of Long Island Lighting Company. Early reports about the emergency suggested that it triggered l many different emergency response elements, for example, the mobilization of
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many emergency workers, public warning and evacuation, sheltering and so on.
Additionally, few community. level emergencies have been documented in the recent history of Long Island. Consequently, it seemed worthwhile to study this emergency in order to document any response lessons that could be learned.
The propane tank truck accident and fire occurred on the morning of May 24,
.968 and ended on May 26,1988. Our field work began about one wnek later and lasted for almost one week. People and officials were interviewed in person, and ;
two interviews were conducted by telephone. An interview guide was used to give.
some structure to the Interviews, and to make all interviews as comparable as ,
possible. It is attached to this report as Appendix A. The questions on the guld, were adapted to fit this emergency from standard guides used in disaster research.
The interview guide was developed drawing upon guides used by the Committee on Natural Disasters h the National Academy of Sciences, the Disaster Research ;
Center at the University of Delaware, and our own experience in the Hazards Assessment Laboratory at Colorado State University.
Interviews were completed with almost all organizatione and officials I involved in emergency response. At least one interview was obtained from all t
relevant organizations with the exception of the company that owned the tank .
truck.- The organizations represented in our interviews and the positions of each interviewee are listed in Figure 2. A total of 16 Interviews were completed across ,
eight different organizations. Interviews ranged in time from approximately 45 ,
minutes to 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. -
Some respondents expressed initial reluctance to be Interviewed. All l
! respondents became open, candid, and cooperative once the Interview had begun.
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(l!p 3 l w j Figure 2-ORGANIZATIONS AND POSITIONS OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED ,,
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e American Red Cross, Nassau County e Director of Disaster Services e Executive's Offlee, Nassau County
- e Coordinator 4 e Office of the Fire Marshal, Nassau County
'< e Inspector e inspector e Inspector ,
e Inspector e Police Department, Nassau County -
e Chief of Operations e Salvation Army L
s Director for Nassau County e Seaford Fire Department
- e Chief
- e Commissioner i
, e Seaford Middle School e Principal s
- e Wantagh Fire Department e Chief e Assistant Chief L e Assistant Chlef s Assistant Chief e Dispatcher Lg I
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-,t. __-_--.-;-._-.--._
,e Openness and cooperation by respondents is typical of disaster and emergency research; it was certainly characteristic of this research. Nevertheless, it is un!!kely that all respondentr. told us everything they perceived. We feel confident, however, that we were able to compi.e a reasonably accurate account of the major elements of response to this event. The data we sought and obtained was reasonably straightf orward. Most data were confirmed across' interviews with different respondents. Moreover, when all data, interviews, documents and observations were collated, it was clear that no important piece of information was excluded.
We did obtain some conflicting or inconsistent statements from some of the persons interviewed. Thate werc allin reference to details that did not affect any report conclusions. Conflict and incot.tistent statements always exist in this type of research. The matters being studied are not issues of absolute truth since different people of ten have diff erent perceptions or recollections about the same I event. We did not attempt to reconcile different views. More detailed research could have undoubtedly generated more report details and minor clarifications.
Almost certainly, however, it would not have altered our overall findings and conclusions.
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'I I B. CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
- 1. Introduction At about 9:25 a.m. on Tuesday, May 24,1988, a 2,500 gallon propane tank truck overturned and burst into flames on the Seeford-Oyster Bay Expressway in Seaford, Long Island, New York. This accident caus6d major concern about the potential for the propane tank to create a bolling liquid evaporation vapor exploilon (BLEVE). The explosion could have been violent and threatened both lif e and property in a densely populated community.
I Many t..nergency response activities teak place over more than two days following the accident. A chronology of events and accident response follows.
The times listed are approximations, and they are presented in a twenty-four hour clock format.
- 2. Tuesdev 24 May 1988 Pre.0925 : Nassau County Felice Department radio car passed the traveling propane truck on the highway; very shortly thereaf ter a motorist B stopped the police officer and reported that the truck had over-turned on the highway and was on fire.
I Police officers immediately went to the accident and also radioed f or assi.tance.
I Passenger in the overturned propane truck called the 911 emergency phone number.
0925 : Wantagh Volunteer Fire Department notified of accident via Nassau County Emergency Center.
B Wantagh Volunteer Fire Department responded to scene and then I called Seaford Volunteer Fire Department af ter realizing that the accident was in Seaf ord Fire Department's jurisdiction.
A Nassau County Fire Marshallinspector,in the field at the time, I overheard the emergency dispatch and responded to the scene within five minutes of the report.
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E I Shortly af ter 0925 the Nassau County Executive's Offlee found out about incident by monitoring the radio.
I 0925 0933 : Wantagh Assistant Fire Chief arrived on scene and set up equip.
ment and command post.
0925 0950 : Seaford Fire Department Assistant Chiefs arrived on the scene.
0930 Quite a few police officers arrived at the scene of the accident.
The police called in its hazardous materials team.,
I- Shortly af ter 0930 the fire departments made the' deelslon to evacuate the immediate area. The police department began implementing the evacuation and radioed f or assistance.
Principal at Seaford Middle School heard strens, helicopters, and emergency vehicles .. he knew something was happening but did I 0935 not know whet.
t ' Evacuation of community ordered by fire departments for 1,000 I foot radius which was almost immediately expanded to a 1,$00 f oot radius.
Police Department began evacuation of the area designated by I the fire department.
- Wantagh Fire Department contacted other fire stations for 0945 I 0945-0950 :
mutual aid.
Fire Marshal Hazard Materials team (3 inspectors) arrived at the scene of the accident. They immediately went down to the truck I to attempt shutting off a valve.
0950 : Seaf ord Fire Chief arrived on scene.
0952 : Seaford Fire Chief first had to select hose set up site and estab.
Ilsh ladder companies.
0953 : Seaford Fire Chief ordered the community evacuated and the '
Long liland Railroad shut-down.
Police Department set-up separate command post for evacuation procedures at the 7th Precinct.
Ambulances used to help transport some of the evacuees.
0955 : Evacuation zone was expanded to one-half mile radius and then contracted back to one-quarter mile radius shortly thereaf ter.
1010-1020 : Fire Marshal team went to the fire department (had difficulty
- finding who was in charge) to advise and recommend.
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1040 : Fire departments, af ter recommendations from Fire Marshal, '!
decided to attempt extinguishing the flame. The flame was j extinguished. i I
i 1045 : Fire Marshal inspector approached truck second time to shut off '!
the valve. i 1055 : Tank reignited. Conservative Gas Company wanted to try extin-gulshing the flame again. j I 1100 : Evacuation zone expanded to one-quarter mile radius' by order of Seaf ord Fire Chief. :
1 I Seaford Fire Department sent bus to pick-up evacuees from St.
William of the Abbot School where evacuees had originally been sent. This was necessary since expansion of the evacuation zone
]
now included this school within the evacuation area. l Police Department evacuation team went through the evacuation area a second time. .
1130 : Fire Marshal team and Conservative Cae person heard creaking noises from the tank and made a " quick and orderly" retreat from the immediate area. Decided to let it burn. Full community I evacuation and rallroad shut-down decided.
- Fire Marshal team and Conservative Gas Company expert made 1140 I 1300 first of several attempts to shut-off valve.
- Police notifled the Principal at Seaford Middle School not to let I students out until parents came to sign them out or until he was notified differently by the police department. This was the principal's first official notification of the incident.
After the police department accomplished the evacuation, of ficers patrolled the evacuated community around the clock.
I, Nassau County Civil Preparedness Office notifled the Red Cross of the evacuation and requested shelter assistance. The Red Cross responded immediately.
1330 : Parents began arriving at the Middle School to get their children.
1300-1400 : The Nassau County Emergency Office notified the Nassau County.
I Salvation Army Office of incident and requested canteen services.
1330 : Other fire departments mobilized for relief.
1400 : Nassau County Red Cross Director of Emergency Services arrived at the Middle School to set-up evacuation shelter.
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10 l 1430 : Red Cross began serving snacks to evacuees in the Middle School l shelter.
1430-1530 : Salvetion Army canteen services arrived on scene of accident.
1515 : Evacuation shelter in full swing at Middle School at time of school dismissal. This created a confused situation due to the I simultaneous arrival of evacuees and dismissal of students.
The Principal of Seaford Middle Schoollef t and went home for a short while then came back to the school.
1600 : Parents picking up children at the Middle School began to slow down.
Red Cross assembled all the people at the school in order to separate out residents from school students.
1700 : Police Department and Fire Departments notified evacuated area of evacuation again since residents were beginning to arrive home from work.
Traf fic was seriously congested f or several hours.
Nassau County Salvation Army Director arrived in the area and reported to the Wantagh Fire Station where he found an evacua.
tion center sebup, already occupied by evacuees.
1800 : Red Cross volunteers began to arrive at Middle School.
2000 : Last student picked up from the Middle School.
2015 : Principal of Seaford Middle School went home for the night.
Other school staff remained as volunteers.
2030 : Red Cross requested additional supplies from the New York Red Cross chapter.
2300 : Nassau County Red Cross asked the New York Red Cross Chapter to deliver comf ort kits to the Middle School shelter.
- 3. Wednesday 25 May 1988 0000 : Red Cross shelter head. count revealed approximately 60 evacuees sleeping in the gym and 25 socializing in the cafeteria.
0100 : Red Cross released volunteer staff for the night.
0215 : Young boy in the Middle School shelter experienced breathing problems and needed ambulance transportation to the hospital.
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L 0221 : When ambulance arrived to transport the boy, the driver inf ormed the Red Cross that the Middle School shelter was in the evacua.
I tion zone.
0300 : A pollce ofilcer informed Red Cross that the shelter was back in the safe zone.
0530 : Red Cross requested a donation of 100 morning newspapers from Newsday.
School esfeteria staff arrived to prepare breakf ast for evacuees.
0530 0600 : Suburban Cas expert tried to crimp a gas hose in a fourth attempt to extinguish the flame.
0630 : Red Cross met with school administrator to discuss arrangements f or shelter procedures during the day.
0645-0700 : Red Crosa distributed comfort kits and served breakf ast to the evacuees at the Middle School shelter.
0700 : Newsday delivered morning newspapers to the Middle School Shelter.
0700-0800 : Fire Marshal team made fif th attempt to control the fire.
0800 : Middle School opened f or regular classes.
1030 : Red Cross assembled evacuees in the gym in order to maintain some control throughout the school.
1145 : Red Cross served lunch to evacuees.
1200 : Red Cross decided to have another overnight shelter.
1500 : Fire Marshal team and Conservative Gas Company expert attempted to accelerate leak in hopes that the flame would burn out f aster.
