ML20217D285
| ML20217D285 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/1996 |
| From: | Jaudon J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217D186 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-97-252 NUDOCS 9710030107 | |
| Download: ML20217D285 (25) | |
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#p* *%9 UNfiB0 STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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101 MARitTTA STREET. N.W.. SUITE 300 ATLANTA. 000R04A 303tHIRE
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Decembe 23 1996 i MEMORANDUM TO: F1 FROM: n . aud , Deput or ivision f R. actor Safety
SUBJECT:
MINUTES OF THE CRYSTAL RIVER RESTART PANEL THIRD MEETING DECEMBER 18, 1996 The Crystal River Restart Panel met at the Region II offices on December 18, 1996. The following personnel attended the meeting: Panel Members - Johns P. Jaudon, Region II, Chairman i Frederick J. Hebdon, NRR, Vice Chairman Charles Casto, Region II Kerry D. Landis, Region II Stephen J. Cahill, Region II . Lakshminaras Raghaven, MRR Others - Billy R. Crowley, RII The panel reviewed the Crystal River 3 Issues checklist (Attachment A from the minutes dated December 10, 1996) and updated the Checklist, including characterizing a few new items that had been added since the last meeting as either " RESTART" or "NON RESTART." The Checklist will not be re-issued until after the _next meeting scheduled for January 8 - 9, 1997. Between now and the next meeting, the Checklist will be sorted to separate the restart items and the non-restart items. In addition, the i draft assignment of responsibility for inspectic.i of restart items will be added to the checklist. Accordingly, the restart checklist is not attached to these minutes so that they can be promulgated while the list undergoes the changes outlined above. The panel reviewed the licensee's restart list and verified that all items on their list were appropriately referenced on the NRC restart checklist. The recent submittal of Revision 23 to the FSAR was discussed. NRR pointed out that it appeared that a number of the changes 1 therein needed further explanation from the licensee as to what analysis supported the changes. It was agreed that imR would issue a letter requesting a meeting with the licensee to have them explain the supporting analysis for these changes. 9710030107 970929 ' PDR FOIA ( O'NEALI97-252 PDR
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i . . 2 Region II will confirm the schedule the next MCAP meeting with the licensee as January 9, 1996, and request that the following l items be addressed in the meeting The outage schedule and status of activities at the site The December 11 1996, letter relative to implementation , of the new revision to the Problem Report procedure : (CP-111, Processing of Precursor Cards for Corrective Action Program) - including plans for completing implementation of the procedure Status of any outstanding USQs and associated licensing - actions Any changes to the licensee restart list i No changes were made to the MC-350 Crystal River Restart Task , checklist and Crystal River Restart Issues Checklist. These . Checklists will not be re-issued at this time. 3 The following dates weire discussed for the next Restart Panel
- meetings
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,' January 8 - 9, 1997 -- Site l l January 23, 1997 -- RII ' L Docket 50-302 cc: S. D. Ebneter, RII L. A. Reyes, RII E. W. Merschoff, RII F. J. Miraglia, NRR S. A. Varga, NRR G. M. Tracy, OEDO i R. P. Zimmerman, NRR J. A. Zwolinski, NRR l ! 5
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December 23, 1996 MEMORANDUM TO: File FROM: Johns P. Jaudon, Deputy Director Original signed by: Johns P. Jaudon , Division of Reactor Safety l
SUBJECT:
MINUTES OF THE CRYSTAL RIVER RESTART PANEL THIRD MEETING DECEMBER 18, 1996 The Crystal River Restart Panel met at the Region II offices on December 18, 1996. The following personnel attended the meeting: Panel Members - Johns P. Jaudon, Region II, Chairman Frederick J. Hebdon, NRR, Vice Chairman Charles Casto, Region II Xerry D. Landis, Region II l Stephen J. Cahill, Region (I : Lakshminaras Raghaven, NRR Others - Billy R. Crowley, RII The panel reviewed the Crystal River 3 Issues checklist (Attachment A from the minutes dated December.10, 1996) and updated the Checklist, including characterizing a few new items that had been added since the last meeting as either " RESTART" or l "NON RESTART." The checklist will not be re-issued until after the _next meeting scheduled for January 8 - 9, 1997. Between now and the next meeting, the Checklist will be sorted to separate the restart items and the non-restart items - In addition, the draft assignment of responsibility for inspection of restart items will be added to the checklist. Accordingly, the restart checklist is not attached to these minutes so that they can be l promulgated wh..le the list undergoes the changes outlined above. The panel reviewed the licensee's restart list and verified that all items on their list were appropriately referenced on the NRC restart checklist. The recent submittal of Revision 23 to the FSAR was discussed. NRR pointed out that it appeared that a number of the changes ! therein needed further explanation from the licensee as to what analysis supported-the changes. It was agreed that NRR would issue a letter requesting a meeting with the licensee to have
- them explain the supporting analysis for these changes.
r 2 Region II will confirm the schedule the next MCAP meeting with the licensee as January 9, 1996, and request that the following items be addressed in the meeting: The outage schedule and status of activities at the site r i The December 11 1996, letter relative to implementation of the new revision to the Problem Report procedure (CP-111, Processing of Precursor Cards for Corrective ! Action Program) - including plans for completing implementation of the procedure ' Status of any outstanding USQs and associated licensing actions Any changes to the licensee restart list t No changes were made to the MC-350 Crystal River Restart Task ', Checklist and Crystal River Restart Issues Checklist. These checklists will not be re-issued at this time. The following dates were discussed for the next Restart Panel mestings: January 8 - 9, 1997 -- Site January 23, 1997 -- RII Docket 50-302 cc: S. D. Ebneter, RII L. A. Reyes, RII E. W. Merschoff, RII F. J. Miraglia, NRR S. A. Varga, NRR G. M. Tracy, OEDO R. P. Zimmerman, NRR J. A. Zwolinski, NRR bcc: J. Jaudon F.' Hebdon, NRR J. Johnson, RII C. Casto, RII K. Landis, RII ; i L. Raghaven, NRR , L. Mellen, RII 1
- S. Cahill, RII i
R. Schin, RII B. Crowley, RII M. Thomas, RII
December 23, 1996 MEMORANDUM TO: File FRO,M Johns P. Jaudon, Deputv Director Original signed by: Johns P. Jaudon Division of Reactor Safety
SUBJECT:
MINUTES OF THE CRYSTAL RIVER RESTART PANEL THIRD MEETING DECEMBER 18, 1996 The Crystal River Restart Panel met at the Region II offices on December 18,.1996. The following i'rsonnel attended the meeting: Panel Members - Johns P. Jaudon, Region II, Chairman Frederick J. Hebdon, NRR, Vice Chairman Charles Casto, Region II Kerry D. Landis, Region II Stephen J. Cahill, Region II Lakshminaras Raghaven, NRR ' Others - Billy R. Crowley, RII The panel reviewed the Cryseal River 3 Issues Checklist (Attachment A from the minutes dated December 10, 1996) and updated the Checklist, including-characterizing a few new: items that had been.added since the last meeting as either " RESTART" or "NON RESTART." The Checklist will not be re-issued until after the _next meeting scheduled for January 8 - 9, 1997. Between now and the next meeting, the Checklist-will be sorted to separate the restart items and the non-restart items. In addition, the draft assignment of responsibility-for inspection of restart items will be added to the checklist. Accordingly, the restart checklist is not attached to these minutes so that they can be promulgated while the list undergoes the changes-outlined above.- The panel reviewed the licensee's restart list and verified that all items on their list were appropriately-referenced on the NRC restart checklist, The recent submittal of Revision 23 to the FSAR was' discussed. NRR pointed out that it appeared that a number of the changes therein needed further explanation from the licensee as to what analysis supported the changes. It was agreed that NRR would issue a-letter requesting a meeting with the licensee to have them explain the supporting analysis for these changes,
i 2 Region--II will confirm the schedule the next MCAP meeting with the licensee as January 9, 1996, and request that the following items be addressed in the meeting: The outage schedule and status of activities ac the site The December 11 1996, letter relative to implementation of the-new revision to the Problem _ Report procedure
-(CP-111, Processing of' Precursor Cards for Corrective Action Program) - including plans for completing implementation of the procedure Status of any outstanding USQs and associated licensing actions Any changes to the licensee restart list No changes were_made to the MC-350 Crystal River Restart Task Checklist and Crystal River Restart Issues Checklist. These Checkliets will not b'e re-issued at this time.
The following dutia were discussed for the next Restart Panel meetings: , January 8 - 9, 1997 -- Site January 23, 1997 -- RII Docket 50 '02 cc S. D. Ebneter, RII L. A. Reyes, RII E. W. Merschoff, RII F. J. Miraglia, NRR S. A. Varga, NRR G. M. Tracy, OEDO R. P. Zimmerman, NRR J. A. Zwolinski, NRR bcci J. Jaudon F._Hebdon, NRR J. Johnson, RII C. Casto, RII K. Landis, RII L. Raghaven, NRR L. Mellen, RII S. Cahill, RII R. Schin, RII B. Crowley, RII M. Thomas, RII
Attachment A CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST r Status as of Decenter 10 1996 The Crystal River Restart Panel met on November 13, 1996, and developed seven general areas under which the restart issues will be grouped. Those seven areas are:
- 1. Knowledge of design and licensing bases and adequacy of design margin
- 2. Regulatory knowledge and perspective
- 3. Operator performance and knowledge 3 4. Marginally effective engineering organization
- 5. Management oversight; including quality assurance, self assessment, and corrective action ,
- 6. Corrective actions for NRC violations
- 7. Other ress: DasCRxrTrom Amma mRe rm/smR s.ICuses % mee 4 LEAD statWS sT&TUS LIcausWE's RBsTART LIST OF DesInt-RELATE 19353s (D.I.a)(per 10/28/96 Str from FPC) 4 CR3 D.I. 1 HPI puny recirculation to the makeup tank 1 D-1 See L3tt 94-01-02 R CR) D.I. 2 HPI systers modifications to twprove SB14CA margins 1 D-2 See URI 96 02, 1st R 96-04 CR3 D.I 3 LPI pump mission time 1 D-3 See URI 96-201-01 R CR3 D.I. 4 Reactor building spray pump 18 NPSM 1 D-4 See t'R1 96-201-02 R CR3 D.I. 5 Emergency feedwater system upgrades and diesel generator load 1 D-S See URI 96-12-01: EEI R impact 96-12-02
, CR3 D.I. 6 Emergency diesel generator loading 1 D-6 See EEI 96-12-02 R CR3 D.I. 7 Failure modes and effects of loss of DC power 1 D-7 See 13t! 94-12-01, LER R 94-07 CR3 D.I. 8 Generic Letter 96-06 (Thermal overpressure protection for 1 D-8 R Cbntal*wnent pipirra, penetrations, and coolerol 'D ATTACHMENT A
J==sse 2SSUE DESCRIPTZcar assa WRC IE/SER LICBBSEE Causemurra sutC LEAD STATUS STATUB LICEurSEE'S OTEEm RESTART ITEMS a OTSG Tubes AdeT2acy of CTSG tube stress-relieved rolled joints is 7 See licensee Precursor N quest ioned . BuoG analysis of a Davis-Besse pulled OTSG tube. Card FC 94-50T7 of current test data, and limited field emperience conflict with 11/6/96 test data from 1972 which
- qualified
- a stress relieved rolled joint.
GL 96-01 The licensee has identified testing deficiencies in safety- 2 a-1 See MFA SL601 (GL 96-C1) N t est ing related logic cirevits PITE AREAS OP CONTINUING COBBCERN, WTTE IFAP RzO ED INSFECTICEE AND RII REC 0poGNDED ADDITTCstS Management - MRC inspect Problem Idantifications focusing on E audits S OP-2, OP-3 R Oversight - and the problem report ino syst **. - Increased inspection of IPAP Problem Analysis and Evaluataan; focusing on root cause CMcomme.aded eva luat ior's . Inspection Marginally - NRC inspect Engineering Problem Identification and 4 CP-4 R Effective Resolutions with cephasis on licensee evaluations for Engineering eiqnificent issues and wer t eteenlogs, Organization - Also anspect Quality at Engineerang with ex hasis on 10
- IPAP CFR $0.59 sereenim and safety evaluations. accuraev ef the Ce-- - . .de " F5AR. and manam-=*nt evereiqht.
Inspection Lack of - NRC inspect Engineering Safety Focuss focusing on crecer 1 OP-T, CP-8 R Adeq2 ate ident ification of discrepancies with the plant's destqn basis D-13 D-15 Knowledge of a n t he correct ive ar t aen systam. D-16 the Design - Also anspect Engineering Froblem Identification and Basis - IPAP Resolution; focusing on programs f or ident ifyim design basis recommended issues and capturing them in t h- corract iva a t son pr ogrem. ' Inspection - Also anspect Qualaty of Enganeerang; focusang on sensit ivit y/underst andine by the engineering /lI N 91ng etaff o f t he plant 's des ign tesi s.
- Also assess the design margin, including tie licensee's
=* e e.* of e<=ditiem a revi...
Lack of - NRC inspect 50.$9s. eparability. rarort abi l it y 2 CP-S. OP-4 R Sensitivity for the Need to Comply cith Cegulations - IPAP Eccommended Inspect ion Operetor - NRC inspect Safety Focuss focusing on comm2nication within 3 m Performance - operat ions, co==.rnication with other site greut-e. and IPAP overtime Lecommended Inopection INSFECTOR POL 14WUP CTSTER 2
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Is sps DesCRIPTICE AREE Mac 2R/ san LICaens evem - rs WRC . Laan sTafus STATUS l 0 1 05-02-02 Control room habitability envelope leakage. Excessive 1 See TIA 95003s FPC TS R leakage paths through doors, dampers, and drains due to Osange pequest No; 2Se design errors and lack of survelliances/ preventive of 8/28/96; LENS 96-04, maintenance 94-10, 95-ft, 95-04-01, 95-09; Ips 95-02, 95-09, . 95-11, 95-16, 95-21; FPC Itro. of 5/26/95 and [ 10/23/95 I O! 95-021-04 Excessive cooldown rate 3 N-E i O I 96-01-02 Discrep.ancies in the high pressure injection design insis 1 D-9 See CR3 D.I. 1; R analysis CR3 D.I. 2 f OI 96-03-04 Measuring of percent through-wall indicatims ith an 7 See IR 96-04s NRR to N unqualifiej procedure resolve generic issue ! Eno TIAS f OI W O3-05 Eddy current sample ekp nsion based on degraded tube 7 See IR 96-06 N' percentages i I OI W O4-01 Discrepancies in tFa 2DBD and the FSAR regarding the 1 Verify procedures and R l prevention of post-LOCA boron precipitation documentation adequate prior to restart , 4 O I W OS-02 Design concerns with main steam line hangars use.f in seismie 1 R ! and other dynamic load applications OI W O6-03 Non-safety related transfer switch used in ES status 1 R [ jndicating light circuitry URI 93-06-10 Justification for removal of Thermo-Lag protection f rom the 1 N j i source range instrumentation ; t 01 06-07-03 Incorrect information provided by contractors 7 ** N g if 1 URI 96-12-01 Emergency Feedwater low NPSH to both pumps due to postulated 1 D-17 See CR3 D.I. 5: R' ; single failure CR3 D.I. 7 . f OI 96-201-01 tong term plant cooldown following a small break 14CA 1 D-3 See CR3 D.I. 3: See IR R
- assuming a single f ailure in the decay heat drop line 96-11. NRR taking i responsibility for this item.
f C I C6-201-02 NPSH for building spray pump has very little margin, and some 1 D-4 See Ot3 D.I. 4 R 1 calculation factors were nonconservative ! f OI 96-201-03 Operating curves 16, 17, and 18 in OP-103S are not validated by licensee 4 0-1 R 'I OI 96-201-04 Nonsafety-related positioners on safety-related valves 1 R-7, D-10 See IR 96-04 R I O ! 96-301-05 Service water system heat loads did not consider maximum 1 0-1 R input heat (OP-1038, Curve 159 ; OI C6-201-06 Preferred of fsite electrical power source with plant shut 1 N down (500 kw switchyard) is not qualified , OI 96-201-07 EEG not protected against water spray from failure of fire 1 a protection deluge system in EDG room , i
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m ...m m m. - m _.m _ ou ._ m ~_m . ~ . - . . .--..-__.-._-.~..m- - . = _ - m .- .~-m- ..-- - ~ m-_. - - = _ . . _. mm. 5 . I a e 23558 DESCRIPTION mRan sac IR/SSR LICB M W COM Enc LEhD STATUS STRTUS URI $6-201-09 Testing to quellfy relays beyond manuf acturers' ratings was 1 N inadequat e i t t 12R 93-02-02, Switchyard cable failure caused degraded voltage of Class 1E 7 I2R 93-02-01 closed in N 12R 93-02-03 elect rscal buses and actuation of RDG In 95-09 l 12R 94-06-01, Deficiency in understanding of technical requirements leads 2 12R 94-06-00 closed in N 12R f4-06-03, to nonconservative RPS setpoint and potential violation of TS IR 95-16. See also VIO 12R 94-06-04, j 95-02-04 12R 94-06-05 I 12R $5-09 00 Minimal release during sulfur dioxide delivery causes ? See IR 95-11 N . actuation of toxic gas monitor resulting in centrol room
- emergency wentilation actuation j
IAR f5-10-01 Inad,squate prowdure causes low cooling water flow to makeup 1 12R 95-10-00 closed in N , pump resulting in operation outside the design basis IR 95-16. See also tst! h 95-11-02 VIO 95-16-03 ! 12R f5-13-01 Design deficiency may cause makeup tank vorteming resulting 1 I2R 95-13-00 closed in R ; in f ailure to meet Appendie R requirements In 96-06 ! 12R 55-17-00 SN flow to control room coolers controlled by air operated See IR 95-16, VIO 96 *4 1 N l valves which could fail open e6 I2R $5-10 00, ' Inadequate TS note all.*ed delayed entry into TS LCO 2 See NCY 95-10-05 N 12R 55-10-01, - 12R 95-10-02 t IRR $5-19-00 taak instrumentation for SN flow to RBCUs incapable of 1 See IR 95-10 N measuring 90 gpm ! IER f5-23-01, Inconsistent design assumptions cause bu!! ding spray flow I2R 95-23 02 rates to be outside design basis 1 IER 95-23-00 closed in N y 8l In 96-04 i f 12R 95-25-00, Inadequate isolatic-s of safety /non-safety related circuits 1 See VIO 95-21-03 N I IEM 95-25-01
- LER $5-20-00, BNST vacuum breaker has inadequate relief c:apacity 1 See IR 95-21 N 12R 95-20-01
- - - .l 12R 96-01-01 EFIC control circuits misrouted; Appendix R concern 1 LER 96-01-00 closed le P% k IR 96-043 See also NC, I 96-01-0) j 12R 56-02-00 Minipurge valve has safety /non-safety related circuits 1 See VIO 95-21-03 N f without isolation .
t LER 96-03-00, RCS cooldown rate exceeded during cooldown 3 See tst! 95-21-04 N k 12R 96-03-01
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1 IER $6-04 00 CUIE control dampers found damaged & leaking 1 See URI 95-02-02, IR 95- N i 21
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LER 96-05-01 SN flow to RBCUs could exceed design 1 12R 96-05-00 closed in N k IR 96-06. See also VIO 96-01-01 12R 96-06-00, HPI instrument error could result in MPI pump runout 1 See IR 95-20, 1R 96-04, N j IAR 56-06-01 D.I. 2 6 [ t i
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l j- 2SSUB DESCRIPTION mama guic 3R/Sgt LICWWWE CN Nec i. i La&D STATUS STATUp l EER C6-07-00, HPI line SBthCA/140P/ loss of de bus could have insdequate HP1 1 See IR 96-01, D.I. 2 N ! IER 96-07-01 flow instrv e tation LER 96-08-03 Ambiguous TS note results in not performing RCS leak 2 N surveillance prior to Node 2 IER 96-09-00 Failure to reattach instrtenent tubing to seismic supports 1 See tnt! 96-03-06, IR 96- N I af ter modification leads to operation outside design basis 05 I 1RR 96-10-00 Low flow in SN system cooled o m ..ei.;s causes operation 1 See VIO 95-16-03 N outside design basis 1ER 96-11-00 Personnel error causes testing deficiency resulting in 1 See CL 96-01 N condition prohibited by improved TS (GL 96-01 issuesi LER 96-12-00, Operation outside design basis caused by battery chargers 4 See VIO 96-05-07 N IED 96-12 01, haeing inadequate test results accepted in error 12R 96-12-02 i IER 96-13-00 Operator error resulted in the inadvertent actuation of DCP- 3 See NCif 96-03-02 N f 1A IER 96-15-00 Personnel errors cause cable separation / isolation concerne 1 See IR 96-04 N
- 4 resulting in operation outside the design basis (toxic gas monitors) , [
12R 96-16-00 CREVS filter testing did not meet TS specs 2 N LER 06-18-00, Failure to verify R8 penetrations closed per TS 1 0-2 R LER 4-18-01 LEO C6-19-00 Non-safety related switch used in safety related wiring for 1 See URI 96-06-03 N i ES status lights
- f LER 96-80-00 Unreviewed safety questions concerning EDG overloading caused 4 R-2, D-6, D- See EEI 96-12-02 N I !
