|
---|
Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20217K3301999-10-19019 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 195 to License DPR-61 ML20206C8761999-04-28028 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 194 to License DPR-61 ML20238F2131998-08-28028 August 1998 SER Accepting Defueled Emergency Plan for Emergency Planning for Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co ML20202D1621998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License DPR-61 ML20217K2101998-03-27027 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-61 ML20198M8101997-10-14014 October 1997 SER Accepting Proposed Revs to Util Quality Assurance Program at Facility ML20141K4201997-05-22022 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 191 to License DPR-61 ML17181A2261995-07-18018 July 1995 Safety Evaluation Accepting Use of Enchanced Computer Codes Re Topical rept,NUSCO-152,addendum 4, Physics Methodology for PWR Reload Design ML20024J2081994-10-0707 October 1994 SER Authorizing Alternatives Contained in Request for Relief 3-26,per 10CFR50.55(a)(3)(i).Ack Withdrawal of Request for Relief 3-19 ML20058F1151993-11-23023 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 170,69,169 & 86 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20059G6411993-11-0101 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 169 to License DPR-61 ML20059G5261993-10-27027 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 168 to License DPR-61 ML20057E2011993-10-0404 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 167 to License DPR-61 ML20057E1921993-10-0404 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 166 to License DPR-61 ML20058M9051993-09-29029 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 165 to License DPR-61 ML20058M9291993-09-29029 September 1993 SE Re SEP Topics III-2 & III-4.A, Wind & Tornado Loadings & Tornado Missiles. Licensee Estimated Reactor Core Damage Frequency Reduced Signficantly Such That Likelihood of Core Damage Reasonably Low ML20057A3551993-09-0202 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 163 to License DPR-61 ML20057A3501993-09-0202 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 164 to License DPR-61 ML20056G2891993-08-25025 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 162 to License DPR-61 ML20056D7061993-07-26026 July 1993 Safety Evaluation on SEP VI-4 Re Containment Isolation Sys for Plant.All Penetrations Either Meet Provisions of or Intent of GDCs 54-57 Except for Penetration 39 ML20046C1971993-07-20020 July 1993 SE Granting Relief Request P-9 from Vibration Testing Requirements,Based on Determination That Compliance W/ Vibration Amplitude Measurement Location Requirements Impractical ML20046B3581993-07-14014 July 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 161 to License DPR-61 ML20045G6731993-07-0909 July 1993 SER Authorizing Proposed Alternative Tests Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i).Concludes That Acceptable Level of Quality & Safety Will Be Maintained Using Proposed Alternative Tests Instead of Required Hspt ML20045G6781993-07-0909 July 1993 SER Accepting Licensee Proposed Alternative to ASME Code Section XI Requirements Per 10CFR50.55a(a)(3)(i) ML20045F3931993-06-28028 June 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 160 to License DPR-61 ML20045B8061993-06-11011 June 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 159 to License DPR-61 ML20036C0041993-06-0202 June 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util Response to NRC Bulletin 88-002, Rapidly Propagating Cracks in SG Tubes ML20044H0481993-05-27027 May 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 158 to License DPR-61 ML20044D7921993-05-17017 May 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 157 to License DPR-61 ML20035F1421993-04-14014 April 1993 Safety Evaluation Re SEP Topic III-5.A, Effects of Pipe Breaks Inside Containment ML20128E3291993-02-0404 February 1993 Safety Evaluation Granting Util Request for Authorization to Use Portion of Section XI of 1986 Edition of ASME Code for Visual Exams VT-3 & VT-4 to Be Combined Into