ML20246G246
| ML20246G246 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1989 |
| From: | Arnold E, Buford J, Cefola G WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20246G234 | List: |
| References | |
| WCAP-12196, NUDOCS 8908310275 | |
| Download: ML20246G246 (200) | |
Text
m # =m;;g7., 77 - - - --- ~
% 0&,. A[];, _
A > ,
Y~'N]l(N jn ,
L4 L. -
OCAP-12196 : WESTINGHOUSE CLASS 3
^
_; ,r r -.
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM DESIGN BASIS'
~
0 TEMPERATURE INCREASE TO'95 F FOR THE CONNECTICUT YANKEE HADDAM NECK PLANT
,t s
E. C. ARNOLD J. W. BUFORD- ,
G. A. CEFOLA J. M. GRIGSBY July 1989 l
s
)
'. NUCLEAR AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY DIVISION q
,di WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
- . n ..
'.t.
- e 1
' v[, i j;
w S88SiBBMB18Sha P- i
e a
-\
OTHER CONTRIBUTORS
- P. A. Barilla M. Ucak L. I. Walker J. A. Tortorice J. E. Conklin M. Ball K. Leonelli R. Stirzel J. Rice G. Israelson D. Hutchings J. Dudiak J. Mallay J. Hoffman C. Scrabis
~
W. Moore R. Maceyak
~
e
- 1
- , i 6
e a 4.
TABLE OF CONTENTS f_AE d
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
- 1. INTRODUCTION 1-1
^
- 2. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 2-1
- 3. FLUID SYSTEMS EVALUATION 3-1
- 4. COMPONENT EVALUATION 4-1
- 5. LICENSING EVALUATION 5-1
- 6. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 6-1
- 7. REFERENCES 7-1 APPENDIX A - SERVICE WATER SYSTEM FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS l
APPENDIX 8 - SAFETY EVALUATION IN NUSCO NEO 3.12 FORMAT APPENDIX C - FLOW AND PERFORMANCE MARGIN FOR CAR FAN COOLERS k' *
- i "
~
s N
N_- __ __ _ _ _ .
n ~
.g ;
We -
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
LO This' report' describes the justification to increase the design basis 0
temperature' of the Haddam Neck Plant Service Water System to 95 F. A thermal-hydraulic computer model of the system was developed to determine -
process conditions during various modes of' operation. Each component was-0 evaluated to . insure that' supplied flow was ' adequate at 95 F. A i.
licensing evaluation was then performed to insure the current licensed l safety limits were met'. It is concluded that all component's will operate acceptably with 950 F service water (subject to some restrictions on the non-safety related components), current safety limits will be met, and this change does not involve an'unreviewed safety question.
l i
m T
4 t
8 f #
4 e
, 6 e
0
, g 1
M e
.. e t
- 1. INTRODUCTION The Connecticut Yankee (CY) Haddam Neck Plant contains a Service Water System (SWS) which draws water from the Connecticut River, and uses
~ this water to cool various plant components. The warmed water is
' subsequently returned to the river. The design of the SWS is 0
currently based on the inlet river water not exceeding 85 F. Based on recent past meteorological conditions, Northeast Utilities Service Company-(NUSCO) has determined that temperature may become challenged during future summers. In order to address this issue in a systematic-manner, NUSCO contracted Westinghouse to perform the necessary
^
analyses to increase the design basis temperature of the service aater system. This report contains the results of these analyses, which (together with the evaluations to be provided in the Reference 2 NUSCO report) conclude that a river water temperature up to and including 950 F is acceptable.
The analyses evaluated each serviced component to confirm acceptability of increased temperature and any corresponding flow or operating limits. In addition, the capability of the SWS to deliver required flow for various operational and accident alignments was analytically confirmed.
- Section 2 contains a brief description of the SWS. Sections 3 and 4 T
describe the analyses pa. formed, including individual results and conclusions. 'Section 5 contains the results of the Licensing evaluation which justifies a chaage in the ultimate heat sink design basis temperature to 950F. Section 6 is a summary of conclusions
- p. and operating requirements associated with this design change.
Section 7 is a listing of all references.
t t.
l.".
y$
1-1
-- - _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ ____________3
7 _
- ( ;y . -. ;.
,% * ~
i: ' ,
- s. .2. -SYSTEM DESCRIPTION t
. GENERAL This section contains information on the current SWS design.
" Modifications and recommendations required as a result of this L evaluation are contained,in subsequent sections. The Haddam Neck'SWS draws water from the Connecticut River and provides cooling water for the primary and secondary plants.- It also provides water to clean the traveling water screens and for motive force for hypochlorite injection into the Circulating Water System. It provides cooling for-
^
components used for accident mitigation, as well as those used in normal plant operation. The system-is depicted on the CY SWS P& ids, Reference 1. The serviced components are listed in Table 2-1. Both safety-related and non-safety-related components are serviced. The 0
Jc urrent range of river water temperatures allowed is up to 85 F, SERVICE WATER PUMPS The system'contains four service water pumps. 'Each pump has a rated flow of 6000 gpm (at 150 feet developed head). The number of pumps
~
required to operate depends on river water temperature and system heat loads. The maximum number required ta be operating is.up to four. If the pump discharge header pressure becomes too low, standby pump (s),
if available, will be started. For accident mitigation in a loss of Normal Power (LNP) event, one pump on each electrical power train will
- automatically start. If a pump fails to start, its backup pump will
- subsequently start automatically.
y
'l.
M =*
- i.
- 7
^,
2-1 CVWSWS1/JWB/003089
MAJOR REMOTE / AUTOMATIC ACTUATION ISOLATION VALVES i Flow to various portions of the SWS is controlled by remotely operated .
valves. Some valves also have natomatic actuation. The most significant of these are identified balow.
o Valves SW-HOV-1 and 2 provide isolation capability for service water flow to the components in the Turbine Building. They are normally open and close automatically upon loss of normal power, J and close in less than one minute after recespt of a Safety injection *ctuation Signal (STAS). l
(
o Valves SW-MOV-3 and 4 provide isolation capability for service
~
water flow to the Component Cooling Heat Exchangers. Thase valves are normally open and close automatically upon loss of normal power. They can be closed from the control room when j I
component cooling water is not required, or if the component cooling system must be isolated.
o Valves SW-MOV-5 and 6 provide isolation-capability for service ,
i water flow to the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Heat Exch, angers.
They are normally closed during normal plant operations. These valves may be opened from the control room if component cooling i i
water is unavailable. Also, during post accident recirculation, j
. only service water is utilized in cooling the RHR Heat Exchangers. Note the SWS is the safety-grade source of cooling.
l4' o Valves SW-FCV-129 and 130 provide isolation for service water L[ ,
flow to the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG). They are normally closed, but automatically open when the EDGs start.
o Valves SW-TV-2365A and B are air operated valves which are used ,
t E to isolate service water to the Blowoff Tank Condensers. These valves close automatically upon loss of normal power, SIAS, and ;
.. High Containment Pressure Signal (HCP). ,
2-2
! CYWSW51/JWB/003089 f
l
o .
o Valve SW-A0V-9 is an air operated valve which automatically isolates service water flow to the spent fuel pool heat exchangers on a loss of normal power. This evaluation takes no credit for automatic isolation of this valve due to EEQ reasons.
o Valve SW-PCV-606 is an air operated valve which will automatically isolate service water flow to the screenwash system on a loss of normal power. This evaluation takes no credit for automatic isolation of this valve due to the QA status of its associated solenoid valve.
CONTROL VALVES Flows to various components in the SWS are controlled automatically by Temperature, Pressure, or Flow Control Valves. These valve positions vary according to process conditions. All such valves are assumed to be fully open for the flow network calculations performed within the scope of this report.
MANUAL VALVES .
Each component has manual valves to provide isolation and/or flow throttling. The valve position is set, and remains unchanged except for special operations. Valves used for throttling include SW-V-133 and 134 which control flow to the Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchangers (HXs). SW-V-250A & B which control flow to the RHR HXs, and SW-V-264, 266, 268, 270 which control flow to the CAR fan Coolers. Of these, only the CCW HX throttle valves are continually repositioned during normal operations.
e 2-3 CYd!WSI/ M /DL3DB9
r . , .,
~ ,_
.I y.
NORMAL OPERATION d t
.During normal operation, all components are assumed to receive service .,
.wate.r except the EDG Heat Exchangers, the RHR Heat Exchangers, the l.1 . Boron Evaporator Overhead Condenser, the Waste Evaporator Overhead
- Condenser, and the Boron Recovery Distillate Cooler. . Also,- only one
!~ of two Spent Fuel Pool HXs and Turbine 011 Coolers are normally in service at one time. The heat loads generated during normal op2 ration
} may require up to four operating SWS pumps depending on the river temperature and components in operation.
(.
NORMAL RHR COOLDOWN I '
The service water cools the Component Cooling Heat Exchangers, which in turn cool the RHR Heat Exchangers and other auxiliary components.
The SW throttle valves to the CCW HXs are assumed to be' fully opened -
I during RHR cooldown operations.
l-EMERGENCY COOLDOWN This mode of operation assumes that the Component Cooling Water System is unavailable and the SWS is then valved in to provide cooling water directly to the Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger.
POST-ACCIDENT OPERATION i
I
. E '. Upon ECCS Actuation with normal power available, the following 2
automatic actuations are assumed to occur:
,[ 1) The Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) receive a signal to start,
'_[, and service water is directed to the EDG HXs via opening of i s
f,, valves SW-FCV-129 and 130.
( 2-4 CN5.lL1/JWB/0G089
Jo w
/
v L2)
The turbine plant header is .isolued by delayed automatic closure' O
of,5W-MOV-1 and SW-MOV-2. A timer delays' closing of these valves for'less than one' minute. ,
The Steam Generator Blowoff Condensers are isolated by automatic 3) closure of valves SW-TV-2365A & B.
~
Flow' will continue to other components previously 'in service. Prior to initiation of the recirculation phase of post-LOCA operation, the CCW heat exchangers will be isolated by manual closure of MOVs-3 & 4, and the RHR heat exchangers will be valved into service by the opening of MOVs-5 and 6.
Upon a Loss on Normal Power (LNP), the following automatic actuatior.s-are assumed to occur:
1
- 1) The Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) receive a signal to start, and service water is directed to the EDG HXs via opening of
' valves SW-FCV-129 and 130.
- 2) One service water pump is loaded onto each operating EDG., (A second pump will start if the first does not).
- 3) The turbine plant header is isolated by automatic closure of SW-MOV-1 and SW-MOV-2.
- 4) The Steam Generator Blowoff Condensers are isolated by automatic l.
K closure of air operated valves SW-TV-2355A & B.
-is loaded manually within 15 minutes after the beginning of the h'/' event. If an EDG fails, a second and third CAR Fan are loaded h9 manually 10 and 15 minutes respectively after the beginning of the event.
2-5 CYWSW51/JWB/063089 i
(_ _ - _ _ . - - _ _ _ . _ - _ _ - - _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _
. o e
- 6) The CCW heat exchangers are isolated by automatic closure of SW-MOV-3 & 4.
Flow will continue to other components previously in service. If
- there was a LOCA coincident with the LNP, then prior to initiation of the recirculation phase of post-LOCA operation, the RHR heat exchangers will be valved into service by the opening of MOVs-5 and 6.
Section 3 to this report describes the SWS configurations evaluated for 95 0F service water, including any changes to the current
- configuration, as previously described.
4 m
1
- 3 -
P J. .
.. .s. ,
'e l :.
[ 2-6 CYWSW51/JWB/003CB9 l - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ .-______ ___ - - __ -
o_ : c "t-t .
TABLE 2 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM COMPONENTS .
Safety-Related Components with resoect to Function c Emergency Diesel Generators Containment Air Recirculation (CAR) Cooling Coils CAR Motor Coolers-RHR Heat Exchangers RHR Pump Service Water Pumps Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchangers Safety-Related Components with resueet to Pressure Boundary Adams Filters Component Cooling Heat Exchangers -
Piping and Valves Screen Wash Booster Pump Service Water Strainers (These also have a passive screening function)
Non Safety-Related Components Boric Acid Mixing Tank Vent Condenser Boron Evaporator Overhead Condenser Boron Recovery Distillate Cooler Chemistry Laboratory A/C Circulating Water Pumps Closeo Cooling System Heat Exchangers Control Room A/C
- ' Electrical Auxiliary Steam Generator Feed Pump ,
2-7 CNSW51/JWB/063089
- ~v .
- y ~, , , , - . u
't .. .
1, ,
TABLE 2-1 (cont)
SERVICE WATER SYSTEf! COMPONENTS .
- l^
.; e.
?>" Non Safety-Related Components (cont)
, ; -a
. Generator Hydrogen Coolers al Generator Hydrogen Seal Oil Coolers Generator Main Exiter Coolers
? Gland Seal Water Supply Filters HypochlopiteDilutionEjector
~
Isola'ted Phase Bus Coolers
'[~ ,
Kinney Filters
- Main Steam Sample Cooler Office Building A/C Piping and Valves k Primary Drain Tank Vent Condensers Radiation Monitor Recirculation Pump Sample Pump.
Electrical- Auxiliary Steam Generator Feed Pump-
- Steam Generator Blowoff Tank Condensers l# Steam Generator Sample Chiller Condenser L ,- Turbine Oil Coolers
~
Waste _ Evaporator Overhead Condenser
- l 1.-
I
,~
l-A f 4
u ::-
Fs;;
- d. {.
'i.-
. r.
]
- r. -
2-8 CYWSWSI/JVB/003089 1
- l. - _ _ . - - - _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ . - - - - _ - _ . - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _
[' Je .a p .,
l 5:* ,
.3? FLUID SYSTEMS EVALUATION 3.1 OVERVIEW .
A system' flow evaluation was performed for the Haddam Neck SWS to determine the available flows to each servics1. component for all
-limiting system alignments. Various normal and accident condition alignments were evaluated with conservative assumptions made to assure that system performance for all design basis events were enveloped by these flow network cc1culations. The assumptions-made on system alignments and component performance are subsequently described in Section 3.2 The flow network calculations were performed using' a model of the Haddam Neck SWS which was created within the PEGISYS computer program. The PEGISYS program performs flow network and heat transfer calculations based on user inputs of flowpath resistances, pump head-flow data and heat loads. Within PEGISYS, pumps are specified as operating or not with normal or minimum pump curves, valves are opened or closed, and boundary conditions varied to simulate any system configuration.- The Haddam Neck SWS was modeled using as-built piping data, manufacturer's component data, and plant test data. Although not used for validation purposes, results of preliminary calculations using the PEGISYS model compared very closely to results of similar calculations performed by NUSCO, and to existing operating data.
The PEGISYS computer program has been used extensively for evaluations of service water and component cooling water systems, along with various NSSS systems, for plants including Millstone 3, Indian Point (NYPA and Conn. Ed.), Turkey Point (FP&L), and Palisades (Consumers Power). Also, the sub-programs and
- methodologies used in PEGISYS have been derived from other.
.c Westinghouse programs in use for 20 years and compared with actual
, plant test data.
cvWsW53/JWB/063DB9 3-1
1 .
+ ..
V Numerous' calculations were performed to determine flows through each system component for each potentially-limiting normal and design basis accident condition.
Calculations were' performed for the simulated normal conditions to predict-limiting flows to each serviced component. The results of these calculations, when combined with the conclusions of the component evaluations are used to determine that the SWS is an adequate-heat sink-for normal operations with 95 0F river water.
For the simulated accident conditions, each calculation .
k' .or run represents a potentially limiting case for components with a safety function to perform. For these accident cases, a single active failure is assumed as-discussed in Appendix A. Active. failures considered included the failure of a pump to provide flow, a powered valve to move, a EDG to provide power, or a electrical system failure causing the loss of AC power on one electrical division. Table A-1 from the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis in Appendix A outlines the potential post accident SWS alignments which could result from any.
single active failure. From Appendix A, the potentially limiting system alignments were chosen.
, af l
5 9
e 1 l 2-. . . .
.~-
3-2
~
'CYW5W53/JWB/063089
_ ____1______________ . _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ . _
j
h .o . .l B. ASSUMPTIONS APPLIED TO THE SWS FLOW EVALUATION
- 1. All valves in the system are in either a full; open or fully closed position, with the exception of the following valves .
~
which are assumed to be throttled.
.j
- a. V-133, V-134: CCW HX discharge throttle valves. Throttle position limits for these valves are determined in this evaluation and are discussed.in Section 3.4.
- b. V-250A, V-2508: RHR HX discharge throttle valves. Throttle position is locked in place and assumed to correspond to a Cv of 369.
- c. V-264, V266, V268, V270: CAR Fan discharge throttle valves. Throttle position limits for these valves are determined in this evaluation and are discussed in Section :
3.3.
- 2. The following components are assumed to be isolated during all operations for this evaluation. l
- a. E-14-IA, Boron Evaporator Overhead Candenser (Ref. 3)
- b. E-93, Waste Evaporator Overhead Condenser (Ref. 3)
- c. E-15-1A Boron Recovery Distillate Cooler (Ref. 3)
- d. E-60-1B Turbine Oil Cooler (only one is used at a time per Reference 4).
l
- 3. The " Plate Type" Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Heat Exchanger (E-10-1B) will be assumed to operate during all accident conditions. The-
"Shell and Tube" SFP HX (E-10-1A) has a higher flow resistance, and would therefore draw less flow from the safety related ;
components needed to mitigate an accident. To be conservative !
and to allow for operational flexibility, the plate heat l exchanger will be assumed on line and the shell and tube assumed ]
isolated for accident analysis purposes.
~
CYW5W53/JWB/0E3CB9 3-3
. o V'.
- 4. Fire' hoses of 2-1/2 inch diameter are added just upstream of MOVs 1 & 2 and lead to the inlet of the Closed Cooling Water (CWS)_HXs (Ref. 3). . These fire. hoses are' assumed to be always open. The normal CWS service water flowpaths from the turbine .
building header are isolated. With this lineup, service water will be supplied to the closed cooling heat exchangers with and l
[' without MOVs 1 and 2 closed.
According to available operating information, these CWS HXs do not 'use service water at elevated temperatures. ' A well water system would be in use before service water temperature increases to 85 0F.- The modeling of flow diverted-from safety related components to the CWS HXs during accident mitigation represent additional conservatism for the 950F service water
. evaluation.
- 5. A resistance is calculated for the paths from the SWS headers to the Hypochlorite System and the Circulating Water Pump Glands based on continuous normal operating flows of 80 gpm combined.
The 80 gpm flow rate represents the nominal flow combined through both flowpaths according to FSAR Table 9.2-1. This is a minor SW flow; inaccuracies in this flow assumption have no affect on the conclusions reached in this study.
- 6. The Electrical Auxiliary Steam Generator Feedwater Pump is assumed to have no flow resistance across it, so as to conservatively overestimate flow through it.
- 7. The backwash flow control valves for both Adams Filters are
- assumed to be fully open in all cases. This assumption envelopes any leakage through or inadvertent opening of the 3
~, isolated filter backwash flowpath. f bl , ,
J 8. It is assumed that the valve leading from downstream of the
. isolated Adams Filter (FL-53-1A or B) to the SFP HX header is also isolated. This would prevent any flow from passing througt}
the filter.
CYWSW53/Jw2/053389 3-4
I
- s. w
- ,e
- 9. Tube plugging (or clogging by unwanted silt) is treated as a variable. For the accident condition alignments, each safety related component is assumed to have 10% tube plugging or flowpath blockage, except for the CARS, whose tube plugging and fouling are treated as variables, the plate type SFP HX which is assumed to have a 10% loss in available surface area, and'.the RHR pump cooling package which had its hydraulic resistance-increased by 10% for conservatism. The non-safety
-related components are only assumed to have~ their tubes plugged for one case, which is performed to determine flows during normal operations.
- 10. All calculations summarized in this report were performed assuming the extreme low river level of -2.5 feet MSL as shown on the service water pump specification (Reference 5).
Additional calculations were performed assuming the river level to be -5.0 feet MSL, in order to determine the impact of such low levels on flow availability. However, Haddam Neck experiences the lowest river water levels during the winter months, when water temperatures are obviously lower. SWS cooling capacity is tremendously improved at the low temperature conditions experienced in the winter. These calculations demonstrated that the -5 feet river elevation has very little impact on SWS flows, and the final conclusions of this report are unaffected.
- ' 11. The service water flowpaths to each of the following components are assumed to be open for each alignment evaluated within this report.
- a. P-32-IC, Electric Auxiliary S. G. Feedwater Pump
- b. E-25-1A, Main Steam Sample Cooler
- c. E-11-1A, Primary Drains Tank Vent Condenser y' d. E-16-1A, Steam Generator Sample Chiller Condenser
- e. E-78-1A, Boric Acid Tank Vent Condenser
~ .' f. E-70-1A/1B, Closed Cooling System Heat Exchangers (alternate pathway supply hoses) '
tuswss/ss/osaces 3-5
a 4
- 12. For cases where service water pump runout /NPSH was a concern, the maximum acceptable pump curves were used, as established by the In-Service Inspection (ISI) test, Reference 8. For cases where obtaining adequate flow to components was a concern, the minimum acceptable pump curves based on the ISI program were used. The A and B pumps are both stronger than the C and D pumps. Therefore, if only two pumps must be assumed to be operating, the A and B pumps are assumed to be y operating when pump runout is a concern. The C and D pumps are assumed to be operating for all cases when minimum flows are determined.
I
- 13. The elevations of SW discharge headers.were increased in various cases. PEGISYS models all piping as water solid.
However, vertical runs of large pipe leading to the discharge tunnel may not be water solid depending on the flow rates and h geometry of the piping system. When this happens, the atmospheric boundary pressure is improperly assigned at the low elevation of the end of the pipe, resulting in higher flows than can be realistically expected because a siphoning effect would not be as great. -
i
- a. For all accident alignments evaluated, except for Run ISA which maximizes pump runout, the discharge elevation of j
" the last point on the Primary Aux. Bldg. discharge header is raised from 9 ft to 16.9 ft. There is a 180 ft run of pipe at the 16.9 ft elevation before the vertical turn l down to the discharge tunnel. Thus, it is conservative to assume that atmospheric pressure exists at this 16.9 ft elevation. Flows to all safety related components which discharge via this header (CAR Fan and Motor Coolers, RHR HXs and Pumps, and SFP HXs), are decreased due to this assumption.
1* e CYWSWS3/JWB/053089 3-6
I b. cThe' discharge elevation of the piping downstream of the
. A/C' condensers'(C-10-1A,'C-11-1A, C-12-1A) and Turbine Oil Coolers (E-60-1A/1B), has been elevated from 12.5 ft to 25
' ft .for cases when the turbine header isolation fails .
(i.e., SW-MOV-1 or'2 open).. Without this change, PEGISYS will not run due to negative absolute pressures being calculated at the high elevations of the A/C Condensers.
Realistically, atmospheric pressure must exist somewhere upstream of the piping outlet to:the' discharge tunnel.
- This'is a realistic assumption and has no' affect on the conclusions. reached in this evaluation.
l:
e i
~l f,
e
', [.
- CYW5W53/JWB/0E3089 3-7
___:_i__.___.__ m_ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ _____ _ _ _ __m _______________.._________._________.____._-____u_.___...__________________m__._ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. .e
+ .
3.3 DESCRIPTION
OF PEGISYS RUNS (Normal'Doeration and ECCS)
The PEGISYS flow network calculations are discussed below. _ Brief summaries of. the individual runs are provided in which the plant ,
f conditions and assumed failures are identified. Table 3-1 I summarizes the SWS alignments for each calculation performed.
Table 3-2 tabulates the predicted flows through each component for each alignment.-
f Assumptions made in these PEGISYS runs include various levels of-heat exchanger and cooler tube plugging, CAR fan cooler discharge throttle valve positions, and either normal or degraded service water pump curves. The tube plugging and valve position assumptions are based on minimizing flow to various safety related components for each system alignment. In this way, available flows to each component are calculated under the most limiting conditions.
In the case of the Emergency Diesel Generators however, it was deemed unnecessary to minimize flow for each alignment. Results showed that roughly double the minimum required flow was available to the diesels for each alignment. Minor system or component alterations will not significantly decrease this margin.
Special consideration is also given to the CAR Frn Coolers. The
,_- heat duty on the coolers can significantly impact flow through the
- both the fan and fan motor coolers. With high post-accident containment temperature and heat loads, the resulting service
. water temperature and pressure conditions downstream of the CAR
,; , Fan Coolers indicate two phase flow. Two phase flow in the piping downstream of the operating CAR (s) adds a large pressure drop.
PEGISYS does not perform two phase flow calculations.
Q*
(
^l ,
i,
- C CNSWS3/JWB/063089 3-8 e
__m_______ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ . _ . - - _ - _ - . _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ _ - . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
s .
.= .
The service water. outlet temperature downstream of the CARS is a function of flow rate and fouling facter, given constant temperature and required heat duty. Clean CAR units (Zero fouling) require lower flow rates, but result in higher outlet temperatures and higher flow resistances due to the increased percentage of steam in the 2-phase flow. A higher fouling factor decreases the heat transfer capability and the demands increased flow rates, but results in lower flow resistance due to lower outlet temperatures
- and a lower percentage of steam.
The optimal conditions for modeling the CAR Fan Coolers and their discharge piping was determined through an iterative process.
Variables included levels of tube plugging (or clogging), throttle positions for the discharge ball valves, and fouling factor. The component requirements have been established as follows:
- a. Maximum flow through the CARS should be restricted to maintain velocity through the tubes below 10 ft/sec, to address erosion concerns of long term reliability.
- b. Minimum flow through the CARS must be adequate for removal of 26.5 MBTU/hr with a containment ambient temperature of 2610F (Reference 3).
- c. The allowable tube plugging percentage and fouling factor should be as high as possible to permit operational flexibility.
The CAR Fan Coolers' discharge throttle valves are used to govern flow through the coolers to meet these requirements. These ball valves (SW-V-264, 266, 268, and 270) have a full open CV of 1400.
An allowable range of throttle positions was determined to meet the three requirements above. The model . assumes that these valves are set at identical positions (degrees open). Therefore, all four valves will have identical Cv's CYWSWS3/JWB/053ce9 3-9 L-_-__-- - - - - i
. e
~
l An upper limit Cv of 300 for the ball valves was determined in order l1 to limit tube velocities to less than 10 f/s with 15% tube {
plugging. With lower tube plugging levels assumed, increased flow l l
rates and Cvs could be permitted. The Section 4 CAR Fan Cooler ]
evaluation includes a table with maximum allowable flows vs. percent tube plugging.
l The lower limit on ball valve open degree was dictated by the l accident condition containment heat removal requirements. The maximum allowable tube plugging limit and fouling factor chosen for 95 F operation was 5% and .0029 respectively. These were determined to be the the maximum permissible while still leaving a sufficient range for allowable throttle valve pcsitions. Fouling factors varying between 0 and .0029 were enveloped.
The minimum allowable valve Cv was calculated by combining results from PEGISYS runs with separate hand calculations for the two phase flow pressure drop across the valves. First the Cv of 145 was chosen for input to PEGISYS in order to establish the hydraulic resistance needed to obtain the minimum required flow through the CAR Fan Coolers in the limiting SWS alignments. This minimum required flow was predetermined in the Section 4 CAR Fan Cooler evaluation, and is based on the assumed fouling and plugging limits of .0029 and 5%. Separate two phase flow calculations were then performed (using flow and pressure data from the PEGISYS computer output) to determine the throttle valve position required to obtain the minimum required flow rate given the increased hydraulic resistance of the two phase flow condition.
- l. The results showed that the valves must be opened to a Cv greater :
than 180 to permit adequate post accident containment cooling.
l p ,
Considering the uncertainty of the two phase flow calculations, 1 conservatism requires that the valves be set to a position of no
, less than a Cv of 200.
i e
(_
- v tvwsss3/,:we/cs30e9 3-10 l
l i
. 1 To summarize CAR cooler ball valve position requirements, a CV of 300 is applied for runs where it is conservative to maximize flow to the CARS. For runs where'it is conservative to minimize flow to the CARS, a CV of 68 (clean unit) or'145 (fouled unit) .is applied .
if the CAR'is operating, and a CV of 170 (clean unit) or 180
. (fouled unit) is applied if the CAR is not operating, reflecting
.the difference of two-phase vs. liquid flow equivalent Cv.
The Cv's assumed.for each case are identified in. Table 3-1.
1
,a l
l l.
l Jl f ,
CW5453/JWB/063029 3-11
-__-____________-n
. 4 e
Run 1A l
The SWS.is in the ECCS injection lineup,:with normal power available. The assumed failure is I?ss of an electrical bus
[, resulting in the loss of two SW pumps and two CAR Fan Coolers.
Both operable SW pumps and CAR Fans are assumed to be running. The safety related components requiring flow are the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs), the CAR Fan Coolers and their motor coolers.
The minimum allowable throttle valve position on the CAR cooler discharge throttle valves is assumed. .
Run 24 k
The SWS is again in the ECCS injection lineup, with normal power available. The assumed failure is the failure of MOV-2 to close, which leaves the turbine header open. All four SW pumps and CAR Fans are assumed to be operating. The safety related components requiring flow are the EDGs, the CAR Fan Coolers and their motor coolers. The minimum allowable throttle positions on the CAR cooler discharge throttle valves is assumed.
Run 3
'j.,
The SWS is in the ECCS recirculation lineup, with normal power
~- available. The assumed failure is the failure of MOV-5 to open, which results in only one RHR heat exchanger available to cool the
/- sump recirculation flow needed for core cooling. All SW pumps and CAR Fans are assumed to be operating. The intent of this run is to
< calculate the flow rates needed to determine the RHR HX 7 ,.
recirculation cooling performance, as the uncooled recirculation
, sl flow running through inoperable RHR HX mixes with the cooled flow
-[ running through the operable HX. The maximum allowable positions 4[i ~
on the CAR cooler throttle valves is assumed in order to minimize flow to the RHR HX. ,
CYWSVS3/JVB/063089 3-12
p .. .
+
g Run AB and 4G The~SWS is in the lineup for ECCS injection with coincident Loss of Normal Power (LNP). The assumed failure is the loss of an-i Emergency. Diesel Generator. Only one SW pump and.one CAR Fan are
- assumed to be operating. The safety related components requiring flow are the EDGs, the CAR Fan Cooler and its motor cooler. The minimum allowable positions.on the CAR cooler throttle . valves are assumed. This 'run is among the worst cases for containment. heat removal performance.
Run 4B models CAR Fan Coolers with 5% tube plugging and no fouling. Run 4G models the CAR Fan Coolers with 5% tube plugging 2
and with a fouling factor = .0029 Ft -Hr OF/ BTU. The input Cvs for the CAR Fan Cooler discharge throttle valves are different as required by the different 2-phase flow pressure drops. Otherwise, runs 4B and 4G are identical.
Run 5 The SWS is in the lineup for ECCS injection with coincident LNP.
The assumed failure is the failure of MOV-1 to close. Two SW pumps and two CAR Fans are assumed to be operating. The safety related components requiring flow are the EDGs, the CAR Fan Coolers and their motor coolers. The minimum allowable positions on the CAR throttle valves are assumed. This run is among the worst cases for
^
containment heat removal performance. CAR Fan Cooler flows and
~
throttle valve Cvs are verified using specific calculations for two phase ficw pressure drops.
.. 1
^. ,
,' 4
. CYVSwS3/JWB/CE3089 3-13
- . . 1
- i l
Ru.a It The SWS is in the. lineup for..ECCS recirculation with LNP. The-1- assumed. failure could be either the loss 'of an EDG or loss of an .
- electrical bus, both resulting in the loss of two SW pumps 'and two j
' CAR Fan: Coolers. Two SW pumps and two CAR. Fans are assumed ~to be S -operating. The safety related components requiring- flow;are the
'EDGs, the. CAR Fan Coolers and their motor coolers, the RHR heat exchangers and t5e RHR pumps. The intent of this run is to verify adequate flow to the CAR coolers and. motor coolers, so the CAR
' throttle valves are assumed to be in their minimum position.
'~ f Ng.11:
J During ECCS recirculation, the availability of normal power results in a more limiting alignment for SWS flow capability than if normal power had been lost, when an EDG failure is compared to an electrical bus failure. The number of pumps and CAR Fans operating is the same with or without normal power. The only difference in the alignments is the status of the screenwash booster pump, which is assumed to continue operating while normal power is available.
With the booster pump running, its flow is diverted from the safety related components.
. 4, Run 7 This case is the same as Run 6, except that the intent is to verify adequate flow to the RHR HXs, the RHR Pumps, and the Emergency Diesel Generators. Therefore, the CAR throttle valves are assumed
? to be in their maximum open position.
Y/:
'i 3 L^, a N! '
al .
gn ",
CWSV53GE/063089 3-14 4
as .--
~
-.o.
BE_A The SWS is in the . lineup for ECCS recirculation with normal power
~
available. The assumed failure-is the failure of MOV-2 to close. .
$ All four SW pumps and CAR Fans are assumed to be operating. The l: ;
safety related components requirirg flow'are the EDGs, the CAR Fan Coolers and their motor coolers, the RHR heat exchangers and the l RHR' pumps. The intent of this run is.to verify that adequate. flow is available to the EDGs, RHR HXs, and RHR Pumps. The CAR throttle
- valves are assumed to be in their maximum open position. Run 8 is less severe than Run 10, which has the same lineup but with only 3
, ; pumps operating, although all four should be operable.
Ryn 9 This case demonstrates the'same alignment as in Run 8, except that only three service water pumps are running and the minimum allowable CAR throttle valve positions were assumed. The intent of
'this run is to both verify adequate flow to the CARS with posi-accidentheatloads,andtodeterminewhetherthefourthSW pump is needed when the assumed failure is turbine header failure to isolate. This run is provided for information, as the alignment considered is more onerous than'would exist.
Run 9A This case demonstrates the same alignment as in Run 8, except that the minimum allowable CAR throttle valve positions are assumed.
The intent of this run is to identify the flow available to the CARS with post-accident heat loads. . Adequate flow to the CARS has
,\ already demonstrated in Run 9 using this same alignment with only 3
.' SW pumps.
~;
CYVSWS3/JdB/063089 3-15
L . i Run 10 This case is the sarre as Run 8 (ECCS recirculation with normal I power available and failure of MOV-2) except.that only three ,
1 service water pumps are running. Maximum allowable CAR throttle J valve positions were assumed in order to minimize flow to the EDGs, RHR HXs, and RHR Pumps. The intent of this run is to determine whether the fourth SW pump is needed when the turbine header fails to isolate. This run is provided for information, as the alignment considered is more onerous than would exist.
.. Run 11A )
This case demonstrates the same alignment as in Run 8 (recirculation with normal power), except that the assumed failure is the failure of MOV-3 to close. The intent of this run is to demonstrate that failure of MOV-1 or 2 to close (leaving the turbine header open) is more limiting than the failure of MOV-3 to close (leaving the CCW HX flowpath open).
Run 12C The SWS is in the lineup for ECCS recirculation with coincident LNF. The assumed /ailure is the failure of MOV-2 to close. This run is identical to Run 9A, except the loss of normal power results in two differences. First, the screenwash booster pump loses
.' power, enabling more flow to go to the safety related components.
However, only two CAR Fans are operating until 15 minutes into the event, at which time the third CAR Fan would be operating. (The first two are loaded automatically to the diesels, with the third
' loaded 15 minutes into the event.)
0';
CYWSV53/JWB/CS3089 3-16 hu-------______.___... _ _ _
3 Run-13 The SWS is in the ECCS recirculation lineup, with normal power
' available. The assumed failure is .the loss of an electrical bus resulting in the loss of two SW pumps and two CAR Fans. Two SW pumps would be operating. However, three CAR Fans may be assumed to be cperating, because 10 minutes into the event the swing CAR Fan is loaded onto the operable electrical bus. The safety related
, a components requiring flow are the EDGs, the CAR Fan coolers and their motor coolers, the RHR HXs, and the RHR pumps. In this run, the minimum allowable CAR throttle valve position was assumed to verify adequate flow to the CAR Fan Coolers and their motor coolers with post-accident heat loads.
Run 14 This run is the same as Run 13, except that the maximum allowable CAR throttle valve position is assumed to minimize flow to the l EDG_s, RHR HXs, and the RHR pumps.
Run 14A This run is the same as Run 14, except that the RHR HXs are assumed
- to be clean and unfouled, thus minimizing the hydraulic l
^
resistance. The intent of this run is to demonstrate adequate
! cooling flow to the RHR pumps. The driving head for flow to the
- - RHR pumps is provided only by the pressure drop of the service water flow across the RHR HXs. By minimizing this hydraulic
-resistance in a SWS alignment which produces a conservatively low
. flow to the RHR HXs, the minimum cool.ing water flow available to
'. the RHR pumps is established.
. q
- 4 4 j J
I CYWSWS3/JWB/063089 3-17 C_______:______._
i .
[ - .
t j-l Run ISA t
This case represents the most limiting SW pump runout scenario.
The SWS begins in a normal operating lineup with all components in .
a maximum demand condition. A SIAS immediately isolates the Steam Generator Blowoff Tank Condensers and starts the diesels causing
- their service water flowpaths to open. There are no other immediate changes in the system alignment. However, a timer is set so that within one minute of receipt of the SIAS, MOVs-1 and 2 will close to isolate the turbine header. The assumed failure which leads to a potential runout problem is an electrical bus failure resulting in the loss of two SW pumps. This run simulates the l' maximum flow conditions for that first minute while MOVs-1 and 2 are open. As the strongest service water pump pair, P-37-1A and 18 '
are assumed to be running. P-37-1B is the strongest of the two, ';o to maximize the runout condition, IB is assumed to be operating at its non-degraded pump curve, and 1A is assumed to be degraded.
Run 16 The SWS is in the ECCS injection lineup, with normal power l' available. The assumed failure is the loss of an electrical bus resulting in the loss of two SW pumps and two CAR Fans. Both
- l. operable SW pumps and CAR Fans are assumed to be running. The safety related components requiring flow are the EDGs, the CAR Fan Coolers, and their motor coolers. The minimum allowable throttle valve position on the CAR Cooler discharge throttle valves is assumed.
h l
.! } ;
,l ' l d'
l? . ' ,
CYWSW53/JWB/063089 3-18
f
. , e .
The above description is the 3:m as for Run 1. ?he difference in this run is that there is no assumption of 2-phase flow downstream of the operating CARS. The Cvs input to PEGISYS for the operating CAR coolers' df scharge throttle valves represents the actual valve -
position Cv, rather than the lower Cvs simulating 2-phase flow.
The intent of this run is to determine the minimum flow available to the CAR Fan Coolers under conditions where the containment temperature and heat load are less than that which causes 2-phase flow in the downstream piping.
- 1 p
- r.
, . e CYWSW13/.TWB/063DB9 3-19 1.
I _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
l l NORMAL OPERATIONS ALIGNMENTS Run N1 The SWS is in a normal alignment for power operations with elevated service water temperatures. This run represents the maximum flow
. demand in the service water system. All four SW pumps are assumed to be running at their maximum degraded output. The screenwash boostar pumps are assumed to be running, the maximum allowable
. throttle positions (Cv=300) of the CAR cooler discharge throttle valves (SW-V-264, 266, 268, 270) are assumed, and no component tube plugging or clogging is assumed. Also, the CCW discharge throttle valves (SW-V-133,134) are assumed to be throttled to a CV of 750, (only one HX is on line). The plate type spent fuel heat exchanger was assumed to be in use, because there is less hydraulic resistance across it'than the shell and tube type HX. The intent of this run is to detennine how much flow is available to each SWS component for comparison to the required flows of each component during normal operations.
Run N2 ,
This run was not used in this evaluation.
Run N3
- This case is the same as Run N1, except that the shell and tube spent fuel heat exchanger is in operation, with 10% of its tubes
- assumed to be plugged. This case represents the lowest predicted flow to the shell and tube SFP HX during normal operations, and is used to compare with required flows to this component.
~
4 i' y
'f:
A 39 tvW5W53/JWE/0 0 029 3-20
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ . - __ _ _ _ _ _ -- __ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ --._ _ _ . - _ _ .- _ J
1 o .
lI 1
Run NA This case demonstrates more representative SWS operational o characteristics at elevated river temperatures and with a clean ,
l system, and is similar to Case N1 with the following exceptions.
a.- The screenwash booster pump is not operating and is isolated.
l: c. The CAR discharge throttle valves are set with a CV of 240.
(This is an assumed position with the valves opened roughly in the middle of their operational range).
- d. Flow through the S/G Blowoff Tank Condensers is specified as 500 gpm. (This flow rate is r.hosen as a higher value than would be required or expected, as discussed in Section 4, but lower than calculated in the other normal runs).
l This case is not as limiting as Run 1, but may present a more realistic picture of SWS operations at elevated river water temperatures. Run N4 is presented for information only.
~
Run NS The plant is assumed to be shut down following a full core offload to'the spent fuel pool. The primary responsibility of the SWS is to provide flow to the SFP plate type heat exchanger, with the shell
~
l~ and tube SFP HX isolated. The turbine header is assumed to remain open, with throttle valves limiting flow to the turbine oil cooler, seal oil coolers, and generator hydrogen coolers to one half their required flows during power operations. All four (degraded) SW pumps and the screenwash booster pump are operating. SWS component receiving service water in this case are the same as in Run N1
[
except for the S/G Blowoff Tank Condensers. All components are
~
-, assumed to be clean and unplugged except for the SFP HX, which is
, assumed to have an increased hydraulic resistance corresponding to a
- 10% decrease in flow area. Throttle valve positions for the CCW and
. CAR throttle valves are the same as those used in Run 1.
. CYW5V5.5/JWB/0E3089 3-21
. . i V ..
Run N6 This run models a loss of normal power with a diesel failure, with the intent of determining the service water flow available to the .
- plate type SFP HX. Service water is isolated from the turbine
^
header, RHR HXs, and the S/G Blowoff Tank Condensers. The screenwash booster pump is not running, although it is not isolated as valve 5W-PCV-606 is assumed to be open. One CCW heat exchanger is assumed to be operating, with its throttle valve 300open. (A LNP'would isolate both CCW HXs, so this assumption of the CCWS operating represents a conservative alignment for minimizing flows to the SFP HX.) All components are assumed to be clean and unplugged except for the SFP HX, which is assumed to have an increased hydraulic resistance corresponding to a 10% decrease in flow area.
Run N7 This run was not used in.this evaluation.
Run N8 The SWS is assumed to be in a normal alignment identical to that in
- Run 1, except that both CCW HXs are in operation with their throttle valves (SW-V-133,134) fully opened. The intent of this run is to determine how much service water flow is available to the CCW HXs for a normal plant cooldown using the CCWS and RHRS to cool the RCS
. during plant shutdown. The alignment presented in this run is.very conservative, because SWS normal flowpaths are assumed to be fully opened as during normal power operations. Actually, there should be very little flow through the turbine header, with the turbine / generator shut down. .
1.
7 CWSW53/.NB/003029 3-22
S- 0 .g .
q e' * ,
Run N9 This case is identical to Run N1 except that all. components,
- with the exception of the CAR Fan Coolers, are assumed to have ,
l: 10% of their tubes plugged. The CAR Fart Coolers are assumed to have 5% of their tubes plugged, and fouled with a fouling
~
i . factor = .0029 Ft2-Hr OF/ BTU. The intent of this run is to-demonstrate the flows available to SWS components when each is' uniformly plugged or clogged.
m
-at
~w ,
4 1 ,
s {, ,
. O
. c usws3/.wetocaces 3-23
, y A~ . .