3 by interpretation of regulatory requirements 14, D-15, [ OP-5 ! 12R 96-23-00 Personnel error leads to missed surveillances resulting in 2 violation of Technical Specifications (missed remote shutdown panel Efw pump pressure instrument channel cheeks LER 06-24-00 Plant modification causes unanalyzed condition regarding 1 See URI 96-12-01 emergency feedwater } I IER 96-35-00 Personnel error causes testing deficiency resulting in 1 See 9tPA SL601 (CL 96-01) condition prohibited by Technical Specifications (12 contacts in ES logic were not being tested) [ EEI 94-10-01 Four examples of fa!!ure to follow refueling procedure FP-203 3 ** R i' f EBI 96-10-02 Failure to assure roet esuse analysis and corrective actions 5 ** R taken to preclude repetition were adequate after refuel incident (no PR issuod) > i i L
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m ISSUB DesC?IPTION AREE WBC 23/SSR LICEIBM avesmarrg ec LEAD STATUS sTaTOS EEI 96-12-02 EIM3 loading USQs due to ina'Jequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluationes 4 R-2, D-6, D. Enforcement conference R three examples (one modification 6 two procedure changest 14 D-15, to be scheduled. See OP-5 CR3 D.I. 5: CR3 D.I. 6 EEI 94-12-0) Inadequate corrective actions for 10 CFR 50.59 evaluat ton b Enforcement conference a errores two emasples to be scheduled 5 EEI 96-12-04 Use of unverified calculations to support modifications. 4 OP-6 Enforcement conference R NRC inspect licensee's extent of condit ion reviews. to be scheduled EA 95-16 Use of non-conservative trfp setpoints for safety-related 6, 1 See IR 95-16, IR 95-21 R (was EEI 95- equipment (SLIII). Additional examples identified in IR 95- ! 02 04) 16. j EA 95-126 Nine instances where operators violated procedures for PR'r 6, 3 See IR 96-04 R' le0V I.A (was pressure / level (SLIII). I EEI 95-22 01) ,
. I EA 95-126 Conduct of unauthorized tests of MtTr without 10 CFR 50.59 6, 3 See IR 96-04 R NOV I.S (was evaluation (SLIII). Additional examples (four tests)
REI 95-22-02) identified in 1/10/96 letter titled EA 95-126 and EA 96-105). (See URI 96-04-001 ,, EA f5-126, Failure to take adequate corrective actions for operator 6, 5 R { Is0V I.C.1 concerns regarding OP-1039, Curve S. for MlTT pressure / level (vai EEI 95- limits (SLIII) 22-03) EA 95-126, Cbrrective actions for an inadequate curve 8 (two STI's and a 6, 5 0-1 R NOV I.C.2 revised Curve SA 6 08) were also incorrect (SLIII) i (was EE! 95-22-03) EA 95-126, Design controls failed to ensure adequate safety margin for 6, 1 CP-6 R II IsOV I.D.1 HPI pumps for certain IJDCA scenarios (SIYII) (was E2I 95-22 04) EA 55-126, Swapover of ECCS pumps
- suction from BWST (at five feet) to 6, 1 R NOV I.D.2 reactor building susy was inadequate (SLIII)
(was EEI 95-22-04) i EA 55-126, EOPs allowed single LPI pump to supply two HPI pumps, with 6, 1 R ISOY II.A (was insufficient NPSH for LPI puwp (SLIII) EEI 55-32-04) EA 95-126, Failure to take adequate correer +va actions for tank 6, 5 R NOV II.B (was volumes / level / suction point (ELIv) EEI 95-22-03) EA 95-126, Failure to ensure fire water storage tank contained adequate 6, 1 R Is0V II.C (was volume of water (SLIV) EEI 95-22-03) VI3 93-15-07 Inadequate EOF and AP procedures 6, 3 See IR 96-04, IR 96-00 R VIO 94-25-01 Failure to properly control the Control Complex Habitability 6, 7 , See URI 95-02-02 N Envelope (door blocked open for maintenance work) 6
mm ISSUE DESCRIPTION asma NRC IR/SEE LICENSEE eranssWTS 3Ntc LEAD STATUS STATUS VIO f4-27-02 Failure to make two 10 CFR 50.73 reports to the NRC within 6, 2 OP-4 See IR >S-02, IR 95-09 N the required time VIO $4-27-03 Failure to make one required 10 CFR 50.72 report to the NRC 6, 2 OP-4 See IR 95-04 N wit hin t he required t ime VIO 15-16-03 Inadequate procedure for operation of the makeup pu g 1A 6, 1 m cooling water VIO 95-21-03 Failure to isolate the class 1E f rom the non-class 1E 6, 1 R electrical circuitry for the RB purge and mini-purge valves VIO 96-01-01 Inadequate corrective action for HPI flow indication problem 6, 5 R VIO 96-01-05 Two examples of failure to update FSAR as required by 10 CFR 6, 4 N 50.71(e) VIO 96-01-06 Failure to correctly translate design basis of SW system into 6, 1 R procedures, drawings, and instructions VIO 96-02-01 Failure to mair.tain 0,2 footcandles in the protected area 6, 7 See IR 96-07 N V10 93-02-04 Failure to maintain secondary alarm station operable ard 6, 2 N inadequate compensatory measures ea VIO 96-03-11 Failure to follow radiation work permit requirements 6, 7 N VIO $6-03-12 Failure to report the transport of a radioactively 6, 2 N contaminated individual offsite VIO M-03-13 Unescorted visitor personnel within the protected area 6, 7 N VIO 96-04-02 Failure to take prompt corrective action in revising 6, 5 R g 1 procedure VP-500, Plant Safety verification (for STAS). VP-580 contained outdated and incorrect information. VIO 96-05-01 Failure to create a PR and OCR 6, 5 R VIO 96-05-04 Licensee approved eddy current acceptance criteria different 6, 2 N from TS requirements VIO 56-05-05 Failure to follow procedures for updating design basis 6, 4 cP-e R documento VIO T6-05-07 Inadequate receiving inspections for battery chargers (vendor 6, 4 R tests) VIO 96-05-08 Failure to follow purchasing procedures for inverters 6, 4 R VIO 96-06-02 No procedure for deminerallred water flush performed by 6, 3 R operators on boric acid addition lines VIO 76-06-04 No evaluation on non-FSAR vital battery charger configuration 6, 4 R VIO 96-06-06 Failure to timely notify the NRC of a condition outside the 6, 2 N Appendix R Licensing design basis "(10 96-06-07 FR not initiated to resolve CREYS test failure 6, 5 R 7
m IC3tm DESCRIPTION ARSA INtc IR/SER LICEISEE CN INC LEAD SThTUs ST&7US VIO 96-07-01 Failure to protect safeguards information 6, 7 N VIO 96-07-02 Failure to complete screening elements for Fitness for Duty 6, 7 N Personnel VIO 96-08-01 Corrective action not taken on make-up system audit findings 6, 5 R
& excessive vibration on spent fuel pool pump cooling fan moto r VIO 96-09-01 Failure to follow a maintenance procedure resulting in the 6, 7 N inadvertent initiation of the control room emergency ventilation system VIO 96-09-02 Unescorted visitor personnel within the protected area 6, 7 N U10 96-09-03 Failure to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation for 6, 3 R changes to procedures described in the FSAR for controllir:g dissolved hydrogen concentration 1.1 the RCS VIO 96-09-04 Failure to update operating curves to reflect' 1981 power 6, 4 R uprate VIO 96-09-05 Failure to incorporate design change of MUV-64 into 6, 4 a operations procedures UIO 96-09-06 Three examples of design control errors (erroneous 6, 4 I CP-8 R calculation inputs and ISI boundaryl v10 96-09-07 Untimely corrective actions for the EFIC system concerns and 6, 5 R problems VIO 96-11-01 Inadequate work instructions to prevent the inadvertent st art 6, 7 N of the A EDO 6, 7 VIO 96-11-03 Personnel performing work on the reactor building sump N without logging onto a clearance, as required by approved wR VIO 96-11-04 Reactor building sump not constructed in accordance with 6, 1 a approved construction drawings v!O 96-15-01 Failure to perform a required TS surveillance for the remote 6, 2 shutdown panel VIO 96-15-02 Failure of reactor coolant pump oil collection system to 6, 7 R retain oil leaking from reactor coolant pump IFI 94-18-09 Review periodic verification plans - MOV (CL 89-10 item) 2 See IR 95-11 IR 95-21s N See CL 89-10 IFI 95-02-05 Resonance noise in vicinity of MUV-25 7 N IF1 95-08-03 Emergency Operating Procedure update program 3 See IR 95-16, VIO 93 16- N 07 IFI 95-11-01 SCBA requirements for personnel during a toxic gas releare 2 N IFI 95-15-01 Design requirements for nitrogen overpressure (service water) 1 See IR 95-21 R 8
--. _ _ _ - - .. . . . . . . _ . _ . . . -. -m_ _ _ - . . . _ . __m . . . _ . . . . . . -m . - . _ _ _ . _ __ m.m. . . _ . . . .mm. .m_ .
i
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- l
?
i i ISSUs DESCRIPTION hema M IR/sER LIC M N M , , Laan starus svares I IFI 55-15-02 Design requirements for dynamic Is0CA ef fects 1 See IR 95-21 and TIA 96- N 013 ; IFI f5-15-03 Design requirements for reactor coolant pump cooler failure 1 See IR 95-21 and 71A 95- N 014 , 6 IFI 95-15-04 Code requirement for thermal relief valves on decay heat 1 see IR 95-21 and TIA 96- N I removal heat exchangers 014 E IFI 95-15-05 Relief valves removed from heat exchangers 1 See IR 95-21 and TIA 96- N- [ 014 IFI 95-21-02 Modification to the standby feedwater pump recirculation line 1 N [ i IFI $6-03-15 Evaluate the 11censee's revised TS Bases and related 10 CFR 2 R 50.59 analysis , I IFI 56-03-16 Review of MAR 96-02-09-01, HPI flow indicators. Installation 1 N ; package and functional testing results IFI 54-04-03 Effect of setpoint calculations on EOP revisions 1 See VIO 93-16-07 N i IFI 93-05-06 Large bresk loss of coolant analysis generic concerns 1 N e ; IFI 96-06-09 Deficiencies in Mecaties fire barrier program prtvedures and 4 IR 96-15 N. C ! documentat son { t IFI f6-08-02 Reactor building cavity cooling piping thermal relief 1 See D.I. 8. GL 96-06 N ! proteetion 7 IFI 16-15-03 Actions taken to iesolve post-accident recriticality concerne 1 fes reviewing, generic [ due to localized boron dilution B6W issue 1 i IFI $6-201-11 Design basis for decay heat / core flood / reactor coolant piping 1 Identified in IPAP R I i t eenperature report as IF-96-201-01 l L IFI 56-201-12 Conduit sizing criteria - ja ming ratio not considered 1 Identified in IPAP R [ report as IF-96-201-02 I IFI 96-201-13 Cable ampacities - several cables exceed rating, including 1 Identified in IPAP R f DHP-1 report as IF-96-201-03 I IFI 56-201-14 EDG protective trips not bypassed 6 ring emergency mode of 1 D-12 Identified in IPAP R [ operation report as IF-96-201-04 (> IFI $6-201-15 Verification of motor starting data 1 Identified in IPAP R report as IP-96-201-05 f i IFI 96-201-16 Coordination of Second level undervoltage relay (SLURI 1 Identified in IPAP R f setting vs. inverter operation report as tr-96-201-06 [ IFI $5-201-17 Coordination of SIER and fuse protection 1 Identified in IPAP R 3 report as IP-96-201-07 f noLTI-PImrF acFIONs ; 1 I f d 9 i _ _- . _ _ _ - _ _ _ =
.--m.---.__m . ._m _- - _ _. _ ..-..- -_ .. _ _ .. _ . . , . _ m + ,
A ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA SERC ' IR/88R LICEEBER COREWITs NEC Land status sTnTos l MPA 8'.105: Seismic qualification of equipment. Licensee *s criteria and 2 Expected completion M j GL 87-02 procedures approved. Some issues are pending and would te Deceneer. ' resolved thru audit (scheduled for Mar 97). Licensee *s field walkdown results are current ly in staf f review. I MPA 99111 IPE and IPEEE - These are in staff review. leot a restart 2 N , (192)a ites. MPASS118 (IPERE) - , MPA SL507; Pressure locking and theriaal binding of safety-related gate 2 R , GL SS-07 valves. Currently in staff review. An RAI is outstanding. ! Espected completion? MPA SL601: Testing of safety-related logic circuits -' 2 R-1 11/96 - the licensee has R GL 96-01 Licensee response in staff review. More details are identified testing i required. This issue requires attention. deficiencies that must be fimed prior to , restart t MPA 95602: Movement of heavy loads over spent fuel pool 2 N j NRCS 56-02 - Licensee response in staff review.'This would not be a > restart issue. MPA SL208; Thermolag Licensee plans to use Mecaties 2 See IR 96-01s IR 96-06 N ,8 GL 92-00s BU (an alternate material), some reanalysis of APPENDIX R. and S2-01 some emesption. Fire barrier tests of Mecaties including Ampacity tests are in staff review. This also may not be ; restart issue.
- i MPA SL503: Circumferential cracking of SG tube flaws. 2 R f GLf5-03 Licensee response in staff review.
I MPAS L201: Reactor vessel structural integrity. RAI to licensee on 2 N CL 92-01 Rev 7/22/96. Only a data base issue,'not a restart ites. I 1, Supp 1 g MPA SL604s Boraflez degradation. Licensee response is just in. Staff 2 N CL 96-04 review to commence. This may have to be addressed prior to , restart because of sensitivity to spent fuel pool issues. MPA : MOV testing & surveillance. This item is closed with the 2 See IFI 94-18-09 N f GL8A0 exception of IF1 94-10-09 on periodic verification, which is l to be followed up af ter a new generic consuunication is issued. f LICM N/ RELIEF RSOURSTS CCHE Control complex habitability envelope - Including TIA 95-03 2 R t need to be addressed. Licensee submittal does not provide I adequate TS action. t R.G. 1.97 RG 1.97 instrurentation - Subcool maritors etc - category 2 N p In7t rument s change. License amendment may be approved by Decenter. j l Elemetrics & Biometric exemption to allow taking security badges offsite - 2 N l Security Staff review is espected to be couplete soon. Core Flood Relief request RE: Core ficod nozzle - Staff needs more info. 2 N Nozzle PM will keep RII informed. , 10 ?
.- f
l j 1 IssgB SesCRIPTION Am SW IR/pst LEt m em m sano status svares OTSG Tubes OTSG tube testing - Licensee proposed a revised OTSG tube 2 See VIO 96-05-04 N acceptance criteria. m Iss5Es Pressurizer During Refuel 9 a sub-surface flaw was discovered. The 2 N Nossle Flaw licensee performed better inspection during R10 and found the flaw to be acceptable. The new inspection results in reduced flaw size and consequently acceptance criteria !which is based on ratio of flaw to thickness) changes. May require inspection. Staff review in progress. RC Imop In a survey inspection, the staf f noted that certain branch 2 N Piping pipes off the primary coolant loop were not analyzed as Code Analyses Class 1 pipe li.e., no fatigue analysis) as required by the code. Need technical branch's opinion on this. Das is not expected to be restart issue. Criticality he licensee did not carry a previously approved exemption 2 N Nonitor from part 70 170.247) requirements to Part 50 license. Need legal interpretation of the status of the exemption. N '* LTOP Current TS does not address LTOP prevention or siitigation. 2 On the basis of GL 88-11, the licensee submitted information to demonstrate that LTOP in B&W plants have less than 1 in 100 reactor years probability of occurrence and as a result per GL 88-11 non-appendix G methodology can be used for PT curves. Such a PT curve would provide for higher L70P enable pressure and tosperature and would provide operational flexibility. Staff denied the request in 1995 and requested a revised response. The licensee erpetts to respond late 1997. Appendix R Appendix R design basis issues review by FPC consultant. NRC R $ review open Appendix R issues to assure that there are no rest a rt or operability issues imbedded in them. NRC review operator workarounds list to assure that there are See VIO 96-09-07 m OperEter worktrounds no restart or operability issues contained in them Licensee request and NRC review and issue license amendments R-2, R-4 R USQs for all Unreviewed Safety Questions 1USOsl Conduct an IIJtT or seek an Amendment to utilire Method 5 of R I!Jtt Appendix J to 10 CFR 50 NRC review licensee's 50.54f letter response idue 2/9/973 on R 50.54f 14tter design t,ases Verify license conditions are met R License Conditions Sources for issues include: IFS, SIMS, NUREG 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power Plants), Resident's OIL, PM's OIL NOTE: Open allegations, OI investigations, and emerging / draft issues are listed separately. 11 l ___ _- _ _- -
$tstus at of 1?/03/%
CRYSTAL RIVER RESTART TASK CHECKLIST i TASK MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF-APP A : fissue3N1Minaryinotificatiori? {B5b.' ' RIIs
- t M #dN%
Congressional Notification B.2 g. EstMlisOestaMPansli
,m ,
,F 'Bi3Mf NIINNRR}
'c -
illy 1/967- [Cli"W
<SOE!1tre'
~
[AssessVavail$ble?informdioni B.3Ttd 4 c- M ' iCS # dsvelMCaheISpecifiS Chehklisti^ 'Bi3 Lf: RII M Ri '11/13/963' DWD Develop Restart Action Plan B.3 g. RII.-NRR Regional Administrator Approves B.3 h. RII Restart Action Plan , NRR Associate Director Approves B.3 1. NRR Restart Action Plan Implement Restart Action Plan B.3 j. RII Evaluate findings of IPAP_ B.4.1 a. PANEL - Inspection fleenseetper'formsirootscause V ~B.4.152' licens'eeli '
@ lC55dll
- analysissand develops;correctivsi
~
N :' -
! action' plan * ~L *Ma '
NRC evaluates licensee's rool B.4.1 c. PANEL cause determination and corrective action plan Review licensee. generated B.4.3 a. PANEL restart issues Independent NRC identification B.4.3 b. PANEL of restart items (consider external sources) NRC/ Licensee agreement on B.4.3 c. PANEL restart issues Evaluate Licensee's-restart B.4.3 d. PANEL issues implementation process Evaluate Licensee's B.4.3 e. RII implementation of verification process Evaluate Licensee's restart B.4.5 a. PANEL readiness self assessment
'. ATTACHMENT B s'
l TASK MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS , REF APP A NRC evaluation of applicable B.4,5 b. PANEL items from ISSUES section below complete j Restart issues c h 2d B.4.5 c. PANEL Conduct NRC restart readiness B.4.5 d. R:I team inspection Issue augmented restart coverage B.4.5 e. RII inspection plan Comments from other parties B.4.5 f. PANEL considered Re-review of Generic Restart B.4.5 h. PANEL Checklist complete Prepare restart authorization B.5 a. document and basis for restart i NRC Restart Panel approves B.5 b. PANEL
- Restart Authorization No restart objections from other B5c NRR. RII applicable H0 offices PANEL No restart objections from B.5 d RII applicable Federal Agencies Regional Administrator concurs B.5 e. RII in Restart Authorization
' NRR Associate Director concurs B.5 f. NRR in Restart Authorization EDO concurs in Restart B.5 g. NRR , Authorization when required Conduct ACRS briefing when B 5 h. NRR reauested i Conduct Commission briefing when B.5 1. NRR reauested ' Commission concurs in Restart B.5 j. PANEL Authorization when rea_uired Regional Administrator B.5 k. RII authorizes restart 4 4 . ATTACHMENT B e
t d ! JTASK MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS l REF APP A Notify Commission of restart B.6 a. NRR ! authorization (if Commission did.