Single VT-3 ML20128D5231992-11-25025 November 1992 Safety Evaluation Accepting 120-day Response to Suppl 1 to Generic Ltr 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors,Usi A-46, ML20210E1891992-06-12012 June 1992 Safety Evaluation Considers SEP Topic III-5.B to Be Complete in That If Pipe Breaks Outside Containment,Plant Can Safely Shut Down W/O Loss of Containment Integrity ML20062B7411990-10-22022 October 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 132 to License DPR-61 ML20059H3101990-09-0606 September 1990 Revised Safety Evaluation Clarifying Individual Rod Position Indication Testing Exception & Bases for Approving Test Exception ML20059A8021990-08-14014 August 1990 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Accepting Electrical Design of New Switchgear Room at Plant ML20056A5641990-08-0303 August 1990 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Pressurizer Has Sufficient Fracture Toughness to Preclude Fracture of Head W/Flaws Remaining in Component & Pressurizer Acceptable for Continued Svc ML20055G5561990-07-19019 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 129 to License DPR-61 ML20055G5441990-07-19019 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 128 to License DPR-61 ML20044A9691990-07-0909 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 127 to License DPR-61 ML20055E2361990-07-0202 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 126 to License DPR-61 ML20034C5771990-04-26026 April 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 125 to License DPR-61 ML20034A0481990-04-10010 April 1990 Safety Evaluation Granting Exemption Requests from App R ML20012E5021990-03-21021 March 1990 Safety Evaluation Re Reactor Protection Sys Upgrade Phase 1. Sys & Hardware Design Provides Reasonable Assurance to Perform Safety Functions Per Updated FSAR & Tech Specs ML20012E2001990-03-12012 March 1990 Safety Evaluation Accepting Plant Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Sys as Complying W/Requirements of ATWS Rule 10CFR50.62(c)(1) ML20012E1991990-03-12012 March 1990 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Plant Adequately Meets Intent of 10CFR50.62 & Exempt from Further Mods to Provide Turbine Trip on Indications of ATWS ML20006B4011990-01-22022 January 1990 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Electrical Sys Changes for Fire Protection ML19324B3851989-10-24024 October 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 124,35 & 144 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21 & DPR-65,respectively ML19325D8631989-10-18018 October 1989 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Large Containment Results in Slow Hydrogen Accumulation Rate & Ensures That Sufficient Time Available to Implement Addl Hydrogen Control Features as May Be Necessary Following Accident ML20247K2531989-09-11011 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 123 & 41 to Licenses DPR-61 & NPF-49,respectively 1999-04-28
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217K3301999-10-19019 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 195 to License DPR-61 ML20206C8761999-04-28028 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 194 to License DPR-61 CY-99-047, Ro:On 981217,identified Unsuccessful Dewatering of Cnsi HIC, Model PL8-120R,containing Resins.Caused by Apparent Failure of Dewatering Tree.Other HICs Have Been Procured,Recertified & Returned to Plant for Use1999-03-23023 March 1999 Ro:On 981217,identified Unsuccessful Dewatering of Cnsi HIC, Model PL8-120R,containing Resins.Caused by Apparent Failure of Dewatering Tree.Other HICs Have Been Procured,Recertified & Returned to Plant for Use 05000213/LER-1999-001, :on 990105,main Stack RM R-14A Pressure Compensating Signal Was Not Calibrated.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Calibration Procedure.With1999-02-0101 February 1999
- on 990105,main Stack RM R-14A Pressure Compensating Signal Was Not Calibrated.Caused by Personnel Error.Revised Calibration Procedure.With