1 L
~v
+ i
- s .I ,
3.4 RESULTS OF FLOW EVALUATION l The computer runs described in Section C and rummarized in Tables 3-1 and 3-2 are used to predict flows to each SWS component. Some ,
of these runs are also used to establish throttle valve. positions,
- , ' pump runout conditions, or required flowpath alignments.. First, before any of these final runs could be performed, some
[
!! preliminary evaluation of the CAR Fan Cooler operations was required.
1 CCW Discharce Throttle Valve Limits
- Some of the accident conditions alignments evaluated included runs with one CCW HX open, either during ECCS injection phase with normal power, or by failure to close. In each of these cases, the
- assumed maximum throttle position for valves SW-V-133 or SW-V-134 corresponded to a CV of 950. If the results of these calculations for accident condition alignments are to envelope operations with two CCW HXs in operation, then the maximum allowable throttle positions for two HX operation correspond to a Cv of 450. Valves IL '5'W-V-133 and 134 have a safety related funttion to limit flow in the event of an accident when this flowpath is not isolated, 4
l The normal operations alignments were also evaluated with one CCW HX in operation. In these runs, the maximum assumed throttle
-; position for valves SW-V-133 and 134 corresponded to a Cv of 750.
': - ' If the results of these calculations for normal condition l alignments are to envelope operations with two CCW HXs in operation, then the corresponding throttle positions for two HX
- operation correspond to a Cv of 361.
I el
- J '
l ,4 :
g .:
L -
1 ,
7
' ^
Ct 643/Je%/DE3DB9 3-24 l~
l^
l l
l
(: 4 v*
However, these limits of 750 and 361 are only significant in that.
- adequate How may not be available to other SWE components during normal operations.if these limits are exceeded. The maximum allowable tv's for these valves during normal operation are 950/450 .
as identified previously. This maximum allowable setting.is based on acceptable SWS performance during accident.conditicas. The determination of the optimal setting within the limits of the maximum settings should be made by the plant operators based on the cooling water requirements of the plant as a whole.
During. normal plant cooldown operations using the RHR and CCW systems, valves SW-V-133 and 134 may be opened as required to obtain desion service water flow to the CCW HXs. The full open
~
position is the maximum allowable with respect to SWS operational requirements during normal cooldown. Other constraints such as tube vibration limits may prevent these valves from bei_ng fully opened, depending on SWS alignments and the number of pumps running. Design service water flow to the CCW HXs is 7500 GPM.
Run N8 demonstrated that even greater flows are available.
Q Lq.glated F1ows Tables 3-1 and 3-2 list the flows to each SWS component for each normal and accident condition alignment identified in Section 3.3.
The resulting flows to the safety related components during accident conditions are discussed below. The required flows are also addr'essed briefly. Required flows are addressed in greater detail in Section 4 of this report.
- 1. Emeroency Diesel Generators The minimum required flow to the diesel generators is 400 gpm.
In all cases, this flow requirement was far exceeded by the c -
calculated results. The minimum calculated flow was 752 gpm from Run 5. (Run 15A is for a pump run-out evaluation and ,
f would last for less than one minute.)
CYW543/JWB/063089 3-25
4 4
. . 1
- 2. ' CAR F'an Coolers.
The minimum required flow to the CARS with 5% tube plugging and no fouling is 326 gpm. The minimum calculated flow to the CARS ,
in this condition was 332 spm* in Run 4B, and the subsequent m
two phase flow calculations nowed that this flow would be Lchievable with a throttle valve CV of about 150, which is less than the assumed 170.
The minimum required flow with 5% tube plugging and a fouling
^ 2 OF/ BTU is 478 gpm. The minimum factor of .0029 Ft -Hr
- calculated flows to the CARS in this condition were 480 gpm*
,'^ in Run IA and 481 gpm* in Runs 4G,-and 5. Run IA is not a limiting case because there were two CAR Fans operable during 6he injection phase of ECCS operation, versus only one in run.
4G. 'The subsequent two phase flow calculations showed that these flows would be achieved with a throttle valve Cv of greater than 180.
Thus, based on the throttle valves' Cvs needed to achieve the
~
required' flows, the case with a fouling _ factor of .0029 is more limiting than the unfouled condition.
(* This is a conservative estimate, see Section 6 for a full discussion)
') 3. CAR Fan Motor Coolers The minimum required flow as defined in the Section 4 component evaluation is 20 gpm. The minimum calculated flow was 20.5 gpm J per Run 48. However, this calculated value is very
< conservative. The CAR Fan Cooler discharge throttle valve's (I
actual position which corresponds to this case was determined as a Cv less than 150 in the "two phase flow / required valve y,,' position" calculations discussed in Section 3.3. The actual Cv
-/- must be greater than 180. Thus, more than 20.5 gpm will be ,
available to the CAR Fan Motor Coolers.
tvwsws3/ m iocyms 3-26
, . 1 I
I
- 4. RHR Heat Exchanaers The most limiting calculated flowrate to the RHR heat exchangers during post-accident recirculation was from Run 3, where only one heat exchanger receives service water flow due to a failure of the isolation valve (SW-MOV-5 or 6) to open. With one RHR pump feeding both RHR HXs, only half of the RHR pump's output is being cooled. resulting in the highest recirculation temperature due to mixing of cooled and uncooled water. In this case, the calculated service water flow to the single RHR HX was 2569 gpm, while required flow is 1650 gpm per Section 4. The minimum available SW flow during ECCS recirculation while both RHR HXs are operating was 1920 gpm per operating HX from Run 14, while the required flow is 430 gpm.
- 5. RHR pumos The minimum required cooling water flow to the RHR pumps is 1.0 gpm per pump. Tne minimum calculated flow to the RHR pumps
__during recirculation was 3.5 gpm per pump from Run 14A.
- 6. Service Water Pumos Run 15A simulates an alignment which could exist for the first minute after a safety injection signal is generated, prior to closure of MOVs 1 and 2. Pumps A and B run out to 8200 and 8770 gpm respectively, based on a degraded A pump and a non-degraded B pump. Runout at 9000 gpm for one minute has been evaluated as an acceptable condition by the service water pump manufacturer, as discussed in the Section 4 component evaluation.
s CYW5W53/JWB/063089 3-27
l f
I TABLE 3-1
}{RVICE WATER SYSTEM ALIGNMENTS l
COMPONENT / VALVE ACCIDENT CASES IDENTIFICATION /
1A 2A 3 4B 4G 5 6 7 8 9 9A 10 DESCRIPTION SW PUMPS X 0 X 0 X
{
P-37-1A X 0 0 X X X X P-37-1B X 0 0 X X X X X 0 0 0 0 P-37-1C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 P-37-ID 0 0 0 X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
__ J 0 0 0 X X X X X 0 0 0 0 BOOSTER PUMP P-102-1A (1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PCV606 (Scr. wash nozzles)
A0V9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (SFP Hx )
MOV1 (Turbine Bldg.) X X X X X 0 X X X X X X MOV2 (Turbine Bldg.) X 0 X X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X X X X X X X X MOV3 (CCW Hx E-4-1B)(2) X X X X X X X X X X X X MOV4 (CCW Hx E-4-1A)
X X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV5 (RHR Hx E-5-1B) 0 0 X X 0 X X X 0 0 0 0 MOV6 (AHR Hx E-5-1A) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 FCV129 (EDG-HX-2A) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 FCV130 (EDG-HX-2B)
TV2365A/B (E-90-1A, -1B) X X X X X'X X X X X X X FAN COOLER LOADING 0 0 X X 0 0 0 0 E-37-1 (152-153) X X X X 0 0 E-37-2 (21-157) X 0 0 X X X X X 0 0 E-37-3 (148-155) 0 0 0 X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 E-37-4 (150-151)
THROTTLE VALVE POS (Cv)
V-264 180 145 300 170 180 180 180 300 300 145 145 300 V-266 180 145 300 170 180 180 180 300 300 145 145 300 V-268 145 145 300 170 180 145 145 300 300 145 145 300 V-270 145 300 68 145 145 145 300 300 145 145 300 l145
.y 0 - Open or Operating X - Closed or Not Operating ,
(1) The Screenwash Booster Pump loses power during a LNP event, and
. - its function is lost. However, valve SW-PCV-606 is not assumed to change position during any accident event, including during a LNP.
(2) CCW HX manual throttle valve Cv - 950.
j
{
3-28 l
- \
I 1
l .
1 TABLE 3-1 (con't)
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM AllGNMENTS
' COMPONENT / VALVE-ACCIDENT CASES IDENTIFICATION /-
DESCRIPTION 11A 12C 13 14 14A 15A 16 SW PUMPS P-37-1A 0 0 X X X 0 X P-37-1B 0 0 X X X 0 X P-37-lC 0 0 0 0 0 X' O P-37-ID 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 B0OSTER PUMP P-102-1A (1) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PCV606 (Scr. wash nozzles) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 A0V9 (SFP Hx )
MOV1 (Turbine Bldg.) X X X X X 0 X MOV2 (Turbine Bldg.) X 0 X X X 0 X 0 X .X X X 0 0 MOV3 (CCW Hx.E-4-1B)(2) X X X X X X X MOV4 (CCW Hx E-4-1A)
MOV5 (RHR Hx-E-5-1B) 0 0 0 0 0 X X 0 0 0 0 0 X X l MOV6 (RHR Hx E-S-1A)
I;V129 (EDG-HX-2A) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 FCV130 (EDG-HX-28) 0 0 0 0' O O O TV2365A/B (E-90-1A, -1B) X X X X X X- X FAN COOLER LOADING 0
0 X X X X X L E-37-1 (152-153) l E-37-2 (21-157) 0 X 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 E-37-3 (148-155) 0 E-37-4 (150-151) 0 0 0 0 0 X THROTTLE VALVE POS (Cv)
V-264 ,'00
- 180 180 300 300 300 180 V-266 300 180 145 300 300 300 180 V-268 300 145 145 300 300 300 180 V-270 300 145 145 300 300 300 180 0 = Open or Operating
- X = Closed or Not Operating
.- (1) The Screenwash Booster Pump loses power during a LNP event, and its function is lost. However, valve SW-PCV-606 is not assumed to
, change position during any accident event, including during a LNP.
^; (2) CCW HX manual throttle valve Cv - 950.
3-29
l TABLE 3-1 (con't)
SERVICE WATER SYSTEM ALIGNMENTS I
COMPONENT / VALVE NORMAL CASES l IDENTIFICATION /
DESCRIPTION N1 N3 N4 N5 N6 N8 N9 SW PUMPS P-37-1A 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 P-37-1B 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 P-37-1C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 P-37-ID 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 BOOSTER PUMP P-102-1A 0 0 X 0 X 0 0 PCV606 (Scr. wash nozzles) 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 A0V9 (SFP Hx ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV1 (Turbine Bldg.) 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 POV2 (Turbine Bldg.) 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 MOV3 (CCW Hx E-4-1B) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MOV4 X X X X X 0 X (CCW Hx E-4-1A)
X X X X X X X MOV5 (RHR Hx E-5-1B)
X X X X X X X MOV6 (RHR Hx E-5-1A)
FCV129 1EDG-HX-2A) X X X X 0 X X FCV130 (EDG-HX-2B) X X X X 0 X -X TV2365A/B (E-90-1A, -18) 0 0 0 X X 0 0 FAN COOLER LOADING E-37-1 (152-153) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 E-37-2 (21-157) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 E-37-3 (148-155) 0 0 0 0- 0 0 0 E-37-4 (150-151) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 THROTTLE VALVE POS (Cv)
V-264 300 300 240 300 300 300 300 V-266 300 300 240 300 300 300 300 V-268 300 300 240 300 300 300 300 V-270 300 300 240 300 300 300 300
_. 0 = Open or Operating X = Closed or Not Operating
, (3) CCW HX manual throttle valve Cv = 750 in these normal' alignments,
- except in case N8 where valve is fully open.
w
. 3-30
q TABLE 3-2 1A 2A 3 4B 0 6085 3297 0 SW PUMP (P-37-1A) (5-6) 0 6030 3372 0 SW PUMP (P-37-1B) (7-8) 6215- 4475 2556 6308 SW PUMP (P-37-1C) (9-10) 6328 4772 2375 0 SW PUMP (P-37-lD) (11-12) 1344 1397 1461 705 B00 STER PUMP (P-102-1A) (184-185)
HYP0CHL.& SW FILT (25-18)(28-17) 32/32 37/37 42/42 32/32 DG COOLING WATER HEAT EXCH.
803 904 1023 802 DG-HX-2A (46-44) 808 809 861 1030 DG-HX-2B (149-43) 0 97 0 0 A/C CR (C-11-1A) (53-54) 0 92 0 0 A/C CHEM. LAB. (C-12-1A) (53-54) 0 174 0 0 A/C OFF. BLDG. (C-10-1A) (50-23) _
CLOSED COOLING HEAT EXCH.
130 135 174 129 E-70-1A (192-31) 126 127 151 170 E-70-1B (194-31)
TURBINE OIL COOLERS 0 2489 0 0 E-60-1A (56-57) 0 0 0 0 E-60-1B (56-57)
GENERATOR HYDROGEN COOLERS 0 972 0 0 E-62-1A (82-83) 0 1039 0 0 E-62-1B (84-85) 0 891 0 0 E-62-1C (80-81) 0 925 0 0 E-62-10 (80-81)
HYDROGEN SEAL OIL COOLERS 0 180 0 0 E-61-1A (117-62) 0 106 0 0 E-61-1B (117-64)
ISOLATED PHASE BUS COOLERS 0 130 0 0 E-48-1A (69-76) 0 130 0 0 E-48-1B (69-76) 0 245 0 0
., MAIN EXC. COOL.(E-II5-IA) (86-87)
CCW HEAT EXCH 0 0 0 0 E-4-1A (91-140) 5630 6342 0 0 E-4-1B (94-139) .
3-31 L - .- --.- -.--- - - _---- - - __-- _-- _ - _
TABLE 3-2 (con't) i IA 2A 3 4B S/G BLOW 0FF TANK COND. 0 0 0 0 E-90-1A (101-102) 0 0 0 0 E-90-1B (101-177)
S/G SAMPLE CHILLER COND. 41 40 46 52 C-16-1A (124-141) 42 41 47 54 C-16-1B (123-143)
ADAMS FILTERS 3086 3402 4347 3050 FL-53-1A (135-121) 0 0 0 0 FL-53-1B (133-120) l FILTER BACKWASH LINE 263 297 339 267 FL-53-1A (135-40) 272 269 303 345 FL-53-1B (133-41)
SFP HEAT EXCH.
0 0 0 0 E-10-1A (125-126) 891 1009 1144 905 E-10-1B (127-129)
AUX FEED PUM9(P-32-lC)(188-144) 3.3 3.8 4.4 3.3 2.2 2.5 2.9 2.2 MSSC (E-25-1A) (188-190)
BAT VENT 40ND.(E-78-1A)(104-105) 2.5 2.9 3.3 2.6 RC RECIRC. AIR COOLING COILS 538 566 764 565 E-37-1 (152-153) 536 564 760 562 E-37-2 (21-157)
E-37-3 (148-155) 485 549 732 544 E-37-4 (150-151) 480 543 722 332 RC VENT FAN MOT. COOLING COILS E-77-1 (152-153) 36.2 38.1 51.4 34.9 E-77-2 (21-157) 36.0 38.0 51.2 34.7 E-77-3 (148-155) 32.6 36.9 49.3 33.6
, E-77-4 (150-151) 32.3 36.5 48.6 20.5 PDT VENT COND (E-11-1A)(ll8-142) 11.9 13.4 15.2 12.0 l
RHR HEAT EXCH.
E-5-1A (168-171) 0 0 2569 0 0 0 0 0 l' . E-5-1B (164-167)
RHR PUMPS P-14-1A (42-172) 0 0 7.3 0
- j. P-14-1B (42-172) 0 0 7.7 0 3-32 !
TABLE 3-2 (con't) l' 4G 5 6 7 0 0 0 0 SW PUMP (P-37-1A) (5-6)
~
0 0 0 0-SW PUMP (P-37-1B) (7-8) 6364 6315 5328 5416 SW PUMP (P-37-IC) (9-10) 0 6404 5466 5554
_ SW PUMP (P-37-10) (11-12) 700 715 787 783 B0OSTER PUMP (P-102-1A) (184-185) 4 HYP0CHL.& SW FILT (25-18)(28-17) 32/32 32/32 35/35 35/35 DG COOLING WATER HEAT EXCH.
796 752 868 863 DG-HX-2A (46-44) 801 804 874 868 DG-HX-2B (149-43) 0 81 0 0 A/C CR (C-11-1A) (53-54) 0 76 0 0 A/C CHEM. LAB. (C-12-1A) (53-54) 0 145 0 0 A/C 0FF. BLDG. (C-10-1A) (50-23)
CLOSED COOLING HEAT EXCH.
128 132 144 143 E-70-1A (192-31).
125 111 141 140 E-70-1B-(194-31)
TURBINE OIL COOLERS 0 2101 0 0 E-60-1A (56-57) 0 0 0 0 E-60-1B (56-57)
GENERATOR HYDROGEN COOLERS 0 848 0 0 E-62-1A (82-83) 0 0 906 0 E-62-1B-(84-85) 0 776 0 0 E-62-1C (80-81) 0 806 0 0 E-62 4D (80-81)
HYDROGEN SEAL OIL COOLERS 0 157 0 0 E-61-1A (117-62) 0 93 0 0 E-61-1B (117-64)
ISOLATED PHASE BUS COOLERS 0 114 0 0 E-48-1A (69-76) 0 114 0 0
./ E-48-1B (69-76) 0 214 0 0
, MAIN EXC. COOL.(E-II5-IA) (86-87)
~
-- CCW HEAT EXCH 0 0 0 0 E-4-1A (91-140)
- 0 0 0 0 E-4-1B (94-139)
- 3-33
L TABLE 3-2 (con't) 4G 5 6 7
~' S/G' BLOWOFF TANK COND. 0 0 0 0 E-90-1A (101-102) 0 0 0 0 .
E-90-lh (101-177) i S/G SAMPLE CHILLER COND. 43 41 41 43
. C-16-1A (124-141) 44 43 41 41 l C-16-1B (123-143)
ADAMS FILTERS
'~
3132 3094 3250 3497 FL-53-1A (135-121) 0 0 0 0 FL-53-1B (133-120) l FILTER BACKWASH LINE 264 264 275 272 FL-53-1A (135-40) 283 FL-53-1B (133-41) 270 270 285 SFP HEAT EXCH.
0 0 0 0 E-10-1A (125-126) 894 894 924 909 E-10-1B (127-129)
AUX FEED PUMP (P-32-1C)(188-144) 3.3 3.3 3.6 3.6 MSSC (E-25-1A) (188-190) 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.3 BAT VENT 40ND.(E-78-1A)(104-105) 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.7 RC RECIRC. AIR COOLING COILS E-37 1 (152-153) 539 539 570 617 E-37-2 (21-157) 537 537 568 614 520 486 514 591 E-37-3 (148-155) 481 481 508 583 E-37-4 (150-151)
RC VENT FAN MOT. COOLING COILS
.- E-77-1 (152-153) 36.3 36.3 38.4 41.6 E-77-2 (21-157) 36.2 36.1 38.2 41.4 E-77-3 (148-155) 35.0 32.7 34.6 39.8 E-77-4 (150-151) 32.4 32.4 34.2 39.2 PDT VENT COND (E-ll-1A)(ll8-142) 12 11.9 12.4 12.2
. RHR HEAT EXCH.
E-5-1A (168-171) 0 0 2030 2011 E-5-1B (164-167) 0 0 1970 1946
. RHR PUMPS
- l P-14-1A (42-172) 0 0 4.1 4.0
- P-14-1B (42-172) 0 0 4.2 4.1
. s 3-34
TABLE 3-2 (con't) 8 9 9A 10 5840 0 5799 0 SW PUMP (P-37-1A} (5-6) 5711 6576 5660 6628 SW PUMP (P-37-1B) (7-8) 4068 5589 4007 5658 SW PUMP (P-37-1C) (9-10) 4198 5761 4090 5838 SW PUMP (P-37-10) (11-12) 1407 1369 1409 1367 B0OSTER PUMP (P-102-1A) (184-185)
HYP0CHL.& SW FILT (25-18)(28-17) 38/38 35/35 38/38 34/34 DG COOLING WATER HEAT EXCH.
921 849 928 844 DG-HX-2A (46-44) 804 879 809 885 DG-HX-28 (149-43) -
100 90 100 90 A/C CR (C-11-1A) (53-54) 94 86 95 85 A/C CHEM. LAB. (C-12-1A) (53-54) 179 162 180 161 A/C 0FF. BLDG. (C-10-1A) (50-23)
CLOSED COOLING HEAT EXCH.
139 125 139 125 E-70-1A (192-31) 155 141 _ 156 140 E-70-TB (194-31)
TURBINE OIL COOLERS 2562 2322 2573 2305 E-60-1A (56-57) 0 0 0 0 E-60-1B (56-57)
GENERATOR HYDR 0 GEN COOLERS 996 919 1000 913 E-62-1A (82-83) 1064 982 1068 976 E-62-1B (84-85) 913 842 916 837 E-62-IC (80-81) 947 874 951 869 E-62-ID (80-81)
HYDROGEN SEAL OIL COOLERS 184 170 185 169 E-61-1A (117-62) 109 100 109 100 E-61-1B (117-64)
ISOLATED PHASE BUS COOLERS 133 123 133 122
, E-48-1A (69-76) 133 123 133 122 E-48-1B (69-76) 251 231 252 230 MAIN EXC.C00L.(E-115-1A) (86-87)
/' CCW HEAT EXCH E-4-1A (91-140) 0 0 0 0, 0 0 0 0 E-4-1B (94-139) ,
3-35
v .
\
TABLE 3-2 (con't) 8 9 9A 10 S/G BLOWOFF TANK COND. 0 0 0 0 E-90-1A (101-102) 0 0 0 0 E-90-1B (101-177) l S/G SAMPLE CHILLER COND. 46 41 C-16-1A (124-141) 46 42 46 42 47 42 C-16-1B (123-143)
)
ADAMS FILTERS 3731 3083 3379 3395 FL-53-1A (135-121) 0 0 FL-53-1B (133-120) 0 0 FILTER BACKWASH LINE 290 268 293 264 FL-53-1A (135-40) 274 301 277 303 FL-53-1B (133-41)
SFP HEAT EXCH.
0 0 0 0 E-10-1A (125-126) 882 899 986
~
E-10-1B (127-129) 970 3.8 3.5 3.9 3.5 AUX FEED PUMP (P-32-1C)(188-144) 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.3 MSSC (E-25-1A) (188-190)
BAT VENT-COND.(E-78-1A)(104-105) 2.8 2.6 2.9 2.6 RC RECIRC. AIR COOLING COILS 658 516 566 599 E-37-1 (152-153) 596 E-37-2 (21-157) 655 515 564 631 501 548 574 E-37-3 (148-155) 622 455 543 566 E-37-4 (150-151)
RC VENT FAN MOT. COOLING COILS
, E-77-1 (152-153) 44.3 34.8 38.1 40.3 E-77-2 (21-157) 44.1 34.6 37.9 40.1 E-77-3 (148-155) 42.5 33.7 36.9 38.6 E-77-4 (150-151) 41.9 33.3 36.5 38.1 PDT VENT COND (E-11-1A)(ll8-142) 13.0 12.1 13.3 11.9 RHR HEAT EXCH.
.. , E-5-1A (168-171) 2143 1972 2159 1952 E-5-1B (164-167) 2075 1916 2098 1889 RHR PUMPS P-14-1A (42-172) 4.3 4.0 4.4 3.9 P-14-1B (42-172) 4.4 4.1 4.5 4.0 3-36 l
4 9 TABLE 3-2 (con't) 11A 12C 13 i:c .
5620 5740 0 I', SW PUMP (P-37-1A) (5-6) 5435 5587: 0 SW PUMP (P-37-1B) (7-8) 3816 3941 5498 SW PUMP (P-37-1C) (9-10) 3797 3946 5658 l SW PUMP (P-37-ID) (11-12) 1415 846 1372 BOOSTER PUMP (P-102-1A) (184-185)
HYP0CHL.& SW FILT (25-18)(28-17) 38/38 38/38 35/35 DG COOLING WATER HEAT EXCH.
937 932 858 DG-HX-2A (46-44) 945 889 864 DG-HX-2B (149-43) 0 101 0 A/C CR (C-11-1A) (53-54) 0 95 0 A/C CHEM. LAB. (C-12-1A) (53-54) 0 181 0 A/C 0FF. BLDG. (C-10-1A) (50-23)
CLOSED COOLING HEAT EXCH.
157 140 142 E-70-1A (192-31) 153 157 139 E-70-1B~(194-31) _
TURBINE OIL COOLERS 0 2585 0 E-60-1A (56-57) 0 0 0 E-60-1B (56-57)
GENERATOR HYDROGEN COOLERS 0 1004 0 E-62-1A (82-83) 0 1072 0 E-62-1B (84-85) 0 920 0 E-62-1C (80-81) 0 955 0 E-62-ID (80-81)
HYDROGEN 3EAL OIL COOLERS 0 186 0 E-61-1A (117-62) 0 109 0 E-61-1B (117-64)
ISOLATED PHASE BUS COOLERS
' 0 134 0 E-48-1A (69-76) 0 E-48-1B (69-76) 0 134 0 253 0 MAIN EXC.C00L.(E-115-1A) (86-87)
'. CCW HEAT EXCH 0 0 0 E-4-1A (91-140) ,
6493 0 0 E-4-1B (94-139) ,
3-37
TABLE 3-2-(con't) 11A 12A 13 S/G BLOW 0FF TANK COND. 0 0 0
- .E-90-1A (101-102) 0 0 0 E-90-1B (101-177)
^
S/G' SAMPLE CHILLER COND. 46 43 45 C-16-1A (124-141) 47 43 46 C-16-1B (123-143)
ADAMS FILTERS 3694 3472 3174 FL-53-1A (135 '2.'.) 0 0 FL-53-18.(135/;20) 0 FILTER BACKWASH La.;l 287 294 272
. FL-53-1A (135-40) 304 282 FL-53-1B (133-41) 299 SFP HEAT EXCH.
0 0 0 E-10-1A (125-126) 914 960 988 E-10-1B (127-129) 3.9 3.9 3.6 AUX FEED PUMP (P-32-IC)(188-144) 2.5 P. 6 2.4 MSSC (E-25-1A) (188-190) 2.8 2.9 2.7 BAT VENT ~COND.(E-78-1A)(104-105)
RC RECIRC. AIR COOLING COILS 652 609 564 E-37-1 (152-153) 606 523 E-37-2 (21-157) 649 624 549 509 l E-37-3 (148-155) 503 616 543 l E-37-4 (150-151) 1: .
! . ,c RC VENT FAN MOT. COOLING COILS 43.9 41.0 38.0 E-77-1 (152-153) 35.2 l E-77-2 (21-157) 43.7 40.8 E-77-3 (148-155) 42.0 36.9 34.2 E-77-4 (150-151) 41.4 36.5 33.9 PDT VENT COND (E-11-1A)(118-142) 12.9 13.2 12.3 RHR HEAT EXCH.
^'. 2125 2167 2006 E-5-1A (168-171) 2054 2104 1948
.. E-5-1B (164-167)
RHR DUMFS P-14-1A (42-172) 4.2 4.4 4.0 E " P-14-1B (42-172) 4.4 4.5 4.2 3-38
O O
.. i
.- . 4 TABLE 3-2 (con't) 14 14A ISA 16 0 0 8199 0 SW PUMP (P-37-1A) (5-6) 0 0 8766 0 -
SW PUMP (P-37-1B) (7-8) 5591 5605 0 6232 SW PUMP (P-37-IC) (9-10) 5762 5778 0 6343 SW PUMP (P-37-ID) (11-12) 1369 1369 1268 1343 B0OSTER PUMP (P-102-1A) (184-185)
HYP0CHL.& SW FILT (25-18)(28-17) 35/34 34/34 26/26 32/32 DG COOLING WATER HEAT EXCH.
852 851 640 801 DG-HX-2A (46-44) 807 857 856 647 DG-HX-2B (149-43) 0 0 75 0 A/C CR (C-Il-1A) (53-54) 0 0 71 0 A/C CHEM. LAB. (C-12-1A) (53-54) 0 0 135 0 A/C OFF.BLOG. (C-10-1A) (50-23)
CLOSED COOLING HEAT EXCH.
141 141 96 130 E-70-1A (192-31) 127 137 137 93 E-70-IS (194-31)
TURBINE OIL COOLERS 0 0 1945 0 E-60-1A (56-57) 0 0 0 0 E-60-1B (56-57)
GENERATOR HYDROGEN C00LERS 0 0 797 0 E-62-1A (82-83) 0 0 0 852 E-62-1B (84-85) 0 0 0 730 E-62-lC (80-81) 0 0 0 758 E-62-ID (80-81)
HYDROGEN SEAL OIL COOLERS 0 0 147 0 E-61-1A (117-62) 0 0 0 87 E-61-1B (117-64)
ISOLATED PHASE BUS COOLERS 0 0 106 0 E-48-1A (69-76) 0 0 0 106 E-48-1B (69-76) 0 0 200 0 MAIN EXC.C00L.(E-115-1A) (86-87)
CCW HEAT EXCH 0 0 0 0 E-4-1A (91-140)
E-4-1B (94-139) 0 0 4739 5615
- 3-39
I o 4 1 .
TABLE 3-2 (con't) 14 14A 15A 16 S/G BLOW 0FF TANK COND, 0 0 0 0 E-90-1A (101-102) 0 0 0 0 .
E-90-1B (101-177)
S/G SAMPLE CHILLER COND.
42 42 34 40 C-16-1A (124-141) 43 42 34 41 C-16-1B (123-143)
ADAMS FILTERS 3449 3442 2973 3141 FL-53-1A (135-121) 0 0 0 0 FL-53-1B (133-120)
FILTER BACKWASH LINE 268 267 219 262
. FL-53-1A (135-40) 279 278 226 268 FL-53-1B (133-41)
SFP HEAT EXCH.
~
0 0 0 0 E-10-1A (125-126) 896 894 737 887 E-10-1B (127-129)
AUX FEED PUMP (P-32-1C)(188-144) 3.5 3.5 2.5 3.3 MSSC (E-25-1A) (188-190) 2.3 2.3 1.7 22 BAT VENT COND.(E-78-1A)(104-105) 2.6 2.6 2.1 2.5 RC RECIRC. AIR COOLING COILS 609 608 538 535 E-37-1 (152-153)
E-37-2 (21-157) 606 605 535 533 E-37-3 (148-155) 583 582 511 516 E-37-4 (150-151) 575 574 502 510 RC VENT FAN MOT. COOLING COILS E-77-1 (152-153) 41.0 40.9 35 36 E-77-2 (21-157) 40.8 40.7 35 36 E-77-3 (148-155) 39.3 39.2 33 35 E-77-4 (150-151) 38.7 38.6 33 34 PDT VENT COND (E-11-1A)(118-142) 12.0 12.0 9.8 11.8 RHR HEAT EXCH.
1984 2007 0 0 E-5-1A (168-171)
E-5-1B (164-167) 1920 1941 0 0 RHR PUMPS P-14-1A (42-172) 3.9 3.5 0 0 s .. . P-14-18 (42-172) 4.1 3.6 0 0
^
3-40 t
-*A__---.._____ _ _ _ _ _ . .
j-
,, TABLE 3-2 (con't)
F N1 N3 N4 N5 6152 6145 5906 5149 SW PUMP (P-37-1A) (5-6) 6098 6092 5794 5013 -
SW PUMP (P-37-18) (7-8) 4660 4643 4169 3490 SW PUMP (P-37-1C) (9-10) 4941 4926 4281 3346 SW PUMP (P-37-ID) (11-12) 1394 1394 0 1426 B0OSTER PUMP (P-102-1A) (184-185)
HYP0CHL.& SW FILT (25-18)(28-17) 37/37 37/37 37/37 39/39 OG COOLING WATER HEAT EXCH.
0 0 0 0 DG-HX-2A (46-44) 0 0 0 0 DG-HX-2B (149-43) 118 118 121 66 A/C CR (C-11-1A) (53-54) 112 112 115 62 A/C CHEM. LAB. (C-12-1A) (53-54) 211 211 217 118 A/C 0FF. BLDG. (C-10-1A) (50-23)
CLOSED COOLING HEAT EXCH.
145 145 0 160 E-70-1A (192-31) 160 142 142 0 E-70-18 (194-31)
TURBINE Oil COOLERS -
0 0 0 0 E-60-1A (56-57) 3050 3052 3132 1704 E-60-1B (56-57)
GENERATOR HYDR 0 GEN COOLERS 1097 1098 1126 585 E-62-1A (82-83) 1171 1172 1202 625 E-62-1B (84-85) 535 E-62-lC (80-81) 1005 1006 1032 1043 1044 1071 556 E-62-ID (80-81)
HYDROGEN SEAL OIL COCLERS 203 203 209 108 E-61-1A (117-62) 63 E-61-1B (117-64) 120 120 123 ISOLATED PHASE BUS COOLERS 146 146 150 78 E-48-1A (69-76) 146 146 150 78 E-48-1B (69-76)
~
276 276 283 147 MAIN EXC.C00L.(E-115-1A) (86-87)
CCW HEAT EXCH 0 0 0 0 E-4-1A (91-140) '
5233 5239 5377 5509 E-4-18 (94-139) 3-41
N1 N3 N4 N5 -
S/G BLOWOFF. TANK COND. 0 734 735 500 E-90-1A (101-102) 0 781 783 500 E-90-1B (101-177)
S/G SAMPLE CHILLER COND. 49 46 46 48 C-16-1A (124-141) 47 47 48 50 C-16-1B (123-143)-
ADAMS FILTERS 4022 3961 4054 4267 FL-53-1A (135-121) 0 0 0 0 FL-53-1B (133-120)
FILTER BACKWASH LINE 295 296 306 316 FL-53-1A (135-40) 326 FL-53-1B (133-41) 306 307 316 SFP HEAT EXCH.
0 926 0 0 E-10-1A (125-126) 1037 996 0 1034 E-10-1B (127-129) 3.7 3.7 3.8 4.1 AUX FEED PUMP (P-32-1C)(188-144) 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.6 MSSC (E-25-1A) (188-190)
BAT VENT COND.(E-78-1A)(104-105) 2.8 2.9 2.9 3.0 RC RECIRC. AIR COOLING COILS 727 729 724 776 E-37-1 (152-153) 723 725 720 772 E-37-2 (21-157) 691 693 691 738 E-37-3 (148-155) 680 682 680 725 E-37:4 (150-151)
RCVENTFkNMOT.COOLINGC01LS E-77-1 (152-153) 47.1 47.2 46.8 50.2' E-77-2 (21-157) 46.8 46.9 46.6 49.9 44.7 44.8 44.7 47.7 E-77-3 (148-155)
E-77-4 (150-151) 44.0 44.1 46.8 46.9 PDT VENT COND (E-11-1A)(118-142) 13.2 13.3 13.7 14.1 RHR HEAT EXCH.
0 0 0 0 E-5-1A (168-171) 0 0 0 0 E-5-1B (164-167)
RHR PUMPS 0 0 0 0 P-14-1A (42-172) 0 0 0 0 i P-14-1B (42-172) 1 3-42 t
TABLE 3-2 (con't)
N6 ,
N8 N9 0 7722 6088 SW PUMP (P-37-1A) (5-6)
SW PUMP (P-37-1B) (7-8) 0 7662 6035 5854 6892 4488 SW PUMP (P-37-lC) (9-10)
SW PUMP (P-37-lD) (11-12) 6017 7053 4793 B0OSTER PUMP (P-102-1A) (184-185) 756 1306 1392 hP0CHL.&SWFILT(25-18)(28-17) 34/34 29/29 36/36 DG COOLING WATER HEAT EXCH.
840 0 0 DG-HX-2A (46-44) 846 0 0 DG-HX-2B (149-43) 0 83 111 A/C CR (C-11-1A) (53-54) 0 78 106 A/C CHEM.LA8. (C-12-1A) (53-54) 0 148 200 A/C 0FF.8LDG. (C-10-IA) (50-23) l CLOSED COOLING HEAT EXCH.
E-70-1A (192-31) 137 106 139 E-70-li (194-31) 134 103 136 TURBINE OIL COOLERS 0 0 0 E-60-1A(56-S7)
E-60-1B (56-57) 0 2140 3016
. GENERATOR HYDR 0 GEN COOLERS
~~ 858 1088 E-62-1A (82-83) 0 E-62-1B (84-85) 0 916 1159 E-62-lC (80-81) 0 786 1001 E-62-lD (80-81) 0 815 1037 HYDROGEN SEAL Oil COOLERS E-61-1A (117-62) 0 159 203 E-61-18 (117-64) 0 93 120 ISOLATED PHASE BUS COOLERS E-48-1A (69-76) 0 114 137 E-48-1B (69-76) 0 114 137 MAIN EXC.C00L.(E-Il5-1A) (86-87) 0 215 269 l CCW HEAT EXCH E E-4-1A (91-140) 0 8392 0 ,
E-4-1B (94-139) 4765 8648 5203 3-43
TABLE 3-2 (con't)
N6 N8 N9 L
S/G BLOWCFF TANK COND.
E-90-1A (101-102) 0 502 715 0 535 756 E-90-1B (101-177) ,
S/G SAMPLE CHILLER COND.
C-16-1A (124-141) 42 31.6 45.3 C-16-1B (123-143) 43 31.8 45.9 ADAMS FILTERS FL-53-1A (135-121) 3684 2745 3777 0 0 0 FL-53-1B (133-120) ,
FILTER BACKWASH LINE FL-53-1A (135-40) 273 203 297 FL-53-1B (133-41) 281 211 306 SFP HEAT EXCH.
0 0 0 E-10-1A (125-126)
E-10-1B (127-129) 895 679 974 AUX FEED PUMP (P-32-1C)(188-144) 3.5 2.6 3.4 MSSC (E-25-1A) (188-190) 2.3 1.7 2.5 BAT VENT _COND.(E-78-1A)(104-105) 2.6 1.9 2.9
~
RC RECIRC. AIR COOLING COILS
. E-37-1 (152-153) 671 500 669 E-37-2 (21-157) 667 497 665 E-37-3 (148-155) 637 474 641 E-37-4 (150-151) 626 466 632 RC VENT FAN MOT. COOLING COILS E-77-1 (152-153) 43.4 29.4 45.0 E-77-2 (21-157) 43.1 29.2 44.8 E-77-3 (148-155) 41.2 27.9 43.1 E-77-4 (150-151) 40.5 27.4 42.5 PDT VENT COND (E-II-1A)(118-142) 12.2 9.0 12.4 RHR HEAT EXCH.
E-5-1A (168-171) 0 0 0 0 E-5-1B (164-167) 0 0 0 0 1
RHR PUMPS
. P-14-1A (42-172) 0 0 0 0 l P-14-1B (42-172) 0 0 0 0 j
3-44
- - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ l
- 4. COMPONENT EVALUATION Table.2-1 lists the components serviced by the Service Water System.
}. '
' An evaluation of the increased _ service water temperature rise from 850 F to 95 0F was conducted for each of the components listed in .
this table. The component studies consisted of' analyses and/or engineering evaluations sufficient to justify that the SWS process conditions are acceptable, subject. in some cases, to corresponding flow or' operating. limits. All engineering analyses required. for safety .
related component evaluations have been performed by Westinghouse in accordance with the applicable requirements of WCAP-9563 (NATD QA Program). Analyses / data obtained from original component manufacturers has been utilized as reference information only; therefore,.
qualification of these supplier's QA Programs was not performed for purposes of these evaluations.
Various aspects of the unit were included in the evaluation with regard to the function of the component in the system. In some cases the emphasis was.on one or all of the following:
o Impact on performance, o Required service water flow at.various temperature (i.e.,
flow at 85 0F versus flow at 950F),
o Valve position for process flow to achieve desired temperature This section includes a summary of the evaluation done on each component. The components evaluations are organized into sections depending on their safety related status as shown in Table 2-1, and are listed alphabetically in their respective section's. Each item will be covered on an individual basis with a portion of that section devoted to concluding the impact of service water temperature changes. The impact will essentially be the conclusion of the temperature effect and justification that the SWS process conditions are acceptable as a permanent design basis. Included in each section will be a description and/or function of the component as well as the method of evaluation. .
C NSWSA/JWB/063089 4-1 l
.- ___--- ____ _o
l The required flows of service water to each component when the temperature reaches 950 F are summarized in Table 6-1 for normal' operations and in. Tables 6-2 through 6-5.for accident. conditions.
These required flows are based on foulir.g factors and tube plugging ,
percentages (where applicable) as described in the component E .
evaluations which follow.
l The overall conclusion following evaluation of all components listed in i
Table 2-1 is that equipment currently installed in the service water
' system will function and perform within the confines ~ of the system restrictio'ns with 95 F0 service water. The Reference 2 NUSCO report provides results of additional evaluations. performed to support this conclusion.
^:
, [ '.
- G' c .
~
CYWSW54/JWB/063089 4-2
_ _ _ _ _ - . ___--_-m_____-__.._ __- - _ _ _ ___m
4.1 SAFETY RELATED EOUIPMENT WITH RESPECT TO FUNCTION DIESEL GENERATOR HEAT EXCHANGERS (DG-HX-2A: 28)
Description /or Function - Two heat exchangers are provided to cool each diesel generator, in this case the Model 999-20 provided by -
Electro-Motive Division of General Motors Corporation'. The two heat exchangers are located at the front of the accessory rack on the Model 999-20 System. The heat exchangers consist of welded steel shells connected at each end to cast iron hubs. Combination tube supports and baffles inside the shell support the seamless admiralty metal tubes in the heat exchanger. The service water is pumped through the tubes and the engine water flows on the outside of the tubes.
Method of Analysis - An analysis was not necessary since the diesel generator heat exchangers were designed to operate over a range of service water temperatures as described in the following table:
Water Temperature (OF ) Recuired Flow (GPM) Pressure Drop (PSI)
~ 100 440 _
1.0 90 360 0.7 80 230 0.4 70 220 0.2 The values listed in the table above are from Reference 9, and were confirmed and clarified by the vendor in Reference 10. The flows are applicable for 10% tube plugging. Although the fouling factor is not specified, according to Reference 9 these components are designed for
" raw water", and therefore the applicable fouling factor is probably 2
.002 Ft -Hr OF/ BTU, which is common with most SWS components.
Imoact and Conclusions - The heat exchangers for the diesel generators
- are capable of providing adequate cooling with greater than or equal to 0
400 gpm of 95 F service water. The increased service water temperature of 95 0 F in no way affects the integrity or function of the Emergency Diesel Generators.
CYWSWSA/JWB/003089 4-3
REACTOR CONTAINMENT AIR RECIRCULATION COOLING COILS (E-37-1: 2: 3: 4) b Description and/or Function - The Reactor Containment Recirculation Air.