Between Fire Marshal team and Conservative Gas expert attempted to I 1500-1900 :
disconnect hose from the tank.
Fire Marshal team attempted to open another valve in hopes of 1900 2000 :
I During making the flame burn f aster.
I the day : Nassau County Executive's Office set into motion emergency transportation procedures to assist in transporting stranded rail passengers.
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n Night-time i Heat went out in the Middle School shelter and Red Cross had to distribute additional blankets. Ninety evacuees stayed the second night.
4, Thursday 26 May 1988_
- Fire Marshal team concluded that the best thing to do was to let 0600 the tank burnitself out.
approached tank to tabe ' heat sensitive 0600 0615 : Fire Marshal team pictures to ascertain the amount of propane lef t in the tank.
They Evacuees at the Middle School shelter began getting up. 4 I 0600 ~t heard on the news that the flame had olminished.
Fire Marshal team reported the flame went out.
t 0615 :
and Conutvative Gas Company expert 0620 : Fire Marshal team declared the tank to be empty.
is I 0620-1400 t Fire Marshal team and Conservative Gas Company purged the tank.
0700 : Evacuees at Red Cross shelter heard on the news that the flame had gone out.
Even though the flame was out, the fire departments advised Morning evacuees to remain at the shelter because of continuing danger.
- Red Cross shelter evacuees began going home.
0845-0900 Red Cross reported that last evacuee lef t the Middle School 10n0 shelter.
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Incident ended for the police department except for ongoing 1200 paper work.
- Incident ended f or Wantagh and Seaf ord Fire Departments.
1330
- Emergency considered over by the Fire Marshal team.
1400
- Almost all the evacuees at the Middle School shelter were gone, 1500 most had lef t earlier, the last evacuee departed at this time.
- Incident ended for Salvation Army; they rettleved cots and got 1530 some sleep.
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C. ORGAP4ZATIONAL RESPONSE Many different organizations responded to the Seaforet propane tank truck fire and emergency. Organizational response to the event was directed toward three basic functions. These functions were fire fighting, conducting the evacus-tion, and the provision of essentials to the evacuees, for example transportation, food and shelter. The discussion of organizational response presented in this chapter is organized in terms of these three functions since these functions focused the response of organizations. Some exceptions to this one organization-one function response pattern did exist. For example, the Wantagh Fire Department helped to provide food and shelter to some evacuees in addition to fire fighting. These exceptions will be presented as they occurred.
I 1. Fire Flohtino Nassau County contains 71 volunteer fire departments, and over thirty (estimates ranged from 31 to 32) of them responded te the propane tank truck fire. Additionally, the Nassau County Fire Marshal's Office and the Conservative Gas Company also joined the effort. Most of the responding fire departments were available to provide relief teams on the scene, or to cover routine fire fighting needs of the departments which focused resources on the propane fire.
The major fire fighting response was provided by the Seaford and Wantagh Fire Departments and the Of fice of the Fire Marshal. In all, over 400 firefighters were involved in some form of emergency response to this incident. All of these fire-fighters were volunteers, except for members of the Office of the Fire Marshal.
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9
- a. Wantsch Fire Department. The dispatcher on duty at the Wantagh Fire Station received a 911 emergency call from the Nassau County Fire Communlea.
I tions Center in Mineola just prior to 0925 on Tuesday, May 24,1988. A propane tank truck was reported to have overturned and to be on fire. Three to five volunteer stations responded immediately, and an additional station responded as a standby unit. A unit from the Wantagh Station was the first 'to arrive at the.
scene. The location of th9 accident was originally reported incorrectly as at Route 135 and Merrick Read. This location is in the jurisdiction of the Wantagh Department. Thus, the Seaford Fire Department, which is dispatched by the ;
Wantagh Station, responded as a mutual aid department on!.i to find that the
- emergency was actually in its own district.
Sometime between 0925 and 0933 a Wantagh Assistant Chlef arrived on the scene; officers from the Nassau County Police 7th Precinct were already present.
Another Wantagh Assistant Chief arrived on the scene four minutes later. Thelt. <
initial concern focused on cooling the tank in hopes of reducing the explosion danger. Initially, firemen held hoses and tried to keep the tank cool (see Figure >
j 3). It took between five to seven minutes for the Wantagh Station to set-up ;
equipment and estab!!sh a command post. The nozzles of the fire hoses (see Figure 4) had to be weighted and tied down onto concrete and hammered into the ,
asphalt. They decided to leave the overturned tanker truck under the bridge (see Figure 5) because it was too dangerous to attempt moving it to a safer location.
Once they had the hoses securely in place, they sprayed water into the fire and lef t the hoses unattended (see Figure 6). This allowed the fire fighters to operate
. . from a safer distance since anyone close to the truck was in a serious life.
L threatening position, j Around 0935 the fire department chiefs decided to order an evacuation of the surrounding area. The initial evacuation was for a 1,000 foot radius. The area -
l I x t' . - - - - --.-.-----_-____.--_.----_-._.-----w - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - _ - - - - - - .
i 15 Figure 3 FIREMEN HOLDING HOSES TO KEEP TANK COOL
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- Q wk. $ .L ae nen b k 4 Ad4 Figure 4 FIRE HOSE NOZZLES USED DURING ACCIDENT I
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Figure 5 BURNING TANK TRUCK UNDER BRIDGE I
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18 l n gure 6 UNATTENDED HOSES SPRAYING WATER ONTO BURNING TANK l
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was almost immediately extended to a 1,500 foot radius. A fire department ! 1
!!alson alerted the police department from the 7th Precinct about the evacuation )
l zone. The police quickly began evacuating the community by going door-to-deor with bullborns, and they knocked on doors. Once the fire stations had set-up for handling the actual emergency, excess fire fighters assisted the police with the evacuation. Some disabled people needed special assistance and rescue teams j went to houses known to be occupied by disabled persons. The Wantagh Fire l 1 5 Department maintains a computer database list of all disabled persons in the area l which catalogued at least a dozen such persons living in the evacuation zone. Members of the fire department evacuation team reported that possibly three people refused to evacuate. The evacuation team specifically told the people that they should evacuate because they were in serious danger since an overturned { propane tank might explode. Some people did not want to leave because they thought it was a joke. I At about 0945, within 20 minutes of the accident, the Wantagh Fire Depart-ment contacted other fire departments for mutual aid support. This was neces- j sary in order to maintain adequate coverage in case of additional calls about other , emergencies. By oy53 the fire fighters and police made a joint decision to extend the evacuation zone to e one-quarter mile radius; by this time fire fighting I
=
experts had arrived on the scene and advised the fire departments that the longer the fire burned, the greater was the risk of an explosion. By 1035 the fire departments extended the evacuation zone to one-half mile only to contract.the radius back to one-quarter mile very shortly thereaf ter. The Wantagh Department developed a staging area and divided the evacua- , Lion zone into fort quarters. An asslatant chief was put in charge of and was responsible for each quarter. The fire deparments maintained logs for monitoring the fire trucks' refueling needs since the trucks had to be kept constantly running. I I -
80 The fire departments replaced trucks in phases. The fire chiefs developed this plan as events occurred since they had no emergency plan for this type of event on { I which to draw. The Seaford or Wantagh Fire Departments coordinated all fire activities. The fire chiefs used " runners" to relay communications to the command post. This became necessary because media monitoring and broadcasting of the incident clogged up the fire departments' phone channels. Wantagh had three to four cellular phones on the scene at all times. Fire fighters inspected the fire fighting equipment every 45 minutes of ten accompanied by a Conservative Gas Company expert. This expert kept assuring the fire departments that the tank would not explode. One fire fighter related that he did not want to be "down in the hole"(ref er. ring to being near the truck), but he "was there anyway" since it was his job. The fire chiefs reported that all fire fighters performed their jobs in an exemplary f ashion and that nobody refused to perform any requested duties. Sometime during the first night of the incident, the fire fighters spotted three teenagers scaling the expressway fence and climbing aboard a fire truck 1 attempting to steal equipment. They were promptly apprehended by the police. A Wantagh Fire Department dispatcher reported that they received calls ! from as far away as California with advice on how to put the fire out. Suggestions such as " pour milk on It", " drop a bomb blanket over it"," shoot a bazooka into it",
"take a 752 piercing round from an M-16 to put holes into it"," lay mats on It",
"take a tank of liquid nitrogen and freeze It", "altlif t it to a safer area then explode It", and " bulldoze a trench around It" were offered sometimes jokingly and
~I. other times quite seriously.
The incident ended for the Wantagh Fire Department by 1330 on Thursday. The Department used 12 pieces of equipment during the emergency. These I g .
, 1 31 i
N included seven engines, ona ladder truck, one telesquirter, and three rescue units l; used to remove people from the evacuated area. In addition,13 other depart. ments, with a total of 32 pieces of equipment, provided mutual aid. Also, nine i fire departments with five-inch hoses provided specla! call assistance.