05000213/LER-1997-016, :on 970825,discovered That Negative Pressure Was Not Maintained in Sf Bldg,Per Design Basis.Caused by Sf Bldg Ventilation Sys Being Based on Lower Pab Ventilation Flow Rates.Corrected Ventilation Sys Design.With1999-01-25025 January 1999
- on 970825,discovered That Negative Pressure Was Not Maintained in Sf Bldg,Per Design Basis.Caused by Sf Bldg Ventilation Sys Being Based on Lower Pab Ventilation Flow Rates.Corrected Ventilation Sys Design.With
ML20206F1971998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept for 1998 for Cyap. with CY-99-027, Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59, for Jan-Dec 1998.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59, for Jan-Dec 1998.With ML20198G9101998-12-22022 December 1998 Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Haddam Neck Plant. Marked Up Rev 1 Included 05000213/LER-1997-018, :on 971003,discovered That Sf Bldg Exhaust Fan Did Not Meet Design Basis.Caused by Higher than Expected Pressure in Pab.Design of Sf Bldg Ventilation Sys Was Corrected.With1998-12-0808 December 1998
- on 971003,discovered That Sf Bldg Exhaust Fan Did Not Meet Design Basis.Caused by Higher than Expected Pressure in Pab.Design of Sf Bldg Ventilation Sys Was Corrected.With
05000213/LER-1998-009, :on 980915,noted Excessive CV,SW-CV-963,seat Leakage in SW Supply Piping to SFP Heat Exchangers.Caused by Subject Cv Disc Being Stuck in Open Position.Valve Was Exercised & Freed from Stuck Open Position.With1998-10-14014 October 1998
- on 980915,noted Excessive CV,SW-CV-963,seat Leakage in SW Supply Piping to SFP Heat Exchangers.Caused by Subject Cv Disc Being Stuck in Open Position.Valve Was Exercised & Freed from Stuck Open Position.With
05000213/LER-1998-008, :on 980721,determined That Main Stack Radiation Monitor RMS-14B Samples Were Not Analyzed to Required Detection Level.Caused by Inadequate Design.Immediately Controlled Temp of Radiation Monitor Room.With1998-09-29029 September 1998
- on 980721,determined That Main Stack Radiation Monitor RMS-14B Samples Were Not Analyzed to Required Detection Level.Caused by Inadequate Design.Immediately Controlled Temp of Radiation Monitor Room.With
05000213/LER-1997-021, :on 971124,found Contaminated Matls Offsite. Caused by Breakdown of Health Physics Program in Effect at Time Contaminated Matl Was Released from Site.Revised Procedures.With1998-09-0101 September 1998
- on 971124,found Contaminated Matls Offsite. Caused by Breakdown of Health Physics Program in Effect at Time Contaminated Matl Was Released from Site.Revised Procedures.With
ML20238F2131998-08-28028 August 1998 SER Accepting Defueled Emergency Plan for Emergency Planning for Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co 05000213/LER-1998-007, :on 980714,excessive Check Valve Seat Leakage in SW Supply Piping to SFP Heat Exchangers,Occurred.Caused by SW-CV-963 Disc Sticking in Open Position.Increased Test Frequency from Quarterly to Monthly1998-08-13013 August 1998
- on 980714,excessive Check Valve Seat Leakage in SW Supply Piping to SFP Heat Exchangers,Occurred.Caused by SW-CV-963 Disc Sticking in Open Position.Increased Test Frequency from Quarterly to Monthly
CY-98-136, Ro:On 980727,flow Blockage Occurred & Caused Pressure in Sys to Increase,Resulting in Relief Valve Lifting & Pipe Vibration,Which Caused Leaks to Develop.Caused by Nearly Closed post-filter Inlet Valve.Repaired 2 Leaks in Line1998-08-12012 August 1998 Ro:On 980727,flow Blockage Occurred & Caused Pressure in Sys to Increase,Resulting in Relief Valve Lifting & Pipe Vibration,Which Caused Leaks to Develop.Caused by Nearly Closed post-filter Inlet Valve.Repaired 2 Leaks in Line ML20237B7461998-07-22022 July 1998 1998 Defueled Emergency Plan Exercise Scenario Manual, Conducted on 980722 ML20202D1621998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License DPR-61 05000213/LER-1998-005, :on 980511,determined That Design Deficiency Was Found in Main Stack Flow Rate Monitor.Caused by 1974 Mod Change on Original Installation.Declared F-1101 Channel Out of Svc & Develop Means of Estimating Flow1998-06-0909 June 1998
- on 980511,determined That Design Deficiency Was Found in Main Stack Flow Rate Monitor.Caused by 1974 Mod Change on Original Installation.Declared F-1101 Channel Out of Svc & Develop Means of Estimating Flow