L Cooling coils are designed to remove heat from the containment building .
during both normal operation and in the event of a loss of coolant -
accident (LOCA). There are four CAR cooling coil assemblies in the l~
containment building, each consisting of one bank of-five Aerofin Type
'R" cooling coils. Each coil is a 24 tube face, 8 row, 8 pass with 5/8" OD copper tubes and copper solder coated fins (Reference 8).
Cooling watcr for the coils is supplied by the Service Water System.
Method of Analysis - An evaluation was performed of the Haddam Neck CAR 0
^
Units during both norma? and post-accident operation with 95 F inlet service water. For the post-accident condition, the required service water flow rates were determined to maintain a heat removal rate of 26.5 x 106BTU /Hr per unit (Reference 3) for various assumed values of tube plugging. The evaluation of the post-accident condition uses the Westinghouse computer code HECO. A containment temperature of 2610 F is used in the evaluation which is consistent with the design basis post-accident containment condition. To aid in the verification of the modeling of the Aerofin coils, computer evaluations were obtained from Aerofin Corp. which utilize the Aerofin in-house computer program. The Aerofin evaluations consider the same conditions as the 4
Westinghouse evaluation and provide results, which substantiate the Westinghouse results. The table below provides the flow rates required
-1 for various percentages of tube plugging for an assumed water side
'~ 2 fouling factor of 0.002 Ft -Hr OF/ BTU. The right hand column presents the maximum flow limits corresponding to a velocity of
. 10ft/sec in the component tubes.
CYW5WS4/JWB/063089 4-4
a > ~ s s ., y-
~
g Required Maximum
. Flow Outlet Water -Flow
. Tube Rate Temperature Limit.
E IGPMi P1uocaae 1$P,M1 P . L El ,
0% 383 233 .860 10% 400 227 '774 15% 413 223 731
~20% -430 218 688 30% 480 205 602 The performance of the coils was also determined for'an assumed fouling-factor of 0.000 Ft.2-Hr OF/ BTU in order to determine the maximum
~
outlet water temperature and corresponding service water flow rate.
These results are provided in the table below.
Flow Outlet Water Tube Rate Temperature l
Pluaaaoe LQPM1 (#F) 0% 325 258 10% 326 ~ 258 15% 326 258 20% 327 257
'< A study was also done of fouling factors higher than 0.002 -
U Ft2-Hr OF/ BTU. Fouling factors of .0029, .0035, and .0042 Ft 2-Hr OF/ BTU were evaluated assuming 0% and 5% of the tubes in the l,i coils had been plugged. For these fouling factors, the thickness of
. .the fouling film on the inside of the tubes was estimated and the head li .
l- 4
- loss across the coils calculated using the reduced inside diameter.
The coil performance was evaluated for each of these fouling factors p.. and the resulting required service water flow rates and outlet water 6
9 temperatures which correspond to a heat removal rate of 26.5 x l'0 BTU /Hr per unit was provided for consideration in the service water {
- f. flow analysis. .
l
)
tusws4/ustences 4-5
j This analysis showed that the required flow rates could not be achieved for the .0035 and .0042 Ft 2-Hr OF/ BTU fouling factors' but could be :i I
achieved for the .0029 Ft 2-Hr OF/ BTU fouling factor (See Section 3 of this report). ' The required service water flow rate for the 0.0029 Ft 2-Hr OF/ BTU case is 453 GPM with a resulting outlet water ~
l temperature of 2130 F with none of the tubes plugged. When 5% of the tubes are assumed to be plugged, the required service water flow rate 0
is 478 gpm and'the resulting outlet water temperature is 207 F. {
l A curve was generated showing head loss across the coils vs. water flow rate squared for the 0.0029 Ft 2-Hr OF/ BTU fouling factor case in
~ i which t'he in' side diameter of each tube is reduced from 0.541 inches
~ !
(clean tube) to 0.516 inches. This curve appears in Figure 4-1.
For normal operation, a heat removal rate was calculated assuming a flow rate of 650 GPM, a waterside fouling factor of 0.002 Ft2-Hr OF/ BTU and 15% tube plugging. This part of the evaluation was done-by hand calculations which conservatively assume no heat transfer,via condensation. The resulting heat removal rate is 2.18 x 10_6 BTU /Hr for each assembly or 145,360 BTU / min for all four units in the containment building.
Imoact and Conclusion - The evaluation of the CAR Fan Coolers determined that the increased service water temperature of 950 F in no way affects the structural integrity of the component. The analysis
's- has determined that in an accident condition, the containment Air
- Recirculation Cooling Coils are capable of achieving the required heat removal rate with 95 0F service water with 5% tube plugging and a 2
water side fouling factor up to 0.0029 Ft -Hr OF/ BTU. The service 2
water head loss across the coils for the 0.0029 Ft -Hr OF/ BTU fouling case has been calculated and is plotted against flow rate squared in Figure 4-1.
. *,en e
cusws4/ue/oc3cB9 4-6 I
l!l]l
- r
- g c I D
E
_ e 0 R
n o
g 5 A
_ 3 U
- Q S
_ D E
G E O T U
L A
g P R S
E W 9 O
)U T
L
_ u F
- - P% .
G5 s 0 v 5 3^
5 2
S 0
1+
L I
= O
( C D S E S R
A O 5
U R Q
S C E
A T S A S R
e O W L 0 O 5
5 L 1 F D
' A D E
. E G
H G -
1 U -
L V P
8 S
E E R B U U G
. T I X F O
0
- 5 0 0 0 0 0 D 0 D 0
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
_ 8N N3 8x l
a O66EIeE0E ttl ' l (;!iIl! \ (
For normal conditions, the total heat removal capability of 145,360 BTU / min for the containment building is less than an estimated 178,000 BTU / min heat load anticipated in the summer which was provided by NUSCO (Reference 3). It is expected that inherent conservatism in determining heat transfer capability and heat generation will result in _
the containment temperature remaining below the maximum allowed 1400 F. However, actual containment temperature must be monitored to insure that *;he Technical Specifications maximum allowed containment ambient temperature of 1400 F is not exceeded.
REACTOR CONTAINMEM AIR RECIRCUt ATION FAN MOTOR COOLERS (E-77-1: 2: 3:4)
Description and/er Function - The CAR Fan Motor Coolers attach directly to the fan motors and consist of two cooling coils and associated ducting. Cooling air is recirculated through the motor and the cooling coils in essentially a closed system. Service water is circulated through the cooling coils.
Method of Analysis - Westinghouse Calculations have been completed which evaluate the performance of the fan mot'or coolers with 95 0F 1 inlet service water against calculated heat loads. The analysis has determined that there is no adverse impact to the motor life evaluation l which was completed by Westinghouse under a separate NUSCO Contract l (Reference 11.). The motor cooler performance calculation i conservatively assumes a motor life expectancy of 40 years of normal ;
operation and one year of post accident operation. A maximum fouling '
2 factor of 0.00?9 Ft -Hr OF/ BTU was used in the evaluation and the coil performance was evaluated for both 0% and 15% tube plugging. The calculation assumes a service water flow rate of 20 GPM for each motor cooler (10 GPM per coil). Motor 'issses for the normal and post accident conditions, as well as heat infiltration through the enclosure (it is assumed that the enclosure is not insulated) during the post 5-accident condition were included. This resulted in a maximum
.' post-accident heat load of 85589 BTU /Hr. A containment environmental temperature of 280 0F was used.
I 1 CWSW54/.NB/003089 4-8 L____-______ _
...,,'4 In support of NUSCO's motor qualification efforts, Westinghouse provided.two 1ctters (References 12 and 13).which contain details of a
' Westinghouse review. .This review determined applicability of two WCAPs (WCAP 7829 and 9003 addressing motor qualification) to the Haddam Neck ,
CAR motors. This evaluation of the performance of the Haddam Neck CAR motor coolers with elevated service water temperature and the service --
water flow- rate and fouling factor indicated 'above,'does not change the results, conclusions, or recommendations of the References 12 and 13 letters, (the form and function of the Haddam Neck Motor Heat Exchangers remains similar to the heat exchanger tested).
Imoact and Conclusions - The evaluation of the Haddam Neck CAR Fan 0
Motor Cooler performance for 95 F inlet service water, with the fouling factors and service water flow rate indicated above, has concluded that there is no adverse impact to the expected motor life of 40 years of normal operation plus ~one year of post-accident operation.
In addition, the results and conclusions presented in References 12 and .
13, which address the qualification of the Haddam Neck CAR motors, are not impacted by the increased service water temperature. The
, evaluation of the CAR Fan Motor Coolers determined that the increased 0
service water temperature of 95 F in no way affects the integrity of i
the component.
RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL HEAT EXCHANGERS (E-5-1A: IB)
- Description and/or Function.- Two heat exchangers are provided to L
remove residual and sensible heat from the reactor core durirg normal plant cooloown and shutdown operations, and during the post Accident I recirculation phase of Energency Carc Cooling System (ECCS) cperaticos. The heat exchangers are crossfitw shell and U-tube units with borated reactor coolant on the tubeside, and either component cooling water (CCW) or service water on the she11 side. The units were originally designed for 95 F0 inlet CCW on the she11 side.
w 0
Y* cmwt4/JWB/063089 4-g
(
i
1 *
- During normal plant cooldown or shutdown operations, reactor coolant is circulated through the tube side of the RHR HX, with component cooling water removing heat from the shell side. The component cooling water can be replaced with service water by repositioning valves. During i ECCS recirculation, service water is valved into the shell side of the RHR heat exchangers, as water is drawn from the containment sump and -
cooled for return to the reactor vessel.
Method of Analysis - The RHR heat exchanger performance during normal cooldown or shutdown operations is unaffected by the SWS design basis temperature change, because the maximum limit for component cooling 0
water supply temperature is unchanged at Il5 F. Our evaluation of RCS cooldown capability using CCW is included elsewhere in this report.
The RHR HX performance during post LOCA recirculation has been reviewed against the system operational requirements for mitigating an accident. Per reference 14, 2200 gpm water is recirculated from the containment sump and is split between the two RHR HXs. Required flows are determined to return this flow to the RCS at temperatures no higher than 2000F. Two cases were evaluated for meeting this requirement.
First, with two HXs in operation, the minimum iequired cooling flow *.o each HX was calculated. Then the minimum required flow to aly one heat exchanger was calculated assumir.g that the service water supply isolation valve (SW-MOV-5 or 6) failed to open. Because of this valve failure, cooled sump water flowing i.hrough the cperating HX combines with uncooled snmp water flowing through the isolated HX. The mix of 0
the cooled and uncooled flows must still be maintained below 200 F. f
.The RHR HXs were assumed to have 10% of their tubes plugged in this j 2 j evaluation. The fouling factor assumed was .0005 Ft -Hr OF/ BTU, which is lower than considered for other SWS components because these j c HXs are normally exposed to clean water from the CCWS.
Impact and Conclusions - The evaluation of the RHR H. eat Exchangers determined that the increased service water temperature of 95 F in ne i
^
way affects the structural integrity of these components. '
CYWSW54/JWB/0E3089 4-10 i
l
With both RHR heat exchangers operating, the minimum required service N ' water flow to each is 430 gpm at 950F. With service water flow to ynly one HX, the minimum required flow to the operating HX is 1650 gpm
~
at 950F. .
l RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP (P-14-1A: IB)
Description and/or Function - The residual heat removal pumps are.
~
Paciffc Pump, size 8" LX, type SVCR, horizontal, single stage pumps.
The pumps perform a variety of. functions-including providing decay heat removal and low head ECCS recirculation duties. The pumps use service water or component cooling water, depending on which is cooling the RHR Heat Exchanger, as a cooling medium for the mechanical seal cooler, the -
mechanical seal gland cooling jacket and the bearing housing cooling jacket.
. Method of- Analysis - The residual heat removal pumps-were evaluated for the effects of the increased service water temperature of 95 degrees on the sealing effectiveness of the mechanical seal and the performance of the pump bearings. The evaluation also addressed pump operating modes
~
during which the cooling water supply is provided by the component cooling water system at ambient temperatures of 115, 125 and 135 degrees F and process fluid temperatures of 350 and 400 degrees F. The evaluation was performed to determine the minimum cooling water flow rate required to support pump operation under the various process fluid, ambient and cooling water conditions. This evaluation was provided by the pump vendor in Reference 15.
The evaluation of the RHR pump was performed by Dresser Pump Division (Pacific Pumps). The evaluation of the mechanical seal addressed the adequacy of the materials of construction for increased temperature and the sealing capability at higher temperatures. The evaluation of the pump bearing housing addressed acceptability of higher bearing and oil i temperatures. The analysis determined the total heat removal required
- from the seal cooler, seal housing jacket and bearing housing in order to allow pump operation with no damage to the mechanical seal and ,
bearings.
C M W! UJWB/063089 4-11
The analytical techniques used included finite element modeling of the bearing housing and seal housing. The required cooling water flow rates were then calculated based on the amount of heat removal required considering the temperature limitations of the mechanical seal and .
. bearing. The maximum allowable fouling factor was determined in this 2
evaluation to be .003 Ft -Hr OF/ BTU.
Imoact and Conclusions - The evaluation of the residual heat removal pumps determined that the pump cooling water requirements are relatively independent of the ambient temperatures identified. The process fluid temperature of 400 degrees was used as a bounding condition. The report concluded that the cooling water outlet
" temperature should be limited to 7300 F in order to maintain acceptable temperatures in the pump mechanical seal and bearings.
Based on a cooling water outlet temperature of 126 0F, the minimum required cooling water flow rates are 3.0 and 1.0 gpm for cooling water 0
- temperatures of IIS0 F and 95 F respectively. These are slightly conservative flow requirements which are recommended *> normal pump operation, although some additional margin is available.
With these minimum flows available, it was concluded that the pump mechanical seal and bearing will perform adequately with either 95 degree service water or 115 degree component cooling water for the various process temperatures and ambient temperatures identified. No special operating precautions or maintenance requirements are necessary to allow operation of the RHR pump under the analyzed conditions. The evaluation of the RHR pumps determined that the increased service water temperature of 950 F in no way affects the operability of these pumps.
SERVICE WATER PUMPS (p-37-1A: 18: IC: 10)
~
- Description and/or Function - The service water pumps are Worthington Model 24H-590, vertical, 2 stage pumps. The pumps supply river water to all components serviced by, or functioning in the plant service
! water system. The pumps use service water only as the process fluid i .. and not as a cooling medium for pump appurte, nances. ,
CYVSWS4/JWB/063089 4-12
.. i
Method of Analysis - The service water pumps were evaluated to verify j '
that the materials of construction are adequate to maintain pump 0 I
' integrity and function with 'a process fluid temperature of 95 F. The '
0 mechanical' seals were evaluated for sealing capability with the 95 F ,
water. The effect of the increased process fluid temperature on.the ,
pump performance was also evalucted.
Additional concerns have been raised regarding increasing the runout flow limitations of the service water pumps. Specific concerns were- ]
o the maximum runout flow capability for continuous operation and the -
j acceptability of a runout flow rate of 9000 GPM for a period of one j minute. The evaluation of increased runout flow included the l
investigation of pump motor horsepower limitations and margins of NPSH required and NPSH available. NPSH and horsepower requirements at 9000 GPM were obtained from Dresser Pump Division (Worthington), as wel?-as an assessment of pump operation at the 9000 GPM flow rate, bocact and Conclusions - The evaluation of the service water pumps determined that the-increased service water temperature of 950 F in no way affects the integrity or function of the pumps. The mechanical seals' are capable of normal sealing effectiveness at the increased temperature. The increased temperature will result'in no significant reduction in pump hydraulic performance. No special operating precautions or maintenance requirements are necessary to allow 0
operatior, of the service water pumps with 95 F service water.
The evaluation of pump runout flow limitations determined that the NPSH margin was more limiting than horsepower limitations in determining runout flow limitations. The maximum runout flow for continuous operation was determined to be 8000 GPM based on the NPSH margin with river level as low as -2.5 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL). The runout flow limit for continuous operation with the river level as low as -5.0 feet
- MSL is 7500 gpm.
y ,
A r.' .
CYWSW54/JWB/063089 4-13
The 9000 GPM runout condition will result in a full cavitation l
condition in the pump suction, due to the NPSH shortfall of approximately 8 feet (50 feet required vs. 42 feet available) with the river level at -2.5 feet MSL. Full cavitation would also exist with ,
a river level at -5.0 MSL. Dresser Pump Division concluded that
' ', operation under these conditions for a maximum period of one minute _.
approximately once per year will cause no significant damage which
- could affect the pump operability.or service life.
SPENT FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGERS (E-10-1A: 181 l
Description and/or Function - Two heat exchangers are provided to i remove decay heat generated by fuel assemblies in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP). Only one heat exchanger is in service at a time. Heat Exchanger E-10-IA is a shell and tube heat exchanger with borated SFP i.
water circula+',g on the shell side and river water on the tube side.
This heat exchanger was originally designed for a service water temperature of 800 F and a heat. load of 5.43 MBtu/hr with the SFP at 1160 F. Heat Exchanger E-10-1B is a Plate Type heat exchanger. This l heat exchanger was originally designed for a service water temperature 0
of 85 0F and a heat load of 19.963 MBtu/hr with the SFP at 140 F.
Method of Analysis - In Reference 16, Northeast Utilities provided the maximum heat loads for the Normal Operations and Full Core Offload I; I cases, along with the SFP temperature and flow rates. These heat loads
"- are 8.5 MBtu/hr for normal operations, and 19.7 MBtu/hr for a full core offload, both with a pool temperature of 1400F. The SFP flow rate
(- was 900 gpm through either heat exchanger.
l.,. The capabilities of both heat exchangers were evaluated for the normal l= operations case. Only the Plate Type heat exchanger was evaluated for the full core offload case. The heat exchanger calculations were performed using the computer code TSHX'B. Service water temperatures of
~
both 900F and 950F were evaluated to compare flow requirements.
l ll $-
1*
CYWSV54/JdB/063089 4-14 u_________________. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Additionally, both the design heat transfer coefficient and a 10%
degraded heat transfer coefficient (UA) were evaluated for each heat exchanger to reflect a higher level of fouling and/or tube plugging so as to present conservative flow requirements. The design fouling factors were aleo assumed, .002 Ft2-Hr OF/ BTU for the Shell and Tube HX. __
Imoact and Conclusion - The evaluation of the Spent Fuel Pool HXs 0
determined that the increased service water temperature of 95 F in no way affects the integrity or function of these components.
For the normal operations SFP heat lord of 8.5 MBTU/hr, Northeast Utilities specified a shell side (SFP) flow of ??0 gpm and a maximum 0
allowable SFP temperature of 140 F (Ref.16). The flow requirements for the various combinations of heat exchangers, SWS temperatures and UAs are as tabulated below.
Normal Operations SW Temo SFP HX UA SFp Temo SW Flow Recuired 95 Shell& Tube Design 140 827 gpm 90 - Shell& Tube Design 140 633 gpm 95 Shell& Tube Degraded 140 ~ 958 gpm 90 Shel1& Tube Degraded 140 706 gpm 95 Plate Design 140 389 gpm 90 Plate Design 140 348 gpm t 95 Plate Degraded 140 392 gpm 90 Plate Degraded 140 350 gpm For the full core offload SFP heat load of 19.7MBtu/hr, Northeast Utilities specified a shell side (SFP) flow of 900 gpm and a SFP 0
temperature of 140 F (Ref. 16). This heat load far exceeds the capacity of the shell and tube HX. The flow requirements to the Plate Type heat exchanger and for the various SWS temperatures, SFP temperatures and JAs are tabulated below.
CYV5W54/JVB/063089 4-15
Full Core Offload SW Temt SFP HX UA SFP Temo SW Flow Recuired 95 Plate Design 140 2002 gpm 90 Plate Design 140 1122 gpm ,
95 Plate Degraded 140 2209 gpm
~
90 Plate Degraded 140 1177 gpm _
95 Plate Design 149.6 900 gpm 90 Plate Design 144.6 900 gpm 95 Plate Degraded 150.5 900 gpm 90 Plate Degraded 145.5 900 gpm 95 Plate Design 147.1 1000 gpm 90 Plate Design 142.1 1000 gpm 95 Plate Degraded 148.0 1000 gpm 90 Plate Degraded 143.0 1000 gpm The results of our calculations for the two SFP Heat Exchangers as outlined on these two tables have determined the flows required to meet the heat load requirements of both normal and full core offload cases.
For the normal heat load case with 95 0 F service water, the capability of the shell and tube heat exchanger may be adequate to maintain the SFP below 140 0 F depending on the SWS capability to provide flow and the fouling / tube plugging characteristics at the time. However, the plate type HX has excess capacity for removing this normal heat load at less than design flows.
For the full core offload case, the SWS flows necessary to maintain the pool below 140 0 F are far greater than the design flow with 95 0F service water. Per Referer ce 25, the fDSA design basis temperature of the SFP is 1700F. The SFP temperature is maintained below this design limit for all cases evaluated. Also, with SW flow of 10%
,i greater than the design flow of 900 gpm, the SFP can be maintained b below 1500F. Excessive flows to this heat exchanger is not a concern because the maximum allowable flow through this heat exchanger (equal to 1500 gpm according to the component manufacturer) exceeds the ,
SWS flow capability.
CWSWS4/JWB/063089 4-16
[-
I-
. s p ,7 4.2. SAFETY-RELATED COMPONENTS WITH RESPECT TO PRESSURE BOUNDARY l
l ADAMS FILTER (FL-53-1A: IBl L Description and/or Function - The purpose of the filter is to remove
.' particulate from the service water which are larger than 0.005". _
Method of Analysis - The filter required no analysis. The filter was
' 0 originally designed to operate at temperature up to 100 F (Reference 17). The design change to increase the service water 0 0 temperature from 85 F to 95 F has no impact on the filter.
Imoact and Conclusions - The increase in the service water temperature from 850 F to 950 F has no affect on the function or integrity of these filters.
COMPONENT COOLING WATER HEAT EXCHANGERS (E-a-1A:-1-B)
Description nd/or Function - Two heat exchanger are provided to transfer' heat from the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) to the Service Water System. The exchangers are counterblow units with service water on the tube side and component cooling water on the
. shell side. The major CCWS operations can be classified as normal 4
power operations and,CCW/RHR cooldown operations. During normal 0
operations, the design CCW supply temperature is 95 F, and may be allowed to be as high as 100 0F per Reference 18. During RHR
- cooldown operations, the CCW supply temperature is limited to a maximum of 1150 F.
Method of Analysis - CCW Heat Exchanger performance for both normal and cooldown operations was evaluated for service water temperatures of both 90 and 95 0F, and for either one or two sets of CCW pumps and i
J- H'"s in operation. The bases, assumptions, and results of these evaluations, are summarized in Reference 18. The following is a brief synopsis of the evaluation documented in References 18 and 19.
t wswS4/JWB/053089 4-17
4 4 In the evaluation of normal power operations, CCWS flows and heat loads were varied to determine the resulting CCW supply temperature. Service water flow rates through the CCW HX(s) were assumed to be 5000 gpm -
through one HX with only one in operation, and 2500 gpm through each ,
with two HXs in operation.
~
In the evaluation of cooldown operations, variables considered include
'CCWS fiows and heat loads, RHR cooldown initiation time, and the maximum CCW supply temperature. Service water flow of 7500 gpm was assumed through both CCW HX.
In this performance evaluation, no assumptions were made for tube plugging. However, the design fouling factor, upon which the performance calculations are based, is the relatively high value of 2
.00296 Ft -Hr OF/ BTU.
Imoact and Conclusions - The evaluation of the Component Cooling Water HXs' determined that the increased service water temperature of 95 0F in no way affects the integrity or function of these components. The performance characteristics of the CCWS with elevated service water temperatures are outlined in detail in the Reference 18 and 19 letters.
In the normal operations cases evaluated, it was apparent that two
"' pairs of CCW HXs and pumps would be needed to maintain the CCW supply ,
temperature below 1000F based on the assumptions made. Even with two CCW HXs operating, the heat loads must be curtailed by operating only those CCW supplied components which are necessary until service water temperature decreases.
The largest heat load which can not be eliminated is the non-l _
- regenerative heat exchanger, which cools the letdown flow from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Its heat load can be minimized by L; limiting letdown flow to that required for normal purification. The
- 5. eat load resulting from the high letdown flow (corresponding to maximum RCS purification) can increase the CCW supply temperature by W
(.
over 40F. ,
CYWSWSA/JWB/053089 4-18 e-_.____________-__- _ _ - _ _ - -
% ~ %, ,
With normal letdown flows, the CCW supply temperatures can be limited 0
to 101.40F with 95 0F service water, and 96.40F with 90 F service water per Reference 18. These temperatures would be lower if service water flows could be increased to greater than 2500 gpm to each '
CCW HX, which was the basis of this evaluation. Greater flows.would be available to the CCW HXs during normal operations if throttle valves _
SW-V-133/134 were opened to the maximum limits allowed in the accident condition flow evaluations, as discussed in Section 3.4.
In the normal CCW/RHR cooldown operations evaluated, the cooldown times varied widely depending on the conditions assumed. Increased service water temperatures will extend the cooldown times <substantially. The variable which would have the most impact on cooldown times is the auxiliary heat loads (heat loads other than the RHR HXs), as demonstrated in References 18 and 19.
0 References 18 and 19 shows that with 95 F service water and the auxiliary heat loads decreased to 3.7 MBtu/Hr, the RCS can be cooled to 0
2000 F in 53 hours6.134259e-4 days <br />0.0147 hours <br />8.763227e-5 weeks <br />2.01665e-5 months <br /> and 140 F in 64 hours7.407407e-4 days <br />0.0178 hours <br />1.058201e-4 weeks <br />2.4352e-5 months <br />. These results also assume RHR initiation time of 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> after trip, and CCW flow rate through the CCW HX of 2.05 MLb/Hr. In this case, the RCS initially heated up to 3120F. The RCS could have been prevented fro'm heating up by further extending the cooldown initiation time as the core decay heat rate decreased. RCS heat removal through the steam generators concurrent with RHR operation was not considered in this evaluation, although .it is a normal plant practice.
Under the same conditions stated above (heat load and flow), but with 900 F service water, the RCS can be cooled to 2000 F in 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br />, and 1400 F in 43 hours4.976852e-4 days <br />0.0119 hours <br />7.109788e-5 weeks <br />1.63615e-5 months <br />, with RHR initiation time 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after reactor trip.
4 cvwsvs w wB/063089 4-19
y ,
m .- ;.
In evaluating the RCSJcooldown tf acs, t.he cyclic nature of service
- water temperature should be considered. ~ The tfrial effect on river water level. and flow rate would cause the peak service water
. temperature to last for only.a few hours. The cooldown times ,
calculated with.the 95 F0 service water temperature assumed constant m-for periods over a day are overly conservative.
Based on the reference 18 evaluation, plant operations with' elevated service water temperatures may be limited by the CCWS requirements during normal power . operations. The CCWS.does not perform any safety:
functions, and.is not'. considered a. safety'related system. Thus the
, nuclear safety of'the plant is not affected by CCWS operations with'
' ' 950 F' service water. However, the CCWS does support various. systems and components which require adequate cooling to maintain' normal
$ operation of the plant. Loss or degradation of the CCWS function could.
- c. lead to equipment failure or force the plant to shut down to avoid
- damage to serviced components.
Depanding on various plant conditions and operations, with service water temperature at 900F, the CCW HXs will be capable of maintaining
~
a 1000 F supp'ty temperature. With service water teitperatures ranging from 90 to 950F, all unnecessary heat loads must be removed fron the CCWS, maximum letdown conditions avoided, and the SWS aligned to
^
provide the maximum service water flow rate to the CCW HXs, in order to maintain CCW supply temperature below 1000F. Performance of the CCWS g and serviced components should be monitored at service water J temperatures greater than 850F. Decisions on plant and component
' operability should continue to be based on the Technical Spe:ifications-and plant procedures for determining eouipment operability.
..t'i c :; _
y 0-1.*
F *
[_
CYWSWS4/JVB/063089 4-20
y .
tc e...-
m . . .
PIPING'AND VALVES Description and/or Function
~
- Various service water system piping and valves.are required to preserve the integrity of the pressure boundary in order to preserve the:
- function of those components which have safety related functions.
Also, several' valves are required to change position in order to
_ perform their.' safety function in the event of an accident. These
-valves are SW-MOV-1 through 6, SW-TV-2365A/B, and SW-FCV-129/130.
Method of Analysis I The effect of the increased SW temperatures on the piping system
~
upstream of the serviced components is to be evaluated by NUSCO. The SW temperatures downstream of. the safety related components and the CCW HXs have been conservatively calculated and are summarized along with.
pertinent assumptions in the reference 20 letter.
~
Valves which must change position to perform a safety function have
~
been reviewed to assure that the design basis temperature increase will not cause them to' fail to perform their safety function.
Imoact and Conclusions Valves.which must change position to perform a safety function all have design temperatures greater than will be experienced during any normal or accident condition with SW temperature at 950F. In order to assure their operability, NUSCO must verify that the design basis temperature increase does not increase piping loads acting on these valves such that the valves fail to perform their safety functions.
y ~
The following are the maximum expected service water outlet Q.f f 3 temperatu'res downstream of the safety related components and CCW HXs.
s The assumptions made in determining these values are identified in Reference 20. Northeast Utilities has the responsibility for
']. ,
evaluating these temperatures.
CYVSWS4/JWB/063089 4-21 U _-- _. - _ - . . _ . _ . _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - . . _ _ . _ _ _ _
V . ,
Component Outlet Temo.
y
' CAR Fan Coolers 2610F-CAR Fan Motor Coolers <1200F
- Emergency Diesel Generators 1350F Spent Fuel Pool. Heat-Exchangers 1400F-Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchangers <2000 F' _
1 0
~
Residual Heat Removal Pumps 130 F Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers .<1200F c
SCREEN W' ASH BOOSTER PUMP (P-102-1A)
Description and/or Function - The screen wash booster pump is an Ingersoll-Rand "S" Line, horizontal, single stage, double suction
's ' pump. The pump supplies service water from the SW punip discharge
" header to the screenwash spray nozzles on the traveling water screens.
The pump uses service water not only as the process fluid, but aise as a cooling and flushing medium for the pump mechanical seal glands.
Method of Analysis - The screen wash booster pump.was evaluated to verify that the materials of construction are adequate to maintain pump integrity and function with a process fluid temperature of 95 0F. The
[ mec5anical' seal was evaluated for sealing capability of the 950F process fluid in conjunction with the 95 0F gland cooling water. The effect of the increased process fluid temperature on the pump h performance was also evaluated.
J' Imoact and Conclusions - The evaluation of the screen wash booster pump determined that the increased service water temperature of 950 F in no
. way affects the integrity or function of the pump. The mechanical seal
~
is capable of normal sealing effectiveness at the increased
~'
temperature. The increased temperature will result in no significant reduction'in pump hydraulic performance. No special operating
[.
P- precautions or maintenance requirements are necessary to allow 0
.- y operation of the screen wash booster pumps with 95 F service water.
l ' I.f.1'
- ~-
4 cusws4/Jws/ossoas 4-22
.; c.. .
4 ' ' S LSERVICE WATER STRAINER (ST-2-A: B: C: D)
Description and/or Function ~- The function of the 16" Service water strainer is to strain Connecticut. River Water of particles ranging from 3/16*"to 3/8 inches in diameter.
Method of Analysis - An analysis was not necessary since the Service Water Strainer was designed to operate in a temperature range from
.200 F to 3750F and a pressure to 125 psi (Reference 21).
Imoacts and Conclusions - The increase in the. service water temperature from 850 F to 950 F has no affect on the function or integrity of these filters.
~
T 9
CYW5VS4/JWB/063089 4-23
)
4.3' NON SAFETY-RELATED COMPONENTS BORIC ACID MIXING TANK VENT CONDENSER (E-78-1A)
Description and/or Function - The function of the boric acid mixing m
tank vent condenser is to condense any moisture in the vented air from _
the boric acid mixing tank. The condenser consists of a copper cooling coil wrapped around the boric acid mixing tank vent.
. Method of Analysis - The evaluation consisted of calculating the temperature of the air being vented from the tank as cooled by the vent condenser using service water at a temperature of 950F. In order to determine proper operation of the vent con'enser d the vented gas must be cooled below its dewpoint, thereby condensing the moisture and allowing its return to the tank. A fouling factor of .002 was ,
assumed for this component. f I
JmqLet and Conclusions - The evaluation determined that the vent gas te.mperature will be cooled below the dewpoint ano the moisture in the gas will te condensed prior to the gas entering the atmosphere. The ]
prissure drop through the coil was determined to be 1.7 psi. j j
Furthermore the coil is capable of removing all the necessary heat without the aid of the ventilation system. The condenser will, therefore, perform acceptably with 950 F service water. Operation of this component does not affect the nuclear safety of the plant. j e
BORON EVAPORATOR OVERHEAD CONDENSER (E-14-1A)
Description and/or Function - The Boron Evaporator Overhead Condenser is a horizontal shell and tube type heat exchanger designed to condense steam from the second stage evaporator and return the condensate to the distillate accumulator. Service water circulates in
% the tube side to provide cooling to condense the steam. This heat ,
exchanger is out of service and is not used.
(- Method of Analysis - Since this heat exchanger is out of service and is not used (Reference 3), no analysis was performed.
[. cuswsa/Jws/c63089 4-24 l
q
... 4 Imoact'and~ Conclusions - Althoegh the heat exchanger is out of service, it can be expected,' that should the unit be'used in the future, there-will be an impact on performance. This impact would be reflected in ;
the form of a longer process. time being required or consideration of a . ]
0 reduction in the rate of feed. In no case would the 95 F service
' w. water be detrimental to the heat exchanger. Operation of this component does.not affect ~the nuclear safety of the plant.
BORON RECOVERY DISTittATE COOLER ~(E-15-M)
Description and/or Function - The Boron Recovery Distillate Cooler is a .
horizontal shell and tube type heat exchanger designed to cool distillate from the evaporator feed distillate exchanger before the distillate is sent to the waste test tanks. Service water circulates in the tubesideLto provide cooling to bring the distillate down to 1200 F. This heat exchanger is out of service and is.not used.
6thod of Analysis - Since this heat exchat.ger is out of service and is' i
not used (Reference 3), no analysis was performed, Imoact and Conclusions - Although the heat exchanger is out of service, it can be expected that ,should the unit be used in the future, there will be an impi.ct on performance. This impact would be reflected in the form ' ~ A longer process time being required or consideration of a 0
reduction ... the rate of feed. In no case would the 95 F service
! water be detrimental to the heat exchanger. Operation of this component does not affect the nuclear safety of the plant.
CONTROL ROOM, CHEMISTRY LAB. OFFICE BUILDING __A/C UNITS (CP-11-1A:
C-12-1A: C-10-1A) c' Qgscriotion and/or Function - The Control Room and Chemistry Lab areas d are cooled by a Trane Medium Pressure Draw Through Air Conditioning
~~
Unit. The Office Building is cooled with a Trane Medium Pressure Blow Through Air Conditioning Unit. These units use refrigerant'R-22 as i their cooling media going through direct expansion coils. The heat is ,
i- removed from the unit condensers through the use of service water.
CYW5W54/JVB/063089 4-25 s
Egthod of Analysis - The n:ethod used to evaluate the subject units was
~
l by a comparative approximation to a unit for which details exist. The i
impact of a 100F cooling water change on these units could be j established and it was considered that a similar impact would take place on the Haddam Neck installed units. No tube plugging was assumed ,
in this performance evaluation. The design fouling factor of each __
2 condenser is identical is equal to .001 Ft -Hr OF/ BTU.
Imoact and Conclusions - The evaluation of the service water 0 0 temperature from 85 F to 95 F will decrease the capacity of the air conditioning units by approximately 8% which in turn will increase the coil outlet air temperature by approximately 2 0F. This could amount to approximately a 2 0F increase in room temperature. The expected room temperature will be 75 F, an acceptable room temperature for human comfort and equipment. This temperature condition will have no impact on the safety of the plant.
[IEUj, AT1MG WATER PUME (P-34-1 A, IB,1C, ID)
Qu.criotion and/or Function - Service water is supplied to the Sedl gland and the shaft bearings on the circulating water pump. The circulating water pump is a Westinghouse model 66BN. The Westinghouse division which built the pump no longer exists, but the der,ign details and records for this pump were sold from Westinghouse to Hayward I c- Tyler. The service water is injected onto the pump shaft and seal gland to provide lubrication of these areas of the pump while the pump is not operating. Once the pump is in operation, the lubrication and cooling of the bearing is provided by the process fluid. Service water is provided to prevent the pump from starting with a dry bearing, an event which could cause bearing damage and will reduce bearing life.
- The water which spills out of the bearing and gland is captured by a drain system.
.'~
Method of Analysis - Service water is needed to provide bearing J lubrication only when the circulating water pump'is not operating.
. Once the pump is operating, the lubrication and cooling is provided by C WSW54/JWB/063089 4-26 l
i l
l 1
i
0
.the process fluid. Thus, the only concern with the 95 F service
" water is the effect on the bearing'and gland when the pump is not 0 i operating. Hayward Tyler ' evaluated the effect of the 95 F service
-l water on the circulating pump bearing and gland and it was determined ,
0 that the pump will not be adversely affect by the 95 F water.
Imoact and Conclusions - The evaluation of the circulating water pump 0
determined that the increased service water temperature of 95 F in no way affects the integrity and function of the pump. The shaft bearing
- will be adequately lubricated with the higher temperature service water. No special operating precautions or maintenance requirements are necessary .to allow operation or the circulating water pump with 0
950 F service water. Operation of this component with 95 F service water dces not affect the nuclear safety of the plant.
CLOSED COOLING SYSTEM HEAT EXCHANGERS (E-70-IA: IB)
Description and/ or Function - This. system provides cooling for-auxiliary plant components, and consists of closed cooling water pumps, closed cooling water heat exchar,gers, a surge tank, ana associated valving and contrals. Normally, service water provides cooling through
~
the closed cooling HXs. However, a well utter system is also available to provide cooling.
Method of Analysis - As part of the Service Water System flow network evaluation, service water is being supplied to the two heat exchangers. However, provisions are provided to switch from service water to the well water supply whenever the closed cooling water outlet 0
temperature can no longer be maintained below 90 F due to increasing 0
SWS temperature. As this provision applies for the 85 F service 0
water design case, an analysis of the component for a 95 F service water temperature is not considered necessary.
I'
+
i u
r CYWSWS4/JVB/063089 4-27
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- Imoact and Conclusions -'From the equipment standpoint, the design.
temperature change has no impact as provisions are provided for switching from service water- to well water as dictated by the exit temperature conditions of the cooled stream. This is monitored by'the 4 site operations staff.
ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMP (P-32-1C)
Description and/or Function - The electrical auxiliary steam generator feed pump is an Ingersoll-Rand model HMT pump which is driven by an electric motor. The pump supplies water from the demineralized water storage tank to the feed station in the turbine building. The pump uses service water as a cooling medium for the pump oil cooler and as a cooling medium for the packing and stuffing boxes.
Ugthod ~of Analysis - The electrical auxiliary steam generator feed pump was evaluated by Westinghouse and Ingersoll-Rand to verify that the pump bearings will perform adequately with the increased oil temperature due to the increased service water temperature. The pump stuffing ~ boxes were evaluated to verify that the packing cooling and
~
' lubrication will be adequtte to continue proper sealing with the higher service water temperature.
Imcact and Conclusion - The evaluation of the electrical auxiliary steam generator feed pump determined that the increased service water i 0
$ temperature of 95 F should in no way affect the integrity or function of the pump. The stuffing box packing is capable of normal sealing effectiveness with the increased cooling water temperature. The pump lubrication system and bearings will perform acceptability with the increased service water temperature to the pump oil cooler. No special operating precautions or maintenance requirements are judged to be necessary to allow operation of the electrical auxiliary steam 0
generator feed pump with 95 F service water. Operation of this ]
0 component with 95 F service water does not affect the nuclear safety ]
{. 1 of the plant.
. e 4-28 CYWSWS4/JWB/063089
4 4 %
~
GENERATOR HYDROGEN COOLERS (E-62-1A: 18: IC: 10)
! - Description and/or Function - There are four hydrogen coolers operating in parallel, whose function is to remove. heat created in the ,
generator. The generator internals are cooled by' hydrogen gas circulated through the generator The heat absorbed by the circulating _
]
hydrogen is transferred to the SWS through the generator hydrogen coolers. The nominal hydrogen gas temperature exiting the cooler is 460C. However, this temperature can be allowed to vary up to 50C.
Method of Analysis - This equipment was originally designed to operate -
with 4300 gpm of 950 F service water, as documented in the instruction book, Reference 22.
To support'this study, recent calculations were performed and are documented in a report by the Westinghouse Power Generation Division, Reference 23. A computerized analysis using latest technology was performed to predict the cooler performance. The original manuf acturing drawings were used to define the geometry that was used q in the analysis. Cases with and without 10% tube plugging margin were addressed. A fouling factor of .002 Ft -Hr2 OF/STU was assumed.
impact and Croclusionji - With no tubes plugged, the servh:e watar flow 7 ate required to maintain the hydrogen gas temperature exiting the cooler below the nominal limit of 46 C 0 is 4475 gpm at 950F. With 9
10% of the tubes plugged, the service water flow rate required to meet this same temperature limit would cause tube velocities to exceed the maximum allowable limit of 10 f/s.
0
' However, since hydrogen temperatures are allowed to approach 51 C, the required service water flow rate would be substantially less. The
~
f required flow rates were not determined at this higher hydrogen
" temperature. Review of the Reference 23 report shows that required flow increases asymptotically beyond 900F. By allowing an increase v
.~
~ in hydrogen temperature of 05 0 (90 F), the heat transfer .
capabilities of the hydrogen coolers are substantially increased.
CYWSWS4/JWB/063089 4-29
-h'_ --__._.__________m_ _ _ , _ _ _ _ , _ _ _
. s .
0 As service water temperature increases beyond 85 F, the hydrogen exit temperature from these coolers should be monitored and maintained below 0
E 510 0. Operation of this component with 95 F service water will not affect the nuclear safety o'f the plant.
'l GENERATOR HYDROGEN SEAL OIL COOLERS (E61-1A: -lH1 Description and/or Function - The generator has seals on the rotor shaft to prevent escape of hydrogen gas. .These seals require oil (turbine lube oil) to function. Seal oil is injected into the bearings and then divides into two flow paths. One flow path is.through labyrinth seals into the generator (hydrogen side seal oil) and the other is through labyrinth seals away from the generator (air side seal oil). Coolers are used in each stream to keep the temperature of the-oil injected into the seals from exceeding 1200F.
Method of Analvsji - The Instruction Manual, Reference 22, indicates that the hydrogen and air side coolers require 50 gpm and 100 gpm respectively, of 95 0F service w6ter to meet the required heat loads.
Since the time that the origir.a1 equipment wus designed, the analytical tools and methods have been advanced. To support this study, calculations were performed and are documented in a report by the Westinghouse Power Generation Division, Reference 23, to predict the performance of the Hydrogen Seal Oil Coolers. Based on the detailed
,f fabrication drawings, a computerized analysis was performed utilizing the latest technology. Performance predictions were calculated for cases with and without 10% tube plugging margin. A fouling factor of 2
.002 Ft -Hr OF/ BTU #as assumed.
.l
e CYWSWS4/JWB/0630Bs 4-30
c ..
Imoact and Conclusions.