- b. Seaford Fire Department. At about 0925 on May 24,1988 a Seaford Fire Department dispatcher received a message from the Wantagh Fire Station j that the overturned propane truck was located in Seaford's fire fighting jurisdic- )
m tion. The Wantagh Fire Department had initially responded to the accident under the impression that it was in Wantagh's jurisdiction. Sometime between 0925 and f 0950, a Seaford Assistant Chief arrived at the scene of the accident. The Seaford Fire Chlef was at his regular job when the incident began; it took between 20 to 25 minutes af ter notifiestion before he arrived at the accident scene, at approxl- , mately 0950. By 0952 the Seaford Chief began selecting an alternative site for [ fighting the fire with five inch hoses. He also established ladder companies so . I. that the fire department would have adequate response capacity for other possible t alarms in the area. Shortly af ter the chief's arrival, at about 0953, he made the deelslon to evacuate the area and notified the Long Island railroad to shut-down. The Chief of Seaford informed the Jamaica / Queens rallroad office of the j Long Island rallroad, where he is a police officer, that the railroad had to close at I the Seaford station. He immediately ordered evacuation of the community. The i initial evacuation zone was less than a quarter mile radius. The Chief also set-up an emergency operations center in the field "around" his car. The police department helped with the evacuation; they used route notifica. tion by driving through the streets with strens and bullhorns. The Seaford Chief consulted at 1100 with propane fire experts on the scene and then expanded the evacuation zone to a one-quarter mile radius. Evacuation team"s went into action for the second time. The chief then became aware that children at St. Williams of i ut ll
22 the Abbot school had been sheltered in tbe basement of the school. He believed that this was the worst place they could have gone since propane is heavier than air. If it escaped and traveled it could have easily ended up in the basement of the school. He redirected a bus from the fire fighting post to the school in order to evacuate the children. ] Some 31 to 32 other fire departments also responded to the accident by 1330. Many responded as mutual aid units, relief, or to provide back-up assist. ance. About 25 to 28 percent of Seaford's force called in to volunteer for duty. 3
'3 The Seaford Chief indicated that there is always a problem with getting adequate g initial response to emergencies when volunteers are at work, but typically the i
response rate is between 20 to 25 percent. At 1700 the evacuation teams renotified the community about the evacua. tion because people began arriving home from work. The fire department wanted to make sure the community was adequately warned. Between 0953 and 1700 five disabled residents had to be evacuateed via , ambulance. Provision of food, blankets, and transportation for evacuees became a concern. Some residents refused to evacuate because they did not think the situation was serious. There were no reports of anyone evacuating from areas outside of the evacuation zone. Traffle in the area became very congested from 1700 on into the evening. The railroad station at Seaford was closed; people got off at the Freepott station and had to be bused to Masapequa where they were then put back on the railroad at Merrick Road. Sunrise Highway was also closed. No major accidents occurred, the traffic just could not move quickly. The Seaford Chief became concerned that someone needing emergency care would not be able to get through the heavy traffic. There were no reports of aberrant or any usual behavior by people in
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evacuating vehicles. I I
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M During the incident, between 15 and 20 people went to the bridge over. looking the accident to see the fire. The pollee promptly chased them away. I During the night some teenagers attempted to loot a !!ght off of a fire truck and they were arrested. The fire fighters, the Hazards Materials Specialists for the Office of the I Fire Marshal, and the Conservative Gas Company expert went down to the tank truck at regular intervals to observe the " burners" and to refuel their water pump I trucks. The Haron Bus Company donated a bus in which fire fighters could rest. : This but was used at one point to help evacuate additional people from the com-munity. A local pizza shop provided pizza for the fire fighters' and the Fire Department Ladies Auxillary supp!!ed sandwiches. Eventually, some evacuees began to complain that the fire departments , should be able to put the fire out since they were anxious to return home. The Seaford Chief was in charge of the situation, and he received all sorts of suggestions throughout the emergency. His strategy was to take information from , others and make decisions. He would meet with representatives from all the l direct emergency agencies, get advice, then make decisions accordingly. The I flame burned out at about 0630 on May 26,1988. Thus, the incident ended for the Seaford Fire Department with the exception of post-incident briefings and evalua. tions.
- c. Nassau County Fire Marshal's Office. An Inspector for the Nassau County l~lre Marshal's Office was in the field on May 24,1988 and heard about the l
propane truck accident and fire over his vehicle radio. He went directly to the accident; he arrived within five minutes of the event at about 0925. h ' The Nassau County Fire Marshal's Office regularly monitors radio dis-patches. While doing so, they overheard the Wantagh Fire Department notifying the Seaford Fire Department of the accident. The Fire Marshal's Office e I
34 .l concluded that the emergency sounded like one that would involve thel.r hazardous i materlats (hazmat) team. Consequently, their hazmat team prepared to respond. ! I The volunteer fire departments are in charge of emergency situations related to fires according to law. The Fire Marshal's Offlee responds to fire emergencies in an advisory capacity. Sometime between 0945 and 0950 three Fire Marshal Inspectors arrived at the scene of the accident. Their initial observation of the incident was that it was E a " serious situation". The hazmat team was already dressed in full gear, and they assessed the situation with a spotting scope from the vantage point of the Sunrise Highway overpass. They visually located the burning point and evaluated the position of the tank. They approached the burning tank af ter putting on appro. priate breathing apparatuses. One hazmat specialist walked up to the tank to - 1 attempt to shut off the valve which was emitting the torch like fismes. The Wantagh Fire Department was applying water to the tank. The hazmat specialist tried to close the valve, but the fire was hot and prevented him from staying very long. The valve was operational, but he was unable to turn it off. He tried to shield his f ace with a helmet but he received flash burns and had to back.off. At 1010 the hazmat team approached a person whom they thought looked to y be in charge of the incident. The Chief of the Seaford Fire Department walked up ( to this group as the conversation was occurring. The Seaford Chief was the person actually in charge since the incident was located in Seafords jurisdiction. The Wantagh Fire Department who was first on the scene relinquished authority to the Seaford Department. The Wantagh Department Chief told the Fire Marshal team . that it was Seafords fire when the Seaford Chief joined the group. Thus, the Fire Marshal team had to explain their intentions a second time. Explaining everything twice took time, from 1010 to 1020, and thus delayed the situation. They felt that the only way to shut the valve was to first extinguish the flames. They then I g
l E ' 85 I I, advised the fire departments that the fire needed to be extinguished. The dilemma at this point was to determine what would happen to the vapors once the I fire was put out. They reasoned that the best approach was to put the fire out and f i then turn the valve off. The Conservative Gas Company expert on the scene t agreed with this approach. At 1040 the Wantagh Fire Department attempted to extinguish the blaze. The fire was actually extinguished at thle time due to the sheer force of water being put into the flame which caused flame separation. One hazmat team l member approached the tank to look more closely at the valve. It would not move at all. This *vas due to either the effect of 3,000 degree flames or a pressure build-up. At 105$ they went to the underside of the truck to try to shut off the main valve. The fire reignited as this was being attempted. A smoldering rubber !I hose caused the vapor to burst into flames again. They lef t the scene saying "so i l. much for that idea". An expert from Chemtract's chemical industrial response team arrived at 1045. By approximately 1100 a total of three propane fire experts had arrived at the scene of the accident. The Conservative Gas Company expert wanted to l 5' attempt to extinguish the fire once again by turning the valve. Once again the valve could not be turned and the fire was nc.t extinguished. The Fire Marshal's team assessed the tank condition and flame impingement prior to each time the tank was approached. At 1130 they gave up the idea of closing the valve when two Conservative Ga6 representatives said that the " tank L I was making creaking and grinding noises" and that it sounded like " fatigue" and that it could " blow". Everyone made an orderly retreat from the tank. At this time the Seaford Chief decided to let the fire burn out. The Fire Marshal's team
/
thought this was a good decision since they had already had three unsuccessful
" shots" at solving the problem by turning off the valve, and the tank was decaying. ,
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A 26 . Their philosophy then became that if it cannot be put out it must be contained or isolated. It was at about this time, according to the Fire Marshal team, that the ! 2 Seaford Chief decided to extend the evacuation zone beyond 1,000 feet and to close down the railroad. Since the valve could not be closed, it now became important to keep the , propane flame burning. Propane is heavier that air and could escape into sewers and basements causing secondary explosions. A steady stream of water could keep ' I e the tank cool and slow down the evaporation. On the other hand, the walls of the j tank could weaken and rupture resulting in an explosion. At this point the Fire Marshal team reasoned that any of several things could happens the tank could burn out,it could explode, or they could attempt to make another hole in the tank and the gas could evaporate. The Fire Marshal team advised the fire departments I to pull back all unnecessary equipment and personnel. Thus, the fire stations moved back and set up a hose stream. The command post had to be moved three times. The f arthest back from the fire it was at any one time was one quarter to one-half mile. Fire personnel had to return to the danger zone several times to check on equipment and the burning .t El l up tank. The Fire Marshal team rotated thlf ts and took a break from 1900 on Tues. [ r day to 0300 on Wednesday. The inspector on duty was on call during this time. At 0400 on Wednesday, May 25,1988, another expert referred by Chemtract wanted to try to crimp the hose to stop the burn. The expert did not consult with l the Fire Marshal team and never attempted to find out what they had already : tried. He decided to wait for daylight and at about 0600 they made this attempt. It did not work because the Fire Marshal team had shut that particular valve much earlier. According to one inspector of the Fire Marshal's Office, the problem with so-called " experts" was that they wanted to try things that others had already attempted, and they did not bother to talk to others involved. ; I , l
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_..7 27 f o i Between 0700 and 0800 the same expert who tried to crimp the hose and several others approached the truck. They hoped to control the situation by a cutting a hole into the deck plate of the truck so that they could reach in to shut off another valve. During this time, other members of the Fire Marshal team functioned as "look. outs," scanning the truck for unusual conditions. If danger seemed imminent, they would alert the people at the truck with a boat whistle. l This attempt failed since there was no valve inside the deck plate to shut off. This concluded the " shut it down" phase of response. < A sixth attempt to control the situation began the " burn it off f aster" phase of response and it occurred around 1500. It conslated of trying to access a fitting on the bottom of the tank to insert a hose in hopes of making the flame burn ! f aster. This did not work because the check valve on the fitting was in place and operational. l Sometime between 1500 and 1900 the Fire Marshal team made a seventh !E I attempt at intervention by trying to disconnect the hose which they had previously t tried to crimp. This f ailed because the tank was built with a safety feature which prevented the gas from escaping. Af ter nightf all, between 1900 and 2000, the Fire Marshal team attempted to open yet another valve in hopes of making the flame burn faster. This too f ailed and they concluded it would take about eight days for the fuel to burn off. Thus t began the "let it burn" phase of response.
+ At 0600 on Thursday, May 26, 1988 the Fire Marshal team approached the ank with a thermal image camera to determine the amount of " product"(propane)
'In the tank, and to spot weaknesses in the tank. They were unable to detect with this camera. They did not notice that there was less " fire" than y.lef t the tank the previous night. About 15 minutes later "the thing
" (Thisiwas a surprias. Jhus, a burn estimated to last for eight to nine
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37 i Between 0700 and 0800 the same expert who tried to crimp the hose and several others approached the truck. They hoped to control the situation by cutting a hole into the deck plate of the truck so that they could reach in to shut off another valve. During this time, other members of the Fire Marshal team functioned as "look-outs," scanning the truck f or unusual con' d itions. If danger seemed imminent, they would alert the people at the truck with a boat whistle. This attempt f ailed since there was no valve inside the deck plate to shut off. Thl concluded the " shut it down" phase of response. A s!xth attempt to control the situation began the " burn it off f aster" phase i of response and it occurred around 1500. It consisted of trying to access a fitting i on the bottom of the tank to insert a hose,in hopes of making the flame burn f aster. This did not work because the check-valve on the fitting was in place and operational. Sometime between 1500 and 1900 the Fire Marshal team made a seventh attempt at intervention by trying to disconnect the hose which they had previously 1 1 tried to crimp. This f ailed because the tank was built with a safety feature which 5 prevented the gas from escaping. Af ter nightf all, between 1900 and 2000, the Fire Marshal team attempted to open yet another valve in hopes of making the flame burn faster. This too f ailed I and they concluded it would take about eight days for the fuel to burn off. Thus began the;"let it burn" phase of response. At 0600 on Thursday, May 26, 1988 the Fire Marshal team approached the j tank with a thermal image camers to determine the amount of " product"(propane) lef t in the tank, and to spot weaknesses in the tank. They were unable to detect anything with this camera. They did not notice that there was less " fire" than j n when they lef t the tank the previous night. About 15 minutes later "the thing went out." This was a surprise. Thus, a burn estimated to last for eight to nine ! a
.g._ s 1
_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ __ __i__._______________._________._._________________._._______.______
28 1 l-days lasted enly 45 hours. Thislmay have been because the tank load was under-estimated, the burn was faster than estimated, some of the interventions unknowingly worked or, as one Fire Marshal inspector said jokingly, "the driver had customers the company didn't know about." When the fire unexpectedly went out at 0615, the Fire Marshal team decided to cautiously approach the tank since they did not know why it had gone out. They were now unsure as to what to do: should they relight any remaining vapors or try I to disperse the fumes? The Fire Marshal team along with the Conservative Gas Company expert approached the tank and at 0620 the Conservative Gas Company expert declared the tank empty. From 0620 until 1400 the Fire Marshal team and the Conservative Gas Company expert purged the tank with nitrogen. The tank was then loaded onto a flatbed truck for transport out of town. At this time they discovered a separate 60 gallon propane tank on the side of the truck which had neither exploded nor burned. It was at 1400 that the propane emergency incident ended f or the Fire Marshal's Office. The Fire Marshal's Of fice expended approxl.
