ML20246K336

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 32 to License NPF-57

ML20246K336
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	08/28/1989
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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ML20246K330	List: ML20246K336
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NUDOCS 8909050440
Download: ML20246K336 (4)

Text

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SAFETY EVALUATION SY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.32 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-57 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 6,1989, Public Service Electric & Gas Company requested an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 for the Hope Creek Generating Station. The propo,ed amendment woulc revise:

(a)

Technical Specifiertion (TS) Section 3.6.1.2.e and Table 3.6.3-1 to increase the hydrostatic test pressure from 1.0 P(a) to 1.10 P(a) for containment isolatinn valves provided with a water seal from the suppression pool, (b) reword Technical Specification 3.6.1.2.e to clearly define as-lef t penetration leakage for these same valves, and (c) delete an incorrect cross-reference in Section 4.6.1.2.1.

2.0 EVALUATION A.

The valves at issue in this change are those which provide containment isolation for lines which penetrate the suppression pool and are water filled following an accident scenario which requires their long-term isolation. TS 3.6.1.2.e addresses these valves and requires:

A combined leakage rate of less than or equal to 10 ppm for all other containment isolation valves in hydrostatically tested lines in Table 3.6.3-1 which penetrate the primary containment, when tested at P(a), 48.1 psig delta pressure.

This requirement is also reiterated in TS Table 3.6.3-1, Nott 4.

However, Paragraph III.C.2 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J requires:

(a) Valves, unless pressurized with a fluid (e.g. water, nitrogen) from a seal system, shall be pressurized with air or nitrogen at a pressure of P(a).

(b) Valves, which are sealed with fluid from a seal syr, tem shall be pressurized with that fluid to a pressure not less than 1.10 P(a).

Since the subject valves are provided with a seal system as discussed in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 6.2.3,10 CFR 50 Appendix J, Paragraph III.C.2.b applies and the valves should be tested with water to a test pressure of 1.10 P(a),

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h Therefore, PSE&G has concluded that the.TS for the subject valves is in error and should require a Type C water test at 1.10 P(a) with the combined leakage not exceeding 10 gpm.

i In order to demonstrate that the results of the Type C test conducted during the last refueling outage (at a pressure of 48.1 psig,1.0 P(a) provided satisfactory assurance of containment integrity, PSE&G has calculated what the leak rate would have been at a pressure of-1

! l-52.9 psig (1.10 P(a)). A conversion calculation has been utilized based upon Equation 3-21 on page 3.5 of. Crane Technical Paper No.

410. The measured leak rate, at a test pressure of 48.1 psig and accounting.for the maximum pathway leakage, totaled 2.4 gpm; while the calculated leak rate, which could be expected if testing were performed at 52.9 psig, would have been 2.5 gpm. The difference in leakage rates.is less than 5% and when compared to the maximam leakage limit of 10 gpm, the difference is a negligible 1%. As a result, PSE&G has concluded that the hydrostatic testing conducted during the last refueling outage, at a test pressure of 1.0 P(a), is representative of the leakage which could have been expected if testing was performed at a pressure of 1.10 P(a).

Since the hydrostatic test pressure requirement of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J must be met, a change to the TS is required to increase the test pressure from 1.0 P(a) to 1.10 P(a) for hydros.tatically tested containment isolation valves. Attachment 2 contains the necessary TS changes.

B.

A second change to TS 3.6.1.2.e is necessary to indicate that the 10 gpm leak rate criteria applies to penetrations and valves in order

' to account for in-series containment isolation valves. When testing containment penetrations with in-series valves, the as-left leakage for the subject penetration is calculated using the valve with the highest leakage (i.e. a worst case single failure of the valve with the. lowest leakage is assumed.) The current TS wording could be misconstrued to mean that, for penetrations with in-series valva;s, the as-left leakage rate is the sum total of all valves in the given penetration.

In order to eliminate this ambiguity, a reference to penetrations should be added to this specification as shown in.

The proposed wording would be the same as wording contained in TS 3.6.1.2.b which identifies the requirement to maintain containment isolation valve leakage "...less than or equal to 0.60 L(a) for all penetrations and all valves..." Since this specification makes specific mention of "all penetrations and all valves," when in-series valves in a given penetration are tested the as-left leakage rate assigned to the subject penetration is calculated using the valve with the highest leakage.

From a physical standpoint, even if one of two valves in a given penetration is leaking at rate

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. greater than the other, the leakage rate of the entire penetration cannot be any greater than the leakage associated with the valve with the lowest leakage.

However, applying single failure criterion requires assuming the failure of the valve with the lowest leakage.

Hence, the leakage rate calculated for the penetration uses the leakage associated with the valve with the highest leakage.

This change clarifies the wording of the TS to correctly calculate the leakage rate of a penetration and therefore is acceptable.

C.

Amendment 16 revised the Drywell and Suppression Chamber Purge System specification to permit the operation of the purge system for up to 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> per year. Original Surveillance Requirements 4.6.1.8.2 and 4.6.1.8.3 discussed the test requirements for the purge supply and exhaust valves with resilient material seals.

Amendment 16 combined these two test criteria under current Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.8.2.

Therefore, TS 4.6.1.2.1 must be revised to delete the reference to TS 4.6.1.8.3.

The remaining reference to Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.8.2 assures that the proper cross-reference between the two TS exists. This change is simply an administrative revision to TS 4.6.1.2.1 [and is an acceptable clarification to the Technical Specifications.]

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to the surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazaids consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

4.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (54 FR 31118) on July 26, 1989 and consulted with the State of New Jersey. No public comments were received and the State of New Jersey did not have any comments.

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The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:. (1) there is reasonable-assurance that the health and safety of the public'will not be endangered by operation in the propos~ ed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the l

l Comission's regulations and the issuance of-this amendment will not be inimical; to the comon defense and security nor to the health and safety l

of the public..

a Principal Contributor:

C. 7. Shiraki I

Dated: August 28, 1989

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