- not concur in Restart
- . Authorization) 4 Notify EDO of restart B.6 b. NRR 4
authorization (if EDO did not concur in Restart Authorization) Notify Congressional Affairs of B.6'c. NRR i 1 restart authorization j Notify ACRS of restart B.6 d. NRR l authorization (a briefing may be i substituted) Notify Applicable Federal B.6 e. agencies of restart authorization Notify Public Affairs of restart B.6 f. RII authorization Notify State and Local officials B.6 g. RII ' of ~ restart authorization . Notify citizens or groups that B.6 h. RII expressed = interest during the restart approval orocess
'. ATTACHMENT B
. . . . r. .n.,. .. , . ,, ,- - - . , - . . -
Status et e' 1?'t3/% CRYSTAL RIVER RESTART ISSUES CHECKLIST ISSUE MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A ASSESSMENT OF ROOT CAUSE-IDENTIFICATION AND CORRECTION Conditions requiringtshutdown? C.1;1 ?a;
- are clearly understood- PANELL
.Cq Root,causesioff the' conditions 2 C 1.1&
PANEC recuiring shutdown clearlyi LC: uncerstood:- -
^
Root:causes'4ofzother significant C.1.1:Uc; problems clearly understood :PANEe 'Ci ~ Effectiveness of root cause C.1.1 d. PANEL analysis program Thoroughness of corrective C.1.3 a. action plan PANEL Completeness of corrective C.1.3 b. action plan PANEL Control of corrective action C.1.3 c. PANEL item tracking Effective corrective actions for C.1.3 d. PANEL the condition requiring shutdown implemented Effective corrective actions for C.1.3 e. PANEL other significant problems imolemanted Plan Control of long-term corrective C.1.3 f. PANEL actions Effectiveness of corrective C.1.3 g. PANEL action verification process Effectiveness of 0A Program C.1.4 a. PANEL Effectiveness of industry C.1.4 b. PANEL exoerience review program Effectiveness of Licensee's C.1.4 c. PANEL independent review groups Effectiveness of deficiency C.1.4 d. PANEL reporting system ATTACHMENT C
i ISSUE MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A
- Staff. willingness to raise.
- concerns C.1.4 e. PANEL E
Effectiveness of commitment C.1.4 9 PANEL 4 tracking-program j External' Audit (i.e. INPO) , capability C.1.4 h. PANEL 1-i 4 ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS
- i. Goals / expectations communicated C.2.1 a.
to staff l- Demonstrated expectation of l adherence to procedures C.2.1 b. 3 Management involvement in self- C.2.1 c. i assessment and-independent self-i assessment capability ~ Effectiveness of management C.2.1 d. [- review committees-L Management's demonstrated i C.2.1 e, , ' awareness of day-to-day-operational concerns ' Management's ability to identify C.2.1 f. and prioritize significant l- issues Management's ability to i C.2.1 9 coordinate resolution of i significant issues ! Management's ability to ! C.2.1 h. implement effective corrective a :tions Inpact of any Management C.2.2 a. l' -reorganization 1 lEffecthenessdrdimslyi '% M2i2ibk i ' 4 resolut' i onioffesployee4co,ncernsil d,i ~<" IIFn96$0Sk M'&
, ;y , m; .
,.3 j 3. ,' s %a m !IRi90094 s
.g , kc s9 g?
Adequate engineering support as C.2.2 c. PANEL i demonstrated by timely resolution of issues ATTACHMENT C ) e
1
- ISSUEL MC 03501 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS 4 -
REF APP A Adequate plant administrative-C.2,2 d. PANEL i procedures'- , Engineering / licensing ! n Effective information exchange
- C.2.2 e. '
) with other utilities i i ASSESSMENT OF PLANT AND CORPORATE STAFF EFFECTIVENESS Demonstrated commitment to C 3.1 a. l 3 achieving improved performance Demonstrated safety C.3.1 b. consciousness i '- Understanding of management's C.3.1 c. expectations and goals 1 Understanding of plant issues C.3.1 d. j and corrective actions 4 Qualifications and training of C.3.1 e. i staff Attentiveness to duty C.3.1 9 i level of attention to detail C.3.1 h. L Staff overtime usage C.3.1 j.
- j. Procedure usage / adherence C.3.1 k.
- Awareness of plant security C.3.1 1.
Licensed operator staffing meets C.3.3 a. p requirements and licensee-goals ! Levellof formality in control C.3.3 b. j room [ ' Effectiveness of control room C.3.3 c. simulator training Control room / plant operator C.3.3 d. [ awareness of equioment status Adequacy of plant operating C.3.3 e. procedures j Procedure usage / adherence C.3.3 f. o Log keeping practices- C.3.3 q. _ i f ATTACHMENT C 4
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ISSUE MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A l ASSESSMENT OF PHYSICAL READINESS OF PLANT Operability of technical C.4 a. specification systems Operability of required C.4 b, secondary and support systems Results of pre-startup testing s 4 c. Adequacy of system lineups C. ; d. Adequacy of Surveillance C.4 e, tests / test program Significant hardware issues C.4 f. resolved (i.e. damaged equipment, equi modifications) pment ageing, Effectiveness of the plant C.4 h. maintenance program Maintenance backlog managed and C.4 1. impact on operation assessed - Adequacy of plant housekeeping C.4 j. and eauipment storaae ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS Applicable license amendments C5a. have been issued Applicable exemptions have been C5b, granted Applicable reliefs have been C,5 c. granted Significant enforcement issues C.5 f. have been resolved Allegations have been C.5 g. appropriately addressed 10 CFR 2.206 petitions have been C.5 h appropriately addressed COORDINATION WITH INTERESTED AGENCIES AND PARTIES Federal emergency Management C.6 a. Agency ATTACHMENT C
ISSUE MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A Appropriate Sate and local C.6 e' officials Appropriate public interest C.6 f. groups local news media C.6 g. I l J e
. ATTACHMENT C i -
i
I
/YO tug'o, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION p 4 REGloN 11 et o 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 $ j ATLANTA GEoRotA 30323-0199 \*****/ January 14,1997 MEMORANDUM TO: File FROM: ohns P. Ja o , Director Division of Reactor Safety
SUBJECT:
MINUTES OF THE CRYSTAL RIVER RESTART PANEL FOURTH MEETING HELD JANUARY 8,1997 The Crystal River Restart Panel met at the Crystal River site on January 8,1997. The following Panel members and others were present: Panel Members: Johns P. Jaudon, Ril, Chairman Frederick J. Hebdon, NRR, Vice Chairman i Keny D. Landis, Ril Stephen J. Cahill, Rll Laksminaras Raghaven, NRR Others: Robert P. Schin, Ril The Panel noted that the Plant status was cold shutdown (Mode 5) with a steam bubble in the pressurizer. The Senior Resident inspector advised that there was work in progress on some valves and that a Train (A) outage was scheduled to begin January 13,1997. . The Chairman pointed out that the licensee had announced several personnel selections, these were: Roy Anderson as Senior Vice President; he is expected to be onsite in late January and relieve March 3,1997. John Cowan as Site Vice President; he is expected onsite by early February 1997. Dave Kunsemiller as Director of Site Support; he is on site and should relieve by the end of January 1997. John Holden as Director of Engineering; the onsite date was not known by the board, i The Panel discussed Licensee Event Report 96-22, which reported a potential design issue that potentially could result in the simultaneous failure of circuits both in the control room and the remote shutdown facility. It was reported that the licensee had determined to conduct a broader review of Appendix R issues because of this potential design issues. The NRR Panel members noted that there was a restart item to resolve some Appendix R exemption requests and that action on these requests should be coordinated with review of the licensee's review to assure that the total context of Appendix R issues was understood. },
2 4 The Restart Panel noted that FPC was still developing recovery milestones and that the scope of the design changes was not completely finalized in some areas. l There was a lengthy discussion on whether or not the licensee's plan to review past 10 CFR 50.59 reviews of modifications and to develop time lines for the Emergency Diesel
. Generation system, the Emergency Feedwater system, Building Spray system, Low Pressure injection system and High Pressure injection system and to perform a failure modes analysis of DC power would get the licensee to a point to conclude that the safety systems at Crystal ; River met their design basis requirements. The Restart Panel decided to discuss this with the licensee at the public meeting scheduled for January 9 onsite in order to assure that they j
understood the Panel's concems la this area. ' l The Restart check list of open items was reviewed. Findings from recent reports were added and characterized. It was further determined that duplicate items, coded as Non Restart because the item was coded as Restart under another classification, should be further coded to show that there was another item on the same subject that was coded restart. This was accomplished and the revised Restart Open item checklist is enclosed (Attachment A). The NRR representatives discussed the lack of technical s[ecfications for Low Temperature Overpressure Protection, which is already coded as a Restart item. It was noted that NRR has not yet sent correspondence to the licensee on this subject, although the licensee is
- aware that the item in on the Restart Open item Checklist.
The need to schedule available inspection resources effectively was discussed. The Panel decided that the inspection activities of the resident inspectors, the project engineer, and DRS inspectors should be carefully coordinated. Panel members K. Landis and C. Casto, Branch Chiefs from DRP and DRS respectively, were tasked to develop a tentative inspection plan to assure that items ready for inspection were promptly inspected. The due date for this tentative plan is January 23. This plan is to become a living schedule modified as necessary,
- Dates for future meetings were scheduled as follows
in Region II - January 23,1997 (10:00 am) 4 At Crystal River - February 12,1997 (8:00 am)
Attachment:
A. Restart Open item Checklist i Docket 50-302 cc w/att: L. A. Reyes, RA/Ril E. W. Merschoff, ADRA/ R!l 4 J. R. Johnson, DRP/Rll S. A. Varga, NRR This discussion was held January 9,1997. Wth FPC at the pubhc rneetog I L .% .,
Attachment A CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST ~ R ITEMS -(TO BE INSPECTED BY THE NRC BEFORE RESTART) . Status as of January 13, 1997 The Crystal River Restart Panel met on November 13, 1996, and developed seven general areas under which the restart issues will be grouped. Those seven areas are: 1 1. Knowledge of design and licensing bases and adequacy of design margin
- 2. Regulatory knowledge and perspective
- 3. Operator performance a.d knowledge ,
- 4. Marginally effective engineering organization 5.
Management oversight; including quality assurance, self assessment, and corrective action t
- 6. Corrective actions for NRC violations
- 7. Other .
ISSUE DESCRIPTION ARIA NEC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE COBsGNTS NRC STATUS STATUS LICENSER'S RESTART LIST OF DESIGN-RELATED ISSUES (D.I.s)(per 10/30/96 Itr frem FPC) CR3 D.I. 1 HPI pump recirculation to the makeup tank 1 RI D-1 See URI 96-01-02 IFI R 96-17-02. In 96-12 CP) D.I. 2 HPI system modifications to improve SB14Ch margins i 1 RI D-2 See URI 96-01-02. LER R ; 96-06. IR 96-12 1 CR3 D.I. 3 1.P! pump mission time 1 Lenahan/ D-3 See URI 96-201-01 IR R MRR 96-12 CR3 D.I. 4 Reactor building spray pump 2B NPSH 1 Lenahan D-4 See URI 96-201-02. IR R 96-12 , CR3 D.I. 5 Emergency feedwater system upgrades and diesel generator load ie= pact 1 Schin D-5 See URI 96-12-01 EEI " R 96-12-02. IR 96-12 CR3 D.I. 6 Emergency diesel generator loading 1 Fillion D-6 See EEI 96-12-02 IR R 96 12 f CR3 D.I. 7 Failure modes and ef fects of loss of DC power 1 Fillion D-7 See URI 96-12-01. LER R i 96-07 IR 96-12 CR3 D.I. 8 Generic 14tter 96-06 (1hermal overpressure protection for Containment piping, penetrations, and cooleral 1 Lenahan/ D-s See IR 96-12 R Crowley l i Attachment A , b
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IISUE DESCRIPTICII asah NRC LEAD IR/SSR LICENSEE C0bedENTS NItC I STATUS STATUS LICENSEE'S OTERR RESTART ItatS RMG 29/30 Seismic monitoring of HR Rad Monitor 1 Lenahan D-19 R BWST NPSH NPSH concern with ECCS pumps when SFP pumps are running in 1 Thomas D-19 R BWS and Rectre r FIVE AREAS OF CONTINUING COSICERN, WITE IPAP --- - _ INSPECT!0Bf Age RII L -- _ ADDITICIts Management - NRC inspect Problem Identifications focusing on OA audits I Crowley/ OP-2, OP-3 Inspect New PC system R Oversight .. IPAP and the problem terortina system. - Increased inspectaan of QA Thomas I Problem Analysis and Evaluations focusing on root cause Recommended evaluations. , Inspection I Marginally - NRC inspect Engineering Problem Identification and 4 Schin CP-4 50.59 R Effective Resolutions with emphasis on Ileensee evaluations for Engineering OP-6 significant issues and work backlogs. i Organization - Also inspect Quality of Engineerings with emphasis on to !
- IPAP CFR 50.59 screening and safety evaluations, accuraev of tU f fRecommended FSAR, and management oversight. *
' Inspection t
Lack of - NRC inspect Engineering Safety Focuss focusing on proper 1 Schin OP-7, OP-8, R
'1 Adequate identifiention of discrepancies with the olant's desian basis !
Kso, ledge of in t he correct ive action system. D-13 D-15 the Design D-16
- Also inspect Engineering Problem Identification and Essis - IPAP Resolutions focusing on programs for identifyine desion basis -
R3 commended issues and capturing them in the corrective action program. ! Inspection - Also inspect Quality of Engineering; locusing on + sensitivitv/understandine by the engineerina/11eensino staff of t he plant
- s desian basis.
- Also assess the design margin, including the licensee's
- extent of condition
- reviews !
lack of - NRC inspect h, operability, report abilit y 2 Schin ! S2nsitivity OP-5, OP-4 R ; for the Need j to Comply ' With Kegulations - IPAP , R2 commended ) Inspection . Operator - NRC inspect Safety Focuss focusing on communication within 3 RI R Performance - operations, comsmanication with other site aroups, and 1 PAP overtime R2 commended y Inspection i I l h e L 2 " t
If$UE DESCRIPTItat asma WRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE CCEemMTS NRC STATUS STATUS INSFECTOR FOLLOWUF SYSTEN URI 95-02-02 Control room habitability envelope leakage. Excessive 1 Schin leakage paths through doors, daspers. and drains due to See TIA 95003: FPC TS R design errors and lack of surveillances/ preventive Change Regast No. 208
- staintenance of 8/28/96: Leas 96-04, 94-20. 95-01, 95-04-01, 95-09; 1Rs 95- -
02, 95-09, 95-11, 95- ! 16, 95-21s FPC lt ro. of 5/26/95 and 10/23/95 URI 96-01-02 Discrepancies in the high pressure injection design basis analysis 1 RI D-9 See CR3 D.I. 1 R CR) D.I. 2 URI'96-04-01: Discrepancies!!n t.he EDBD'and the FSAR;regarding the p Crowley;-
~ '
' prevention of ' post-LOCA boron precipit ation ' " ' ' 11
! !R 96-19 ' See EEI $6-13-0*7.i Rfl C 121 96-05-02 Design concerns with main steam line hangars used in seismic 1 Lenahan and other dynamic load applications R tRI 96-06-03 Non-safety related transfer switch used in ES status 1 Fillion R indicating light circuitry
. . a;.. >,,. . . . . . . - .: < . . . . > . . , , . . . _ , , ~ . , . .,, x URI.96-1 b O1:!.. ~
; Emergency:Feedweter/ low' WPSE to. both pumps due -to; postulated ;
.e. . .. ..
!": 'See CR3:D.I.25: '
l, single-failuret l11 :Schini
+
IR'96-19 " ' ' D-17 J . . . R, C - , e
, CR3 D.I. 70 EEI 96-19.- t 03,'-04i -05. -06 URI 96-17-03 Failure to conduct required Technical Specification 4 Fillion See MPA 91401 (CL $6-surveillance testing on safety related circuitry (CL 96-011 01)
R URI 96-201-01 Iong tern plant cooldown following a small break thCA 1 Crowley/ D-3 See CR3 D.I. 3: See IR R assuming a single failure in the decay heat drop line NRR 96-11. NRR taking responsibility for this item. tRI 96-201-02 NPS" for building spray pump has very little margin, and some 1 Lenahan D-4 See CR1 0.1. 4 R ca.) _ ,etion factors were nonconservative 1RI 96-201-03 Operating curves 16, 17, and le in CP-1038 are not validated 4 Hopper by licensee 0-1 R URI 96-201-04 Nonsafety-related positioners on safety-related valves 1 Thomas R-7, D-10 See IR 96-08 R
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- URIl96 201-05" -Service water system. heat? loads did not; consider maximumf * ~
e- , , . . input-heac-(OP-103B,' Curve:15)^ '
' 1';. . .