' mately 360 person hours during this incident and estimated that six million gallons of water were used.
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- 2. The Evaeustion The evacuation of the public in response to the propane tank truck fire involved several organizations. For example, the Nassau County Police and some volunteer firefighters helped to warn residents and inform them of the evacuation advisement the Seaford Fire Department Chief determined the size at the evac.
untion zone and revloed this zone several times on the basis of new information. The prime organization in charge of the evacuation, however, was the Nassau County Police,
- a. Nassau County Police. Prior to 0925 of May 24,1988 a Nassau County
,assee the p,opane t,uck on the seaf o,e.0,ste, eay Ni hway. ., eoiice ,selo c.,
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1 39 l 1 When the officer turned around at the end of the highway, a motorist stopped him i to report that the propane truck had overturned. The officer immediately pro- ; ceeded to the scene of the accident. The driver of the truck informed the officer _that the propane tank was fully loaded. The officer called for the police hazard-ous materials team. At about 0930, a number of additional Nassau County Police officers arrived on the scene. The fir.:t sergeant on the scene arrived shortly af ter 0930 and made the I deelslon to evacuate the area. He radioed for help. The police department set-up t its command post at the 7th Precinct Headquarters in Seaford. The first evacua-tion began shortly af ter 0930 when the police directed people to the assembly hall at a nearby Catholle school. Other evacuees went to the Wantagh Fire House. The fire department subsequently expanded the evacuation zone, and the people l ! I who were originally directed to the catholle school had to evacuate a second time. The Wantagh Fire Chlefs indicated that the police did not make public announcements from helicopters, nor were helicopters used for evacuation. , Although, the police did use helicopters f or traf fic observation, standby transport-ation, and for transporting county officials to the scene of the accident. The Fire ' l8 Marshal Inspectors indicated that by the time the command post was withdrawn to one-quarter mile, the community evacuation began with police going door-to-door
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i alerting people. The police also used fire trucks and police car loudspeakers while going house to-house. They announced that people were not being f orced to leave, but it was strongly recommended that they evacuate. The County Executive also made a television announcement that it was optional for people to evacuate. The l Fire Marshal Inspectors thought this was not a good move on the County Execu. tive's part since it could have confused some people. i The police department's first priority was to accomplish a safe evacuation; its second priority was traffic control and protection of the evacuated area; and 'I i I <
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i 30 its third priority was to take care of its own personnel who had to pull extra duty i
-- and were not able to get food breaks. The police also provided transportation for experts from the airport to the scene of the accident by both automobile and helicopter. It was difficult for the police department to get an accurate count of evacuees because they were too busy going door-to-door alerting the community, k B
'"' * 'Y '* d '" "' 2' ' ' ' ' " " ' "' ' ' d " ' " ' "' ' ' d' d " ' ' ' ' Y 1 E in the evacuation centers.
Between 50 to 60 officers went door-to-door to warn the people to evacuate. The police department also had patrol cars driving through the neighborhood to alert residents with a public address system. One woman had to be transported vla ambulance. The police told the people in the neighborhood exactly what had happened and that they needed to evacuate. They also told Se people where to go f or shelter. Evacuation became complicated because children were iri achool when the incident occurred. When school was dismissed some children tried to enter the evacuated neighborhood and had to be directed to the Middle School. Wantagh Fire Department Chiefs reported that some private schools had not been informed of the evacuation. Polic9 were in charge of coordinating and inf orming the schools regarding the evacuation and the event. Traffic control presented some oifficulties; however the public was very cooperative. The roadways were congested and some people were confused about chich alternative routes they should take to get to their destination. It took drivers much longer than usual to reach their destination. Many drivers slowed down to look at what was going on and this added to the traffic problems. In adcalon, more traffic problems occurred since the Long Island Railroad had been shut-down by early afternoon of the first day. Buses were used to help transport people who were stranded because the trains were stopped. The pr.llee depart. ment used buses, the County Executive's Of fice provided buses, and the Long ; I ! I
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Lisland Railroad $o.;rovided buses to help alleviate thl's transportation problem. 1 People:also'used their own cars and shared rides with one another. Long Island j
, . Railroad assigned officers' to the police department command post for the dura- j
.. 1 tion of the incident.
The, poll'ce.' department knew of no one who evacuated from outside the actual evacuation zone. They also knew of no people who evacu'ated early since. the people did not have a " handle on what was going on." Several businesses had
- to be shut-down during the evacuation.
One woman went to the grocery store when she was first notified of: the evacuation.' She apparently thought the evacuation would not last very long. When she returned from the store she discovered that it was still unsafe for her to go home with her. grocerles. Many people stood around the perimeter of t'he evacuation zone. ' Mont were nonworking women who had no idea that it would turn into a lot @ term situation.
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The police also had to intercept workers who lived in the evacuation zones as ; they came home from work and inform them of the evacuaticn and where shelters
.were located. Some drivers stopped to ask police for alternative routes. .There 3 was some confusion about where to go and how to get there. The police depart-ment allowed some people to go back into their. houses for special reasons, but only if accompanied by an officer.
The evacuation was very orderly from the perspective of the police depart ment. Everyone took it very well with the exception of some who became upset r when they could not return home in a few hours. Most of the people who complsined about the inconvenience caused by the fire not being extinguished
,5 : sooner were not fully aware of its real danger. The police department knew of no l problems with the behavior of evacuees in the shelters where police officers were
-assigned. The Re,d Cross did not become involved immediately because the police s
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W, w y 3g [ 12' h , Jdeparttpent did not notify them of the incident right away. The police department.
.ha'd four to five ambulances on the scene and around the area at all times.
nThe ' police department used its standard operating procedures f or large !
- accidents. : They used an evacuation plan which is included in their general civil
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- defense emergency plan. ,
W- !The police ' department assigned about 20 officers per shif t to patrol the area around the clock after the initial evacuation was completed. The police auxillary also assisted in patrolling the area. The police department reported no larcenles-t or burglaries commited in the evacuation area during the incident with one excep. tion.. Three teenagers were arrested for taking a piece of equipment off a fire l truck. One police detective, not assigned to the emergency area, lived in the evacuation neighborhood. He ' asked to be relieved from duty so that he could make sure his f amily was saf e. The police department had enough staff at'all s times, they were able to make due with what they had, and the detective's request l was granted. The' fire went out shortly af ter 0600 on May 26,1988. Everything was back p to normal by noon. Long Island Railroad opened up right after the incident was over, but not before the bridge was inspected for damage.- It was thought that the s b *. propane truck could have hit the bridge when it' had its accident. The truck did ' 1
= not impact the bridge, since the police department found no damage. ,
The police impounded and inspected the propane tank and vehicle. Before it t could be moved the tank had to be purged with nitrogen. This was done by Con- L; servative Gas Company. The tank and truck were then taken to Mitchell Field f or [" . further inspection. The actual incident ended for the police department in the 1
- b afternoon of that Thursday; although it was defined as still ongoing when we con-6 ducted our interview since'the county was pursuing a law suit and reports still had to be prepared.-
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4 3 y) 1 The police used 319 staff hours the first day of the ibcident,' 368 the second day, and 344 the third day. 3.- Food. Shelter and Transportation.
- a. Seaford Middle School. The principal of the Seaford Middle School-heard alrens, helicopters, and emergency vehicles at 0930 on Tuesday, May 24, 1998,' and he concluded that something was going on. _ The Middle School is the
; planned and designated evacuation ~ center for any emergency operation in the
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area. This designation is a part of a countywide emergency plan which determines how f acilities 3re to be used during an emergency. It -was not until Uh0. however, that the police called the principal- to tell
- him' not to let the stucents out until he either heard from the police again or
.y 1 ' parents came to pick them up. At 1330 some evacuating parents began arriving at
. the school to pick up children. The school allowed the children to leave only if the parent signed a release form. A " big rush" of parents began to' arrive at 1500 to
. get their children as pts.nned. At the same time, other schools _(The Montessort
- . School and St. William of the Abbot) brought their students to the Middle School
' as evacuees. The teachers from these schools stayed to identify the children since the Middle School did not know their children. One mother complained because the Middle School did not know the location of her Montessori School child. Many
; parents had difficulty getting to the school because of traffic congestion. In one I instance, a bus driver just dropped off a " retarded boy who barely knew his name."
The driver lef t and no one knew who the boy was or where he belonged. Eventual-Lly someone came for the boy, but not before it caused the boy considerable stress;- he kopt saying "this is the baddest day of my life." 4 The most evacuees and parents began to arrive about 1530 and some brought pets, for example dogs and birds. These pets also used the school as an evacuation t g
s t' fabelter - The, police never called the principal back, although officers arfived for duty at the school by 1500. A few memb'ers of the school staff lef t at 1500,'some. left at 1600, and some stayed until 2000 or 2030. The principal briefly'lef t the' school' at .1515 to go home to tend to' personal business. Everything was being
. covered pretty -well by others at that time. He returned to the school shortly-
.thereafter.
The Red Cross arrived at the school at 1530 to set-up the' evacuation shelter. '
'The' Red Cross ran the evacuation center. Red Cross workers took care of the
.needs of evacuees, for example medications, emergency kits, cots, and blankets. -
They also made: arrangements for residents to go back into their homes'to get s' things. Local pizza and doughnut merchants donated food. Shortly:siter 1300 six Midcle School students " split" out a window. These - stud'ents subsequently got detention and had to hear a police lecture on obeying' rules during en emergency. In ado tion, students from a high school located near-
'the scene of the accident were told ta go to the Middle School evacuation shelter;
.they never showed up. They were not supervised after being released from.the High School.