05000213/LER-1998-006, :on 980507,design Deficiency Was Found in Stack RM RMS-14B Sampling Lines.Caused by Design Not Meeting ANSI N13.1-1969 Stds.Corrective Action Plan for RMS-14B Is Being Developed1998-06-0808 June 1998
- on 980507,design Deficiency Was Found in Stack RM RMS-14B Sampling Lines.Caused by Design Not Meeting ANSI N13.1-1969 Stds.Corrective Action Plan for RMS-14B Is Being Developed
05000213/LER-1998-004, :on 980507,discovered Design Deficiency in Stack Radiation Monitor RMS-14B Isokinetic Sampling.Caused by Failure to Account for Spent Fuel Bldg Ventilation Flow. Will Develop CAP for RMS-14B1998-06-0404 June 1998
- on 980507,discovered Design Deficiency in Stack Radiation Monitor RMS-14B Isokinetic Sampling.Caused by Failure to Account for Spent Fuel Bldg Ventilation Flow. Will Develop CAP for RMS-14B
05000213/LER-1998-003, :on 980505,compensatory Sampling Frequency Exceeded Time Limit W/Sw Effluent RM Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Individual Was Counseled & Technicians Were Reminded of Sampling within Required Frequency1998-06-0202 June 1998
- on 980505,compensatory Sampling Frequency Exceeded Time Limit W/Sw Effluent RM Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error.Individual Was Counseled & Technicians Were Reminded of Sampling within Required Frequency
05000213/LER-1998-002, :on 980421,determined That Visual Insp of Switchgear Cable Shaft Sprinkler Sys Was Not Being Performed Once Per 18 Months.Caused by Inadequate Implementation of License Amend.Fire Watch Patrol Established1998-05-19019 May 1998
- on 980421,determined That Visual Insp of Switchgear Cable Shaft Sprinkler Sys Was Not Being Performed Once Per 18 Months.Caused by Inadequate Implementation of License Amend.Fire Watch Patrol Established
05000213/LER-1998-001, :on 980409,seismic Monitor Sp Was Not in Compliance W/Ts.Caused by Inadequate Engineering Review. Submitted Proposed License Amend to Correct Issue1998-05-0707 May 1998
- on 980409,seismic Monitor Sp Was Not in Compliance W/Ts.Caused by Inadequate Engineering Review. Submitted Proposed License Amend to Correct Issue
CY-98-068, Follow-up to Verbal Notification on 980413 of Film on Discharge Canal.Investigation Continuing.Samples Collected for Petroleum Analyses & Biological Characterization at Intake Structure & Discharge Canal.Replaced Sorbent Booms1998-04-15015 April 1998 Follow-up to Verbal Notification on 980413 of Film on Discharge Canal.Investigation Continuing.Samples Collected for Petroleum Analyses & Biological Characterization at Intake Structure & Discharge Canal.Replaced Sorbent Booms CY-98-045, Ro:On 980212,0219,0225 & 0312,separate Sheens of Approx One Cup of oil-like Substance Was Observed at Discharge Canal. Cause Has Not Been Clearly Identified.Called in Vendor Spill to Install Sorbent Booms to Absorb Sheen.W/One Drawing1998-04-13013 April 1998 Ro:On 980212,0219,0225 & 0312,separate Sheens of Approx One Cup of oil-like Substance Was Observed at Discharge Canal. Cause Has Not Been Clearly Identified.Called in Vendor Spill to Install Sorbent Booms to Absorb Sheen.W/One Drawing ML20217A0001998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217F0611998-03-31031 March 1998 Historical Review Team Rept ML20217K2101998-03-27027 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-61 CY-98-046, Follow-up to 980311 Verbal Notification of Film on Discharge Canal.Cause Not Yet Determined.Film Is Contained & Will Be Absorbed by Containment & Sorbent Booms That Were in Place in Discharge Canal1998-03-12012 March 1998 Follow-up to 980311 Verbal Notification of Film on Discharge Canal.Cause Not Yet Determined.Film Is Contained & Will Be Absorbed by Containment & Sorbent Booms That Were in Place in Discharge Canal ML20216D6531998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217D7381998-02-28028 February 1998 Revised MOR for Feb 1998 Haddam Neck Plant CY-98-012, Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck Plant1998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck Plant