scrowley.f
.-IR'96-195 0-11' ,. SeelE51 96+19-05~ ' R. C 1 -
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URI 96-201-07 EDG not protected against water spray from failure of fire 1 Fillion R protection deluge system in EDG room LER 95-13-01 Design deficiency may cause makeup tank vorteming resulting in failure to eeet Appendia R requirements 1 Piellan IIR 95-11-00 closed in R IR 96-06 LER 96-18-00, Failure to verify RB penetrations closed per TS 1 R1 0-2 LER 96-18-01 R EEI 96-10-01 Four examples of failure to follow refueling procedure FP-2P3 3 Hopper ** R EEI 96-10-02 Failure to assure root cause analysis and corrective actions 5 Hopper ** R taken to preclude repetition were adequate after refuel incident (no PR issued) 3
_ _ . _ ._ m .. .___m - -* - - ISSUE DESCRIPTION ARSA 3rRC LEAD 2R/SER I.ZCENSEE COBsWNTS NRC STATUS STATUS EEI 96-12-02 EDO loading USOs due to inadequate 10 Cf1t 50.59 evaluationes 4 Schin/ R-2. D-6, D- Enforcement conference RL three examples (one sodification & two procedure changes) Fillion 14 D-15, 1/24/96. See CR3 D.I. 07-5 5t Ot3 D.I. 6 EEI 96-12-03 Inadequate corrective actions for 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation 5 Schin errores two examples Enforcement conference R 1/24/96 EEI 96-12-04 Use of unverified calculations to support modifications. 4 Schin CP-6 Enforcement conference R NRC inspect licensee's extent of eendition reviews. , 1/24/96 I EEI 96-19-01 Three inadequate procedures for containment penetration 4 RI i surveillances Enforcement conference R -{ 1/24/96 t EEI 96-19-02 Inadequate corrective actions for inadequate containment 1 RI Enforcement conference R penetration surveillances 1/24/96 EEI 96-19-03 EFW NPSH USQ due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation 1 Schin for a modification Enforcement conference R 1/24/96 EE! 96-19-04 Failure to update applicable design documents to incorporate 1 Thomas Enforcement conference R EFW design information (EFF-2 assumed operating when EFP-1 trips at 5000 RCS pressurel 1/24/96 'f EEI 96-19-05 Failure to include applicable design information in the 1 Thomas design input requirements for an EFW modification (EFP-2 Enforcement conference R ' continuing to operate after EFP-1 trips at 5003 RCS pressure 1/24/96
- and hydraulic requirements)
EEI 96-19-06 i EFW USQ due to removing the automatic open elenal from ASV- 1 Thomas 204 reducing the reliability of EFP-2 inforcement conference R
, 1/24/96 EEI 96-19-07 Inadequate 50.59 evaluation for post I4CA boron precipitation I control 1 Crowley Enforcement conference R 1/24/96, verify j procedures and -
documentation adequate > prior to restart. i EE! 96-19-00 Error in dasign calculations for SW system heat loads ! 1 Crowley Enforcement. conference R " 1/24/96 EA 95-16 Use of non-conservative trip setpoints for safety-related 6, 1 twas EEI 95- equipment (SLIII). Hellan See In 95-16 IR 95-21 R Additional examples identified in IR SS- l 02-04) 16. 4 EA 95-126, Nine instances where operators violated procedures for Mt/T 6, 3 Schin See IR 94-04 NOV I. A (was pressure / level (SLIII). R EEI 95-22-01) . i EA 95-126, NOV I.B (was Cbnduct of unauthorized tests of MLTr without to CFR 50.59 5, 3 Schin I evaluation (SLIII). Additional examples (four tests) See IR 96-04 R
}
EEI 95-22-02) identified in 1/10/96 letter titled EA 95-126 and EA 96-185). (See URI 96-04-08) [ EA 95-126, Failure to take adequate corrective actions for operator . EDV I.C.1 6. 5 Schin R concerns regarding OP-1038, Curve 8, for MtTr pressure / level (was EEI 95- limits (SLIII) 32-03) t ~ i EA 95-126 Corrective actions for an inadequate Curve 8 (two STI's and a 6, 5 NOV I.C.2 RI O-1 R (was EEI 95- revised Curve SA & BB) were also incorrect (SLIII) i 22-03) 4 l
ISSUE DESCRIPTICar assa NRC LEAD IR/SEE LICENSEE CoDetENTS NRC STATUS STATUS EA 95-126, NOV I.D.1 Design controls failed to ensure adequate safety margin for 6, 1 RI OP-6 HPI pumps for certain 14CA scenarios (SLIII) R (was EEI 95-22-04) EA 95-126, Swapover of ECCS pumps
- suction from BWST (at five feetl to NOV 1.D.2 6, i RI reactor building sump was inadequate (SLIII) R (was EEI 95- '
22-04) EA 95-126, EOPs allowed single LPI pump to supply two HPI pumps, with 6, i RI NOV II.A (was insuf ficient NPSH for LPI pump (SLIII) R EEI 95-22-04) EA 95-126 Failure to take adequate corrective actions for tank C3v 11.B (was 6, 5 RI volumes / level / suction point (SLIV) R EEI 95-22-03) EA 95-126, NOV 11.C twas Failure to ensure fire water storage tank contained adequate 4, 1 R1 volume of water (SLIV) , R EEI 95-22-03) VIO 93-16-07 Inadequate EOP and AP procedures 6, 3 Hopper 0-3 See IR 96-04, IFI 96- R 04-03, IR 96-08 VIO 95-16-03 Inadequate procedure for operation of the makeup pump 1A 6, 1 cooling water RI R VIO 95-21-03 Failure to isolate the class 1E from the non-class 1E 6, 1 Thomas / electrical circuitry for the RB purge and mini-purge valves RI R VIO 96-01-01 Inadequate corrective action for HPI flow indication problem 6, 5 RI R VIO 96-01-06 Failure to correctly translate design oasis of SN system into 6, 1 RI R procedures, drawings, and instructions VIO 96-04-02 Failure to take prompt corrective action in revising 6, 5 Hopper procedure VP-580, Plant Safety Verification (for STAsl. VP- R 580 contained outdated and incorrect information. VIO 96-05-01 Failure to create a PR and OCR for damaged main steam line 6, 5 hangars 14nahan, R Raghavan VIO 96-05-05 Failure to follow procedures for updating design basis documents 6, 4 Crowley OP-8 R VIO 96-05-07 Inadequate receiving inspections for battery chargers (vendor 6, 4 tests) Schin R VIO 96-05-08 Failure to follow purchasing procedures for inverters 6, 4 Schin a ifl0 96-06-02 No procedure for demineralized water flush performed by 6, 3 s R1 R operators on boric acid addition lines VIO 96-06-04 No evaluation on non-FSAR vital battery charger configuration 6, 4 RI R VIO 96-06-07 PR not initiated to resolve CREVS test failure 6, 5 Lenahan R ti!O 96-08-01 Corrective action not taken on make-up system audit findings 6, 5 RI R
& excessive vibration on spent fuel pool pump cooling fan motor 5
1."SUR DESCRIPTION ARPA NRC LIAD IR/SER LICENSEE CCetGNTS NRC STATUS STATUS VIO 96-09-03 Failure to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation for 6, 3 Thomas changes to procedures described in the FSAR for controlling R dissolved hydrogen concentration in the PCS VIO 96-09-04 Failure to update operating curves to reflect 1961 power uprate 6, 4 Thomas i R VIO 96-09-05 Failure to incorporate design change of MUV-64 into operations procedures 6, 4 Thomas / Licensee Crowley R . Denied Vio VIO 96-09-06 Three examples of design contro? errors (erroneous 6, 4 cateulation inputs and ISI bound ry) M. Miller OP-8 R VIO 96-09-07 (Jntimely corrective actions for the EFIC system concerns and problems 6, 5 Themas R VIO 96-11-04 Reactor building sump not constructed in accordance with 4, 1 R1 _ approved const ruction drawings R VIO 96-15-02 Failure of reactor coolant pump oil collection system to 6, 7 W. Miller retain oil leaking f rom reactor coolant pump R IFI 95-15-01 Design requirements for nitrogen overpressure toervice watert 1 L. Mellan Need to review R licensee's calculation
& conclusion. See IR 95-21 IFI 96-03-15 Evaluate 50.59 the licensee analysis for HP!*sflow revised TS Bases and related 10 CFR indicators 2 RI R
IFI s6-17-02 Potential overflow for HPI/LPI recirculation resulting in make-up tank 1 RI See CR3 D.I. 1 R IF1 96-17-04 Adequacy of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R fire study and documentation 1 W. Miller
. R IPI 96-201-11 Design basis for decay beat / core flood / reactor coolant piping temperature 1 Lenahan Identified in IPAP R report as IF-96-201-01 IFI 96-201-12 Conduit sizing criteria - jaavaing ratio not considered 1 Fillion Identified in IPAP R report as IF-96-201-02 IF1 96-201-13 Cable ampacities - several cables exceed rating, including DHP-1 1 Fillion Identified in IPAP R report as IF-96-201-01 IFI 96-201-14 EDG protective trips not bypassed during emergency mode of operation 1 Fillion D-12 Identified in IPAP R report as IF-96-201-04 IFI 96-201-15 Verification of motor starting data 1 Fillion Identified in IPAP R report a s IF-96-201-05 IFI 96-201-16 Coordination of Second level undervoltage relay (S"wR) 1 Fillion setting vs. inverter operation Identified in IPAP R report as IF-96-201-06 IFI 96-201-17 Coordination of SLUR and fuse protection 1 Fillion Identified in IPAP R report as IF-96-201-07 MULTI-Pt. ANT ACTIONS .
MPA $L507; CL 95-07 PressureCurrently valves. locking and thermal binding of safety-related gate in staff review. An RAI is outstanding. 2 NRR R Expected completlon? 6
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b ISSUE DESCRIPTIcet asem NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE C0ssEENTS NRC STATUS STATUS MPA SL601s Testing of safety-related logic circuits - 2 CL 96-01 Fillion R-1 Licensee response in staff review. More details are 11/96 - the licensee R required. This issue requires attention. has identified testing g deficiencies that must ' be fixed prior to restart MPA 8L503s Circumferential cracking of SG tube flaws. 2 Blake/NRR CL95-03 Licensee response in staff review. R
- t LICENSE ABGMDHENT/ RELIEF REQUESTS e
CCHE Control complex habitability e. J1 ope - Including TIA 95-03 2 Schin/NRR need to be addressed. Licensee sutaittal does not provide R adequate TS action. OTHER ISSUBS
?
LTOP Current TS does not address LTOP prevention or mitigation. ! ' 2 R system branch will On the basis of CL 88-11, the licensee submitted information R to demonstrate that LTOP in B&W plants have less than 1 in send letter to licensee that they l 100 reactor years probability of occurrence and as a result per CL 38-11 non-appendix 0 methodology can be used for PT have to submit TS. . curves. Such a PT curve would provide for higher LTOP enable pressure and temperature and would prov.ide operational ' flexibility. Staff denied the request in 1995 and requested ' a revised response. The licensee expects to respond late 1997 Appendix R Appendix R design basis issues review by FPC consultant. NRC review open Appendix R issues to assure that there are no N. Miller / D-11 R NRR restart or operability issues imbedded in them. , Operator NRC review operator workarounds list to assure that there are Worka rounds R1 M-2 See VIO 96-09-07 R no restart or operability issues contained in them LSQs l Licensee request and NRC review and issue license amendments NRR R-2, R-4 for all Unreviewed Safety Questions it!SOst R USQ EDG Load Uprate Fillion/ R-2 See EEI 96-12-02, CR3 R NRR D.I. 6 USQ ASV 204 Thomas / R-4 See EEI 96-19-04, CR3 R NRR D.I. 5 USQ DH-45-F1 Crowley/ R-5 See URI 96-201-05 R s NRR
, USQ EDG Load List Update ,
Fillion/ R-6 See EEI 96-12-02, CR3 R NRR D.I. 6 USQ ITS 3.0.3 relief for LP!/DH to allow modification of air operators for DCV 17, 18, 177, 17e Thomas / R-7 See URI 96-201-04 R NaR I1Jtt Conduct Appendix an 11Jt? J to or seek 10 CTR 50 an Awendment to utilize Nethod 8 of NRR R 50.54f Letter NRC review licensee's 50.54f letter response idue 2/9/97) design bases on NRR R I 1
- 5 7 i
ISSUE DasCRIPTION 3 AREA Imc LEAD 2R/SER ' LICENSEE CoseerrS mutC ~ STATUS STA*US License verify license conditions are siet Conditions RI A-Sources for issues include:. IFS,--SIMS, NUREG 1435 (Status,of Safety Issues at Licensed Power- :
- Plants), Resident's OIL, PM's OIL, ' - NOTE: Open allegations, OI investigations, and emerging / draft. issues are listed separately.
t e 8
-. - .. ~. . .
CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST N ITEMS (INSPECTION PRIOR TO RESTART IS NOT NEEDED) Status as of January 13, 1997
~
ISSUE DESCRIPTION APEA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE STATUS COMMENTS NRC , STATUS f LitEN5EE*5 RESTART L1$7 0F DESIGN-RELATED 155UES (D.I.s)(per 10/28/96 Itr from IPC) weum atamo core l 5 MfrCHWXI PA LICENSEE *5 OTER RESTART ITENS OTSG Tites 1.dequacy of OTSG ttbe stress-relieved rolled joints is qctioned. IMOG 7 analysts of a Davis-Besse pulled OT5G tibe. current test data. and 11stted See Itcensee Precursor N (G) field expertence conflict with test data from 1972 telch *qualsfled* a Card PC %-5077 of stress-relieved rolled _toint 11/6/%. (No IIA) FIVE AREAS OF COWTINUING CONCERN. WITH IPAP RECGefl0ED INSPECTION AfD Rf! RECGefl0ED A[0!TIONS INSPECTOR FOLLOWUP SYSTEN 01 95-021-04 Excessive cooth rate 3 See CR3 D.I. 1. N (5) LRI %-03 04 Measuring of percent through-wall Indications with an esigualifled 7 procedure See IR %-06. Generic N (G) 1ssue teing addressed by fftR . (no T!A) tRI %-03-05 Eddy current sagte expansion based on degraded ttbe percentages 7 See IR %-06. N (S) 0 1 % 10 Justtfication for removal of Thermo-tag protection from the source range 1 instrunentation N (5) i i 01 %-07-03 Incorrect information provided by contractors 7 ** N (5) ~ tRI %.201-06 Preferred offstte electrical peer source with plant shut h (500 kw 1 switchyard) is not qualifted. hote: tintti this issue is resolved. N (5) l Itcensee is not using 500 KV switchyard as an electrical power source. tRI %-201-09 Testing to qualify relays beyond manufacturers' ratings was inadequate 1 N (5) l tER 93-02-02 Switchyard cable failure caused degraded voltage of Class 1E electrical ifR 93-02-03 7 buses and actuation of EDG tER 93-02-01 closed in IR N (I) ! 95-09. f 9 i
11S*f DESCRtPTt3t AREA If!C LEAD IR/SER LICDISEE STATUS CDetWT3 MC
' sTaft?S __
LER 94- % 01. Deftctency in erzierstanding of tecmical -whes leads to 2 r (ER 94- % 00 clcsed $n IR LER 94 f6-03. nonconservative RP5 setpetr:t and potential vtoletton cf 75 W G1 , LER 94- W C4 95-16. See En W 16. d tER 94-WM P , LER 95-03 a? mntaat release ering sulfur dion de delivery causes actuation of toute 2 See IR W il. gas sontter resultiner in control cons anargancy we'ttiatim actuatim nED l LER 95-10-01 Inadesate proceare causes low cooling water flew to ma6ew pig . 1 resulting in eseration outside the des 69n Basis LER W10-00 chrsad ta IR W(D W 16. See also W I W 11-0? VTO W 16-03 LER 95-17-00 SW f1w to control room coolers controlled t'y air crerated valves tMd 1 could fati epan See la 95-16. WIO 96 a C1 06 1 LER 95-18-00 Inadegaste T5 note allewn! delayed entry into T5 LCO LER W 18-01. 2 See NCV 95-18-05. NED LER 95-12 02 I tER 95-19-00 l Leak te:strumantation for SW flow to R8tus treapable of measuring 90 goe 1 ' See IR W 18. s(D LIR % 23-01. Incmststent desty asstrctions cause butiding spray f1w rates to be 1 l ttR % 23-02 outside design bests tER W 23-C1 closed in IR R til !
% 0a LER 9545-00. Inadequate isolation of safety /ren-safety related circutts 1 (EQ %2%C1 See 410 95-21-03 m G1 LER 95-28-00 BGT vacuum Vater has inadequate reitef capacity tER % 28-01 1 See IR 95-21. N (11 !
LER 5 01-01 EFIC centrol circuits misrouted: Asperet R c mcern 1 LER WC1-00 closed in IR a tu
% G4; See also aCV W 01-43 LER %-02-00 Minipur9e valve has safety /non-safety related circuits without isolation 1 See 410 % 21-03. # (I)
L LER %-03-00. RCS cooldus rate exceeded during cooldows tia % C3-01 3 See LEI W 21-04 #(D ,. LER 96-04-00 CCrE control daipers foird damaged & lesttog > 1 See tft* WG2-02. IR W m (01 E' _ _; LER % 05 01 SW flow to RBCus could exceed destyi 1 tER %-C5-00 closed in IR "am W O4 See also VIO W t 01 41 l LER %%00. WI t.istrument error could result tn WI pump rwout 1 i tER % % CI Saa IR % 20. It % C4 Nm ! CR3 0 3 2 j LEQ % C7-00. tfR %07-01 WI itne 58LOCA/LOCP/ loss of dc bus could have ina$essate WI f1w testesmentation 1 See IR W OI. CR3 0 1. 2. m CD1 L LER E 08-00 Anbtguous 15 note results in not performieg RCS 1(ak servet11ance prior to i Phda 2 2 E (51 ' LER E 09-00 Failure to reattach instrument tibing to seismic steparts after i 1 wrs;tfication leads to eparatton outsida design bests See 5 1 96-43-06. IR W W(D 0% LER W 10-00 Lp f1> 11: SW system cooled %d causes operatte outside drstyi 1 bests See V10 W 16-03. m el LER W 11-00 Personnel error causes testing deficiety resulting in concitte 1 prestbited by taproved TS (GL %01 tssesi See en FL601 GL %-01)._ a c1 10
= _ _ _ _ _
!$$UE DESCRIPTION AR[A WC LEAD 1R/$[R LICDCEE STATUS CDeOTS MtC sta v; LER % 12-00 Qeratton outside destys bests caused by battery chargers having LER % 22-01 4 Snadequate test results accepted in error See V10 %C5-47 m (0) ttR % I7-C?
LER %-13-00 Operator error resulted in the inadvertent actuatim of tre-1A 3 See 90V WC3-02. # (!) LER % 15-00 Persome) errors cause cable separation /f solaticri c:ricerns resulting in 1 otwratten aetste tte esign bests (to.se gas aretters) See it W S4- a (!) . LIR %-16-00 CREYS filter testing did not seet T5 spats 2 R1 m (5) LER E 19-00 Non-safety related switch used sn safety related wiring for E5 status I ittts See tRt WCS-C3. # (D) LIR %20-00 tWrertewed safety questions concerning EDG cuerloading camed by 4 interpretation of retstatory re:nnre vets R-2. 0-4. 0-14 See EEI %12-02. e (3) 0-15 CP-5 LIR % 23-00 Persomel error leads to missed servelliantes resulting in violatim of 2 See V10 E 15-01. m (D) Tectrical Specificatteres (sissed remote shutocus panet EFW pop pressare instrssemet channp1 chett) LER % 24-00 Plant modificatttre causes trianalyzed cmdition regarding energency 1 fea%st er See tRI %12-01. 4 (D) LIR % 25-00 Persomes error causes testtag deftcierry resultics in condition 9 ibtted by Tectritcal Spec 1f tcations (12 cetacts in E5 logic mere not 1 See sea MC1 (GL E01), s (D) ing tested) V!O 94-25-01 Failure to pr e erly c etrol the C e trol % 1em Habitability Envelope 6. 7 See tRI E 02-02. t(bor bierted e for me*ntens te unrt) N (D) 710 94-27-02 Fallire to make tw la UR 50.73 reports a the aftC within the remdred t tee 6. 2 CP-4 See IR E 02. IR E OS. m (t) VIO 94-27-03 Failure to make one reestred 10 UE 50.72 report to the setC within the ronred time
- 6. 2 (P-4 lSeeIRE0". N (1) a V:0 % 01-05 T.e emanples of fattire to todate F5AR as required by la UR 50.71(e) 6. 4 m G)
VIO %-02-01 Failure to maintain 0.2 footcandles in the protected area 6. 7 See IR %47 m G) VID E C2-04 Faslure to maintain secedary alarm station gerable and inadessate comansatory maasures 6. 2 m G) VIO %-03-11 Fatlire to follme radiation work perwit regstrements 6. 7 # G) I VIO W O3-12 Fattire to report tte transport of a radioactively cantastnated individus1 effstte
- 6. 2 m G)
. VIO %-03-13 thescorted visitor perscmet within the protected area 6. 7 E G)
VIO %-05-04 Licensee approved eddy current acceptance criter13 41fferent from 15 requiremants 6. 2 N 15) VIO E 06-06 l Fattire to timely nettfy the NRC cf a cedittom outside the Appendia R e itc*nsing opstgn bests 6. 2 4 G) VIO E 07-01 Fatture to protect safeguards informatiot 6. T E G1 11
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15511E DGCRIPTION AREA selC LDO IR/5ER LICDISEE STATUS CDsENTS meC STaftf5 Nt171-PUWIT ACTT(pf5 W A #6105; 5etssic ga11fication of eestament. Licensee's criterta and procedires GL 87-02 2 Espected completion a G) approved. Same issues are pending and was16 be resolved thru ausst
- December.