The Principal of the Middle School related that the school nurse volunteered . am : to remain at the school since the Red Cross did not bring a nurse. It helped that her home was located in the evacuation zone. Some teachers stayed all night and the administrative secretary stayed.to maintain a' communication center .at the <
. school.
The board of education discussed the possibility of cancelling school for. the '
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next day.' They decided against this because it would likely contribute to children
'being out in the community unnecessarily who could then possibly try to look at the ' accident more closely.
E E:
e 4 35; I g The media' came to the school.- This addEd to the already hectic environ. W ment.LHowever, people did not_ mind when a f amilar CBS news person arrived. . All kinds of- rumors circulated, for example some people thought s' convict had escaped when they heard helicopters overhead, and some thought that they
- could not go home for 20 days.
The Red Cross told the principal immediately that they would pay for any 8
- food used in the cafeteria, thus the principal began making arrangements to 'get food out to the evacuees.~ The principal was annoyed that some nearby neighbors
! adults and- children)'not in the evacuation zone came into the school for free t
food. At 1600 the number of parents arriving to collect children began to slow down.1 At about this same time approximately half-a-dozen kids who had already been picked up by parents 'came back onto the school grounds. They were riding on bicycles, passed in front of windows, and waved at the children in school who were still waiting to be picked up.
- At 2000 the parent of the one remaining student arrived at the school. ' The school had been unable to contact this single parent because he lived on a b' oat and did not have a telephone. _The principal went home at 2015 af ter he was sure that everything was well covered. At the time he lef t, 60 to 70 evacuees had already arrived at the school and more were on their way.
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The next day-(Wednesday, May 25, 1988) the Middle School opened in full-
> session, but only .198 students arrived te- classes. The total enrollment at the W Middle School is $18 students. The school adjusted its curriculum. New material was not introduced because the absentee rate was so high. Staff absences were
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the same as under normal circumstances. The evacuees stayed in either the gym or in a partitioned off section of the cafeteria. The school maintained its full schedule, and adjusted its activities g
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5 around the ' evacuees. Some students expressed problems with having their_ rest-rooms filled with older people shaving and grooming. . Animals were also present.
. Everyone was very tired. The school cafeteria staff prepared all the food for the ,
evacuees, the head cook came in early and everyone stayed longer than usual. The G school charged 'the teachers and the television crews f tr food but not the ! l l evacuees.
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No one really felt in danger throughout the' incident, even though at one-point they were tdJ to keep the blinds closed in order to contain shattering glass in case of an explosion. Classes went on as usual, although the students were dis. tracted and wanted to talk about the emergency. At one point, a fireman told the
- 1 principal that-the school should evacuate, but that only the police had authority to t
' make such a decision.
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! 1 Police officers were assigned to the school for the entire emergency period.
1
; They stayed in the . office around the communications center. The police depart-ment also had officers on every street corner around the sealed of
- cammunity..
i. On the third day, Thursday, May 26, 1988, people in the school heard ever television that the fire had cone out. The evacuees were nevertheless advised to stay at the shelter since there was still danger. The school had a scheduled field. l trip this day, and 383 students were in school. Most evacuees lef t early in the morning even though they were not allowed back'into their homes until about _ 1400. The last evacuee lef t at 1500. - This marked the end of the incident from the viewpoint of the school. Clean-up was accomplished by normal custodial staff; they also temporarily stored the Red Cross cots and blankets used during the emergency. The evacuees c were _very " good," they did no damage. By Friday, May 27, 1988, school was back to normal, although people were still talking about the emergency. The incident was no longer prominent on television, and enrollment was back to routine or about two absentees per day. 'g ,
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- b .- . Red Cross.; Att approximately 1300 on Tuesday, May 24,'1988 the:
Director of Emergency Services for the Massau County Chapter of the American. j
~ Red Cross ~ received a' call from Civil Preparedness. This call alerted the Red . ,
1 Cross of the ongoing situation in Seaford and stated that no shelters were open at that time. . The Red Cross Director told Civil Preparedness that they would
' respond immediately. and go to the command post. However, at 1335 the Red ,
Cross received a request from the 7th Precinct of the NassaJ County Police to go directly to St.-Williams of the Abbot School to staff a s'elter that had already i been opened.
< Traffic impeded the Red Cross Director's arrival since the Seaford-Oyster
' j Bay Highway had been closed and other routes were severely congested. Upon a
. arrival at St. William of the Abbot, evacuees were being told that the evacuation zone had been extended and that they should re-evacuate to the Seaford Fire.
house. The Red Cross were also informed by telephone from the 7th Precinct that some evacuees from St. William of the Abbot had gone to the Wantagh Firehouse. The Red Cross Director began the registration of the evacuees when he a 7 arrived at the Seaford Firehouse. He then received another phone call from the M
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7th Precinct. It informed him that.this firehouse site was declared dangerous and that everyone should proceeu to-Seaford Middle School. The Middle School was }
' + then opened as a Red Cross shelter. The Nassau County Director was the only Red Cross person present during the first four hours. Fire companies and the Red Cross transported 37 students to the school. A registration desk was. set up and '
~ operated by school staff. .
Between 1400 and 1430 the Seaford Middle School became the officially o designated Red Cross shelter f or the emergency. At 1445 the registration showed
. 71 residents and 98. students from St. William's and the Montessori schools. Since the shelter opened before school was dismissed at 1500, parents began to arrive to l : 4 I r
I 30 sign-out their csidten at'the same time that evacuees arrived at the shelter. For t 45 minutes to on hour thereaf ter, the school setting was confused because of-congestion in the hallw'ays due to this simultaneous influx of evacuees and school dismissal. Parents ' were required to sign release forms' before taking their children, and this added to the " confusion." The registration of evacuees was also -
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hampered due to all the congestion. At '1515 shelter operations were in full swing. The cafeteria staff, upon the request of the Red Cross, volunteered their time and began to serve snacks.. Two nurses were at the' shelter; the school nurse stayed and eventually a Red Cross. nurse arrived. Five' wheelchalt evacuees were present. Several evacuees had forgotten their medication, and the Red Cross went to a pharmacy to get them their prescriptions. I. At 1600 the- Red ~ Cross- Director asked the teachers of both evacuated schools to assemble thelt students in the gym. He also asked the evacuated residents to go in the . cafeteria. He told the students that snacks were being served, and he asked the teachers for the names of students. He then addressed the shelter residents about the situation, told them why the Red Cross was I- brought in, and informed them about how they could help. --The next two hours
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were extremely hectic. Nevertheless, the operation of the shelter ran smoothly, and all the concerns and needs of the residents were addressed. This was because school staff and evacuees were cooperative and the arrival at approximately 1600 of two additional-Red Cross staff. Red Cross volunteers began arriving at 1800 when dinner was bdng served. Af ter dinner, the shelter was " besieged" by the. media. News crews conducted interviews and taped shelter activities. The last' student 'lef t school at 1900; and the registratinn of evacuees - continued. The Red Cross still had not been informed of the scope of the situation at this time. The decision to make the Middle School into an overnight shelter
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. occurred because it looked like it would continue as a long-term situation. This- ,
was surmised af ter a fireman observed on the television news said," don't know,it a[ I could last another day or - another 20 days."- The Red Cross.then decided to .. 3 ps s prepare for an overnight operation. They contacted the Mineola office and. asked [
- them to go to the chapter office to help others transport cots and blankets. They ]
returned to the shelter and began to set up cots. Evacuees were then addressed (i about what the Red Cross was doing; they were told that the gym would be set-up . I. for sleeping, and that the cafeteria would remain open throughout the night for 1uld 'not sleep. Initially,100 cots were obtained from the
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0 1 use by anyone who , Mineola office and transported with four station wagons and vans. The Greater New York Red Cross Chapter was contacted at 2030 to request 150 additional cots,200 blankets, and 400 comfort kits, h b
. I'7 At approximately 2100 the 7th. Precinct phoned again and stated that the ]
Salvation Army would be distributing cots and blankets to various shelters. nit was y at this time that the Red Cross first discovered that more than one shelter was { operating in the area. The Red Cross Director then contacted the Wantagh Fire- , house and-spoke with a Fire Commissioner about other shelter operations. The 1 1
)
commissioner stated that approximately 75 evacuees were at the Wantagh Fire- k [ ', would likely be low. The assistant principal gave assurance that he would ask for yg, I the full cooperation'of staff and students, and that the sheller operation would not O gi . l My Interfere with the school's' operations.
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d W u; ,
' At 0645 the Red Cross distributed comfort kits tt, the evacuees at the W:,
Middle School, and then served a breakf ast of. eggs, bacon, and bagels at 0700, s Evacuees were talked with about the presence of the media. They were told that l? " arrangements would be made to limit media activities if anyone felt uncomfort-a 4 M. able about being interviewed. Rumors were circulating by this time, such as people could go home in three hours or in 20 days. A lot of ef f ort went into rumor
*I control., School opened for classes at 0800; although about half of the students did ,
l not attend classes. Many parents simply chose to keep their children out of school
- n for that day. One class went on a previousy scheduled field trip. Evacuees were
'l l
u; asked to assemble in the gym at 1045 so the cafeteria could be cleaned and set-up - for lunch, and it was served at 1145. _, 2
%l The shelter received a call from Red Cross staff in the Mineola office indi- ' I cating'that they would soon be at the ' shelter. With lunch finished and replace-ments present, the Director went to the Wantagh Firehouse - to' see how that shelter was running. He spoke with a Fire Commissioner who stated that the h J ,
M . j, y , Wantagh Firehouse wa:: doing as best as possible, and that staffing did not seem a problem. The commissioner did, however, express some concern about the cost of J operations. The Red Cross Director mentioned consolidating the shelters at the ; m. Middle School. The Fire Commissioner and the Red Cross Director both felt that 3E i
,g the heavy traffic conditions precluded that option. Consequently, both shelters 1
- stayed in operation. They decided, however, that the Middle School shelter would absorb the firehouse evacuees if the incident lasted another day.
] .
g m. - . _ . _ . ._ _ _- _ _ _ _ _ _ _
( '
"' > 42-
[n iThe Red Cross then found out that the fire departments were unable to cap [ ;, the fire, and that the incident could very well turn into a' long-term situation.
~
'Thus, at 1200 the decision was made to make it another overnight shelter. Some.
_ time af ter 1300 the Red Cross Director went home for three hours and then I, ,.' returned to the shelter. The phone company. automatically shut off the payphones at the school some time that day, becat.se the money from them had not been collected. This con-strained evacuee access to communication. Service was restored later that day. During the evening, an evacuated physician: volunteered to do hypertension
- checks on the other evacuees. About 90 people stayed at the shelter the second night. Some evacuees from the previous night lef t to go elsewhere and new l
evacuees. came in for the first time. About five people stayed awake all that B' night. The heat went off, and this required the use of extra blankets.