A. Hydrocen Side Seal' Oil Cooler (E61-1B) - Based on nominal
- fabrication ' drawing dimensions, this unit will maintain oil ,
~
0 0 temperature'below 120 F with 95 F service water at 26 gpm and 30 gpm for the cases with and without tubes plugged respectively. ,
The vendor has stated that this oil cooler could.have been manufactured with tolerances outside the nominal range. . If. this was the case, then the required lnd flow could be higher.
Therefore, it is. recommended that performance of this oil cooler be monitored in order to maintain cooler exit temperature below- .
1200 F.
B. Air Side ' Seal Oil Cooler (E61-1 A1 -' The analytical prediction based on nominai drawing dimensions for this unit determined that even with no tubes plugged,-'the oil temperature ' exiting the cooler will reach' the 120 0F design limit when service water temperature ~
exceeds 87 0 F at a flow rate of 498 gpm (which corresponds to the 10 f/s tube velocity' limit).
'With 10% cf tne tubes plugged, 450 gpm of 8_30 F service v:ater flow is re uired to handle the heat. load. Again, this maximum flew limit is based on a maximum allowable tubu velocity of 10 L FPS.
i However, the plant has operated in the past with service water temperatures in excess of 800F. It is expected inat the reference 23 report may be very conservative. In order to verify that adequate cooling is available, it is recommended that the oil temperature. exiting the cooler be monitored when service water temperature exceeds 750F. The cooler exit temperature must be maintained below 1200F.
The operation of these hydrogen oil coolers with 950 F service water
~ '
~v 'does not affect the nuclear safety of the plant. '
4 Crd5WS4/JWB/063089 4-31
r .
GENERATOR MAIN EXCITER COOLER (E-115-1A)
Description and/or Function - The generator exciter air cooler is a cross-flow cooler using finned tubing to increase the heat transfer ,
area. The generator exciter internals are cooled by a recirculating air stream. The cooler is nominally sized assuming the exit air ---
temperature is 45 0C. However, this is not a critical value and operation between'500 C and 400 C is permissible.
Method of Analysis - This cooler was originally designed to operate with 200 gpm of 950 F service water, as documented in the instruction ,
book, Reference 22.
In order to' support operation with 950 F service water, the Westinghouse Power Generation Division has recently recalculated the performance of this cooler. The results of these calculations are summarized in the reference 23 report. Benefits of technology advances ,
and. operating' experience have been incorporated in a computerized analysis to predict the cooler performance for this study. The
^
computer model is based on the original cooler manufacturing drawing dimenciens. Cases wi9.h and without 10% plugging margin were addressed. A fouling factor of .002 Ft -Hr2OF/ BTU was assumed. [
i LEE 3 red 19Ehi!9M - The Servict kater fica requirements at 950F are 46.4 gpm with no tubes plugged and 56 gpm witti 10% of the tubes piugged. In each instance the design limit of 500 C for cuolst exit air temperature was not exceeded. Operation of this component with 950 F service water does not affect the nuclear safety of the plant.
[
a CYWSW54/JWB/063089 4-32
-- --.mm__-___________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _
D' *-
, e GLAND SEAL WATER SUPPLY FILTERS (FL-50-1A AND IB)
Description and/or Function - Two Gland Seal Water Supply Filters are upstream of the four circulating water pumps. The function of these filters is to remove particulate from the stream before entry into the
.4 ~---
pumps. The filters include provisions for continuous back flushing.
Method of Analysis - An analysis was not necessary since the 0
manufacturer has confirmed that 95 F service water has no effect' on the operation of the filter. 1 Imoact and Conclusions - The filters are capable of operating with 950 F service water temperature. Operation of-these filters with 950 F service water does not affect the nuclear safety of the plant.
HYPOCHLORITE DILVTION Description and/or Function - For the hypochlorite dilution function, service water is provided through a two-inch line to the hypochlorite variable orifice ejector. There the service water mixes with hypochlorite solutien from the sodium hypochlorite storage tanks and is then retarned to the bay through tte eight hypochlorite diffusers. The diffssers are simply pipes capped on the free er.d with 20 holes drilled 1 through the wall to allow the diluted hypochlorite solution to exit.
Method of_3ngivsis'- Since service water is being used only as a diluting agent, no analysis is necessary, 2
Imoact and Conclusions - Service water temperature of 950F has no adverse impact upon the hypochlorite dilution function.
l
[ 1 I
l
- e CYWSW54/JWB/053089 4-33 l
l i
j L-___________.__-_-_ _ _ _ _ - _
b o ISOLATED PHASE BUS DUCT COOLERS (E-48-1A: 18)
Description and/or Function - The purpose of the duct cooler is to maintain the conductor temperature less than-1050C and the duct enclosure less than 120 0C. Cooling of the isolated phase bus is accomplished by forced air cooling in a closed system. Moving air is channeled down the bus between the housing and the conductor in the two outer phases, and upon reaching the end of the bus assembly, either at the generator or transformer, the air passes into the center phase.
As the warm air flows out of the center phase into the heat exchanger, it is dispersed by an equalizing baffle, then passed onto the cooling coils. To eliminate the possibility of water which may be present on the cooling coils being carried into the bus assembly, the air is passed through a water eliminator before entering the enclosure to be recirculated. A drip pan beneath the cooling coils and water eliminator picks up any condensci water.
Method of Analysis - Insufficient information was available from site records 'to allow a re-evaluation of the Isolated Phase Bus Duct Cooler
~
to be accomplished. However, the reference 22 Instruction Book shows that the various heat exchangers for the turbine generator were !
l designed for 95cF service water. .Considering that the isolated phase bus was likely ordered in ccncert with and utilizes the same croling water system es the turbine-generator, it is more than likely that ;
950 F was also used as the design temperature for the Isolated Phase I clus Duct Ccoler .
Imoact and Conclusions - Ne calculations could be made to support operations at the elevated service water temperature, although it is l likely that the cooler was designed for 95 0F service water.
Therefore, monitoring of the duct enclosure and the conductor will be required if service water exceeds 85 0F'. The conductor must be limited to 105 0 C, and the duct enclosure to 80 0 C.
Sight windows i are provided on the enclosure for this purpose. The function of the Isolated Phase Bus Duct Cooler does not affect the nuclear safety of the pl ar. ..
cvvsWS W VB/003089 4-34 4
KINNEY FILTER (FL-60)
Description and/or Function - This filter is upstream of the main exciter coolers. The function of the filter is to remove particulate from the stream before it enters the exciter. The filter includes provisions for continuous back flushing.
Method of Analysis - An analysis was not necessary since the 0
manuf&cturer has confirmed that 95 F service water has no effect on the operation of the filter.
Imoaet and Conclusions - The filters are capable of operating with 950 F service water temperature.
MAIN' STEAM' SAMPLE COOLER (E-25-1A)
Description and/or Function - The main steam sample cooler is a dual heat transfer coil which cools the high pressure main steam sample to permit an operator to withdraw the sample. The service water and sample fibwrates are controlled by four manual control valves.
~
Method of Analvsis - An analysis was performed to determine the outlet sample temperature assuming the service water flow rate of 4.5 gpm at 95 F. The sample out'tet temperatures were calculated assuming the sartple controi valve vos throttle over a range of 0% to 100% open. The 0
sampiss tempernure exceed!, 212 F when the sample flow ratc is between 90% and 9k. of the maximum flow rate. The fooling factor Applied to 2
this ccoler 1s .002 It -He OF/ BTU.
Impact and Conclusions - This equipment will function as intended at 4
950 inlet service water temperature. To maintain a 100% water
. sample, the service water flow rate should be maintained at no less than 4.5 gpm and the sample flow rate should be limited to 90% of the
~
maximum (0.35 gpm). The function of the main steam sample cooler does
- not affect the nuclear safety of the plant.
e n
CYWSWSA/JWB/063089 4-35
--_-__--1__. _ . , _ _ , . _ _ , , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , , _ _
PIPING AND VALVES Description and/or Function Various service water system piping and valves are required to channel
^ flow at controlled rates to the non-safet/ related components. -
Method of Analysis The effect of the increased SW temperatures on the non-safety related piping and valves is evaluated by NUSCO in Reference 2.. .
- Imoact and Conclusions The effect of the increased SW temperatures on the non-safety related piping and' valves is evaluated by NUSCO in Reference 2.
PRIMARY DRATN TANK VENT CONDENSER (E-11-1A. 1B)
Description and/or Function - The function of the primary drain tank verit condenser is to cool the saturated gases _being vented from the primary drains tank and recover water which would otherwise be lost through venting to the waste gas system. The original duty of the
. . .; condenser was to recover 5.038 lb/hr of steam as condensate.
j Nthed of Analy111 - The condeiser was evaluated assuming that the c'esign heat transfer coeffic'sent remained constant ovu the range of :l
[ tew>eratures corsicered. This approximation is valid beraa e the L[ steamside film is the primary contributor to the heat transfer resistance. The steam inlet and outlet conditions were held constant i for all situations that were evaluated. The steamside film and its properties can thus be assumed to be constant. Because the condenser
'- was fabricated with excess heat transfer surface, the LMTD of the
- U ' condenser could decrease as a result of the service water temperature
, ?'[ increase with no loss of performance. The fouling factor applied to 2
, this condenser is .002 Ft -Hr OF/ BTU. ,
CYWSW54/JWB/0630B9 4-36 w
m_____-__m-___.m___. _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
v + , ,
. - .. a
- 4 .
g . Imoact and Conclusions .The primary drains tank vent condenser will j
0 perform its design heat transfer duty with.95 F' service water
- provided that:the service water flow to the condenser is increased from i
0.75 gpm.to about 2.24 gpm.. This flow change is easily within the flow ,
r~ handling capability of the condent.er. The service water flow increase
'" , of 1.5 gpm will have a negligible affect on the service water system.
If two of the condenser's 16 tubes are plugged, the condenser has sufficient area to perform its duty when 350F water is used for 0
-cooling. With two tubes plugged and using 95 F water,;the condenser
. cannot pcrform its full duty for any flow rate of service water. It is estimated that the condenser will produce 4 to 4.5 lb/hr .of. condensate with two tubes plugged and 2.24 gpm of 950 F. service water. Operation
?:J of this component with 950 service water has no affect on the. nuclear ,
safety of the plant. ,
i RADIATION MONITOR RECIRCULATION PUMP (P-141-1A)
Descriotionand['orFunction-Theradiationmonitorrecirculationpump supplies samoles of service water from the outlet of the spent fuel pit
-heat exchanger to a radiation monitor. The water is then returned to the service water drain header line. The radiat_ ion monitor recirculation rump uses service water only as the process fluid and not as a cooling medium for pump appurtenances.
4 Method of Analysis - The radiation monitor recirculation pump was evaluated to verify that the materials of construction are adequate to maintain pump integrity and function with a process fluid temperature of 950F. The mechanica' seal was t 'aluated for sealing capability for the 950F water. The effect or the increased process fluid temperature on the pump performance was also evaluated.
4
.I**
3 CYWSW54/JWB/063089 4-37
- 9
m
'~
- jJ . . .
y 'Imoact and Conclusions - The' evaluation of the radiation monitor recirculation pump' determined that~ the increased service water ,
temperature of 95 0 F in no.way affects the integrity or function'of
-the pump. ' The mechanical' seal is capable of normal sealing. ,
effectiveness at the-increased temperature. The increased temperature will result in no significant reduction in pump hydraulic performance. -
No special operating precautions or maintenance requirements are necessary to allow operation of the radiation monitor recirculation pump with 950 F service water.
fi ,
SAMptE PUMP (P-8-1A) .
Description and/or Function The river water sample pump is a Marlow Pump Model 1-1/2 HU21ECA3, horizontal pump. The pump' supplies samples of service water from the service water drain header line to the l receiver effluent radiation monitor. The water is then returned to the
-serv,1ce water drain header line. The sample pump uses service water only as the process fluid and not as a cooling medium for pump appurtenances.
q
~
Method of Analysis - The river water sample pu!np was evaluated to .f verify that the materials of construction are adequate to maintain pump integrity and function with a process fluid temperature of 95 0F. The mechanical seal was evaluated for. sealing capability with'the 950F j water. The effect of the increased process fluid temperature on the d V pump performance was also evaluated.
Imoact and Conclusions - The evaluation of the river water sample pump
'* determined that the increased rervice water temperature of 950F in no i
~
way affects the integrity or function of the pump. The mechanical seal is capable of normal sealing effectiveness at the increased l
-[ temperature. The increased temperature will result in no significant l_l reduction in pump hydraulic performance. No special operating i precautions or maintenance requirements are necessary to allow {
[ .) operation of the river water sample pump with 950 F service water. -
ml' c m ws m ws/conu 4-38 4
D4' EA -
-STEAM GENERATOR BLOWOFF TANK CONDENSER (E-90-1A: IB)
Qgjtpriotion and/or Function - The function of.the Steam Generator:
', Biowoff Tank Condenser is, as.the namelimplies, condensing of the . .
2 blowoff which 'is flashing. The original specification' sheet (Ref. 24) calls for 3312 lb/hr steam generator flash to be condensed.
Method of Analysis' - A computer program analysis of the as constructed condenser was-.made with the initial service water flow rate of 160,650 lb/hr (about 320 gpm) provided at 850F provided as the cooling medium. Results were within the range of specifications and the program was considered to be suitable for additional runs. The fouling 2
factor applied to this condenser is .002 Ft -Hr OF/ BTU.
Imoact and Conclusions - The_ analysis determined that for original desien condition, the unit had approximately 4% excess surface. The original conditions of design were to condense 3312 lb/hr of steam with a service water flow rate of 160,650 lb/hr (322 gpm) at 850F. As the 0
temperature of the service water increases to 95 F, the unit can condense the original flash design flow of 3312 lb/hr provided the
~
service water flow is increased to 198,000 lb/hr. (396 gpm). With 10%
of the tubes plugged and 225,000 lb/hr (450 gpm) of 950 F service water (limited by 10 ft/see tubeside velocity), the unit would be limited to condensing 3111 lb/hr (or a 6% reduction from the flash design flow). The function of the steam generator blowoff tank condenser does not affect the nuclear safety of the plant.
STEAM GENERATOR SAMPLE CHILLER CONDENSER (C-16-1A: IB)
Description and/or Function - The Steam Generator Sample Chiller
~
Condenser removes the latent heat of vaporization and subcools a high pressure gaseous refrigerant into a liquid state. The heat is
- transferred to the service water running through the tubes from the
,[ refrigerant on the shellside of the heat exchanger.
L .,
1' CYWSWS4/JWB/053089 4-39
. FALhod of Analysis - The' equipment supplier, Carrier Corporation,-
provided an assembly drawing and performance curves for the' condenser.
The performance evaluations were done, assuming that.the heat load is 10
^
tons,(120,000 BTU /hr), the design. load of the cendenser. For a given. .
refrigerant condition, the required increase in cooling water flow X could be taken directly from the performance curves as the cooling water temperature-increased from 850 F to 950F. Although the. actual
^
refrigerant conditions are not known, the required coolant flow was determined for a wine range of saturated ~R-12 conditions which is expected to-include' the actual working conditions.
U
! A condition of 10% tubes' plugged was not considered in the evaluation.
J- The design of the condenser does not permit tubes to be plugged. The process of attamptinn to plug tubes has been judged likely-to result in extensive damage to tne shell which would make it unsuitable for further use. The condenser design .is suitable only for complete <
i replacement if it should develop a leak. The fouling factor applied to ,
2
'this condenser is .001 Ft -Hr OF/ BTU.
1 i l
Imoact and Conclusions - The Steam Generator' Sample Chiller Condenser will perform its design heat transfer duty with 95 0F service water provided that the service water flow to the condenser is no less than 10 gpm. The function of this component does not effect the nuclear safety of the plant. -
4 TURBINE Olt COOLERS (E-60-1A: 18)
' 1. . ~
Description and/or Function - The turbine lube oil coolers remove heat from the oil used to cool and lubricate the turbine rotor bearings.
The oil must be cooled to 1200 F after returning from the bearings at
')
f: temperatures between 1500 F and 1600 F. Although two coolers are
^'
provided, only one cooler is in operation at a time.
'C
. c 3 qf Method of Analysis - The turbine oil coolers were originally designed J N to handle the required heat load with 2200 gpm of 950F service water as documented in the instruction book, Reference 22. The original
? l
- calculations which support this cooler performance are not available.' !
CWSVS4/.1WB/063089 4-40
- - - - ---___-a_--_a- __-__._.---a--------- ------------__--u---_u--- _-___-----,---__.---.-,---_--------------a__.- - .-_-_--____-____-__-------_u -u-a-- . . , _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ - -
.s- - .
A recent study, Reference 23, was performed by the Westinghouse Power Generation Division to examine the performance capability of these-
~
1 coolers. Utilizing the. technology and methodology advances since the design of the oil coolers, a computerized analysis was performed and ,
the results are reported here. The original physical characteristics of the oil coolers were used in the analysis. Performance predictions --
were made for both no tubes plugged and 10% tube plugging cases. A fouling-factor of .002 Ft -Hr2 OF/ BTU was assumed.
Imoact and Conclusions - With no tubes plugged this cooler will perform adequately with 950F service water when provided a flow of 2997 gpm. .
0
. With 10% of the tubes plugged, the cooler saturates at about 91.5 F service water. The 10 FPS tube velocity limit is reached at a service water flow of 2810 gpm which further limits the cooler performance to 900 F water temperature.
l In order to operate a degraded unit (10% tubes plugged) with service 0
water temperatures in excess of 90 F, the cooler exit oil temperature 0
^ mustbem5nitoredandmaintainedatorbelow120F. The same monitoring requirement applies with a clean unplugged oil cooler if the SW flow rate available is not sufficiently high. i l
Another consideration would be'to operate both coolers when service water temperatures exceed 900F. However, use of both turbine oil coolers would require both revision of the flow network analysis, and possibly procedural limits on the throttle valve positions. The function of the turbine oil coolers do not affect the nuclear safety of the plant.
l l'i 0,
U 4
CYV5WS4/JWB/063089 4-41
,w ,
a.3 , -
' TRAVELING WATER SCREENS (SC-1-1A: IB:' IQ.lD.),
h n .y Description and/or Functj.2n -LThe Traveling Water Screens'are used to'
~
' strain particulate for the main service water inlet piping. ,
k*
'. ' Method of Analysis - An. analysis was not necessary as the screens' are _.
. manufacture of materials which are not subject to damage as a result
' of service w.ter temperatures.of s50F.
Imoact and Conclusions - The Traveling Water Screens are and have been
./-
0 capable, as part of the original ' design, of operating with 95 F-- ,
n b
WASTE EVAPORATOR OVERHEAD CONDENSER (E-93)
Description and/or Function - The Waste Evaporator Overhead Condenser is a horizontal shell and tube type haat exchanger designed to condense-
~
steam'from the Waste Evaporator and return the. condensate to the Waste Evaporator Distillate Tank. Service water circulates in the tube side to provi'de cooling for condensing the steam. This heat exchanger is.
normally'out of service. ,
, Method of Analysis - Since this heat exchanger' is normally out of
. service and is not used (Reference 3), no analysis was performed.
^
Imoact and Conclusions - Although the heat exchanger is out of service, it can be expected that should the unit be used in the future, there will be an impact on performance. This impact would be reflected in
.g the form of a longer process time being required or consideration of a
- reduction in the rate of feed. In no case would the 950 F service water be detrimental to the heat exchanger.
h '
h r[
CYVSVSA/JWB/063089 4-42 u ____.--__________.____m._._m_m______________________________________._________._________.___m. _ _ _ _ ___.____._______-___m_-
n_; _ _ - _ - _
- 5. ' SAFETY EVAU.% TION The following safety evaluation is provided consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. In addition, a safety evaluation ~ ,
i consistent with NUSCO Nuclear Engineering and Operations Procedure NE0 3.12, " Safety Evalv:c.lons" is provided in Appendix B.
A. EVALUATION SCOFE Adequate service water cooling must be provided to plant equipment to ensure equipment operability and adequate cooling performance.to ,
remove component and decay heat to support safe plant operation, shutdown, and mitigation of postulated design basis accida",ts.
0 Increasing the service water design basis temperature from 05 F to 950 F will reduce the Service Water System's (SWS) cooling ability to some extent, will increase the temperature of the service water being ,
returned from cooled equipment, and will increase the temperature of the process fluids being cooled by SWS serviced coolers and heat exchang'ers. This evaluation will assess the following areas related to increasing the maximum allowable Connecticut River water ,
temperature to 950F:
- 1. Normal Operations Normal, safe plant operation is defined for this evaluation to be the ability to cool equipment whose sudden failure could cause a design basis transient analyzed in FSAR Chapter 15 or whose operability is required to ensure that initial conditions assumed in the accident analyses are not exceeded. This includes cooling the containment atmosphere via the containment air recirculation fan coolers, cooling cooling various coolers required the spent-fuel pit heat exchanger, s The SWS also provides cooling to the
' for turbine / generator operation.
n 4
/
5-1 CYW5W15/JMG/063089
. . - _ - _ _ _ - . _ _ . _ _ - - - _ - - . . - - - - - _ _ _ . _ _ - - _ - - - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -_n-_ _-- --_ _ _ _ - _ - - - _ _ - - - - - - _ _ - - - _
In addition, - .
CCWS which in turn cools' the the reactor coolant pumps.
rooling water from the Connecticut Rivor is used to cool the main condenser via the circulating water system-(CWS). Condenser vacuum must be maintained to prevent turbine trir,s on low vacuum.
The evaluation.of normal safe plant operations, specifically addresses the following items: _.
0
- a. The affect of increasing the service water temperature to 95 F on the ability of the SWS pumps to operate and the ability of the piping, and components to maintain structural integrity is addressed to ensure that SWS operability is maintained for normal operations. Component structural integrity and the operability of the SW pumps will be addressed in this report. The structural integrity (stress analysis) .of the piping, as well as the operability of the active valves, is in NUSCO's scope and is addressed in Reference 2.
- b. The SWS provides cooling to the Containment Air Recirculation Fan Cooling Coils (CARS) to maintain containment temperature below limits. The containment temperature during normal operations is an important input to the containment integrity analysis associated with LOCAs and Stesm Line Ruptures. The ability of the SWS to maintain' containment temperature within normal operating limits will, therefore, be addressed.
- c. The SWS provides cooling to the Containment Air Recirculation Fan
/
Motor Coolers, also to support containment cooling during normal operations. The ability of the SWS to provide sufficient cooling during normal operations to support CAR fan motor operability will, therefore, be addressed.
- d. The SWS provides cooling to the spent fuel pit cooling system l which in turn maintains the SFP temperature below limits. The
} ability of the SWS to maintain the SFP temperature below limits
' '[- will, therefore, be addressed.
~
I- ,
5-2 CYWSW15/MG/DE3089 l '.
l N--_-___________________________ ___
'9,. 4
- e. The SWS provides cooling to the CCWS, which in turn provides cooling to the RCP thermal barrier and the RCP bearing coolers.
The loss of reactor coolant flow, which can be caused by a -
mechanical failure of one or more RCPs, is a transient evaluated E in the FSAR as an event of moderate frequency.
y
- f. The SWS provides cooling to secondary plant equipment required to support turbine / generator operations (e.g., the main turbine lube oil coolers, the generator hydrogen ' coolers, the isolated phase bus duct coolers, the generator hydrogen seal coolers, and the -
generator main exciter coolers). The loss of the main turbine / generator can lead to a loss of load transient. The loss of load transient is evaluated in the FSAR as an event of moderate frequency,
- g. Cooling water from the Connecticut River also cools the main condenser (via the Circulating Water System). Increasing the allowable river water temperature potentially increases the chance for a turbine trip due to low condenser pressure. Turbine
- trip can lead to a loss of load which is a transient evaluated in the FSAR as an event of moderate frequency.
- 2. Normal Plant Cecidown The SWS provides cooling to the CCWS (via the CCW heat exchangers), which in turn provides cooling to the RHR heat exchangers to remove decay heat during the second phase of normal plant cooldown. Normal plant cooldown is not considered a licensing requirement as hot standby is the design basis safe '
As discussed in Section 4, the plant can be shutdown condition.
0 The cooldown cooled to cold shutdown with 95 F service water.
times are extended as the service water temperature increases.
There are no FSAR accident analyses associated with the normal
.[ cooldown function, and therefore plant cooldown is not a subject b of this safety evaluation.
1-CYVSV55/JMG/DE3089
1, . .
l- s 3. Post-accident _0oeration
- a. The ability of the'SWS to operate and maintain structural integrity during post-accident operation must be addressed. This ,
' includes the ability of the pumps to operate, the active valves H to move, and the pressure retaining parts to maintain structural __
integrity.- Component structural integrity and the operability of l
the SW pumps.will be addressed in this report. The structural integrity. (stress analysis) of the piping, as well as the operability of the active valves. is NUSCO's scope and is addressed in Reference 2. ,
'b. The SWS Provides cooling to the diesel generator 2A and 2B heat x exchangers to support EDG operation following a loss of normal power. The FSAR considers the loss of normal power in
. conjunction with other events including:
Loss of forced reactor coolant flow (FSAR Section 15.2.8)
- Steam line break (FSAR Chapter 15.2.9)
Steam generator tube ruptere (FSAR Chapter.15.2.10)
- Loss of normal feedwater flow (FSAR Chapter.15.2.12)
~
- Reactor coolant pump rotor seizure (FSAR Section 15.2.13.1)
- Loss-of-coolant accidents (FSAR Chapter 15.3) .
The SWS's ability to provide adequate cooling to support EDG l operability will, therefore, be addressed.
a
- c. The SWS provides cooling to the RHR heat exchangers to cool the recirculated emergency core coolant during ECCS recirculation following a LOCA. The SWS's ability to maintain the recirculated ECC temperature below limits will, therefore, be addressed.
- d. The SWS provides cooling to the-RHR pump seal coolers, bearings
and packing during ECCS recirculation. The ability to cool the
.' RHR pump to support post-accident operability will, therefore, be U" addressed.
ij -
'. 5-4 CYWSW55/JMG/063DB9 k _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ .
m; < .
- s. .. .
. i. . ..
l H( e..The-SWS provides cooling to the Containment Air Recirculation Fan:
Cooling Coils (CARS) to maintain containment temperature and
- pressure below design limits. The ability of the'SWS to remove' .
the design basis, post-accident heat load will,- therefore,- be addressed.
lL[ f. The SWS also provides cooling to the Containment Air Recirculation Fan Motor Coolers, post-accident, to support
. containment cooling.
The areas not addressed in this report, which are addressed by NUSCO in' Reference 2 are:
- The effects of increased process temperatures on the piping stress analyses. The structural integrity of the SWS piping.
(that'is not isolated during post-accident operations) should be addressed as piping ruptures would divert SW flow from essential equipment.
~
- The potential effects of increased nozzle loads due to pipe thermal expansion on the active valves' ability to operate.
' Certain valves are required to operate to isolate non-essential equipment folicwing an accident, or to provide flow to equipment which is normally isolated but requires flow for accident mitigation.
- Containment analysis issues associated with new pressure and temperature profiles.
- 5-5 CrJSW55/JMG/063089
-- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - .______---___-___---_______a
B. EVALUATION s
l.. ' Normal ' 0oeration
.a. SWS Operability:
- 1. s SWS operability, for this evaluation, is defined as the ability of the pumps to operate, the active valves to operate, and the ability of the pressure retaining portions of.the system to' maintain structural integrity.
The SW pumps are two stage pumps taking suction from the Connecticut River and discharging to the SWS. The pumps use 4
service water only as the process fluid and not as a cooling -
medium for. pump appurtenances.
As discussed in Section 4,' increasing the service water temperature to 950F will rot degrade pump performance or degrade the service water pumps ability to operate during normal operations. In addition, continuous operation at 7500 gpm (0
-5 ft. MSL river level) was evaluated and found to be acceptable
~
relative to horsepower and NPSH criteria.
.The pressure retaining components of the SWS were_ evaluated, and as discussed in Section 4, all evaluated components are capable of maintaining structural integrity with 95 F0 service' water.
In addition, the design temperature of the SWS valves exceeds the maximum calculated SW temperatures for all conditions.
- b. CAR Performance:
L
- The SWS provides cooling for the Containment Air Recirculation
~
Fan Cooling coils (CAP.S). The CARS are the primary means of wl)'
.- J removing heat from the reactor containment atmosphere during
+- I normal operation or during and after high energy line breaks
,:.?_
s.&
L e
. ~;
5-6 CYW5VS$/JMG/063089
,- .. -= _ _
x .
4 +
inside containment including a loss-of-coolant coolant accident (LOCA). There are. four containment air recirculation units inside the reactor containment. During normal operation, each CAR is configured to include a cooling coil, fan and connected ductwork that distributes cool air throughout the containment.
Following a. LOCA, however, each CAR is. reconfigure to also ____
include moisture separators, particulate filters, and filter tray: filled with impregnated charcoal.
The CAR cooling coils are finned, transverse flow type. Service water flows through the coils to remove the heat. In addition to the change in the design basis temperature, this evaluation establishes a larger design fouling factor (0.0029 compared to 0.002).
The CARS provide cooling to maintain the containment temperature below allowed limits during normal operations. - The initial containment temperature is an important parameter in determining the peak containment pressure following design basis accidents (steam line breaks and LOCAs). As discussed in Section 4 and 6, the heat removal capability during normal operations, with 95 0F service water is calculated to be less than the expected heat removal requirements. Conservatism in this calculation, however, is expected to result in actual containment heat removal I capability being adequate to maintain containment temperature below the 140 0 F limit. For example, the analysis does not take
~
credit for heat transfer through the containment concrete walls.
Containment temperature is monitored and maintained below a 1400 F technical Specification limit. Thus there are sufficient procedural methods in place to assure that the maximum allowable containment temperature is not exceeded during normal operations.
f 9
5-7 CYW5W55/JMG/DE3089
a
- c. CAR Fan Motor Cooler Performance:
The SWS also cools the Containment Air Recirculation Fans Motor ,
Coolers. These fans provide the air flow over the CAR coils.
They are 440V, 250 HP direct drive, centrifugal type fans rated __.
at 72,000 cfm during normal operations.
The fan motors are equipped with water-resistant insulation and a closed circuit cooling arrangement, consisting of two cooling coils. The fan motor cooler enclosure is designed with a ,
pressure equalization valve to equalize the enclosure pressure during a LOCA and a loop seal vent to depressurize the enclosure as containment pressure and temperature drop. The enclosure is designed so that any moisture entering the motor will'~ pass over the cooling coils and be condensed before it reaches the motor windings. The cooling coils are cooled by service water and are designed for 10 gpm of service water per motor cooler coil.
As-indicated in Section 6, increasing the service water temperature to 950 F and increasing the design fouling-factor to 0.0029, will not have an adverse affect on the CAR fan motor' calculated life or operability.
- d. Spent Fuel Pit (SFP) Cooling:
SWS provides cooling to the SFP Cooling System heat exchangers, which in turn cools the water in the SFP. Two heat exchangers are provided (a large plate type and a smaller shell and tube type), but only one is in service at a time.
The design basis heat load during normal power operations results from one third of the core being recently discharged. A second
'., design basis is a full core off-load. For this case, other plant heat loads can be reduced as the plant is not operating at power,
~
e a
5-8 CTV5W15/JMG/003DB9
g- .' e 4' . .j v ..
and none of the design basis accident, which require SWS cooling-y
. for prevention or mitigation, are possible.
As discussed in Section 4, either heat' exchanger is capable of ,
maintaining the SFP temperature below 1400 F, during normal power operations with 950F. service water. in addition, the . _ _
plate type HX is capable of maintaining.the SFP temperature below l
the' 1700 F design limit (Reference 25) for the full core off-load case.
- e. CCWS HT Performance: ,
The SWS provides cooling to the CCWS heat exchangers, which in turn cools other equipment including the RCP thermal barriers and bearing lube oil coolers. The sudden failure of one or more RCPs can cause a transient evaluated in the FSAR.
Three CCW pumps and two heat exchangers are provided. During normal operations, the design CCW supply temperature is 950F, and may be allowed to be as high as 1000F. As discussed,in Section 4,'during normal power operations with 95 0F. service
~
water, two of the three CCW pumps and two heat exchangers will be required to limit CCWS temperature below acceptable limits. Even with two pumps and HXs, plant operations may need to be modified to reduce the heat loads on the CCWS (such as avoiding maximum 0
letdown) to maintain the CCW HX outlet t nperature below 100 F when river temperatures exceed 850F.
As far as CCW cooling to the RCPs is concerned, operation with 0
CCW temperatures up to 115 F are allowable for short periods of time. CCW cooling is provided to limit RCP bearing temperatures and to cool the thermal barriers as a backup to seal injection.
Seal and bearing temperatures are monitored and alarmed on high temperature. As indicated in Section 4, CCW temperatures should be able to be maintained below acceptable limits. If 5-9 CYW5W55/JMG/0E3089
. e l
- ~
l insufficient cooling was being provided, however, the plant j
- operators would be aware of the situation, .and could take action to reduce seal or bearing temperatures as appropriate. .If the i l
temperatures can not be reduced, and there is-indication of degraded RCP operation-(e.g. high ' seal leakoff flow, excessive i bearing temperatures, or high pump vibration), the piant can be _.
brought to a safe shutdown prior to sudden seal or RCP failure. ,
8 Based on this, the probability of sudden seal or RCP failure is not expected to be significantly increased due to increasing the /
l allowed 3WS temperature to 950 F. (A loss of reactor coolant flow transient is already assumed to be a transient of moderate frequency in the accident analysis, requiring only reactor trip {
for mitigation). [
i
- f. Main Turbine / Generator Cooling:
The SWS provides cooling to the turbine oil coolers, the generator nydrogen coolers, the isolated phase bus duct coolers, the generator hydrogen seal oil coolers, and the generator main exciter coolers. Adequate cooling is required to support turbine / generator operation. The sudden loss of the turbine / generator may cause a loss of foad transient. The loss of load transient is analyzed in FSAR Chapter 15 as an event of moderate frequency.
The SWS provides cooling to the turbine lube oil coolers. Two coolers are provided but only one is normally in service at a time. The lube oil coolers remove heat from the oil used to cool and lubricate the turbine rotor bearings.
As discussed in Section 4, the oil must be cooled to 1200 F.
Depending on the amount of tube plugging in the cooler, the analysis indicates that one cooler may not be able to maintain lube oil temperature below 1200 F with 950 F service water.
- Turbine lube oil temperature is, however, monitored. Therefore, i
^
the operators would be aware of a high oil temperature condition 5-10 CYWSW55/JMG/DE3089
. . . . 1; that might arise due t'o' insufficient SWS cooling,- and would be able to take the appropriate action to reduce oil temperatures.
If oi1~ temperature can not be reduced, and degraded turbine
. operation is indicated, the plant can be brought to a safe shutdown prior to a sudden turbine failure. Thus, the
probability of a sudden turbine failure resulting in a loss of _
' ' load transient is not expected to be increased. . (The loss of load transient is already considered to be a transient of moderate frequency in the accident analyses)..
' SWS provides cooling to the generator hydrogen coolers. There are four hydrogen coolers operating in parallel, whose function is to remove heat created in the generator.
As discussed in Section 4, the hydrogen temperature must be 0 0 maintained below 51 C (123.8 F). Based on the evaluation documented in Section 4, it is likely that the hydrogen coolers 0
will be able to maintain hydrogen temperature below 510 with 950 F service water. Hydrogen temperature, however, should be 0
monitored when service water is above 85 F.to ensure that it remains below limits. The probability of a loss of load event is not expected to be increased due to hydrogen temperature with 950 F service water.
SWS provides cooling to the isolated phase bus duct coolers. As discussed in Section 4, 950 F service water is not expected to have an adverse effect on the isolated phase bus duct cooling.
Operation with 950 F service water is not expected to increase I the probability of a loss of load event due to inadequate isolated phase bus duct cooling.
SWS provides cooling to the generator hydrogen seal oil coolers.
These coolers maintain the generator rotor shaft seal oil below 1200 F. Two coolers are provided, one for the hydrogen side l seal oil flow path and one for the air side seal oil flow path.
e 5-11 CYW5VS5/>G/DE3029 L __ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ __ .____________o
The evaluation documented in Section 4 indicates that the coolers may not be adequate to handle the heat load and maintain seal oil 0 0 temperatures below 120 F with 95 F service water. This is, however, a conservative evaluation (worst case cooler _ design tolerances)- and seal oil temperature can be monitored when _
service water is above 850F. Thus the probability of a sudden loss of the turbine / generator due to seal oil temperature is not expected to be increased due to operation with 950 F service water.
The SWS provides cooling to the generator main exciter cooler.
The generator main exciter cooler is provided to maintain the
- exciter air temperature below about 50 0C. The evaluation documented in Section 4 indicates that the generator main exciter cooler should be able to maintain the exciter air temperature below 500C. In addition, main exciter air temperature can be monitored when service water is above 850F. Increasing exciter air temperature is not expected to cause a sudden loss of the turbine / generator.
- g. Main Condenser --
Cooling water from the Connecticut River provides_ cooling to the main condenser via the Circulating Water System. As cooling water temperature increases, the condenser vacuum may decrease
, slightly. If condenser vacuum decreases to the low setpoint, the turbine is tripped. Condenser vacuum is, however, alarmed on the main control board and monitored by the plant computer. If condenser vacuum decreases due to increased cooling water temperatures, the low condenser vacuum c'ondition will be noticed by the plant operators and appropriate action to restore vacuum
> f
- can be taken. Thus, the probability of a loss of load transient caused by condenser low pressure turbine trips is not expected to be increased due to increasing the allowable river water 1
temperature. ,
L.-
l ,
l- 5-12 l CYWSV55/JMG/0E3CB9 i - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
FT~
x ,,
t
~
[ t+ -.
- 2. Normal Cooldown LRHR cooling during normal cooldown'is not a licensing' -
requirement. The effect of increasing service water temperature) on the RHR cooling function is discussed'in Section 41 As __.
~
' indicated in Section 4, adequate cooling is provided to reach-cold shutdown, but'the cooldown times are extended as service water temperature increases. There are no FSAR accident analyses associated.with the normal cooldown function, and therefore' plant cool'down 'is not a subject of this safety evaluation. ,
- 3. Post-Accident Ooerations
'a. SWS Operability:
SWS operability, for this evaluation, is defined as the ability of the pumps to operate, the active valves to operate, and the ability of the pressure retaining portions of the system to mai-ntain structural integrity during post-accident operation.
~
The SW pumps are two stage pumps taking suction from'the river and discharging to the SWS. The pumps use service water only as the process fluid and not as a cooling medium for pump appurtenances.
' As discussed in Section 4, increasing the service water temperature to 950F will not degrade pump performance or degrade the service water pumps ability to operate during post-accident operations. In addition, pump operation at 9000 gpm, for one minute was evaluated relative to horsepower and NPSH 4
criteria. This high flow situation may arise during the first portion of post-accident operation before the secondary plant headers are isolated by SW-MOV-1 and SW-MOV-2. The evaluation 3 e
5-13 CYWSW55/JMG/CE3C89
c c ]
+
=5 .
. . c m'
indicated that operation for.1 minute at 9000 gpm would be- q acceptable. Operation at 7500:gpm (9 -5 ft MSL river level)' is:
/ -acceptable for long-term operation.
'The pressure retaining components of the SWS which are not isolated during . post-accident operation, were evaluated .and, as _
_ discussed in Section'4, all evaluated. components are capable of
, maintaining structural integrity'with' 95 0F service water. The. .
i SWS valves.were evaluated and it was determined that the design
. temperature of the valves exceeds the calculated maximum water temperatures for all operations. ,
- b. Emergency Diesel Generator Cooling: l l
Two heat exchangers are provided to cool each emergency diesel generator (EDG). The EDGs provide power to the emergency on-site power generation system. This independent power source is required to supply vital plant auxiliaries if normal ac power is lost. The diesel generators are 2850 kW, 60 Hz, 900 rpm diesel engine-driven synchronous generators. The engines are cooled by water circulated through cored passages in the cylinder liners and heads. Water circulation is provided by two engine-driven centrifugal pumps. The heated engine discharge water flows through a temperature regulating valve which responds to water temperature and either route the water through the heat exchangers and then to the lube oil coolers, or directly to the.
- lube oil coolers. The engine water, if routed to the heat !
exchangers, flows through the shell side of two heat exchangers ;
in parallel. Cooling water from the service water system flows through the tube side of the heat exchangers through valves SW-FCV-129 and SW-FCV-130. These air operated valves are.
- provided air from the emergency diesel compressed air system and
,', open on a diesel start signal (SIAS or LNP).
i n
, 7; ,
~I '
5-14 CYVSWS5/JMG/063089
- nt As' indicated in Section 6, the Diesel Generator heat exchangers i can' provide sufficient cooling to the EDGs_while being supplied service water at 950 F, lAs indicated in Section 6, sufficient-service water flow (>400 gpm) is provided to cool the EDGs for
, all SIAS and loss of normal power cases. Thus, EDG operability _ _ ,
is assured.
- c. RHR Heat Exchanger. Performance:
' The SWS provides cooling to the Residual Heat. Removal (RHR) Heat exchangers during the ECCS recirculation phase following a LOCA.
During ECCS recirculation, spilled reactor coolant is collected in the containment sump which provides the suction source for the
'RHR pump (s). The RHR pump (s) discharges through the RHR heat exchangers and back to the RCS, if RCS pressure is low, or to the suction of high head safety injection and then to the RCS, if RCS pressure is high. As this recirculated coolant passes throcybout the RHR heat exchanger tubes, it is cooled. This cooling rtwries heat from the RCS and containment and also ensures that subcooled reactor coolant is returnod to the RCS. ~
Reference 26 indicates that acceptable ECCS performance is provided with ECCS temperature returned to the RCS less than ,
2000 F. Acceptable ECCS performance ensures that the core will remain in a coolable geometry and that long-term cooling can be maintained.
The evaluation documented in Section 6 indicates that SWS cooling t'o the RHR heat exchangers during ECCS recirculation, is adequate to maintain the returned ECC temperature below 2000F.
4 y 5-15 CYv5V5F:/JMG/0E3089
_w -. ,
Y
- d. RHR Pump Cooling:
~
The SWS provides cooling to the RHR pump mechanical. seal coolers,, . . .
l' - the mechanical- seal gland cooling jacket and the bearing housing.
/ . cooling. Jacket during post-LOCA ECCS recirculation. This cooling is' required to ensure pump operability during post-LOCA long-term
- cooling.
As indicated in Section 6, operation with a service water 0
temperature of 95 F in no way affects the integrity or function .
of the RHR: pumps.. Adequate cooling is provided and RHR pump operability is ensured'with a. service water temperature of
- 950F.
- e. CAR Performance:
The' SWS provides cooling to the Containment Air Recirculation Fan Cooling. Coils (CARS)_to maintain containment temperature and
. pressure .below design limits following steam line breaks and LOCAs inside containment. The design basis heat load capability'.
of the CARS is 26.5 x 106 Btu /hr per CAR unit at a 261 0F ambient containment temperature. With a Service Water inlet
-temperature of 95 0 F and a design fouling factor of 0.0029, this
. heat load can be removed to the Ultimate Heat Sink-via the SWS under design basis accident' conditions as indicated in Section 6.