tsche& sled for fler 97). Licensee s field melkdtnrs results are ctrrently in staff review W A $8111 (IPE):
~g IPE and IPEEE - These are in staff rartew. seat a restart stem. 2 m G)
W afb 118 tlPE{ D . WA #1602; NRC8 ftm!aer;t of heavy loads over spent fuel pool 96-02 2 N G)
- tsceasaa respms* ta staff review This we,1d not be a restart issur WA fL708 Thermolag . Licensee plans to use flecattss GL 92-08: BU 92-2 See IR 96-01: IR 96-G6 h G)
(an alternate material). scue reanalysts of APPDOII R. and ssue 01 exemption. Fire barrier tests of flecattss intlesDng Augecity tests are in staff review This aise eey act be restart issur WAf L201: Reactor wessel structral integrity. fiA! to licensee m 7/22/96. Osly a 2 GL 92-01 Rev 1 data base iss,ue. not a restart item. m (5) SWp1 W A fl604: Borafles dryadstion. Licensee response is just in. Staff review to 2 GL 96-04 connence. mts mer have to be adiressed prior to nstart because of 5 G) sonsttirtty to spaat fuel pool issues WA 70F testing & s e vettlance, lhts item is closed witti the exceptten of IFI 2 See IFI 94-18-09 m (I) GL 87"IO 94-18-09 m perteste vertfication. *sitch is to be follmed e after a new wie caustricaties is issurd tItfri afflotwf/REtfU NEQtESTS R G. 1.97 RG 1.97 instrumentation - Seetool monitors etc - category dange. License 2 lestrwumts amanement may be accrowed by 0poseer R G) 81ametrics & Blametric enceptim to allee tdtng security badges offsite - Staff rewtew 2 Seartty is ewpected to be etuplete som N G) Core Flood Relief request RE: Core flood n:itzte - Staff needs more info. Pft will 2 Norrie taap Sil tafor w ! l m G) OT5G Tiees CT5G tiee testing - Licensee proposed a rertsed GTSG time acceptage criteria 2 See VIO 96-05-Sa N G) OTI(W 155UE5 Pressurizer During Refuel 9 a sie-surface flaw was discovered. The Itcensee performed 2 Nozzle flew better inspectim dring RIO and found the flaw to be acceptable. The new # G7 inspection results in redred flaw size and consequently acceptance cetteria (Jrtcts is based on ratto of flaa to thickness) changes Staff rertew in preigress . CI toop Piping In a survey inspectitet.15e staff noted that certain brancta pipes off the 2 Analyses primary coolant loop were not analyzed as Eode Class I pipe it.e.. no N G) fattgue analysts) as required by the Code. Need IN technical brant!:'s optaton m this. 13
ISSE K3CRIPT131 AREA 8RC LEAD IR/SER LICEW21 STATUS CDe(ETS mRC ST1't*5 eQt#1 3t I 1994 tM the staters of t** Wir jources for issues include: IFS. SIM5. NOREG 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power P ants). Resicent's ull. , PM's 01'. NOTE: Open allegations. OI investigations. and emerging / draft issues are listed separately. I LIST OF ACRONYMS USED 1 AP Abnormal Operating Procedure BWST Borated Water Storage Tank C Closed CCHE Control Complex Habitability Envelope CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR3 D.I. Crystal River 3 Design Item CREVS Control Room Emergency ventilation System EA NRC Escalated Enforcement Action EDBD Engineering Design Basis Document ECCS Emergency Core Cooling Syrtem EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EEI NRC Escalated Enforcement Item E0P Emergency Operating Procedure FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report . GL NRC Generic Letter ILRT Integrated Leak Rate Test (of the Reactor Building) IFI NRC Inspector Followup Item LER Licensee Event Report LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LPI Low Pressure Injection LTOP Low Temperature Overpressure Protection HPA NRC Multi-Plant Action MUV Makeup Valve - N (D) Not an NRC Restart Item (because the issue is duplicated by a restart item) N (G) Not an NRC Restart Item (because it is a generic issue affecting multiple operating plants and is being addressed by NRR)
.N (I) Not an NRC Restart Item (because previous inspection of the issue is adequate for restart)
N (S) Not an NRC Restart Item (because resolution of the issue is not needed for safe restart) NOV NRC Notice of Violation NPSH Net Positive Suction Head 14
i l OCR Operability Condition Report OP Operating Procedure , PR Problem Report i R NRC Restart Item l' RB Reactor Building RCS Reactor Coolant System - RMG Radiation Monitor SFP Spent Fuel Pool TIA NRC Task Interface Agreement (between NRC offices) . TS Technical Specifications i URT NRC Unresolved Item US0 Unreviewed Safety Question VIO NRC Violation '
~
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DRS\EB\CRISSUE1.350 b I 5 i e j i i i 15
=
# 'o g NUCLEAR RE UNT COMMISSION I *TrNTi. o Edi!EE" January 28, 199 HEMORANDUM T0: File FROM:
L Joh s P. Jaudon, Dir ctor W Div ion of Reactor Safety
SUBJECT:
MINUTES OF THE CRYSTAL RIVER RESTART PANEL FIFTH MEETING l HELO JANUARY 23. 1997 ' The Crystal' River Restart Panel met at Region 11 offices on January 23. 1997. The following Panel members and others were present: Panel Members: Johns P. Jaudon. Rll, Chairman Frederick J. Hebdon, NRR Vice Chairman Kerry D. Landis Ril Stephen J. Cahill. RII Laksminaras Raghaven NRR Charles Casto. RIl Others: Harold O. Christensen, Ri! Robert P. Schin. RII Billy R. Crowle Glen M. Tracy.OEDOy RIl The Chairman noted that H. Christensen would replace C. Casto on the panel effective February 3, 1997. This was because Mr. Christensen was replacing Mr. Casto as the Engineering Branch Chief, when Mr. Casto was transferred to the Division of Reactor Projects. The planned inspection activities and rational for how restart items are to be inspected and closed was discussed. The initial inspection, scheduled for January 27 31, 1997, will be performed by several ins)ectors who have assigned responsibilities on the restart check list. T1e intention is to have the inspectors review their assigned items and determine the status of the items and the licensee's schedule for completion. The inspection plan for the initial inspection was presented to panel for review. The panel also discussed the licensee's preparation of packages for each inspection item. The packages should accumulate documentation of licensee corrective actions for each item and will be used in the inspection process to aid in closure of the items. It was noted that at the time of the last Restart Panel meeting, the packages had been started, but only minimal information had been accumulated. The panel re emphasized the need for good packages to facilitate inspection and timely closure of open issues. The Restart check list of open items was reviewed and updated. A number of items were moved from N classification N (Non-restart) to R (Restart). mm% //// 3
i 2 Two new item. TIAs 96 013 and S6 014 were added to the list as restart items. The revised Restart Open item Check list is enclosed as (Attachment A). Dates .for future meetings were scheduled as follows: 1 At Crystal River February 12, 1997 (NRC only - 8:00 AM) (Licensee - 12:00 PM) In Region 11 - March 3. 1997 0 10:00 am At Crystal River - The week of March 17, 19971
Attachment:
" A. Restart Open item Checklist Docket 50-302 cc w/att: L. A. Reyes, Ril E. W. Merschoff, Ril J. R. Johnson. Ril S. A. Varga, NRR G. M. Tracy. OEDO R. Zimmerman, NRR J. A. Zwolinski, NRR
- 0. M. Collins Ril B. Schin. DRS B. Crowley, OR,5 Panel Member
' To be coorctinated with the bimonthly MCAP meeting.
l
t Attachment A CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECK IST
~~
R ITEMS (TO BE INSPECTED BY THE NRC BEFORE RESTART) Statue as of Janisary 24, 1997 The Crystal River Restart Panel met on November 13, 1996, and developed seven general areas under which the restart issues will be grouped. Those seven areas are!
- 1. Knowledge of design and licensing bases and adequacy of design margin
- 2. Regulatory knowledge and perspective
- 3. Operator performance and knowledge
- 4. Marginally effective engineering organization
- 5. Management oversight; including quality assurance, self assessment, and corrective action
- 6. Corrective actions for NRC violations
- 7. Other ISSUE DESCRIPTION ARE1 NutC LERD IR/SEE LIC W SEE N 3Ntc STATUS STATUS LICwSar*s RzsTART LIST or DEsrcK-REI.kTED ISSUES (D.I.e3fper 19/28/96 1tr fr a FPC)
CR3 D.I. 1 MPI puap recirculation to the makeup tar
- 1 RI D-1 See URI 96-01-02. IFI R 94-17-02, In 94-12 CR3 D.I. 2 NPI system modificatierts to improve SBIDCA sergins 1 RI D-2 Sea CRI 96-01-02, LER R 96-04, 1R 96-12 CR3 D.I. 3 LPI pump mission time 1 tanahan/ D-3 See URI 96-201-01, IR R NKR 96-12 CR3 D.I. 6 Reactor ins 11 ding spray pump 2B WPSN 1 tenahan D-6 See URI 96-201-02, IR R 96-12 CR3 D.I. 5 Emergency feedwater system upgrades and diesel generator load 1 Scitin D-S See tRI 96-12-01: EEI R impact
*6-12-02. IR 96-12 CR3 D.I. 6 Emergency diesel generator loading 1 Fillien D-6 See EEI 94-12-02, IR R 94-12 CR3 D.I. 7 Failure modes and effects of loss of DC power 1 Fillica D-7 See URI 96-12-01 12R R 96-87, IR 96-12 CR3 D.I. 8 Ceneric Letter 96-06 (Ibermal overpressure protection for 1 Zenshan/ D-8 See IR 96-12 containment piping, penetrations, and coolers) R Crowley
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rssen DescRrtricar ==sa wRe z. mad' rR/ssR I.Icusses crseaRrrs wRe STRTUs STATUS , Dr$7ECTOR FOL14srOP SYSTEN OI 95-02-02 Control room habitability envelope leakage. Excessive 1 Schin See TIA 95003: FPC TS R leakage paths through doors, daspers, and drains due to Change Request sto. 208
- design error. and lack of surveillances/ preventive maintenance of s/2s/96: LERs 96-04, 94-10. 95-01. 95-04-01. 95-09: irs 95-02, 95-09, 95-11 95-16, 95-214 FPC ltrs.
of 5/26/95 and 10/23/95 URI 96-01-02 Discrepancies in the high pressure injection design basis 1 RI D-9 See CR3 D.I. la R analysis 0 3 D.I. 2 URI 96-04-01 Discrepancies in the EDeD and the FSAR regarding the . 1' Crowley IR 96U19 prewntion of post-LOCR boren precipitation .See EEI 94-19-075 R. C URI 96-05-02 Design concerns with main steam line hangars used in seismic 1 Lenahan, see v!O 94-05-01: a and other dynamic load applications Raghavan Coordinate with L. Fqh. URI 96-06-03 - Non-safety related transfer swite ,used in ES status 1 Fillion indicating light circuit ry R URI 94-12-011 Emergency Peedwater low NPSR te both pumps due to postulated ' 1 Schia ' IR 96-19 D See CR3 D.1 5; sin 31 e failure . ' R. C-CP3 D.I. 7: EE1 56 l 03 -04, -05, 06 URI 96-17-03 Failure to conduct regaired Technical Specification 4 Fillion surveillance testing on safety related circuitry (CL 96-01) See MFA SL601 (CL 96- R 011 URI 96-201-01 Long term plant cooldoven in11owing a saml1 break 1DCA 1 Crowley/ D-3 assuming a single failure in the decat heat drop line NRR See CR3 D.I. 3: See IR R 96-11. MRR taking responsibility for this item. URI 96-201-02 ItPSM for building spray pump has very little margin, and some 1 Lenahan D-4 See CR3 D.I. 4 a emiculation factors were nonconservative URI 96-201-03 Operating curves 16, 17, and 18 in OP-1019 are not validated 4 Hepper by licensee 0-1 R tOI 96-201-04 Monsafety-related positioners on safety-related valves 1 ghomas R-7. D-10 See IR 96-09 R URI96-201-05$ ' Service water systes heat loada' did not consider mariname ' 1 Creeley . IR 94-19 O-1 input heat eOP-1035. Curva 151 ' See EEI 94-19-08 1,; C URI 96-201-07 EDG not protected against water spray from failure of fire 1 Fillion protection deluge system in EDG room R LER 95-13-01 Design deficiency may cause makeup tank vortening resulting 1 Mellen 12R 95-13-00 closed in in f at ture to meet Appendix a revsirements IR 96-04 R IJD 96-18-00, Failure to verify RB penetrations closed per TS 1 RI O-2 R LED 96-18-01 EEI 96-10-01 Four examples of f ailure to follow refueling procedure FP-203 3 Hopper ** R EEI 96-10-02 Failure to assure root cause analysis and corrective actions 5 Hopper ** taken to preclude repetition were adequate after refuel a incident (no PR issued) 3
i zssUn esserrrTIcar 'AmmA mac tans' rn/ssR L cursus cces arrs mac
- STATUS STATUS ,
EEI 96-12-02 EDG Ivading t3SQs due to inadeqtaate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations: 4 Schin/ R-2. D-6. D-three examples ione modification & two procedure changesi Enforcement confere*sce R Fillion 14. D-15, 1/24/96. See CR3 D.I. CP-5 57 CR3 D.I. 6 EEI 96-12-03 Inadequate corrective actions for 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation 5 Schin errores two examples Enforcement conference R 1/24/96 - EEI 96-12-04 Use of unverified calculations to support modifications. 4 Schin NRC inspect licensee's esteet of condition reviews. CP-6 Enforcement conference R 1/24/96~ ERI 96-19-01 Three inadequate procedures for containment penetration 4 RI Enforcement conference a surveillances 1/24/96 EEI 96-19-02 Inadequate corrective actions for inadequate contairmnent 1 RI Enforcement conference R penetration surveillances 1/24/96 EEI 96-19-03 EFW NPSR USQ due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation 1 Schin Enforcement conference R for a modification 1/24/96' EEI 96-19-04 Failure to update applicable design documents to incorporate 1 Thomas Enforcement conference R EFW design information (EFP-2 assumM operating when EFP-1 1/24/96 trips at 500s RCS pressurel EEI 96-19-05 Failure to include applicable design information in the 1 Thomas design input requirements for an EFW modification (EFP-2 Enforcement conference R continuing to operate af ter EFP-1 trips at 5005 R" w oure 1/24/96 and hydraulle requirements 3 EEI 96-19-06 EFW t3SQ due to removing the automatie open signal fe s sv- 1 Thomas Enforcement conference R 204, reducing the reliability of EFP-2
, 1/24/96 EEI 96-19-07 Inadequate 50.59 evaluation for post-LOCA boron precipitation 1 Crowley Enforcement conference R cont rol 1/24/96. Verify proce bres and documentation adequate prior to restart.
EEI 96-19-00 Error in cesign calculations for SW eystem heat loads Crowley I Enforcement conference R 1/24/96 EA 95-16 tJse of non-conservative trip setpoints for safety-related 6, 1 Mellen See IR 95-16 IR 95-21 R twas EEI 95- equipment (SIJII). Additional exawples identified in IR 95-03-04) 16. EA 95-126, Nine instances where eperators violated procedures for MJT 6 3 Schin See IR 96-04 R NOV I.A (was pressure / level (SLIII). EE! 95-22-01) EA 95-126, Conduct of unauthorized tests of MtTY without 10 CFR 50.59 6, 3 Schin See IR 96-04 R WOV I.B twas evaluation (SLIII). Additional examples (four tests) EE! 95-22-02) identified in 1/10/96 letter tilled EA 95-126 and EA 96-1853. (See tml 96-04-06) EA 95-126, Failure to take adequate corrective actions for operator 6. 5 Schin R NOV I.C.1 concerns regarding OP-103B, Ctsrve 8, for MUT pressure / level (was EE1 95 limits (SLIII) 32 - C H EA 95-126, Corrective actions for en inadequate Ctarve 8 (two STI's and a 6, 5 RI O-1 m NOV I.C.2 revised Charve SA & SB) were also incorrect (SLIII) (was EEI 95-23-03r 4
. - - - . ~.
ISSUE DRSCf.IPTION ARIA ERC LEAD ^ IR/SER LICEIrTES CTRWENTS 3RC STRTUS STATUS ~ EA 95-126, Design controls failed to ensure adeTzate safety margin for 6 1 RI CP-6 R NOV I.D.1 RP1 pumps for certain 14CA scenarios (SLIII) twas EEI 95-7t2-04 ) EA 95-126 Swapover of ECCS pumps" suction from BetST let five feet) to 6 1 RI NOV I.D.2 reactor building sump was inadegaate (SLIII) R fwas EEI 95-2t2-04 9 il EA 95-126, EOPs allow *d single LPI pump to supply two RPI pumps, with 6, I RI R IUCV II.A (was insufficient ItPSH for LPI purp (SLIII) Gr! 95-22-04) EA 95-126 Failure to take adetsate corrective actions for tank 6, 5 RI R IeOY II.B twas volumes / level / suction point (SLIV) EEI 95-22-01) EA 95-126 Failure to ensure fire water storage tank contained adegaate 6, 1 RI R NOV II.C (was volume of water (SLIV) EEI 95-22-01) VIO 93-16-07 Inadequate EOP and AP procedures 6 3 Hopper 0-3 See IR 94-04 IFI 96- R oe-OL Is es-Os VIO 95-16-03 Inadequate procedure for operation of the makeup putop 1A 6 1 31 R coolirsg water , s VIO 95-21-03 Failure to isolate the class 1E from the non-class 1E 6, 1 Thomas / R electrical circuitry for the RB purge and mini-purge valves RI i VIO 96-01-01 Inadequate corrective action for NPI flow indication problem 6. 5 RI R i VIO 96-01-06 Failure to correctly translate design basis of SW system into 6. 1 RI R procedures, drawings, and instructions VIO 96-04-02 Failure to take prompt corrective action in revising 6, 5 Meyper R procedure VP-580, Plant Safety verification (for STAsl. YP-580 contained outdated and incorrect information. l MO 96-05-01 Failure to create a PR and CCR for damaged main steam line 6. 5 Lenahan. See URI 94-05-02: R hangers Raghavan Coordinate with L. naf.svan i l VIO 96-05-05 Failure to follow procedures for updating design basis 6, 4 Crowley CP-8 R ! documente [ MO 96-05-07 Inadequate receiving inspections for battery chargers (vendor 6. 4 Schin a t est al VIO 96-05-0s Failure to follow purchasing proced. ares for inverters 6, 4 Schis R VIO 96-06-02 Iso procedure for demineralized water flush performed by 6. 3 RI R operators on borte acid addition lines VIO 96-06-06 No evaluation on acn-FSAR vital battery charger configuration 4. 4 RI R VIO 96-06-07 PR not initiated to resolve CREYS test failure 6. 5 Lenahan R S i t
t Isses DescRIrrzow . ==ea RRe r.xAn' IR/suR I.IcnRsus comesRrrs wRe STATUS STm?Us VIO 96-09-01 Corrective action not taken on make-up system audit findings 6, 5 RI R
& excessive vibration on spent fuel pool ptry cooling fan mot or
~
VIO 96-09-03 Failure to perform a 10 CFR 50 59 safety evaluation for 6, 1 Thomas R changes to procedures described in the FSAR for controlling dissolved hydrogen concentration in the RCS VIO 96-09-04 Failure to update operating curves to reflect 1981 power 6, 4 nomes R uprot e VIO 96-09-05 Failure to incorporate design change of Mt!v-64 1 to 6, 4 nossas/ Licensee a operations procedures Crewley Denied vio VIO 96-09-06 Three examples of design control errors (erroneous 6, 4 M. Miller CP-8 R caleviation inputs and ISI boundaryl UIO 96-09-07 Untimely corrective actions for the EFIC systee concerns and 6, 5 Thomas a probloos UIO 96-11-04 Reactor tuilding surp not constructed in accordance with 6, 1 RI a approved corstruction drawings VIO 96-15-02 Failure of reactor coolant pump oil collection system to 6, 7 u Miller R retain ett leakirvy f rom reactor coolant pump IFI 95-15-01 Design requirements for nitrogen overpressure (service water) 1 L Mellen Need to review R licensee's calculation
& conclusion. See IR 95-21 IFI 95-15-02 Design requirements for dynamic IDCA effects 1 See IR 95-21 and TIA R 96-013 IFI 15-15-03 ' Design requirements for reactor coolant pump cooler failure 1 See 1R 95-21 and TIA R 95-@l4 IFI 95-15-04 Code requirement for thermal relief valves on decay heat 1 See In 95-21 and TIA R removal heat ewehaegers 96-014 IFI 95-14-05 Relief valves removed frase heat exchangers 1 See IR 95-21 a d TIA R 96-014 IFI 96-03-15 Evaluate the licensee's revised TS Bases and related 10 CFR 2 RI R 50,59 analysis for NFI flew indicators IFI 96-17-02 Potential for RPI/IXI recirculation resulting in make-up tank 1 RI See CR3 D.f. 1 R werflow IFI 96-17-04 Adequacy of 10 CFR 50 Appendia R fire study and documentation 1 W. Miller R WI 96-201-11 Design basis for decay heat / core flood / reactor coolant piping 1 1enahan Identified in IPAP R temperature report as IF-96-201-01 IFI 96-201-12 Conduit sizing criteria - jasming ratio not considered 1 Fillion Identified in IFAP R report as IF-96-201-02 IFI 96-201-13 Cable sepacities - several cables e1teced rating, including 1 Fillion Identified in IPAP R DHP-1 report as IF-96-201-01 IFI 96-201-14 EDG protective trips not tr} passed during emergency mode of 1 Fillion D-12 Identified in IPAP R operation report so IF-96-201-04 6
9 IS$75 DESCRIFTIN AREA MRC LEAD IR/SEE LICEstSEE CCBS W rFS Mpc STATUS STA?JS , IFI 16-201-15 Verifiention of ciotor starting data 1 Fillion Identified in IPAP R r,-o i as IF-96-2St-C$ IFI 96-201-16 Coordination of Second level undervoltage relay (SLUR) 1 Fillion Identified in IFAP R -- settinr2 vs. inverter operation r; c t as IF-96-201-06 IFI 96-201-17 Coordfa in of SLUR and fuse protectics 1 Fillion Identified in IFAP R report as IF-96-201-07 MU4.TI-PLANT ACTIOtt3 MPA GL507 Pressure locking and thermal binding of safety-related gate 2 MPR R CL 95-07 valves. Ctarrently in staf f review. An RAI is outstanding. Erpacted comolet ion? MPA #L601: Testing of safety-related logic circuits - 2 Fillion R-1 11/96 - the licensee R CL 96-01 Licensee response in staff review. More details are has identified testing required. This issue requires attention, deficiencies that einst be fixed prior to rest a rt MPA SL503 Circumferential cracking of SG tube flaws. 2 Blake/NRR CL95-03 Licensee response in staff review. R LICENSE ABGNDutElfr/RILIRF REGUESTS CCHE Contrcl complex habitability envelope - Including 75-200 and 2 Schin/NRR R TIA 95-03 need to be addressed. Licensee submittal does not provide adeepsate TS action. USQs Licensee regnest and NRC review anu issue license _-. " . ..i s NRR R-2 R-4 for all threviewad Safety Ouest ions (USOs) R USQ EDG toad Uprete Fillion/ R-2 NB1r See EEI 94-12-02. CR3 R D.I. 6 USQ ASV 204 Thomas / R-4 See EEI 94-19-04 CR3 R MRR D.I. S USQ DM-45-FI Crowley/ R-S See URI 96-2c1-05 R sena USQ EDG Load List Update Fillion/ R-6 NRR See EEI 96-12-02. CR3 R D.I. 6 USQ ITS 3.0.3 relief for LP!/DH to allow modification of air Thomss/ R-7 See URI 96-201-04 R operators for DCY 17, 19, 177 178 WDR ILRT Conduct an ILRT or seek an J.a.--A..; to tatilize Method B of NRR Appendix J to 10 CTR 50 7
ISSUE DSEC21PTICor 'RRE1 NgtC LEAD IR/SEE LICEESEE COEs erTS 3Ntc status STATUS , CTuRR ISSUBS LTDP Ctstrent TS does not address LTCP prevention or mitigation. 2 R system branch will R Cn the basis of GL SS-11, the licensee submitted information send letter to
- to demonstrate that LTCP in B&W plants have less than 1 in 100 reactor years probability cf occurrence and as a result licensee that ther per CL 48-11 non-appendia G methodology can be need for PT have to satmit TS.