CY-98-010, Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59,Jan-Dec,19971997-12-31031 December 1997 Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59,Jan-Dec,1997 ML20198N6681997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217P4861997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 Annual Financial Rept, for Cyap ML20199L5891997-12-24024 December 1997 Independent Analysis & Evaluation of AM-241 & Transuranics & Subsequent Dose to Two Male Workers at Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Plant 05000213/LER-1997-020, :on 971117,determined That Radioactive Effluent Dose Calculations Were Not Performed within Required Frequency.Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Will Revise Procedures & Will Enhance Tracking Process1997-12-16016 December 1997
- on 971117,determined That Radioactive Effluent Dose Calculations Were Not Performed within Required Frequency.Caused by Procedure Inadequacy.Will Revise Procedures & Will Enhance Tracking Process
ML20203K4271997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant 05000213/LER-1997-017, :on 970924,identified Three Locations of Detectable Plant Related Radioactivity in on-site Landfill Area.Caused by Failure to Conduct Adequate Survey.Access to Area Controlled1997-11-18018 November 1997
- on 970924,identified Three Locations of Detectable Plant Related Radioactivity in on-site Landfill Area.Caused by Failure to Conduct Adequate Survey.Access to Area Controlled
05000213/LER-1997-019, :on 970808,compensatory Sampling Frequency Exceeded W/Rms Determined Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error Due to Incorrect Interpretation of Ts.Compensatory Sampling to Be Conducted in Time Frame Required1997-11-17017 November 1997
- on 970808,compensatory Sampling Frequency Exceeded W/Rms Determined Inoperable.Caused by Personnel Error Due to Incorrect Interpretation of Ts.Compensatory Sampling to Be Conducted in Time Frame Required
ML20199B1141997-10-31031 October 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant 05000213/LER-1997-018, :on 971003,Spent Fuel Building Exhaust Fan Flow Was Found Below Design During Testing.Caused by Personnel Error.Evaluated Replacement of Spent Fuel Building Exhaust Fan Capable of Overcoming Higher Pressures1997-10-30030 October 1997
- on 971003,Spent Fuel Building Exhaust Fan Flow Was Found Below Design During Testing.Caused by Personnel Error.Evaluated Replacement of Spent Fuel Building Exhaust Fan Capable of Overcoming Higher Pressures
ML20198M8101997-10-14014 October 1997 SER Accepting Proposed Revs to Util Quality Assurance Program at Facility ML20198J8811997-09-30030 September 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant 05000213/LER-1997-015, :on 970813,functional Testing of Radiation Monitoring Sys Was Not Performed as Defined in Ts.Caused by Lack of Understanding of Definition of Acot.Revised Appropriate RMS Surveillance Procedure1997-09-12012 September 1997
- on 970813,functional Testing of Radiation Monitoring Sys Was Not Performed as Defined in Ts.Caused by Lack of Understanding of Definition of Acot.Revised Appropriate RMS Surveillance Procedure
05000213/LER-1996-027, :on 961010,boron Injection Flow Path Below Minimum Required Temperature Was Determined.Caused by Inadequate Design of Heat Trace Controls in Rtd.Boric Acid Flow Paths from Bamt Were Declared Inoperable1997-09-12012 September 1997
- on 961010,boron Injection Flow Path Below Minimum Required Temperature Was Determined.Caused by Inadequate Design of Heat Trace Controls in Rtd.Boric Acid Flow Paths from Bamt Were Declared Inoperable
05000213/LER-1996-016, :on 960801,potential for Inadequate RHR Pump NPSH During Sump Recirculation Was Determined.Caused by Failure to Fully Analyze Containment Pressure & Sump Temperature Response.Redesign of Piping Proposed1997-09-12012 September 1997
- on 960801,potential for Inadequate RHR Pump NPSH During Sump Recirculation Was Determined.Caused by Failure to Fully Analyze Containment Pressure & Sump Temperature Response.Redesign of Piping Proposed