! : People began to wake up at 0600 on T anday, the third day of the incident.
i The Red Cross and cafeteria staff served a regular breakfast with coffee, along with doughnuts which had been donated by a local merchant. They heard on the television news at 0600 that the flame on the propane tank had diminished; and at WK 0700 they heard that the flame was out. The police also called about this time to Inf orm the shelter that the fire was no longer burning. I! Evacuees started to go home at approximately 0845. The police department still had the perimeter around the evacuation zone closed off Returning evacuees had to present identification to get back into the area. The last evacuee lef t the shelter at 1000. The incident then ended for the Red Cross with the exception of cleaning up and paying bills.
, I, c. Salvation Army. The Salvation Army in Nassau County was called by the Nassau County Fire Emergency Office sometime between 1300 and 1400 on Tuesday, May 24, 1988, the first day of the incident. They told them about the l
- n -
;yax .
u f, g > v 43 , emergency, and requested that a Salvation Army canteen be set up for use by.
' 3 -.
J emergency. workers. The Salvation Army ~ maintains a mobile. canteen, stocked - i
'N with food and emergency kits, it is always ready to go in the, event of an f ' emergency. All they needed to do to prepare the canteen was fill it with frc:h water.
A Salvation Army Major who is a response coordinator and a secretary lef t in-the canteen. It took about one and a half hours to arrive at the scene because of traffic congestion. It is normally a 30 minute drive. They arrived sometime between 1430 and 1530, and the canteen was' set t up near the fire fighting
+ command post. The Director of the Nassau County Salvation Army arrived on the; i
scene about 1700, and he went directly to the canteen.' He found out who was in Ta' charge of the emergency by asking others. As far as he knew, the Seaford Fire
;g
~ Chief was in charge of the whole operation.
The-police department had gone through the evacuation area to tell, people to evacuate and about the Wantagh Fire Station shelter. The-Director of the l- ~ Salvation. Army went to the Wantagh Firehouse to check on the shelter. He found about 100 evacuees at the station who needed cots, food, and other supplies. He . i 1 - then " bought out a couple of 7-11's' to give food to the women's auxiliary for distribution to evacuees. The Salvation Army also supplied the firehouse evacuees
- -with cots and comfort kits. They fed breakfast on both mornint,1 to about 100 evacuees and firemen. The Salvation Army also operated a nourishment station 1
near the command post throughout the entire incident. They also delivered food , y under Police escort to the Red Cross evacuation shelter at the Middle School and gave out " overnight pecks" to evacuees.
' ~
Different relief shif ts of Salvation Army personnel and volunteers came from Staten Island, Brooklyn, Queens, and Suffolk County. Volunteers were mobi-l'c- lized via CB-type radio calls. Only one volunteer could not respond due to a LI
v n,
. 1 ,
3* s: , 44_ n previously scheduled important meeting that day; all other contacted volunteers w l responded. _ T he Salvation Army set up volunteer shif ts once the situation was p understood.- They scheduled a meeting for 0730 on the 26th to set-up three worker 1-shif ts, since they did not know how long the emergency..would last. . They subse- , quently cancelled the meeting af ter the fire went out. At times, voluteers had to
.g ,
i qg -, be pulled out and told to get rest. Everyone went beyond the call of duty. Every-one worked very long hours the first day. One Salvation Army truck driver who was transporting cots and supplies had ~ _ l: trouble getting into the area. Some communication problems between the driver i and the Salvation. Army command post arose. Thus, the Salvation Army driver misdelivered the cots and supplies to the Red Cross Middle School shelter where L: "they were put to good use."
-i '
LL - Most of the public encountered by the Salvation Army seemed to understand 1,' a the situation, yet some did not think the situation was dangerous. Some evacuees wondered why they had to evacuate, and some expressed concern abnut potential N [- q looting in the evacuated areas. Salvation Army personnel heard of some people. - 1 F
!?
who refused to evacuate, but they did not hear of anyone evacuating from areas < c ,j l
' outside 'of the evacuation zone.
. The[ Salvation ' Army provided services in the area until the fire went. ' The
' incident ended for the Salvation Army at 1530 on Thursday, May. 26,1988, when they-arrived back at the Mineola office. They retrieved their cots and then.got some sleep. During the incident, the Salvation Army expended 238 person hours and 133 T -- mobile canteen and truck hours. They provided approximately 500 cups of hot i chocolate,9,000 cups of coff ee,700 sandwiches,61 dozen doughnuts,150 bowls of stew, 750 cups of soup,14 gallons of milk,1,250 cold drinks, 900 cups of water, uI , l :
g N: 4}, w
-300 cups of tem,II,350 granola bars, and provided cots and blankets for the
.+ - Wantagh Fire Station and Middle School shelters.
- d. Nassau Coyty Executive's Office. . Shortly af ter 0925 on Tuesday,' May i 24,-1988 thellncident coordinator forl the Nassau County Executive's Office unofficially heard about the truck accident through routine monitoring of the radio. The coordinator felt as if it was his job to make sure that everyone else did their jobs. '
The coordinator was not aware of any refusals to evacuate, although he did receive reports that some people went back to their homes with police escort to get clean clothes and other supplies.
. The coordinator was not officially notified about the incident until some-
~ time the second day. His office then implimented an emergency transportation plan. This plan made arrangements to pick up and transport railroad commuters by bus through the area where the railroad was shut down. Af ter evening rush
. hour traffic, the incident ended for the Nassau County Executive's Office incident coordinator since there were no more commuters who needed to be transported.-
IL I g; gi. I. g x
l t
* , i; W
h , , , - j D. EVALUATIONS' BY THOSE NVOLVED q 4: ! f The organizational respondents that 'we interviewed were asked about lessons ]
- l learned from their experience with this emergency. This was done by asking them.
i, questions ' about how they thought .their organization and others perf ormed, and.- what they might do differently were they to experlence the emergency a second
"'l- time. .
In general, all respondents felt that the emergency was well handled. Most respondents gave their own organization high marks. There was some tendency to
' offer criticisms of how other organizations performed; however, evaluations were definitely positive. Public' behavior was also positively evaluated.- Respondents
?w freely suggested what they would have their organization do differently were a y.. similar emergency to occur im the future. All evaluative comments contribute to lessons learned from this emergency. These lessons f all into two c'ategories. The
" first is needed changes in regulations and safet'y laws. The second is what was x
learned regarding emergency preparedness. , [ $1- _'
- 1. Regulations i
j This emergency was reason for many respondents to question the adequacy e y lI of safety laws in Nassau County on the condittor, of trucks hauling dangerous materials. The view was recorded during our field interviewing that the propane f tank truck was deficient in repair, and that this contributed to the accident in the. , ,L first place. We heard more than once, for example, that the driver's seat in the.
'"i i truck was actually a lawn chair. One reported !"esson, therefore, was that safety y
laws could be revised regarding such vehicles. This is not surprising. In f act, most
- _2___-_-___-_-_ ,- .
i \, g.
; gy; legal changes regarding emergency response, pre'paredness, mitigation, and relief a
j g. ' are the consequence of experienced emergencies.' , Hg ' -l 2.- Emeroency Preparedness I o'
~
Several l'essons regarding emergency preparedness were referenced in differ-- f ent ways by different organizational respondents. Some of these comments were :, I' general while others were specific to particular organizations. The preparedness l
!!sssons ref erenced by the people we interviewed follow.
L First, most respondents recognized that one cannot plan ahead for every possible specific emergency contingency. Nevertheless,it was thought that some specific organizational and inter. organizational emergency planning and/or stan. dard operating procedures should be developed for emergencies of this type. . In : 9 f act, most respondents thought response to this emergency was good considering l that no such plans were in place prior to the emergency, but that plans should be developed to help guide response in future emergencies. , Second,2 firefighters repeatedly suggested that. too many firemen were o g g exposed to too much risk, in retrospect,it seemed that'too many firefighters .j
. went. too: close to the burning propane _ tank truck. too many times. It was ';
L, suggested - that the development of standard operating procedures (SOPal for
.j emergencies like this one.could reduce the exposure of firefighters to the risk of .
explosion, and reduce the need to rely only on personal egerlence in responding to future emergencies like this one.
. Third was the way in which outside experts could best be ma.' aged in future l
F n emergencies. It was thought that ideas and subsequent attempts to extinguish I
- such a fire are best managed by channeling all efforts through centralized
.. , , i command and control; and central command and control must have all available
'W information at a!! times. For example, one attempt to extinguish this fire was T
;48:
performed without the knowledge that it would be unsuccessful. This knowledge was already in the. possession of other firefighters. The development of SOPS for , I how different organizations would communicate information could help to mini- : mire this problem in the future. !
.1 Fourth, the' person (s) with major decision-making responsibilities < for. fire- 1 fighting and other duties, for example running a shelter, got too little rest and sleep. Fatigue can impair the judgment of anyone. Although there was no i evidence that it did so in this emergency, the use of SOPS could define leadership rotation and avoid this potential problem.in the future.
Fifth, members of emergency response organizations pointed to the need to manage the media in future emergencies. The media, of course, converged to the w% . l ' emergency scene and to shelters. However, they had to have their safety assured ! (they sought to go too close to the fire), and it was reported that their presence I > 1 f got tiresome at shelters. A formalized way to plan for the presence of the media in future emergencies was seen as potentially.useful. Sixth, many of the people we interviewed pointed to communications as a h L problem in this emergency. For example, communication problems arose between the command post and shelters, between the police- and shelters, between fire lm: chiefs and assistant. chiefs, between response organizations with different radio "J - . frequencies, and with the use of cellular phones because of overload. A dequate . , communications in the emergency could have been f acilitated with better or more . l
? Integrated equipment and plans that would facilitate the communication of infor- ,
. mation between orgenizations.
m .
,' : Seventh, coordination between responding organizations was not seen as a *
-(
pi -major problem which affected general response to this emergency. However, the (-
~ 1ack of coordination in some arenas was occasionally pointed to as a constraint to
!! response. For example, it was stated several times that too many fire depart-k '
I 49 , I - monts vo'lunteered to offer help; and that seme wished that information preseated - i to the public about the evacuation had been coordinated. One organization stated - on television that the evacuation was voluntary,'while those carrying tho word to' the public through door-to-door communication attempted to portray the need to evacuate with more certainty. It was recognized, therefore, that coor6 nation of response to emergencies between organizations could be useful, and that planning could help achieve coordination. Finally, people we interviewed had a number of specific recommendations.- These recommendations fo!!ow. The Red Cross thought it would be useful to plan how it could be in better communication with.the Nassau County Police in future I emergencies. The Seaford Fire Department thought consideration should be given to developing a county-level emergency plan. The Wantagh Fire Departmenti thought a large mobile Emergency Operations Center (EOC) would be useful in . response to future emergencies. 'An EOC, it was reported, should be large enough
= to house everyone. The Salvation Army thought county-wide identification cards would enh'ance response by decreasing' delays caused by strict perimeter control.