curves. Such a PT curve would provide for higher L W. enable pressure and temperature and would provide operational flexibility. Staff denied the request in 1995 arms requested a revised response. The licensee erpects to respond late 1997 Appendia R Appendir R design basis issues review by FFC consultant. NRC W. Miller / D-11 R review open Appendia R issues to assure that there are no NRR restart or eperability issues imbedded in thee. Operator NRC review operator workarounds list to assure that there are RI M-2 uorkarounds See V10 96-09-07 R no restart or operability issues contained in them 50.54f Letter NRC review licensee's 50.54f letter response (due 2/9/97) on NRA R design bases ' License verify license conditions are set RI Cbnditions R RC Loop 2a a **r"r ia*P'c"*a th' *taff aat'd that c"tata bra"ch pipes off the primary coolant loop were not analyzed as Code 2 ""2 R Piping Class 1 pipe u.e.. no fatigue analysisi as required by the gg Code. Need NRR technical branch's epinion on this Sources for issues include: IFS, SIMS, NUREG 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power Plants), Resident's OIL, PM's OIL NOTE: Open allegations, OI investigations, and emerging / draft issues are listed separately. 8
,I CRYSTAL RIVER 3 .CSSUES CHECKLIST N ITEMS (INSPECTION PRIOR TO RESTART IS NOT NEEDED) -
3 Statise as of Jarnaary 24, 1997 t 155tK DE30 TIFT 104 AREA 88tC 11A0 IIt/ Sat LinuSEE STAit!5 C3eENTS - sett STaTU5 LICENSEE *5 RESTART LIST F DE519s-sttLATED ts5UES (D.I.s)(per 10/28/96 Itr from FPC)
, _ en ne arceeop, s w'fWW W t*W tfCtr4[*5 OTWR REST 4tf ITTN5 075G T b s Adequacy of OTW tde stress-retteved rolled joints is questioned. 80G 7 See Itcensee Precursor n (G) analysis of a Devis-Besse pulled 0T% tibe. curreat test data. and 1*stted Card PC %5077 of field egerience cmfitet with test data frts 1972 Wch *eas!1 fled" a 11/6/96. tuo TIA) stress-retteved rolled joint FfVE AREAS OF CONTreaffuG CDsTam. vfTH IPAP 81[CoustleED T45PECTT9s AIC R!t RECastierD g)DITIONS INSPECTOR F0ttGaJP SYSTEN CI %021-04 Encessive cocidcui rate 3 See CR3 0. I.1. e ($1 GI E 03 04 Measiring of percent through-ws11 indicatims with an uvausitfled 7 See IR % C6. Generic N (G) procedtre tssue teing a&fressed by 8547 (no Tial QI % 03-05 Eddy ctrrent sgle espanston t>ased on degraded tiee percentages 7 See la M-06. m ($1 (RI %%I0 Justification fy removal of 7%e-so-Lag protection frm the source range I a t$1 instrmantation (FI %-07-03 Incorrect information provided try ctrtractors 7 "
u (3) C 1 % 201-06 Preferred offstte electrical power source with plant shut cbn (500 tv I a (5) switchyard) is not qualtfled. foote: tmtti this issue is resolved. licens** ts not intag 500 av switettyard as an electrical peer snurce C I % 201-09 Testing to quaitfy relays teyond manufacturers' ratings was inadeguate 1 m (5) (ER 93-02-02. Switchyard cable fatture caused dagraded voltage of Class IE electrical 7 LER 93-C2-01 closed in It n (!) tf R 93-07-03 tvses and actuette of EDG % 09 9
VSSUE DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LIAD ^ IR/SER LICDt5EE STATUS CDeUTS sett s m us , LER 94- %-01. Deftciency in irerstancing of tectrical reautrements leads to 2 LER 94-06-03. runcmservative RPS setpoint and potential violatim of T5 LER 94-06-00 closed in IR N (D) LER 94-06-04 95-16. See EA W16. LER 94- % 05 LER 95-09-00 mnimal release during si,1 fur dtontde delivery causes actuation of tonic 7 gas amtter resulttag in cetrol revse awrynty wantilatecri actuotte See IR E 11. N (1) LER 95-10-01 Inadacuate pacedtre causes lov cooling inster fion to ma6ete piso 1 resulting in geratttri outside the desip tests LER W10 00 closed to IR N (t) i W 16 See also (FI %- 11-0?. *TO 45-M-03 LER W 17-00 5W flow to corcrol room coolers controlled by air operated valves Wrich 1 could fatI apan See IR W 16. VIQ E C1 N (C1 06 LER W 18-00 Inadequate 15 note allowMi delayed entry inte T5 LCD 2 LER 95 18-01. See NCV 95-18-05 m (I) tER W 18-02 LER W 19-00 ted instrirentation for SW flow to PBCDs incapable of e'.g 90 gpa 1 See IR W IS. N (I) i LER % 23-01, Inconsistent desir asstapttons cause building spray flow rates to be 1 tER W 23-02 outsida deste bests LER 95-23-00 closed in IR N (1)
%-04 LEO 95-25-00. Inadequate f solettore of safety /ricn-safety related circuits 1 See viD %21-03.
IfA W 25-01 N (D) LER % 28-00. BW5T wacuise breder has inadaquete rettef capacity 1 tfR % 28-01 See IR W21. N (i) LER E 01-01 EFIC rentrol circuits etsrouted. Appendia R concern 1 LER 95-01-00 closed in IR N (I)
%-04 See also NCW W 01-03 LER % C2-00 mntpurge valve has safety /non-safety related circuits without isolation 1 See VIO95-21-03. N (I)
LFR %-03-00. ACS cooldwi rate enceaded dstng coolibat 3 t[R W O3-01 See tRI 95-71-04. N (I) LER E 04-00 COE control decers foind damaged & leding 1 5** (Fi 95-02-02. IR 95- N (D) 21 (ER E 05-01 SW flow to RBCUs could exceed desty 1 LER %-05-00 closed in 12 W (0)
% 04. See also VIO W 01-0Y LER 96-06 03 WI instrtment error could result in IFI prp rtrout 1 LER % C6-01 See IR % 20. IR W O4 N (D)
CR3 0 1 2 tER 96-07-00. IF1 line 58LOCA/ LOOP / loss of oc bus could have inadaquete HPI flow 1 tf R %-07-01 tastetmeatation Sae IR %-01. CR3 0 I. 2. N (D) LER %-08-00 Arbiguous T5 rote results in not performing RCS led surveillance prior to 2 Ptw1a 2 N (5) LER %-09-00 Failure to reattach instrisment teing to seisarte sterorts after 1 modtfication leads to creratim cutstde deste basis See tRI S6-03-06. IR % N (11 05 LER % 20-00 tow flow in SW system cooled cruponents causes gera*,im outstde deste 1 basis See VIO95-16 N (D) LER % 11-00 Persarmet error causes testing deficiency resetting in condition a pre:bited ty *grovad T5 (GL %-01 tsstes) See PFA R601 (GL E01). N (D) 10
?
!$3UE DES 3 TIFT 10N
' APED IWC LEA 0
- C3r50s utEustt sinTus testuTS sac STATUS ,
LEli W12-00 (beration outside destyi basis caused by battery chargers having 4 LER W 12-01. tnedequate test results vpted in error See V10 5 05-07 N G)- tfR % I7-07 LER %-13-00 (berator error resulted in the inadvertent actuatim of DCP-1A 3 See ICV E03-02, m (I) LER %-15-00 Persomet errors cause cable varattm/tsolatim cmcerns resulting in 1 ccuratim outst* tv *sttri tiasts (to=tc ges monttors) See !* E ce. e (t) LER 96-16-00 CREYS filter testing did not meat T5 specs 2 RI N n) LER 5 19-00 fem-safety related switch essed in safety related wiring for E5 status It11ts 1 See LRI WE03. e (D) LIR E 20-00 tereviewMf safety esestims concerntag EDG overloading caused by 4 interpretattm of replatory regstrawats R-2. D4. 0-14 See EEI E12-02. m (D) 0-15. OP-5 LER %23-Ofs Persomet error leeds to missed surveillantes resulting in violatttrl of 2 Technttal Spectfications (etssed renote shutdown panet Em pop pressure See V10 E 15-01. 2 (D) instrismant chamel chect1 LER % 24-00 Plant modtfication causes unanalyaed cmdttton regarding emergency faadmeter I See tRI %I2-01. m (D) LER % 25-00 Persenei error causes testing deficiency resulting in ceditten 1 bited by Tectritcal Specificattms (12 ctritects in E5 logic were ret See IFA fL6CI (GL W CI). e (ti)
. ng testad)
VIO 94-25 01 Failire to properly cetrol the Cetrol Cgles Habitabtitty Envelope 6. 7 See tRI 95-02 02. (door biorsed enan for matntenante wort) R (D) VIO 94-27-02 Failure to ade tuo 10 CFR 50 73 reports to the seit within the required 6. 2 ttaa (P-4 See IR 95-02. IR 9506. # (t) VIO 94-27-03 Failure to mate one regstred 10 CFR 50.72 report to the NRC within the 6. 2 OP-4 See IR 95-05. F (I) rwsutred t$me CIO %-01-05 Two emmeles of fattire to todate FSAR as reestred by la CFR 50 71(e) 6. 4 a n) V10 %-02-01 Failure to maintain 0.2 footcandles in the protected area 6. 7 See la % 07, m (5) VIO E 02-04 Failure to matntain secondary alare station operable and inadequate 6. 2 e atory w ures m n) V!O 96-03-11 Fatture to fo11a. radiation merit pe-att requirements 6. 7 a n) VIO E 03-12 Fatture to report the transport of a radteactively cetaminated indiviassi 6. 2 of fs tte m ni v!O 5 03-13 , tmescorted rtsttor persomet within the protected area 6. 7 m n) VIO E 05-04 Licensee approved eddy cur *ent acceptance criteria etfferent frca T5 6. 2 requiremmts m n) VIO 96-506 Fatitre to timely nottfy the NDC of a cmdtttcyl outside the Appendia R 6. 2 ttcensing das1tyi basis m (5) VIO E 07-01 Fatitre to p'otect safeguards information 6. 7 m (5) 11
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i IISUE DGCPIPT138 sett LIAo I ED IR/SDt LICrustE STAPJS CDooTS aut I Starv5 wA T1-PLANT ACTIONS WA M105: Seismic quaitfication cf e7**pamt. Licensee's criterta and proce&res 2 Espected empletton GL 87-02 approved Sme issues ** andtng and w3uld be resolved thru audtt a G) C*catre .. (scheduled fy Mar 97). .. Jtsee s field walttbc results are currently in staff rew-taw WA Mill (IM): IPE and IEEE - These are in staff review _ Net a restart tten 2 a G) WAMll8 (18tET)
@ A f1602: "ed to after a new ganarte cremanication is isswd t1CEri AMINDMENT/RftltF RE@f575 R G.1.97 RG 197 instrumentation - 5@ cool monitors etc - category change. License 2 fastrteents anprv>=nt may to W ty t>caear m G) 9tonetrics & B1 metric ewton to allow taking security badges offstte - Staff rewtew 2 Securtty is evparted to tw ctretete soon m G)
Core Flood Relief request RE: Core flood acr21e - Staff neads more info. PM will 2 g G) Norrie t**p Rif inferend 075G Tiees 07% tibe testing - Licensee proposed a revised CT% taba acceptante 2 crttarta See VI3 96-05-04 m G) CTE R ISSUES Pressurfter Dtring Refuel 9 a sib-surface flan was discovered. The iteensee performed 2 C3rzle Flaw better inspection during RIO and found the flaw to be acceptable. The new 4 G) twspection results en redred flaw stre and cmseguently acceptance criterta (etch 15 based on ratto of flaw to thtctness) changes. Staff revlaw in progress Criticality The itcensee did mt carry a previously amroved enemption from part 70 2 Montter (70 24?) requirements to Part 50 Itcense. Nead legal interpretaticn of 4 G) the status of ttie evenetton sources for issues incluae: IFS. SIH5. NUREG 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power Plants). Resident's OIL. PM's OIL 13
. r t NOTE: . gallegations. OI investigations. and emerging /u .c issues are listed separately. i LIST OF ACR0lmtS USED -
- AP Abnormal Operating Procedure * ' '
BWST Borated Water Storage Tank.
- C Closed '
i CCHE Control Complex Habitability Envelope ! CFR Code of Federal Regulations { f CR3 D.I. Crystal River 3 Design Item
'CREVS Control Room Emergency Ventilation System
. .EA NRC Escalated Enforcement Action L EDBD Engineering Design Basis Document
- ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System i EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EEI NRC Escalated Enforcement Item E0P Emergency Operating Procedure FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report
, GL NRC Generic Letter j' 'ILRT Integrated Leak Rate Test (of the Reactor Building) j IFI- NRC Inspector Followup Item LER Licensee Event Report LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident l LPI Low Pressure Injection-j LTOP Low Temperature Overpressure Protection i MPA NRC Multi-Plant Action ! MllV Makeup Valve i N (D) Not an NRC Restart Item (because the issue is duplicated by a restart item) j N (G) Not an NRC Restart Item (because it is a generic issue affecting multiple operating plants and is being
- addressed by NRR)
N (I) Not an NRC Restart Item (because previous inspection of the issue is adequate for restart) li N (S) Not an NRC Restart Item (because. resolution of the issue is not needed for safe restart)
- NOV NRC Notice of Violation i NPSH Net Positive Suction Head j OCR Operability Condition Report
- OP Operating Procedure 1
PR Problem Report R NRC Restart Item i RB Reactor Building ! RCS Reactor Coolant System
- RMG Radiation Monitor SFP . Spent Fuel Pool i
i It l L .. - _ .
i TIA NRC Task Interface Agreement (between NRC off.._,) . i Technical Specifications TS . URI NRC Unresolved Item ' USO Unreviewed Safety Question VIO NRC Violation i OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DRS\EB\CRISSUE1.350 ? . 15
. _ ~~ _ - . . -
n
,8' 'o T80/q UNITED STATES g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1 "ETd8EME!""
February 24, 1997 MEMORANDUM T0: File FROM: - Jo s . Jaudon 01 ec or h A i D1 1sion of Reacto .afety l
SUBJECT:
MINUTES FOR THE CRYSTAL RIVER RESTART PANEL SIXTH MEETING HELD FEBRUARY 12. 1997 The Crystal River Restart Panel met at the facility site on February 12, 1997. The following panel members and others were present: i 4 Panel Members: Johns P. Jaudon RII, Chairman Frederick J. Hebdon, NRR, Vice Chairman Stephen J. Cahill, Senior Resident Inspector Laksminaras Raghaven, Project Manager Others: Robert P. Schin, Reactor Inspector, RII ! -
- BillyR.Crowley.ReactorInspector,RIJ i McKenzie Thomas, Reactor Inspector, RII Larry S. Hellen. Reactor Inspector, RII8
; Paul J Fillion, Reactor Inspector, Rll'
! The inspection team, which was onsite to review restart items. 3rovided a mid-week de)rief of their findings. Salient )oints made in this de)rief included that work packages and welding found in tie field were good. Also it was noted that engineering work done in response to Generic Letter 96 06 appeared to be good. It wa:; also noted that there was a problem being developed that indicated that the temperature controls and design for some buildings and areas did not appear to match the specific temperature requirements for some instruments located in the buildings and areas. The inspectors will continue to pursue this issue. The panel reviewed the Restart Task Checklist and the Issues Checklist. Some items were characterized as "Not Applicable" [NA): others had responsibility assigned; for many other items for which there was activity, the panel characterized the status as "On going" [0] on these. All three restart list are attached for information. J
' Chly present for the discussion of inspection status
' See Footnote 1.
- See Footnote 1
*SeeFootnote1
- e. ej _i9e s-
- 1 .'
I file 2 The panel noted that the licensee was still developing plans for how to address some design issues. It was concluded that when the licensee made these determinations, it would be a>propriate to hold a meeting with the licensee in-Headquarters so that a > road spectrum of NRC management could be briefed on the proposed resolution of the various technical issues, it was also suggested that the frequency of panel meetings was too often for the point in recovery at which the plant was now: therefore.-the frequency of meetingsshouldbeadjustedaccordingly. The next meting was tentatively set for the week of March 21 onsite. The Chairman noted that the schedule for the conduct of Maintenance Team inspections in Region !! was under review, and it had been necessary to move another utility into the May time slot originally scheduled for Crystal River. The inspection of Crystal River would be re scheduled.
-The panel also discussed various issues expected to be raised at the public meeting scheduled with the licensee the same day as the panel meeting. The record of the public meeting will be docketed by separate correspondence.
Docket: 50-302 Attachments: A. Restart Open Item Check List B. Crystal River Issues Checklist C. Crystal River Restart Task Checklist
I f i Attachment A 4 CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST 4 R ITEMS (TO BE INSPECTED BY THE NRC BEFORE RESTART) Status as of February 24, 1997 3
' The Crystal River Restart Panel met on November 13, 1996, and developed sev,en general areas under which the restart issues will be grouped. Those seven areas are:
- 1. Knowledge of design and licensing bases and adequacy of design margin -
j 2. Regulatory knowledge and perspective i 3. Operator performance and knowledge ,
- 4. Marginally effective engineering organization
; 5. Management oversight; including quality assurance, self assessment, and corrective action
- 6. Corrective actions for NRC violations i 7. Other I
i Issus DasOzrTIcar ARaa ante Laan Im/ssa Lzcausas Caesarrs NRc STATUE STATUS LICEuSEE*S RESTART LIST OF DESIQB-RELATED ISSUES (D.I.e5 fper 10/28/96 Its fras FPC) O 3 D.I. 3 MPI pump recirculatiosa to the makeup tarJL 1 RI D-1 See URI 96-01-02, IFI R 96-17-02, IR 96-17 G 1 D.I. 2 MPI system esm11fications to improve N m margias 1 RI D-2 See URI 96-01-02, IER R 96-06, IR 96-17 [ 03 D.I. 3 LPI pussp mission time j 1 t=nahan/ D-3 See URI 96-201-01, IR R IERR 96-17 G 3 D.I. 4 Reactor knailding spray pump 18 3iPSM 1 f*nahaa D-4 See URI 96-201-02, IR R i 96-15 O3 D.I. 5 Emergency feedwater system upgrades and diesel generator load 1 Schia imoact D-5 See URI 94-12-01; EEI R 96-12-c2, IR 96-17 ) O 3 D.I. 6 Emergency diesel generator loading 1 Fillion D-6 See EEI 96-12-02, IR R 96-17 G 3 D.I. 7 Failae modes and effects of loss of DC power 1 Fillion D-7 See URI 96-12-01, LER R 96-07 IR 96-17 i G 3 D.I. a Generic Intter 96-06 IThermal overpressue protection for 1 Lenahan/ D-e See IR 96-12 R Containment piping, penetrations, and cooleral croeley (
. . _ . . _ _ . - _ _ , ._ _ - - - , ~ _ . .
- _- - - - * - - ~
l ISSUE DESCRIPTION ARSA Inc 1.EAD IR/SER I.ICasSSE r* = " r8 NRC STATUS STATUS LICanSER'S N RESTART TTWAS i RMG 29/30 Seismic monitoring of MR Rad 8tmitor 1 haahan D-19 R BasST NPSM NPSM concern with. ECCS pumps wtaen SFP pumps are running in 1 Thomas D-14 R 7 Bats and Lecire i l Prvu AmanS Or courrmazms en c===. wrTu reAe - < - zuseecrzon Aim arr =-- AnorTzans 4 i j
- NRC inspect Problem Identifications focusing on CA audit s 5 Crowley/ OP-2, OP-3 Inspect New PC system R Oversight -
IPAP and the probl== reportine syst em. - Increased taspection of On Thomas } maer===ad=1 Problem Analysis and Ewalet&ons focusing on root cause I evatuations. 1 aspect ica i I paarginally - NRC i==p-et Engineering Problem Identificarica and 4 0-h i m CP-4 50.59 R ! Effective m**^1utica; with ==rh**is on licensee evaluations for OP- 6 ( Engineering Orgaalaatica stuntftrent issues and work berk loos.
; - #~ 30 anspect Quality of Engaaeerang; with ==r>=*1s en H , - IPAP CPR *.s 59 screentne and safety evaluations, accuracy of t he B-Aad FAAR, asm1 managemer.t overs 1 oht .
