ML20246K523

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 31 to License NPF-57

ML20246K523
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	08/21/1989
From:	Mccracken C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20246K518	List: ML20246K514 ML20246K523
References
NUDOCS 8909050499
Download: ML20246K523 (4)

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated February 27, 1989 and supplemented on April 3, 1989, Public Service Electric & Gas Company requested an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 for the Hope Creek Generating Station. The proposed amendment would add clarification and consistency to the refueling specifications with respect to reference measurements, load setpoints and travel limits. The changes would also conservatively raise the minimum allowable Source Range Monitor (SRM) count rate to agree with SRM requirements imposed elsewhere in the specifications.

2.0 EVALUATION (a) The changes to TS 3.9.1.b.3 and 3.9.6 clarify the use of the main hoist as the only hoist permitted for fuel movement within the RPV.

Section 9.1.4.2.10.2 of the final safety analysis report (FSAP) states that fuel har,dling is performed using the main hoist fuel grapple. This requirement is implied by the wording in the TS it is not clearly stated surveillance requirement section; however,(LCO) section.

in the TS limiting condition of operation The proposed change will clarify the required use of only the main boist for fuel movement within the RPV.

(b) The change to TS 4.9.6.1.b (which becomes TS 4.9.6.c) specifies a shift of reference from the " top of active fuel" to the " point of attachment of the grapple to the fuel bail handle" and also revises the main hoist up-travel stop setpoint with regard to the distance between the refueling cavity normal water level and the new point of reference.

In support of this change, the licensee provided an l

" Analysis of Refueling Bridge Up-travel Limits." This analysis shows that the new value of 6'6" from the point of attachment of the grapple to the fuel bail handle corresponds to the present TS limit of 8'0" from the top of active fuel. The tolerance (+3'/-0")

assigned to the main hoist up-travel stop limit defines a range in which to set the stop that provides adequate _ clearance for transporting loads over the fuel transfar "csttle chute." The licensee's analysis indicates that ne fuel bundle is raised higher 8909050499 890821 PDR ADDCK 05000354 P

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provided in'Section 15.7.4 of the FSAR.. Furthermore..the licensee's analysis: concluded that the radiological doses at the refueling q

platform are not increased by this change because the combined effect

.of.the revised ~ reference point and the dimensional change to the up-travel limit results in no change in the actual height of the-fuel bundle with respect to the surface of the refueling cavity water when.-

withdrawn' to the normal up-travel stop. On the basis of the above consideration, the-staff agrees with the licensee that the change to TS 4.9.6.1.b does not allow a fuel bundle to be lifted higher than previously permitted by the analysis and adds a minimum height-hoisted. tolerance to ensure that a bundle will have adequate clearance over the fuel transfer chute floor.

(c) The change to TS 4.9.6.1.d (which becomes TS 4.9.6.f) raises the loaded rod block setpoint from 485 pounds to 535 pounds, thereby allowing a blade guide to be hoisted by the main hoist without tripping the rod block interlock. The licensee stated that this problem was encountered in the past during control rod replacements.

The setpoint at which the fuel-loaded rod block is actuated is below the redundant' interlock setpnint 550 pounds..Therefore, the basis

.for the fuel-loaded rod block (to ensure that no control rod is removed while fuel is being handled) satisfies the criteria.

(d) The changes to TS 4.9.6.2.b and 1S 4.9.6.3.b involve the combination of duplicative' specifications for both auxiliary hoists in TS 4.9.6.d.

The. licensee stated that the point of reference and the.

dimension for the up-travel stops for the two hoists are changed to permit transport of control rods out of the ppV and through the

" cattle chute" without-the use of special rigging arrangements currently required to prevent interface problems in the chute. The licensee's analysis demonstrat'es that the proposed increase in height to which a control rod can be lifted is within the bounds of the preyfous analysis for a fuel handling (bundle drop) accident provided in Section 15.7.4 of the FSAR. The radiation dose rates associated with a control rod assembly at the up-travel limit would be slightly increased by this change; however, the calculated radiation dose rate (3.6 mr/hr at the surface of the water in the refueling cavity) from a control rod withdrawn to the height requested by the amendment will remain less than the calculated dose rate from a fuel bundle withdrawn to its current up-travel limit by the main hoist (7.6 mr/hr one foot above the surface of the water in the refueling cavity). The staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and concurs with the licensee's conclusion.

(e) The changes to TS 4.9.6.2.c and 4.9.6.3.c involve an elimination of surveillance requirements for rod block interlocks on the monorail and the frame-mounted auxiliary hoists. The rod block is not required for these two auxiliary hoists as these hoists are precluded from lifting any fuel bundle as indicated in the proposed TS 3.9.6.

Therefore, elimination of surveillance requirements for rod block interlocks on auxiliary hoists is acceptable.

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-(f) The changes to TS 4.3.7.6.c-and 4.9.2.c conservatively raise the minimum allowable Source Range Monitor (SRM) count rate to agree with SRM requirements imposed elsewhere in the specifications.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of'a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part P0 and changes to the surveillance requirements...The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase-in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumuletive occupational radiation exposure. -The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has

'been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the' eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR-51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with-the issuance of this amendment.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendment involves no_significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (54 FR 29410) on July 12, 1989 and consulted with the State of New Jersey. No public coments were received.

The coments from the Bu eau of Nuclear Engineering of the State of New Jersey and the NPC staff response appear belov:

CcmmentNo.1) Can a fuel assembly be raised on the auxiliary hoists?

NRC Staff Response: Although the weight of a fuel assembly is within the lifting capacity of the auxiliary hoists, procedural controls, Technical Specifications load limits and restrictions, and an overload cutoff preclude their use for this purpose.

Coment No. 2) What radiation monitor protection is or will be provided on the refueling bridge since approval of this License Change Request will allow a control rod to be raised higher than previously?

NRC Staff Response: There is a permanent area monitor that alarms in the control room, and, during refueling, there is a portable radiation monitor on the bridge that alarms locally.

Coment No. 3) Can a fuel assembly and a control rod be raised simultaneously? For instance, one on an auxiliary hoist and one on the

' main hoist? If this can be done, has the radiation dose rate been calculated for this lift?

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f P NRC Staff Pesponse: This simultaneous lift is precluded by a three-position selector switch with positions for Monorafi Mounted Auxiliary.

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' Hoist, Frame Mounted Auxiliary Hoist, and Main Hoist. Administrative 1y, the ifcensee's refueling procedures do not allow the lift.

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The staff has. concluded, based on the considerations discussed above,

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~that:

(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of-the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, l

and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be-inimical to the common: defense and security nor to'the health and safety of the public.

- Principal Contributor:

C. E. McCracken Dated: August 21, 1989 9

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