As the h'est removal safety function of the CARS is not degraded below that assumed in the safety analyses due to increasing service water design temperature and fouling factor, the peak
.ontainment pressure resulting from a design basis accident will
- e. Main below design conditions.. (See Reference 2).
~~
1
- i. -
y.' .
W
,'- ' 5-16 CYWSVS5/JMG/063089
4 4 Lf. CAR Fan Motor Cooling:
The SWS also cools the Containment Air Recirculation Fans Motor ,
n' Coolers following design basis accidents. These fans provide the air flow over the CAR coils. They are 440V, 250 HP direct drive, _ _ _ .
centrifugal type fans rated at 50,000 cfm in the post-accident configuration.
The fan motors are equipped with water-resistant insulation and a closed circuit cooling arrangement, consisting of two cooling ,
coils. The fan motor cooler enclosure is designed with a pressure equalization valve to equalize the enclosure pressure during a LOCA and a loop seal vent to depressurize the enclosure as containment pressure and temperature drop. The enclosure is designed so that any moisture entering the motor will pass over the cooling coils and be condensed before it reaches the motor windings. The cooling coils are cooled by service water and are designed for 10 gpm of service water per motor cooler coil.
As indicated in Section 6, increasing the service water
~
temperature to 95 0 F, increasing the design fouling factor to 0.0029 and reducing the SW flow rate to 10 gpm, will not degrade the ability of the CAR motor coolers to support CAR fan motor operability during post-accident operation.
W e
9
+ .
5-17 CYW5W55/JMG/0E3CP9
0 t l
l C. 50.59 EVALUATION
SUMMARY
0
~ Increasing the Service Water System design basis temperature to 95 F and the CAR unit design fouling factor to 0.0029, does not involve an l ' '
unreviewed safety question in that:
- 1. Increasing the service water temperature and the CAR unit fouling factor, will not increase the probability of an accident ,
previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report. l Equipment cooled by the Connecticut River via the SWS, the CCWS and the CWS, whose sudden failure due to insufficient cooling f could cause a transient evaluated in the FSAR, have been o - evaluated for 950 F river water temperatures. This evaluation indicated that the probability of a transient evaluated in the
> FSAR is not expected to be increased by increasing the maximum allowable river water temperature to 95 0F.
0
- 2. Increasing the service water temperature to 95 F and the CAR unit fouling factor to 0.0029, will not increase the consequences of any accident previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis
~
Report.
The following design basis accidents are potentially affected by increasing service water temperature and increasing the CAR unit fouling factor:
- SWS provides cooling to the diesel generators 2A and 2B on a loss of normal power If insufficient cooling is provided to support EDG operation any accident that is analyzed assuming a loss of normal power could be affected. The EDG evaluation above, however, indicates that sufficient cooling is provided during worst case conditions so EDG assumptions for design basis accidents are not affected.
- i 5-18 CYV5W55/JMG/C03089
,+ .
- SWS provides cooling to the CARS following high energy line L breaks inside containment to limit containment pressure.
The large break LOCA is the limiting design basis accident-in terms of containment pressure and CAR performance.
- SWS provides cooling the RHR heat exchangers during ECCS j' recirculation following a LOCA. The RHR heat exchangers cool the recirculated emergency core coolant before it is returned to the RCS. The emergency core coolant then cools the core to ensure that the core remains in a coolable geometry and long-term core cooling can be provided.
- SWS provides cooling to the RHR pump seal coolers, bearings and packing during ECCS recirculation following a LOCA. RHR pump operability is required to ensure that long-term core cooling is provided.
Increasing the service water temperature to 95 F0 and the CAR unit fouling factor to 0.0029, will not result in an increase in the consequences of an accident as follows:
- a. As discussed above, sufficient cooling is provided to the diesel generators to_ support EDG operability. Increasing SWS temperature, therefore, does not affect the onsite power assumptions for any design basis accidents.
- b. As discussed above, sufficient service water flow is l provided to support CAR performance equal to or greater than that assumed in the design basis accident analyses. In addition, sufficient service water flow is provided to the CAR Fan Motor Coolers to support CAR oper' ability as assumed in the design basis accidents. Therefore, increasing the service w'ater temperature does not affect the CAR
' performance as assumed in any design basis accidents, and
" ' containment pressure will remain below design limits.
l 5-19 l C WSW15/JMG/003089 l-
- c. As discussed above, sufficient service water flow is provided to the RHR heat exchangers to cool the recirculated emergency core coolant returning to the RCS to less than '
2000F. In addition ~ sufficient service water flow is provided to the RHR pump seal coolers, bearings and packing _
to support RHR pump operability as assumed in the LOCA analysis. Therefore, increasing the service water-temperature does not affect the ECCS performance assumed following a LOCA, and a coolable core geometry and long-term core cooling are maintained.
Based on a, b and c above, increasing the service water temperature will not increase the consequences of any design basis accidents.
- 3. Increasing service water temperature to 95 0F and the CAR unit fouling factor to 0.0029, will not create the possibility of an accident which is different than any already evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report.
As discussed above, the Service Water System can perform all of its safety functions with a design basis temperature of 95 0F.
I Sufficient cooling is provided to safety related equipment to support safety equipment operability. In addition, SWS f operability during normal and post-accident operation has been evaluated and, within the scope of this evaluation, SWS operability is not adversely affected by increasing SWS ,
temperature to 950F. Thus, failures that might occur in the SWS and cooled equipment would be considered to be random ;
failures and not a consequence of increasing SWS temperature. l Single random failures were evaluated in Appendix A. Appendix A did not identify any single failures that could degrade SWS j D- performance below acceptable levels. Thus no new failure modes l
~
for safety related equipment, beyond acceptable analyzed
, e j i
5-20 CYW5W55/JMG/0EEB9 f
1 L_____--_-____-----_---.---__
failures, are associated with increasing service water l temperature to.950F. As no new unacceptable failure modes are created, and all previous safety. functions are supported,
" 0 increasing the allowable service water temperature to 95 F does ,
not create the possibility of a new accident different than previously evaluated in the FSAR. -.
- 4. Increasing the service water temperature to 95 F0 and the CAR unit fouling factor to 0.0029, will not increase the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR. .
1
- a. As discussed above, sufficient cooling is provided to the diesel generators to support EDG operability. Increasing SWS temperature, therefore, does not increase the probability of failure of the diesel generators.
- b. As discussed above, sufficient service water flow is provided to the CAR coolers and fan motor coolers to support l
' CAR unit operability as assumed in the design basis i accidents. Therefore, increasing the service water temperature and CAR unit fouling factor, does not increase the probability of failure of the CAR Units.
- c. As discussed above, sufficient service water flow is provided the RHR pump seal coolers, bearings and packing to support RHR pump operability as assumed.in the LOCA.
Therefore, increasing the service water temperature does not increase the probability of failure of the RHR pumps.
- d. As discussed above, within the scope of this evaluation, a
0 increasing the service water temperature to 95 F will not degrade SWS operability (pump operability and component and i- valve structural integrity). The structural integrity of the SWS piping and the operability of the active valves is
} addressed in Reference 2.
P ,
1: 5-21 CYV5v55/JMG/003089 L ___ _-__ _-____ _
Based on a, b, c, and d above, the probability of a malfunction of equipment important to safety is not increased due to increasing the maximum allowable river water temperature to .
95 0F, 0
- 5. Increasing the service water temperature to 95 F and the CAR unit fouling factor to 0.0029, will not increase the consequences of a malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report.
[ .
The failure modes and their effects are evaluated in Appendix A.
L As indicated in Appendix A, the SWS can perform its safety functions, without causing an increase in consequences for design basis accidents, following any postulated single failure. In l
l addition, adequate cooling is provided to support design basis safety functions including containment cooling and the cooling of recirculated ECC. Therefore, the consequences of a malfunction l of equipment important to safety, are not increased.
L
- 6. Increasing the service water temperature to 95 F0 and the CAR unit fouling factor to 0.0029, will not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety different than already evaluated.in the Safety Analysis Report.
Increasing the SWS temperature will not create the possibility of new failure modes within the SWS. SWS failure modes are listed in Appendix A. As indicated in Appendix A, the SWS can perform its safety functions, without causing an increase in consequences for design basis accidents, even following any postulated single failure. In addition, new failure modes of for SWS cooled equipment are not created by increasing the service water
..~ temperature and the CAR unit fouling factor. As discussed in 4
~
above the failure of SWS cooled equipment is not expected with a
~
SWS temperature of 95 0 F and an increased CAR unit fouling 5-22 l C W % /JMG/0E30E9 I
- t t
l
- factor. Therefore, nrtw failure modes for equipment important to J safety, different than already evaluated in the safety analysis report, are not created by increasing the SWS' temperature to j 950F. -
~
h 7. Increasing the service water temperature to 95 0F and the CAR'
. unit fouling factor to 0.0029 trill not reduce the margins of 7 safety as described in the basis to any Technical Specification.
- a. As discussed above, sufficient cooling is provided to the diesel generators to support EDG operability.- Increasing SWS temperature, therefore,'does not affect the onsite ac power assumptions for any design basis accidents. Thus the consequences of accidents which challenge the fuel cladding and RCS pressure boundary, and which rely on onsite ac power, are not affected,
- b. As discussed above, sufficient service water flow is provided to support CAR performance equal to or greater than
. assumed in the design basis accidents. In addition, sufficient service water flow is provided to the CAR Fan Motor Coolers to support CAR operability as assumed in the design basis accidents. Therefore, increasing the service watar temperature and CAR unit fouling factor, does not "i affect the CAR performance as assumed in any design basis accidents, and containment pressure is limited to pressures previously calculated, and thus below design limits.
- c. As discussed in Section 5, sufficient service water flow is
^
provided the RHR heat exchangers to cool the recirculated emergency core coolant returning to the RCS to less than 2000 F. In addition, sufficient service water flow is
- provided to the RHR pump seal coolers, bearings and packing
/ to support RHR pump operability as assumed in the LOCA.
5-23
'CYWSW55/JMG/DE3CB9
g,, .
e
' Th refore, increasing the service water temperature does not . .
' affect the ECCS performance assumed following_ a LOCA, and a coolable core geometry and long-tcrm core cooling are maintained.
- d. The safety limits for the protective boundaries (fuel
~" cladding, RCS pressure boundary, and containment) are met __
' 0
-with 95 F service water.
- e. Increasing the service water temperature to 950F does not affect the physical properties of the protective barriers *. Therefore, the assumed or design basis ,
failure point of the beundaries are not affected.
As consequences are not increased, safety limits are not changed, i
l and the assumed barrier failure points are unchanged, the margins of safety as described in the basis to any Technical L
Specifications are not reduced.
L l
l l'
l 1:
L
).
The affect of increased SW temperature on the piping stress analyses for the piping which forms part of the containment
- - boundary (CAR coils and return piping) is addressed in Reference 2.
l <
l,
< 9
- ~ 5-24 CntSW55/JMG/053029
l
6.0 CONCLUSION
S AND RECOMMENDATIONS I
It is concluded that the Haddam Neck Service Water System will
~ ~ ~ ~
operate safely and successfully with 950F water, subject to'some restrictions as described below. Table 6-1 through 6-5 contain a s .
summary of flow requirements and capabilities for normal and post 0
accident operations with 95 F service water. All of the flow requirements for each of the safety related components are met in each' accident condition alignment. During normal operation most non-safety related components clearly receive adequate flow.
However, some performance monitoring is suggested for a few non-safety related components as described in Section 4, and summarized in this section.
Below are certain recommendation , restrictions, and monitoring requirements noted to optimize Sws performance.
6.1 Recommendations
- 1. More' flow would be available to the CAR Fan Coolers during accident mitigation if:
- a. valve SW-A0V-9 was closed by an SIAS or high containment pressure signal,
- b. flow to the Emergency Diesel Genera. tors was decreased,
- c. valve SW-PCV-606 closed upon loss of normal power,
- d. the C and D service water pumps were refurbished to improve their output to that of the A and B pumps.
~ '
- 2. Certain components' parameters should be monitored to establish an operating baseline as temperatures and or tube plugging levels increase. Monitoring requirements are noted in the following pages.
F-
- 3. The ball valves in the discharge piping of the CAR Fan Coolers ,
should be throttled so that their position is maintained with a Cv of 300.
6-1
p -
E 4. Efforts should be made to decrease the maximum containment heat load on the CAR Fan Coolers during normal operations, either by improving insulation or by supplementing existing. cooling systems.
- 5. The PEGISYS model of the SWS stands by itself. However, we
.- recommend additional testing of the service water system flow characteristics during the next refueling outage because:
.a. The fouled or eroded nature of the piping and components of
~- the service water system can not be analytically predicted,
- b. . positions of the SWS throttle valves are best verified through testing,
. 6.2 Restrictions
- 1. The ball valves in the discharge piping of the CAR Fan Coolers must not be throttled to a position with a Cv less than 200, in order to provide margin above the analytical limits regarding containment cooling. These valves must also not be throttled to a position with a Cv substantially higher than 300 (i.e. less than 350), in order to: -
A. assure'that the maximum tube velocity limit (10 ft/sec based ,
on erosion concerns of long term reliability) is not exceeded, and B. assure that required flows to other safety related components are adequate in the event of an accident. (Note that substantial flow margin is demonstrated for the other safety related components so.that their flow availability would not be sensitive to CAR discharge throttle positions).
Measurement inaccuracies must be considered in the positioning of
}
these valves.
ht' b .
p .
6-2
.________________m. - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ______..--____________.-___________.____._____--____.__._.__.__u_--_m
, t. -.:
~
If both component' cooling. water heat exchangers are. aligned to ~
J2.
receive' service water, the positions of throttle valves SW-V-133
. and 134 must be equal to or less than a CV of 450. With only'one
" :CCW HX in operation (with service water isclated from.the other),
<.r the corresponding. throttle . valve position must be equal: tof or ~~"
- ' less than a Cy of 950. If these conditions are not met .then the analyses performed for this report are not valid.
- 3. All' four service water pumps must be operable in . order to meet n . the assumptions of this evaluation. .
14 Tube plugging of the safety related components, except for the CAR Fan Coolers, must be limited to 10%. The CAR' Fan Coolers
- must bel 11mited to 5% tube plugging. Also, the fouling of the CAR Fan Coolers and their Motor Coolers must be limited to-2
.0029'Ft -Hr OF/ BTU.
The assumed fouling factors and tube plugging limits are identified in the component evaluations in Section 4. The difference between actual tube plugging (or resistance in heat transfer area) and the levels assumed in this evaluation would provide additional margin for increased fouling.
t 9
l .
,*r-
'M l
m 6-3 L - --__ __-_ ____ - _ ___ _ _ ______ _________ _ ______ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
G . .
(.
4 0.- . ..
Monitorino Requirements at Elevated' S' ervic' e Wat' er Temperatures 6.3 0
As service water temperature.; approaches 95 F, several~of the >
~
non-safety related components are expected to be' operating' at- the yv ,' limits.of their capacity to meet cooling requirements. For these' _
i components, performance monitoring-is required to assure that valuable equipment is not' damaged. The following table provides these monitoring requirements for normal power operation.
0
and. Serviced components operating.
within acceptable limits
~ :
0
0
- c. Hydrogen Seal Oil Coolers Oil Temperature 5 120 F ,
(Both A : ;nd Hydrogen Side)
- d. Is'olated Phase Bus Duct Cooler Conductor Temperature.'s 105 0C 0
and Duct Enclosure Temp. s 80 C 0
- e. Turbine Gil Coolers Oil Temperature 5120 F-f The water, hydrogen, and oil temperature limits presented above apply to the outlet temperatures of the process fluids.
n
' This table is intended to supplement the existing operating procedures and alarms, and the experience of the operators. If the plant operators determine that components excluded from this table may also
- t.
require monitoring during operations at elevated river water
[j .. . temperatures, then the performance of these components should also' be.
N' monitored.
gt I
- n
.c . i l
- f,
- 7 6-4 i i
j
- x. .
6.4 Conservative Assumptions Related To the Safety Related Comoonents-The following is a ;ist of the conservative assumptions made in this '
evaluation which support operations of the safety related components with 950F service water. _ _ _
A. General:
- 1. Availability of required flows was verified despite any coincident single failure as described in the Appendix A .
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis.
- 2. All available flow rates were calculated assuming the SW pumps to be in the fully degraded condition with the lowest allowed pump curve per the IST acceptance criteria.
- 3. The screenwash booster pump is assumed to be running in all accident alignments with normal power available, thus
-diverting flow from the safety related components. In those cases where normal power is lost, the screenwash booster pump is not running. However in this LNP scenario, valve SW-PCV-606 is assumed, due to the non-QA solenoid, to remain open diverting flow from the safety related components.
However, due to EEQ limitations, no credit is taken for the isolation and the valve. It is assumed to be open in all accident alignments diverting flow from the other safety related components.
- 5. The closed cooling heat exchangers are assumed to be aligned to the SWS during each alignment analyzed, thus diverting flow I from the safety related components. However, at SW temperatures greater than 850F, these HXs are cooled by a
- well water system so that no service water would be diverted to the CWS HXs during an accident.
6-5
. .w
- 6. The backwash flow control valves for both Adams Filters are
-assumed to be fully open -in all cases, diverting flow' from the safety related components. Normally one Adams Filter is ,
. isolated and only one of these backwash _ flow control valves is 4- opened. . -
l L< 7. Extremely low river water elevations were assumed in this evaluation. Haddam Neck experiences the lowest river water levels during the winter months, when both service water temperatures and flow requirements are much 1.ower. .
B. Emergency Diesel Generators
, 1. The'EDGs receive almost twice as much flow as' required in every alignment evaluated, thus indicating substantial margin in service water cooling capability to the diesels.
C. CAR Fan and Fan Motor Coolers ,
- 1. The flow requirements for both the fan and motor coolers
- 2 0F/ BTU.
envelope operations with fouling up to .0029 Ft -Hr Also, tube plugging has been accommodated for each by up to 5%
for the CAR Fan Coolers and 10% for the Motor Coolers.
=
- 2. The available flows to these coolers were calculated based on throttle positions of valves SW-V-264, 266, 268, and 270 at a minimum allowable position corresponding to a CV of about 180. The recommended valve positions will correspond to Cv's of approximately 300. Appendix C is provided to demonstrate the flow and heat removal margin available with these throttle valves open to a Cv of 300 and with service water temperatures 0
. of either 90 F and 95 0F.
J..
9 6-6 l
)
- 3. The CAR Fan heat duty used in'this report was based on the Haddam Neck containment analysis. ' Any margin or assumptions '
made in the containment analysis may also apply to CAR Fan performance in this evaluation.
l' D. RHR Heat Exchangers_and Pumps I
i
- 1. Substantial' margin exists between the required and available flow rates for the both the RHR HXs and the RHR pumps.
- 2. The most ' limiting cooling water flow requirements to the RHR 0
pumps are ba' sed on a 115 F component cooling water supply, which is provided during normal cooldown operations. Adequate flow margin is available' under these circumstances also.
en h
f 9
r, ,
I g I 6-7
l -
. o
- TABLE 6-1 i NORMAL OPERATION 1 .
0% TUBE PLUGGING 10% TUBE PLUGGING REQUIRED- AVAILABLE REQUIRED AVAILABLE-(GPM) (GPM) (GPM) (GPM)
COMPONENT I
Screenwash Sprays (1) 1394 (2) (2)
Hypochlorite Dil. Ejector (2) AS REQD. (.2) (2) .
Circ Water Pump Gland (2) AS REQD. (2) (2) .
Emergency Diesel' Generators (3) ~
70 (4) 112 (4) 106 Control Room A/C 63 (4) '118 (4) 111 Chem Lab A/C Office Bldg. A/C 97-(4) 211 (4) 200
' Closed Cooling HX. (5) (6) 287 (6) 275 Turbine Oil Cooler 2997 3050 (7) 3016 Gen. Hydrogen Coolers (5) <4475 (8) 4316 (8) 4285 Gen. Hyd. 5eal Oil Coolers:
Air Side (9) 203 . (9) 203 Hydrogen Side 26 120 30 120 Iso Phase Bus Cooler (5) (10) 292 (10) 274 Main Exciter Cooler 47 (11) 276 56 (11) 269 CCW Heat Exchanger (5) 5000 5233 5000 5203 SG Blowoff Tank Condensers 400 (12) 734 450 (12) 715 SG Sample Chiller Cond. 10 46 (13) 45 i Spent Fuel Pool HXs: f plate type (14) 389 996 392 974 {
958 926 )
l' shell & tube type (14) 827 >926 (15)
Elec. Aux SG Feed Pump (16) 3.7 (16) 3.4
. , Main Steam Sample Cooler (17) 4.5 2.4 4.5 2.5 C-[ BAT Vent Condenser (18) 2.8 (18) 2.9
,.- CAR Cooling Coils (19) (20) (20) 705 (20) 650
$3 CAR Motor Coolers (19) 20 45 20 44 Primary Drain Tk Vent Cond. 2.3 13 2.3 12 ,
RHR Heat Exchangers (3) l l
.~ RHR Pump Seal Coolers (3)~ j 6-8 i
e' 'W.
NOTES TO TABLE 6-1 General:,The required flows in-this table are based ,on Lthe component
{. evaluations in Section 4 of this report. The available flows are _ _ .
based on Section 3 of.this report. Flows available with no tube plugging were-determined in.Run N1. Flows available with 10% tube plugging were determined in Run N9. The only exception to this rule is in the case of the shell and tube. SFP HX; where the available flow with 10% tube plugging was determined in Run N3.
Note that in Run N9 with all components atsumed to have 10% of their tubes plugged, the hydraulic resistance of the entire SWS increases almost uniformly, backing the SW Pumps up to a higher point on their Head / Flow curve. The effect is that the system flow balance is not changed significantly.
- 1. The required flow is unknown. However more than adequate flow is availabie.
- 2. Tube plugging is not appropriate for consideration for these flowpaths.
- 3. Component not in service.
0
- 4. The required flows for these air conditioners are based on 85 F service water with no tube plugging. Increased service water temperature with these required flow rates results in slight increases 0
in room temperature. The expected room temperature will be 75 F.
- 5. Flow rates stated represent combined flows to each identical unit.
,J 6. The Closed Cooling HXs do not use service water after the river temperature increases enough that closed cooling water temperature can not be held below 900F. Therefore, required flows to the CCI HXs .
are not relevant to this evaluation.
6-9
- 7. The Turbine Oil Coolers can not have 10% of their tubes plugged and maintain oil temperature below 1200 F without exceeding the 10 ft/see velocity' limit in the tubes. With 10% tube plugging, service water flow of 2810 gpm at 900 F will meet the required heat load for normal
. operation:s. .-
- 8. The required service water flow rates calculated for this evaluation 0
are based on maintaining hydrogen temperature at 46 C.- However, 0
hydrogen temperature is permitted to reach 51 C per the Reference ?L3 report. The' required service water flow rate would be much lower at
- this higher hydrogen temperature, such that more than' adequate SW flow should be available, and operations with 10% tube should also be acceptable.' Performance monitoring has been recommended for the hydrogen coolers in Section 6.3.
- 9. The required flow to the air side coolers must be determined based on performance monitoring, as described in Section 6.3.
- 10. The required flow to the Isolated Phase Bus Duct Coolers is unknown.
0 It is expected that the available flow at 95 F is more than adequate. Should service water temperature ~ exceed previously experienced temperatures, periodic monitoring of tile component is recommended until an experience base is established. The process variables to monitor are provided in Section 6.3.
- 11. The Main Exciter Cooler's required flow with no tube plugging is based
~
on a 400 C exit gas temperature. The required flow with 10% tube 0
plugging is based on a less desirable (but still acceptable) 50 C exit gas temperature.
- 12. The Steam Generator Blowoff Tank Condensers will condense 3312 lb/hr of steam as designed at the required service water flow rate listed for 0% tube plugging. With 10% tube plugging, the required flow
-" listed will condense 3111 lb/hr. Flows listed are per condenser.
8T y
6-10
o . .
I l' l
- 13. The required flow to the-Steam Generator Sample Chiller Condensers for 10% tube plugging was not determined because tube plugging is not allowed for these components.
- 14. The required flows presented are needed to maintain the Spent Fuel Pool below 140 0 F following a 1/3 core offload. Only one SFP HX will
'., be in operation at one time.
- 15. - The available flow to the shell and tube'HX was not calculated with 0%
tube plugging. However, the available flow would be more than the 926 gpm calculated for 10% tube plugging.
- 16. The required flow to the Electric Aux. Feed Pump is unknown. The available flow (assumed to have been adequate for operation with service water temperature up to 850 F), is assumed to be adequate for 950 F service water. Flow to this pump can be maximized if the Main Steam Sample Cooler is not operating.
- 17. The sample flow rate must be decreased for the 950 F service water to provide adequate cooling. This limitation is expected to have no impact on sampling availability. -
- 18. Any flow rate of the same order of magnitude as the available flow rate through the BAT Vent Condenser is assumed to be acceptable.
, 19. The flows listed for the CAR Fan and Motor Coolers represent the average flow to each cooler.
r 6-11
- 'O ~
L
- 20. . The CAR Fan Cooler flow requirements during normal operation are l dependent on the containment heat load. Per the Section 4 component evaluation, some effort to minimize the containment heat load may be ,
required for operation with 950F service water. It is expected that
. inherent conservatism in determining heat transfer capability and heat ___
generation will result in containment temperature remaining below the maximum allowed 1400 F.
The minimum required flow for 0% tube plugging and no fouling was not determined. Also, note that the tube plugging level.is not.10% for ,
the CAR Fan Coolers. Rather, 5% tube plugging was assumed, along with 2
a fouling factor of .0029 Ft -Hr OF/ BTU.
The available flows to the CAR Fan Coolers is based on the CAR Fan Cooler discharge throttle valves set such that their Cv would be 300.
m 9
- 6 O
f 4
s '. .
6-12
u.
. .- ,.t h
TABLE 6-2 POST ACCIDENT INJECTION WITH NORMAL POWER AVAILABLE 4
0% TUBE PLUGGING- 10% TUBE PLUGGING l REQUIRED AVAILABLE REQUIRED AVAILABLE COMPONENT (GDM) (GPM) (GPM) (GPM)
Emergency Diesel Generators. 400. >803 (1) 400 803 CAR Cooling coils (2) 325 >332 (2) 478' 480 .
CAR Motor Coolers (3) 20 >20.5 (1) 20- 32 RHR Heat Exchangers (4) 0 0 0 0 RHR Pump Seal Coolers (4) 0 0 0 0 e
TABLE 6-3 POST ACCIDENT INJECTION WITH A LOSS OF NORMAL POWER 3% TUBE PLUGGING 10% TUBE PLUGGING REQUIRED AVAILABLE REQUIRED AVAILABLE COMPONENT (GPM) (GPM) (GPM) (GPM)
Emergency Diesel Generators 400 >752 (1) 400 752 CAR Cooling Coils (2) 325 332 478 481 CAR Motor Coolers (3) 20 20.5 20 32 RHR Heat Exchangers (4) 0 0 0 0 RHR Pump Seal Coolers (4) 0 0 0 0 9
% O i
6-13
TABLE 6-4 i POST ACCIDENT RECIRCULATION WITH NORMAL POWER AVAILABLE
" 10% TUBE PLUGGING 0% TUBE PLUGGING'
'~~
,. REQUIRED AVAILABLE REQUIRED -AVAILABLE COMPONENT (GPM) (GPM) (GPM) (GPM)
Emergency Diesel Generators 400 >851 (1) 400 851 CAR Cooling Coils (2) 325 >332 (2) 478 503 CAR Motor Coolers (3) 20 >20.5 (1) 20 34 RHR' Heat.Exchangers:
One in Operation (5) 1650 >2569 (1) 1650 2569 Two in Operation '430 >1920 (1) 430 .1920 RHR Pump Seal Coolers 3.0 >3.5 (1) 3.0 3.5 (6)
TABLE 6-5 POST ACCIDENT RECIRCULATION WITH A LOSS OF NORMAL POWER 0% TUBE PLUGGING 10% TUBE PLUGGING
.. REQUIRED AVAILABLE REQUIRED AVAILABLE COMPONENT (GPM) (GPM) (GPM) (GPM)
Emergency Diesel Generators 400 >863 (1) 400 863 CAR Cooling Coils (2) 325 >332 (2) 478 508
- . ' CAR Motor Coolers (3) 20 >20.5 (1) 20 34 l ,- ,
RHR Heat Exchangers:
One in Operation (5) 1650 >2569 (1) 1650 >2569 I
Two in Operation 430 >1946 (1) 430 1946 RHR Pump Seal Coolers 3.0 (6) 3.0 (6)
L-V 6-14 Li.___._________________.________________
r . ..
e *h NOTES TO TABLES 6-2. 6-3. 6-4. AND 6-5 General: The flows listed are per component. The available flows are from the I
most limiting runs which are summarized in Section 3.
- 1. Flows available without tube plugging were not calculated, but required flow rates are exceeded.
-2. The available flows to the CAR Fan Coolers were calculated based on discharge valve (SW-V-264, 266, 268, 270) throttle positions corresponding ,
to a CV of 180, except for the one case noted below. More flow will be available with these valves opened further. See Appendix C for a demonstration of the flow and heat removal margin available to the CARS with the throttle valves set at a CV of 300.
The available flow rate for a' clean CAR Fan Cooler was calculated only in Run.4B, which was an LNP case with flows identified in Table 6-3. This case was shown to be not as limiting as the case with !". tube plugging and a fouling factor of .0029, because the throttle valve position needed to achieve the required flow corresponded to a Cv of less than 170. See Section 3 for a discussion of the two phase flow conditions in the discharge piping.
For the CAR Fan Coolers, the required flows listed under the 10% tube plugging column actually represent flow requirements with 5% tube plugging -
2 'l and a fouling factor of .0029 Ft -Hr OF/ BTU.
- 3. For the CAR Motor Coolers, the' required flows are based on 15% tube plugging and a fouling factor of .0029. The available flow rates are based on 10% tube plugging with the same fouling factor. Flow through the CAR Motor Coolers is dependent on the flow rate and hydraulic resistance across the Fan Coolers. The lowest CAR Motor Cooler flow was calculated
- in Run 4B where the discharge throttle valves were set at a position corresponding to a Cv of less than 170. Thus these results were very conservative. ,
- 4. This component is not operating in this alignment.
6-15 i
. 5. -The limiting case for RHR heat exchanger performance exists when there is flow to only one RHR heat exchanger. This- results in only half of the
.RCS/ sump flow being cooled by the operating HX and then mixing with the hot sump water coming from the inoperable HX. 'The available flow was calculated-in Run 3 based on a failure of SW-MOV-5 to open during
-~~
L" recirculation with normal power available. Having normal power available is more-limiting than an LNP event.
- 6. The PEGISYS model was adapted to calculate the minimum flow to the RHR Pumps in only Run 14A (failure of an electrical train with normal power available), which was determined to be the limiting alignment for service-wattr flow to the RHR Pumps.
4 P
s.. ~
n- :
~
f e
6-16 T
v x ,
i
- 7. REFERENCES
- 1. _NUSCO Drawing 16103-26014, Sheets 1 through 7, Revision 7, Piping
..- and Instrumentation Diagram, " Service Water System". _.
2.- NUSCO Report, " Supplement To WCAP'12916", July 1989.
- 3. NUSCO Letter'GMB11-89-B-112, "Various Issues",' March 23, 1989.
- 4. GMB10-89-B-42, " Service Water System Information", January 24,
-1989.
~
- 5. Stone & Webster Spec. No. CYS-226, " Specification for Service Water Pumps", Unit No. 1, CYAPP, July 16, 1964.
- 6. Intentionally blank.
- 7. Intentionally blank.
- 8. Haddam Neck Surveillance Procedure SUR 5.7-10, May 6, 1988.
- 9. Emergency Diesel Generator Specification, M-I-E-2-5,
" Electro-Motive Power Specifications, Model 999 System", GM Electro-Motive Division, LaGrange, Illinois, Section 10, page 33,
~
- 10. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., Letter dated 2/23/89, " Emergency Diesel Generators-EMD-20-645E4 (999) EDG Heat Exchangers'.
- 11. NUSCO General Order to Westinghouse GO#HR54510.
- 12. " Containment Fan Cooler Motors - Encl. CYW Containment Fan Cooler Motor Qualification", CYW-78-518, 4/5/78.
- 13. " Connecticut. Yankee Atomic Power Company, Haddam Neck Plant,-
Reactor Containment Fan Cooler Motor Evaluation", CYW-84-608,
. 10/17/84.
- 14. NUSCO Letter GMB-88-R-515, " Connecticut Yankee Maximum Post-LOCA RHR Temperature And Flows", October 3, 1988.
- 15. Dresser-Pacific Pumps Report titled " Cooling Water Analysis For Residual Heat Removal Pump 8"LX SVCR P-42443", May 4,1989.
' 16. NUSCO Letter GMB13-89-B-196, " Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Information"., April 24, 1989, e
,c 7 1-
_.____a- . . . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____________--_-____________-__;____.________m________________ __- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ - -
. o e *
- 17. Telephone Conference, G. Israelson 'of Westinghouse and J. Doan of R. P. Adams Company.
g
. 18. . Letter CYW-89-556, "High Service Water Temperature Impact on CCWS
- and RHR Performance", May 24, 1989.
~
- ~ i
,19. Letter CYW-89-560 "High Service Water Temperature Impact on CCWS ~__
~
and RHRS Performance", June 5, 1989.
- 20. CYW-89-553, " Service Water System Piping Temperatures", May 23, 1989.
- 21. Zurn Catalog 230-ADV,- April 1975.
Instruction Book 1250- C604, Westinghouse Electric Corp., June .
I 22.
1966.
- 23. W PGD Report, " Turbine-Generator Auxiliary Coolers, Performance Study For Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck Plant", by H. G.
Hargrove, February 28, 1989.
- 24. Atlas Industrial Mfg. Co., Job #2579, Spec. Sheet .Rev.1, Data
. Sheet for " Steam Generator Blowoff Tank Condenser", March 8, 1973.
- 25. Amendment 7 to the Facility License No. OPR-61 For Haddam Neck.
- 26. NUSCO Memo NE-89-SAB-017, "CY ECCS Recirculation Delivery Temperature", January 19, 1989.
b s n e w
- 7-2 4
C . :o APPENDIX A SERVICE. WATER SYSTEM FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS The Service Water Systen (SWS) provides cooling water to components which ~~~'
- require service water cooling during normal power operations and plant cooldown. In addition, the SWS provides a continuous supply of cooling water to the essential components that the system cools following' a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), high energy line break, a loss of normal power, as well as other non-LOCA transients. .
The SWS provides cooling for the following essential (vital) loads:
1 Containment Air Recirculation (CAR) Coolina Coils and Fan Motor Coolers -
CAR cooling and motor cooling coils are required following a high energy
-line break inside containment. The limiting SWS requirements occur following a large Break LOCA when the mass and energy release to the containment are maximized.
- 2. Emeroency Diesel Generator Heat Exchanaers - The EDG Heat Exchangers are cooled by service water when the EDGs are started on a loss of normal power, or an SIAS.
- 3. RHR Heat Exchanaers - The RHR Heat Exchangers are cooled by service water during ECCS recirculation following a LOCA. The RHR HXs provide cooling to
' remove heat from the recirculated emergency coelant before it is returned to the RCS from the containment sump.
- 4. RHR Pumo Bearinos. Packina. and Seal Coolers - Service Water flow from the RHR HX inlets is diverted through the RHR pump seal coolers, bearings and packing areas to provide cooling to support RHR pump operation during ECCS recirculation.
" SDent Fuel Pool Heat Exchancers - The Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) heat exchangers 5.
- are cooled during normal operations and during non-LNP conditions.
?.
A-1 04MB/JMG/063089
J In order to support sufficient service water flow to these essential functions following postulated accidents, several automatic and manual actions must be performed. These include: J l
l-
- A. The secondary plant headers must be isolated by the closure of SW-MOV-1 and -
- 1~ SW-MOV-2. This occurs on a loss of normal power or on a SIAS/HCP signal. __
B. The Diesel Generator Heat Exchangers must receive service water flow on a loss of normal power, or following a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS), by having valves SW-FCV-129 and SW-FCV-130 open on a diesel start signal. .
C. Service water flow to the Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers must be isolated on a loss of normal power by automatic closure of valves SW-MOV-3 and SW-MOV-4. With offsite power available, SW-MOV-3 and SW-MOV-4 must be closed' manually from the control room prior to switching to ECCS recirculation.
D. Service water flow to the Steam Generator Blow-off Tank Vent Condensers is isolated on a loss of normal power or a SIAS/HCP by closure of valves SW-TV-2365A and B.
E. Service water flow to the RHR Heat Exchangers and RRR Pump bearings, packing and seal coolers must be manually established by opening SW-MOV-5 and SW-MOV-6 from the control room during the switch to ECCS recirculation.
F. Two Service Water Pumps start on a loss of normal power, one on each !
emergency diesel generator (EDG). If one pump does not start, the second pump on that EDG will start automatically.
. G. Additional Service Water Pumps are started prior to switching to ECCS recirculation. As two service water pumps are required during ECCS recirculation, and a EDG failure can disable both SW pumps on an electrical
., , train, all four SW pumps must be operable during normal operations. Thus, four SW pumps will be available to ECCS recirculation if there are no
~ ,} . failures.
A-2 CA2EB/JMG/063CB9
In order to ensure that safety functions performed by the SWS'can be supported- i assuming any single' failure in the Service Water System, with or without offsite power available, a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was performed as documented in Table A-1.
Failures considered in this FMEA include: (1) the failure of pumps to start.or- _ _ .
provide flow, (2) the failure of diesel generators to start or provide electrical power, (3) the failure of active valves to move to the correct.
l position on either an automatic or manual- signal, and (4) the failure of any one electrical power bus. The failure of check valves to mm f i; their correct position,. the failure of relief valves to perform their relief function, and '
- the spurious movement of valves are considered to be of a low ~enough' probability as to be excluded from consideration in this FMEA. ' An operator inadvertently opening SW-MOV-5 or 6 is considered to be unlikely, but has been considered.at CYAPCO's request.
- SW-MOV-1, SW-MOV-2, SW-MOV-3, SW-MOV-4, SW-MOV-5, and SW-MOV-6 are powered from MCC 5. MCC 5 receives power from either electrical power divisions. The failure of MCC5 is not considered in this FMEA as instructed by CYAPC0 (Reference A-1).
RESULTS Sufficient redundancy in SWS pumps and flow paths are provided to ensure that no single active failure can prevent the SWS from performing its safety functions.
In conclusion, the FMEA demonstrates that the Service Water System can perform its safety functions even after sustaining any single active failure.
REFERENCES.
h A-1. Northeast Utilities letter, GMB 14-89-B-257, dated May 21, 1989.
~
, e A-3 0425B/JMG/0E3029
-_ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . O
t t r r e n t
r r e n r r e n e e h a l e e h a l e e h a l t d t l a a pi a t d t l a a pi a ta ad t lpia s w e h t w e h t w e ht y n t
h y n h t y n h
+ k r e t
o r e e o r e e o r e a c nb a s ic onb am s ic onb am s iv ms o snes ri e s e ims m e v R
e v n s i se i r r r
e om ie r s cl pd n .
r om e
s cl i pdn . e o i pd s cl n .
- 6 '.- r a p t ph a t n r a p t u y s u ph a t n r a p t u
ph a t u ru m s e n
o y s uo ur sm e u o o ru ms e o y s o f l S ed ip f lp n S e d ip f l p n S ed ip p n l p ed a u l p ed a u l p ed a u l u h n e q l uh n e q l u h n e q A s t a h e A s t a h e A s t a h e W W W S
S 1 , S 1 d, s 3 d s
rs -fa ls 3 l 1 d e e a s 1 l a s 1 1 l
o n i . e r 1 el wi o u i o loe nios it m i . r e s wi s f l o m e s wi s f )
e is ite) 6 c n c o ui o i e 5 e r i0 l q r i D l q 6 r ic si f loqe ui o o v 1 o v f et s h 1 o v t s h l
S t
s f r ed n f etr c sst h iv f r d r c s t v f r D e y r c s t Y
L S y
yS a l y
ef l e o i ed yd e n yS a e n y l ef l e o i ed yd e n yS & l ef e lo A c p r f b l S a c p r f b S a c p r f N n n .C p a e e n ,C p a e e l n . B pu a e e
- c. A o a
.s u h d a s eT e c . IA a
d w .s u h d ac . AI a d w . s s eT e h d o ms t eT e n ir r n d w n oA ph d e n o A ph S n o B ph lc i e T
t c ul o m t n r r n ul u u ul o nu t u
C E f e d f e
s t p
u p , e .ocut u u t e t (
R d f e g n e r
s t g
. u t p , e o cl R el b ei(
d f e
r g m e s t p p , e.
el b e weloibi n lefi T ) f r gn mu le o r b a n ul o r b a n u l o r b F E E S A
E su ii pb e d a t f lg s
s i pb w oi ed a t f ig is lef .
s i pb w o i s ed a t f e
ig e n n 4 c er l
c e n 4 rl D H r
l v e i y r i p a c u vi ei l 1 u i v l y r l
- t ot a ly r p a ia 1
N P e g u a e g m d o t a l e g m A
5 0 4 d e rot R p w a O t a va lnh e s t f n p ot o r r e r a v n h e uf r r R p w a O t n p ot o e r a v n h e u f n R p w a O t T
(
l i
- 0 C M E J
E N R I 1 U (
- L A I E e e A L e e d d E F B d d L A o 'i iv i
v B R LI M v o o A E o r r r T T A e p p p A V r WP u o o l o t t
E R i t C E a s W F s ls I
V O l w. w l w.
R P l o l o l o E a l al al S E F f F f F f T
E I E S K F N F A 0 Y
T e e e U h h h C t t t I
T o o . o .
C t m. t m e
t m e
E e r t N r t r t N e sy e sy e sy O n t t a s t
a s C o a s w w i w r r t r c r e r e r e n e t e t e t u v a v a F iv aw ir w i w r
r e y
e e l ic iy ic l y ic p v p v p v p r p r p r u e u e u e S s S s S s y
g p g t
n m n
/ u u u
, P P P
- . r r D r L; I e e t e
t t
. ,- t a a a n W ) W ) W )
_.'y.
~- .
c eI A
e1 8
eI C
- - c -
ic ic i 1 7 1
_ v 3 v 3
- v 3 r - r -
r -
C e P eP e P 2, S ( S ( S (
) )
_ )
I 2 3
- 1 L
uh o s a a
. p wN r t r t r r e n - t e e h a l is ts .
ta ad t lpia n e n e il t w e h y n t
m b in lb k h t da ar r e o r e d a a c nb a s a r e m o m s e s p e irv n s i e ne r s p eo eo R n s e ai pd u e u e 4 s cl ph a t n . pb pb r a p t n W o u u u s e W o S t o y s o r m S t S e f l l
l p e d a ipu p n uh n e q d r .
u o S.
r .
u S.
o F T F T A s t. ah e t y W .
n l S
d, s 3 o a e .
o 1
1 . r e a s 1 t
, t y lp et r a . t t
y q 'si foslohe niso mi a uq sn n el wi n ed r ed r o u e e t c e a y e mh en t ic e a y o vei ic m i e) o 5
1 t e r s l f e t v
t 6 1
he iu mmhlpnire ruq dco rm syd p t a vi n e r e a itc h e lp t u m lp r a v u iron se eq ec 5
f l
A S
s y
f c
y S &
r C l
y p r f rcstien ef e ol b
yd ed S a t
o e r y q o r r s e e r pl n r s p 1 i r i f l u t
t o
c o e r y f r r r s p N n n . B up a e eh d a l
A t
t f
a u e e e u w t a u e e A o e y d w ,s s eT e dn icr
. I m o r h h o s e an o w r im oF rah th S
T t
c n oA ul o m t ph e ru nu seul anl ow ir F at t F d t s h d n e ul l n pf p . s pt h nd C
E f e d f s t e p u
p .