Ymepecgiggt l 1.ack of - IntC inspect Engineering Safety Focus; focusing on proper 1 Schin 07-7, OP-e, Asequate R
! Ldentif tratica of discrepancies with the clant's design basis D-13, D-15, 4
Emowledge of a n t he correct iwe act ion syst em. ! the Design D-16
- Also anspect Engineerang Problem Identification and
] & asis - 2 PAP Resolution; iacusing en oroarone for identif vtno desie besis ' BN t esues and cacturtne thee in t he enrrect twe act son cremaram. '
, Inspectica - Also anspect Qualaty of Engineeraag; focustag on sens t r ivie w /underst andi no by the enoineerinariteersino st aff of rhe elant*a dessan bests.
- Also == === t,.e desian margin, includlag the licensee *s
**=t ene ed ennoteinn- reviews Lack of - NRC inspect 50 99s, coerability, reonrtabtfity 2 Schia OP-5, OP-4 Seasitivity R for the aseed to Comply mith aeg.14tions -
IPAP EM Inspect ina Operator - NRC 4==p-et safety Focus; focusing en commmuntration within 3 RI Performance - R oterar tems, cememunication with ot her site arrues, and IPAP overt ime e - a.4 Imap=etima l s 2 .
f ISSUR DESCRIFTICH hana 3sRC LEAD 22/SER LICENSEE MS NRC STATUS STATUS J INSFECTom FN7 - SYSTEas j tas! 95-02-02 Control room habitability envelope ledage. Excessive 1 Schin See TIA 95003; FPC TS R lemaage paths through daors, dampers, and draina A w to th age Request No. 200 dealga errors and lack of surveillances/prewentive of 8/29/96; Leas 96-maintenance 04, 94-10, 95-01, 95-04-01, 95-09s irs 95-02, 95-09, 95-11, 95-16, 95-21; FPC ltrs. of 5/26/95 and 10/21/95 (JRI 96-01-02 Discrepancies in the high pressure injection design basis 1 RI analysts D-9 See CR3 D.I. la R e CRI D.I. 2 GI 96-06-01 Discrepancies in t.r.a I:As0 and the FSAR regarding the r>renntion of paar-1/XA barna preciptration
'a' Crobley '
IR 96a19 See EEI 96-19-07. R. C CRI M 02 Design concerns with main steam line hangars used in seismic 1 leahaa. See VIO 96-05-01 R and other dy - ic load applications Raghavan Coordinate with L. Raghavan CRI 96-0" 03 skaa-aafetw re_.ted transfer switch used in ES status 1 Fillion D-21 R indacat ino l acht circuit ry URI 94 12-01., Esergency Feadwatet, ce NPiH to both pumps dua to postulated 1 teh i == ' 1R 96-19.- D-17. See CR3 D.2J 5s . R; C - sin 51e failure 3 3 D I. 74 EE1 96 G1. =04. -05, -06 URI 96-17-03 Failure to er= whet required Technical Specification 4 Fillion See MPA #L601 (GL 96- R i surweillance testino on safety related circuitry ICL 96-015 013 . URI 96-2b1-01 Long term plant cooldown following a small break 14CA 1 Crowley/ D-3 See CR) D.I. 3; See IR R j assumang a single failure la the decay heat drcp line NRR 96-11. NER takirej responsibility for this item. tRI 96-201-02 NPSM for building spray pump has very little margin, and some 1 r - han D-4 See CR3 D.I. 4 R calculat aon f actors were anawrvat twe CRI 96-201-03 Operating curves 16 17. and le in CP-1918 are not validated 4 Hopper 0-1 R tw licensee URI 96-201-04 Norasaf ety-related positioners on saf ety-related valves 1 Thomas R-7 D-10 See IR 96-CS R 13RI 96-201-05 ' Service water system heat loads did not consider nazimas. 1L Crowley -- IR 96-19 O ll: Seh EEI 94-19 00 2 anput heat - scP-101a. curve 1st 1. C CRI 96-201-07 EDG not protected against water spray from failure of fire 1 Fillion prot ect ion deluoe system in EDG room R LER 95-13-01 Design deficiency may cause makeup tank vorteming resulting i Mellen LER 95-13-00 closed in R in f ailure to meet AMumdin R requirements IR 96-06 12R 96-10-03 Failure to verify RB penetrations closed pas TS 1 2I O-2 R LEn 96-13-01 EEI 96-10-01 Four examples of f ailure to follow refueling procedure FP-201 3 Hopper ** R
- . EEI 96-10-02 Failure to assure rect caase analysis and corrective actior.s 5 Hopper ** A taken to preclude repetition were adequate af ter refuel incident eno PR issued) 3
-e
ISSUE DESCRIPTICSE AAEA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE manreuTs NRC status snrus EEI 96-12-02 EDG loading USQs due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.39 evaluationes 4 Schin/ R-2, D-6, D- Enforcement conferer.ce R three emasples (one modification h two procedure changes) Fillion 14 D-15, 1/24/96. See CR3 D.I. OP-5 57 CRI D.I. 6 EEI 96-12-03 Inadequate corrective actions for 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation 5 Schin errorer two examples Enforcement conference R 1/24/96 EEI 96-12-04 Use of anverified calculations to support modifications. 4 Schin NEC inspect licensee's extent of condition reviews. OP-6 Enforcement conference R 1/24/96 EEI 96-19-G1 Three inadequate procedures for concainment penetration 4 RI Enforcement conference R surveillarv:es 1/24/96 EE! 96-19-02 Inadequate corrective actions for inadequate containment penet ration surveillances 1 RI Enforcement conference R 1/24/96 EEI 96-19-03 EFW NPSH USQ due to inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 saf ety evaluation 1 Schin for a modification Enforcement t.onfeaence R 1/24/96 EEI 96-19-04 Failure to update applicable design, documents to incorporate 1 Thomas Enforcement conference R EFW desion information (EFP-2 assumed cperating when EFP-1 1/24/96 trips at 500s RCS pressurel EEI 96-19-05 Failure to include applicable design information in t!.e 1 Thomas Enforcement conference R design input requirements for an EFW modification (EFP-2 continuing to operate af ter EFP-1 trips at 5008 RC3 pressure 1/24/96 and hydraulic requiremental EU 96-19-06 Enf USO due to reasoving the automatic open signal f rom ASV- 1 Thomas Enforcement conference R 204, reducing the reliability of EFP-2 1/24/96 -- EEI 96-19-07 Inadequate 50.59 evaluation for post-LOCA boron precipitation 1 Crowley Enforcement con'eaence R control 1/24/96, Verify procedures and exumentation adequate pr ior to restart - EEI 96-19-Os Error in design calculations for SW system heat loads 1 Crowley Enfarcement conference A 1/24196 - EA 95-16 Use of non-conservative trip setpoints for safety-related 6, 1 (was EEI 95- Mellen See IR 95-16, IR 95-21 R equipment (SLIIII- Additional examples identified in lit 95-02-04) 16. EA 95-126 Nine instances where operators violated procedures for MUT 3 Nov I.A imas 6, Schin See IR 96-04 R pressure / level (SLIII) , EEI 95-22-01) EA 95-126. Con &act of unauthorized tests of MUT without 10 CFR 50.59 6, 3 Schin MOV I.S (was evaluation (SLIII). Additional examples (four testal See IR 96-04 R EE1 95-22-02) identified in 1/18/96 letter titled EA 95-126 and EA 96-185). (See URI 96-04-081 EA 95-126, Failure to take adequate corrt.ctive actions for operator 6, 5 Schin MOV I.C.1 concerns rsgarding OP-1018, Curve 8 for PFJT pressure / level R twas EEI 95- limits (SLIIII 32-01) EA 95-126, Corrective actions for an inadequate Curve * (two STI's ams a 6, 5 at 0-1 R asov I.C.2 (was EEI 95-revised Curve SA 4 GB) were also incorrect (SLIII) g 32-018 l 5 4
Issus DESQL"frIcar ARaa NRC Laan IO/saa LICENSEE COBSEENTS NRC STATUS STATUS EA 95-126, Design controls failsd to ensure adequate safety margin for 6, 1 RI OP-6 R NOV I.D.1 HPT praps for certain IDCA scenarios (SLIII) twas EEI SS-22 04) EA 95-126 S=apover of ECCS pumps' suction from BWST (at five feet) ti, 6, 1 RI, Mellen R NOV I.D.2 reactor building sump we inadequate (SLIII) leas EEI 95-22-04) EA 95-126, EOPs allowed single LPI pump to supply two RPI pumps, with 6, 1 RI R Nov II.A (was insufficient NPSM for LPI pump (SLIII) EE! 95-22-049 EA 95-126, Failure to take adequate corrective actions for tank 6, 5 RI R NOV 11.8 (was volumes / level / suction point ISLIV) Ert 95-22-03b EA 95-126 Failure to ensure fire water storage tank contained adequate 6, 1 RI R WOV II.C (was volume of water (SLIV) EEI 95-32-038 VIO 93-16-07 Inadequate EOP and AP procedures 6, 3 Hopper 0-3 See IR 96-04, IFI 96- R 04-03, IR 96-08 FIO 95-16-03 Inadequate procedure for cperation of the makeup pump 1A 6, 1 RI R cooling water VIO 95-21-03 Failure to isolate the class 1E from the non-class IE 6, 1 Thomas / R electrical circuitry for the Ra purge and mini-purge valves RI VIO 96-01-01 Inade<p. ate corrective action for HPI flow indication problem 6, 5 RI R VIO 96-01-06 Fai4ure to correctly translate design basis of SW system into 6, 1 RI R procedures, drawings, and instructions VIO 96-04-02 Failure to take prompt corrective action in revising 6, 5 Hopper R procedure VP-580, Plant Safety verification (for STAS) .- VP-Ss0 contained curdated and incorrect information. VIO 96-05-01 Failure to create a PR and OCR for damaged main steam line 6, 5 I4nahan. hangars See URI 96-05-02s R Raghavan Coordinate with L. Raghavan VIO 96-05-05 Failure to follow procedures for updating design basis 6, 4 Crowley 09-8 documents R VIO 96-05-07 Inadequate receiving inspections for battery chargert (vendor - 6, 4 Schin R eestal VIO 96-05-08 Failure to follow Isrchasing procef .*es for inverters 6, 6 Schin R VIO 96-06-02 No procedure for demineralized water flush performed by 6, 3 k1 operators on boric acid addition lines ,i p-U1O 96-06-04 No evaluation on non-FSAR vual battery charger cos. figuration 6, 4 RI
,f VIO 96-06-07 PR not initiated to resolve CREYS test failure 6, 5 Lenahan 'w
% -uW 44, 5
i
?
ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA MRC LEAD IR/SER ' LICENSEE CQgeWKTS NRC STATUS STATUS VIO 96-08-01 Corrective action not taken on make-up system audit findings 6, 5 41 R
& excessive vibration on spent fuel pool pump cooling fan mot or VIO 96-09-03 Failure to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation for 6, 3 Thomas R changes to procedures described in the FSAR for controlling dissolved hydrogen concentr= tion in the RCS VIO 96-09-04 Failure to update operating curves to reflect 1981 power 6, 4 Thomas R.
uprate VIO 96-09-05 Failure to incosporate design change of MUV-64 into 6, 4 Thomas / Licensee R operations procechares Crowley Denied Vio-VIO 94-09-06 Three examples of design control errors (errcneous 6, 4 M.' Miller CP-8 R calculation inputs and ISI boundaryl VIO 96-09-07 Untimely corrective actions for the EFIC system concerns and 6, 5 Thomas R problems VIO 96-11-04 Reactor building susp not constructed in accordance with 6, 1 RI R approved construction drawiruza VIO 96-15-02 Failure of reactor coolant pump oil collection system to 6, 7 W. Miller R retain ein leaking f rom reactor coolant pump VIO 96-20-01 Failure to adhere to reactor coolant system cooldown limits 3 RI VIO 96-20-02 Failure tu follow procedure AI-400C for review and 1 RI development of Maintenance Procedure PM-191, Main Turbine / Generator. Feedwater Turbin ,e I y p IFI 95-15-01 Design requirements for nitrogen ovengesure (service water) 1 L. Mellen Need to review R licensee's calculation
& conclusion. See IR 95-21
*9~
IFI 95-15-02 Design requirements for dynamic ICCA effects 1 See IR 95-21 and TIA R 96-011 IFI 95-15-03 Design requirements for reactor coolant pump cooler failure 1 See IR 95-21 and TIA R 95-014 IFI 95-15-04 Code requirement for thermal relief valves on decay heat 1 See IR 95-21 and TIA R removal heat exchangers 96-014 IFI 95-14-05 Relief valves removed from heat exchangers 1 See IR 95-21 and TIA R 96-014 IFI $6-03-15 Evaluate the licensee's revised TS Bases and related 10 CFR 2 RI R 50.59 analysis for MFI flow indicators IFI 96-17-02 Potential for NPI/LPI recirculation resulting in make-up tank 1 RI See CR) D.I. 1 R l overflow l IFI 96-17-C# Adequacy of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R fire study and documentation 1 W. Miller R IPI 96-201-11 Design basis for decay heat / core ficod/ reactor coolant piping 1 Lenahan Identified in IPAP R
. temperature report as IF-96-201 01 IFI 96-201-12 Conduit sizing criteria - jaaning ratio not considersd 1 Fillion Identified in IPAP R ref<>rt as IF-96-201-02 6
IS3UE DESCRIPTION ARsA NaC LaAD Is/SaR LICENSEE C00SEENTS NRC STATUS STATUS IFI 96-201-13 Cable espacities - several cables exceed rating, including 1 Fillion Identified in IPAP R DHP-1 report as IF-96-201-03 IFK 96-201-14 EDG g,rotective trips not bypassed during emergency mode of I Fillion D-12 Identified in IPAP R operation report as IF-96-201-04 IFI 96-201-15 Verification of motor starting data 1 Fillion Identified in IPAP R report as IF-96-201-05 IFI 96-201-16 Coordination of Second level undervoltage relay (SLUR) 1 Fillion Identified in IPAP R settino vs. inverter operation report as IP-96-201-06 IFI 96-20c 17 Coordination of SIJJR and fuse protection 1 Fillion Identified in IPAP R report as IF-96-201-07 uuLTI-ruarr ACTIomS MPA #L5074 Pressure locking and thermal binding of safety-related gate 2 NRR R GL 95-07 valves. Currently in staff review. An RAI is outstanding. Expected completion? MPA sL601; Testing of safety-related logic circuits - 2 Fillion R-1 11/96 - the licensee R GL 96-01 Licensee response in staff review. More details are has identified testing required. This issue requires attention, deficiencies that must be fixed prior to restart MPA 8L503; Circumferential cracking of SG tube flaws. 2 GL95-01 Blake/NRR R Licensee resoonse in staff review. LICENSE * ,/ RELIEF REQUESTS I CCME ' Control complex habitability envelope - Including TS-20s and 2 Schin/NRR R TIA 95-03 need to be addressed. Licensee submittal does not provide adequate TS action. USQs Licensee request ans* NRC review and issue license amendments NRR R-2, R-4 R for all Unreviewed Safety Questions (USOsl USQ EDG toad Uprate Fillion/ R-2 See EEI 96-12-02, CR3 R KRR D.I. 6 USQ ASV 204 Thomas / R-4 See EEI 96-19-04, CR3 R NRR D.I. S USQ DN-45-FI Crowley/ R-5 See URI 96-201-01, URI R NRR 96-04-01 USQ EDG Icad List Update Fillion/ R-6 See EEI 96-12-02, CR3 R WRR D.I. 6 USQ ITS 3.0.3 relief for LPI/DH to allow modification of air operators for DCV 17, 18, 177, 178 Thomas / R-7 See URI 96-201-04 R WRR IIJtT Conduct en IIJtT or seek an Amendment co utilize Method 8 of NRR Appendix J to 10 CFR 50
+
9 s 7
ISSUE DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE COBSGNTS NRC STATUS STATUS OTNER ISSUES LTOP Current TS does not address LTOP prevention or mitigation. 2 R, system branch will R On the basis of GL 88-11. the licensee submitted information send letter to to demonstrate that LTOP in B&W plants have less than 1 in licensee that they 100 reactor years probability of occurrence and as a result have to submit TS. per GL 88-11 non-appendix G methodology can be used for PT curves. Such a PT curve would provide for higher LTOP enable pressure and temperature and would provide operational flexibility. Staff denied the request in 1995 and requested a revised response. The licensee expects to respond late 1997 Appendix R Appendix R design basis issues review by FPC consultant, NPC W. Miller / D-11 R review open Appendix R issues to assure that there are no Fillion/ restart or operability issues imbedded in thee. NRR Operator NRC review operator workarounds list to assure that there are RI M-2 See VIO 96-09-07 R Workarounds no restart or operability issues contained in then 50.54f Intter NRC review licensee's 50.54f letter response (due 2/9/97) on NRR R desian bases License Verify license conditior.s are met RI Conditions R RC Loop In a survey inspection, the staf f noted that certain branch 2 NRR R PiPin9 Pi Pes off the Primary co lant 10 P were DOC analyzed as Code Class 1 pipe 41.... no fatigue analysis as required by the Analyses Code. Need Nam technical branch's opinion on this Sources for issues include: IFS, SIMS, NUREG 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power Plants), Resident's OIL, PM's OIL NOTE: Open allegations, OI investigations, and emerging / draft issues are listed separately. ~ O 8
-s
CRYSTAL RIVER 3 ISSUES CHECKLIST N ITEMS (INSPECTION PRIOR TO RESTART IS NOT NEEDED) Status as of February 24, 1997 j IS5UE DESCRIPTION AREA NRC LEAD IR/5ER LICENSEE STATUS CDeENTS NRC STATUS LICENSEE *5 Rf5 TART LIST OF DE51GM-RELATED ISSUE 5 (D.I.s)(per 10/28/GT,i:r from FPC) J 4 i 4 tICENSEE's OTE R RESTART ITENS { OT5G Tees Adequacy of OT5G tee stress-relieved rolled jotnts is wttoned. 80G 7 See Itcensee Precursor N (G) analysts of a Davis-8 esse pi,11ed GT5G tee. current test data. and limited Card PC E 5077 of f tels emperience conflict with test data from 1972 etch 'quaitfled* a 11/6/%. (No TIA) stress-relieved roIIed Jotr.t i i FIW AREAS OF COff!NtlING CONCERN. WITH IFAP RECDetM)fD INSPECTION ARD RII RECOeIFICED ADDITIONS 4 9 l INSPECTOR Faump sv5TTN
~ n: u v n - x. . , mg n ~,. n. . ,., s m. .ag , - . m+... w 6$ i
,.,.,,,-,n 1.M M 4fg ' fuseaste.casteue[Ntey C , Q ?E 'g,M</j@S pM% ig ; Ayg3
. . ..g y
[jf%., .a..; hs 118 56- 3 7 WS n s;
, .a.m.- .. . .re..,
Jee.G30,l1g gi@{ W W @!$QC
?.
l El W O3-04 neasuring of percent througnwil indications with an mquaitfled 7 See IR %-06. Generte N (G) i procedure issue being addressed by ( NRR (no TIAl WI % C3-05 Eaty current sagte expansson based on degraded ttee percentages 7 See IR %-06. N (5) l WI %-06-10 Justsfication fw removal of Thermo-Lag protection from tre source range tnstruentatton 1 N (5) a WI % G7-03 Incorrect informatton provided by contractors 7 ** N (5) f I WI %201-06 Preferred offstte electrical peer source with plant shut om (500 kw I switchyard) is not Qualtfled. Note: UnttI '.his issue is resolved. N (5) 1*censee is not using 500 KV switchward as an electrical prwr source WI E 201 Testing to quaisfy relays beyond manufacturers' ratings was inadequate 1 N (5) LER 93-02-02. 51tctiyard cable fatture caused degraded voltage of Class IE electrical 7 LER 93 02-01 c1used fn IR N (I)
, ifR 93-02-03 buses ams actuatton of EDG
, 95-09
~, .
9
.s
4 1 IS$UE DESCRIPTION AitEA NRC LEAD IRISER LICENSEE STATUS CONNENTS IRC i STATUS LER 94-06-01, Deficsency in understanding of technical requirements leads to ! 2 LER 94-06 00 closed in IR N (D) LER 94-06-03. nmconservattwe RPS setpoint and potenttal violation of TS , LIR 94-06-04 95-16. See EA 95-16. tfR 94-06-05 LER 95-09-00 mnimal release during sulfur dtoalde delivery causes actuation of toate 7 gas annitor resulting in control room currgency went11ation actuation See IR 95-11. N (I) LER 95-10-01 Inadequate procedure causes low coo 16g veter fiw to makes4> pump resulting in operattui outside the design best5 1 LER 95-10-00 closed in IR N (I) 95-16. See also URl %- J 11-02. VIO 95-16-03 t LER 95-17 00 W f1> to control room coolers controlled by air .Jperated valves etct 1 4 cm 1d fail man See IR 95-16. VIO 96 01- N (D) 06 LER 95-18-00 Inadequate T5 note allowed delayed entry into T5 LCO 2 See NCV 95-18-05. N (1) IfR 95-18-01 tIR 95-18-02 LER 95-19-00 Led instrumentation for W flw to R8Cus incapable of messartng 90 gpm i See IR 95 18. N (I) LER 90 23-01 Incutststent deste asstaptions cause butiding spray fl= rates to be I tfR 95-23-02 outside dest:p basis LER 95-23-00 closed in IR N (!)