05000213/LER-1997-014, :on 970808,ESFA Occurred Due to Deenergization of High Containment Pressure Actuation Circuits.Reemphasized Expectations of Mgt for Performing non-routine Operational Tasks1997-09-0505 September 1997
- on 970808,ESFA Occurred Due to Deenergization of High Containment Pressure Actuation Circuits.Reemphasized Expectations of Mgt for Performing non-routine Operational Tasks
05000213/LER-1996-021, :on 960828,valve Leakage Resulted in Nitrogen Intrusion Into RCS During Cold Shutdown.Caused by Leaking Valve BA-V-355.Training Has Been Been Provided to Operators on Event & Features & Limitations of Sys1997-09-0505 September 1997
- on 960828,valve Leakage Resulted in Nitrogen Intrusion Into RCS During Cold Shutdown.Caused by Leaking Valve BA-V-355.Training Has Been Been Provided to Operators on Event & Features & Limitations of Sys
05000213/LER-1996-005, :on 960301,spent Fuel Cooling Was Shut Down Due to Discovery of Loose Parts.Caused by Inadequate Design. Piping from Both Sent Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps to Plate Exchanger Were Inspected for Loose Parts w/bore-a-scope1997-09-0505 September 1997
- on 960301,spent Fuel Cooling Was Shut Down Due to Discovery of Loose Parts.Caused by Inadequate Design. Piping from Both Sent Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps to Plate Exchanger Were Inspected for Loose Parts w/bore-a-scope
1999-04-28
[Table view] |
Text
-
~
gaareg I
t UNITED STATES y.
j j
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'f WASHINGTON, D.C. 2055MKc1
. ]
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.194 CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY HADDAM NECK PLANT DOCKET NO 50-213
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated June 2,1998, as supplemented January 18 and March 9,1999, the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO, the licensee) submitted a proposed revision to the Haddam Neck Plant Technical Specifications (TSs). The June 2 letter proposed to relocate the requirements for a seismic monitor to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM),
consistent with the guidance contained in Generic Letter 95-10, Relocation of Selected Technical Specification Requirements Related to Instrumentation. The proposed amendment fulfills a commitment that CYAPCO made to the NRC in Licensee Event Report (LER)
LER 50-213/1998-001-00, dated May 7,1998.
By letter dated January 18,1999, CYAPCO submitted a revised page of its Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), which incorporated Section il of its TRM by reference and l
stated that changes to the TRM require a [10 CFR) 50.59 Safety Evaluation. The January 18 letter also submitted a revision to Section 11 of its TRM, which contained the TS requirements for seismic monitoring.
l By letter dated March 9,1999, CYAPCO submitted an additional clarification of its proposed revision.
The January 18 and March 9,1999, letters did not contain any information outside the scope of the initial Federal Reaister notice,
2.0 BACKGROUND
Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), requires applicants for nuclear power plant operating licenses to state the TS to be included as part of the license.
The Commission's regulatory requirements related to the content of the TS are set forth in 10 CFR 50.36. That regulation requires the TS to include items in five specific categories:
(1) safety limits, limiting system settings and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls.
However, the regulation does not specify the particular requirements to be included in a plant's TS.
9905030231 990428 PDR ADOCK 05000213 W
PDR
[4
E
=
I I
)
2-i The four criteria defined in 10 CFR 50.36 to be used in determining whether a particular matter is required to be included in the TS are as follows:
(1) installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; j
(2) a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design-basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier; (3) a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design-basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier; and (4) a structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.