. u t e o c l R in pf p . p t n . af a i y gl t y gl t m o at e s n a n u b n o t
F ) f r gn mu le el b ei( t o r b l a n r n nl )
n r i e p F E E S E
s i pb w oi is ef - o a i ia en np uby r sm c d t t e b t A a r 2 o a c dnt r nt p r t
n y rdu vioteralalyt freeigg m p an in4 A ed e ipli o p l
w on erv en ip r l D H e p d p n e p d N P i l a
1 s u p a u a p u ow co ve es iu t A
N e r a v n h e uf nrp ro l o c e i s q a u e t
q v uR l e i sqa u e q S 0 R p w a O t t o F s d e e w s h e a s ( F s d e e w s h e a -
E 1 D 1 O C M E J
E R IN_ n u( n o l
- t o A l E e e A L e e t E f B d d' t a a L A o i l
B R LI M v lo o A E o s T T A e r p is i A V r WA u o o
t o t . t ,
E R t t S S C E a A s A I
V W
O F
l s
- w. ls I l l
I S
R P l o l S E al a a S E F f F a F a T
E I E S K F N F A 0 w t w t Y o n
. o n T e l a l
, 5' U h f l f la p C t p r r TI o . e y e y r t r C t m t a a a a E e w d N r t wd n N e sy n O n t e o e o C o a s c c ic c e e
t t
w r irv s v s r
r et e t e e t s s s s iv F
t aw s w e a r
e e s e e .
y t e r. t e r l ic la thd e a h e t d p v p r o a los o e a
u e s o e t h S s I t h I 4
T p
m
- u P
D r 44 I e t
t a 4
n W )
2
, m D 1 eI V V
= ic 1 O O M
v 3 M- - ,
t- r -
W W C eP $
S ( S
) )
)
4 5 6
{ I j' il'
s k
r e
n e
- R x
y r e , r e , A B o ef m o re sp y e f .m o r spy 2 is b 2 t is x d f a o s e -
o t W
v e u p b d f a o s e -
o t W e ei ss v b 6 u D d t r e e
d G e D u r h w g S w pd h w g S w pd E o ed E d e w y o e n wo nu W lo inl l
o e m
W lo inl S e a t h W d a t h W d n n ol a s p o toll to p ob e ,S n t t S b t , S nu u f G B a n d IS Y
sy h 6 e n r
it le t r o S h G e n r
b tvi itesici ne uB t r o d D e( d f e s e e t d L S t 5 v e i s Ic emf n u o( B tu S o( ie ld E .it A
N n r
o ed s f o ed s f mf l p o . f u s . ip dluE l GD is f
A o nh r
ef p u s s h t r ef p ui s p c gf le p o f B u
s c , o(
~
t S t e e e5 iu a e e e eS u a q e. u n ob a
q h o s h l s
c 2At i s l l
T h o t h n t ed b B g s C e t t n t ed b t t g g2 n a E
F )
f f
e m s d mt l d i
. e l a
m s d m t e . l d l a ii e a n G e i D h d v a a la in G i d le t F E E S E
o ue on roe n a Iw r t a ) o ueo nr ean r
n cf mt op v 4 i v a) l E o
r e e)
A l D a e b r a D H N P A f on w
in cf mte p t k w n o ip u sn r a o v A e 2 f
i wt k wi e p n r a 2 o . o ul c s e
v ir l 2 oE c' . ee iu o h r q l
n an o uq ss s r u e n n q A
N l o al q s s r u lo o F c t f l
e ei a R oN o e i nu N H t r s R t o K v e v i N H o r a R S O F c t f e eI a R E I '
D T O C M E J
E N R I 1 U ( a a a a t
A E n n n n l
A L e o o o o E F B d e L A o -e s n n B R l M s e e A E l o lo p p T T A e l c o o A V r c WA u o ' ot o l
i o t t
. E R t C E a s s . s I t F s .
t S l S.
V 0 l S l S R P l A l A i A l A a a a I a I E
S E F S I
F 15 F S F S i
E t E s K f N f A O V
r r T e . e .
s e e U
C d
a s
r d
a r ic ic L H
I e e r e e e r e v v T h h o s h h o s r B C t t n t t n r l
'. E r a e r a e e e e 2 s
N m e r d m e r d s s e n e L N O n ot e n r a n o o t r a n o e i ta e M C f w eg c f w eg c d i d e d E to h i o t w e k w e k v o v c
n l o ic m a an lo cv emat an t.
ot A r
p w 2
ot r
p w u f v e t r t f
r t o r r o
F ol s e s f s e s f ol o e e s f e s f t f t g t f t e o t e o a n e h h - a h h - s r r a s r t t w l t t w n e e h n et lo r o o u o e t n c e
- s o ol i n t b I s o ol s t b p a e x O w g e p
O w a
D J : .
I t
A 5
9 5 9 0 n 6 6 2 3 e 3 3 1 1
. n 2 2 V V
_ . o -
V C E e V I f F
';. n T o -
W W W .
C W S 5 5
. 5
)
) ) ) 0 7 8 9 1 Ll ,i I
t' 3
' t v a i t
r t
a .
r is e t e s n l is lb i b i
r t n a in a r e t r m a e p h ep c
e s o a o R
we s e ub p
o mb u o t pt W. . . W .5 5 5 S.
4 T 4 T V V .
s S S
- e. s e s e X, s t y w t y w o n n o . en b l . en b l
b o lb io E a l
mde 5 a ,it 5 a e n p md f t A r f t e n t V l A V l ,t T H c m r S i d c r S l d c I P in l
e g eid g eid a e n S
I t n i it w uq un nm ip q u un f o
o a e n r u n f o
o v r uf nu S s y e o it e Bo w av i f u w e iuq F S p a Y
S t
r u B r u yT u R y T y(
R q y( c F
- 0. e l.
A e ql ( 1 e ql ( c n B, et oS e Xi n a . 1 1
v e a t N
A n
o f
iv c ta 1 i i r fe . d a
w.
I r e .
f t
f S t Rd l t a n t
. R d H
l a n t t . d w n od u l e a d n r s e n o d e a ul n r s 'et lowe T c RF ,i e n s e R
d,it e ne d f a a , t r d f a a , r t C
f e d t a e n s s i e s er op e
r g 4 s e o f
ru E
o es sn s ic t h e e f n e e ic n r p s t F
F E
) f E
wi te tofi ) w t s s s of ) rs i gti go n p) s i 1
g* of p) u 6 e a f r
E S e A d u f u 6 e d , p e s t A lol f A loi b t f u 2 ce i s, p e s 1 c i s 1 a ep D H N P A
f a e w s b
V s r ro lo t
u F n
f W
t s r a m w s o o s u n
u v d o e r u w h r tn no r e ed u v p d o e r mow h r
e e d r n losm e is Ru l
M S ef f i R R p pT a a R p pT t a a I T 5 0 S ef f E l D i O C M E J
E ft R l s
U ( s 1
n n a a A
ll t e e p r r A t e ,p ,
o e, y e h ly we th E F B d o e s l w t L A o s a p oi p o i .
B R M ly a ly g h p p w p p w d A E ll gh n p n u u e e n i p te ir n s t
T T A s l t s l t A V r n e r n a n ,
a n lo e
V A lu i o re d io r t u r o r d u io t
to te d e to ic d c E R e t r i C E a t t t a v e c s r ic . c . ls I W F a v e c r d v e l t
c n S is t c n S V O r d v le A t A i R P e a j e a l j l e ioI a le ioI a O i av in p n n p n a l E F e c S F S E T
O i av i F e c S E I E S K T N F A O Y
X s s X p p T H n H n m o m n U
C I
mi t R
H iot u
p u
p e p s t
T R c R c e V V o tn C oj e o j S $
E n n e N t n t o o i v N a e O n w i w i t t m
C o o g lo ng r r e P i l i
n e = r N t f t c r f ir w w o o -
n u
V u S d V u 5 d o .
p p . t 0
F s ) s ) s 8
1 s 1 de ex e A e n g e B . t I . ie d t d
t 1 e n i n ig i la 5 s e la 5 s lp a p a s r p p o - a o - a uC e u I
s E h
( p I s E
(
h p S uAI S 1 D d n n io e io e s
i r is r v lu 8v lu 0
1 i
D i a 0 ia f F l l
. t a n a n n 9
- e. 5 6 ic i a ic i a -
r r r r V V V
+
O O t f t c
t 0 A
M M c -
_ w -
V le "A le "B V V
_ C E " E " S S S
)
) ) )
_ 3 ) 5
_ l 2 4 1
_ 1 1
_ l
al al al y n p y n p y n p ly n p eh p l eh p l
ph t e h p u lphe h p t u ph t p t r sl u ph p t t
r sl u .
pt r s l p t r s l u o a u o a u o u o ia s h nt s h nt n it s h nt ntia sh n t s
s ic e en nie t smph ic eh la ne c e a n s ic e a n n t k
r ph h l sph i h l e phw t m h lp se e w t p s wt p s s wt p s s m iu s u p r h y e s t p r h y e s u p r h y e a p rh y e e t r n e t r e t r et r W d o a d W d o e d W d o e d W d o a d S e b m n .
e i at S e b m n .
e h a t S eb a n e h at S ab e imne t .n rh s r e p s e n rh s r n rh s r n r h s r p s e u u e p s e u e p s e u e o ni r m o ni r m o ni r m o n l r m f io ol h e ip f ol m pht e d ip f omp i h ted ip ptu dhe e ip
- l f s n e p t d n p u l p pu uo e e l m p u e u l m p u a u e r l
l o u o e q l x t l o u o e q l o u o e q
^ A c s s h e A e s s h e A c s s h e A c s s h e l
l ) l ) l ) l )'
i 4 l 4 l 4 l 4 i i 1 i 1 t 1 1 -
s t t t w, 's w. e s w, e w. is nd e s e s ,s ,
s d n c D od, ic ode i dan ode i dna ic C lode i en S
I S
t e
s i
fo rvdn f i tc 3 l e r
a f v o re dn y u e 0 l f ir t c 3 fo ic v r d D l f r i tc 3 f v o r d e n y u e1 f ir tc 3 Y y e a ly u e1 1 e n y u e 1
, qf yS a l qf yS al qf yS al q f L S yS p ef n c p ef n c p ef n c p ef n c
' A n n , p r e u n n .B,s p r e u n a . 5 p ur e u N
A o a . C u R e . C pur e u R a u R R s
d w ,s s e( d w s e( d w 5 t d w n o8. os phs e( -
n o A ul ph o m t n o A u l ph o m t n
u l oA. osm phts e(
T c ul m t d f C )
f e d f eg s t p
u p , e d f eg m e s t p
u p , e
. d f e
s t p pu , e .
e s t o u , e p
E E F 5 f r s e el r el r g m e el r g n sa le o r b el n s l o r b n u t o r b n ul o r b F
E # E s i pb w oi s
s i pb w ol s i pb w oi s i pb w oi ed l
P ed g ed e t fe tg ed a t fe ig a t f eig D r la ytr lfei c u i v e rl c rl y r c i r u v e l
y r cu vi e v l l l u i et lnh e l l y r i N R e g d ot e e g d ot e l e g A O d ot el e g d ot e l e r a v n h e e r a v nh e e r a v nh e e r a v 5 T I
R p w e ot n R p w eO t n R p w e O t n R p w e O t n E A 0 L 0
s U
I C R
E I 1
mC t E
- l R A l (
e e A e e e d E F t d d d d i L t o i i i v
B R 9 t v v v A t A I
o o o r
o r
1 f L e r r p A I r p p p '
WA u o o o V l o t t t E A l t e s ,
IC R F s w, s w, ts .
V E l l w t w
RW E O l
al o l al o t e lo F f telo F f S P F f F f
. E E T
K E
N IS A F Y t e e e h
e
_ O h h h T t t t t U o o o C
I t o t t t T . .
C r m r e m r m. r e e m
- E e e e e e t t t N t t t t a s t
a sy N a s e s O n w y w y w y w C s s s s to r r r r t e r e r e r e r c v e v e v et iv te
' ' n i t i t r a u r a r a ir a F w w w w s s s s ie e e e i c ie e ie e v -
lp icv l p iv lp icv l p icv 4 p r p r p r p r u e u e u e u e S s S s S s S s p y p p y, P m
u P
n u
P m
u P
m u
)
, ; D r r r r I e e e t t te t t a a a a j n W ) W ) W ) W )
l y, -
m eI ic A
el c -
B el ic C
1 eI c -
i1 D
., 1 i 7 v 3 v 3 v 3 C
-- r -
eP v 5 r -
eP r -
e P r -
eP S ( S ( S (
- S (
) ) ) )
6 7 8 9 1 1 1 1 W < l
t t a a a r r r t t
_ t s
is e s ,
e.
s i e n l inl k inl b l e
b a
i b n a r m a d r d r a d r a ep a ep m a ep e s o s o
- R m o p g y a e n m
, n u b e s i b u t p p p o o o
.t . t .t W. . W. . W. .
5 5 5
~ S S. - S.
4 T 4 T 4 T u
. 8 8
. o o s n s n mh d s u s u ot e el ei R
.e el ei R X frWi div d ic abn tt o
- s. e 'o y s y H S
m e
e e t r h s
, icba n tt vl e b
e e t r h s
vl e b
V o w s. < o otl r
C f t le. p I t S s h d r m w yd h d r r e i pm woydt C l r a m e a e l s via ip ot e Y y t a m e l e t l s e o d l ed e o d l e d o g en bas ia i L
A N
A n
o t
oh rf a e ia t
t r a u f f h n u e eh s o g q a u n
t oh r a t
f e ia s v iuf f t r a
h n u e eh s o g q a u n
t i
n nl p oiaw on e t
s n w e o r B s n w e o r u r B s t e r m v l
^
S t e a o lt s F a l u r (
e a lo t s F a l (
inul pf an es . sgt ia ul n s a oi u e o a f noie . in vi c T
C ) % in pf a l e . p is eh n e
. s t E E F S 1
- t y g p g t m n t
t s t y g lp gt n n eh t s t d l p n n r n n ne up ed n n r n n n u ed n n F A i o a yi s e m yi e p s s ie rm io) oB ia m u iel E o a t i r d m s i crotio) p l
P cdn ria r t d m A 9 cd A c1 t
- n ic D
N N u p r el e e p pf w on er a uc ip re el ot p f Sc w 4 e r f A O I l w co o ei v eir mlnciu q t a h u e u n r n d l
o c v iml u t e i r n q a h u e u n e p r nd l
o1 s uf
- s o u o S T F s 'd pi e wt s pf a F s d pi e w t s pf a F E ef ' s t E A -
D L O U MC R
E I _
C R C _" n C 1 U E o oE
- L R t A I ( t i e t e t et A t, a h t a E F E d a h L L o l c .
lotc n. la l T
B A
R B E A T L M
e o t s i no i wi is wi io s t i oa s n ig r A I r s t e WA u o a o a ,
o s v V l t ol t ol o E A i t u t u t h
C a d c d c s a c l
I R F e r r le r r l u t V E RW l
i ioic i ioic l a a w n i E O a r e a r e F p r F m s S P F p r E t E i K t N 5 A F w Y F T
O t t lo U s s f a
I C e w r. e r, e r) e B T e C ed e d t 1 h a h a a -
E w4 M t e t e h -
M h o eE O n o (
C io t t n
t t n ic t w a w a v X r H c ol n lo l p l p e u f f y
s CW F y s r s r s C e a e a e t d t d t e a n a n la th l o l o o o c c s o
- . I s e s iwes I t
~.
(
i D
I t
n 2 3 e 1 V V 5
m V
O O O M
= M M-
,*. C a
V W S V
S S
) )
- )
1 2 0 2 2 2 6
i t o o t
a m c . m o
c .
r o nF r n u 'F
~
r t
s . f u '0 d 0 f
d 0 0
'~-
i e w n2 s - w n2 zy k inl b S o a < CS Io a <
r m a C l
) C f ) s a
m d
a r
ep C f E
nI A is E n1 i B
. i R e
s p
o den io sHK d
e n
io 5--KsH
, m ub e i ta E( ) i ta E ( )
p bl bl m u A o m u 8 o c d I
~
.t o c d 1 c r e -5 c r e - l
[ W. .
e i c ol -5 'e c o -
i S h e oL S. h e oE T r c(
4 T T r c(
g o n p
l
) l
- h' d e
. y s b t
l i
l m l m l
e s 8 a m mt o i d s n e ot e u a o h s .i1 -
e o s r L
9 r W i d o S p e r s f r 6
) w5 f r n f v a b ct fC y d e S e 1
o ot a i C R d wt V e - oA o -
I l E t n wt V iod lia H eoo. m t
t W w . r l c l t R E I
- f ( e pn a lo aw R. n o a O I
. S s C o s e. p n K n a l wM d 5 f Y y C l t l l u r e - gK a i a ,f L' v t f -
e ceWS f S f nb s g d E n H s p y L
e a i ia f te A
N n t o g nl t y
(
a R wR f H l d f s e r n i ei nd i v
(
li R S l E
tr e d i A o s i np a o e e o i w n t . o f d e ok l v h oK oH C t k il vhr 4
s f d l f u i pi ci r g r H oR C R c a p e u S t e t m v l c
T C )
c e
u r o a f s a e n e c e s t r
f g e oS v o oc p r t n t a p e u p s o u r p t g i t ft o E
m . p pu s it vi l f s t r s , s h h E E F S f p n y t o p) inds i)
. p
) f u , s s
h h t t inR ned o n s o g s u t F A E H P
E n d o
cA t ia m elicapph pAt u
p u l l
o B s A I i 1 g s r n r o r 3 y i le n ed n
) l f o o e o
t e f d r i n r o r 3 e t e s D I n i su hc es ln ol - - -
cl e5 -w5o e- r t
c ef l iv p c ir l n a o N 4_ w - e r f o4 s u f f a o e a u d f o e A 0 l - s o u o us aR r u oh E l E a e oh e R oi u r o u e oh e R 1
N s ( f ( s b c t h ( N s s pt f b c t h S 1 F E ef s t C A -
0 L 0 U N C R
E I g g R C C n n l U E nC a iS a iS
- L R oE r C r C A I (
e et n u C n u C A od E od E E F E d t a L L o a nl o n nl o q.
M lo a l
B R B A E A e a t p n io e na p t ic T e s n . o g r t TA IL r i g r o g r t o is veo a o is eovl a WA u e V l o is v l u t u E A i t o t l h c l h c C a l h r s a c s a c r I
V RW R
E F
l l
u n i t l l
u n it ic lsl a a w e aut n ic ic E O a a w a a w e F ms r c S P F ms F m s r .
E E
^
EK TI M S A F d T F w d nd O o h 1 n h ) a n T l et 8 ad et A a U f n c r A b I C
r) ic ou -1A a ivr n5 - o -
I 1
g 4 v s 5 - - g I
.k T C teA1 a -
r e e E 4 n e eE 1 - 4 in E
s h ( i s h ( - k
- [ N I
M w4 e
t K P c 1
- k e t
X P c
( a
. - f n eE( d mH ( a d mH p C io ic o p i o s t
c v X r H ivof Hr p R s , s , v r R of H 'p s, s e r R m g r r R m g r n p w u n e p w
' (1 ;
F u s CW s C e
ol t t f o o pi r lo R a o ol t t f o o pi u n le R a o r o t e r H e c r H e c a h s r e R b s r e R b l t n ed l n e d l o e t a d ) a et p a a de nB) ae I
s ot p a e nB e O wh aI s O wh a I s
- [
i .
D I
t n 5 6 m 4 - -
d'. V V V O
- O a
C
- O H-W S
M-W S
M W
S J
) )
- ) 5 4
3 2 2 2
C -- -
l
! l!
~ -
s k
r e
m
,- a R
y .'y r
- 0. t B, t e o y 1 o e I o e s t a a P t
wf wf S d t a S d t W n a
s e r e5rf F e .
n W n S a y s .,
d S a y d R. c p a d e l o e l o e H n oh ss e S t I
S t
s inC n s to r inA On s tro I P F fi etir ty r o y ,I O , p d, p Y y 5 P o u b e p y . p L S . d . e p t a f A c s e p c s oS e F
t a u N n n pe r u n a m p le r u t t a. s s s A o a m l i
- s. )4 dn p ub i u s) 4 f a e e s t d ub u n p a q e1 a q e1 w oR c- n e us re o
i c u l e r u l e r e e r h a C ) e d oi r a d d oi r ad l E E f e w av n e w av e s a n f r u s.
t o
t s
r T e s a r T eh t ,n
'se .- na ra nio3 F S f s t F A a r n o n ng i E
E H D
P s e
c s i s t
.n a in3 1 c s u g ia ep c s t 1
n t
e ar s a ig la p er eh ioit l c N N u p a p c n d n m n u o n c d t o n A 0 d m m m n u e u e s u R s e n n c o u l e u e u uR R p r pf ( R p r pf t
( I T i a a cf S i - -
E A .
_ D L O U M C E l R C l uE
- t R A l (
e A y, y E F E d L L o l p lp .
B R B M p p d A E A .
u e T T L e u s s A I r s o
- W AV u o l o t lc E A i t C a .
s r. s I R F s r e l e l V E RW E O dwa o l
a o w
- l a
S P F p F p F E E T
K E
N IS A F Y F s s p p 0 m T m u U u p C p n .
e I
S p s T S
. ; C W W S
ot n
E S n e N o v N o t a e O 'n t t m
C to r r e P t e e r N w L c w o o -n n o p . p . t u D o F B s I d n s I e e n g te d t d i n i n p a g in p a is r p p uA uC e u ,
S l S I D d n n
' o
. io e i e u s r is r q sf u i u
. v l v l i i 0 i i D a 1 D a F F l l
. t. . a n a n 9 l m ci ci -
! i a a r r ir r V g-wt C l c
e E "
T "A
t T l
E
- c e "
B 0
A W
) ) )
6 7 8 2 2 2
l
1)'
. t
~
s k
r a
m e
R el ei t d c i S ic t p e S d v n g8 it .
,6 v n m r C n 6 C r u up pC a m r u u2 d A pC m e o r d e .iA u mE o ed e p e mE r n s I A q u B r r n m s I G r u p e4 8
- o. a r2 e'. p eA f o a
$ e rD i f n o e r no r or n f q on.r o n t n o eE u r e, 5 r e 5 t
5 s i t t r - i t t G e r v a o ei ef u e e a D s i ef u Y
$ y2 wt r t t eR w h , y2 wE i t t e R w e 4, o h .
n m e n p e w c a b c
L ot 4 . (
A c c a b (
p pt ,de N n o
n a o m e n s e w d ,de a o dnf vrd ic o umj d A , 3 t n e e s , 3 t nf ic d r vd pi oij n e e t on.
s d c pi n. e v nd , e c
5 i
t c u r e m ic r e n iv a , fe 2
u de pss ea SdC rWt tS ic t r e v ar io a2 f t e de s ed u S v a i p s a pC r t t e s ,fa ie ,fa E f r m o C e s a r m o C e s a c s F
F f
E s p udl n eE s n l ce 'G 1 s p n ud l eE s n e l
u eG 1 r D - t E ) e u) r D -
E V o t
e o e o gd b c E V o E e o e o gd b cG n n r 5 O n D S c r cb n n r 4 5 O n c r cb - h M -
N A u e e yi ot i - h M u e e yi ot ic) C t e A H d t s nl r c s cd C t - e d t e a s nl r c s a n u e u eG C oW r P e a a n u e u e n C oW r M b S a R w a cod s mr4 M b S a S R w a cO d s mr a E N D 0 O 1 M T C
E E 1
R t
JN f
- f A
l l (
I o a e o a A e e d s r t F R d d s r i s o E o s o v o t
B RW M iol o v
r ol r A E O e r e T T P e r p a w p a w A r o*
W LA l u o n p o on p E M i t o t o l C R a s r a l
s r a .
mS . ,
I O F l e mS V N l e
w r A l w r A R l a o o1 E F a o oI F p n5 S O F p nS E S E S RO A
L T A C I 5 I 1 d
- G - - n T
U 1 D C 1 o V a C 3 E C 2, 3 t O
- s M .
I T P o s n oi n
.M ed o P , r n e V
- 4 C t s pio o wr nS d E
N t
p iot lp ad n - m t p u o a n
N r mt r p1 a O n e ui e u - e ui t t w pd w sV . w pd s 3 .
C to , 6 o r a d ie in eV o d o p r a p n M O 4 p r - 6 t
e r - d d e n phl oM n w O d m C t n s uW n n C t p c p - a u A a I A a I F w ie t $ a a s w ui s h s $ 5 V
s l n o3 5 w ie -
e e pi t - -
ie c e D . B ,V t c 8. p V V l i I 2 5 l 2 O ii1 uh r O O p v p M p v c e M M p r d s i w - - p r d G C pd -
u e nD C u n W u e n A h oW W S s a 2 w pS S S s aE M s a S' 7
9
, l l 8 e e 9 s s 1 D e e /
0 I i A i B D 2 D 2 3 t
/
y r y r 6 n c o 0 e c o nt /
n n t e a 9 o
p e
g r a g r r e r e .
m o e n e n M C me me E G J
/
E G 8 1
2
) ) 3 a b 0 I ll!}!
m ,
~
st i
r a
m e
R
.2 r e 3, l l ed l o t i a - B e s e,liwi l
s a v t V / c "tn e et ec pr net -5ie
, ,i s ,
w ot O A t e wi t r r M v l r r y 6 r b m a o sp ne y a o sg e n b s n W 3 e a e mh ipt nlpa iredooi2seT em S 2 s l b f S e t f t e n o I t s e r u m o S d s
r u 5 d h v t - i e S s o e p lyCC ed t u qmo p ,V o a r )
Y y o e p yC e C d t t h w v a 5 S t t h n a L
A r T r lnE n r T r n E u
o e r y s et u - -
r r qV V T
s n W n s a eO u s a e O t f e n u A o l l
t s .ta g o n B l
i ts . a t g o n B s tn w ma oi w wuqleOto5 M
- d )
. r a ioR (
s t c fa l ly w .g ir (
f a l l y w .g r i (
eul a loiT r e f n W n a S a wo t i
C e l l e n u l l e n u n p f p r t l l s p nc .
E f A i ca ic ti d n C iw ac ic ti d n
. i t y gl t . e n p g , f. m u d we ie re rr tel I
n r n a n er a n 4- e p uf e cdn ir in mp s le f 1 F
F E v a d o pD t i v a d o r r ei o a tt y i y r t
E ) pB t t E m I ) m I a e e r t )
m s pi ic a ru OmV r t D S u p p o n s po iu ec 4 u p p o c4 o uq je n m s M la e e p N A A ii P f m t u u wo p a t b r i R e e q j n n u f m t i p a t b r i R o
u u w e e n u low eco viessei f s d e e p s p( S u qmpfu u f ir a sW- ois at l w #
S I E N D 0 O l M i t
E E l l f R J a a o t U N m
- L I m r r s a A I (
t o e s A e t o r n t o r r n t
l F R E
d o a a l a l o t f B RW M t f s o o a r A E O s o e s e I T P e e r s i r w A r r s s e o W L u s o ot p A l o o l t lo t f C M i t a l C R a -
s r r. s a .
I O F s r r w m5 V N l e e l e e l l o r A R i t w i t w a E F a f o a f o F f l oI nS F a p F a p S 0 E 5 E s K o N l A w Y
l o
T U e e f C c r I ic i v e y T v r t r C r e a a E e r wd N s n N
O n o o e o C t t ic ec ,
io v s r t w . w n m. r e c
n l o me i e e t d u f f t s s a t
s s a e F s y s eh s y e s e s e e y d t d
i r i r v e l a h t lp v e ot o p ot r a r a s ot u P w I s P w d -
-* p g m n q u P
u a P r
D r I e e t t t a a
- n W ) W )
C 1
- e. A -
4 eI eI V c - -
if ic 7 O M
w v 3 v 3 -
r - r -
e P e P W C S ( S S (
) )
)
c d e
s k
r a
m e
R r e r r o r e d l 3 o s W e t y . s s eC W de t i a - B e s eC d t l t uC w a a p n uC w a a p n e t
n a v i w ot r n O
V /
P S v A ic l e n i f l o e w p e h u mb l
n i f l o e w h
t of e s p a y t of e e t e p e t - 6 r b S
m e mh n a icv t s n W 3 e a no e g r y i c o u il b n o e g ry t
he ip t o s e S 2 s - l q ia ed cd in am e mp e in I
S Y
s y t u m p r l
,V l
o a r ) cd am vr t e va ar de w is t i w w a 5 w is t e d L
A S q o o e r y s e t u - -
ed oi1 T T s o e erp ri s el n lo e e rp r s N n t f r r q V W s n l r ia re ns ou f b v A o t a oi w eO S e n u f b v oi w u t uil s
e a n w m w uql ot M
- d )
. r s ioR ( r t d uil q n a ioB(
r t d ia S
T C
t c
e ul lo ir T ef n Wa nS a n
i pf p . r t l m.t c i p n .
t e
e) ia T t e e s t r s p c s m n t
e a h e )
A n t
E f
f f t y gl t e n p g ,f m ud a wt h 8 n 1 e t . e e u ud.
- s n r pf e w t 1
- s e
n r n uf e s F
E )
E o a i ia ne ra ie y in 4- e p t eh 4 s e a o t W y t eh 4 g - e m D S E cd t n tr w o e neip pf m s ic s asru OM mV la t r t y r e e p o ic ugE - e mp s w
S t e p o%i ic u E v o( mi p w N A v s u m s - ot f p v o( mi r r o ugo of pn r r o A H P l o c e i s q u u tr f
a M s a a u eh X r q u l e pf T s s R w a u u e h X r q S t H f u
S F s d e e p s p( S i w s s S t H f E N D 0 O l M i C
E E R J f o n n 1
U N L I o o A I ( s a el el A e e s a t a E F R d 't u r t a mr a mr L E o a l o l l B RW M l o o o o A E O o s
a re s n T T P e i is n A r i r w f W L u e o o o f
- o o A l ot p t t
E M i t f s s C R a a l s s r. s s r.
I U F s a .
o i ol e V N l w mS l l l e t w R l o r A a o a o E F a l oI F a p F a p S O F f nS E S E S K O N L A
Y w l
o T
U f X X C H H I r
- T e y C t r W V E a a C C N wd C C N n o o O n e o C i o c c i e ,
t t v s r w w t
c r e o l o
n e t d l
. u s s a f f F e e s) s )
s w h e 8 e A e e y t 1 t I t
a - la -
la th lp l 4 4 o p o - o -
I s o us I s E
( I s E
(
t 0
1 t
n 3 4
- e. 2 - -
V V V wM u
O W
O M-V O
M W
C S S S
) )
)
f g h
r ia ec ss a c s ir i e s a a n r er n r er e e ph p ph p d
d, o ci mo o ic m o
s e e l h c l h c s s tra l o
- s. l o;
s l
a w
G l
a w
eD G
c ev c ev f eD f v
m v
- e l l al e al e R l l a a h a h
- . l a l s v t s v t
- a v a v f
e d
e f
e r t d
e i0 d 3 t e om .
r m i
0 e o 3 t d m r m.
r t a ar 1 a f e 1 a f e a ar - r t - r t s e V e r s V e r s
, s e y C y F op ia s V p C pi V p T o T o F o a s '
r e r r e r o o m e A t ,
B t .
~ e f m e e f o 2 G e 2 G e d f o t d f t eD v ) eD v) a o s a a o s a G u oG G u oG e - w e - w o D d f b 4 D d f b 4 h w g o h w g o o a o a o n l ed t d l
t m
e s
$ b it ia icv W l r t n
a SW .
W lbr inl S t i iced a
t v na W S t . t oi d f t
a e) n r a a u
d t
ol d f l e) n a r b a u
Y y h G e n r e t h G e n r e t n) e l n 8 e l n B L S t S v e el t n) t S v e e i s s b n e 5 l t i d i i 4 i d i i 4 i s s b n e 5 r A
N n r
o ed s a ie mp n o ed s nh e ol a
ie m l l p uF d n a lp u aF d n l
A o nh e eT ia ic ipquR nu p o e u p o e u S
T t
c e
h o s h t r e e Te oli c iuR w
a i v f q u
e h o s h t r w v f u c s
A g u
. s s R y
u c s
B g u y
. s s R C e t t n t
. a fu e y t t n t e . afu e yb g2 g2 i nc b f e b n in c b n is d liG D at dis E m s d mt e s l F f mo se d n mt o e s n r l a d o e n o n r e a e d liG D atd F
E D S
)
E E
f r un cf o mr e a ed t d e ip p t
n n r un o r e a f i cf m d in dn t d o o
e e
.hr ts nou d o o
c e
e
.hr is nu d
c N A A H w ti k w o n o a n lo qeuup m s iv e u r soB s o lo w t k w no n a lo ip u m sp iv q u r s B o se ou 5 e G X v A B o I S e v B B o
P l p e( F c t f e p p e( N H o2 ( N H o2 (
S F c t f -
E N D O O I M T C
E E R J n 1 U N n o a a
- L I o A I (
el n . n E
A F R d e
t el a S t a S ol a
ol.a L
B RW E
M o l a mAI r la mA1 r n e g n n n e
A E O o oS o o5 p i p ig T I A
P e r
s n a is n a o s o s W L u i f o o r f
ot ot A l o o r o t r t r E M i t s
o t s a a C R a s s r s t ls t I O F ls os er l o e l s s V N l l w l l l w a G a G o
l R a E F a o F a p F D F D S O F a p E S E S K O N L A
Y r r
e .
e
% e T s U s d C
c a r e e r e a r ic ic l e e r e h h o s v v i h h o s n r l r l C t t n t r a e t
e e e e E r a e s s s s N m e r d m et r ed n N
O n ot e n r a n o o
r a n o e ie ta d d e d ei a e t C io f w eg c f w eg c i h i d e h w e w e v o v o t
o icv em k
c ma akn ot A ot 8 a an c r r 2 o iv e t l 2 .
n l p w s p w s u f r t t f r t o r r o r r F s e s f ol o e ol o e g s e s f e s f t f t g t f t e s f e o a n a n t e o t a h h - s r r a s r r a
_ a h h - l t t w n e eh n e e h
~
t t w o u o e t n c e t n c lo r o s o ol p a e x p a e x s o ol I s t b O w g e O w g e E n t b
_ . . D
. I A B 9 0 t 5 5 2 3 n 6 6 1 1 3 3 - -
- e. 2 2 V V wT - -
. i V E C V T F F o - W W W C W 5 S S
) ) )
) j k 1 L t E
I
. ~'
~
s k
r a
m
, e
+
R
~
n o
o o
- w o T w t n
w o T w t n oi is d t e a l
f t ie y
l f t.n . l y
s l n o v e
m n . c g e ei t
b S e g e ei b io isa l I t n ml f n ml f i p b f l d t v ,
S s i p b f l d Y y t i a u a e a r n L
A S r ul s ia K ev qe ai e n u t en d K e q r
tv iulia a eu ns it udn lua f o is ep h o N
A S
n o H di i.e a iv es o tf v d s B
(
Hil R d H
e a
v d e o a i s B v s (
v t T ei d
d e
v T t
c i
R ,l s o e R ,t s p r o e s e . ns a r 9 i o ed tn m ppro .
C E f e o ed nt m p o . c -V ss t h e u t t t F f t h e u t t s s p s n c e0 a E s s p s n p w e F e k A E ) wt s p w e ) wt s a - s
, E oi eW mlpf o m loi b eW5 ulnpf oipm)5 f f t W y D S l f a m b S i ip5 f a m a S a N A u n W s r o m Wo W q u u n w W st r o w Wo W q u t t A H o of l P S ef i S S eR N n o a S l S ef T S S eR
. E e ~ -
D 0 O l M i C
_ E E R J s 1 U N s
- I n n e
A IL ( e p p e A e ,
o e, e
_ E F R d o s _s t
a L E o y a l B
A RW E O M l 'g a h ly gh o T T P e t n p t n p s n
i
_ A r W LA u n ri e n e i r n o 'o o r d u io r t o r d u i l r t t E M i e e t C R a t t t a v e c a v e c ls I O F r d v e V N r d v le R e a j e p
a n a n l j l a
E F p n a n i S O O i v i O i v I F E S E S K O N L
. - A Y
X X T H n H n U o R P C
l Ei t l H io R c t F 5 t s i R c n C oj e oj e o ev E
I t n t n t
.s H0 n w i w i w e
0 o g C i o l o g n l n lopN t f i f i f L
_ r c r W g W u
_ n u
WS d u S d S n i
F s r s) s) e B e A e u t I . t I e,
t d a - e a -
la s l 5 s l 5 s o - a o - a s 'X s E h s E h p Io i ( p I ( H
+
,N -
__ - d.
.. ;7 ;:
. =
_Y 7 .
D I
- t n
y~ , - 5 6
V 9
V V
~
O O 0 M- A
^
-s C
M W
W W S S 5
) ) )
. m n o i
l
i i
t t
a a r r t
t is e is e .
s inl b lnl b k
r m a e a a d r d r m a ep a ep e s o R s p
o p m e m u b e
ub p p o t
o . t W. . .
W. .
5 5 S.
S. 4 T 4 T
=
C B o t A l o - t l
r r I l t o r I l 2 t e op wo C w op wd o
A g iwG r t 6 I p iwA r T p t n D a p t m e - m 2 o 1
1 n
u p
D E for I
w usd o r d r o n 1
3 u
p B
I G ir u
. s d a
m o p e n 6 f f a - D p6 n 6 S e 3
- W gt e P W g n gE yd t o a n n u nl n ic o a n I t S g n yd r r 5 S s y
P o
S v
t s u e e s o n u n l n s u Y
S p p ol a r d d R w h . p n i p oi a d d R r s e a L
i n a e e a o t 4 .
n .d (
ue 'r de ir
(
A p u e r e u W d u 5 r o N
A n
o p v e t d S e n -
u W d u 5 s r o l . .de p v e t d S e n -
a w r d a V iu l
a w r d a V o iu . s d 3 t r e.
e h op ta lyd na mO q Mn e iol S t r h o a yd a mO w q n e e n c T c e p t l n o M T e r iol v a 2, fe t l s l a lo d - r b C e t l a l s l a
a l d -
t b
a ie s ,fa a l l a eW t a e W . e la l w c v ic n n t S e r a l
f l E ~
wi a e n n t S c wi a e F ) f e 'G t i o e e r a g a ul i
F E E S E
e w ic v ic a t io e e ar g -
n V a
6 u
r a .
c v i
)
r D -
1 E V o t e i a n c v a
D i N F A
A l
ivrc d8 el1 t r h a c l t omj vectn aedbn tep Wi-u Om s
n M p s r i caed1 5
- h M C t O n
- e ic 0 r h a t b t in p ic e v
r dr e 1 t m c cl o et ej v d e m l
u n a n p u e r s s r a e r n C o W r e l N e nl a e iw ua i h a oS p r a a M b S a S e e iw a i h a o p r a 1 S
E IO S. -
D T O A M L U
E C R R 1
- U IC L f o a f
o a A I E e e A R e d E F ( d d s r i ss or L
B A
R R M o
iv ol r os o v o ol r T
E E T W e r e r p a w e
p a w A O WP E L l
i r
u t
o n p o l o 'ot o n p l
o C A a s r u .
I M F s r a .
l e m S V R ~
l e mS l w r A R O l w r A a o oI E M a o oI F p n S S F p nS F
E 0 E
K 5 N 5 A 0 A C Y E l 1 d I l d - - n T - - n 7 o V a U 7 o V a 3 t O C 3 t O - M M 4.
.e r I
T P , r - 4. o P
n W C o n e W t s o w nS d E t s o w n S d n N pi o ur o a n ei t o r p u o a N
O C
n r m e u it w p d s p
t t 3 .
reo un i s w pd t t 3 .
io o d e n r - 6 d ie ni r we- O6Vd t
c n
p r a C t e
t i
n ph o M n i e V w O d p re an lphc op -M C t a n
u p A a I F
A a s
w I
u ic p W- a s w p s ih s S 5 u W te ceB .A s h sie S 5 ii;Z 5 w
l
.V 2 O
- te e . B w ie 2 .VO -
i p icv D 2 5 lp I
M p v p M p r d G C p d -
p r d G C pd -
u e n D C u n W u e n D C u n W S s a E M s a S S s a E M s a S l
- l e e s s D
I ie A ie B D 2 D 2 t
y r y r
+ n c o e c ot n t s, n e a c e a wem e g r g r r e r e n e n C E G m e E G
)
)
p q
. < I
' j J
o '
s k
r a
m t e
, R l 0 n .d 8 n n 1 oW d e e p 1 oW Sdn l e
. od S n l d .
lode p t i e p n a b n t n a b
_ S m
e t r
a t
i tr d a pl t m y o e ul i e e r l
)
7 l a u i B o t r
a s
i t rm t
d a pl ul y it a a o e e
r e . 7 h lb d d
)
l a
iav ed nd
)
7 I t s d t a a h b d d a( d t S s a s d ul t a e n v a sd ul t a e n
_ Y y o n n u .l iu6 r a a . o t t n e a a c n n u ,li r a a r a L
A S t t n e a a c r I v e ai l d r I v m r e r v aq iu6 l iuq 6 e a n n a n mri e a er un r v q s a l N s a l o n ic o a e n i e n o .h o n c i r)
.h l t A l t s i e ef r u t r u l s i e ef t i 7 s uqd l
a yd t e r e e R s R S t a yd t e r e e R o T c f l l l cb r b e r y f l l l cb r b e r y e u e r e s e n l l u e r e s w y C l l A i a o j e oh l p r a C i a oje oh l ab p t b E f ab m w c w n v f t l m wc w t gi h d n v f t l
- wi od wt de f I F ) l F E E it a u o6 p w p0 it A i ha d ;
i od w tw de u y d pl e
[ S D H A gIB a m
I eB nd t 2 s n e t n u
m1 a u m 1 g n
eA n e o n nd e u mt m r ld u a tG 2ml s p y u t
p p o pi r N P A
p gto pim l r u ar G gly uo e yR r
h n y l
f u u u u ot D u nB o r d o h n B
_ N f u u u u ot D u nB p a pd w s E p o( i a (
S 0 i p a pd w s E p o( i O b I E l D i O A M L U
E C l l R R a a 1 U I a a
- l C m m n A l E r n r o
A R e t o o t o r n E F ( d r n a
_ L o a t .
t f t
r l B R R M t f r l a a s o a a A E E s o n e t n T I W e e t g r s s g A O r r s s V P l u
o o s
t s
o is o o i t l t o is E L i t l l C A I M F a
s r r, s a l
s r r, s a V R l e e l u l e e l u R O l t w l n l t w l n E N af o a a af o a a S F e p F m F a p F m F
E O E
K S N S A O Y L r T e eB U e c g e t 2 C c i nd ic f i vi n a G il v r e a v e D C r eb r h r E d.