% 04 j ~
LER 95-25-00. Inadequate tsolation of safety /non-safety related circuits 1 See VIO 95-21-03. (fR 95-?S-01 N (D) LfR 95 28-00 BW5T vacuum breaker has inadegate reitef capacity 1 tfR 95-78-01 See IR 95 21. N (1) i LIR % 01-01 Ef!C corstrol circutts misrouted. Appendia R concern I LER %-0100 closed in IR N (I)
%-04: See also NCV 96 01-03 LIR % 02-00 matpurge valve has safety /ron-safety related circutts without isolation 1 See V10 95-21 03. N (1)
LER 96-03-00.. RC5 cooldown rate exceeded ouring cooldows 3 (FR W O3-01 See tRI 95-21-04. N (1) LER W O4-00 COE cetrol dagers found damaged & leding 1 See URI 95-02-02. IR 95- N (D) 21 j LER 5 05-01 W fim to E8Cus could eaceed destgm I LER WO5-00 closed in IR N (D) E 04. See also VIO 96 01 01. LER 96-06-00. HP! Instrument error could result in WI puup rureut 1 tfR E 06-01 See IR 95-20. IR 96-04 N (D) Ot3 D 1 ? LER E 07-00. HP! Inne SBLOCA/ LOOP / loss of oc bus could have inadequate wl f1= tFR % 07-01 *nstrtmentattor, 1 See IR E 01. CR3 D.I. 2. N (D) 4 LER W O6-00 Auctsmous 15 note results *n not performing RCS led survestlance prior to 2 Mnde 2 N (5) 1 LER %-09-00 Failure to reattacts instrument tabing to setsste st4 ports after undtfication leads to operation outside design basis 1 See tRI %-03-06. IR % N (I) 05 LER E lo-00 La fim in W system cooled components causes operation outstde deste 1
. basis See VIO 95-16-03. N (D) 1 LIR 96-11-00 i Personnel error causes testing deftetency resulting in condition 1 See efA #L60; (GL 96 01). N (D) orchibited by taproved TS (GL Wel issues) e 10
!$5UE DESCRIPTION AREA NRC tfAD 1R/SER LICfMSIE STATUS COMMtNTS NRC STATUS LER E 12-00. Operation outside destspi bests caused by battery chargers having 4 See VIO E 05-07 Lf4 E 12-01. inadequate test results accepted in error N (0) tER %-12 0?
LER %-13 00 Operator error resulted in the inadvertent actuation of OCP-1A 3 See NCV E03 02, N (I) LER 5 15-00 Personnel errors cause cable separation /isclation concerns resulting in roeration outstc> the destgn basts (toetc cas annitors) 1 See IR E 04 N (I) LER 5 16-00 CRfv5 filter testing did not meet T5 specs 2 R1 N (5) LER E 19-00 non-safety related switch used in safety related wiring for E5 status Itqnts 1 See URI E 06-03 N (D) LfR E 20-00 wireviewed safety qwstions concerning EIG overload *1 caused by 4 R 2. D-6. D 14 See [El 96 12-02. taterpretatem of regulatory requires =nts N (D) 0-15 OP-5 tfR E 23-00 Perscmnet error leads to missed survetilances resulting in violatton of 2 See VIO E 15-01. N (D) Technical Specifications (missed remote shutdcwi panel EFW puro pressure instrtment channel chert i LER E 24-00 Plant modification causes manalyzed ccadition regarding emergency frecuator 1 See LEI W 12-01. N (0) LER 96-25-00 Personnel error causes testing def tctency resulting in condttson 1 See MPA #L601 (GL E01). N (D) prohibited by Technical Spectfications (12 contacts in E5 logic wre not Detng tested) Y!O 94-25-01 Fatture to pecperly control the Control Complea Habitability Envelope 6. 7 See URI 95-02-02. N (D) (donr binched coen fx matatenance wrk) VIO 94-27-02 Fatture to ade t=010 CFR 50.73 reports to the NRC within the required 6. 2 time OP-4 See IR 95-02. IR 95-08. N (1) V!O 94-27-03 Failure to ade one required 10 CFR 50 72 report to the NRC within the 6. 2 See IR 95-08, redred t1me OP-4 N (I) VIO E 01-05 T=o cumples of fatture to andate F5AR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(c) 6. 4 4 (5) VIO E 02-01 Failure to maintatn S.2 footcandles in the protected area 6. 7 See IR E 07. N (5) VIO E 02-04 Failure to maintain secondary alarm station operable and snadequate 6. 2 crapensatory measwes N (5) CIO E 03-11 Failure to folicw radiation et permit requtrements 6, 7 N {5) V10 E 03-12 Failure to report the transpcst of a radioactively contaminated individual 6. 2 offsste N (5) v!O E 03 13 unescorted visitor persome) within tre protected area 6. 7 N (5) vs0 W C5-04 Ltcensee approved e my current acceptance criteria different from TS 6. 2 reouirements N (5) V!O E 06-06 Failure to timely nottfy the EC of a conditton outside the 4pendts R 6. 2 11censtag design basis N (5) v!O E07-01 Fallwe to protect safeguards information 6. 7 N (5) 9
.8 11
155E DESCRIPTION MtEA teC LEAD IR/SER LICENSEE STATUS C(NENTS NRC STATUS VIO % 07-02 Failure to complete screening elements for Fttness for Duty Personnel 6. 7 N (5) VIO E 09-01 Failure to follow a maintenance procedtre resulting in the inadvertent 6. 7 taittation of the control rons emergmry wenttlation system N (5) VIO E 09-02 Onescorted visttor personnel within the protected area 6. 7 N (5) VIO E 11-01 Inadeguate merk instructions to prevent the inadvertent start of the A EDG 6. 7 N (5) VIO %-1103 Personnel performing wrk on the reactor butiding sump without logging 6. 7 onto a clearance as required by approved ut N (5) VIO E 15-01 Failure to perform a rewired T5 survet11ance for the remote shutdows 6. 2 panel N (5) IFI 94-18-09 Seview pertodic vertfication plans - M)V (GL 89-10 iten) 2 See IR %-11. IR 95-21; N (1) See GL 89-10 IFI 95-02-05 Resonance notse in vicinity of MN-25 7 N (5) IFI 95-08-03 Emergency Operating Proce m re w date program 3 See IR 95-16. VIO 93-16-07 N (5) IFI E ll 01 SCBA requirements for personnel during a taatc gas release 2 N (5) IFI 95-21-02 Moctfication to the star 2)y feedwter pump rectrculation inne 1 N (5) IFI E 03 16 Review of MAR E 02-09-01 WI flow indic tors, installation package and 1 funrttonal testsno results N (5) IFI E 04-03 Effect of setpotat calculations on E0P rewtstons 1 See VIO 93-16-07 N (D) IFI E 05-06 Large break loss of coolant analysts generic concerns 1 N (5) 7-. y , ...
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4J54C^ IFI 5 08-02 Reactor butidtng cavity cooling piping thermal reitef protection 1 See D. I. 8. GL %-06 N (D) IFl 5 15-03 Actions taken to resolve post-accident recrtticality cmcerns due to 1 NRR reviewing, generic B&W locatorea borna dilutton N (G) tssue EATI-PtANT ACTIGr5 W A #8:05; Setsatc quaitfication of e@isment. Licensee's criteria and procedures 2 Expected cospletion N (5) (L 87-02 approved. Some issues are pending and =cu14 be resolved thru audit Decentier. (sche e led for Mar 97). Licensee s field walkdcwt results are currently in staff revsew MPA #6111 (IPE); IPE and IPEEE - These are in staff revtew. Not a restart ites. 2 N (5) w ade!!8 (IPffE)
. W A M60h NRCS - Movement of heavy loads over spent fuel pool 2
%-02 N (5)
- ticensee resoonse in staff rewtew This =culd not be a restart issw
.e 12
IMUE EISCRIPTION ARIA NRC LEAD IR/5ER LICEkSEE STATUS COMMEN15 NRC STATUS WA R208; Thermolag - Licensee pians to use Mecattss GL 92-08; SU 92- 2 See IR E 01; IR 96-06 N (5) (an alternate material). some reanalysis of APPEND 1I R. and some 01 enesotton. Fire barrter tests of Necattss including Agacity tests are in staff review This also may not be restart tssue MPAd L201: Reactor vessel structural integrity. RAI to licensee on 7/22/%. Oily a 2 GL 92-01 Rev I. data Dase tssue not a restart sten N (5) lop 1 MPA R 604; Borafien degradation. Ltcensee response ts just in. Staff revtew to 2 N (5) GL %-04 commente. This may have to be addressed prior to restart because of sanstttwity to spent fuel pool tssues WA rov testing & su.ve llance. This stem 1s closed with the exception of IFI 2 N (I) CL 8710 See IFI 94 18-09 94-15-09 on periodic verification. dich is to be followd op after a new generte ersensiiration is issued i LICENSF AMENDMENT /Rit!EF RF0 TESTS R G.197 RG 197 instrunentation - 54 cool monitors ete - category charge. License 2 Instrtsients amenenent may t* approved by Decencer N (5) 81csaetrics & Biometric exemption to allcw taking sectrity badges offstte - Staff revtew 2 Scrurttv ts espected to be ocuplete sorri N (5) Core flood Reitef request R0 Core flood nozzle - Staff needs more info. ppt will 2 Nonle keep all snformed N (5) OT5G Tees OTSG tee testing - Ltcensee proposed a revised OT5G tee acceptance 2 rriterta See VIO E 05-04 N (5) OTNER isstES Pressurtzer Ibring Refuel 9 a se-surface flaw was discovered. The Itcensee performed 2 hozzle flaw better inspection during R10 and found the flaw to be acceptable. TFe new N (5) inspection results in re%ced flaw stre and consequently acceptance criterna (esch is based on ratto of flaw to thickness) changes. Staff review in prtvzress Criticality The Itcensee did not carry a prevtously approved enesption from part 70 2 N (5) Monitor (70 24?) requirements to Part 50 license. Need legal interpretation of the status of the esception Sources for issues include: IFS. SIMS. NUREG 1435 (Status of Safety Issues at Licensed Power Plants). Resident's OIL. PM's 0IL NOTE: Open allegations. OI investigations, and emerging / draft issues are listed separately. LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
.AP Abnormal Operating Procedure BWST Borated Water Storage Tank a
13 l
C Closed CCHE Control Complex Habitability Envelope CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR3 D.I. Crystal River 3 Design Item CREVS Control Room Emergency Ventilation System EA NRC Escalated Enforcement Action EDBD Engineering Design Basis Document ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EEI NRC Escalated Enforcement Item E0P Emergency Operating Procedure FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report GL NRC Generic Letter ILRT Integrated Leak Rate Test (of the Reactor Building) IFI NRC Inspector Followup Item , LER Licensee Event Report LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LPI Low Pressure Injection LTOP Low Temperature Overpressure Protection MPA NRC Multi-Plant Action MUV Makeup Valve N (D) Not an NRC Restart Item (because the issue is duplicated by a restart item) N (G) Not an NRC Restart Item (because it is a generic issue affecting multiple operating plants and is being addressed by NRR) N (I) Not an NRC Restart Item (because previous inspection of the issue is adequate for restart) N (S) Not an NRC Restart Item (because resolution of the issue is not needed for safe restart) NRC Notice of Violation NOV NPSH Net Positive Suction Head Operability Condition Report OCR OP Operating Procedure PR Problem Report R NRC Restart Item RB Reactor Building RCS Reactor Coolant System RMG Radiation Monitor SFP Spent Fuel Pool TIA NRC Task Interface Agreement (between NRC offices) TS Technical Specifications URI NRC Unresolved Item US0 Unreviewed Safety Question VIO NRC Violation 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: S:\DRS\EB\CRISSUE1.350
, 14 s
5tatus as er 2/19/97 CRYSTAL RIVER RESTART ISSUES CHECKLIST ISSUE MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A ASSESSMENT OF ROOT CAUSE IDENTIFICATION AND CORRECTION C$riditions f reqUi8ng !:~shufd6wn + 'Ci131i1 pane 6 ~ 4 CL
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problems ~cisarlytutMer~stoods ~- ' Y"& ' W ~ Effectiveness of root : h e C.1.1 d. Panel 0 analysis program Thoroughness of corrective C.1.3 a. Panel 0 action plan Completeness of corrective C.1.3 b. Panel 0 action plan Control of corrective action C.1.3 c. Panel 0 item tracking Effective corrective actions for C.1.3 d. Panel 0 the condition requiring shutdown implemented Effective corrective actions for C.1.3 e. Panel 0 other significant problems
- implemented Plan Control of long-term corrective C.1.3 f. Panel actions Effectiveness of corrective C.1.3 g. Panel 0 action verific6 tion process Effectiveness of QA Program C.1.4 a. Panel 0 Effectiveness of industry C.1.4 b. Panel experience review program Effectiveness of Licensee's C.I.4 c. RII 0 independent review groups Effectiveness of deficiency C.1.4 d. Panel 0 reporting system k
ATTACHMENT B i
ISSUE MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A Staff willingness to raise C.1.4 e. Panel- O concerns ! Effectiveness of commitment C.1.4 g. Panel 0 tracking program External Audit (i.e. INP0) C.1.4 h. capability 3 ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS Goals / expectations communicated C.2.1 a. RII to staff Demonstrated expectation of C.2.1 b. RII adherence to procedures Management involvement in self- C.2.1 c. RII & 0 assessment and independent self- NRR assessment capability i Effectiveness of management C.2,1 d. RII 0 <- review committees Management's demonstrated C.2,1 e. RII 0 awareness of day-to-day 4 operational concerns Management's ability to identify C.2.1 f. RII & 0 g and prioritize significant NRR issues Management's ability to C.2.1 g. RII & 0 , coordinate resolution of NRR
- significant issues i Management's ability to C.2.1 h. RII 0 implement effective corrective actions Impact of any Maria ement C.2.2 a. RII & 0 reorganization NRR iENedTGs'nessdhditimS192 h- ~'ICl222& RII$' ! IRS 6E0 0 D
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Lr solutionjohemployeelc6ncernst IIRf96s09) Adequate engineering support as C.2.2 c. Panel demonstrated by timely resolution of issues ATTACHMENT B
ISSUE MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A Adequate plant administrative C.2.2 d. RII O 3rocedures - Engineering / Licensing Effective information exchange C.2.2 e. RII 0 with other utilities ASSESSMENT OF PLANT AND CORPORATE STAFF EFFECTIVENESS Demcastrated commitment to C.3.1 a. RII & achiev'ng improved performance NRR
~
Demonstrated safety C.3.1 b. Panel consciousness Understanding of management's C.3.1 c. Panel expectations and goals Understanding of plant issues C.3.1 d. Panel and corrective actions Qualifications and training of C.3.1 e. RII staff Attentiveness to duty C.3.1 9 RII Level of attention to detail C.3.1 h. RII & NRR St67f overtime usage C.3.1 j. RII Procedure usage / adherence C.3.1 k. RII Awareness of plant .cecurity C.3.1 1. RIl Licensed operator staffing meets C.3.3 a. RII requirements and licensee goals level of formality in control C.3.3 b. RII room Effectiveness of control room C.3.3 c. RII simulator training Control room / plant operator C.3.3 d. RII awareness of equipment status Adequacy of plant operating C 3.3 e. RII procedures Procedure usage / adherence C.3.3 f. RII Log keeping practices C.3.3 g. RII ATTACHMENT B
i ISSUE MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A ASSESSMENT OF PHYSICAL RF.ADINESS OF PLANT Operability of technical C.4 a. RII specification systems l Operability of required C.4 b. RII secondary and support systems Results of pre-startup testing C.4 c. RII Adequacy of system lineups C.4 d. RII Adequacy of Surveillance C.4 e. RII tests / test program Significant hardware issues C.4 f. RII resolved (i.e. damaged equipment. equipment ageing. modi fications) Effectiveness of the plant C.4 h. RII maintenance program Maintenance backlog managed and C.4 1. RII impact on operation assessed Adequacy of plant housekeeping C.4 j. RII and equipment storage ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS ' Applicable license amendments C.5 a. NRR have been issued Applicable exemptions have been C.5 b. NRR granted Applicable reliefs have been C.5 c. NRR granted Significant enforcement issues C.5 f. RII & have been resolved NRR Allegations have been C.5 g. RII appropriately addressed 10lCFR2?206fpetitfonfhaidibeen
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appropriately: addressed'~ ~ ~ " 19:'97' COORDINATION WITH INTERESTED AGENCIES AND PARTIES ATTACHMENT B f
p - __ ISSUE MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A Federal emergency Management C.6 a. RII & Agency NRR Appropriate Sate and local C.6 e. RII officials Appropriate public interest C.6 f. RII & groups NRR Local news media C.6 9 RII .I J ATTACHMENT B
$tatut at of 7/1?/97 CRYSTAL RIVER REST ^RT TASK CHECKLIST TASK MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A Issue preliminary 1 notification 18.2-b. RII- C6 Congressional Notification B.2 g.
- Establish Restartfinel i
* ' Bl3 a; RIIUNRR 311/1/96D C:1
.SDE41tr
' Assess available information; B.3 b? Panel- '0!
t.- . DeveloFCase Specific Checklist 0
~~
B.3 f. RIIONRR- 111/13/96? 'CL Develop Restar t Action Plan B.3 g. RII. NRR 0 Regional Administrator Approves B.3 h. RII Restart Action Plan NRR Associate Director Approves B.3 1. NRR Restart Action Plan Implement Restart Action Plan B.3 j. RII Evalnate?findingsloEIPAf! Inspection
.B i4jl] PANEL 2/12/97 'C Licensee!performsircobause: B.4;1Jbi ; Licensee) Oj analysis andidevelops corrective-action: plan NRC evaluates licensee's root B.4.1 c. Panel 0 cause determination and corrective action plan Review licensee generated B.4.3 a. Panel 0 restart issues Independent NRC identification B 4.3 Panel 0 of restart items (consider external sources)
NRC/ Licensee agreement on B.4.3 c. Panel restart issues Evaluate Licensee's restart B.4.3 d. RII _ issues implementation process Evaluate Licensee's B.4.3 e. RII 0 implementation of verification process Evaluate '.icensee's restart B.4.5 a. RII readiness self-assessment ATTACHMENT C
TASK MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE STATUS REF APP A NRC evaluation of applicable B.4.5 b. Panel items from ISSUES section below complete Restart issues closed , B.4.5 c. Panel Conduct NRC restart readine.n B.4.5 d. RII team inspection Issue augmented restart covera 9e 3.4.5 e. RII inspection plan 4 ~ Comments from other parties ' O.4.5 f. Panel considered Re review of Generic Restart B.4.5 h. NRR Checklist complete Prepare restart authorization B.5 a. RII & document and basis for restart NRR NRC Restart Panel approves B.5 b. PANEL Restart Authorization No restart objections from other B.5 c NRR. RII applicable HQ offices PANEL No restart objections from B.5 d RII & applicable Federal Agencies NRR Regional Administrator concurs 8.5 e. RII in Restart Authorization NRR Associate Director concurs B.5 f. NRR in Restart Authorization EDO concurs in Restart B.5 g. NRR Authorization when required Conduct ACRS briefing when B.5 h. NRR requested Conduct Commission briefing when B.5 1. RII & requested NRR Commission concurs in Restart B.5 j. Authorization when required Regional Administrator B.5 k. RII authorizes restart ATTACHMENT C
l .$ , TASK MC 0350 RESP. REFERENCE e STATUS-REF APP A Notify Commission of restart B.6 a. NRR authorization (1f. Commission did not concur in Restart Authorization)- Notify E00 of restart B.6~b.- NRR authorization (if EDO did not concur in Restart Authorization) Notify Congressional Affairs of B.6 c. NRR restart authorization Notify ACRS of restart B.6 d. NRR authorization (a briefing may be substituted) Notify Applicable Federal B.6 e. ' agencies of restart authorization Notify Public Affairs of restart B.6 f. RII authorization Notify State and Local officials B.6 9 RII of restart authorization Notify citizens or groups that B.6 h. RII expressed interest during the restart approval process ATTACHMENT C}}