ML20151R251

Sser Supporting Power Ascension Test Program Acceleration. SALP Input Encl

ML20151R251
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	01/22/1986
From:	NRC
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Shared Package
ML20151R168	List: ML20151R163 ML20151R251
References
NUDOCS 8602050500
Download: ML20151R251 (6)

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SUPPLEMENTAL SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION POWER ASCENSION TEST PROGRAM ACCELERATION INTRODUCTION This safety evaluation describes the staff's review of test program changes submitted for approval as part of the program to accelerate power ascension testing for the Hope Creek Generating Station. The proposed changes were submitted by letters from Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G),

dated November 6 and December 9, 1985. These changes are as follows:

1. Test 3: Elimination of Fuel Loading Chambers (FLC) during fuel loading

2. Test 5: Control rod scram time testing modification at full reactor pressure

3. Test-11: Process computer test OD-11 elimination

4. Test 16: TIP uncertainty test deletico Test 3: Fuel Loading Modification Test 3 is the fuel loading phase of initial operations. It has usually been necessary in past fuel loadings to use FLC in addition to SRH detectors to achieve l'echnical Specification required count rates with (any) fuel in the core. A number of utilities have in the past requested and been granted reload fuel loading operations in which a small number of fuel assemblies are loaded before the usual required count rate on SRM or FLC are (necessarily) achieved.

This initial loading is sufficient to provide the needed count rate. These exceptions are based on the fact that the permitted (small) number of assemblies can not be critical, even with all control rods renoved.

0602050500 060122 4 PDR ADOCK 0500

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The proposed modifications to Hope Creek Test 3 are to pennit the loading of 16 assemblies without (necessarily) meeting the usual required 0.7 counts /sec for the SRM or FLC. This too is based on analysis (by GE) which shows that this array would not be critical (with rods out) and would provide the necessary count rate. This change would make it unnecessary to use FLC, which interfere with operations, and would permit the use of the standard SRM alone. (TheFLC could be used, if needed.) The procedure places the sources in the alternate locations, close to the SRM and uses a spiral loading pattern around the initial source-SRM and 16 assembly locations rather than around the core center.

These procedures are compatible with a number of previously approved reload procedures. The criticality calculations are done with standard methodology.

They are consistent with other analyses reviewed in this area. Tests on other reactor startups indicate that required count rates should be achieved. The Technical Specifications will require (after loading 16 assemblies) the usual count rate on at least one SRM (the SRM near the initial loading). The other SRMs will be checked with a source, as has been approved for other reactors, J

until they reach a suitable count rate. A new Technical Specification, 3/4.10.7, has been added to provide for this first cycle revised procedure and surveillance.

It provides acceptable restrictions of this procedure. If the described procedures are followed, the proposed change to the loading process, surveillance and Technical Specifications is acceptable.

Test 5: Control Rod Scram Time Test 5 is concerned with testing of control rod drives. As part of the test rods are scram time tested af ter fuel loading at cold shutdown. During reactur

heatup four selected rods are time tested at various reactor pressures. Normally all rods are time tested at rated pressure and low power, and again four rods are selected for testing during power ascension. PSE&G has preposed that this sequence be rodified such that the. test of all rods at. rated pressure and low power be replaced with a test of four rods and a test at approximately 30 percent power of all withdrawn rods as part of the scram in the Loss of Offsite Power test. This would result in the 37 " Control Cell Core" (CCC) rods not being fully tested since they wculd not be fully withdra n .

GE has analyzed the reactivity worth of the scram over the insertion range of ,

interest to transient analyses and found only a small difference in reactivity insertion between the scram of all rods and a scran in which the CCC rods and 8 other (assumed) extrece, inoperable rods do not insert. (The CCC rods are low worth rods.) They have also reexamined the transient analyses of events with this reduced scram function and determined a MCPR penalty to be applied for the assumption that these rods do not participate in the scram. The operating limit MCPR (OLMCPR) is increased by no more than 0.01 for either the ODYN option A or for the curve of OLMCPR vs measured scram time for ODYN option B. The proposed ODYN scram time would involve only those rods fully neasured in the scram time test.

PSE&G has proposed Technical Specification changes which would (1) exempt, for first cycle only, the 37 CCC rods f rom stran time tests in Specification 4.1.3.2 and.3and(2)increasetheOLMCPRby0.01inSpecification3/4.2.3andrelated figure.

Our review has fcund that since (1) all rods will have been scram tested at cold conditions, (2) four rods will have been tested during heatup, including full pressure, and thus indicate any departure from nonnal trends, (3) rods will be tested at 30 percent power except for exempted CCC rods, (4) analysis indicate little reactivity worth change during times important for transient analyses, and transients have been rexamined assuming no scram at all for CCC rods and 8 inoperable rods and suitable OLMCPR aajustments have been made to account for changes, (5) the delay of testing until 30 percent power is consistent with the Technical Specifications which allow operation up to 40 percent power following core alterations before scram time testing, and (6) -

suitable Technical Specifications have been proposed to exempt CCC rods and to increase OLMCPR, the proposed changes to the Test 5 procedures are acceptable.

Test 11: 00-11 Deletion Test 11 involves the testing of the Process Conputer and its programs. 00-11 is one of these programs and deals with the area of fuel pellet-clad interaction monitoring (Preconditioning Interim Operating Management Recomendations, PCIOMR). The program assists in implementing PCIOMR recornendations to prevent this type of fuel failure mechanism during operation. With barrier fuel, however, as used in Hope Creek, GE has removed the PCIOMR procedures from the operation plans since they are no longer needed. Thus, PSE&G has proposed the renoval of the 00-11 test from the startup program. Our review has indicated that there is no need for PC10liR nonitoring for this fuel and the removal of this test is acceptable.

Test 16: TIP Uncertainty Test 16 measures the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) uncertainty, composed of geometry effects and randem noise. These are determined by comparing symetric' pairs of TIP readings and repeated traverses of comon TIP tubes. The criterion for first cycle TIP uncertainty tests is that it should be less than 6 percent.

This is the value which if used in the uncertainty analyses for GETAB (rather than the 2.6 percent value nomally used in first cycle) would increase the power density value sufficiently to increase the safety limit MCPR by 0.01.

Previous tests in other reactors have always provided a TIP uncertainty well below 6 percent. Furthermore, the uncertainty is lower when using the recently '

introduced TIP gama detector rather than the usual neutron detector since the gama system is less sensitive to geometry errors. Thus PSEAG has proposed to delete the test.

TIP operability is determined in preoperational testing and during power ascension power distribution measurerrents and tests of the Process Computer.

Previous fests in other reatters have indicated no problem in the TIP uncertainty area, and the-gama detectors have even lower uncertainty parameters. The Hope Creek system should be well below the criteria. The safe operation of the plant will not be affected by deleting this test. No changes to the Technical Specifi-cations are required by this deletion. The proposed deletion of Test 16 is acceptable.

I SALP INPUT FOR THE HOPE CREEK TEST CHANGES

1. Managerent Involvement The documentation presented with the proposed test changes request was satisfactory.

Rating: Category 1

2. Resolution of Technical Issues The documentation showed a clear understanding of the technical issues involved.

Rating: Category 1

3. Responsiveness to NRC Initiatives There were no NRC questions Rating: None 4