E e s A e t e e N s r 2 s d ot N o e .
o o a t e
r a
O n o t t G d t C i o t f D e r aE t t
r h n t o s t w . e r w e red _
o me m o a o m.
t y .
c t e el n l a et t l a t u f t wt s f t w a d w ao a l
s yso ny F s s s y s y s u e s ie s d l e s ie c el na d l d r l r e a i r l g m iot v e p ed u pt a n v e ot p p r iv ie n nd r a u a o a r a u e P w S wl m P w S sb a p p p p 9 m m m m 8 u u u u 9 P P P P 1
/
D r r r r 0 i I e e e e 3 t t t t /
t a a a a 6 n W W W W 0
/
e e4 eB eC eD S I
ic 1- ic 1- ic l
- ic I -
v7 v 1 v7 v 7 r 3
- G r 3 r 3 r 3 H C e - e - e - e - J S P S P S P S P /
B 7
2
) ) ) ) 3 r s t u 0
!! l( !! ll L
s k
r
- a
< m e
R l
l l
l D i D i n n I w
-. t I
io d d; s w t io d d : s n
. n n e p yd e e t t n e p yd e et t m mh n m t e mh n o a a t m t e
$ e . o la a t l t pt a s t u8 a pf r r u e t he ip t a s l t lu8 a pf rr u e t S s y
h l e iuq om p'M ro_ rc 1 t a o t u m p 'G r c 1 t s W s p p a o o e r yED ior tcr m Y t q o L S s W s p S p p y S to e fr yE i rc i e A y d u t f r d u N n r a o p e s
s l r n s t a o p e ul r n s A o t a u a s n w m Tw d r P l u a s n w m w e a oiT d r P l a o e a o e
$ t r n pe , nu f e r eul a l o ir n e , uf e r c ul nu a ,lb a ~
l i
C e in pf p ah u a ,b l a i pf p . ah p n t E f . t t y gl t e g ne m e a s)
F F E
) f E
t y gl t e g n e m e r la n s)
A n r n ai eb n n l e oi r l nA n r o n ai en lb n t e oi a to2 o a i t t
a io2 c dat i t m a i m a ir E S I b f 1 cd t i b f 1 A r n r n p l e v t D H n r n ipli e v t r a cn nu w o e eii e . l r a c n N P w o e e e . l e n u A
N l o c eiv ss q uv an t l V. i h e u R lo eics v q v s n u a t .ih Wl e e uR
(
S 0 F s d e e a eS wt b f ( F s d e e a eS wt b f -
E l -
D l O A M L U
E C f R R n o
1 U I o
- L C A I E s a el .
A R e g s o r t a S E F ( d t a mA L o a l o l r 1 B R R M l o o$
A E E o a r s n T T W e is r- w e a
- A O WP r
u e o i f ,
ot p o o r E L l
i t f t s
o C A a al s s r M F s a ,
I V R i w mS l o e t o r A l l w R O a o E N al o I F a p S F f nS -
F -
E O E
K $
N $
A 0 w Y 1 w o l
o l T f U f
. C r I r e y T e y r r t C t a a E a a wd
- N wd n N n e o O n e o c c C c c to t irv se r, irv se r.
e c e n et d e t d u s s a s s a F a e e e s eh s wh e e y e e y t t a h l a h l p t p l
o t
p los o us p
I s ot us I 5
+
D I
,4 t
n l 2 e,
y' .
, v V
O o
C
- M W
S M
W
) )
- .* v w t
!I
s
' k r
a m
e R
- ~
.^
- n~
r l r l s W e l
s W e l D W e C uC w a d 1 o
D I iwS W eC u C w a n o e d
nI ;
iwS n o e d d: s r yd. 1 i f l h io d d s r .
- f. h
- it i l n e p u t of t n e p u yd m of t
y n y o a a t m o t e IS t e n cd n a *s o e g r o a a t t l r ofot eet .r o e g r s t l u8 a p r uf e t r )
is in a u8 a p f ) cd f S s 'G Y
L S y
w is it imG o
D o r r e p1 s ty W ih 'a o A t s p2 p 1 w
o e e p t le r c1 t O o r p s WS i
h a oA t
s p2p 1 r W e, s n A r r Eo ir ic y u N n l e e rp r E ir tc ol W .e us n l v p e ol A o f bu iv l ow p e r pl u a, or .b l
eR u f b i l r t d u w r a T d n e , a o pl u . b l eR u S t r t d a T d e a ra y e uf e a r l T c e n eh p uf t C e t a h 8 n e) it .ae t n
u a ,b l l i b t
a h A n e) t . a th pu an ,l b i a y b E
F )
f f wt 1 e t e m e r l a av nsd wt I e t e
- s nl g n e m e r l a av nd s F E E - ss enl b ng in e oi a L S A
eh 4 ic uEg - e plm a i r l e oi a b f a io de n
eh 4 s eb n i b fe v s io e ic uE g - e mpl a ir l a t
d n
D H e r v a s p t c u r a p c u N P v o( mii e .l v o( mii e .l A r r o u a t e m n o r r o u a t W l e m n oB N e h X r q v n V. il h e u u B eh X r q ev an eS . wi th be pf S 0 S t. H f e a eS wt b pf ( S t H f u u (
E l '
~ D i 0 A H A E tC -
1 R R I n n I
L C o o A I E el A R e h l a t F ( d t a t t o la mr l a mr 8 R R M o o A E E o o s n T T W e r is n A
WP O
u f i f ;
l o o t o o E L t C A ia s
- r. s s r s .
I M F ls s o e V R o e l l l w R O l l w E N a o a F a p o
, S F a p F
E O E
K S N S A O
, *, Y L T
U X C X H H TI C W V E C C 2 N C C N
O n o o C i o t t t w w c o o n l l u f f F .
s) s )
eB e A t I t 1 a - a -
'j l 4 los E
-4 o -
s E I ( I (
(
.3 s l 0
1 t
n 4
,, s e 3 1 -
V V O O
,- . 1- M- M W
C W S S
) )
x y
- r i r
i a '
a d, d.
e
- s e s k s o .s
- r o .s e
n l
c ev lc ev
_ e l l l R l
- l a l a
- a v a v f f d d
.. e e e r t e
r t a a a a r r s e s e V p V p T o I o r e , r e e, ef m e e f m d f o n r W d f o n r W a o s o S a o s o o S e - io f e - t f e t is h w g t e t is h w g n
t a r n m o n l a r n o i l
a ol D e e t y S e W l ol D e - e t y W l u ' h ei n b
_ I S
t s
S b i t r a i t
s t uI h ei n b c T b S b tr it s t c T b ic emd
'G ic e md h G e n 'G r r y h 6 e n r r d 'n Y
d i f uipu ne l f L
A N
A S
n o
t 5 v eD o i n r
o ed s nh i s E i c a e o p r e r 8 e w s q u d
l l
f f
i u u n ip de tSis r
o ed n h v e s E D ioi r e c a . l e o p r B e w s q u e o d
t r w 1 t e o t r w .I tr s d B 5 t e e eT d r s d B e e e T d n W pa pt n l (
n p a p n l ( h o s h
- T C
E f
c e
h o s h t t m s d mt e n t e .a W. m t 5 u p
s u m a a e ti '.
t t m s d mt e n t e . a . up s um 5
m a a p e t t
) f o g y n o)
Spalbs nedde r e u n o o r ne lb n F g y )
F E E S A
E f
o wcf r e n omn alb ri upla o r e n .l W s i 2 A
n cf m a pl I
,l pl S r u a W lba l
e e A s d 2 s 1 fw it nokanwlo iu i e : enuauro ia e io pl l 1 D H i e e u r i e v v N P o no anlo iuq ia wt k w o n n n n u a a t r S
E A
0 l
N l F c t f v n e a el t i mf a t a o v o r pRu lo F ct f q v n e a eI mf a t l v o r u pR D i O A M L U
E C R R U I n n l
- L C o o A I E el .
A R e e,l .
t a S E F ( d t a S L
B R R M o l a mA r 1 l a mAI r A o o$ o oS is n a E E
- T T W e is n a A O r f
_ WP u f o o r l
i t o o ro t o E L s C A a s s s r I M F s s r o e V R l o e l l l w R O l l w a o E M e o F a p S F a p
- F E O E
K S N S A O Y L r r e ,
T e .
d s U d s a r C a r e e r e I e e r e h h o s T h h o s n C t t n t t r a e E r a e m et r d N m e r d o e n N o t e n r a n o O n r a n o w eg c C i o f w eg c f t w e k w e k c
n l o icv em a an lo ic m a an u f r t t f v e t r t F s e s f s e s f e s f e s f e o t e o t a h h -
a h h -
l o r t t w o lo u t
s o ol t w o
s i o nt bol I s t b D
I A 8 t 5 5 n 6 6 3 3
- e. 2 2 4
V f C
- T V
W 5
T W
S l
) a z a
n t l in tr t o a l i r o a m c h l e m c ht n ve .
l o n t i n v o n r u iw h a id X s w a i h d X s.
f r u s f d s s
t t H t t H d s w n e w n e a le s n e n S o k e wb A e wb B S C l
_ r m o 2 m e 2 C C f lo ) a ls . C f ) s .
a m
pl l f l G iplf l l G E A i F E F R
e iu q e w i D u q e w i D d o - s 0 nI d o -
e i 5 X 0 n1 A is '0 e r e e ro e ei5 X 0
, o wh l wh m ol t in t - H 2 a E in ta E - H 2 l motl ( ) d a
i ef h g a
i ef h v g b
m u o cd l ( ) d 8 e 1 r dlo c d u 8 e 1 r c ir e 5- iqu t v t ni o u ni o u c r e -5 iu l e e n or e s c e n or e i l c o - q e c o -
- s c s e s h h e oE e h e oE e
_ s e s h E r a t T r c( r T r c( r
- E r a t G g D y o n p l
l ) l f
6 f
b 6
t i l X us l m e s 8 a e o m
o y n od o H a o h i1 s r b u e n te o t
S p e r . s ) w5 f r 5 m e R ed u b cR C sf r 6 oA o - y d e H C e -
S I t e r d u e y r n R u u l e
a n t R E Md w t V t 1 l
- f E t
(
n w t e pm a lo awMO i ob by e to mr R na lo a wMO l l s
S Y y i dn b l
)
d 5 e - g X f
a u ,f a n ic f -
S a u d a v g n H s p g eW L
a eW 3 A f o e f s i de Mid o . s n d c S idv E i R S
( n c Mki d iv S f
N n b d n wR f e r n i n l e A o n d h oSu iov po ciop kp sleiov yh u oX oH C t in s u i t n o f d e ci r gR r H oR C R c i r g R S t i o e u l f a p e u p c E a p e u T c t B e o f t o p p s o C e l u c t ( lt f B u f (
g e . p r t n u r b g mt t n n s. s, s h h u
E F )
f f
s ef e .
s E e in ds 8 s A u , s h h s t t d in f R ied n t t e fo n i) ) f F E E g s r e l o g s u E S r f o r . p) . l o n r o r d o o ic i d e tri i n r o D H A
d E
/i l
d 8 2 m 7 ol -
cl 5 w5 e 1 i I
- t y ir le n e d un o
c ef v p c r le s n a o e a u . med l
N P l u e d e - o -E af e oh a o e a o d f o A
N oA t n oG t n oh E l e B oi u r o u e oh eB N s S p t f b c t h S O C 2 i a C O i a N s ( f ( s b c t h (
E I D T O A M L U
E C g g R R n n 1 U I S ai S a a A
- L C E a i r C n u C
~ r C I
A R e n n n u C od E E F ( d ol.a ol. a od E .
L o nl o n nl o n.
B R R M n n n e g n o e a t o A E E e g e p na t i p n i T W e r p is o
p o is g r t o g r it A O e al e a WP l u
t ot r
ot t r t o
o is v o u o is vho clu t
E L l ia a a l h e CI A M F s t ls t s s a c u it r ls a ct ir V R l i s l
l n t
c l a a w e u i c n
R O E N a G la F O G a a w e F m s r F m s r S F O F
E O E
K S N S A D T L d d d T h ) n h ) n n e e e t 8 1a d e t A a a U n I C ic ic ic u o - A a ic r o - A ,
I v s 5 v n5 I g T v l v - -
I g r C r r l r e eE 4 - - in E
N e e s s e e s s e eE( 4 i n s h 1 s h t
( 1 k
- c N e t e t t - k O n ei a ei a e X P c e X P a p
C o d d e d d e d mH ( a d mH (
h o p . i o v o h i
iv o r R s , r i i v o v r R s s, s t of H p c ot A o t B f. H p s n r r 2 r R e g r R m g r 2 .
p w s, p w ru n e p w u p w s o r r o o p i l o o pi u n le F c r r ol t r o ol t r o oi o e ol o e o a o t f R a o t f t s r r a a n t f t s r r a a n g t f s r e R b r Me c s r e R b r H e c n e eh n e e h n e d l n ed l n c e d d ) a e t a d ) a e t n c e t p a e x p a e n t
B e p a e n B e p a e x s O w g e O w g e O wh a I s O wh a I 0
g 1 t 9 0 n 2 3 5 6 e 1 1 n -
V V o
p V
C V
O O C M-m t F M .
o - -
W W
C W S W S S
) l
) )
b c d e b c d e
!lI
g . ...
- . ' APPENDIX B~-
g ,
SAFETY EVALUATION FORM FROM NEO 3.12
REFERENCES:
See'Section 7.
PART Q:
SUMMARY
INFORMATION
'1./ Description of aspects of the change being evaluated.
The change being evaluated is an increase in the Service Water System 0
.(SWS) design basis temperature from 850 F to'95 F.
- 2. Identify parameters and systems affected by the change.
The SWS pr~ovides cooling to various primary and secondary plant equipment during normal power operation, plant cooldown and following postulated accidents as described in Section 3. Increasing the SWS temperature potentially degrades the system's ability to cool these components.
The safety functions' (and non-safety-related functions which may o
affect overall plant safety as per NEO 3.12) performed by the SWS include:
Normal Ocerations
- Provide cooling to the Containment Air Recirculation Fan Cooling 7" Coils (CARS) to maintain containment temperature below Technical Specification limits. The containment temperature during normal
[~ B-1 CYWSWAB/JMG/063089
{
. . ]
operations is an important' input to the containemnt integrity j analysis: associated with LOCAs and Steam Lind Ruptures (NEO 3.12, j Figure A.3, items 10.3.1 and 10.3.3)
. f
. 'i
- Provide cooling to the Containment Air Recirculation Fan Motor Coolers, also to support containment cooling. --
- Provide cooling to the spent fuel pit cooling system which in turn maintains the SFP temperature below limits. (There are no NEO 3.12, Figure A.3 events associated with this safety ,
function.)
- . Provide cooling to the Component Cooling Water System (CCWS),
which in turn provides cooling to the RCP thermal barrier and the RCP bearing coolers. The loss of reactor coolant flow, which can be caused by a mechanical failure of one or more RCPs, is a transient evaluated in the FSAR. (NE0 3.12, Figure A.3, item
~
10.3.2, lists this as an event of moderate frequency)
- Provide cooling to secondary plant equipment required to support power operations (e.g., the main turbine lube oil coolers, the generator hydrogen coolers, the generator hydrogen seal coolers, and the generator main exciter coolers). The loss of the main turbine / generator can lead to a loss of load transient. The loss
- of load transient is evaluated in the FSAR (NEO 3.12, Figure A.3, item 10.3.5, lists this as an event of moderate frequency).
- Cooling water from the Connecticut River also cools the main condenser (via the Circulating Water System). Increasing the allowable river water temperature potentially increases the chance for a turbine trip due to low condenser pressure. Turbine trip can lead to a loss of load which is a transient evaluated in L-[ the FSAR (NEO 3.12, Figure A.3, item 10.3.5, lists this as an
- event of moderate frequency).
A J;
5, B-2 CYWSWAE/JMG/OS3CB9 l
. s
? .
- Normal Plant Cooldown
~
- The SWS'provides cooling to the CCWS (via the CCW heat- -
exchangers), which in turn provides cooling to the RHR heat
.. .exchangers' to remove. decay heat during the second phase of normal plant cooldown. Normal plant cooldown is not considered a licensing requirement as hot standby is the design basis safe shutdown condition. As discussed in Section.4, the plant can be cooled to cold shutdown with 950 F service water. The cooldown times are extended as the service water temperature increases. -
There are no NE0 3.12, Figure A.3 events associated with the normal cooldown function. Therefore, normal plant cooldown is not a subject for this safety evaluation.
Post-accident Operation
- Provide cooling to the diesel generator 2A and 2B heat exchangers to support EDG operation following a loss of normal power. The FSAR considers the loss of normal power in conjunction with other events including:
- Loss of forced reactor coolant flow (NE0 3.12, Figure A.3, item 10.3.2)
- Steam line break (NE0 3.12, Figure A.3, item 10.3.3)
- Steam generator tube rupture (NEO 3.12, Figure A.3, item 10.3.4)
- Loss of normal feedwater flow (NEO 3.12, Figure A.3, item 10.3.5)
- Reactor coolant pump rotor seizure (FSAR Section 15.2.13.1)
. - Loss-of-coolant accidents (NEO 3.12, Figure A.3, item ,
10.3.1)
B-3 CYW5VAB/JMG/063089
.--..________________________j
., o l
- Provide cooling to the RHR heat exchangers to cool the I recirculated emergency core coolant during ECCS recirculation following a 1.0CA.
- Provide cooling to the RHR Pump seal coolers, bearings and packing during ECCS recirculation.
- Provide cooling to the Containment Air Recirculation Fan Cooling Coils (CARS) to maintain containment temperature and pressure below design limits. -
- Provide cooling to the Containment Air Recirculation Fan Motor 3
Coolers, also to support containment cooling.
- 3. Identify the failure modes associated with the change beina evaluated.
The SWS provides cooling to various equipment. Increasing the SW allowable temperature, thus creates the potential for failures due to
~
insufficient cooling or increased SWS process temperatures. The evaluation contained in Section 6 indicates that adequate cooling will be provided to equipment important to safety. In addition, the SWS process temperatures will remain below the equipment material design temperatures of the SWS cooled equipment, valves, and filters.
(Report Reference 2 addresses the potential effects on the piping stress analyses as they relate to structural integrity. The SWS piping that is not isolated during post-accident operations must maintain its structural intrigity so that flow is not diverted from safety-related equipment. Thus, new failure modes associated with cooled components such as common mode operability failures or SWS temperature related component material failure in terms of structural integrity are not created.
~
The evaluation in Sections 6, however, indicates that two SW pumps must be available during ECCS recirculation. This is a change from
- l l
B-4 CYWSWAB/JMG/063089 4
1
I -
w; .-
f{ .
=.., ,
+ , .
L ' pre'vious evaluations which indicated that only one'SW' pump was E
required during recirculation. Single failures which reduce the SW pump availability to:less than two pumps operating during.
recirculation, are therefore, unacceptable. The failure Modes and .
Effects- Analysis presented in Appendix A did not identify any single failures which 'could reduce SWS capabilities below acceptable levels.
/
9 9
9 6
(. -
p.
8 B-5 CYWSWAB/JMG/063089
4
- l ,
l' PART 1: IMPACT ON THE ACCIDENTS. EVALUATED AS THE-DESIGN BASIS 1
- 1. Identify the design basis accidents-potentially impacted by the change The following design basis accidents are potentially affected by -
increasing service water temperature:
- SWS provides cooling to the diesel generators 2A and 2B on a loss of normal power or a SIAS. If insufficient cooling is provided to support EDG operation, any accident that is analyzed assuming .
a loss of normal power could be affected.
- SWS provides cooling to the CARS following high energy line:
breaks inside containment to limit containment pressure. The large break LOCA is the -limiting design basis accident in terms of containment pressure and CAR performance.
- SWS provides cooling the the RHR heat exchangers during ECCS recirculation following a LOCA. The RHR heat exchangers cool the recirculated emergency core coolant before it is returned to the RCS. The emergency core coolant then cools the core to ensure that the core remains in a coolable geometry and long-term core cooling can be provided.
- SWS provides cooling to the RHR pump seal coolers, bearings and
. packing during ECCS recirculation following a LOCA. RHR pump operability is required to ensure that long-term core cooling is provided.
F
- RHR cooling following design basis accidents is not a design basis safety function as the safe shutdown condition following a b
~
design basis accident is hot standby not cold shutdown.
- Cooling water from the Connecticut River via the SWS, CCWS and 4 the CWS provides cooling to equipment, whose sudden failure could cause a design basis transient B-6 CYVSWAB/JMG/063089
- The SWS provides cooling to the-CCWS, which'in turn provides cooling to the RCP thermal barrier .and the.RCP bearing-coolers. The' loss of reactor coolant flow, which can be - -
caused by a mechanical failure of one or more-RCPs, is a P~~
transient evaluated in the FSAR. (NEO 3.12, Figure A.3, item 10.3.2, lists this as an event of moderate frequency)
- The SWS provides cooling to several turbine / generator coolers (turbine lube oil, generator hydrogen . generator seal oil, and generator main exciter coolers). The loss of -
the main turbine / generator can lead to a loss of load-transient. The loss of load transient is evaluated in the FSAR (NEO 3.12, Figure A.3, item 10.3.5, lists this as an event of moderate frequency).
- Cooling water from the Connecticut River also cools the main condenser-(via the Circulating Water System). Increasing the allowable river water temperature potentially increases the chance for'a turbine ' trip due to low condenser pressure. Turbine trip can lead to a loss of load which is a transient evaluated in the FSAR (NEO 3.12, Figure A.3, item 10.3.5, lists this as an event of moderate frequency).
l
/
l ;-
e B-7 CYWSWAB/JMG/063089 2
o -
- 2. Discuss'how the. parameters and systems, affected by the change, impact the consequences of these accidents.
- a. As discussed in Section 6, sufficient cooling is-provided to the
^~
. diesel generators to. support EDG operability. Increasing SWS r-temperature, therefore, does not affect the onsite power assumptions for any design basis accidents,
- b. As discussed in Section 6,-sufficient service water flow is provided to support CAR performance equal to or greater than that .
assumed in the design basis accident analyses. In addition, sufficient service water flow is provided to the CAR Fan Motor Coolers to support- CAR operability as assumed in the design basis accidents. Therefore, increasing the service water temperature does not affect the Cf,R performance as assumed in any design basis accidents, and containment pressure will remain below design limits.
- c. As discussed in Section 6, sufficient service water flow is provided the RHR heat exchangers to cool the recirculated emergency core coolant returning to the' RCS to less than 2000F. .
I In addition, sufficient service water flow is provided to the RHR pump seal coolers, bearings and packing to support RHR pump j operability as assumed in the LOCA. -Therefore, increasing the service water temperature does not affect the ECCS performance
~
assumed following a LOCA, and a coolable core geometry and long-term core cooling are maintained.
l Based on a, b and c above, increasing the service water temperature ]
will not increase the consequences of any design basis accidents. ]
)
i .;;
- l l
l B-8 l CYW5WAB/JMG/063089 11 0__________--___-____-_
p
- 3. Discuss the impact.of the change on.the probabilit'y of occurrence of the design basis'~ accidents. identified in 1..
, -i 21 discussed above, cooling water from the Connecticut River provides- l
,. cooling _ to equipment, whose sudden failure could cause 'a plant transient that is analyzed in FSAR Chapter 15 (or is listed in.NE0
, 3.12, Figure A.3). This equipment includes:
- The CCWS which in turn cools-the Reactor Coolant Pumps
- -The main turbine / generator coolers-
- The main condenser (via the Circulating Water System) y 0 Increasing.the allowable river water temperature to 95 F, however, is not expected to increase the probability of the sudden failure of
.this equipment for the.following reasons.
CCWS/ Reactor Coolant pumos The SWS provides cooling to the CCWS which in turn cools other equipment including the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) thermal barriers and bearing lube oil coolers.
As discussed in report Section 4, the CCWS temperature during normal 0
operation should be around 95 F, but is allowed to increase.to 0
1000 F. As discussed in Section 4,.with the service water at 95 F, some operational restrictions, such as avoiding maximum letdown, may 0
be required to maintain CCW temperature below 100 F. CCW cooling is provided to limit RCP seal and bearing temperatures. These important parameters are monitored and alarmed on high temperature. Thus, if
- g. insufficient cooling was being provided, the plant operators would be
,' W. aware of the situation, and could take action to reduce seal or ,
i
' ~ bearing temperatures as appropriate. If the temperatures can not be-
! .?
reduced, and there is indication of degraded RCP operation (e.g. ,
V-B-9 CYWWAB/JMG/063089
- s. m._- -. ____--___m.__--_ --- __--
o -
high seal leakoff flow, excessive bearing temperatures, or high pump vibration), the plant can be brought to a safe shutdown prior to sudden RCP failure. Based on this, the probability of sudden RCP failure will not be significantly increased due to increasing the .
allowed SWS' temperature to 950 F. (A loss of reactor coolant flow transient is already assumed to be a transient of moderate frequency -
in the accident analysis, requiring only reactor trip for mitigation).
Main Turbine / Generator The SWS provides cooling to the Turbine oil coolers, the generator hydrogen coolers, the generator hydrogen seal oil coolers, and the generator main exciter coolers.
Turbine lube oil temperature is monitored. Therefore, the operators would be aware of a high oil temperature condition that might arise due to insufficient SWS cooling, and would be able to take the appropriate action to reduce oil temperatures. If oil temperature can not be reduced, and degraded turbine operation is indicated, the plant can be brought to a safe shutdown prior to a sudden turbine failure.
Thus, the probability of a suJden turbine failure resulting in a loss of load transient is not expected to be increased. (The loss of load transient -is already considered to be a transient of moderate frequency in the accident analyses).
The generator hydrogen coolers are required to maintain hydrogen temperature below 510C. Hydrogen temperature will be monitored when service water is above 850 F to ensure that it remains below limits.
Increasing hydrogen temperature, however, is not expected to cause a sudden loss of the turbine / generator.
The generator hydrogen seal oil coolers are provided to maintain the l',' oil entering the seals below 120 0F. Seal oil temperature will be 0
} ,) monitored when service water is above 85 F. Increasing seal oil
^> temperature is not expected to cause a sudden loss of the 7 turbine / generator. ,
4 B-10 CWSuB/JMG/063089 1
y o-
. 4 The. generator main. exciter cooler is provided to maintain the exciter' air temperature below about 50 0C. The main exciter air temperature.
0 Increasing can be monitored when service water is above 85 F. .
exciter air temperature is not expected to cause a sudden loss of the
~~
, turbine / generator.
Main condenser Cooling water from the Connecticut River provides cooling to the main condenser via the Circulating Water System. As cooling water -
temperature increases, the condenser vacuum may decrease slightly. If condenser vacuum decreases to the low setpoint, the turbine is tripped. Condenser vacuum is, however, alarmed on the main control board and monitored by the plant computer. If condenser vacuum decreases due to increased cooling water temperatures, the low condenser vacuum condition will be noticed by the plant operators and appropriate action to restore vacuum can be taken. Thus, the probability of a loss of load transient caused by condenser low pressure turbune trips is not expected to be increased due to increasing the allowable river water temperature. ,
l l
l l
4
,-7 e
B-Il tyWWAB/JMG/063089
( 1
, g- : o' -
> ' -* 9 .
4.- Identify the safety systems affected b'y t' he cha' nge.
- The Service Water System provides cooling to the following safety systems:-(1)'. diesel generators 2A and 2B, (2) Containment' Air h( Recirculation; Fan Cooling coils and Fan Motor Coolers, (3) RHR heat exchangers and RHR pumps, and (4) the Spent Fuel Pit Cooling System-f* heat exchangers.
li
- 5. Discuss the impact of the change and/or the failure. mode associated I with the change, on the probabil'ity of failure of these safety- .
systems.
- a. As discussed in Section 6, sufficient cooling is provided to the diesel generators to support EDG operability. Increasing SWS temperature, therefore, does_not increase the probability of failure of the diesel generators.
- b. As discussed in Section 6, sufficient service water flow is prov'ided to the CAR Fan Cooling Coils and Motor Coolers to support CAR operability as assumed in the design basis accidents. Therefore, increasing the service water temperature
~
and the design basis fouling factor does not increase the
~
probability of failure of the CAR Units.
- c. As discussed' in Section 6, sufficient service water flow is provided the RHR pump seal coolers, bearings and packing to support RHR pump operability as assumed in the LOCA. Therefore, increasing the service water t'emperature does not increase the probability of failure of the RHR pumps.
As discussed in Section 6, adequate cooling can be provided to d.
the heat exchanger (s) to maintain'the SFP temperature below J' design limits. Therefore, increasing the SW temperature to i 950 F, will not increase the probability of failure of the SFP
- Cooling System.
B-12 CYVSWAB/JMG/003029
6-
' ,j!( _q t i X i.-
!< f 1
6.' Discuss the' impact of the change on the performance of these safety _
' systems.
L .
- a. As discussed in Section 4, sufficient cooling is.provided to the 9 "
- diesel. generators to support EDG' operability. Increasing SWS- ,
temperature,-therefore, does not affect the onsite power assumptions for any design basis accidents,
- b. As discussed in Section 6, sufficient service water flow is
~
provided to support CAR performance equal to or greater than assumed in the design basis accidents. In' addition, sufficient service water flow is provided to the CAR Fan Motor Coolers to support CAR operability as assumed in the design basis accidents. Therefore, increasing the service water temperature and fouling factor does not affect the CAR performance as assumed in any design basis accidents.
~
- c. ' As discussed in Section 6, sufficient service water flow is-provided the.RHR heat exchangers to cool the recirculated 0
g emergency core coolant returning to the RCS- to less than 200 F.
In addition, sufficient service water flow is provided to the RHR pump seal coolers, bearings and packing to support RHR pump operability as assumed in the LOCA. Therefore, increasing the service water temperature does not affect the ECCS performance assumed following a LOCA.
- d. As discussed in Section 6, sufficient cooling is provided the SFP Cooling System heat exchanger (s) to maintain the SFP temperature below design limits. In addition, the SFP Cooling System is not credited in mitigating any design basis accidents, and there are no identified consequences with increased SFP temperatures.
Therefore.. increasing the SW temperature does not degrade the performance of the SFP Cooling System.
B-13 CWSWAB/.!MG/063DB9
- $; -. g; 1.j L 4
, ,- M d
. _Wl
SUMMARY
FOR PART I.
_lDi_ 80 _ -
X --
.o Based upon.2, does the change. increase the consequences of a design basis accident?
7 X
' o Based upon 3. does the change increase the probability of a' design basis .
accident?.
X o Based.upon 5.-does the change increase the probability of a failure of.a safety system?
- X o Based upon 6 does the change' degrade the performance of a safety system below.
that assumed in the design basis analysis?-
If any of the above is answered yes,.the change is an unreviewed safety question.
.This evaluation does not address the piping stress analyses as they
- relate to SWS structural integrity.
=
9
^
9 .r
'E 4
,o a
.. B-14 CWSWAB/.MG/DC3DB9
- s- .
PART II: POTENTIAL FOR CREATION OF A NEW UNANALYZED EVENT
-1. Based upon Part I, assess the impact of the change and/or failure modes associated with the change, to determine if the impact has -
modified the plant renponse to the point where it can be considered a
~
new accident.
As discussed in Part I, the Service Water System can perform all of its safety functions with a design basis temperature of 950F.
Sufficient. cooling is provided to safety related equipment (Diesel Generators, Car Fan Motor Coolers, RHR pump seal coolers, bearings and packing, RHR HXs, and'5FP HXs) to support safety equipment operability. Thus no new failure modes. for safety related equipment are associated with increasing service water temperature to 950 F.
In addition. as discussed in Part I, sufficient service water cooling is provided to the CARS and the RHR heat exchangers to support safety-system performance consistent with that assumed in the accident aalyses. Thus, no new failure modes of fission product barriers are created by increasing service water temperature to 950F. As all previous safetv equipment operability and safety system performance assumptions are su ported, the possibility of a new accident, different than previously evaluated, is not created.
- 2. Determine if the failure modes associatid with the change represent a new unanalyzed accident.
Increasing the SWS temperature will not affect the failure modes (e.g., failure of a pump to start or run, failure of a valve to move on demand, failure of a EDG to start or run) within the SWS. SWS l failure modes are listed in Appendix A. The failure modes of SWS cooled equipment are also unchanged by increasing the service water )
temperature, as discussed in item I, above. Therefore, failure modes associated with increasing the SWS temperature to 950 F do not represent a new unanalyzed accident.
^
e B-15 CYVSWAB/JMG/053089
31 Determine if the change, or failure mode associated with the change,
(
increases the probability of an accident to the point where it should be considered within the design basis. .
As discussed in Part I, the Service Water System can perform all. of --
its safety fuirtions with a design basis temperature of 95 0F.
Sufficient cooling is provided to safety related equipment (Diesel Generators . Car Fan Motor Coolers, RHR pump seal coolers, bearings and packing, RHR HXs and SFP HXs) to support safety equipment operability. Thus no new failure modes for safety related equipment - .
are associated with increasing service water temperature to 95 0F.
In addition, as discussed in Part I, sufficient service water cooling is provided to the CARS and the RHR heat exchangers to support safety system performance consistent with that assumed in the accident analyses. Thus. no new failure modes of fission product barriers are created by increasing service water temperature to 950F. As all previous safety equipment operability and safety system performance assumptions are supported, the probability of an accident is not increased'to a point where it should be considered within tu: design -
basis. ,
j
SUMMARY
FOR PART II i
_1El_ NO X
Based upon 1,2 and 3 does the change' create the potential' fcr a new unanalyzed accident?
L- ~
1 If the answer is yes, the change represents an unreviewed safety question.
L' -
+
B-16 j Cr.ISWAB/JMS/053DE9
- _ _ _ _ ________________________________m
l a .(
.o. e ;,
m :.
.PART III:: IMPACT ON THE' MARGIN OF SAFETY-
{
{
- 1. Based upon the consequences identified in Part I,' discuss the~ impact of.the consequences on.the protective boundaries ,
a.. As discussed above, and in Section 6, sufficient cooling is _
provided to the diesel generators to. support EDG operability.
~ Increasing SWS temperature, thErefore,-does not affect the onsite power assumptions for.any design basis accidents, thus the
~
consequences of. accidents which challenge the fuel cladding' and
- RCS pressure boundary.are not affected. ,
'b. As discussed in Section 6, sufficient service water flow is provided to support CAR performance equal to or greater than l assumed in the design basis accidents. In addition, sufficient service water flow is provided to the CAR Fan Motor' Coolers to support CAR operability as assumed in the design basis accidents. Therefore, increasing.the service water temperature does not affect the CAR performance as assumed in any design basis accidents, and containment pressure is limited below design limits. ,
The CAR units and return lines are considered part of the containment boundry. As SW inlet temperature to the CARS is increased, the maximum outlet temperature will also be increased
, slightly. The effect of this slight temperature increase on the A CAR coils and return line piping stress analyses / structural integrity-is to be addressed by NUSCO.
o
- c. As discussed in Section 6, sufficient service water flow is provi,ded the RHR. heat exchangers to cool the recirculated 0
emergency core coolant returning to the RCS to less than 200 F.
l e .,
~
In addition, sufficient service water flow is provided to the RHR g, . ' pump seal coolers, bearings and packing to support RHR pump operability as assumed in the LOCA. Therefore, increasing the
~
e
- B-17
<J CYVSWAB/JMG/0E3089
_-__m_2.-_-.-_.._-.___ _ _ - . . _ - . __
~ s -
service water temperature does not affect the ECCS performance assumed following a LOCA, and a coolable core geometry and long-term core cooling are maintained.
Based on a, b and c above, increasing the service water temperature will not increase the consequences of any design basis accidents. .
1 l
- 2. Identify how the protective boundaries, if any, are directly affected by the change or a failure mode of the change.
I As discussed in 1 above, increasing the service water temperature will .
not present increased challenges to the protective barriers (the structural integrity of the CAR units and returns lines, which are considered part of the containment boundary, will be addressed by NUSCO).
- 3. Discuss the impact of the change on the safety limits for the protective' boundaries identified in 2.
The safety limits for the protective boundaries remain unchanged.
0 Increasing'the service water temperature to 95,F does not affect the physical properties of the barriers. All previous safety limits are applicable and are met following postulated accidents with a SWS temperature of 950F.
- 4. Discuss the impact of the change on the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.
As discussed in 1, 2 and 3 above, increasing the service water temperature to 95 0F does not increase the consequences of any
. accident, nor does it affect the physical properties of the protective barriers so that the assumed or design basis failure point of the boundaries are not affected, nor are the safety limits for any i protective boundary changed. As consequences are not increased and safety limits are not changed, and the assumed barrier failure points are unchanged, the margins of safety are not reduced.
B-18 CYWSWAB/JMG/053089 4
_ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __-__m______m_
.4 o' b w
SUMMARY
FOR PART III .I 1
i
_y.fL NO -+
.X
- 1. Based on 1. do the consequences of the design basis accidents exceed'the limits E. for an unacceptable' change given in
- Attachment 8A to NEO 3.12, Rev. 47 X
- 2. Based on 2, 3 and 4, does the change.
reduce the margin of safety provided.for the. protective boundaries?
- If any of these questions are answered yes, the change is unsafe and should not be implemented.
1
~
.The margin of safety, rel ated to the CAR unit and return line stress analyses / structural integrity as they relate to the containment
- barrier, are not addressed in this evaluatio'n but are addressed in Report Reference 2.
p.
t mm s.
4 B-19 l CYVSWAB/JMG/063089
') .
.. .j ; >
o ...
- l. e :, 'w s
- = s .
u , ._,
I i
PARTLIV SAFETY' EVAL.UATION CONCLUSION l: .,
r, ,
I l [ . Based upon the evaluation' in Parts I, II, and III, the change:' . . _ _
..2 ...
1
' ii..
-e X is safe and-is not an unreviewed safety question. *
- is safe but is an unreviewed safety question. --<
l ' -
~ is' unsafe and cannot.be implemented.
'This conclusion covers the aspects of the safety evaluation covered in ,
this report only.
..e Y
Lin t : - .o .-3
! D :'r ..
??' <
,' +
B-20 CYW5WAB/JMG/0E3089
a w 4 .
APPENDIX C FLOW AND PERFORMANCE MARGIN FOR CAR FAN COOLERS
- This appendix is_ provided to demonstrate flow and performance margin for the CAR Fan Coolers. In the Section 3 flow evaluations, the minimum allowable throttle' valve positions were determined based on the required flow to .the CAR Fan coolers. The results showed that the valve positions
- If must be restricted to a Cv no less than 200, to provide margin for analytical uncertainties. With the valves set at the recommended position, more flow will be available to the CAR Fan Coolers. As stated in Section 6, the recommended CAR discharge throttle position corresponds to a Cv of 300.
Flow evaluations are performed here to determine available margin for post-accident containment cooling based on Cv = 235, 270, and the recommended 300. Calculations were also performed to demonstrate margin in two other circumstances. The first is the flow and performance margin with
^
0 90 F service water rather than 95 F. The second circumstance is a 0
condition where the piping resistance would be substantially higher.
As discussed in Section 3, the required heat removal for a CAR fan cooler during post accident conditions is 26.5 MBtu/hr. The corresponding minimum 0 0 I "" required flowrates at service water temperatures of 90 F and 95 F are l 448 gpm and 478 gpm, respectively. These flowrates are based on the conservative assumptions of 5% tube plugging and a fouling factor of 0
0.0029 Ft2 -Hr OF/ BTU. To obtain the required flow rate at 95 F, the minimum acceptable throttle valve Cv was calculated to be 180. However, in l
l order to provide margin above the analytical limits, the minimum allowable throttle valve position is specified as a CV of 200.
In order to evaluate the available margin, the flow delivered to the fan coolers was determined at nominal throttle valve positions as shown in Table C-1. Table C-1 provides a listing of the throttle valve Cv's, available flow rates, and increased heat removal capabilities. Accident ,
condition Run 5 was used as the basis of these calculations which take into C-1
p a -
account the high hydraulic flow resistance due two phase flow downstream of the fan coolers, as discussed in Section 3. As the flowrate through the fan coolers is increased, the pressure drop due to the two phase flow is decreased because of the lower outlet temperatures. This in turn allows
, more flow through the fan coolers. ---
As shown in Table C-1, the flow margin with a CV of 300 is 8.4% at 95 0F.
l At 900F, this flow margin is increased to 16.5%. These margins are 1
determined under the most restrictive conditions of this evaluation.
Accident condition run 5 is a limiting case for fan cooler performance, with the plant assumed to be in post accident recirculation with a LNP, and failure of a turbine header isolation valve to close. All conservative assumptions outlined in section 6.4 apply.
J An additional case was evaluated to determine the impact of an increased piping resistance in the piping leading to and from the CAR Fan Coolers.
The PEGISYS program conservatively predicts piping flow resistances. This calculation was performed to demonstrate margin, with the hydraulic resistance for the 6 inch piping increased by approximately 50%. The fan coolers are assumed to be 5% plugged with a fouling factor of 0.0029. This evaluation again involved the added hydraulic resistance due to two phase flow, and was bhsed on accident condition Run 5.
With a throttle valve Cv of 300 and a service water temperature of 950F, 486 gpm is delivered to an operating fan cooler during post accident conditions. Therefore, even with a 50% increase in local piping hydraulic resistance, the CAR fan coolers will provide adequate cooling for post accident conditions.
C-2
.e e TABLE C-1 CAR Fan Cooler Flows at Nominal Throttle Valve Cv's
- Available -
Flow Heat Removal-SW-Temp Flow - Heat Removal Margin . Margin
' Cv _.{,2F ) (aom) (MBtu/hr) (%) (%)
235 .95 501 27.12' 4.8 2.4-270 95- 510. 27.37 6.7 3.2 300- 95 518 27.65 8.4 4.4 300. 90 522' 28.52 16.5 7.6 m
h e
8
~
C-3
3.---
Gu a
0 e
- e N
O 1
l 4
l l
l 1
1 9
0 s - -- --- - - - - - ---- - - ---- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _
3 ;n, .
- y i
- NUSGo Supplement.to WCAP-12196 July 1989 Service Water Piping Safety Evaluation 1
Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Evaluation Containment Evaluation l
l Service Water Pump Availability Evaluation.
l CAR Fan Motor Cooler EEO Evaluation Reference #18 of WCAP-12196; Westinghouse letter CYW-89-566, High Service Water Temperature impact on CCWS and RHR Performance Westinghouse letter, CYW-89-573, dated July 11, 1989; Corrections to WCAP-12196:
- Radiation Monitor Recirculation Pump (P-141-1 A)
- Sample Pump (P-8-1 A)
- Tables 6-4, 6-5.
c 1
_ _ __---_ _ _ -- ----_- _ _----_- _ ___--_ _ _ _ _ _ _- _ _ _ _ j
v .
4 *
' jf .
SIRESS ANALYSIS SAFETY EVALUATION POR DESIGN BASIS ULTIMATE HEAT SINK TEMPERATURE CHANGE
REFERENCES:
- 1. P&ID 16103-26014 Sh 1-7 L 2. P&ID 16103-26008 Sh.3 3.' Criteria Document for CY Safety Related Piping Seismic Qualification Program, Rev 2.
- 4. Piping Stress Analysis Guidelines for Seismic Qualification of Safety Related Piping at CY.