The Seaford Middle School thought it would be good to develop a list of emergency. numbers for use in calling parents of students. The Nassau County Police thought it would be good to have better ways to determine the size of the initial evacua-tion areas. The lessons for emergency preparedness pointed out in this report section were those reported by the people who responded to this emergency. The list does not outline all that one could say about emergency preparedness. Nevertheless, the listed lessons were based on their first-hand experience. In general, this l emergency and these lessons document an already well-established pilnciple in emergency research. Emergency plans are not necessarily needed for sound response to an emergency; however, they certainly can help. I :
4 E 2 i .. { s
..n:
-- [ E. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT EhERGENCY RESPONSE
=
_- ,, This' concluding report ser tion addresses = emergency response issues as
"'
- experienced in the Seaford propane tank truck emergency and evacuation. Thesa 4
lasues are divided into three. categories.. The first la public response; the second is
~
response by emergency. workers; the third is organizational response. N'< 1. Public Response Respondents across organizations were asked about public behavior during~
.n.
this emergency evacuation. Their accounts. describe prototypical public emer-gency response. - 3 The public came together to help one another during the emergency in a way' _7 that has of ten been labelled as an " altruistic or therapeutic community" in the-disaster research literature. For example, the director of the Red Cross shelter noted that the whole community was really f antastic and came together during the emergency. Respondents with the Seaford Fire Department reported that s they knew of no incidents of aberrant or any usual behavior'by people in evacuat-ing vehicles despite the heavy traffic during the evacuation. The Nassau County
]
Police Department reported that some motorists were confused as to which alter- [ native routes they should take to get to their destinations, but that the evacuating public was cooperative. They also reported that evacuees shared rides with one another. The sense conveyed to us during interviews was aptly put by the Princi-pal of the Seaford Middle School when he said " people in these emergencies, they stop being grouches and they help."
- As is of ten the case in emergencies, one exception did exist to the general conclusion that people helped one another and were altruistic in their emergency =
( d% ,, i 51~ 4,% N response. Respondents at the Wantagh Fire Department and others told us of one r % : cr,ee of. attempted thef t. : Firemen spotted some teenagers scaling the expressway
-; fence and climbing aboard a fire truck to steal some lights. The teenagers were arrested by the police, and the story was fully covered by the media. This isolated /t case, and the media coverage devoted to it, is illustrative of why and how the
_ myth of loot'ing during emergencies is perpetuated in American culture. 4 Respondents also were able to share information with us about public parti-I- i c'ipation in the evacuation. Several respondents were aware of some members of
; the public who simply refused to evacuate. For example, the. Wantagh Fire Department reported that members of the fire department evacuation team knew of possibly three ' people who refused to evacuate. There is no way to precisely
< estimate what proportion of the persons _ advised to evacuate chose' to stay ~at I home based on this study. It can readily be concluded, however,~ that there were some refusals to evacuate. Additionally, the number was not likely large. The Nassau' County Police Department told of how some Fire Marshal inspears thought the County Executive could have confused people when he announced on television that the evacuation was voluntary. Nevertheless, there are almost always some people who refuse to evacuate in all emergencies.
Respondents were unaware of any members of the public who evacuated fromL areas outsle;e - of the evacuation zone. For example, the Seaford Fire Department knew of no reports or cases of " shadow evacuation." Additionally, the Nassau County Police were unaware of any one who evacuated from outside the actual- evacuation zone. Our organizational respondents were unaware of any
!' shadow evacuation," but this does not mean that none occurred. Nevertheless,if it did occur it was likely small enough to go unnoticed by members of organiza-tions involved in and in charge of the evacuation.
=
A
' 52 -
d .y
- Evacuees' became anxious to return home. For examp.te, the Seaford Fire
~
< Department reported that some evacuees eventually began to complain that the
. / fire _ departments had~ not been able to put the' fire out quickly and 'that' they_
wanted to go home. People unware of the emergency did attempt to gain access 1
' to the evacuated ares. For example, the Nassau County Police told'of how they
~.
had to intercept workers who lived in the evacuation zone ^ as they came home' _= from work, and inform them of the evacuation and where shelters were located.
- The police also told of many people who stood around the perimeter of the
- evacuation zone waiting to go home..The police also allowed some evacuees to go c, back to their homes for special reasons, but only if accompanied by an officer.
The need for return trips home was not great, but incidents did occur. Convergence to the site of the emergency also occurred. During the emer-
- gency some 15 to 20 people went to the bridge overlooking the accident to see the fire. The Seaford Fire Department also informed us that the:.e people were made p
to leave by the police. This account possibly documents more than convergence. It also adds further ic; son to conclude that some people refused to evacuate.
. However, there is no.way to determine if the persons on the bridge were in f act members of _the public who never evacuated, reporters or someone else.
. The Red Cross was in charge of shelter operations and operated the. Red Cross shelter at the Seaford Middle School. Other shelters were also in operation at;other places around the Seaford area. For example, the Wantagh Fire Depart-O ment offered shelter to evacuees. A total of 125 evacuees spent the first night at
'the Seaford Middle Schoch and approximately 150 additional evacuees were shel-tered elsewhere. Of these,75 were sheltered at the Wantagh Fire Department.
The Principal of the Seaford Middle School.(the site of the Red Cross shelter) told
- . %o of how some evacuees arrived with pets. The Nassau County Police informed us
.that it was difficult for them to get an accurate count of the total number of I
,r <
~l . l$3 r
E evacuees.> They estimated that about 2,000 people evacuated.H This estimate is
'I . ' i not likely f ar off. The zone evacuated was a one-quarter mile radius circle around e ,
the propane fire in. a region of Long Island with about 5,133 people per square mile. These figures suggest that 13.75 percent (13 to 14 percent) of the evacuees s used public shelters in this evacuationL This confirms the judgment of the Nassau County Police who said that most evacuees did not stay in public shelters. It is , ( also a typical' shelter use rate in U.S. evacuations. [ Rumors were documented among evacuees in this emergency. For example,= the Principal of the Seaford Middle School heard some evacuees talking about an
- escaped convict in response to hearing overhead helicopters, and others talking about not being able to go home for 20 days. These rumors were confirmed by the Red Cross Director who was in charge of the evacuation shelter at the Seaford w
5 Middle School. ..He also stated that a. lot of effort had to be put into rumor s control.
' Public response to the Seaford propane tank emergency on Long Island was - prototypical of how people behave in U.S. emergencies of this sort. For example, people came- together to form an altruistic or therapeutic community. The j . evacuation was orderly and free of aberrant behavior. Selfish and anti-social acts 2
s were all but absent. . An isolated case of attempted thef t did occur, and it was y presented 'by the media in a way that illustrates why myths about public emergency responses are perpetuated in American culture. There were some people who simply refused to evacuate. Most evacuees did not make use of public shelters. . Rumors occurred among evacuees that had to be addressed by response
; organization personnel. Evacuees became tired of being away from home. The public was concerned about looting and the police worked to prevent it, but none occurred. These and other examples illustrate general public behavior principles i that are characteristic.
I _I 1
S 9
'54, p '
2.. Emeroency Worker Response kg Persons interviewed were asked about the response of emergency workers
. within their own organizations and in others.- Thelt. accounts portray exemplary .] behavior by workers in emergencies. .
- Emergency workers were readily available to staff response organizations, and staff mobilization occurred quickly. Staff of fire departments, the Fire Marshal's Office and the police department were on the scene within minutes of-the accident. In f act, there was a surplus of emergency worliers and organizations who responded to the emergency. For example, respondents in the Wantah Fire m -
Department pointed out that excess firemen were made available to assist the h .. . - police-In disseminating evacuation warnings to the public. It was also reported
.= i n
"' that excess fire departments arrived at the accident scene. The Seaford Fire Department reported that about 25 to 28 percent of its force called in to volun-b teer for duty, and that their typical response rate is between 20 to 25 percent.' It M
should be romembered that all firemen are volunteers -on Long Island, and that
]
response by firemen typically requires that they get off work at their regular jobs -
'before reporting for duty as firemen.
Volunteering for emergency work in response to this emergency was charac-s teristic within all relevant organizations performing emergency response. For example, volunteering for emergency work at the Seaford Middle School where the - Red Cross Shelter was in operation was prototypical. Teachers from the Montes-sori School and St. Williams of the Abbot School brought 'their students to the shelter and then volunteered to stay to help with child identification. The Seaford Middle School nurse volunteered to remain at the school since the Red Cross did not immediately bring a nurse. The cook and cafeteria staff volunteered to prepare snacks when the shelter first opened; and then they came in on following
- days ,to prepare breakf ast and other meals f or the evacuees. Some teachers even 3
A i .. . _ ___
y 55 %k : . g > stayed tot volunteer their services, and the school's administrative secretary y - volunteered to maintain a communication center for the shelter. Evacuees in the . shelter even volunteered to help with things that needed to be done. g Volunteering for emergency work was hardly limited to firemen and to
. people at the Red Cross shelter at the Seaf.iro i4!ddle School.lt also character.
l' zed what. happened in other relevant involved orgarizationr. For example, the
- women's auxillary prepared and delivered for d to evacuees at the Wantagh Fire 1' Department shelter; and. the Salvation Army mobilized volumeers for multiple-shif ts'from Staton Island,. Brooklyn, Queens, and Suffolk County. In f act, the Salvation - Armyt reported that only one person requested to perform volunteer
' work was unable to do no because of a previously scheduled appointment.
