ML20237G685
| ML20237G685 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 08/17/1987 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237G668 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8708240187 | |
| Download: ML20237G685 (4) | |
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UNITED STATES g-y g
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7, *
- E WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
%, *... + j SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION t
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 8 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-57 4,
PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY HOPE' CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated May 22, 1987, as supplemented June 30 1987, Public Service Electric & Gas Company (the licensee) requested an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 for'the Hope Creek Generating Station. The proposed amencment would modify the Technical Specifications to perm',t a. temporary ihcrease in the Hope Creek Main Steam Line Radiation-High-High scram and isolation setpoints to allow operation with expected higher radiation levels resulting from hydrogen injection testing. The purpose of the hydrogen injection testing is' to determine the feasibility of hydrogen water chemistry control as a means of reducing intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) of stainless steel piping.
2.0 EVALUATION 2.1 High Radiation Scram and Radiation Setpoints The Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors (MSLRMs) provide reactor scram as well as Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) closure signals upon detection of high radioactivity levels in the main steam lines. The closure of the MSIVs limits the release of fission products in the event of fuel failures.
The. proposed Technical Specification change 3 (Tables 2.2.1-1, 3.3.2-1, and 3.3.2-2) would allow adjustments to the rormal background radiation level and associated trip setpoints for the MSLRMs at reactor power levels greater than 22 percent of rated power. The adjustments will be based on either calculations or measurements of actual radiation levels resulting from hydrogen injection. Hydrogen water chemistry results in
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increased N-16 levels in the main steam lines.
L The licensee states that the only design basis accident which takes credit for the main steam line high radiation scram and isolation set point is the, Control Rod Drop Accident (CRDA), Generic analysis of the consequerees of a CRDA have shnwn that fuel failures are not expected from a CRDA cccurring at greater than 10 percent power. This is primarily a result cf analyses which show thatt es power increases, the severity of the CRDA decreases due to the effuts of increased void formation and i
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increased Doppler reactivity feedback. Since hydrogen injection during the test will be limited to above ?? percent of rated power and the MSLRM setpoint adjustments will not be altered below this power level, the staff concludes that the currently approved CRDA analysis for Hope Creek is bounded appropriately and remains valid. Therefore, the proposed
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Technical Specification changes are acceptable.
2.2 padiation protection The staff has reviewed the licensee's submittel regarding the radiological implications of the dose rate increases associated with N-16 activity increases during hydrogen injections into the reactor system. The reviev addresses the radiation prutection/ALARA measures for the course of the planned test, in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1(c) and Regulatory Guide 8.8, "Information Relevant to Ensuring that Occupational Radiation Exposures at Nuclear Power Stations will be as low as is Reasonably Achievable."
(ALARA)
One objective of the hydrogen injection test is to determine general in-plant and site boundary dose, rate increases due to hydrogen additio.n.
The licensee has stated that radiation protection /ALARA practices.will be implemented during the test. Additionally, the licensee has stated that data will be obtained for shielding design should additional shielding be necessary for L permanent hydrogen water chemistry installation.
The staff has reviewed the licensee's proposed dose control measures and surveillance efforts planned for the hydrogen addition test. Tests of this type have been conducted at other operating BWRs, following staff review of similar Technical Specification changes. These test conditions, as identified by the licensee, as well as the' measures proposed for radiation protection /ALARA at Hope Creek, are consistent with those utilized at the other BWRs during their hydrogen addition tests. None of these tests involved any significant, unanticipated, radiological exposures or releases.
Dresden 2, which has operated with hydrogen-water chemistry for two cycles, did not experience a measurable increase to site exposure. The staff does not expect a significant site boundary dose rate increase during the Hope Creek test. The conduct of the test and radiological surveys during the test will ensure ALARA in accorda;nce with Regulatory Guide 8.8 and is, therefore, acceptable.
2.3 Hydrogen Storage and Distribution System By letters dsted May 22 and June 30, 1987, the licensee provided infonnation on the hydrogen and oxygen storage and distribution system to facilitate the Hydrogen Water Chemistry pre-implementation test. The licensee's hydrogen arid oxygen storage and distribution system is designed to minimize the potential hazard to safety related systems and meets the applicable parts of the BWR Owners Group, " Guidelines for Permanent BWR Hydrogen Water Chemistry Installations," 1987 Revision. The staff has reviewed this submittal to the guidance provided in NRC Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5-1 of NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan.
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The pre-implementation test will be conducted with the guidance of General Electric (GE) taking into consideration the. lessons learned from j
approximately eight other hydrogen in,iection tests previously performed with GE assistance. Compressed hydrogen will be supplied and stored onsite in a ~ gaseous tube trailer (130,000 scf). The separation distance of the hydrogen tube trailer and safety related structures meets the BWR Owners Group (BWROG) Guidelines. The hydrogen distribution system contains-an excess flow check valve to limit the release of hydrogen in the event' of a pipe break. Hydrogen will be injected into the feedwater system at the suction side of the condensate feed pumps. To prevent the accumulation of combustible levels of hydrogen at the condensate booster pumps, near the control valves and/or at various locations along the supply lines, the hydrogen supply lines will be leak tested prior to the test and will be monitored for hydrogen concentrations during the test. The monitors will alarm when hydrogen concentrations exceed two. percent and isolate the hydrogen supply line when the hydrogen concentration reaches.four 3
percent in-order to prevent reaching an. explosive concentration.
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0xygen will be injected upstream of the off-gas recombiner to ensure that j
all excess hydrogen in the off-gas stream is recombined.
l The Hope Creek Plant uses sodium hypochlorite for cooling water system treatment. This eliminates the potential hazard associated with a 3
simultaneous chlorine (also used for cooling water treatment) and hydrogen release.
We ffnd that the proposed handling of the hydrogen for the test is in accordance with the BWROG (1987 Revision) " Guidelines for permanent Hydrogen Ster Chemistry Installations," meet General Design Criteria 3, and Branch Technical Position CMEB 9.5.1 of NUREG 0800 and are, therefore, acceptable.
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such
-a finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eli 0-categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(gibility criteria for 9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
2 4;0' CONCLUSION
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The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (52 FR 24557) on July 1, 1987, and a second notice (52 FR 26596) on July 15, 1987, and consulted with the State of New Jersey. No put'lic comments were received and the State of New Jersey did not have any comments.
The staff has concluded, based on.the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and-safety of:
the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security nor to the health and ' safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
F. Witt j
4 Dated:
August 17, 1987
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