The purpose of this safety evaluation is to assess the, impact to. system structural integrity of the requalification of the service water system for an increase in the maximum operating temperatures. The following-calculations have been revised to incorporate these changes:
Operating Temperature Calculation E2. Orir. New Description 81-057-043 GP 85 F 95 F ' Service water piping in screenwell house 81-057-071 GP 85 F 95 F Service water supply to diesel generators 81-057-072 GP 850F 95 F Service water supply to diesel generator 2A 81-057-073 GP' 85 F 950F Service water supply to diesel generator 2B 81-057-076 GP 85 F 95 F Service water supply to CAR fans.
81-057-074 GP 120 F 135 F Service water return from diesel generator 2A 81-057-075 GP 120 F 135 F Service water return from diesel generator 2B 81-057-050 GP 1200F 1400F Service water return riser (typical) 81-057-031 GP 1200F 140 F Service water in cont.
6"-WS-151-154 (loopl) 81-057-033 GP 1200F 140 F Service water in cont. .
6"-WS-151-151 (loop 4) 81-057-035 GP 120 F 1400F Service water in cont.
(loop 3) 81-057-037 GP 1200F 140 F Service water in cont. !
6"-WS-151-153 (loop 2)
Page 1 of 3
( , _ _ - .
STRESS MALYSIS SAFETY EVALUATION FOR DESIGN BASIS ULTIMATE HEAT SINK TEMPERATURE CHMGE The increase in maximum operating temperature will affect the thermal loading condition only. - Deadweight, pressure and seismic pipe stresses are unaffected by this change. The revised analysis was performed in accordance with the documents listed in references 3 and 4 All piping stresses are within the Code allowable limits. All supports and anchors have been evaluated and determined acceptable for the revised loading conditions. The structural integrity of the valves is acceptable for the new maximum operating temperature.
The service water return piping outside containment and outside the diesel generator building is extremely flexible and based on engineering judgement can easily accommodate the increase in normal operating temperature without degrading the structural integrity of the piping or supports. Therefore, the temperature increase on this piping is considered acceptable and does not require further analysis.
Based on the above, the service water system is structurally qualified for the new maximum operating temperatures. These temperatures will not jeopardize the intended structural function of the current system design.
Also, the results of the temperature increase does not result in an unreviewed safety question per the requirements of 10CFR50.59 as defined below:
- 1. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated has not been increaaed because the loading conditions have been analyzed in accordance with applicable criteria which meets or exceeds the original construction criteria.
- 2. The possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously has not been created since the service water system is structurally qualified for the applicable specified loading conditions.
- 3. The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification has not been reduced since the structural qualification of the service water system is maintained for the specified loading conditions.
Page 2 of 3
_---_____ ________- - ~
p .. .
.'i
~
l.
STRESS ANALYSIS SAFETY EVALUATION FOR DESIGN BASIS ULTIMATE HEAT SINK TEMPERATURE CHANGE l.
PREPARED BY:
M.G. Ches s k -
DATE: *O S
.u. Cole n APPROVED BY:__ + # 8//- DATE:~7*/O*8)
. Mawson/ / '
REVIEWED Bf d / DATE: -l2 '
W.KupinskQ/
REVIEWED BY: Cid DATE: 7-/3~,ff R.P. Nocci REVIEWED BY: .-
DATE: -7!/ 3!S1 T.L. Johnsg I Page 3 of 3
j l' .*/.
1
- a peonmEAST tmLMES l 9 Ur7ETEa*
_ . _ . . . . .c- _.__""~_~ @
!( .
L L J %*%i 'l",,*0,"__ m LFJJ December 1.4, 1988 4
PSE-SA-88-294 TO: P. D. Mason Berlin V030 FROM ' D. L. Coleman J 4"'
Berlin V021, Ext. 3353
SUBJECT:
Connecticut Yankee Service Vater Return from CAR Fans for LOCA Thermal' Conditions
REFERENCE:
Memo, P. D. Mason to D. L. Coleman, dated November 7, 1988.
Attached please find a technical evaluation (SA-TE-88-031-1) for the service water return piping from the CAR fans. This evaluation considers elevated piping temperatures as requested in the referenced memo. This evaluation should close-out our commitment to you.
DLC:cav Attachment i
J cc GED j/ f R. E. F.cMullen osro cev 3.ca pses.es
?-
GREERATION NECRANICAL BIGINEERING TBCENICAL EVALUATION COIStBCTICUT YAMtEE SERVICE VATER RETURN I
FROM CAR FANS FOR 1ACA THERMAL CONDITIONS 54-TE-88-031-1
.The purpose of this technical evaluation is to determine the acceptability of subjecting the service water return piping from the CAR fans to elevated temperatures (265'F) resulting from a LOCA event. The ' elevated temperatures affect Line - Nos. 6"-VS-151-151, 152, 153, and 154. These lines are located inside containment, and are classified as safety related, CA, Category I.- The scope of this evaluation is limited to the structural' aspects of the piping and associated supports / anchors.
For the. purpose of the evaluation, it is assumed that the LOCA event is classified as a faulted conditi as defined 'in the ASME III Code.gn, and. should meet Level D service limits It is further assumed that this event is a one-time occurrence, and does not occur coincident with a SSE event.
This is consistent with the criteria in.Section C of Reference.l. Level D service limits consider only primary stresses, and exclude . thermal or secondary stresses. Realizing this, ' the ' piping and norsles in question need only meet primary stress levels. These stresses have been documented in References '4 through 9 and are well below the Code allowable limits as defined in Reference 1. . This approach is technically justifiable ' based upon a one-cycle occurrence, the ability of the secondary stresses to be self-limiting, and the expected lov accumulated plastic strain levels.
The eleveted piping temperature causes primary loadings to the supports and anchors. All .the supports have been evaluated and determined to provide adequate restraint - to maintain primary stress integrity of the piping for the LOCA condition. This has been documented in References 4 through 9.
Based on the above, it is concluded that the service water return piping from the CAR fans and supports are structurally acceptable for elevated temperatures resulting from a LOCA event.
1.. It is recogaised that connecticut Yankee piping was designed and constructed to 831.1, 1955 rules with additions 1 requirements stipulated for the procurosent, fabrication, construction, and inspectica of piping systems sad their components. These combined requirements were reviewed under the SEP program and determined to be equivalent to the " Quality' requirements of section III of the ASME B&PV. Cede. consistent with the re-evaluation of safety related piping at ceanecticut Yankee, this evaluetten was conducted using the design rules of ASME III.
F889.13 Fage 1 DLescow (12/14/881
GENERATION NBCBANICAL ENGINEERING TECENICAL EVALUATION C019fECTICUT YANKEE SERVICE VATER RETURN
[
FROM CAR FANS FOR LOCA THERMAL CONDITIONS SA-TE-88-031-1
REFERENCES:
- 1. CY Safety Related Piping Seismic Qualification Program Criteria Document, Revision 2
- 2. CY UFSAR Sections 3.7 and 9.2
- 3. Memo, P. D. Mason to D. L. Coleman, dated November 7, 1988
- 4. NUSCO Calculation No. 81-057-031GP, Rev. 1
- 5. NUSCO Calculation No. 81-057-033GP, Rev. 1
- 6. NUSCO Calculation No. 81-057-035GP, Rev. 1
- 7. NUSCO Calculation No. 81-057-037GP, Rev. 1
- 8. NUSCO Calculation No. 81-057-049GP, Rev. 1
- 9. NUSCO Calculation No. 81-057-050GP, Rev. I
- 10. NUSCO Drawing Nos. 16103-20231, Sheets 103C, 103D, 103E, 103F, 103T
- 11. CY Piping Specification No. CYS-579 PREPARED BY: d. DATE:
D. L. Coleman INDEPENDENTLY // ,
C [/
REVIEVED BY: /4 , . C I, E L/n DATE: / 2-/#-8/3 K'.p.SicEles-APPROVED -BY:
$ % DATE: /f //Ad6
. J. MaVSof)/ [
P829.13 page 2 DLescaw (12/14/88)
! ,- l
' ^ .
_e y- i
' 500RTHEAST UTILITIES '
, .:,==;:17::::
. . . _ . . . _ . _ . ,hp-c c a = =.= == , 1
@- 3 1
April 13,1989 PSE-CE-89-260 To: Mr. S. J. Veyland Berlin, V006 FROM: Mr. M. L.
Berlin, V21 Extension 4896
SUBJECT:
CONNECTICUT YANKEE RHR HEAT EXCHANGER (E5-1A & IB) DESIGN TEMPERATURE
REFERENCE:
Memo #GMB-89-R-185, dated March 22, 1989, S. J. Peyland to J. F.
Ely, same subject.
As you requested, Component Engineering evaluated the acceptability of oper-ating either of the RHR heat exchangers with a shtll temperature of 230'F. It is concluded that operation of the heat exchangers (ES-1A and IB) under the specified circumstances with a shell temperature of 230'F is acceptable.
The temperature rise of 30'F beyond the shell design temperature . of 200'F-vould occur due to a failure of either MOV 5 or 6 to open during the sump recirculation phase of a LOCA. Failure of.either MOV vould cut off the ser-vice water cooling supply to one heat exchanger shell side. The shell tem-perature could then reach the maximum sump temperature of 230*F by circulation of the sump water through the heat exchanger tube side. Based on a review of the stress allovables and other information available, it is apparent that the increase in shell temperature to 230'F vould not present an unacceptable con-dition.
If you have any questions, please contact me.
MLP/beb ~
cc dk GME/d G. E. Cornelius 22.10 (beb) o570 CEV.7-Es .
CP91
. =. ,
TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF IMPACT OF INCREASED ColfrAINMENT PRESSURE RESPONSE TO A LOCA
REFERENCES:
1)' Calculation No. 78-836-256 GP, Rev. 1.and Rev. 3.
- 2) Experimental Results for a 1/8 Scale Steel . Model Nuclear Power Plant Containment Pressurized to Failure, NUREG/
CR-4216, SAND 85-0790, December 1986.
- 3) GMB14-89-b-247, Containment. Analysis Issues, May 30, 1989.
4). PSE-EM-89-168, CY - Impact.of Increased Fouling of CAR Fans on Containment Analysis, June 9, 1989.
DESCRIPTION:
The Connecticut Yankee service water system has been reevaluated to assess the cooling capability with increased river water temperature of up to 95.0'F and increased fouling of the system. This reevaluation has changed the perform-ance characteristics of the containment air recirculation system. The CAR system has been evaluated . with the performance parameters shown in Table 2.
Before the change, the performance parameters vere as shown in Table 1.
TABLE l' Temperature ('F) Energy Removal Rate (Btu /Hr) 300 -42.50 x 10' 261 -34.20 x 10' 220 -28.50 x 10' 184 -23.63 x 10' After the changes, the new performance parameters are as shown in Table 2.
TABLE 2 Temperature (*F) Energy Removal Rate (Btu /Hr) 300 -32.73 x 10' 261 -26.54 x 10' 220 184
-16.90
-11.20 xx 10 10
The LOCA and MSLB containment analysis do not utilize the 300'F data point
. (see References 3 and 4 for details).
The change in CAR system performance has resulted in a small increase in the :
predicted pressure response from 51.94 psia to 53.44 psia. -
EVALUATION:
The containment design pressure is 54.7 psia. This limit is not to be exceeded. However, exceeding the limit does not mean that instantaneous 3 vessel rupture is imminent. In fact, experimental case studies conducted at j the Sandia Laboratories (Reference 2) demonstrate that vessels designed for I
l DOCS 32.51 (beb) Pebe 1
_____--_-___-.___-___-___------.-__L
L
,, si ,
. . . l TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF IMPACT OF INCREASED CONTAINMENT PRESSURE RESPONSE TO A LOCA, 54.7 psia limits are not likely to rupture until about 200 psia. Exceeding
.the 54.7 psia internal pressure means that at that point more detailed anal-yses should be done or we should modify significant operating parameters on which the predicted press.tre response is sensitively dependent.
CONCLUSION:
t ' Decreasing the CAR Unit performance parameters to those shown in Table 2 vill L not degrade the CAR system performance to a point where the containment pressure response exceeds the design basis of 54.7 psia or the current EE0 temperature limit of 280'F. The increase in pressure of 1.5 psi does not create an unreviewed safety question. This change does not affect the offsite dose calculations.
PREPARED BY: DATE: 9 7//7 KpthF. Frame / ~/
REVIEVED BY: H ( L- DATE:
Subh if Chandra t) l APPROVED BY: / .
't. lupinski U
4~
N DATE: 7/7 h (
r, r r 07/07/89 DOCS 32.51 (beb) Pabe 2
( ,
l 3 1
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING TECHNICAL EVALUATION ,
The project to increase the Service Vater System design tem- EE Concern:
perature limit from 85 to 95 degrees has identified the need 1 ; T' H " ( D torun2servicewaterpumpsduringtherecirculationphaseof')sp(c" the design basis LOCA. Prior to this design change, only 1 service water pump was required. / (
Ouestion: From an electrical perspective, can power be provided to 2 service water, given any single failure, during the recir-culation phase of accident mitigation.
Answer Yes. Connecticut Yankee is designed such that either onsite, or offsite power vill be available for a minimum of 2 service water pumps during the recirculation phase of accident miti-gation.
Evaluation: The electrical power distribution system at Connecticut Yankee is divided into two major divisions. Each division can power 2 of the 4 available service water pumps. Three of these pumps are rovered from the old switchgear room and one from the new roon which was installed to meet 10CFR50 Appendix R.
Generation Electrical Engineering has reviewed this arrange-ment with regard to the stated concern and determined that power vill be available for at least 2 service water pumps during the_ recirculation phase of accident mitigation.
During the design basis event, LOCA and LNP with failure of one DG or electrical bus, only one service water pump is automatically loaded onto the diesel generator. Once safety injection has been secured, and operations initiates recircu-lation, there is adequate margin to load a second service water pump onto the operating diesel. If the single failure is within the service water system,-(e.g., failure to isolate secondary plant), the 2 service water pumps vill be started automatically. One service water pump on each major division.
During a LOCA vith offsite power available, the limiting single failure is the loss of one electrical bus. In this case, 2 service water pumps vill still be available, powered by the alternate major division.
Conclusion:
The requirement to power two service water pumps during the recirculation phase of the design basis LOCA is consistent with the existing electrical design of Connecticut Yankee. .
~
b W. H. Fecker, Supervisor Generation Electrical Engineering l 4.36/89 WH8/psn
' 4
, n .
1 g-nonmaarrummes feig gcfedefiCufPQstf AND 80ml# COu**m' g; 3 ..,, oc .ac= co-- .
.eChv0mg eatga egnea Cowam
. u, c c0 k k d pt.eF ast awap lasf RGv c0**W' July 7, 1989 GSP-89-266' TO: P. D. Mason Gen. Mech. Eng.
FROM:
R.J.Bumstead/d[/3 Gen. Elec. Eng.
Berlin N017 - Ext. 5031
SUBJECT:
Connecticut Yankee - CAR Fan Motors Service Vater Temperature Increase -- PA 88-047
REFERENCES:
- 1. File EE0-CY-115
- 2. NUSCO Calc. No. PA 78-836-505GE
- 3. Westinghouse Report VCAP 12196 dated July 1989 The Connecticut Yankee (CY) CAR Fan motors (F-17-1, 2, 3, 4) are environ-mentally qualified as documented in Reference 1.
The qualified thermal lifetime of the motors is calculated in Reference 2 as 54.75 years based on an average motor temperature of 200'F. Substituting a 5'F increase in motor temperature into Reference 2, due to the' design basis change of service water temperature from 85'F to 90*F, the thermal life decreases to 43.55 or about 43 years.
Reference 3 ensures that the heat removal duty of the motor coolers is still adequate with the design basis change.
The accident test profile in Reference 1 envelops the postulated LOCA/MSLB temperature profile by a substantial margin (324*F peak vs. 280*F peak).
Therefore, a worst-case service water temperature increase of 5'F vill not have a significant impact on the environmental qualification of the CAR fan motors.
Please contact me if you need additional information.
RJB/gek cc: B. A. Tuthill A. K. Gulesserlan J. J. Craffey 7.7.89 D.4:89 oS70 F.Ev.7-86
.( ' .; ,
l CYW-89-556 Westinghouse Energy Systems wuciear ano enneen Electric Corporation h*"*D D"""
- Box 355 Pmsburg!1 Pennsylvania 15230 0355 May 24, 1989 RC&SGSS-CYW-2002 S.O.: CYW-280 Mr. W. C. Faye Northeast Utilities Service Company P.O. Box 270 Hartford, CT 06141 270 NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY HADDAM NECK PLANT Hioh Service Water Temperature Imoact on CCWS and RHR Performance In Reference 1, Northeast Utilities has requested Westinghouse Fluid the inlet service water Systems temperature to to evaluate the CCWtheheat impact of increasingF exchanger to 90 and 95 0 F on
- 1. the operations of the Connecticut Yankee (Haddam Neck) CCW system during 100% Power operations, and
- 2. the CCW/RHR system during Plant Cooldown operations.
The base cases defined by Northeast Utilities in References 1 and 2 have been performed, in addition to others as deemed necessary by Westinghouse to evaluate the impact of key parameters on the system performance: RHR initiation time, CCW heat exchanger heat load, maximum - allowable CCW outlet temperature, CCW flow to the CCW heat exchanger, etc. The results of our evaluation are summarized in the attachment and are documented in Reference 3 (which will be transmitted to Northeast Utilities at a later date along with all the other Service Water - related calculations). .
9
_ . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ m
c cy ,.
. s l:: 4. *f , . ' c '. . 3
. i CYW-89-556
' I
. RC&SGSS-CYW-2002 If'you have any questions, pisase contact this office.
Very truly yours, k b. M M. D. Longacre Operating Plant Projects.
New England Area zel/m/0700E
References:
- 1. Letter GMB-89-R-271, 5/8/89
- 2. Letter'GMB-89-R-281,.5/11/89
- 3. Calculation FSSE/SS-CYW-1314, 5/19/89 cc: P..P. Mason (Berlin)
G. E. Cornelius (Berlin).
R. E. McMullen (Berlin) e 9
h _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _ _ _ _ -
- . .: c
- o.; :,,
t/c . ,. .. . :
Ja .
l ,-
l l
1 Attachment I 1
)
Letter CYW-89-556 (RC&SGSS-CYW-2002)- ;
.1
' Connecticut. Yankee (Haddam Neck)
I High Service Water Temperature Impact
' on CCWS and RHRS Performance 1 May 1989 l
i Prepa_ red by . !
i 1
l Westinghouse Fluid Systems ;
P.O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 i
l 4
1
_ . _ _ _ _-_.-_-_-_---.--.-----m- - - - ----
. I
- i. .
z- .
?
References:
- 1. NU Letter'GMB-89 R-271, " Connecticut Yankee Component Cooling Water Analysis," 5/8/89.
- 2. NU Letter GMB-89-R-281, " Reply to Questions on Connecticut Yankee Component Cooling Water Analysis," 5/11/89.
- 3. WCAP-11139, Modele E, " Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Plant Design Basis Documentation Package Auxiliary Coolant System," January 1986 (Contains original system description, March 1966).
- 4. Westinghouse Fluid Systems Calculation FSSE/SS-CYW 1314," Connecticut Yankee - SW Temperature Impact on CCWS and RHRS," May 19, 1989.
l 1
I I
- i l
\
Connecticut Yankee CCWS/RHRS Performance Page 1 of 9
Part I: CCW Heat Exchancer Performance Durino 100% Power Operations References I and 2 requested that the following CCW system alignments be considered.
A. 900F Service Water 1 CCW pump and 1 CCW heat exchanger on line Components Serviced: RCP thermal barrier, RCP Oil Coolers,
- Neutron Shield Tank, Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger, Seal Water I
Heat Exchanger, Charging Pump 011 Coolers, Containment Penetration Coolers, Valve Stem Leakoff Cooler and Waste Gas Compressors.
B. 950 F Service Water 2 CCW pumps and 2 CCW heat exchangers on'line Components Serviced: Same as item A above.
In addition to the above cases, Fluid Systems has also evaluated the following for Northeast Utilities'information.
C. 900 F Service Water 2 CCW pumps and 2 CCW heat exchangers Components Serviced: Same as item A.
D. 950F Service Water 1 CCW pump and 1 CCW heat exchanger Components Serviced: Same as item A.
Since Sections E2.1.6.1.2 and E2.1.6.1.3 of Reference 4 show different heat loads and flowrates for the " normal purification" and " maximum purification" modes of operation for the non-regenerative heat exchanger (the primary heat load during 100% power operations), three cases have been evaluated for each system alignment defined above:
- 1. " Normal Purification" - Represents minimum actual CCW flow and minimum actual CCW heat exchanger heat load.
- 2. " Maximum Purification" = Represents maximum actual CCW flow and maximum actual CCW heat exchanger heat load.
The resulting CCW heat exchanger CCW inlet and outlet temperatures and outlet service water temperatures are summarized in Table 1.
Connecticut Yankee CCWS/RHRS Performance Page 2 of 9
. . .s Part II: CCWS/RRRS Performance Durino Plant Cooldown References I and 2 requested that the following system alignments be considered.
A. 900 F Service Water RCS Initial Temperature = 3000F RCS Final Temperature - 1400F 2 CCW heat exchangers 3 CCW pumps 2 RHR heat exchangers l
2 RHR pumps 1 RCP operating to 1600F i
Auxiliary heat loads:
RCP thermal barriers & oil coolers neutron shield tank cooler l
non-regenerative heat exchanger seal water heat exchanger containment penetration cooler charging pump oil cooler
.RHR pumps i -
Yalve stem leakoff cooler
- l -
Degasifier_ vent condenser
'Degasifier vent cooler Waste gas compressors Degasifier effluent cooler B. 950 F Service Water All other system requirements are the same as item A above.
The calculations performed for the system aligninent in item A above resulted in unacceptable cooldown operations. RCS temperature exceeded saturation temperature for RHRS normal operating pressure (approximately 300-400 psig) for approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> during the cooldown before the SW/CCW systems could match the RCS decay heat (while maintaining CCW heat 0
exchanger CCW outlet temperature s ll5 F), thus causing boiling in the RCS. So, Fluid Systems performed selected iterations on RHR initiation time, SW inlet temperature, CCW heat exchanger maximum - allowable CCW outlet temperature, and the auxiliary heat load to determine optional
" acceptable" performance.
Case 1: 0 Base case for 90 F Service Water Runs This case is identical to item A requested by Northeast Utilities in References 1 and 2. Actual auxiliary component heat loads and CCW flowrates were extracted from References 1, 2, and 4. The -
RHR initiation time following reactor trip has been assumed to be four hours (this represents the Westinghouse standard assumptions for the approximate time for the steam system to cool the RCS from Tavg to 3000 F).
Connecticut Yankee CCWS/RHRS Performance Page 3 of 9
mm ..
F u ;,
. g ..
~. .
.l Case 2:. Same as Case I except RHR initiation time equals eight hours.
Case 3: Same as' Case I except RHR initiation time equals 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />.
Case 4: Same as Case I except service water temperature equals 680F.
This case represents the maximum service water temperature which
. prevents boiling in the RCS given the system constraints in Case 1.
Case 5: Same as Case 1 except the maximum - allowable CCW heat exchanger outlet temperature is assumed to be 1200 F (the current Westinghouse standard limit).
Case 6: Same as Case 1 except the maximum - allowable CCW heat exchanger outlet temperature is ll8 0F. This case represents the
" minimum" CCW heat exchanger outlet temperature maximum limit which prevents boiling in the RCS given the system constraints-in Case 1.
Case 7: Same as Case 1 except the auxiliary heat loads are set to zero.
This case represents all significant heat load components shut off (however, CCW flow .is still provided).
Case 8: This case evaluates the cooldown performance assuming desiga CCW flow to esch CCW hett exchanger and the auxiliary heat load reduced by one half of the degasifier effluent cooler heat load. Service water temperature, maximum CCW heat exchanger outlet temperature, and RHR initiation time are the same as Case 1.
Case 9: This case evaluates the cooldown performance assuming design CCW flow to each CCW heat exchanger and the auxiliary heat load reduced by all the components in the Degasification System-except the valve stem leakoff cooler (i.e., excludes the degasifier vent condenser, degasifier vent cooler, the waste gas compresso. , and the degasifier effluent cooler).
Service water temperature, CCW heat exchanger outlet temperature, and RHR initiation time are the same as Case 1.
Case 10: 0 Base case for 95 F Service Water Runs Since Case I showed unacceptable results with all auxiliary heat loads, 0 actual CCW flow, four hour RHR initiation time, and ll5 F maximum CCW 0 heat exchanger outlet temperature, the base case for the 95 F service water calculations assumes the same -
1 CCW riow, CCW maximum temperature and RHR initiation time but assumes urn auxiliary heat loads.
-Connecticut Yankee CCWS/RHR$ Performance Page 4 of 9 l
c -
.j
- a. i. j
- , i Case 11: The case varies from Case 10 by assuming the auxiliary heat load I
is equal to the total less the degasifier effluent cooler (i.e., j the most prominent auxiliary heat load shut off; however, CCW '
flow is still delivered to it).
Case 12: This case evaluates 950 F service water, actual auxiliary heat loads and CCW flow, RHR initiation at four hours, and the Westinghouse current standard maximum CCW limit of 1200F. l
.J Case 13: This case.is the same as Case Il except the maximum CCW temperature is 1200F. ]
Case 14: This evaluates 95 F0 service water,115 F maximum 0 CCW temperature, design CCW flow through each CCW heat exchanger, all auxiliary heat loads listed for Case 1 less.the Degasifier System Components (except the Valve Stem Leakoff Coolers) and an RHR initiation time of four hours.
Case 15: This case is the same as Case 14 except that it evaluates the effects of increasing the RHR initiation time to eight hours.
Case 16: This case is the same as Case 14 except that it evaluates the effects of increasing the RHR initiation time to 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />.
The variable 0
input and corresponding calculated cooldown times to 140 0F and 200 F, the time CCW heat exchanger outlet temperature remains at the maximum limit, and the maximum RCS temperature achieved during the -
cooldown are summarized in Table 2.
l t
l Connecticut Yankee Crwi/RHRS Performance Page 5 of 9
i
' I -
- d 3 I! \]
S3LCHI Q Qw Q
Y' 2 Q* Q b 1 , -, b3 {
l ,' O
[4 " - * --- 9 y.
W g g 4
K g 9
,g T is-l ,
9177"# 9 9 l
, ,i
- l. WrV f' k l I
b Qt f' 'i
['q % - -rd s K 4 hn A
> g .g k1;L 3
i D 4 M ef r, 1 v 'F 'P' g t$ t; 4 g ( y b NDP k $ $ $ h k , i %.
N i iL t 4 '7' @ ' ' ~ g .\ E g g
>s v-+ s w K, h, 3 , . % 6 E) Y k $ h
!d (4 (~v~r.>
Xf/ Adap d g ~
g U
1j!.1 s g S Q 6 -k'"
AI, w >c w 't 4 4 % i 4 f " $(jji
- 7 (w/,; ,
7 ,.
i 1 I {.
W M >p g g R !4 h ik k d !a h
NJ d
-- N pp N .
4 t A 4 0 h'
't s{ %
2 n t h h d fl i f S Q k s' k \
1
- q) s a e (w/*> ,,
} a P 1
,,g
}y n,s [ g *
. . s g ,
.j $
(c=m> "2 " w s s
*} l. s ,
d l yyt t ,--# %{ 4 . 4 m s .; !q 4 ,.__,_ v e i
- v +^
- bo S .4 S 0, h
m x v ri w $. @ e (
@. a g g e D b f
g- n' .g . . ~ , (g'( * [ r,XH
**). - . - -
%o v s gw
- 2.3 ,,
< -vj u
- s 4 m 4 % o 4 Connecticut Yankee CCWS/RHRS Performance Page 6 of 9
'~
- l.
1 l
- s. w p z ? g ? f $
t4 "-e WP -
@ t K 5 s & g f h h ;
war ~~ 7 % % % h l
}f t
4
*'e ~ d s ver W
> h y
t 4 t - 5h {- t4 app h) R q E k i oN 1l + ie-- 3# K h b $ E $ is M 4 h I w
- N i I N
- 0) % % E i 1
(W/WV) X+f MDP '& y
)
4 h y k%k WXM N 4 R % 4 g A ' 7 , (T/p) *a v * *a as l XM M DD h $ u[ s w h h h a { I w A E s b ge a a p3 , . .n n o v s u e h t , 9h (wM 4 , ,,
, . ,, ,, F O r b5 x b
f
- h 5 k r rb 7&Tr 'F ' ' f v, 2 e E E s h
** m=,- ,& '
k - Q ' h - A % k s a I _S h r", h r- - ,7 h h h a E MW y 'd Q 4 4 ) i N %3 4
~
4 93 , R A Q R H 4
' ') > C0 p C N s & k s s Connecticut Yankee CCWS/RHRS Performance Page 7 of 9
-a- .,
l' ' .,
.( fnA W .ru 7 33 T9W W a
b
; t t t t t t >
a- # 0 r>F K g y 5- & A A .; k
=,-++ g 2
,A y = g g 4 yi l .
r= , r-AC.
^
% W % ? m 5
t<> -s e
- I'W W f
4 j j! j. j f j S j&l .I
]
)
M
+m 4' 4 0 4 4 9 1 s ,l ) {
c,,
#9k W
, w $
6 4 j - J 4 J! 1 J! 1 5 j ij h
+ ~ .r_ c a oc 2 1 % % t -
- q. k <V s 1 0 4
).Q (r)T# N d j jl h q } $ j (
g . ;rrO - =," Y d y 4; f -( s g s W ev-p g e6 - % 2 4 '* S' S I f & '" " TJ
- Y k N % k,
% &[ ] ,
q [4> 'D> r. c 1 j j h j h I
}=
f h Jy . WAFW
'* L% d = t t 4 % % .
[f (j ' Y o a -~ 1 g g g ? I a .I,
,q P T? " .- re r - - g Q i '
.t' Y 4s ) "
v ( s [ t g YO
- a
, w m b
" e e h --
g a e mu - N m 4
'?
9 7 N 9 N i s, 1 [sy *; y6 g
., m in >> % N l
< l4 s 1
N k k h e K K $ K K ] f ,$ q r " , - -M
- t ) 4 ) s i t I %
%, 1 u S. rlj
,< {a
< 3 d ~r ' X .g g g g
,g a g S- K ,
m
<~'r a i a > e- i i e
; i t i(,N i
% C %g]$
~
% Q 4 h C d E 2 h (r) M $ % 9 60 yh i
Connecticut Yankee CCWS/RHRS Performance Page 8 of 9
-g. .
( fnA-ow'av g <
} )
< t g '$ .
Fe. N' d y
,; - . - b g o Y e )t k tok W j y,
.v .;- G rsy 'k g ,g K ,% A A $ .? k
< =, - + w y { j (
g g g g { l c
, ~ :s u l (U I:LVW* *?dp # q
$ M . .
i e 4 ' q
?
h 9 WA N tl E W $ $ 4 .
} }
. ,4 ~ { *j i d J!
a 1 g J! i {s fw j' A l W Wf' e U 4 e S 4 ; h },
$Q
?, g (r) .T7 # c =r' )
h
$ )s } b 4 M I ktIl ,
b 4 h
) f N h v r is' f ti N Y b
-0 yW m 29 T. J' &T ,
j; 9>'o> m - 1 4 h 0 h j4 h h !e }V [l k t M y l 'TT7
= .
u q - p a M&9W
-v - -- s t & S w w. s fk N k p
H MfM S 5 ! (,
- . v r -u S 3 i 3 9 3 y
n
}6
\ WWN % % m s s k
Y H !"'M
- Q Q q h, '
.e d t">> ; >g ] ,
h N p h .\ R h h K g g b
'l
# # (837
, - ;; - /- g.
4 h k ( % k,j b
% 4-Ch q .1
- og 46 P "7 ' ~ # " ~ ' h, k K K % & h 1 -
K fl J '? '" a N & k A D 4 h 8 1 R,- 4 e 1 !.it . d T {9 D)3 2 gv. w = $ g c. c (s) +'v q Q t i g I Connecticut Yankee CCWS/RHRS Performance Page 9 of 9
S- , p_._
,{,. 6
. t, -
) CYW-89-560
., y
? Westinghouse Energy Systems Nucleaf and Advanced Electric Corporation Temnen ham Box 355 Pinsburgh Pennsylvania 15230 0355 I i June 5, 1989 RC&SGSS-CYW-2019 S.O.: CYW-280 Mr. W. C. Faye Northeast Utilities Service Company P.O. Box 270 Hartford, CT 06141-270 NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY HADDAM NECK PLANT Hiah Service Water Temperature Imoact on CCWS and RHRS Performance The purpose of this letter is to document the corrections to Table 2 of the Reference you discussed with R. K. Stirzel by telephone on May 25th regarding RHRS initiation times. Table 2 of CYW-89-556 summarizes the results of the Connecticut Yankee (Haddam Neck) Plant Cooldown performance calculations. You pointed out that the text of the report states that the RHRS initiation time for Cases 8 and 9.is 4 hours; whereas, the table lists 8 hours. Fluid Systems has reviewed the original calculation and has verified that the initiation time used in the computer runs for the subject cases is 4 hours. Attached is Revision 1 of Table 2 which incorporates the corrected RHRS initiation times. If you have any questions, please contact this office. Very truly yours, N. . -- M. D. Longacre ' Operating Piant Projects New England Area
#5 R.K. Stirzel/m/0700E
Reference:
CYW-89-556, 5/24/89 cc: P. P. Mason (Berlin) . G. E. Cornelius (Berlin) R. E. McMullen (Berlin) J t _________A
4 ( fMA- cer sv 7
)qw r.t
'h T& W k y 1 q
I{ o
=# 4r.w 5
=, " -vw x
n
,s > 3 p
.s 3 e
x .: ( vk g
,4 si y ; .% 4 ,=- + ,e ei m y y 4 , y i w -
s tU dW S k
- hh k h h I n TR,V 7'y 4 % % ,? ,, M f
# "# U h N $ $ 4 $ ,j c, , . ~ .
J9P 9*9 i! 6 4 d 3 - a 4 J 7 i
'a ae j W1 g ( h
-. m = = R 1 t t g y gg y, ip
.s enn.W . r = ==v 4
N 1 ts. )y <
) j t 4
i [-9
,x ,p 1 h <cv g e6 2 (4 7 S' < '
f, #" '"88 P # 5 N N V 4 $ h, ;, , h;,(
- M)'(I) m ~, c 1
$ b h ) ( l%
{l rw - # #
&wy W dl '<
T
?
% < I !
N
*& N > '\ h.d' :
k b (< f 'o. - W/kF W
-rr-e }4 } } ) 4) s t t fl
!4 J .,
, y
[ e' N l H F -TY - . v 'e - w i .i 4 s Q D 5 il(. b ; j lq s h ';l' t s t ,., ,, s
, i YO
- e w % k e, e, h --
L X# rnu v 7 9 7 7 9 7 7 ? 3 ,}l A I ' %
" 4 5 N 3_ w m >> N N
- N q h 'ei N
s3 4 _, ,,,,---- g
- b h l ,3,,
,- l ep h b h h k <
g I
$ ]
k , / .- " ra n~ h ) i i k fr! .ks .*j[j ( h D t9 < a!)$
^~ =M S g g g g .( g g j f [ i' ,I'{
$ @ d $ $ E @ @ l i I 4
'- ~ ~ 'r
( [ ; d ,;l g N C5 Oh (O
~W %
4 5 4 % 9 b to k k t Connecticut Yankee CCWS/RHRS Performance Page 8 of 9
I
, g)
'.8 4
- lfMA-sM4'W $
( s m m' a - ya
,m . - -
a 3 , p 4 i'tf -
* )* )*
)
*g 199 W t n ,
4 .ng 4.ccr>F $ g ,g h S. A A $ . E
<=;r"3-
$ k k I k E h k ku i l
1 b) d" 4 , 4 l ??U ?'t? 't % N . 4 en < ' z g # &# k ( I O k 3 $ $ . J j O)W**N A e a s -
, r~re ,
.s 4
< a 3 < q \, }.
I? I rr > T#
- j d, j,6 j.
d i hs 1 a . ~ , WJ W g M f
} I, f .
d , I (, ML fx m 39 TJ' % N (' k, ', 4 i M) 'D) W Y h , m I
'N ' T ' #
- r h 4 K Q Y aCi 0 9 t
4 L W59W }, h y N l!< ' m er -A k " [f ,f 6 f , S. d s-M y FPW - - - - rf c w
'd, 6 9 f j y 5 9 9 4t- t
'l N-i 0 M/M h w o, m "
k
%,j
. x--
-e W WJ
- ; a a ;, ; I j 4 ) tu By a p, J .___ v a
b
'h*
i N { ~'"~~ g'- , K .\ K S- K A A g 3 4 ) g %. %
'}i L ##(827 k k 'h lj 9 , -- , _-- -/ w
% 2 3
i % l q. '(f h (
-m # A ,r.c g g g g g 4 y {
- ~ +1 e
'. ' 7
$ k k a - & n n '
1,i1,9? n T { 9 ti,4 g) o 0 k 't E E (S) '" 0 % % Q N Connecticut Yankee CCWS/RHRS Performance Page 9 of 9
'[ e
.TLA.11 '99 128 01 ESBU CUSTorER' PROJECTS gm P.2/5 7' / q
- F ,
- Nd ]
CYW 89-573 l West lDgh00se Enerp Systeins gpPennstvani 152soosss Electric Corporation July ll,1989. Mr. Paul D. Mason FSSE/SS-CYW-E068 Northeast Utilities Service Company S. O. CYW-280 P..0. Box 270 Hartford,,CT-' 06141-720' NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY HADDAM NECK PLANT CORRECTIONS TO WCAP-12196
Dear Mr. Mason:
The attachment to this'1etter provides revisions-to parts of the subject report.on the service water system design basis temperature increase. evaluation. .The Section'4 component evaluations of the Radiation Monitor
' Recirculation-Pump (P-141-1A), and the Sample Pump (P-8-1A) have been revised to envelope the maximum expected service water temperatures in the respective discharge piping durirg. normal operations and following a full core off-load into the spent fuel pool. Also, Tables 6-4 and 6-5 are revised to identify the required flow to the RHR pump coolers as 1.0 gpm, rather than 3.0 gpm. This correction is consistent with the required flow identified in the component evaluation for the RHR pump.
If there are any questions, please do not hesitate to call John Buford at (412) 374-5928. Very truly yours, k,b . N,b D. Fuller,
~
anager Operating Plant Projects New England Area
.0 W. Buford/jb/10810 cc: R. E. McMullen IL, IA 4 Attachment
J Jut 11:'89 12iaa Esau customer PROJECTS P.3/5 i e ATTACHMENT TO CYW-89-573 RADIATION MONITOR RECIRCULATION PUMP (P-141-1A) Description and/or Function - The radiation monitor recirculation pump supplies samples of service water from the outlet of the s>ent fuel pit heat exchanger to a radiation monitor. The water is tien returned to the service water drain-header line. The radiation monitor recirculation pump uses service water only as the process fluid and not as a cooling medium for pump appurtenances. The maximum temperature of the service water entering the pump suction is 1400F. This is based on the maximum outlet temperature of the-spent. fuel pool heat exchanger following full core off-load into the spent fuel pool. Actual service water tempe operations cre expected to be lower than 140gatures F.. Theduring radiation normal monitor recirculation pump is not required to perform any safety related. functions. Method of Analysis - The radiation monitor recirculation pump was evaluated to verify that the materials of construction are adequate to maintain pump integrity and function with a process fluid temperature of 140 0F, The shaft s aling device was evaluated for sealing capability _ for the 140gF water. The effect of this process fluid temperature on the pump performance was also evaluated. Imoaci and Conclusions - The evaluation of the radiation monitor recirculation 0 pump determined that the service water and temperature of 140 F in no way affects the integrity and function of the pump. The shaft sealing device is capable of normal sealing effectiveness at this temperature. The service water temperature will result in no significant reduction in pump hydraulic performance. No special operating precautions or maintenance requirements are necessary to allow0 operation of the radiation monitor recirculation pump with t 140 F service water. ! SAMPLE PUMP (P-8-IA) Description and/or Function - The river water sample pump is a Marlow Pump Model 1-1/2 HU21ECA3, horizonta of service water from the service wa1 terpump. The drain pump supplies header line to the samples receiver effluent radiation monitor. The water is then returned to the service water drain header line. The sample pump uses service water only as the process fluid and not as a cooling medium for pump appurtenances. ~ The maximum temperature of the service water entering the pump suction is 1400F. This is based on the maximum outlet temperature of the spent fuel pool heat exchanger following full core off-load into the spent fue1 7ool. Actual service water temperatures during normal operations are expected to be lower than 1400F. The sample pump is not required to perform any safety related functions. _.-____.__________-__-__-.__.__-.----a
e> ,e JUL 11 *e9 12:02 ESBU CUSTOMER PROJECTS ' P.4/5 4 Method of Analysis - The river water sample pump was evaluated to verify that the materials of construction are adequate to maintain pumg integrity and function with a process fluid temperature of 140 F. The mechanical seal was evaluated for sealing capability with the 1400 F water. The effect of the increased process fluid temperature on the pump performance was also evaluated. Imoact and Conclusions - The evaluation of the river water sam determined that the increased service water temperature of 140gle F.inpump no way affects the integrity or function of the pump. The mechanical seal is capable of normal sealing effectiveness at the increased temperature. The increased temperature will result in no significant reduction in pump hydraulic performance. . No.special operating precautions or maintenance requirements are necessary to allow operation of the river water sample pump with 140 F service water.
/_ - ,
* } JLa.' 11 '89 128 83 CSBU CUSTCrER PROJECTS P.5/5 4e TABLE 6-4 POST ACCIDENT R_ CIRCULATION WITH NORMAL POWER AVAILABLE 0% TUBE PLUGGING 10% TUBE PLUGGING REQUIRED AVAILABLE REQUIRED AVAILABLE COMPONENT fGPM) fGPM) fGPM) fGPM)
Emergency Diesel Ger.erators 400 >851' (1) 400 851 CAR Cooling Coils (2) 325 >332 (2) 478 503 CAR Motor Coolers (3) 20 >20.5(1) 20 34 l RHR Heat Exchangers: One in Operation (5) 1650 1650
>2569 (1) 2569 Two in Operation 430 >1920 (1) 430 1920 RHR Pump Seal Coolers 1.0 >3.5(1) 1.0 3.5 (6)
TABLE 6-5 POST ACCIDENT RECIRCULATION WITH A LOSS OF NORMAL POWER 0% TUBE PLUGGING 10% TUBE PLUGGING REQUIRED AVAILABLE REQUIRED AVAILABLE l- COMPONENT (GPM) (GPM) (GPM) (GPM) Emergency Ofesel Generators 400
>863 (1) 400 863
! CAR Cooling coils (2) 325 >332 (2) 478 508 CAR Hotor Coolers (3) 20 >20.5(1) 20 34 , RHR Heat Exchangers: One in Operation (5) 1650 >2569(1) 1650 >2569 Two in Operation 430 >I946 (1) 430 1946 RHR Pump Seal Soolers 1.0 (6) 1.0 (6) l l I , 1 i J}}