' Organizational respondents were also asked about any known incidents of role conflict .or emergency role abandonment by emergency workers. That ls, were emergency workers in a position of having to choose between performing o non-emergency roles (for example, staying at their non. emergency jobs ~ or being with 'their f amily) versus emergency work roles, and did anyone actually abandon their' emergency job. No cases of role abandonment were identified. In f act most organizational' respondents reported an excess of emergency workers, and even an 3_
excess of emergency response organizations in the case of responding fire depart. ments. . Additionally, staff absences at the Seaford Middle School were reported i the same as under normal circumstances, a
$ These conclusions do not mean that there were not a few cases: Involving emergency workers (or people that had jobs somewhat related to emergency 4
# response) who went somewhere else during the emergency.
1 The closest case -to . role abandonment documented involved one police detective who was not assigned to do work in the emergency area. He did, however, live in one of the neighborhoods that was being evacuated. He asked the
y police department if he could be telleved of _ duty so that he could make sure that
~
his f amily was safe.' The police department had enough staff that day to accom-plish their work without the detective. His request was granted. This is hardly a case of role abandonment by an emergency worker for a couple of reasons. First, the detective was not involved in emergency response. Second, the detective only _ lef t his routine job af ter receiving permission from superiors.: Another person marginally involved in an emergency response role had
~
reason to leave his job during the emergency. In this case, however, it was not role abandonment since he left only when it was clear that other workers were available to do the jobs that needed to be performed. The principal of the Seaford
' Middle School lef t to go home to tend to personal business f or a brief period. He -
did not leave until the end of the routine school day and until he was'sure that emergency work .was being covered by other people. He returned to the school
. quickly, it should 'be noted that the principal had no emergency response role, although he was the person in charge of the school. This case is hardly one of role
- abandonment. The principal's short absence was actually a way for him to clear conflicting obligations so that he would be free to participate in what became an emergent, voluntary emergency response role.
Finally, there was'the already referenced case of the one Salvation Army volunteer who could not report for volunteer duty .because of an ' appointment scheduled bef ore the emergency. 'This case was also not one of role abandonment.
~
It'is not expected that Salvation Army volunteer workers are able to respond each time they are called. The Salvation Army had ample volunteers to do work in this emergency. Typically, thy call upon a large reserve of potential volunteers until enough are recruited f or work. We also were interested in any acts of heroism performed by emergency workers.. Individual cases were certainly reported. For example, one hazmat 8 B-
57 specialist with the Flie Marshal's Office attempted to turn off a valve on the burning tank while shielding his f ace from the flames with a helmet. He received
- flash burns.
It is difficult, however, not to conalder the behavior of all responding fire. men as herole.uThe ritk in this emergency was a severe explosion and fireball that - could have engulfed the entire evacuated area. Nevertheless, firemen repeatedly were within'not only the perimeter of the potential fire ball, but also close to the
- burning tank. . As one fireman put it, he did not want to be "down in the hole" but n' he "was there anyway" since it was his job. The truck tank was frequently approached by many fire fighters. Their response to this event'was also defined as
.herole by the public._ A special celebration for them by the townspeople was planned at the time we conducted our research.
Emergency worker response during this emergency revealed familiar
=. 1 patterns observed in other U.S. emergencies. People quickly reported to work in -2 mobilizing emergency organizations. A surplus of emergency workers were avall.
able to do ' work. People volunteered for emergency work in large numbers and
.from all walks of life. Role abandonment by emergency workers was simply not a
{ ^ 4 problem. It:-did'not occur. Finally, the emergency was characterized by herole
- 1. . acts,in this case as firemen exposed themselves to severe risk and flames.
- 3. Organizational Response Organizational . response to the propane truck tank fire was effective, parti.
]
cularly'when one considers that no emergency response plans were in plho for - this type of emergency. The Nassau County Police Department used its standard operating procedure
'(SOP) f or ~large accidents. It is a general plan. They used an evacuation plan which is included in their general civic defense emergency plan. The fire depart- )
e
+
n,
$8 ment had no SOPS f or rerponse to a propane truck tank fire. In fact, the Seaford Fire Dapartment thought that SOPS for response to a future t m at emergency are needed and that a county response plan is also needed to help coordinate future response between organizat!ws. Despite the lack of plans and training on event-specific procedures, organizations were able to adapt to the needs of the situation as they emerged.
The lack of plans, however, did reveal problems for organizational response in ref erence to communications and coordination between some response organi-zations. For example, communication problems existed both with communications technology, as well as with attempts to communicate between organizations. Fire department phone channels became clogged since reporters were using the same channels. Some private schools were never officially informed of the evacuation. The Red Cross was, not notified of the emergency early, consequently the Red I
- r." rte shelter was not opened until the evacuation was well underway
*/4'
. The Red S%lter only learned over television that it should prepare to house people 1 WWihg Pather than fr u n Jp ? om an of ficial communication. The Salvation Army had n
Re R i
.l J$ %+MQ, *, ed Cross abSiter rather than to the sheiter at the Wantagh
; *A6 of poor communication. These communication problems
%. y . .a /W/Q,g .k%s P f or eme rgency response. This is fortuitous.
s hl t X ,a 4 3 v f .. p 1gPq"hy g oQ hg@gehgM y j M~ky g'g /j *s were sometimes a problem between response 4h
'%;w 4 /NWe Marshal's Office was e t o p gy " ~
hy: ned that it took f dy p ,,,'dff gas a y . w % ,pyg Qg, y a
,,o sg ,aAg h %a
.p p "% f-/%a4 g# ..
TkN@! 4a Mhhh i w).
;g m g'%
rg- , F @- 4 i ,, .
. 58
, ment had no SOPS for response to a propane truck tank fire. In f act, the Seaford 1
Fire Department thought that SOPS for response to a future similar emergency l are needed and that a county response plan is also needed to help coordinate i future response between organizations. Despite the lack of plans and tralaing on event. specific procedures, organizations were able to adapt to the needs of the
~
situation as they emerged. The lack of plans, however, did reveal problems for organizational response in ref erence to communications and coordination between some response organi. ; zations. For example, communication problems existed both with communications I technology, as well as with attempts to communicate between organizations. Fire s department phone channels became clogged since reporters were using the same channels. Some private schools were never officially informed of the evacuation. i The Red Cross was not notifled of the emergency early, consequently the Red Cross shelter was not opened until the evacuation was well underway. The Red 1 '.I Crosa shelter only learned over television that it should prepare to house people
- a f overnight rather than from an official communication. The Salvation Army had cots delive*ad to the Red Cross shelter rather than to the shelter at the Wantagh Fire Department because of poor communication. These communication problems did not produce major problems for emergency response. This is fortuitous.
Coordination of activities were sometimes a problem between response organizations. For example, the Fire Marshal's Office was concerned that it took 4 time to explain its intentions twice to two fire departments as the Wantagh . Department relinquished control to Seaford when the Seaford Chief arrived at the accident site. The different shelters available to house evacuees only became aware of each other well af ter they had each opened and had received evacuees. Shelter consolidation at the official Red Cross shelter could only then be considered. Additionally, an outside fire expert brought in to offer assistance was
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I!' [l 59 l j L I never put in touch with fire fighters already on the scene. Consequently, he sought to shut a tank valve that others had already shut before his arrival. Despite these coordination problems respondents generally ' thought that coordination between and within response organizations was good. For example, I activities between volunteer fire departments were coordinated. Mutual and agreements worked. A staging area was quickly estab!!shed by f!re fighters, and . j the evacuation zone was divided into quadrants to f acilitate warning the public. , The police and firemen worked cooperatively to alert the pubtle. Response to ths
.m emergency was described as " picture perfect" from the viewpoint of the Office of ;
g the Nassau County Executive. The Nassau Police Department thought everyone i did what they were supposed to do during the emergency. In many ways the praise offered about how well response went during this emergency is warranted. In f act, everything that needed to get done was accom. plished. However, as the people who responded to this emergency are aware (see I report section D ertitled " Evaluation by Those involved") there were some lessons
- that were learned about how to better ready for future emergencies.
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I I INTERVIEW GUIDE I Nassau County, Long Islanc, new York t Propane Truck Emergency June 1988 I We' are interested in getting a detailed picture of what happened in connection with the propane truck fire emergency during the week of May 23rd. Let's focus on your organization (the X). , We would like to get a step by-step account of what your group did.
' To start offt (N AME S - A F FILI A TION S-T E L E P HONE.T IME)
- 1. a. Tell me how your. organization first got involved in the situation? .
(NOTIFICATION) (Get initial perceptions, definitions, actions) (Separate
,out own organization and other organizations)
I b. What happened next? (MOBILIZATION)(ROLE CONFLICT)(VOLUNTEERS. LILCO) (EXTREME BEHAVIOR = COWARDICE OR HEROISM)
'EW (Trace from first hearing of something was going on to later actions)Who, when, why) (Get clear decision points) (Obtain pictures as inf ormant saw .
1 at the time) i
- c. When/how was the pub!!c involved / warned?
- d. What was the last involvement of your organization in the situation?
(Trace to cessation of organizational action) (Obtain definition of normal) ,
- 2. a. Let's look at the evacuation a little more closely and in detall -- when did I the question of evacuation first come up in your organization? (Get who, when, and why)
What sort of issues arose in the evacuation? (volunteers) (people, b. I c. organizations, other things) (enough staff - refusals to warn) what issues arose regarding public participation in the evacuation? ! I (Orderly, shadow, early, late, non) altruism. selfishness) (aberrant behavior) I
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- d. Was your organization involved in sheltering the evacuees? l 5 If so, what did you do? l' Were there any problems in the shelters?
(People, organizations, other things)
- e. When was the evacuation over? '
(How lemg did they expect it to last?) Get perceptions, definitions, i actions) (Who, when, and why involved in return of evacuees) I
- 3. Why. did your organization do what it did in the situation? (altruism) l (Separate out threat, warning, evacuation and return stages) (Find out to W what extent decisions and actions followed prior planning and/or experiences, and/or was ad hoc)
- 4. a. How would you evaluate how your organization acted in the situation? !
(Keep in mind diff erent stages) How about other organizations? (Especially those with wnich the i b. organization had the most interaction) I c. How well or how poorly do you think the public (especially those evacuated) felt the situation was handled? '(Separate evacuation and sheltering)
- 5. If your organ 17ation had to do it all over again, would you do anything diff erent than you did this time? (Any lessons learned)
Leaving this particular situation asidet
- 6. What kind of disaster planning does your organization have?
l (f ormal and/or informal) l 5 (intra and inter-orgenizational)
- 7. What disaster relevant resources does your organization have?
I (People, equipment, f acilities) THANK RESPONDENT I INDICATE THAT IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO PHONE LATER TO FILL IN GAPS I ASK IF THEY WOULD RECOMMEND ANYONF IN PARTICULAR WHOM WE SHOULO TALK TO o OBTAIN: 1. logs and/or radio tapes I 2. 3. 4 af ter-action report or critique disaster plan organizational' chart
- 5. any write-ups of prior disasters I
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' WITHIN ORGANIZATIONS: head !
' operational deelslon makers l
!!ne staff i I communication personnel (radio, switchboard) l liaison personnel I 3 GET: Interviews g statistics documents i
. - - - photographs B ACK.0F. MIND CONCEPTS: communications coordination and control I " conflict priorities convergence leadership (intra. and interorganizational) ( l g authority g new tasks / functions ; new organizational structure decision making how long evacuation took '. ' defining the area at risk i number of evacuees I mass media behavior number of people in shelters how many spent the night , I how many checked in 1 I
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