As a result, existing TS requirements, which fall within or satisfy any of the criteria in the regulation, must be retained in the TSs, while those TS requirements that do not fall within or satisfy these criteria may be relocated to other licensee-controlled documents.
)
3.0
SUMMARY
OF PROPOSED CHANGES The following information will be deleted from the TSs and transferred to the TRM:
3/4.3.3.3 Seismic Instrumentation Table 3.3-5 Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Table 4.3-4 Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements 4.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION LER 50-213/1998-001-00 contained commitment number CY-98-048-01, which stated, "A proposed modification to the Haddam Neck Plant's technical specifications will be submitted to the NRC by July 1,1998." The licensee submitted a license amendment request on June 2,1998, which proposed a modification to the seismic monitoring instrumentation requirements. The licensee has, therefore, fulfilled its commitment.
The licensee proposed a relocation of the requirements for seismic monitoring instrumentation to the TRM and a correction of a typographical error.
Section Vi(a)(3) of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 requires that seismic monitoring l
instrumentation be provided to promptly determine the response of those nuclear power plant features important to safety in the event of an earthquake. This capability is required to allow for a comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the unit.
1 L
Comparison of such data is needed to determir'e whether the plant can continue to be operated l
safely and to permit such timely action as may be appropriate. However, the capability of a L.
, plant to withstand a seismic event or other design-basis accident is determined by the initial design and construction of systems, structures, and components. The seismic instrumentation is used after the initiating event occurs to alert operators and to evaluate the plant response.
Seismic monitoring instrumentation requirements do not meet the four criteria of 10 CFR 50.36 and are not required to be included in the TSs as discussed below.
Regarding the first criterion, the Final Commission Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors (58 FR 39132) explained that instrumentation to detect precursors to reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage, such as seismic instrumentation is not included as a first criterion. Regarding the second criterion, the seismic instrumentation does not serve as a process variable, protective design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design-basis event, which challenges fission product barriers. Regarding the third criterion, seismic instrumentation is not part of a primary success path and does not actuate any protective equipment or serve any direct role in the mitigation of a design-basis accident. Regarding the fourth criterion, the seismic instrumentation does affect the probability or consequences of a seismic event, and is not significant to public health and safety. The staff has co'icluded that the seismic monitoring instrumentation does not satisfy the 10 CFR 50.36 criteria and may be relocated to a licensee-controlled document.
By letter dated January 18,1999, the licensee proposed a method to relocate seismic monitoring requirements to a licensee-controlled document. The January 18 letter contained copies of approved changes to its UFSAR and TRM. The approved changes have incorporated Section 11 of the TRM into the UFSAR by reference and will transfer seismic monitoring instrumentation TS requirements to Section 11 of the TRM. By incorporating the TRM into its UFSAR, changes to the TRM are subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The staff concludes that sufficient regulatory controls exist to adequately protect public health and safety.
In addition, the licensee provided a commitment to implement changes to the TRM concurrent with implementation of the license amendment.
The licensee corrected a typographical error in the measurement range of the Triaxial Servo Accelerometer. Upon transfer from the TSs to the TRM, the measurement range will be corrected from "O to 0.59" to "O to 0.5g." The licensee stated that the revised measurement range is adequate to determine if earthquake motion is within the design basis of the plant.
Based on the preceding facts, the staff finds that the relocation of seismic monitoring instrumentation requirements from the TSs to the TRM is acceptable.
5.0 STATE CONSULTATION
in accordance with its regulations, on October 20,1998, the State of Connecticut official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comment.
I g
~
4 60 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (63 FR 50936, September 23,1998). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility enteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental assessment or environmental impact statement need be prepared in connection with the issuance of die amendment.
7.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor: Thomas L. Fredrichs Date: April 28, 1999